Linguistics in the Netherlands 1974–1976: Papers [Reprint 2019 ed.] 9783110860016, 9783110133202

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LINGUISTICS IN THE NETHERLANDS 1974 - 1976 edited by WIM ZONNEVELD

LISSE THE PETER DE RIDDER PRESS 1978

(c) Copyright 1978 All rights reserved. ISBN 90 316 0159 4 Printed, in The Netherlands.

CONTENTS - Preface - 1974 - F. Balk - Smit Duyzentkunst

1

Phoneme and Alphabet - G.F. Bos

7

Syntactic Structure and Semantic Relations - Abraham P. ten Cate

19

Semantische Prädikate und Kasusbegriffe - F.G. Droste

35

On Reference and Referents - Henk Haverkate The Vocative Phrase in Modern Spanish. A Contribution to the Study of Illocutionary

46

Functions - Wim Zonneveld

63

Two Problems with Minor Rules - 1975 - L. van Buuren

70

Phonological Hierarchy in English - Ineke Holierhoek

81

Auditory Verbs in Dutch - Frank Jansen

102

Sentence Initial Elements in Spoken Dutch - A.F.V. van Katwijk

109

Accent Patterns in Number Name Sequences - W. van Langendonck Locative and Temporal Prepositions, Semantic

116

Syntax and Markedness Theory - Willem J. Meys

160

Contrast Movement Reconsidered - Wim Zonneveld The Psychological Reality of Angled Brackets

169

X976

W.U.S. van Lessen Kloeke The Features 'Long' and 'Tense' and the Place Stress Rules in German Anneke Neijt Marked Coordination in Conjunction with the SOV - SVO Problem J.J. Spa Les Noms de Nombres Cardinaux en Francais (Approche Arithmético-Générative) Bib1iography

PREFACE Taalkunde in Nederland is the annual conference of the Dutch Algemene Vereniging voor Taalwetenschap. The present volume is a collection of papers presented at the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh TIN-meetings, held at the University of Amsterdam, 26-01-1974, 25-01-1975, and 24-01-1976 (the proceedings of the three former TINs were published as S. Dik, ed., Taalwetenschap in Nederland 1971, University of Amsterdam, 1972; and A. Kraak, ed., Linguistics in the Netherlands 1972-1973, Van Gorcum, Assen, 1975) . In general, the TIN-meetings have the aim of providing linguists working in the Netherlandic language area, in the words of Kraak's preface, "with an opportunity to report on work in progress and to discuss their results with colleagues". As such, the proceedings of the meetings provide an accurate reflection of the activities going on within the Netherlandic linguistic community. In particular, one will find represented below the subfields of algebraic linguistics, phonology, morphology, phonetics, spelling, syntax and semantics. Not all papers presented at the 1974-6 meetings are included below, of course for various reasons. The following papers were read at one of the conferences, but published elsewhere before the appearance of this volume: F.G. Droste: On Proper Names, Leuvense Bijdragen 64, 1-14, 1975 (TIN 1974). A. Evers: Het cyclische karakter van lexicale insertie, contained in The Transformational Cycle in Dutch and German, Ph.D. diss., University of Utrecht, 1975 (reproduced by Indiana University Linguistics Club, 1975 (TIN 1974) . H. Schultink: Plaats en aard van morfologische regels in een transformationeel-generatief taalmodel, Forum der Letteren 15, 23-39, 1974 (TIN 1974). S. Daalder en A. Blom: De strukturele positie van reflexieve en reciproke pronomina, Spektator 5, 397-414, 1976 (TIN 1975). E. Williams: Across-the Board Application of Rules, Linguistic Inquiry 8, 419-23, 1977 (TIN 1975).

G.J. de Haan: Regelordening en domeinformuleringen op transformaties, in G. Koefoed en A. Evers (red.), Lijnen van taaltheoretisch onderzoek, Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, 1976 (279302) (TIN 1976) . D.J. Napoli and M. Nespor: Negatives in Comparatives, Language 52, 811-38, 1976 (TIN 1976). N.S.H. Smith: -AAR, Leuvense Bijdragen 65, 485-96, 1976 (TIN 1976) . The following three papers are included in collections which have been scheduled to appear at approximately the same date as the present one: H. Gilijamse: Homorganic Glide Insertion in Dutch, in Van Coetsem, Robinson, and Zonneveld (forthcoming), Studies in Dutch Phonology. N.S.H. Smith: Foley's scales of relative phonological strength, Communication and Cognition, Phonology Issue. W. Zonneveld: Verbal paradigms in Dutch, id. F.G. Droste's 1974 contribution is replaced by his recent "On reference and referents". Furthermore, the 16 contributions of this volume have been organized into three sections according to year of presentation at TIN, and within each section according to alphabet. Bibliographical references are contained in one overall bibliography at the end of the volume. Finally, gratitude for typing out the manuscript is due to Connie Menting.

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PHONEME AND ALPHABET F. Balk - Smit Duyzentkunst University of Amsterdam

"Do phonemes exist?" is not so much an "odd" question, as an unclear one. It is difficult to find an answer, apart from the philosophical problems caused by discussing the existence of anything, what-so-ever. Nevertheless, some time ago two Dutch linguists wrote in "Vrij Nederland" with great certainty that the phoneme does not 2)

exist, more precisely, does not exist any more

. They con-

cluded to ihe phoneme's death from a.o. Chomsky's arguments for the supposition that a separate phonological level of descrip3) tion must be preferred . The context of their statement was the Dutch "spelling battle", which was topical again in those days. They also stated that the phoneme, being non-existent, represents a senseless concept in alphabetical writing principles . However, I think that for a correct understanding of the question about the existence and function of phonemes it is necessary to analyze the notion "phoneme". The supposed uselessness of a phonological level in a generative grammar as such has no consequences at all for the function of the notion "phoneme", neither in a technical description nor in any other frame, especially concerning the orthography. Although one may have one's doubts about the existence of phonemes, it is clear that the notion phoneme does exist. So one can ask: 1. How is the notion "phoneme" constituted? 2. To what extent is it functional in a language description? 3. To what extent is it functional in language competence and performance? 4. To what extent is it functional in orthography, especially in the alphabetical writing?

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Many indications support my assumption that the phoneme concept would never have been developed without the alphabetic script. On the other hand, it can hardly be denied that, historically, the alphabetical script would never have existed without some unconscious activity of a phoneme concept in the human mind. I emphasize the position of the alphabet in phonemics, because apparently no phonologist ever paid attention to even a possible influence of the alphabet on his phoneme concept formation. On the contrary, the concept "phoneme" has always been presented as concerning sounds and absolutely not letters. In phonology the distribution, the distinctive features and specific regularities of word sound elements are the things that matter. It is, however, remarkable that, to the native speaker, a word consists of letters, not of sounds at all. This native speaker"s intuition also plays a part in all attempts of linguists to "define the phoneme", especially in such structural techniques as the famous "commutation test", the "neutralization" process, and also in the choice of symbols for a socalled "phonological alphabet" (even for a "phonetic alphabet") and of those that stand for the phonological representation in generative phonology. Of course I will not claim that the phoneme concept has nothing to do with speech sounds, but I only try to demonstrate that certain specifications and elaborations of the concepts "phoneme", "phonemic", "phonological" and so on, contain unexplained alphabetical elements. The commutation test is most typical for that. In this test it is presupposed that realizations of phonemes can be isolated and exchanged, e.g. the first phoneme realization and the last one of Dutch [ pop ] ("doll"). The only things that really can be isolated and exchanged are the letters. I challenge anybody to try to isolate the first [ p ] of Dutch "pop", perceivable for the native hearer, without making some extra noise, caused by a little air passing the lips, or without already saying the first beginning of the next phoneme, the [ o ]. It's impossible. The only result is an inaudible pressing together of the lips. What can be isolated is

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just the articulation movement. The supposed ability to replace the first articulation movement by the last one in Dutch

[pop ]

cannot simply be effectuated without inconvenient acousticaudiological consequences: the last [ p ] ends in a short noise, caused by the opening of the lips and the release of some air. If one tries this very same articulation in the beginning of the pronunciation, the result is something like [ p»op ]. On the other hand, if one does not open the lips at the end, and thus "exchanges" the last [ p ] with the first, the audible result is something like [ po: ]. The phonemic identity of the first and the last [ p ]'s however, is in any phonological description taken for granted. The conclusion from all this must be necessarily that the notion "phoneme" is primarily an articulatory one, inasfar as the term "phoneme" suggests that the thing-mentioned can be isolated. Some other phonemes, especially vowels, can more easily be isolated audibly; but for the general notion that also includes plosives, the articulation is the basic factor. Theoretically there must be a corresponding acoustic feature. Such a feature has indeed been demonstrated by phonetic experiments. These experiments caused the phonetician to state that the beginning [ p ] of Dutch [ pop ] must be considered as an 4) acoustic feature of the [ o ] . This statement is caused by the circumstance

that there is no possibility, neither live,

nor mechanical, to isolate the first [ p ] audibly (and consequently acoustically) as the beginning of the word [ pop ] without producing the [ o ]. It is plausible that the natural feeling of linguists that phonemes (or "segments") can be isolated and exchanged, has arisen from their familiarity with the alphabet, and the supposition that there is in principle a fundamental correspondence between letter and phoneme, a supposition which is not completely supported by reality and which is formed unconsciously and intuitively. It can be rather misleading if one wants to "define the phoneme" or justify the choice of symbols that have to stand for the phonological representation in generative phonology.

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In Dutch there is a striking example of the deceptive suggestions of the alphabetic writing in phonemics. Some linguists maintain that the Dutch language has a.o. one well defined phoneme: the so-called "sjwa" [a]

(the vowel in Dutch "de"

("the") approximately the same as the vowel in English "the"), which vowel must be expressly distinguished from Dutch [ A ]like in Dutch "dus" (approximately the same as the vowel in English "first").The difference between the two sounds, in articulatory and acoustic properties cannot very well be demonstrated empirically, and if it could, it is so small that in no other case it would be a reason to consider the sounds as two "autonomous" phonemes. In polysyllables containing both [A] and [a] the first is never stressed; so only this "nonstress" feature must justify the differentiation. But nowhere else stress is used to differentiate vowel phonemes from each other. Naturally such an ad hoc criterion must be rejected, because it is in conflict with the general characteristics of "the" phoneme. Yet Dutch native speakers have a strong intuitive reluctance to identify Dutch [A] and [ i] , and to label the last one "unstressed [A]". Analyzing the Dutch spelling system, I must conclude that the psychological reluctance is caused primarily by this spelling system: the identification of [A] and [»] cannot be expressed in writing in a recognizable way to the native writer/reader. In our orthography [A] is written as 'u', and [d] as 'e1. Replacing 'u' for [A] by 'e' results in the pronunciation of a third sound, evidently neither [A] , nor [ a] , but [£] ;"results to the native reader in the pronunciation of" I shall replace by the symbol /•pet'

>

» . So 'dus'/'des'

* [dAs] / [des] , 'put'

[pAt] / [pit], (Dutch for "thus" / "of the" and

"pit" or "well" / "cap",respectively). On the other hand, replacing 'e' for [»] by 'u' neither [A] , nor

>

a fourth sound, evidently

[a] , nor [£ ] , but [ ii] : the written forms

•de'/'du'—) [da]/[du]; 'ne'/'nu'

»[ n»J /[ nii] , (Dutch for

"the"/(nonsense form) and (nonsense form)/"now",respectively. No two other similar sounds for which phonemic identity could be claimed are reproduced in writing in a so divergent way that in the spelling system the identification cannot be expressed.

I will not deny that

the so-called "sjwa" ([a]) in Dutch has

an exceptional position in many respects (e.g. as "svarrabhakti vowel"), but this is no reason to distinguish it phonemically from [A] . "Phoneme" has always been presented as a general notion relatsd to speech, not to script, and within this general concept Dutch [A] and [3] ought to be identified. I see just one explanation for the intuitive unwillingness to do so: the Dutch alphabetic system, mastered by the Dutch native speaker/hearer, for whom writing and reading are almost automatic activities, of which he is hardly aware, forces him to protest. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the Dutch children who begin to write, always identify [A ] and [a] in their script; they write e.g. "lievu tantu" instead of "lieve tante" (Dutch for "dear aunt"). I think it is useful, to further investigate the influence of the alphabetic script on our phonemic concept formation. So three conclusions can be drawn. 1. Our factual phoneme concept is not independent of our knowledge of the alphabetic

script.

2. The phoneme, as a general nonalphabetic notion, directly related to speech, is primarily an articulatory concept, with corresponding acoustic features, that can only be demonstrated if at least- a whole syllabe is pronounced

.

3. The phoneme concept (as well as the notions derived from it) as formulated under 2., are functional in competence, in performance, in language description, as well as in alphabet ic writing. MORAL The phoneme concept is apparently rather complicated. Therefore the existence of the phoneme is neither more nor less questionable than the existence of anything else.

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Notes 1. The analysis of the influence of the alphabetic writing on phonemic concept formation I presented earlier in a lecture for a team of phoneticians and linguists in the Institute of Phonetic Sciences (University of Amsterdam), 1963. I then did not yet relate my study to the other questions dealt with in this paper. 2. G. Booy and S. de Haan (1972a :15); Id. (1972b ). 3. N. Chomsky and M. Halle (1968). 4. Alvin M. Liberman et al. (1956). 5. "Die kleinsten Segmente, die noch eine klare Abfolge zu bilden scheinen, sind die Silben. Innerhalb der Silbe aber ist die Abfolge traditionell festgelegt durch die unlineare Konzeption der griechischen Alphabetschrift". H. Lüdtke (1969: 147-76).

SYNTACTIC STRUCTURE AND SEMANTIC RELATIONS G.F. Bos Free University of Amsterdam

1• Introduction In this paper I would like to stress the importance of the distinction between syntactic structure and the semantic relational configuration (SRC) of the (sub)categorial semantic aspect (S)CA of the stem morpheme of the verb. In Bos 1971 (190-195) I demonstrated how differences in syntactic and morphological features lead to the establishment of three subcategories of the verb (in Dutch), each with a SCA functionally related to these features. The SCA is defined as that aspect of the total meaning of the individual members of the subcategory which is common to them all. The SCA's of these three subcategories were shown to contain a semantic aspect 'relation' to one or more relata (the terms of the relation), i.e. a semantic relational configuration. The categorial semantic aspect of the stem morpheme of the verb bouwen (build) contains the SRC: 'thought of as an 'activi ty' originating from 'something' thought of as 'acting', direct ly related to 'something' thought of as 'acted upon' (Bos, 19 71 194; 1969; 1972). The semantic structure of the SCA of bouwen is demonstrated in the following diagram:

CA: SCA:

BOUWEN thought of as 'elapsing in time' A * 'Activity' >B (=SRC)

2. Function of the semantic relational configuration The SRC can be shown to be functioning completely in all uses of the verb, even though there is no explicit reference to the

