Local energy autonomy: spaces, scales, politics 9781119616252, 1119616255, 9781119616290, 1119616298, 9781786301444, 178630144X

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Local Energy Autonomy

Urban Engineering Set coordinated by Bruno Barroca and Damien Serre

Volume 1

Local Energy Autonomy Spaces, Scales, Politics

Edited by

Fanny Lopez Margot Pellegrino Olivier Coutard

First published 2019 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, this publication may only be reproduced, stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms and licenses issued by the CLA. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms should be sent to the publishers at the undermentioned address: ISTE Ltd 27-37 St George’s Road London SW19 4EU UK

John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street Hoboken, NJ 07030 USA

www.iste.co.uk

www.wiley.com

© ISTE Ltd 2019 The rights of Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard to be identified as the authors of this work have been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Library of Congress Control Number: 2019932361 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-78630-144-4

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xiii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fanny LOPEZ, Margot PELLEGRINO and Olivier COUTARD

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Part 1. Governance and Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 1. Urban Planning and Energy: New Relationships, New Local Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cyril ROGER-LACAN

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1.1. Distributed energy: the constant adaptation of urban areas . 1.2. “Sustainable cities” and new energy systems: from harmonization to a common origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3. Reshaping local governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 2. Decentralized Energy and Cities: Tools and Levers for Urban Energy Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . Allan JONES MBE

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2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3. Woking, UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4. London, UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5. Sydney, Australia . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2. Sustainable Sydney 2030 . . . . 2.5.3. Green Infrastructure Plan . . . . 2.5.4. Trigeneration Master Plan . . . . 2.5.5. Renewable Energy Master Plan

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2.5.6. Advanced Waste Treatment Master Plan . . . . 2.5.7. CitySwitch Green Office Program . . . . . . . . 2.5.8. Better Buildings Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.9. Environmental Upgrade Agreements . . . . . . 2.5.10. City of Sydney Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.11. Carbon-neutral Sydney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.12. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6. Seoul, South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.2. Fukushima nuclear disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.3. One Less Nuclear Power Plant . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.4. Seoul International Energy Advisory Council . 2.6.5. International Energy Advisory Council . . . . . 2.6.6. One Less Nuclear Power Plant, Phase 2 – Seoul Sustainable Energy Action Plan . . . 2.6.7. Seoul Energy Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.8. Interregional cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.9. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7. Overall conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 3. The Third Industrial Revolution in Hauts-de-France: Moving Toward Energy Autonomy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eric VIDALENC

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3.1. The industrial revolutions in the region . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1. The cornerstones of the first industrial revolution . . 3.1.2. The successors of the second industrial revolution: the automotive industry and electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2. The TIR’s resources in Hauts-de-France. . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1. An expanded view of some of the local expertise . . 3.2.2. The basis of local ecosystems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3. Strong political backing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.4. The expansion of the TRI/REV3 brand . . . . . . . . 3.2.5. Multiple financial tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.6. Subregional territorialization: energy subsidiarity. . 3.2.7. Network managers are changing their views . . . . . 3.3. Initial assessments and analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1. Late, but still a strong objective . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2. An update on the TRI/REV3 trajectories . . . . . . . 3.3.3. A techno-centered vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.4. Tensions regarding the priorities and temporalities . 3.3.5. From solidarity to regional autonomy through energy subsidiarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

Chapter 4. Rethinking Reliability and Solidarity through the Prism of Interconnected Autonomies . . . . . . . . . . . . Gilles DEBIZET 4.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2. Four prospective scenarios for urbanized spaces . . . . 4.2.1. Large companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2. Local authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3. Cooperative stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.4. Regulating state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3. Intermediaries with new energy autonomies . . . . . . 4.3.1. Energy storage as an essential factor of autonomy 4.3.2. Energy autonomies as organizations . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3. A combination of different energy scenarios according to the regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4. A variety of decision-making scales relating to energy infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.1. The country and the continent . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2. Housing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.3. The building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.4. The district . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.5. The city or metropolis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5. Conclusion: solidarities must be reinvented in the era of connected energy autonomies . . . . . . . . . . 4.6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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80 82 82

Part 2. Urban Projects and Energy Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 5. Critical Densities of Energy Self-sufficiency and Carbon Neutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Raphael MÉNARD

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5.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1. What can environmental measures be related to? . . . . . . 5.1.2. Critical densities and catchment areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2. Energy consumption density . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1. Differences regarding the 2,000 watts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2. 0.1 watts per square meter as average for mainland France 5.3. Renewable energy production density . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1. Renewable energy production is Eulerian . . . . . . . . . .

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5.3.2. Energy harvesting plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3. Quantification of the production flow of a region . . . . . . . 5.4. Self-sufficiency, convergence: 1-W regions . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1. The 7 hectares, surface area per person in the world garden . 5.4.2. The story of urban transition in cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.3. The fundamental equality of self-sufficiency . . . . . . . . . 5.4.4. Some self-sufficiency paths according to density . . . . . . . 5.5. Emission density and carbon neutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.1. Post-COP21 and carbon neutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.2. Equivalent emission densities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.3. Carbon sequestration density . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.4. The fundamental equation of carbon neutrality . . . . . . . . 5.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.1. Continent–sea balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.2. The city–countryside dichotomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.3. The city, an energy-carbon monster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.4. The mathematics of density, relocating according to the right proportions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.5. The scales in question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 6. What Autonomy is Available in the Design of Energy Solutions within French Urban Development Projects? The Example of District Heating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Guilhem BLANCHARD 6.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2. Urban heating within development projects: an opportunity for local monitoring of the energy system . . . . . . . . 6.2.1. Windows of opportunity for local players . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2. Urban development and district heating projects still remain subject to numerous external constraints . . . . 6.3. The decision-based autonomy of urban heating projects from the perspective of urban development projects’ technical management 6.3.1. Design of the supply infrastructure: a weakly structured coordination between design arenas . . . . . . . 6.3.2. Coordination of supply and demand: an even more significant division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4. Conclusions and final thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

Chapter 7. Positive Energy and Networks: Local Energy Autonomy as a Vector for Controlling Flows . . . . . . Zélia HAMPIKIAN 7.1. Positive energy, autonomy and flow dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2. The case of Lyon confluence and the Hikari block: a rhetoric of mutualization for achieving partial self-sufficiency . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3. The “right” scale of autonomy and control over flows . . . . . . 7.4. From autonomy to flow management: who is in charge? . . . . . 7.5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 8. From Energy Self-sufficiency to Trans-scalar Energy . . Florian DUPONT

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8.1. Self-sufficiency or sharing of the heat supply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1.1. Four examples of scale jumping that question self-sufficiency . 8.1.2. Assess the strategic contribution of each operation to the networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2. Redefining the goal of self-sufficiency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.1. Using the cost–benefit analysis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.2. Using a new financial paradigm including the old one? . . . . . 8.2.3. First achievement: 1,000 trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.4. From self-sufficiency to synergies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3. The importance of strategic planning using project levers . . . . . . 8.3.1. Electricity networks redefine their mesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3.2. Liège: valorizing the electrical infrastructures of the industrial valley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3.3. Mains gas seeks its revival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3.4. From data to planning: cities think about energy . . . . . . . . . 8.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Part 3. Energy Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 9. Sociotechnical Morphologies of Rural Energy Autonomy in Germany, Austria and France . . . . . Laure DOBIGNY

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9.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2. Technical choices and autonomy processes . . . . . . . . . . 9.3. Actors of local energy autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4. Spatial and autonomy temporalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4.1. Bringing the relevant techniques into existence . . . . . 9.4.2. Social and geographical morphologies . . . . . . . . . . 9.4.3. The influence of regulatory and legislative frameworks 9.4.4. The role of energy policies and political structures . . .

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9.4.5. Pioneer towns: “was it easier before?” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5. From the construction to the transferability of “models” of autonomy: what impasses and issue are there? . . . . . . . . 9.6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 10. Community Energy Projects Redefining Energy Distribution Systems: Examples from Berlin and Hamburg . . . . . . Arwen Dora COLELL and Angela POHLMANN 10.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1.1. Rethinking networked infrastructures beyond “public versus private”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1.2. Citizens claiming networked infrastructures in Germany’s largest cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2. Situational analyses of urban energy system transformation . . . 10.3. People have the power? Citizens claiming energy infrastructure. 10.3.1. (Re)negotiating infrastructures of decision-making on the power grid: the case of BEB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3.2. From protest to empowerment: civil society engagement in Hamburg’s energy distribution systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4. Discussion: reconfiguring the social in sociotechnical? . . . . . . 10.5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 11. Autonomy and Energy Community: Realities to Reconsider? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ariane DEBOURDEAU and Alain NADAÏ

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11.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2. Mapping and genealogy of energy community approaches . . . . . 11.2.1. Technological element: innovation at the heart of energy communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2.2. The collective element: which communitie(s) favor energy issues? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2.3. Institutional element: framing and empowering communities . 11.2.4. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3. Scope and limits of existing works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3.1. A high presence of instrumental and normative approaches . . 11.3.2. The singularity of English language “critical localism” . . . . 11.3.3. The locational nature of analytical frameworks . . . . . . . . . 11.3.4. The minimalist and shifting contents for the notion of community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3.5. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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11.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Part 4. The Challenges of Energy Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 12. Regional Energy Self-sufficiency: a Legal Issue . . . . . Benoit BOUTAUD

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12.1. Self-sufficiency analyzed through the prism of the territory 12.1.1. A reality far from clichés . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1.2. Going beyond the productive aspect . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.2. Regional energy self-sufficiency: a legal issue . . . . . . . . 12.2.1. Municipalities that become legally self-sufficient . . . . 12.2.2. The energy self-sufficiency of municipalities: an organizational challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 13. Electricity Autonomy and Power Grids in Africa: from Rural Experiments to Urban Hybridizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sylvy JAGLIN

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13.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2. From the “crisis” to electrical experiments . . . . . . . . 13.2.1. Electric disasters and riots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2.2. Huge investment needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2.3. Renewables and decentralized systems: a third way for sub-Saharan Africa? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3. Electrical hybridizations between pragmatic autonomy and new dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3.1. Rural experiments.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3.2. ... and urban hybridizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3.3. Off-grid under constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 14. Energy Self-sufficiency: an Ambition or a Condition for Urban Resilience? . . . . . . . . . . . . Bruno BARROCA

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14.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.2. A matter of definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.3. Technical systems and resilience . . . . . . . . . 14.4. Self-sufficiency and functional resilience . . . . 14.4.1. Functional resilience and system modeling .

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315 316 319 321 321

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14.4.2. Can self-sufficiency be achieved by managing failures of technical systems? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5. Self-sufficiency and the meta-system: toward spatial resilience? 14.5.1. Meta population, meta-system and self-sufficiency . . . . . . 14.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 15. Urban Metabolic Self-sufficiency: an Oxymoron or a Challenge? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sabine BARLES

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15.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.2. Energy and matter: urban metabolism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.3. The city and its hinterlands: the lack of physical autonomy 15.4. Decision-making self-sufficiency: a challenge?. . . . . . . . 15.5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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331 332 335 341 346 347

List of Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Foreword

In taking the local dimension into account in urban operations, calling into question the human, urban, technological and so-called “natural” risks of urban balances, and discussing the rise of digital technology in the design and management of socio-technical systems or the ever increasing scarcity of resources, a systemic interpretation of urban structures and a geographical interpretation of the social and spatial distributions of today and tomorrow are called for. It is to this dual approach that the Urban Engineering set, which puts forward thematic issues of knowledge resulting from the mobilization of theoretical foundations, analysis of practices and prospective approaches, responds. While urban territories play a central role in current global issues, this set of books presents an interdisciplinary vision of the relationships between urban spaces and their environments. Just as closely related to urban planning and geography as to urban sociology or engineering sciences, urban engineering is not fixed in a particular discipline but establishes connections between them. It provides urban actors with knowledge and approaches that link together planning, engineering and territory. To work as an urban engineer is to master the techniques corresponding to urban systems while integrating them into their local contexts. In urban engineering, the notion of technical optimum and reflection at the spatial and temporal scales is only relevant when considering other urban, social, territorial and environmental legitimacies. Despite the advantages expressed by the scientific methods used, by the recognition of practitioners, local authorities and operational and institutional actors, urban engineering does not guarantee immediate and disciplinary unity. This assumed fact raises questions about its position in the field of academic research. The set is part of this questioning: it defends both the interdisciplinary nature of urban engineering and also its operational nature, which makes it possible to link research and action. These advantages lead to the reinterpretation of dominant

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models, the proposal of approaches to the evolution of practices and the exchange and confrontation of knowledge to stimulate reflection on the future. This first book – Local Energy Autonomy – launches the Urban Engineering set based on a forward-looking theme and discusses particular social, economic, technical and environmental challenges. Bruno BARROCA and Damien SERRE Coordinators of the Urban Engineering set

Introduction

Energy and territories: towards new configurations Energy production, supply and consumption in territories are once again provoking public debate. While the peak oil horizon seems to be constantly shrinking, particularly due to the development of non-conventional hydrocarbon exploitation, the challenge of climate change has imposed the theme of energy transition at international level. This is reflected in the discourses and (to a lesser extent) the actions of many actors (political, economic, associative) according to different registers: evolution of the primary energy mix of electricity or heat production systems; promotion of low-carbon or non-carbon renewable energies and reduction of dependence on fossil fuels (to which nuclear energy can be added, or not, depending on the country); the quest for energy efficiency gains in transport, buildings, productive activities (goods, services, food, etc.) and the promotion of less energy-consuming practices. These forms of action have one thing in common, although they are not limited to it: they all aim, by their very principle, at a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions linked to energy production and consumption. There is, however, a modality of action that is experiencing increasing success – some would say a revival of fortune – in energy transition discourses and strategies, and that does not mainly rest on the same principle: the search for increased local energy autonomy [DOU 19]. This quest for autonomy was forcefully articulated more than 10 years ago by the then Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, as part of the “decentralized energy revolution” that he initiated in London and which his successors, Boris Johnson and the current Mayor of the British capital, Sadiq Khan, have essentially pursued. It is now expressed in a number of strategic documents issued by cities or other local authorities and confirmed, for example, by the growing interest among stakeholders in exploiting Introduction written by Fanny LOPEZ, Margot PELLEGRINO and Olivier COUTARD.

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(more systemically) local energy potential. It also largely underpins, for instance, recent legislative provisions in France promoting the development of “selfproduction” and “self-consumption”. The authors of this book have therefore chosen to examine contemporary reconstructions of the links between energy and territory through the issue of local energy autonomy, and the related processes of empowerment, a term used here to designate the increasing power of local actors on issues related to energy. The term “local energy autonomy” refers to a wide variety of existing or planned configurations and is not systematically used in documents or by the actors concerned. Three factors of diversity stand out in particular: the variable content and scope of the targeted autonomy (electricity, heating of buildings, travel, power, etc. separately or in combination); the diversity of the spatial scales envisaged (from buildings to the greater metropolitan area); and the various meanings of the notion of autonomy applied to energy production, circulation and consumption. Let us clarify this latter point. Figures of local energy autonomy In its original political sense, the notion of autonomy refers to the dual ability (of an individual or group) to define one’s own rules and to comply with them. In this perspective, local energy autonomy refers to the ability of an actor or, more often than not, a local system of actors (a system in which some are generally supra-local actors) to define the conditions of production, circulation, supply and consumption of energy of the “place” under consideration. This concept applies in particular to organized collectives: a population group under the same local political authority (commune, department, region, etc.) or an association of individuals on a voluntary basis (as in the transition towns movement). It seems to us that two main types of energy autonomy should be distinguished in this political sense. On the one hand, secessionist autonomy, which refers to a radical independence project or community isolationism [MAR 16] or to groups or individuals wishing to break away from, especially, electricity operators for possibly very different reasons [LOP 14, VAN 15]. This is the consequence of the deliberate action taken by a group of individuals, a community or a State to establish an economy, or even a society, a closed and an energy system without any interconnection with traditional networks. Thus, secessionist autonomy is close to autarky or autarchy. On the other hand, there is a cooperative or generative autonomy which, differently from the first case, is open to the potential for achieving mutualization and interconnection between autonomous local networks according to a political project shared by the actors, and which could be referred to

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as “connectable places”. The scale can be as large as in the first case, and the actors and the levels of governance are more diverse [LOP 19]. The general perspective adopted in this book is to question local energy autonomy in its political meaning and scope, as we have just described it. However, the current uses of the notion of autonomy (in terms of energy in any case) also fall under two other meanings: i) a metabolic meaning, referring to the notions of self-production, selfconsumption and self-sufficiency, i.e. the idea that autonomy can be measured by the capacity of an individual, a household, a group, the population of a territory, to produce their own means of energy subsistence, to paraphrase François Ascher1 (one could even speak of energy autotrophy); ii) a socio-technical or organizational meaning, referring to the structure and management of energy systems, energy autonomy being assessed according to the capacity of a local energy supply system to operate more or less independently of neighboring or higher-level systems [RUT 14]. From this point of view, a solar panel installed on the roof of a detached house has a very different meaning depending on whether it is owned, managed and used by the house’s inhabitants (autonomous configuration) or by the regional or national electricity company (heteronomous configuration). Taken together, the chapters in this book provide insights into these three registers of local energy autonomy and their inter-relationships. As detailed at the end of this introduction, the chapters have been grouped into four parts according to their main focus, i.e., respectively: actors involved in the governance of local energy systems; the consideration of energy issues in urban projects; energy communities; and the “challenges” of energy autonomy. This structure provides a first reading grid for the book. In the rest of this introduction, we would like to propose a second one, even if this double grid obviously does not exhaust the richness of the analyses, reflections and theories developed in each contribution. Four major cross-cutting questions seem to emerge from the different chapters and objects of study presented by the authors: – the form and dynamics of the links between the metabolic, socio-technical and political dimensions of local energy autonomy; – the scales of structuring contemporary network spaces; – energy autonomy as a context or a breeding ground for experimentation (innovations, appropriations, diversions, etc.); 1 Ascher (ASC 2001: 11) suggests to define cities as “groupings of populations that do not produce themselves their means of food subsistence”.

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– infrastructural diversification (in terms of socio-technical systems, decisionmaking structures and power relations). Metabolic, socio-technical and political empowerment: congruences and tensions The three dimensions of autonomy do not necessarily go hand in hand. There are examples of highly centralized policies to promote local energy self-sufficiency (for example, at the scale of large regions, or at the much finer scale of the housing block). Nor is there any strict infrastructural determinism. For instance, interconnection to major networks does not prevent the existence of forms of local decision-making autonomy, and the same infrastructure systems can be put to very different uses. In France, for example, decentralized production is currently perceived as an economic means of adjustment between supply and demand to the benefit of major suppliers. In the near future, hierarchies could be reversed: the large electricity grid could become a last-resort supplier for local “energy territories” in case of insufficient local generation or system overload, or to prevent a blackout. The deliberate design of energy islands is also justified in terms of energy security, in view of the possible increase in climatic disasters (hurricanes, tidal waves) or other major disruptions, as discussed by Bruno Barocca (Chapter 14). However, the change in socio-technical configuration and organizational scale can also be accompanied by the advent of more localized energy governance, as shown by Laure Dobigny (Chapter 9) in her chapter on autonomous rural communities in Germany, Austria and France or by Arwen Colell and Angela Pohlmann (Chapter 10) in their study of electricity supply compensation projects in Hamburg and Berlin. The collective organization of “energy commons” or energy projects led by civic forces (inhabitants, local economic actors) will seek institutional and/or municipal support. To achieve progressive empowerment, it is the very notion of an energy community that must be redefined, as Ariane Debourdeau and Alain Nadaï explain (Chapter 11). Thus, the search for local forms of energy autonomy can act, at the same territorial levels, as a factor of empowerment, in the energy field or more broadly. In other words, for a system of local actors, the issue of energy (supply) can be a factor of political empowerment. In particular, the “takeover” of the energy issue can give rise to a broader process of infrastructure transition aimed at defining (or reinventing) a unit of place (housing, housing block, neighborhood, city, territory) designed to be efficient in terms of energy, ecological and economic balance, based on a “relocation” of the entire chain (resource, production, management) of one or more service loops.

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The structuring of network spaces: new logics and new scales During the second half of the 20th Century, energy (as well as many flows) was largely “invisible” at a local level and particularly in cities, both literally by burying or removing part of the infrastructure and figuratively by “relocating” energy choices. Today, debates, reflections and projects concerning the relocation of energy and the search for forms of energy autonomy contribute to providing a new visibility to the question of energy, its production, circulation, uses, the income generated, associated pollution, etc. This visibility takes various forms: from “abstract” awareness through institutional or activist messages to the spatial materialization of energy systems (such as wind power installations), which are often a source of conflict. Bringing the question of local scale, short distances, decentralized or distributed energy production, local pollution, strategies and processes of energy transition back to the center of public debates contributes to or announces major transformations in the urban and territorial project, and in the organization and management of space. The energy issue also offers the actors of the territory the opportunity to build a new story. This was particularly the case in the Hauts-deFrance where Eric Vidalenc analyzes the strategy of the Third Industrial Revolution (Chapter 3). The links between the design of built-up areas and the design of energy systems question both the perimeters and scales of each other. Territories are subject to a certain density of “energy harvesting” and new consumption ratios, which produce scalar tensions. By extending the analysis to a set of flows (energy, but also water, waste, human and animal food, etc.) – in other words: metabolism – Sabine Barles (Chapter 15) shows that, in the current situation, any claim to autonomy for dense cities is impossible to achieve. However, if we look at it from a more forwardlooking point of view, the perspective may change. Raphael Ménard (Chapter 5) thus places the massive reduction in energy consumption at the heart of the changes needed to achieve a carbon neutrality objective. Under these assumptions, a significant reduction in the gap between the supply perimeters and the emission and discharge areas of flows, particularly energy flows, seems conceivable. It is also the divergent interests of actors that lead them to favor different scales or “scalar arrangements”. For example, some developers prefer the scale of the building or the micro-district, while energy companies project on a larger scale: large districts, even large territories. The spatial-technical approach to energy transition calls for an adaptation of governance in the light of the new links between energy and urban planning. Cyril Roger-Lacan (Chapter 1) thus defends the idea that urban planning and energy planning should be systematically associated, and details the issues and implications of this vision.

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Energy autonomy projects reveal two divergent approaches. On the one hand, the attempt to identify “good” perimeters, giving priority to a certain scale: BEPOS, TEPOS, energy catchment area, etc. On the other hand, the gradual abandonment of this quest for dimensional optimum for rethinking energy empowerment in light of three distinct registers of action that are likely to refer to different scales or spaces. These include the mobilization of existing resources, the management of emergencies and climate and energy crises, and social (re)configurations that are conducive to empowerment. Taking into account the existing situation as a lever makes it possible to promote mutualization and energy solidarity with what already exists in terms of the territory, i.e. not only to “land” a new technology or the new decentralized massive production of energy and to think upstream of the synergies between networks and buildings, both new and old (the latter in connection with thermal renovation). This requires moving towards weakened solutions where the relevance of the scale is determined on a case-by-case basis based on the reality of each project. This operational vision is confronted with divisions in decision-making and the contributions of Zélia Hampikian (Chapter 7), Guilhem Blanchard (Chapter 6) and Florian Dupont (Chapter 8), who describe and analyze the various clashes and tensions that result. The perspective of climate and energy emergencies leads us to consider autonomy as a temporary and non-permanent condition (the notion of autonomy thus acquiring a temporal dimension), as well as a relative condition (partial autonomy). On the basis of different topics, Bruno Barroca (Chapter 14) and Allan Jones MBE (Chapter 2) both conclude that there is an interest in guaranteeing a minimum local energy supply, making it possible to respond to sudden crisis situations, limited in time and limited in space (i.e., to a specific portion of a territory, a specific facility, a subnetwork, etc.). The (micro) local solidarity scales (at least regarding functional solidarity) would be more robust (resilient) in the face of extreme events: see for example the doctrine developed by the State of New York, which supports an ambitious micro-grid development program. Thinking about autonomy based on social (re)configurations thus means questioning the conditions of aggregation, mobilization, participation, the construction of a collective meaning, an ideology, even a conflicting vision, etc. One topic appears throughout these different visions: that of abandoning a universal system of local autonomy in favor of a plural vision of territories that do not have the same status or the same relationship with energy, and where infrastructural diversity prevails.

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Infrastructure diversification, redistribution of skills and reconstruction of stakeholder systems The social ideal of major infrastructure as a public service construction, which combines economy of scale, technical reliability and quality service for the greatest number of people, has been destabilized since the 1990s by the logic of liberalization and commodification [GRA 01]. The centralized technical object is confronted with new assemblages and changes in value. Attempts to rebuild public service from the commons [ALI 18] and “return to the public” or “de-privatization” changes at municipal or regional level are increasing and should not be perceived as a downturn [JEA 17]. Micro-installations for energy production and other citizen initiatives for energy relocation are most often a sign of the desire to re-energize the public at local level. As John Dewey [DEW 27] argued, the public concerned by infrastructure is not an immobile and predefined mass of citizens, but an active community of interest, part of which is increasingly engaged in the search for more collective and efficient governance of natural resources and new arrangements for the diptych of autonomy/solidarity, as Gilles Debizet (Chapter 4) points out. Ultimately, it is appropriate to speak of forms of autonomy or processes of empowerment in the plural. Indeed, processes of infrastructure transition(s) are marked by a wide diversity of technical and political choices at local levels, often resulting in a socio-technical hybridization of existing systems rather than the deployment of new supply configurations independent of these systems. In her study on the supply of energy in urban and rural areas in Africa, Sylvy Jaglin (Chapter 13) highlights the ambivalence of the changes at work, between pragmatic autonomy and new dependencies, and the unexpected circulations between rural and urban areas. The organization of space and hierarchies within stakeholder systems are thus disrupted by energy changes and the quest for greater autonomy. The materialization of the transition is subject to a need to develop concurrent engineering and energy project management. This issue is addressed in many chapters, including those written by Guilhem Blanchard (Chapter 6) and Gilles Debizet (Chapter 4), who stress the need for “intermediate actors”. Historical actors in the energy or urban sectors are looking for new skills to imagine a redistribution of roles for the control of relocated energy flows, but also in the design-maintenance of systems. As Guilhem Blanchard (Chapter 6) and Zélia Hampikian (Chapter 7) show, new roles are also emerging for private actors in urban production (developers, donors, etc.): what place is there for new business models? Or for new forms of contractualization (performance guarantee, etc.)? Transformation dynamics can be top-down or bottom-up. For Allan Jones MBE (Chapter 2), a top-down approach (strategy broken down into projects and actions) can work, particularly for large cities (London, Sydney and Seoul). The approach is based on a range of principles, tools and objectives that are flexible and adaptable to

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local contexts, rather than on the transfer of a “ready-made” model. Benoit Boutaud (Chapter 12) shows that French-style localism tends to rule out any idea of an autonomous “energy community” that would emerge more or less spontaneously from civil society or even local authorities, in favor of “territories” engaged in an autonomy approach circumscribed by state frameworks. This is why empowerment processes must also be understood in their legal dimension in order to highlight these frameworks. Conversely, the contributions of Laure Dobigny (Chapter 9) and Arwen Colell and Angela Pohlmann (Chapter 10) attest to the importance, in the German context, of bottom-up approaches among associations. The analytical opposition between “ascending” dynamics (conquered autonomy) and “descending” dynamics (granted autonomy) must however be relativized. Indeed, an empowerment that is initially top-down, granted or conceded by the State, can be appropriated by a community to be further developed, in the energy field or in other areas of common interest, even if the achievement of the empowerment processes requires a favorable legislative and regulatory framework and, more broadly, a congruence between citizen mobilization and action by local and national (and, where applicable, European) public authorities. At the crossroads of innovation, experimentation and diversion What are the possible forms of support for these changes by the public authorities? One way consists in establishing, by way of derogation, spaces allowing experimentation and the local appropriation of energy issues, at least temporarily. The notion of experimentation is important because it makes it possible to capture both projects framed by explicit procedures and more unexpected forms of action, diversions and overflows, “more subversive, informal and undisciplined dynamics of experimentation, shaping in their own way electrical autonomies that escape projects”. The notion of diversion opens up another important issue concerning the standardization of experiments and autonomy solutions and their relation to modelbased solutions. Sylvy Jaglin (Chapter 13) points out that, in some African countries, “the territorialization of electrical autonomy resists the standardization of electrical experiments”. From a dynamic perspective, “ready to use” models and experiments “without a safety net” thus appear as two particular modalities of a continuum of approaches combining the two action logics to varying degrees; indeed, local experiments often mobilize elements of models in circulation at international level. On a more theoretical level, the analyses in terms of the circulation of models and those in terms of experiments refer to two distinct conceptualizations of local public action, the first limiting the competence of local actors (or, more rigorously: local systems of actors or action) to the choice of “solutions” more or less adapted to the problems they wish to solve, the second granting these local actors an ability to assemble resources (cognitive, technical, financial, etc.) of diverse origin in real processes of local innovation.

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Perspectives To conclude, let us mention three perspectives opened up by this book. Firstly, it seems to us that all the contributions confirm an assumed bias in the book, namely that it is the processes of empowerment rather than the degree of autonomy achieved within a given local territory that must be the focus of researchers’ attention. It is the study of these processes – understood as the provisional, incomplete, controversial, conflictual, even reversible, but also potentially transformative... outcome of the strategies and (interdependent) actions of a set of actors – that most accurately and completely illuminates the possible room for maneuver available to local action systems and the constraints they face. Secondly, we would like to note that while the book highlights the spatiality (and “scalarity”) of energy empowerment processes and forms of local energy autonomy, it does not deal head-on with their temporality. However, this temporal dimension is of major importance in at least two inter-related respects. On the one hand, the quest for autonomy is based on a vision of a more desirable future whose imaginary, ideological, but also material modalities of construction must be questioned. Indeed, these visions of the future provide information for research on empowerment, and on transition dynamics more generally, both from an analytical point of view (what is important to study and how can it be studied?) and from a normative point of view (for what purpose should local energy autonomy be sought? Are the processes at work consistent with the visions of the future underlying them?). On the other hand, empowerment processes are long-term and must be understood as such. Over what time scale is autonomy sought? What trade-offs are there between the search for autonomy in the short term and in the long term? What are the links between the urgency of contemporary challenges and the powerful but slow dynamics of infrastructural reconfigurations? Finally, the issues studied in this book cannot be dissociated from more general political questions. A change in the socio-technical energy regime, including a change in the primary energy source (from nuclear to solar, from coal to wind power), in infrastructure scale (large to small), in governance (from large globalized companies to citizen cooperatives, for example), can significantly reduce the negative impacts of existing energy systems on ecosystems. On the one hand, however, it does not in itself guarantee the emergence of a generally more virtuous political dynamic, i.e. one that would aim at a transition to an ecological society based on a radical transformation of production and lifestyle patterns in order to adapt our consumption to the planet’s carrying capacity. On the other hand, energy autonomy can serve different purposes: lower energy use, carbon neutrality, social cohesion, etc. But it is not the prerogative of progressive groups. It can be promoted by members of a gated community of white supremacists or by developers exposed

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to real estate speculation as well as by groups of degrowth activists in rural areas. Thus, the definition of an energy project that is ecologically compatible with the territories concerned is only one of the elements of a broader project. In the context of climate change and energy transition [LEP 18], it seems to us not only politically desirable, but also scientifically heuristic to place these questions on new territorial energy arrangements in the more general perspective of the advent of an ecological society, involving a decrease in consumption, the effective search for sobriety and the definition of a more global emancipation project [AUD 17]. Book structure The 15 chapters of this book propose to jointly understand the spatial, infrastructural and political dimensions of projects and processes for energy empowerment. The authors – whether architects, historians, engineers, geographers, socio-anthropologists or urban planners – seek to shed light on the links between the forms of relocation of energy production, circulation and consumption at work, the underlying interplay of actors and the concomitant (re)articulation between small and large socio-technical regimes. The authors are particularly interested in the processes (partial and contested) of energy relocation that articulate forms of metabolic, socio-technical and political empowerment. The chapters are grouped into four parts according to their main purpose (questioning). In Part 1 – Governance and Actors – four contributions question the notion of energy autonomy through the role of the actors involved, who support and promote it or who endure it. Based on case studies at different scales, the challenges of energy governance – actors’ skills, forms of solidarity and horizontal or vertical relations of coordination or coercion – are linked to those arising from broader political decentralization processes. The relevance and limitations of planning tools and various approaches promoting energy autonomy are examined. The four chapters of Part 2 – Urban Projects and Energy Systems – are based on an analysis of recent urban projects in which the issues of local energy production and distribution have been a central element in the thinking of architects, urban planners, developers, builders and contracting authorities. They tend to demonstrate that the consideration of energy issues in these projects has had an impact not only on the choice of technical solutions adopted, but also on actors’ practices and the conduct of projects. Part 3 – Energy Communities – sheds light on the notion of autonomy through the study of citizen initiatives. These are described throughout empirical studies of their development trajectories, highlighting local roots, contextual conditions and inter-relations (interdependencies?) with public action and private actors, at different

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scales. Additional insight is provided by an analysis of the growing scientific literature on energy communities. The fourth and final part of this book – The Challenges of Energy Autonomy – brings together four contributions that examine the spatial and functional limits of energy autonomy from a specific analytical perspective: urban metabolism and territorial ecology; urban resilience; experimentation; and (French) local authority law. The contributions collected in this book are the result of a series of three seminars organized under the aegis of Labex Futurs Urbains. The first seminar, entitled Les territoires de l'autonomie énergétique and coordinated by Olivier Coutard (CNRS, LATTS), Fanny Lopez (ÉAV&T, LIAT) and Margot Pellegrino (UPEM, Lab'URBA), was held at the École nationale supérieure d’architecture Paris-Malaquais and the École d'architecture de la ville & des territoires in Marne-la-Vallée (ÉAV&T) on 17th and 18th February 2016. The second, entitled La fabrique de l'autonomie énergétique, coordinated by Guilhem Blanchard and Zélia Hampikian (ENPC, LATTS), François Balaye (Université Grenoble Alpes, PACTE), Milena Marquet (UGA, GAEL) and Charlotte Tardieu (EIVP, Lab'URBA) took place in Paris (EIVP & ENPC) on 13th and 14th June 2016. The third, entitled Grassroot initiatives in energy transitions: Paris/London/Berlin and coordinated by Olivier Coutard, Fanny Lopez and Margot Pellegrino, was held on 19th May, 2017 at the ÉAV&T. In total, these seminars brought together about 30 speakers, half of whom were selected to compose the book after a revision process by the scientific editors. References [ALI 18] ALIX N., BANCEL J. L., CORIAT B., SULTAN F. (eds), Vers une république des biens communs, Les liens qui libèrent, Paris, 2018. [ASC 01] ASCHER F., Les nouveaux principes de l’urbanisme, Editions de l’Aube, La Tourd’Aigues, France, 2001. [AUD 17] AUDIER S., La Société écologique et ses ennemis. Pour une histoire alternative de l’émancipation, La Découverte, Paris, 2017. [BAF 18] BAFOIL F., LEPESANT G. (eds), Énergies renouvelables. Les biomasses, l’éolien, le solaire. Stratégies nationales, structuration des réseaux et innovations en GrandeBretagne, France, Allemagne, Report for the Caisse des dépôts et consignations, Sciences Po CERI, 2018. [DEW 27] DEWEY J., The Public and its Problems, Ohio University Press, Athens, 1927.

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[DOU 19] DOUZOU S., GUYON M., LUCK S. (eds), Les territoires de la transition énergétique, Lavoisier, Paris, 2019. [GRA 01] GRAHAM S., MARVIN S., Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition, Routledge, London, 2001. [JEA 17] JEANNOT G., “Les communs et les infrastructures des villes”, in CHATZIS C., JEANNOT G., NOVEMBER V., UGHETTO P. (eds), Les Métamorphoses des infrastructures. Entre béton et numérique, Peter Lang, Paris, 2017. [LEP 18] LEPESANT, G. (ed.), Énergies nouvelles, territoires autonomes?, Presses de l’Inalco, 2018. [LOP 14] LOPEZ F., Le rêve d’une déconnexion, de la maison autonome à la cité autoénergétique, Editions La Villette, 2014. [LOP 19] LOPEZ F., L'ordre électrique, infrastructures énergétiques et territoires, Édition MétissPresses, 2019. [MAR 18] MARVIN S., RUTHERFORD J., “Controlled environments: an urban research agenda on microclimatic enclosure”, Urban Studies, March 2018. [RUT 14] RUTHERFORD J., COUTARD O., “Urban energy transitions: places, processes and politics of socio-technical change”, Urban Studies, vol. 51, no. 7, pp. 1353–1377, 2014. [VAN 15] VANNINI P., TAGGART J., Off the Grid: Re-assembling Domestic Life, Routledge, London, 2015.

PART 1

Governance and Actors

1 Urban Planning and Energy: New Relationships, New Local Governance

The relationship between urban planning and energy dates back to the early stages of urbanization. However, in the last few decades, the development of energy systems, especially electricity and gas systems, has followed a specific technical logic, which revolves around extensive production and transport infrastructure on a larger scale. The relationship between energy and urban planning merely consisted in adjusting their technical development path to the urban fabric, public space and other construction constraints. This was certainly not the case for district heating grids that were, from the start, correlated with an urban project, even in the centralized models that marked their development between the 1960s and the 1980s. However, this relationship remained related to some simple and unequivocal equations, and the urban and built environment was treated as the offtaker of an energy that was produced outside of it. This situation, which prevailed during most of the 20th Century without major changes, is currently undergoing a radical transformation due to the emergence of new local energy systems. Local communities become the crucible that enables the deployment of a new type of energy intelligence, an intelligence that sets two concrete dynamics in motion and makes them coherent. The first of these dynamics concerns the energies themselves, the standardization of their production and uses, as well as their control and efficiency. It combines two sets of possibilities: on the one hand, the development of the resources of an area – the unavoidable energy waste and recoverable energy, the unused production

Chapter written by Cyril ROGER-LACAN.

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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potentials, all the renewable energy resources – and, on the other hand, the progressive re-engineering and efficiency improvements of their various uses. The second dynamic is the need to link this energy intelligence more closely to the design and management of other policies: urban planning, land use, waste, housing, transport and intelligent mobility in particular. In order to progress in depth in the energetic field, it is necessary to connect it to these other policies, requiring renewed and strengthened local public governance. The purpose of the following considerations is to briefly shed light on how the relationship between energy and urban planning is changing, and to understand the implications of such a change. While the distribution of energy in all its components has already created a set of new challenges for those who plan and develop cities and land use, a second stage in this transformation has already started, initiating a new logic where urban development and local energy systems jointly arise from a common origin, and are part of a process of joint transformation. Distributed energy is understood as the production of energy in a neighborhood, a group of buildings or a single apartment block; but it also includes the multiple possibilities of district energy exchanges in the subsystems which distribute the energy produced in a decentralized way, especially when buildings and networks are equipped with active and controlled demand systems. We can also include here the new uses of energy that develop alongside this transformation, such as electromobility. The impact of this transformation on the institutions that run and manage cities, and those that design and operate energy systems, is manifold and engages new actors alongside the old ones. We will briefly try to list some of the issues that all those involved will have to solve together through a governance system that will have to be almost completely reinvented. 1.1. Distributed energy: the constant adaptation of urban areas The possibility of using distributed energy systems is likely to have profound effects on urban planning and development. These effects are at first discrete but, at different stages, will modify a wide variety of parameters and approaches. To fully understand the subject, the direct effects of these new urban planning possibilities must be considered – the integration of decentralized production in land-use planning or local building standards, for example – but also the indirect and systemic effects that are more difficult to foresee. As an example, let us note that an

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increase in the degree of energy autonomy of buildings can have opposite effects: reduce the networks’ pressure in the design of the urban fabric and thus, at first glance, lead to more isolated constructions; or, in the opposite sense, favor the emergence of small thermal networks, combining heat and cold, enabling energy exchanges and using storage components, which go hand in hand with a denser urban planning and increased community management, which allows economic models for these networks to appear, in connection with new lifestyles. These effects are therefore not unequivocal. Once this clarification has been made, at least four main types of distributed energy effects can be distinguished in urban planning and construction. First, the development of distributed energies leads to many changes regarding land use, creates new nuisances in inhabited areas (but can reduce them in other areas) and changes building standards. It therefore imposes multiple adaptations in terms of urban planning and land use. The early integration of renewable energies into urban planning is both an urbanistic constraint and a condition for the efficient development of renewable energies. It concerns the sites and land reserved for the different installations, but also construction modes that favor “highly” distributed energy, such as rooftop photovoltaic installations or solar canopies, solar thermal heating or microcogeneration at the building level. Beyond the technical adaptations of many urban planning documents, the question raised by these developments is twofold. On the one hand, the determination in all European countries to promote more resilient local energy systems, based especially on the development of local and carbon-free energies, is pushing local actors, and the organizing authorities in particular, to take over the issue and act in common projects. The German renewable energy generation fleet, which exceeds 80 GW installed and is potentially 1.5 times the size of the French nuclear fleet, is owned by over 50% by local actors: citizen cooperatives, local investment firms created by small companies, farmers, etc. These collective grassroots commitments, the degree of which varies from one country to another, clearly resonate with the desire to develop renewable energies. In Denmark, the development of wind energy, on an unequaled scale in Europe, has mainly been based since the 1980s on the obligation to offer local communities and their citizens the opportunity to invest in the different projects. On the other hand, the decisions that mark the development of renewable energies, whether regarding urban planning or the environment, are now part of an “environmental democracy” development context, based on the principle of public participation in decisions affecting the environment, a long-standing part of the

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European legal order (“Plans and Programs” Directive, Aarhus Convention), and constitutionalized in France by Article 7 of the Environmental Charter. This legal environment, and the resulting change in mentality that it conveys, slows down and complicates project development, both due to the consultations that it requires and the subsequent opportunities for litigation it can lead to. In France, as demonstrated by the changes back and forth that have affected the legal regime of wind energy, it has been difficult to find the right balance regarding this matter1. Similar legislations will therefore have different impacts depending on the location and context, and on whether local stakeholders participate in the energy development within the region, the two situations at times arising at once. The paradox over the last few years in most European countries has been that increased cooperation of local communities in the development of distributed energies, expressing their desire to participate as much as possible in these new forms of energy production for territorial development and new forms of urban development and exploitation of local resources, has not, however, helped to prevent the increasing resistance faced by many projects, particularly those regarding wind energy. On the other hand, as will be seen later, the projects focusing on thermal energy and district heating and cooling grids have found new momentum in this interdependent relationship with urban planning. Second, energy becomes a new component of urban development and planning models. As an example, the conversion of military or industrial wasteland includes, often as a priority, the production of renewable energies: some of the largest solar power plants in France are a result of these types of projects. Similarly, in some rural areas in Europe, wind, solar and biogas projects of agricultural origin have changed the landscape and economic models linked to land use. In some countries, specific crops for biofuels have been used. However, this tendency is in sharp decline in Europe2. In Germany, almost one in two farms currently has income resulting from renewable energies3, and field data suggest that in the last 10 years, in countries where renewable energies have grown the most, revenue from leasing land to wind or photovoltaic installations, sometimes combined with direct participation in project companies and methanization projects, have offset, in varying proportions, the 1 ROGER-LACAN C., “Entre urbanisme, aménagement et environnement: réflexions sur la sécurité juridique de l’énergie éolienne” Bulletin de droit de l’environnement industriel, June 1013. 2 The European Commission aims to gradually reduce them in the renewable energy mix from 10% to 5%, as well as their concentration in crops with the highest environmental impact. 3 In 2010, 41% of farms already reported renewable energy as their second source of income. This percentage exceeded 80% in certain states in the west. http://www.statistik-portal.de/ Statistik-Portal/landwirtschaftszaehlung_2010.

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decrease in agricultural income resulting from market conditions or the evolution of European subsidies. Other data highlight the new links between the profitable development of renewable energy and the transformation of economic models of a growing number of farms4, far beyond alternative income. Beyond the land use changes and modifications of urban planning documents that these energies require, the entire economic and urban planning dynamics for the land development are modified in advance when an energy component is included. For example, the so-called solar cadastre techniques that make it possible to identify the energy potential of photovoltaic or thermal installations in the building network of a region using 3D mapping tools, when used as part of open and shared infographic tools, can enable both owners and developers to foresee and prioritize the performance of potential projects, and help the community develop its urban planning documents, or the characteristics of certain construction projects. They also enable measuring the progress of local collective projects for the development of solar energy in a region, compared to a better identified maximum potential. Third, urban planning choices must include increasingly complex energy-related decisions. The often exaggerated ex ante energy performance of “efficient” new buildings raises complex questions about the viability of certain network infrastructures. The widespread idea is that an electrical connection is enough to ensure the energy supply required for these buildings, even though the collective and environmental optimum should lead to investment in public grids. The case of the Paris Saclay5 heating and cooling network is a good example of this type of decision: evidently, the geothermal solution was preferable in the long term and allowed for satisfaction of a large part of the heating and cooling needs of some research institutes and laboratories. In order to reach this solution, which is satisfactory for everyone, a modeling and systemic anticipation analysis was necessary. The addition of the institutions’ and promoters’ spontaneous preferences working on the real estate projects of the Plateau de Saclay would have led to a suboptimal and opposite situation, leading to the accumulation of autonomous 4 Riccardo Testa and Salvatore Tudisca; DOI: 10.3844/ajabssp.2016.100.102; American Journal of Agricultural and Biological Sciences; Volume 11, Issue 3. On the way, the essential question raised by these interactions is that of investment choices, and that of a “slow order of merit”, which at present makes it possible to prioritize them and choose solutions. From this point of view, and even if the increasingly controllable nature of demand is decentralizing the stakeholders that balance the networks and energy exchanges, the idea (stemming notably from Jeremy Rifkin’s work) of tomorrow’s world being an “energy internet” where everyone is both a producer and a consumer and exchanges energy in a universe with zero marginal cost, provides no answer to this decisive question on the investment choices that must be made. 5 M. Galindo Fernandez, C. Roger-Lacan, V. Aumaitre and U. Gährs, (2016).

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solutionss with limitedd scope for opptimization. In n order to avoid irrational cchoices in this areaa, the challennge is to esttablish a cleaar and transpparent methoodological framewoork that allow ws stakeholderrs to cooperatte in a commoon frame of rreference. This is not n self-evidennt because thee energy, enviironmental, ecconomic and uurbanistic parameteers to be taken into accounnt do not direcctly lead to ann optimal soluution; the choice depends d on how h they aree weighted, and a combinedd with long-tterm cost assumptiions: for exam mple, how is a geothermal solution s valueed, and the prootection it entails against a oil prrice fluctuations, when fo orecasts of said s prices arre highly uncertainn? The organnizing authoritty must also be given the power to proomote, or sometim mes impose, a solution in the name of the collectivee optimum oor general interest, such as the compulsory c coonnection to heating h grids supplied by rrenewable %, or contractuual modes of action in areaas where devvelopment energies at over 50% depends on public works. y efficiency priority into building Finallly, the integgration of a broad energy processees and techniques, as well as building g design, has visible and profound effects on o urban plaanning in term ms of constrruction techniiques, materiials used, mobilityy concepts that determine the construcction standardds (for exampple areas reservedd for bicycles and electric bicycles witthin buildingss) and the location of buildings, along with the preventioon of certain effects e such as heat islandss in dense uring their life fecycle, includding their urban arreas. Buildinggs’ energy connsumption du construcction, involvess a large num mber of choicces, many off which are rrelated to urban pllanning in the broader sensse, as shown in n Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1. The effecctive consump ption of a build ding and or a color its lifecyycle (sources: Ancre/CSTB//CEA/Tilia). Fo version n of this figure,, see www.iste e.co.uk/lopez/l /local.zip

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1.2. “Sustainable cities” and new energy systems: from harmonization to a common origin This new link between distributed energy and urban planning is itself part of a set of interrelated developments that modify land uses and construction methods, but also, and especially, change the flows, networks and services that irrigate the urban fabric. These changes are complexly interrelated. However, there are three important facts to consider. First, energy is not always the dominant principle in these evolutions, in fact it is far from it, and the issue is therefore its adaptation to transformations driven by other logics. This is particularly clear in the case of transport, which usually represents 30– 35% of the energy consumption of a region, and is therefore a major demand control issue. Furthermore, the evolution of transportation and mobility plans mainly responds to objectives related to mobility itself, to urban logistics and to the prevention of direct pollutants – air quality and noise pollution. Experience shows that energy management plans often integrate transport issues with greater difficulty than other major sources of emissions, while transport planning remotely deals with energy optimization issues. Nevertheless, synergies are high and can be illustrated by simple examples. The development of trans, often replacing former “urban highways”, comes with the rehabilitation of the affected areas and a concentration of living spaces which allows us to create viable economic models of district heating and cooling networks, partially powered by renewable and decentralized sources. However, to benefit from these equations, it is necessary to collectively program these different evolutions and the infrastructure which support them. Similarly, the transformation toward electric mobility – all vehicles combined – requires a search for consistency in the implementation of charging infrastructure with the constraints of distribution networks. This operation, which is initially relatively simple, will become increasingly complex when the so-called smart charging stations, programmed to optimize charging and users’ bills – two constraints that an adapted pricing system must make consistent – will be located as storage vectors and as grid regulation tools. These techniques, which are currently being tested on some demonstrators and developed in “real size”, will gradually change the way in which energy investments will be harmonized with urban mobility and displacement plans.

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Furthermore, when energy planning is integrated upstream into urban planning, especially in new neighborhoods, it affects planning and construction modes. As stated in the Tilia report to the European Commission in December 20166, these links are particularly strong for heating and cooling systems, which account for over 50% of the energy consumption across Europe. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the dominant district heating model was based on scale effects that involved both the centralization of production, mainly through large coal or gas-fired boilers, and a compulsory connection to networks in a world where consumers did not have the freedom to choose their energy suppliers, both in Eastern and Western Europe. Today, the situation is radically different with heating and cooling grids developing as part of an urban project based on the logic of adjusting new, local energy sources to precise demand projects, which are themselves shaped by a new logic: planning and construction methods, district renewable energy resources, locally recycled waste heat and thermal exchanges. These systems are incrementally deployed in stages, constantly integrating new sources of energy when they are economically and environmentally competitive, interconnecting local grids and linking together different types of energy, including electricity and thermal energy, through cogeneration, trigeneration, thermal storage and heat pumps, and through the pilot management of buildings’ thermal inertia. Similarly, energy planning makes it possible to rethink the synergy between rural and urban areas to introduce a new strategic component to land-use planning. Sometimes unproperly referred to as “positive energy areas”, those community projects where the real target should not be to locally produce more energy than is consumed but to seek a systematic and complementary development of the areas’ resources, which implies reconsidering their uses and possible optimization, highlight this possibility. Launched in Germany (Regional Energie Konzept) and Scandinavia before reaching France, they often succeed in fulfilling an increasing amount of energy needs in urban areas using very local inputs, often using various biomass resources or methanizing agricultural waste. A project carried out by Tilia in Querfurt (12,000 inhabitants, Saxony-Anhalt), combining the co-methanization of agricultural waste and other enzymes with the cogeneration and restoration of the local heat network made it possible to reduce energy bills linked to the heating network by 30%, particularly in social housing, to decrease CO2 emissions linked to its supply by 40%, and to obtain a 25% return on public equity invested in projects.

6 M. Galindo Fernandez, C. Roger-Lacan, N. Aumaître, U. Gährs. (2016).

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Finally, new forms of joint development of new urban neighborhoods and distributed energy are emerging, which changes the problem’s terms: the issue is no longer the reciprocal impact of urbanization and energy infrastructure, but rather the gradual reconstruction of energy production and exchange systems through some sort of urban cellular renewal. Each new block, each new construction or technical infrastructure provides the opportunity for a partial rearrangement of the energy supply exchange system. From a technical point of view, the energy exchange concept is vital to this new situation. It will become increasingly important as joint heating and cooling or air conditioning systems become part of these processes, which global warming and consumption patterns make unavoidable. The coexistence of the demand for heating and cooling requirements increases the role of exchanges in the system: the unavoidable waste heat released by an industrial refrigeration system can heat buildings; a low temperature grid and system (typically around 30–40°) can more easily produce heat and cold in its substations, and serve as a heat exchanger to the entities it serves. Finally, this type of system combines heat, cooling and electricity, and opens new possibilities to manage the electrical intermittency, supported by inexpensive thermal storage instead of electrical storage, which still remains much more expensive and suboptimal, except in non-connected areas. Other tools in different fields currently allow the fine-tuning of this close and bidirectional interaction between energy and urban planning. Thus, “microcadastre” systems, for example, obtained with mobile digital cameras and proposed by some companies, enable rethinking in detail the public lighting systems in connection with other road improvements. “Self-healing” networks allow power grid operators to manage certain failures and their consequences in real time without the need for immediate physical intervention and, through the operational security they provide, facilitate the integration of networks in the urban fabric by reducing maintenance and intervention constraints. Some emerging trends in urban planning will also affect this convergence. For example, considerations on how to better use the urban subsoil, conceived as the new frontier of urban density (“the city below the city”), is potentially rich in consequences of the use of energy, since it will be a source of new constraints (lighting, ventilation) together with new possibilities (insulation, inertia and thermal recycling).

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1.3. Reshaping local governance The proliferation of forums, research demonstrators and talks by companies or public organizations on “smart cities” or the “Internet of energy” – portmanteau words that cover very broad ideas and the promotion of a digitization perceived as a kind of large Mesmer tub in which the countless difficulties of city development would dissolve – should not mask a more dubious reality where governance issues are unequally solved. In European countries, three issues dominate this adaptation of governance to the new links between energy and urban planning: (i) the issue of skills; (ii) enhanced cooperation within and between local organizations; and (iii) citizen initiative and participation and local democracy. 1) Skills. This issue arises mainly within the energy-organizing authorities. The introduction of new energy production patterns for the use and exchange in urban development requires planning skills quite distinct from those for traditional networks, which were developed from centralized energy generation and transmission and designed according to national plans. In Europe, there are three predominant situations. There are those where, as in England, the competence of energy-organizing authority was withdrawn from the communities and municipalities mainly in favor of national regulatory authorities. In order to return to them a skill which unites energy and urban planning, it is necessary to rebuild ad hoc structures, often with broad planning responsibilities, such as the Greater London Authority, which is undertaking innovative work with the reconstruction of energy models, especially regarding heat networks. However, this evolution is only starting and the questions remain essentially as they stand. The predominance of regulatory approaches, based on comparative competition and microeconomic efficiency which have shaped, more radically and sooner than elsewhere (as early as the end of the 1980s) British energy networks and systems, raises with intensity the question of taking into account the systemic, urban and environmental benefits that can arise from new decentralized approaches in the midst of urban planning. Regulators need to adjust their tools and methods to these models. In the German and Northern European systems, there is a municipal utility model that ensures energy networks (and, generally, water and transport) and unbundled production activities (boiler plants, electricity decentralized production, geothermal

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energy, large-scale conventional waste generation) predominate, and the integration of energy and urban planning is more favorable. In Scandinavia in particular, the real development of joint energy and urban planning projects has enabled the development, particularly in the domain of district heating, of very efficient systems that integrate the use of energy in the urban fabric, promoting their control in real time and the integration of new sources of waste heat or “green” energy7. However, the technical services of these cities heavily rely on their municipal utilities and the link with urban planning cannot be taken for granted. In France, municipal concessions of electricity and gas arising from the 1906 law, which survived the nationalization of 1946, are transferred to large intermunicipality associations. This transfer, and the new powers entrusted to these structures by the law for modernization of territorial public action and affirmation of the Metropolis (MAPTAM, 2014), the Energy Transition for Green Growth Law (2015) and the Law on the new territorial organization of the Republic (NOTRE, 2015) raise the question of their new technical challenges, compared to mainly national operators that have, for several decades, developed networks and production according to a centralized technical logic, locally adapting national schemes. A considerable effort is required to allow these local organizing authorities to “take control” of the planning of energy systems, and even more so to integrate it with urban planning. This evolution has started but is still in its initial stages. Furthermore, it highlights two issues: – the first issue is the actual exercise of energy planning skills, already discussed above, in connection with a range of areas from urban planning itself to transport, waste or the development of public works. For the most part, these problems have not been resolved. The departmental authorities, which gather the municipalities which supply electricity and gas, have developed real energy skills, well beyond their initial role. The large urban communities, intermunicipalities and metropoles, which usually exercise their energy powers directly, still have relatively little technical expertise in the energy field, and the teams in charge need to establish working relationships with the departments responsible for traditional urban planning, which are provided with better resources and have different working

7 For detailed case studies, particularly in Copenhagen and Stockholm, we will revisit the report by M. Galindo Fernandez, C. Roger-Lacan, V. Aumaître, U. Gährs (2016).

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habits, which is not an easy task. The transfer of these powers to the intermunicipality level will undoubtedly favor the coherence; – the second issue is the effective engagement of local public structures in a more active and operational role in the energy field. Following the example of Northern European countries, local authorities and their public or semipublic companies could play a more active role in the energy transition in France in terms of decentralized production, but also regarding energy efficiency and services. Jurisprudential evolutions, that no longer require the failure of private initiatives to enable a municipality to engage in an economic activity8, converge with the specific energy law, arising in particular from certain articles of the Energy Transition for Green Growth Law of August 17, 2015, to allow municipalities, and especially the intermunicipalities, to create dedicated structures to directly engage in activities, alongside private or public partners, which are likely to favor the local energy transition. The government launched, in early 2018, “ecological transition contracts” to encourage municipalities and intermunicipal cooperation public institutions to engage more significantly in processes which link, in a concrete and quantified way, urban planning, the energy and ecological transition and the economic development of the regions. 2) Improving cooperation within local organizations. As a direct continuation of the previous point, and in the light of field experience, its importance cannot be overstated. Nothing had prepared traditional administrative and technical organizations for the joint development of new forms of urban planning and new controlled energy systems, rearranging production and local demand. Generally speaking, in France, the aforementioned laws have had the effect of concentrating a large number of powers in the hands of intermunicipalities, metropolises or urban communities. The graph in Figure 1.2 summarizes this convergence. However, there’s a long way to go before this theoretical convergence of powers results in an efficient operation, which integrates the different subjects according to the lines drawn above. Cooperative maturity, which is analyzed on several levels, should be a priority: between organizing authorities and operators, between operators of different

8 The main development was a result of the Assembly of the State Council’s decision, Ordre des avocats au barreau de Paris du 31 mai 2006, amending the legal precedence principles of the trade union chamber of commerce in Nevers of May 30, 1930. This legal precedent was by the Corrèze Department Decision of May 3, 2010.

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networkss, between thhese operatorrs and extern nal suppliers of solutions, between public and a private actors, betw ween central regulatory authorities aand local authoritiies.

Figure 1.2 2. Mapping off new responsibilities of the authorities in areas related to en nergy transitio on. For a colorr version t figure, see e www.iste.co..uk/lopez/loca al.zip of this

This question greaatly exceeds the t scope of this t contributtion. Howeverr, we can bservations. shed lighht on some asppects based onn empirical ob First,, North Europpean systemss have been more m successfful in this cooperative integratiion, which sppans over maany of the ex xisting fracturre lines betweeen these actors observed o elsew where. A cullture of deceentralized genneral interest, open to private and a cooperatiive actors, faacilitates the integration of o energies innto urban developm ment, and the continuity off their develop pment in a flexxible approachh, open to 9 new enerrgy inputs andd innovations that improve the system’s efficiency e . Second, part of thhe challenge arises a from thee difficulty to get actors att different scales too cooperate att a common and a relevant sccale. The casee is obvious in France, 9 See alsoo the report citeed in note 5 aboove, summary conclusions.

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where the major national technical organizations have ensure for decades, the development of energy systems (basically, all the production, transport and distribution, with the exception of heat grids), without taking into account the local perspective other than through the development filter of their own network (gas or electricity), or their large-scale production and transport constraints. The bottom-up logic, which leads to rethinking energy systems starting with the consumption and sources that can be mobilized at the building or neighborhood level to develop the networks, did not prevail until recently. However, the building or block is not the optimum level in which to consider these new systems. Actors working at a different scale must therefore accept the need to consider things from the other party’s perspective, and also to originate their planning at the local authorities level. Third, the most obvious bottlenecks do not always appear where one would expect them to. Technical organizations that manage the distribution networks (heat, electricity, gas) often cooperate better with each other than the different departments of a city or organizing authority when a problem goes beyond their traditional divisions. In this respect, above all, it is particularly difficult to integrate the concept of energy into the work performed by the administrations in charge of urban planning documents. 3) Citizen participation and local democracy. All the changes analyzed or foreseen in the first two parts of these considerations are based, at least in part, on the emergence of new actors from local civil society, expressing the double desire to contribute to the energy transition and take a bigger part in shaping their local public services. As mentioned above, in some Northern European countries an essential part of the renewable energy generation park is managed by this type of local structures and vectors: project companies which are often cooperative, or which gather traditional local actors (local public companies, local authorities) and citizens. Crowdfunding techniques have come to take over and develop an evolution that was already largely underway when they appeared. The French case, where the major industrial or service stakeholders and their subsidiaries have shared the bulk of the decentralized energy production market, appears in this respect as a minority model in Europe, while the possibilities recently made available by the law to encourage local investment in renewable energies are still not leveraged at the scale observed elsewhere in Europe. The analysis is quite similar in terms of energy self-

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consumption, which is also supported by local structures generally created in a climate of neighborhood conviviality and citizen initiative. It is still rather difficult to discern what awaits these developments, which mix rapidly evolving behaviors and technologies that continually reduce the scale at which energy infrastructures are developed, and even more so in related fields such as decentralized sanitation, rainwater harvesting, waste recycling in increasingly shorter loops, where similar developments are emerging, and where digitization increases certain possibilities to establish the management of these small infrastructures on a larger scale. We do not however believe that an optimum management can emerge from an ever increasing fragmentation of these infrastructures, nor from the “autarchy driven” urbanism that could stem from it10. It is, however, certain that all these systems are moving toward a new situation, integrating partially self-managed infrastructure and short cycles into more complex systems, which will emphasize all the changes that have just been presented. If, as many believe, the issue of data and data sharing affects the whole field and appears at the heart of governance patterns that will shape new relationships, it is also true that the physical and spatial constraints, as well as the biological risks and possibilities, will retain an essential and growing role as the natural space and its resources become scarcer assets and their sharing more complex: this is true for energy, which will increasingly rely on energy recovery and heat exchange systems that cannot be “dematerialized”; it is also true for “short loops” or other priorities subject to biological constraints (water recycling, waste digestion, revegetation and permeabilization of urban soils), which will help urban planning keep its mission of socializing the use of the environment for the general interest. 1.4. References ADEME, Livre Blanc aménagement des territoires et économie circulaire, Ademe Presse, Paris, 2017. DEBIZET, G., Scénarios de transition énergétique en ville: Acteurs, régulations, technologies, La Documentation française, Paris, 2016.

10 For those who would like to know more about the history of this thought, we recommend Fanny Lopez’s fine study (2014).

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GALINDO FERNÁNDEZ, M., ROGER-LACAN, C., GÄHRS, U., AUMAITRE, V., Efficient District Heating and Cooling in Europe, Report to the European Commission, Joint Research Center available at: http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC104437/ study%20on%20efficient %20dhc%20systems%20in%20the%20eu%20-dec2016_final%20-%20public%20report6.pdf, 2016. LOMBARDI, R., LEACH, J., ROGERS, C., Designing Resilient Cities: A Guide to Good Practice, HIS BRE Press, London, 2012. LOPEZ, F., Le rêve d’une déconnexion: de la maison à la cité auto-énergétique, Editions de la Villette, Paris, 2014. ROGER-LACAN, C., “Energie et territoires: les fondements d’une nouvelle donne”, Passages, April 2015. ROGER-LACAN, C., “Les nouveaux défis du service public de l’énergie dans les territoires”, Energie Plus 557, p. 22, December 2015. ROGER-LACAN, C., District heating and cooling grids: a backbone to balanced local energy transitions?, European Commission Research Review, Setis, available at: https://setis.ec. europa.eu/setis-reports/setis-magazine/low-carbon-heating-cooling/district-heating-and-coolinggrids-backbone, June 2016. RUTHERFORD, J., COUTARD, O., “Urban energy transitions: Places, processes and politics of socio-technical change”, Urban Studies, vol. 51, no. 7, pp. 1353–1377, 2014.

2 Decentralized Energy and Cities: Tools and Levers for Urban Energy Decentralization

2.1. Introduction Microgrids can comprise the internal electricity networks supplying individual or groups of buildings or extended electricity networks supplying industrial or shopping precincts, community energy or local municipal or private wire networks. They all have one thing in common. Electricity generation is decentralized and located on site or locally close to demand and supplied to consumers via microgrids. While the first public electricity supplies were based on small-scale decentralized energy generation supplying electricity over microgrids, in some cases by renewable energy (Godalming Museum Trust, 2014), these were replaced by the incumbent large-scale centralized energy generation systems that we know today. These primarily using fossil fuels and/or nuclear power, supplying electricity over national or statewide grids. However, concern has grown about the greenhouse gas and pollutant emissions from fossil fuel power stations, particularly from coal-fired power plants, and their impact on climate change and human health. Additionally, following the Three Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011) nuclear accidents/disasters safety concerns have also grown about nuclear power plants. Furthermore, energy deregulation has not fulfilled its early promise with the lack of genuine competition and the ever-increasing cost of energy from centralized Chapter written by Allan JONES MBE.

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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energy. For example, in the UK it has become clear that electricity regulation has been designed to support the energy industry, not consumers. For example, there are 205 licensed electricity suppliers in the UK but the incumbent “Big 6” energy companies have between them a 92.4% share of the market (Ofgem, 2019). 2.2. Background The combination of consumer concern about climate change/environmental damage and the lack of control over centralized energy generation has led to a groundswell of grassroots initiatives to develop decentralized energy generation and microgrids for self-supply. This new age of “prosumers” and decentralized energy initiatives (with a few exceptions, e.g., California) are led by the world’s cities, not by national or state governments. From as early as 1990, the author has been aware of this and the desire of consumers to do something about it. Each of the local authorities in this chapter, despite the differences in scale and context, illustrates specific skills and political will to engage in the relocation of energy to the local economy. Some of the tools and levers were common to each city but these were progressively adapted or improved, or completely new tools, adopted were to respond to the different energy landscapes, politics and regulatory regimes found in each country. This chapter sets out two background case studies on the author’s achievements in Woking and London followed by two more detailed case studies on his work in Sydney and Seoul. The case studies cover the different tools and levers adopted and how the original Woking concept was modified to deliver targets for other cities. 2.3. Woking, UK Woking is a large town in Surrey, England, located 37 km south-west of central London. The local authority, Woking Borough Council, serves a population of nearly 100,000. The Borough comprises Woking town center and a number of villages. IBM UK, McLaren (Formula One motor manufacturer) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) have their headquarters in Woking. In 1990, the Council adopted an Energy Efficiency Policy, which was the catalyst for all that Woking has since achieved. The Council implemented a series of energy efficiency and decentralized energy projects from 1990 to 2004, including the first trigeneration project of the UK, the first local authority owned, private

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21

residential, decentralized, wire microgrid energy systems, the largest domestic solar photovoltaic (PV)/cogeneration installations, the first stationary fuel cell system and the first public/private joint venture Energy Services Company (ESCO).

Woking Borough Council Achievements from April 1990 to March 2007 Reduction in energy consumption Reduction in water consumption Reduction in CO2e emissions Supply from decentralised energy Energy efficiency improvement of the Borough’s housing stock

52% 44% 82% 82% 33%

Figure 2.1. Woking achievements from 1990 to 2007 (source: South West Renewable Energy Agency (2007); Regensw, 2007 )

The reduction in energy consumption, water consumption and CO2e emissions, and as well as the supply from decentralized energy, relate to the Council’s buildings and operations, including reductions in energy consumption and CO2e emissions for private sector buildings connected to the Council’s decentralized energy network. Energy efficiency improvement of the Borough’s housing stock relate to both public and private sector housing stock as required by the Home Energy Conservation Act 1995 (Crown, 1995). As of 2013, Woking’s CO2e emissions for the whole of the Borough (all emission sources) had been reduced by 36% compared to 1990 levels. The Woking decentralized energy system comprised private wire microgrids that enabled electricity to be generated locally and supplied at a lower price than grid electricity. More than 80 private wire microgrids were installed taking advantage of the exempt licensing regime in the UK. The Council’s enabling agreement for exempt supplier operation brought together all decentralized energy sites into a common local electricity trading system balancing imports and exports between the sites across the local public wires distribution grid. In 2005–2006, electricity supply was 82% from decentralized energy on private wire microgrids and 18% from the centralized energy grid. The principal tools and levers adopted by the Council to deliver its energy and climate change targets were political will by all three major political parties, energy

22

Loca al Energy Auton nomy

and clim mate change policies p and targets, t local planning, insstallation of ““show by doing” projects p (initiially by the Council but later by its ESCO – Thhameswey Energy),, private wirre microgridss, environmen ntal leadershiip, and publiicity and annual reeporting of acchievements placed in the pu ublic domain.. The ability a to instaall local generration and sup pply on privatte wire microggrids was limited by b the exemppt licensing regime r to 50 MWe with no n more thann 1 MWe supplyinng residential consumers (1,000 houseeholds) per microgrid. m Heence, the reason why w there are more m than 80 private p wire microgrids m in Woking. W

Figure 2.2. Woking g Energy Interrnet (source: Woking W Borou ugh Council (2 2004)). For a color ve ersion of this figure, f see ww ww.iste.co.uk/llopez/local.zip p

2.4. Lon ndon, UK Withh a population of around 8.77 million, the Greater Londdon Authority (GLA) is the strattegic authorityy for the capiital city of th he United Kinngdom with a directly elected Mayor. M Londoon is a growinng city and itss population is i predicted too increase to 9.4 miillion people by b 2021. The Mayor’s 20004 election manifesto m inclu uded a comm mitment to esstablish a c agencyy for London. There was a recognition thhat although thhe Mayor climate change had impllemented robuust policies annd strategies on o decentralizzed energy annd climate change, delivery of thhese policies and a strategies remained at risk without a body to stimulatee, develop, ennable and/or deeliver projectss on the grounnd.

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23

The London Climate Change Agency (LCCA) was established as a municipal company to develop and implement projects that have an impact on climate change. The London ESCO was established in 2006 as a public/private joint venture ESCO between the LCCA Ltd (19% shareholding) and EDF Energy (Projects) Ltd (81% shareholding) to design, finance, build and operate local decentralized energy systems for both new and existing developments. The London ESCO project portfolio covered around 50 potential short-, medium- and long-term decentralized energy projects with an investment value of £200 million (€225 million) in projects reducing CO2e emissions by 310,000 tons a year, representing a 2% reduction in energy supply emissions through the London ESCO alone. The decentralized energy and energy services markets were catalyzed by the establishment of the London ESCO, which saw the ESCO market in London increasing from having no ESCOs in 2006 to 12 ESCOs in 2007. By 2013–2014, London had 12,800 sites generating 820 GWh of renewable electricity, which is more than double the amount of generation in 2008. London also had 275 cogeneration/trigeneration installations generating over 1,700 GWh of heat and power. The Mayor’s Climate Change Mitigation and Energy Strategy 2011 focused on reducing CO2e emissions. In 2008, London emitted 44.71 MtCO2e. This is approximately equal to London’s CO2e emissions in 1990, having fallen from a peak of 50.4 MtCO2e in 2000 when the GLA was established. The Mayor’s CO2 emissions reduction targets in London Target year

Target CO2 emissions reduction on 1990 levels (%)

2015

20

2020

40

2025

60

2050

80 Table 2.1. London’s CO2 emissions reduction targets (source: Greater London Authority (2011))

24

Local Energy Autonomy

In 2013, London’s energy supply emissions were 31.52 MtCO2e representing a 10% reduction in emissions since 2007, despite a very cold winter in 2013. Overall, London’s 2013 emissions fell to 11% below 1990 levels and 20% below the peak 2000 levels. The Interim London Energy and Greenhouse Gas Inventory shows a 16% reduction in emissions below 1990 levels and 25% below 2000 levels. This exceeds the 20% reduction in emissions target for 2015, despite a higher than forecasted growth in population. The principal tools and levers adopted by the GLA were similar to those adopted by Woking in addition to the London Plan, LCCA, London ESCO, partnerships such as the LCCA Founding Supporters, the London Better Buildings Partnership (BBP) and the London Energy Partnership, as well as action to remove the regulatory barriers to decentralized energy. This was necessary due to the scale of London and for the private sector to make significant contributions to reducing emissions in London. The ability to install local generation and supply on private wire microgrids was much more restricted in London than in Woking due to the limitation on the number of residential households that could be connected to private wire microgrids under the exempt licensing regime. Therefore, action to remove the regulatory barriers to decentralized energy became a key part of the LCCA’s business plan. Following lobbying of the UK Government by the LCCA, the energy regulator Ofgem removed the barriers to decentralized energy in 2008 enabling decentralized energy generators to supply local residential and non-residential consumers on local distribution networks without limitation on the “virtual private wire” principal (Ofgen, 2008). This regulatory change later became known as “Licence Lite” and increases the economics of decentralized energy by 30% over exporting electricity into the national grid. 2.5. Sydney, Australia 2.5.1. Background The City of Sydney is the local government area (LGA) covering the Sydney central business district and surrounding inner city suburbs of the greater metropolitan area of Sydney, New South Wales (NSW). The current Lord Mayor has been in office since 2004. The City of Sydney is the nation’s economic powerhouse, representing around 25% of NSW gross domestic product (GDP) and around 8% of Australia’s GDP.

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However, the City is also recognized as the nation’s environmental leader and one of the world leaders in tackling climate change. 2.5.2. Sustainable Sydney 2030 Sustainable Sydney 2030 (City of Sydney 2008) is the vision and strategic plan for the City of Sydney to make Sydney a green, global and connected city by 2030. The full spectrum of interested individuals and groups were consulted on Sustainable Sydney 2030 over a period of 18 months making it the most extensive engagement process in the City’s history with 90% of respondents wanting urgent action on climate change. Sustainable Sydney 2030 was adopted by the Council in 2008 and provided the mandate for the Lord Mayor to deliver the targets to make Sydney more sustainable by 2030.

Key Energy and Climate Change Targets in Sustainable Sydney 2030 1. 2. 3. 4.

The City will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 70% below 2006 levels by 2030 The City will meet 100% of electricity demand by local generation by 2030 The use of public transport for travel to work will increase to 80% by 2030 At least 10% of City trips will be made by bicycle and 50% by walking by 2030

Figure 2.3. Sydney’s energy and climate change targets (source: City of Sydney (2008))

As 80% of Sydney’s greenhouse gas emissions come from coal-fired power plants, the 70% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions could not be delivered without replacing coal-fired centralized energy generation with low or zero carbon decentralized energy generation. Therefore, the 100% local electricity demand would need to be met principally by decentralized energy – 70% from trigeneration1 and 30% from renewable electricity generation by 2030.

1 Trigeneration or combined cooling, heat and power (CCHP) refers to the simultaneous generation of electricity and useful heating and cooling (via heat-fired absorption chillers) from the combustion of a fuel or solar heat collector or the electrochemical reaction of a hydrogen fuel with oxygen in a fuel cell.

26

Local Energy Autonomy

Sydney Town Hall supplied by solar photovoltaics and trigeneration decentralized energy microgrid

Figure 2.4. Sydney town precinct decentralized energy microgrid (source: City of Sydney). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

2.5.3. Green Infrastructure Plan A key objective in Sustainable Sydney 2030 was to develop a Green Infrastructure Plan comprising five master plans as follows: – decentralized energy master plan – trigeneration; – decentralized energy master plan – renewable energy; – decentralized energy master plan – advanced waste treatment; – decentralized water master plan; – energy efficiency master plan. 2.5.4. Trigeneration Master Plan The Trigeneration Master Plan (City of Sydney, 2013a) was the first decentralized energy master plan to be adopted by the City in 2013. The Master Plan forecasted what the energy demands would be by 2030 on a “business as usual” basis to ensure that the Master Plan adopted catered for the 2030 energy demand. The Master Plan broke the city down into energy demand layers and geographical areas to determine the heating and hot water demands, and how much

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27

of the electric cooling demands could be converted to heat fired absorption cooling demand. This would have the double benefit of significantly reducing electricity consumption and peak power by switching from electric cooling to thermal cooling, and in turn enabling more local electricity generation from the need for additional waste heat to supply both heating and cooling demands. The Master Plan was then developed into low-carbon zones for energy dense inner city areas, hot spots outside the inner city areas (e.g., university campuses), and then the remainder of the city that consisted of mainly low-rise suburban areas where domestic energy generation systems would be more appropriate. The Master Plan showed that 70% of the City’s electricity demands and 100% of the City’s heating and cooling demands in 2030 could be met by trigeneration, reducing the City’s greenhouse gas emissions by 31.9%. Although the initial fuel for the trigeneration network would be natural gas to enable the economic development of the heating and cooling infrastructure, the City resolved that by 2030 renewable gases from waste and other renewable energy resources would replace fossil fuel natural gas in the trigeneration systems enabling them to provide carbon-free electricity as well as carbon-free heating and cooling. The renewable gas resources necessary to deliver this outcome was included in the Renewable Energy Master Plan. 2.5.5. Renewable Energy Master Plan The Renewable Energy Master Plan (City of Sydney, 2013b) was the second decentralized energy master plan to be adopted by the City in 2013. The Master Plan established that no more than 18.2% of the city’s electricity demand in 2030 could be met by renewable electricity generation, primarily solar PV. The reason for this is that cities have very high energy demands with tall buildings whose roofs are small in comparison to the number of energy-consuming floors, as well as small geographical area in relation to the city’s energy demands and over-shadowing of buildings impacting solar energy generation. Therefore, the City needed to make up the balance of the 30% renewable electricity generation required from outside the city. However, the City did not want to include renewable electricity generation from Queensland or Victoria or even outback NSW whose electricity could never reach Sydney, so the City developed a proximity principle that would only include renewable electricity generation within 250 km of the city. This principle was based on work that the author did in London to identify electricity flows from centralized energy generation. However, in practice, enough renewable electricity generation could be sourced within 100–150 km of the city to make up the 30% renewable electricity generation target.

28

Loca al Energy Auton nomy

The second stage of the Masteer Plan was to t identify rennewable gas resources ney. The rennewable gas resources derived from waste within 250 km of Sydn identified comprised virtually all forms of wasste that are not otherwise recycled, mercial wastee, sewage andd landfill. Beeyond the such as from residenntial and comm b sourced frrom livestockk manure, aggricultural city, rennewable gases can also be stubble and a husks from m crops or noon-native foresstry off-cut waste. Energy ccrops and native woodlands w weere specificallly excluded from f the Masster Plan to aavoid any potentiall land use connflicts with foood crops and destruction d of native woodlaands. Produucing renewaable gas from m bioenergy, using u either anaerobic a diggestion or gasificattion to converrt it into a susttainable naturral gas for injeection into thee gas grid for pipellining into thee city, enabless typically 80% of the prim mary renewable energy resourcee to be recoovered comppared with tyypically 20% % for electriccity only generation connectedd into the electricity e grrid. The reneewable gas resources omic proximityy to the gas grrid. identified in the Masteer Plan are all within econo Greeenhouse gass emission savvings from reenewable gas grid injection n com mpared to eleectricity generration only and a other gas uses

Figure e 2.5. Greenh house gas emiission savings s from renewab ble gas grid in njection (source: City C of Sydney)). For a color version v of thiss figure, see www.istte.co.uk/lopez//local.zip

The Master M Plan identified i thatt the total resiidual municippal solid wastee (MSW) and com mmercial and industrial (C C&I) waste resource r avaiilable in NSW W within 250 km of the City’s LGA was aroound 3.7 milllion tons a year, forecast too grow to

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4.6 million tons a year by 2030, taking into account population and tourism growth, significant increases in waste generated by businesses and institutions (representing 90% of the City’s LGA waste), and significant increases in demolition and construction waste. The Master Plan identified that there was more than enough renewable gas resource required for both trigeneration and other gas uses. Expecting smaller cities such as Newcastle and Wollongong, gas use within and beyond the 250 km proximity zone is limited due to the sparsely populated rural areas of NSW, and yet there is a significant renewable gas derived from waste resources in areas beyond the city. Due to Australia being a major gas producer, there is also an extensive gas grid across NSW transporting gas from remote areas to cities, as well as gas export terminals on the coast. Economic advantages, that would not otherwise exist, for rural local authorities in utilizing local advanced waste treatment and renewable gas grid injection plants to meet the City of Sydney’s renewable gas demand would mean the virtual elimination of non-recyclable waste going to landfill, and the avoidance of the landfill levy, which would save other local authorities $177 million (€200 million) a year and businesses $252 million (€280 million) a year in these areas. 2.5.6. Advanced Waste Treatment Master Plan The Advanced Waste Treatment Master Plan (City of Sydney, 2014) was the third decentralized energy master plan to be adopted by the City in 2014. The Master Plan was a subset of the Renewable Energy Master Plan for the renewable gas resources available from the MSW collected by the City and from the C&I waste collected by city business waste contractors. The Master Plan also provided the environmental and financial data to build an advanced waste treatment facility for the City’s MSW and C&I waste. The Master Plan demonstrated that the diversion of MSW and C&I waste from landfill would increase from 52% in 2012 to 94% by 2030. This would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 7% below 2006 levels by 2030. The City and the City’s LGA businesses would also save in the region of $3.9 million (€4.3 million) and $18.7 million (€20.8 million) a year, respectively, in the landfill levy. In addition, using advanced gasification as part of the advanced waste treatment would produce more than enough renewable gas to supply the City of Sydney’s own trigeneration and other gas uses. The Master Plan also included indicative financial analysis for a plasma gasification advanced waste treatment facility with renewable gas grid injection over

30

Local Energy Autonomy

its 35-year life based on two scenarios – one at 100,000 tons of waste a year and one at 150,000 tons a year. It showed that in both scenarios facilities would be in profit by Year 9 with a slightly better profit for the 100,000 tons of waste a year scenario. The increased income from a 150,000 ton facility is offset by higher capital costs and higher pro rata operating costs leading to a slightly lower profit compared with a 100,000 ton facility. The 100,000 ton facility was required as a minimum and the 150,000 ton facility would be required if the City obtained a higher commercial and industrial waste input take-up than calculated for the 100,000 ton facility. Decentralized energy master plan

Electricity

Heating and cooling

Gas

Reduction in GHG emissions (%)

Trigeneration

70%

100%

–

31.9

Renewable energy

30%

–

100%

37.5

Advanced waste treatment

Inc. above

Inc. above

Inc. above

5.2

Total renewable energy

100%

100%

100%

74.6

Table 2.2. Delivering a 100% Renewable Energy Sydney by 2030 (source: City of Sydney (2014))

Taken together, the Trigeneration, Renewable Energy and Advanced Waste Treatment Master Plans would enable 100% of the City’s electricity, heating and cooling demands to be met by 100% renewable energy resources and reduce 2006 greenhouse gas emissions by 74.6% by 2030. 2.5.7. CitySwitch Green Office Program Tenants have a critical role to play in reducing emissions since they influence up to 50% of the energy use in commercial office buildings. By 2018, 901 tenancies covering 4 million m2 of floor space had joined CitySwitch in Australia (see CitySwitch, 2019). The City funds meetings, publications, education programs and City support staff. Tenants can make a significant impact on landlords by choosing to occupy the highest energy efficiency rated buildings. This forces landlords to improve the energy ratings of their buildings as the cost of losing or not attracting anchor tenants leads to costly voids, which is far greater than the cost of energy efficiency and decentralized energy.