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relata in the word content of the sentence. a. The SRC may remain completely implicit: bouwen is beter dan slopen (building is better than pulling down). In the infinitives bouwen and slopen the somebody who is 'acting' and the something that is 'acted upon' are present in the interpretation, but remain implicit. The same holds good for (1) - (3) , (13) and (18) . b. The SRC may be incompletely explicit: het bouwen van huizen (the building of houses) and (4) - (7), (14) and (15); only one of the relata (thought of as 'acted upon') is explicitly referred to; the other is again present in the interpretation. c. The SRC may be completely explicit: het bouwen van huizen door arbeiders (.. by labourers) or de huizen worden door de arbeiders gebouwd (.. are being built by) and (8) - (12), (16), (17) and (19) - (21) . From this we may conclude that the SRC belongs to, is contained in the SCA of the stem morpheme of the verb, that it may be completely or incompletely explicited in diverse kinds of syntactic structures, and that it is a property of the SCA of the verbstem. From (22) - (24) we may conclude that the verbstem of impersonal verbs like regenen (rain), hagelen (hail) etc. do not contain an SRC; the SCA is only 'state of things'; it is not thought of as related to something. 3. The differences between the SRC and Tesniere's 'Valence' The question may arise whether the SRC is not merely another label for what Tesniere (1953, 4 ff.; 1959, 103 ff.) and, for instance Helbig cum suis (1971) call Valence (Valenz). There is, however, an important difference. In the Valenztheorie the attention is focussed on the number of (obligatory or optional) NOMINAL MEMBERS (parts of the sentence) requested by the use of a FINITE FORM of the verb, although Valenz seems to be considered as a property of the verbstem. For essen, for instance, we often find essen^, ^ ^ ^ , referring to the fact that both er iszt Brot and er iszt

are possible. Wohnen appears to have the

Valenz 2, because of the impossibility of er wohnt without a

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local adjunct (er wohnt in Dresden). We may observe, however, that, though er wohnt cannot be used without an 'adjunct1, this need not necessarily be a local adjunct, cf. er wohnt schön, gut etc. Moreover, the relation between wohnen and the local adjunct seems to be of a different character from the relations between essen and its relata; in essen ist gesund the somebody who is eating and the something which is eaten, are implicit in the interpretation. The case of wohnen is quite different. It requires an adjunct, a semantic complement, in every use, cf. •wohnen ist angenehm; gut (in Dresden) wohnen ist angenehm. In fact, the opposite of what I said for essen, is true; the 'location' or 'quality' is not implicit in the interpretation; it*must be expressed by means of an adjunct; wohnen seems to be semantically incomplete. I would conclude that the relation to something thought of as the 'place' of wohnen is not an aspect of the SRC, which is: thought of as 'state of things' valid for 'something', i.e. Valenz 1. One other example may suffice. In Helbig's (1971, 41) analysis of wir wollen ihn besuchen the Valenz of besuchen, which is undoubtedly 2, is left out of account. Now the most interesting feature of the SRC is that wir is interpreted as the somebody who visits and ihn as the somebody who is visited. This again goes to show that the SRC is a semantic property of the SCA of the verbstem, which may be explicited in different syntactic structures, cf. lachend kwam hij binnen (he entered laughing) in which hij is interpreted as the somebody who is thought of as 'acting' (lachend) and as the something for which the 'originating of a state of things' (kwam) is valid. In Latin morphological congruence seems to work together with the SRC of the verbstem to help the user of the language to the right interpretation, cf. ridens intrabat; ridentes intrabant; ridens pueros domum intrantes vidit; domum intrans pueros ridentes vidit. In Dutch word order fulfills this role: lachend kwam hij binnen; hij zag hen lachend binnenkomen. The Valenzgrammatik focusses on the SYNTACTIC question of how many nominal members are requested by the FINITE FORM of the verb, and presents the answer to this question, wrongly it seems

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to me, as a property of the verbstem or of the infinitive. For the establishment of the SRC of the verbstem, however, it is necessary to test all the uses of the verbstem, not only that of the finite form. As may be seen from what is said above this constitutes an important difference, and leads, moreover, to different results. It is only after having taken account of all the uses of the verbstem, that one may decide as to (1) which SRC is present and (2) conclude that it is a property of the SCA of the verbstem. 4. The difference between the SRC and syntactic structure It is important to distinguish between the SRC, which is responsible for the interpretation, and the syntactic structure in which it is explicited. On the one hand the SAME SRC may be explicited in different syntactic structures, which is the case in (8) - (12) . On the other hand the SAME SYNTACTIC STRUCTURE may serve as a frame for the expliciting of DIFFERENT SRC'S: (a) een huis bouwen, (b) een huis bezitten (to possess a house) are instances of the same syntactic structure: any verbform - direct object. Any difference in morphological or syntactic features can be put down to the choice of verbs belonging to different subcategories. The syntactic relation between the words, and the semantic function of this syntactic structure remain the same. It may be described as the relation between any form of the verb and a noun (with CA 'thought of as something') or the equivalent of a noun, having the semantic function: that which is thought of as 'elapsing in time' is thought of as directly related to 'something' which is thought of as a non-active participant (Bos 1972, 13). The choice of bouwen and bezitten with different SRC's is responsible for the difference in interpretation: in (a) een huis is interpreted as the something which is 'acted upon'; in (b) as the something which is directly related to the 'state of things'. A syntactic structure such as noun + a prepositional construction consisting of the preposition van (of) and a noun, whose semantic function is very general, in the sense of non-

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specific, i.e. any relation between 'something1 and 'something', may be interpreted in many different ways, according to the semantic classes or semantic-syntactic, i.e. (sub)categorial, classes of the words chosen. The following constructions are all instances of the same syntactic structure, displaying the same features: (c) de poten van de tafel (the legs of the.table); (d) een standbeeld van Myro (a statue of Myro('s) or by Myro; in Dutch only van, not door); (e) het bouwen van huizen (the building of houses); (f) het kruipen van kleuters (the crawling of infants); (g) het vallen van de bladeren (the falling of the leaves). The choice of the infinitives of verbs in Dutch as substantivetranspositions (i.e. with the CA 'something', but containing in their SCA's different SRC's) is responsible for huizen in (e) being interpreted as the 'something' which is 'acted upon', kleuters in (f) as the 'something' thought of as 'acting' and bladeren in (g) as the 'something' to which the 'originating of a state of things' imparts itself (both verbs having only one relatum in their SRC's). In (c) and (d), however, because of the absence of an SRC, no such interpretation is possible; the semantic function of the syntactic structure together with the influence of the choice of words leads to the interpretation in (c) of legs belonging to the table or the table having legs. In (d) matters are more complicated: we know that things in the outer world for which we use the word statue are usually made by people for which we use the word sculptor or artist, that these statues may represent some person and may be in the possession of someone. Moreover, we know of the habit of artists to portray themselves. On the basis of this knowledge of the outer world (d) may have, according to the circumstances, all the above-mentioned interpretations, provided we know that Myro was a Greek sculptor. 5. Syntactic structure Contrary to the prevailing belief in generative and TG-grammar the so-called surface structure is not so uninformative as we are asked to believe.

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In the first half of this century European and American linguists of diverse persuasions, nowadays commonly called structuralists, criticized traditional grammar for its inadequate definitions and inconsistent criteria of analysis as a result of which valuable work has been done in the field of syntactics. The 'wordgroup' or 'construction', a domain sorely neglected by traditional grammar, came into the limelight. Linguists like Jespersen (1924), Hjelmslev (1953), Firth (1957), Bloomfield (1933), De Groot (1939, 1949 a/b, 1956, 1968) to mention only a few names, searched for criteria to analyse the sentence and to describe and define types of constructions. In the USA, in spite of the very valuable work done by Pike (1954-1960) , IC analysis came to the forefront, and exercised a strong influence on European linguistics after the second world war, though it was severely criticized too (a.o. Haas, 1955, 1960, 1973; De Groot, 1957, 1968). In fact most European linguists regarded IC analysis as inadequate. In the sixties Chomsky told us explicitly that, though inadequate, IC analysis could be cured by supplementing it by the creation of deep structure and transformations (1965, Ch. II). Critical contemplation of his ideas on the question of how to elicit valuable information for linguistic analysis, however, reveals that he is simply reintroducing the deficient analysis of traditional grammar. The empirically justified criticism of traditional grammar ought to be well-known, so I shall not repeat it. Its most serious defect is the preoccupation with the declarative sentence with a finite form to the exclusion of the analysis and description of syntactic relations on the level of the construction, a defect which seems to have escaped the attention of Chomsky and generative linguists in general. And this cannot be cured by accepting IC analysis as uncontroversial or by introducing deep structure 'cases' or semantics as a substitute. With Haas (1973, 106) I am of the opinion that 'There seems to be no other way than to ask, once more, for EMPIRICAL CRITERIA of syntactic cohesion (to explain the bracketings) and of categorization (to explain the labels) - i.e. for operational

- 13 criteria, the operations being performed on concrete rather than upon intrinsically obscure

sentences,

notations'.

Careful analysis of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations between the words of a sentence under the restriction that in applying, for instance, substitution and omission

tests,

the functional part - whole and part - part relations remain the same, may lead to the discovery of conventional types of combinations of words like those mentioned above

(e.g. verbform -

direct object). These syntactic structures appear to have a conventional semantic function, created by the interaction of the

(S)CA's of the members

(words), which, as has been demon-

strated above, is very general. It is this level of analysis, the level of the SYNTACTIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WORDS OF A SENTENCE, which is almost totally neglected in generative grammar. The differences in INTERPRETATION, due to either the SRC's of verbforms or the SEMANTIC CLASSES of the constituents, are considered as differences in syntactic structure and accounted for by different deep structures. The result is that syntax dissolves into different kinds of interpretative semantics

(Chomsky,

1965;

Fillmore, 1968; Anderson, 1971; a.o.) and that the similarity in syntactic structure is left out of account. An empirically justified description of the syntactic

frame

with its semantic function, within which the SRC's operate, is of the utmost importance, and in this respect generative

gram-

mar is inadequate. 6. Illustration of the importance of the distinction SRC and syntactic Examples

between

structure

(25) - (28) are usually viewed as instances of the

same syntactic structure: noun, functioning as subject finite verbform. Only in the case of het regent

(it rains) doubt

sometimes arises, due to the fact that het has no paradigm here and no referent in the outer world. As regards 'locational' er

(29), the

(English there, German da) is usually not con-

sidered as the subject, but the fact remains that it is required in Dutch in the position or function of a subject, whenever a

- 14 finite verb is used. It is not so easy, though, to discover the semantic function of this syntactic structure (De Groot, 1968, 64; DaneS, 1968, 55 ff.; Fillmore, 1968, 6, 16; a.o.). Fillmore even denies the existence of a 'semantically constant value' for the notion 'subject of'. It is clear that the semantic function cannot be reduced to a common denominator of the SRC's, their mutual differences being too great. Even the attempt to weaken the semantic function to: 'relation between that which is thought of as 'elapsing in time' and its first relatum', is bound to fail, because of huizen in (27) not being the first relatum and regent in (28) not having a SRC and consequently no relatum. There is, nevertheless, a characteristic common to (25) (29): whenever a finite verb is used, a subject is required in Dutch (and in English), even with regent (rains). My conclusion is, that the syntagmatic relation holds between the FINITE-NESS OF THE VERB and the subject. The semantic function may be described as follows: by means of the finite form 'that which is thought of as 'elapsing in time'' is placed in a period of time with a determinate relation to the time of the speech act and is spatially located in 'something', referred to by the word content of the subject. The relation Subject - Finite form is a time-space relation. That nouns and their equivalents can be shown to be categorized as 'spatial' has been argued by Balk (1963, 122): 'In de trein (the train) the train is thought of as in some way spatially defined, i.e. it can occupy a given space. In de trein reed (the train moved) the space which the train occupies is thought of as in unision with time'. (Translation mine). When there is no SRC as in regenen, the semantic function of het regent is as described above; by means of het the 'state of things' is spatially located in 'something' (CA of het), which, though 'definite', cannot be referred to in more specific terms. In the case of er wordt gewandeld the 'activity' is spatially located in er, which refers to a 'place', which cannot be referred to in more specific terms, cf. er wordt gewandeld;

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hier wordt gewandeld; er wordt hier gewandeld. When there is an SRC, the relation between subject and finite form is, apart from and above the semantic 'time-space' function, interpreted according to the specific character of the SRC: he builds houses ('actor1-'activity'-'acted upon'); he sleeps (well) ('state of things' valid for 'something'), etc. 7. Conclusion Apart from my plea for a reintroduction of analysis and description of syntactic structure and its semantic function, and for the recognition of the existence of the SRC as well as of the distinction between SRC and syntactic structure, I would venture the following remarks on semantics. At least three semantic levels should be distinguished. First, at the level of the word the semantics of the categorial and subcategorial aspect of the word classes, i.e. classes of words or stem morphemes which have morphological and syntactic features in common. Second, the level of the semantic function of syntactic structures. On this level the word classes, categories on the lower level, appear to have determinate functions as members of syntactic structures, the categories of the constructional level. It appears that the possibility or impossibility of membership of a given construction depends on the SCA's of the words. These syntactic structures with their very general semantic function supply the syntactic frame for the highest semantic level, the level of interpretation. In a way Chomsky was right in stressing the interpretative character of his deep structure, for nearly all functional and semantic observations of traditional grammar are interpretative. But the level of interpretation, important though it is, cannot be viewd as the one and only explanation of syntactic and semantic structure without damage to the explicitness and justification of the grammar proposed.

-

16

-

EXAMPLES Verba personalia Subcategory A1 intransitive Completely implicit: 1. wandelen is gezond; walking is healthy.

A2 transitive 1. bouwen is beter dan slopen; building is better than pulling down.

2. er wordt gewandeld.

2. er wordt gebouwd.

3. Loop! Walk!

3.

Incompletely explicit: 4.

4. de huizen worden gesloopt; the houses are (being) pulled down. 5. er worden huizen gesloopt. 6. sloopt het huis! pull down the house! 7. het slopen van huizen; the pulling down of houses.

Completely explicit: 8. de kleuters kruipen; the infants crawl. 9. het kruipen van kleuters; the crawling of infants;

de arbeiders bouwen de huizen; the labourers build the houses, het slopen van huizen door arbeiders; ... by labourers.

Jantje's kruipen; John's crawling. 10 .

10. de huizen worden door de ar-

11.

11. er worden huizen gebouwd door

beiders gebouwd. de arbeiders. 12. lachendfkwam hij

ij (they)

(kwamen z binnen; he

entered laughing.

12. huizen bouwend is hij rijk geworden; door huizen te bouwen zijn ze rijk geworden; building houses he (they) has (have) grown rich.

- 17 -

Subcategory B1

B2

intransitive

transitive

Completely implicit: 13. slapen is gezond; sleeping is healthy

13. hebben is beter dan krijgen; having is better than getting.

Incompletely explicit: 14.

14. een huis bezitten is beter dan er §§n moeten huren; possessing a house is better than having to rent one.

15.

15. het hebben van kinderen; the possessing of children.

Completely explicit: 16. hij slaapt; he sleeps.

16. hij heeft een huis; he has a

17 .

17. zonder geld te bezitten was

house hij (waren zij) toch rijk; without possessing money he was (they were) still rich. Subcategory C intransitive Completely implicit: 18. vallen is pijnlijk; falling is painful. Completely explicit: 19. de bladeren vallen; the leaves fall. 20. het vallen van de bladeren; the falling of the leaves. 21. door vallen en opstaan heeft hij veel geleerd; cf. in doing this he has learned much.

-

18

-

Verba impersonalia 22. *regenen is plezierig;

raining ( to rain) is pleasant.

23. * door hagelen wordt soms het gewas vernietigd;

through

hailing the crop may be destroyed. 24. *regenend was het zonnig;

raining it was sunny.

Subject - Verbum finitum 25. hij wandelt; hij bouwt (het huis); he walks; he builds (the house). 26. hij slaapt; hij heeft (een huis); he sleeps; he has (a (house) 27. de huizen worden gesloopt; the housen are (being) pulled down. 28. het regent; it rains 29. er wordt gewandeld.

-

19 -

SEMANTISCHE PRÄDIKATE UND KASUSBEGRIFFE Abraham P. ten Cate University of Groningen

0. Im Laufe der Zeit sind mehrere Kriterien entwickelt worden, um die verschiedenen von Fillmore vorgeschlagenen Kasus identifizieren zu können. Ein Grund für die Beschäftigung mit der Kasusgrammatik ist die Erkentnis, daß die semantischen Relationen, die mit den Kasusbegriffen eingeführt werden, einen vertretenswerten Versuch darstellen, einen Teil der Intuitionen der Sprachgebraucher zu explizieren. Nicht unumstritten ist die Frage, ob diese Intuitionen auch nicht auf andere Weise ausgedrückt werden können (Chomsky 1972, 174ff.). Auf dieses Problem werde ich kaum eingehen; mich wird hier besonders beschäftigen, auf welche Weise man zu einer sinnvollen Definition und Abgrenzung der Instrumental- und Agenskasus,^die sich manchmal als sehr verwandt erweisen, kommen kann 1.

Zunächst möchte ich auf die Frage eingehen, wie es bezüglich

dieser beiden Kasus zu Verwirrungen kommen konnte. 1.1 Fillmore kennt zur Unterscheidung von Instrumental und Agentiv folgende Kriterien: (a) Der Referent eines Agentivs ist ein belebtes, normalerweise sogar menschliches Wesen. Der Instrumental ist dagegen "der Kasus der unbelebten Kraft..." (Fillmore 1968, 24); (b) Beide Kasus haben einen Bezug zur vom Verb ausgedrückten Handlung, der, und dies ist ein kritischer Punkt, nicht deutlich angegeben wird: der Agentiv drückt den instigator des vom Verb ausgedrückten Geschehens aus, der Instrumental ist causally involved in dem Geschehen. Diese Eigenschaften, zusammen mit einigen anderen, die aus den Begriffsbestimmungen in The Case for Case abgeleited werden können, reichen für so eindeutige Fälle wie Satz (1), (1) Karl zerschlug die Kiste mit einem Hammer. wo die Verteilung von Agentiv und Instrumental in den Nominal-

-

20

-

phrasen auf der Hand liegt. Es handelt sich in diesem und ähnlichen von Fillmore diskutierten Fällen um kausative Handlungsverben mit einem affizierten Objekt. Undurchsichtiger ist die Lage bei Sätzen, wo der Agentiv fehlt und an Subjektstelle ein Instrumental erscheint. In Sätzen ohne Agentiv aber mit einem Instrumental an Subjektstelle wird der Agentiv häufig vorausgesetzt. So z.B. in (2) und (3): (2) The key opens the door. (3) Der Stein zerbricht das Fenster. Man darf annehmen, daß ein

in der zugrundeliegenden Struktur

vorhandener Agentiv getilgt worden ist. Es gibt aber Fälle, wo diese Erklärung nicht plausibel erscheint. Bekannte und vieldiskutierte Fälle sind hier die Witterungserscheinungen, von denen umstritten ist, ob sie dem Agentiv, dem Instrumental, oder sogar einem eigenen Kasus Force zugewiesen werden sollen (4) : (4) Der Sturm entwurzelte viele Bäume. Problematisch in Bezug auf eine Zuordnung der Aktanten zu Agentiv und/oder Instrumental ist auch eine Gruppe von Phänomenen, die ich, mangels eines besseren Terminus, hier "psychische Kräfte" nennen möchte ((5) und (6)): (5) Er spendete aus Mitleid. (6) Die Angst trieb ihn zu dieser Tat. Ein starres Festhalten an dem animateness-Kriterium zur Unterscheidung von Agentiven und Instrumentalen führt in diesen Fällen zu intuitiv unbefriedigenden Kasuszuordnungen. 1-2 Als formal-syntaktische Hilfsmittel zur Abgrenzung der Kasus verwendet Fillmore (1968) zwei Prinzipien: 1. Das Koordinationsprinzip, nach dem nur Nominalphrasen mit gleicher Kasuszuordnung sich verbinden lassen; 2. Ein Kasus darf nur einmal in einem

-

21

-

einfachen Satz vorkommen. Auch diese Prinzipien und das mit inhen verbundene Verfahren sind umstritten. Das Koordinationsprinzip ist von Dougherty (1970) angegriffen worden mit Hilfe von Sätzen wie (7) und (8): (7) *Der Wind und die Säge fällten den Baum. (8) *John opened the door with a key and the wind. Das Prinzip, daß ein Kasus nur einmal in einem einfachen Satz vorkommen darf, wird von Fillmore (1971) ausführlich besprochen im Zusammenhang mit einem Vorschlag Huddiestons, für die Naturkräfte einen neuen Kasus Force einzuführen. Er verwirft diesen Vorschlag hauptsächlich aus dem Grunde, daß Forces weder mit Agentiven noch mit Instrumentalen kontrastieren. Fillmore betrachted Naturkräfte als Instrumentale aus zwei Gründen: (a) Das Prinzip nach dem ein Kasus nur einmal im einfachen Satz vorkommen darf, erklärt dann die Ungrammatikalität von (9), da in diesem Satz zwei Instrumentale vorkommen. (9) The thunder frightened the cattle with lightning. Würde man Forces als Agentive betrachten, so sollte offenbar für diese Gruppe das Vorkommen von Instrumentalen ausgeschlossen werden, und das wäre eine ad hoc-Beschränkung für die Witterungserscheinungen . (b) Wenn Forces generell dem Instrumental zugeordnet werden, können Sätze, in denen eine göttliche Kraft als Urheber der Naturkräfte vorkommt, eleganter erklärt werden, als wenn sie 2)

Agentive waren In dem gleichen Aufsatz (1971) bringt Fillmore aber auch einde neue Analyse des Verbs hit in einem Satz wie (10), (10) I hit the ball over the fence. wobei in der zugrundeliegenden Struktur zwei Sätze vorkommen, die in das semantische Prädikat CAUSE eingebettet werden. Das Prinzip, daß ein Kasus nur einmal in einem einfachen

-

22

-

Satz vorkommen darf, ist nich eindeutig, da es auch vom grammatischen Modell und von der Beschreibungsebene abhängt, was unter einem einfachen Satz zu verstehen ist. Er müßte doch zumindest deutlich sein, ob diese Prinzipien auf die zugrundeliegende, z.T. prälexikalische Struktur anzuwenden sind oder auf eine der Oberflächenstruktur näherliegende Ebene oder auf die Oberflächenstruktur selbst. Die Unsicherheiten, die sich mit dem Gebrauch dieser Fillmoreschen Prinzipien verbinden, hängen z.T. mit dem Status der Kasusgrammatik als Grammatikmodell zusammen. Daß der Kasusgrammatik ein selbständiger Status eigentlich nicht zukommt, dafür zeugen wiederholte Versuche, die Kasusbegriffe in Tagmemik (Platt 1971) und Dependenzgrammatik (Robinson 1969, Vater 1973) unterzubringen. Dabei hat sich die Unmöglichkeit ergeben, die Kasus im Status semantisch-syntaktischer, selbständiger Kategorien aufrechtzuerhalten. Eine Möglichkeit, dem "kasuellen Zwitterstatus" abzuhelfen, ist das von Robinson, Nilsen (1973) und Vater (1973, 133ff.) praktizierte Verfahren, die Kasus als semantische Merkmale in die komplexen Symbole von Verben aufzunehmen: sie werden daher in die Merkmalbündel der Aktanten kopiert. Die Versuche einer Integration von Kasusgrammatik und generativer Semantik gehen darauf hinaus, daß die einzelnen Aktanten in Verbindung mit ständig begleitenden Prädikaten auftreten, die die Verbindung zwischen Aktant und Satzprädikat schaffen. Bei den kausativen Handlungsverben, auf die ich mich hier beschränken werden, treten sowohl Agentiv wie Instrumental in Verbindung mit dem semantischen Prädikat CAUSE auf. Den evidenten Unterschied zwischen beiden Kasus etablieren weitere Prädikate. 2.

Im Folgenden werde ich einige Arbeiten besprechen, in denen

die hier diskutierte Problematik anklingt und untersuchen, welche Zusammenhänge zwischen Kasusbegriffe und einigen semantischen Prädikaten angenommen werden können. 2.1 Huddieston (1970) diskutiert Kausalitätsverhältnisse im

- 23 Zusammenhang mit den Witterungserscheinungen. Sein Ausgangspunkt ist, daß Fillmore bei den Kasusdefinitionen allzu einseitig davon ausgeht, daß die einzelnen Kasus unterschieden werden sollen, wodurch Gemeinsamkeiten nicht berücksichtigt werden. Huddieston verwirft das animateness-Kriterium, das in The Case for Case der einzige Grund ist, weshalb die Naturkräfte als Instrumentale aufgefaßt werden, da animate, wie Huddieston bemerkt, kein relationales, sondern ein inhärentes Merkmal ist. Einer seiner Vorschläge ist, Force und Agentiv in einem Cause.Kasus zusammenzufassen. Man braucht dann noch ein zusätzliches Merkmal [+ Intentional] o.ä., um den intentionalen Agentiv davon trennen zu können. Dieser Vorschlag trägt der Tatsache Rechnung, daß jeder Satz, der einen Agentiv enthält, in der Oberflächenstruktur prinzipiell zweideutig ist

. Merkmale

wie [+ Intentional], [+ Purposive] oder [+ Volition] sind zu dieser Unterscheidung brauchbar, während Filimores animatenessKriterium dazu nicht beiträgt. Das Kriterium wurde u.a. von Zoeppritz (1971) und Poldauf (1970) angegriffen, und Fillmore (1971) machte es rückgänging. Das heißt aber zugleich, daß er sein wesentlichstes zwischen Agentiv und Instrumental unterscheidendes Merkmal fallen ließ. 2.2 Filimores letzter Beitrag zur Kasusgrammatik (1971) enthält einen interessanten, wenn auch nicht sehr expliziten Vorschlag zur Kausalität. Sein Vorschlag ist dieser: der Satz (10) wird auf zwei zugrundeliegende Sätze zurückgeführt: (11) I hit the ball. (12) The ball went over the fence. die beide in das semantische Prädikat CAUSE eingebettet . werden (13), (13)

S o

-

24

-

wobei S in instrumentaler, S_ is goal-Relation zu CAUSE 4) steht . Die innere Struktur der Propositionen wird nicht aufgehellt; es ist jedoch anzunehmen, daß auch da Kasusrelationen vorliegen und daß in (13) der Agentiv in der ersten, instrumentalen Proposition angesetzt werden soll. Dies beinhaltet eine Aufspaltung des Kasusbegriffs in mindestens zwei Kategorien: erstens gibt es Kasusrelationen zwischen dem semantischen Prädikat und den in ihm eingebetteten Propositionen; darüber- . hinaus gibt es noch Kasusrelationen innerhalb der Propositio5) nen Der Agentiv wird von Fillmore (1971) nicht ausführlich behandelt, da er diesen Kasus modifizieren möchte. Deutlich wird, daß der Agentiv als principle cause am Anfang einer Kausalitätskette steht. Der Instrumental ist der Kasus der unmittelbaren Ursache (immediate cause) eines Ereignisses oder, im Falle eines psychologischen Prädikats, der Stimulus, das Ding, auf welches reagiert wird. Diese Umschreibungen sind kein Fortschritt gegenüber denen in The Case for Case, wo der Agentiv der instigator einer Handlung, der Instrumental "causally involved" genannt werden. Eine wesentliche Modifizierung gegenüber früheren Vorschlägen zur Kausalität ist es, daß CAUSE als Relation zwischen zwei Propositionen aufgefaßt wird. Daß etwas bewirkt wird erfolgt nicht durch eine Person oder einen Gegenstand, sondern eine Handlung oder ein Zustand 6) bewirkt eine andere Handlung oder einen anderen Zustand . So wird auch McCawley's (1972) Analyse des Verbs kill in (14)

alive

y

- 25 wo x den Tod des y herbeiführt, von Fillmore dahingehend abgeändert, daß eine Handlung des x den Tod des y zur Folge hat. 2.3 Dowty (1972) bringt einen ähnlichen, aber expliziteren Vorschlag. Er bezieht sich auf eine Arbeit von Ross (1972) , der für Handlungsverben ein zweistelliges Prädikat DO einführt, in das einerseits das Subjekt als Agentiv, anderseits das Verbs eingebettet wird. Dowty beschränkt sich auf die sogenannten accomplishment verbs, das sind Handlungsverben, mit denen sich eine Änderung des Objekts verbindet, also etwa töten, zeichnen, 7) zerschlagen, usw. (perfektiv-resultative Verben) . Zur Beschreibung dieser Verben benötigt man das Prädikat CAUSE, mit dem, wie auch Dowty meint, als Argumente zwei Propositionen verbunden sind. Anstelle von McCawley1s kill-Analyse (14) schlägt Dowty eine Analyse (15) vor, in der das Prädikat zwei Satzargumente dominiert. Diese Analyse entspricht Filimores Vorstellungen.

alive

Harry

Mit Hilfe des Prädikats DO, das immer bei Handlungsverben vorkommt und dann den Agentiv dominiert,kann Dowty die Ambiguität zwischen intentional und nicht-intentional bei den accomplishment verbs aufheben. (15) repräsentiert die nicht-intentionale Lesart, in (16) wird das Prädikat CAUSE noch einmal eingebettet Q\ in das Prädikat DO

-

(16)

S DO

26

-

o

John

S

CAUSE

S

DO

John

1

S

2 S

4

3

BECOME

John

S5

NOT alive

S

6 Harry

Es ergibt sich hierbei, dag die Analyse mit Hilfe semantischer Prädikate die Inhaltsdefinition des Agentifs beeinflußt. Das heißt, daß es für einige Phänomene, die bis jetzt von Fillmore nicht zum Agentiv gerechnet wurden, auf Grund der Prädikatenanalyse nicht mehr sinnvoll ist, sie einem andern Kasus zuzuordnen. 2.4 Der Instrumental steht gleichfalls im kausalen Verhältnis zu der vom Verb ausgedrückten Tätigkeit, müßte also auch von CAUSE dominiert werden. Zunächst werde ich ein Inventar aufstellen von den Instrumentaltypen, die von dieser kausalen Analyse gedeckt werden sollen: (a) Konkrete, beherrschbare Instrumente, die dem menschlichen Agens bei der Ausführung der Handlung zur Verfügung stehen; häufig irgendwie kulturell bestimmte Gegenstände (1): (1) Karl zerschlug die Kiste mit dem Hammer. Wenn sie in einem Satz ohne Agentiv vorkommen, so wird der Agentiv auf jeden Fall präsupponiert ( (17—(19)) : (17) Mercedes fährt bequemer. (18) Aspirin heilt besser. oder der niederländische Werbeslogan (19) Croma bakt en braadt beter. Mönnich und Schwarze (1971) führen für den Instrumental das Prädikat USED (FOR) ein. Es gibt jedoch einige andere Relationen, die von Fillmore gleichfalls dem Instrumental zugeordnet werden, bei denen das USE-Prädikat unangebracht erscheint, nämlich:

- 27 (b) Witterungserscheinungen; ein altbekannter Fall in der Kasusgrammatik. Zusammen mit den (c) psychischen Kräften, die einen Menschen zu einer Handlung bringen können, bilden sie eine kleine Grupne, die hauptsächlich auf Grund des animateness-Kriteriums dem Instrumental zugeordnet werden: ein negatives Verfahren also. Die USE Analyse, die die konkreten Instrumenten richtig faßt, ist bei diesen Relationen nicht anwendbar, wohl aber können diese Kräfte in Verbindung mit dem Prädikat CAUSE auftreten. Zu (a): Ein Satz wie (1) läßt sich in Dowty's Schema grob etwa folgendermaßen analysieren:

Paraphrasiert lautet die Struktur etwa: Indem Karl etwas tut, und zwar schlagen, wobei er einen Hammer benutzt, wird die Kiste kaputt. In diesem Satz ist der Agentiv explizit. In einem Satze wie (18) wird der Agentiv, der sowieso unsnezifiziert ist, getilgt; in (21) (21) Der Felsblock tötete die Königin kann ein Agentiv getilgt worden sein - in diesem Fall ist der Felsblock instrumental gedacht; es ist aber auch möglich, daß in der zugrundeliegenden Struktur überhaunt kein Agentiv vorhanden ist. In dem Falle ist der Felsblock als Naturkraft gemeint . Zu (b): Den Naturkräften ist eine Anzahl Beschränkungen

-

28

-

auferlegt, denen Agentive nicht unterliegen. Lee (1971, 8) nennt folgende drei Tests für den Agentiv (hier zitiert nach Dowty 1972, 64) : (i)

Das Verb kann im Agentiv vorkommen

(ii)

Es kann im Ergänzugssatz von Verben wie versuchen, überzeugen, zwingen auftreten

(iii) Die Verben können vorkommen mit Adverbialen wie vorsichtig, absichtlich, usw. Diesen Tests genügen die Agentive nur dann, wenn sie intentional gebraucht sind: bei nicht-intentionaler Lesart versagen sie. Eine Zuordnung der Naturkräfte zu den nicht-intentionalen Agentiven liegt denn auch auf d'er Hand, wobei jedoch das gleichzeitige Auftreten eines Instrumentals für diese Grupne ausgeschlossen werden soll (vgl. (7) und (8)). Eine solche Zuordnung trägt der latent metaphorischen Erscheinungsform dieser Phänomene Rechnung. Der Wind, zum Beispiel, ist zu sehr vielen Dingen imstande, die sonst nur Lebewesen können: - Etwas (von einer Stelle zur anderen) bewegen: umwerfen, wegschlagen, antreiben, leeren - Etwas zerstören: zerschmettern, brechen Der Blitz tötet, entzündet, kann aber nicht morden (intentionale Handlung!) und tötet nicht mit Hilfsmitteln (erschießen, erdolchen) ; Der Regen zerstört, zerbricht, usw. Es gibt natürlich immer Fähigkeiten, die menschliche Agentive wohl, Naturkräfte jedoch nicht besitzen, und umgekehrt. Die Beschränkungen, die Naturkräfte zusätzlich kennen, sind bedingt durch die physische Erscheinungsform dieser Kräfte. Man wird ja nicht erwarten, daß der Wind ein Buch schreibt oder eine Omelette bäckt. Andererseits wird ein Mensch nicht einen Deich durchbrechen, es sei denn mit Instrumenten, oder gar eine Mühle antreiben. Das sind aber Beschränkungen, die in dieser Analyse einen Kasusunterschied nicht rechtfertigen, da das Verhältnis der menschlichen und natürlichen Agentive zu den sie dominierenden Prädikaten immer gleich ist: ein Unterschied ist nur, daß Naturkräfte keine Desambiguierung in Bezug auf Intentionalität brauchen.