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The CitySwitch program enables the City to educate tenants and proselytize energy efficiency ratings, emissions reductions and the impact that tenants could have in incentivizing landlords to improve the energy efficiency of both the landlord’s and tenanted parts of their buildings, particularly at new renewal, or break clause lease contract points, to create pressure for landlord action. The City of Sydney CitySwitch Green Office currently comprising 144 tenancies occupying over 1 million m2 or 21% of the city’s office (25% of Australia’s) floor space has improved the NABERS rating from 3.8 to 4.6 from 2006 to 2017 and reduced greenhouse gas emissions by 65,420 tonnes a year (City of Sydney, 2018). 2.5.8. Better Buildings Partnership In 2011, the City established the Sydney BBP with 13 major landlords who own 50% of the city’s commercial floor space. This includes two universities and one technical college. The BBP now has 16 members who collectively reduced greenhouse gas emissions in their property portfolio by 45% and reduced energy bills by $30 million (€33.4 million) a year since 2006. The BBP program of works led to a significant growth in energy efficiency, trigeneration, low-carbon heating and cooling networks, renewable energy, water efficiency, recycled water and waste minimization. Similar to the BBP in London, the City identified that the number of properties owned by landlords started to taper off into smaller numbers of properties owned by many smaller landlords. For Sydney, this was 13 major landlords that the City needed to convince to join the BBP and adopt the same energy and climate change targets as the City using Energy Disclosure and NABERS energy ratings as the driver to improve the energy performance of their buildings. This was achieved by inviting the Chief Executive Officers of Sydney’s major landlords to a dinner at Town Hall hosted by the Lord Mayor where the energy and climate change targets of Sustainable Sydney 2030 were set out along with the contribution a Sydney BBP could make toward the targets. 2.5.9. Environmental Upgrade Agreements In 2011, the City introduced Environmental Upgrade Agreements (EUAs) in its LGA taking advantage of amendments to the NSW Local Government Act 1993 to overcome the barriers to implementing energy efficiency and environmental upgrade works in commercial and multiresidential buildings. EUAs enable the establishment of an innovative financing mechanism for building owners to gain access to commercial finance at a lower cost to progress

32

Local Energy Autonomy

energy efficiency and environmental upgrade works. EUAs also overcome the split incentive between landlord and tenant as most leases provide for proportional passthrough of local council rates and charges, which is used as the basis of the scheme. Local governments have the power to impose charges on local rates to cover such things as infrastructure, deeds of covenant or particular requirements on particular buildings. This enables any associated costs to be passed through to the occupier by the landlord and forms part of the rental or lease charge. It is this legal power that enables the City (or indeed, any local authority) to apply an EUA charge on behalf of the environmental upgrade funder so that the funder’s loan finance is guaranteed even if the landlord or the tenant becomes insolvent since the local authority is a primary debtor and so receives its debts first. This is the process that local authorities use to recover unpaid rates, waste charges, etc., from the assets of the building should companies go into liquidation. The local authority is not exposed to the cost of the EUA charge as it is simply acting as a pass-through but has to approve the EUA charge at the outset. EUAs are voluntary and where entered into the EUA charge must be the same or less than the energy cost savings over the payback period. At the end of the payback period, the occupier gets the full benefit of the energy cost savings. The benefit to the landlord is that it increases the energy rating of the building and therefore enables anchor tenants to be retained or acquired at no cost to the landlord while the benefit to the tenant is better environmental public relations, reporting and shareholder approval as well as energy cost savings at no additional cost to the tenant. The benefit to the EUA funder is low risk as the repayment of their loan finance is guaranteed, which in turn reduces the interest rate. The benefit to the local authority is that EUAs overcome a major obstacle to improving the energy ratings of existing as well as new buildings, which makes it much easier to achieve their environmental targets at no cost to the local authority. The local authority is allowed to make a small charge for the approval and administration of the EUAs. The City worked with NSW Government to introduce EUA legislation (Office of Environment and Heritage, 2018) and the City was the first local authority to take advantage of this with a $26.5 million (€17.5 million) trigeneration microgrid scheme serving phase 1 of the new Central Park development. To date, 4 EUAs with a total value of $30.4 million (€20 million) have been signed and a further seven EUAs are currently being implemented or negotiated for energy efficiency works of the order of $2–3 million (€1.3–2.0 million) each. Implementing EUA legislation in NSW would not have been possible without the City of Sydney committing to being the first local authority to implement EUAs, otherwise other local authorities would not participate in EUAs. Local authorities that have so far implemented EUAs include the City of Sydney, Newcastle City

Decentralized Energy and Cities

33

Council, Lake Macquarie City Council, North Sydney Council, Parramatta City Council and the City of Melbourne. In 2014, the Government of South Australia adopted the EUA legislation and the Government of Victoria has extended its EUA legislation to the whole of the state and nine councils have so far adopted EUAs in Victoria.

Figure 2.6. Environmental upgrade agreements (source: City of Sydney (2011))

2.5.10. City of Sydney Projects The City is implementing Sustainable Sydney 2030 at two levels – one at the LGA level and one at the City’s own buildings and operations level. “Show by doing” is an important principle since the City cannot expect others to do what it is not prepared to do itself on its own buildings and operations. It was important for the City to not only deliver the Sustainable Sydney 2030 energy and climate change targets for its own buildings and operations but also to deliver these targets at a more accelerated rate than its residents and businesses to show environmental leadership. In support of this approach, the City decided to implement four major carbon reducing projects – Building Energy Efficiency Retrofits to 45 of the City’s major buildings, LED Street Lighting to replace 6,448 street lights with LEDs, Solar PV on 31 buildings and the Town Hall Precinct Trigeneration project. The four major carbon-reducing projects were installed from 2011 to 2016 and reduced greenhouse gas emissions by 26.6% below 2006 levels. Other trigeneration, solar PV and community renewable energy projects are ongoing.

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Local Energy Autonomy

Project

Energy savings (%)

Water savings (%)

Reduction in GHG emissions (%)

15.5

21.8

15.0

5.5 3.0 3.1 27.1

– – –21.8

5.3 3.3 3.0 26.6

Building energy and water efficiency retrofits LED street lighting Solar PV Trigeneration Total

Table 2.3. City of Sydney major projects on its own buildings and operations (source: City of Sydney (2016))

2.5.11. Carbon-neutral Sydney Following adoption of Sustainable Sydney 2030, the City adopted a strategy for carbon neutrality by first reducing emissions and then offsetting emissions. The strategy places reducing emissions through undertaking projects first and then offsets the remaining emissions so that each year the reduction in emissions through undertaking projects increases and the offsetting of emissions through carbon offsets reduces. Prior to 2008, the City offset its emissions by buying Green Power. However, this policy cost $2 million (€1.3 million) a year and the City’s total emissions were actually increasing until 2008. Green Power is very expensive, it does not reduce the City’s emissions, it does not incentivize carbon reducing action on the ground and there are more cost-effective carbon offsets available. Therefore, in 2010, the City resolved to replace the City’s Green Power purchase contract with a Renewable Energy Fund of up to $2 million a year that was to be used for renewable energy projects on the City’s own buildings and operations. The City also resolved that the City’s Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) were to be retired so that they were counted as additional renewable energy in Australia and not counted as part of Australian Government’s low renewable energy target. The City’s remaining emissions were to be offset by more cost-effective alternative accredited carbon offsets so that the City remained carbon neutral. The City’s carbon offsets are procured by competitive tender each year. The City also resolved that its first renewable energy project would be a $2 million program of works to install solar PV on more than 30 of its buildings. As Green Power tenders are always procured after the end of the financial year to fully account for actual electricity consumption, the new renewable energy policy was able to be made retrospective back to 2009.

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A renewable energy generator would normally claim RECs and receive payments for them and this would contribute toward the Australian Government’s renewable energy target. By law, a renewable energy generator must claim RECs but if they do not claim payment for them, they do not contribute toward the Australian Government’s renewable energy target and are counted as additional renewable energy over and above the Australian Government’s target. This is referred to as retirement of RECs. Total tCO2e

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Green power

8,163

41,901

43,569

0

0

0

0

0

0

Offsets

3,564

12,574

10,826

51,736

50,030

48,336

46,701

43,945

40,769

Total

11,727

54,475

54,395

51,736

50,030

48,336

46,701

43,945

40,769

CO2e (%)

22

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

Table 2.4. Percentage of emissions the city offsets by carbon neutral credits (source: City of Sydney (2015))

The City’s emissions in Table 2.4 comprise: – scope 1: gas, fleet fuel and so on; – scope 2: electricity emissions; – scope 3: emissions from flights, taxis, contractors fuel and events. In 2008, the City of Sydney became the first local authority in Australia to be certified as carbon neutral under the National Carbon Offset Standard. By 2016, the City had reduced its greenhouse gas emissions on its own buildings and operations by 27% and across the City’s LGA by 19% below the 2006 baseline. Also, in 2016, the City released its Environment Action Plan 2016–2021, which includes a plan that targets 50% renewable electricity through working with the City’s business and resident groups to sponsor large scale renewable energy projects to supply the City of Sydney LGA. 2.5.12. Conclusion The principal tools and levers adopted by the City were similar to those adopted by Woking and London plus Decentralized Energy Master Planning, EUAs, the Sydney Better Building Partnership, City Switch and 100% carbon offsetting. This

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Local Energy Autonomy

was necessary due to opposition to decentralized energy, renewable energy and taking action against climate change from vested interests, the Australian Government and some States. “Show by doing” and the publicity associated with this became a very important component of the City’s actions as it was necessary to demonstrate to Australian consumers and state politicians that decentralized renewable energy and taking action on climate change was not only possible but necessary to move away from fossil fuels. Sydney initially sought to establish a public/private joint venture ESCO and had gone as far as putting this out to tender. However, unlike other cities in this chapter, under Australian law ministerial approval was required before a local authority could establish a corporation and it was subsequently established that this was unlikely to be forthcoming. To counteract this, the City decided that the private sector would own the local generation and supply of electricity, heat and cooling but the City would own the district heating/cooling infrastructure and receive income from heating/cooling distribution charges. Decentralized Energy Master Planning was a new tool that was adopted by the City to determine in advance the amount and type of renewable energy that could be generated by decentralized energy inside the City’s LGA and what balance of renewable energy was needed to be generated from outside but in proximity to the City’s LGA to deliver a 100% renewable energy city. This was a first for a city anywhere in the world. EUAs were also a new tool to reduce the risk and lever in low-cost finance for decentralized energy in private sector developments. Carbon offsetting was also a new tool to publicly demonstrate that purchasing Green Power from the centralized energy grid was not the solution to delivering the City’s energy and climate change targets but reducing emissions by “show by doing” decentralized energy projects and offsetting the remaining emissions by more cost-effective carbon offsets with the money saved reinvested in decentralized renewable energy projects in the city was. Table 2.4 shows significant reductions in emissions that have been delivered since 2009 while remaining 100% carbon neutral by this change of policy as well as levering $2 million (€1.3 million) a year for decentralized renewable energy from existing budgets. Although action to remove the regulatory barriers to decentralized energy has, so far, been unsuccessful due to opposition from Australian Government and some states, it has created unintended consequences that has led to a proliferation of energy efficiency, “behind-the-meter” decentralized energy and energy storage with a significant reduction in electrons being transported by the national grid. Sydney has also had an impact on the rest of Australia, where there has been an explosion of “behind-the-meter” decentralized or small-scale renewable energy from

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just under 99,500 installations in 2008 to nearly 2.9 million installations in 2018. Rooftop solar generation alone generated 7,206 GWh in 2016–2017 and Australia now has the highest penetration of rooftop solar panels in the world. From July 2016 to June 2017, renewable energy in Australia generated enough electricity to power 7.1 million homes, representing 70% of all households and reduced greenhouse gas emissions by 25.4 million tons. As a result, the Australian Clean Energy Regulator has confirmed that Australia will now meet its 2020 Renewable Energy target. 2.6. Seoul, South Korea 2.6.1. Background As the local government of Seuil, the Capital City of South Korea with a population of more than 10.2 million people, the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) is more centralized than the governors of most cities, and is responsible for correctional institutions, public education, libraries, public safety, recreational facilities, sanitation, water supply and welfare services. The current Mayor of Seoul has been in office since 2011. In 2011, Seoul’s energy consumption accounted for 10.9% of the nation’s total energy consumption and was on the rise, making a 12% increase between 2006 (41,824 GWh) and 2011 (46,903 GWh) (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2014). Of this, Seoul’s electricity consumption accounted for 10.3% of the national total. Seoul is also heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels, with oil and liquefied natural gas accounting for 38.9% and 29.7% of the energy mix, respectively. New and renewable energy accounted for just 1.6% of the city’s total energy consumption in 2011. In addition, Seoul’s electricity reserve margin reduced from 12.2% in 2004 to just 5.5% in 2011. This inevitably led to power cuts. On September 15, 2011, a large-scale blackout occurred in many parts of the country including Seoul. To increase its energy self-sufficiency, Seoul needed to reduce its energy consumption and increase its decentralized renewable energy generation and microgrids. 2.6.2. Fukushima nuclear disaster The Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 triggered strong opposition to nuclear power plants due to worries about radiation damage across the world, with Germany committing to shut down all of its nuclear power plants and a number of other countries abandoning their’s.

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In 2011, South Korea produced 31% of its electricity (154,500 GWh out of 496,900 GWh) from nuclear power plants while pursuing an ambitious expansion of its nuclear power capacities, which led to mounting public concern over the nuclear safety and radioactive waste disposal from a mid- and long-term perspective. SMG was, therefore, faced with the challenge of finding practical alternatives. 2.6.3. One Less Nuclear Power Plant Following the election of the Mayor of Seoul, SMG launched the “One Less Nuclear Power Plant” (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2013) program of works in 2012 to reduce centralized energy demand by 23,260 GWh (2 million TOE) displacing the capacity of Wolseong Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 (9,188 GWh or 790,000 TOE) and saving 14,072 GWh (1.21 million TOE) of oil and LNG consumption by 2014. Other key targets included reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 6.06 million tons by 2014, increasing Seoul’s electricity self-supply from 3% to 8% by 2014 and 20% by 2020, and generating economic benefits of KRW 1.52 trillion (€1.2 billion) from replacing fossil fuel imports and creating 34,000 new green jobs compared to 2014. “One Less Nuclear Power Plant” comprised 10 key action plans: 1) make Seoul a city of sunlight where the entire city is a solar PV plant (320 MW); 2) ensure energy self-sufficiency of core facilities by fuel cells (230 MW); 3) improve energy efficiency of buildings (12,000 buildings energy efficiency retrofits); 4) realize a Smart Lighting City by LED (installation of 8 million LED lights); 5) launch “2030 City Master Plan” with a view to energy-efficient urban structure; 6) reinforce design standards for new buildings by introducing energy cap/other measures; 7) secure 150,000 members for car sharing scheme; 8) produce job creating effect in green industries (e.g. new and renewable energy industry); 9) create citizen lifestyle with energy saving actions; 10) establish and operate Seoul Natural Energy Foundation.

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Seoul City Hall supplied by solar photovoltaics solar thermal and geothermal energy decentralized energy microgrid

Figure 2.7. Seoul City Hall decentralized energy microgrid (source: Allan Jones Energy and Climate Change). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

Seoul delivered its “One Less Nuclear Power Plant” target 6 months early by reducing centralized energy demand through a combination of energy efficiency and decentralized energy microgrids by 23,725 GWh (2.04 million TOE) by June 2014. 2.6.4. Seoul International Energy Advisory Council In 2013, the Mayor of Seoul appointed 10 international energy experts from France (1), Germany (1), Indonesia (1), Sweden (1), the United Kingdom (2) and the United States (4) to form the Seoul International Energy Advisory Council (SIEAC, 2017; IEAC, 2017) to provide expert energy advice to SMG on its “One Less Nuclear Power Plant” action plan. Two additional energy experts from China and Germany were appointed in 2014 and another energy expert from Japan was appointed in 2015. The author is a member of SIEAC. The SIEAC provided expert energy advice to SMG on its “One Less Nuclear Power Plant” plan through 2013–2014 and provides advice on its ongoing “One Less Nuclear Power Plant, Phase 2 – Seoul Sustainable Energy Action Plan” (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2014).

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So far, SMG has adopted 38 of the SIEACs recommendations covering policy (15), production (microgrids, solar PV, biomass, CHP, etc.) (6), energy efficiency (10), industry (1) and community (energy welfare, energy self-sufficient village, etc.) (6). 2.6.5. International Energy Advisory Council Energy experts in the SIEAC considered that the combination of expertise and experience was too important to limit the knowledge and advice to one city government and that an IEAC (2017b) should be established independent of the SIEAC to help and advise other world cities and organizations to develop and implement effective strategies toward a 100% renewable energy future based on a combination of energy efficiency and decentralized renewable energy microgrids. The IEAC was registered as a “not for profit” company in the United States in 2014 and the author is President/Chair of the IEAC. 2.6.6. One Less Nuclear Power Plant, Phase 2 – Seoul Sustainable Energy Action Plan In developing Phase 2, SMG reviewed the energy policies of the leading cities of the World, in particular, New York City “PLaNYC 2030”, the European Union 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies, France government sponsored nationwide debate regarding a possible shift of the country’s energy system from nuclear to renewable energy and the City of Sydney “Sustainable Sydney 2030” and “Renewable Energy Master Plan”. Phase 2 commenced in 2014 and builds on and develops the original Phase 1 program of works to reduce centralized energy demand through a combination of energy efficiency and decentralized energy microgrids by 46,520 GWh (4 million TOE) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 10 million tons of CO2e (20.5% reduction from 2011 GHG emission levels) and to increase Seoul’s electricity self-supply to 20% by 2020. The vision and strategies for Phase 2 are based on: – vision: “Seoul, an Energy Self Reliant City” where citizens produce energy and consume it efficiently; – values: energy self-reliance, energy sharing and energy participation; – policy goals: - a city pursuing decentralized energy production on micro grids;

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- social structure based on efficient, low energy consumption; - creation of green jobs through innovations; - promotion of energy sharing, warm communities. Key implementation systems included energy collaboration through “Seoul Energy Governance” and the establishment of the “Seoul Energy Corporation” to improve performance. By 2016, the Phase 2 program of works had reached 60% of the 2020 target for energy efficiency and decentralized energy displacing 41,635 GWH (3.58 million TOE) of centralized energy with 3,954 GWh (0.34 million TOE) from decentralized energy microgrids (solar PV, fuel cells, CHP, waste heat recovery, etc.), 21,515 GWh (1.85 million TOE) from energy efficiency (green building design, building retrofit project, LEDs, etc.) and 16,165 GWh (1.39 million TOE) from energy savings (eco-mileage, waste recycling, energy self-sufficient village). The Phase 2 program of works has also reached 57% of the 2020 target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions had by 2016 and delivered a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 8.9 million tons a year. 2.6.7. Seoul Energy Corporation Following the advice of SIEAC that Seoul would need an agency to supervise energy policies and lead the Phase 2 program of works, the Seoul Energy Corporation (SEC) was established as a public corporation of SMG in December 2016 and officially launched in February 2017. A total of KRW 358.4 billion (€275 million) was invested in the SEC by SMG. The IEAC undertook an extensive Municipal Energy Corporation Workshop with SMG and SEC, which included case studies of municipal energy corporations from different cities around the world, focusing on the process, difficulties encountered, governance and the success of the corporations in delivering the city’s targets. This assisted SEC in developing its governance, policies and processes. SEC goals are to continue to implement the “One Less Nuclear Power Plant” program of works to deliver SMGs Phase 2 targets. As part of its “Open Energy World for Citizens”, SEC will implement four key projects to encourage energy independence in Seoul: 1) decentralized energy supply and microgrids; 2) alternative transport vehicles and energy efficiency;

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3) energy sharing; 4) interregional cooperation. SEC will establish a “virtuous energy circulation structure” in which Seoul will be transformed from an energy consuming city to an energy producing city by reducing energy demand, supplying more new and renewable energy and recovering unused thermal energy such as recovering wastewater heat. By 2020, SEC will have also completed the Magok Trigeneration Plant to supply low carbon district heating and cooling to an additional 75,000 homes. SEC will also expand on its new and renewable energy generation facilities by installing an additional 70 MW of solar PV and 90 MW of fuel cells by 2020. In addition, it will construct a Total Service Center in four regions by 2020 in order to distribute mini solar PVs for home use to reduce the costs of the centralized energy increasing electricity pricing scheme. SEC will increase the number of electric vehicles to 10,000 by 2018 to reduce transport energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. In 2018, SEC will install a renewable energy station demonstration project called “Solar Station” that will charge with solar energy and store the remaining electricity. In addition, SEC will provide an “Electric Car Life-Cycle Management Service” encompassing the purchase, charging, resale and disuse of electric vehicles, and launch the “EV Loan” scheme to provide Seoul citizens with low-interest loans to purchase an electric car. SEC will also establish the “Seoul Energy Management System” by 2020 in order to reduce the energy consumption of high-energy consuming public facilities such as water treatment plants, sewage treatment centers and hospitals by between 5% and 10% using building energy management systems and information technology. SEC will work on developing the “Seoul Energy Welfare Model” to provide low-income households with customized four-season energy welfare services. SEC will proactively find and support economically disadvantaged households in association with door-to-door community centers. SEC will finance energy welfare funds from some of the profits that it earns and develop a variety of projects to improve the energy efficiency of residential premises in addition to providing subsidies and air conditioning units. SEC will also open and operate various education programs to cultivate energy experts and promote energy self-sufficiency and sharing in local communities by supporting youth ventures and energy cooperatives.

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2.6.8. Interregional cooperation In order to resolve the inconveniences suffered by residents living near nuclear or thermal power plants that may be supplying Seoul, SEC will implement mutual growth and cooperative projects, such as construction of solar power plants, in partnership with other local governments. SEC will take the initiative in realizing a nuclear-free society by producing and distributing a manual of the “One Less Nuclear Power Plant” project and spreading their energy saving and decentralized energy know-how. As the City of Sydney’s Renewable Energy Master Plan showed, we cannot achieve more than about 20% conventional renewable electricity generation inside a highly urbanized world city such as Seoul and additional renewable energy generation needs to be procured from outside city boundaries. SMG has, therefore, targeted local authority areas in proximity to nuclear power plants due to widespread opposition to nuclear energy. These local authority areas tend to be on the coast or in rural areas so there is much greater opportunity for large-scale renewable energy generation in low-energy consuming areas. SEC will spread the value of mutual growth to realize energy democracy in cooperation with other local governments. Its major cooperative projects include the solar energy generation, certified emission reduction and energy welfare projects. In conjunction with local communities, SEC will carry out a variety of new and renewable energy projects, including as solar and wind farms. As Seoul is limited in constructing large-scale solar and wind power plants due to its geographical limitations, SEC will ultimately contribute to spreading new and renewable energy generation in collaboration with other regions with more favorable conditions. Representatives from six cities with nuclear power plants attended the SEC launch to demonstrate their support for SMGs initiatives in turning existing nuclear power plants into stranded assets and preventing new nuclear power plants from being built. 2.6.9. Conclusion The principal tools and levers adopted by Seoul were similar to those adopted by Woking, London and Sydney plus public opposition to nuclear energy, expert advice from SIEAC and IEAC, SEC and interregional cooperation. Similar to Sydney, Seoul faced opposition from national government that was pursuing a policy of increased centralized energy and new build nuclear power plants, meaning so it was necessary to both adapt existing and adopt new tools and levers to counteract the policies of the Government of South Korea and the government owned monopoly utility Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO).

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The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster coinciding with the Seoul Mayoral election was the catalyst for electing an independent Mayor with an election manifesto commitment to oppose and displace nuclear power plants. To this, an action on climate change was added. Since electricity will always flow to the nearest energy demand, it became clear that energy efficiency and decentralized energy would reduce and displace the need for centralized energy fossil fuel and nuclear power plants. However, due to its historical reliance on the national grid, Seoul lacked the expertise to deliver such major programs of work, and so it established SIEAC to provide the international advice that it needed for its “One Less Nuclear Power Plant” program of works. This was later followed by appointing IEAC to provide advice on establishing the SEC and other matters. Similar to Sydney, despite substantial financial and technical resources, it became obvious that decentralized energy inside Seoul’s metropolitan area would need to be supplemented by decentralized energy and large-scale renewable energy outside Seoul’s metropolitan area. This led to the development of the interregional cooperation program where SEC, in cooperation with other local authorities, builds decentralized energy and large-scale renewable energy plants to supply Seoul and therefore reduce Seoul’s and other local authority’s reliance on centralized fossil fuel energy and nuclear power. This is similar to the approach taken by Sydney, but much more direct in targeting local authorities outside of Seoul, impacted by centralized energy power plants and with much better renewable energy resources than urban dense Seoul. Similar to Sydney, Seoul has had an impact on the national energy agenda. The 2017 South Korean Presidential election saw a new President elected with a mandate to follow Seoul’s lead to cut South Korea’s reliance on coal and nuclear, stop plans to build new nuclear power plants and to increase renewable energy from 6.6% to 20% by 2030. 2.7. Overall conclusions The Sydney and Seoul case studies build on what was previously achieved in Woking and London. From city to city, new lessons were learned, better ways of doing things were adopted and different obstacles were overcome to deliver each city’s targets. Not only were innovative technologies applied but more importantly, innovative ways of implementing those technologies were adopted to overcome or side-step regulatory, political and institutional barriers. None of this would be possible without a robust policy and strategic framework at the outset, deliverable targets, know-how to implement innovative technologies and programs of work, continuous monitoring and reporting of achievements in the

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public domain, publicity and above all strong political will and leadership by someone inside the organization with the technical know-how to deliver the targets. Much of what was undertaken by Woking and London could be applied to Sydney. However, commercial and industrial energy demands were much greater than residential energy demands, driven not only by the scale of commercial floor space but also by very high air conditioning demands due to the climate in Sydney. Therefore, a more beefed up version of the BBP as well as the CitySwitch Green Office Program for tenants and EUAs for new and existing buildings had to be adopted to make significant inroads into the City’s energy and climate change targets. However, state government did not support the establishment of a public/private joint venture ESCO for Sydney or regulatory reform. This did not stop Sydney or Australian consumers and has led to unintended consequences for government and utilities with the proliferation of energy efficiency, “behind-the-meter” decentralized energy and energy storage in both Sydney and Australia. Seoul is similar, but in some ways different to Woking, London and Sydney. The 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Disaster led to the election of a new Mayor with a manifesto commitment to displace centralized fossil fuel and nuclear power generation with a combination of energy efficiency and decentralized energy. Similar to Sydney, the outgoing Government of South Korea opposed regulatory reform due to its ownership of KEPCO and new nuclear build plans. However, it did not have the legal powers to stop Seoul undertaking energy efficiency and decentralized energy works or establishing an ESCO. Based on this, it can be seen that the “Jones effect”, from its origins in Woking, has been progressively modified, adapted and improved for world cities on three different continents which despite having differing political, energy and environmental landscapes had an overriding aim to displace centralized energy with a combination of efficient and decentralized energy to provide affordable energy and to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Using similar tools and levers, Woking, London, Sydney and Seoul, through their actions, have set the bar and have encouraged others to follow their lead, including national and state governments that have amended or introduced legislation or regulatory reform to overcome the barriers that were identified by these cities. In conclusion, the Sydney and Seoul case studies demonstrate that a city is not limited to only having an impact on its own LGA but can also have a national impact by acting as an environmental leader, and adopting tools and levers previously undertaken by other cities but adapted to suit the local environment and politics.

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2.8. References CITY OF SYDNEY, Sustainable Sydney 2030: The Vision, available at: http://cdn.sydney 2030.com.au.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/2030vision/2030VisionBook.pdf, 2008. CITY OF SYDNEY, Decentralised Energy Master Plan: Trigeneration, available at: https://www. cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/193057/Trigeneration-Master-PlanKinesis.pdf, 2013a. CITY OF SYDNEY, Decentralised Energy Master Plan: Renewable Energy, available at: https:// www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/153282/Renewable-EnergyMaster-Plan.pdf, 2013b. CITY OF SYDNEY, Advanced Waste Treatment Master Plan, available at: https:// www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/215204/2014-429946-AdvancedWaste-Treatment-master-plan-FINAL-amended-as-per-Council-resolution.pdf, 2014. CITY OF SYDNEY, Green Environmental Sustainability Progress Report, available at: https://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/304762/Green-ReportJanuary-to-June-2018.pdf, 2018. CITYSWITCH, What is CitySwitch?, available at: http://cityswitch.net.au/About-Us/WhatisCity Switch, 2019. CROWN, Home Energy Conservation Act 1995, available at: https://www.legislation. gov.uk/ukpga/1995/10/pdfs/ukpga_19950010_en.pdf, London, 1995. GODALMING MUSEUM TRUST, Godalmung and Electricity, available at: http://www. godalmingmuseum.org.uk/index.php?page=1881-godalming-and-electricity, 2014. IEAC, International Energy Advisory Council, available at: https://www.ieac.info/, 2017. OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE, Upgrade your building, available at: https://www. environment.nsw.gov.au/business/upgrade-agreements.htm, 2018. OFGEN, Clearing a path for growth in sustainable community electricity generation, available at: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/76454/ofgem-21.pdf, 18 June, 2008. OFGEM, List of all electricity licensees with registered or service addresses, available at: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/list-all-electricity-licensees-registeredor-service-addresses, 19 December, 2019. REGENSW, Woking Borough Council Energy Services Company, available at: http://regensw. s3.amazonaws.com/1271676202_325.pdf, 2007. SEOUL METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT, One Less Nuclear Power Plant, available at: https://www. ieac.info/IMG/pdf/201305smg-one_less_nuclear_power_plant.pdf, 2013. SEOUL METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT, One Less Nuclear Power Plant, phase 2, available at: https://www.ieac.info/IMG/pdf/20140914olnpp2-lr.pdf, 2014. SIEAC, Seoul International Energy Advisory Council, available at: https://www.ieac. info/Seoul-International-Energy-Advisory-Council-SIEAC, 2017.

3 The Third Industrial Revolution in Hauts-de-France: Moving Toward Energy Autonomy?

In a centralized country such as France, the current energy transition dynamics in place, and in particular their decentralizing dimension, raise new questions. Despite the recent legislative changes, and with particular thanks to the energy transition for green growth law (TECV) of 2015, which placed the regions as the leaders of the energy transition or, more anecdotally, thanks to the recent devices favoring photovoltaic self-consumption, the organization of the French energy system remains largely centralized. At the technical, economic and institutional levels, this is in line with the vertical and built-in system set up in France after World War II, even if regional authorities regularly take on new powers, particularly regarding energy. At the institutional level, municipalities, departments and regions are now working “with the State [...] to fight against the greenhouse effect through the control and rational use of energy”. Each local authority potentially has jurisdiction on this issue, or at least on a part of the climate and energy issue, even if the regions are trying to hold strong with leaders having few financial resources allotted to them [PRI 17]. In the context of local and regional initiatives, which are still hesitant regarding energy transition in France, the Third Industrial Revolution (TIR) strategy in the Hauts-de-France region is particularly interesting to study. The Hauts-de-France (formerly Nord-Pas-de-Calais) is a region marked by its industrial history, massively equipped with infrastructure (roads, railways, highways and high-speed lines, energy networks, a nuclear power plant, important industrial centers, etc.), it was particularly affected by the industrial boom, and then its decline (16,000 brownfields on 4,000 hectares of land, polluted sites, and being the most Chapter written by Eric VIDALENC.

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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urbanized region in France behind Île-de-France). It is in this region where the first of the industrial revolutions materialized. In 2012, the American future-oriented essayist Jeremy Rifkin was convened both by the Regional Council of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, under the authority of its socialist president Daniel Percheron, and by the Chamber of Commerce and Regional Industry, through its president Philippe Vasseur, a former UDF (Union for French Democracy) minister. The aim was to adapt the TIR’s overall outlook to include regional issues and set more than just a “simple” regional roadmap for energy transition; a real regional project likely to develop and maintain employment locally for the upcoming decades. The TIR sets energy self-sufficiency as a long-term goal (covering 100% of the energy needs using renewable energies) and a new political process starting now [CLE 17]. Herein, following the description of the successive industrial revolutions that have taken place in the regional territory and the regional energy system, the TIR dynamics in Hauts-de-France will be described and its means analyzed in order to see how 5 years after its launch, it is questioning and reconstructing the region’s self-sufficiency, autonomy, and creating a new collective narrative. 3.1. The industrial revolutions in the region The Nord-Pas-de-Calais region largely contributed to the French industrial boom. With the coal and textile sectors, both of which have now almost disappeared, followed by metallurgy in the 1960s and 1970s, and the automotive industry up until present, large industries, often under the State’s incitement have since the start of the industrial era been part of the economic activity of this region and its development [INS 14a]. 3.1.1. The cornerstones of the first industrial revolution 3.1.1.1. Coal mining With a population of 1.2 million spread over 120 km from west to east, the mining area is still the symbol of the coal era. This territory, a physical and cultural landscape and urban entity, epitomized the first industrial revolution: a mining industry based on the exploitation of local resources without taking into consideration the human and environmental impacts. This activity continued until the 1990s when the last mineshaft was closed. During the 19th Century, many coal deposits were discovered in the north-west region. In 1913, from Valenciennes to Béthune, passing through Douai and Lens, the

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mining basin produced 27 million tons of coal per year (67% of national production) and employed 130,000 miners. A production record was reached in 1930 with 35 million tons. After World War II there were shortages and the “coal battle” started. At the height of the activity the 18 initial companies in the Nord-Pas-deCalais mining basin created in 1944 employed 222,000 miners, which is equivalent to the current industrial employment rate in the region. The production amounted to 28 million tons and reached the record amount for the post-war period after modernization in 1958 (about 50% of national production). The decline followed, with the first less-profitable mines being shut down in the 1960s, overproduction, and the Bettencourt Plan of 1968, which established the closure of all mines in the north in the 1980s. The subsoil’s exploitation structured the economic activity of the region for over a century, but also urban organization (from miners’ cottages to mining cities), facilities (railway infrastructures, canals, etc.), population (multiple migrations) as well as culture and health. The territory was marked by waste heaps, pits, railroads leading to coal mines, the subsidence of certain areas, multiple hydraulic disturbances, etc. They are the legacy that has been hidden for a long time, and which is now seen as the complex markers of the region’s identity [FON 14]. In fact, since the early 2000s, the mining basin has also become a renaissance space through iconic economic and cultural operations such as the base and twin dumps of 11/19 along with the eco-business pole (CD2E), the sustainable development resource center (CERDD) in Loos-en-Gohelle, the Louvre-Lens Museum which together with the EuraLens association is committed to transforming the region, the Lewarde historic mining center or the fact that the UNESCO listed the mining basin as a World Heritage Site in 2012. There are also “softer” structuring operations: greenways along former railroads leading to coal mines; revegetation of waste heaps and green and blue ecological corridors; in a nutshell, the “shift from a black archipelago to a green one” according to Michel Desvigne, winner of the Grand Prix de l’urbanisme (urban planning Grand Prix) in 2011. 3.1.1.2. The textile industry Before the 19th Century, the textile sector had a proto-industrial organization in the form of small workshops mainly located in rural areas. Merchants– manufacturers supplied raw materials to rural artisans who owned their weaving looms and worked exclusively for those merchants for a fixed price. Some technical innovations, such as the Jacquard loom, disrupted not only production methods and the organization of the industry, but also the city and its organization. In the Roubaix-Tourcoing conurbation, artisanal workshops were gradually replaced by large spinning mills. In 1965, the regional textile industry, which accounted for onethird of national production [ORT 65], employed over 140,000 people, (20,000

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more than the coal mines at that time) and was mainly based on raw materials (cotton, wool, jute, etc.) massively imported from Australia, Argentina, South Africa, New Zealand or Pakistan. The second half of the 20th Century was economically more complex. The 1970s’ recession magnified the problems: a slowdown of the domestic market, a sharp increase of imports, automation of production chains and massive offshoring. The conversion of the industry into commercial activities offering mail orders (La Redoute, 3 Suisses, etc.) or mass retailing (Mulliez Group) only marginally halted the decline. The sector only employed 50,000 people in the 1990s and around 12,000 in the 2010s. 3.1.1.3. The steel industry Starting in Valenciennes and the Maubeuge region and as a result of the connection with coal mining during the 19th Century, a small-process metallurgy industry was created to respond to the needs of mining companies, providing tools for miners and small equipment. The connection to efficient mass transport networks was part of this industrialization. At that time, rail transport was developing, making it easier to transport the essential iron and coal ores. Large complexes were created from the forges and foundries. The iron and steel industry continued to develop in Valenciennes and Sambre, ideally located between the coal mining basin and Lorraine, which produced iron. Between 1945 and 1960, there was a strong demand for iron and steel. Production plants were located in Isbergues and Outreau in the proximity of rivers for cooling the steel. Metalworking or processing plants appeared around the blast furnaces. Iron and steel production units were gradually set up starting in the 1960s (Usinor providing 4,000 jobs in those early years on the only Grande-SyntheDunkirk site), while the oldest sites were particularly affected by the economic crisis of the 1970s. 3.1.2. The successors of the second industrial revolution: the automotive industry and electricity The State carried out an industrial conversion plan when faced with the coal and textile crises of the 1970s. In the mid-1970s, the automotive and steel industries, the latter in Dunkirk in particular, were in full growth and appeared as sectors of future industrial activities. The north was an exception, dependent on the powerful and monolithic “industries of the past”, and this modernization meant the situation had to be amended for that region.

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The automotive sector appeared as a successor creating more jobs. Relying on market growth, the large car manufacturing companies settled in the region: Renault in Douai, then Toyota in Valenciennes. These had a knock-on effect favoring new industrial activities (equipment producers) or old specialized activities (steel, metallurgy, glass, textile, plastic, paint, etc.). Road infrastructure developed during the second half of the 20th Century leading to an increase in international trade in response to the massive increase in households owning individual vehicles. In 1974, the Council of Ministers decided to build the Gravelines nuclear power plant (the Messmer Plan). At present, this plant has six 900 MW reactors that have been connected to the grid since 1980, making it the largest electricity generating unit in western Europe. Dunkirk, with its major energy facilities, such as petrochemical plants, a nuclear power plant, gas pipelines transporting one-third of French gas, a coal terminal, a gas power plant and 20 Seveso sites, embodies the economic, energetic and decisional focus of the second industrial revolution. This second industrial revolution was based on resources (oil, gas, uranium) transformed in large production centers and distributed to the final consumer through “top-down” transport and distribution networks (oil pipelines, gas pipelines, electrical networks, maritime routes, etc.). Unlike during the first industrial revolution when energy from coal was exploited regionally, this stage greatly relied on imported resources. However, these “successors” arrived during a complex time. As a result of globalization, the regional fabric industry experienced an evolution that was common to all the industrialized economies marked by a considerable geographical extension of markets and supply areas. The two historically most powerful industries in the region underwent important structural changes (textile) or even disappeared (coal). As a result of the 1971 sectoral and regional conversion plan [ORE 71], the textile industry lost 105,000 jobs (only 12,000 jobs remained in the early 2000s) and the mining industry lost 90,000 jobs. In fact, by the early 2000s, Nord-Pas-de-Calais was no longer an important industrial area in terms of employment or added value rate. Its share in the national GDP has been steadily declining while the population working in the industrial sector has decreased by 60% compared to the 1960s. The region is still thought of as the epitome of an industrial territory: waste heaps, industrial heritage, remains of mining sites and brownfields, etc., which are all strong markers constantly present in the region’s landscape and in everyday life. However, the region is currently close to national industrial employment levels. Its economic profile has become commonplace as a result of important transfers, notably through the public

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economy, but is still vulnerable as a result of weak regional demand (reduced attractiveness, little tourism, retirees leaving, etc.). Thus, the region was in a paradoxical situation: the industry had mutated, but the jobs generated by industrial activities continued to shrink. However, in the early 2000s, Laurent Davezies and Pierre Veltz, while pointing out the crucial role played by the residential economy in the region’s resilience, believed that industry is “not an activity of the past” [VEL 04 ]. Instead, they spoke about an “industrial services economy” a feature of what Veltz now calls the “hyper-industrial society” [VEL 17]. Nord-Pas-de-Calais represents in some way regional “extractivism”, in particular through the exploitation of coal. “Based on activities which extract large quantities of natural resources, mainly for export” [DUC 17], the economic development of the region has long been defined by a single industry and a dependency on outsourcing to outside of the region, whether national or international. Dunkirk, although different in some aspects, illustrates in a certain way this extreme dependence. As shown through the work of the local urban planning agency (AGUR), in particular today with the Toile Industrielle, over 44% of employees in the Dunkirk industry (compared to 38% of all employees) work in a business controlled by a foreign group, which is more than double the regional rate for all jobs (21.3%) [AGU 15]. To better understand the infrastructure heritage of the region, here the regional energy system is described and put into perspective with certain national characteristics. An industrial peculiarity National and regional energy systems (with 1,900 and 209 TWh of final energy consumption, respectively) [OBS 17] have many points in common beyond their orders of magnitude. As written by Benoit Boutaud, the French model derives its particularity from the high degree of centralization it has experienced over a long period of time [BOU 16]. The objectives of the energy system were controlled by the State as part of a vertically integrated monopoly until the early 2000s. The EDF-GDF public company, under the government’s supervision and the State’s administration since 1946, left little room for other actors, especially local authorities. The nature of the production, transport and distribution infrastructures were consistent with this type of organization: centralized and top-down, from the producer to the consumer. The last half century was devoted to building a homogeneous and efficient system from a national vision. The position of a regional authority, and that of a region, was first of all that of the consumer; although a few decades previously the 1906 law had established municipalities as the owners of public electricity and gas distribution networks. With a strong dependence on regional energy and hence a high energy bill (more than 8.7 billion euros in 2011), the Hauts-de-France’s regional energy system falls within the national average: primary energy from fossil fuels is dominant, it is almost fully imported,

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with heavy transport use and oil dependence and a high energy bill. Among the distinctive features of this region is the energy demand per capitas, which higher than the national average (35 MWh/year, compared to 28 MWh/year), and the share of renewable energy (about 4%) or electricity (12%) used, which is well below the national average (15% and 19%, respectively). The regional context is therefore not comparable to that of Occitania, which has been committed since 2017 to a “Positive Energy Region” approach for example, already covering more than one-third of its electricity demand with renewable energy. Industry (which still represents 41% of the demand in Hauts-de-France) still has a major influence on the energy balance of the region. Demand dynamics in the former Nord-Pas-de-Calais is due to the importance of industry, which is stronger than in the former Picardy region (or than the whole of France). The region is more highly dependent on the economic situation, and the high energy intensity of the regional economy (1 GWh of energy only “produces” €600,000 of GDP, compared to the €950,000 national average), a vulnerability factor in the event of a rise in energy prices. Renewable energies are still limited At present, wood is still the main renewable energy used (7.7 TWh/year in 2015, compared to 5.7 TWh/year in 2010) in a region which has few forests and hence with limited local production. However, the more recent renewable sectors are experiencing remarkable dynamics. The wind sector has grown the most in recent years (3.3 GW and a production of more than 6 TWh/year in 2017 compared to 2 TWh/year in 2010), making this regional territory the first, ahead of the Grand Est region. Agrofuels have reached a maximum production in recent years (1.9 TWh/year). Regarding methanization, which is taking off with more than 500 GWh/year, and with the declared goal of making the territory the leading region in Europe for biomethane injection, a more regional approach is clearly in place: the joint production of electricity and heat (cogeneration) could provide an approach which is more consistent with local energy needs, including heat. This is also the case for energy-from-waste (unavoidable heat waste): the region has considerable deposits (tens of TWh just for the former Nord-Pas-de-Calais region) but this approach requires on-site or nearby valorisation with the deployment of heat networks. The regional energy balance summarized in the Sankey diagram below gives a good idea of the current system: mostly fossil fuels (with a significant share of coal in connection with the steel industry), with a very high demand, and with significant losses between primary energy (left), networks (center) and end uses (right).

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Figure 3.1. Energy balance for Hauts-de-France in 2015, produced by Enerdata and Energies Demain (data obtained from the Climate Observatory1 (2017)). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip Box 3.1. The regional energy system for Hauts-de-France

3.2. The TIR’s resources in Hauts-de-France In his work published in 2011, Jeremy Rifkin [RIF 11] proposed a vision of the future energy system combining renewable energies and digital technologies. The Third Industrial Revolution describes the transition to renewable energies through a decentralized logic with each region having its own and diverse potential (wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, marine energy, etc.). This vision must enable the organization of regions with a single type of industry, typical of the first industrial revolutions, based on concentrated energy deposits, coastlines, the proximity of the main mass transport axes, etc., in order to promote more widespread resources, which they all possess. This is a way of reintroducing the industrial activity in these regions, ideally by reducing global and local pollution2. The economic activity and employment issue are crucial for regional political power. According to J. Rifkin, these dynamics would encourage us to move from a “vertical” power system to a more shared and “horizontal” governance. 1 http://www.observatoireclimat-hautsdefrance.org/Les-indicateurs/(subcategory)/315. 2 This vision is less binary due to some controversy regarding waste incineration, for example.

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Following the annual World Forum held in Lille to which J. Rifkin was invited in 2012, he was asked to write the Regional Master Plan [CCI 13] and “translate” the TIR in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Although marked by a certain technological determinism, the vision proposed by J. Rifkin enables to bring together and into perspective the dominant trends (the first industrial revolutions described above) and weak signals (changes described hereunder), which can appear chaotic if considered independently. 3.2.1. An expanded view of some of the local expertise J. Rifkin’s approach has from the start required the supplementation of something else since it has sometimes been considered as “off-ground” by some local experts. The TIR vision is based on the five pillars that have become five regional working groups, and to which three “transverse pillars” have been added which are just as important to the regional TIR approach: circular economy, functional economy and energy efficiency. Regional authorities, entrepreneurs, energy network managers, academics and environmental activists have met many times during the process. A public–private and trans-partisan management (Regional Council and the Regional Chamber of Commerce and Industry, covering the whole political spectrum, from left to right) has undoubtedly contributed to the reassurance of the different stakeholders regarding their expectations. However, at the onset of this call, the following were missing: the deconcentrated State, the unions and the general public. Even if Rifkin devoted half of his work to “lateral power”, citizen involvement remained modest and the process a downward one; admittedly less centralized than the energy policy has historically been in France, but still largely vertical and technocratic. It was a dynamic largely initiated by the existing powers. Jean-François Caron, mayor of Loos-en-Gohelle and vice-president of the Orientation Forum of the TIR, recalled when the Master Plan was published in 2013 that the “collective management” introduced acts as the “guarantor of mobilization” and an “example of future shared power”. It will be necessary to go further for the TIR to become a regional project speaking to everyone, including those who are currently excluded from the economic system (unemployed people) and the youth (high school students, university students, etc.) who are the future citizens and makers of the region. 3.2.2. The basis of local ecosystems This region has a long tradition of experimentation and innovation, especially in the Dunkirk area. The Urban Community of Dunkirk (CUD), where the first large wind turbines (300 kW) in France were installed in 1991 before the construction in

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1996 of a wind farm managed by a mixed-economy company bringing together the local authority and the Electricité de France company (EDF), is today a pioneer in the production and injection of hydrogen from renewable electricity in the natural gas distribution network (the GHRYD demonstrator project). The first Energy Transition Conference held in 1999 on the initiative of CUD and the French Environment and Energy Management Agency (ADEME) were held here. It should be noted that at this institutional level, in 1992, the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region was the first one to be led by a woman ecologist, Marie-Christine Blandin. Technology and digital infrastructures are not emphasized as much in the Regional Master Plan, but must, according to J. Rifkin’s vision, also contribute to this optimization of local energy systems, which are more distributed, and then to the rise of a “horizontal” society. Since 2002, the Motors and Electrical Devices for Energy Efficiency center (MEDEE) focuses on electrical engineering and brings together SMEs, large industrial groups and universities. Since 2011, a center for regional excellence, the Pôle Energie 2020, brings together all the energy sector regional stakeholders. On a former industrial wasteland in Lille, EuraTechnologies gathers start-ups and digital giants in one location. Also in Lille, there are some “jewels” such as the OVH group, the third hosting company worldwide, or Ankama, a digital creation and development company in Roubaix; these are other advantages of this local digital system, with no other links to other major sectors, in particular the energy sector. Regarding mobility, car manufacturers are making more sustainable productions with hybrid, electric and hydrogen-fueled cars being manufactured in the region (with some major companies such as Toyota and Renault in particular). DBT, a small company and manufacturer of charging stations for electric vehicles, is located in the Douaisis area. This is not yet an ecosystem based on low-carbon vehicles, but these stakeholders could create a system, in particular alongside the network operators (Enedis, RTE). As for rail industry, five world-class manufacturers (Alstom, Bombardier, Titagarh wagon, Faiveley and Siemens), along with many smaller companies, make Nord-Pas-de-Calais the leading region in France for the production of railway equipment and materials. In brief, when J. Rifkin was convened in 2012, an entire ecosystem of stakeholders (been historical and recent) with solutions in the energy field and digital transition was already in place. 3.2.3. Strong political backing Regional elections were held at the end of 2015. The regional executive was largely renewed. The outgoing majority (the socialist group (PS) and the ecologist group (EELV)), having been left out in the first round, were not part of the regional

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political opposition, and a new regional president, Xavier Bertrand, was elected with a right-wing political majority (Republican group). This change in power was striking in many ways, particularly because it was the first time since the creation of the regional institution in 1974, that the right took the lead. In addition to this political change, institutional changes also took place as the region merged as a result of these elections. The former Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Picardie became the current Hauts-de-France, with a population of more than 6 million people. Philippe Rapeneau, the vice-president of sustainable development, the TIR and energy transition, was in charge of the Energy and Climate policy. As part of the regional institution’s development and merger, a transversal board for the TIR was created to promote a cross-services approach to the implementation of the TIR regional strategy. 3.2.4. The expansion of the TRI/REV3 brand The TIR could have suffered from these changes. However, in early 2018 this does not seem to be the case; several elements stepped in to support the existing dynamics. Toward the end of 2015, a brand was created to communicate and come together regarding the regional TIR dynamic: REV3 is now the official name used, especially on social networks and in the digital sphere. The TIR leadership forum meets regularly (two or three times a year) and brings together all the stakeholders of this approach (about 400 guests). This forum was held in Hauts-de-France for the first time in 2016 in Amiens, with the presence of J. Rifkin who returned to “gauge the pulse” of the dynamic with the newly elected regional president. Finally, the aim of going international was announced by the regional executive. There are plans to create a network with other territories, which are likely to have the same objective and a similar approach. Rotterdam and The Hague have already reached an agreement with the American economist’s team and Luxembourg’s Minister of the Economy is going to embark in a similar process. Maroš Šefčovič, vice-president of the European Commission for the Energy Union, and Jeremy Rifkin announced in Brussels in February 2017 an inter-regional project the day before the Committee of the Regions’ meeting. The outline of this initiative is still unclear, but the Hauts-de-France region strives to take the pilot’s seat. 3.2.5. Multiple financial tools In 2016, a guide to TIR financing was introduced to all the project regional support schemes; however, no “criteria” for access to funding were shared or set for

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all. Funding mechanisms are very diverse: equity, equity loans, zero-interest loans, securities, debt, crowdfunding, repayable advances and grants. However, in September 2017, a REV3 reference document was published to inform the various regional project leaders of how to be in line with the TIR/REV3. In 2017, the Regional Council and ADEME used the old funds allocated to energy transition and to the circular economy of the Picardie and Nord-Pas-deCalais regions (FREME – Regional Fund for the Environment and Control of Energy and Waste, and FRAMEE – Regional Fund to Aid the Control of Energy and the Environment) to create the Regional Fund for the Amplification of the Third Industrial Revolution (FRATRI), with respective annual contributions of the order of 8 million euros over the 2015–2020 period. The Regional Council also plans to rely on private funding, and in order to generate the necessary momentum, it has subscribed shares for a total of 12.5 million euros in Cap3RI, the TIR investment company via the ERDF (European Regional Development Fund), along with the European Investment Bank and private banks. This company is intended to finance companies with projects in any sector related to the TIR. This Cap3RI investment fund initially had, in 2016, €37.5 million and evaluated 80 projects with potential investments ranging from €1 to €3 million. A savings account issued by Crédit Coopératif was launched in 2015 aimed mostly at the general public. It is open to all citizens in the region or in the rest of the country, and in its first year raised more than €10 million in savings, a significant amount for a project focused on a single region. Finally, a crowdfunding platform (in partnership with several existing stakeholders: Kisskissbankbank, Hellomerci, Cowfunding, Kiosktoinvest) was recently set up in an attempt to mobilize new resources and funding. One of the next stages will be to draw up an inventory and a qualitative and quantitative assessment of these financial resources to ensure that they are consistent and meet the objective announced. However, at the moment, the situation already seems to have a wide enough range of financial measures, not to mention national funds of several hundred million at the regional level, such as the CSPE, which enables investors to have a guaranteed purchase price for electric renewable energy projects. 3.2.6. Subregional territorialization: energy subsidiarity At the end of 2015, the region and the ADEME launched the Planning and Energy Programming Studies (EPE) to enable the local authorities at the subregional

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scale to define their energy strategy in consistency with the TIR’s goal, i.e. covering their energy needs using renewable energies by 2050. In 2018, more than 25 local authorities of varying sizes, ranging from a population of tens of thousands to 1.2 million people in Greater Lille, have embarked on this energy transition territorialization process. With time, the entire regional territory will have to be covered. It is more than just a choice of the autonomous or self-sufficiency level defined a priori; it is first and foremost a political approach marked by subsidiarity [MAG 13]. First, energy saving deposits are taken on board, followed by the recovery of renewable energies’ potential, and finally the complementary exogenous supply. Each territory and local authority considers what it is able to do at its own level and establishes its energy strategy and associated resources with the stakeholders within said territory. At a more operational scale, the self-sufficiency and autonomy terms are slowly and increasingly appearing in the projects developed by promoters, donors and local authorities, with each one of them basically trying to take its share of this movement. 3.2.7. Network managers are changing their views As an important consequence of the decentralization of energy production that is taking place, the energy transport and distribution stakeholders, be it gas (GRTGAZ, GrDF) or electricity (RTE, Enedis), are gradually changing their approach, probably at the national level as much as at the regional one. They are now positioning themselves as facilitators of renewable energy production. Not with supergrids (with the massive development of transport networks) nor microgrids (with the appeal of a full disconnection), these current positions are full of pragmatism, although with strong changes in the way in they perceive and manage the energy transiting through their networks. As opposed to the self-sufficient image of the building, district, or region, networks are presented by their managers as a way of facilitating the integration of renewable energies into the energy system. Both the gas and electricity systems play on their current strengths. The gas network acts as a buffer between “production” and “consumption” whenever there is discrepancy between them via pressure variation or the inversion of the distribution flows toward the transmission network, and potentially the underground storage. Simply put, this it frees up time and already plays a massive storage role. Injection, which should become the standard for biogas recovery, will reinforce this role and this requirement. For its part, the current electricity network is channeling renewable productions to consumption centers. This frees up space. By way of example, the regional renewable energy integration scheme put forward for consultation by RTE in 2017 aims to develop 3000 MW [RTE 17] of interconnections in Hauts-de-France. The development of renewable

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energies is not seen so much as something that questions the networks, with an economic model to be adapted, and their operation, but rather as something supporting their development dynamics. Alongside this structural logic of network operators, some promoters or partners still carry out “micro network”, “disconnected” or autonomous projects, such as Vilogia in Mouvaux or Maisons et Cités in Lens, working on social housing renovation projects, with goals such as “100% renewable and local energies”. These projects are still technological innovations (smartgrids, digital integration) and economic (functional economy, circular economy) showcases, and do not yet constitute structural repositioning, in particular because storage technologies required to strongly encourage the “short circuit” energy logic are still not developed enough, especially compared to existing networks. We must not however forget to mention here the Energeia cluster, which aims to incubate and create a network of TIR companies in the Greater Amiens region. Created in 2015, it knows the storage issue well and includes leading stakeholders (RS2E – Electrochemical Energy Storage Network comprising 17 laboratories including LRCS, a laboratory specialized in batteries and 15 industrial and three technology transfer centers). 3.3. Initial assessments and analyses Now, 5 years after the initiative was launched, a first qualitative and quantitative assessment of the TIR can be made. 3.3.1. Late, but still a strong objective Renewable energies now cover more than 8% of regional energy consumption which is a clear increase, albeit the regional area covered is different (Hauts-deFrance rather than only Nord-Pas-de-Calais). This rise is explained by the increased use of wood and wind energy. The newly created Hauts-de-France region is now the leading region in France in terms of installed wind power facilities (more than 3.3 GW in 2018). By 2020, more than 6.5 GW could be connected to this network according to the connection requests registered by RTE (the electricity transmission network) despite the Regional Council president no longer promoting wind energy, considering that the region has taken its share. The region was a pioneer in the injection of biogas into the gas network (in particular with the organic recovery site being inaugurated in 2007 south of Lille) and now has 70 production sites (injection, heat, electricity). The energy balance is

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still “modest” with 550 GWh/year but what is noteworthy is this new sector’s goal. In 2015, a group of regional stakeholders (CORBI) was created with the aim of making the region the European leader in injected biogas. Regarding long-term objectives, while the regional climate-air-energy plan (SRCAE), an institutional regional energy planning document launched by the Grenelle de l’environnement (Grenelle Environment Round Table) in 2010 in a relatively “top-down” logic, aimed to “simply” triple the production of renewable energies, the Master Plan’s objective was to reach 100% renewable energy by 2050 based on some conclusions reached by the Regional Scheme for Sustainable Territorial Development (SRADDT). In France, in 2013, no region had committed to reducing its energy consumption by nearly 60% and covering 100% of its energy needs with renewable energy by 2050. Being able to reach this common vision with all the stakeholders in this region, which has the largest nuclear power plant in Europe (a new LNG terminal inaugurated in 2016), the newest combined gas cycle power plant in France (in Bouchain and also inaugurated in 2016), and the location of major consumer sites, is noteworthy. As pointed out by Fanny Lopez in past projects, self-sufficiency is too often referred to using the future [LOP 14]. Nevertheless, these environmental goals are still more ambitious than anything previously proposed whether at the national or regional level, except those suggested by some associative stakeholders such as Virage-énergie or Négawatt. The goal in itself is not positive, especially if it is not accomplished; however, we must remember that in the current energy context and in recent years, it is not uncommon for objectives to be exceeded by the achievements (national solar photovoltaic power, wind power in Hauts-de-France by 2020, etc.). This local ambition deserves credit for disrupting or questioning the objectives set at other levels, especially at the national one. 3.3.2. An update on the TRI/REV3 trajectories During 2017, ADEME, along with the Regional Council, the CCIR network, the regional prefecture and the REV3 Mission, launched new studies about TRI and its implications [ADE 18a, ADE 18b]. They aim to extend the scope of the TIR to the new Hauts-de-France region by going into the details of the developments in the various technological sectors, to then express them in terms of the volume of activities and jobs required for their implementation. This work has enabled the focus on the dynamics that started 5 years ago and update the trajectories accordingly to reach the initial objective. The first purely energy-based findings are mixed: renewable energies are widespread and have a strong dynamic (+70% in 5 years to reach 17 TWh/year at present), but energy consumption has stagnated at more than 200 TWh/year.

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The potential p of reenewable enerrgies accordin ng to the threee scenarios annalyzed in these woorks make it possible p to inccrease the pottential up to 80 or 120 TWhh/year by 2050 according to thhe scenarios. This is a con nsiderable inccrease but wiithout the n total), whichh was part of tthe initial reductionn of energy coonsumption (bby a factor 2 in goal, covvering the reggional energyy needs using exclusively renewable r ennergy will not be acchievable.

Figure 3.2. 3 Energy tarrgets and TIR R trajectories fo or the Hauts-d de-France regiion, [ADE 18c] (2017). ( For a color c version of o this figure, see s www.iste.co.uk/lopez/lo ocal.zip

In coonnection witth these enerrgy scenarios,, an assessmeent of the m means and human resources neecessary for their implem mentation haas been carrried out. r ennergy and Considerring the threee main sectoors, which aree buildings, renewable mobilityy, 46,000 morre jobs will be needed (fulll time equivaalents [FTEs])) in 2050 compareed to the current level, and 21,600 2 more than t in the trennd-based scennario. The challengge is therefoore quantitativvely and qu ualitatively siignificant. Renewable energies developed in a centralized way. This territorializatiion and sectorr structuring isssue is all the more importaant than it has beenn until now; the increaseed presence of o renewable energies is not very territoriaalized. The different energyy industries in n the region have h developeed mainly on the basis b of nationnal support poolicies (purchaase price, national calls forr tenders, etc.), witthout the regiion having jurrisdiction in energy e matterss until the intrroduction of recentt laws. Somee sectors are not able to take t off as a result of thee national com mpetition procedurres, such as thhe case of solaar photovoltaiic. Others, althhough they arre rapidly growing, have ownersship and territtorialization problems. In thhe case of winnd power, mple, in 2016 the two windd turbine plan ns proposed were w cancelledd in court for exam

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for the “lack of a prior environmental assessment”3 (like nine others in France). After that, only the national framework serves as regulatory framework in this sector. Hence, this enormous growth of a decentralized sector is performed in a regulatory framework, which is still largely centralized. Agrofuels also illustrate this old trend. In terms of jobs and economic activity, the benefits, while not insignificant, are certainly lower than they could have been, especially compared to Spain, Denmark or Germany. Thus, for example, FTE/MW installed in France is 18, while in Germany it is 30 [ADE 17]. This difference in the structuring level of industrial activities is explained by “local” development, installation and operation activities. Germany has been able to develop wind power industries that are very active both nationally and abroad. Historically, several factors have been decisive: a domestic market for important outlets, local content requirements, early support for research and development, an export support system and a policy that builds on the industrial strengths of the regions. Current institutional and regulatory modifications could change the situation by 2019 since the SRADDET, which is currently being drafted by the Regional Council, will be opposable and will constitute the new local regulatory framework. It may enable the local ownership of these decentralized renewable energy sectors, which are still largely developed in an “a-territorial” way. 3.3.3. A techno-centered vision Several local stakeholders also find that the TIR in Hauts-de-France leave out some of the ecological transition challenges. The Virage Energie association, which works to put energy sufficiency or sobriety – the idea of reducing or altogether avoiding energy use – on the energy agenda, regrets the absence of these challenges in the work that has been carried out until 2017. However, the 2018 scenarios include explicit hypotheses in this regard. TIR helps maintain the idea that wealth is created in industry, even though it only represents 15% of the jobs in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region (and 14% on average in France) [INS 14]. New companies are now creating wealth and jobs through the exchange of information rather than that of materials. The TIR can obscure the idea of a broader ecological and social transition, according to which the context of the finite nature of materials would encourage a 3 https://www.hauts-de-france.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/?L-eolien-terrestre-15851 [Accessed on May 3, 2018].

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more profound evolution, notably through the development of more energy sober lifestyles [SEM 15]. More generally, beyond the simplified vision of transitions and the first two industrial revolutions criticized by J. Rifkin, experts such as Philippe Bihouix or Guillaume Pitron criticize the failure to take into account many aspects related to resources (gray energy, materials, rare land, etc.) [BIH 14a, BIH 14b, PIT 17]. Economist Jean Gadrey [GAD 13], among others, criticizes J. Rifkin’s ambiguity when promoting a more shared, collaborative mode of decision making, widely involving stakeholders, in opposition to a “vertical” (centralized, top-down) power, when the latter mainly works with the authorities in power. 3.3.4. Tensions regarding the priorities and temporalities In connection with some of these criticisms, the possibility of using certain energy resources in the short term or to do without them as quickly as possible is a matter of debate. The new regional executive (the Republicans, LR) is more in favor of nuclear energy with statements showing the desire to host a new EPR reactor. Thus, the prospects of nuclear energy or the use of underground resources such as coalbed gas [DRE 15] raise some questions. Those in favor present them as necessary in the transition process, as a non-carbon energy source in the case of the first one and the fossil fuel with the least carbon in the case of second one. Susceptible to competitiveness in the short term, the question remains whether these investments instead of slowing down the transition toward a largely renewable energy system are actually making it possible to follow a consistent and resilient trajectory in a pragmatic way. One of the problems with the energy transition approach is the discrepancy between what is said by politicians, mainly, the different opinions, and some achievements that follow other agendas and plans, especially industrial ones. All these temporalities are not made coherent today. The temporalities of the energy sector enable us to understand why in a few orders of magnitude a nuclear power plant is now built for 60 years; the renewal of the car fleet or housing heating facilities takes 20 years; buildings, transport and energy networks have lifetimes of the order of one century, etc. In addition, there is a considerable difference between the temporalities of the slow and structural energy transition and those of the digital transition, which is fast and disruptive, through perhaps more temporary. However, as pointed out by Gérard Magnin, former Director of Energy Cities, one of the prospective challenges is to align the timeframes, in other words to bring consistency between the long-term perspectives and short-term actions; in short, to establish consistent trajectories. The pressure on some major equipment sometimes

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reflects diverging interests at this stage of the transition, but also overlapping temporalities at the risk of sometimes portraying a sense of inconsistency. Let us take again as example the LNG terminal and the 600 MW combined gas cycle power plant in Bouchain, both inaugurated in 2016. The construction principles and discussions on the appropriateness of these facilities had been taken before 2012. However, henceforth all these temporalities must be better organized for the transition to succeed in the next 30 years. 3.3.5. From solidarity to regional autonomy through energy subsidiarity Finally, as L. Davezies and P. Veltz have shown, national solidarity and redistribution (through public employment, pensions, subsidies, etc.) were important stabilizing mechanisms in the 1980s and 1990s. The TIR dynamic brings a new vision of the region’s stakeholders who no longer wait just for this national solidarity. Clearly perceiving these limits in the economic context following the 2008 crisis, they have tried to implement a project for the autonomy empowerment of the region using their own forces and dynamics. As Philippe Vasseur4 said, what is being claimed in this great transition is more a right to experimentation than additional means, which most actors consider to be constrained. The current process in Hauts-de-France, and more specifically that related to energy, it is not a matter of moving toward energy self-sufficiency. This selfsufficiency is notably questionable from a technical point of view given that in a globalized economy, a high percentage of the technical components of this 100% renewable system would be imported. It is rather a matter of talking about autonomy and subsidiarity as political processes, i.e. choices made by the region stakeholders to rely as much as possible on local energy-saving deposits, then on local renewable energies, etc., without claiming the disconnection of major infrastructures and national or even European technical systems. J. Rifkin’s vision is more ambivalent about this disconnection: the TIR puts more emphasis on “the energy Internet”, which relies on a principle of ultra-connection, than on the will to make buildings and districts “self-sufficient”. More broadly, and at the European level in particular, tensions could arise in a context of strong regionalist demands for autonomy and independence for certain regions, particularly in the richest places (Catalonia, Flanders, Scotland to name a few symbolic cases). The redistributive model (welfare state) is in crisis and it will 4 At the time president of the CCIR, then Special Commissioner for the revitalization and reindustrialisation of Hauts-de-France for an exploratory mission until the end of 2017, and president of the REV3 Mission since 2018, https://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/la-troisiemerevolution-industrielle-du-nord-pas-de-calais-au-dela-de-jeremy-rifkin.N291918 [Accessed on November 22, 2017].

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be necessary to ensure that these attempts for autonomy are not made at the expense of regional solidarity, which has already been undermined [DAV 15]. In connection with the region’s history, the TIR has found a way to be embodied in this territory of northern France, even at the risk of the past being glorified [ZOL 85]; a golden age that should return, which is always looming. However, after the damage caused to the working-class culture, especially mining, in a region marked by economic crises and decline (industrial disasters, pollution, deindustrialization, offshoring, unemployment, etc.), it was necessary to propose a new collective narrative with new perspectives. Not all stakeholders agree on the speed at which we should move toward a mostly renewable energy system, which relies primarily on local resources. However, many of those who have this objective find themselves in touch with the region’s history and in favor of a more sustainable economic development. The proposed narrative has worked from the start of the process, and the region’s new president, Xavier Bertrand, has endorsed it stating to the Committee of the Regions during a seminar on the implementation of the TIR in cities and regions held in Brussels on February 7, 2017: “With Jeremy Rifkin and the Rev3 dynamics, we are taking Hauts-de-France’s industrial roots and creating a future for them”. Certain “extractivist diseases” described, such as “concealing other ways of thinking about the future or the weak commitment of local populations in the decision-making process” [NUT 13], could even be overcome. By enabling the region’s future to be considered more independently from a hegemonic energy resource, be it coal, nuclear or oil, the TIR provides other perspectives. It seeks to overcome a regional history marked by strong energy imbalances – the mass exports of the first industrial revolution (coal), then the mass imports of the second revolution (oil, nuclear) – to design a more balanced future where consumption and production are considered together and more coordinated. The TIR dynamics in Hauts-de-France is a technical, economic, political and institutional process. It questions the centralized economic and energy model along with the regions’ aspirations to regain control of their future. The TIR should be monitored in the coming years to appreciate the progress made and the obstacles it will certainly face, and how it may overcome them. For now, in 2018, the TIR is still one of the most ambitious energy transition roadmaps in France and a remarkable approach given its ability to make regional energy self-sufficiency and autonomy a collective goal.

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3.4. References [ADE 17] ADEME, Etude sur la filière éolienne française, Report, available at: http://www. ademe.fr/etude-filiere-eolienne-francaise-bilan-prospective-strategie, 2017. [ADE 18a] ADEME, Scénarios rev3 pour les Hauts-de-France: conséquences sur l’emploi et approches métiers et filières, Report, 2018. [ADE 18b] ADEME, Proposition de scénarios pour la Troisième Révolution Industrielle en Hauts-de-France, Report, 2018. [ADE 18c] ADEME, ENERDATA, ENERGIES DEMAIN, Scénarios d’actualisation du Master Plan pour la Troisième Révolution Industrielle en Hauts-de-France, Report, 2018. [AGU 15] AGUR, Dunkerque, un terrain de production pour les multinationales, Cahier de l’Agur no. 11.3, available at: http://www.agur-dunkerque.org/Documents Publications/ Cahier_11.pdf, 2015. [BIH 14a] BIHOUIX P., L’âge des Low Tech, Le Seuil, Paris, 2014. [BIH 14b] BIHOUIX P., Pourquoi Rifkin fait fausse route, Les Echos, available at: http:// www.lesechos.fr/14/10/2014/LesEchos/21792-053-ECH_pourquoi-rifkin-fait-fausse-route. htm, 2014. [BOU 16] BOUTAUD B., Un modèle énergétique en transition? Centralisme et décentralisation dans la régulation du système énergétique, Dotaral thesis, Université Paris-Est, 2016. [CCI 13] CCI OF NORD-DE-FRANCE REGION AND NORD-DE-FRANCE REGIONAL COUNCIL, La Troisième révolution industrielle, Master plan, 2013 [CLE 17] CLER, Opérateurs Energétiques Territoriaux, Bâtisseurs d’une autonomie énergétique territoriale, Report, 2017. [DAV 15] DAVEZIES L., Le nouvel égoïsme territorial, Le grand malaise des Nations, Le Seuil, Paris, 2015. [DRE 15] DREAL, Note d’information relative aux gisements d’hydrocarbures « non conventionnels » et à leur exploitation en NPDC, 2015. [DUC 17] DUC M., L’extractivisme sans extraction? Au Groenland, des politiques de développement territorial entre volontarisme minier et dépossessions, Géoconfluences, available at: http://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/glossaire/extractivisme [accessed November 22, 2017], 2017. [FON 14] FONTAINE M., Fin d’un monde ouvrier: Liévin, 1974, Editions EHESS, Paris, 2014. [INS 14a] INSEE, Dossier Nord-Pas de Calais, “Atlas Industriel Bilan et Enjeux”, 2014. [INS 14b] INSEE, Insee Analyses Nord-Pas-de-Calais, no. 9, 2014. [GAD 13] GADREY J., Jeremy Rifkin, gourou du gotha européen (1), Alternatives Economiques, available at: https://blogs.alternatives-economiques.fr/ gadrey/2013/05/09/ jeremy-rifkin-le-gourou-du-gotha-europeen-1, 2013.

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[LOP 14] LOPEZ F., Le rêve d’une déconnexion. De la Maison à la cité auto-énergétique, Edition de la Vilette, Paris, 2014. [MAG 13] MAGNI G., “La transition énergétique pour quelle société?”, International Conference of Territorial Intelligence, Besançon, France, May 30–31, 2013. [NUT 13] NUTTALL, available at http://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/glossaire/extractivisme, [accessed 22 November 2017], 2013. [OBS 17] OBSERVATOIRE CLIMAT, Tour d’Horizon Climat Energie Hauts-de-France, 2017. [ORE 71] OREAM, Aménagement d'une région urbaine : Le Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Editions Actica, 1971. [ORT 65] ORTF REGIONS, Crises et Mutations du secteur textile dans la Région Nord-Pas de Calais, available at: http://fresques.ina.fr/jalons/fiche-media/InaEdu03001/crises-etmutations-du-secteur-textile-dans-la-region-nord-pas-de-calais.html, 1965. [PIT 18] PITRON G., La guerre des métaux rares, La face cachée de la transition énergétique et numérique, Editions Les Liens qui Libèrent, Paris, 2018. [PRI 17] PRINGENT S., Transition énergétique: des régions encore pingres, available at: https://www.contexte.com/article/energie/transition-energetique-des-regions-encore-pingres_ 66627.html, 2017. [RIF 11] RIFKIN, J. The Third Industrial Revolution, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011. [RTE 17] S3RENR HAUTS-DE-FRANCE, available at : http://www.rte-france.com/fr/ projet/s3renr-hauts-de-france-un-schema-pour-mieux-raccorder-les-energies-renouvelables, [accessed 22 November 2017], 2017. [SEM 15] SEMAL L., SZUBA M., VILLALBA B., “« Sobriétés » (2010-2013): une recherche interdisciplinaire sur l’institutionnalisation de politiques locales de sobriété énergétique”, Nat., Sci., vol. 22, no. 4, 2015. [VEL 04] VELTZ P., DAVEZIES L. (eds), Le Grand Tournant, Nord-Pas de Calais, 1975-2005, Editions Aube Nord, Belgium, 2004. [VEL 17] VELTZ P., La société hyper-industrielle, Le nouveau capitalisme productif, Le Seuil, Paris, 2017. [ZOL 85] ZOLA E., Germinal, G. Charpentier, Paris, 1885.

4 Rethinking Reliability and Solidarity through the Prism of Interconnected Autonomies

After decades of importing fossil and fissile fuels, their recent (and soon to be large-scale) replacement by renewable energies that can be collected locally now makes it possible to consider the distribution of energy in a horizontal and circular way and not only vertically and downwards. Intermediaries (human stakeholders) between the large networks and the final consumer are starting to appear now that we are bringing together local (including microlocal) production and consumption. If these intermediaries have storage facilities, they plan energy autonomy at scales that differ from those at which large networks interconnect. This chapter aims to outline what these energy autonomies could be like depending on the type of stakeholders likely to impose their views on the coordination of urban energy systems. It also underlines how their large deployment interconnecting with various networks questions the reliability and solidarity of said networks, which could lead to redefining the energy “social contract”.

4.1. Introduction During the 20th Century [LOP 15] and driven by utopian currents which were occasionally implemented, energy autonomy became plausible with the rise of small unitary renewable energies and the new open possibilities of the “valorization of endogenous resources” of a region. This boom, however, questioned the durability of energy networks [COU 15]. The prevailing dynamics during their massive deployment based on the principle of service uniformity, spatial extension and increased flows could be reversed with the Chapter written by Gilles DEBIZET.

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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development of self-consumption and local energy exchanges. A decrease in the flows, higher access rates and the possibility of unsubscribing are the main factors behind a potential downward spiral trend for these networks [DUP 11]. In order to analyze the organizational, political and regulatory changes of sociotechnical networks, Coutard [COU 02] proposed to study their governance and not the government. Moss [MOS 11] added “city” and “nature” to the most common triptych of network stakeholders: users/suppliers/regulators. This highlights the existence of intermediate social spaces between these six elements in which human stakeholders – referred to as intermediaries – act; an intermediary is a stakeholder “capable of reconfiguring the relationship between the various types of stakeholders as well as between different arenas and spatial configurations” [MOS 11]. This concept of intermediary is used to analyze the changes induced by the low-carbon city development project [BUL 14], particularly in the field of energy [GUY 11, TAB 17, DEB 17]. We here agree with this definition of “intermediary”. Due to the high levels of consumption and land scarcity, urban spaces will still require exogenous supplies for a long time. Energy autonomy, in the sense of the ability to control one’s energy future, appears to us as utopian since it is an idealized positioning for some while it instills doubt in others. Several public action mechanisms we believe to be the first signs: this is the case of the new regulations for “positive-energy buildings” and the “positive-energy regions”1 approach [YAL 14, NAD 15]. These expressions convey the idea that the energy flow crossing through an area would be limited to the balance between production and consumption within it. Admittedly, a detailed examination of these mechanisms shows that their goal is not energy autonomy; however, they make us think about the relationship between the energy produced and the energy consumed in a region and, consequently, about exogenous energy supplies. In a recent book [DEB 16a], the observation of innovative intermediates at the districts scale linking consumption, in situ production and the use of exogenous energies led us to develop energy transition scenarios for cities by 2040, each one of them focusing on a different kind of stakeholder likely to involve the other stakeholders. Starting with these scenarios, this chapter identifies new types of energy autonomies. A spatialized analysis of the possible scenario combinations showcases the overlap of interconnected energy autonomies to form a “Russian doll”. This analysis requires us to redefine the terms of reliability and solidarity.

1 Etymologically, a positive-energy building (BEPOS) is a building that, over a year, consumes less energy than it produces. The community-based and regional stakeholders (gathered in the Effinergie association) proposed a BEPOS certification in 2014. The Housing and Sustainable Habitat Ministry defined a governmental label in 2017 called “Positive energy and carbon footprint reduction building”, anticipating the next thermal regulation of 2020 that would apply to all buildings.

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4.2. Four prospective scenarios for urbanized spaces In a recent study [DEB 16a], we developed different scenarios for urban energy coordination by 2040. For each scenario, the relationships between energy systems, the city’s manufacturing/transformation processes and public regulations were established. A literature review on the energy features roughly 50 European eco-districts [BLA 15] along with an in-depth survey conducted in four French eco-districts and suggests that a few stakeholders play a vital role in the city’s energy organization. While technologies determine the solutions available, their use is conditioned by stakeholders who consider them as an opportunity, coordinate their action and remove any obstacles. Conversely, the technologies used depend on driving configurations inspired by the stakeholders. It was previously assumed that the future of energy in cities would depend on the category of those stakeholders in a vantage point within the field, “pivotal stakeholders” [DEB 16a, p. 15] in reference to the notion coined by Michell et al. [MIT 97]. Hence, four scenarios have been proposed: – large companies (LCs) supply the urban energy systems; – local authorities (LAs) plan the regional production and distribution infrastructures; – regulating state (RS) is the central government issuing regulations; – cooperative stakeholders (CS) are groups of consumers taking back the control of their energy destiny. A morphological analysis was performed, in accordance with the prospective methods, using the results of single-disciplinary analyses in political, economic and management sciences and also in geography and in science and technology studies [DEB 16a]. This enabled us to reject a handful of variables per scenario and prioritize the logics of the most structuring actions in each scenario. Exogenous assumptions common to the four scenarios were defined: a significant decrease in energy demand for heating and an increase for cooling; an increase in the price of fossil fuels; strong growth of intermittent energy sources leading to large fluctuations in the wholesale price of electricity. At the institutional level, it has been assumed that a public authority would still be able to impose taxes to finance the operation of large networks and that the market remains an essential, but not unique, method of economic transaction. Ultimately, the difference between scenarios lies in the regulations, in the nature and location of the energy systems and in the spatiality of flows crossing through the networks.