29 Im Falle eines angenommenen göttlichen Urhebers bleibt die Instrumental-Interpretation der Naturkräfte natürlich immer Möglich. Zu (c): Die psychischen Kräfte, die natürlich immer mit einem Lebewesen verbunden sind, werden in der Oberflächenstruktur gekennzeichnet durch regelmäßiges Vorkommen der Präpositionen aus und vor: (22) Karl zitterte vor Furcht. (23) Karl spendete aus Mitleid. (24) Karl lachte vor Glück. (25) Karl erstarrte vor Schrecken. Die Gruppe ist den Naturkräften in soweit ähnlich, als auch hier eine relativ kleine, vielleicht geschlossene Menge von Phänomenen vorliegt. Diese Gruppe wurde von Babcock (1972) einem eigenen Kasus zugeordnet, nähmlich dem Cause-Kasus (CA), der auch die Naturkräfte umfaßt. So wird die Tiefenstruktur des Satzes (22) von Babcock folgendermaßen wiedergegeben (26): (26)

Past

zittern

vor

Babcock ordnet Karl dem Lokativ(L)-Kasus zu (Die Furcht ist in Karl, so daß er zittert). Fillmore nimmt bei psychologischen Prädikaten einen Kasus Experiencer an. Die englische Paraphrase (27) des Satzes (22) (27) Fear made Karl tremble zeigt, daß die psychische Kraft vor einer Lexikalisierung des semantischen Prädikats CAUSE auftreten kann (made). Das motiviert meinen Versuch, auch diese Relation in Verbindung zu bringen mit dem Prädikat CAUSE.

- 30 Bevor ich zu komplizierten Fällen übergehe, werde

ich zu-

nächst versuchen, Satz (22) zu analysieren (28):

CAUSE

Sj^ Die Furcht ?

S Karl zittert

Es fragt sich, ob Dowty's Analyse diesem Satz gerecht wird. Die intentionale Agentiv-Lesart ist für diese Fälle, auf Grund der oben genannten Tests, ausgeschlossen. Die nicht-intentionale agentive Lesart ist auch nicht unproblematisch. Anders als in den vorigen Fällen ist eine Auflösung dieses Satzes in die zwei Propositionen (29) und (30): (29) Die Furcht macht etwas. (30) Karl zittert. wie bei (31), dem (32) und (33) zugrundeliegen, (31) Karl tötete Johann. (3 2) Karl macht etwas. (33) Johann stirbt. unbefriedigend. Offenbar ist hier die innere Struktur von S^ anders. Das suggeriert auch Babcocks Vorschlag, Karl als Lokativ zu betrachten. Es fragt sich jedoch, ob Karl auch in (34) (34) Karl zittert. immer noch als Lokativ, bzw. als experiencer betrachtet werden soll: Meines Erachtens auf keinen Fall; Karl ist in diesem Satz ein (nicht-intentionaler) Agentiv. Es ist daher erforderlich, daß dem Konstituenten Karl in der unterliegenden Struktur zwei Kasus zugeordnet werden, nämlich sowohl der Lokativ, wie auch der Agentiv. Das hat zur Folge, daß die zwei Propositionen, auf die Satz (22) in einer kausalen Analyse zurückgeführt werden soll, folgendermaßen lauten: (35) Karl hat Furcht. (36) Karl zittert. In einer Baumstruktur sieht dieser Satz etwa so aus (37):

- 31 (37) CAUSE BE TO TO

Karl Karl Furcht

zittern

Karl

Diesen Fall kann man noch weiter komplizieren, indem neben dem Grund für das Zittern (Furcht) auch noch die Ursache der Furcht genannt werden kann, nämlich irgendein Ereignis oder die Handlung eines anderen Menschen. (38) Aus Angst vor dem Elfmeter rannte der Tormann davon. (39) CAUSE BE TO CAUSE-

Z

Sc

S, D D

Elfmeter

davonrennen

Tormann

Angst

In dieser Weise kann besser als im Fillmoreschen Konstituentenmodell, das Babcock unmodifiziert übernommen hat, die komplexe Kasusstruktur dieses Satzes zum Ausdruck gebracht werden. Es zeigt sich zugleich auch, daß man nicht in jedem Fall, wo die traditionell bekannten Kasusbegriffe nicht ausreichen, einen neuen Kasus erfinden muß: in der Oberflächenstruktur sind viele Relationen undeutlich, die in der unterliegenden Struktur klar ausgedrückt werden. 3. Ich habe, mehreren Anregungen aus der Literatur folgend, eine Anzahl von Kasusrelationen in Verbindung mit einigen semantischen Prädikaten betrachtet. Es zeigt sich, daß sowohl

- 32 Agentiv wie auch Instrumental, natürliche und psychische Kräfte sind bei jener Gruppe von Verben, die ich heranzog, nämlich den kausativen Handlungsverben mit affiziertem Objekt, verbinden lassen mit dem Prädikat CAUSE. Damit hat sich eine Forderung von Huddieston erfüllt: die Kasus sollen nicht nur unterschieden werden, sondern auch Gemeinsames soll zum Ausdruck gebracht werden. Wenn man eine Analyse mit Hilfe des Prädikats CAUSE verwirft, so bedeutet das, daß eine wichtige Generalisierung verloren geht. Eine zweite, vorläufige Schlußfolgerung ist, daß die Anzahl der Kasus in der Tat gering bieigen kann: der von Babcock eingeführte CAUSE-Kasus konnte durch Rückführung auf zwei andere Tiefenkasus eliminiert werden. Ein scheinbarer Nachteil dieser Analyse ist, daß soviel Verschiedenartiges in den Agentiv einfließt. Beim Agentiv wird jedoch unterschieden nach der Intentionalität: intentionale Agentive sind ein Teil des Fillmoreschen Agentivs, der nicht-intentionale Agentiv umfaßt den anderen Teil, zusammen mit den natürlichen Kräften. Ich sehe nicht ein, weshalb für die natürlichen Kräfte das gleichzeitig Vorkommen von Instru9) mentalen nicht ausgeschlossen werden kann . Filimores Alternative hat den Nachteil, daß sie gegen das Koordinationsprinzip verstößt (Dougherty 1970) .

In dieser Analyse ist der Instrumen-

tal ein homogener Kasus. Außer CAUSE, das bei der Definition von Kasus keine Rolle spielt, weil es sich um eine Eigenschaft des Verbs handelt, werden die Prädikate (BE) TO für den experiencer, USE für den Instrumental und DO für den Agentiv verwendet. Ob diese Prädikate in der Tat ständige Begleiter von Kasus genannt werden dürfen, sollen erst Analysen zeigen, bei denen auch andere Verben als die hier diskutierten mit einbezogen werden. Außerdem soll die Analyse auch auf andere Kasus, die hier nicht diskutiert wurden, ausgedehnt werden. Anmerkungen 1. Diese Arbeit ist ein Teilergebnis des von der Niederländischen Organisation für reinwissenschaftliche Forschung (Z.W.O.) unterstützten Projekts "Generative Syntax des

- 33 Deutschen". Ich danke Herrn W. Abraham für wertvolle Kritik an einer früheren Version dieser Arbeit. 2. Es hat den Anschein, dag Fillmore hier ad hoc eine inhärente Kasusspezifizierung einführt; das heißt, daß eine Gruppe von Phänomenen in dieser Weise schon im Lexikon, unabhängig von dem sonst zentralen Kasusrahmen des Prädikats, einem Kasus zugeordnet würde. Ein solcher Versuch findet sich auch bei Nilsen (1973, 25f., 83) für den Instrumental. 3. Dowty (1972) bringt interessante Beispiele dafür, daß die Intentionalität bei Agentiven ein relevantes Merkmal ist: (a) Karls Weggehen erregte Aufsehen. (b) Karl erregte Aufsehen dadurch, daß er wegging. Karl ist in (a) ein nicht-intentionaler Agentiv, in (b) ambig in Bezug auf Intentionalität. 4. Undeutlich bleibt, weshalb die beiden Propositionen im Instrumental- und Zielverhältnis zum Prädikat sind. Vgl. aber Kastovsky 1973, 70 (3.2.1.). 5. Im übrigen ist das nicht ganz neu, denn auch in The Case for Case gibt es die Möglichkeit, daß eine ganze Proposition einem Kasus zugeordnet wird; es kann nähmlich statt einer Nominalphrase als Objektiv auch ein ganzer Satz in der Objektiv-Funktion auftreten. 6. Diese Analyse trägt der Tatsache Rechnung, daß viele Sätze, die einen Agentiv enthalten, in einem gewissen Sinne unvollständig (elliptisch) sind, da nicht eine Person an sich etwas verursacht, sondern da eine Person etwas verursachen kann durch sein Handeln, sein Nicht-Handeln, oder sein Dasein. Vgl. auch Vendler 1967, 147 ff.; De Rijk 1968a, 10; Geis 1973. 7. Dowty unterscheidet diese von den reinen (imperfektiven) Handlungsverben (zuschauen, lachen, gehen) und von den reinen achievements (sterben, verlieren). 8. In der sich an diesen Beitrag anschließenden Diskussion zeigte sich, daß diese Struktur verbesserungsbedürftig ist, da das Prädikat DO zwei unterschiedlichte Aufgaben erfüllt: zum einen expliziert es den Handlungsaspekt; des Verbs töten, zum anderen desambiguiert es den Satz in Bezug auf Intentionalität. Für die letzte Funktion bietet sich das auch sonst in der generativen Semantik übliche Prädikat INTEND an, das, um den Wirkungsbereich auf den Subjektsatz einzuschränken, in die durch S^ dominierte Teilstruktur gehört. 9. Vgl. Fillmore 1971, 17 . 10 Mönnich und Schwarze (1971, 6) gehen der spekulativen Frage nach, ob man, wenn in einer Matrix angegeben werden kann, welche Prädikate sich mit welchen Kasus verbinden, und welche Prädikate unterscheidend wirken, nicht besser davon ab-

- 34 sehen kann Kasusbegriffe in semantischen Repräsentationen zu verwenden. Ein offenbarer Vorteil eines solchen Verzichts wäre, daß man sich über die Art und Weise, wie die Kasusbegriffe in der zugrundeliegenden Struktur repräsentiert werden sollen, nicht mehr den Kopf zerbrechen mu3. Die Kasus können dan konfigurationeil definiert werden, etwa in der Weise, wie Chomsky (1965, 71) die Relationen Subjekt und Objekt definiert.

- 35 ON REFERENCE AND REFERENTS F.G. Droste University of Leuven

Summary : In the process of meaning (= to mean) referring is one of the objectives (a second is the attribution of a property). If we symbolize the process of communication on a slightly elevated level with the formula f_(x) , the condition for the attribution of f is the correct delimitation (unique definition) of x. The isolation of the uniquely defined x - as it usually takes place by means of proper naming - and, consequently, of its referent can only take place within and in relation to a frame of reference, the so-called possible world. Therefore, a referent is a uniquely defined element within a state of affairs which has been fixed in W.. The confusion of the referent with the object it relates to entails a confusion of linguistics and ontology; the consequences for communication as well as for model theory are unacceptable.*) Our short explanation will be developed along the following lines: Frege and reference; terminological problems (reality, assigning properties, Davidson); meaning and communication: restriction by means of expansion; the linguistic base formula f(x) which does not necessarily mean: communicative formula Strawson's demi-correctness; possible worlds and the favourite position of the first imaginary world: linguistic reality; model theory and the human brain; Donnellan's attribution problem; reference on a non-real (=derived) level: the past; the referent as an abstraction within a presupposed domain. According to Frege, the referring function of a linguistic expression contributes to the delimitation of the truth-value of a sentence. A sentence, referring to Odysseus, may have meaning, but since there is no

referent in reality, the sentence cannot

^Some aspects of this paper have been discussed at the 12th International Congress of Linauists in Vienna (1977)

- 36 be judged as to its truth. Or, to put it in Frege 1 s terminology: "Es wiirde die Bedeutung von 'Abendstern' und 'Morgenstern1 dieselbe sein, aber nicht der Sinn" (1969:41). The question whether the referent and the object in the extension of a term are identical is not problematic to Frege: "Die Bedeutung eines Eigennamens ist der Gegenstand selbst, den wir damit bezeichnen" ['the referent of a proper name is the object itself which we mean by it 1 ] (1969 :44) . Since referring in our theory is a special form of meaning,, we think it necessary to clearly distinguish between the referent and the object the communication is about. For the latter we have to follow the linguistic specifications of the referential process, as advocated by Strawson and Linsky. To Strawson it is neither the sign that refers nor the expression or the sentence. In Linsky's formula it is said that "what secures uniqueness is the user of the expression and the context in which it is used together with the expression" (1969: 339). Davidson has tried to put it down in a slightly more formalised way; his (model theoretical) explanation thus reads: "'That book was stolen' is true as (potentially) spoken by £ and t^ and only if the book demonstrated by £ at t is stolen prior to t" (1969:16-17). We hope to prove further on that the variable w (for 'world') is failing in this context. In Davidson's example 'Thaeates flies' (1969:1) Thaeates is assigned to the name 'Thaeates' and the property of flying to the predicate 'flies'; and the relation of participating is related to the process of concatenation. Although this is a hypothetical process of which the author is doubtful himself, he subscribed to the idea that the terms such as property and assignment have an objective value and are fundamental to normal analytic procedures. The suggestion is created that ontological entities have ontological properties; the same superficial statement has been made i.a. by Mates (1973:412)without proof. To avoid possible confusion we state that the only controllable properties are linguistic ones, as they are expressed in predicative or attributive constructions; so far, properties are no

more than concepts of concepts, whose existence fully depends on the linguistic act from which they result. The same goes, to a certain extent, for the phenomenon of reality. Is it the real world itself - whatever that may be -, is it our concept of the world, or is it the concept as it manifests itself by linguistic means that is essential to our discussion? And what, exactly, belongs to that real world? Only concrete, tangible entities, or also abstract phenomena such as democracy, God, hope, the near future? Are only living persons part of reality or also people of the past like Napoleon, Socrates; and what about Homer? My today's actions, are they as real as yesterday's doings and tomorrow's plans? We have no intention of denying the real world, but there is also, more important, the reconstruction of that world on a conceptual level. In Althuser's Marxist terminology: there are real objects and there are objects of knowledge, the latter depending on the process of cognitive appropriation (1968: 39ff) It seems wise to restrict ourselves to the latter domain: the real world we discuss is the conceptual reconstruction of reality. It is the sum total of states of affairs, considered as the real world by the members of a cultural community. As a model of the external world, it is fiction, not ordinary fact. We, therefore, subscribe to Kripke's observations, expanding them so as to cover also reality itself: a possible world is determined "by the descriptive conditions we associate with it"; possible worlds are "stipulated, not discovered" (1972: 267). We acknowledge some external form of reality, but we think that this reality only becomes perspicuous by means of the model we construct: the favoured possible world. In the communicative procedures used by vertebrates, every sign has a sequence of possible applications, i.e. conditions of use only to be distinguished within a context. A sign, rather than having a meaning, signifies. Although we shall avoid pragmatic statements it is worth while to refer to Grice's suggestions, arguing that meaning is to be identified with the intention to induce some effect in an audience (1971: 58).