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4.2.1. Large companies LCs deploy and manage production equipment in the city. They are necessary due to their ability to raise capital and add value to the expensive storage equipment required for the deployment of intermittent renewable energies. Electricity, gas and heat are all supplied by a single company, which is the distributor for all the networks in a section of the city. It offers consumers a range of energy services. Supervised by the LA, the base rate corresponds to the company’s steering of certain domestic equipment. The “premium” subscription is more expensive and offers a customized or restriction-free service. The LA decides on the scope of the concession and its duration, which is long enough for the distributor to amortize the cost of production, storage and the purchase of efficiency equipment located in and on the subscribers’ buildings. Once it has been selected, the distributor, often from national or international companies, favors complex solutions (multiplying supply sources) and a high technological level that allows real-time control of the demand. It retains the data related to production and consumption, which is a major commercial advantage. Energy is part of a global activity revolving around the “smart city”, also including transport and security. This scenario leads to a city with, on the one hand, multienergy districts, and on the other hand, areas with public distribution benefiting from standardized services (see section 4.2.2). Solar and local geothermal energy only serve part of the local consumption. The distributor resorts to the market to purchase electricity at low prices during peak solar and wind power production and store it in various forms (heat, or even hydrogen or gas) in anticipation of future consumption. Although the multienergy concession agreement contravenes the principle of dissociation between network management and energy supply, it doubly satisfies the European Union because it reinforces the position of large national and international companies, which are able to develop a real continental gas and electricity market. Big cities do not fear the multienergy concession agreement because they possess enough expertise and power to impose social tariffs for the access to energy and a high share of local renewable energy. 4.2.2. Local authorities According to this scenario, LAs plan and closely supervise energy production and distribution. Motivated primarily by the creation of wealth and jobs, they are committed to providing equal access to energy in their region. In addition to energy

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efficiency, they favor the mobilization of local renewable energies, which is maximized by increasing storage. In the most densely populated districts, an urban network is used to mobilize heat from public solar panels and salvage geothermal and unavoidable heat. Combined heat and power, through the use of biomass, also supplies this grid and the electricity grid in addition to photovoltaics. In less densely populated areas, the gas network is preferred, once again along with the electricity one. These different networks are still operated by specific companies but are closely supervised by the city, which has taken over the jurisdiction of the granting authority. By means of smart grids, the city imposes exchanges between these networks: thermal storage (which is the cheapest) is sized in order to anticipate the consumption of heat and cold and to add value to the surpluses of electricity production. Production and consumption data are made public in real time to prevent Internet giants from capturing the value associated with energy exchanges between buildings. Depending on the topography, the urban fabric and the presence of a heat network, roof equipment such as solar thermal energy, photovoltaics or revegetation are imposed. The city manages to maintain uniform access rates throughout the region. The mobilization of renewable energy through the urban area is not enough and so the city cooperates with peripheral territories: wind farms, photovoltaic parks, wood-energy or methanization sectors and also hydroelectric storage. The competition between cities leads to areas of almost real energetic autarky uniting a city and its hinterland. Additional energy contributions are sometimes necessary and are provided through agreements with distant regions or occasional purchases from the market. Ultimately, flows through large gas and electricity networks will decrease sharply. The corresponding drop in revenue will lead to a reduction in maintenance and gradually to the interconnection of networks. Increasing disparity in reliability and tariffs will lead the State to negotiate with all the LAs an economic equalization between regions as well as the preservation of a minimal national network. 4.2.3. Cooperative stakeholders A significant proportion of households live in housing cooperatives where they hold shares rather than own housing. Their self-management culture encourages them to be more self-sufficient regarding networks and institutions. Driven by

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environmental and social objectives, cooperatives favor renewable energies. The rules for energy use are the result of collective deliberations: they are simple and rely on proven technologies. Price and quality of service are uniform within a cooperative but differ between cooperatives and compared to the rest of the region. Some cooperatives group together to diversify their production and storage means. They also join forces with the tertiary sector, whose periods of consumption are complementary, in order to exchange heat or electricity. Cooperatives in densely populated districts invest in peripheral facilities to obtain their supply. Data transparency makes it possible to set shared goals and increase trust. The cooperative model attracts other existing condominiums; however, it still remains limited to discrete groups of buildings. The cooperative model coexists in space with the LAs’ model. LAs support these initiatives, thus encouraging a social and solidarity-based economy that anchors wealth and jobs in the region. However, the LAs rigorously supervise said initiatives to avoid autarky and the formation of individual socioeconomic groups. Aside from limited cases of autarky, the connection to the local and national networks remains necessary. Flows crossing through national transport networks are substantially decreasing as a result of large self-production by cooperatives and the mobilization of the hinterland. The power and interconnection of the transport networks are also decreasing. Threatened by administrative barriers set by the State, the cooperatives negotiate a statute and tax provisions that allow their inclusion and, in fact, their contribution to the financing of the networks. 4.2.4. Regulating state The State takes control of many areas pushed by the climate urgency. The State imposes objectives and rules for each stakeholder in the fields of energy, real estate and local development motivated by carbon efficiency, the country’s energy independence and equality between citizens. The State guarantees access to electricity at the same price throughout the country; this price is low so as not to penalize modest households. It also plans infrastructure in consultation with national gas and electricity companies and optimizes renewable energy installations: – large solar parks in the south, wind farms in the corridors and tidal stream generators along the ocean; – hydroelectric reservoirs in the mountains;

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– and wood-burning power plants near forests and biogas power plants in large agricultural areas. This regional specialization and the distance between the production points and places of consumption (cities in this case) are a strong appeal to the national transport network. These large infrastructures do not involve the small regional stakeholders to a large extent and therefore spark off strong local opposition. At the same time, renewable energy production is imposed on new buildings and those receiving restoration subsidies. Available surfaces such as roofs and facades are systematically used for photovoltaic production. Since the subsidized purchase rate of renewable energy has been eliminated, a large part of the electricity produced on buildings is self-consumed, starting with individual houses. Collective housing has not been left out: a new regulation now allows occupants to directly use the electricity produced by the condominium. This results in a drastic drop in electricity purchases and in the volume passing through the network while transfer peaks remain high. Smart grids are extensively used in buildings to smooth out these peaks. Self-consumption also compromises the financing of district heating networks. In the absence of action levers, LAs are withdrawing from energy transition. Ultimately, the State stands alone before the financing options for the electricity network: – increasing tax on the volume consumed would encourage consumers/producers capable of storing it, thus leaving the whole network load on consumers who do not have the capacity to take it on; – increasing the tax on the power contracted would increase inequalities of access to energy and would encourage residents of single-family homes to disconnect from the grid. To escape this regressive spiral, the State taxes self-consumption through digital technologies and orders, in contradiction with the principles of free competition, steering excess electricity toward storage managed by the State, leading to the appearance of large strategic gas reservoirs from “power-to-gas” technologies. 4.3. Intermediaries with new energy autonomies 4.3.1. Energy storage as an essential factor of autonomy When a human entity (the final consumer or intermediary) consumes self-produced heat or electricity, it begins to consider the energy supply by the

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network as a supplement to its own production. This supplement is essential because the urban space can hardly produce more energy than it consumes (see above). Storage makes it possible to overcome a permanent dependence on the network. Storage is already being used for certain purposes: for example, batteries make it possible to use electronic devices outside the electrical network; hot water tanks allow instantaneous use of heat much higher than the contracted power. Storage could be used much more in the future to temporally disconnect intermittent in situ production (especially solar energy in urban areas) and also for the variable energy requirements, but not necessarily at the same time. The very low monetary and environmental costs of thermal storage compared to the reversible storage modes of electricity (batteries, fuel cells, etc.) increase the thermal energy’s potential of being used [LUN 16], which the different scenarios take into account. Thermal storage increases the self-production share in order to anticipate the consumption of heat (and cold). It does so by reducing the use of the public network in the CS scenario, reinforcing the region’s energy autonomy in the LA scenario and offering opportunities for speculation on electricity’s spot price in the LCs scenario. 4.3.2. Energy autonomies as organizations If we define energy autonomy as an organization (i.e. an institution) able to manage energy, i.e. with a capacity to reliably organize flows in a dissociated way from a large network, each scenario highlights specific energy autonomies: – a cooperative grouping together a set of buildings equipped with storage facilities, in particular thermal and wood-energy (CS); – a local authority that orders grid operators to develop, articulate and operate storage facilities: hydroelectric, wood and thermal energy, in the city and its hinterland (LA); – an institution operating energy networks at the scale of a city section (i.e. several districts) where it controls storage (essentially thermal) connected to the electricity grid (LC). Highlighted by these different scenarios, these energy autonomies coexist with others at the housing or building scale as well as at the national level. Thus, energy autonomies, whether existing or emerging, are considered along with others in a trans-scalar way according to their spatiality such as in the case of Russian dolls.

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4.3.3. A combination of different energy scenarios according to the regions The RS and LA scenarios are antagonistic: national versus local pricing systems, national optimization versus local supervision, regional specialization of renewable energy resources versus all-out mobilization of the hinterland, disengagement versus mobilization of LAs, etc. Not being able to cover the entire territory , the LCs and CS scenarios coexist with the LA scenario, but not with the RS scenario, which are, respectively, incompatible with the multienergy concession on a section of the city (LC) and the electricity exchange between members of a cooperative (CS). Thus, if the RS scenario does not predominate, several combinations could exist depending on the regions: LC + LA, CS + LA and LA alone. Thus, if we consider the State and the households or the entity grouping them within a building, we see three to four scales of energy autonomies coexisting according to the different scenario combinations (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1. Energy autonomy scales according to the possible combination of scenarios

4.4. A variety of decision-making scales relating to energy infrastructure The new energy autonomies are intermediaries between the national and building scales and break the direct, historical link between the “national” gas and electricity supplier and the final consumer. The reliability of energy as perceived by the end user is decoupled from that of the energy supply by large gas and electricity networks. It is, therefore, necessary to question the reliability determination methods within energy autonomy.

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4.4.1. The country and the continent On the one hand, the State regulates the relationship between the different energy stakeholders and defines the consumption modes according to the principles defined by the European Union which imposed, for large networks, the separation of the distribution task from the production and supply tasks, with the latter being put in competition. In the RS scenario, the State exercises a strong regulating power in terms of the establishment of the means of production regarding national gas and electricity companies and regional institutions (Figure 4.1, RS – country – black). European-scale companies share with the European Union the interest of developing a real continental gas and electricity market (Figure 4.1, LC – continent – gray). On the contrary, the State’s or the European Union’s power is more limited in the LA and LS combinations (Figure 4.1 – gray for country and continent). In all these cases, the decisions made by these institutions – State and European Union – result from a deliberation process involving the executive and legislative powers. 4.4.2. Housing At the other end, housing is the smallest scale at which the triggering or suspension of energy consumption is decided or at which any production is assigned to a specific use, storage or injection into the network. Individuals have room for maneuver but it is the household or the facility that pays the energy bills. In general, public authorities ensure that consumers have the ability to choose the carriers and suppliers (Figure 4.1 – RS and LA – housing – black). However, in the LC combination, large multienergy companies could take control of household energy equipment at attractive rates; in the CS combination, cooperative members are inclined to delegate energy choices to the cooperative because they participate in its decision making. This is the reason why the corresponding “housing” boxes in the graph are gray and not black (Figure 4.1, LC and CS). Between the country and housing, we have identified three intermediate energy scales: building, district and city. 4.4.3. The building While electrification strengthens the housing scale, deployment of gas and urban heating [KIM 12] have instead reinforced the building scale. Collective gas heating and the connection to the urban heat network introduced the energy issue into condominium and social housing residence committees’ deliberative bodies. The forthcoming net-zero (energy) building requirement in France will strengthen heat management at the building scale. The same could apply to electricity because of the

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recent government decree authorizing collective self-consumption2 (Figure 4.1, RS – building – black). The building is the first collective level of consumer cooperatives (CS) in which deliberations precede decisions (Figure 4.1, CS – building – black). Conversely, the introduction of a private entity for the management of the different energy vectors of a section of the city leads, as described in the LC scenario, to a certain divestment of the building collective since this entity would customize the service for the different households and take control of certain production and storage equipment located in or on the building (Figure 4.1, LC – building – white). 4.4.4. The district In a LC scenario, energy management would be optimized at the district level in order to maximize profit while guaranteeing a minimum quality of service to end consumers and fulfilling the contractual objectives set by the local delegated authority. At this scale, the production means, storage and distribution are managed by a manager appointed by the delegated entity (Figure 4.1, LC – district – black without deliberations). The district scale is also conceivable in the CS scenario: a heat system for blocks of houses (i.e. several buildings) could extend to neighboring blocks with the LA’s approval. A recent government authorizing decree extends collective self-consumption to electricity too. In any case, we imagine that the decisions would be made through deliberations and divided between the building and district levels (Figure 4.1, CS – district – black). 4.4.5. The city or metropolis Finally, the last energy autonomy revealed by these scenarios is the city or metropolis case. We imagine intermunicipality rather than just the municipality for

2 Collective self-consumption consists of the members of a collective consuming electricity produced by the collective or one of its members. In France, it contravenes the principle of prohibition of sale or direct transfer of electricity between subscribers either through the network or outside of it. Referred to during the parliamentary debates on the Energy transition and green growth law enacted in August 2016, collective self-consumption is authorized under the conditions established in an application decree published in May 2017 and in a future decree setting the network use rates.

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two reasons. First, the vast majority of French municipalities do not have the necessary human resources to supervise the managers of the energy networks. Second, a rapid energy transition (of the order of one or two decades) assumes close coupling with the economic, urban and housing development policies which are – in France – the prerogatives of intermunicipal structure and no longer the municipality. In the three scenarios other than the RS, the intermunicipal authorities supervise public infrastructures and said scenarios have different delegation modes. In the case of a direct control of the various networks (LA), the political discussions can “go with the flow” according to various public actions (social pricing, urban projects, large energy equipment, economic interest, etc.) (Figure 4.1, LA – city – black). Finally, in the case of the CS scenario, political discussions are necessarily more modest once the cooperative initiatives have been authorized (Figure 4.1, CS – city – gray). In the case of the delegation of local public service networks to the same entity (LC), political discussions only take place when renewing said delegation (Figure 4.1, LC – city – gray). All in all, building and district are recurring deliberative spaces in three of the four scenarios. The LC scenario stands out due to the non-deliberative nature of management and even investment. The company managing networks and production infrastructures optimizes their profitability by connecting three business models, each predominated by a different spatial context: European wholesale electricity market, customized services to users, a response to the local delegating authority establishing a low price for a basic service and potential environmental goals. This high connectivity and the regional multianchoring of the LC provides a flexibility which cannot be equaled by the other forms of energy autonomies. 4.5. Conclusion: solidarities must be reinvented in the era of connected energy autonomies While the uniformity of the service and the increase in revenue were crucial in allowing the networks to reach a size large enough to perpetuate their existence [DUP 11, COU 04], the probable appearance of energy autonomies at the district community scales of the city questions once again these main principles of the gas and electricity national public services. Socially constructed during the 20th Century [POU 07], this uniformity testified to regional solidarity between the cities with very profitable networks and the less densely populated countryside: the former would finance the network more than the latter. Regardless of the scenario, the mobilization of renewable energy and the deployment of storage capacity by subscribers or groups of subscribers will increase self-consumption and reduce flow through the network. The network’s funding basis

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will decrease as will the budgets allocated to its operation, which could lead to the reduction of peak capacity and supply reliability for subscribers. At the same time, the new energy autonomies described in three of the four scenarios will increase the energy resilience of a growing share of citizens and businesses: the expectations in terms of the reliability of subscribers of large networks will diverge. The decrease in revenue together with the heterogeneity of the expectations regarding the networks could well lead to questioning the current principle of gas and electricity rate unification at the national level. In our four scenarios, the rates paid by end users of energy services differ by city (LA) and within cities according to affinity (CS) or the range of services (LC). These disparities in service (reliability and price) question the social contract: that of equal access to energy regardless of national location. This social contract, valid for the electricity serving almost all businesses and households, aims however to put things into perspective since the electric network only carries one-fifth of the total energy consumed in France. The other networks already show large differences regarding access to energy: for example, barely half the households have the opportunity to connect to the gas network, and 10 times less to a heating network where costs and rates are specific to each of them. As for the access to wood fuel, it varies substantially depending on the region, for example, it is almost non-existent in large cities. Thus, there is no single national social contract for energy but variable contracts depending on the energy supplier and the region. One can, therefore, expect self-consumption, both individual and collective, to smoothly extend these differences of access to all forms of energy. The geographical uniformity of the electricity and gas rates sold by these national networks may no longer be considered necessary for regional equity; the current financing of gas and electricity social rates would not necessarily last. It is important to rethink regional and social forms of solidarity along with the completion of the regionalization of energy. Two types of strained relationships will have to be taken into account. First, the strain between the network and the region (metropolis, city, district, etc.): the economies of scale allowed by a network organization massively aggregating flows of the same form of energy are confronted with the energy resilience of a region that converts the various forms of energy within said region to increase its autonomy. Second, the nature of the decisionmaking process: economic optimization approaches (notably LC) contrast with the processes of democratic deliberation (RS, LA and CS). It is not a matter of opposing the terms of each of these two tensions head on, but rather of recognizing their own specific places in order to rethink solidarities through the subsidiarity of the regulatory and protective State.

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4.6. Acknowledgments This publication has been supported by ADEME as part of the Ecoquartier Nexus Energies research involving the PACTE, GAEL-EDDEN, INNOVACS, CEA laboratories at INES and the Grenoble École de Management as well as the National Research Agency “Investments for the Future” within the Eco-SESA Cross Disciplinary Program framework (ANR-15-IDEX-02). 4.7. References [BLA 15] BLANCHARD O., DEBIZET G., “Écoquartier, systèmes énergétiques et gouvernance : Une base de données bibliographique”, Innovatio, vol. 2, available at: http://innovacsinnovatio. upmf-grenoble.fr/index.php?id=127, 2015. [BUL 14] BULKELEY H., CASTÁN BROTO V., MAASSEN A., “Low-carbon transitions and the reconfiguration of urban infrastructure”, Urban Studies, vol. 51, no. 7, pp. 1471-1486, 2014. [COU 02] COUTARD O., The Governance of Large Technical Systems, Routledge, London, 2002. [COU 04] COUTARD O., HANLEY R., ZIMMERMAN R., Sustaining Urban Networks: The Social Diffusion of Large Technical Systems, Routledge, London, 2004. [COU 15] COUTARD O., RUTHERFORD J., “Vers l’essor de villes “post-réseaux” : infrastructures, innovation sociotechnique et transition urbaine en Europe”, in FOREST J., HAMDOUCH A. (eds), L’innovation face aux défis environnementaux de la ville contemporaine, Presses Polytechniques Universitaires Romandes, Lausanne, 2015. [DEB 16a] DEBIZET G., Scénarios de transition énergétique en ville : Acteurs, régulations, technologies, La Documentation française, Paris, France, 2016. [DEB 16b] DEBIZET G., TABOURDEAU A., GAUTHIER C. et al., “Spatial processes in urban energy transitions: Considering an assemblage of Socio-Energetic Nodes”, Journal of Cleaner Production, vol. 134, pp. 330–341, 2016. [DEB 17] DEBIZET G., TABOURDEAU A., “Making compatible energy planning with urban decision-making: Socio-energy nodes and local configuration”, in BESSEDE J.-L. (ed.), Eco-design in Electrical Engineering: Eco-friendly Methodologies, Solutions and Example for Application to Electrical Engineering, no. 440, Springer, 2017. [DUP 11] DUPUY G., “Fracture et dépendance : L’enfer des réseaux ?”, Flux, vol. 83, no. 1, pp. 6-23, 2011. [GUY 11] GUY S., MARVIN S., MEDD W., Shaping Urban Infrastructures: Intermediaries and the Governance of Socio-Technical Networks, Routledge, London, 2011.

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[KIM 12] KIM E., BARLES S., “The energy consumption of Paris and its supply areas from the eighteenth century to the present”, Regional Environmental Change, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 295–310, 2012. [LOP 15] LOPEZ F., Le Rêve d’une déconnexion, La Villette, Paris, 2015. [LUN 16] LUND H., OESTERGAARD P.A., CONNOLLY D. et al., “Energy storage and smart energy systems”, International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management, vol. 11, pp. 3–14, 2016. [MIT 97] MITCHELL R.K., AGLE B.R., WOOD J., “Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts”, Academy of Management Review, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 853–886, 1997. [MOS 11] MOSS T., “Intermediaries and the governance of urban infrastructures in transition”, in GUY S., MARVIN S., MEDD W. et al. (eds), Shaping Urban Infrastructures: Intermediaries and the Governance of Socio-Technical Networks, Routledge, 2011. [NAD 15] NADAÏ A., LABUSSIÈRE O., DEBOURDEAU A. et al., “French policy localism: Surfing on ‘Positive Energie Territories’ (Tepos)”, Energy Policy, vol. 78, pp. 281–291, 2015. [POU 07] POUPEAU F.-M., “La fabrique d’une solidarité nationale. Etat et élus ruraux dans l’adoption d’une péréquation des tarifs de l’électricité en France”, Revue Française de science politique, vol. 57, no. 5, pp. 599–628, 2007. [TAB 17] TABOURDEAU A., DEBIZET G., “Concilier ressources in situ et grands réseaux : Une lecture des proximités par la notion de nœud socio-énergétique”, Flux, vols 109–110, nos 3–4, pp. 87–101, 2017. [YAL 14] YALÇIN-RIOLLET M., GARABUAU-MOUSSAOUI I., SZUBA M., “Energy autonomy in Le Mené: A French case of grassroots innovation”, Energy Policy, vol. 69, pp. 347–355, 2014.

PART 2

Urban Projects and Energy Systems

5 Critical Densities of Energy Self-sufficiency and Carbon Neutrality

Finding the routes to self-sufficiency. The end of the two-century long fossil fuel interlude. Creating a new global convergence, a myriad network of local self-sufficiency. What is the limiting balance between the consumption and collection of renewable flows? What is the density, the level curve of an energy topography that identifies self-sufficient regions? What are the good governance scales for orchestrating energy self-sufficiency and carbon neutrality? 5.1. Introduction This chapter originates from a presentation made at the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne entitled “Territories with 1 watt”1. Before this conference, in November 2015, Léo Benichou sent the following question to Fanny Lopez, Marc Barthelemy and me: “[...] Inspired by Marc Barthelemy’s work on networks, Raphaël Ménard’s work on energy catchment areas, and of course Fanny Lopez’s work on the disconnection dream, I would like to raise the following question: Given the challenges of mobilizing solar (and derived) energy resources at the service of human societies. Given the infrastructures’ energy costs (fixed and mobile) that make it possible to collect, transform, store, transport and deliver energy carriers and services. [...] How can an optimal scale for the expansion and pooling of our energy infrastructures be determined? When sizing our

Chapter written by Raphael MÉNARD. 1 In 2016 as part of the IDEAS doctoral seminars.

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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networks what would be the relevant dimensions to reveal the thresholds and the balance between optimality regimes? Between dependence and self-sufficiency, “Nucleocrat Jacobinism” and the “ideal of disconnection”, how can physics help us give some meaning to warm water? [...]” Jotting down my first thoughts I answered the following: “[...] One watt per m² is for me the right balance, the order of magnitude of the primary flow’s threshold, the possible equilibrium between the density of an abundant and complex renewable supply (with a mix combining biomass and solar-wind energy, excluding local specificities of other flows: geothermal and hydraulic) and the combined consumption density. For a decrease of primary consumption per individual of about 4,000 W, the average density P+E2 of the area considered would be 250 people per km². In my opinion, outside metropolitan areas, the large cantons (or small departments) represent the convergence area between these two densities. [...] In southern countries this value would probably be smaller due to lower individual consumption and higher solar potential [...]” Before explaining these values, this permanence scale, I would like to share the following thoughts inspired by the works of David MacKay. This Cambridge physicist, who died prematurely in April 2016, wrote a major piece on energy issues. In his book Sustainable Energy, Without the Hot Air, MacKay examined the technical and spatial issues of an energy-carbon transition [MAC 09]. In this book, he explains the appropriate sizing that would allow the convergence between our energy consumption and an adapted mix of renewable products3. This method joins the work carried out by the members of the Négawatt Association and their proposals regarding the triptych-slogan “sobriety, efficiency and renewable”. Another researcher, the Canadian Vaclav Smil, is gathering information on the spatial densities of energy flows both for production and consumption [SMI 15].

2 P + E for the density adding population and jobs which is sometimes a more relevant indicator. 3 He specifically describes the capacity for decreasing energy consumption in Great Britain. He simultaneously analyzes the contextual implementation of a tangible cluster of renewable energies. He is thus depicting in this geographical perimeter the technically and socially conceivable paths with the aim of bringing together supply and demand.

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5.1.1. What can environmental measures be related to? I include myself in this “MacKayan” affiliation, a methodical construction linking energy consumption and production, and carbon emissions and sequestration. Amory Lovins, founder of the Rocky Mountain Institute, also explains the issues of self-sufficiency, although Smil may be critical about the way he includes the spatial challenges of renewable energy [LOV 11]. The strength of MacKay’s description lies in measuring energy at the individual’s level, thus involving our civic responsibilities. MacKay reminds us of the urgent cultural transition and emulates Buckminster Fuller’s aphorism: “There isn’t an energy crisis but simply an ignorance crisis”. MacKay and the 2,000-Watt Society’s quantitative framework coincide in placing energy uses at the core of the changes needed [MAC 09]. Regarding the size, this variable focusing on the individual4 differs from the concept currently used by energy system designers for whom energy advantages are traditionally brought back to the surface. In energy system design accounting, annual kWh and CO2 emissions are measured per square meter. Consumption is derived from the space available from the container. This quotient5 is inappropriate because a structure with no use does not generate any externality: it does not need to be heated, or to be well lit, etc., and so it would not consume any energy6. Aspects relating to density have often aroused my curiosity. In the article Dense Cities in 2050: The Energy Option? [MEN 11], I introduced an initial controversy to this line of thought: urban density would be the necessary condition for ecological qualities. Indeed, 20 years ago, Australian researchers, Newman and Kenworthy, revealed the correlation between urban density and energy consumption regarding the use of cars. Based on surveys carried out in major cities around the world, this correlation revealed that fuel consumption decreased with increasing density [NEW 99]. This curve shows the impact of density on a portion of our energy consumption. However, this asymptote, which has become famous with time, creates the illusion that individual consumption sharply decreases with a high urban density, as if the latter made it possible to offset the effect of population. Interpreted in a rush, it could even suggest that the surface density of energy consumption has become infinitesimal.

4 Or on use. 5 The same applies to transport efficiency, cars in particular. Most efforts seem to focus on reducing the vehicle’s fuel consumption and/or its emissions, whereas the real criterion is the service provided and thus the massive increase in occupation rate induced. 6 Common language misuse: energy is not consumed, the first law of thermodynamics states that it is conserved. It is the energy quality that is consumed.

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Figure 5.1. 5 Graph takken from the article a “Dense Cities in 2050 0: The Energy Option?” showing g the evolution n of energy consumption link ked to car use e and the prod duction of renewab ble energies according a to urrban density [MEN [ 11]

↓ Incoming floows

Outgoingg flows ↑

En nergy

Locall production of reenewable energy

Final energy dem mand or energy consum mption

Caarbon

Pum mping of atmospheeric CO2 annd carbon sequesttration

Emission E of direcct and/or indirect greenhouuse gases

Figure 5.2. 5 Incoming and a outgoing flows f for a givven region

In thaat same articlee [MEN 11], I showed that this correlatioon would evolve in the coming years y as a resuult of the impprovement of the t efficiencyy and use of thhe vehicle fleet andd also as a reesult of the massive m integrration of renewable energiees due to their tecchnical maturiity and econoomic competiitiveness. I quuestioned thiss balance between consumptionn and productiion densities within a partiicular scope oof energy mine more accountiing. Thus, as a continuatioon of said artticle, this papper will exam globally the flow tenddencies accorrding to density. We will see s how this pparameter

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determines the maximum pressures of energy self-sufficiency and/or carbon neutrality. To analyze this, we will use fluid mechanics and its description models. There are two options to choose from: the so-called “Eulerian” point of view or the “Lagrangian” one. These are two different frames of reference, two different ways of describing nature. In the Lagrange description, the equations are written from the moving particle’s point of view; an account as seen by the protagonist of the scene, the particle of matter itself. To quantify consumption, we will therefore preferably follow the moving particle that represents the individual. In section 5.2, we will follow MacKay’s theory which diverts the consumption flows toward the person7 [MAC 09]. The same applies to carbon, discussed in section 5.5, by estimating the emissions as being equivalent to the individual8. For Euler, the narrative is omniscient: the world is described from a motionless position and matter is observed by a static observer. In section 5.3, we will evaluate, according to this framework, the renewable energy production capacities of a territory (or its carbon sequestration capacities in section 5.5) such as Smil does in Power Density [SMI 15]. We will also see how the energy consumption space density9 enables the transposition of the different points of view. 5.1.2. Critical densities and catchment areas With the use of some quantification tools with the aim of testing the hypothesis of energy self-sufficiency in 2050, section 5.4 will look at a specific case, the example of a small urban area in Lille a few hectares in size [MEN 15]. We will analyze the reasons that prevent it from ensuring its own energy self-sufficiency. We will show various types of energy transition paths according to different densities where the “critical point” is the famous watt per unit area, the “reference level curve of energy self-sufficiency”. We will describe the dual situation of carbon, the spatial issues between highly emitting regions and those that can act as atmospheric carbon pumps, trapping the carbon atom in biomass, in the countryside and forests in particular, i.e. low-density regions. The concept of exergy rate10 will appear in some of the diagrams herein. This value measures the energy quality. The closer this rate is to 1 (or to 100%), the higher the energy quality. On the other hand, low heat (for example the heating of a 7 For example in watts per person. 8 In tons of CO2 equivalent per person per year. 9 Or population space density. 10 As part of the Réforme project, we set the bases for “energy algebra”, a two-dimensional expression of energy to describe quantity and quality such as changing real numbers to complex numbers [MEN 14].

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home) will have a very low exergy rate of the order of a few percent. The prevailing unit of measure for this quantity is the watt (W). It measures a time flow of energy, i.e. power. By using this unit, we do not need to relate an energy quantity (such as kWh11) to a given time (e.g. a year). Therefore, a home at “50 kWh per m² per year” will be at “6 watts per m”12. Another example: Paris’ solar potential is equal13 to 130 watts per m²: this corresponds to the average solar flux, both in summer and winter, during day and night. According to this convention, time no longer intervenes in this equation; flux averaged over a certain period of time is measured14. “KWh per day or kWh per year” are nothing more than average power: an energy quantity divided by time15. Therefore, unless specified, the energy units16 will be expressed as primary energy17, upstream in the energy’s lifecycle. In some cases, the term “electrical” or “thermal” will refer to the energy quality of the flow being considered, and will therefore provide an indication of the “exergy rate” of the flow or the quantity in question. 5.2. Energy consumption density 5.2.1. Differences regarding the 2,000 watts Energy consumption is Lagrangian and here we return energy needs to the individual. The 2000-Watt Society vision developed in Switzerland18 established a framework for developing urban scenarios aimed at dividing individual energy consumption by at least 3. This method is global; it incorporates building-related consumption, mobility, infrastructure and food consumption. In Europe, primary energy consumption averages around 6,000 watts per person, more than triple the world average of just over 2,000 watts per person. Two hundred years ago, before the fossil fuel transitions, consumption was much lower: between 500 and 1,000 watts per person.

11 This unit is also composite since typographically it joins power (W or kW) with a quantity of time (1 h). 12 50kWh divided by 8,760 hours in a year. This value should of course not be confused with that of the sizing of heating which would be close to 50–100 watts per m² and which would correspond to a peak value. 13 Expressed in kWh, horizontal solar irradiation is about 1,100 kWh per m² and per year. 14 As a general rule this is a year unless otherwise specifically stated. 15 The unit of time will eventually appear when we evaluate energy reserves: for example to quantify the storage capacity of an electric battery (for example in the form of Wh or kWh). 16 Of flux (in watt) or storage capacity (as described above). 17 Primary energy comes from raw energy products as provided by nature: wood, coal, oil, natural gas, uranium (for non-renewable energy forms; solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, tidal and hydro power for renewable forms). 18 http://www.2000watt.ch/fr/.

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Figure e 5.3. Individu ual consumptio on of primary energy (in W pe er person) and d its correlation according to o latitude (acco ording to Réforrm [MEN 14]).. For a color version v of this t figure, see e www.iste.co..uk/lopez/loca al.zip

At prresent, the quaantity and quaality19 of our energy needs are strongly rrelated to living sttandards20. Inn Réforme [M MEN 14], we w tested the relationship between consumpption and latittude. In the reegions contain ned within the wide ring cenntered on the equaator and locateed between laatitudes 30° so outh and 30° north, lives m more than two-thirdds of the worlld population (see diagram below); b this “large “ society”” is living at 1,000 W, a power close c to that of o westerners’ great-grandpparents. Obvioously, this o the discovvery of a is not a question off a new geoographical deeterminism, or correlation between climates andd energy con nsumption. Thhis graph revveals the

19 In tw wo centuries, average a demandd has increaseed from 500 too 2,000 W. Inn fact, the consumpttion of our anccestors was maainly based on heating needs (to keep warm m, cook or transform m matter). Sincce the postwaar economic boom, b the largge increase in mobility, communiication and the digital age creaated final energ gy needs that aree more qualitattive from a thermodyynamic point off view. 20 Generaally measured in i annual GDP per capita.

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relationship between living standards and latitude, showing the existing division between northern and southern countries. There are also clear paths to be followed by the different regions of the world to move toward continuous energy production (100% renewable) and carbon neutrality. 5.2.2. 0.1 watts per square meter as average for mainland France The density of use makes it possible to transpose individual demand into spatial density according to the relation below. The density of a region is usually expressed in persons per km² or in persons per hectare. Before applying the product directly, we will perform the appropriate conversions. With the density of use, the Lagrangian approach is transformed into an Eulerian one. For mainland France, with a population of around 120 inhabitants per square kilometer and an average consumption per person of about 6,000 W, the energy consumption density is of around 0.6 W/m2. For Paris, with over 20,000 inhabitants per square kilometer, the consumption density reaches 120 W/m2, which is close to the value of the average solar flux striking the capital.

Consumption density [W/m2] = Individual consumption [W/pers.] × Population density [pers./m2]

Framed text 5.1. Consumption density formula

If we take the product of individual consumption with the geographical latitude density function, we obtain the relation between surface consumption and latitude. Average continental consumption is 0.1 W/m2 and drops to 0.03 W/m2 if we include oceans and seas. Land lying between latitudes 25° and 55° north is, on average, the most energy-hungry: more than 0.2 W/m2. This, however, remains three times lower than the French consumption density for two reasons: France is on average denser than the regions within these continental bands and its population requires 6,000 W compared to the 4,000 W required on average per person in the regions between 44° north and 51° north. Smil makes a historical summary of the chronology of consumption densities for the most important eras for humanity [SMI 15]. In the era of hunter-gatherers, tens of thousands of years ago, human density was one person per 10 km² in arid environments and increased to one person per km² near the coast. The consumption

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density was w about 0.1 mW/m², whiich is one thou usandth of thee current valuue21. With agricultuure and the inntensity of lifee during the Neolithic, N connsumption inccreased to 20 peoplle per km² andd consumptionn flow increassed to 4 mW/m m2, equal to thhe values of Sudann or Guyana at a present. In Rome, insidee the Aureliann walls, the population density reached r 67,0000 people per square kilometer and ledd to an intennsity of 7 W/m² [S SMI 15], a vaalue not far frrom the fiction nal example we w will later share for Lille in 2050 2 [MEN 15].

Figure e 5.4. Energy consumption density accorrding to latitud de (according to t Réforme [M MEN 14]). For a color version n of this figure,, see www.iste e.co.uk/lopez/l /local.zip

Tablee 5.1 summarrizes in desceending order current c consum mption densitty values. Singaporre is in first position withh more than 100 W/m², a combinationn of high individual demand annd very high density; at th he other end, Mauritania cconsumes m2, a hundred thousand t timees less than Sin ngapore. 1 mW/m

21 Aboutt 0.1 watts per m2 as average foor mainland Fraance.

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Table 5.1. Some energy consumption flow values per country. The population data are from 2012. The energy data are from 2009 (source: International Energy Statistics, 2012)

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5.3. Ren newable ene ergy produc ction density y 5.3.1. Renewable R e energy prod duction is Eu ulerian Upstrream of dem mand, the prooduction of reenewable eneergies is the result of regional planning. Production P fllows are thee result of land-use l chooices: for r cappacities, such as a wind agricultuural or forestryy production; for installed renewable farm or a solar park or o a hydraulicc dam. Watts per unit areaa are producedd without any direect relation too human dennsity. Smil ciites an impreessive amountt of data accordinng to the type of renewable production: 5–10 5 electric watts w per m² ffor a solar park22; 2–3 2 electric waatts per m² forr a wind farm;; and, in generral, about 0.1 W/m² for 2 biomass23 [SMI 15]. MacKay M reporrts similar ratio os [MAC 09]..

Table 5.2. 5 Some pro oduction densiity values by MacKay M serve as average vvalues to quanttify the result of o energy harvvesting plans (according ( to Réforme R [MEN N 14]). For a color version v of this table, see ww ww.iste.co.uk/lo opez/local.zip

How w can a mix of local produuctions be stru uctured? Whaat energy, matterial and knowleddge investmennts are necessaary to obtain space s systemss capable of coonverting flows croossing througgh a region? Primary P flows are solar, winnd, hydraulic,, wave or geotherm mal. Biomass is an “iintermediate energy carrrier” resultinng from photosynnthesis and theerefore from solar s energy. In adddition, the moost homogeneeous energy on the earth’s surface is solaar flux. It is the dennsest of renew wable energiess: 169 W/m2 on o average onn the Earth’s suurface. In France, solar s flux is 130 1 W/m² on average, with h many moments where it is zero (at night) annd a few raree times when it reaches 1,,000 W/m². Inn the south oof France, the solarr energy deposit generallyy exceeds 150 0 W/m². In Mauritania, M itt exceeds 22 Value not to be confuused with the peeak power of th he park. 23 Therm mal or metabolicc use.

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200 W/m² whereas in Norway it reaches 80 W/m². This primary flow is therefore fairly evenly distributed over the planet and very available in those areas where the vast majority of the world population is located: most people receive more than 200 W/m². Each region receives at least 100 watts per unit area: this is more than most of the consumption densities we have listed above. It is also necessary to efficiently convert this flow, according to a “selection of renewable energies” in harmony with the region’s needs: food as “fuel” for the metabolism of living things, low heat to keep inhabitants warm, moderate heat for washing, heat at higher temperatures for our stoves24 and more qualitative forms of energy such as those allowing movement, light or electricity, an essential aspect of modernity that enables the processing, dissemination and storage of information. For production, the relationship below is the ruthless product of our regions, the yield being a weighted average of the different contributions25 of each energy harvesting26.

Offer density [W/m2] = Renewable energy deposit [W/pers.] × Yield [%]

Framed text 5.2. Production formula

5.3.2. Energy harvesting plans Energy harvesting plans are graphic instruments developed within the Réforme framework [MEN 14]. They make it possible to estimate the equivalent conversion efficiency of a region and visualize its mix of renewable energy productions. A specific typical yield is associated with each energy production facility27. Much like land use mapping (where maps show how land is being used), this new representation establishes an energetic land use pattern. If the region is considered as a solar system, as a “portfolio of renewable yields”, weighted by the relative areas and their yields, our regions can probably reach higher values than 1 Wm2, which is the target consumption value for regions with population densities between 100 and 1,000 persons per km². 24 And some other uses for material transformation. 25 Formula for estimating the equivalent density of renewable production of a section in space in horizontal projection. At the regional level, the yield will correspond to an average yield, the abundance of a variety of different yields: biomass, solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, etc. 26 Specific energies such as geothermal or hydropower will be evaluated separately. Here we are interested in land, whatever its size, and its solar collecting power. 27 Agriculture being one of them.

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Figu ure 5.5. An exxample of an energy e harvesting plan carriied out by Réfforme [MEN 14 4]. The examp ple of a Paris district, d a 100 × 100 m2, sum mmarized into a square show wing a breakd down of energyy productions (and the ineffficient part in g gray). For a color ve ersion of this figure, f see ww ww.iste.co.uk/llopez/local.zip p

5.3.3. Quantificatio Q on of the pro oduction flow of a regio on Harvvesting plans evaluate each region regaardless of itss scale, indiccating the inefficiennt areas and those t that deliiver a certain quantity and quality of prroduction. In the fuuture, accordinng to each eneergy harvesting plan and its geographicall location, we can imagine the creation c of a temporal sig gnal of its prooduction flow w, both in d also be ussed for carbon and to quantity and quality. This represeentation could ws of a given region r (sectionn 5.5). visualizee the potentiall atmospheric pumping flow In reetrospect, 1,0000 years ago, the Neolithicc was alreadyy an energy rrevolution with thee compositionn of the first land plans in i order to maximize m the yield of agricultuural supply annd its resistancce. Our ancesstors made haarvesting planss specific to biomaass. Accordingg to biomass polycultures, p the t thousandthh of the typicaal yield of farming areas consistted of 0.1 W28 regions. Furthermore, F the individuaal energy 28 Consuumption rangingg between 1,0000 and 10,000 W per person.

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footprint was likely to be at least greater than 5,000 m² (or even 1 hectare) while the critical population density at that time was probably around 100 to 200 persons29 per km². 5.4. Self-sufficiency, convergence: 1-W regions 5.4.1. The 7 hectares, surface area per person in the world garden Over the past two centuries, the world’s population has experienced an exceptional growth with a sevenfold30 increase during this period. This demographic acceleration has induced the inverse effect with a drastic decrease in the average surface area of earth per person. If we evaluate the planetary area per inhabitant, the result is generally surprising: we tend to think of at least kilometric scales. Quite the opposite, our space is very limited and the spaceship earth metaphor has never been so relevant: we only have seven hectares per person and two-thirds are water31. When equally shared, each person cultivates a plot of land to fulfill all their needs32, which is a little less than 150 m per side. This fraction of the globe is representative of the diversity of landscapes: deserts, mountains, wastelands, etc., a sample, a geographical chimera33. On this piece of land, each person also offsets his or her greenhouse gas emissions to ensure carbon neutrality by 2050: this will be dealt with in section 5.5. Thus, this contemporary spatial rarity conditions the dual constraint of a reduction in consumption density (section 5.2), and a massive increase in renewable production density (section 5.3). In this third section, we will explore different situations that make the convergence of energy self-sufficiency tangible or not.

29 In Europe, the solar deposit is of the order of 100 W and the typical biomass yield is of the order of 0.1%, with local production density of the order of 0.1 W/m2. 30 In the preface to the second edition of Something New Under the Sun [MCN 10], John R. MacNeill considers that fossil fuels are at the root of most of the biosphere, lithosphere, atmosphere and the aquasphere’s transformations. This “energy tsunami” has at the same time generated an exponential growth of global population, one of the many “crooked curves”, typical of the Anthropocene. 31 Total surface area: 510 Mkm2; oceans’ surface area: 360 Mkm2 (71%); land masses surface area: 149 Mkm2 (29%). 32 And especially their energy consumption. 33 For educational purposes, we could consider making up a place to illustrate this, a thematic park dedicated to this concept, to this “physical experience of the maximum dimension”. This would undoubtedly seduce Olivier Rey, the philosopher who documents the “out of scale” and “out of proportion” in modernity in Une question de taille [REY 14].

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Table 5.3. Evolution of land surface area per person for the last 350 years. It shows the decrease from 65 hectares per person in 1750 to less than 7 hectares in 2050, making the assumption of 9 billion people on earth. In 300 years, the potential area to capture energy and matter has been reduced by a factor of ten, while individual energy and material requirements have grown by one order of magnitude. In 2050, the continental surface per human will correspond to a square with sides which are less than 140 m in length

Due to the enormous increase in energy requirements and the intensity of CO2 emissions, these nearly 8 billion gardens will have to be up to two orders of magnitude more productive than two centuries ago, given that the total energy consumption has been multiplied by nearly 70. However, if we can convert only 0.03% of the solar flux hitting each of these 7 hectares, we will obtain the famous 2,000 W required per person. This amount seems small enough, easily attainable and amounts to the composition of a planetary energy harvesting plan, which is finally perfectly feasible. 5.4.2. The story of urban transition in cities The following example is a prospective one, which we use here to illustrate this quest for self-sufficiency on a smaller scale. It takes place between today and 2050 in an area of a few hectares in the center of Lille [MEN 15]. At the end of 2015, the “La Fabrique de la Renaissance” project34 was awarded the EDF Architecture Bas 34 By the 169-Architecture, Obras and Elioth team.

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Carbone prize in a competition, which proposed to understand the required transformations to create an energetic landscape in 2050 at the scale of an existing Lille district.

Figure 5.6. General view of the Fabrique de la Renaissance (169-architecture, Obras and Elioth, drawing by Diane Berg). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

The main idea of our project was to reintegrate workshops and factories into the heart of the city and develop a manifesto describing the trajectory of the interwoven mutations of energy, matter and culture [MEN 15]. The Third Industrial Revolution is not an “uberization” of the economy. This transformation is above all a cultural one, a political utopia where all the inhabitants participate in the transformation of the built fabric and the means of mobility with the enthusiasm of a joyful frugality. In 2050, this district is completely self-sufficient regarding all of the built environment’s energy needs because of the Duc, a low-tech solar infrastructure. 5.4.2.1. Is energy self-sufficiency accessible to 50 inhabitants per hectare? On a larger scale, with a surface area of 15 hectares, on which the project operates, we have described the strategy of decreasing energy consumption, a sort of local Negawatt scenario (section 5.2). We have then developed a scenario for increasing the production of renewable energies. At the end of this method, we will see how density guides energy self-sufficiency. When all efforts have been made to limit consumption and the urban form has offered its maximum solarization possibilities, only density allows the control of the energy self-sufficiency of the region. Energy consumption is evaluated over a wide area: the built environment, individual mobility35, added to food and to constructive depreciation, the embodied energy compared to its obsolescence. We followed the guidelines of the 2000-Watt 35 By exploiting the Newman and Kenworthy curves linking density and the distance traveled per person.

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Society: to include everything as consumption36. We analyze consumption using technical parameters and uses, including the density37 and building footprint variables38. In [MEN 15], this last parameter quantifies the decrease in the propersona residential area seen in the Euro-region from 2040 onwards: spatial happiness does not necessarily mean more space. 5.4.2.2. Initial state, a reminder of the situation in 2015: 22 W/m² At the beginning of our imaginary story, the site’s urban density39 is 50 people per hectare. The car fleet is almost exclusively thermal. The built fabric, although very close, has poor insulation. The typical annual consumption is 250 kWh/ m2. For a building footprint40 of more than 60 m², the consumption flow is of the order of 4,000 W per inhabitant. With a mix containing 85% hydrocarbons, annual emissions equal about 9 tons of CO2 per inhabitant41. By looking at the diagram, it appears that with standard equipment parameters, the consumption density can reach more than 70 W/m2 of urban surface. Hence, this consumption density becomes comparable to Lille’s horizontal solar potential42. With this consumption intensity, hoping for selfsufficiency is unreal since it would require an average conversion yield of over 50%. 5.4.2.3. Intermediate stage, the project’s first results in 2025: 15 W/m² In 2025, the effects of the Fabrique are felt by its neighbors. As a result of the district’s community of knowledge and practice, the passion for transformation has begun to positively affect some of the surrounding fabric. The district’s residents, helped by students and with the guidance of engineering students, transform their homes: draftproofing windows, double curtains, insulating from the outside with old books. Thus, the average consumption of buildings in the district has decreased from 250 to 150 kWh/m² per year. The thermal car fleet has reduced its average consumption; the share of electric vehicles is over 20% for all the distances traveled. Carpooling has increased sharply while some eco-rickshaws start to appear in the district. 36 For example, energy consumption related to leisure mobility is not included. It should be noted that a round trip Paris–New York is equivalent to about 6,000 kWh for a second-class user. To “energetically pay” an annual round trip over a similar distance is equal to 700 W, i.e. one-third of the 2,000 W. 37 Variable “d”, in persons per hectare. 38 Variable “f”, in built square meters per person. 39 i.e. “P+E” over the 15 ha. 40 Adding the residential footprint and that of buildings for professional uses. 41 This value is the one used as the emissions starting point for a Parisian resident in our Paris changes era study, which is around ten tons. 42 120 W per horizontal square meter.

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In 20025, and with the same usees, individual consumption is now less thhan 3,000 W per person. With a mix containiing 70% hydro ocarbons, greenhouse gas eemissions he district leveel, energy connsumption are now around 5 tonss per year per person. At th r high:: nearly 15 W/m², W which iss five times higher h than thhe current density remains average consumption density in thee Netherlands (see table in section s 5.2). 5.4.2.4. The project in 2050, a district d at 2,00 00 W and a density d of 8 W W/m² In 20050, while thee building foootprint density y has decreaseed43, the urbaan density 44 has sligghtly increaseed . The prooduct of “f.ee”45 has slighhtly decreaseed: some buildings have been deconstructed d d and their co omponents havve made it poossible to y of standingg buildings. A sort of increase the efficienccy and the spatial quality “donatioon of construcction organs”,, the tangible implementattion of a locaal circular economyy.

Table 5.4. Summary and compari rison of energ gy consumptio on between 2 2015 and Density-footpriint” graphs th hat allow the estimation off individual an nd spatial 2050. “D energy consumption. c I 2050, keep In ping a populatiion density of 50 people perr hectare, the enerrgy consumptiion remains higher h than 8 W per m² eve en though gre eat efforts have bee en made to re educe all enerrgy consumptiion. For a colo or version of tthis table, see www w.iste.co.uk/lop pez/local.zip.

43 “f”, thhe residential suurface area per person p has decreased comparedd to 2025. 44 Holidaay rates have im mproved as a result of the district’s attractivenness. 45 Whichh corresponds too the district’s built b density.

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Thus, the morphological density has decreased by about 10%: there are more voids, more interstitial spaces, meaning it is also possible to give that space back to living species, biodiversity and the pleasure of gardening. In the end, the population density remains the same, notwithstanding the “qualitative downsizing” of those living in the existing transformed spaces. Individual consumption becomes less than 1,500 W, or 8 W/m², which is equal to 6% of Lille’s solar potential. Thanks to the Fabrique and its inhabitants, by setting up an ingenious material loop, energy consumption per capita is now less than the equivalent of 1 ton of oil: one-third of the value in 2015, a decrease by a factor of three in less than 30 years. 5.4.2.5. A first assessment of the convergence between consumption and production If the residents’ consumption is reduced while maintaining the same density of use, the energy consumption density is now limited to 8 W/m². Given the complexity of this urban fabric and given the confusing urban geometry, will we succeed in producing that much? Now, with experience in energy harvesting plans (seen in section 5.3), and given the solar potential of 120 W/m², will we achieve a renewable yield of nearly 7%46? If this urban land consisted of half of the current buildings, and one-third of the roofs had solar panels with an average yield of 30%, even then the equivalent yield would only be 5%. In 2050, as a result of photovoltaics being highly competitive and due to a drastic increase in conversion efficiency, all individuals and condominiums have mostly opted for this very economical solution. The improved knowledge of construction works and the joys of eco-home improvements that prevail in the district have also largely favored this colonization of roofs and exposed windows, as much as it has favored harvesting microregions for renewable energy production. Solar electricity production is thus rapidly reaching 60 times the level it had in (albeit tiny) 2015, from 0.05 to 3 W/m²: enough to supply the district’s needs most of the time and to export large amounts of energy to the public grid. In addition to this informal solarization, our project developed a new type of urban infrastructure, a “low exergy solar system” known as the “Duc”. Its creation is extremely simple, a nod to the American counter-culture of the 1960s and 1970s. During that time, architect Steve Baer designed what was probably the most efficient solar system to produce low heat with a high efficiency for one of his

46 ~8 W/m² divided by a solar power of 120 W/m².

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zomes. The Duc uses this same principle while extruding it, linearizing it and spreading it over most of its roads. It is a low-tech smart grid that everyone can use: it proves that it is easy to “hack” the sun, to convert energy in order for us to become “urban energy peasants”. It stores in its water-filled tubes the solar energy for the day. At night, or when it is cloudy, flaps fall back to store the accumulated heat. It helps to significantly increase the district’s production by generating 2 W of heat per meter square of land of the entire district. Almost half of the thermal energy consumption47 is now produced and stored locally in energy and water tanks scattered around the district. It is also the supply umbilical cord of the entire urban system. Six meters above the ground, it ensures the transfer of all materials and objects, from the port to the workshops.

Figure 5.7. Some scenes near the Duc. Fabrique de la Renaissance Project (169architecture, Obras and Elioth, drawing by Diane Berg). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

5.4.2.6. Energy self-sufficiency at the building scale At the end of this transition, “an” energy self-sufficiency by 2050 is emerging. Self-sufficiency is then assessed according to two distinct consumption perimeters. The first one is restricted, adding the energy consumption of the building in use. In this case, the district’s 15 hectares are mostly positive energy: production exceeds consumption by 35%. The second perimeter adopts a global point of view by also taking into account the energy necessary for individual mobility and the supply and depreciation of embodied energy. According to this broader scope, self-sufficiency is reduced as consumption increases while the supply remains the same. However, it still reaches nearly 60%, which is an achievement for a dense district.

47 Heating, cooling, domestic hot water.

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Figure 5.8. The non-convergence between demand and local production in 2050 in Lille

5.4.3. The fundamental equality of self-sufficiency 5.4.3.1. Energy densities of conventional utilities This urban prospective illustrates the difficulty of self-sufficiency when the consumption density is much higher than the watt per square meter. Yet, “a watt” compared to “a region” seems out of proportion. For conventional infrastructures, we usually think of capacities of about 10 MW for a heat network and up to several gigawatts of electricity for a nuclear power station or a large hydroelectric dam. These infrastructures are also different at the regional scale: they constitute large densities of energy transformation. However, as soon as we spatially average out these values over their total footprint, they become much weaker. In Power Density [SMI 15], Smil analyzes a wide variety of utilities: gas or coal power plants, nuclear power plants, etc. If we compare their production flow with the total amount of space they claim48, the average equivalent flow is generally around 100 W/m², values similar to those of solar energy. 5.4.3.2. Renewable energy densities As we saw in section 5.3, due to conversion efficiencies, densities are generally more modest for renewable energies. In Lille, the renewable energy production density was 5 W/m². Applying the formula below, and if our aim is 100% self-sufficiency, it would be necessary to reduce population density. However, this 48 The sum of the effect of stock, waste, intermediate processes, mines, etc.

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self-sufficiency would not be complete: food self-sufficiency requires at least about 1,000 m² per person and this is in the case of an essentially vegetarian diet. The pressure caused by food generates a critical density (a maximum of 1,000 people per km²) about which the roofs of contemporary architecture cannot do much. Renewable energy source [W/m2] × Yield [%] Self-sufficiency [%] = Individual consumption [W/pers] × Density [pers/m2]

Framed text 5.3. Self-sufficiency formula

5.4.4. Some self-sufficiency paths according to density 5.4.4.1. 1 W/m2, the harvesting objective at the regional scale Equality establishes the different terms of the scale. The energy consumption’s global density is about 0.1 watts per continent square meter. Then why claim a harvesting objective which is 10 times larger? Over the next few decades, the population is likely to increase while the average consumption is likely to change as well. It would therefore be prudent to anticipate an increase in consumption density. From a spatial point of view, a large part of the territory must remain as a natural space, protected from an energy drain and dedicated to carbon sequestration as we will see in section 5.4.5.2. It would, therefore, make sense to gather harvesting near human densities as well as within already artificialized spaces. These spaces must produce more and the flow rate of 1 W/m2 is the right order of magnitude. Energy harvesting types can also be spatially cumulative: the agrivoltaic is an example of the interdependency between the greenhouse and photovoltaic cultures; agriculture and wind turbines are a good example. According to this method, the following sections illustrate the diversity of possible self-sufficiencies according to the territory’s density. 5.4.4.2. Path for a region with 100 persons per hectare According to this first fictional scenario, individual consumption drops sharply from 6,000 to 2,000 W. The spatial consumption density decreases from 60 to 20 W/m². At the same time, renewable energy production has been developed to a great extent: the production density reaches 5 W/m² in 2050. In the end, dependence is greatly reduced but complete self-sufficiency is not possible; it is about 25% and convergence does not seem physically possible at this intensity of use (10,000 people per km²). This solution is comparable to the imaginary case described in the Fabrique de la Renaissance.

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5.4.4.3. Path for a region with a moderate population density (10 persons per hectare) Anotther scenario: in a region which w is 10 tim mes less popuulated49, the inndividual consumpption of 6,0000 W decreasess to 4,000 W.. Hence, the consumption c ddensity is reduced from 6 to 4 W/m². W At the same s time, thee energy plannning of the areea has led oduction. In 2050, the deensity of to a siggnificant incrrease in locaal energy pro production will reach 3 W/m². Selff-sufficiency now n seems feaasible and woould equal T moderattely populateed region can therefore aim to reeach full 75%. This self-suffficiency for thee supply of itss energy needss in the long term. 5.4.4.4. Path for a region with h a low popu ulation denssity (one perrson per hectare)) The last scenario is as follows:: a region witth a populatioon density muuch lower a increase in energy consuumption as a rresult, for than the previous ones50, it posits an ds. This exam mple could be that of a example, of an improovement in livving standard region inn a developinng country whhere the averaage consumpttion per citizeen would increase from 1,000 to t over 2,500 W. In this caase, the consuumption densiity would 0 W/m². How wever, the ren newable energgy productionn capacity increase from 0.1 to 0.3 is able too make up forr this consumpption density (1 W/m²) andd the region becomes a net energgy producer (+0.7 ( W/m²). This region with w a low-poopulation denssity is not only selff-sufficient (3000%), it can even e export en nergy.

Figure 5.9. 5 Left: posssible path forr a densely populated p reg gion (100 perss/ha), the converge ence between energy co onsumption and a renewablle energy prroduction. Center: moderate pop pulation density (10 pers/h ha), the region n can tend to oward full e cantons in Germany ha ave already attained a this situation. self-suffiiciency. Some Right: low population density d (1 pers rs/ha)

5.4.4.5. Intermediate e conclusion n: energy catc chment area as This last scenario illustrates thee ability of some regions too become the exporters wable productss. They wouldd be the extenssion of the “ennergy catchmeent areas” of renew of denseely populated regions. Thiss concept, a diversion d of the t vocabularyy used in

49 Whichh roughly corressponds to the avverage density of o the Ile-de-Frrance region. 50 That iss 100 people peer km², or a poppulation density y similar to that of mainland Frrance.

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hydrography, was created in 2008 alongside the Grand Pari de l’Agglomération Parisienne consultation [MEN 09], where the energy issue was the center of the concerns of our team’s response51: “Reducing the ecological footprint of a city’s future. What is the city’s ecological footprint? Through its metabolism, the city absorbs and swallows resources on at least a regional scale (food, waste), if not a national (electricity, water) or even a continental scale (fossil fuels, etc.). The impact of its activity can be seen today at a global level. As one of the symptoms of this state of affairs, the Greater Paris area makes up 2% of the national territory but represents 10% of greenhouse gas emissions. The challenge for cities in the 21st century is to reduce this footprint: to decrease the consumption and use of energy and to install self-production strategies in cities [...]”.

Figure 5.10. The before and after of Greater Paris. How to reduce cities’ energy dependence? How to bring energy catchment areas closer to the cities? Drawing by the author [MEN 09]. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

Later, in 2013, as part of a conference52, my conclusion was unequivocal: with a density nine times greater than the national average, energy equity between the regions required the Greater Paris area to be enlarged. 5.5. Emission density and carbon neutrality 5.5.1. Post-COP21 and carbon neutrality The previous section described the possible paths to be followed to get rid of our addiction to fossil fuels as a supply of energy. In this section, the dual problem of 51 Elioth’s contributions to the AJN-AREP-MCD team in 2008. 52 Quel Grand Paris? Et avec quelles énergies ?, speech delivered in a conference at l’Ecole Spéciale d’Architecture.

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carbon accentuates even more the pressure that exists on densities. In fact, in order to respect the Paris Agreement on climate change, and in order to keep the chances of global warming limited to 2 °C by 210053, it would be necessary for humanity to be carbon neutral by around the 2050s54. Emissions of greenhouse gases of human origin would need to be balanced out by carbon storage to then become “net negative”. In the second half of this century, humanity would store more carbon than it emits.

Figure 5.11. Decreasing trend of global annual CO2 emissions, compatible with limiting the temperature increase to + 2 °C (blue strand) or + 1.5 °C (red strand) (source: Joeri Rogelj et al.). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

The climatic emergency calls for a global and extremely rapid reduction of current emissions, which at present are above 40 billion tons of CO2 equivalent. Thus, this first assessment of the “critical amount of carbon” is starting to take shape given that one person emits an average of 6 tons of CO2 per year, while 1 hectare of properly exploited forest pumps about 3.6 tons of CO2 per year. Hence, it would be necessary to allocate a significant portion of our small 2 hectares described at the beginning of section 5.4 exclusively to carbon neutrality, nearly 1.6 hectares, a plot 53 Compared to the pre-industrial era with reference date 1880. 54 In its 2014 report, the IPCC developed “carbon budgets” associated with goals to limit the average temperature increase: between 2011 and 2100 humanity could still emit a maximum of 550 GtCO2 (i.e. 550 billion tons of CO2 equivalent) to guarantee a limited warming of + 1.5 °C, or a maximum of 1,000 GtCO2 stocked to hold back an average increase of + 2 °C. Beyond this value, and therefore reaching a concentration considered critical by experts, the terrestrial “climate machine” could go out of control: scientists admit to being unable to predict the probable runaway global warming. At the current rate of about 40 GtCO2 equivalent being emitted annually, and without rapid action to decrease our emissions, the first estimate will be surpassed in about 2025 (+ 1.5 °C) and the second one (+ 2 °C) in about 2035.

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of 130 m per side. In order for limit the area destined for the sole purpose of sequestration, it is therefore necessary to massively reduce our greenhouse gas emissions and thus make neutrality tangible. 5.5.2. Equivalent emission densities To illustrate this pressure, if we consider that the annual CO2 emissions of a Parisian are more than 10 tons, then the density of annual emissions for Paris is greater than 2,000 tons of CO2 per hectare. On the other hand, in Mauritania, with an average population density which is slightly higher than 4 persons per km² and very low individual emissions55, the CO2 annual emission density is of around 0.03 tons per hectare. This equivalence arises from the transposition of the formula found in section 5.2 for energy consumption. Emission density [tCO2eq/ha/year] = Individual emissions [tCO2eq/pers./year] × Population density [pers./ha]

Framed text 5.4. Density of greenhouse gas emissions

5.5.3. Carbon sequestration density Sequestration through afforestation is undoubtedly one of the most effective56 carbon sinks. At the national level, forests in mainland France occupy roughly 30% of the territory, i.e. 16 million hectares. The French Environment and Energy Management Agency (ADEME) recalls that “forests contribute to the mitigation of climate change through two levers: a sequestration effect and a substitution effect”. Regarding sequestration, French forests constitute a “net sink” of 59 Mt of CO257 per year, or about 3.7 tons of CO2 per hectare per year. Afforestation may lead to a change in the use of certain soils and, if dietary patterns tend toward less meat consumption, the conversion of certain cereal fields currently used to feed livestock into forests could have a greater carbon impact than the unique sequestration generated by afforestation. In the future, we will probably draw plans for atmospheric carbon harvesting similar to the energy harvesting plans described in the second section of this work.

55 Roughly 0.7 annual tons per capita. 56 Ben Caldecott, Guy Lomax and Mark Workman, Stranded Carbon Assets and Negative Emissions Technologies – February 2015, SSEE, University of Oxford, p. 15. http://bit.ly/ 1ESZYzT cited by http://adrastia.org/technologies-emissions-negatives-racicot/. 57 French national inventory report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, CITEPA, 2014.

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Figure 5.12. Th he balance bettween emissio on and sequesstration densitties

5.5.4. The T fundame ental equatio on of carbon neutrality y In 20014 in Paris, emissions am mounted to 25 5.6 million toons of CO2 eqquivalent. Under thhe assumptionn of compensating with forests, the carbbon neutralityy of Paris would have h required a forest areaa of approxim mately 50,0000 km² exclussively for emissionn sequestrationn, i.e. 500 tim mes Paris’ surfface area. In thhe study carried out by the Eliotth group, Paris change d’ère (Paris ch hanges era) [MEN [ 16], thhe carbon neutralityy strategy impplied the alloccation of nearrly 9,000 km² to the sequesstration of persistennt emissions: a hundred times the cadastrral surface areaa. Conssidering the scale s of Greaater Paris and d its seven million m inhabittants, and assumingg that they would w follow a similar redu uction path, thhe surface area for this amount of sequestratiion would neeed to be as a first approxim mation of abouut 30,000 c about 200 2 km in diameter d whicch is 5% of mainland m Fraance. The km², a circle formula below is the same as that governing energy self-suffficiency but trransposed u to analyze the t carbon neu utrality ratio of o a given terrritory. to carbonn and allows us Surface seequestration [tCo o2eq/pers./year] × Fraction of land [%] Neutrality [%] = Individual emissions [tC Co2eq/pers./year]] × Density [perss./ha]

F Framed text 5.5. Carbon ne eutrality capacity

5.6. Con nclusion 5.6.1. Continent–se C ea balance In seections 5.4 andd 5.5, we desccribed the spaatial tensions induced i by ennergy and carbon constraints. c Thhe Earth’s suurface is taken n into accountt and so grow wth limits

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appear in these critical energy and carbon flux densities. On the global scale, there is no doubt that energy self-sufficiency and carbon neutrality will necessarily require the support of maritime surface area. Undoubtedly, when faced with continental restraints and the many dilemmas posed by the carbon issue, marine territories will be precious allies providing a more flexible definition of our energy catchment areas: harvesting wind and sea currents, floating solar technology, development of aquatic biomass crops, etc. Will we eventually reach polarization: use the sea for energy and food, land for matter and carbon? 5.6.2. The city–countryside dichotomy At the regional level, the energy and carbon catchment areas question the evolution of the links between the city and rural areas, but they do so also regarding the regions’ other metabolic flows [BAR 04]: materials, supply and drainage. John McNeill recalls that the firewood used in Delhi is produced 700 km away from the Indian capital; he also points out that the harvesting area required to heat Vancouver is 20 times greater than that of continental France [MCN 10]. In order to understand this intensity of metabolic consumption, we can point out that the densest megacities in Asia, with nearly 50,000 inhabitants per km², have a human mass per unit area of more than 2 kg/m2, a density three orders of magnitude greater than that of large seasonal gatherings of herbivores in green regions of Africa. Are these hyperdensities sustainable? 5.6.3. The city, an energy-carbon monster Two centuries ago, before the thermoindustrial era, the city–countryside dichotomy was clear: rural areas were for agricultural production, exploitation of forestry, breeding and hunting. The countryside was the space for the conversion of solar energy, organized by the production and transformation of biomass. The countryside was the offer. On the other hand, the city was where people concentrated and therefore the concentration of energy consumption and carbon reemissions through the combustion of biomass. Demand was shaped by food and heating needs. Here and there, some buildings and structures ensured a production function: the water and wind mills. Eunhye Kim quoted a possible definition of the city: “a space where inhabitants do not produce their own food”. The city remains the consumption territory and thus maintains a singular link with its hinterland [KIM 12]. The city (and all the more so the metropolis) has become a region of very high consumption and very high emission of greenhouse gases. Conversely, the rural production of the beginning of the 19th Century was not able to follow the qualities and ease of extraction of most hydrocarbons. This situation worsened with the

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exploitattion of fossil fuel f resourcess during the 20 0th and 21st Century C [KIM M 12]. The countrysside has basicaally turned intto a territory mainly m devoteed to the prodduction of our foodd needs58 annd whose prooductivity haas been boossted by fossiil inputs: thermoinndustrial mechhanization of agriculture, extensive e use of fertilizers, intensive use of phytosanitary p ment area asppect also connveys the products, etcc. This catchm oppositee concept as reecalled by Bonnneuil and Freessoz [BON 13]: “T The 19th century was maarked by very y strong conccerns about tthe m metabolic breaak between urrban and rurall areas: urbannization, i.e. tthe cooncentration of humans and their feeces preventeed the minerral suubstances’ retturn to the soill, which are esssential for ferrtility”.

Figu ure 5.13. A dia agram showing g the energy consumption c d densities for Fr French terrritory with stee eper vector lin nes imitating hy ydrographic fllowlines [MEN N 14]

5.6.4. The T mathem matics of de ensity, relo ocating acco ording to th he right proporttions The sustainable s lim mits of the theermoindustriaal era have been exceeded. How can the futurre, energy, carrbon, food andd material catcchment areas be b reconstructted? How can faireer divisions be made usingg the populatio on density maap? How can different regions be b outlined too heterogeneouusly and equaally divide up the map? Thiis method is also reelevant and coould be applied to the energ gy consumptioon density mapp in order to determ mine where thhe homogenouus consumption n territorial bllocks and islannds are. 58 Directt or indirect, in particular p biom mass production for cattle food..

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Figure 5.14. Some examples e of re egional energy y catchment arrea consolidattion. The m shows the regional r redisttribution accorrding to the en nergy density a analysis diagram perforrmed by the Réforme R team [MEN [ 14]. Forr a color versio on of this figurre, see www.istte.co.uk/lopez//local.zip

5.6.5. The T scales in n question Sustaain the balannce between regions by converging them towardd similar consumpption densitiees: the effort required to build sustainnable catchmeent areas should be b the same foor all parties involved. Self-sufficiency for each regioon would then evoolve homogeneeously. Accorrding to this principle, the sum s of the parrts, that is the counntry as a wholee, would be sttronger and mo ore resilient. The philosopher p annd mathematiician Olivier Rey R remindedd us in Une quuestion de taille of the advantagee of benevolennce at the smaall scale [REY Y 14]. “[...] Kohr wass convinced thhroughout his life that the appropriate a unnit of distance to organize a healthy h society was of the order of thhat seeparating his native villagge from the country’s cappital, Salzburrg, tw wenty-two killometers awayy. Are small societies s inevvitably closed in onn themselvess, marked byy provincialism and paroochialism? The A Athens of Anttiquity or Florrence during the Renaissannce (which had 40,000 inhabitaants at the staart of the 15th century, whicch was the tim me of its greatest splendor), too mention jusst two spectaccular examplees, prrove otherwisse. In fact, it iss the political unification off vast territoriies w which makes all other sm maller cities sterile by puumping all thhe ennergies towardds a few enorm mous centers [...]”59. 59 p. 88.

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In light of the different examples provided in this chapter, the value of watts per unit area or the space requirements for carbon neutrality make us think about the scales and proportions of territorial development (and the updating of political and administrative governance in line with ecological priorities). We have seen how the intensity of cities requires more space to decide on the different self-sufficiency and neutrality paths to follow. Said area would probably be of the order of hundreds of kilometers, i.e. a large region would be the right scale. Outside these metropolitan areas, the cantonal scale of about ten kilometers would be more appropriate to bring together human energies and contextualize harvesting. Introduced between blocks of buildings in the cities, these smaller scales would increase fluidity and an important adaptation reactivity. 5.7. References [BAR 04] BARLES S., Mesurer la performance écologique des villes et des territoires : Le métabolisme de Paris et de l’Île-de-France, Final research report on behalf of the City of Paris, 2004. [BIH 14] BIHOUIX P., L'âge des low tech, Le Seuil, Paris, 2014. [BON 13] BONNEUIL C., FRESSOZ J.-B., L'Événement anthropocène: La Terre, l'histoire et nous, Le Seuil, Paris, 2013. [HOP 10] HOPKINS R., Manuel de Transition De la dépendance au pétrole à la résilience locale, Guides Pratiques, Montreal, 2010. [KIM 12] KIM E., BARLES S., “The energy consumption of Paris and its supply areas from 18th century to present”, Regional Environmental Change, 12(2), 2012. [LOP 14] LOPEZ F., Le Rêve d'une déconnexion. De la maison à la cité auto-énergétique, La Villette, Paris, 2014. [LOV 11] LOVINS A.B., Reinventing Fire, Chelsea Green Publishing, Chelsea, 2011. [MAC 09] MACKAY J.C., Sustainable Energy – Without the hot air, UIT Cambridge, Cambridge, 2009. [MAN 14] MANIAQUE C., Go West – Des architectes au pays de la contre-culture, Parenthèses, Marseille, 2014. [MCN 10] MCNEILL J.R., Du nouveau sous le soleil, Editions Champ Vallon, Paris, 2010. [MEA 12] MEADOWS D.H., RANDERS J., MEADOWS D., Les limites à la croissance (dans un monde fini), Rue de l’échiquier, Paris, 2012. [MEN 09] MÉNARD R., “Introduction au développement durable” in NOUVEL J. (ed.), Naissances et renaissances de mille et un bonheur parisien, du Mont Boron, Paris, 2009. [MEN 11] MÉNARD R., “Dense Cities in 2050: The Energy Option?”, Summer Study Proceedings, ECEEE, 2011.

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[MEN 14] MÉNARD R. et al., Reforme, Final research report, Programme Ignis Mutat Res, 2014. [MEN 15] MÉNARD R., La Renaissance des Fabriques. Un monde possible en 2050, October 2015. [MEN 16] MÉNARD R. et al., Paris, change d’ère. Stratégie de neutralité carbone de Paris en 2050, Report, Elioth, 2016. [NEW 99] NEWMAN P., KENWORTHY J., Sustainability and Cities: Overcoming Automobile Dependence, Island Press, Washington, 1999. [PER 13] PERLIN J., Let it Shine: The 6,000-Year Story of Solar Energy, New World Library, Novato, Paris, 2013. [REY 14] REY O., Une question de taille, Stock, Paris, 2014. [SMI 15] SMIL V., Power Density: A Key to Understanding Energy Sources and Uses, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2015.

6 What Autonomy is Available in the Design of Energy Solutions within French Urban Development Projects? The Example of District Heating

6.1. Introduction The question of energy autonomy can be approached from different angles. We can in particular distinguish three aspects of autonomy given the focus of our interest: – as to dependencies across a territorial energy system regarding exogenous resources, we can then talk of functional autonomy, being able to go as far as selfsustainability; – as to interactions and in interdependencies established between a territorial energy system and its environment, we can then speak of technico-economical autonomy able to go as far as self-sufficiency; – as to the capacity of actions of a given player or a system of players around a given energy system, we can then talk of political or decisional autonomy, being able to go as far as complete control over the energy system. It is this third understanding of energy autonomy toward which our contribution is positioned. We are endeavoring here to discuss the decision-based autonomy of urban development players who seek to plan, design and implement energy solutions around their given intervention area. These energy solutions can, for example, take the form of “autonomous” buildings being designed for energy savings, the residual Chapter written by Guilhem BLANCHARD.

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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consumption being taken care of by decentralized production and energy storage from locally available resources. In a less self-sufficient mindset, the energy solutions can also consist of local adaptations of sociotechnical systems structured on a large scale. Such can be seen, for example, in the case of local optimizations within the design and the regulation of the electrical distribution network, which yet remains connected to a wide-ranging continental production and energy transport system. Finally, a third way consists of deploying network infrastructures on a local scale, such as district heating and cooling systems upon which we are more particularly focusing upon in this chapter. But first, why study decisional autonomy of urban development players in implementing energy solutions? The role of local players in the energy governance has been subject, in recent years, to a sizable research effort that has translated into a set of now abundant field works [BUL 05, BUL 14, RUT 14a, RUT 15]. The significance of the research for this question relates in particular to the acknowledgment of a transformation underway to multiscale governance systems. This reconfiguration tends to give a more significant role to urban players despite the still significant weight of national and supra-national powers. This significance is all the stronger for a partial decentralization of energy policies, which could correspond to a partial decentralization of sociotechnical energy systems, a related debate revolving around the resilience of the Large Technical Systems model, faced with the willingness to optimize local metabolisms and/or local autonomy [COU 10a, COU 16]. Within works revolving more specifically around the French situation, there are works that allow us to see the interplay of actors for the distribution of powers in energy governance [POU 14, POU 16], the partial appropriation of energy governance tools by urban local authorities [GAB 15a], how they construct the energy problem as an issue for urban public action [ROC 17] or even the negotiation of strategic options, when the ecological and energy transition brings tensions between various public action trends into play [COU 10b]. We propose here to complete this literature by studying the operationalization of a certain political autonomy in the processing into matter of energy systems. The question here is to focus upon realizing the energy transition (toward greater autonomy) [RUT 14b], that is to say around how the regulatory frameworks, public policies, the sociotechnical models and the governance systems are processed into the matter of districts, buildings and infrastructures. To do this, we study the deployment of district heating and cooling networks within urban development projects, by first showing that these projects appear as windows of opportunity to give concrete expression to and assert a certain local energy autonomy, even if the control of energy system by the local authorities remains limited by a set of factors

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(section 6.1). We then focus upon the organization of energy design within an urban development project in the Bordeaux region. We will show that the development of energy systems appears as a fragmented process between different players with a low level of coordination, which further limits the capacity of local government to give concrete expression to a precise view of the infrastructure (section 6.2). With this fragmentation being likely to assert itself as a problem in the years to come, we then discuss current trends that aim at increased integration of urban energy systems’ design and implementation (section 6.3). NOTE.– Our consideration falls within doctoral research into urban planning, revolving around the energy design activity of French urban developers. It relies upon field investigations combining in-depth analysis of the Bordeaux Euratlantique project over the period 2009–20161 and more superficial monitoring of other French projects, completed by monitoring academic and institutional works concerning the energy transition and urban development and through the involvement in symposiums and other arenas such as the “Comité Stratégique des Réseaux de Chaleur” (Strategic Committee for District Heating). 6.2. Urban heating within development projects: an opportunity for local monitoring of the energy system 6.2.1. Windows of opportunity for local players If the deployment of district heating and cooling networks as part of urban projects is of concern to us here, it is because such urban heating infrastructures have characteristics that should favor the realization of a given local energy autonomy, as much on a technical and functional level as upon the decision-making level. We are primarily concerned with urban development projects, which are collective, time-limited processes for the transformation of a delimited area so as to enable the deployment of a given urban fabric (industrial and service activities, housing and facilities). For around 10 years, we have seen a rapid increase in energy issues within development or urban renewal activities in France: taking responsibility for the energy issue is no longer confined to a small number of symbolic cases, but dealt with within the majority of wide-ranging projects. In

1 The investigation in Bordeaux Euratlantique was deployed around 50 semistructured interviews, the involvement in around 15 meetings and the analysis of several thousand pages of project documentation, some of which are working versions. It took place between spring 2014 and summer 2016.

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response to and accompanying these processes, appeals for regional, national and European projects are increasing, as well as certifications, labels, methodologies and other frames of reference. Of course, such a success happens with the inclusion of energy and climate issues upon local political agendas [EME 07, SOU 09a]. Development projects are part of policy instruments available to urban public actors to mobilize a set of human, political and financial resources, so as to constitute a capacity for collective action over the territory [PIN 09]: they therefore serve to promote various public policy objectives including energetic and climatic ones. Beyond this, development projects also have the advantage of their extent, since they at once transform the urban structure, the buildings, the infrastructures and urban services over a given territory. With regard to the buildings, regulation mechanisms for the property development enable the implementation of some of the local authorities’ priorities, for example favoring resorting to certain energy sources (solar) or to certain construction materials (wood). With regard to infrastructure, the extension and/or the strengthening of distribution networks can, for example, be accompanied by smart grids and new services (such as energy janitors). Last but not least, urban development projects offer the opportunity for coordinated initiatives around the various components of the urban energy system, which allows for efficiency gains compared to more targeted interventions. Thus, the urban structure will be able to generate opportunities for energy recovery by positioning a datacenter in the vicinity of a swimming pool, while works around urban morphology will be able to favor sunlight on the roofs, in areas where the buildings should put solar panels in place. The energy performance requirements will be stronger within sectors where the distribution networks reach their capacity limits, and more flexible where the infrastructure is insufficiently operated. A multitude of synergies are therefore possible [HAM 17], and the urban contracting authority can theoretically play a role of coordinator by ensuring the compatibility or optimization of interfaces between components, while responsibilities are usually taken by the poorly interacting communities of construction, infrastructures and urban design. Urban development projects are then windows of opportunity to implement a certain number of energy solutions contributing to the objectives of public local players. Among these solutions, district heating systems, based upon the deployment of heating and cooling networks, are nowadays seeing significant success in Europe [GAB 15b, GUY 16, HAW 16, ROC 14]. The move toward these networks arises from their structural characteristics. They are indeed able to exploit some local energy deposits (geothermal, biomass, unavoidable energy from waste incineration, water decontamination, industrial production or other processes) without being subject to the constraints and losses linked to the conversion from

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thermal energy into more easily transportable carriers such as electricity or gas. The network sharing, moreover, allows for the broadening of the financing base for investments, and for the smoothing of energy demand over time, which often results in better technical and economic performance than with decentralized solutions. District heating and cooling networks are, therefore, presented to local public actors as solutions reconciling some advantages of large technical networks with optimization and closure of territorial metabolisms. Beyond their possible contribution to the functional autonomy and “greening” of local energy systems, the urban heating solutions arouse the interest of communities seeking to (re)gain control of their energy system [DEB 16, ROC 14, ROC 17]: – with regard to technical autonomy, district heating and cooling networks reduce the dependence upon electric and gas systems2, for which regulation is instead operated on supra-local scale. Moreover, the local character of these networks is reinforced by their physical function, since significant energy losses per linear meter of pipe leads to limiting the scale of deployment to urban units with sufficiently dense and continuous built-up areas; – with regard to policy autonomy, local authorities have never lost their scope of activities in public service for urban heating, this having been reaffirmed and consolidated during legislative debates of recent years (the MAPTAM law on the metropolis status in 2014, the LTECV law relating to energy transition in 2015). This scope of activities is strengthened by the fact that urban heating is not for the moment concerned by the unbundling of production, distribution and supply of energy that has been imposed upon electricity and gas. The energy system is therefore comparatively more integrated and, a priori, better controlled by local authorities. Ultimately, compared to the sociotechnical regimes3 of electricity and gas, the urban heating regime is clearly the major part of the local scale. By studying the deployment of district heating and cooling networks during urban development projects, which themselves appear as interesting windows of opportunity for local public actors, we are therefore interested in instances favoring increased local control of the development of energy systems. However, this context is far from completely eliminating exogenous frameworks for local energy policies, which are the subject of the following sections.

2 However, even urban heating systems fed by local resources still depend upon gas (for back-up thermal production) and electricity (for feeding production equipment, in particular in the case of geothermal power stations with temperature increases). 3 A sociotechnical regime being defined in the sense of [DEB 16], as “a coherent group of sociotechnical, organizational and stable rules over a long period” (p. 12).

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6.2.2. Urban development and district heating projects still remain subject to numerous external constraints Despite the theoretical autonomy of local governments in the fabric of urban heating systems, district heating and cooling network projects remain subject to some dependencies that can be grouped into two categories. One groups together supra-local frameworks in the energy sector, since margins for local maneuver still fall within multilevel governance. The other is composed of dependencies upon exogenous dynamics, which can be local but are not controlled or controllable by the staff working on the local projects. For the first category, three major elements put into perspective the local character of the energy regime of urban heating: – first, urban heating is a public service with an industrial and commercial nature (known as “SPIC”), and is for this reason subject to several legislative and regulatory, national and European constraints, which have a fairly strict framework for the definition of the business model (such as the principle of budgetary equilibrium, the absence of cross subsidies and the principle of equality) and the management model (rules of direct or delegated management) of a district heating or cooling network; – the design choices are then constrained by a large number of technical standards, which are defined at national level (Association Française de Normalisation (AFNOR) – French Association for Standardization) or European (Comité Européen de Normalisation (CEN) – European Committee for Standardization). For example, the NF EN 12831 standard – used by the engineering offices to proportion heating power in buildings – limited until 2017 the possibilities for joint optimization of district heating and buildings’ energy savings, as it did not correctly take into account thermal equilibrium dynamics in “low consumption” buildings [OVE 15, POG 17]; – finally, the economic viability of district heating and cooling networks often relies upon a significant financial envelop of public subsidies, which are accompanied by conditions heavily weighed toward the technico-economic choices made by local actors. In the French case, we will in particular refer to the conditions for granting funds by the Fonds Chaleur (“Heating Fund”), implemented by the state and managed by the Agence de l’Environnement et de la the Maîtrise de l’Énergie (ADEME, Environment and Energy Conservation Agency), which contributes greatly to investment for the creation or the extension of infrastructures4: among these conditions in particular feature minimal criteria for energy density (1.5 4 It is difficult to find reliable data for public subsidies in the investment in district heating networks but the order of magnitude which circulates relating to the Fonds Chaleur is 30 to 60% depending upon the network type.

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MWh/lm·year), which plays a structural role in the design and the assessment of network feasibility. In terms of actual operation, the existence of reduced taxation for the supply of heat coming from more than 50% of renewable and recovery energies also constitutes a powerful framework for projects creating or converting networks, which generally reach a developmental objective from this rate. The elements set out above lead us to note that supra-local stages of energy governance play their part in the choices relative to local energy systems. Superimposed upon these frameworks are other dependencies, which are exogenous from the energy world, but can however have a major influence on local energy infrastructure projects. Here we will retain three groups: – dependencies of supply projects regarding institutional dynamics, in particular reconstitution of local authorities around intermunicipal authorities undergoing rapid development. From this point of view, the territory Est Ensemble, in the Paris region, provides an interesting example: owing to the low level of intermunicipal integration, no fewer than five urban projects – which are however closely related both in space and time – have given rise to energy supply projects, without coordination between them (Figure 6.1). It was necessary to await the delayed increase in power to start a posteriori, at the end of 2014, a study as to the development of a district heating network consistent over the entire area [COM 14]; – dependencies upon local non-energy policies, notably during the implementation of synergies for energy recovery, which assumes intervention around policies for water, waste or decontamination. It is, for example, the case when a network fed by waste heat recovery from an incinerator assumes consolidation of the territorial strategy for waste management in the coming decades, whether or not to validate significant investment in the incinerator likely to generate heat. Within these types of dependencies, it is not so much the capacity for theoretical action of local authorities which is potentially an issue, but rather their capacity to act in practice in a coordinated manner using a large set of levers and in the limited time of a given urban development project; – the dependencies regarding local or extra-local dynamics with little control by local authorities, as with the relocation of private energy generating and/or highenergy consuming activities (for example industrial facilities, datacenters) or the development rhythm of the property markets. Interesting case studies can be found in [HAM 17].

Figure 6.1. District heating networks and urban development projects across the territory of Est Ensemble. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

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To summarize, the development of a district heating infrastructure during an urban development project certainly is a window of opportunity that somewhat favors accrued local monitoring of urban energy. However, this type of project is no less subject to multiple external constraints, which puts into perspective the decision-based autonomy of local actors. The monitoring of urban heating projects is consequently built around a compromise between favorable and unfavorable factors for local autonomy, about which some relate to the energy regime itself, and others to the facility for collective action around given projects (Table 6.1). + Local autonomy

Energy regime

A heating regime with a slightly local bias:

An energy governance which remains multiscaled:

– intrinsically local technical solutions;

– national and European SPIC regulations;

– integration of production– distribution–provider activities;

– technical standards framing design choices;

– maintained competencies, indeed reaffirmed, for local authorities.

– state financial aid with granting conditions.

Development projects as windows of opportunity:

Collective action

– Local autonomy

– mobilizing the capacity for collective action across the territory; – action around all components of the energy system; – coordination of initiatives enabling efficiency savings.

Exogenous dependencies upon non-energetic variables: – institutional divisions; – other sectoral policies; – extra-local dynamics (location of private activities, development of property markets and others).

Table 6.1. Favorable and unfavorable factors for local monitoring of urban heating projects as part of development projects

6.3. The decision-based autonomy of urban heating projects from the perspective of urban development projects’ technical management We could end the discussion here and record existing tensions between factors favorable and unfavorable to local decision-based autonomy regarding systems of urban heating, which we could possibly compare to other energy systems using a similar matrix. However, it appears interesting to us to go further within the panorama of opportunities and constraints by analyzing the organization of collective action with regard to energy during urban development projects.

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In line with some research on urban development project activity [ARA 04, DEV 09, FER 14, IDT 09, TAR 15], our goal is to open the black box of projects “technical management” to understand how it frames the development of urban energy systems. For this, we will rely upon the case study of Bordeaux Saint-Jean Belcier (Box 6.1). NOTE.– We favored a monographic study for reasons of access to the field. Our investigation necessitated the analysis of a large volume of data and the establishment of a relationship of trust with local players. For all that, the analysis indeed seeks to bring out the processes, the rationales, constraints and opportunities, which constitute a field of possibilities that other actors might focus on in other cases [GRA 16]. We are therefore highlighting the urban heating project in Bordeaux Saint-Jean Belcier. We will illustrate the organization of the urban fabric of energy and its limits within two of its dimensions: – initially, choices relating to the layout of the network and to the potential provision of cooling will enable us to approach the design of single infrastructures for energy provision within development projects; – second, we are concerned with the coordination between energy supply and demand, through the projections for energy needs of new constructions. The area of concerted development needs in Saint-Jean Belcier is part of the operation of national significance Bordeaux Euratlantique, which is typical of the “large operations for urban development in areas abandoned by activities taking up a lot of space, [...which] can attract investors and [to which] local councilors are attributing a central position within their strategy for the agglomeration” [BOU 01]. The principle is to develop 800,000 m² of development on industrial and railway areas abandoned in the immediate proximity of the TGV (high-speed train) station, so as to make up a mixed and compact district forming a new “central business district” for the agglomeration and including a wide-ranging business hub. In respect of the subject, which is of interest to us here, namely local control of the development of district heating and cooling networks, three project characteristics must be underlined. First, the development of the area was entrusted to an ad hoc structure, the Établissement Public d’Aménagement Bordeaux Euratlantique (the Public Establishment for the Development of Bordeaux Euratlantique – EPABE). This state body constitutes the base of a strong urban contracting authority, with which are associated significant politicians and technical services from the Greater Bordeaux metropolis, the City of Bordeaux and the commune of Bègles. This is, therefore, a case where those running the urban project are likely to gather all resources (whether political, financial, specialist expertise or others) necessary for the running of an energy project.

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Next, the Euratlantique project was launched shortly after the Grenelle de l’Environnement (the environmental debate bringing together local and national industry, trade unions and the French government). The Euratlantique project is considered by the state and local authorities as an opportunity to implement urban development responding in an exemplary way to the issues of sustainable development, which is in particular happening through work around “energy performance”. This is, therefore, a case study where the energy issue is considered to be important, without however constituting an absolute political priority in relation to other aspects such as property attractiveness or the management of mobility services5. Lastly, for the provision of energy in the Saint-Jean Belcier zone, the interest of the local authority and its advice for mutual energy solutions, the low land footprint for waste heat recovery as well as its prioritization by national government bodies, rapidly led to favoring the deployment of a district heating network from a waste incinerator located to the south of the development area. There is no competing project here – the sole alternative envisaged in case of failure being resorting to “traditional” decentralized solutions (gas boilers for residential areas, and reversible heat pumps for the tertiary [service] sector). Box 6.1. The urban development project Bordeaux Saint-Jean Belcier

6.3.1. Design of the supply infrastructure: a weakly structured coordination between design arenas We are first concerned with developing the urban heating infrastructure by briefly describing the linking of the design arenas throughout the project. The story starts in 2010, with the creation of EPABE as a development authority in the area. The developer immediately acquired the assistance of a consultant for energy issues, and together with the chosen consultant started a study for energy provision in Saint-Jean Belcier. This study, which aimed to produce a comparison of the importance and feasibility of various energy solutions, quickly focused upon the hypothesis of a district heating network exploiting the presence of a waste incinerator to the south of the development area (Box 6.1). To maximize the energy density of the infrastructure and minimize the operational risks linked to its deployment, an initial layout was developed over the single area of the most densely packed sectors of the newly planned district. This configuration does not include the sectors where shops and office buildings are concentrated, which are the greediest consumers of cooling systems: the decision was therefore made not to seek to deploy any cooling network. 5 In other words, it is not an exceptional operation in the sense of the significance given to the energy issue (in terms of political publicity at least), unlike projects such as the similar operations Clichy-Batignolles in Paris or the ZAC de Bonne in Grenoble.

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Only the developer and its consultant were involved in this initial energy study phase. Yet, the EPABE had to involve elected representatives and municipal and metropolitan services in the project. This was, on the one hand, because the establishment is co-managed by the state and the local authorities, with systematic consensus-seeking prior to all major decisions; on the other hand, because the intermunicipality, which already owns the incinerator as part of public waste services, also has the authority for providing public heat services over time. From 2012, the developer therefore started a round of meetings with the various local services, so as to negotiate their support for the urban heating project. On this occasion, notably involved are the local urbanism agency and the local energy agency, which have become involved in the local energy planning work [AUR 11]. In line with this work, the two agencies wished to see established interdependencies between the new district and the old buildings nearby: so as to find a compromise between this desire and the willingness of the developer to quickly implement an infrastructure upon a single new area, a new layout was established to enable the future expansion of the network toward the old district [BLA 17]. Within this new configuration, the constitution of a district cooling network became conceivable, but does not appear sufficiently worthwhile to gain strong support. In 2014, the Greater Bordeaux metropolis started the consultation to delegate the urban public heating service based upon this new layout. The consultation file leaves open the possibility for candidates to propose an extension toward the old districts and/or the deployment of a cooling network, but does not allow for the manifestation of particular enthusiasm regarding these options6. However, for reasons of commercial strategy, the two candidates in the delegation capture them fully and propose significant extensions to the district heating, as well as the creation of large-scale district cooling, which was far more significant than had been envisaged up to that point. These alternative tenders appealed to local elected representatives and were not subject to the reactions of EPABE, and for a very good reason: the Greater Bordeaux metropolis did not wish to involve the developer within the formal consultation process, for which it is solely responsible from a legal point of view, and for which it is keen to ensure confidentiality. It was therefore on this new basis that the public service commission is approved. From the end of 2015, it became a question of realizing the solution that has just been contracted for. However, the district cooling network layout retained during the negotiations between the Greater Bordeaux metropolis and the network operators 6 Thus, proposals for extension are permitted in the form of optional extras, and not requested as compulsory variations. Moreover, the network plan shows that new constructions located within the interface between the new area and the city center of Bordeaux, which are also the highest consumers of cooling systems, are not subject to any connection obligation. For greater precision around this point as for the entire process, refer to our PhD thesis [BLA 18].

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was not compatible with the urban programming, which the developer was taking responsibility for. No parcel of land appropriate for both EPABE and the network operator was found to establish the cooling station. Consequently, a further sequence of negotiations was entered into. It had not ended when our research ended and, as of December 31, 2016, no suitable solution had yet been found to begin the deployment of the cooling network, which consequently seemed in the process of being abandoned [BOR 17]. Following this account, let us now turn our attention to the diagrammatic sequence of design arenas within the design process for the development of the energy infrastructure (Table 6.2). Two complementary elements flow from this. We first note that the energy project emerged from the urban project upon the developer’s initiative, but was gradually dissociated from it. This dissociation, already seen in Parisian projects [TAR 15], may be explained in particular by the organization of local governments, since urban development and energy service in general depend on various collectives obeying separate rationales. Insufficient coordination between the two collectives here ends in a deadlock situation, to the extent that the energy project developments make it partially incompatible with the urban project. The urban development projects therefore appear to be potential facilitators in the development of local energy systems: it is indeed the given development project that forces the urban heating project to emerge. However, it is also a complicating factor for collective action since making both projects coherent results in friction, in some cases even deadlocks. Beyond that, the low level of coordination of design arenas for the urban heating project calls into question the need for the existence of an energy contracting authority, that is to say of an organization responsible for the realization of local political initiatives for infrastructures and energy services. In the case described here, the stages are indeed managed by separate actors, without any single one being present throughout the entire process, and without coherence between successive stages being either guaranteed, or through precise and collectively accepted framework documents, or by regular checks with all stakeholders. The energy project implemented does not therefore result from a strategic vision (possibly subject to successive compromises), but from the loose linking of design arenas with new perspectives being used each time, which in themselves transform the planned energy system without referring to a comprehensive framework document. Such an acknowledgment might appear surprising while the project studied benefits from sizable engineering, as much as with regard to urban development as local authorities. However, it is in line with observations carried out during symbolic projects of eco-districts in Europe [SOU 09b] and consolidated by the study of three large Parisian projects [TAR 15]. The weakness of the coordination of all urban heating projects is, moreover, illustrated further in a more tangible manner when we

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look at the enumeration of the various supply components (the network) and demand components (the buildings). No.

Stage

Pilot player

Stakeholders

1

Development of a supply strategy

Urban developer

2

Consolidation of the favored energy solution

Urban developer

Local authorities

3

Delegation of the public urban heating service

Intermunicipality

Network operators

4

Realization of the retained energy solution

Network operator

Urban developer + intermunicipality

Table 6.2. Linking of design arenas for the infrastructure of urban heating

6.3.2. Coordination of supply and demand: an even more significant division In the previous section, we acknowledged the weak coordination of the design process for the district heating infrastructure in Bordeaux Saint-Jean Belcier. This fragmentation of the design process and its consequences is illustrated more clearly still if we consider the articulation of technical choices relating to the supply infrastructure (therefore to the energy supply) and to the constructed buildings (therefore to the energy demand). We see it here by looking into the assessment of thermal needs at various stages of development of the urban heating system7. Again considering the case of Bordeaux Saint-Jean Belcier however, our exchange with professionals working in urban heating and development leaves us thinking that the organization described is fairly typical of projects implemented in France in the last decade. The estimates of future thermal needs of the area served are essential parameters in the development of the district heating network and district cooling network, around technical as much as economic matters [SUM 92]. From a technical point of view, estimates of demand, and in particular power demand estimates, are at the basis of decision-making processes relating to the choices of energy sources and to the proportioning of infrastructures (the piping diameter, fluid temperature, choice of boilers and heat exchangers and other aspects). From the economic point of view, the technical proportioning linked to power demands will structure the “investments” section of the business model, while demand estimates as much in 7 For more details upon this subject the reader should refer to [BLA 16].

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terms of power as actual consumption will also determine the “income” section (energy prices for the end user). Yet, the estimates of future energy demand of a given area are subject to very high uncertainties, related to technical performance within the construction and the building equipment used, as well as climatic hazards or even domestic practices. We are therefore in a situation where a strategic parameter for the energy project is subject to great uncertainties. This could make you think that this parameter is subject to a process of decision making or negotiation between the various stakeholders. Yet, in fact, these assessments are absorbed within two project phases by four of the various actors, according to four diverging methodologies, without ever having a form of pooling enabling discussion and all the more to make these estimates converge. Thus, during the upstream phases, two assessments are produced without themselves being linked together: – at the time of the comparative study of various options for energy supply of the urban project, an initial assessment (so-called “no. 1”) was produced by the energy consultant of the urban developer – in this case a firm of consultants specialized in territorial energy strategies – so as to test the robustness of pooled solutions against the structuring hypotheses for the given urban development project. Within this context, the hypotheses retained tend to minimize future needs, so as to face the risks of partial implementation or delaying the development project; – contemporaneously with determining the strategy for energy provision, negotiations between promoters, architects and the urban development contracting authority are started (from 2011) regarding necessary property operations within the first sectors for the construction work. Notably discussed on this occasion are energy and environmental performances expected on the part of the future development, generally at the stage of the simplified preliminary draft of the architectural project. The assessments (no. 2) produced upon this occasion rely either upon regulatory tools (the calculation engine for thermal regulation) or conventional tools (thermal dynamics simulation engines), which mobilize hypotheses for consumption, which are more contextualized than in the comparative study of energy supply options. However, these more precise data are not reinjected into preliminary drafts of network supplies. In terms of the so-called “operational” design phase (from the detailed preliminary draft) of the district heating network as with building, we further see there are two arenas of assessment of future needs: – with regard to the supply operator network, the proportioning of the infrastructure relies upon slightly oversized hypotheses with regard to future needs (assessments no. 3), so as to avoid underdimensioning able to cause the breakdown of the heating system in the case of peak load. The operator, however, seeks to

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reduce its safety margin thanks to its experience, so as to optimize its investment and more generally its business model; – with regard to buildings which will be fed by the networks, these are so-called “fluid” consultancies that are responsible for proportioning secondary networks circulating inside the building and assessing the need for connection to the primary network. So as to avoid under-sizing the secondary infrastructure, they favor significant hypotheses regarding future needs. On the other hand, consultancies being rarely subject to pressures to minimize their safety margin, the connection demands generally rest upon significant overestimation of the power which has been contracted to purchase (assessment no. 4). We can identify at least two consequences of this division of assessments for local authorities, which raise energy issues. We first remark that the choice of a favored solution for the supply of the zones being developed relies upon hypotheses (no. 1), which are very different from those used during the establishment of the business model for the energy service (assessment no. 3). Yet, the choice of energy solution by the local authorities relies widely upon the estimates of the future price of heat: the decision therefore relies upon very partial information as to its options. We then observe a global dissonance between the needs assessments from the perspective of supply (nos. 1 and 3) and that of demand (nos. 2 and 4)8. This divergence has highly practical consequences for the operation of the system of heat provision. Indeed, pricing of heat is structured in two parts: the variable element relying upon effective heat consumption (in kilowatt-hours) during the given heating season; the fixed element relying upon the power which the user contracts to purchase with the power distributor (in kilowatts). From the user’s point of view, the overestimate of power contracted to purchase by “fluid” consultancies leads to an increase in the fixed element, and therefore to an overall heat cost higher than the estimates that were able to be supplied to it by the operator or the local authorities when the network business model stabilizes. From the operator’s point of view, the theoretical capacity of the infrastructure is quickly consumed by contractual obligations linked to the power purchased. This limits network expansion – except for taking the risk of not being able to deliver the expected power. Moreover, oversized infrastructure can come out of the sphere of optimized system operation, which can be translated by a depreciation of output, and accelerated aging of equipment and other facets. We are, therefore, in a situation where the organization of the entire design process for the urban energy system does not enable the articulation of technical

8 Within the sole Bordeaux case study, the same acknowledgment has emerged for three successive networks (Ginko, Bassins à Flot, Saint-Jean Belcier) in less than a decade.

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choices linked to supply and demand, which results in all parties being dissatisfied. Without necessarily going as far as taking the responsibility of energy producers and consumers for their respective estimates, local public players with responsibility for energy may have been able to ensure communication between players responsible for various components of the energy system. The situation again illustrates the limits of a local authority that is not able to ensure the technico-economic coherence of the energy project over its territory. 6.4. Conclusions and final thoughts The study of deployment of district heating systems when implementing French urban development projects enables the evidencing of two elements to take into account within the reflection around political (or decision-based) local autonomy as regards energy. First, the generic analysis of the characteristics of the urban heating energy regime and the conditions for collective action around development projects invite us, in line with other works [POU 14, GAB 15a], to speak in relative terms of the idea of local political autonomy in the energy sphere. Thus, even if the urban heating regime appears as one of the most favorable to local authorities and even if development projects offer an area and resources, which are particularly interesting as regards collective action around the energy system, local planning relating to the energy project is no less confronted by multiple constraints. These are linked to the multiscalar character of the energy system and to the interfaces with other issues for local action. By then opening the black box of technical project management in the case of Bordeaux Saint-Jean Belcier, we have evidenced other curbs for local authorities wishing to fully invest in the theoretical margins of maneuver available to them to transform the energy system on their territory. The case of Bordeaux confirms that the coexistence of a strong urban contracting authority with ambitious energy objectives does not necessarily involve tight control of the deployment of a new urban energy system (see [SOU 09b, TAR 15] for convergent analyses). In the absence of actors playing the role of “energy contracting authority”, the development of the system of urban heating is conducted by linking design arenas with separate players and objectives, without actual comprehensive coordination serving a strategic vision. The consequences of such an organization of the design process can, moreover, lead to a dissatisfaction shared by the main stakeholders, so illustrated in our case by the freezing of the district cooling network and the tensions linked to the discord between different assessments of the new buildings’ energy needs. Consequently, the constitution of a collective organization able to ensure the coordination of stakeholders around urban energy projects is in our eyes a major

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issue for local authorities wishing to develop their decision-based autonomy. Can we speak of local control of the energy system when no mechanism enables us to ensure the realization of a potential strategic view within the urban energy fabric? This increase in power of a capacity for controlling the entirety of energy projects may be all the more rapid because it responds to significant technico-economic issues. Indeed, the predictive reflections around energy transition [ART 16, DEB 16] often place the emphasis upon reconfiguring infrastructures around more integrated systems, whether optimizing the technical and economic dimensioning (low temperatures, low power and other aspects), implementing new “smart” regulations or even implementing synergies for recovery and pooling resources, notably through multivector energy systems (heat, gas, electricity). Yet, the viability of such systems assumes the availability of a comprehensive view and an enhanced control of all components of the energy system, since it is precisely a matter of optimizing the interfaces between these components. It would, therefore, be interesting to reflect upon organizational evolutions likely to develop when faced with these issues. This is why we will now conclude this chapter by a few words about so-called “weak signals” that we have been able to identify in some French initiatives, and their conditions for development. Two complementary avenues appear to us to be outlined. An initial trend is the transformation of urban development management models, passing from a distributed form of organization to concurrent engineering of the urban fabric. Concurrent engineering consists of the adoption of collaborative and integrative organizations upstream of product development processes (here urban systems), so as to incorporate all constraints (and avenues for resolution) of stakeholders from the start of the design phase. Among the pointers of a possible switchover toward this type of operation are included the multiplication of macro-lots, groups of large-scale developments for which public authority negotiates programming and development with teams bringing together actors in real estate development, construction and urban services. These new organizations can rely upon Buildings and Cities Information Modeling and the development of private expertise relating to supervision of large projects (such as that used in major transport projects). However, several limits are still in conflict with a concurrent development organization becoming more widespread. It is, in particular, the case for the remuneration for the functions of coordination and supervision, which one might think have insufficient value within current business models for urban fabric. Beyond this, the adoption of integrated organization poses the issue of the collective capacity for quick decision making. The capacity to “ensure” urban development is paramount in the contexts of high uncertainty and the distribution of political resources, which make decision-making processes highly delicate [ARA 04]. Yet, our doctoral research has enabled us to show that the urban contracting authority

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now relies upon a principle of subsidiarity, which precisely facilitates decisionmaking processes. The local emergence of players bringing a significant energy contracting authority is the second avenue that we have identified. These actors must have a significantly broad area of action to ensure the coherence of energy systems being deployed. Dependent upon the relevant territory, the pioneer actors of this type of organization can take various forms: where there are local infrastructural tensions, as in Brest, powerful energy planning on the part of local authorities and/or network operators may be envisaged. Where the energy system is one of the backbones of the urban project, it is instead the developer who can be led to take a highly proactive position (in Saclay for example, the public development organization has chosen to be the works owner for the energy infrastructure and envisages creating a subsidiary to manage the public service thus created). On the other hand, this type of organization assumes the emergence of professionals able to understand the issues from the spheres of energy, urban development and building construction. Moreover, it appears to us that these configurations are likely to be produced in territories where energy has a particularly important position on the scale of priorities to the extent that interdependencies are too complex to enable a systematic optimization of interfaces for all themes spanned by urban projects. 6.5. References [ARA 04] ARAB N., L’activité de projet dans l’aménagement urbain: processus d’élaboration et modes de pilotage. Les cas de la ligne B du tramway strasbourgeois et d’Odysseum à Montpellier, PhD thesis, École nationale des ponts et chaussées, 2004. [ART 16] ARTELYS, ENEA CONSULTING, BRGM, Étude de valorisation du stockage thermique et du power-to-heat, Study report, ADEME & ATEE, 2016. [AUR 11] A’URBA, ALEC33, Planification énergétique “ Facteur 4 ” de l’agglomération bordelaise. Première phase, Report, Communauté urbaine de Bordeaux & Ville de Bordeaux & ADEME, 2011. [BLA 16] BLANCHARD G., “Unstandardized standards: the making of demand in districtheating projects in France”, DEMAND Centre Conference, What energy is for: the making and dynamics of demand, Lancaster, United Kingdom, April 2016. [BLA 17] BLANCHARD G., “Quelle traduction des stratégies territoriales de transition énergétiques dans les choix opérationnels des projets d’aménagement? L’exemple de Bordeaux Saint-Jean Belcier”, Développement durable et territoires, vol. 8, no. 2, 2017. [BLA 18] BLANCHARD G., Comment la maîtrise d’ouvrage urbaine conçoit-elle les choix d’aménagement ? Élaboration et assemblage des choix énergétiques à Bordeaux Euratlantique, PhD thesis, University of Paris-Est, 2018.

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[BOR 17] BORDEAUX METROPOLE, Service public du chauffage urbain, Annual activity report, 2016, Report to the metropolitan council, 2017. [BOU 01] BOURDIN A., “Comment on fait la ville, aujourd’hui, en France”, Espaces et sociétés, vol. 2, nos 105–106, pp. 147–166, 2001. [BUL 05] BULKELEY H., BETSILL M., “Rethinking sustainable cities: Multilevel governance and the “urban” politics of climate change”, Environmental Politics, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 42–63, 2005. [BUL 14] BULKELEY H., CASTAN BROTO V., MAASSEN A., “Low-carbon transitions and the reconfiguration of urban infrastructure”, Urban Studies, vol. 51, no. 7, pp. 1471–1486, 2014. [COM 14] COMMUNAUTE D’AGGLOMERATION EST ENSEMBLE, Étude d’opportunité pour la mise en place d’un réseau de chaleur sur le secteur d’aménagement ex-RN 3/Canal de l’Ourcq, Cahier des clauses techniques particulières, 2014. [COU 10a] COUTARD O., RUTHERFORD J., “The rise of post-networked cities in Europe? Recombining infrastructural, ecological and urban transformations in low carbon transitions”, in BULKELEY H., CASTAN BROTO V., HODSON M., MARVIN S. (eds), Cities and Low Carbon Transitions, Routledge, London, 2010. [COU 10b] COUTARD O., RUTHERFORD J., “Energy transition and city-region planning: understanding the spatial politics of systemic change”, Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 711–727, 2010. [COU 16] COUTARD O., RUTHERFORD J. (eds), Beyond the Networked City: Infrastructure Reconfigurations and Urban Change in the North and South, Routledge, London, 2016. [DEB 16] DEBIZET G. (ed.), Scénarios de transition énergétique en ville. Acteurs, régulations, technologies, La Documentation française, Paris, 2016. [DEV 09] DEVISME L. (ed), Nantes, petite et grande fabrique urbaine, Parenthèses, Marseille, 2009. [EME 07] EMELIANOFF C., “La ville durable: l'hypothèse d'un tournant urbanistique en Europe”, L'Information géographique, vol. 71, no. 3, pp. 48–65, 2007. [FER 14] FERGUSON Y., Politiser l’action publique, une approche par les instruments. Le cas du programme Constellation, PhD thesis, University of Toulouse-Jean Jaurés, 2014. [GAB 15a] GABILLET P., Les entreprises locales de distribution à Grenoble et Metz. Des outils de gouvernement énergétique urbain partiellement appropriés, PhD thesis, University of Paris-Est, 2015. [GAB 15b] GABILLET P., “Energy supply and urban planning projects: Analysing tensions around district heating provision in a French eco-district”, Energy Policy, vol. 78, pp. 189–197, 2015. [GRA 16] GRABER F., “Une histoire pragmatique des formes projet”, in CHATEAURAYNAUD F., COHEN Y. (eds), Histoires pragmatiques, Éditions de l’EHESS, Paris, 2016.

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[GUY 16] GUY S., KARVONEN A., “District heating comes to ecotown: Zero-carbon housing and the rescaling of UK energy provision”, in COUTARD O., RUTHERFORD J. (eds), Beyond the Networked City: Infrastructure Reconfigurations and Urban Change in the North and South, Routledge, London, 2016. [HAM 17] HAMPIKIAN Z., De la distribution aux synergies? Circulations locales d’énergie et transformations des processus de mise en réseau de la ville, PhD thesis, University of Paris-Est, 2017. [HAW 16] HAWKEY D., WEBB J., LOVELL H., MCCRONE D., TINGEY M., WINSKEL M., Sustainable Urban Energy Policy. Heat and the City, Routledge, London, 2016. [IDT 09] IDT J., Le pilotage des projets d’aménagement urbain: entre technique et politique, PhD thesis, University of Paris VIII, 2009. [OVE 15] OVERDRIVE, Étude de sensibilité des typologies de bâtiments résidentiels et de bureaux sur la pertinence de l’approvisionnement par un réseau de chaleur ou de froid, Provisional study report, EPA Bordeaux Euratlantique, 2015. [PIN 09] PINSON G., Gouverner la ville par le projet, Presses de Sciences-Po, Paris, 2009. [POG 17] POGGI P., “Chauffage collectif – Quelles architectures hydrauliques en construction neuve?”, Qualité Construction, vol. 160, pp. 44–51, 2017. [POU 14] POUPEAU F.-M., “Central-local relations in French energy policy-Making: Towards a new pattern of territorial governance”, Environmental Policy and Governance, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 155–168, 2014. [POU 16] POUPEAU F.-M., “La gouvernance locale des réseaux d’énergie. Entre départementalisation et métropolisation”, in MARCOU G., EILLER A.-C., POUPEAU F.-M., STAROPOLI C. (eds), Gouvernance et innovations dans le système énergétique. De nouveaux défis pour les collectivités territoriales, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2016. [ROC 14] ROCHER L., “Climate-energy policies, heat provision, and urban planning: A renewal of interest in district heating in France: Insights from national and local levels”, Journal of Urban Technology, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 3–19, 2014. [ROC 17] ROCHER L., “Governing metropolitan climate-energy transition: A study of Lyon’s strategic planning”, Urban Studies, vol. 54, no. 5, pp. 1092–1107, 2017. [RUT 14a] RUTHERFORD J., COUTARD O., “Urban energy transitions: Places, processes and politics of socio-technical change”, Urban Studies, vol. 51, no. 7, pp. 1353–1377, 2014. [RUT 14b] RUTHERFORD J., “The vicissitudes of energy and climate policy in Stockholm: Politics, materiality and transition”, Urban Studies, vol. 51, no.7, pp. 1449–1470, 2014. [RUT 15] RUTHERFORD J., JAGLIN S., “Introduction to the special issue – Urban energy governance: Local actions, capacities and politics”, Energy Policy, vol. 78, pp. 173–178, 2015. [SOU 09a] SOUAMI T., Écoquartiers: secrets de fabrication. Analyse critique d’exemples européens, Les Carnets de l’info, Paris, 2009.

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[SOU 09b] SOUAMI T., “Conceptions et représentations du territoire énergétique dans les quartiers durables”, Flux, vol. 2, nos 76–77, pp. 71–81, 2009. [SUM 92] SUMMERTON J., District heating comes to town. The social shaping of an energy system, Linköping studies in art and science, Linköping, 1992. [TAR 15] TARDIEU C., Transition énergétique dans les projets urbains: conditions de mise en œuvre. Analyse des cas Paris Rive Gauche, Clichy-Batignolles et Paris Nord Est, PhD thesis, University of Lille 1, 2015.

7 Positive Energy and Networks: Local Energy Autonomy as a Vector for Controlling Flows

One of the transformations in the recent promotions of local energy autonomy is called “positive energy”, a concept first applied to the French construction industry through BEPOS (Bâtiment à Energie Positive – positive energy building) and then to other scales, such as blocks of houses, neighborhoods or territories. The underlying idea remains the same every time: to produce more energy than is consumed in a year in a given geographical area. A priori, the development of such local production contrasts with the dominant model of energy production through centralized systems, linked to consumption areas by large networks whose technico-economic functioning is based on a principle of solidarity through a single tariff for consumers, regardless of their actual network use. Questions then arise surrounding the relationships between the areas that we want to be autonomous in energy production, and even contributors to global production, and the rest of the territory: how do energy and financial flows flow between a “positive energy” group and its environment? How are infrastructures interconnected (or not interconnected)? What are the challenges of these interactions? The purpose of this chapter is to address these questions, in particular through the socio-technical analysis of the La Confluence district’s energy supply in Lyon, and especially of the Hikari block, named “the first positive energy block in France” by its developer Bouygues Immobilier. The chapter is structured in four parts. The first part deals with an emerging criticism of the conception of positive energy at the Chapter written by Zélia HAMPIKIAN.

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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building level by real estate actors and those working in urban production, which reflects a challenge of distributing the balance between production and consumption. The second part presents the principles of the Hikari block’s energy functioning and its relationship with the La Confluence district, distinguishing between heat and electricity flows. Based on this distinction, the third part shows that, beyond the discourses related to transition or energy efficiency, the choice of an autonomy scale is also linked to flow control issues. Finally, the last part shows that recent regulatory (and technological) developments tend to redistribute this control and therefore the financial value that can result from it, as illustrated once again by the projects carried out by the actors in La Confluence. 7.1. Positive energy, autonomy and flow dynamics The notion of a positive energy building is as much a concept, as described in the introduction, as it is a label and a possible future regulation in France. Indeed, although the previous thermal regulations for new buildings (RT2005, RT2012) only imposed consumption1 constraints, the regulations in force from 2020 should impose as standard a production higher than consumption at the building level, in particular as an application of the Grenelle laws [ADE 08]. As a result, the number of energyproducing buildings, while not representing a significant proportion of all buildings, is expected to increase significantly. This perspective raises two lines of questioning and visions of the energy interaction between these buildings and their environment, which are however based on a common observation: if these buildings must produce more energy than they consume annually, this does not guarantee that they produce this energy at the same time they consume it. This is particularly the case when production systems are intermittent, like thermal or photovoltaic solar panels, which are widely used to meet local production objectives. In technical terms, while the energy balance of these buildings must be neutral, they are not autonomous in terms of capacity and it may be necessary to extract energy from an external source to meet users’ needs. Conversely, their energy production may exceed their needs at some point in time: an example of such a shift is that of solar production to supply homes, even though this production is most significant in the middle of the day, when homes are often empty [MED 14]. In short, a positive energy balance over the course of a year is not equivalent to achieve independence between the local energy system and the surrounding infrastructure: interactions with energy networks of various scales may be necessary to meet user needs or to expel surpluses, even though these networks are not designed in this way.

1 For the consumption of heating and cooling, domestic hot water and lighting.

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Faced with this situation, the French Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy (MEDDE), guarantor of the transition to RT2020, considered in 2014 encouraging self-consumption or self-production with a working group composed of representatives of solar energy professionals [MED 14]. The problem was as follows: since the management of interactions between these buildings and the network was complex, could methods be found to reduce these interactions to a minimum? In other words, could they encourage the users of these buildings to consume all the energy they produce so that they do not need to inject a surplus in the network (self-consumption) or to produce all the energy they consume so that they do not need to extract flows from the network (self-production)? The document produced by the working group reviews possible incentives for synchronization between consumption and production or for choosing a sizing of production systems that limits interactions with the network. Nevertheless, the analysis carried out concluded that it is worthwhile not to limit the reflection on local energy autonomy to the scale of the building, in particular under the impetus of the Hespul association2 [MED 14, p. 46]: “the pooling of investments and the proliferation of consumption on the scale of several buildings should therefore be considered. Thus, solar installations – photovoltaic and thermal – of a building will be able to supply the other buildings on the urban block [...]: on the scale of this block, consumption will be entirely covered by decentralized production, without each building necessarily being energy autonomous”. This conclusion is underpinned by an argument that concerns the temporal balance between production and consumption [MED 14, p. 46]: “the reflection on ‘urban blocks’ and BEPOS buildings will therefore also have to integrate this research, at all times, of the best possible adequacy of the production and consumption curves in order to minimize the maximum powers injected”. In other words, according to the argumentation adopted, the fewer consumers connected to a given production infrastructure, the more difficult it is to make optimal use of it over time. There is, therefore, a tension in the discourse between a call for more local autonomy so as not to disrupt the operation of centrally managed distribution infrastructures and the recognition of an intrinsic inefficiency of this autonomy, which could be resolved by increased interaction between buildings. This latter vision is in line with the one that has developed in recent years among real estate production players, whose various representatives criticize the notion of BEPOS that RT2020 could impose on them. Thus, at the Institut Français pour la Performance Energétique du Bâtiment (IFPEB, the French institute for the energy performance of buildings), which brings together private actors in real estate,

2 Interview with the head of the networks and planning division, Hespul (02/04/2015).

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construction and energy sectors3, the notion of BEPOS “2.0” is developing. The expression used to define it is “building with optimized energy, power and solidarity 2.0” [IFP 16]. In the institute’s view, solidarity refers to a series of characteristics, first and foremost: “local exchanges, when it is proven that the buildings complement each other and that these transactions are technically possible (mutualization organization and energy solidarity, mixed use at the district level)” [IFP 16, p.20]. It is, therefore, a question of introducing interactions between energy-producing buildings and their environment, in particular to avoid the oversizing of production systems involved in the search for complete autonomy [IFP 16, p. 12]: “a BEPOS 2.0 building does not necessarily achieve the ‘annual positive energy’ equation, but interacts in an intelligent way with the other consumers and producers in its area”. The same use of the notion of solidarity applied to energy can be found in the promoter Eiffage Immobilier’s message4. Forged as part of the Phosphore research program conducted by the company from 2007 onwards [EIF 14, p. 73], the expression “energy solidarity” is used to explain a principle of going beyond the scale of the building to think about energy performance by “sharing and balancing production and consumption on a block scale: each building, according to its nature, size and orientation, has a different profile and potential in terms of energy performance. [...] Phosphore’s teams have chosen to move away from the individual approach, which is considered counterproductive, in favor of a systemic approach of energy solidarity”. Similarly, the Plan Bâtiment Durable (sustainable building plan), which brings together building and real estate stakeholders to structure an approach to achieve energy efficiency objectives, advocates exceeding the building scale. The idea behind this is that of a multiscale optimization [PLA 13, p. 4]: “the different scales – the building, the district, then the territories at national level, and beyond that, the major networks at European level – will communicate and allow energy optimization, both economically, in terms of regulation (storage and production), and in terms of securing energy supply”. In short, these different discourses clearly reveal the tension that positive energy systems bring to the forefront: their interaction with already existing larger scale networks disrupts their management by national operators, while complete self-sufficiency would impose significant technical and economic constraints on the designers, managers and users of these systems. Thus, the arguments put forward by the actors mentioned in this section highlight the question of interactions between 3 The institute carries out studies and partnership projects to “implement, thanks to operational knowledge, the means of an ambitious and efficient energy and environmental transition for real estate and construction compatible with the market” (online at: http://www.ifpeb.fr/qui-sommesnous/missions-et-objectifs/ [accessed on August 01, 2016]). 4 The developer has registered the concept as a trademark.

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buildings, blocks or neighborhoods with positive energy and their environment as a technical and economic challenge: who, as managers of the group or those of larger scale networks, must implement the technical systems and bear the costs associated with the difficulty of finding a local balance between production and consumption? 7.2. The case of Lyon confluence and the Hikari block: a rhetoric of mutualization for achieving partial self-sufficiency Now that we have identified this issue, we propose to analyze its resolution in the concrete case of the Hikari positive energy block in the La Confluence district of Lyon. The objective here is to understand the interactions between stakeholder relationships and technical systems in the dynamic construction of this block and its exchanges, in terms of energy, with the surrounding neighborhood and networks, i.e. to conduct a sociotechnical analysis [GUY 11]. We base this on a field survey conducted between May 2014 and March 2016 during which we interviewed project stakeholders through semidirective interviews, visited the site, monitored its development, attended public presentations and collected press articles, presentations and working documents [HAM 17]. This work allowed us to reconstitute the construction dynamics of the block’s energy system and, more broadly, of the neighborhood where it is located. To understand it, we had to first synthetically trace the emergence of the project. In Lyon, the development of La Confluence was initiated in the early 2000s, when the Urban Community of Greater Lyon decided to regenerate a district considered isolated in the heart of the city. La Confluence is indeed situated between the Rhône and the Saône located in the historical heart of the Lyon conurbation. The local authority introduced an ad hoc developer, the SEM (Société d'Economie Mixte – Economy Mixed Company) Lyon Confluence, which has now become an SPL (Société Publique Locale – Local Public Company5), this change in status allowing it in particular to manage public services, of which we will see one of the applications below. The operation was the subject of two ZACs (Zones d’Aménagement Concertée6 – Concerted Development Areas), the first of which has now been completed. Initially, energy issues were not part of the stakes in the redevelopment of this neighborhood, particularly because the promotion of the operation to real estate 5 A Société Publique Locale is a French form of a limited company that can only have local public governments as shareholders. 6 A Zone d’Aménagement Concerté is a common French form of urban development operation in which a local authority or public body decides to provide services in a specific zone in order to subsequently sell or concede the land to public or privates users.

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operators was considered complex and the developer did not wish to add more constraints to the lot buyers. The energy approach gradually emerged during the project, in a primarily partnership oriented perspective aimed at finding funds to finance projects that would enhance the neighborhood’s environmental quality [HAM 17]. At the time of the preparation for the launch of the second ZAC of development operation, i.e. at the beginning of the 2010s, the reflections on the energy strategy of the operation were relaunched: “this is where the question arises with regard to these approaches, this cooperation: but what is possible, what is relevant to propose to this territory, rather than to add efficient buildings next to each other?”7. It was within this framework that the “Lyon Smart Community” project emerged, in partnership with the NEDO (New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Agency), the Japanese equivalent of ADEME (Agence de l'Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l'Energie). Aiming, in terms of the Japanese agency, to make La Confluence an interesting showcase for the integration of Japanese companies into the European market of “sustainable districts”, the project consisted of financing demonstration projects. One of them was a “positive energy block” project on the last lot of the ZAC1, known at the time as block P. It was the latter that we were interested in. In 2011, after the agreement was signed between SPL, Grand Lyon and NEDO, the Japanese agency made a call for tenders to designate the Japanese company that would be part of the technology partnership. Toshiba won the competition, seizing the opportunity to demonstrate its offer for energy and the city in a highly publicized district8. Once this partnership was established, the SPL launched an international competition to select the team that would design and build block P. At this stage, the instructions were as follows: the block must include housing, offices and shops and must, of course, reflect positive energy on a 1-year scale, but with a more demanding acceptance than the usual BEPOS label. Indeed, it was no longer only the regulatory uses (heating, cooling, domestic hot water, lighting, ventilation) that had to be taken into account in the annual energy balance but also the so-called “specific” uses of electricity, i.e. the consumption of household and computer appliances, which is not the case for the majority of buildings bearing the BEPOS stamp9. In addition, through a calculation device, the developer strongly encouraged 7 The director of SPL Lyon Confluence speaking during the operational development meetings, 06/10/2015. 8 The Smart Community Director of Toshiba France speaking at a PUCA seminar, 26/01/2015. 9 See the inventory of “positive energy” operations carried out by ADEME on the following website: https://www.observatoirebbc.org/bepos, [accessed 03 December, 2017]. It can be seen that less than half of these operations take all uses into account when calculating the energy balance.

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designerrs to supply thhe block usinng biomass10. Finally, the team had to include a consultinng firm speciaalized in smart grid issues and be able to work in paartnership with Tosshiba, which provided p all thhe energy systtems for the prroject. At thhe end of the competition, to which 17 teams t enteredd in the first pphase and which piitted four proj ojects against each other in n the second phase, p the teaam led by Bouyguees Immobilierr, together with the archittectural firm Kengo Kumaa and the design firm fi Manaslu Ing., won (see Figure 7.1 a summary off the relationss between the varioous stakeholdeers in the operration). The proposed p projeect was calledd “Hikari” and conssisted of threee buildings with w mixed fun nctions (see a representatioon of the project and a the compoosition of the block b in Figurre 7.2)11.

Figure 7.1. 7 Summaryy diagram of th he actors invollved in the “en nergy” part of tthe Hikari blo ock constructio on and their re elationships with w each otherr – author’s fig gure

10 The prrimary energy coefficient c for biomass b is chosen very low com mpared to electtricity. 11 It should be noted thhat Bouygues Immobilier’s I Hikari H project was w not conducted with a common approach, withh Bouygues Coonstruction’s ABC concept (A Autonomous Buuilding for Citizens) aiming to prooduce autonom mous buildings in terms of water, w energy and waste managem ment (interview w with the Dirrector of Inno ovation and Suustainable Devvelopment, Bouyguess Immobilier, 15/10/2014).

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Figure 7.2. Presentation of the Hikari block (source: Bouygues Immobilier). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

In addition to an architectural composition and high-performance technical solutions on the building budget (insulation, high waterproofing and home automation), the team also proposed a particular energy design that met the constraints of positive energy through the concept of “pooling”: energy production, which comes from biomass cogeneration (vegetable oil), absorption chillers and solar panels, was shared between all the functions of the block rather than designed individually (see Figure 7.3). The idea put forward by the promoter was as follows: the diversity of functions at the scale of the block makes it easier to find a balance between local production and consumption, and thus to reduce the installed production capacity within the group, compared to a design that is specific to each building. We, therefore, find the argument presented in the first part of this chapter that positive energy should be thought of on a scale that goes beyond that of the building. The promoter thus justified that the block’s heat production systems should be designed to be self-sufficient: the block is self-sufficient in this respect and does not interact with its environment. In short, mutualization is presented as a vector of autonomy in terms of energy flow.

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Figure 7.3. Schematic representation of the Hikari block’s energy functioning (source: Bouygues Immobilier). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

However, it can be seen in practice that the mix of activities at the block level was not sufficient to achieve such a result. Despite the complementary nature of the uses between weekdays and weekends and between daytime and evening, which ensures consumption at all times, there was still a significant peak in consumption and the division of power announced by Bouygues Immobilier was much more effective because of the installation of hot water storage tanks: “we have 28 m3 of storage, which allows us to undersize biomass cogeneration to the strict necessary minimum”12. Thus, the autonomy of the heat production system on a block scale, beyond the size gains allowed by the functional mix, was made possible by a more complex technical system. In comparison, the approach to managing electricity flows at the block level was twofold. On the one hand, the electricity produced by biomass cogeneration was entirely consumed by the block’s offices and shops. This was made possible, on the one hand, because this production was low compared to the needs of all activities and, on the other hand, because of a storage battery supported by Toshiba as part of the partnership with NEDO. In this case, we find a logic comparable to the design of the heat supply system: we obtained a flow autonomy because of a more complex technical system. On the other hand, the electricity produced by the solar panels 12 Interview with the Director of Manaslu Ing. (02/04/2015).

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located on the facades of the buildings was transferred to the national grid managed by Enedis. There was, therefore, no search for a temporal balance between production and consumption for this particular flow at the block scale, and the conceptors were therefore more interested in the annual energy balance than in the design of the energy system. If we put this result in perspective with the strain we discovered at the end of the previous section, we can conclude that, in the case of the Hikari block, it was solved in a dual way: the designers and users of the block bore the equilibrium cost for heat flows through a technical complexity of their supply system, while the national grid operator bore the cost of equilibrium for photovoltaic electricity flows. Therefore, we wonder why this duality exists: what interests do the project actors put forward to justify it? Was it negotiated? 7.3. The “right” scale of autonomy and control over flows To understand the stakeholders’ interests in the choice for partial autonomy, we must first discuss the promoter’s motivations in designing the block’s energy system. Indeed, among the constraints imposed by the developer on the teams, which we recalled in the previous section, nowhere was the need to design a shared system indicated. The proposal, therefore, came entirely from the winning team and a more precise assessment shows that the promoter was the originator. When asked about the choice of this mutualization, the Bouygues Immobilier representatives involved in the project located themselves on the scale of the district or city, which may seem to concern neither a property developer nor the Hikari block. However, this was indeed a deliberate strategy by Bouygues Immobilier, which took the form of the construction of the UrbanEra brand (see Figure 7.4 for a representation of what it covers). To justify this evolution, the promoter used a very detailed argument based on two issues: the financing of urban services and the scale at which they could find an economic balance: “local public authorities no longer have money [...] but still have projects and development requests on the part of their territory. So they understood one thing: there are a number of services that can be financed by private promoter and private operators. We tell them, okay, but we can’t do that, we can’t find an economic model on a 20-unit building, the economic model of these shared services [...] we know how to do it on an entire neighborhood. [...] So that’s why, in our consultations, before we had barely 10% of consultations on neighborhoods, now we've reached 30%”13.

13 Interview with the Innovation and Sustainable Development Director, Bouygues Immobilier (15/10/2014).

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Figure e 7.4. The Urb banEra approa ach (source: Bouygues B Imm mobilier presen ntation). For a color ve ersion of this figure, f see ww ww.iste.co.uk/llopez/local.zip p

The choice of eneergy pooling in the case of o Hikari is prrecisely an ellement of ment of this strrategy, the scaale of the blocck being desiggned as a firstt step that deploym would allow, a later onn, to move onn to that of the t district orr the city. It is also a questionn of demonsstrating to thhe actors of national energy e netwoorks that developm ments of the type t proposedd by UrbanErra did not disrrupt their connventional operationn: “one couldd say to oneseelf, I inject[th he surplus eneergy] into thee network and thenn this is EDF's 's problem. It seems more intelligent i to say s to ourselvves: let us look, loccally, if theree are not habitats that havve local needss. We must be able to create a first level of local optimizaation to have the smoothestt possible connsumption w has valuue in terms off economic model. m A buildding that conssumes the curve, which same thiing all the tiime or a building that is constantly osscillating, in terms of energy, ecological, and a thereforee economic impacts, i is not n entirely tthe same mmobilier, thee interest of pooling p on thee scale of thing”14. In short, for Bouygues Im the Hikkari block is based on a demonstratiive objectivee: the promooter must demonsttrate its abilityy to build partts of the city th hat offer enerrgy productionn services without their t operationn disrupting thhat of the larg ger scale netwoorks. How wever, a contraadiction appears between the t discourse held by the promoter and the concrete desiign of the bloock’s energy system: the example giveen, in the 14 Innovaation Manager, Bouygues Imm mobilier, speakiing at a PUCA seminar s (22/10//2014).

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excerpt from the interview cited above and in all the discourse we have collected, concerns the electricity grid. However, we have seen that in the case of Hikari, the interactions between local production and the national grid are frequent since the solar panels are all connected to the grid managed by Enedis. This contradiction is also the subject of criticism from the SPL: “we inject globally on the network and it is a balance... There is almost no self-consumption”15. The developer is in opposition to this conception and explains that he wants to develop a greater autonomy for photovoltaic electricity flows in other blocks: “we would like to work in particular on the self-consumption of photovoltaic production, by setting up inverters that will facilitate microstorage, to play precisely between production, tertiary consumption, consumption of... but here it is, to do it in a much more active way, here [in regards to Hikari] is a little... it is a little virtual”16. Nevertheless, despite apparently contradictory conceptions of energy autonomy between the two actors, the promoter did not oppose the developer’s vision. In line with the general discourse accompanying the deployment of the UrbanEra brand, it also pursued the objective of developing the self-consumption of electricity by striking a balance at local level. To justify why it had not been set up in the Hikari block, its representatives put forward a legal limit that would prevent this balance from being achieved on the right scale: “we know that technically it is feasible and we now just have a regulatory constraint, which is the ERDF [now known as Enedis], which has the monopoly of distribution in France, does not allow trade across the public space. That is, if I produce energy here, I can't send it across the street because I'm crossing a public road. We're eagerly waiting for it to be changed!”17. In short, the promoter justified not having designed an autarky for the electrical part of the block’s supply by the impossibility of implementing it on this scale without having to install a large, costly and complex storage capacity. It is, therefore, understandable that the visions of the actors were similar: each had the objective of developing the energy autonomy of local groups. However, and in an apparently contradictory way, the developer had another criticism of the design of Hikari’s energy system, this time relating to the block’s heat supply: unlike in the case of electricity, the block’s autarky was in this respect not viewed favorably by the SPL. The reason for this viewpoint had to be sought on the side of another network, this time at the neighborhood level. In 2013, still according to a “zero carbon” strategy, the developer decided to build a heating network at La Confluence and in the adjacent Saint Blandine district, supplied by a 15 Interview with the Sustainable Development Project Manager at SPL Lyon Confluence (01/04/2015). 16 Ibid. 17 Interview with the Innovation and Sustainable Development Director, Bouygues Immobilier (15/10/2014).

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biomass cogeneration plant located at the southerrn tip of the district d (see Figgure 7.5), w thereforee produce bothh heat for the district and electricity to be fed into which would the natioonal grid. Thee developer was w also requiired to operatte this networrk, which was one of the fundam mental reasonss for the change in status thhat allowed hiim to be a public seervice manageer, mentioned in the previou us section.

Figure e 7.5. Scope of o the heating network n servic ce (source: SP PL Lyon Conflluence). N Note: Chaufferrie biomasse = biomass boiiler room. For a color versio on of this t figure, see e www.iste.co..uk/lopez/loca al.zip

How wever, the faillure to conneect a building g to the edgee of the netw work was considerred as a loss of o income forr the developer. In addition, the SPL coonsidered that the block’s prodduction couldd have been taken into account in thee heating

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network project and that the balance between the latter and local consumption could thus have been found at the district level, without the need to install a major storage facility within Hikari: “I do not see that there is any profitability in not transferring their production to the heating network”18. In short, the developer’s relationship with the block’s energy design chosen by the promoter, summarized in Table 7.1, is dualistic and does not follow a simple search for technical and economic efficiency. On the contrary, it was the promoter’s choices that met technical and economic constraints: autarky is easier to achieve for heating than for electricity, the former being much easier to store than the latter, which, moreover, can be transported with fewer losses. To understand this duality of perception, we propose to introduce the notion of control into the equation. Indeed, it can be seen that beyond a question of a “good” scale of autonomy, the developer’s criticisms can be related to the control that the promoter’s choices allow him or her to keep or not to keep with regard to the circulation of energy. The integration of electricity flows into the national grid certainly caused the promoter to lose some control over the flows, but it also caused loss of control for the developer, just as the autarky in terms of heat prevented him/her from having a look at their management. In other words, the energy design choices advocated by the developer were only a vector of energy efficiency, via a greater diversity of flows, if the district scale alone is considered. Heat

Electricity

Principle of the block’s energy design by the promoter

Autarky, particularly with regard to the district heating network

Connection of the local generation system to the national power grid

Developer's opinion on this design

Autarky is criticized by the developer

The connection is criticized by the developer

Proposed explanation of the opinion

Connecting the block to the heating network would give the developer control over a larger quantity of flows.

Connection to the electricity grid is beyond the developer’s control

Table 7.1. Summary of the promoter’s choices for the energy operation for heating and electricity flows of the Hikari block and the developer’s relationship with this design 18 Interview with the Sustainable Development Project Manager at SPL Lyon Confluence (01/04/2015).

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The search for autonomy at one scale or another thus becomes a vector of control for the actors involved in urban design and management at these scales. This logic was reflected in Bouygues Immobilier’s report to national electricity players as part of the development of the UrbanEra brand. Indeed, the promoter regularly communicated the idea that he did not pursue the objective of creating completely self-sufficient neighborhoods in this respect, in order to avoid making his strategy appear as a strong threat to Enedis overall control over the flows: “we wanted to show them that we did not want to do their job”19. In addition to the organizational and financial cost issues identified in the first part of this chapter, the question of the scale of autonomy added an issue of attributing control over the circulating flows. The last part of this chapter shows, again based on the case of La Confluence, that this issue is translated into questions regarding the management model and distribution of the financial value of this circulation. 7.4. From autonomy to flow management: who is in charge? Following reflections on the self-consumption of photovoltaic electricity at the district level, the SPL questioned the model to be followed in order to manage the local circulation of flows: “in fact, at the city level, it works. So at the neighborhood level it necessarily works. The question is: who is in control? […]. There is indeed the question of the very local manager model. [...] All we would have to do is sell [to the lot owners] just one volume, and keep the roof, and then we get a little back on the land charge to produce, and we will say to them, don’t worry about it, we’ll do it for you and we’ll manage it. It’s a kind of micro-ERDF. Because here we are not going to inject energy into the network at all, so we will only live on the subscription that will be given to us”20. This ambition took on a more concrete form at the end of 2015 when, still according to a fundraising strategy through partnerships, the developer and the Lyon Metropolitan Area responded to a national call for projects called “démonstrateurs industriels pour la ville durable” (DIVD), launched by the French Ministry of the Environment, Energy and the Sea and aimed at “experimenting with new ways of designing and managing urban projects”21. The

19 Interview with the Innovation and Sustainable Development Director, Bouygues Immobilier (15/10/2014). 20 Interview with the Sustainable Development Project Manager at SPL Lyon Confluence (01/04/2015). 21 Extract from the description of the call for projects on the website of the French Interministerial Agency for Urban Planning, Construction and Architecture [accessed: 15/02/2019]: continuation of the extract: “the collective benefits expected from this experiment are a more sober use of resources, a reduction in public and private costs, greater social cohesion and a facilitated democracy”, http://www.urbanisme-puca.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/AAPD emonstrateurVilleDurable.pdf.

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consortiuum proposed by the comm munity was one o of the winners, w with a project called Lyyon Living Laab. The objective of this project was to rethiink the local governance of urban services,, and in particcular about ennergy supply:: “the ambitioon is to strenggthen the role of the t communityy, by giving itt the means to o act and to bring b about thhe city of tomorrow w around a concrete dem monstration on o the scale of the La Coonfluence district, aiming to deesign a sustaiinable, desirable and innovvative districtt and the 22 g operatoor of urban services” s . Inn concrete teerms, this establishhment of a global involvess the emergennce of a locall public operaator of “territtorial energy data and services”” that, via a diigital platform m, would contrrol the circulaation of energyy flows at the scalee of La Confluuence. This ambition oncce again reveaaled a confron ntation betweeen the model defended by the developer and that proposedd by the prom moter. Indeed, Bouygues Im mmobilier, in partneership with Allstom, createdd in 2011 a staart-up companny called Embiix, whose objectivee was to offerr services relatted to energy management in eco-neighbborhoods. In particcular, Embix proposed a Community Energy Mannagement Sysstem (see Figure 7.6), 7 i.e. an infformation sysstem operated by the company whose aim was to optimizee the flow of energy at thee “local grid””. In short, thhrough this suubsidiary, Bouyguees Immobilierr proposed creating a local energy e operatoor.

Figurre 7.6. The Co ommunity Ene ergy Managem ment System developed d by E Embix (sou urce: Embix prresentation brrochure). For a color version n of this figure, see www.istte.co.uk/lopez//local.zip 22 Descriiption of the Lyyon Living Lab project on the PUCA websitee, http://www.uurbanismepuca.gouvv.fr/divd-lyon-lliving-lab-a819.html, last conssulted on 01/06//2016.

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While at this stage the public model seems to have prevailed over the La Confluence district through the Lyon Living Lab project, recent developments could provide a counter model, again on the part of Bouygues Immobilier. To understand them, we need to take a detour through a regulatory change initiated in the summer of 2016. As a representative of the promoter mentioned in the second part of this chapter points out, the control that private actors can exercise over the circulation of energy flows is initially limited by the impossibility of exchanging electricity through public spaces outside the national grid: this is the expression of Enedis’ monopoly over the entire French territory. As we have understood, this rule bothered the promoter, who argued against it on the basis of an idea of reducing the costs of renewable energies which, when consumed locally, induce lower infrastructure needs compared to centralized sources: “it is essential that this lower network investment, linked to renewable energies, is reflected in the economic equation”23. In fact, what the promoter criticized is found in TURPE’s payment rule (Tarif d’Utilisation des Réseaux Publics d’Electricité24) linked to the obligation to borrow from the Enedis network: “as soon as I step outside, ERDF taxes me the TURPE on my outward journey and the TURPE on my return. I pay twice the TURPE so my energy [produced and consumed locally] is no longer profitable at all”25. The requests of the actors in the real estate production sector, relayed in particular by the IFPEB, which we have dealt with in the first part of this chapter, were first addressed in June 2016 in a draft order. The latter aimed to implement part of article 119 of the French Energy Transition Law for Green Growth26, which focuses on self-consumption, including “collective self-consumption” of electricity. In this project, self-consumption was defined collectively as “when a sale of electricity is made between one or more final consumers and one or more producers”, linked to each other in various collective forms, “whose extraction and injection points are located on the same low voltage antenna27 of the public 23 Eric l’Helguen, CEO of Embix, January 2015, [ESB 15]. 24 The TURPE is a tariff set by the French State, paid by any user of the French electricity grid to pay the infrastructure manager (Enedis). Its amount is the same regardless of the user’s location. 25 Interview with the Head of Energy Innovation and Smart Grids, Bouygues Immobilier, 20/01/2016. 26 Law No. 2015-992 of August 17, 2015 on the energy transition for green growth, published in the Journal officiel de la République Française (Official Journal of the French) on August 18, 2015. 27 The CRE notes that terminology is not part of the vocabulary of energy companies and is not legally defined and that the term “low-voltage start” is preferable [CRE 16].

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distribution network”28. Collective self-consumption, therefore, corresponds to local exchanges of energy production associated with financial exchanges on a scale that can go beyond the framework of private blocks. Beyond this definition, the draft order set out two substantial changes to the current organization of the French electricity distribution network. First, it proposed that the CRE (Commission de Régulation des Energies – French Energy regulatory Commission, in charge of proposing to the State the value of the TURPE) establish tariffs for the use of public distribution networks specific to these operations (Art. L. 315-3). Second, it proposed to allow the resale of surplus local production directly to a third party, without going through conventional operators (Art. L. 315-5). The project also argued that public grid operators must facilitate these operations, particularly with regard to electricity metering (Art. L. 315-6). The CRE has a number of criticisms of the text and in particular the part of the text that concerns the TURPE. Thus, while the Commission “considers it relevant that the pricing of networks in the context of self-consumption operation should reflect this particular use”, it “does not, however, favor the creation of specific tariff categories that could eventually freeze the structure of tariffs for the use of public electricity networks” [CRE 16, p. 2]. These precautions regarding a simple tariff may seem excessive. However, they take into account its important role in the national organization of electricity distribution in France: “The TURPE is an extremely powerful political tool for territorial organization. [...] All the directives on which France was built and the distribution of energy are behind a simple tariff”29. In short, the CRE is concerned about the creation of the first exceptions to national solidarity that it organizes through the TURPE, arguing in particular that there is little feedback on collective self-consumption operations and their technical impact on the network. The Commission’s position is, therefore, conservative with regard to the organization of the current electricity system, which is fundamentally opposed to the draft order. Despite this reluctance on the part of a major player in the regulation of the French electricity system, the final order was finally published in the Journal officiel on July 28, 2016, then translated into a law30, and finally into an implementing

28 Draft order on self-consumption of electricity, French Ministry of the Environment, Energy and the Sea, June 4, 2016. 29 Interview with the IFPEB Director (07/03/2016). 30 Law No. 2017-227 of February 24, 2017 ratifying Ordinances No. 2016-1019 of July 27, 2016 on self-consumption of electricity and No. 2016-1059 of August 3, 2016 on the production of electricity from renewable energy sources and adapting certain provisions relating to electricity and gas networks and renewable energy.

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decree31 that did not include all the CRE’s recommendations, which once again expressed its disagreement [CRE 17]. More precisely, the official text confirms the creation of a specific TURPE or “micro-TURPE” [POI 16]. However, it is limited to low-power installations (less than 100 kW), but it can be cumulated in the case of a collective self-consumption operation. In this way, the legislator limits the loss of income that could result from this movement for Enedis, while opening a first gap toward a reorganization of solidarity in the financing of electricity infrastructure. It is precisely this gap that brings us back to La Confluence and the Bouygues Immobilier district. Indeed, less than 3 months after the publication of the order, the promoter publicly announced his intention to use it to create “a decentralized local network for the supervision of energy exchanges in the city of Lyon”32. To do this, the promoter intended to use blockchain technology to guarantee each user the source of the electricity they consume: in short, it was a question of securing transactions to justify that exchanges were effectively at local scale and that the tariff for using the network was adjusted. The first phase of the project consisted of allowing these exchanges between inhabitants of the same building, before the value of the “self-consumption TURPE” was published and allowed the implementation of exchanges from one building to the next. The proposed model was therefore still different since the blockchain technology, built to work without a trusted third party in decentralized transactions, had to itself play the role of the intermediate operator allowing flow management. However, the promoter found it to be of a natural financial interest, since the suppliers of such technology could be remunerated on the transactions they permitted. In short, the decline in the value of the TURPE, justified by the search for greater local autonomy, enabled private actors such as Bouygues Immobilier to generate financial value through the proposal of a local transaction management infrastructure. The promoter did not hide this ambition, since one of its representatives explained that he ultimately wished to position himself as an actor in energy trading33. In short, in the ongoing process of energy empowerment at various local levels, whether we are talking about blocks, neighborhoods or cities, the fundamental 31 Decree No. 2017-676 of April 28, 2017 on self-consumption of electricity and amending Articles D. 314-15 and D. 314-23 to D. 314-25 of the Energy Code. 32 “Bouygues immobilier s’associe à stratum et energisme pour déployer une blockchain pour smart grid”, press release, 05/10/2016, https://www.bouygues-immobilier-corporate.com/ news-room/bouygues-immobilier-sassocie-stratumn-et-energisme-pour-deployer-une-blockchainpour-smart, last accessed on 12/03/2017. 33 Interview with the Innovation and Sustainable Development Director, Bouygues Immobilier (15/10/2014).

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question of the distribution of the costs and benefits represented by energy flows is at stake, linked to the control that the various actors can exercise over them. Current regulatory developments, as well as the larger share that some local authorities intend to play in the management of their energy supply, are creating opposition between still unstable models for managing this autonomy. However, each one can strongly disrupt the monopolistic model based on national solidarity that we have known in France for more than 60 years. 7.5. Conclusion Since the early 2000s, the territory of La Confluence in Lyon has been the site of energy experiments in which models of local empowerment have been successively proposed. In this chapter, we have analyzed these developments and identified a series of challenges associated with the deployment of positive energy systems. At first glance, the issue facing those involved in the design and management of these units, as well as those who operate the energy networks that surround them, is that of achieving a dynamic balance between production and consumption. On the one hand, the self-sufficiency of these systems is accompanied by significant additional technical and economic costs for their users and managers, particularly because of the need to install storage devices. On the other hand, achieving balance through interactions with larger scale networks transfers these costs to the operators of the latter. Thus, according to this chapter, each of these actors should have an interest in shifting the responsibility for this balance to others. Nevertheless, a second issue is added to this first and makes reading more complex: avoiding this responsibility also means losing control over the circulation of flows, which is associated with a financial issue since the actors who control it can derive value from it as a transaction intermediary. The game is no longer so clear since both the autonomy and the connection of these building groups each bring costs and benefits to all actors. The analysis of the projects deployed at La Confluence shows that the solution of this equation is not given in advance: the historical managers of national networks, local authorities and private actors in urban production each propose models that aim to preserve or take credit, at least in part, for the value of the circulation of energy flows. In short, the current promotion of local energy empowerment is being seized by actors who are conventionally outside the sphere of energy supply as a window of opportunity to redesign the organization of the latter in their favor.

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7.6. References [ADE 08] ADEME, Feuille de route sur les bâtiments et îlots à énergie positive et à bilan carbone minimum, Public Report, 2008. [CRE 16] CRE, Délibération de la CRE du 13 juillet 2016 portant avis sur le projet d’ordonnance relative à l’autoconsommation d’électricité, 2016. [CRE 17] CRE, Délibération de la CRE du 13 avril 2017 portant avis sur le projet de décret relatif à l’autoconsommation d’électricité et modifiant les articles D. 314-15, D. 314-23 à D. 314-25 du code de l’énergie, 2017. [EIF 14] EIFFAGE, Des villes et des hommes, Contributions du laboratoire Phosphore d’Eiffage à la ville durable, 2014. [ESB 14] E-SBA, “Urgences”, L’actualité mensuelle de la Smart Building Alliance, no. 2, available at: http://www.smartbuildingsalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/e-SBA2_ janv15.pdf [accessed 22 July, 2016], 2015. [GAB 15] GABILLET P., “Energy supply and urban planning projects: Analysing tensions around district heating provision in a French eco-district”, Energy Policy, vol. 78, pp. 189–197, 2015. [GUY 11] GUY S., KARVONEN A., “Using sociotechnical methods: researching humantechnological dynamics in the city”, in MASON J., DALE A. (eds), Understanding Social Research: Thinking Creatively about Method, Sage Publications, London, 2011. [HAM 17] HAMPIKIAN Z., De la distribution aux synergies? Circulations locales d’énergie et transformation des processus de mise en réseau de la ville, PhD Thesis, Université Paris Est, Champs-sur-Marne, 2017. [IFP 16] IFPEB, Le BEPOS 2.0 sera (surtout) un Bâtiment à Énergie et Puissance Optimisée et Solidaire!, Regulatory work, 2016. [MED 14] MEDDE, Rapport sur l’autoconsommation et l’autoproduction de l’électricité renouvelable, Report, 2014. [PLA 13] PLAN BATIMENT DURABLE, Embarquement immédiat pour un bâti sobre, robuste et désirable, Group progress “Réflexion Bâtiment Responsable 2020-2050”, 2013. [POI 16] POIRIER A.-C., [Avis d’expert] Que dit l’ordonnance autoconsommation ?, Green Univers, 2016.

8 From Energy Self-sufficiency to Trans-scalar Energy

For several years now, the issue of energy self-sufficiency has been shaping policies regarding buildings and urban projects. This chapter provides feedback on the projects carried out by the Franck Boutté sustainability consultancy that, without being a representative sample, convey the operational need to redefine the subject. The concept of self-sufficiency, as requested by public clients, is usually defined by a zero annual consumption balance. This definition appeared with the first “eco-districts” such as BedZED (Beddington Zero Energy Development), which seems to be the most widely accepted one. The concept was made more precise with the definition of the BEPOS Effinergie certification label (which still thinks in terms of a balance sheet but with a possible margin) or the European definition of NZEB (Nearly Zero-Energy Buildings). On the other hand, the TEPOS (Territoire à energie positif – Territory with positive energy) associative movements or the TEPCV (Territoire à energie positifs pour la croissance verte – Territory with positive energy for green growth), French national call for projects, have added vagueness by valuing the dynamics of the energy transition instead of providing a technical definition. In the midst of a society consumed by energy consumption, there is a strong and legitimate temptation to ensure that a new project assumes its own energy production and so from this point of view, energy self-sufficiency is a relevant aspect when examining projects. On the other hand, energy self-sufficiency as a project response appears to us in the examples below as an unbalanced environmental solution, not well integrated with a regional energy perspective.

Chapter written by Florian DUPONT.

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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Self-sufficiency immediately raises the question of scale and its definition. This definition has been part of an ongoing debate: should it be defined based on regulatory uses? On actual consumption? On power or consumption, etc.? This collides with the debate on the relevant scale (plot, district, regional, etc.). An operational examination of self-sufficiency almost always reveals a marginal optimization in perspective of the existing urban buildings that carries almost all the energy issues. Indeed, the energy self-sufficiency concept does not have a specific technoeconomic model; it reveals several possible bricks for the interactions between the different energy networks where buildings, neighborhoods and regions are just the last link. Intervening as a consultant at different project scales, but always looking to provide a project management service that reasons in relation to its prerogatives, the practice is regularly confronted with having to find the right scale of intervention even when challenging public assignment. The result is a more complex decisionmaking process, and leads to the emergence of an intervention philosophy seeking more interactions and cost–benefit analysis. The first part of this chapter aims to illustrate these considerations as they result from concrete cases by first focusing on the aspect of heat supply. The second part outlines alternative methodologies, keeping the intention and ambition of energy self-sufficiency in mind by redefining it. Finally, the third part includes it all in a planning perspective on energy issues using examples of ongoing research and studies in different cities. 8.1. Self-sufficiency or sharing of the heat supply Heat networks reveal the interactions between new projects and existing buildings since they pool the supply between these entities with two radically different performances. Indeed, heating is the first lever for the improvement of the current housing stock, while it only occupies a minor position within new constructions. The examples below discuss this difficulty in projects carried by the agency. 8.1.1. Four examples of scale jumping that question self-sufficiency 8.1.1.1. Bordeaux council estate: a building with shared positive energy The CREM (Conception réalisation entreties maintenance – Design realization upkeep maintenance) competition program with an energy performance guarantee demanded the presentation of a building with positive energy (bâtiment à energie positive – BEPOS).

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The brief b results inn a very densse and compacct building annd so it was thhe energy consumpption calculatted that madde it possiblee to highlightt the intrinsic project performaance. Due to Bordeaux’s mid-season climate c and thhe exclusivelyy tertiary program m, the needs off the buildingg could not ex xclusively be covered by ellectricity. Obtaininng the BEPOS certificationn then becam me a real andd relevant gooal in the attempt to find a baalance between the enviro onmental, tecchnical and eeconomic w how the buuilding wouldd produce aspects. The challengge was thereffore to know a to whom it i could redisttribute it. Desp pite a favorabble exposure too sunlight energy, and and the absence a of nearby shade, coovering the ro oof with photoovoltaic panels was not enough to t meet the eleectricity demaand, thus trigg gering two alteernative routess. The first idea wass biogas combbined heat an nd power (CH HP) set to prooduce the b The unrequired heat could additionaal electricity necessary forr the energy balance. then be reinjected r intoo a local network to supply the nearby scchool, which w was using an old-faashioned oil-ffired heating system. s This unnecessary extra e power leed to this scenario being abandooned. w to set up a geothermall supply that would also bbring cold The second idea was mps. through the installation of heat pum s led too offering thee extra cold to o the Palais Roohan and the B Bordeaux The scenario City Halll which, locatted in a listed building, werre unable to im mprove their iinsulation or energgy supply. Unnlike the prevvious scenario o, this poolinng did not reequire the installatiion of additioonal power since s the geo othermal systeem was sizedd for the project’ss heat requirem ments. The strength s of thhis project liess in the fact th hat a new faciility in the heeart of the city centter can providde something new to existiing buildings by pooling its energy with the historical herritage, which has h no way off independentlly improving iits energy ormance project, the result iis several efficienccy. Instead of having a singgle high-perfo more effficient buildings.

Figure 8.1. Diagram of heat sharin ng between th he efficient buiilding and the old one. ersion of this figure, f see ww ww.iste.co.uk/llopez/local.zip p For a color ve

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8.1.1.2. The Hoche eco-district: more consumption in new buildings, better consumption in old buildings and less overall Nowadays, new high-performance buildings tend to weaken the business models of district heating networks. This argument is only valid if we exclusively take into account the project’s scale because pooling the heating system sometimes makes it possible to reach the required thermal density to make the heat network profitable. In Nanterre, l’Etablissement public d’aménagement de la Défense (the Public institution for the development of La Défense) developed in 2015 a 4 hectare district with 600 new homes with a dual objective, building performance and an energy supply through a biomass heating network. These two objectives came into conflict when the project leader of the heating network saw how the economic model was weakened by these low-energy buildings. The Komarov project, adjacent to the Hoche eco-district, had a renovation program for its facades but no energy renovation of the heating system despite it being out of date. By pooling the network of these two neighborhoods, it was shown that the carbon footprint for both of them improved fivefold. This pooling has not only enabled the installation a heating network, but has also helped a rather disadvantaged neighborhood connect to said network. Accessibility to energy is strengthened and the impact of the new project is reduced.

Figure 8.2. Energy solidarity at the regional scale for the Nanterre Hoche eco-district: the heat network is made possible by connecting the neighboring estate to obtain a carbon footprint which is divided by five. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

8.1.1.3. The Groues project: will David turn Goliath green? As a future district, and showcasing the environmental exemplarity of the city of Nanterre, the Groues project close to La Défense aims to achieve ambitious goals in

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terms of energy savings, efficiency and energy supply. The stakeholders’ goal is twofold: – the first one is the Factor 4 Approach, defined here over 40 years (between 2010 and 2050), and poses the carbon issue as a global objective; – the second is the “zero-energy district” or even the “positive-energy district” approach, which focuses on renewable energy self-sufficiency. The definition of this objective, as scientifically imperfect as it may be, is still crucial since it defines political expectations and technical control. Enertherm, the La Défense heat network, is powered by two fuel and gas heating systems for a total power of 360 MW. There are two heating systems in order to ensure the supply of the business district (following an interruption in the service due to the breakdown of the only heating system at the time), leading to an important power reserve. Currently, the amount of CO2 in 266 g of CO2/KWh does not enable reaching the Factor 4 objectives (nor benefiting from a reduction in VAT), hence generating four alternative scenarios for a simple connection: – Scenario 1: supplying 52% of the heating requirements using a wood-fueled heating system exclusively serving the Groues project and supplementing the remaining 48% with the existing Enertherm network. – Scenario 2: supplying 85% of the heating requirements using a wood-fueled heating system exclusively serving the Hanriot Arago and Coeur des Groues areas and supplementing the remainder with the existing Enertherm network. The needs of other areas are 100% covered by the network. – Scenario 3: supplying 25% of the requirements using heat pumps on groundwater and wastewater plus local thermos-frigo pumps, supplemented (75%) by the existing Enertherm network. – Scenario 4: replacement of 46 MW of the Enertherm grid with a renewable source and 100% supply of the Groues project requirements via the grid. The evaluation of the various scenarios has shown that scenarios 1–3 improve the carbon footprint of the Groues project alone, compared to a simple connection to the Enertherm network. On the other hand, only scenario 4 enables having a positive impact on the entire network. To a certain extent, it is possible to say that with this solution the neighborhood offsets some of the neighboring emissions. The analysis of these scenarios leads to the comparison of very different investment levels and very different carbon impacts. However, based on this last

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indicator, the case of a global transformation of the network is, without a doubt, much better.