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38

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In our theory, defended elsewhere (1976: 21ff.), we hold that meaning is a process of isolation. On the level of lexicality this can be schematised by distinguishing an interrelated set of matrices, each of which adds to the more narrow specification of the intended object. The sequence of matrices are: a classificatory m. >

> a semantic m.

» a pragmatic m.

a conceptual m.

The classificatory matrix only contains those features which are necessary to distinguish one item from another (cf. the classificatory matrix in transformational phonology). The insertion of the lexical item in a string implies the expansion of the former matrix to the semantic matrix. Redundancy rules, the so-called implication rules, add the lexical features which could be predicted in a set-theoretical way. The semantic matrix, therefore, contains all features, essential to the lexical item as an element of language use. The mapping of the semantic onto the pragmatic matrix relates to the context the item is used in. Expansion rules add those features that can be predicted in a 'natural1 way: they help realise a significant structure that covers a subdomain of the original (semantic) field. Thus, in the sentence One of the few bachelors between all those married men accompanied his wife and children to the hospital. the possible ambiguity of his is dissolved by means of the pragmatically added features [-wife], [-offspring] to the complex symbol of bachelor. Application rules, at last, expand the pragmatic matrix to a conceptual one; thereby, conceptual data are added which are not primarily linguistic, since they derive, also, from our knowledge of the world. On this level it is possible to explain methaphorical use, individual interpretation, etc. Meaning, thus considered, is not a static phenomenon as is the form of an item, but a process. We demonstrate this, schematically, with the following device (for the item dream):

- 39 His dreams were over: no more chance of marrying a beauty-queen. classificatory matrix: [ +idea, +sleeping] semantic matrix: [ ...] , [+abstract,

+animate]

pragmatic matrix: [...], [...], [+day dreaming, +desire] conceptual matrix: [...], [...], [...], [positive longing, striving for,...] Meaning, in this sense, is a process of isolation, through combination with other meaningful elements, of a state of affairs or an element within a state of affairs. It is the narrowing down in successive phases of a possible 'referent' by means of fundamentally vague structures which results in a precise definition through successive combinations. According to Strawson, subject-predicate prepositions are propositions in which a particular-specifying expression, the subjects, is combined with a concept-specifying expression, the predicate. Apart from subject and predicate, there is "some feature of the mode of combination" of these expressions (1974:21). We are inclined to go one step further and to discern a dual, rather than a tripartite relation: there is a subject term with a naming function and a predicate term qualifying the term within its scope. The qualifying function, often but not solely expressed in the predicate term, is not qualifying proper, but qualifying - an idiosyncratic procedure - of another element. "Whereas naming can be represented by a variable x» qualifying is not just representable with f, but it is a function with a scope in which at least one Variable should be present: f(x)" (Droste 1977 :10) . Naming and qualifying do not have to be restricted to the linguistic field alone; both are processes representative of all kinds of communicative acts. Calling by name, as it can be discovered in (higher) animal societies (cf. Thorpe 1967), is a naming function outside the domain of language. Far more in use, however, is the process of qualifying; it may indicate danger,

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40

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food, well-being, etc. Naming and qualifying, therefore, do not have to coincide with the above syntactic functions. Only if both means are combined in one act, that is if the qualifying relates to a naming expression, does a subject-predicate structure arise. Within the subject-predicate structure, comprising both communicative

acts

of naming and qualifying, the essence

of sentence structure is laid out. It is in its property-assigning function of the predicate to the subject that a higher means of communication, free from environmental ties, can emerge. As a consequence, the relation Q(N), or, possible, P(S) is to be considered as a unity whose structure as well as its function is primarily linguistic. Only as a unity can it validly represent conceptual structures outside the domain proper of language. Not the elements of P(S) refer independently, but P(S) evokes a conceptual structure in which the linguistically moulded relations are predominant. This approach forces us to accept a conceptual structure which is based upon and dependent on a linguistic structure. Consequently, linguistic meaning does not refer to arbitrarily chosen extra-linguistic phenomena, but always refers to phenomena of a conceptual order (the latter being related to data on very different levels). This is easily evidenced by sentences such as When I think of your mother and her imaginary members of the family ... in which your mother and her imaginary members of the family can be joined in a coordinate structure, although the first expression ultimately relates to the observable reality and the second to a derived world. It is only by giving them an equivalent value, i.e. on the conceptual level, that no similarity problems arise. As regards the theory of possible worlds, there are several models in model theoretical considerations which can be adapted to linguistic needs. We refer, especially, to the formal model to which a grammar of language relates - and the interpretative

- 41 model - cf. the domain of language usage (HermerSn 1974:115). Since there exist a whole series of possible applications (= worlds) and interpretative systems relative to a set of rules, we shall limit our terminology to: the linguistic expression (meaning)

the state of affairs (conceptualization)

>

the frame of reference (imaginary world) The frame of reference depends on the shared presupposition(s) of the speech participants: dream, expectation, law, linguistics, reality, past, future, etc. In the set of frames, 'reality' has a favoured position, since it can be measured in relation to the environment. Once more it should be underlined that reality, as one out of a set of possible worlds, is not identical to the external world or environment. It is items such as horse, tree which give rise to confusion. They may seem direct reflections of our perception, but they are only seemingly so. As mentioned above, the linguistic entity (its complex symbol) derived its properties not from the objects themselves, but from the linguistic interpretation embedded in a cultural approach of our surroundings. A wood, for instance, does not consist of trees: the concept wood is a conceptual- set whose members are concepts of trees. Naming as well as qualifying is a process developing its terms in relation to phenomena within a generally accepted state of affairs. Rather than accepting that the features in a complex symbol reflect properties of 'objects' in the extra-linguistic environment, we hold that the properties of concepts and conceptual structures are assigned to objects. Of course we do not imply that this assignment applies in an arbitrary way; the interaction of fact and imagination is certainly not to be denied. In our theory, then, linguistic expressions create a state of affairs within a frame of reference (cf. also Carnap 1969:685); the latter is the sociologically accepted sum of the total of the states of affairs evoked by linguistic expressions and mutual

- 42 (cultural) understanding. The frame may be verbally expressed, as in once upon a time there was ..., in which the time coordinate, the place coordinate and the reference coordinate (cf. Lewis 1972:175ff.) are kept empty in order to delimit the frame of reference of the fairy-tale. Bolinger's distinction between 'natural1 and 'manmade' entities (1965) is only acceptable if 'natural1 implies "defined in relation to the environment". The above remarks attribute a predominant part to linguistic rules in the cognitive process. Together with the rule-system of language (the grammar), a whole series of rule-systems is innate in the human brain, such as the grammar of vision (cf. Gregory 1970, Blakemore 1976), the grammar of sexual behaviour, the grammar of hearing, etc. It is the rules of language which enable communication and those forms of thinking by which mankind distinguishes itself from other living beings. The innateness of 'grammatical' systems - and we now confine our considerations to linguistic rules only - implies that our experience is a guided experience, rather than a 'natural' one which should be given with the objects to be discerned. The environment, therefore, becomes reality, that is interpreted reality, by means of the conceptual matrices filtering the outside world in an unambiguous and culturally determined way. This implies a fundamentally one-sided approach: there are no specific terms either for naming or for qualifying, but it is on the level of linguistic construction that both procedures originate. It is therefore that expressions, constructed according to the predicative principle may function as naming elements: What astonishes me (is his reliability) Apart from proper names and deictic elements, every communicative element qualifies. Every term is a predicate term, but it may function, in an expression, as a naming element. It is interesting to refer to Donnellan's distinction in relation to the ambiguous expression:

- 43 Smith's murderer is insane According to Donnellan (1971:102ff.) Smith's murderer may be used attributively (we do not know who the murderer of S. is) or referentially. In our representation this can be schematized as, respectively: (a) (b)

Ex Ex

[MSx - Ix] (MSx) [ Ix]

We do agree that the expression MS in (a) is a predicate, primarily. However, as a naming expression it also refers, be it not in the direct way (b) does. The reference, however, is valid in a second instance, that is after having created a state of affairs to which it may apply. Before venturing a definite delimitation of the phenomenon of reference, we want to introduce an example from the (near) past: In 1963 president John F. Kennedy was murdered in Dallas With the first expression In 1963 the frame of reference is fixed: it is the past, the non-reality, that is an imaginary world recreating a situation that once existed. This reconstruction is comparable to the reconstruction of the murder of Julius Caesar, as it has been done, e.g., by Shakespeare. Another indication of the non-reality is the tense operator £ (for past) referring to an environment which is not here and now. To which person, or rather to which John F. Kennedy does the expression refer? With Frege we have to state that no J.F.K. exists, no more than Odysseus; does it follow that the statement has no truth value? To Frege all statements had to relate to the existing world, the concrete environment in order to be valid; his referential law only functioned relative to what really was. It seems, however, that my personal references to J.F.K. have always been indirect references, also before the fatal date. His existence was known to me only from hear-say (in the broadest sense). My way of referring has not changed since the events

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44

-

of 1963. The only possible explanation for this continuity is given by the specific relation on the referential level: my expression J.F.K. relates to a given concept as it did 15 years ago. Reference, thus considered, never relates to an entity outside our cognitive domain, but to a concept within a state of affairs that is part of a generally accepted frame of reference. One can try and solve problems of this kind with the picturetheory as defended by Goodman. In his view 'centaur' and 'unicorn' have the same extension (null), whereas a centaur-picture and a unicorn-picture apply to different objects (1952; cf. also Linsky's 1969 notion of 'denoting'). This way out seems both artificial and unnecessary. In the above sentence I refer to J.F.K. in exactly the same way I did before and I'll do in the future (changes in the frame of reference are, of course, not to be denied). Every form of reference is reference to an illusion, therefore. Let us assume that in the sentence That man, they should have killed him before his reelection the expression that man ultimately relates to the person of Richard Nixon. And let us suppose that the person Nixon - not the concept - is the referent of that man. The qualifying expression - the predicate - should then either relate to a conceptual structure, or to a property on the extra-linguistic level. Both representations are inconceivable. In the former proposal a conceptual structure should relate to an entity, i.e. the man Nixon, and elements of a totally different nature would have to interact. In the latter representation reference would be made to an ontological entity and a property would be indicated; however, the relation of both would not be expressed; the referent and a certain property would be juxtaposed, but as entities outside our mental grasp, they could not be combined by a linguistic, i.e. illusory act. If, however, the assignment of a property takes place on the conceptual level and the property combines with a conceptual

- 45 referent, elements of the same nature are put together. The syntactic procedure F(S) then assigns a conceptual prooerty to the conceptual referent through the intermediary of the semantic procedure Q(N). Our conclusions can be brief: (a) meaning and reference, to be distinguished from the ontologically conceived principles intension and extension, are not unrelated phenomena; they are, contrarily, starting point and end point on a functional scale, viz. the scale of linguistic communication; (b) in as far as the process of meaning (= to mean) is to be identified with naming, it can be said to aim at the unambiguous isolation of an element out of a set (it is therefore that Quine's transposition of the Russell doctrine states that "pronouns are the basic media of reference",1952:100). Successful isolation implies that the relevant expression of speaker £ at time t in world w refers; (c) a referent is an unambiguously isolated element within a state of affairs of which it is a constitutive part; as such, it falls within the limits of a (presupposed) frame of reference and, consequently, it has to be considered as a conceptually defined entity; (d) the objects referents stand for do not play a part in the linguistic process, since they need translating into a rulegoverned structure; they are as they are experienced and they exist for speech-participants as experienced and linguistically interpreted entities: only as such are they part of the state of affairs we evoke through mental processes.

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46

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THE VOCATIVE PHRASE IN MODERN SPANISH. A CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF ILLOCUTIONARY FUNCTIONS. Henk Haverkate University of Amsterdam

INTRODUCTION The study of vocatives has never playe.d a central role in linguistic research. Grammars of languages in which vocatives are marked by noun-inflection, for instance, confine themselves mainly to describing the morphology of case forms, and as far as current transformational grammar is concerned, I know of only one monograph devoted to the subject. We can explain this lack of interest by taking into account the fact that most linguists are not primarily concerned with the analysis of constituents not inherent to the basic structure of the proposition. It is, however, just the extrapropositional origin of vocatives that I want to take as the starting-point for the present paper. Consider, therefore, first the following syntactic and semantic phenomena relevant to the heuristic phase of the inquiry. On the surface level vocatives typically fill the peripheral slots at the beginning or the end of the sentence. Furthermore, they are marked with a special intonation contour, including an optional pause, which separates them from the rest of the sentece, even if they do not occur in initial or final position. So, vocative intonation may play a distinctive role in assigning the correct illocutionary function to sentences with identical phatic structure. Compare, for example, the imperative and declarative interpretation of (1)

;Cierra la puerta, Juanl ('Close the door, John!')

- 47 (2)

Cierra la puerta Juan. ("John closes the door') With regard to semantic structure, vocatives have no in-

fluence whatever on the well-formedness of the sentences in which they are embedded. For that matter they are always 2) optional constituents. It might also be pointed out in this connection that within the model of case grammar, vocatives could not qualify as cases, for they do not hold specific relations either with the verb or with any of the noun phrases of the proposition. Now, if we admit every speech act to be composed of an illocutionary and a propositional sub-act, vocatives are not related to the latter, but they are related to the former, as we have implied above. Further evidence for this claim is provided by the empirical fact that speakers more often have recourse to vocatives in, for instance, giving a command or asking a question, than in making an assertion. It follows that vocative function must be described in terms of the situational setting of the utterance, or, to put it more exactly, in terms of the interaction between the speaker and the hearer. Within this pragmatic framework a distinction between obligatory and non-obligatory use of vocatives is called for. In the former case vocatives serve to prevent the message from missing its locutionary target. As a result, they appear in sentence-initial position. Observe, for instance, the non-omissible vocative of (3)

;Peat6n, circule por su

izquierda!

('Pedestrian, keep to the left;') In sentences of this kind vocatives might be called 'attention-getting devices'.

It is, of course, just this

function to which the term 'vocative' itself refers. One of the factors causing vocatives to be optionally used is the tendency of reinforcing certain illocutionary functions. One could think here of the relatively high frequency with which vocatives occur in warnings, promises, requests, etc. Other

- 48 interactional conditions, however, may be involved as well, as shown by formulas like (4)

Buenos dlas, Don Pedro. ('Good morning, Don Pedro')

and (5)

Perdone Vd., caballero. ('Excuse me, sir') As far as the distribution of optional vocatives is concer-

ned, examples of the type just mentioned have a fixed structure with the vocative appearing sentence-finally. In other cases, on the contrary, free distribution seems to be the rule. That is, vocatives do not only fill the sentence-initial and the sentence-final slot, but may also be embedded within the proposition, as illustrated by the following set of examples: (6a)

Juan, no grites tanto, que se va a despertar el bebi. ('John, don't shout so much, you'll wake up the baby')

(6b)

No grites tanto, Juan, que se va a despertar el beb£. ('Don't shout so much, John, you'll wake up the baby')

(6c)

No grites tanto, que se va a despertar el beb§, Juan. ('Don't shout so much, you'll wake up the baby, John')

From all that has been said about the role vocatives play in the communication process, it follows that from the purely linguistic point of view they can best be described by means of a model which explicitly accounts for the illocutionary function of the sentence. Now, the purpose of the present paper is to examine how this can be carried out within the framework of the so-called 'performative analysis'. Summarizing the fundamentals of the model under discussion, 4) as it has been developed by J. Ross, we can say that every sentence whose surface structure does not contain an explicit

- 49 lexical reference to the illocutionary function involved, is analysed as embedded in a higher sentence which does express that reference by means of an abstract verb. Furthermore, this superordinate sentence consists of a subject, an indirect object and a direct object. The two former refer to the speaker and the hearer, respectively. The latter represents the proposition to be derived in the surface structure. However, as Ross considers every sentence to be performative, he fails to account for the semantic difference between overtly performative sentences and sentences whose illocutionary function is not made explicit lexically. Therefore, in the context of this paper, I shall speak of performative sentences in the former sense only. Now, the following five arguments support the claim that vocatives are generated as non-restrictive appositions to the higher indirect object: 1.