Figure 8.3. Carbon impact of the thermal supply solutions at La Défense (in gray) and at Groues (in red): The comparison is difficult given that the geographical and investment scales are different. However, this illustration helps show the interest of a leverage effect on the entire heat network instead of a neighborhood’s self-sufficiency. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

These significant strategies, distinguished at the district and La Défense levels, made it possible to raise the question of the transformation of the heating network to the developer and the local authorities. The strategies were refined with other strategies for the subdistrict according to the requirements (need for cold in the Balcon district surrounding the station) and being aware that a certain number of buildings could use geothermal energy with the risk of putting a strain on the use for all others. At the time of writing, the greening of the network is being recorded. The energy used is under debate but the first developers have committed to connect to the heat network. 8.1.1.4. The limits of relativity: the example of the Bercy Charenton urban development area in Paris Going beyond the scales does not always work. It can easily help minimize the results of the project. Indeed, in terms of energy, it is always possible to find another consumption source, another building and other consumption (and emission)

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equipment that is much larger and which makes the initially considered solution pointless, and even more so when the scale considered is changed. For the Bercy-Charenton urban development project, which is expected to be completed in 2019, several structuring energy sources have been identified to contribute to the energy self-sufficiency of the district: – extraction from the Dogger groundwater reservoir; – extraction from the Albien groundwater reservoir with the Parisian network (CPCU and Climespace) as backup; – full connection to the CPCU and Climespace networks. On the one hand, the energy output of a well from Dogger was negligible compared to the power available within the CPCU network and, on the other hand, a new geothermal well was the only opportunity to obtain some self-sufficiency. A borehole at Albien is conditioned by a partnership with Eau de Paris as was done for Clichy Batignolles, given the strategic value of this water table for the drinking water supply of the capital. The scenario with a well at the Dogger appears to be the most relevant for self-sufficiency and carbon emissions: Scenario Gas and electricity Tempered water loop at the Albien Extraction at the Dogger CPCU and Climespace

15,900

Annual renewable energy share for the hot/cold mix (in % consumption) 1.5

4,200

80

1,400 11,500

82 58

Carbon emissions (in tons of CO2/year)

Table 8.1. Different supply scenarios and carbon impact

There are several points that stand in the way of a self-sufficiency scenario through drilling at Dogger: – the burden on the developer balance sheet since the existing network does not need this new source of power; – the need to benefit the existing network; – a significant part of electricity consumption (67% of primary energy consumption) encourages focusing efforts in this direction in the context of an already green heating network supply.

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This time, this relative analysis of the importance of a new borehole in the city’s heat supply is confronted with the minimization of the problem. The significant investment at the scale of a development operation is less justified when it is a question of supplying a network that far exceeds this scale and where drilling will not radically affect the supply. In this case, the aim of self-sufficiency would have undoubtedly helped to create a more virtuous energy supply. 8.1.2. Assess the strategic contribution of each operation to the networks The four preceding examples illustrate how defining the scope of energy self-sufficiency constitutes a key element to appreciate its relevance. Self-sufficiency probably deserves to be compared to a more systemic vision that defines the concept of interaction with networks. The first two examples (the Bordeaux council estate and the Hoche district) are ultimately two self-sufficient entities (which produce their own energy), while benefiting the buildings already there. In both cases, the request for self-sufficiency generates an even more environmental response than the request itself. On the contrary, the Groues project is a clear example of the result of stakeholders’ interactions where self-sufficiency is a threat to the heat network manager and encourages a more global change. Finally, the last example shows the risk that this enlarged vision poses by minimizing an issue. What these projects have taught us as a consultancy is the importance of questioning this control over self-sufficiency in order to tackle the most important energy-saving and emission deposits and that the combination of the technical dimension (a cost–benefit analysis) and the stakeholders’ role (economic models, communication, etc.) is essential. Heat networks must prepare for a decrease in thermal densities in the context of building renovations, which should become widespread with time. Planning this evolution by joining new and old operations seems to be a fundamental aspect. Thus, any new project that can potentially connect to the network has the ability to question its performance. Whether it is a new operation with a thermal density high enough to justify the creation of a new network as in the Hoche district or the council estate cases, a renovation project of the built heritage to lower the temperature of the network (and therefore limit losses) or a sufficiently large project

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to question the networks’ supply and possibly lead to their going green, such as the Groues project, they all have a role to play in the reinforcement of the profitability and the quality of the networks. This requires having the means to redefine decision-making indicators and to cross-reference the energy networks’ planning aspects with the development operations. 8.2. Redefining the goal of self-sufficiency All the examples above show that self-sufficiency is triggering questions that modify projects. However, they also show that the concept of self-sufficiency struggles to define a relevant environmental analysis since the balance sheet for annual consumption does not consider certain factors. This has led us to investigate new tools to better meet this global ambition. 8.2.1. Using the cost–benefit analysis? Environmental indicators alone are struggling to translate these sets of scales since they only measure global impacts, without taking into account the intervention or competence areas and, hence, financing. Cost–benefit analyses support contractors’ decisions through a step-by-step analysis. They link the use of the planet’s resources and the contractors’ economic resources.

Figure 8.4. Cost–benefit analysis: the appropriate objective is defined by a point where the curve of production cost crosses the curve of the energy used. This theoretical curve shows that an increase in the construction efforts is only justified by the resulting gain. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/ local.zip

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Even if this conceptual approach is not systematically applicable to all the stages of each project, it is crucial that it guides the project decisions. In order to compare this technical-economic dimension with potential environmental impacts, we were able to think in terms of the marginal abatement costs.

Figure 8.5. This graph shows the marginal abatement cost (extra cost relative to a reference) of carbon abatement along the y-axis together with the carbon abatement potential. The most profitable measures in overall cost are shown from left to right, also indicating the importance of their impact. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip.

This analysis, carried out for the Gare de Lyon-Daumesnil project in Paris for the company Espaces Ferroviaires, made it possible to prioritize different carbon-related topics (particularly white and gray energy). It first appears that cost-effective measures regarding the overall cost have relatively little impact. Then, there are four major abatement options with fairly different marginal costs. It should be noted that the PV evaluation was performed without carrying out an estimate on the TURPE (Rate of Use of the Public Electricity Network), which would probably change this result. Like any overall cost analysis, it collides with the prerogatives of each contracting authority and the capacities of public stakeholders to carry out such a project or not. This is particularly true in the very attractive Parisian context: the

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context makes it possible to convey objectives to promoters or buyers, which are not necessarily possible elsewhere. In this regard, it is essential to perform an analysis per contracting authority and for the users.

Figure 8.6. Analysis of marginal abatement cost for users. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

In this example, it is quite clear how photovoltaic energy, which is fundamental from the point of view of self-sufficiency, can be interesting to the planner or the local authority by reducing the user’s costs. This issue often takes us back to electricity, which is gaining importance in operations without there being, in most cases, many alternative options available to photovoltaic energy. This technology largely depends on the price signal adopted for resale or self-consumption (hence the

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importance of current trade on the latter) and on the ability of the real estate market to finance this equipment or not. This indicator makes it possible to measure the efficiency of an additional contribution of a project (i.e. an additional cost compared to a reference) and thus provides a complementary vision of self-sufficiency. Here, self-sufficiency raises the following question: how can the energy balance be minimized? And the cost–benefit analyses question the best possible use of a voluntary overinvestment in favor of the climate. Adding on to this an approach per stakeholder it seems would enable the investigation of complex arbitrations. 8.2.2. Using a new financial paradigm including the old one? The reduction in energy consumption of older buildings (which represents the most important share of energy consumption) is a major objective. Indeed, new buildings only represent 1% of consumption of the built city per year, and it is essential that they contribute to improving the performance of the older buildings. The cost–benefit analysis has therefore led us to imagine how these additional costs could instead supply projects applied to those buildings already there. In order to promote this dynamic, a financial exchange mechanism could be set up between new high-performance buildings and old energy-consuming buildings: a sustainability grant. The principle would be as follows: new builds would give a share of the overinvestment avoided to be used for the renovation of old buildings. Thus, new buildings appear while having a positive impact on the old. 8.2.3. First achievement: 1,000 trees In terms of energy objectives, the Pershing site project as part of the Réinventer Paris framework meets the requirements of the climate plan: it is connected to the city’s energy networks and produces electricity through PV installations. Functional diversity enables the development of energy exchanges between programs, smoothing the power and consumption demand, allowing the occasional use of external resources because of daily heat storage and an exchange loop. Going beyond all this, the project wants to contribute to the refurbishment of deteriorated buildings. A foundation financed by the promoters will subsidize the renovation of Parisian condominiums.

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Fiigure 8.7. Dia agram showing g the contributtion of building gs to their regiion

8.2.4. From F self-su ufficiency to synergies Whetther it is thhrough the choice c of ind dicators or openness o to financial arrangem ments for refurbishment, r , projects have h shown the limits of the self-suffficiency approoach based onn the annual consumptionn balance sheeet. These examples help questioon the relevancce of the issuee. Neverthelesss, the establisshment of alternativve answers reemains interessting. The ansswer will unddoubtedly lie in a very strategic and prospecttive vision of energy netwo orks that enable the establisshment of expectedd synergies wiith buildings. Communitiess and networkk managers arre starting to have this strategic and regionall vision and these t synergiees’ requiremennts could soon starrt to emerge. 8.3. The e importanc ce of strateg gic planning using proje ect levers The current c overcoonsumption of o energy is no ot the result of o an energy ppolicy but of the sum s of sectoor-specific policies. Even though this idea is not nnew, our experiennce seems to show that urrban planning g plays a funddamental rolee in more transverssal approachees to energy public policcies. Whetherr through plaanning or through an urban project, urban plaanning raises the t question of the materialiization of various regional secctor-specific objectives, including thhose on enerrgy, and particulaarly regarding energy self-suufficiency.

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This is particularlyy true of the connection c bettween urban planning p and ttransport, ns the fundam mental lever inn terms of which iss not the subjeect of this papper, but remain the amoount of carbonn impact andd due to the fact that thesse decisions aare made against the t tide, whichh condition alll the subsequeent developmeents. This is just as impportant for thee definition off energy self-ssufficiency inn terms of networkss as it is in terrms of a regionnal energy perrspective. The large Chatelaaine Project in i Geneva illlustrates this problem. A series of o d designed the densificatio on of an essentially e reesidential vague operations neighborrhood aroundd public transsportation serrvices. At thee site, there is a heat network fed by the burning of household h waaste that has large power reserves, s Thiss is an unattracctive resourcee because, given its use especiallly during the summer. of high temperaturess, it does nott have many y developmennt prospects w when the t encourage self-sufficienccy. In additionn, many of thee existing operationns are meant to buildings use fuel oil boilers, b whichh with time sh hould disappeaar. This context enccouraged the joint development of refurbishment r ts, boiler replacem ments and thee deployment of the heat network n evenn with a channge in its operatingg temperaturees.

Figure 8.8. Le ess energy co onsumption, more m pooling off heat sourcess. For a color ve ersion of this figure, f see ww ww.iste.co.uk/llopez/local.zip p

Whille this principlle appealed too urban planning departmennts, energy serrvices and the heatt network opeerator, the prrocurement co ontext (the cooordination oof several small urbban projects) did not enablee this long-terrm vision to become b a realiity and be implemeented. This operation is a good demoonstration of the t lack of poorosity betweeen urban planningg and the deesign of urbaan services. What W the preevious exampples have revealedd about heat networks n is alsso found for other o networkks, including eelectricity and gas.

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8.3.1. Electricity networks redefine their mesh The issues that have emerged for the examples above on heat networks are also seen in the case of electricity networks with the increase in self-consumption and storage. Indeed, the sizing by the network manager could shift from generic oversizing (current standards being questioned) to a measured and formalized sizing of the network (to guarantee the service). A top-down trend is also shared. The local adaptation of a national policy would be a contextual response. The managers of the electricity network are only beginning to face the reality of the development, its processes and stakes. They have only just started to dialogue with the licensing authorities and the developers with the establishment of a new relationship. The challenge will be economic equalization. The strength and weakness of the network is the equalization of national tariffs. The questions raised by heat networks at a regional level (generally intermunicipal) will appear at the much more complex national level. In this respect, the current exchanges on collective self-consumption between the regulatory bodies (ministries and the French Energy regulatory commission (Commission de régulation de l’énergie – CRE)) and the network operators (in particular but not exclusively Enedis) are fundamental. They critically examine the network management mesh (a step-down substation) along with the project operation units (development operations such as the ZAC (urban development area) or the housing scheme, then the real estate operations and the condominiums plots) since they do not match. The inconsistencies in energy development and planning have already led to the appearance of these situations. 8.3.2. Liège: valorizing the electrical infrastructures of the industrial valley At present, Wallonia’s energy bill is divided into four major sections: industry (33%), transportation (31%), housing (25%) and finally the tertiary sector (11%). By 2020, the province aims to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) by 30% compared to 1990 and achieve a production of 7,400 GWh of renewable energy. To meet these objectives, the joint development of a dynamic for the renovation of the built environment and the production of renewable energy is required. However, it is not only a question of setting up renewable energy production sites in the area, but of defining a real implementation strategy based on the

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conditionn of the distribbution networrks and the en nvironmental context: c a devvelopment geographhy. For exampple, the easterrn part of the province p has many m citizen iinitiatives (installattion of PV paanels in privatte homes, smaall privately-oowned wind fa farms) but the netw work is saturaated and doees not have the t necessaryy capacity reserves to accomm modate new rennewable energgy production n devices. On the other hannd, in the Meuse Valley, V the neetwork is oveersized, could d carry more energy and, ttherefore, would alllow for the innstallation of renewable en nergies. The diversity d and tthe nature of the renewable eneergies producced in the reg gion are also more relevaant to the gly affected by the evollution of regional context. Thhis work wiill be strong n and eeconomic self-conssumption, whiich will eventtually redefinee the role of networks models. The energy sttrategy of the Liège provin nce thus depennds on a distriibution of c goall of renewablle energy roles wiithin the provvince to conttribute to a common production in respectt of different environmentaal contexts annd an efficiennt use of public ecconomic resouurces, particullarly networkss. 8.3.3. Mains M gas se eeks its reviival The gas network has a differeent dynamic. In new neigghborhoods, eespecially g solution is not too ssuccessful those suupplied by a heat networrk, a mains gas regarding its advantagges and disadvantages, especially when only used forr cooking a still doubtts). (and eveen then, there are

Figure 8.9. Compa arative diagram m summarizin ng gas and electriicity solutions for cooking

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However, at a given moment this analysis rarely incorporates a future vision of the gas network. With the current trend of decreasing consumption and higher prices, the question on the importance of maintaining or strengthening this network by developing it arises. In a context where many buildings depend on this network, and which could eventually integrate more renewable energies or even accommodate other uses still unknown to us today, can we settle for a review per operation? One could imagine that regional planning encourages the densification of gas uses in view of the longterm viability of the network. To this regard, at the national level, GRDF (a French gas company) is also commissioned by the French CRE. For consultancy agencies working within restricted missions, this issue goes beyond our prerogatives but we tend to always warn about the network’s actual principle, which only exists through the participation of all the elements it combines. In a society seeking a decline in resource exploitation, the long-term profitability of networks is a matter of substance. 8.3.4. From data to planning: cities think about energy It is this long-term vision that young cities try to develop as a planning element within their region. The existence of the networks is justified by: – a proliferation (and therefore smoothing) of the power demand; – complementarity of production and storage sources. We are well aware of the importance of mastering both by planning their connections, such as the network “content”. New strategic approaches are emerging in several regions, including the cases of Lyon and Lille shown below, but Paris, Nantes, Lorient or Brest could also be used by way of example. 8.3.4.1. The Lyon metropolis: the decentralization of political powers for a better energy management Lyon is in the most nuclearized region in the world and only 4% of the energy is produced in the area. This is why in June 2015 the Métropole de Lyon launched its Energy Master Plan (Schéma directeur des énergies – SDE), which aims to enable energy planning for the whole region. This initiative was created as a consequence of the evolution of management methods and the decentralization of local energies. Indeed, the expertise of this metropolis on energy networks helped complete the

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vision available on planning or transportation documents. The SDE tool is a direct result of the energy plan to reduce both CO2 emissions and energy consumption by 20%. Lyon has made sure to acquire all the legal elements necessary for controlling the heat networks and the ability to take advantage of consumption. The SDE was developed based on an energy diagnosis that exhaustively identified all the production and consumption of the city in all areas (residential, industry, transport, etc.). This energy network made it possible to understand the different types of energy used in various places and thus to guide the heat supply by locating the places where it was possible to reinject heat resulting from renewable energies. The development of district heating will be carried out along with a refurbishment program for old housing – once again the vision is evolving from the silo energy concept to a partnership one. This cartographic project also enables a collective appropriation by the big public stakeholders so that the unavoidable energy lost by some can be reused by others. The Energy Master Plan is, therefore, a tool for seizing an innovative system by being in a partnership approach. 8.3.4.2. The Métropole européenne de Lille: a global network management The Métropole européenne de Lille (MEL) consumes a lot more energy than it produces: in fact, only 2% of its requirements come from local production. Hence the willingness of the MEL to produce heat and electricity in the city and manage it intelligently through a smart grid extended along the Deûle. In order to do so, it launched an initiative called “So MEL So Connected” and surrounded itself with service providers to study the different aspects of its environmental strategy. The first initiative is to connect a maximum number of networks to the Halluin Energy Recovery Center (ERC), which produces electricity and heat by cogeneration. The creation of the Metropolis made it the administrator of 82 km of heat and cold networks that were previously administered by the municipalities themselves. This has made it possible to consider the connection of certain networks to the ERC along with the optimization of industrial processes to make the most of unavoidable energy waste. The second initiative is based on the exploitation of industrial wasteland to turn it into renewable energy plants by covering it with small- or medium-sized wind farms, solar power plants, geothermal wells or even production units that use wood, biomass, biogas, etc. For a long term view, these energy issues will be spatialized through an analysis of buildings, networks and uses. Priority geographical areas of intervention have thus been highlighted in terms of the urgency regarding refurbishment and

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connection to the network. Each of these ZIPs (industrial port areas) has been assigned a specific operational action plan based on available public and private resources. 8.4. Conclusion As a practitioner, we do not choose our subjects and cannot claim the completeness of our approach. However, it seems to us that requests confront energy self-sufficiency with the reality of the legal, technical and economic scopes of the clients. While fully understanding the intentions of self-sufficiency, this approach seems now irrelevant to fuel the energy dimension of urban projects. Alternative tracks should at least focus on: – environmental indicators reflecting an impact (carbon emissions, pollutants, etc.); – cost–benefit analyses to guide the adequate mobilization of economic resources; – allowing solutions such as energy sharing and refurbishment financing; – a new measure of the synergy between buildings and networks. We consider the latter to be one of the main projects for future neighborhoods since it is a bit behind in comparison with other environmental issues such as water or biodiversity. Sewage regulations set rules for architectural and urban projects according to the context. The leakage rate for a given rain profile depends on the local network capacities. The demands made to developers foresee the evolution of the network by gradually constructing separating sewage networks, which are useless at the time of their commissioning. At another level, the green and blue infrastructure (les trames vertes et bleues, in French) defines the contribution of a project to the regional project regarding biodiversity. Energy has never really been considered in this way because self-sufficiency was initially thought of at the building scale and electrical networks were expected to follow rather than impose their constraints. Local networks have been able to outline these interactions and are often the first step in strategic thinking. The regions need to establish this prospective planning to know what they expect from their neighborhoods and their buildings: self-sufficiency, production, storage, smoothing, etc. This provides us with a very wide redefinition of energy in projects.

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That being said, we are aware that the first effect of self-sufficiency commissions is to set an ambition. The relevance of energy self-sufficiency deserves to be challenged, but without forgetting that in complex operational processes where the purpose is not energy, it is this ambition that leads to reconsiderations, technical and economic evaluations, tests and feedback. We can only hope that these ambitions are generalized, perhaps making synergy a fundamental value, and by finding the environmental indicators and uses that will characterize it.

PART 3

Energy Communities

9 Sociotechnical Morphologies of Rural Energy Autonomy in Germany, Austria and France

9.1. Introduction In Europe, rural towns are increasingly achieving energy autonomy by local implementation of renewable energies (RE) and energy-saving measures. Based upon the production of a socioanthropological and comparative study in Germany, Austria and France, the purpose of this chapter is to describe the “forms” that these local autonomies take. By mobilizing methods of ethnographic investigation1, five rural towns have been studied: Freiamt (Germany, BadenWürttemberg, 4,200 inhabitants), Jühnde (Germany, Lower Saxony, 780 inhabitants), Mureck (Austria, Styria, 1,600 inhabitants), Güssing (Austria, Burgenland, 3,700 inhabitants) and the community of towns Le Mené (France, Côtes-d'Armor, 6,300 habitants). The choice of towns initially rested upon their degree of electric and thermal autonomy (heating and hot water). By autonomy we mean a town for which the production of RE over a year is equal, indeed superior, to energy consumption over the area, and for which the management of these RE facilities is at local level (municipal, citizen, mixed and other sections of the population), whether or not the facilities are connected to national energy networks. Why speak in this case of “autonomy” and not of “self-sufficiency”? Our study reveals that these local energy projects go beyond energy self-sufficiency, which moreover is not the intended Chapter written by Laure DOBIGNY. 1 Observations, participant observations and semistructured interviews in the mother tongue of the interviewees (German and French).

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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purpose, but falls within a broader process of autonomy (encompassing political, economic, symbolic and other aspects) [DOB 16, DOB 12]. Etymologically, the term autonomy means indeed to self-govern according to one’s own laws, that is to say, the ability for self-determination, to make choices and act freely2. Autonomy would thus be less of a purpose to achieve than a process, where what changes is the individual’s or the collective’s relationship to institutions [CAS 75]. In seeking to understand the processes leading to energy autonomy as much as its impacts, we have chosen to study German and Austrian towns which have reached complete autonomy, that is to say, per our definition, that their energy production is equal to or greater than local consumption. For all that, these towns are not cut off from national energy networks and re-inject into these networks all or part of their electrical production. Only the heat networks, enabling the supply of clean hot water and heating, are local and disconnected from large networks. For the moment, no French town has achieved such a level of autonomy. Le Mené thus only has partial autonomy, yet proves to be one of the locations where energy autonomy is among the most successful, with the objective of succeeding in attaining complete autonomy by 2030. In this chapter, we will analyze the factors that explain these differences of temporality between the three European countries. We will see that these are, beyond the national frameworks and their public policies, directly linked to social morphology and the local economic fabric, that is to say to the constraints peculiar to a town (spatial, physical, economic and social). In being inspired by the concept of social morphology, put forward by Mauss, which studies the “material substrate of societies, that is to say the form that they take on by establishing on the ground the volume and density of the population, how it is distributed as well as all things which are a center for community life” [MAU 50, p. 389], we will use the term “sociotechnical morphology” to express how local energy autonomy takes on technical, social, spatial and temporal aspects within these towns. Energy is not a simple technical object, which may be cut off from the social aspect, but a “Total Social Fact” [MAU 50], that is to say that altering the energy system has political, social, economic, symbolic, aesthetic, legal and other implications, which may be seen at a local scale. The objective of the chapter is thus to show the diversity of these “forms” or sociotechnical morphologies of the energy autonomy and to explain the factors contributing to them: who are the players in the sphere and what technical choices have they made? What type of collaborations do we see within these projects? How does social and economic morphology, or even the topography of a town influence 2 Definition drawn from Littré, http://www.littre.org; and the Centre National de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales (CNRTL), http://www.cnrtl.fr.

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local energy autonomy projects? How do we explain the various timescales of these projects? What roles do energy policies, regulatory frameworks and national legislation play for local projects? How is the context altered (whether political, social, or legislative) between pioneering towns and current projects? Lastly, having regard to this comparative and transnational study, what can we conclude upon construction and migration of self-sufficient energy “models”? 9.2. Technical choices and autonomy processes First, we explain technical choices and processes that have led to local energy autonomy. The choice of RE is of course, highly variable according to the town and its natural resources (wind, hours of sunshine, water resources, geothermal resources, and others) but also the socioeconomic resources (agricultural, forestry, economic and industrial fabric). The local economic fabric effectively has a direct impact on biomass resources: the production of agricultural and industrial subproducts such as liquid manure, forms of dung, pruning and crop harvest waste, sewerage sludge, agro-industry waste and other waste forms. These resources can be used within local heating plants or methanation plants, which enable heat and electricity production. Methanation is thus an inescapable technical choice of rural energy autonomy and an RE selected by all of these towns due to the existence of local biomass resources, the relative stability of energy production (comparative to flow energy sources, such as wind and solar) and the dual energy production that it allows (for example thermal and electrical). Within all of these towns are added heating plants operating with timber, connected to one of these heat networks. Solar is also found in all towns studied due to its easy implementation and the scale variation which it allows (individual solar panels, agricultural operation scale plants, a sports association, communal buildings or more wide ranging citizen facilities and others). That having been said, the use of other REs varies according to their local energy significance. Thus, the towns of Le Mené and Freiamt have installed wind power (through citizen financing); Mureck, Güssing and Le Mené oil mills (mainly using oil seed rape) producing biofuel and oil cakes3; microhydro power in Freiamt and other such arrangements. Local autonomy thus takes various forms, according to social morphology, the local economic fabric, the technical choices made and the players for these energy initiatives. This diversity is clearly expressed among the towns studied. Thus, a single methanation power station (700 kW) supplied by a wood-burning heating plant (550 kW) in 2005 enabled Jühnde to reach energy autonomy (a town composed of 780 inhabitants, located in Lower Saxony, Germany). The idea and 3 Plant proteins mainly intended for farm animals.

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concept of “bioenergiedorf” 4 was created in 2001 by an interdisciplinary team, from the University of Göttingen (IZNE – the Inter-disciplinary Center for Sustainable Development), which has accompanied the inhabitants of the village in its implementation. The RE facilities are managed in the form of citizen cooperation (citizen financing, government aid and a bank loan). On the contrary, in Freiamt (Baden-Württemberg, Germany), it is the addition of a multiplicity of RE facilities which has led to autonomy for this undulating land (the Black Forest) and dispersed dwellings. An abundance that falls within the range of REs implemented as in their mode of management and ownership: citizen and private wind turbines (installed from 2001 to 2014), photovoltaic and thermal solar panels on private houses, associations (for example sports clubs) or private organizations (such as farms and businesses), a network of municipal biomass, private hydraulic turbines (milling and sawmills), domestic geothermal use and agriculture methanation (2002), stoves and domestic wood-burning heating plants, and other such activities. In Mureck (within Styria, Austria), the picture is different again: a group of farmers has developed successive RE facilities, one by one, gradually enlarging the range of actors and beneficiaries for this energy production (municipalities and citizens) and ultimately leading the town to achieve autonomy. First, a rapeseed mill (agricultural cooperative, 1991), a heat biomass network supplying the entire town (1998), to which was subsequently added a methanation power station (2005), and finally a citizen photovoltaic park (2011). In Güssing (Burgenland, Austria), energy autonomy falls clearly within a local municipal economic development policy, which has been led by its mayor since 1990, and differentiates itself by this point of view from other towns. The RE facilities have therefore been initiated by the municipality with a heating network (supplied by a wood heating plant, 1996) by integrating the inhabitants in the financing of these facilities as well as local players (farmers for methanation facilities, sawmills and researchers), by means of semipublic companies held in the majority by the municipality to avoid all energy prices speculation. Wood being an abundant local resource (45% of the area comprises forests), the majority of RE facilities operate using wood, including some that are innovative and experimental such as wood gasification (1998),5 and developed with help of researchers from the 4 “The bio-energy village”, in the sense that its energy provision is predominantly covered by the biomass. 5 The first unit for wood gasification was built in 1998 and enables electricity and heat production from timber, with a yield twice as high as the cogeneration process (where the biomass is burned and drives a steam turbine). This process produces synthetic natural gas from wood, also enabling envisaging other uses such as synthetic fuel.

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Vienna Technology University. Solar photovoltaic (2000) and thermal power plants have been added to this over the course of the years, as well as methanization units and small heat networks (2002). Güssing also has an oil mill (rapeseed and other cereals) for fuel production. Although the Communauté de communes of Le Mené (group of towns, located in Côtes-d’Armor, France) is inspired by the Güssing “model”, the sociotechnical morphology of its autonomy nevertheless departs from the Güssing example. Different groups of players (farmers, municipalities and citizens) implemented various and relatively separate RE projects. They, nevertheless, have the objective to achieve local energy self-sufficiency by 2030, an objective based on a common framework that constitutes the area’s prognosis, and its potential for the use of energy carried out by Solagro6 at the beginning of the 2000s. A group of around 50 farmers (now 65) thus installed a rapeseed oil mill (2007), operating initially as CUMA7 and then a cooperative, which produces oil cakes for farm livestock, cooking oil and biofuel for tractors. Although the concept of a methanation power station to process liquid manure was the first project initiated in Le Mené by a second group of pig farmers (1998), it was not actually realized until around 13 years later (2011) following strong local opposition. Municipal heat networks have also been put in place, linking public buildings and municipal housing (Saint-Gouéno), as well as shops and 30 houses (Le Gouray). Planned in the other towns, these heat networks are being provided because of the implementation of a local wood-energy industry (including pruning, related contracts and wood donations). Among the municipal projects, we may, for example, see the equipment one of the Plessala schools of a photovoltaic roof with an area of 160 m2. Lastly, a group of inhabitants have put in place a citizen wind project (seven wind turbines of 850 kW that commenced operation in 2013) by the association of 137 inhabitants grouped together in the form of CIGALES8 (providing 30% of the capital) and the SICAP (Société Coopérative d’Intérêt Collectif Agricole, Collective Agricultural Company) in the region of Pithiviers, a local energy company. Despite all of these RE projects implemented to which may be added energy saving and efficiency, the presence in the area of an agroindustrial company that employs around 2,000 individuals has a significant impact upon local energy needs, and makes it more difficult to attain autonomy. These examples therefore stress the significance of local conditions, whether social, economic, environmental or topographical, for

6 Not-for-profit collective company, promoting other means for energy and agriculture, producing technical studies and assessments, but also disseminating knowledge and knowhow. http://www.solagro.org 7 Cooperative for the Use of Agricultural Machinery. 8 Spread over eight clubs of investors CIGALES (Investors Club for Alternative and Local Management for Interdependent Savings), the number of members in a club is restricted.

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understanding the various sociotechnical forms or morphologies of local energy autonomy. These various sociotechnical morphologies also evidence different processes: while energy autonomy in Jühnde falls within a unique process (a model of the Bioenergiedorf – Bioenergy Village), this runs counter to an additive process that we find within the other towns, characterized by the successive implementation of RE facilities by the same players (Mureck, Güssing) or by a multiplicity of facilities involving various players (for example Freiamt and Le Mené). Finally, while these facilities in the majority fall within cooperative processes, we will stress the peculiarity of Güssing and its municipal process. The area’s achievement rests upon a local energy policy, which is nevertheless participative (the integration of other actors, whether they are inhabitants, companies, farmers, researchers and others in these projects). A local energy policy partly found in Le Mené, which (exclusively) combines municipal and cooperative projects, and is distinguished from other towns by unconventional alliances that are put in place there (CUMA and major investors, CIGALES and cooperative companies, and others). 9.3. Actors of local energy autonomy Although the processes and forms of autonomy of these towns allow us to see a large diversity, common features emerge. Thus, contrary to the ideas received, it is not in the most favored areas (both economically and socially) that the most ambitious energy projects emerge, but within “complex areas”9. The areas studied are “complex” for various reasons, sometimes cumulative factors: historically poor regions, with unemployment, a low level of local economic development, aging and/or reduced populations, low levels of economic and/or tourism pull factors, poor soils and the existence of pollution. These are areas with no future prospects (for example economic, social or environmental). These complexities will, nevertheless, prove to be both the source and driver for mobilization and action, as much on the part of elected representatives as the local inhabitants. The energy initiatives can thus fall within local economic development projects, job creation and the eradication or reduction of pollution (through methanation, as with Le Mené), curbing the rural exodus and other factors. However, these local complexities especially open up scope for creativity, invention and innovation for new ideas and new players: everything is conceivable when everything is (re)done and there is little for stakeholders to lose. It is therefore not simply by chance that a multitude of 9 A phrase used by a local elected representative in the Le Mené region to describe his own territory.

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innovative and ambitious initiatives in terms of environment and energy emerge within the so-called “complex” towns: these local complexities are the starting point, the driver and even open up the possibility for action, creation and innovation. These case studies call into question a second idea generally acknowledged around energy autonomy at local scale, namely the predominance, within these projects and their initiative, of the various municipalities. Apart from Güssing, where energy autonomy falls within a local policy and has been led by the municipality, within the other towns, municipalities and elected representatives have rarely been the initiators for these projects. They have followed, encouraged and accompanied them as they immediately saw the positive impact that these projects would have had both for the area and their respective complexities. However, inhabitants, ordinary local citizens and economic players (farmers) initiated and constructed these projects, led by several highly committed charismatic figures and spokespeople for these initiatives. This is far from marginal aspect since in Germany in 2016, 42% of RE production capacities belonged to citizens [TRE 17]. Thus, not only are these ambitious initiatives emerging within poor areas or areas with complexities, but ordinary citizens are project managers – in particular farmers, and rarely elected representatives or notable individuals in these towns. Farmers actually prove to be pioneers and drivers for renewable energy facilities in our case studies, and within all three countries studied, even though this socioprofessional category is often viewed as conservative, generally little prone to change or innovation. A precursory role is confirmed on national scales: thus between 1983 and 1998, around 300 biomass heat networks were put in place in rural Austrian towns, the majority by agricultural cooperatives [RAK 98]. In Germany, 10.5% of RE production capacities in 2016 belonged to farmers, that is to say more than the four large German energy companies (EnBW, E.ON, RWE and Vattenfall), which only held 5.4% of RE production capacity [TRE 17]. The farming world thus proves to be a genuine driver and inescapable player in local and rural energy autonomy, whether in Germany, Austria or in France [DOB 15]. In the towns studied, farmers and inhabitants are therefore the main initiators of local RE projects. They take part individually or through collectives, taking the form of citizen or agricultural cooperatives, citizen companies and associations such as CIGALES and others. Nevertheless, the role of elected representatives is not to be underestimated. The elected representatives envisage local dynamics (including social, economic and political) including the overall viewpoint, which explains their interest and support when these types of projects emerge within “complex” areas. In this way within each of the towns studied, all of the political parties represented came down unanimously in favor of local RE projects. These projects have been perceived as the means of preserving or awakening fragile local dynamics and hence been highly welcomed by municipalities, which have provided their full support and

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assistance, as much material as symbolic. When they are not the initiators, the mayors and municipal teams are therefore indirect players but, nevertheless, necessary for local autonomy to occur. However, these categorizations of players should not be considered as rigid, as in these small towns the players often wear several hats: farmer and mayor, technician and municipal councilor and others. Thus, although the role of municipalities was a secondary one in Mureck, Freiamt and Jühnde as it was not initiated or taken in these projects, at Le Mené these were both initiatives of farmers, inhabitants and elected officials, who are sometimes the same people (inhabitant and farmer and town mayor). Moreover, the borders between them are porous: within towns where the municipality is not a central player, the mayor was able to particularly put a lot in or, in his personal capacity, become a member of the RE cooperative established within his town. Likewise in Güssing, where the RE facility falls clearly within a municipal policy, this was not possible without the help of the local inhabitants and farmers but also businesspeople, industrialists, engineers and academics. Lastly, a third premise concerning local autonomy, corollary to the previous one, and moreover which we made at the beginning of this study, was that energy autonomy comprised the purpose pursued by these towns. This is far less evident than it appears in these places. The energy autonomy of given towns may be sought as a purpose by a given municipality and the elected representatives, as their role and their situation causes them to have a complete view of local dynamics and to perceive the economic, social and political impact that these projects can have. Yet within the towns studied, in the majority it is citizen projects, which do not immediately fall within a complete view or a forecast at town scale. Moreover, even in the case of Güssing, where the municipality was an innovator, achieving energy autonomy was not pursued at the very beginning. Having been one of the first European towns to have achieved autonomy by means of RE, there was no precedent and this objective appeared highly ambitious, indeed inaccessible. The idea to use REs began at the very beginning of the 1990s. The position is very different today, the existence of autonomous towns is a reference point, and equally forms of models. Autonomy becomes an objective to reach, it is transformed into a purpose and pursued as such, since there are precedents for it. Thus, in France, areas hoping to achieve autonomy are grouped within the Network of Areas with Positive Energy (“TEPOS”) led by the CLER10, of which Le Mené forms part, and where moreover the first (annual) meetings of this network took place in June 201111. 10 Network for Energy Transition. 11 This network “gathers together rural areas with the objective of reducing their energy needs to the maximum extent, by simplicity and energy efficiency, and replacing them through local renewable energy sources”; CLER. http://www.cler.org/Des-TEPOS-100renouvelables-c-est (updated on November 6, 2014).

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These towns and those currently starting RE projects more frequently display the willingness to reach, at a given time, local energy autonomy. This was not the case for those pioneer autonomous towns studied. Within the majority of these towns, it is a succession of renewable energy projects, on a fairly variable time scale, from 4 to 20 years, which has, in the end, led to this autonomy. It is not self-sufficiency which was sought, but instead a certain autonomy (whether decision making, economic and political) as these interview extracts clearly show: “At the start of the project, was there an idea to achieve energy autonomy?” “Not at all, Not at all! The idea was to do something unique to us. I stress that the aim was to specifically leave the profits or the capital within the region, not give away the land, we have rented the land for 25 years, to an anonymous investor somewhere [the first local RE project was wind-based]. However having possession, seeing what becomes of the facility was important, because our fear was that someone would come, build on it and then not be interested in it, and then the facility would remain abandoned – we didn’t want that. We wanted forms of RE, but we wanted to have our say, which gives some background to our project”. (Mayor of Freiamt, Germany12) “This was not the case at the beginning. Autonomy, in reality, was only the fact that the farmer should produce his fuel himself. It was, all the same, a concept of autonomy […] Moreover the rest of the renewable energy activities were added over the course of the years. The fact of saying: yes, the entire region has autonomy”. (The project initiator in Mureck and farmer, Austria13) Doing it yourself, retaking ownership and exercising control: the autonomy in question goes beyond the sole purpose of energy, although energy provides support in this regard. The idea of energy autonomy has therefore happened along the way, without having been decreed or decided, in the course of RE projects and the involvement of inhabitants, as the Mayor of Freiamt explains it: “[Following a wind energy-based project] bioenergy came with the facility of biogas and then it continued, and this idea of becoming autonomous, we no longer know today when it appeared, probably 12 Extract from an interview, Freiamt, May 30, 2008. 13 Extract from an interview, Mureck, June 25, 2008.

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sometime between 2003 and 2005. However, this was not a decision made by a town council; it was on the contrary more a dynamic which developed amongst the population wishing to participate. We reached our objective, especially with having photovoltaic panels on the roofs. There was a state subsidy at the time and when we constructed them, people started to say: ‘I wish to get involved as well, I want to, I want to participate and be able to say that I contributed to this selfsufficiency program’. Therefore this is how it all started. However it arose as a process and we cannot say that from a given day that it specifically happened”14. This autonomy falls within a process that, such as it is, is not the definable “end”: energy provides a starting point and not a destination as such. Thus, in all of these towns new projects emerged or are in the process of emerging – energy-based or around energy at the point when “self-sufficiency” has already being reached. This is the reason why the notion of self-sufficiency is inadequate as a means of describing local processes and their purpose. The notion of autonomy is, on the other hand, particularly relevant – the idea of free will, being able to choose, decide and carry out actions for yourself emerges as a strong theme from the interviews, as the rest of the interview with the Mayor of Freiamt attests: “I still say that the inhabitants of Freiamt15 being free citizens, and wishing to make decisions for themselves, were highly important issues. The first aspect was that we wanted to decide for ourselves, having a genuine identification with the projects, playing an active role within this sphere. The other reason was, of course, given where they live [the Black Forest], small farmers had low incomes and renting their land in this way, provided them with an additional income. In this way, we were also ensuring that they could remain on their farms and that they did not have to leave. It is something that we have already seen in mountain regions, people leaving the area because it is not profitable, and in this way we earn an income from doing nothing and that helps of course. These were the two main aspects of the project”16. There is, thus, in the choice of REs at local scale, a willingness to act by conforming to your values and a certain representation of social relationships. The interviews expressed the social values of cooperation and interdependence: keeping the profits of energy locally, providing work for local farmers, that is to say 14 Extract from an interview, Freiamt, May 30, 2008. 15 “Frei” means “free” in German. 16 Extract from an interview, Freiamt, May 30, 2008.

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supporting the local economy and not investor profits in public limited companies. To these we add ecological values: protecting energy and environmental resources, limiting the town’s impact on global warming and other factors. These local energy projects thus rest upon ecological values but also, and especially, social and political values and ideals and the policies of equality, self-management, self-production, interdependence, cooperation, democracy, collectivization and others [DOB 16]. 9.4. Spatial and autonomy temporalities The German and Austrian towns have, therefore, reached energy autonomy without having pursued it (while this will become a model to which some French towns aspire by 2020 or 2030). The four autonomous towns studied all “became” such in 2005 – in the end a fairly abstract journey: their energy production exceeding their energy consumption that year. However the period between having the project idea and this autonomy took 4 years in Jühnde, 9 years in Freiamt, 15 years in Güssing and 20 years in Mureck. How do we explain such temporal differences between these towns and, especially, between Germany and Austria, on the one hand, and France, on the other hand – or is no town actually yet autonomous? 9.4.1. Bringing the relevant techniques into existence However, now it is in some ways quicker to achieve local autonomy, with the development and the “standardization” of techniques, the passing on and the exchange of knowledge between towns through study trips, meetings around particular themes, networks and twinnings, and other activities The first towns to have initiated these technical choices took much more time, because they had to bring these techniques into existence on the desired scale. In Mureck, where the process has stretched out over around 20 years, like in Güssing where around 15 years were necessary, the players sought engineers and researchers from Austrian universities (Graz and Vienna) to implement and produce their ideas. The first time constraint was of a technical nature: if these techniques are simple, and the players knew that their idea – such as the construction of a rapeseed oil mill for the 500 farmers from the Mureck cooperative – was “technically” feasible, the idea still needed the aid of engineers to design a rapeseed press of this size, which was unprecedented. It was also necessary to test and adapt the tractor motors intended to run on the oil. That having been said, once implemented, technical reproduction was simple and quick. The company, having produced this first oil mill in Mureck, the first of its kind in the world in 1991, made these its specialty and

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moreover built the second in Güssing. In 2008, it had installed 26 more throughout the world, mostly in Europe17. The Bioenergiedorf model developed in Jühnde, which is both technical and organizational – the implementation of a single methanization power station, supplemented by a back-up wood-fired heating plant, in the form of a citizen cooperative – “only” took 4 years, and is presently quickly spreading around Germany. Given that the project falls within the framework of a research project, the technical research carried out by the inhabitants (sizing, researching suppliers and other aspects), as well as “organizational” decisions (choice of legal status, financing, democratic and decision-making process, organization into a working group, organizational structure and other aspects) benefit the villages below. This is all the more so since the research team has delivered instructional turnkey materials, the so-called “road maps”, precisely intended for this dissemination and reproduction. Some towns reproducing the Bioenergiedorf model have, moreover, been followed by the researchers on the team [WUS 12]. Although this model is transferable in and of itself, it must still be adapted to local constraints and specificities. 9.4.2. Social and geographical morphologies The second time constraint concerns the peculiarities of the towns, namely their social morphology and their geography: the number of inhabitants, the dispersal of dwellings, geographical and topographical constraints (for example a hilly setting) and legal constraints in cases of classified or protected sites (natural areas) or their economic structure. Thus, a commune such as Jühnde, which is clustered and small in size (780 in habitants), wooded and agricultural, can achieve complete autonomy in terms of electricity and heat because of a single small methanization power station. On the other hand, a town with more inhabitants, but particularly including buildings dispersed over a large surface area, such as Freiamt (52 km2 in the Black Forest), will increase its number of small RE facilities. This is because its extent and topography prevents the implementation of a single heat network or a municipal electrical network, given the cost involved. The community of Le Mené (6,300 inhabitants over 163 km2) includes the industrial site of Kermené (an abattoir cutting and processing pig meat and beef) on a 170-hectare site, employing 2,232 people. Due to the presence of this industrial site, it is difficult for the town to achieve energy autonomy. Energy consumption for such a food industry is huge relative to the number of inhabitants. On the contrary, the almost non-existent economic fabric of Jühnde (a grocery, a doctor’s surgery, a veterinary surgery and a few farmers) largely facilitates achieving autonomy. The higher the energy consumption, the 17 BDI – BioEnergy International, www.bdi-bioenergy.com.

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greater the required investment for the production of an equal RE quantity. This is why, despite highly ambitious programs, no average-sized town has yet achieved energy autonomy – although they may aspire to it – and in small towns as in large towns, action is taken contemporaneously with or in priority over decreasing energy consumption at source (energy efficiency and practice change). Figures 9.1–9.5 present morphologies of studied towns and the spatial positioning of RE facilities. Clustered towns with grouped together and centralized RE facilities (located to the north of each image, adjoining the central area of economic activities and dwellings) are shown in Figures 9.1 and 9.2.

Figure 9.1. Jühnde (Germany). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

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Figure 9.2. Mureck (Austria). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

Dispersed towns with RE facilities follow this dispersal pattern over the area, as shown in Figures 9.3 and 9.4.

Figure 9.3. Freiamt (Germany). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

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Figure 9.4. Le Mené (France). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

An extensive town, with RE facilities that are slightly dispersed (located in particular along the zone of activity crossing the image, the center of the town being located at the top and to the right of the image), is shown in Figure 9.5.

Figure 9.5. Güssing (Austria). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

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9.4.3. The influence of regulatory and legislative frameworks The regulatory and economic framework is also an element that plays a role in the duration of RE projects. Thus, the approaches were simplified in Germany, whether regarding the legal structure or the financing of these projects18, which has not been the case in France. The status of German cooperatives does not, for example, fix a limit on the total subscriptions or the number of members, and has been reviewed to favor citizen initiatives: exemption since 2004 of the obligation to publish a financial prospectus and reform of the law around cooperatives in 2006, facilitating the association of investment companies (for example public entities or companies). The financing of projects is also better facilitated in Germany when compared to France, whether with regard to subscriber conditions, for public and private players in terms of project equity or external financing (due to easier access to banking finance and lower costs) [POI 14, pp. 14–15]. Thus, Germany has witnessed the number of energy cooperatives greatly increase from 2008, going from around 75 in 2006 to 136 in 2008, then subsequently to 888 in 2013 [OBS 14, p. 196]. RE citizen initiatives are, nevertheless, far more numerous in Germany, since these figures do not take account of other legal forms – limited liability company (GmbH) or limited liability partnership (GmbH Kommenditgesellschaft) in particular – for which there is no central register [POI 14, p. 8]. Among the towns we have studied, only one opted for cooperative status (eG, in Jühnde), and that was well before 2006. These modifications to the regulatory framework have either not at all (or only to a small degree) influenced the pioneer towns studied, as they happened subsequent to the majority of projects in these towns. However, they have had a significant effect on subsequent projects, participating in the acceleration of citizen initiatives over the last 10 years: while pioneer German and French projects ran contemporaneously (around the end of the 1990s, the beginning of the 2000s), the gap between the number of such initiatives is now considerable between the two countries. These regulatory and financial means of facilitation partly explain the wider distribution, which has been more extensive and indeed quicker for both private and citizen RE initiatives, a driver for these local projects. The duration for the development of wind projects is thus around 2.5 years in Germany, compared to 8 years in France [POI 14, p. 18]. Moreover, considering as comparative examples similar projects within similar timescales, we are able to see that the implementation of a methanation power station in Mureck (Austria), from 2002 to 2005, succeeded prior RE projects and therefore enjoyed an established organizational structure as 18 The case of Germany has been far more widely documented by political scientists and economists than the case of Austria. The more frequent resorting to the Franco-German comparison, rather than the Franco-Austrian comparison, in this section reflects this difference in the level of detail of research in the field dealing with them.

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well as a certain level of credibility with banks and inhabitants. Equally, a similar one developed in Jühnde (Germany) over 4 years from 2001 to 2005 (the first project, developing a village participative model never before seen, including the search for finance that was fairly time consuming), and over 10 years at Le Mené (France) from 2001 to 2011 (the first RE project started within this locality, which provoked strong opposition on the part of the population, including legal action, contributing to this long timescale for development, added to which was an unconventional, but equally time-consuming, financial arrangement). Although falling within a singular local context, these examples allow us to observe the various timescales seen in these three countries for similar projects using the same techniques and involving approximately identical periods. These timescales are not without their links with the national political contexts of these towns. 9.4.4. The role of energy policies and political structures Of course, the fourth factor explaining these timescale differences is the national energy policy led by these three countries, as well as their political structure. The development of RE citizen initiatives was thus slightly more advanced in Austria (in the middle of the 1980s, beginning of the 1990s) than in Germany (the middle of the 1980s for pioneer initiatives, then especially at the end of the 1990s, beginning of the 2000s), followed by France (from the 2000s) with even fewer projects concluded to date, and no energy-autonomous towns as such. It is of interest to place side by side this timescale for local RE projects and the nuclear policy of these three countries. Austria, which is the only one of these three countries not to produce nuclear power19, is also the country to witness local autonomous citizen initiatives in the earliest timescale, and to politically encourage them. For Germany, nuclear power is a small share of its electricity generation (15.5% in 2014 [DES 15]) and the opposition to it is strong among the population (60% of people surveyed opposed it in 2010, before the Fukushima accident [EVR 13, p. 163]). It is closely followed, both in timescale and within the advances to initiatives, by Austria. Lastly, the slowing down in France of renewable energy production cannot be disassociated from its nuclear policy: nuclear power represents 77.5% of the electricity produced, and its calling into question among political decision makers is still somewhat peripheral. The consensus around continued nuclear power generation (through in particular a renewal of nuclear plants) is widely shared on the right as on the left. This is witnessed by the commitments by François Hollande’s government, which were not kept, to reduce the share of 19 The referendum of November 5, 1978 against the use of civil nuclear sources was followed in December 1978 by Atomsperrgesetz, the law against the use of nuclear energy, ratified by the integration into the Constitution of 1999 of a law to institute a nuclear-free Austria.

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nuclear power generation (which should in theory see a 50% reduction in its use for electricity generation by 2025) and the closure of some power stations. Mirroring this, the position of Austria, which was very quickly opposed to nuclear energy, is linked to its leading role in the generation of renewable forms of energy. REs represent a third of global energy consumption in Austria (30%) and 78% of electrical production [STA 17], which is the equivalent of the share of nuclear in French energy production (77.5% of nuclear, 16.1% RE including large-scale hydroelectricity and 6.3% of thermal energy) [COM 15, p. 47]. The nuclear policy adopted thus influenced not only the energy choices implemented in each country and around policies, ambitious to a greater or lesser degree, with regard to RE and climate, but also around citizen mobilization as such, through the image that these national exchanges of views reflected energy and climate issues, and whether or not there was a need to develop such sources individually and locally, at given levels of policy making. Beyond these economic and regulatory factors, or incentive mechanisms for public policies, which in the three countries compared here consist mainly of the application of feed in tariffs, with some differences between countries (more or less advantageous pricing, varying thresholds or ceilings of the electrical output capacity in place, and other factors at play), the image conveyed by the local authorities on the energy issue, and suitability, is also entirely central in the emergence of RE citizen initiatives – whether individual or collective. Thus, while the number of local projects remains tentative in France, the number of energy cooperatives registered in Germany has increased tenfold during the last 7 years. However, the federal political structure in Germany has not had the impact that one might often suppose for energy decentralization. As Aurélien Evrard shows [EVR 13] in the German electrical sector, the power and scope of activities of the so-called states (Länder) with regard to energy is highly restricted. Local RE projects on a municipal scale, however, contribute to redefining this distribution of powers and scope of activity with regard to energy. In Austria, the relatively high autonomy of the individual states (Länder) has nevertheless played a role in the development of REs, with policies that are more or less incentivizing, especially in the development of thermal solar from the 1990s [OBS 08, p. 122; AMB 12, p. 32]. The existence of a local distribution company (for example a municipal company) is not necessarily an action lever to implement a local energy policy, the development of RE and other associated elements. This commonly acknowledged idea around decentralization is called into question by the works of Pauline Gabillet, who shows the highly limited power of these state-owned companies in France, notably constrained by the economic energy markets [GAB 15]. The same curbs are seen in Austrian municipal companies (such as that of Mureck) including the margins of action to develop REs that are very low. Local RE projects are being developed in

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parallel and by other players. The municipal company does not even buy the electricity produced by these local facilities through the mechanism of feed-in tariffs; this electricity is far more expensive than that bought in bulk on the energy markets through a grouping of Austrian municipal companies. Although the link between this federal structure (political and energy decentralization) and local energy initiatives is far from being mechanistic, it is undeniable that this political structure has an involvement in local projects. This applies if there is a customary historical citizen commitment in local business, that is to say of representations that citizens have of what they are, or are not, able to accomplish and the issues which may, or may not, fall within the sphere of citizen action. Likewise, the centralization and the influence of the state in France, within the energy sector, on the one hand, and in the general method of political regulation, on the other hand, have a direct involvement in the various complexities (whether legal, technical, political and structural), which local energy project face. Moreover, the appropriation of the energy issue by citizens and local players is the main problem such that energy is, in these representations, a state matter. Political structure – federal in Germany and Austria and national in France – therefore has a significant influence on the energy representations as to whether or not it is a legitimate purpose, with regard to both suitability and local action. 9.4.5. Pioneer towns: “was it easier before?” Finally, and paradoxically, it was easier, say several players, to complete these RE projects when they did them early on, that is to say as pioneer projects, as they did not have to face controversies and a more restrictive legislator framework regarding site installation, for example, which followed. For other players, it is easier nowadays since the knowledge of these techniques is broader and far less localized; they are more easily accepted. The initial projects certainly did not have to face sociotechnical controversies established within the public debate (the landscape dimension of wind turbines, the use of cereals within biogas plants and other factors), which can influence local consensus. The latter are instead subsequent to these projects and often come from players outside of the given town (as was the case for the landscape issue for the wind turbines in Freiamt). Nevertheless, we should remain cautious with respect to the influence of these controversies and their actual representation within local conflicts. The analysis of the conflict around the biogas plant in Le Mené, Géotexia [DOB 16], shows that it does not revolve at all around the technique of methanation in itself, or on the development of REs, but around what the power station will be used for locally (processing large-scale agroindustrial waste in a drinking water catchment area). This conflict falls within a singular context and a critique of

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regional policy for agroindustrial development is relevant here, but may not necessarily make sense in another area. Thus, a view on a macrosocial scale might bias the analysis by allowing the belief that the recurrence of conflicts in implementing individual RE projects arises from the emergence of sociotechnical controversies shared across these subjects, while observation on a microsocial scale would reveal conflicts each very different to the others. The representations therefore change, but not necessarily unfavorably for REs, rather in an ambivalent way: these controversies are accompanied by a broader plebiscite of these techniques. Pioneer actors, and they all insisted upon this point, had to undertake significant work informing the population of these techniques, which is necessitating far fewer subsequent projects. The initial projects played the role of demonstrators (the first wind turbine farm of Le Mené for the second wind farm, the first methanation micropower station in Freiamt for the later project by a local farmer and so on). However, the pioneer status confers some advantages, such as obtaining finance (regional, national or European-based) to support dissemination of technical innovation, as was the case for Jühnde or Güssing. There is also a larger level of media coverage of these pioneer initiatives, and an increased profile of the town and the development of local tourism, as well as legislation which is sometimes more flexible due to its being non-existent in some respects. Nevertheless, the following projects can benefit from legislation adapted to these projects with simplified and optimized processes, such as the alteration of methods relating to cooperatives to promote citizen RE projects and the implementation of banking infrastructures dedicated to the granting of loans for these projects in Germany. The financial and technical risk is also reduced. The conditions in which the towns implement these RE projects are therefore shifting. They evolve over time and differ according to their national frameworks. Energy feed-in tariffs have thus fluctuated: they were low during their implementation at the beginning of the 2000s. They were then revalued, and nowadays they tend to be reduced, according to the success of given RE options and their development policy. Pioneer towns have therefore had, around some aspects, different implementation conditions than those of today, with their corresponding advantages and disadvantages. They have often introduced RE projects gradually over time, and not necessarily in the same production conditions between the first and last facilities from first implementing RE projects. Taking into account the various conditions (economic, technical, political, legislative, social) in which these projects are completed does not therefore enable us to decide upon whether or not there is a facilitator nature for the “pioneer” period (the 1990s to the beginning of the 2000s) compared to later periods.

Sociotechnical Morphologies of Rural Energy Autonomy

Aspects

Jühnde (G)

Freiamt (G)

Mureck (AU)

205

Güssing (AU)

Le Mené (FR)

[1990] 1996

[1997] 2011 (Meth) [2000– 2001] 2007

First RE project [Concept] completion

[2001] 2005

[1996] 2001

[1985] 1991

Autonomy

2005

2005

2005

2005

–

2005 METH+RC B PV

2001–2014: wind power 2002 METH METH (2) 290 PV panels 150 panels S. Th Wood/Geoth ermal Hydraulics RCB (municipal)

1991 Oil mill 1998 RCB 2005 METH 2011 PV

1996 RCB (1) 1998 GB (1) GB (2) Cogeneratio n Timber 2000: PV (1) 2002: RCB (2) PV (2) S. Th power station METH Oil mill

2007 Oil mill 2011 METH 2013 Wind RCB + PV (municipal)

Morphology of towns

Clustered

Stretched out, dispersed and undulating

Clustered

Stretched out

Dispersed (Community of towns)

Spatial nature of RE facilities

Clustered

Dispersed

Clustered

Slightly dispersed

Dispersed

Initiators

Academics

Farmers Inhabitants Associations Companies

Farmers

Town

Farmers, then towns and inhabitants

Players

Inhabitants Farmers Town Academics

Farmers Inhabitants Town Associations Companies

Farmers Inhabitants Town

Town Inhabitants Farmers Companies Academics

RE facilities

Farmers Towns Inhabitants Large investors

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Legal and economic types of groupings

Processes and forms of autonomy

Cooperative

Unique and cooperative process

Limited liability partnership Private companies Municipal associations

Additive process; multiplayers

Cooperative Limited liability company

Additive and cooperative process

Semipublic company (towninhabitants) Municipal companies

Cooperative CUMA (cooperatives for the use of agricultural equipment) Plc (multishare holders) SAS (investment clubs providing finance to local and solidarity businesses; cooperative companies) Body under local government control

Additive process; municipal and participativ e process

Additive process; multiplayers municipal and cooperative process (innovative alliances)

Table 9.1. Comparative table and summary of sociotechnical morphologies for rural energy autonomy. RE facilities legend: GB, gasification of timber; METH, methanation; RCB, heat biomass network; PV, solar photovoltaic; S. Th, solar thermal

9.5. From the construction to the transferability of “models” of autonomy: what impasses and issue are there? This panorama of “forms” of local energy autonomy or its sociotechnical morphologies makes their multiplicity evident, as much spatial and in terms of timescale, as from the point of view of its players, management and financing

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methods, technical choices and other factors. RE facilities are thus managed by different types of collectives and legal structures: citizen cooperatives (Jühnde), professional cooperatives (CUMA, Mené, Mureck), semipublic companies with public and private elements (Güssing), citizen companies (Freiamt, Mureck), investment clubs providing finance to local and solidarity businesses (Mené), municipal installations (Mené), associations (Freiamt) and private facilities (companies, individuals), which are based on new forms of alliances: municipality– inhabitants (Güssing), multiplayers (Mureck, Jühnde) or even between farmers and manufacturers (Mené). This diversity questions the relevance and even the possibility of establishing sociotechnical models of local energy autonomy. The community of towns of Le Mené, for example, may have been able to and may have had to be the most influenced by the European towns that came before it, by the timescale of its RE projects, but also by the exchanges effected, such as study visits and trips by elected representatives and project leaders to Güssing and to other European towns. However, although actors in Le Mené speak of having been particularly inspired by Güssing, it is the town which is differentiated the most from the others within our transnational study, whether in terms of its technical and organizational choices, as in what they represent and their purposes [DOB 16]. Yet the national context, as it is also the only French town studied, seems less explained by these divergences – although it contributes to some aspects – as its specific local context (agroindustrial developement, regional socioeconomic context, local identity and history). Although there are many influences between towns, the RE projects will nevertheless be adapted to the local context and social morphology, its topography, its history, the alliances which are, or are not, possible in the given local environment and other factors. Nevertheless, we have no other choice but to note that the Modell Güssing (Güssing model), just like the Bioenergiedorf of Jühnde, is being exported. The Modell Güssing is defined as a decentralized and local production strategy using all of the renewable resources of a region20. Thus, the local company Güssing Renewable Energy offers assistance to towns or companies to achieve energy autonomy, transferring knowledge and technologies of the Güssing model, with franchises and licenses, across the world, with subsidiaries in the United States, Asia, India, the United Arab Emirates and in Serbia.21 Likewise, according to the site dedicated to the German Bioenergiedörfer, 192 Bioenergiedörfer (bioenergy villages) are currently registered in Germany, 47 of which are in the process of

20 http://eee-info.net/index.php/de/das-modell-guessing (the most recent consultation on August 16, 2016). 21 A site is dedicated to the business activity of this company: www.gussingrenewable.com.

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being completed22. It is a model which is being exported abroad as well, and particularly in Asia (Korea, China, Japan, Thailand, Taiwan and Indonesia), in Ukraine and the United States. This model has therefore expanded, as much in Germany as abroad, but this standardization is ultimately more exogenous than endogenous. The model has indeed been disseminated by researchers who had started it in Jühnde, making available a “turnkey” methodology to locally implement a Bioenergiedorf. Moreover, contrary to the Modell Güssing, energy autonomy is not a prescriptive criteria for the Bioenergiedorf, only the production of electricity and heat which comes, in the main, from the biomass is prescriptive in this way. That having been said, the Austrian government is clearly setting the objective of achieving energy self-sufficiency by 2050 [AMB 12, DOB 16]. One of the political instruments for achieving this objective was put in place by the program “Climate and Energy Background” in 2007, and the support since 2009 of regions to become “Klima- und Energie-Modellregionen (KEM)” (“model regions for climate and energy”), that is to say regions without fossil fuel energies and self-sufficient using RE. The concept of KEM was the first, in the Austrian strategy, to favor REs and integrate the three political objectives of mitigating climate change, guaranteeing energy security and promote regional socioeconomic development. Currently, 91 regions group together 772 towns involved in this program and process.23 However, these are regional processes, the contribution that inhabitants are themselves offered to make is often limited to a financial contribution. It rarely consists of involving them in the decision-making process [KOM 18]. In France, there are also bodies outside of the given towns, such as the CLER, which have developed designations and definitions of the “Areas for the generation of positive energy” (TEPOS) or “100% Renewable Energy Communities”. Pursuing local energy autonomy is, nevertheless, an explicit objective for these networks24. This exogenous standardization, which is a political lobbying tool in favor of REs and a decentralized and local view of their development, at national scale as well as at the European scale flows from the collaboration and networking of these various players and lobbyists. It led to the implementation of the Rurener network, which is the European equivalent of the TEPOS networks in France, grouping together the 100% Renewable Energies Communities, namely the rural towns pursuing local energy autonomy using RE. Beyond the implementation as a network, this 22 Wege zum Bioenergiedorf. http://www.wege-zum-bioenergiedorf.de/bioenergiedoerfer/ liste/ (the most recent consultation was on June 15, 2018) 23 https://www.klimaundenergiemodellregionen.at (the last consultation was on June 15, 2018). 24 The CLER states “an area generating positive energy has the objective of reducing its energy needs as much as possible, through abstaining from using energy and also energy efficiency, and covering its needs through local renewable energy sources (‘100% renewable and more’)”; www.territoires-energie-positive.fr

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standardization of the autonomous town, and lobbying implemented for its development, has a political influence on national energy policies. Thus, the TEPOS concept was taken up in the law relating to energy transition in France25 and renamed “Area for Positive Energy Generation for Green Growth” (TEP-CV)26. The standardization of the autonomous area and its institutional reappropriation in France has been accompanied by public policies favoring their development, as has happened with the German Bioenergiedorf and the Austrian Modell Güssing. The construction of local autonomy models and their dissemination are thus essentially exogenous and non-endogenous processes to pioneer towns. Although that contributes to their profile and proliferation, especially through political institutionalization, at the local scale we see less application of a given model than its diversion for particular purposes, ways of doing things and representations which are peculiar to it, as the example of Le Mené shows. Even the notion of autonomy, which comes back to self-management, free will and self-determination – ideas at the heart of these local energy projects – is incompatible with the construction of “models” and their transferability, with a view to producing an energy transition. This way of envisaging energy issues, in the end, neglects an essential aspect of the energy issue, which is that energy is not (only) a technical issue but a “Total Social Fact”. That is to say that through the various energy choices and sociotechnical systems all kinds of institutions manifest themselves (whether political, legislative, economic – an energy system is also based upon particular forms of energy production and consumption, with other aspects coming into play). Modifying the given energy system therefore has, by necessity, implications for the various dimensions of social life; these may be economic, political, symbolic or esthetic. Regarding these five case studies, an unequivocal image of energy autonomy seems indeed difficult to design. Local energy autonomy can not be developed by applying a model, because it falls within and constructs necessarily a given sociotechnical morphology, which is unique to it, according to its singularities, whether social, economic, spatial or historial. Moreover this construction of models, 25 Law number 2015-992 of August 17, 2015 relating to energy transition for growth in green energy. 26 The TEP-CV is “an area of excellence in energy and ecological transition. The community is committed to reducing its inhabitants’ energy needs in construction, economic activity, transport, and the leisure industry. It offers a global program for a new development model, which is simpler and more economical”; Ministry of the Environment, Energy and the Sea, online: http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Un-territoire-a-energie-positive.html, originally produced on July 30, 2015 (updated on August 4, 2016).

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in view of their capacity for reproduction, also conveys a challenging representation of the energy issue, which then appears as solely technical, concealing the fact that its essence and its implications are eminently social. 9.6. References [AMB 12] AMBASSADE DE FRANCE EN AUTRICHE, Les énergies renouvelables en Autriche. L’autarcie énergétique en ligne de mire, 2012, available at: www.ambafrance-at.org/ .../Les_energies_renouvelables_en_Autriche.pdf. [CAS 75] CASTORIADIS C., L’institution imaginaire de la société, Le Seuil, Paris, 1975. [COM 15] COMMISSARIAT GENERAL AU DEVELOPPEMENT DURABLE, Bilan énergétique de la France pour 2014, References, 2015. [DES 15] DESTATIS, Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015, available at: https://www.destatis.de. [DOB 12] DOBIGNY L., “Produire et échanger localement son énergie. Dynamiques et solidarités à l’œuvre dans les communes rurales”, in PAPY F., MATHIEU N., FERAULT C. (eds), Nouveaux rapports à la nature dans les campagnes aujourd’hui, Quae, Versailles, pp. 139–152, 2012. [DOB 15] DOBIGNY L., “Le rôle central des agriculteurs dans les projets d’EnR. Apports pour une socio-anthropologie des énergies renouvelables”, in ZELEM M.-C., BESLAY C. (eds), Sociologie de l’énergie, CNRS Éditions, Paris, pp. 349–356, 2015. [DOB 16] DOBIGNY L., Quand l’énergie change de mains. Socio-anthropologie de l’autonomie énergétique locale au moyen d’énergies renouvelables en Allemagne, Autriche et France, PhD Thesis, Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University, 2016. [EVR 13] EVRARD A., Contre vents et marées, Politiques des énergies renouvelables en Europe, Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, 2013. [GAB 15] GABILLET P., Les entreprises locales de distribution à Grenoble et Metz: des outils de gouvernement énergétique urbain partiellement appropriés, PhD Thesis, University of Paris-Est, 2015. [KOM 18] KOMENDANTOVA N., RIEGLER M., NEUMUELLER S., “Of transitions and models: community engagement, democracy, and empowerment in the Austrian energy transition”, Energy Research and Social Science, vol. 39, pp. 141–151, 2018. [MAU 50] MAUSS M., Sociologie et anthropologie, PUF, Paris, 1950. [OBS 08] OBSERV’ER, Etat des énergies renouvelables en Europe, 8ème bilan Eurobserv’er, Report, 2008. [OBS 14] OBSERV’ER, Etat des énergies renouvelables en Europe, 14ème bilan Eurobserv’er, Report, 2014, available at: http://www.energies-renouvelables.org/observ-er/stat_baro/ barobilan/barobilan14_FR.pdf.

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[POI 14] POIZE N., RÜDINGER A., Projets citoyens pour la production d’énergie renouvelable: une comparaison France-Allemagne, Working Paper, no. 01/14, IDDRI, Sciences Po, Paris, 2014. [RAK 98] RAKOS C., Lessons Learned from the Introduction of Biomass District Heating in Austria, E.V.A. Austrian Energy Agency, Vienna, 1998. [STA 17] STATISTIK AUSTRIA, Energiedaten Österreich 2016, 2017. [TRE 17] TREND:RESEARCH, Eigentümerstruktur: Erneuerbare Energien. Entwicklung der Akteursvielfalt, Rolle der Energieversorger, Ausblick bis 2020, 2017. [WUS 12] WÜSTE A., SCHMUCK P., “Bioenergy villages and regions in germany: an interview study with initiators of communal bioenergy projects on the success factors for restructuring the energy supply of the community”, Sustainability, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 244–256, 2012.

10 Community Energy Projects Redefining Energy Distribution Systems: Examples from Berlin and Hamburg

10.1. Introduction The German Energiewende [FED 10] is shifting both policies and technologies of energy systems and has given rise to new, often locally or community based, actors in the energy market [MAU 12; NOL 13: 544; YIL 13: 173; SOU 15: 49; SCH 16]. The Energiewende has (re)politicized energy systems, especially on the local level. No longer the “last mile” connecting centralized production and its consumers, local power grids are now contested sites of “prosumption” and a cornerstone of local sustainability politics. Beyond capitalizing on political and technical opportunity structure, citizen-owned energy projects are forming as expressions of a larger social movement for climate change mitigation and carbon reduction [SCH 15: 61; HES 05: 516]. Their activities include not only energy generation but strategies of energy efficiency, reduced consumption, general awareness-raising and, more recently, a proliferating interest in energy distribution and new cooperations with local utilities [DEB 17]. These “community energy projects” – civil society engagement in energy system change, majority owned and managed by often local citizens – explore new technical, financial and managerial configurations for energy system change at the community level [SCH 15; MON 07] and reconfigurations of ownership [HOF 05].

Chapter written by Arwen Dora COLELL and Angela POHLMANN.

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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10.1.1. Rethinking networked infrastructures beyond “public versus private” In Germany, municipal and civil society interest in public utility management has been reinvigorated [SPO 09], with over 70 new local power companies emerging between 2005 and 2012 alone [WAG 17: 396]. Municipal utilities are successfully established in towns and cities of various sizes [WAG 17: 406], although studies indicate that smaller local grid operators are more likely to proactively embrace innovative approaches of the Energiewende, and manage local grids more effectively [CUL 16; MUE 13]. Similarly, while community energy projects, typically taking the form of cooperatives, can also be found in larger cities, they tend to proliferate in rural areas [MAU 12; DEB 14]. Against this backdrop, this chapter purposefully studies citizen engagement in alternative grid management schemes in the two largest cities of Germany, Berlin and Hamburg. While previous publications have explored campaigns for municipalization of grid operations in both cities [MOS 14b; ANG 16], and the establishment of a cooperative in Berlin as a grassroots initiative seeking to directly influence grid operations [BLA 15], this chapter examines community energy induced alterations to political, material and symbolic dimensions of sociotechnical infrastructures in both cities. To date, citizen engagement in distribution grids remains an exception in Germany [DEB 14]. Challenges include incumbent grid operators fighting to retain control of closely regulated and often stable sources of financial return, but also asymmetrical regulatory conditions. Current concessionnaires can exploit an ambiguous legal framework and draw political power from their strong economic position vis-à-vis municipal administrations [BEC 13; BER 13]. Tactics include refusing disclosure of relevant information – effectively blocking competition – and incentives, such as sponsorships or neighborhood support or threats, such as changing location of company headquarters, to the local administration [REI 02]. “Revolving doors” between local administrations and private energy utilities further blur the lines separating private and public service providers [CAR 13]. Incumbent grid operators may impede commissioning and the unbundling of grid structures by withholding payment of license fees, or even refusing negotiations altogether. Far from being exceptions, these tactics are “a nationwide phenomenon” [BEC 13: 10], the power imbalance frequently going unchecked by federal authorities regulating electricity markets [BEC 13: 18; BUN 13; KRI 13]. 10.1.2. Citizens claiming networked infrastructures in Germany’s largest cities In qualitative case studies from Berlin and Hamburg, this chapter explores how community energy actors disrupt and (re)interpret systems of energy distribution.

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How do these projects alter the political, material and symbolic dimensions of local energy systems, changing sociotechnical structures as much as power relations of the old energy world in the process, while themselves seemingly working in ways “neither strategic nor managed” [SEY 14: 41]? We argue that community energy projects importantly go beyond academically acknowledged disruptions of energy procurement. Citizen initiatives in energy distribution are an immediate re-politicization of networked infrastructures. The first case, BürgerEnergie Berlin eG (BEB, Citizen Energy Berlin), researches a cooperative’s struggle in applying for ownership and operation of the Berlin electricity distribution grid, competing against Vattenfall, one of Germany’s “big four” energy utilities. One share equaling €100, the 2,000+ members of the cooperative raised over €10 million before presenting their bid for a partnership with the city of Berlin in March 2016 [BEB 16a]. As this book goes to press, the political reassignment of the concession in Berlin, legally governed in the application to the Senate, is yet undecided. The reassignment of the concession, a window of opportunity typically opening every 15–20 years, however, has enabled a shift in the policies and politics of urban electricity and sustainability more broadly. BEB challenges common dichotomies of public and private management in utility services, suggesting a “third way” of cooperative infrastructural relations between municipal authorities and citizens. The second case discusses the intertwined activities of the “Moorburgtrasse-Stoppen” and “Unser-Hamburg-Unser-Netz” [“Our-Hamburg-Our-Grid”] (UHUN) initiatives, and the “Kultur-und-EnergieBunker-Altona-Projekt” [“Culture-and-Energy-Bunker-Altona-Project”] (KEBAP) in Hamburg. The name KEBAP indicates its framing of energy issues as both related and significant to neighborhood culture(s). KEBAP originated in the Moorburgtrasse-Stoppen initiative, which successfully resisted a pipeline scheme wherein Vattenfall sought to connect a new coal-fired power plant to the city’s long-distance heating grid. KEBAP aims to set up a renewable, participatory and decentralized energy production project, countering Vattenfall’s energy practices on as many grounds as possible. Beyond this, the idea was to create a renewable heat project that could challenge Vattenfall’s quasi-monopoly of Hamburg’s long-distance heating grid on political, legal, economic and symbolic grounds. Section 10.2 will introduce the theoretical and methodological background of this case study. Sections 10.3.1 and 10.3.2 will then present the community energy projects in Berlin and Hamburg and discuss the changes to the political, material and symbolic infrastructure of energy systems in Germany’s two largest cities. We will conclude with a combined discussion of empirical and methodical learnings and brief conclusions on further research on the role of community energy engagement in infrastructure change.

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10.2. Situational analyses of urban energy system transformation Clarke’s “situational analysis” provides both analytical methods and theoretical frameworks of interpretation1. The transformation of the local energy sector, thus, is shaped by technological artifacts (the low voltage distribution grid in Berlin, the heating grid and respective power stations in Hamburg), interconnected with individual and collective actors (within the community energy projects as well as on the level of the municipality and local energy utilities), and related discourses. Interrelations and power struggles importantly shape the interpretation of these research situations. We conceptualize community energy projects as social worlds, negotiating conflicts on local distribution networks within social arenas of urban energy governance. Our body of research includes semistructured interviews, participant observations and document analysis. In Berlin, the study covers the establishment of BEB between May 2011 and December 2017. Four semistructured interviews were conducted with members of the cooperative as well as representatives of community energy associations. In addition, two conferences on local energy system governance and several smaller educative events hosted by the cooperative were attended, as well as 11 general assemblies2. In Hamburg, this chapter covers 13 semistructured interviews with members of KEBAP who were also involved in the UHUN or the Moorburgtrasse-Stoppen initiative. Participant observation in project meetings and events took place between January 2012 and April 2013. Document analyses of primary and secondary literature included publications and press releases by stakeholders, related policy documents and local newspaper publications. In interpretation, we focus on social worlds and arenas, investigating how political, material and symbolic dimensions of sociotechnical infrastructures manifest in the social worlds of community energy projects, and are purposefully altered to affect the arenas of negotiation they move in. Clarke’s social worlds are created by “groups with certain commitments to certain activities, sharing resources of many kinds to achieve their goals, and building shared ideologies about how to go about their business” [CLA 91: 131], building on Strauss’ concepts of interactive (re)negotiations of orders and groups [STR 78: 122]. Social worlds manifest in their practical consequences. However, they are themselves contested processes rather than stable manifestations [STR 05: 178], and inherently involve conflict and power. Social worlds are differentiated from one another by the “shared commitment” [CLA 91: 131] of their members, but membership itself is dynamic [STR 05: 180]. 1 This builds on wider research of the authors including community energy projects in Germany, Scotland and Denmark [POH 18; COL 18]. 2 The first author is a founder and board member of the cooperative BürgerEnergie Berlin. Observations and information obtained in these functions are not part of the body of research.

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Both BEB and KEBAP are understood as social worlds. They are the social spaces in which alternative configurations of energy distribution and related decisionmaking processes, ownership, services and distribution of financial returns are planned and executed. Participants of diverse social worlds negotiate ideas and conflict in social arenas [CLA 12: 149; STR 05: 189]. In the case of BEB, the social arena of negotiations on the power grid can be distinguished by those actors legally bound by the formal application process. But it could also be defined as the contested space of urban energy politics involving collective actors directly or indirectly claiming a voice in negotiations on energy system change, ownership and decision-making processes. In the case of KEBAP, the social arena comprises municipal actors, as well as the local energy utility, and collective actors participating in the negotiations on the design and implementation of a heating infrastructure. These arenas are underpinned by relatively stable and pre-existing negotiated orders [STR 05: 191–193], including municipal orders and legal frameworks regarding concessioning, technical artifacts and networks, energy sector design and local configurations of community energy engagement. 10.3. People have the power? Citizens claiming energy infrastructure 10.3.1. (Re)negotiating infrastructures of decision-making on the power grid: the case of BEB Berlin’s electricity grid is the largest municipal grid in Germany and one of the largest in Europe, covering around 2.2 million customer connections [BLA 15: 247]. Historically, it was governed by a vertically integrated public utility, BEWAG. But Berlin took a leading role in the privatization of public assets in the 1990s, partly due to the city’s financial crisis post-reunification [BEV 12]. Since 2001, local energy assets are held by Vattenfall, which also provides default electricity services3 to the city’s households. Yet, the city failed to install appropriate monitoring and evaluation, or indeed pursue existing agreements [MON 07: 336]. The Senate effectively withdrew from pro-active energy governance, while Vattenfall, in turn, did not seek engagement in public debate on energy system development [BLA 15: 249]. This resulted in poor performance on regional innovation and environmental modernization as well as limited economic benefits for the city [MON 05: 328–336]. 3 The default service refers to the electricity consumption of households with no conscious choice to switch providers (or at least tariffs). The default tariff is typically comparatively expensive. It is usually provided by the company also operating the local distribution grid, although grid services and retail were unbundled following market liberalization. In 2014, Vattenfall held a market share of 80% in private electricity consumption [SCH 14].

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The lack of leadership of the Berlin Senate was underscored by its failure to instate an effective policy framework for an efficient, cost-effective and environmentally conscious energy system, causing Berlin to rank last in the development of renewable energies in a 2012 review by the German Institute for Economics [DIE 12]. Beyond the reduced generating capacities of a city–state with less open spaces, the report underscored that Berlin was failing politically to establish an effective framework of local energy transition [ibid.]. The challenges to energy system services in Berlin have sparked diverse academic explanations [BLA 15; ANG 16]. These point to learnings on urban energy system governance [MOS 14b] and the emergence, dynamics and effects of grassroots initiatives challenging the incumbent [BLA 15]. By studying alterations to political, material and symbolic infrastructures of Berlin’s energy systems, we add to this literature by providing a more complex and ambiguous picture of local individual and collective actors beyond the dichotomies of private versus public management or challengers versus incumbents. We thereby contribute to academic understanding of infrastructures as contested spaces in their political, material and symbolic implications. 10.3.1.1. Challenging the politics of energy distribution The concessionary application process opened a window of political opportunity in 2012. Frustration with the inactivity of the Senate gave rise to “coalitions of challengers” [BLA 15: 248] originating in the grassroots and seeking both indirect and direct access to the political and financial assets of the distribution grid. The Energy Round Table (Berliner Energietisch, BET), a coalition of local initiatives and local as well as national NGOs, chose the political and legal vehicle of a municipal referendum to force establishment of a municipally owned utility providing new environmentally and socially progressive local energy services, as well as municipally owned grid operations [BET 12a, 12b]. Although the referendum ultimately failed the required quorum of 25% of the population eligible to vote on municipal level, it was a narrow miss: 24.1% had voted in favor. While supportive of the round table’s claims of environmentally and socially progressive energy system services, the cooperative BEB sought direct political and material access to the power grid by entering concessionary applications in 2012. The citizen-owned cooperative was established as a partner for the municipality for the purpose of joint electricity service provision [BEB 14b]4. Its key objectives include strengthening democratic decision-making processes around infrastructure

4 In 2012, The Senate established its own energy utility, as well as a placeholder company entering the application process in case of municipalization. While the latter is predominantly a vehicle of the concessionary process, the utility is engaged in several small-scale energy generation projects and local electricity retail.

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management by direct participation of citizens in ownership and management, supporting local value creation by promoting direct financial ties to citizens through shares in the cooperative and reinvesting profits in local projects of energy system transformation through a fixed share of revenues [BEB 11]. BET and BEB, through configuration of their respective social worlds, widened the legal arena of the application process to an arena of contestation over grid politics. Unlike renewable energy generation, grid operations are still largely dominated by the paradigm of private versus municipal management. While BET sought reconfiguration of political structure by referendum, BEB questioned indirect representation of local communities in municipal management paradigms [MON 07; BEB 13b, 14a]. The cooperative claimed more direct access to distributive infrastructures [COL 16]. Community energy projects in distribution grids thus present distinct cases of material participation in renewable energy technologies as public participation [BAT 17]. Changes in politics of the grid, in this case, importantly refer to “‘the public’ being imagined, given agency, and invoked for various purposes by actors in technical-industrial and policy networks” [WAL 10: 931]. Representatives of all factions of the Berlin Senate had publicly supported involving the cooperative in grid operations in a civic conference in 2012, but the governing coalition of Christian and Social Democrats opened no pathways of participation. The Senate publicly denounced the round table’s draft law and moved the date of the referendum. Instead of holding simultaneously with federal elections in September, it was moved to November to reduce voter turnout [BEB 13a, 13b]. This lack of interest in participation also showed in the design of the concessionary application [BEB 14a, 14b, 14c, 15a]. Participatory opportunities for representatives of civil society did not exceed non-binding advisory councils for citizens [BEB 14d]. Private negotiations with Vattenfall to mediate the ownership and operation over both electricity and gas grids in 2015 excluded the cooperative and resulted in a suggested by-pass of the concessionary application and cooperation of the Senate with Vattenfall, incumbent in the electricity grid, and E.ON, incumbent in the gas grid [BEB 15a, 15b, 15e, 15f]. The 2016 elections changed political leadership in the Senate. The Green and Left Parties had publicly supported citizen participation on the grid in their electoral campaigns, the Green Party even including the cooperative in its electoral program [BUE 16]. The cooperative itself campaigned to raise awareness of, most notably the absence of, energy politics leading up to the elections. This culminated in a public ceremony wherein the management of the cooperative handed over more than 10,000 signatures in support of cooperative grid management to the newly elected leadership, including 66 signatures of designated members of the Senate [BEB 16b]. The cooperative was ultimately included in the coalition agreement, Green and Left Party and Social Democrats committing to citizen participation in grid ownership and operations [SOZ 16]. While this commitment is symbolic, as the application

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process is independenntly governedd by the senattor of financee within the m municipal ment, it neverthheless constituutes a significcant change inn political com mmitment governm to civil society s particiipation [BAT 17: 10–11]. It I marks the acknowledgme a ent of the cooperattive as a relevvant actor of the arena of power p grid poolitics. Changges in the politics of the powerr grid in the city were marked simultaaneously by ccampaign successees of challenngers, inactivvity and ineffectiveness of the Sennate and underesttimation of itts challengerss by the incu umbent [BLA A 15]. But chhanges in material and symboliic dimensionss of the enerrgy system allso contributeed to the p channge. cooperattive’s discursive power andd the ability to mobilize for political

Figure 10.1. 1 BEB han nds over 10,10 01 signatures in favor of a citizen-controlle c ed grid to representativves of the new wly elected Berlin Senate in 2016 [©BEB]]

10.3.1.2 2. Material pa articipation as a public partticipation BEB reconfiguredd the material and symbolic implications of the grid byy framing o political chhange and soccietal well-being (Daseinsffürsorge). it as an instrument of b being physsically remotee from consum mers, has Conventtional energy generation, by been shoown to also seeem psychologgically remotee [SHA 07]. Psychologicall P ly remote structurees can appear beyond the inndividual's inffluence [HEI 10; FOR 08; PAS 00]. The enerrgy grid, simiilarly, seems beyond the sp phere of citizzens’ influence but not through physical remooteness. It waas, instead, rem moved from inndividual access by its social coonstruction ass a complex, invisible struccture governeed by technicaal experts

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[STR 15]. BEB changed the technicized narrative of the power grid, governed by experts and dominated by a logic of security of supply, efficiency and costeffectiveness. Instead, BEB framed the grid as an accessible sphere key to local politics of environmentally friendly energy politics and local value creation, and open to civil society participation. Beyond a discursive construction, the cooperative formed a legal vehicle for a civil society campaign to enter the concessionary process and submitted a legally binding and competitive offer alongside the incumbent, backed by considerable financial commitments. Networked infrastructures thus hold material and discursive relevance in conflicts of challengers and incumbents [BLA 15: 253; MCF 08: 364]. An understanding of networked infrastructures as disconnected, black-boxed and seemingly naturalized entities, whose technical workings are indifferent to their sociopolitical surroundings, may then give way to new socioeconomic configurations of power utilities [MOR 01; HOF 05; CHI 17]. The cooperative presents a material attempt to institutionalize alternative structures of civil society control, accessibility and transparency. Members elect and control the board (which chooses the management), and vote on strategic decisions in the general assembly. The German legal and regulatory framework for cooperatives is well established, and auditors monitor performance regularly. General assemblies are open to the public (although voting is closed to non-members). Membership is not reserved to locals but intentionally open to all sharing the political aims of the cooperative and interested in the political symbol of the Berlin power grid beyond its immediate local context. While the majority of members are local, national and international interest in membership indicates the relevance of acknowledging the symbolic value of alliances beyond the local. A team of voluntary workers, led by the management, runs the daily affairs of the cooperative. The team is open to members as well as interested nonmembers (interview with member of cooperative, February 2016), but is indeed locally based. Surprisingly for non-paid engagement, volatility is comparatively low, with most team members in early 2018 engaging with the co-operative for two years or longer, and some still involved from its establishment in 2011. The cooperative created a material representation of civil society interest in political change, underpinning the discursive position of an energy system alternative with a legally binding offer and financial backing. In the face of a considerably delayed application process (the concession expired on December 31, 2014, and it currently remains open when a new concessionaire will be chosen), the cooperative established operations in energy generation and retail jointly discussed and developed in the team and subsequently in general assemblies (BEB general assemblies, June 2016, December 2016). This created the first citizen owned retailer of renewable electricity in the city of Berlin in early 2018 (BEB general assembly, December 2017). Community energy, hereby, must not be “conflated with local ownership” [HOF 05, p. 392]. Sustainable energy systems instead need meaningful forms of economic, political and social-material participation for citizens.

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10.3.1.3. New symbols of urban energy transition Changes to symbols include the explicit connection of technical infrastructure and visions of urban development, and the discursive framing of ownership, affectedness and intentionality in respective decision-making processes. As discussed, the cooperative re-framed the local distribution grid by raising awareness of its strategic relevance with respect to the local Energiewende as well as local value creation. Rather than forming a community of those immediately affected, though, as is often assumed in the design of infrastructure participation, the cooperative created a community of relevance and intention [BAT 17: 2–3]. While being a paradigm frequently applied in the design of participatory processes in networked infrastructures by policy-makers or energy utilities, as well as academics [BAT 17: 2; AAE 16; MAR 12; AIT 10], “communities of the affected” value engagement with energy systems predominantly when their local deployment “affects” people. People’s responses are seen as reactions to this deployment and its acceptance. Communities of relevance, on the other hand, acknowledge that people may simultaneously be affected and not affected by energy systems, as they are interested in what is at stake but have no means of participation [MAR 12]. Also, relevance suggests a wider frame of affectedness. Ontologically, this assumes “issue specification as a wider material, technical, political and social process” [MAR 12: 55]. BEB, by creating a forum for those seeking to influence both the framing of and the decision-making in networked infrastructures directly but independently of their local status, acknowledges the paradigm of communities of relevance and creates a legal forum for its enactment. The cooperative is a forum for those materially affected, as well as those politically or symbolically affected, or concerned, but without voice. At the same time, its discursive frame clearly indicates its intentions for energy system change, reconnecting the symbolic, material and political dimensions of its agenda. In Germany, this means highlighting the ways by which material infrastructures are linked to (rather than disconnected from) their sociopolitical context; specifically, the rejection of management strategies designed to discourage political, social or economic engagement of citizens with their local energy system, together with an abandonment of the rhetoric of technocratic infrastructure management [HOF 05; SWY 07]. Such an approach brings questions of social and civic engagement to the forefront of infrastructural (re)configuration as well as more robust modes of participation [BER 09; BER 12; WIL 97]. The case of BEB also adds contrast to the study of community energy, as it is an application of “community energy” (so far) altogether disconnected from financial gain. To date, its success is predominantly ideational. Yet, the cooperative has managed to sustain a campaign for over 6 years, bridging multiple periods of prolonged waiting while Senate decisions of the application process were postponed or interrupted. At the same time, the organization’s key – and often only – currency was political visibility

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gained through its numbers of supporters [BEB 16a, 16b]. Its strategy for mobilization relies heavily on political and symbolic motives: holding the Senate accountable in the process of applications, but also with a view of its political ambition in infrastructure design, creating transparency and offering participatory forums of education and involvement in grid operations. Still, its overall numbers, when compared to the population of the city, remain low. Its ability to engage beyond a community already sensitized for overarching issues of sustainability is often limited. By contrast, profound research in a small-scale case of citizen-led energy system transition offers important additional insights into the contextuality of energy engagement and its interconnections with identity and citizenship. 10.3.2. From protest to empowerment: civil society engagement in Hamburg’s energy distribution systems Hamburg is Germany’s second largest city with around 1.7 million inhabitants and around 1.1 million household and commercial connections to the electricity grid. Like Berlin, it established close ties to Vattenfall in its energy infrastructures following market liberalization in the late 1990s and subsequent private investments in energy infrastructure and services. Vattenfall held majority shares in the city’s electricity grid operator. While formerly the energy system established by the partnership between Vattenfall and Hamburg’s city government had been largely unchallenged, this changed in 2009. Two different but closely related campaigns, both of which were initiated and driven by civil society actors, were mainly responsible for these changes: the UHUN campaign and the MoorburgtrasseStoppen initiative. 10.3.2.1. Challenging the politics of energy distribution First, in 2009 a range of different civil society groups and organizations started to campaign for a re-municipalization of the grids. According to schedule, contracts for the grid concessions for electricity and long-distance heat would come to end on December 31, 2014. The gas concession was contracted to end in 2018, with a special right of cancellation effective until December 31, 2014. As Hamburg’s government did not intend to regain concession rights, the initiative aimed to force it to do so by means of a referendum forcing the city government to return the electricity, gas and district heating grids to the public hand. Together the groups set up an umbrella organization – the UHUN network. The network planned, organized and ran the referendum and its predecessing stages. In the course of preparing for the referendum, UHUN raised awareness for the political and juridical situation that granted Vattenfall a monopoly over the heat production and distribution.

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Second, also in 2009, Vattenfall received approval to build a new coal power plant in the outskirts of Hamburg. A new pipeline was planned to transport heat into the city center. The technological features of this pipeline (width of the pipes, temperature and pressure of the water pumped through) would have given Vattenfall a quasi-monopoly over the heat distribution in large parts of Hamburg. Furthermore, the pipeline was planned to cross most of Hamburg’s inner city parks. During construction, most of the parks would have had to be (temporarily) torn down. While the destruction of the parks provoked an emotional response in people, what really outraged most was the quasi-monopoly Vattenfall would gain by building the pipeline. A number of local citizens’ initiatives formed to counter these plans. Most of these started out as neighborhood initiatives around the green areas and parks included in the pipeline plans. Together they created the umbrella initiative “Moorburgtrasse-Stoppen”. Supported by environmental and other civil society groups – most prominent among them Friends of the Earth Germany (BUND) – these initiatives increasingly gained public attention and media coverage. In late November 2011, the governing SPD declared that the pipeline plans would be put aside until the referendum on the re-municipalization of the heating grid in September 2013. If in this referendum the citizens decided against the re-municipalization of the grids, the pipeline plans would be abandoned conclusively in favor of a new combined cycle power plant. If the referendum decided for the re-municipalization, the plan approval procedure would be resumed. This plan is to be explained with the financial interests of Vattenfall. The re-municipalization of the grid meant the end of Vattenfall’s quasi-monopoly over the long-distance heating grid in Hamburg. Before the referendum, Vattenfall had not only been the biggest producer of heat in Hamburg but also owned the heating grid. Unlike electricity grids, the heat sector has not been liberalized. This legal situation enabled Vattenfall to close the grid to any other potential heat producer. If the referendum would be successful, and the municipal grid operator would open the grid to other energy providers, the new power plant would not be financially viable for Vattenfall. Hence, Vattenfall threatened not to proceed with its plans to build the new power plant at all. The SPD argued that without the waste heat from the new combined cycle power plant the city would be reliant on the pipeline from the older coal power plant to ensure the city’s heat provision. While meant to play off the UHUN and the Moorburgtrasse-Stoppen initiatives against one another, this argumentation further outraged people, who felt that they were now being threatened by the SPD to stop the referendum as otherwise they would involuntarily support a coal power plant they had objected to in the first place. Instead of succeeding in demoralizing the organizations involved in the re-municipalization campaign, with this argumentation the SPD increased the citizens’ emotional outrage about the energy policy of the SPD, which many people felt was in league with Vattenfall. Hence, through its tactic the Senate in fact further made the two campaigns work closer together. They thereby profited from each other: public awareness and media

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attention raised by one of the campaigns also benefited the other campaign. Apart from the overlaps in participating organizations and individuals, the two campaigns also had the same opponents – Vattenfall and Hamburg’s government. Despite a heavily financed media campaign by Vattenfall and the Hamburg government, in which they promoted the status quo, the UHUN campaign succeeded in convincing a majority of the electorally registered inhabitants. With 444,352 votes (50.9%), the network won the referendum in September 2013. In February 2014, the SPD – which had governed in a coalition with the Green Party since September 2013 – announced that Vattenfall’s pipeline plans were finally “politically dead” and would not be resumed, irrespective of the outcome of the formal plan approval process [MOO 14]. 10.3.2.2. Challenging the system on material and symbolic grounds: KEBAP When both UHUN and the Moorburgtrasse-Stoppen initiative succeeded, this highly motivated many people – who also had already gained much knowledge about Hamburg’s energy policy – who felt compelled not only to continue their engagement but to take it one step further. KEBAP originated from this specific context. A group of seven people formed the first core group of the project. Their plan was to turn an old Flakbunker from World War II into a site where people from the neighborhood could come together and produce renewable heat locally. By producing renewable heat in a cooperative, they could not only challenge the fossil fuel based logic of the heat production system, but would also organize heat production as a participatory process. The most fundamental – and in fact radical – idea of the project, however, was to create a project within which energy production would be an integrated aspect of peoples’ day-to-day life. Instead of producing energy that is geographically remote and socially isolated from the consumers [MAU 08: 11; KOC 90], KEBAP aspires to put energy production back into the hands of the people. Because of the interest of the first core group’s members, and in order to increase the social integration of energy production, KEBAP not only aspires to produce and distribute energy, but also wants to realize a range of other interests and needs of the local residents. Among the ideas and activities pursued within KEBAP are urban gardening, community cooking, yoga classes, movie screening and a neighborhood community room. The basic idea of KEBAP hence is to decentrally produce heat from renewable sources in a participatory and empowering local economy based cooperative, which aims to make energy production an integrated aspect of a self-organizing community. While the members of the first core group felt very much inspired by the idea of “upgrading” themselves from mere protesters to creators of a real alternative, they nevertheless also understood their project as a means to symbolize their not only continuing but intensifying activities against Vattenfall and the conventional energy system.

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“it is about power. This is what always motivates me. Because I believe that those power shifts we had in the energy sector caused a concentration of power on only few, which form an ominous [“unheilvolle”] alliance with political actors. This is obvious in the energy sector” (Board Member 3: 57–62). From the outset, the initiative sought to combine protest against an incumbent of the energy system with constructive engagement in an alternative energy project, which would serve as an alternative to Vattenfall, and the conventional system of energy production with all its entrenched power structures. The geographical position of the bunker is one reason why the group decided to concentrate on this specific building. “The Moorburgtrasse-Stoppen initiative suggested to specify the concept for this particular bunker. Which, as a detached building, a very large one as well, is by its location predestined for this kind of use. Because it is situated relatively close to the planned long-distance pipeline and also is situated in one of the parks through which the original pipeline should have been laid” (Board Member 2: 119-128). The interviewee explains that the bunker was not only chosen by the initiative because it fitted the intention of the first core group to oppose Vattenfall’s pipeline plans. More specifically, the bunker was chosen because it suited the aims of the first core group. In the Moorburgtrassen arena, the position of the bunker in geographical space acquired a particular symbolic meaning. This symbolic meaning is explained further in the interview. “the bunker is also situated more or less exactly halfway between the – still under construction – coal power plant and the planned feed-in point. The pipeline would have been nearly eleven kilometers long, and the bunker is more or less halfway, very close to the planned pipeline. For us this was the crucial reason, to plan the whole project as a stumbling block for Vattenfall – which has apparently worked out alright” (Board Member 2: 132–138). As transpires from the quote, the members of KEBAP estimated that the position of the bunker increases the symbolic meaning of their project as part of the Moorburgtrasse-Stoppen initiative’s resistance activities against Vattenfall. The building’s positioning halfway on the planned Moorburgtrasse increased the symbolic visibility of the project as not “just another renewable energy project” but materially and geographically related to the Moorburgtrasse-Stoppen initiative.

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10.3.2.3. Challenging the system on legal and economic grounds As was stated in the beginning of this section, one of the core intentions of both the UHUN and the Moorburgtrasse-Stoppen initiatives’ members had been to publicly criticize and terminate Vattenfall’s quasi-monopoly over Hamburg’s longdistance heating grid. When setting up KEBAP, the participants not only intended to create a project that would serve as a symbol for the possibility of an alternative energy system, but that would be in a position to challenge Vattenfall on legal and economic grounds. Hence, instead of planning a micro-heating or district heating system, the group deliberately decided to design KEBAP with the intention of feeding heat into the long-distance heating grid. By now, it has become rather common among renewable heating projects to opt for the installation of microheating or district heating grids. These are deemed much more efficient in relation to the loss of heat and the required supply temperature, both of which are much lower in small, decentralized grids. Despite these arguments, the KEBAP members interpret the long-distance heating grid as a resource. “Why the long-distance heating grid? Obviously, we define ourselves as a local economy project, and also as resilience project. Which means: make use of locally existing resources. In brackets – fallow, under-used, not optimally used. And use these as good as possible. This approach we follow to the letter” (Board Member 2: 143–147). According to the quote, the KEBAP members re-interpreted the long-distance heating grid from being a deficient artifact of the conventional energy system to being a resource that would serve the project’s aspirations. More importantly, the aim to feed heat in into the long-distance heating grid opened another opportunity for the project to realize their political agenda. “So, and why should one build a second micro-grid, if there is a long-distance heating grid in existence? Through which one also could then make it a pilot project. Which would be politically very charged, to achieve the opening of the long-distance heating grid” (Board Member 2: 148–152). The quote explains one of KEBAP’s core strategies: by creating a potential heat source, the members of KEBAP came into a legal position to demand access to the heating grid – something which so far did not exist in Vattenfall’s quasi-monopoly. Together with Greenpeace Energy, the BUND, the consumer protection agency and other organizations, the group submitted an inquiry to the cartel office in 2010. In January 2012, the cartel office responded to the inquiry. In its official statement, it required Vattenfall to open the heating grid for external heat producers. In the inquiry, KEBAP for the first time officially appeared as a future energy producer and potential competitor. Being a competitor, KEBAP had gained the legal right to

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challenge existing economic monopoles. The project members took the opportunity to “use” the project as a tool in their continued resistance against Vattenfall’s heat monopoly. Subsequent to the cartel offices response, KEBAP members formally handed in an inquiry to Vattenfall in which they officially asked for the conditions and charges for passing-through heat. The success of the UHUN initiative in 2013 changed the situation. While the intention of KEBAP now is no longer to challenge Vattenfall in its position as grid operator, the aim remains to break the company’s monopoly, as Vattenfall remains the only heat producer feeding into the longdistance heating grid. 10.4. Discussion: reconfiguring the social in sociotechnical? In both Berlin and Hamburg, civil society initiatives successfully established a citizen-owned actor in a social arena previously dominated by technical and political experts. A young cooperative, BEB completed a formal tender for grid operations, as well as creating public debate not only on the social, economic and environmental direction of grid management but also on its underlying paradigms concerning ownership and decision-making. KEBAP countered incumbent development plans not only with neighborhood protest but with the successful establishment of a viable local alternative to incumbent coalitions of the local energy sector, creating visible energy systems on a local scale. They pressured an incumbent coalition of policy-makers and energy utilities to alter their approach to network design, and acknowledge citizens as a relevant actor at eye level in public debate – if not necessarily infrastructure decision-making. In both Berlin and Hamburg, a coalition of challengers led by community energy actors importantly framed the local discourse on energy system change [BLA 15]. In both cases, the incumbent reacted by offering a different frame of the infrastructure services than that of the projects and sought to counter the initiatives. The utility became more visibly engaged in local debates of energy sector design and service provision, both through personal engagement in public debate and through print and poster publications in the cities. Community engagement in distribution networks, in this sense, opened a space of sector transformation previously closed to civil society engagement. The two cases highlight the interconnectedness of a transition in energy systems and urban governance [ANG 16]. The importance of a more meaningful debate on the advantages and limitations of the (re)municipalization of utility services, as well as a more rigorous understanding of “civic engagement” and “community energy” architectures [HOF 05] around infrastructural politics [BLA 15], is underscored. Community energy projects such as BEB and KEBAP may indeed open and maintain forums of institutionalized and sustained commitment with a strong community focus. At the same time, regulation on cooperatives regarding the conditions of membership, their statutes and actions provides close control of their

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performance and actions. Their role as watchdogs of municipalities and private energy utilities creates a new infrastructural actor promoting transparency and providing monitoring. Yet, community energy projects also need to strike a balance of community activism and entrepreneurial professionalism. If they operate as energy companies, they compete against large, established and frequently incumbent market forces. Their differences to this competition are profound. As communitybased actors, their intentions include the involvement and information of their members and the larger public. Renegotiating the infrastructures of energy systems services and their decision-making processes, in this sense, also refers to a reconfiguration of operational structures that mediate the challenges of functioning within a market and larger socioenvironmental objectives. Both cases draw attention to distribution grids as political sites crucial to mediating the debate around sustainability on a local level [BIC 09]. Contrasting the cases of BEB and KEBAP, however, also points to challenges associated with transforming the scale of infrastructure management. Applying a cooperative approach, typically realized in smaller structures characterized by strong communal ties, to a project of considerable technical and financial dimensions is not without difficulties. BEB faces the trade-off of a highly visible large project and an attendant structure less amenable to meaningful mobilization and engagement. Just as difficult as the need to increase membership and foster public identification with the cooperative’s aims, the transformation of forms of ownership within well-established utilities challenges financial and management structures. Beyond the cooperative’s financial capacity, successfully taking over the distribution grid depends on its political strength. This is achieved predominantly through a meaningful engagement of citizens that translates to credible pressure on public institutions. The ability of citizens to identify with the object and aims of the cooperative is consequently imperative. Ultimately, the long-term success of cooperatives depends on the interest of the many, rather than merely the work of the few engaged in the application process and the entrepreneurial tasks involved. The cooperative must therefore preserve and reinvigorate its democratic decision-making processes in order to fulfill its aims of improving citizen control of the grid. This includes honoring the strategic decision-making power of the General Assembly, as well as nurturing policies of transparency and accountability necessary for members to be able to exercise their powers of control. 10.5. Conclusion The cases of Berlin and Hamburg present examples of community energy projects as (organizations of) movements of energy transition, the simultaneous and interrelated change in social and technical infrastructures; rather than energy transformation, a shift in technology [CHI 17]. Beyond their contribution to the

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deployment of renewable energies as investors of capacity increase, this suggests a more profound role for community energy projects in shaping energy infrastructures and future transition pathways through political, material and symbolic engagement. It merges political and economic citizenship. While the conventional system has distanced energy production from its consumers both geographically and socially, initiatives in Hamburg and Berlin created vehicles of political, material and symbolic ownership and voice in infrastructure decisions previously closed to civil society, seeking to “re-socialize” energy. This indicates that communities of intention provide a fruitful analytic perspective to study political, material and symbolic changes to local systems of energy distribution. In both Berlin and Hamburg, different civil society groups were found to overlap and mutually reinforce one another’s activities and interests. Conceptualizing of community-level actors as intersecting and interacting social worlds, and renegotiating the rules of local energy sector transformation in respective arenas of commitment and contestation, provides a fruitful analytical blueprint to understanding changes to political, material and symbolic dimensions of sociotechnical infrastructures. The Berlin and Hamburg cases of citizen engagement in infrastructure design and decision-making showcase how closer proximity to energy infrastructures in renewable systems intersects with stronger claims of voice and inclusion in related decision-making processes and revenue streams. This does not only apply to projects of energy generation, but also in questions of its distribution or retail. Yet, affectedness is not limited to physical affectedness but instead contrasted with corresponding participation, and political or symbolic affectedness. Both cases challenge the study of community energy projects and their roles in energy system transition. The strong relevance of contextual factors for the emergence and assertion of both BEB and KEBAP indicate the messiness involved in mapping the structure and agency of community energy projects and the sociotechnical landscapes they move in. More recent research in the situatedness of community energy projects [POH 18; BAT 17] shows promise both in assessing the inherent complexities and ambiguities of projects in their emergence and adaptation and in explaining their potential in sociotechnical system change. New forms of public–private partnerships between municipalities and their citizens could open windows of opportunity for discourse and deliberation of community transitions [GRA 03]. Networked infrastructures such as the local distribution grid may indeed present ideal focal points for building a civic culture wherein “sustained attention to issues […] create[s] a sense of community that transcends identity based upon a narrow reading of self-interest” [HOF 05: 91]. As the cases of Berlin and Hamburg indicate, this kind of reconfiguration of the interaction with networked infrastructures could form a key element for the advancement of a wider democratic governance of cities. Yet, supporters of “a more

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[STR 15] STROMNETZ BERLIN, Faktenblatt Stromnetz Berlin GmbH, July 2015, available at: https://www.stromnetz.berlin/de/file/Faktenblatt_Stromnetz_Berlin_83587236.pdf [accessed April 24, 2018]. [SWY 07] SWYNGEDOUW, E., “Sustainability and post-political and post-democratic populism: Reclaiming democracy?”, in SAEY, P. (ed.), Van Christeller tot Wallerstein: Liber Amicorum, Nautilus Academic Books, Zelzate, pp. 9–118, 2007. [WAG 17] WAGNER, O., BERLO, K., “Remunicipalisation and foundation of municipal utilities in the German energy sector: Details about newly established enterprises”, Journal of Sustainable Development of Energy, Water, and Environmental Systems, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 396–440, 2017. [WAL 10] WALKER, G., CASS, N., BURNINGHAM, K., BARNETT, J., “Renewable energy and sociotechnical change: Imagined subjectivities of ‘the public’ and their implications”, Environment and Planning A, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 931–947, 2010. [WIL 97] WILLIAMSON, T., What Comes Next: Proposals for a Different Society, National Center for Economic and Security Advice, Washington, D.C., 1997. [YIL 13] YILDIZ, Ö., “Energiegenossenschaften in Deutschland. Bestandsentwicklung und institutionenökonomische Analyse”, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Genossenschaftswesen, vol. 63, no. 3, pp. 173–186, 2013.

11 Autonomy and Energy Community: Realities to Reconsider?

11.1. Introduction It is through the direct link with climate change and energy transition that the themes of “energy communities” emerged from the year 2000 onwards in several Western and European countries. This new theme was therefore linked with the processes of generic energy transition and, in particular, with its two key components that are the relocation of energy consumption and production, and at the same time, a potential growth of energy autonomy at local level. For all that, beyond these generic properties, the thematization of these local processes using the term “energy community” has been, from the start, the subject of divergent analytical trajectories depending on the subjects which are studied, and the cultural and institutional areas in which they arise. Energy communities have thus caused problems both specific and diverse, and correlatively analyses and discussions in the light of which the heuristics of this notion can (or should?) be explored further. Drawing up a “genealogical” map of approaches of “energy communities” can only enrich the perspective of the contribution of international works to approach the French position, in which the themes of energy communities are tentatively emerging.

Chapter written by Ariane DEBOURDEAU and Alain NADAÏ. This work was produced with the financial support of the Agency for the Environment and Energy Control (ADEME) (Program: “Placing innovation on the factor 4 trajectory”, Convention 11 10 C 0079).

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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This timidity no doubt has to do with the connotations associated with the notion of “community” around which it serves a purpose to briefly return, all the more so since this negative meaning remains a very Franco-French concept1. Having appeared in the 19th Century, in particular in the works of Ferdinand Tönnies (2015, [1887]), then that of Emile Durkheim (1975), the concept of “community” has witnessed a very different fate in France and in English-speaking countries. Subject to the plethora of definitions and uses, criticized for its lack of robustness and analytical accuracy, the concept of community is generally set apart from social science studies in the French language, echoing the primacy, inherited from the 1789 Revolution, of “national community” across an entire specific community, by definition suspected of communitarian or corporatist forms of abuse. In the English-speaking world, the notion of community is, on the contrary, very widely used, in particular as a result of the polysemy of the term “community”, which comes back simultaneously to the idea of the specific social group, the local population, the location and form of solidarity. There is a pervasiveness of the notion of community to such an extent that the sociological historian, Robert Nisbet, makes no hesitation in asserting, “the typological study of the concept of community is sociology’s richest concept to social thinking” (Nisbet, 1966, p. 71). This radical position is no doubt disputable, evidencing the position given to the notion of community within sociology and English language ethnology, immeasurably positioned with that which is devolved to it by the same disciplines in France (with the notable exception of Gurvitch in his works on sociability) (Gurvitch, 1950). Moreover, it is from anthropological works that the notion of community is widely disseminated in the Human and Social Sciences (HSS) sphere (Derouet, 1987), within a slightly modified meaning, which adds a territorial dimension. This is especially the case for so-called “cultural” anthropology, which shows the notion by adjoining to it that of the “dominant form of habitat through history”, combining the idea borrowed from Robert Parks and his epigones from the School of Chicago − in the sphere of urban sociology and ethnology − of a community as an ecosystem, “simultaneously a location, the people living in the location, the interaction between people, the feelings giving rise to this interaction, the common life that they share and the institutions regulating this life” (Médard, 1969). It results from an original view of the individual–society relationship, which makes community the fundamental unit for organization and transmission within a given society and its culture – while being criticized for its polarization within a single local dimension (Arensberg, 1955, 1961).

1 It is not, for example, shared in the countries as geographically close such as Belgium, in particular Wallonia.

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This increase in uses tends to make the “community” a “context” for analysis rather than, strictly speaking, an “object” for analysis. An observation which, as shown by Derouet (1987) “is also applicable for mesosociological approaches and so-called ‘local’ studies, which consider the community more as a level of analysis and a meeting place between various disciplines”. Gurvitch (1950) thus stresses the notion of community, despite the fact that “a certain heuristic value [...] has no less contributed in many cases to sustaining an unfortunate confusion between the field and the type of relationships analyzed”, a characteristic that broadly endures within the corpus that comprises the field literature around energy communities. Existing works raise numerous questions, especially relating to their epistemological affiliation and subsequently the type of framing adopted (normative or descriptive approach, linking concrete experiences with regard to climate energy at national and/or local level, and connecting to the politicization of this issue at national or international level), the given content between the notion and the subject, and its potential relevance to understanding issues associated with energy autonomy in the French context. The question of the status of the notion of “community” is posed with a particular acuity in the French context, as much from the point of view of scientific concepts as in the vernacular language. Moreover, beyond the suspicions that it evokes, the notion of “community” has the possibility of a decisive energy transition by supplying a substratum layer or, more precisely, the protagonists and/or the potential targets for the decentralization and the relocation of energy systems, production such as consumption, and starting with the deployment of forms of energy autonomy. An inventory of the publications analyzed here is not achronistic. It was produced in 2012–2013 as the aftermath of the project CLIMENCORED (2011– 2015), at a time where, in particular, so-called grassroots attention polarized political and academic attention around the foundations and the relevance of localism in public politics, this trend was almost non-existent in France. Since French localism, which is different to English language localism, emerged in public policy (Nadaï et al., 2015), it has ensured the understanding of English language debate and the genealogies of the inescapable analytical approaches, feeding a criticism of French localism. In the light of recent developments, and in particular with the 2015 law on energy transition, the semantics of “territories” is now forced onto the arsenal of public policies. By showing the notion of “positive energy territories”, according to “the state, the local authorities and their groupings, companies, associations and citizens are combining their efforts” as part of an “approach enabling

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achievement of the equilibrium between consumption and the production of energy at local level as much by reducing energy needs and by respecting national energy system equilibria”2. French localism, thus radically − and logically − avoids all ideas of autonomous “energy community”, spontaneously centered upon civil society and anchored within an associationist rationale and for the benefit of “territories committed within an autonomous approach limited by state frameworks and mainly articulated around local institutions” (“communities and their groupings”). Within this context, the genealogies of analytical approaches that follow from it are no longer of interest to provide a criticism of French localism. It is about better understanding the role played by the notion of community within the English criticism of localism and it captures the heuristics to analyze French localism which, by affirming the prevalence for a territorial rationale over that of the community, de facto defines possible forms of energy autonomy. The problems flowing from it persist at the present time. Should we teach genealogy from existing analytical trends, notably regarding different meanings of “community” mobilized to study energy transitions? What paths are opened by such a work of explanation and make up an analytical “tool box” by using the notion of “energy community” and what is the heuristic value of them? How do such paths enable us to clarify the actual and potential role of “energy communities” in the search for local autonomy as an entirely separate component from the energy transition processes? Section 11.2 sets out the mapping of the entirety of this. Section 11.3 sets out the notions of the mobilized communities and then discusses the scope of this analysis. 11.2. Mapping and genealogy of energy community approaches The “polyphony” that characterizes the works on energy communities and the multiple epistemological affiliations of the existing analyses make the understanding of an “energy community” particularly complex by being highly unstable and fluid. The temptation to invent from scratch or from literature the given notion is even stronger when it is complex to acquire an image from all of the analyses mobilizing it. This task remains no less of a precondition, which is not only useful but also necessary, so as to capture the issues and the approaches, within which the notion of energy community is encapsulated. Is this not simply to

2 JORF, text 1 (out of 76) – Article L100-2, August 18, 2015.

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equip the study of pioneer sites for energy transition with a sufficiently robust notion from an analytical point of view? The mapping of the main analytical trends of energy communities at European scale proposed here identifies these trends and approaches and traces their relationships3. To do this, a corpus of texts (around 100 articles), gradually aggregated and only representing to a greater or lesser degree existing analyses in 2012 on the subject, were analyzed through the prism of eight criteria: – type of research subject; – type of group(s) affect(ed); – area/scales; – land/countries; – works/discussed references; – involvement of research in the process studied (for example research action); – theoretical framework; – definition of the energy community. This inventory and genealogy indeed necessitated distinguishing within articles, which appeared as “appropriate quotes” – i.e. the bibliography cited to attest to the relevance of analyzed problems – and quotations constituting the heart of the theoretical system of reference and the method used. Only this latter provides the viewpoint of analysis developed around the energy communities. Figure 11.1 enables visualization of the main origins of the works on energy communities. The approaches of the energy communities were distributed, within a circle, according to their epistemological and/or thematical degree of proximity. This degree of proximity was decided according to the theoretical relationships displayed by the analyses, and prepared outside of the circle of analyses within the following mapping. We have distinguished three entries through which relationships operate: the first is centered upon technology, the second focuses on collective issues and the third has a more institutional bias.

3 This analysis was produced in 2012–2013; some additional hybrids have since appeared. In any case, this does not in the least invalidate the mapping offered. Also note that certain more recent references are mentioned in the body of the text, without being integrated into the mapping.

Figure 11.1. Mapping analyses and their origins. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

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These three thematic elements have a particular distinctiveness in understanding the genesis of existing approaches of energy communities. They also feature at the heart of all views on actual energy autonomization, and at the beginning of which it is possible to trace the relations and the links that undertake the analyses of energy communities compared to the trends of technology analysis by collectives or institutions. 11.2.1. Technological element: innovation at the heart of energy communities The “technological element” is a corpus of texts, which renews technology approaches since the 1960/1970s, by questioning the notion of adapted or appropriate technology (Dunn, 1978). This approach will encounter energy topics such as small-scale development, coined by Schumacher (2010) or the soft energy path, formulated by Lovins (1977), and therefore makes conceivable a relocation of energy issues at community level. At the beginning of the 1990s, the coupling between, on the one hand, the sociology of the inspired innovation, Sciences, Technologies and Society (STS), centered on the inherent entanglements between science, technology and social aspects inherent in the “sociotechnical system” (Akrich, 1989; Bijker et al., 1987; Hughes, 1993) and, on the other hand, the evolutionist economy (Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 1982, 1977) gives rise to transition studies. Centered around technology trajectories learned over a long period, and on a large scale, these transition analyses identify three “key” levels in the emergence of and the generalization of innovations: innovation niches (localized), sociotechnical systems (socioinstitutional interlocking mechanisms) and the countryside (large-scale spatiotemporal inertia, political, cultural or infrastructural). It is around this basis that the so-called multilevel perspective (MLP) emerges and is essential within numerous European countries (the UK and the Netherlands in particular), which makes “energy communities” a niche for innovation for which the conditions for generalization should be called into question. In the 2000s, these transitions studies were articulated in strategic market management approaches so as to form a quasi-simplistic current of transition management (TM) − with growing success (Schot and Geels, 2008). Contrary to the “multilevel” approach, TM has a normative aim: the innovation niche is an instrument to initiate and orientate a change in the system. TM has been met with relative success, with regard to aiming to provide the tools for public action, to supply the instruments to conduct proactive policies – evoking the attention of decision-makers and political institutions, which rejuvenate action in the energy transition sphere.

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11.2.2. The collective element: which communitie(s) favor energy issues? The “collective” elements correspond to energy community analyses, which have as their center of gravity the collective of actors, its structure and the emergence of affected energy-related groups. This entry ranges from approaches envisaging this collective as a network and agency with the most institutional perspectives, which are concerned with the conditions for social structuring and the interplay between actors, so as to favor the emergence of reflexive players and citizens affected by the consequences (whether energy or climate related) of their actions. The first works – inspired by Granovetter (1973) – envisage the collective as a fabric of interpersonal relations, as a “network” for which the subnetworks can be identified and described in detail, like a form of architecture. The notion of “agency” associated with these analyses (Theory of Agency II) is a vehicle here, not as a capacity distributed, such as analyses associated with the sociology of science and technology (Theory of Agency I), but as both an intention and a power to authorize institutional change. Second, the collective is approached through the notions of “social capital” and/or so-called “habitus”, the prism through which the right conditions for innovative action become apparent. These conditions are not acknowledged by the actors themselves and – here we are considering critical sociology – these analyses fall within the same movement as the motivations and their rationalization by the various players. These lines of questioning are also mobilized by approaches inspired by social entrepreneurship (van der Horst, 2008) or falling within environmental and “social psychology” (Heiskanen et al., 2010), which analyzes the gap between values (those which are shared), attitudes and behaviors (value-action gap) – impacting the emergence of innovative energy behaviors. Lastly, the collective is approached at the dividing line with institutional analyses through approaches of “social structuring”, to borrow the terminology of Giddens (1984). This perspective places the emphasis on the role of institutions within the constitution of a reflexive capacity of agents, as a precondition for the emergence of climatic and energy issues for players. 11.2.3. Institutional element: framing and empowering communities The institutional element gravitates for the most part around a distributive issue, that is to say how the community is defined4, fashioned by the distribution of 4 The “framing” is designed here akin to Goffman, who stresses the dual nature: that operated by players using cognitive resources as well as forms of behaviors and strategies to define the

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“values” meant in the broadest sense of the term, whether they relate to power, profits, image, contribution or other such issues. In doing so, it is grouped less around references to our knowledge, maybe resulting from a granularity and the scale of broader analyses, which makes it difficult to capture issues and processes linked to energy communities. The references encountered fall into three types of approaches. The first falls fairly directly within the line of collaborative planning and social learning, two trends which renew rational thinking for planning of the 1960s by insisting on the complexity and issues, the role of the planner (Krieger, 1974; Forester, 1999), the role of apprenticeships (Etzioni, 1968; Friedmann, 1987), social mobilization and accounts within planning processes. These works rely upon the apprenticeship process through new forms of association with the public, and echo “apprenticeship communities” (Wenger, 1999). These approaches have been used in the analysis of the planning of wind-based policies to stress the capacity for learning about open processes for heterogeneous players, such as local communities (Agterbosch et al., 2009; Breukers and Wolsink, 2007), or to analyze the allocation of power within deliberation processes (Lukes, 2005), especially the role conferred upon non-experts. The second type of approach is rooted within ecological modernization, based upon the hypothesis that the economy operates as a political lever when policy implementation is not immediately acceptable, a logic upon which the majority of financial incentive mechanisms rest (purchase tariffs, etc.). We find within this trend of profit analyses to be linked with wind development (Strachan et al., 2015). With regard to energy communities, relationships have been identified between the various trends of collaborative planning and community approaches centered around “community benefits”, linked with ecological modernization. The community is approached through institutional transformations and the positioning of various actors, with regard to the profits that they are likely to derive from it (Toke, 2005). The latter motivates the contribution to the community. Thus, these approaches focused around “profit” efficiency in the form of community catalysts, notably through a growing public contribution (local regeneration, increase in local incomes, skills and jobs, social cohesion, capacity to act and the development of new organizational forms and other aspects). The focal point of the empowerment of citizens introduces an additional dimension directly linked to energy citizenship and to conditions for effective citizen participation in these processes (Aitken, 2010; Cowell et al., 2011). Some frameworks of their interactions; and that operated by the outside world, with material and organizational mechanisms.

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analyses are even highly inspired by developments in sociology of science and technology around the construction of the division between lay/expert knowledge (Irwin, 2006) to analyze power relations, and the power of local communities, in local planning processes (Aitken, 2009). The third type of approach corresponds to analyses of energy policies, essentially centered around the comparison of the instruments of these policies (quantitative obligations, exchangeable quotas, feed-in tariffs, premiums and other factors). These technico-economical and empirical approaches have done little to make energy communities theme-driven, although this is not through the economic energy saving means of REs and in particular wind power. Our research was thus carried out from wind development models based upon local cooperatives in Germany and Denmark (Meyer, 2007) to consider tools that may or may not favor cooperative mechanisms, or even the adaptable nature of this model (Bolinger, 2005). In the end, the component approaches of the institutional entry are characterized by an analysis of a type related to economics/political sciences. Its objectives are associations between public and citizen institutions which bring into play distribution or learning issues. On this basis, they group together the research works for which the viewpoints are frequently instrumental, but also positive and critical – particularly with regard to the trend of empowerment. 11.2.4. Discussion From these various breakdowns into “elements”, three aspects prove to be remarkable. First, it is appropriate to underline the low level of territorialization of analyses in favor of a relatively undetermined “locality” and for which sociogeographical characteristics are to a greater or lesser degree absent from a rarely historicized treatment. Only the normative localism of the grassroots innovation analyses partially escapes this criticism, in particular in the developments that it has seen since 2012, through the production of numerous in-depth case studies. Second, the technological element remains very directly in line with the question of technological and energy issues. It places the emphasis around the capacity of collectives to use, carry and resupply innovations, particularly at local scale. One of the main consequences of it is the relatively small attention given to “communities” as such, as evidenced by the rare references to discussions and rural sociological analyses, especially around “communities”, a subject which has however seen significant developments (Liepins, 2000). From this point of view, these analyses agree with what Liepins described as “minimalist” approaches

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(see infra) in the sense that they do not predetermine the subject community but use the term to implicitly limit and undertake a research subject5. Lastly, we note, on the one hand, that notions such as “network”, “learning”, “agency” and “niche” circulate within very different theoretical frameworks. On the other hand, approaches which are almost diametrically opposed can be subject to analyses that themselves cross-over, evidencing the use of theoretical frameworks. This observation calls for specifying approaches and/or concepts, which are at the heart of their basic inventory, if we wish to capture the framework differences at play. 11.3. Scope and limits of existing works The approaches of the communities distributed within the circle in Figure 11.1 are detailed in Table 11.1, according to four criteria: the type, in the sense of the aim that these analyses provide: critique [C]; normative [N]; positive [P]; instrumental [I]; the theoretical approaches from which they take their inspiration (influences); the main authors and, failing that, the geographical origin of these approaches; the objects tackled, and how they are dealt with (specifics). 11.3.1. A high presence of instrumental and normative approaches Lines of questioning of the majority of these approaches revolve around how to develop local initiatives, what their conditions for emergence are or even their capacity to justify changes to systems… These common questions are subject to varied processing with the aim ultimately of favoring the development and the wide dissemination of these initiatives. It happens thus: social psychology approaches, mainly Germanic; from British or North American normative localism, through the investigation of emergence conditions of a community management (capacity, agency and the theory of networks); TM coming from the Netherlands, which tends to hybridize with preexisting approaches to develop efficient policies, particularly on a European scale. The notion of a “transition arena” in particular serves this aim. These arenas are envisaged as experiment instruments for the co-creation of sustainable communities at the local scale. The experiment is conducted by combining a TM viewpoint, backcasting processes (i.e. a future desirable scenario is defined, from which we develop policies and identical programs, to ensure that they happen) and approaches to social and environmental psychology with regard to individual behaviors.

5 Articles of English “critical localism” indeed reflect this highly pragmatic approach to the subject (Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008).

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These approaches therefore make local communities instruments, or tools – in particular for public action – of which it would be a question, as with innovation niches, to fashion, manage and replicate as widely as possible in order to modify sociotechnical systems and landscapes in place within the energy sphere, or more broadly, sustainable development. Approach

Type

Influence

Location/authors

Sociotechnical system

[P]

STS analyses upon technological development

Akrich, Rip, Kemp, Bijker

Transition studies/ MLP

[P]

STS + Multiscalar/multilevel governance

The Netherlands & the UK Rip, Kemp, Geels, Schot

TM

[I]

MLP + Strategic market management

The Netherlands Geels, Kemp, Loorbach

[N]

Lovins/Dunn + MLP (niche focus) + Public policy analysis

English language field works Seyfang, Smith, Rogers

[C/P]

STS + MLP + Social psychology + citizenship

English language field works Walker, DevineWright

[P/N]

Social capital (Putnam, Bourdieu), + Network (Granovetter) + Agency

The UK and some in the USA Newman, Dale

[I]

Social capital (Bourdieu, Putnam) + Social structure (Giddens)

UK Fudge, Peters, Sinclair

GI

Critical localism

Positive localism

Instrumental localism

Specifics (subjects and processing) Sociotechnical innovation such as hybridization sciences, technologies, social sciences. Technology/ environment coproduction Local emergence and dissemination of sociotechnical innovation via the triptych “niche/ system/landscape” Governance/strategic niche management, with a view to the generalization of local sociotechnical innovations Role of humans in niche innovations: capacities for action vectors in energy innovation, local governance Emergence of localism in UK energy policy. Energy citizenship. Critical and positive approach Enumeration of social capital/collection of experiments/agency: community as a network or driver agency for innovation Instrumental approach (psychological, social). Focus on local governance and citizen/community reflexiveness

Autonomy and Energy Community: Realities to Reconsider?

Social entrepreneurship

[I/P]

Social entrepreneurship + Learning community

Van de Horst

[I]

Social psychology + Culture theory + Low-carbon communities + TM

Germany/Finland

Empowerment

[P/C]

Social learning, Planning & participation + Power (Lukes) + STS

Aitken, Agterbosch, Breukers, Cowell

Community beliefs

[I/P/C]

Ecological modernization + Community benefits

Toke, Aitken

[I/P]

Environmental economics – Empirical comparative studies

Meyer, Nielsen, Toke, Bolinger

Community management

Cooperative model

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Collective learning, social capital, social entrepreneurship (values, communal/general relevance), position of leaders Community management: collective behavior, analysis of the value behavior gap Local communities: expert/lay knowledge, institutional learning, allocation of power in RE processes Economic policy construction. Focus on community benefits i.e. RE profit – sharing (wind power) Tools for comparison of energy policies and cooperative wind power development (Germany/Denmark)

Table 11.1. Approaches of energy communities

They thus aim for the largest possible dissemination of “exemplary” initiatives, and, as a result, the gradual imposition of new dominant social norms, the content of which is not necessarily predefined, but the outlines of which are defined, at least in part. These instrumental approaches, and particularly the TM, are therefore characterized by a type of “demiurgic propensity”6 for public or private action, which conceives the local community as a unit to be modeled in view of the more extensive social transformations, which are stimulated by social norms. In addition, these approaches convey highly normative designs of what is, or should be, a community, without questioning either specifics or differences. They tend to construct the given “premises” for this by targeting uniform public policies or at least dispensing objectives and methods to succeed in it. Energy autonomy is hardly in this version instrumental and normative, supported by a community that is both author and actor. It is at least one of the objectives assigned to a community with flawed outlines, conceived as a target for the view that is often quantitative, provided by public policy around energy transition. 6 See the discussion in the article by Shove and Walker (2007).

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11.3.2. The singularity of English language “critical localism” This singularity resides in being one of the rare trends that questions the emergence of “localism” within public policy. It implements this line of questioning according to two viewpoints. On the one hand, it endeavors to take account of the notional contents and the experiments of the United Kingdom in so-called “gray literature” and through producing field studies around the experiments and their public support from 2000 onwards. On the other hand, it restores this questioning within a broader analysis of “methods” (sociotechnical aspects) according to which conventional and renewable energies are developed. It places the emphasis, within this analysis, upon the role conferred upon the public by these various modes and provides, in doing so, a significance to the notion of the “public”7, often omitted and yet susceptible to supplying highly fruitful clarity around energy issues. Indeed, the “public” has the substantial advantage of permitting emphasis on a particular issue around which a given collective gathers − the “public” of this issue, that is to say all affected individuals − without presuming that the emergence of this public necessarily carries the “community”, that is to say a socially integrated group, which would go well beyond energy questions around all aspects of social life. As well as the notion of “public”, it enables the definition, in relation to what may characterize an energy community, without claiming to outline the ultimate shape. Moreover, although this approach is no doubt not directly adaptable within the French context – before 2015, the “localism”, which was developed in DEFRA documents8 at the end of the 1990s, has no equivalent within French energy-climate policy. However, it opens the way to interesting lines of questioning around the “local” position within public policy mechanisms and around how these mechanisms take hold or do not take hold of innovative local experiments within the energy sphere. Inseparably, the question of the theme of these experiments and the “performativity” of this theme, according to which we describe the collectives concerned as “community-based”, “territory-based”, as a “demonstrator territory”9, “commune/communité de communes (community comprised of towns)” and other such terms.

7 Notion of “public” meant in the pragmatic sense conferred by John Dewey (2010). The moment of emergence of an issue corresponds, according to Dewey, to a political moment: that of the constitution of the “public” in the sense of a problem and collective affected by a given issue, which seeks to share it and to make it public. 8 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 9 This terminology is used in public policy discourse around TEPCVs (areas set aside to operate solely through green energy infrastructures) in France, which would position, for this localism, the community according to the given innovation niche.

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It then appears entirely regrettable that, in extending the notion of “public”, critical localism offers no genuine solution to understanding the gradations and the differences between local experiments and energy communities, from the most spontaneous through to initiatives promoted and led by local decision-makers as part of directly defined public action mechanisms. 11.3.3. The locational nature of analytical frameworks The locational nature of analytical frameworks is prominent, despite rapid development as a result of international success of certain analytical trends (TM, Practice theory). It mainly arises from differences in framing between UK analyses, highly inspired by sociotechnical analyses based upon notions such as technology, local, mode, configuration that works and analyses developed in Germany and the Netherlands. German analyses are based more upon local development approaches and research-action, often inspired by social or environmental psychology approaches (whether individual/collective). The Dutch approaches, increasingly influential in Europe, are based upon the founding notions of the MLP and TM, around notions such as transition, niche/system and management. These analyses are therefore positioned, in terms of what the value of their conceptual and analytical resources is primarily worth for a given national territory, indeed a “culture” as much popular as scientifically attached to this territory and its geographical, historic and social specifics. 11.3.4. The minimalist and shifting contents for the notion of community The set mapping out also enables us to bring out the given contents of the notion of community through the various approaches identified, summarized within Table 11.2. The sharing of relations, the exploitation of theoretical frameworks and the circulation of notions mold a number of notions around the given meaning of the term community. 11.3.4.1. Learning community This notion corresponds to the problem framing of energy initiatives around learning issues. Thus, van der Horst (2008) stresses the significance of collaborative learning issues between organizations during the development of projects (learningby-doing), a learning which is at the origin of the emergence of a given “community of practice” in the sense of there being shared ways of undertaking, and of knowhow, around these projects. These learning processes, commonplace though they are, also demand to be specified (What actors are affected/involved? What types/ dynamics of learning are used and how is this learning distributed? What payments

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and conversions are possible in other forms of assets, for example so-called symbolic gestures?). 11.3.4.2. Shared community The notion of “shared community” also cuts across the analyses having, however, a variable notional content. Some inclusive approaches proceed from a methodological individualism close to the economy (centered around the individual/institution coupling) and reduce the significance in individual or collective gain (Bolinger, 2005). On the contrary, other approaches seek to frame the problem of emerging conditions and stabilizing community benefits. Thus, Aitken (2010) follows the difficulties of a wind turbine developer confronted with criticism and an opposition in her attempts to redistribute part of the profits to the community concerned. The author concludes by underlining the potential profit of institutionalizing these transfers so as to stabilize the given area, and the procedures to put in place potential profits. Cowell et al. (2011) clearly explains the issues linked to the composition of a profit community as a prerequisite for a practice of community benefits: “To interpret ‘community benefits’, one must acknowledge that the ‘community’ is a contested, multi-dimensional concept, based on identity, practice, objectives and the places to which these apply […] the concept of community benefits is characterised by ‘constructive ambiguity’, in which fluidity of meaning allows the concept to hold together a range of interests surrounding wind farm development”. Although it effectively presents an undeniable flexibility, through the pragmatism by its definition of the community as “the most affected group of people”, such an approach remains strongly stamped with a highly economizing and territorial-based view of “profits” regarding the principle of the community. 11.3.4.3. “Innovation niche” community The approaches that are rooted within analyses of sociotechnical and multilevel systems tend to approach the community as an “innovation niche”, providing an innovative technological configuration. Nevertheless, beyond this generic shared definition, the term “niche” covers very different analytical meanings and viewpoints. The approaches are inspired by transition studies and “multilevel” analysis, thereby assuming a positive aim. They approach the community as a niche in the capacity of “a working technological configuration” and consider the welcome conditions for these configurations on niche scales. The analysis revolves around processes, mechanisms and conditions for the emergence of these configurations

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within these communities, their historical authenticity and their singular history, how a capacity for action or innovation has gradually built up within them, and the potential role of public policy mechanisms within these processes. In short, the niche is approached from an internalist point of view10 − the community is what its actors want it to be − but it relies implicitly upon the preexistence of a community as a substratum of the given community/energy niche, thus built within layers of additional consistency of the community. On the contrary, the approaches inspired by TM have an evolutionary and instrumental aim of the niche, which they envisage from the point leading to a change in the technological system, that is to say in its relationships to other niches or its chances of ramping up the technological system. The high level of hierarchization and the quasi-functionalism (proliferation within the niches, selection/inertia by the given system and the landscape) of this analytical framework coupled with an instrumental aim leading to an analysis capturing the external niche. This tends to “even out” the specifics of communities in favor of lines of questioning around the imposition (considering whether this is desirable) of sociotechnical innovations, as new dominant norms. 11.3.4.4. “Sociotechnical” community The critical localism defines the “community” as a method11 for energy development characterized by participation and neo-communitarianism based upon multiple models (partnerships, cooperatives, user-led), articulated around the development of small-size technologies (micro- or meso-; whether solar, wind, hydro, biomass, heat pump based), whether or not it is connected to the network and characterized by sharing the collective profits. Once again, but for various reasons given in the interest community, what happens to these community methods is considered imprecise and disputed within works in the field, although articulated around collective local interest − as opposed to project development by private individual actors: “Such perspectives were brought into the mainstream of energy policy in the early 2000s, largely for instrumental rather than normative reasons, but drawing on a neo-communitarian discourse of local participation and empowerment […] A series of funding and support programs were set up and by late 2004 an estimated 500 projects, predominantly in rural areas, were under development […] What

10 For a definition, see Weber (2001, p. 483). 11 Walker and Cass (2007) choose the notion of “mode” to indicate their disagreement with the hierarchized nature of the TM: “We specifically use ‘mode’ here in preference to the terms ‘systems’ and ‘niche’ that are commonly used in the works on socio-technical systems”.

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makes these projects distinctively ‘community’ is imprecisely defined and contested. In practice, however, they have involved processes of project development that are to some degree local and collective in nature, and/or beneficial project outcomes (economic and social) that are also to some degree local and collective, rather than distant, individualised or corporate in destination” (Walker and Cass, 2007, p. 462). Short of being a project reality with fluctuating forms, the energy community has therefore constituted a rhetorical tool in the context of British localism from the beginning of the 2000s: “community energy, a term of choice for those seeking to further the development of distributed technologies, oftentimes represents more of a rhetorical appeal than a call for a substantive change in the ongoing operation of the grid” (Hoffman and High-Pippert, 2005, p. 391). The concept of critical localism is thus based in part, around denouncing the reification of the community by public action frameworks, that is to say how “local” public policies make for the community’s existence in a rhetorical way by calling it as such, and thus operating “energy communities” on a level playing field, which tends to empty the notion of all analytical consistency such that it covers heterogeneous realities. While calling for a degree of vigilance, this criticism only partially operates, however, within the French context to the extent that “energy communities” are not as such targeted in public decisions. It however arises with another degree of acuteness acting upon “areas” and more specifically even “positive energy territories”. More congruent than the community within the French context, owing to reasons of spatial and political organization in particular, the “territory” and more precisely still the “project territory”, which makes up the positive energy territory, must be filtered by UK critical localism to energy communities. Is its vocation to become an “empty shell”, like the notion of the British energy community? or on the contrary, is it potentially the “boundary object” between energy policies and the relocation of energy infrastructures, in that it encapsulates the possibility of a “flexible interpretation” at the same time as a group of invisible infrastructures − in which there is no shortage of a resurgence of so-called “communities of practice”12? 11.3.4.5. Community, "social capital” and “social architecture” The notion of social capital is at the heart of several approaches within collective elements, in which the community is then defined by this capital. Recent developments around this notion, initially offered by Durkheim (1996 [1893]) relating to the life of the group, has gradually led to more or less formalized

12 Positive energy territories as dividing lines of energy policies are a research subject in themselves, and an avenue for explorations that appears to us particularly productive (see Star’s summary, 2010).

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definitions, in particular within the extension of the works of Bourdieu13 around various form of capital, and Granovetter around networks/links. The proposals are thus fairly general definitions – Onyx and Bullen (2000) define it as networks, reciprocity, trust, social norms, commons and agencies. Putnam defines it as “social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam, 2001, p. 20) – to formalized proposals based upon the architecture of relationship networks. The latter are attempting to capture structures leading to the ability of some collectives to regenerate their norms to seize emerging issues and to build itself up as a collective agency for the latter. They formulate, as a problem, social capital by clarifying the tensioning of consolidation dynamics/renewal of strong/weak links of social networks: “We question the importance of social capital as a primary indicator of a community's ability to engage in sustainable development as social capital can have both hindering and facilitating effects [...] We present ‘bonding’ social capital consisting of strong network ties as a negative in excess quantity as it can lead to the enforcement of social norms that hinder innovative change, and ‘bridging’ social capital consisting of weak network ties as a benefit that allows actors to bring about critical social changes” (Newman and Dale, 2005, p. 477). Nevertheless, such links do not enable you to take account of the renewal and rearrangement of social networks (the architecture of relationships which underpin social capital), and a fortiori of social capital, when developing new technologies such as renewable energies. As interesting as they are, these approaches put to one side an essential component of the transition toward energy autonomy: the sociotechnical dimension, such as it can be deployed within “shifting” energy communities, that is to say engaged in processes which this type of approach only enables us to take account of with some difficulty. 11.3.4.6. Community as the “capacity” for innovation The approach through “capacity”, which is at the heart of grassroot innovation approaches, attempts to broaden the understanding of conditions for the emergence of collectives, engaged within the construction of future sustainable resources: “Limiting capacity to social capital is rather restrictive, however, and many other ‘capacities’ could be called forth […] Robbins and Rowe

13 Bourdieu defines social capital as a resource linked to the existence of networks and sustainable relationships, more or less institutional-based with mutual recognition. It insists on the constructed nature of this capital, through strategies for institutionalization of these relationships of mutual recognition (Bourdieu, 1986).

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found that community capacity relates to resource availability […] Healey et al. talk of the need to build institutional capacity which they conceptualise as the strength of civil society as well as the presence of a common purpose and the willingness to form coalitions to achieve that purpose [...] In the extensive literature on decision-making, capacity building refers to the act of getting people to engage in democratic processes” (Middlemiss and Parrish, 2010, p. 7560). Notions of communities Approaches

Type

Sociotechnical system

[P]

Transition studies/MLP

[P]

Learning

Relevance

Niche

Sociotech method

Social capital

Innovation capacity

Location

Social representation

X

X

X X

TM

[I]

X

GI

[N]

X

X

Critical location

[C/P]

Positive localism

[P/N]

X

Instrumental localism

[I]

X

Social entrepreneurship

[I/P]

Community management

[I]

X

Empowerment

[P/C]

X

Community beliefs

[I/P/C]

X

Cooperative model

[I/P]

X

X

X

X

Table 11.2. The notions of community mobilized within the various approaches

This approach is rooted within works around justice and environmental citizenship, and around sustainable consumption. They support the theory that the

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capacity of a given agent inducing change is partly conferred by its context and shifts the focal point of (the social capital of the) collective toward examination of the agent (whether individual/collective) viewed within its context. Agreeing with the theory of the English language practice, this approach therefore envisages agency as encapsulated within social structures, which confer upon it both its context and means. It results from a community approach through its responsibility regarding its environmental footprint and taking this responsibility by means of “capacities”, both collective and individual (Middlemiss and Parrish, 2010). “Culture” comes back to the legitimacy of the issues in question (sustainability) regarding history and community values; organizational capacity returns to values defended by local organizations and institutions and to the means put in place to make these values exist; the infrastructural capacity comes back to the plant and facilities in place with regard to ways of life (needing to be sustainable); and personal capacity comes back to understanding the issues, the tools and the willingness to change individuals. The subject for analysis is the potential for emerging initiatives to build a capacity for change as a common element. The approach, despite its analytical and descriptive steps, falls within a normative perspective in forming, on the one hand, the community around a principle of responsibility and, on the other hand, by supporting in its analysis the role of emerging initiatives in effecting change. Empirical approaches have tried to put into perspective the significance conferred upon this community capacity by exploring the multiple barriers, which limit the scope (budget inefficiencies, rivalries between parties, legislative barriers and others) (Burch, 2010). 11.3.4.7. Community of locality As we have mentioned above, the recorded approaches were only territorialized to a very small degree. The community of locality is defined through the physical attributes of resources and the potential for energy saving to quantify within empirical approaches (Kellett, 2007). Limited through its physical geography and available resources, the territory appears in these approaches as a variable “exogenous” to the community, external data that certainly have impact, but do not fully participate in its constitution − with the difference in approaches that are more attentive to community/territory-based co-production. 11.3.4.8. Community social representations The approach by social representations assumes a community in the sense of sharing these frameworks/representations as ways of perceiving issues and notably those relating to energy technologies. This perspective is central to the approaches to social psychology. It can, in some cases, be explicitly built around the theory of the same name: “A social representation has been defined as that which pervades daily conversation and the mass media, is used by individuals in order to understand and act upon society, serves them as a reference frame for their thoughts and decisions,

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and colours their imagination” (Moscovici, cited by Devine-Wright, 2010, p. 4128). The social representation community is, therefore, perhaps that which together with the community of locality assumes most strongly the preexistence of a stabilized collective, made up of, and determining, future energy resources: a resource collective and the given potential in one particular case, and a collective of given social representations in another case. These approaches have been subject in recent years to research proposals, which broaden the spectrum through notions of attachment to given places, which is a question of learning on multiple scales ranging from local to global (Devine-Wright, 2013). This territorialization/ deterritorialization of the approach to social movements and energy communities offers an interesting avenue to understand the character that is simultaneously embodied and multiscalar from the relocation of energy systems, which themselves are more autonomized. 11.3.5. Discussion Ruth Liepins (2000) was interested in approaches of the notion of community in rural sociology. In her work, she highlights four types of approaches, summarized in Table 11.3. Types of approaches

Characteristics

Structuralfunctionalist perspectives

In “structural-functionalist” approaches, the community is a phenomenon, which is relatively unobtrusive, based upon close and positive interactions, relationships, geographical proximity or mental connection. It is a collective entity both stable in form and in its functions, having observable characteristics (structures) and oriented towards an aim/objective.

Community ethnographies

“Ethnographic” approaches envisage the community as a living entity, a relatively stable object, an observable reality, for which strata can be described through a detailed account of experiences and genuinely lived relationships.

Symbolic construction approaches

“Symbolic constructive” approaches share the majority of methods and assumptions of the ethnographical approach, but envisage the community as a mental construct, i.e. having shared meanings and symbols.

Minimalist approaches

“Minimalist” approaches originate directly from the limits of the first two currents of analysis, which attribute a pre-existence of given facts to the community. That having been said, minimalist approaches make implicit usage of the term “community” to specify a particular level of research, an entity or a plurality as to the social element. Table 11.3. Liepins view of community approaches (2010)

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Overall, the approaches to energy community avoid some of the biases owing to the framing of this analysis around sociotechnical issues, rather than the notion of community itself. It is present very little per se, even in collective cases. A technical element does not necessarily infer a presupposition of the community and its structure as a preexisting and stable entity. An excellent illustration of this is supplied by the most critical approaches around “community benefits”, which attempt to formulate them as a problem and to follow the issue of constitution of a collective from and around that of sharing wind power profits. What amounts to a redistribution as opposed to a bribe? Who gains by it, in what forms and for what uses? What is the collective concerned, does it preexist and if not how should it be made up? A further example corresponds to works in “critical localism”. These works have been initiated around compiling a register of empirical realities covered under the umbrella term of “community renewables”, so as to capture the outlines rather than endorse prior categorization of the reference object. The approaches for which records have been compiled have a tendency to prove to be minimalist, with the notable exception of instrumental approaches14. Counter to critical localism, the latter aspire to a categorization of their object so as to exhibit a prescriptive discourse around how to orientate the collectives toward future desirable sustainable energies. It follows therefrom that there is a trend toward the community presupposing that the analysis should focus upon the factors, which can orientate it toward the desired formats. For all that, the analyses, even the non-instrumental ones, still strive even less to follow as such the processes of emergence of communities. British analyses of “grassroot innovation” are the exception rather than the rule. Highly concerned as to the factors and conditions for the emergence of local initiatives, however, they tend to focus upon the internal dynamics of these processes, putting forward issues of capacity building (Middlemiss and Parrish, 2010; Seyfang et al., 2013) without always articulating these processes as mechanisms for public policy, and their development and role15. The mechanisms of public policy end up simply being questioned in a piecemeal way. French field works around energy communities have been presented as particularly in their infancy at the beginning of the current decade, starting in 2010, which explains why we have given it little discussion space here − and why several

14 Some instrumental approaches share emblematic or ethnographic presuppositions (e.g. the “culture theory” by M. Douglas) while making theoretical frameworks available to them by hybridizing them, often to only retain partial framework elements. 15 The works of Burch (2010) target in some way this limit of analyses of grassroot movements as constituting a collective innovative capacity.

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notable publications since that date only marginally negate it (Yalcin-Riollet et al., 2014). Several recent articles analyze local experiments in France and Germany and explore how energy autonomy is both perceived and experienced by local actors (Dobigny, 2007). The remainder of the analyses around the local dimension of energy issues focus upon the role of local businesses around energy production (Poupeau, 2004) − notably, around some local government control having survived energy centralization from the beginning of the 20th Century in France – or around the implementation at local level of climate-energy policy mechanisms (Chanard et al., 2011)16. This low level of development and this partition of the analyses have contributed, notably as part of the research project CLIMENCORED (ClimateEnergy Policies, Communities and Sustainable Energy Networks), to renewed attention given to recent local experiments in France (Nadaï et al., 2012). It is then a matter of developing approaches that articulate the emergence of these experiments in their history and their territoriality, as well as in the French institutional context, marked by the strong centralization of the sector and post-war energy policies. If this context justified − and still partly justifies − the attention given to local government and local mechanisms for energy-climate policies, it then appeared opportune to capture these objects in the light of energy decentralization that would go down multiple avenues and which especially would approach partition − traditional in the French context – between the central state and local level. In other words, is it a form of decentralization never before seen, in the sense that it is not operating in a traditional way, between the state and the local communities through a delegation of powers, means and skills? Bringing into line European and local levels – through the Convention des maires (Mayor’s Convention) (2009) or European support for the creation of local energy agencies and local initiatives indirectly provided by the latter – tended to equally confirm the scope of readjustments to implement through local energy innovation experiments provided by “communities”. In this Light, the definition per the law of 2015 of “positive energy territories” should be called into question, which now are assigned to produce energy transition policies. Are they conceived as entities taking part in the renewal or the continuity of territorial policies? By combining, on the one hand, a strong trend for institutionalization, notably via local communities and their groupings, and, on the other hand, a multiactors dimension open to civil society, do positive energy territories have a tendency for certain similarities to Britain’s energy communities − and therefore exposure to a critique close to local British localism17? However, do they suggest an organizational format open to innovative links between the institutions and the collectives affected?

16 We are not taking account here of field publications, which are more developed, around urban experiments and sustainable towns and cities. 17 That is to say, communities with little substance and instrumentalized by local authorities.

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11.4. Conclusion This genealogical and notional analysis of the community opens up fruitful prospects to escape various pitfalls of existing analyses around energy communities, but also to explore the current heuristics for the community notion for the critical analyses of relocation processes of energy issues linked to the notion of territory. In addition, could the analysis of communities, as Liepins thus suggests, be inspired by recent developments in sociology and human geography and consequently attached to following dynamics at play, the heterogenity which characterizes them, and integrating material and discursive processes, practices and the areas within which they become a reality? Reported in the French case and the issues, which we are outlining, this observation invites us to capture local energy initiatives equally as “sites” for energy decentralization that “come about”. A decentralization for which these sites are actors as much as they are backed by this process. Actors, because beyond initiatives that they provide at local level, and because of their history and their territoriality, the necessary correlations with the emergence of these initiatives contribute to making up the scales and levels of decentralization (Bukeley, 2005). Backed, because of circumventing French centralism and the redefinitions that permit the beginnings of this decentralization – such as the sudden renewal of the role of local government control of energy production – are the necessary ingredients for the emergence of such initiatives. It is not, of course, “instrumental” localism, since it positions these initiatives as protagonists in, and not objects of, decentralization. Neither is it “normative” in the sense that it does not oppose potentiality and capacity of the local, seen as a basis for energy transition, to an assumed generic nature and incapacity for public policies. It may be “critical”, but in a different meaning of British critical localism. Certainly, it is a question of a “localism” emerging with public policy but restrained, resulting from the law on energy transition to a given “territory”, whether or not it is likely to encapsulate the idea of a community. Indeed what type of community evolves in such circumstances? For all that, any critical approach will especially revolve around the movement caused by an analytical perspective that no longer opposes, a priori, the state or public or local policy, but attempts to capture them as sites for expressing a movement of energy governance at “territorial” scale. It will be a question of following shifts in work (discourse, practices, areas, dynamics, heterogeneousness) from local experiments, but without being limited in that regard. Moreover, French analyses are essentially empirical and proceed by starting either through the issue of climate and climate-energy policies (PCET – regional climate, air and energy policy/SRCAE – regional climate air energy scheme), or through local electricity distribution companies. They describe more territorial

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entities than local “communities”. Collectives being subsumed within the territory moreover lead to the analyses remaining local, with mechanisms that support innovative initiatives, often involving European or transnational connections, precisely tied by the collectives concerned. In addition to territory, institutions and local communities represent the territory also at the fore of these analyses, and take part in institutionalist readings that misunderstand the role played by the collectives affected. Yet, a quick inventory of the experiments in progress (Nadaï et al., 2012, 2015) shows that initiatives are diverse, and very often result from hybrid transfers from local communities and institutions. This encourages us to question the area as a “boundary object” opening the way to articulating the analyses between institutions and collectives, and on multiple scales (local, national and transnational). Within this context, what is the relevance for the analysis of the French situation of the term “community”, a term partly inspired from these “renewable energy communities”, a subject for specialist analyses for British localism? Although this term appears to capture the sense of a “common energy”: applied through local innovative experiments, it may be appropriate to remain vigilant in the analysis so as not to reduce or describe too hastily the ways in which this energetic commons proves problem orientated and further updated through these experiments. Besides, some experiments highlight a citizen dimension (participatory or deliberative), while others appear more to originate in public action – and sometimes to be confined, such as those denounced by critical localism. This view of the energy community tends to introduce the concept of sharing between institutional transfers and citizen transfers for given energy initiatives. Yet, it is a question of a partition that the notion of territory enables us to usefully go beyond; in addition, it would gain by integrating as much as possible the lessons from the thorough analysis of field publications on energy communities. The notion of territory is, like that of community, likely to drive instrumental, normative, critical or positive approaches, which it identifies and characterizes in order contribute to the critical analysis of emerging French localism. Only the territories themselves have the ability to be understood with difficulty as “data” − according to a form of reductionism which tends ex ante to assimilate them into a territorial community for example − but more as “constructs”. The capacities for local initiatives − energy and more − to “produce a community” constitute moreover a significant method to construct a new territory. These potential movements between the notions of community and territory argue in favor of taking account of multiple meanings devolved to the communities recorded here, in their capacity as possible components for territorial analysis of emerging positive energy.

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Even more so, although the notion of the “energy community” still appears to make more sense, it is reasonably because it plays the enlightening role, hollowed out from the emergence of alternatives and the process of social transformation already underway. Reporting the genealogy of energy approaches is consequently similar to explaining the main vectors and mechanisms to which analyses attach this transformation in the process of taking place, according to the focal restraint (whether technical, institutional and/or collective) and the relations which it recognizes more or less explicitly. The map drawn up is only designed as a tool to orientate oneself within the multiplicity of approaches of energy communities as well as a defence in favor of using the most appropriate possible of these various theoretical and analytical options, guaranteeing the heuristics of the notion of communities. An intuition strengthened by the shifting contents conferred upon the community, to the extent that it proves the most often transversal in respect of the different approaches and articulates almost on a “case by case” basis the various meanings of “community” listed above. Although the notion of the energy community contributes in an entirely decisive fashion to the lines of questioning around configurations favoring the emergence and the staying power of this type of experiment using the term “territory”, it is appropriate from an analytical point of view to clearly identify meanings and concepts of the notion of community at work in situ, thus avoiding the pitfall of “the level playing field” by a definition along too strict lines to understand the proliferation of local energy innovations and possible forms of energy autonomy that they provide. 11.5. References AGTERBOSCH S., MEERTENS R.M., VERMEULEN W.J.V., 2009. The relative importance of social and institutional conditions in the planning of wind power projects. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 13, 393–405. AITKEN M., 2009. Wind power planning controversies and the construction of “expert” and “lay” knowledges. Science as Culture, 18, 47–64. AITKEN M., 2010. Wind power and community benefits: Challenges and opportunities. Energy Policy, 38, 6066–6075. AKRICH M., 1989. La construction d’un système socio-technique. Esquisse pour une anthropologie des techniques. Anthropologie et Sociétés, 13(2), 31–54. ARENSBERG C., 1955. American communities. American Anthropologist, 57, 1143–1162. ARENSBERG C., 1961. The community as object and as sample. American Anthropologist, 3(2), 241–264. BIJKER W.E., HUGHES T.P.E., PINCH T.J., 1987. The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

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NADAÏ A., DEBOURDEAU A., DOBIGNY L. et al. 2012. Communautés énergétiques, un état des lieux. Projet de recherche climencored, CIRED, Nogent-sur-Marne. NELSON R.R., WINTER S.G., 1977. In search of useful theory of innovation. Research Policy, 6, 36–76. NELSON R.R., WINTER S.G., 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. NEWMAN L., DALE A., 2005. The role of agency in sustainable local community development. Local Environment, 10, 477–486. NISBET R., 1966. The Sociological Tradition. Basic Books, New York, NY. ONYX J., BULLEN P., 2000. Measuring social capital in five communities. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 36, 23–42. POUPEAU F.-M., 2004. Quelle place pour les collectivités territoriales dans le secteur électrique français? Gérer et Comprendre. Annales des Mines, 46–50. PUTNAM R.D., 2001. Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community. Simon & Schuster, New York, NY. SCHOT J., GEELS F.W., 2008. Strategic niche management and sustainable innovation journeys: Theory, findings, research agenda, and policy. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 20, 537–554. SCHUMACHER E.F., 2010. Small Is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. Harper Collins, London. SEYFANG G., PARK J.J., SMITH A., 2013. A thousand flowers blooming? An examination of community energy in the UK. Energy Policy, 61(13), 977–989. SHOVE E., WALKER G., 2007. CAUTION! Transitions ahead: Politics, practice, and sustainable transition management. Environment and Planning A, 39, 763–770. STAR S.L., 2010. Ceci n’est pas un objet-frontière! Réflexions sur l’origine d’un concept. Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances, 4(1), 18–35. STRACHAN P.A., COWELL R., ELLIS G. et al., 2015. Promoting community renewable energy in a corporate energy world. Sustainable Development, 23(2), 96–109. TOKE D., 2005. Explaining wind power planning outcomes. Energy Policy, 33, 1527–1539. TÖNNIES F., 2015. Communauté et société: Catégories fondamentales de la sociologie pure. PUF, Paris. HORST D., 2008. Social enterprise and renewable energy: Emerging initiatives and communities of practice. Social Enterprise Journal, 4(3), 171–185.

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WALKER G., DEVINE-WRIGHT P., HUNTER S. et al. 2010. Trust and community: Exploring the meanings, contexts and dynamics of community renewable energy. Energy Policy, 38, 2655–2663. WEBER F., NICE R., WACQUANT L., 2001. Settings, interactions and things: A plea for multiintegrative ethnography. Ethnography, 2(4), 476–499. WENGER E., 1999. Communities of Practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. YALÇIN-RIOLLET M., GARABUAU-MOUSSAOUI I., SZUBA M., 2014. Energy autonomy in Le Mené: A French case of grassroots innovation. Energy Policy, 69, 347–355.

PART 4

The Challenges of Energy Autonomy

12 Regional Energy Self-sufficiency: a Legal Issue

Until the 2000s, the French national territory was considered as the energy sector’s frame of reference. At present, the opposite is true and it is conceived and organized under the prism of the “regions”: institutional, subnational or local. From the Grenelle de l’environnement (Grenelle Environment Round Table) to the law on the energy transition for green growth (LTECV), legislation has largely promoted these administrative perimeters within which the authority of elected representative councils (regional authorities) and decentralized state services is exercised to implement public policies1. The powers granted to local authorities regarding the energy sector have significantly increased in the last decade as a result of the transfer of powers and the relaxation of conditions enabling them to act in this sector. This dynamic originates in regional decentralization, which, based on the constitutional principle of a free administration, has been transferring for almost four decades administrative powers from the state to local authorities. The consequence of this decentralization is administrative and financial self-sufficiency according to the expression employed by jurists and political scientists. Up until recently, the energy self-sufficiency concept was used to describe small-scale processes or objects such as buildings or collective projects. Different perspectives have appeared which for example study this self-sufficiency through history of art (Lopez, 2014) or within the framework of the population communities (Dobigny, 2016). At present, the concept is increasingly related to energy selfsufficiency on a larger scale to describe energy policies carried out by Chapter written by Benoit BOUTAUD. 1 A region cannot simply be reduced to its administrative boundaries, but it is precisely those boundaries that are mentioned when dealing with regions in the energy field (see, for example, Faure, 2004; Paquot, 2011).