Since both the indirect object and the vocative refer to the addressee, they are linked by coreference.

2.

Vocatives cannot be preceded by prepositions.

3.

The formal and distributional properties of determiners occurring in vocative phrases are the same as those occurring in non-restrictive appositions.

4.

Vocatives may be optionally dissociated from their antece-

5.

Vocatives may occur without their antecedent.

dent .

The last three arguments will be evaluated below in the sections 'The determiner of the vocative phrase', 'The position of the vocative in performative sentences' and 'The position of the vocative in non-performative sentences', respectively. In the two preceding sections I will discuss the generation of nonrestrictive appositions and the filters of the vocative slot. The final conclusion will be that it makes sense to subcategorize non-restrictive appositions into vocative and non-vocative ones.^' I THE GENERATION OF NON-RESTRICTIVE APPOSITIONS First I wish to draw attention to a proposal made by W. Motsch, who derives non-restrictive appositions from the same

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50

-

base as parenthetical copula sentences the subject of which is coreferential with a noun phrase of the matrix sentence. In this way Motsch accounts for the identical semantic interpretation of two different surface structures. Consequently, the differences, being of a syntactic nature, are made explicit transformationally. That is, for appositive constituents to be derived, both copula and subject deletion apply. As the latter transformation is triggered by coreference with the antecedent of the matrix sentence, we could speak here of a rule for optional Equi NP deletion. Turning now to parenthetical sentences, we see, on the one hand, that the copula is not deleted, and, on the other, that the deletion of the subject applies optionally. Compare, for instance: (7a)

Su padre - su padre es el embajador de Inglaterra - se niega a venir. ('His father - his father is the ambassador of Great Britain - refuses to come')

(7b)

Su padre - es el embajador de Inglaterra - se niega a venir. ('His father - that is the ambassador of Great Britain refuses to come')

The corresponding sentence with appositive constituent would be: (7c)

Su padre, el embajador de Inglaterra, se niega a venir. ('His father, the ambassador of Great Britain, refuses to come' )

Notice, incidentally, that the nominal character of the predicate requires the verb ser to be used as the copula. Now, an alternative analysis would exclude the verb ser and its subject from the deep structure, and introduce them transformationally. The base, therefore, would contain two adjoined noun phrases and, instead of a deletion transformation to derive

-

51

-

the appositive construction, we would need an expansion formation to derive the copula of the parenthetical

trans-

sentence.

A second transformation would apply optionally to derive the subject as a copy of the antecedent. There are two arguments in favour of this proposal. First, the copula does not have any semantic content of its own; there are restrictions on the embedding of parenthetical

second, copula

sentences. This is particularly the case if the antencedent a pronoun referring to the addressee. So, the following

is

sentence

is deviant, if not ungrammatical: (8a)

Te suplico a ti - tfl eres el mejor amigo que yo tengo que no me abandones. ( 1 1 beseech you - you are the best friend I have - not to leave me alone')

The normal version of stead of the copula (8b)

(8a) would have an appositive phrase in-

sentence.

Te suplico a ti, el mejor amigo que yo tengo, que no me abandones. ('I beseech you, the best friend I have, not to leave me alone')

If we now take a look at performative sentences containing a vocative constituent, we see that the vocative can never form part of a parenthetical sentence. Therefore, (9a)

Lo que yo te pregunto a ti - tfl eres Chelo - es si has visto a Juan. ('What I ask to you - you are Chelo - is if you have seen John')

is ungrammatical. However, (9b)

Lo que yo te pregunto a ti, Chelo, es si has visto a Juan. ('What I ask to you, Chelo, is if you have seen John')

- 52 is a well-formed sentence. The explanation of this is that the copula only provides information on tense and aspect, these features being predictable in the appositiye constructions under consideration; for the relation between antecedent and apposition is invariably marked for present tense and durative aspect. The period of time involved always includes the moment at which the sentence is uttered, that is, from the point of reference of the higher illocutionary verb. From the foregoing we conclude furthermore that it is for reasons of redundancy that vocatives do not co-occur with temporal adverbials. For example, if in (10)

El Sr. González, amigo mío, viene con nosotros. ('Mr. González, a friend of mine, is coming with us')

amigo mlo is interpreted as a non-vocative apposition, it may be expanded with hasta hace poco ('until recently'). However in (11)

Oye, amigo mío, ¿ vienes con nosotros? ('Listen, my friend, are you coming with us?')

amigo mío does not allow such an expansion, for it can only have a vocative function. 7) THE FILLERS OF THE VOCATIVE SLOT In the above examples the vocative function was performed by members of two nominal subcategories: common nouns and proper 8) nouns. Let us consider next if personal pronouns can also serve as vocatives. Assuming there to be no difference in intonation contour between (12)

;Eh, tti, ven aquí! ('Hey, you, come here')

and

- 53 (13)

lEh, Juan, ven aquí I' ('Hey, John, come here!')

one could consider tú in (12) a vocative constituent. Other possible sources are: the not deleted higher indirect object or the subject of the sentence. Now, if tú turns out to be a vocative, sentences like (12) constitute an argument against the analysis put forward in this paper, for there are no appositive constituents which are a reduplication of their antecedent. It can be shown, however, that second-person pronouns do not serve as vocatives, since vocatives may be embedded in any sentence regardless of the illocutionary type of which it is a token. But, second-person pronouns do not meet this requirement, since they cannot fill the vocative slot in declarative sentences that don't have second-person subjects. So, for instance, (14)

Tú, ya está lloviendo. ('You, it is already raining')

is ungrammatical, but (15)

Juan, ya está lloviendo. ('John, it is already raining')

is a perfectly grammatical sentence. If, on the other hand, tú is derived as the not deleted indirect object of the matrix clause, we would have to modify the rule of performative deletion for this particular case only. Such an ad hoc solution can be avoided if we choose as a third possibility to take tú as the subject of the sentence. This choice is supported by the fact that no nominal form other than 9) tú can agree with ven. Up till now we have examined instances with simple vocative phrases. There are, however, also complex vocative phrases, which show that vocatives are not only themselves analysable as appositive constituents, but may function in turn as antecendents

- 54 of other appositions. This can be seen from (16a) and (16b): (16a) A ti, Maria, mi mejor amiga, te pido que no me abandones. ('You, Mary, my best friend, I beg you not to leave me alone1 ) (16b) Maria, mi mejor amiga, a ti te pido que no me abandones. ('Mary, my best friend, I beg you not to leave me alone') From the order in which the constituents in question appear, it is obvious that Maria is the antecedent, and mi mejor amiga the apposition. Put another way, any permutation shifting mi mejor amiga to a position at the left of Maria would produce an ungrammatical sentence. In conclusion, proper nouns can never be used as appositions to vocatives. Ill THE DETERMINER OF THE VOCATIVE PHRASE Unlike non-vocative appositions, to which no restrictions apply as far as the selection of determiners is concerned, the determiner slot of the vocative phrase can be filled only by first-person singular forms of the possessive pronoun. This restriction provides an argufnent in favour of the theory of the performative analysis, since the above realizations of

the

possessive pronoun are to be considered a reflex of the subject of the illocutionary matrix clause. In this connection, military terms of address constitute a relevent instance, for inferiors addressing their superiors are expected to use the form mi. So, it is appropriate for a private soldier to say, for example, (17)

;A SUS 6rdenes, mi sargento! ('At your command, sergeant!')

As for the realization of the possessive pronoun involved, both the stresses form mio and its unstressed counterpart mi may occur in vocative and non-vocative appositions. Consequently, the following sentences are ambiguous on the phatic level with respect to the interpretation of mis amigos and amigos mios

- 55 respectively: (18a) Les dije a ellos, mis amigos, que fueran a la fiesta. ('I ordered them, my friends, to go to the party1) (18b) Les dije a ellos, amigos mlos, que fueran a la fiesta. ('I ordered them, my friends, to go to the party') Disambiguation takes place on the prosodic level. I have not. examined, however, if the difference in intonation contour manifests itself obligatorily. Turning now to the semantic structure of the above examples we see that a set-theoretical difference is involved. In both (18a) and (18b) the vocative refers to all of the members of the set constituted by the addressee. In the case of non-vocative apposition, on the contrary, there are two interpretations according to the formal realization of the possessive pronoun. That is, mis amigos may refer to the whole set of friends of the speaker - and will normally do so if no contrastive stress is added to the determiner -, whereas amigos mios obligatorily refers to a subset of the set just mentioned. A related set-theoretical phenomenon has been discussed by G. Lakoff, who claims that vocatives can be conjoined but not disjoined. With regard to this he uses instances like John and Bill, the pizza has arrived and "John or Bill, the pizza has arrived to demonstrate the similarities between universal quantifiers and conjunctions, on the one hand, and existential 12)

quantifiers and disjunctions, on the other. Vocatives, however, refer either to the whole set of addressees or to a subset of this set. In the latter case they always have an addressee-selecting function, and may, therefore, occur disjoined. As a result, they must be analysed in terms of existential quantification. Compare: (19)

;Pedro o Carlos, abridme la puerta, por favor! ('Peter or Charles, please open the door!')

- 56 -

Nevertheless, it must be noticed that disjunction of vocatives is entirely determined by the illocutionary function of the sentence. Declarative sentences, for instance, are compatible with conjoined vocatives, but not with disjoined' ones, as may be seen from the following examples: (20a) ;Pedro y Carlos, me ha tocado el gordo! ('Peter and Charles, I've won the first prize!') and (20b)*;Pedro o Carlos, me ha tocado el gordo! ('Peter or Charles, I've won the first prize!') THE POSITION OF THE VOCATIVE IN PERFORMATIVE SENTENCES Keeping in mind that in our approach performative sentences are sentences in which the illocutionary matrix clause arises on the surface level, we have to distinguish three positions for vocatives to occupy: 1.) Sentence-initial position 2.) Sentence-final position 3.) The position after the antecedent. In the latter case vocatives fill the same slot we have assigned to them in the deep structure. The following examples illustrate the above distributional properties of the vocative: (21a) Chelo, lo que yo te pregunto a ti, es si has visto a Juan. ('Chelo, what I ask you, is whether you have seen John') (21b) Lo que yo te pregunto a ti, es si has visto a Juan, Chelo. ('What I ask you, is whether you have seen John, Chelo') (21c) Lo que yo te pregunto a ti, Chelo, es si has visto a Juan. ('What I ask you, Chelo, is whether you have seen John') Now, the fact that native speakers consider sentence (21c) to be the most acceptable variant of the series, provides a valuable argument for the present claim that vocatives be derived as

- 57 appositions to the illocutionary indirect object. Furthermore, it is interesting to point out that in performative sentences vocatives do not appear embedded in the proposition, so that even in an example like (21b) the intonation contour causes the relation between the illocutionary component and the vocative not to be interrupted. Comparing next the distribution of vocative appositions with that of non-vocative appositions, we find that the latter are subject to the following restriction. In case of dissociation from the antecedent non-vocative appositions cannot be shifted to the right of it if the antecedent is a specified noun-phrase. Sentences (22a) and (22b) may suffice to demonstrate this principle : (22a) El dueño de la casa, José Hernández, está de vacaciones. ("The proprietor of the house, José Hernández, is on holiday') (22b)*E1 dueño de la casa está de vacaciones, José Hernández. ('The proprietor of the house is on holiday, José Hernández') Obviously, (22b) is a grammatical sentence of Spanish, but not in the sense intended here: José Hernández can only be interpreted as a vocative constituent, and doesn't, therefore, show coreference with el dueño de la casa. If the antecedent slot, however, is filled by a non-specified noun phrase the above restriction does not hold. So, both of the following sentences are grammatical: (23a) Uno de los dueños de la casa, José Hernández, está de vacaciones. ('One of the proprietors of the house, José Hernández, is on holiday')

- 58 -

(23b) Uno de los dueños de la casa estS de vacaiones, José Hernández. ('One of the proprietors of the house is on holiday, José Hernández') Notice, in passing, that (23b) is ambiguous on the phatic level with respect to vocative and non-vocative interpretation. V THE POSITION OF THE VOCATIVE PHRASE IN NON-PERFORMATIVE SENTENCES As for the derivation of sentences in which the vocative is the only lexical representative of the illocutionary deep clause, we have to prevent the performative deletion rule from erasing the apposition to its indirect object. The ordering of the relevant transformations is as follows: firstly, the vocative must be dissociated from the indirect object. Secondly, a permutation transformation may apply. Lastly, performative deletion applies. As far as the above permutation is concerned it is important to note that unlike performative sentences, vocatives may be embedded in the proposition. In that case they normally appear after the first constituent, regardless of its grammatical function. This constituent, however, may not be a proclitic pronoun. Observe, for instance: (24)

Este libro, Juan, es mío. ('This book, John, is mine')

(25) *Lo, Juan, he hecho yo. ('It, John, I have done it') A further restriction applies to sentences with SVO order: such sentences do not admit vocative embedding between the verb and its object, except for objects realized as complement sentences. Consequently, (26)

Mi padre vendió, Juan, el coche. ('My father sold, John, the car')

- 59 is ungrammatical, whereas (27)

El profesor dice, Juan, que no es verdad. ("The teacher says, John, that it is not true')

is not. It has been implied above that vocative embedding is restricted to positions between the major constituents. As a result, complement clauses differ from matrix clauses in that they do not contain vocatives. That is the reason the following version of (27) is ungrammatical: (27a) El profesor dice que, Juan, no es verdad. ('The teacher says that, John, it is not true')

13)

Taking into account the above distributional potential of vocatives we are in a position to correctly analyse sentences like (28)

Tû, Juan, lo has hecho. ('You, John, have done it')

In this example, the constituent Juan is neutral with respect to vocative and non-vocative interpretation, for it refers to the addressee, just like the preceding tu. We are faced, therefore, with the following descriptive problem: should Juan be considered a vocative or an apposition to tû? It can be demonstrated by means of a permutation test that the former analysis is the correct one. That is, Juan may be shifted to sentencefinal position, this operation being impossible if it stood in in appositive relationship with tû. Summarizing we come to the conclusion that strong arguments can be provided for the claim that vocatives be derived as nonrestrictive appositions. At the same time we have found four phenomena which show the necessity of distinguishing within this category between vocative and non-vocative appositions. I repeat them in the order of their discussion:

-

60

-

1. Vocative phrases do not allow expansions with temporal adverbials. 2. The determiner slot of the vocative phrase can be filled only by the first-person singular form of the possessive pronoun. 3. If this pronoun is present, vocatives cannot but refer to the whole set of referents intended, that is the set constituted by the addressee or addressees. 4. Although the antecedent tu is a specified noun phrase, vocatives may undergo a dissociation transformation

and be

shifted to the right of it. Notes 1. THORNE, J.P. (1966:69-78) 2. That these facts have long been recognized by traditional grammarians may be illustrated by the following quotation from S. Gili y Gaya: "El vocativo no es complemento de ninguno de los componentes de la oración, ni guarda con ellos relación gramatical alguna. Por esto va sin preposición. Los vocativos son, como las interjecciones, palabras aisladas del resto de la oración por medio de pausas, refuerzo de intensidad y entonación especial en el lenguaje hablado, y de comas en el escrito." ('Vocatives are not complements of any of the constituents of the sentence, nor do they hold grammatical relations with them. That is the reason why they are not preceded by prepositions. Just like interjections, vocatives are words separated from the rest of the sentence by means of pauses, reinforcement of intensity, and a special intonation contour in spoken language, and by means of commas in written language') GILI Y GAYA, SAMUEL (1955:192). 3. Cf. SCHLEGOFF, EMANUEL A. (1972:357). 4. ROSS, JOHN ROBERT (1970). 5. Obviously, the non-restrictive character of the apposition is determined by the filler of the antecedent slot, which must be a second-person pronoun. 6. "Eine Basis für die Erzeugung von Appositionen sind parenthetische Kopulasätze, deren Subjekt mit dem Subjekt der NP, auf die sich die Parenthese bezieht, identisch ist." MÖTSCH, WOLFGANG (1965:95).