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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municipalities, intermunicipalities or even regions. This is a change that does not come without having an effect and which requires contextualization. We therefore propose for a complementary perspective to be adopted here, corresponding to local and legal institutional regions, taking into account the new role of municipalities within the energy sector’s organization2. In order to do so, we are going to take a municipality (Montdidier) that a few years back instituted, along with a few others such as the municipality of Mené, the emerging idea of regional energy self-sufficiency, and contributed to its dissemination when the LTECV was being drafted. Even if the municipality has certain features (an electricity public company (régie)), it nonetheless remains representative of the local authorities that are now beginning to seize the energy issue. In particular, it makes it possible to understand, before the recent laws significantly expanding the powers of local authorities, that the self-sufficiency concept at the institutional regional level relies less on infrastructures, especially production, than on the municipality’s ability take on the energy issue according to its resources and objectives. This ability to act within the French territory, which is managed by the State, is a fundamental problem in the sense that it is from here that the effectiveness of the municipalities’ self-sufficiency arises. Self-sufficiency must be taken as an element of the unitary and decentralized Republic’s administrative organization, which legally sets the municipalities’ maneuvering margins. Therefore, the proper functioning of this configuration depends on the success of the energy transition. 12.1. Self-sufficiency analyzed through the prism of the territory 12.1.1. A reality far from clichés It is 2012 and the new President of the French Republic, François Hollande, decides to implement an idea expressed during his campaign and launches a large consultation that will lead to the LTECV. Among the different themes, “energy selfsufficiency” appealed to a wide audience, both due to the alternative to the centralized French model it implied, and due to its ability to express the many changes that the energy sector was experiencing. This self-sufficiency focuses especially on the municipalities’ regional scale since municipalities have become the new spaces of reference for public policies. Up until now, its specific implementation had concerned buildings, but now the attention has turned to the few regions that have achieved concrete goals such as Montdidier in the Somme department, a founding member of the TEPOS network – a territory with positive 2 Here, we are developing some aspects presented in a doctoral thesis defended in 2016 (Boutaud, 2016).

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energy – with the particularity of having important energy infrastructures. We are going to focus on this example to better understand what the concept of selfsufficiency is3. In the early 2000s, in a context of liberalization of the energy sector and economic difficulties, the municipality of Montdidier evaluated what was the best way to protect its inhabitants from an increase in the cost of energy and to increase the value of its resources and its facilities while preserving the environment. It therefore engaged in different actions, some of which were pioneers at that time. This modernization started with the régie. This is a feature specific to the French energy landscape where the municipality itself is in charge of distributing and commercializing electricity to about 3,500 customers. Created in 1925, the régie’s activity was threatened by the appearance of competition and the arrival of suppliers from abroad. The municipality, which relied on régie, accepted in 2003 to participate in an ADEME (French environment and energy management agency) program known as “Pilot city for energy management”, which aimed to better understand the local energy system and to introduce consumption and energy efficiency control measures: feasibility studies for the construction of a heating system and a heat network, PV panels; energy diagnoses in private homes and municipal buildings; reconsidering public lighting; energy conservation awareness campaigns; recruitment of a project coordinator; etc. At the same time, the municipality and the régie took the risk of investing in production while their counterparts remained little involved in this activity. The idea was to be able to complete the process while providing a return on investment that could finance certain energy measures and provide the local authority with some resources. In a few years, the local authority acquired large infrastructures compared to its size. First of all, a 10 MW thermal power plant for the production of fuel oil, which had been installed since 1991 and with a contract signed with EDF. This plant is not intended to supply consumers daily but is just there to support the national system when managing peak consumption. Later, in 2006, a wood-fueled heating system was built to supply a heat network to which several municipal buildings are connected (hospital, high school, etc.) and which has since been extended to private buildings. Finally, from very early on the creation of a wind farm was considered. This finally came into being in 2010 (supplemented in 2013 with photovoltaic panels), a 300 kWp park that became the largest in Picardy at the time. This original configuration was also the origin of an ambitious smart grid project known as “Montdidier: regional energy intelligence for the local authority” 3 This research is based on interviews conducted between 2012 and early 2015 with the municipal energy policy stakeholders (mayors, deputy mayors, managers of the public company, ADEME). Hence, it does not take into account subsequent developments.

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(Montdidier : intelligence energétique territoriale pour la collectivité – MIETeC). The aim was to test an electrical network management system based on two tools in 750 households and with 50 tertiary customers (ADEME, 2013). Those two tools were, on the one hand, a centralized computer system for managing the energy consumption balance at the municipal level, coupled with solutions for storing and controlling electricity consumption according to technical, economic or environmental constraints, and, on the other hand, a tool for consumers to help them better control their energy consumption. This tool was based on different communication means (SMS, municipal journals) in order to involve the maximum number of users. The existence of the public company (régie), which possesses technical and accounting data for the region given its small size, helped at the time with this large-scale test that involved, besides the ADEME, the University of Picardy and a research unit as part of the future investments program ( programme investissement d’avenir – PIA) funding (3.8 million euros). Despite this project’s ambitions, the required conditions for it to become a reality were not met, in particular due to technical difficulties in its implementation. Despite this, when energy transition started to turn into a hot topic around 2012, all the attention naturally turned to the Montdidier region to use it as a “laboratory” or “model”. The process received wide coverage by national media, albeit sometimes with clichés and simplifications4. We note in particular that while communication on the actions carried out did not initially mention the concept of energy self-sufficiency, it still became the municipality’s slogan5. The concept appeared in the media or in events, during that period, referring to it as “autonomous”, “independent” or “self-sufficient”, with the underlying idea that the municipality is the one implementing this policy through its own means, hence becoming some sort of “island”6.

4 For example, on TV news (TF1, TV news of January 29, 2012; France 3, TV news of September 14, 2012), on the radio (France Info devoted a special brief to this topic for a whole December 01, 2012) or in the written press (RÉJU, Emmanuel, “Montdidier, energy transition laboratory”, La Croix, December 11, 2012). 5 The press release of 2008 on municipal energy policy did not mention self-sufficiency as an objective unlike the 2012 one (Commune de Montdidier, 2008, 2012). From this date on, the Montdidier/self-sufficiency pair has been constantly present in the media. 6 For example, in a report on the French television newscast of September 14, 2012 (“[...] Montdidier in Picardie, a city with a population 6,000 that will soon be totally energy selfsufficient thanks to wind power, solar energy and a wood-fueled furnace [...] The municipality does not want to depend on the outside anymore [...] The municipality-run régie also has a conventional power station to tackle consumption peaks”); or the report of France 2 of September 25, 2012 entitled “Those municipalities where the electricity bill is not paid”; or the report “Montdidier, an ecological city” of channel LCP of February 17, 2015 in the program “24H Sénat” which indicated that when the régie exports electricity when production is high, the municipality “pays no power and resells energy, [...] they are all advantages”.

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However, we must not search for any disconnection in the municipal infrastructure logic, or even a power distribution network that does not resort to the interconnected network in the case of damage caused to local production or in the event of a disconnection. Montdidier is no more an island than the other metropolitan regions. While disconnected self-sufficiency has become technically possible at the building scale, finding a municipality with this type of profile is unlikely in the current state of technology7. Since 2010 it had infrastructures that provided the equivalent of 50% of its annual electricity consumption, i.e. about 18 GWh, most of which was provided by the wind farm. However, we should not stop at this figure. This calculation is indeed an annual balance sheet not taking into account the periods when the concession company takes from the network when no other means of production is working (no wind or maintenance for example), when consumption is very high (peak of 19 h in winter) or when the network is injected given that production is at its peak and consumption is low. Monthly or interseasonal storage techniques, which may be associated or not with supply– consumption management, remain at the experiment level at lower scales and have to face numerous technical and economic factors (Hampikian, 2017, Chapter VI). The logic followed is therefore of electricity import–export. Belonging to an interconnected network that must constantly balance supply and consumption also implies management and planning that goes beyond the scale of a concession company. The voltage and frequency balance is a very delicate operation as part of the tasks carried out by the transmission network operator in connection with the distribution network operators. This balance is achieved at the national level, in close collaboration with other European network operators. It is therefore not the responsibility of the municipality that only injects and withdraws electricity when the production resources, which are part of the concession company, are not enough. Neither does direct planning concern the municipality. The connection of many intermittent production resources requires the network to be able to transfer a large amount of electricity in order to avoid a blackout. This requires planning the development of the transport and distribution infrastructures. It is with this objective in mind that the regional climate-air-energy plans (schémas régionaux climat air énergie – SRCAE) were created in 2012, which set the objectives for the next 10 years on renewable energy development. RTE (Réseau de transport d’électricité) proposed a plan for the modernization of infrastructures that will host this production approved by the regional prefecture and the regional council (RTE, 7 Tests were conducted in an island environment. Eigg in Scotland or El Hierro in the Canary Islands have achieved almost full electricity self-sufficiency by combining complementary energy resources, a small population, the use of specific equipment (emergency generators, batteries, pumping stations) and a drastic change in consumption patterns.

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2012). The development of networks is, therefore, planned and determined at this regional level. Inside, the concession company is a regulated system. For example, Montdidier did not receive funding from a specific source station exclusively devoted to its concession as it had requested in order to connect a giant wind project (7.5 MW) given the cost it entailed for other producers wishing to build parks8. No more than from a technical point of view should economic logics be sought in energy self-sufficiency that would enable the municipality to finance its energy policy alone. Without even referring to the model of local distribution companies, protected by legislation since the nationalization law of 1946 and whose operation depends on a strict legal framework where the State dictates the mechanisms for resource allocation, Montdidier can rely on the financial resources provided to it by the production facilities. As part of the significant support provided for the development of renewable energies, the construction of the wind farm first received € 1 million from ERDF, a € 1 million zero-interest loan from the Picardie Region and a € 120,000 grant from the Somme Departmental Council from a total investment of € 11.1 million. The production is then sold in full under the purchase obligation that generates approximately 1.5 million euros annually (gross operating income). This mechanism is based on the contribution to the public electricity service (CSPE) paid by all French consumers through their consumption bills. Therefore, the concept of regional energy self-sufficiency must be understood taking into account these different elements, which we have briefly referred to and that can modify or put into perspective the initial idea that one can have about energy at this scale. In particular, we understand that energy self-sufficiency cannot be simply reduced to a matter of the relationship between production and consumption. Even if the local authority has powerful production resources, such as described here, there are indeed other more important factors to take into account. 12.1.2. Going beyond the productive aspect Montdidier has more concrete achievements and a more consistent experience than many other municipalities and so “self-sufficiency” became a competitive advantage when this concept started to attract the interest of a wider audience. Self8 The source station is an expensive work that links the transmission system to the distribution network. There is a regional cost-sharing mechanism for the 10-year grid transformation that each wind farmer must fulfill. With this system, an average cost per megawatt hour is calculated regionally so as not to burden the first applicants with infrastructure costs that would then benefit the rest. With this source station, the public company (régie) reduced the very high connection costs of its wind turbine, however, the regional share increased accordingly. The regional council and prefecture decided in favor of controlling the cost of this share (RTE, 2012).

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sufficiency has turned into a catchphrase with physical infrastructures as its main element, which have often embodied the idea of regional energy self-sufficiency in its entirety. Its brevity and the need to find simple messages with an impact and wide media coverage have contributed to creating confusion about the technical and economic realities of the electricity grid at this scale as well as to reinforcing the productive nature of self-sufficiency. Infrastructures produce electricity but also generate figures that are easy to understand and use, which explains the introduction of the production–consumption balance sheet. Information on the different tests carried out has also gradually led its main stakeholders to become a political and national object for the promotion of energy decentralization, highlighting production for those same reasons. Production is indeed important because it is consistent with the municipalities’ responsibility to promote renewable energy and the concept of transition. It is also a source of activity and a potential development lever. More specifically, these projects provide tax revenues or dividends if the municipality is a shareholder (AMORCE, 2016c; Chabrol and Grasland, 2016), such as the case of Montdidier where the municipality was the first to own the wind farm in its entirety. The production of 300 kWp of PV is also anecdotal (1% of consumption) but was thought of as a revenue-generating investment. An example of decision-makers’ (elected officials, the régie’s managers) pragmatism is how they searched for available financial resources and completed an original project even if not all their actions succeeded (MIETeC)9. Here, we are dealing with an important aspect, the fact that production is not an end in itself but one of the resources available to the municipality. On the one hand, several other actions have been carried out in terms of energy efficiency and energy consumption control (assistance for electric mobility, biomass use, updating public lighting, etc.) as well as in terms of distribution network (landfill, updating). The resources generated by the production infrastructure make it possible to cover these expenses for which financing is found with difficulty, about which it is difficult to inform and the benefits of which are visible especially in the long term. On the other hand, production is a means with the general purpose of benefitting the entire region. If we go back to 2001, the start of the energy project, we find the municipality’s desire to respond to its population’s energy insecurity, update the old electric régie in a liberalization context and create jobs while being part of an 9 A pragmatism that could have been interpreted as opportunism since the Montdidier “model” could only be highlighted by the media at the cost of an important gathering of resources from outside the region. Two causes are at the origin of this tension. First, how this configuration and the extrapolations have been publicized and circulated by the press, which has led to concerns due to the impossibility of making an economic generalization. Second, the test was related to the energy sector, and in particular electricity, which at the time was not yet familiar with the idea of direct intervention of a municipality in wind power generation.

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environmental approach10. At that precise moment when the regulatory context had not yet evolved and municipalities were still not very interested in energy in this way, Montdidier used the tools at its disposal (natural resources, régie, high renewable energy purchase rates, subsidy for their development) to make this theme a competitive advantage by activating a specific, local and non-standardized resource (Campagne and Pecqueur, 2014). It has used energy as a regional development instrument. Due to the municipality’s financial situation, it was unacceptable for elected officials to allow a wind farm to be constructed, which would have only benefited a private external stakeholder, excluding local taxes. At around that time we find a similar strategy in some other municipalities such as the Issoudun federation of municipalities in the Indre department, one of the most advanced. Here, there is no public company, or régie, but instead a mixed economy company created in 2010 with public and private partners (Issoudun Municipality, Sergies, the central area’s regional council, a savings bank), which became the owner of several wind turbines, the revenues of which were earmarked for municipal services or infrastructure11. Often, local difficulties are at the origin of these projects that target economic development (Dobigny, 2016). Currently, a growing number of municipalities are in this position and if they so wish they have at their disposal tools for production or other measures (renovation platforms, funds for heating, etc.). It is, therefore, not necessary to have a distribution board; in fact its creation is not allowed by French legislation and the capacity to act as a lever for a relative transition (Gabillet, 2015). The Montdidier case is not intended to be a turnkey model since each region has its specific features and elected officials who can choose to invest in other more suitable sectors. Here, for example, the régie facilitated the construction of the smart grid project that had been cancelled, or that of the wind farm because the context was stricter than nowadays. Since then, the legal environment has significantly changed. Regulatory changes make it possible, among other things, for a municipality to directly invest in a wind farm, or any other renewable energy source, like any other stakeholder that participates in a company’s capital (Grossmann, 2016). This approach shows the ability of a municipality to define goals for its region and to use the means that will be used to fulfill them. This situation is no longer an isolated case as proven by the positive energy territories movement created in 2011 and which became widespread as part of the framework of calls for regional projects and then as part of the governmental framework in 2014. It is not a radical disconnection project, which would also be unreal. The role of trade, especially between urban and rural areas, is constantly mentioned, with some of them having 10 As part of the development of wind turbines, it was a matter of whether a maintenance center should be installed in the town. This project will not see the light of day. 11 Other local authorities have done something similar, for example the federation of municipalities of Haut Vivarais (AMORCE, 2016b).

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the need but no space and others having the space but no need. The aim is to be “a stakeholder of its development” by rejecting an energy concept which is too vertical for a more “decentralized” vision seeking to fix as much as possible the financial and material flows within the region (Nadaï et al., 2015; Régnier, 2013). In order to do so, Montdidier mobilized internal and external resources at a given time. The room for maneuver at its disposal and the infrastructures located in its region are part of a system of regions with which the municipality reaches a compromise from a regulatory and material point of view. In fact, Montdidier has never considered “energetic secession”, which makes little sense considering the technical and economic ties that link it to other regions and other stakeholders (municipalities, the State, the European Union). The production aspects are obviously important, yet they should not be considered as a self-sufficiency-providing element but rather as a result of the municipality’s self-sufficiency which is manifested through many other indicators. There is of course a legal foundation for these margins for maneuver. The margins correspond to the ability to act because of and within the limits set by the law. These legal powers which are transferred or granted by the State are also the foundations of the decentralized organization that has existed since the early 1980s. This decentralization took longer to arrive for the energy sector, but is at present the core of the transition’s organization (Boutaud, 2017). Thus, regional energy selfsufficiency must be analyzed through the prism of political science and law. 12.2. Regional energy self-sufficiency: a legal issue 12.2.1. Municipalities that become legally self-sufficient The liberalization of the electricity and gas sector has led to significant changes in institutional organization: the creation of the energy regulatory commission (commission de régulation de l’énergie – CRE), the breaking up of monopolies into separate entities, etc. These changes were driven by the state under the effect of community law in a context of increased visibility within a society of energy issues and the pursuit of decentralization, which gradually placed local authorities and their regions at the center of energy public policies. Their place and role in the French administrative organization is defined by the Constitution amended on March 28, 2003. These communities “shall be self-governing through elected councils and shall have power to make regulations for matters falling within their jurisdiction” (Article 72), which include, for example, housing, land use planning, transport or urban planning. This power is administrative in nature and relies on the existence of an elected committee from which communities obtain their legitimacy. Thus, we are here speaking of administrative self-sufficiency or administrative and financial self-sufficiency, since each power theoretically comes with its own financial

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resources (Tartour, 2012). On the other hand, municipalities remain under the control of the State, which delegates powers for certain acts or in certain clearly defined fields. Above all, this self-sufficiency is not strictly political in the sense that it is neither legislative nor constitutional given that, on the one hand, the delegation of power is, in theory, precarious and revocable, and, on the other hand, the municipalities do not have jurisdiction over their powers12. This means that they are not independent because they are not sovereign entities as opposed to the State. From an operational point of view, this of course has its consequences when it comes to the relations between the State and the elected officials, the latter being, for example, able to discuss the “autonomy of their power” even though it is out of the question (Vanier, 2008, p. 76). The legal literature clearly makes a distinction by not referring to the municipalities’ duties using any of these concepts. This distinction, which is obviously more complex in reality, is fundamental because self-sufficiency or rather the process of becoming self-sufficient is the core of the decentralization initiated in the 1980s. This administrative decentralization is based on three principles: the lack of supervision of one municipality over another, the maintenance of existing local administrative structures and financial compensation for the transfer of powers. Energy, often referred to as the “sovereign” sector which is legally wrong but politically true, has for a long time remained independent of this movement, which initially concerned urban planning, housing or transport13. The municipalities’ margins for maneuver remained limited until the act of July 12, 2010 on the national environmental commitment (Grenelle)14. Since then, the modernization of territorial public action and affirmation of the metropolis act (MAPTAM, 2014), the act concerning the new territorial organization of the Republic (NOTRe, 2015) and the act relating to the energy transition (LTECV) have established the “region” as a privileged framework of energy public action and the municipalities as the stakeholders in charge of its implementation, under the State’s authority and its services, which are also regionalized. Nowadays, municipalities evolve within a limited legal framework that allows them to act more freely than before regarding energy control and efficiency and, more recently, energy production. This could include initiatives made by each municipality, but can also include obligations such as that of designing a regional climate-air-energy plan (plan climat air énergie territorial – PCAET) for municipalities with a population of over 20,000. It is not a matter of listing the many 12 Slight differences exist for overseas territories. 13 This is a general remark because municipalities have never been completely left out during the nationalization period (Poupeau, 2017). 14 In particular, the act of February 10, 2000 on the modernization of the public power service, or the act of July 13, 2005 on a program setting the guidelines for an energy policy (POPE).

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prerogatives, which vary according to the type of municipality and cover other sectors such as mobility or agriculture15. In brief, the important thing to remember is that they are divided into two major legal and economic areas. The first one is planning, with the development or co-development of climate-air-energy plans or regional development, sustainable development and regional equality plans (schémas régionaux d’aménagement, de développement durable et dégalite des territoires – SRADDET), and regulations, through the creation of regional coherence plans (schémas de cohérence territoriale – SCOT) or local urban planning (plans locaux d’urbanisme – PLU). The second one is that of the economy through the management of, support of or participation in energy-related activities: energy management (regional energy renovation platforms, third-party investment, calls for tender), testing (research projects on power networks), fuel poverty, etc. Given these legal and economic levers, along with opportunities to act through the representation system at the national level (including Parliament), municipalities are now able to guide consumer behavior, the development of energy infrastructures or the urban development of their region more than in the past. However, these prerogatives are subject to very unequal ownership depending on the possibilities to act and the choices made by each municipality. This dynamic is still very recent and can sometimes even seem fragile even for the largest ones (Bosboeuf, DégremontDorville and Poupeau, 2015). This is because the energy transition in France is an institutional organization as much as it is an energy mix, and regional energy selfsufficiency has become one of its main challenges. 12.2.2. The energy self-sufficiency of municipalities: an organizational challenge In order to establish the terms of such an important issue as the role of municipalities in energy at present, more than a few lines are required. Here we will just state that the organization of the French energy system has three problems, which differ in their almost Braudel-like scale and time: the burning issue of the resources allotted to municipalities; the newer issue of their position alongside the State after liberalization; and finally, the fundamental issue of the Republic’s organization. Regional energy self-sufficiency is the common element of these three problems, making it a strong organizational challenge. The first problem is financial. In the French system, the resources allotted to local authorities are governed by the principle of self-government included in the Constitution in 2003. The bulk of it comes from State grants and taxes. Regarding 15 For an overview, see, for example, the document produced by the Climate Action Network (2016).

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the latter, local authorities are free to set them (rate modulation) but do not possess the ability to create them (Allé and Navarre, 2016; Dubois, 2013). Local authorities’ financial autonomy is a “poorly defined principle” as brought up again during the preparatory work for the 2018 finance act (Hervé, 2017). The government has also called for a general revision of local taxation at the national conference of the regions (a forum for dialogue between local authorities and the State). Concerning energy, these resources come, for example, from funds (e.g. ERDF) or calls for proposals (e.g. positive energy territories for green growth (territoires à énergie positive pour la croissance verte – TEPCV)), but also from taxes. The energy tax system is mainly made up of: the climate-energy contribution (known as the “carbon tax”), which focuses on fossil fuel consumption and sets a price for carbon emissions; the domestic energy consumption tax (taxe intérieure de consommation sur les produits énégetiques – TICPE) applied to oil products and a part of which is assigned to the regions; or municipal and departmental taxes on final electricity consumption (General commissariat for sustainable development, 2015). A portion of the taxes from the establishment of production resources also goes to local authorities (Chabrol and Grasland, 2016). Financing has recently emerged as an issue in energy transition for which enormous investments need to be made over the next few years while the resources are limited. Even though local authorities are more frequently called upon, their access to resources is also under pressure as a result of the State lowering the budgetary maneuvering margins and its desire to reduce local spending. These grants are currently the subject of intense debate because their reduction is considered as a decrease in self-sufficiency (Passavant, 2016). It is also a matter of better earmarking the energy-climate taxes for local authorities and financing their new powers (France Urbaine, 2017). Indeed, the climate-energy contribution is currently a State recipe mainly feeding the tax credit for employment and competitiveness (crédit d’impôt compétitivité entreprise –CICE)16. It would just be a matter of collecting part of this amount to finance actions, which are heavy on the decreasing local budgets17. Recent advancements such as the development of calls for proposals or the possibility of investing directly in production could be a sign of new financing processes that are less based on grants and more on “self-financing”, for example by receiving part of the tax and financial benefits related to renewable energy production facilities (AMORCE, 2016a). This is a mechanism that, in this particular sector, might turn less toward recentralization than toward a new form of decentralization. The second problem is more recent and it is the position and role of the State since liberalization. The history of the political decentralization process has had 16 For example, see the statements made by France Urbaine to this regard. 17 A regional climate-air-energy plan costs between € 36,000 and € 58,000 (AMORCE and APCC, 2017).

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many difficulties. A mild euphemism, some would say, at a time when, once again, the ghost of recentralization reappears18. Although energy, particularly electricity and gas, have only just recently been added to the list of sectors affected, it is gradually entering the discussions and power relations between national and local authorities. In this respect, the energy landscape that has been created since liberalization has also been slow to stabilize. For the State, maintaining its capacity to join local forces in order to meet the energy challenges faced while controlling them is a balancing act. The territorialization policy, which gives more powers to the regions, the metropolis and the municipal unit, also meets the integration priority of the local authorities, whose legitimacy as main actors of the transition is not questioned when the State’s choices are questioned. In fact, the State seems to be regulating by trying to preserve its influence between the current assertion of local powers on the issue of energy, the construction of a European market and the increase in the number of stakeholders (private and intermediary). Nevertheless, it continues to be at the center of the regulating process through the control it exerts over various levers such as funding sources or delegated powers (Boutaud, 2016). The development of regional air-energy climate plans, SRCAE, has left an important place for regional prefectures (Poupeau, 2013). This observation is a symptom of the lack of effect found by jurists of the laws on decentralization of the French Republic’s organization (Ghevontian, 2015), a situation which has recurrently been denounced by the authorities, including recently on the occasion of events organized relating to this issue (Leroy, 2016). Regarding the municipalities, while the 2000s did not experience a break, the energy issue has been a technical but also a political instrument (Poupeau, 2015). For those who launch or respond to calls for proposals, investing in infrastructure or engaging in attaining objectives through planning, energy is one of the instruments of a global statement. Although the current events and unexpected budgetary development can induce a certain pessimism regarding its effective implication, the observation of the dynamics over longer periods of time reveals the constant progress of municipalities’ energy self-sufficiency through the co-evolution of the technico-economic and regulatory spheres. Several elements converge, making them, alongside the State, the European Union or other institutions like CRE, regulators in their own right. Some crucial issues are even more local than national, such as energy data (Bourdin and Vallerugo, 2017) or the operational deployment of renewable energy production infrastructures, which requires proximity relations that the State can no longer provide (Epstein, 2013). The regulations governing these different sectors, such as urban or land-use planning, are under the jurisdiction of 18 La Gazette des communes, des départements, des régions reported, in its discussion of March 28, 2018 marking the 15th anniversary of the Act II, of decentralization of its mixed review and the fragility of its achievements in terms of local responsibilities (La Gazette des communes, des départements, des régions, 2018).

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local powers that already belonged to local authorities. The increase in production infrastructures has thus encouraged the State to grant more prerogatives at the subnational level, given the impossibility for it to ensure such specific regulations by explaining that local authorities have established themselves as operational regulators for the transition simultaneously with the development of renewable energy. These technical developments should not, however, conceal the fact that these are above all organizational issues. Being able to invest in energy production resources is not, in the case of local authorities, a direct guarantee of power; it is just an economic and territorial element. By extension, the power of local authorities to cover, for example, their electrical needs by accepting production resources is not directly related to their power to decide the energy policy conditions for their territory and/or the control they have over their exploitation. We could compare this to the creation of heat networks, which is an opportunity for local authorities in charge of energy to take control over their territory (Rocher, 2013). This is one of the first examples of decentralization in the energy field as a consequence of the act of July 15, 1980 on energy saving and the use of heat supported by a specific tax system and help from the ADEME. In practice, local authorities have not taken the control of the direct use of these networks but have delegated it, thus ensuring their control by delegating a public service. Hence, regional energy self-sufficiency is not purely a technical issue but a politico-administrative issue influenced by technical components. This observation therefore raises the question of the effects of a significant increase in legal independence on the unitary organization of the French Republic, which is the third problem of regional energy self-sufficiency. At a time when it is difficult for us to grasp the level of ownership of local authorities in the sector, this may appear premature or even far-fetched. Yet energy, if combined with similar processes in other sectors, is also likely to contribute to the weakening of the State and open up to self-sufficiency with more political tinges, hence engaging national unity. It is, therefore, important to establish the outline in order to weigh the effects and make appropriate organizational choices. Decentralization and self-sufficiency are, of course, compatible with the unitary State provided that we do not consider self-sufficiency as a continuous process (Marcou, 2003). Indeed, as comparative law shows, the unitary state, characterized by the exclusivity of the legislative power, is not synonymous with a centralized State (Marcou, 2014). On the other hand, the effects of this self-sufficiency on interregional solidarity are real and question in particular the principle (the myth) of regional equality. The increasing difference between the regions and spaces is a strong dynamic (Davezies, 2015; Estèbe, 2015), which questions the sector’s organization. The fact that the ministry in charge has included the concept of solidarity in its title is not trivial, testifying to its importance but also its fragility. This question arose immediately after the liberalization that dismantled the vertically

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integrated public monopoly at the national level, which ensured the essential functioning of the solidarity mechanisms and the unity of the energy system on national territory. This question has gained importance more recently under the effect of technico-economic changes (self-consumption), of the criticism made of the State’s energy policy (discretionary choices, distribution monopoly), of stronger competition between local authorities and of increased tension for access to resources in an unfavorable economic context. Consequently, having more self-sufficient local authorities requires, on the one hand, dialogue and compromise given the increased governance of the sector, and, on the other hand, a re-examination of the rules governing the relationship between the State and the local authorities as well as between the different local authorities in order to preserve much-needed harmony. Regional energy self-sufficiency presumes that the State is strong, but neither all-powerful nor rigid, and able to maintain the subtle organization balance between the different powers that reinforce themselves within a superior and unitary regional unit. In these circumstances, regional energy self-sufficiency, which is administrative in nature, is not able to call into question national or local interregional relations or solidarities. On the contrary, it feeds on exchanges, trust and cooperation given that the renunciations or efforts made benefit everyone and will sooner or later reach those who agree to them. 12.3. Conclusion The context in which the regional self-sufficiency principle has become widespread has left much room for the productive aspects of this concept without the deciding factors of an energy system of this size having been necessarily clearly identified. These productive aspects have been put forward at the expense of the particularities of self-sufficiency in the French administrative and regional organization. This has nothing to do with the autarky, the economic, material and social isolation it implies, which is almost incongruous at the time of hyperconnection. Regional energy self-sufficiency is also not directly related to independence. Current events remind us that this is the prerogative of sovereign states (see Catalonia), even though local and regional authorities are clearly the stakeholders. Regional energy self-sufficiency must be considered as a legal principle expressing the transfer (in theory precarious) of the jurisdiction in the energy field to a local authority for which it is allocated resources – in theory proportionally – to exercise this jurisdiction. This is a consequence of the issues of centralization and decentralization given its institutional and constitutional nature.

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The self-sufficiency process that we have seen in recent years is based on a balance that depends on the room that the State intends to leave to local authorities for maneuver and on their ability to take on these prerogatives. The selfsufficiency’s level (up/down), its scope (number and distribution of powers), the conditions to exercise it (funding) and its impact on regional cohesion (solidarity/equality) are a difficult challenge for energy transition and for the evolution of the French political and administrative organization. 12.4. References ADEME, MIETEC, pour Montdidier : intelligence énergétique territoriale pour la collectivité [Online], ADEME Presse, 2013. ALLE C., NAVARRE F., Le système financier local français. Bilan des connaissances et perspectives de recherche, PUCA, Paris, 2016. AMORCE, Financement des projets d’énergies renouvelables par les collectivités et les citoyens : Enjeux sociaux et politiques, retombées économiques, montages juridiques, 2016a. AMORCE, L’éolien, facteur de réussite de développement sur un territoire, 2016b. AMORCE, Les recettes perçues par les collectivités au titre de la fiscalité éolienne: Règles générales, montants et répartition, 2016c. AMORCE, APCC, Combien coûte un PCAET ?, 2017. BOSBOEUF P., DEGREMONT-DORVILLE M., POUPEAU F.-M., “Les communautés et les politiques énergie-climat en France. Quelques enseignements autour d’une enquête de l’ADCF”, in EILLER G., MARCOU A.-C., POUPEAU F.-M., STAROPOLI C. (eds), Gouvernance et innovation dans le système énergétique, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2015. BOURDIN A., VALLERUGO F., Big data et énergie, Synthése des travaux 2016–2017, White paper, Atelier énergie et territoires, 2017. BOUTAUD B., Un modèle énergétique en transition ? Centralisme et décentralisation dans la régulation du système électrique français, PhD thesis, Université Paris Est, 2016. BOUTAUD B., “Transition énergétique”, in PISSALOUX J.-L. (ed.), Dictionnaire encyclopédique des collectivités territoriales et du développement durable, Lavoisier, Paris, 2017. CAMPAGNE P., PECQUEUR B., Le développement territorial. Une réponse émergente à la mondialisation, Editions Charles Léopold Mayer, Paris, 2014. CHABROL M., GRASLAND L., “Fiscalité locale des énergies renouvelables, un levier incertain de développement local (France)” [Online], Cybergéo: European Journal of Geography, 2016. COMMUNE 2008.

DE

MONTDIDIER, Montdidier, ville pilote en maîtrise de l’énergie, Press release,

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COMMUNE DE MONTDIDIER, Montdidier, ville pilote en maîtrise de l’énergie, Press release, 2012. Available at: https://docplayer.fr/53930253-Montdidier-ville-pilote-en-maitrise-del-energie.html. DAVEZIES L., Le nouvel égoïsme territorial, La république des idées, Paris, 2015. DOBIGNY L., Quand l’énergie change de mains. Socio-anthropologie de l’autonomie énergétique locale au moyen d’énergie renouvelables en Allemagne, Autriche et France, PhD Thesis, Université Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne, 2016. DUBOIS J., Gestion des collectivités locales et financement des projets territoriaux, Lavoisier, Paris, 2013. EPSTEIN R., “L’Etat local, de la résistance à la résiduation : Les services extérieurs à l’épreuve des réformes administratives”, in BOUCKAERT G., EYMERI-DOUZANS J.-M. (eds), La France et ses administrations: un état des savoirs, Bruylant, Brussels, 2013. ESTEBE P., L’égalité des territoires, une passion française, PUF, Paris, 2015. FAURE A., “Territoires/territorialisation”, in BOUSSAGUET L., JACQUOT S., RAVINET P. (eds), Dictionnaire des politiques publiques, Les presses de Science Po, Paris, 2004. FOLLOT M.-L., GONZ Z., MEILHAC C., Tableau de bord de la fiscalité énergétique, Commissariat Général au Developpement Durable, 2015. FRANCE URBAINE, Manifeste des élus urbains, 2017. GABILLET P., Les entreprises locales de distribution à Grenoble et Metz : Des outils de gouvernement énergétique urbain partiellement appropriés, PhD Thesis, Université Paris-Est, 2015. GHEVONTIAN M., “A la recherche de l’autonomie locale française. La libre administration des collectivités territoriales, un miroir aux alouettes ?”, Revue générale des collectivités territoriales, vol. 57, pp. 219–233, 2015. GROSSMANN E., Le rôle des collectivités territoriales dans la production d’électricité d’origine renouvelable : Le cas de l’éolien terrestre, PhD Thesis, Université de Picardie Jules Verne, 2016. HAMPIKIAN Z., De la distribution aux synergies ? Circulations locales d’énergie et transformations des processus de mise en réseau de la ville, PhD Thesis, Université Paris Est, 2017. HERVE L., Avis présenté au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du suffrage universel, du Réglement et d’administration générale sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2018, adopté par l’Assemblée nationale, no. 114, Commission relations avec les collectivités territoriales du Sénat, 2017. LA GAZETTE DES COMMUNES, DES DÉPARTEMENTS, DES RÉGIONS, Quel avenir pour la République décentralisée ?, Symposium, Sénat, Paris, 2018. LEROY M. (ed.), L’autonomie financière des collectivités territoriales, Symposium, CRDT, Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, Reims, 2016.

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LOPEZ F., Le rêve de déconnexion de la maison autonome à la cité auto-énergétique, Editions de la Villette, Paris, 2014. MARCOU G., “Décentralisation : Approfondissement ou nouveau cycle ?”, Cahiers français, no. 318, November 2003. MARCOU G., “Les collectivités locales dans les constitutions des Etats unitaires en Europe”, Nouveaux cahiers du conseil constitutionnel, vol. 42, pp. 63–87, 2014. NADAÏ A., DEBOURDEAU A., LABUSSIERE O. et al., “Political territories in climate-energy transition, transition in climate-energy policy”, in LAVILLE B., THIÉBAULT S., EUZEN A. (eds), Designing Solutions to Climate Change, Victoires éditions, Paris, 2019. PAQUOT T., “Qu’est-ce qu’un territoire ?”, Vie sociale, vol. 2, pp. 23–32, 2011. PASSAVANT L., Financer les politiques régionales : De l’autonomie à la contrainte budgétaire : Le cas des Régions Alsace, Limousin et Nord-Pas-de-Calais, PhD thesis, Université de Montpellier, 2016. POUPEAU F.-M., “Quand l’Etat territorialise la politique énergétique. L’expérience des schémas régionaux du climat, de l’air et de l’énergie”, Politiques et management public, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 443–472, 2013. POUPEAU F.-M., “La gouvernance locale des réseaux d’énergie. Entre départementalisation et métropolisation”, in EILLER A.-C., MARCOU G., POUPEAU F.-M. et al. (eds), Gouvernance et innovations dans le système énergétique, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2015. POUPEAU F.-M., L’électricité et les pouvoirs locaux en France : Une autre histoire du service public (1880–1980), Peter Lang, Brussels, 2017. REGNIER Y., “Autonomie et solidarité : Les territoires à énergie positive préfigurent un nouveau paysage énergétique”, Pour, vol. 218, pp. 181–188, 2013. RESEAU ACTION CLIMAT, Nouvelles compétences climat-énergie des collectivités territoriales, 2016. ROCHER L., “Le chauffage urbain dans la transition énergétique : Des reconfigurations entre flux et réseau”, Flux, vol. 922, pp. 23–35, 2013. RTE, Schéma régional de raccordement au réseau des énergies renouvelables de la région Picardie, 2012. TARTOUR L., L’autonomie financière des collectivités territoriales en droit français, L.G.D.J, Paris, 2012. VANIER M., Le pouvoir des territoires : Essai sur l’interterritorialité, Economica, Paris, 2008.

13 Electricity Autonomy and Power Grids in Africa: from Rural Experiments to Urban Hybridizations

13.1. Introduction Will the electricity revolution in Africa come from the deployment of decentralized solutions? By contributing to decarbonizing the energy mix and relying on off-grid systems now available everywhere on the continent, is the exploitation of local renewable resources able to meet the demand of some 600 million Africans that dominant industrial systems have failed to serve, and under what conditions? This is the challenge that policies arising from a late realization of energy deficiencies and their role in the (poor) development of the continent1, and which are now priorities for Agenda 20632 and the African Development Bank (ADB 2017), intend to address. Beyond the promises of this new electrification model, this chapter looks at the modes and places of the announced sociotechnical transition by examining the

Chapter written by Sylvy JAGLIN. 1 “Africa’s energy infrastructure deficit is a major obstacle to economic growth”: statement by ADB Group President, Donald Kaberuka, at the World Energy Congress (September 12–16, 2010, Montreal). https://www.afdb.org/fr/news-and-events/afdb-at-world-energycongress-energy-is-key-to-africas-development-7075/. 2 Plan for the structural transformation of Africa adopted in May 2013 at the Golden Jubilee of the African Union.

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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relationship between large networks and decentralized solutions, defined here as “autonomous” modes of access to electricity3. From renewable and/or fossil energy sources combined in various ways, three main families of decentralized solutions can be identified in sub-Saharan Africa: mini-grids4 powered by power plants, most often hybrid, supplying electricity to end customers (households and craft businesses); energy kiosks offering community services; and individual systems (solar torches, lanterns and kits) for basic lighting and electronic device charging (Berthélemy and Béguerie 2016). Most often proposed by external actors, in terms of supply or even commercial opportunism, these solutions are part of an autonomy model which, far from expressing a challenge to the network, legitimizes “by default” self-sufficiency imaginaries. In this sense, the interpretative registers here are very different from those prevailing in the analysis of alternative energy scenes in Europe (Christen and Hamman 2015). Since African configurations are recent, however, the dynamics and modalities of autonomization are likely to evolve and a processual definition of autonomy is preferred here to qualify relations to the grid, which may also vary depending on whether one considers physical infrastructure, socioeconomic mechanisms or the political logic of decentralized solutions (Bridge et al. 2013). It is, therefore, a question of understanding when and where electrical autonomy is appropriate; by which collective dynamics (ephemeral or sustainable) it is supported; in which project it is part of, as an end in itself or as a step in a long-term process integrating coordination modes between centralized and decentralized access to electricity. The chapter first seeks to clarify the link between electricity shortages and the recent expansion of international discourses, initiatives and intervention frameworks to facilitate the large-scale deployment of decentralized solutions from renewable energy (Africa Progress Panel 2017). It shows that the diffusion of decentralized solutions takes two main paths. One, institutionalized and mediatized, takes the form of off-grid projects included in international programs (Bloomberg NEF and Lighting Global 2016). These projects, which we propose to consider as electrical experiments (Hamman 2016), primarily concern rural areas outside the territories served by network operators. The other channel of diffusion, commercial and often

3 When electrification is carried out by means of an off-grid device, it is primarily the local production of electricity that defines autonomy. It should be noted, however, that this technical definition of decentralization does not take into account the organization of the electricity sector, since the same centralized operator can operate technically independent local systems. 4 Depending on the number of users and the power available on the grid, they are sometimes referred to as nano-grid, micro-grid or mini-grid. In this text, we will use the generic term mini-grid.

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informal, is through import channels (particularly Chinese solar equipment5), local traders in new and second-hand equipment, and purchasing practices based on customers’ economic opportunities and the information they have at their disposal. It is developing wherever there is demand, taking advantage of the dynamics and places of “inconspicuous globalization” (Choplin and Pliez 2015). In other words, off-grid electrification devices, designed for rural autonomy, are partially “diverted”6 to various urban autonomy practices. There are two main reasons for this. The first is that the city/countryside division has only a limited operational scope in the face of increasingly diffuse African urbanization. The second is that grid/off-grid specialization does not offer satisfactory answers to the poor quality of conventional urban electricity service. Although designed as a rural pre-electrification solution7, off-grid projects are also a response to the significant latent demand in urban spaces. This misappropriation of place and objective is a little-known result of experiments in electrical autonomy, whose use is being reinvented by the population. It invites us to take an interest in the grid/off-grid interfaces, thus created in cities, and leads us to an examination of the places and types of friction resulting from urban practices for assembling the available technical devices. What respective places do the centralized network and the autonomous devices occupy in the emergence of new arrangements, both spatial and functional? Do they herald more permanent electrical hybridizations? These questions open up a largely unexplored field of research. Institutional actors and experts stress the impossibility of making reliable projections due to the lack of data and hindsight. All are therefore operating today in a context of great uncertainty, between the hope of a boom in the off-grid solutions market and fear of a collapse due to the lack of a sustainable economic model (Payen et al. 2016; PwC 2017a). Indeed, despite the profusion of commitments, rhetoric and initiatives in support of decentralized electrification solutions, the true scale of achievements remains limited and, above all, very poorly documented. In addition, the analysis of documents on decentralized rural electrification solutions faces two pitfalls: imperfectly defined, “rural” is used to describe very diverse spaces, including diffuse urbanization (town, peri-urban, sprawl along major roads); sources, many of which are in the gray literature (project sheets and documents, sites of various organizations), anticipate or exaggerate the impact of 5 The vast majority of low-cost equipment comes from China (Bloomberg NEF and Lighting Global 2016). 6 In the sense proposed by Olivier de Sardan in his analysis of development projects (Olivier de Sardan 1995). 7 Understood as a preliminary step to electrification: “Unlike electrification, end-users are not connected to a grid or are not energy self-producer” (Tavernier and Rakotoniaina 2016: 68).

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interventions that are not yet implemented or only in the start-up phase. It is therefore difficult to establish the real state of deployment of these systems, their appropriation, the uses made of them, the degree of satisfaction among inhabitants, etc. The “facts” on which to base the reflection are quite few and rely on a limited number of examples cited on a recurring basis. These also offer only tenuous indications in relation to our hypotheses on interface hybridizations, which must be sought among the “problems” encountered by rural projects: unfair competition from urban traders, markets flooded with imported products, circulation of non-branded and second-hand equipment, etc. are all dynamics in which urban drivers are most often ignored. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to establish a “state of knowledge” on urban electric hybridization based on available sources and the landscape that emerges from them8. The focus is on sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa, whose electricity indicators and development are exceptional in every respect on the continent (Jaglin and Dubresson 2016). Section 13.2 presents the context of off-grid projects, justified by the “crisis” of centralized systems in a continental context of power shortage, and their expected contribution to the electrification of the continent. Section 13.3 shows that the future of the grid/off-grid pair is not sealed: while their economic models have yet to be invented in rural areas, decentralized solutions, circulating according to long and short-range market channels, are already part of urban dwellers’ daily lives. The conclusion returns to the singularity of an African physiognomy of electrical autonomy and the prospects for hybridization in urban areas connected to the grid. 13.2. From the “crisis” to electrical experiments With more than 600 million people without access to electricity out of a population of a billion, sub-Saharan Africa is the region of the world with the worst indicators in this sector9: generation and distribution capacities are very insufficient and average per capita consumption is among the lowest in the world (UNEP 2017). Many projects seek to remedy this “crisis”. Some of them aim to strengthen and complement national infrastructures by building new centralized production capacities from fossil and renewable energies, extending network infrastructures and 8 The approach is part of the Hybridelec project, (ANR 2017 Challenge 2). Scientific leader: E. Verdeil (Sciences Po Paris). Co-coordinator: S. Jaglin (Latts, UPEM). 9 Due to the lack of access to modern energy, traditional biomass (wood transformed or not transformed into coal) remains the main source of energy in sub-Saharan Africa (80% of consumption). Its use, coupled with the use of candles and kerosene in cities, causes problems such as air pollution in homes, the severity of which is the subject of late awareness (Muindi and Mberu 2017).

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modernizing them to facilitate the integration of intermittent energies. These interventions represent the bulk of the amounts to be invested for the coming decades and are presented as essential for the construction of the continental infrastructure backbone (ICA 2017; Eberhard 2015). This vision of electricity development is capital-intensive and in line with the internal expertise of major financial institutions. It has long been exclusive, but it is now partially in competition with another, based on an approach that values decentralized or off-grid solutions, community ownership and endogenous local development (Berthélemy and Béguerie 2016). Encouraged by the recognition of access to electricity as a major development issue10, this second approach benefits from international initiatives that encourage greater commitment from governments and private industrial actors, and benefits from innovations and “disruptive technologies” that would now have the capacity to “unleash Africa’s energy future” (Africa Progress Panel 2017). 13.2.1. Electric disasters and riots The electricity shortage situation is primarily due to insufficient production and distribution capacities. The installed capacity of sub-Saharan African countries was 90 GW in 2014 and, without South Africa, it fell to 40 GW. The undersizing and obsolescence of distribution networks also aggravate the electricity deficit, with some countries having even experienced grid contractions during the 1990s due to wars or lack of infrastructure maintenance (Eberhard et al. 2011; Eberhard 2015). In 2015, the average rate of access to electricity service in urban areas was 60% and electricity infrastructure served on average 20% of localities. According to international standards, the amount of electricity needed to meet the basic needs of a household of five people (lighting, ventilation, communication: mobile phone, radio and/or television) would be around 250 kWh per year for a rural household and 500 kWh for an urban household (Desarnaud 2016). The available data estimate the average consumption of an African household (excluding South Africa) at 181 kWh per year (ADB 2017) and indicate that, even in cities that appear to be well served by the grid, electricity service is provided only for a few hours a day, on an irregular basis and with varying voltages, increasing dependency on generators. The infrastructural backlog of the continent and electricity poverty must also be seen in the context of rapidly changing societies. Two major forces of change thus 10 The issue of access to electricity has recently been linked to development and poverty alleviation issues. Thus, it was not part of the Millennium Development Goals defined in 2000 and it was not until the RIO+20 conference in 2012 and the Sustainable Development Goals (2015 – 2030) that an ambition for universal access to electricity formulated in Goal 7 (“Access to clean energy at an affordable cost”) was clearly stated at international level.

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have a major impact on electricity demand. First, sustained average population growth (+2.6%/year): even though catching up is in itself a considerable challenge, it is made even more difficult by the prospect of a tripling of the urban population by 203011. Then, the growth of middle classes in the South (Desjeux 2011) is accompanied by an increase in purchasing power and consumer spending, particularly on energy, as well as increased demands on governments. While uneven, this process is noticeable in many African cities, which are regularly affected by electricity shortages caused by persistent – or even increasing – mismatches between supply and demand. These shortages have significant economic and political costs (“power riots”) and the priority of public authorities is to increase and secure electricity supply, particularly in cities. Senegal is an illustration of this: the 2011 electricity crisis, linked to a drop in production itself caused by the catastrophic financial situation of the national company Senelec, resulted, in a context of sustained population growth (+2.7%/year from 2000 to 2016), in a wave of cuts over more than a year. Exasperated, people expressed their anger on the streets and violent protest movements were reported across the country and in the capital city. The government’s short-term policy response focused on maintenance work to improve the rate of capacity utilization. In the current medium term, it combines the construction of new coal-fired power plants, which were the only ones capable, under current conditions, of producing cheap electricity, with the development of solar energy (Taccoen 2017). Nigeria, Africa’s largest oil producer, is also seeking rapid solutions in a context where the domestic terminal at Lagos International Airport was plunged into darkness in February 2016 and University of Lagos students blocked access roads to their main campus in April to protest against “an epileptic (sic) electricity supply” (Taccoen 2016: 4–5). 13.2.2. Huge investment needs To remedy this catastrophic deficit, the traditional approach has been based on massive investments in new centralized production capacities and in the extension of national electricity grids. It aims to modernize electricity systems to meet a high level of consumption and service from the outset and relies on private investors to provide financial and technical capital in the form of public–private partnerships (Eberhard et al. 2016). However, this option has so far faced many obstacles. The main reason for the chronic undersizing of electricity infrastructure is, according to many reports, the financial vulnerability of companies in the sector: 11 The average annual urban growth rate is 3.4% according to United Nations estimates, more than the growth rates of conventional electrification.

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“the main cause of the slow progress in access expansion in SSA is the poor financial viability of electricity utilities” (Trimble et al. 2016: 7). While these companies cannot borrow at affordable rates, most African governments are unable to finance projects, and public development aid has and will only partially fill this gap. Two other sources of financing have certainly emerged in recent years: independent private financing (67 projects in sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa since 1990), which nevertheless remains concentrated in a small number of countries12, and Chinese investments (30 projects between 1990 and 2014 in 16 countries, although with a predominance of large-scale hydropower projects13) (Eberhard 2015). It is interesting to note here that these Chinese investors favor the financing of large energy infrastructure as part of explicit policies to expand centralized systems (OECD/IEA, 2016), in response to the request of many governments. With more than ten new hydropower plants by 2020, the expansion of the low-voltage grid and the construction of interconnection networks with neighboring countries, the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation’s (EEPCo) strategic plan adopted in 2010 is emblematic of these ambitions (Gascon 2015). For the time being, however, despite these powerful network dynamics, access to the necessary financing to improve the national electricity sector remains insufficient in most countries. The amounts of capital required are colossal, difficult to estimate and even more difficult to secure in an unstable political and economic environment. Comparing existing studies, some of which include all the countries on the continent while others cover only those in sub-Saharan Africa, shows the difficulty of correctly estimating needs (Trimble et al. 2016). In the fog of projection figures, the data probably closest to the objectives set are provided by Africa Energy Outlook 2040 for the implementation of the energy component of PIDA (Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa): for the four power pools in sub-Saharan Africa, they estimate that US$ 45.6 billion/year will be needed between 2014 and 2040 to achieve an average electrification rate of 65% (ADB/African Union/NEPAD 2011). While the assessment of the amounts to be invested is complicated, their breakdown by type of project is no less so. The amounts posted most often concern new projects without taking into account the need to renovate or replace the existing infrastructure, although it is partly obsolete: when the service exists, it is very expensive (twice as expensive as in Latin America, three times as expensive as in South-East Asia: Eberhard et al. 2011), often rationed and of poor quality. In theory, energy efficiency policies could be an alternative solution by freeing up capacity to 12 Mainly Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and, more marginally, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana (Eberhard 2015). 13 77% of projects.

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connect unserved households while improving the service of those already electrified. According to the example provided by Desarnaud (2016), a 40 W solar panel can power a 25 W incandescent lamp for 5 h or, with more efficient devices, two LEDs for 5 h as well as a television, a fan, a mobile phone charger and a radio for 3 h. However, the author also points out that the technical conditions for such a development are often not met in African countries where the most efficient electronic products and household appliances are absent from local markets or too expensive for a majority of households. The objective of electrification via conventional electricity systems therefore seems unrealistic in the short to medium term and is no longer considered in the scenarios of the main international energy initiatives. While most experts affirm the need to launch large-scale energy projects quickly, more and more of them are thinking of an electricity development also based on decentralized solutions that are faster to implement and less costly (Africa Progress Panel 2017; ADB 2017; PwC 2017a). As envisaged today, African electricity development could thus combine the consolidation of national systems, based on an energy mix that depends on available resources and financing opportunities, and decentralized electrification solutions using a mix of diesel and renewable energy sources. The former are designed to support economic growth, the latter to promote the development of territories, officially in isolated areas or scattered rural settlements. They embody a gradual electrification scheme in which the first few kilo watt hours, accessible with a minimum level of service, are considered decisive in terms of socioeconomic development. In the documents, there is no reference to a possible redefinition of the electrical model and the conditions for its transformation, but rather the implicit wager of an advantageous combination between these two electrification paths, with a separation of territories and the social functions of electricity. 13.2.3. Renewables and decentralized systems: a third way for subSaharan Africa? The context is favorable to the massive development of renewable energies in Africa. The continent has abundant resources and the potential for installed production capacities is estimated at 10 TW for solar, 350 GW for hydro, 110 GW for wind and 15 GW for geothermal (UNEP 2017). Even if comparisons are difficult and controversial, studies anticipate that renewables will quickly become competitive. For example, a 2011 European Union report calculated that decentralized solutions based on renewable energies (solar and hydro), combined

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with the extension of the existing grid or generators, would make it possible to electrify the entire continent at a cost per kilowatt hour of less than €0.30 (Monforti 2011). In fact, technological advances and the fall in the price of certain equipment, particularly solar equipment (down 80% for photovoltaic modules since 2009) make it possible to deploy competitive decentralized electricity production from renewable energies (IRENA 2016). Off-grid technologies are also fast to deploy: sales of solar-powered pico-solar energy in Africa have increased from 500,000 in 2011 to 11.3 million in 2015 (Africa Progress Panel 2017). They have the advantage of diversifying resources in a flexible, evolving and scalable way: individual system, isolated or interconnected mini-grid and national grid. Modular, solar technologies also allow the combination of several devices to create a system that corresponds to the needs and financing capacities of the consumer–producer: the PV panel can supply both connected and autonomous decentralized systems; in the latter, it can be used alone “over the sun”, coupled with a storage system and/or integrated into a hybrid system that most often includes a generator (Pillot 2014). For many analysts, the African electricity future would therefore be part of a triple transformation movement: low-cost fossil energy production to respond quickly to the impatience of urban consumers, development of renewable energies in centralized installations connected to the grid (geothermal, large-size wind and solar farms, hydroelectricity) and mobilizing advanced technical and economic engineering, accelerated deployment of small capacity decentralized and rural solutions, partly powered by renewable energies, adjustable to the purchasing power of households and the limited capacities of local public and private actors. However, this neat vision says little about the processes and results of “bottom-up” transitions, about the forms of autonomy actually practiced by urban dwellers, and about local energy mixes. 13.3. Electrical hybridizations between pragmatic autonomy and new dependencies There are indeed contrasts between prospective visions and feedback from the field. On the one hand, project deployment is slow and many projects do not go beyond the study stage (Buchsenschutz 2016). On the other hand, the heterogeneity of technologies and energy sources (renewable and fossil), the geographies of their diffusion and the multiplicity of decentralized solutions, including in the presence of the network, show an apparent disorder far from the logic and intentions displayed. What are the reasons for this “dissipation”? An approach in terms of electrical experimentation provides insights into the processes at work.

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Referring “both to the development of temporary projects and their implementation on small scales” (Hamman 2016: 2), the notion of experimentation is inspired here by the work of socioanthropology development (Lavigne Delville 2011; Olivier de Sardan 1995) and suggests analyzing off-grid electrification projects both as systems of action and as territories–laboratories for sociotechnical solutions to be tested. In countries under an “aid regime”, it invites us to examine the forms of intermediation between the project universe and the local space, the intertwining of project reappropriations and reinterpretations, the modes of articulation – or disarticulation – between projects and public policies (Baron and Lavigne Delville 2015). At its peak, the electrical experimentation should make it possible to identify the conditions for achieving three related objectives: testing technological solutions in different environments; identifying promising markets and the conditions for developing commercial solutions for target customers and territories; and advancing electrifying. It therefore aims to promote localized learning processes, on the one hand, and to improve knowledge of the value chain of decentralized electrical solutions that depend on disparate and dispersed resources (equipment suppliers, service managers, mobile phone operators, application developers, etc.), on the other hand. Thought and understood as “outdoor” laboratory tests, electrical experiments are carried out in reception areas but, like any development project, they can experience overspill14 (Jacob and Lavigne Delville 2016) and are exposed to forms of appropriation involving disarticulation, selection and “diversion” (Olivier de Sardan 1995). Their effects, promising or undesirable, can fuel more subversive, informal and undisciplined experimental dynamics, shaping in their own way electrical autonomies that escape projects, for example in urban areas. In this second part, we question these differences by shifting the gaze and looking at the “displaced” effects of the experiments. The aim is to explore the social dynamics by which project design can be subverted to the point that solutions of rural autonomy lead to urban electric hybridizations. 13.3.1. Rural experiments.... In rural areas, individual solutions – from lanterns to SHS kits (solar home systems) – have been very successful. First tested in pilot projects in East Africa, they are at the heart of market building strategies in 11 African countries, the main 14 With reference to Callon’s work on the sociology of translation, Jacob and Lavigne Delville define overspill as a process of questioning the problematization (how to pose and respond to the problem to be addressed) of a development project that tests the strength of the network of associated actors (Jacob and Lavigne Delville 2016).

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ones being Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, followed by Nigeria, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, where they are deployed by many companies, start-ups and giants in the sector (Engie, EDF15, Schneider Electric, Total, Philips, Orange, etc.), particularly as part of the World Bank Group’s Lighting Africa program, which would have equipped around 11 million households (Bloomberg NEF and Lighting Global 2016). The projects are based on relatively similar combinations of ingredients. First, a technical offer (Azuri Technologies’ SHS Indigo Duo, which has been broadcast in Rwanda since 2013 with USAID support, includes, for example, a unit connected to a 2.5 W solar panel, equipped with a phosphate-iron-lithium battery, two light points using LEDs and adapters for charging a telephone). Second, a local marketing network based on “last mile” distributors, strategic for the entire value chain, who must be trained and then supported in their activity. Finally, financing mechanisms, which are diverse and can be based on microcredit, as proposed by the Fondation Energies pour le Monde in Burkina Faso, or on pay-as-you-go (PAYG)16, facilitated by the use of “mobile money” platforms, as in the Light Lwengo offers in Uganda, the Mahazava start-up in Madagascar or the Bright Light project in Benin. The latter, which was tested in 2016, is based on a partnership between a national supplier of solar lamps (ARESS) and a mobile telephone operator (MTN Benin), whose agents distribute the equipment and whose network allows the use of the Easy Buy payment tool17. Behind this first front, informal circuits for the sale and repair of appliances proliferate on local markets and increase the penetration of these devices in response to households’ needs for lighting, telephone charging and even radio and television operation, as shown, for example, by a study in Burkina Faso (Bensch et al. 2016) and observations in Lower Casamance in Senegal (Francius et al. 2017). According 15 At the end of 2016, in partnership with the American company Off-Grid Electric, EDF created ZECI to supply off-grid solar energy in Côte d’Ivoire. In 2018, EDF, Off-Grid Electric and a Ghanaian industrial company launched ZEGHA and an off-grid solar kit offer in Ghana. At the end of 2017, Engie acquired Fenix International, a specialist in domestic solar installations in rural and peri-urban areas in Uganda and Zambia, and announced its intention to reach a market of 20 million people (Le Monde de l’énergie [online], March 5, 2018, http://www.lemondedelenergie.com/edf-afrique/2018/03/05/). 16 A leasing system that allows, after the initial payment of a modest sum for the purchase of a solar kit, use before becoming owner by means of regular payments of a small amount. The system is equipped with a locking mechanism in the event of non-payment. Among the leaders in this market in sub-Saharan Africa: M-KOPA (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda), Azuri (Rwanda), Off-grid Electric (Tanzania, Rwanda), Mobisol (Tanzania), Nova Lumos (Nigeria) (Bloomberg NEF and Lighting Global 2016). 17 See the project sheet on the GSMA website: https://www.gsma.com/mobilefor development/programme/m4dutilities/bright-lights-for-benin-market-introduction-of-pay-as-yougo-solar.

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to a study conducted in seven African countries, these informal networks for the sale of non-branded equipment have a decisive role in the “silent transition of lighting” from the most used fuels (lamp oil and candles) to LED torches powered by dry cells, now sold in almost all shops (Bensch et al. 2015). Although in principle aimed at rural customers, these commercial networks are concentrated in cities, where the supply chains originate (Bloomberg NEF and Lighting Global 2016). In villages and towns, particularly along the main traffic routes, collective solutions – kiosks and autonomous mini-grids – seem a priori more appropriate. The kiosks offer electrical services for charging, printing, Internet access, refrigeration, television/cinema, etc., often coupled with a commodity trade. They currently exist in several African countries18, but their development is hampered by a fragile business model, as studies in Togo (Galichon and Payen 2017) and Madagascar (Tavernier and Rakotoniaina 2016) show. In the latter country, HERi Madagascar, a social enterprise created in 2011, is developing a model of franchised kiosks for female entrepreneurs (44 in January 2016). Each kiosk is powered by six solar panels (total capacity of approximately 1 kW) and equipped with two batteries, a charge regulator and a 450 W inverter to connect devices running on alternating current. If the operation of a kiosk seems to be able to find a financial balance after two years, on the other hand, HERi Madagascar’s initial investment and operation depend, for the moment, on external contributions (idem). Halfway between individual options and connection to the national grid, the mini-grid producing and distributing electricity locally to end users is a possible solution in more densely populated areas: in addition to the domestic needs of households, they aim to meet the operating needs of public facilities and those of small economic activities. In the cotton-growing regions of southern Mali, the NGO GERES promotes an “Electrified Activities Zone” model, in which a hybrid solar/agrofuel plant supplies electricity to a group of very small interconnected companies (hairdresser, baker, welding company, etc.)19, sometimes in addition to a mini-grid serving households (Béguerie and Pallière 2016). The oldest models of mini-grids20, such as in Mauritania (Munnich 2016), operate with diesel generators; the most recent ones use renewable energies, mainly solar, such as in northern Burkina Faso (Fondem 2016), or a solar-diesel hybrid to overcome intermittency problems (now the major choice in Mali). They can be deployed and managed by the national incumbent operators, but the principle of private management by 18 In particular Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar at the initiative of some actors (EnDev, HERi Madagascar, KPLC, Solarkiosk, Schneider, etc.). For a detailed study of the model, see: Hartl 2014. 19 See the GERES website: http://www.geres.eu/fr/nos-actions/par-pays/afrique-de-l-ouest/ geres-mali. 20 On the history of this model, see: GVEP (2011).

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licensed operators or concession holders (companies or cooperatives) is now favored. In Kenya, the national company KPLC’s diesel-powered mini-grids are gradually being replaced by hybrid systems and, since the 2016 legal and regulatory review creating permits (3 MW), entrusted to private distributors (electricity is then purchased in bulk from KPLC) or to independent producers/distributors. In Mali and Senegal, an SSD (Société de services décentralisés21) model has been developed, with an electrification concession for a renewable period of 15–25 years (Heuraux and Houssou 2015). Created in 2001, the SSD Yeelen Kura has thus obtained from the Malian Agency for the Development of Domestic Energy and Rural Electrification (AMADER) an operating permit in 23 municipalities in the cotton zone for a renewable period of 15 years. Access, another Malian SSD, operates 12 mini-grids providing domestic electricity and street lighting, mainly in rural areas, but is also developing an urban project to complete the national grid with solar installations (GSMA 2017). Mini-grids powered by micro hydropower plants also exist in Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia and many observers agree that mini-grids represent “a significant market”. However, their current deployment remains hampered by the lack of a clear regulatory framework, insufficient operating revenues, a general lack of capacity and, above all, a lack of investment in the face of risks perceived as too high (Payen et al. 2016). 13.3.2. ... and urban hybridizations With a few exceptions, none of these three decentralized solutions is officially designed for cities, although their future is partly urban for at least two reasons. First, it must be stressed that the political-administrative organizations of many countries lead by convention to classify as “rural” many villages and towns that are primarily concerned by decentralized electrification projects. Then, in the (larger) cities themselves, population growth and urban sprawl, the sharp increase in electricity demand, particularly from the middle and wealthy classes, the insufficient capacity and stability of existing networks and, more generally, the poor quality of service, also require innovative solutions. Finally, urban dwellers constitute an attractive “market” for the products and technical kits that projects are finding it difficult to sell in rural areas because of poverty even more than because of implementation risks (Allet 2016). This is reflected in the emergence of local markets for non-branded solar products, which institutional actors consider to be unfair and inefficient competition for companies in the sector22 (PwC 2017a) but which are also, for many rural households, “wise investments” (Grimm and Peters 21 A decentralized services company. 22 “The market for cheap, non-branded pico-solar products – unbranded items or copies of branded ones – is at least as big as the brand-quality market in number of units sold” (Bloomberg NEF and Lighting Global 2016: 2).

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2016). Thus, in Burkina Faso: “We find that the adoption rate of a non-branded SHS [Solar Home System] is considerably higher at 36 percent compared to eight percent for a branded SHS. [...] We show that non-branded SHSs provide a similar service level as branded solar, in that they do not fall behind in terms of consumer satisfaction and durability, and that non-branded products are more cost-effective” (Bensch et al. 2016: 3). The presence of solar panels and solar kits in shops and urban markets shows that individual solutions are also penetrating cities, where product ranges seem to be more extensive (from non-branded low-cost low-tech equipment from informal retailers to branded products from approved suppliers) and in more diverse associations (generators, solar equipment, batteries). Accompanying the “lighting transition” (Bensch et al. 2015) and the need to recharge mobile phones in rural areas, the use of decentralized solutions is, in cities, a response to the growth and diversification of demands but also a city parade against network failures (Bloomberg NEF and Lighting Global 2016). There are many strategies for use: saving on electricity bills (solar water heaters, solar panels), securing supplies in addition to inconsistent and poor-quality service (generators, batteries, Nigerian inverters23), self-generation of electricity in the absence of a grid (unconnected solar panels). This calls into question the very idea that decentralized solutions are restricted to the pre-electrification of isolated rural populations, as confirmed by the experience of solar equipment vendors: demand is high for equipment that is on average more powerful and more expensive, from connected urban households that are confronted with intermittent service (Bloomberg NEF and Lighting Global 2016). In these urban contexts, autonomous systems are first and foremost a palliative of the network and a means of rapidly increasing the satisfaction of growing needs. Through urban practices, off-grid systems are thus de facto confronted with coexistence with the grid: “It is not difficult to imagine how solar kits could become an integral part of the daily experience of this population, if local grids fail to meet power demand. Some manufacturers and distributors are already reporting that they target sales in urban areas, even of portable lights. These are most likely used as back-up lights during power outages” (idem: 44). This has two consequences for urban electrical services: a stacking of devices and practices in response to uncertainty and a long-lasting hybridization of electrification configurations (Jaglin 2017). However, these configurations are poorly understood, both by assessments of rural experiments (Galichon and Payen 2017; Payen et al. 2016; Pillot 2014) and by urban studies, focusing on “palliative delivery” modes (Mpiana Tshitenge 2015) and “incremental infrastructures” (Silver 2014). With a few exceptions (Andreasen and 23 Variable power modules composed of one or more batteries and an inverter, generally connected to the grid and possibly to solar panels to stabilize and secure the electricity supply.

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Møller-Jensen 2016; Tenenbaum et al. 2015; Smits 2012), coevolutions of decentralized solutions and the network are poorly articulated, even though the compartmentalized geography of modes of access to electricity does not stand up to empirical examination. 13.3.3. Off-grid under constraints The democratization of off-grid systems and infrastructure consolidation must therefore be considered together, since the future of electrical autonomy is not so much outside the grid as in interaction with it. This leads to new configurations that rebuild inertia and dependencies. In the majority of African countries, the dynamics of technological innovation and use are now focused on solar kits, solar panels and batteries. Components are most often imported, software is developed by NGOs or start-ups with external support and project structures are financed by international aid. Major research and development efforts remain necessary to take it to the next level: electrical engineering to make mini-grids and individual devices more reliable, but also business models for supply must be invented in countries where technical, socioeconomic and political factors are unstable, especially at local levels. Capital and expertise will hopefully come, but the urgency must be met: African urban dwellers are now seeking a more systematic use of electricity for uses that correspond to their vision of modern urban life. They are therefore turning to a proven solution: the power generator, whose market is growing rapidly. Rightly criticized for their pollution (air and noise pollution) and operating costs (depending on a diesel fuel that is often imported), they also have unequalled advantages: of all sizes and variable power, they can be purchased in stores or created from old engines using DIY, and they are flexible and can respond to occasional interruptions as well as compensate for a structurally insufficient supply. In many cities, they are an essential auxiliary to electricity supply: the growth of their market in Africa is estimated at more than 10%/year (Douet and Coulibaly 2015) and their number is estimated at 60 million in Nigeria (Taccoen 2016). However, the overall situation is not well known. On the one hand, there are signs of market maturation with improved equipment (quieter and more fuel-efficient units, even “clean” units with gas recovery, or associated with solar panels in hybrid solutions) and, on the other hand, uncertainty factors related in particular to diesel supply conditions and equipment maintenance problems24. The 24 The cost of which depends in particular on national subsidy policies for petroleum products, which are now disputed, while the transport of fuel remains problematic due to the lack of road infrastructure.

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ability of national policies to offer credible solutions to electricity demand, whether grid or off-grid, remains the main variable in this market and, according to Aggreko, the world leader in temporary power solutions managing more than 2,000 MW in 34 countries across the continent, “contained power generators” of all sizes have a bright future ahead. A variety of factors, beyond the lack of capital, also determine the success – or failure – of decentralized solutions and receive too little attention. First, the organization of a facilitating environment requires appropriate national measures. This observation is widely shared, but concrete measures have barely been drafted in many countries, where government voluntarism is insufficient to adapt policy, regulatory and tariff frameworks (Africa Progress Panel 2017). Political intervention is also necessary to organize markets. Structural reforms have been undertaken to partially deregulate the vertical monopoly of national utilities in some countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya). But technical (Tenenbaum et al. 2016) and commercial (Beaurain and Amoussou 2016) sectoral regulation is lagging behind while the emergence of new markets attracts greed: “Many importers, installers and retailers have started in the field but, due to the lack of rules and controls, counterfeit equipment is available alongside very good equipment and unscrupulous players are more numerous than very well-trained installers. For local populations, who are generally illiterate and poorly informed, the purchase of equipment is like a game of chance”25. For Beaurain and Amoussou (2016), the development of the sector must be supervised to protect young companies and businesses issuing certified equipment from the “unfair” practices of informal competitors (smuggling products, unauthorized equipment, etc.). It must also be done to build household confidence by marketing cheap and sufficiently efficient equipment that is adapted to climatic and environmental conditions (heat, dust, humidity), and that is robust and repairable by local craftsmen. However, the role of labeled branded materials in this process is a matter of debate (Bensch et al. 2016; Grimm and Peters 2016). Second, the technical and economic difficulties should not be underestimated. Studying the potential of solar energy in Djibouti, Pillot points out that the most widely used and best-known systems in the world today are decentralized grid-connected systems in the context of universal electrification; however, these configurations offer little appropriate feedback for autonomous photovoltaic devices in sub-Saharan Africa (Pillot 2014). The fact that individual autonomous systems are already widely used is only part of the answer to the problem because their effectiveness is quite relative, according to the author, who suggests that 25 Le Monde de l’énergie [online], September 5, 2017, http://www.lemondedelenergie. com/afrique-paiement-usage-solaire-individuel/2017/09/05/.

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experimentation efforts should focus on storage solutions coupled with intermittent sources under real conditions of autonomous systems operation. It is also often argued that the spread of decentralized power solutions in sub-Saharan Africa benefits from leveraging effects of the mobile ecosystem, as claimed by the GSMA26: mobile operators need electricity for their often isolated towers and can in turn provide a reliable source of revenue while helping to collect electricity bills through mobile applications. More generally, electronics and mobile services are transforming business management (smart meters, prepaid, mobile money) and have the potential to significantly expand the customer base by adapting electrical services to people without bank accounts at the “bottom of the market”. In Mali, where 26% of the population have access to electricity but 90% are thought to be covered by mobile networks, a study suggests that the use of mobile money and GSM M2M technology27 would increase the profitability and quality of mini-grids and solar home installations managed by SSDs in southern regions (GSMA 2017). However, these promising solutions have yet to be tested and evaluated. Failing this, the lack of technical adaptation to local configurations results in the early failure of many decentralized solutions28 and only partial control of the conditions for successful different models (Galichon and Payen 2017; Payen et al. 2016). It also manifests itself in discrepancies between the supply and the consumption needs both of households (misuse of kits with too many devices connected to them has been noted in some projects29) and of craftsmen (whose machines require more power and reliability). GERES “Electrified Activities Zone” is thus a response to the limitations observed in the mini-grids operated by the SSD Yeelen Kura, whose service offer, from 4 pm to midnight, severely limits the activities of small businesses during the day, even though this latent demand represents an untapped commercial potential for the SSD30. More systematic feedback is also needed to compare solutions. For example, the hire-purchase model dominates in East Africa while West African SSDs favor the sale of electricity services, arguing that this is more likely to ensure sufficient use in the long term (GSMA 2017). A rigorous comparison of the respective effects of these systems on household inclusion and the

26 International association of operators, manufacturers and industrialists in the mobile telephony sector. See the website of the “Mobile for Development Utilities” program. www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/m4dutilities. 27 Machine-to-machine: communication between devices. 28 According to AMADER, Mali has 200 mini-grids, only half of which were in working order in 2017 (GSMA 2017). 29 J. Daniélou (ENGIE Lab), personal communication, February 2017. 30 See the project sheet on the GERES website: http://www.geres.eu/images/fiches/ficheprojet-mali-pep-fr-v2.pdf.

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sustainability of their access to electricity should be carried out to inform electrification choices and assess the challenges of variable geometry autonomy. Finally, a third set of factors, of a political–institutional nature, deserves attention. In this area, obstacles do not only come from “above”, from the lack of governments’ political will or the resistance of national electricity companies. The deployment of decentralized solutions also comes up against obstacles “from below” due to the weakness of local initiatives, public actors’ lack of capacity, and resistance from interest groups (for example, those, importing generators and fuel in Nigeria). Like elsewhere (Nadaï et al. 2015; Christen and Hamman 2015), the mobilization of territorial resources is decisive in the genesis and success of local energy transition projects in Africa (Beaurain and Amoussou 2016). However, the transactional nature (Hamman 2016) of empowerment processes and the representations inspired by off-grid solutions are rarely questioned. On the one hand, electrification projects assume that renewable energies and decentralized solutions, by making it possible, fulfill a desire for electrical autonomy while many households dream of a connection to the grid. Although local renewable energy sources are raising, along with hopes for rapid electrification, a “new” question of autonomy, little is known about how this influences the geographically and socially situated representations of grid and off-grid systems. On the other hand, electrification projects tend to “freeze” the demand of local communities whose social, political and economic dynamisms cannot be reduced to a stable and objectifiable whole. Despite appearances, electrical autonomy devices do not arrive on greenfield land and are part of existing offers and practices, particularly in urban areas. Whether total or partial, substitution involves a change or even a displacement of social norms; it disrupts power relations and can generate tensions and resistance. A project does not easily and immediately fit into its host environment and society, usually based on different interests, capacities, visions, temporalities (Jacob and Lavigne Delville 2016). In other words, the territorialization of electrical autonomy resists the standardization of electrical experiments: “Mini-grids require a mode of governance, for what is a local public good, that is appropriate to the context and enables collective maintenance management and conflict resolution in the event of disputes about how this common resource is to be shared” (Berthélémy and Béguerie 2016: 8). Where collectives are poorly structured, too conflictual or too heterogeneous, an autonomous mini-grid is unlikely to function on a sustainable basis; where the initial conditions seem more favorable, the sustainability of a mini-grid often depends on how it has been designed, sized and organized to facilitate learning and enhance its profitability (Payen et al. 2016). Everywhere, the rise of decentralized electrification solutions depends on the modes of appropriation and their effects on emerging sociabilities, for example around new electrical services (shared refrigerator spaces, collective television-video, telephone charging in stores, etc.).

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13.4. Conclusion Despite the territorial compartmentalization of electrification policies distinguishing reticulated cities from off-grid countryside, hybridization processes are under way. All you have to do is walk around African cities to see that social practices, straddling urban and rural worlds, contribute to the technical and geographical spillover effects of electrical experiments and contribute to the introduction of decentralized solutions into the grid’s territories. In this context, the autonomy promoted by electrical experiments seems both fragile in its foundations and poorly understood in its implications. First, since cities are absent from projects both as spaces and as actors, reflection on future transformations deprives itself of particularly dynamic observatories and promising laboratories. It also deprives itself of a political barometer, as the failures of the major electricity networks feed social impatience in real urban cauldrons (Jaglin and Verdeil 2017). Second, this reflection is ill-equipped to anticipate the way in which decentralized electrical solutions contribute to a profound remodeling of the nature of the service offered, far from the monopolistic public electricity systems that have dominated until now but also very different from the autonomy thought for the rural world. On the contrary, it seems crucial to compare the expectations of electrical experiments with their real results and to deepen, through field research, the understanding of their effects on the transformation of electrical systems and the redefinition of the respective roles of grid and off-grid. Finally, considering stand-alone solutions in an exclusive pre-electrification scheme rather than in co-supply configurations with the grid reduces the power to re-imagine what the electric city of tomorrow could be. In Africa 3.0 l’autre Eldorado technologique, PwC unveils its vision of a radical transformation of the African continent through solar and digital electricity (PwC 2017b). What autonomy can this revolution lead to? That of isolated territories with stagnant trajectories or that of societies with increased “capacities”, combining the resources of chosen electrical autonomy, ever-increasing connectivity and controlled dependency on the grid(s)? Where, if not in cities, is this second scenario the most likely? In other contexts, Daniélou and Ménard formulate the hypothesis that “giving a district temporary energy autonomy through a high density of solar panels, as is the case in some projects, becomes a condition for the survival of the electricity distribution network” (Daniélou and Ménard 2014: 4). The idea is not without relevance for subSaharan Africa. Flexible, less costly and risky than national electrification policies based on large networked infrastructures, autonomous electrification systems provide (elements of) answers to the necessary economic and human development of a continent where population growth poses considerable challenges to spatial

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planning. They also propose (elements of) responses to the need to redesign modes of action in the context of financial scarcity and the gap between a predefined, designed and planned “top-down” offer and heterogeneous urban demands. Paradoxically, rural electricity experiments are thus inspiring new solutions for cities, where networks are undercapacity, but by democratizing autonomous devices, they also promote a crypto-hybridization of centralized electricity systems. Recognizing these crypto-hybridizations as part of sustainable solutions, by rethinking the relationships between networks and autonomy in urbanized spaces, would open up new possibilities. 13.5. References ADB, AfDB Group’s Strategy for the New Deal on Energy for Africa 2016–2025, African Development Bank, Abidjan, 2017. AFRICA PROGRESS PANEL, Lumière Puissance Action – Electrifier l’Afrique – Résumé du rapport, 2017. ALLET M., “Solar Loans through a partnership approach: Lessons from Africa”, Field Actions Science Reports, Second semester, pp. 128–137, 2016. ANDREASEN M.H., MØLLER-JENSEN L., “Beyond the networks: Self-help services and post-settlement network extensions in the periphery of Dar es Salaam”, Habitat International, vol. 53, pp. 39–47, 2016. ADB/AFRICAN UNION/NEPAD, Africa Energy Outlook 2040. Study on Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa, Sofreco led Consortium for AfDB, Abidjan, 2011. BARON C., LAVIGNE DELVILLE P., “Introduction”, in E. VALETTE, C. BARON, F. ENTEN et al. (eds), Une action publique éclatée ?, GRET/LEREPS, Nogent sur Marne, 2015. BEAURAIN C., AMOUSSOU M.B., “Les enjeux du développement de l’énergie solaire au Bénin. Quelques pistes de réflexion pour une approche territoriale”, Mondes en développement, vol. 176, pp. 59–76, 2016. BÉGUERIE V., PALLIÈRE B., “Can rural electrification stimulate the local economy? Constraints and prospects in South-East Mali”, Field Actions Science Reports, Second semester, pp. 20–25, 2016. BENSCH G., PETERS J., SIEVERT M., “The lighting transition in Africa – From kerosene to LED and the emerging dry-cell battery problem”, Ruhr Economic Papers, no. 579, Essen, 2015. BENSCH G., GRIMM M., HUPPERTZ M., LANGBEIN J., PETERS J., “Are promotion programs needed to establish off-grid solar energy markets? Evidence from Rural Burkina Faso”, Ruhr Economic Papers, no. 653, Essen, 2016.

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BERTHELEMY J-C., BEGUERIE V., “Introduction. Decentralized electrification and development: Initial assessment of recent projects”, Field Actions Science Reports, Second semester, pp. 4–9, 2016. BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, LIGHTING GLOBAL, Off-grid solar market trends report 2016, International Finance Corporation, Washington, DC, 2016. BRIDGE G., BOUZAROVSKI S., BRADSHAW M., EYRE N., “Geographies of energy transition: Space, place and the low-carbon economy”, Energy Policy, vol. 53, pp. 331–340, 2013. BUCHSENSCHUTZ M., Développement du solaire et de l’éolien en Afrique subsaharienne : Comment faire sauter les verrous ?, Secteur Privé & Développement, Blog, facilitated by Proparco, 2016. CHOPLIN A., PLIEZ O., “The inconspicuous spaces of globalization”, Articulo – Journal of Urban Research [Online], vol. 12, 2015. Available at: http://journals.openedition.org/ articulo/2905. CHRISTEN G., HAMMAN PH., Transition énergétique et inégalités environnementales: Énergies renouvelables et implications citoyennes en Alsace, Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, Strasbourg, 2015. DANIÉLOU J., MÉNARD F., “L’empire du réseau”, Métropolitiques [Online], November 3, 2014. Available at: http://www.metropolitiques.eu/L-empire-du-reseau.html. DESARNAUD G., Électrifier durablement l’Afrique et l’Asie, IFRI, Paris, 2016. DESJEUX D., Le chassé croisé des classes moyennes mondiales ou la consommation comme analyseur de la nouvelle donne internationale, 2011. Available at: http://www.argonautes. fr/2011-04-ddesjeux-classe-moyenne-mondiale-le-chasse-croise/. DOUET M., COULIBALY N., “Énergie : En Afrique, les groupes électrogènes carburent à la crise”, Jeune Afrique, August 5, 2015. EBERHARD A., “Garantir l’accès à l’électricité en Afrique : Les défis à relever en matière de financement et de réformes”, Revue d’économie du développement, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 43–53, 2015. EBERHARD A., ROSNES O., SHKARATAN M., VENNEMO H., Africa’s Power Infrastructure. Investment, Integration, Efficiency, The World Bank, Washington, DC, 2011. EBERHARD A., GRATWICK K., MORELLA E., ANTMANN P., Independent Power Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. Lessons from Five Key Countries, The World Bank, Washington, DC, 2016. FONDEM, 10 centrales solaires pour 40 000 ruraux dans la région nord du Burkina Faso, Paris, 2016. FRANCIUS R., TROMPETTE P., CHOLEZ C., “Lampes solaires, kit, batteries… Les nouveaux marchés de l’électrification rurale en Afrique”, L'archicube, vol. 22, pp. 65–72, 2017. GALICHON I., PAYEN L., Energy Access in Rural Togo: The Relevance of the Energy Kiosk Solution, ENEA, Paris, 2017.

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GASCON A., “L’Éthiopie des ‘15 Glorieuses’, moteur de l’Afrique orientale. Entre recherche de leadership et fragilités”, Afrique contemporaine, vol. 1, no. 253, pp. 37–51, 2015. GRIMM M., PETERS J., “Solar off-grid markets in Africa. Recent dynamics and the role of branded products”, Field Actions Science Reports, Second semester, pp. 160–163, 2016. GSMA, Le potentiel de la téléphonie mobile pour l’accès à l’énergie en milieu rural au Mali, London, 2017. GVEP, The history of mini-grid development in developing countries, Policy Briefing, September 2011. HAMMAN P., “Durabilité et lien social : Transitions et transactions dans l’expérimentation”, Sociologies [Online], June 16, 2016. Available at: http://sociologies.revues.org/5384. HARTL J.M., The energy kiosk model for electrification. Status quo and future strategies, Thesis, Technico Lisboa, 2014. HEURAUX C., HOUSSOU J-C., Les Sociétés de Service Décentralisés : Des partenariats novateurs pour électrifier les campagnes africaines, Secteur privé & Développement, Blog facilitated by Proparco, January 19, 2015. https://blog.secteur-prive-developpement. fr/2015/01/19/les-societes-de-service-decentralises-des-partenariats-novateurs/. ICA–LE CONSORTIUM POUR LES INFRASTRUCTURES EN AFRIQUE, Tendances du financement des infrastructures en Afrique – 2016, ADB, Abidjan, 2017. IRENA, Solar PV in Africa: Costs and Markets, IRENA, 2016. Available at: http://www.irena.org//media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2016/IRENA_Solar_ PV_Costs_Africa_2016.pdf. JACOB J-P., LAVIGNE DELVILLE P., Comprendre la trajectoire des interventions de développement Research report, AFD-IRD-IHEID-APAD, Paris, 2016. JAGLIN S., “Politiques d’infrastructures en Afrique subsaharienne : Le réseau est-il soluble dans la transition urbaine?”, in K. CHATZIS, G. JEANNOT, V. NOVEMBER, P. UGHETTO (eds), Du béton au numérique, le nouveau monde des infrastructures, Éditions PIE Peter Lang SA, Brussels, 2017. JAGLIN S., DUBRESSON A., Eskom. Electricity and Technopolitics in South Africa, UCT Press, Cape Town, 2016. JAGLIN S., VERDEIL E., “Emerging countries, cities and energy: Questioning transitions”, in S. BOUZAROVSKI, M. PASQUALETTI, V. CASTAN BROTO (eds), The Routledge Research Companion to Energy Geographies, Routledge, London and New York, 2017. LAVIGNE DELVILLE P., Vers une socio-anthropologie des interventions de développement comme action publique, HDR, Université Lyon II, 2011. MONFORTI F. (ed.), Renewable Energies in Africa: Current Knowledge, European Union, Luxembourg, 2011.

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MPIANA TSHITENGE J.-P., “Privatisation par le bas du réseau électrique de la SNEL dans la périphérie de la ville de Kinshasa”, in J. BOGAERT, J-M. HALLEUX (eds), Territoires périurbains : Développement, enjeux et perspectives dans les pays du Sud, Les Presses agronomiques de Gembloux, Gembloux, 2015. MUINDI K., MBERU B., “Invisible and ignored: Air pollution inside the homes of Nairobi’s residents”, The Conversation, August 16, 2017. Available at: https://theconversation. com/invisible-and-ignored-air-pollution-inside-the-homes-of-nairobis-residents-81109. MUNNICH D., “CDS: A case of autonomous water and energy networks”, Field Actions Science Reports, Second semester, pp. 12–19, 2016. NADAÏ A., LABUSSIÈRE O., DEBOURDEAU A., RÉGNIER Y., COINTE B., DOBIGNY L., “French policy localism: Surfing on ‘positive energie territories’ (Tepos)”, Energy Policy, vol. 78, pp. 281–29, 2014. OECD/IEA, Boosting power sector in sub-saharan africa. china’s involvement, Paris, 2016. OLIVIER DE SARDAN J.-P., Anthropologie et développement. Essai en socio-anthropologie du changement social, APAD-Karthala, Paris, 1995. PAYEN L., BORDELEAU M., YOUNG T., Developing Mini-Grids in Zambia: How to Build Sustainable and Scalable Business Models?, ENEA/Practical Action, Paris, 2016. PILLOT B., Planification de l’électrification rurale décentralisée en Afrique subsaharienne à l'aide de sources renouvelables d’énergie : Le cas de l'énergie photovoltaïque en République de Djibouti, PhD thesis, Université de Corse Pascal Paoli, Corte, 2014. PWC, Solutions off-grid : quelles perspectives en Afrique ?, PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisory, 2017a. PWC, Afrique 3.0 l’autre eldorado technologique, Décryptages #2, 2017b. SILVER J., “Incremental infrastructures: Material improvisation and social collaboration across post-colonial Accra”, Urban Geography, vol. 35, no. 6, pp. 788–804, 2014. SMITS M., “The benefits and complexities of distributed generation: Two energy trajectories in Laos and Thailand”, Forum for Development Studies, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 185–208, 2012. TACCOEN L. (ed.), Lettre Géopolitique de l’Electricité, no. 62, April 2016. TACCOEN L. (ed.), Lettre Géopolitique de l’Electricité, no. 74, April 2017. TAVERNIER L., RAKOTONIAINA S., “HERi Madagascar: Upscaling the energy kiosk concept”, Field Actions Science Reports, Second semester, pp. 68–79, 2016. TENENBAUM B., GREACEN C., SIYAMBALAPITIYA T., KNUCKLES J., Quand la lumière vient d’en bas. Comment les petits producteurs d’électricité et les mini-réseaux peuvent promouvoir l’électrification rurale et les énergies renouvelables en Afrique, World Bank, Washington, 2015.

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TRIMBLE C., KOJIMA M., PEREZ ARROYO I., MOHAMMADZADEH M., Financial Viability of Electricity Sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa. Quasi-Fiscal Deficits and Hidden Costs, Policy research paper no. 7788, World Bank Group/Energy and extractives Global Practice Group Washington, DC, 2016. UNEP, Atlas of Africa Energy Resources, United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, 2017.

14 Energy Self-sufficiency: an Ambition or a Condition for Urban Resilience?

14.1. Introduction The concept of resilience enables us to have a positive outlook on hazards, which is no longer simply a question of the ways in which we cope with them. Urban resilience takes hazards as an opportunity to positively transform urban systems. In recent years, urban resilience has become a major issue for cities, while the evolution of hazards under the effect of climate change is posing new challenges for risk adaptation and mitigation. Climatic disasters are changing and can be more frequent and more intense than in the past. In the health field, resilience is often approached through the concepts of dependence (on addictions) and self-sufficiency (when aging); in urban research, this approach has been hardly developed. Resilience, taken as the transformation of limitations into advantages, is an approach used by cities to portray a positive image of themselves and improve said image. New York City has thus widely publicized its “exceptional” resilience following hurricane Sandy, which hit in 2012. However, New York was strongly affected by the hurricane as revealed by the feedback below (French High Committee for Civil Defense 2013). Hurricane Sandy exposed the local urban subsystems’ many forms of energy dependence as a result of the main energy networks’ failure and the fragility of technical relief equipment often located in areas susceptible to flooding, thus causing multiple system failures. Energy selfsufficiency (whether permanent or temporary during the crisis) seems to be one of territories’ main resilience elements during a crisis and post-crisis.

Chapter written by Bruno BARROCA.

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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The construction of the two American Copper Buildings on the banks of the East River in New York, designed after Hurricane Sandy, has been completed. There are 764 apartments in the structures, which are morphologically adapted to flooding and the first floor can be flooded while functionally ensuring energy self-sufficiency for two outlets in each of the apartments and for heating and ventilation equipment installed more than 7 m above street level. This chapter examines the resilience–self-sufficiency duo with the aim of overcoming the apparent simplicity of the relationship between these two terms that tends to make self-sufficiency the horizon of territorial resilience. Section 14.2 will deal with resilience independently of urban technical systems’ self-sufficiency in connection with energy. In this first part, a definition adapted to urban planning is suggested; a definition that includes the semantic diversity of the resilience concept resulting from multiple disciplines. Section 14.3 makes it possible to identify the relationship between resilience as defined herein and technical systems. Once this framework has been established, the chapter continues by addressing energy self-sufficiency through the functional resilience of territories and equipment using two different approaches: on the one hand, the reliability of critical infrastructures (section 14.4) and, on the other hand, exploratory elements of territorial organization in “meta-systems” connecting the spaces affected and “smart shelters” (section 14.5). 14.2. A matter of definitions The concept of resilience is relatively old and derives from different disciplines. Except for the case of a few particular articles, its use in hazard risk geography, development and urban planning increased during the mid-2000s (Barroca et al. 2013; Serre and Barroca 2013). Besides its frequency of use and it being described as a buzzword (Comfort et al. 2010), the polysemy of the term has caused many debates. Despite this polysemy which could have hindered its use, the concept of resilience has in a few years become the main concept of urban risk management, initially in English-speaking countries (Vale and Campanella 2005) before spreading all over. Within the scientific community, resilience is considered according to three main approaches: the study of the concept from its creation, the elements that define it and the way in which it is received, interpreted and implemented (Reghezza et al. 2012; Reghezza-Zitt and Rufat 2015); the development of tools and methods; and the study of resilient constructions at the building or district level (Raven et al. 2018; Serre et al. 2018). The first two are usually oriented toward spatial analysis and the reliability of critical infrastructures (Serre et al. 2013; Gonzva et al. 2017). In the

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third appproach, protecction issues annd resilient urrban forms plaay an importaant role in the analyysis. Thuss, depending on o the subjecct, the definitiions of resilieence can refeer to very differentt aspects. Thhis contributees to the diffficulty of itts implementtation. In geographhy, stressing society’s s ability to bounce back b from a disruptive d evennt as well as postdiisaster reconsttruction is com mmon (Jébrak k 2010). In development, the concept of resiliencee is used in a very broaad sense, mes not directtly related to hazards and is thus regularly used to describe sometim differentt types of citiees: sustainablee, inclusive, frrugal, etc. Acccording to UN N-Habitat, the resillience of urbaan systems iss a matrix (F Figure 14.1) dealing with different “types” of resilience: spatial, funnctional, orgaanizational, sttructural, etc., coming across diifferent types of risks.

Figure 14.1. Urban systems model app proach (HABIT TAT III 2015)

The 100 1 Resilient Cities Program m is a perfectt example, offe fering a netwoork for the sharing of o expertise inn risk manageement and clim mate change adaptation a praactices for 100 citiies around thhe world. Thhrough this program, p a broadened b cooncept of resilience is applied to a City Resilience Fram mework deveeloped by Arrup. Four Resilience differentt dimensions of urban reesilience are included in this City R Framewoork: health annd well-being,, the economy y and society,, infrastructurre and the environm ment, leadershhip and strattegy. Urban resilience, ass defined by the 100 Resilientt Cities Prograam, provides a wide scope to t the conceptt while it also validates the fact that t a resilientt territory affeected by an ev vent does not necessarily n retturn to its initial sttate. Resiliencce considers the t possibility y of a new, more m efficientt balance. This balaance will simuultaneously ennsure the efficciency of systtem functions,, and will develop greater resistaance to cope with w deeper in nsights (Maire 2018):

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– urban resilience does not only focus on possible shocks or major crises, but also on chronic crises and stress that are equally affected in the medium and long terms; – urban resilience concerns the capacity of a territory as a whole, including its institutions, stakeholders, infrastructures, systems, flows, etc., to anticipate, prevent, continue functioning and developing independently of, those shocks or chronic crises it may be exposed to. This global approach is based on territories through the implementation of a strategy (City of Paris 2017), which is integrated and guides the action of existing structures. Beyond the complex nature of a systemic approach inherent to the resilience concept, the latter is often associated with the concept of adaptation (in particular adaptation to climate change), but also regularly linked to that of self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency, whose synonym, autonomy, originates from Greek and simultaneously refers to what comes from oneself, “autos”, and what is relative to rules and laws, “nomos”, can broadly be associated with the capacity of a system or individual to support and govern itself. In the remainder of this chapter, we will consider self-sufficiency mainly in relation to the technical, functional and organizational capacities of urban systems during catastrophic events. The concepts of resilience and self-sufficiency methodologically echo the systemic approach of urban areas and introduce other concepts related to the complexity of interactions, feedback, dependence, self-organization, (Dauphiné and Provitolo 2003), or to external effects. In the literature, urban resilience to climatic hazards and self-sufficiency are generally considered according to: – the autonomy time available to an urban system to function normally. In that case, we are talking about functional self-sufficiency. The autonomy time of an urban system can be evaluated according to the internal production capacities said system has in connection with its consumption and reserves. This time can be related to a measure of resilience (Bristow and Kennedy 2013); – the self-organization capacities forcing people to know how to react. The ability to mobilize local resources is often essential when considering the selforganization of a population. Self-sufficiency through the mobilization of local resources is, however, only conceivable through the self-sufficiency of social groups, even if the idea of allowing populations to self-organize could be interpreted as a disempowerment of public authorities (Daluzeau et al. 2013). In the discourse of those in charge, recent disaster experiences are often staged in retrospect, highlighting the emergence of self-sufficiency arising from natural and spontaneous

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solidarity. The concept of resilience has a dynamic approach; the territory, individuals, institutions, development, etc., are not passive in the face of risk. Resilience encourages action and questions the evolution of systems with respect to (re)configuration dynamics (Thomas and Da Cunha 2017) and the forces that drive them in a situation of unusual stress. Resilience can be defined as: the ability to temporarily or sustainably improve systems’ operation as a result of an expected or unexpected disastrous event while adjusting their operation during said event. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the second part of this definition, i.e. self-sufficiency during the disastrous event. Mechanisms for temporary or long-term system improvement are often highly contextual and very rarely analyzed with the exception of a few examples of post-disaster waste management. 14.3. Technical systems and resilience Urban technical systems are characterized as the skeleton (Ventura et al. 2010; Lhomme et al. 2011) or as the nervous system (Yusta et al. 2011; Serre 2015) of modern societies. In other words, urban operation is highly dependent on technical systems. These systems are described as critical infrastructure and defined in a European Union directive published on December 8, 2008 in the EU Official Journal: a critical infrastructure means an asset, system or part thereof, [...], which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security and the economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact [...] as a result of the failure of those functions. Hence any infrastructure can become critical at a given moment depending on the missions assigned to it and the risks that may arise. Technical systems are sensitive and subject to disruptions, especially when facing natural hazards: floods, earthquakes, etc. Studies of urban technical systems in environments with a priori “unfavorable” characteristics generally focus on analyzing the system and the territory’s vulnerability. For the latter, the territorial sensitivity index (TSI) is a simple method to observe the distribution and concentration of a territory’s infrastructures (in the broad sense: urban technical systems but also hospitals, schools, etc.) that are likely to be directly affected by a potential flood and that play a very important role in the communities (Thomas et al. 2012). More specifically, technical systems have specific vulnerabilities. Urban technical systems, due to their geographical extension and their close proximity to potentially dangerous infrastructures (industry, storage facilities, etc.), can present themselves as hazard reducers and/or causes of malfunctioning during a crisis. The disruption of a given technical system by a hazard can have a domino effect on the functioning of other systems and,

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consequently, on the whole urban functioning (Robert and Morabito 2009). Technical systems may be “exporters” of the crisis given the increasing interdependency, and its geographical extension can spread failures to other networks or areas not directly affected by the hazard. The interdependency of critical systems is therefore largely associated with the vulnerability of urban territories. The propagation of failures and risks by technical systems raises questions about the effectiveness of the prevention measures in place. In addition, territorial adaptation, resistance, substitution and solidarity mechanisms show the relevance of effective self-management strategies. This is partly due to the technical systems that can find alternate ways of providing services from reconfiguration through interactions. Currently, local initiatives promoting resilience through the study of system reconfiguration, and thus integrating the territory’s selfsufficiency when confronting hazardous situations, remain rare. Existing local methods focus instead on characterizing the vulnerabilities of technical systems but do not provide any ways, or provide just a few, to reduce the existing urban fragility, ensuring some form of self-sufficiency of technical systems. Ensuring territorial self-sufficiency through technical systems is a challenge that goes far beyond the mere implementation of technical equipment because a resilient technical system, such as an energy system, should be able to continue functioning and guarantee the fulfillment of its purpose even when faced with unexpected events that change its environment. In an imperfectly known and non-cooperative or even hostile context, the missions attributed to urban technical systems cannot be precisely defined, and the system (including the system stakeholders) must be provided with the means to interpret them, to analyze the environment, to decide on appropriate measures and react to asynchronous events. In the face of risks, resilient technical systems seem to have to reconcile decisions and reactions. The capacity to be self-sufficient through the partial “disconnection” of these various technical systems (drinking water, waste water, energy, telecom and transport networks, among others) appears as a form of resilience. This disconnection does not consist of wiping out historic infrastructures and networks but rather of considering decentralized, dispersed, alternative or “small-scale” technologies (Coutard and Rutherford 2009; Coutard and Rutherford 2015). Functional synergy (Gey 2012) is therefore appropriate since it involves, for example, the design of programs capable of locally producing, storing and using energy. This design habit, often performed at the building scale, has for several years now been successfully implemented at the “district” scale. The district scale, which is still considered to be local, enables functional synergies and integrates other pieces that contribute to urban resilience (Balsells 2015). To expand Gey’s proposal (2012) on the operation of decentralized technical systems, we can say that the district is no longer opposed to its external environment but on the contrary uses

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what could previously have damaged it: wind, the sun, rain. This questions the transformations occurring within the urban territory, as well as the identification of incoming and outgoing flows in small territories (plots of land, districts, etc.), with the idea that they can, in turn, be used as resources. Resilience is, therefore, closer to urban metabolism (Barles 2015; Delaitre et al. 2016). Research has shown that not all resilience is good (Djament-Tran et al. 2012) and that the appearance of a post-network urbanism as previously described composed of sociotechnical (referred to as mixed) systems (Coutard and Rutherford 2009) or improved systems (Gey 2012) entails the risk of reintroducing inequalities. In 2015, Olivier Coutard and Jonathan Rutherford described the dangers of offering differentiated access to resources with the possibility of differences in tariffs between territories for an identical service (Coutard and Rutherford 2015). Thus, the energy self-sufficiency of a district through the mobilization of local resources can be considered as an element of its resilience improvement in the case of flooding risk, which is likely to disturb the large energy supply networks. However, that same energy selfsufficiency can increase social vulnerability by deconstructing the existing social cohesion and fragmenting solidarity and urban equality of access to resources. Finally, so as not to displace the risk, new regulations must appear that include all the social, technical and environmental aspects. In the remainder of this chapter, urban technical systems are considered according to the two approaches to resilience: “functional” and “spatial”. 14.4. Self-sufficiency and functional resilience Territorial self-sufficiency depends on the capacity, or lack thereof, of these territories to locally mobilize resources according to needs. Hence, if technical systems can carry out their tasks and at the same time meet the consumption demand, they will guarantee territorial self-sufficiency. The territories affected, despite being dependent on those technical systems, are self-sufficient because they do not require any specific assistance. Self-sufficiency depends on the ability to ensure the service’s reliability. Guaranteeing the provision of services from the most important infrastructures is a form of the so-called functional resilience that corresponds to “the ability [of the system to satisfactorily adjust] its functioning during a disastrous event” (see definition above). 14.4.1. Functional resilience and system modeling This approach directly refers to engineering resilience, which is the subject of many works (Nemeth et al. 2016) and is implicitly linked to keeping a minimum level of operation. Studying the engineering resilience of a system most often leads

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to the analysis of the difference between the disturbed state and the state of equilibrium as well as the system’s ability to return to the state of equilibrium when it moves away from it. A resilient technical system, such as an energy system, should therefore have the capacity (1) to continue functioning and provide a service even during events that alter its environment such as during a climatic hazard, (2) to be able to operate when damaged and resume a nominal operating level after the disturbance, (3) to limit its damage and be able to quickly start operating following the crisis. The technical system can be modeled starting from the values of its input, state or output variables at a given time t. The state of a system, if considered as a system that can be deconstructed or almost deconstructed, can also be perceived through the interactions of its subsystems. The interaction between subsystems depends on production and reception. When acknowledging this aspect of resilience, the disruption made on the system by a hazard needs to be countered, which can lead to the need to work on prevention or the reconstruction of the system to improve it. Resilience is equivalent to a state (in relation to the state of the system), or to a definable process as a series of phenomena leading to determinable results. The process is similar to the changes that take place in the system with time, processing the input variables to deduce and optimize the output variables. In order to do it, engineering resilience makes recommendations that are often the opposite of an economy of means. Structural measures for local protection, network over-distribution, etc., of this type of resilience are thus opposed to some of the objectives of sustainable development (Lizarralde et al. 2015). 14.4.2. Can self-sufficiency be achieved by managing failures of technical systems? There exist different methods of urban risk management to evaluate the reliability of a technical system and a critical infrastructure. The methods are most often related to characterizing the relations and interdependencies of technical systems but also to the dependence relations between technical systems and territories. Dependability (UNIT 2011) is an approach which, in addition to the standard methods of risk analysis based on physical and statistical criteria, induces a functional study. It is based on having a deep knowledge of the studied system’s functioning (Zwingelstein 1996), which in the case of urban technical systems can be a difficult objective to fulfill. In practice, it is impossible to isolate a subsystem from the other elements of the territory and other technical systems given the multiple and varied existing links. Despite this limitation, the dependability model is sometimes used based on the principle of functional modeling. The latter consists of identifying the technical system’s interactions so as to formally establish the links between functional failures, their causes and their effects (Gervais et al. 2011).

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Several methods can be associated with this: a functional analysis, as well as an analysis of failure modes and their effects, have been deployed on urban technical systems while spatial approaches show possible operational actions (Beraud et al. 2012; Lhomme et al. 2013; Gonzva et al. 2017; Serre et al. 2018). The characterization of operating and failure modes leads to a specific approach of risk management and the reliability of critical infrastructures. A set of actions focusing on reliability and associated with the search for the technical system’s operating self-sufficiency can arise from a functional approach. Both the analysis and the actions can include geographic information (Gonzva et al. 2016; Serre and Heinzlef 2018): – the physical resistance of overprotected components so as to protect the components and ensure they are functional in the case of the system being attacked by a natural or technological hazard, etc. For example, raising electrical distribution substations protects them from flood risks. In the “American Copper Buildings” complex, the 48th and final floor does not house a luxury apartment but instead hosts powerful electric generators powered by natural gas while level 1 hosts the other main technical devices (heating, ventilation); – the technical system’s self-sufficiency is based on its independence from, in particular, business continuity plans covering all the organizational, structural and material aspects that can be mobilized. Many critical infrastructures such as telecommunications or sanitation are equipped with alternative equipment to ensure electricity and hence their self-sufficiency. Also, during hurricane Sandy, AT&T, one of the four major mobile operators along with T-Mobile, Verizon and Sprint, installed over 3,000 generators and mobilized a convoy of tank trucks for refueling facilities (French High Committee for the Civil Defense 2013). This technical systems’ energy self-sufficiency acquired from batteries or generators is strongly limited in time; – the network’s interconnection can ensure the provision of the service by redirecting the flow along different routes when part of the network is damaged or out of service. In the literature, we find various indicators of network redundancy especially for the assessment of technical systems’ vulnerability to failures (Barroca et al. 2006; Lhomme et al. 2013); – the availability of reserves in order to use internal resources by creating temporary or permanent storage places closer to the places of use; – the ability of the technical system to find degraded operation modes that do not involve the complete breakdown of the service and ensure a minimum service. While self-sufficiency at the time of a crisis and post-crisis can be evaluated through the functional resilience of critical infrastructures, this approach seems

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difficult to evaluate for rare, higgh-intensity risks. r Functioonal resiliencee implies wn risks, substantiial resources that require maintenance,, investment and breakdow which arre even more serious s if not regularly r checcked and testeed. 14.5. Se elf-sufficiency and the meta-system m m: toward spatial resilie ence? To ennsure “the abiility [of the syystem to satisffactorily adjust] its operatioon during the disruuptive event” (definition abbove), the form malized approoach in spatiaal ecology regarding metapopulaations reflects the self-sufficciency and resilience of poopulations by considering “popullations of popuulations”. 14.5.1. Meta popula ation, meta--system and d self-sufficiiency A meta-system, by b analogy wiith metapopu ulations, can be b defined ass a set of spatiallyy separated teerritorial subssystems, whicch are nonettheless intercoonnected. These teerritorial subsyystems occuppying spaces of o variable siizes (associateed with a multifunnctional buildding or a disttrict) can ind dividually andd temporarilyy become shelters or spaces afffected that cannot guaranteee to cover thhe needs. Thrrough the u of these spaces s can evvolve, be interconnnection of terrritorial subsyystems, the use abandonned and then reecolonized. Orgaanization and connections c a the decisiv are ve elements off this spatial rresilience. The metta-system beccomes resiliennt when it alllows people to t take refugee in selfsufficiennt spaces befoore returning to the spacess temporarily abandoned dduring the crisis. Inn the literature, we find thaat several org ganization connfigurations hhave been modeledd on metapopuulations accorrding to entitiees that may haave different sizes (the case of a set of entitiees of similar siize such as the A and C moodels, and the case of a larger enntity such as model B bellow) and con nnection levels between thhe entities (Figure 14.2, source: the author). The T quality and a potential to t host the enntities are also impportant aspectss.

Figure 14.2. Summa ary of the main n meta-system m models. Red d areas are the e spaces erve as shelterr, whereas the e gray areas are a the spacess affected. Forr a color that se version n of this figure,, see www.iste e.co.uk/lopez/l /local.zip

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Non-uniform territorial self-sufficiency can be considered from the metapopulations approach. Movements between the abandoned and the selfsufficient spaces can be considered over extremely variable timescales ranging from a few minutes for short-dynamic risks to longer periods for slow-dynamic risks. The territories’ self-sufficiency is established on the basis of one-time elements introduced into the territorial subsystem network. Regarding energy, this approach refers to: – the mobilization of local resources during the crisis. Thus, in the fall of 2017, during hurricanes Harvey and Irma, the few microgrids in Texas that are fueled by gas or solar energy were able to keep many supermarkets and gas stations open. This form of resilience, linked to the energy network’s architecture relying on local production, could pave the way for an increase in the distributed energy networks, particularly for equipment located in areas which are at risk of suffering natural hazards; – the identification of shelters that are accessible and self-sufficient in the event of a crisis and post-crisis, and which temporarily serve as dwellings before “recolonizing” the original locations after the event. In risk management, these places of temporary use would eventually become points for the supply of medical equipment, food and other necessities. During hurricanes Harvey and Irma, it was the energy self-sufficiency throughout the hazard that “created” these shelters. In some cases, this is taken into account before the disruptive event. Such is the case in Dordrecht (the Netherlands), a city with a population of 120,000 located between –1 m and +3 m below and above sea level. The aim in this city was for 20% of the population in the area at risk of flooding to be accommodated in schools that became “Smart Shelters”: schools under normal conditions and shelters during a crisis. These Smart Shelters welcome between 8,000 and 14,000 people and must be selfsufficient regarding energy, sanitation, communication and drinking water. The investment cost for this operation is estimated to be between 9.8 and 17.2 million euros (Blom and Dura Vermeer Business Development BV 2013; Escarameia et al. 2013). Another Smart Shelters project in a school in Hackbridge (London suburbs) located in a flood zone guarantees its energy supply with a privileged connection to the nearby energy production center. This center would only act as a protective measure during floods (Moreau 2016). This school, which is the center of the project, is expected to be raised so as not to be affected by rare hazards with a frequency of 1:1,000. Locating this school in the flood area is considered as the central point of the energy production system management (BACA Architects 2010). Smart Shelters are adapted to the presence of risks (constructive processes) and are self-sufficient, especially regarding energy. Other Smart Shelter examples exist. They are not specific devices; they correspond to buildings that have a specific role during normal times and adapt in the event of a hazard to act as shelters. In the

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cases of Dordrecht and Hackbridge, these shelters are schools, but in other territories they are movie theatres, conference rooms, etc. The spatial resilience approach brought on by meta-systems and smart shelters is positioned toward a self-sufficient territory that is equipped to deal with natural hazards. Different spatial configurations have been studied (Figures 14.3 and 14.4) in the FloodProbe project (Blom and Dura Vermeer Business Development BV 2013).

Figure 14.3. A main smart-shelter concept (seen in model B: Islands – Main land described in Figure 14.2). Source: Blom and Dura Vermeer Business Development BV (2013). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

Figure 14.4. Multiple smart shelters forming a network throughout the territory (seen in models A, C or D described in Figure 14.2). Source: Blom and Dura Vermeer Business Development BV (2013). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/lopez/local.zip

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14.6. Conclusion Self-sufficiency and resilience are concepts that can be considered synergistically, as proved by the feedback from different experiences or from development projects. For hazards occurring with a medium frequency, critical infrastructures must be able to guarantee the service’s operating reliability, thereby ensuring the response to territories’ needs. For rare and high-intensity events, the feedback shows that the territories’ energy self-sufficiency becomes an important condition of resilience. Energy self-sufficiency, seen as the ability to mobilize local sources of energy, depends on many aspects of crisis management. The capacity of the population’s self-organization and the transmission of information strongly depend on it. Local production makes it possible to consider the various means of access to energy resources at all times during a hazard. Approaches that include selfsufficient smart shelters energetically contained within a meta-system that meets the minimum needs of the territories are stimulating routes for an integrated management of urban risks, which goes beyond the logics of protection and is anchored in the functioning of the territories. 14.7. References BACA Architects (2010). The Life-Project, Long-term Initiatives for Flood-risk Environments. IHS BRE Press, United Kingdom. Balsells, M. (2015). Résilience à l’échelle du quartier : Pratiques, théories, et opérationnalisations face aux risques d’inondation, Phd thesis, Mons University. Barles, S. (2015). Métabolisme urbain et résilience? In La résilience métropolitaine peut-elle se concevoir sans aménagement ?, Proceedings, Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallé, Atelier International du Grand Paris. Barroca, B., Di Nardo, M., and Mboumoua, I. (2013). De la vulnérabilité à la résilience : Mutation ou bouleversement ? EchoGéo, 24. Available: http://journals.openedition.org/ echogeo/13439. Barroca, B., Bernardara, P., Mouchel, J.-M., and Hubert, G. (2006). Indicators for identification of urban flooding vulnerability. Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 6, 553–561. Beraud, H., Barroca, B. and Hubert, G. (2012). Functional analysis, a resilience improvement tool applied to a waste management system – application to the “household waste management chain”. Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 12, 3671–3682. Blom, E. and Dura Vermeer Business Development BV (2013). Construction technologies for flood-proofing buildings and infrastructures. Concepts and technologies for smart shelters. FloodProBE report WP04-01-12-1.33.

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Bristow, D. and Kennedy, C.A. (2013). Urban metabolism and the energy stored in cities. Implications for resilience. J. Indus. Ecol., 17, 656–667. Comfort, L.K., Boin, A. and Demchak, C.C. (2010). Designing Resilience Preparing for Extreme Events. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. Coutard, O. and Rutherford, J. (2009). Les réseaux transformés par leurs marges : Développement et ambivalence des techniques “décentralisées”. FLUX, 76–77, 6–13. Coutard, O. and Rutherford, J. (2015). Vers l’essor de villes « post-réseaux » : Infrastructures, innovation sociotechnique et transition urbaine en Europe. In Quand l'innovation fait la ville durable, Forest, J. Hamdouch, A. (eds). Presses Polytechniques Universitaires Romandes, Lausanne. Daluzeau, J., Gralepois, M. and Oger, C. (2013). La résilience face à la normativité et la solidarité des territoires. EchoGéo, 24, 22. Dauphiné, A. and Provitolo, D. (2003). Les catastrophes et la théorie des système auto organisés critiques. In Les Risques, Moriniaux, V. (ed.), Edition du temps, Nantes. Delaitre, M., Di Nardo, M., Gonzva, M., Barroca, B. and Diab, Y. (2016). Echelles spatiales et approches méthodologiques pour l’analyse de la vulnérabilité : D’une approche sectorielle vers une approche systémique. Espace Populations Sociétés - Numéro spécial “Interroger et comprendre les effets d’échelles de la vulnérabilité”. Djament-Tran, G., Le Blanc, A., Lhomme, S., Rufat, S. and Reghezza-Zitt, M. (2012). Ce que la résilience n’est pas, ce qu’on veut lui faire dire. Escarameia, M., Stone, K., Van, M., Zevenbergen, C. and Morris, M. (2013). Technologies for flood protection of the built environment. Guidance based on findings from the EU-funded project FloodProBE. Gervais, R., Peyras, L., Serre, D., Chouinard, L. and Diab, Y. (2011). Condition evaluation of water retaining structures by a functional approach: comparative practices in France and Canada. Eur. J. Environ. Civil Eng., 15, 335–356. Gey, A. (2012). Penser la dimension technique de la ville durable. Les apports d’une “mécanologie” de la ville. Flux, 88, 47–59. Gonzva, M., Barroca, B. and Serre, D. (2017). Resilience of urban systems: A proposal for a methodological framework dedicated to the operators’ needs (Résilience des systèmes urbains: proposition d’un cadre méthodologique pour répondre aux besoins des exploitants). Urban Risks, 1(2). Gonzva, M., Barroca, B., Lhomme, S., Gautier, P.-E. and Diab, Y. (2016). Apport de la sûreté de fonctionnement à l’analyse spatialisée du risque inondation. Revue internationale de géomatique, 26, 329–361. HABITAT III. (2015). Urban resilience. New York. Haut comité français pour la défense civile. (2013). Retour d’expérience suite à l’ouragan Sandy sur la côte Est des Etats-Unis.

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Jébrak, Y. (2010). La reconstruction et la résilience urbaine : L'évolution du paysage urbain. Université de Québec à Montréal. Lhomme, S., Serre, D., Diab, Y. and Laganier, R. (2011). A methodology to produce interdependent networks disturbance scenarios. International Conference on Vulnerability and Risk Analysis and Management, American Society of Civil Engineers. University of Maryland, Hyattsville. Lhomme, S., Serre, D., Diab, Y. and Laganier, R. (2013). Analyzing resilience of urban networks: A preliminary step towards more flood resilient cities. Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 13, 221–230. Lizarralde, G., Chmutina, K., Bosher, L. and Dainty, A. (2015). Sustainability and resilience in the built environment: The challenges of establishing a turquoise agenda in the UK. Sustain. Cities Soc., 15, 96–104. Maire, S. (2018). Le temps de la résilience urbaine est revenu. In Quelles stratégies pour quels risques : La ville en question, Barroca B. (ed.). Moreau, A.-L. (2016). Planning in urban flood prone areas: Focus on six principles to reduce urban vulnerability. FLOODrisk 2016 – 3rd European Conference on Flood Risk Management. E3S Web Conference, Lyon, France. Nemeth, C.P., Hollnagel, E. and Dekker, S. (2009). Resilience Engineering Perspectives. Volume 2: Preparation and Restoration. Padstow. Raven, J., Stone, B., Mills, G., Towers, J., Katzschner, L., Leone, M., Gaborit, P., Georgescu, M., and Hariri, M. (2018). Urban planning and urban design. In Climate Change and Cities: Second Assessment Report of the Urban Climate Change Research Network, Rosenzweig, C., Solecki, W., Romero-Lankao, P., Mehrotra, S., Dhakal, S., Ali Ibrahim, S. (eds) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Reghezza-Zitt, M. and Rufat, S. (2015). Resilience Imperative. ISTE Press, London and Elsevier, Oxford. Reghezza-Zitt, M., Rufat, S., Djament-Tran, G., Le Blanc, A. and Lhomme, S. (2012). What resilience is not: Uses and abuses. Cybergeo : European Journal of Geography [Online], available: http://journals.openedition.org/cybergeo/25554. Serre, D. (2015). Adapting territorial systems through their components : The case of critical networks. In Resilience Imperative, Reghezza-Zitt, M. and Rufat, S. (eds). ISTE Press, London and Elsevier, Oxford. Serre, D. and Barroca, B. (2013). Preface: Natural hazard resilient cities. Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 13, 2675–2678. Serre, D., Barroca, B. and Laganier, R. (2013). Resilience and Urban Risk Management. CRC Press, London. Serre, D. and Heinzlef, C. (2018). Assessing and mapping urban resilience to floods with respect to cascading effects through critical infrastructure networks. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 30(B), September, 235–243. Available: https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.ijdrr.2018.02.018.

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Serre, D., Barroca, B., Balsells Mondéjar, M. and Becue, V. (2018). Contributing to urban resilience to floods with neighbourhood design: The case of Am Sandtorkai/Dalmannkai in Hamburg. J. of Flood Risk Manage., 11, S69–S83. Thomas, I. and Da Cunha, A. (2017). La ville résiliente. Comment la construire? Presses de l’université de Montréal. Thomas, I., Bleau, N., Soto Abasolo, P., Desjardins-Dutil, G., Fuamba, M. and Kadi, S. (2012). Analyser la vulnérabilité sociétale et territoriale aux inondations en milieu urbain dans le contexte des changements climatiques, en prenant comme cas d’étude la Ville de Montréal. Final report. Ouranos. UNIT (2009), Analyse de risques : Identification et estimation : Démarches d'analyse de risques–Méthodes qualitatives d’analyse de risques. Online training course, Niandou H. (coordinator) and Talon, A., Boissier, D., Peyras, L. Available : http://www.unit.eu/ cours/cyberrisques/etage_3_aurelie/co/Etage_3_synthese_web.html. Vale, L.J. and Campanella, T.J. (2005). The Resilient City – How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster, Oxford University Press. Ventura, C.E., Juarez Garcia, H. and Marti, J.M. (2010). Understanding interdependencies among critical infrastructures. Proceedings of the 9th U.S. National and 10th Canadian Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Toronto. Ville de Paris and 100 Resilience Cities. (2017). Stratégie de résilience de Paris. Yusta, J.M., Correa, G.J., Lacal-Arantegui, R. and Lacal-Arántegui, R. (2011). Methodologies and applications for critical infrastructure protection: State-of-the-art. Energ. Policy, 39, 6100–6119. Zwingelstein, G. (1996). La maintenance basée sur la fiabilité. Guide pratique d'application de la RCM. Hermès Editions, Paris.

15 Urban Metabolic Self-sufficiency: an Oxymoron or a Challenge?

15.1. Introduction The aim of this chapter is to address the issue of material and energy urban self-sufficiency through the concepts of urban metabolism, the socioecological regime and the hinterland. In section 15.2, we will show the importance of simultaneously taking into account energy and material flows (urban metabolism) as part of an analysis of the socioecological transition, which justifies the stance adopted here. We will then consider how the debate on metabolic self-sufficiency in the particular case of cities should be approached, emphasizing the impossibility of urban self-sufficiency and therefore the need to take into account the urban hinterlands (in the broad sense) (section 15.3). The issue of cities’ ability to decide on metabolism will be discussed in section 15.4, which will show the limited nature of this capacity and the actions cities can take. The conclusion will focus on some issues of socioecological transition in relation to self-sufficiency. All of this work, mainly using the Parisian case as example, is based on previous work by the author and an inexhaustive review of the literature. The use of the expression “self-sufficiency”, particularly in the field of energy, is rather tricky since it refers both to the concept of being autonomous (such as the autonomy of a battery) and to the concept of having the capacity to choose and act, as pointed out by Benoît Boutaud [BOU 16]. Throughout this chapter, we will alternate the use of the terms “physical autonomy” and “autonomy” to designate the former, and simply “self-sufficiency”, or, in case of ambiguity, “decision-making self-sufficiency” for the latter, which may take a variety of forms, especially

Chapter written by Sabine BARLES

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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for a relatively long-term analysis, which is what we will attempt to do here. This self-sufficiency is that of urban regions and will therefore be analyzed through the prism of local authorities and other urban public institutions1. 15.2. Energy and matter: urban metabolism Since the 1950s, energy has received a great deal of attention from ecologists because of Schrödinger’s work on the thermodynamics of living organisms [SCH 46], which introduced a first paradox in the search for energy self-sufficiency in the physical sense of the term: regardless of the ecosystem, the primary energy that it mobilizes is external to it since it comes from the sun, and this is of course the case for the entire biosphere. Since then, energy has often been used to characterize human societies, and particularly cities, in their interactions with the biosphere. In the 1970s for example, the ecologist Eugen Odum described systems and ecosystems according to their source and energy level, with the “fuel-driven urbanindustrial systems” [ODU 75] exceeding all others in terms of energy flow2. At the same time, the economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen suggested rebuilding the economy on a thermodynamic and biological basis [GEO 71]. A little later, Stephan Boyden used the term “extrasomatic” to describe the energy mobilized by human societies in addition to the energy required for the functioning of the ecosystems in which they exist, and made this variable the main explanation for the transformations undergone in the long term, distinguishing three great eras for humanity: hunting and gathering, agriculture and industry [BOY 81, BOY 92]. This energy periodization has been picked up more recently by many researchers in the field of socioecological studies, or environmental history, when discussing the socioecological regimes that have succeeded one another since the appearance of humankind (see, for example, [DEV 02]); the socioecological regime of a society represents how it interacts with and fits into the biosphere. Indeed, energy seems to be both a variable and a fundamental characteristic of the interactions between human societies and the biosphere, and even between societies themselves, as long as energy is considered as a whole, that is, taking into

1 A more comprehensive approach would include the self-sufficiency of natural or legal persons, but it would make us lose the spatial aspect that we have opted to focus on here. Moreover, much of what is said here about local and regional authorities can be extrapolated, all else being equal, to individuals, especially regarding the lack, or the limited condition, of self-sufficiency, whether it is physical or decision-making. 2 The natural ecosystems’ energy levels ranged from 1,000 to 40,000 kcal/m2 (4.2–167.5 MJ/m2), those of the solar-powered ecosystems and subsidized by humans from 10,000 to 40,000 kCal/m2 (42–167.5 MJ/m2), and those of “fuel-powered urban-industrial systems” from 100,000 to 3,000,000 kcal/m2 (420–12,600 MJ/m2) [ODU 75].

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account not only the so-called technical energy (used by different devices such as radiators, vehicles, ovens, computers, etc.), but also the energy contained in food [HAB 06]. It also enables the same unit to be used to describe many characteristic processes and activities of human societies (food, heating, transport, production of goods, to name only the main ones). Since the 1960s, energy accounting has emerged as an alternative to monetary accounting, which is the dominant system when evaluating and characterizing the activities and operations of human societies. Energy also appears as one of the fundamental elements of any socioecological transition (“the key to a transition is located in a society’s energy system” [FIS 09]), meaning that the terms such as energy transition, ecological transition and even socioecological transition are used almost interchangeably in the corresponding literature and in public policies (although the third expression is very rarely seen). The links between energy consumption and climate change, concern about the depletion of fossil resources, the impacts on ecosystems and, above all, the dominant energy system’s effect on public health, reinforce the technical and scientific community’s interest in energy, and that of politicians who are directly or indirectly dedicated to interactions between societies and the biosphere and their consequences. However, this energy approach has its qualities’ flaws. It contributes to masking a number of characteristic elements of socioecological regimes: for example, water use by societies, the nature and intensity of use of the materials and resources consumed, and the way in which societies arrange and manage space. If each of these elements has an energy dimension, it does not only come down to that. Some societies are able to mobilize very large quantities of one material or another without its energy consumption or regime being any different from that of another society with a different material profile. Finally, the socioecological regime of a society is characterized both by the energy and the materials it mobilizes, i.e. by its metabolism, that is, all of the energy and material flows and stock it brings into play. However, the energy approach cannot fully characterize a regime, all the more so when it is reduced down to technical energy, which is often the case of studies focusing on cities. Moreover, it tends to reduce the dominant socioecological regime’s impacts down to those of the energy regime (especially down to climate change, the depletion of fossil fuels and public health, as mentioned above), while those impacts are not only much more abundant in other areas but also more serious, as shown by Rockström et al. According to them, the planet’s nine limits are represented by biodiversity (and the loss thereof), the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles and their alteration, climate change, ocean acidification, changes in land use, freshwater use, depletion of the stratospheric ozone, chemical pollution and the aerosol load in the atmosphere (the latter two processes have not been quantified). In 2009, these limits were considered to have been exceeded for the following (in order of decreasing importance): biodiversity, nitrogen and climate; about to be exceeded

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for: phosphorus; and to a lesser extent: ocean acidification [ROC 09]. This work was reviewed in 2015 and showed that the limits had then been exceeded for genetic diversity, nitrogen, phosphorus, land use and climate (always in descending order of importance) [STE 15]. Finally – and this criticism focuses more on socioecological approaches in general than on energy in particular – these limits are often macroscopic and not very spatialized (with the exception, in particular, of works in the field of territorial ecology [BUC 16], such as the present book), which conceals the local specificities of the dominant socioecological regime and its effects, which are themselves due to both natural and anthropogenic variables, thereby also limiting the possibilities of the spatialization of the metabolism of societies. This has important consequences when discussing self-sufficiency, given that if energy self-sufficiency resulted from one region or another, it could just be the tip of the iceberg of interregional flows. In the remainder of this chapter, we will, therefore, address the question of localized socioecological regimes’ self-sufficiency identified from the territorial metabolism, which we will consider in the particular case of cities. In fact, the urban socioecological regime has characteristics that distinguish it (everywhere and at all times) from the regimes in other regions and which strongly resonate with the debate on self-sufficiency. The city can be considered as a result of the capacity that agricultural societies have had (and have created too) to produce surplus food, leading to the development of trade and the possibility of not producing food for a part of the population and hence developing other activities, including commercial ones, based on the (intermittent) geographical proximity between sellers, buyers and their intermediaries. Hence, the city was created as a result of the socioecological agricultural regime that made sociospatial specialization possible. It is, by definition, associated with a particular metabolism linked in particular to the outsourcing of food production, and often linked to that of energy resources. This is why urban self-sufficiency – in the physical sense of the term – historically appears as an oxymoron. Other characteristic elements of urban metabolism can be added to this externalization: the density of incoming and outgoing energy and material flows (in J/ha or tons/ha), linked to population density and the importance of trade (and in some cases production); the presence of a large stock of materials related to different city features (buildings, infrastructure, goods, etc.); the significant portion of so-called final consumption, often associated with emissions into nature. The socioecological urban regime has not escaped the transition that resulted from the industrial revolutions. These increased urban features: the expansion of the urbanization processes, growth of flows and urban stock of materials, total outsourcing of urban metabolism (at least in developed countries), at the source (for supply) and at the end (through emissions of any kind). Those revolutions prompted, in cities and elsewhere, the linearization of metabolism;

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societies constantly drawing new, often non-renewable, resources within the biosphere before releasing them back into it in a degraded form. Linearization has therefore been added to outsourcing. Cities have lost all physical autonomy since becoming increasingly dependent on the regions and external environments to obtain their supplies and for their emissions, as well as for the distribution of their products. 15.3. The city and its hinterlands: the lack of physical autonomy It is therefore necessary to carry out an analysis of the physical dependence of cities prior to any discussion on urban autonomy, regardless of the meaning with which this term is used. This dependence can be considered through the prism of the hinterland, of which we provide an extended definition herein3: the hinterlands of a city are the regions and areas which allow it to obtain its supply of raw materials, finished and semifinished products; those which receive the products that have been developed, processed and packaged; and finally those which receive the final emissions (waste of any kind). The urban hinterlands thus encompass supply, distribution and emission areas. They can be associated with the flow of energy as well as with the main flows of matter brought about by urban functioning, in descending order: water, building materials and agricultural and food products. Fossil fuels are also part of these flows but will be considered here according to their energy dimension since that is the main purpose with which they enter the city. The work carried out in recent years in Paris and its metropolitan area has provided a fairly good idea about these flows, their evolution over time and the hinterlands associated with them. Figure 15.1 and Table 15.1 show some data for this area. Regarding energy, the Seine river basin played a major role as a supply of wood, basically the single source of energy until the 19th Century, with its recurrent shortage being managed by the expansion of the energy hinterland, particularly with the Yonne river basin and as a result of the development of wood floating during the 16th Century. The transition to fossil fuels occurred around 1850, when coal represented over 50% of Paris’ primary source of energy and when the “underground forest”, as referred to by Rolf Peter Sieferle [SIE 01], took precedence over the overland forest. While unit energy consumption remained relatively stable throughout the 19th Century, it boomed during the 20th Century, along with total consumption, due to the growth of the urban population. This is associated with the fragmentation, remoteness and gradual diversification of the energy hinterland, with

3 There is extensive literature addressing this concept. In addition to Van Cleef’s fundamental text [VAN 41], an analysis can also be found in [BAR 19], where the choice of an extended definition for the hinterland is discussed.

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the average supply distance increasing from about 200 km in the 18th Century to nearly 4,000 km at the start of the 21st Century [KIM 12, KIM 13]. The situation is more complex in the food sector where the transition arising from the appearance of fossil fuels happened later. This sector includes the diet: more meat meant an increased need of plant products for animal food, which led to an increase in the amount of land required. However, the last two centuries have been marked by an increase in agricultural yields, first as a result of the optimization of the polyculture–livestock system and then as a result of the fertilizer revolution: mining of phosphates (second half of the 19th Century) and potash (early 20th Century), as well as ammonia synthesis through the Haber Bosch process (also early 20th Century). Associated with the improvement of breeding species (which also means better yields) and with the specialization of agriculture (which leads to the differentiation between farming and breeding areas), all of which was largely promoted by the common agricultural policy established after the Second World War, it allowed the drastic reduction of the area needed to feed people in urban areas. According to Petros Chatzimpiros, this area in Paris has increased from about 1 ha per capita in the early 19th Century to 0.2 ha per capita two centuries later [CHA 11], hence the area required to feed the Paris metropolitan area is much lower today than it was a century ago despite the growth of the population [BIL 09] (nonetheless, the figures published by Fabien Esculier are higher: 0.45 ha per capita today for the Paris metropolitan area [ESC 18]). The globalization of trade and the specialization of agriculture have simultaneously led, as in the case of energy, to the distancing, break-up and diversification of the food hinterland, from an average supply distance of under 200 km two centuries ago to almost 700 km at present (for protein) [BIL 12]. This is not much compared to energy, but it hides another reality: these figures are only for human consumption and do not take into account the origin of the food consumed by livestock and the fact that the specialization of agriculture mentioned above does not allow production on the spot. The study of the circulation of nitrogen used in the food industry (and hence that of proteins) shows that nearly one-third of the nitrogen used to produce food for Parisians is contained in soybeans imported from South America to feed the animals raised in France, meaning that the average protein supply distance is closer to 3,000 km and is therefore of the same order of magnitude as that of energy. The flows of construction materials over time are less well known. Nevertheless, a quick analysis shows a certain stability of mass consumption. For the period between 1854 and 1869, the net consumption for Paris amounted to 1.6 tons per capita/year on average, according to the city toll records4, which represents a low 4 Bibliothèque administrative de la ville de Paris, 206033(25).

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estimate given fraud and the fact that that the materials were untaxed for certain uses. Note that 92% of these materials are non-metallic minerals (stones of all kinds, bricks, slates, binding agents, etc.). Binding agents represented 30% of the consumption, and of this 30%, plaster accounted for 90%. Despite the gradual remoteness of quarries, most building materials came from the departments of the Seine, Seine-et-Oise and Seine-et-Marne (current Île-de-France), while the fuel used for manufacturing plaster, bricks and tiles, cement and lime combining wood and charcoal came from the Seine river basin and coal was imported from central and northern France, Belgium, Germany and Great Britain [KIM 12]. The work of Vincent Augiseau shows that at present the use of construction materials reaches 2.3 tons per capita/year in Île-de-France, 94% of which are non-metallic minerals. Even though the distance is still shorter than for most other materials consumed in urban areas, this work also shows a growth in the size of the hinterland, with imports from Great Britain and Belgium, meaning that Île-de-France is not physically autonomous: in 2013, it only contributed 51% of its own supply [AUG 17]. In fact, the same applies to construction materials as to the food sector: the manufacture of construction materials, and in particular cement, is now based on the mobilization of fossil fuels with a much more distant origin. To the flows that enter the city, it is then necessary to add those other flows, considered as indirect in physical accounting, that reflect the total amount of materials required for their production and transport [REP 14]. A summary analysis shows that, for the Paris region, these are by weight three times higher than direct imports (all materials combined, whether they are raw materials, finished or semifinished products, or fossil fuels, with the exception of water that will be discussed in the following), and hence the Ile-de-France metabolism is produced elsewhere. The case of water is very particular. One way of associating it with a hinterland is to convert the withdrawals destined for the city concerned into a runoff surface on the basis of the amount of rainfall at the basin(s) supplying water and, more specifically, effective precipitation (rain subtracting evapotranspiration), as Enric Tello and Joan Ramon Ostos did for the case of Barcelona [TEL 12]. Table 15.1 shows the results for the Paris metropolitan area. In two centuries, this hinterland, or direct hydric footprint surface area, has been multiplied by more than 500 as a result of the increase in population (increased by almost 20 times) and that of unit consumption (increased by almost 30 times). At the beginning of the 19th Century, the direct hydric footprint was contained within the metropolitan area, but it has largely overflowed since, now representing more than 3.5 times its surface area. The dual perspective of population growth and declining rainfall would bring this ratio to 15.3 by 2050. This again testifies to urban dependence on resources, although the Paris metropolitan area example is not the most extreme case since it draws water

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from its own basin. Supply chain distances, or interbasin transfers, can be much larger for other cities (see the example of Athens in [STE 12]). We can go even further by taking into account the total hydric footprint [PAT 15]. These indicators are expressed in terms of volume and aim to account not only for the water consumed directly by the cities (and other territories) through supply and distribution networks, but also that which has been mobilized for the production of goods and services consumed by them, and which are also produced and developed all over the world. The hydric footprint becomes a water footprint when water quality degradation is taken into account: the quantification is done by estimating the volume of water that would be necessary to dilute the pollution emitted and make it compatible with the receiving environment. These indicators are at the origin of the concept of virtual water transfers (often wrongly abbreviated as virtual water), which represent the volume of water that a region has consumed outside its limits (which corresponds to the indirect flows in material flow analyses). The corresponding flows have mainly been analyzed for different countries around the world (see, for example, [HOE 12]), not so much at the urban scale, and not entirely for Paris, but we can nevertheless mention the work carried out on Berlin, Delhi and Lagos, which provided virtual hydric transfer values (i.e. without taking into account the qualitative aspect of the footprint) of 643 m3 per capita/year, 434 m3 per capita/year and 1,210 m3 per capita/year, respectively, for average distances of 4,400 km, 430 km and 850 km [HOF 13]: such as energy from Paris in the case of Berlin. These transfers, as well as the hydric and water footprints, are mainly related to food consumption and evapotranspiration associated with crop production, which is consistent with the food hinterland issue discussed above. To complete this overview of urban hinterlands, we should also consider, as previously suggested, the distribution areas (receiving exports from cities) and emission areas (receiving cities’ direct discharges). It is clear that a city – at least a very modern western city – has a concentrating effect from this point of view: it distributes to a shorter distance than that from which it attracts, and emits at an even smaller distance (Figure 15.2). This emissions localism is especially due to the importance of atmospheric emissions (here we do not take into account postemission circulation), which represent 70% of the emissions into nature in Île-de-France, and due to the relatively close (though they could be outside the metropolitan area) wastewater and solid waste outlets [BAR 09]. In reality, these results by weight would certainly be slightly different insofar as some waste is part of national or even international markets. The total disassociation between supply areas and emission areas must however be noted, meaning that they have little in common with each other, which questions the possibilities of flow recircularization (see below). Even if these emissions are close, they are still outsourced since they are released into nature after their treatment (if there is any treatment at all).

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Figurre 15.1. Energ gy, food (expre essed in nitrog gen) and waterr consumption n in the Paris me etropolitan are ea in 1786, 18 896 and 2006 expressed e as (a) total, (b) p per capita and (c) average supp ply distances (according ( to [BAR [ 15, BIL 12, CHA 11, K KIM 12]). For a color ve ersion of this figure, f see ww ww.iste.co.uk/llopez/local.zip p

1801 Paris meetropolitan areea Populatioon (in thousandds) Surface area a (km2) Water coonsumption (m3 per capita/yeear) Water coonsumption (Mm m3/year) (Direct) urban hydric footprint Surface (m ( 2 per capita) Surface area a (km2) Watersheed (%) Metropolitan area (%)

1896

2 2010

22050

548 34

3,340 473

10,4460 2,8845

15,000 3,462

5 3

110 366

1 146 1,5527

146 22,190

34 19 0.02 55

730 2,438 3 515

9 970 10,1181 13 3 358

1,220 18,250 23 527

Table 15 5.1. Direct hyydric footprint for the Paris metropolitan area, 1801–2 2050. It is based on n an average annual rainfa all of 750 mm/y /year and a ru unoff of 20%. F For 2050, the rainffall is reduced to 600 mm m/year and th he unit consumption is asssumed to remain constant. c The ese figures arre taken from m the work led d by Agnès D Ducharne [DUC 03 3] and that of PIREN-Se eine (https://w www.piren-sein ne.fr/). The p population projectio on is that for Greater Pariis and a spatial growth ra ate of half th hat of the populatio on is assumed d (a combinattion of densific cation and spatial expansio on). For a color verrsion of this fig gure, see www w.iste.co.uk/lop pez/local.zip

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Figure 15.2. The thre ree urban hinte erlands: supplly areas (inputts%), distributiion area mercial exportss%) and emisssion area (emissions into na ature%), Pariss, 2003. (comm For the calcullation method,, see [BAR 09 9]

15.4. De ecision-mak king self-suffficiency: a challenge? The image that em merges from this t brief anaalysis is that of o a city withh multiple mission areass forming an exploded hinterlannds with the supply, distribbution and em mosaic around a the world, spatiallyy reflecting th he contemporary transform mations of urban metabolism. m Phhysical autonoomy is therefo ore almost nonn-existent. W What about decision-making self-sufficiency? It I is clearly veery limited tooo, although a little less than the physical autonomy for certtain flows. As faar as water iss concerned, the t growing needs n for this resource linkked to the appearannce of hygienee and comfortt have been acccompanied, in i the case off the Paris metropolitan area, by b an increaasing decision-making self-sufficiencyy. In the a the sources it considered necesssary: the aquueducts to 19th Cenntury, Paris acquired transportt the water it drew and thee Ourcq canal which historically precedded them, and the city c also negotiated the righht to use waterr from the Seinne and Marnee rivers. It is itself the organizinng authority for f water supp ply and distriibution withinn the city M of the suuburban comm munes (150) have united since s the 19220s in the limits. Most Ile-de-Frrance water unnion (SEDIF), a public bod dy of intermunnicipal cooperration that now perrforms the sam me function. The other co ommunes are either indepeendent or grouped in smaller unnions. The saame is true fo or the sewer system: s comm munal and

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intercommunal networks are part of the large wastewater system run by the wastewater treatment authority of Greater Paris (SIAAP), and thus the organizing authorities are local authorities. There is another body in addition to these relatively well-known institutions that strengthens the autonomy of the Paris metropolitan area in terms of water supply: the basin public institution Seine Grands Lacs, which covers Paris and the three departments within the inner ring. Seine Grands Lacs is the successor of a Seine department service created in the interwar period with the aim of creating and managing several dam reservoirs located upstream of the capital to support the low water in the summer and avoid any shortage of water in Greater Paris. In 1969, following the administrative reorganization of the region, it became the interdepartmental institution of the dam reservoir of the Seine basin (IIBRBS) and continued its public works by adding flood protection work to its low-water support. In 2011, it finally became the institution it is at present. As far as water is concerned, we can therefore speak of urban decision-making self-sufficiency; we can even say there is dominance over the resources and extraterritorial control rather than dependence [BAR 17a]. The case of energy is the exact opposite and the French Revolution, associated with energy transition, resulted in a loss of control of its flow. Until 1789, Paris controlled its entire supply basin (often described as a district). Every river that allowed for wood floating and bound for the capital would be in its remit, and the Paris administration supervised the commerce and transport of the wood from the first transaction (the purchase of the standing wood) to the second and last (the sale to individuals or communities in the capital) [BAR 17a]. In 1785, when the energy crisis was at its peak, a strip of nearly fifty kilometers on either side of the rivers for wood floating were allocated to the city: (in theory) almost the entire Seine river basin. This extraterritorial control was not able to resist the liberalization of trade and the creation of departments, while the arrival on the market of alternative fuels shifted energy management to the State and private companies. The city has certainly remained an organizing authority within its limits, especially since the 1906 energy distribution law, but it has lost its extraterritorial prerogatives while the primary resources have considerably moved further away from it. As far as food is concerned, the situation is once again different as analyzed by Sabine Bognon [BOG 14]. The Ancien Régime was marked by the ubiquity of the State in providing the capital’s supply. The 19th Century increased the importance of municipal authorities – which were still highly dependent on the State via the Seine prefecture – and that of traders. The combination of the common agricultural policy and the development of mass distribution after the Second World War, to name only these two elements, was accompanied by an abandonment of most of the Parisian food prerogatives, which translated into the privatization of the food system despite the State’s attempts to readjust it in favor of less dominant stakeholders, particularly through the creation of the Rungis national interest market

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[BOG 18]. Urban food self-sufficiency is limited to the organization of outdoor and indoor markets, to the (limited) action of the municipality in commercial urban planning and to its role as a customer for the mass catering within its competence. Almost all construction materials are not under the control of local power, with the exception of road works and other projects belonging to local authorities, who once again take on the role of customers, or building owners to be more precise. Hence, most of the time the choice of materials, which are part of a production and marketing circuit driven by the private sector, return to the project manager and not to the authorities, despite the State’s role in the management of quarries5. Recent regulatory changes maintain the division between resources (whose management is supervised by the State) and waste (from the Ile-de-France region and other departments), although waste management plans have to be in line with circular economy and so must contribute to making them a resource. Cities are not only in charge of their wastewater but are also in charge of part of their waste. Municipalities manage household and assimilated waste, which they often transfer in whole or in part to public entities for inter-municipal cooperation: in the case of the Paris metropolitan area, some municipalities (84, including each of the 20 districts of Paris) have retained authority over waste collection and have transferred its treatment to the intermunicipal union for waste treatment (SYCTOM). Other unions are in charge of collecting waste on behalf of the SYCTOM member municipalities, while others join other unions. It can therefore be seen that there is some sort of urban decision-making self-sufficiency here, which is made particularly complex by the multiplicity of stakeholders who share the decision-making capacity. Finally, decision-making self-sufficiency in terms of urban metabolism is both limited (to certain flows) and fragmented (for a given flow) – and yet we have not taken into account consumer goods that, although they are quantitatively less important than the flows dealt with here, also have certain aspects in connection with the exhaustion of certain non-renewable or hard-to-reach resources. When decision-making self-sufficiency exists, it is shared by many urban institutions. If we consider the urban metabolism as a whole, the constellation of decision makers brings together stakeholders from different territorial, or even non-territorial, scales. What is true for the Paris metropolitan area is also true for most cities nowadays. Moreover, with the exception of water and some technical annexes owned and

5 Especially after the collapse of the Wilson Bridge in Tours in 1978 (attributed to the extraction of alluvial material from the minor bed of the Loire river) and the 1993 law (Law no. 93-3 of January 4, 1993), which integrated quarries in the classified facilities system for the protection of the environment and established the departmental career plan, transformed into a regional plan in 2014 by the so-called ALUR law (Law no. 2014-366 of March 24, 2014).

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managed by cities outside their borders, decision-making self-sufficiency is exercised within their administrative limits, i.e. not where urban metabolism is mainly deployed as we have already seen in the previous section. Under these conditions, and without minimizing their internal action, it is difficult for cities to take control of socioecological transition matters as identified in section 5.1, even if cities themselves have recognized their importance, and despite their role in this issue having been constantly confirmed. Some examples help describe this situation. Biowaste is currently receiving special attention and the city of Paris, among others, is experimenting with the implementation of its dedicated collection to then proceed to its methanization. However, a quick calculation (Table 15.2) shows the very little appeal of this solution: the energy content of biogas barely represents 0.21% of the total Parisian energy consumption, while the electricity that could be drawn from it is only 0.05%. If these figures are applied to residential consumption alone, the values, respectively, increase to 0.63% and 0.16%, which is still very low. Furthermore, this estimate does not take into account a potential food loss reduction, or the amount of biowaste that escapes sorting. It could also be argued that this calculation omits biowaste produced from the food service industry, which, according to the family budget survey [INS 11], accounts for 29.4% of household food expenditure in the Paris metropolitan area (23.4% in mainland France), including 7.0% for the institutional catering sector (5.5% in mainland France). Regardless of the fact that most of this flow is not managed by the local authorities (which only control the flow of their own institutions), taking it into consideration would not significantly change the results: the amount of energy that can be produced from biowaste is minimal. It might be more useful to take biowaste into account in view of a biogeochemical policy (focusing on nitrogen and phosphorus in particular, the importance of which has already been seen above), but this does not seem to be on the agenda despite its importance regarding the challenges of the socioecological transition [BAR 17b]. Another action carried out by local authorities concerns their own collective food services, where their conversion to the triptych quality/proximity/sustainability as described by Sabine Bognon and Pauline Marty would be one of the levers of the socioecological transition [BOG 15]. Once again, the expected results are tenuous. In the case of Paris (city and department), the sustainable food plan aims to reach 50% of sustainable food by 2020, combining the increased use of certified products (organic farming, Label Rouge, sustainable fishing or the Marine Stewardship Council), increased proximity (Ile-de-France and five bordering regions according to the 2010 breakdown), the absence of GMOs, deep-sea fish and palm oil, 100% free-range eggs and a 20% decrease of meat in the diet [MAI n.d.]. This proactive approach must nevertheless be put into perspective: the meals served barely represent 1.4% of the meals had annually in inner Paris (Table 15.3), which

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translates to sustainable meals representing only 0.7% by 2020. The potential driving effect of such a policy cannot be denied as well as its impact in terms of the structuring of those sectors, which are currently poorly adapted to large-scale urban demand. Nevertheless, there is a significant imbalance between the globalized Parisian food system mentioned in section 15.3 and the content of Paris’ decisions on this matter6. It would of course be necessary to dig deeper with this evaluation of the actions carried out by Paris and its metropolitan area and by cities in general. However, these two examples allow us to hypothesize that their lack of physical autonomy, combined with their weak decision-making self-sufficiency and the overemphasis of energy issues in the transition discourse, even though this is also now disguised as circular economy, considerably limit the effectiveness of their actions and often lead them to focus on minor flows, which has the effect of perpetuating the dominant socioecological regime rather than transforming it. Total Total final energy consumptiona

154,440 TJ/year

Of which is residential consumption (33%)a 50,965 TJ/year b

Unit 69,128 MJ per capita/year 22,812 MJ per capita/year

Waste collected (all waste)

1,090,243 tons/year

488 kg per capita/year

Household and other similar wasteb

928,717 tons/year

416 kg per capita/year

Amount of biowaste in household wastec 167,111 tons/year

75 kg per capita/year

Corresponding amount of biogasd

14,287,995 m3/year

6 m3 per capita/year

Corresponding amount of methaned

8,606,219 m3/year

4 m3 per capita/year

Biogas energy contentd

321 TJ/year

144 MJ per capita/year

Share of the total energy/residential consumption 0.21/0.63%

0.21/0.63%

Energy content of the electricity producedd 81 TJ/year

36 MJ per capita/year

Share of the total energy/residential consumption 0.05/0.16%

0.05/0.16%

Table 15.2. The energy potential of the methanization of biowaste from residual a b c d household waste, Paris (according to: [MAI 09]; [MAI 17]; [ORD 14]; [AST 06]d) 6 The analysis of Parisian markets conducted by Sabine Bognon (2014) led to similar results.

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Millions of meals per year a

Residents (absent 4 weeks per year, 2.5 meals/day) Commuters (1 meal/day, 50% of days)

b

1,860 130

c

Tourists (2.5 meal/hotel night)

170 2,160

Total d

Cantines in the city and department of Paris

30

Total (%)

1.4

Table 15.3. The share of the food service industry (managed by the city and department of Paris) in Parisians’ diet. According to [INS 18] for a, it is assumed that residents are absent for a period equivalent to 4 weeks per year (excluding business trips and commuting) and breakfast is taken to equal 0.5 meals; b represents the surplus of non-resident employees working in Paris (it is assumed that they are present 50% of the time and have one meal on the spot); c is based on the number of hotel nights. [MAI n.d.]d

15.5. Conclusion Our findings on the lack of physical autonomy and the very limited self-sufficiency of cities to make their own decisions in terms of metabolism put into perspective their ability to contribute to the socio-ecological transition. This diagnosis, which a long-term approach sheds light on, would need to be outlined, whether we are considering the Paris metropolitan area whose situation we have described in broad strokes and small points, or other cities that have perhaps embraced in a more or less assertive way the flows of energy and materials that keep them alive. These conclusions would need to be completed by reflecting further on the characteristics that urban metabolism should have within the radical socioecological transition framework, which would make the functioning of human societies compatible with that of the biosphere and with a reduction of sociospatial inequalities at all scales. If we take dematerialization (understood as the reduction of consumption of materials and associated with the substitution, as much as possible, of non-renewable resources by renewable ones) as one of the major aspects of this viewpoint [BAR 17b], then how would it translate in terms of metabolism and urban hinterlands? In addition, we should question the conditions and forms of decisionmaking self-sufficiency. Considering the outsourcing of urban metabolism, one of the questions asked is that of cities’ ability to control what is happening beyond their administrative boundaries. Should cities have extraterritorial prerogatives, as was the case with energy in Paris during the Ancien Régime and as it still is with water at present? This proposal would force hinterlands, in the broad sense provided herein,

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to be under the yoke of cities and serve them and hence they would be in line with the generalized urbanization perspective described by Neil Brenner [BRE 14]. Another possibility7 would be that of balanced interregional relations, as defended by the reciprocity agreements put forward by the French General Commission for Territorial Equality, which, however, are struggling to take off. This includes going beyond an urban-centric point of view and defining new relationships between cities and their hinterlands (especially between cities and the countryside). Some initial cases seem to be emerging already [VER 16]. 15.6. References [AUG 17] AUGISEAU V., La dimension matérielle de l’urbanisation. Flux et stocks de matériaux de construction en Ile-de-France, PhD thesis, Université Paris 1 PanthéonSorbonne, 2017. [BAR 09] BARLES S., “Urban metabolism of Paris and its region”, Journal of Industrial Ecology, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 898–913, 2009. [BAR 15] BARLES S., “The main characteristics of urban socio-ecological trajectories: Paris (France) from the 18th to the 20th century”, Ecological Economics, vol. 118, pp. 177–185, 2015. [BAR 17a] BARLES S., “The Seine as a Parisian river: Its imprint, its ascendency and its mutual dependencies in the eighteenth through the twentieth century”, in KNOLL M., LUEBKEN U., SCHOTT D. (eds), Rivers Lost – Rivers Regained? Rethinking City-River Relations, The University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2017. [BAR 17b] BARLES S., “Écologie territoriale et métabolisme urbain : Quelques enjeux de la transition socio-écologique”, Revue d’économie régionale et urbaine, no. 5, pp. 819–836, 2017. [BAR 19] BARLES S., KNOLL M., “Long-term transitions, urban imprint and the construction of hinterlands”, in SOENS T., DE MUNCK B., TOYKA-SEID M. et al. (eds), Urbanizing Nature: Actors and Agency (Dis)connecting Cities and Nature since 1500, Routledge, 2019. [BIL 09] BILLEN G., BARLES S., GARNIER J. et al., “The food-print of Paris: Long term reconstruction of the nitrogen flows imported into the city from its rural hinterland”, Regional Environmental Change, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 13–24, 2009. [BIL 12] BILLEN G., BARLES S., CHATZIMPIROS P. et al. “Grain, meat and vegetables to feed Paris: Where did and do they come from? Localising Paris food supply areas from the eighteenth to the twenty-first century”, Regional Environmental Change, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 325–335, 2012.

7 If we also take into account that of the reform of public procurement [MEY 16], which is less territorialized.

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List of Authors

Sabine BARLES Centre de recherches sur les Réseaux, l'Industrie et l'Aménagement (CRIA) Institute of Geography Pantheon-Sorbonne University Paris France Bruno BARROCA Lab’Urba University of Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée France Guilhem BLANCHARD Technologies, Territories and Society Laboratory (LATTS) University of Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée France Benoit BOUTAUD European Institute for Energy Research (EIFER) Karlsruhe Germany

Arwen Dora COLELL Bavarian School of Public Policy Technical University of Munich Germany Olivier COUTARD Labex Futurs Urbains Paris France Gilles DEBIZET CNRS – Grenoble Institute of Political Studies PACTE Social Science Laboratory Grenoble Alpes University France Ariane DEBOURDEAU Center for Studies on Sustainable Development (CEDD) Université libre de Bruxelles Belgium and Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire des Energies de Demain Paris Diderot University France

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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Laure DOBIGNY Institute of Sociological Research University of Geneva Switzerland Florian DUPONT Franck Boutté Consultants Zefco Paris Zélia HAMPIKIAN Technologies, Territories and Society Laboratory (LATTS) University of Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée France Sylvy JAGLIN Technologies, Territories and Society Laboratory (LATTS) University of Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée France Allan JONES MBE International Energy Advisory Council United Kingdom Fanny LOPEZ Ecole d’architecture de la ville et des territoires (EAVT) Marne-la-Vallée France Raphael MÉNARD AREP and Ecole d’architecture de la ville et des territoires (EAVT) Marne-la-Vallée France

Alain NADAÏ CNRS – Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le Développement (CIRED) Nogent-sur-Marne France Margot PELLEGRINO Lab’URBA University of Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée France Angela POHLMANN Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences University of Hamburg Germany Cyril ROGER-LACAN Tilia Paris France Eric VIDALENC French Environmental and Energy Management Agency (ADEME) Angers Douai Franc

Index

A, C African cities, 296, 309 autonomy process, 187 autonomy temporality, 195 carbon impact, 167, 168, 169, 176 catchment areas, 87, 91, 109, 110, 114, 115, 116 citizen, 213–224, 228–231, 233, 234, 236 cogeneration, 148, 149, 153 communities empowering, 246, 247, 248, 255 framing, 241, 246, 253, 261 companies, 71–74, 78, 80 constraints, 123, 124, 127, 128, 135, 136 cooperative, 71–80 cost-benefit analysis, 164, 170, 171, 174, 181 critical localism, 249–256, 261, 263, 264

D decentralization, 273, 274, 279–287 decentralized solutions, 291–294, 298, 299, 303–309 decision-making self-sufficiency, 331, 341–346

deliberation, 74, 78–81 distributed energy, 4–6, 9, 11

E electrical experiments, 292, 294, 299, 300, 308, 309 hybridizations, 293, 299 electricity generation, 19, 27, 28, 46 electrification, 291–294, 296–300, 303–312 emission density, 110, 112 energy consumption density, 92, 94, 95, 104, 105, 115 harvesting, 97–99, 101, 105, 108, 112 issues, 245, 246, 248, 252, 262, 263 network, 47, 55, 64 systems, 3–5, 9, 13–16 transition, 14–16, 18 environmental measures, 89

F, G, H federal structure, 203 free administration, 273 functional mix, 149

Local Energy Autonomy: Spaces, Scales, Politics, First Edition. Edited by Fanny Lopez, Margot Pellegrino and Olivier Coutard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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Grand Lyon, 146 heat sharing, 164, 165 heating network, 152–154 Hikari, 141, 145–154

resilience functional, 316, 321, 323 urban, 315–320, 329, 330 rural towns, 185, 208

I, L

S

innovation, 239, 245, 248–257, 261, 262, 265, 268, 269 local authorities, 273–288 local governance, 12 London, UK, 20, 22 Lyon Confluence, 145, 146, 152–155

scale jumping, 164 self-consumption, 70, 75, 79–81, 143, 152, 155, 157, 158, 159 self-production, 143 self-sufficient energy models, 187 Seoul, South Korea, 37 background, 37 International Energy Advisory Council, 40 interregional cooperation, 43 One Less Nuclear Power Plant, 38 Seoul Energy Corporation, 41 Seoul International Energy Advisory Council, 39 situational analysis, 216, 233 smart shelters, 316, 325–327 social arenas, 216, 217, 228 contract, 69, 81 worlds, 216–219, 230, 233 socioecological regime, 331–345 solar home systems, 300, 304 panels, 142, 148, 149, 152 sub-Saharan Africa, 292–301, 306, 307, 309 sustainable cities, 9 Sydney, Australia, 24 Advanced Waste Treatment Master Plan, 29 background, 24 Better Buildings Partnership, 31 Carbon Neutral Sydney, 34 City of Sydney Projects, 33 CitySwitch Green Office Program, 30

M marginal abatement cost, 172, 173 meta-system, 316, 324–327 microgrids, 19 mini-grids, 292, 299, 302, 305–308, 312 mutualization, 144, 145, 148, 150

N, O, P negotiation, 214, 216, 217, 219 off-grid, 291–295, 299–301, 304–313 physical autonomy, 331, 335, 341, 345, 346 pioneer towns, 200, 203, 204, 209 positive energy, 163, 164 power, 213–221, 224, 226, 229–236 project levers, 175 prospective scenarios, 70, 71

R regulation, 281, 283, 286 renewable electricity, 91, 97, 98, 105, 107–109 renewable energy, 48, 53, 54, 58–66, 185, 191, 193, 201, 208, 277–279, 280, 284, 285 production, 91, 97, 98, 105–109 renewables, 298

Index

Environmental Upgrade Agreements, 31 Green Infrastructure Plan, 26 Renewable Energy Master Plan, 27 Sustainable Sydney 2030, 25 Trigeneration Master Plan, 26

T, U, W technical choice, 186, 187, 195, 207 technical systems, 316, 319–323

355

territory, 48–53, 57, 59, 66, 273–275, 280–287, 290 Total Social Fact, 186, 209 transition, 47, 48, 54–59, 63–68 urban heating, 121–124, 127–132, 135 hinterlands, 331, 335, 338, 341, 346 water footprint, 338, 349 Woking, UK, 20

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