-

6 1

-

7. It is interesting to note in passing that non-vocative appositions may be opaque with respect to temporal and aspectual reference. So, the appositive constituent of (la) Fernando VII, uno de los despotas más temidos de España, expidió el decreto de 4 de mayo en Valencia. ('Ferdinand VII, one of the most feared despots of Spain, issued the decree of the 4th of May in Valencia 1 ) is related to two different parenthetical sentences: (lb) Fernando VII - Fernando VII ES uno de los despotas más temidos de Espafia - expidió el decreto de 4 de mayo en Valencia. ('Ferdinand VII - Ferdinand VII IS one of the most feared despots of Spain - issued the decree of the 4th of May in Valencia') (Ic) Fernando VII - Fernando VII FUE uno de los despotas más temidos de Espafia - expidió el decreto de 4 de mayo en~ Valencia. ('Ferdinand VII - Ferdinand VII WAS one of the most feared despots of Spain - issued the decree of the 4th of May in Valencia') Notice that E. Bach examined similar phenomena with respect to the deep structure of noun phrases containing an attributive adjective. See BACH, EMMON (1968:98-101). 8. Although professional titles are common among the category of common nouns, Schlegoff correctly points out that only a small number of them can be used as vocatives (op.cit. p. 357, fn. 3).So, as for Spanish, with the exception of standard terms of address, like Camarero ('Waiter') and Patrón ('Boss'), most other occupational titles cannot perform a vocative function. Compare, for instance, Joyero ('Jeweller'), Modista ('Dressmaker') and Odontólogo ('Dentist'). 9. Observe that the function of the surface subject of imperative sentences must be analysed in terms of the distribution of 'topic' and 'focus'. 10. It must be pointed out that there are petrified forms of address requiring other than first-person pronouns, such as Vuestra Majestad ('Your Majesty') and Su Santidad ('His Holiness'). Ross calls exceptions of this kind "a total mystery" (op.cit. p. 266, fn. 32).The titles involved, however, form part of a closed set of expressions, which can be accounted for from a diachronic point of view only. 11. It is interesting to note that in his discussion of the parallel English sentences

-

62

-

(la) I urged them, my friends, not to miss the (your) party and (Ib) I urged thém, my friends, not to miss the (your) party Downing implies that contrastive stress is one of the factors determining the vocative or non-vocative interpretation of my friends. See DOWNING, BRUCE T. (1969:575). 12. LAKOFF, GEORGE (1971:277). 13. Notice that interjections do not occur in complement clauses either, which suggests that this category too is closely connected with the illocutionary deep clause. Another argument for this assumption is provided by the complementary distribution of interjections like eh and ah. That is, their selection depends strictly upon tjie illocutionary function of the sentence, eh being incompatible with declarative sentences, and ah incompatible with imperative sentences. The following instances show this principle at work: (la) IEh, tú, ven aquí! ('Hey, you, come here J') (Ib)*;Ah, tfi, ven aquí! ('Ha, you, come here!') (lia) ;Ah, el verdulero! No, no está en casa. ('Ha, the greengrocer! No, he is not at home') (lib)*;Eh, el verdulero! No, no está en casa. ('Hey, the greengrocer! No, he is not at home') (Ila) and (lib) are contextually dependent, being both intended as answers to the question: ¿Sabe Vd. si el verdulero está en casa? ('Do you know if the greengrocer is at home?') Observe, finally, that neither vocatives nor interjections can be reproduced in indirect discourse. 14. Remember in this connection the ambiguity of mis amigos and amigos mios occurring in sentence (18a) and (18b), respectively. 15. The principle involved has been discussed with respect to sentence (22b).

- 63 TWO PROBLEMS WITH MINOR RULES Wim Zonneveld University of Utrecht

0.

The subject of this paper will be the notion minor rule as introduced into transformational generative grammar by George Lakoff (1965), and, more specifically, as applied in generative phonology by Lightner and various others (see, for instance, Lightner, 1968; Wurzel, 1970b: 50-4; Harms, 1968: 1189; Harris, 1969: ch. 3; Schane, 1973: 108-10; etc.). It will be argued that generative phonological theory incorporating the notion of minor rule is too strong in the sense that it allows for certain clearly prepostorous analyses which, although permitted by the theory, no self-respecting linguist would ever seriously put forward. I shall discuss two types of preposterous analysis, the first of which has, to my knowledge, not been discussed earlier, and the second of which is an extension of Lightner's "Two Problems with Insertion Rules", a squib only initially correct. These two sections will be preceded by a brief account of the more relevant points of Lakoff's theory of irregularity within transformational generative grammar, especially as regards the notions simple exception and major vs. minor rule. At the end of the paper I will only tentatively tie the ends together. 1.

Lakoff's theory of irregularity. According to Lakoff a major rule is a grammatical rule which applies to each form which meets its structural description, at the time of application of the rule, save to a (small) number of exceptional forms. A rule which applies only to a handful of forms which meet its structural description is called a minor rule. Given the assumption that each rule of the grammar has associated with it a rule-feature of the type [ a rule nl , where is a variable ranging over the

- 64 values plus and minus, and n is the number or name of the rule, an exception to a major rule, a so-called simple negative exception, is characterized by a negative specification for the rule-feature associated with the rule it exceptionally fails to undergo. Lexical items which exceptionally undergo a minor rule, or simple positive exceptions, have a positive specification for the relevant rule-feature. All non-exceptional morphemes have axiomatically a positive specification for each major rule, and a negative one for each minor rule of the grammar. Both types of exceptions are handled in a unified manner by the evaluation procedure: for a major rule a negative specification is represented in the lexicon as the exceptional or marked value [m rule n],

which is interpreted by a universal

metarule as [ - rule n], while in the case of a minor rule the positive specification is marked as [m rule n] . Non-exceptional specifications are costfree or unmarked: [ u rule n] , which is interpreted by metarules as [+ rule n] for a major rule, and as [ - rule n] for a minor rule. Thus, to put it loosely, the evaluation procedure simply counts marked values, i.e., m's, with no discrimination between exceptions of the simple negative and simple positive types. (I will return to this briefly below). As just one example of a minor rule in Lakoff's sense (1965, 16) consider the following. In English, the plural of nouns is generally formed by appending -(e)s to the basic form. A small class of nouns, however, containing the items goose, foot, tooth, mouse and louse, undergo idiosyncratically a minor umlaut rule of the form (see also Chomsky & Halle, 1968, 209): v

^

/

Thus, taking the application of various other rules for granted, the nouns of this class end up with the plurals geese, feet, teeth, mice, and lice, respectively. These five nouns will be entered in the lexicon as [ m rule UMLAUT ], interpreted by a universal metarule as [ + rule UMLAUT] , since UMLAUT is a minor rule, while all regular nouns are [ u rule UMLAUT ], to be inter-

- 65 preted as [ - rule UMLAUT ]. 2.

A first preposterous analysis. Consider a language A in which certain segments, say

word-final i after s are generally deleted. The grammar of this language, then, will contain the phonological rule (2)

VOWEL DELETION:

i

> (21

/

s

f

Exceptions to such a rule would be characterized lexically as m rule VODE , to be interpreted as [ - rule VODE ], since VOWEL DELETION is a major rule, while all irregular verbs would be [ u rule VODE ], interpreted as t + rule VODE ]. Then consider a language B, for which VOWEL DELETION is a minor rule, applying to only a handful of exceptional lexical items. Normally, then, i. is retained in the context s

f. These

irregular forms are marked lexically as [ m rule VODE ], interpreted as [ + rule VODE ], while all regular forms have the unmarked value. These descriptions appear to be quite straightforward. But now suppose it would be proposed that VOWEL DELETION could be simplified into the following rule: (3)

SIMPL. VOWEL DELETION

[ +segment ] ->-0

/

f

In language A this proposal would, of course, cause disaster. An enormous amount of completely regular forms would have to be specified, i.e. marked lexically, as exceptions to this new rule, lest they lose their final segment, at the gain of only a handful of features which constitute the difference between rules (2) and (3). Nothing seems lost, then, by abandoning this proposal. But what about language B? The striking fact, then, appears to be that in the new description nothing is lost, but, to the contrary, something is gained. Remember that since VODE is a minor rule in this language all regular fotfms are lexically characterized as unmarked, i.e. negatively, for this rule,

-

66

-

while only the few exceptional lexical items which must undergo the rule have marked, i.e. positive specifications. Modifying rule (2) into (3), then, and leaving lexical markings untouched, will give exactly the desired outputs of the grammar of language B, ceteris paribus. In fact the preposterous simplifications of the type exemplified above boil down to the following general type: in a minor rule only the position of the affected segment in the input string and the output counterpart of the affected segment need to be specified. Thus the position of the segment i in the above example is uniquely specified by f, while its output-counterpart is zero. Similarly, Lightner's (1973) minor rule to link French scandale and esclandre (both mean 'scandal'), which inserts 1 in the context esk_a, can be reduced to (4)

[

]

» 1

/

[ +segment ^

This type of preposterous analysis has as in ill consequence that the grammar will in principle be unable to describe processes such as 'in a handful of forms _i is deleted in word-final position after s", nor will be able to distinguish this process formally from the process "in some forms a consonant is deleted in word-final position after the vowel a". 3.

Lightner's preposterous analysis. Lightner (1973) describes the following specious simplifications, given a theory as described in section 1. We can claim that there is a minor rule in English which inserts _1 in word-initial position before words that begin with an underlying vowel. Thus the lexical representations of low, lot, lack, etc. will be /ow, ot, ack/, all marked as exceptional in that they undergo the minor rule of ¿-insertion. It will obviously be "cheaper" to specify a form as undergoing a minor rule than it will be to specify all the features of the segment Alternatively, one can claim that the insertion rule does not insert 1, but rather r. Under this analysis, row, rot, rack, etc. will be represented as /ow, ot, ack/ in the lexicon.

- 67 It is clear that within this theoretical framework any number of ingenious analyses can be invented, all equally preposterous (pp. 106-7). Lightner's remarks, however, although initially correct, stray a long way of the mark, especially as regards the notion 'alternatively' . Given a phonological theory comprising both major and minor rules, as sketched above, and applied on various occasions by Lightner and others, it is possible to have the grammar of English contain minor rules inserting 1 and r, respectively, in two sets of forms /ow, ot, ack/, the former set being marked [ m rule 1] , the latter [ m rule r] . Thus it is even ultimately possible to arrive at an analysis of the following type: (5) (i)

minor rules

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

insert r insert 1 insert o insert t insert k vowel is

lexical entries

(a) m (b) [ m (c) [ • m (d) m

before a word-boundary; before a word-boundary; after a consonant; before a word-boundary; before a word-boundary; tensed.

rule rule rule rule

a, b, a, a,

m m m m

rule rule rule rule

c, c. c, c,

m m m m

rule rule rule rule

'

e, d, f, d,

u u u u

rule. rule. rule. . ] rule. • ]

Given underlying forms such as (ii), and the set of minor rules (i), we derive forms such as rock (a), lot (b), row (c), rot (d), lock, low, and many, many others in a very similar fashion. It is clear that this analysis is "cheap" in Lightner's sense, and it is also clear that it is preposterous. It appears to employ the fact that only a relatively small number of English morphemes has initial r, another relatively small set has _1, etc. This is, of course, not exceptional, but rather completely regular in the sense that this is what the child expects when acquiring its native language: it expects that there will be diversity in the class of initial consonants, in the class of vowels, etc.; i.e., there is no language in which all, or even the majority of, morphemes have the same initial consonant, the same vowel, etc. It is, however, unexpected that five English nouns show an alternation in back and front vowels in the

-

68

-

singular and plural, given the fact that the great majority take -(e)s. This appears to be clearly the sense in which Lightner's problem rather than his analysis is preposterous: given a well-defined notion of exceptionality, which is part of the metatheory and is psychologically real in that it defines intuitions the native speaker has about his mother-tongue, there will be no need of any ad hoc restriction on the theory of grammar to prohibit analyses of the type sketched in section 3: they will be excluded by precisely this definition of exceptionality. Anticipating this, and given such a definition, it seems doubtful whether the first problem, sketched in section 2, will still arise, in view of the fact that it seems doubtful in general whether Lakoff and Lightner's notion of minor rules will survive this definition. In addition to the preposterous analyses sketched above and allowed by a theory incorporating minor rules, support for this assumption can be adduced in the form of some somewhat more indirect observations. *

. In the first place, I touched in section 1 upon the observation that the evaluation procedure does not discriminate between simple negative and simple positive exceptions. It seems, however, less than a priori obvious that these types should be weighed equally heavily against a grammar. In this sense the theory runs the risk of being all too simple and strict. Secondly, a growing number of proposed minor rules has been reanalyzed and expressed as major processes (cf. Kiparsky, 1973, n.4; Brame & Bordelois, 1973, section 2; Hoard & Sloat, 1973; for the last three references of the introduction, respectively) . And finally, the notion minor rule as employed by Lightner et al. appears to be an invitation to exercises in mere rule-writing, not related to any clear native speaker intuition about his mother tongue. It is the task of the phonological component to map underlying phonological representations onto phonetic ones by a set of (ordered) rules, taking the syntactic surface structure as input, not to account by the same tools for perhaps diachronically related , but synchronically unique and unrelated cases (that is, unique and unrelated as far

- 69 ^ as the phonological component is concerned. To the extent that such relations are 'felt', the best tool to express them by appears to be the lexicon). Such practice seems to contribute in no way to a definition of the underlying linguistic knowledge the native speaker has of his language, to wit proposed phonological minor rule relations holding between luette 'uvula' /uvulaire 'uvular' (Lightner, 1973, for French); croire 'believe' /crédibilité 'credibility' (Schane, 1968, for French); leche 'milk'/lactate 'secrete' (Foley, 1967, for Spanish), etc. Taking all these considerations together, there appears to be little room in generative phonological theory for the notion minor rule as described in section 1, and the more need of a reconsideration of those cases where rules of this type have been proposed in the past and will be proposed in future. Notes 1. In themselves these rules can be simplified in various ingenious ways, through ordering, the type of simplification discussed in section 2, etc. For ease of exposition, this has not been carried through.

- 70 PHONOLOGICAL HIERARCHY IN ENGLISH L. van Buuren University of Amsterdam

Illustrative text, divided into locutions pieces ( j| ) , bits ( | ) and words ( ); tonic words underlined: I'm not | quite | sure | how I will | spend | the money || anyway || I mean | I hope | there'll be a whacking | glorious | parade || the sun I '11 be out ||the birds | '11 sing | it'll look absolutelyj splendid ^ the brass bands | wi 11 playfl we'll roll along | in a carriage | covered | from head to foot j in diamonds and soj will the whole | family J we'11 all | be covered | in diamonds^: it ' 11 glitter || beautifully £ the pavements | will be lined | with seven | million | middle aged J people | like | yourself^: shrieking | their heads off | with joy [j because it's been a jollyj awful | fifty j years J quite | frankly ^ and the last | good thingj that happened || was the slithy | toves || gyring {and gimbling | in the wabe ^ since | then || it ' s been a stinker | of a time || that | was the last | good thing || that happened^: Over the past seven or eight years I have tried to apply some new ideas to the teaching and description of English pronunciation. The resulting approach may be said to be, inter alia, (a) PARAMETRIC, i.e. avoiding the concept of phonetic segments or 'speech-sounds', (ii) FUNCTIONAL, i.e. stating the function of phonetic features in the phonology rather than the other way round, as is the customary procedure, (iii) EXHAUSTIVE, i.e. including everything that must be 'learnt' from childhood, without regard for any dichotomy between 'distinctive' and 'redundant'. The approach seems to work. In this paper I wish to look at the kind of phonology that is gradually emerging from this exercise.

- 71 -

It has turned out useful to postulate a phonological hierarchy somewhat as follows: locution : piece : bit : word : syllable : set : phoneme. One does not find a great deal of discussion of such phonological hierarchies in the literature, albeit an abundance of terms and concepts like breath-group, sense-group, phonological phrase, word, cluster, and so on. Halliday (1963) however, following Abercrombie (1962) , postulates the following rank-scale: tonegroup : foot : syllable : phoneme. Pike (1967) mentions, for English, (emic) phoneme : syllable : stress-group : pause-group : breath-group. Both these hierarchies are, as some of the terms imply, strongly phonetics-based. Chomsky and Halle (1968) allow, apart from distinctive features, for phonological phrases of varying extent derived from syntax. The closest parallel is perhaps to be found in Henderson's seminal (1949) article Prosodies in Siamese (not English, unfortunately), who describes prosodies of the sentence, of polysyllables and sentence pieces, syllables, syllable parts, and of phonematic units. Similar views are put forward in other works of the Prosodic School, notably Firth's Sounds and Prosodies (1948). The piece We speak in pieces of information, not in words, nor in sentences. Straightforward common sense tells us that we programme our utterances neurally in stretches of 6 to 7 seconds at the very most (sentences may be much longer), and there is some evidence to support this notion. Laver (1970): "The linguistic unit in English which seems to be the most promising candidate for the typical preassembled stretch is what has variously been called a 'tone-group' (Halliday, 1967b), a 'phonemic clause' (Trager & Smith, 1951), or a 'syntagma' (Kozhevnikov & Chistovich, 1965)." Laver decides to call this unit the 'tone-group'. I prefer a less phonetically loaded term like 'piece'. I certainly do not wish to imply that pieces are spewed forth like sausages from a sausage-machine. The generating process is more complex than that. But I do want to suggest that at its

- 72 final stage it assembles pieces (subject to last minute modifications) that are informationally, though not necessarily grammatically, self-contained, and which have phonetic correlates. The piece would seem to be, in the first place, a semantic unit. Phonologically speaking, some such unit is required between phonemes and sentences. In the present approach the piece is also required as a point of reference for the locution and the bit. More specifically, it is needed to state the distribution of stresses and weak and strong forms. Cp. £ I J am Dracula dial 25 || 71 || 46 4 1 and ^ I'm Dracula^ dial 257 || 146 ^ ; also || stop getting at her || , with weak at or her, not both. Its major use, in English, is however as a vehicle for the statement of intonation (phonology) and pitch (phonetics), hence the frequent references to it as tonegroup, tune or melody. Phonologically, it serves to account for the choices between F (conclusive) and R (suggestive), for tonic placement (indicated in illustrative text), and for choices within the tonic, although this might be better dealt with at a lower rank. Phonetically, most of the pitch-movements in English, falling and rising patterns, upward and downward jumps, etc., are accounted for in terms of the piece. Finally, the piece is also required for the statement of timing features, a subject to which I shall return further down. Suffice it, for the moment, to say that piece-final syllables generally exhibit a rhythmic delay by means of 'lenghtening'. A term like 'tonegroup' obscures the rhythmic aspect. Tag-questions, vocatives and interjections in particular tend to be rhythmically joined to something else, while carrying their own •F tune, often a low rise. For instance I so you won't | tell me| R won't you || , ||R well | F show me | your etchings |R darling | R please ||. By employing the more abstract concept 'piece' one allows for the possibility of compound tunes within such single rhythmic units.

- 73 The_locution English pieces are not separated from each other by silences or taking breath, as is often implied (e.g. Chomsky and Halle, p. 10). Typically, they are strung together by means of a timedelay, rising or relatively high pitch at the end of non-final pieces, and other junctural phenomena. Unlike a single piece, a locution makes a complete question, statement or suchlike, and it is usually grammatically wellformed. Locutions often coincide with sentences, but they may comprise more than one sentence, or less than one, which may then be expanded by 'afterthoughts'. One may venture to suggest that syntax is perhaps not so much a generating as a controlling mechanism. Phonologically, the locution is required for stating restrictions on the F/R choice in the piece, and those on the occurrence of linking/intrusive r: cp. 41s have some more jj if you like^ vs. ^ have some more fr only if you want it of course fr. Phonetically, other junctural phenomena, such as 'clear 1 when a vowel follows' must be accounted for at this rank, as must be the regulation of the airstream: locutions are typically preceded by an intake of breath and delivered in a single holding operation. Timingwise, there tends to be more lengthening in 0ur locution-final than in piece-final syllables. Cp. Father Who art in Heaven ^ hallowed be Thy name 4f Thy kingdom come ^ and ^ Our Father Who art in Heaven || hallowed be Thy name H Thy kingdom come ^ , etcetera. One may also consider the implications of a locution and piece division like the following, heard from a child: ^ 0 u r Father || Who art in Heaven hallowed^fbe Thy name Thy kingdom ^ come || Thy will be done ^ • The_bit It is a well-established fact that not all words in a piece have the same semantic or phonetic status, and it seems there-

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fore reasonable to postulate an intermediate unit. I hasten to add, however, that I feel less confident about bits than about the other units here put forward. A possible alternative might be to allow for Trager-Smith-type close and open junctures between words and groups of words. Turning language back upon itself, I would tentatively characterize the bit as one content or information word, with or without function words. Each bit may be regarded as in information point. Phonologically, the bit may help to deal with the complicated problem of the distribution of primary and secondary stresses, strong and weak forms and tonics. As a hypothesis, it seems worth saying that each bit takes one and only one primary stress, some of which may also be tonic (see text). The tonic words are the special information points, they are what a question or statement is about. Cp.|| were they shrieking | their heads off (J, | were they shrieking | their heads off H , || were they shrieking their heads off || , etc. Phonetically, these points are marked by an upward or downward jump in pitch on the stressed syllable, and by variations in air-pressure. First and foremost however, the bit is the unit required for the description of those aspects of timing that we tend to dismiss as 'rhythm', whatever that may be. It seems to coincide to a considerable extent with what Pike hears as 'rhythm waves'; its nucleus or stress seems to coincide with what Abercrombie perceives as the beginning of a foot. In the English bit, unstressed syllables are shorter than stressed ones, everything else being equal, the pre-stressed ones tend to be run on to the stressed syllable (accelerando), and the bit-final syllables tend to undergo some slight lenghthening (ralentando). Some examples may illustrate these points. Note that in (informationless) quoting or recitation, bits may be quite long, thus: 1| one I rainy | day | the rats | heard |a great | noise 1| vs. || would

- 75 you start 1 reading at | one rainy day the rats heard a great noise [| , || drink | a pint | of milk I a day l| vs. II drinka 1 pinta I milka | day II vs. || the drinka pinta milka day | campaign || , and, of course, in prayer: | Our Father Who art in Heaven hallowed be Thy name Thy kingdom come Thy will be done I. Sharp's (1960) example belongs here: || they flew in | the planesll vs.\| they flew | in the planes || . Note also the following contrasts in informational organisation: || this | is not I the way | to do it U vs. II this I isn't | the way I to do it || , II red and whitel flags II vs. U red | and white | flags || , || a three year old | horse U vs. || you dirty 1 old man || vs. | thirty | old men || , | very | good | show H vs. II very good I show || , Ha glass | of lemonade U vs. || a cup of tea H , U his aunt | Helen | said to him || vs. || his aunt Helen | said to him || , || I can't | see you | buy | four || vs. || I can't | see you | by four|) . The_word

"The word as a phonetic entity", or as I would prefer to call it, as a phonological unit, was firmly established by Daniel Jones as far back as 1931. Of course, all linguists, with the notable exception of (early) Sweet (1885) have always assumed and employed the notion phonological word, even if they actually denied it. One only has to look at their transcriptions. Many of D.J.'s examples could be accounted for in terms of bitdivision, e.g. | they talked | rashlyL

vs. |they talk]trash | .

But the following suffice to make his point: the now famous and ubiquitous

a name - an aim (taken from Passy's Petite Phoné-

tique CoMparée), I'll aid - I laid, it snows - its nose, at will - a twill , at Utah - a tutor, teapot - sea port, selfish shell-fish. Some word-boundary contrasts tend to confuse audiences: "In For Me, In For Me, they've got it Infamy"

(Danny Kaye as Captain

Hook in Peter Pan) and "Darling, your hair is so beautiful, so

- 76 exciting, why don't you dye it" (Me, chatting up the au-pair in a French accent. She was later to recount:) "I believed the tea twere zer nattempt to may clerve, be tea say zime too fat, so I he team to say to nexample". Let me add some more respectable examples: a tease - at ease, I dressed - I'd rest, can die - and I, the sledge - this ledge, this task - must ask, bar them - with him. Also one word vs. two words: diet - dye it (naturally), employer - employ her, actor - smacked her , whiskey - house key, asparagus - a sparrow. Three-way contrasts: it's a rose - it's her o's - it arose, a fright - if right afraid, arm pit - lump it - crumpet. It think, erroneously perhaps, that there are many phonetic features in English that immediately express meaning. At least as far as intonation is concerned trhis view is widely held. It seems worth trying to.set up a semantic phonology for the same reasons that people are trying to set up a semantic syntax. The locution, piece and bit were such semantic-phonological concepts. So, to my mind, is the phonological word to be regarded, although I would shrink from attempting yet another worddefinition at this stage. Suffice it to emphasize that phonological words do not necessarily coincide with orthographic or grammatical words, and that much depends, in the case of compounds, stock phrases and names for instance, on a speaker's conceptualisation at the moment of speaking. Thus, the following examples may be conceptualised and pronounced with or without the word-boundaries shown: super calefragilistic expialidocious (Mary Poppins), how do you do, shut up, B B C, a b c, who done it, New York, when ever, black bird, ill ish, ghoul ish, fish and chip (shop), (the voice of) edu cation and civili sation. North Sea (oil), at random, straw berry, Malmes bury, pas time, abso lutely, im possible, Pop Eye, Mac Lean's, Mac Adam, not at all, yes in deed, the United States, red coat, of course, what's happening, kiss me, I should have thought so. From a phonological point of view the word is required for instance for the statement of word-accent, weak and strong wordforms, word contractions, linking and intrusive r (sawing vs.

- 77 saw it), syllabic consonants, and last but not least for the writing of pronouncing dictionaries, which are, in actual fact, phonological dictionaries. Phonetically, it is required to describe the processes (including assimilations) at word boundaries, and the differences between contrasts of the ice cream - you scream type. A variety of features may be involved: aspiration, rounding, glottal stop, place of articulation, and also that aspect of timing which may be abstracted as speed of approximation and release (e.g. I'm Ike - I might). Indeed, nearly all phonetics until the present day has been the phonetics of words. The_ghon.eme Leaving the area of meaningful phonological units, I may begin with the smallest unit I would employ, the phoneme. For a phonetician's phonology, distinctive features (being smaller still) are of little interest (i) because they represent phonetic rather than phonological abstractions, and (ii) because the phonetic views upon which they are based are rather rusty. Legend has it that Firth once said to Bloch: "The phoneme is dead", and that Bloch turned round and replied: "But it's got a jolly lively ghost". Bloch's reply would still be valid at the present day. It is the phonetician's task to establish what are the characteristic, linguistically determined articulations in a given accent, and to say when and where such movements are made in any given locution. For English, it seems well-nigh impossible not to relate dentality and tongue-flattening iri 'didn't they' to the phoneme /i/, darkness in 'mill' to the phoneme /l/, tongue—tip retroflexion in 'train' to /r/, lip-rounding and darkness in 'cheese' to /tj/, glottal stop in 'next' to /k/, lip-rounding and vowel-place in 'spoons' to /u/, laterality in 'helpless'" to /1..1/. The timing of movements, too, is to be partly explained in terms of phonemes: bitter - Peter - daughter, bid - bin bit, send - sent.

- 78 The_set This term seems preferable to 'cluster', to denote a structure of more than one phonemes, or only one. It should be obvious that the phonemic structure of a syllable like 'twelfths' is not to be stated in terms of phonemes, but rather in terms of sets, and then in terms of phonemes. 'Twelfths' consists of a vocalic nucleus, preceded by an initial and followed by a final set, the latter followed by a post-final set, thus: S^V S f S p f . It is not difficult to state the phoneme combinations for various sets: it would be most cumbersome to state them for the syllable as a whole. As for the vocalic nucleus, that in 'striked' is regarded by some as a clustering of /a/ plus /i/, and by others as a single phoneme. Apart from this phonological argument, there are good phonetic reasons to postulate the set as a phonological unit. Thus, rounding in 'stray' is made over the str-set, lateral in 'please' during the pl-set, rounding, velarisation, bilabial approximant in 'square' during the skw-set, an alveolar fricative articulation in 'lisps' during the sp+s-sets, and so on. Such matters are not irrelevant. They are most relevant for Hindi, Hausa, Japanese learners of English, whose native language leads them to say sitation, sukuru direba, sitoripu tisu instead of station, screw-driver, strip-tease. ?he_SYllable In spite of attempts to kill off the syllable as an 'unnecessary' impossible, harmful' concept (Kohler, 1966), it too, keeps rearing its ugly head. One need not accept the syllable as a phonetic primitive (as some do, and some do not) to recognise its phonological usefulness. In languages other than English, the syllable is the indisputable domain of such 'prosodies' as tone (Yoruba), rhythm (French), voice-type (Gujerati), tonguesetting (Cairo Arabic). In English one needs the syllable above all if one wants to say anything at all about the timing of

- 79 speech. A piece like | I can't see|the wood | for the treesl will take some phonetic seconds to deliver, not for instance 1 or 3 seconds, or 10 minutes. This duration may be regarded as the sum-total of the time-values allocated to the individual syllables, roughly in the proportion 2 : 5 : 3 : 1 : 4 : 1 : 1 : 7 = 24 moras. A second corresponds to about 12 to 15 moras. The timing aspect of speech may be one of its most basic characteristics, much neglected until now. If biologists can say nowadays that "organisms - from one-celled plants to man - either are endowed with, or perhaps are, living clocks" (Ritchie R. Ward, 1972), one may perhaps suggest that language too, is subject to biological clocks. It would seems that much of the temporal organisation of speech is done by means of syllables. From an articulatory point of view the syllable is required mainly to state the occurrence of spreading and rounding, for instance in |absolutely | , and of pitch-change and air-pressure variation in (ri)di(culous). Phonologically, it serves to state the distribution of sets and phonemes, and the structure of words. Syllables make up words, and words consist of syllables.

So far, I have refrained from bringing in the morpheme. In spite of its undoubted phonological relevance in English, it does not seem to fit very well into a hierarchy between syllable and word. It is quite conceivable that one may want to postulate other phonological units operating outside a rank-scale, such as specific linking prosodies. Indeed, I am myself somewhat sceptical about rigid hierarchies, although I feel I had better hang on to this one until I can grope my way to something better, or trade it in for a more sophisticated theory. The position is simply, that there are, at present, no phonological theories around that have any great bearing on phonetic description of a functional, parametric, exhaustive kind. Linguists tend to be suspicious, for some reason, of a

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"proliferation of ranks", more than of a proliferation of structures, systems or transformational cycles. This applies even to those who accept the rank-concept. On the other hand, one has to agree with Firth (1950) that linguistic statements "cannot be achieved ... in one fell swoop" but should be "dispersed in a spectrum of specialized statements". To recognise 7 or 8 ranks in the phonology of English may seem exhorbitant in comparison with most approaches, but I can see nothing intrinsically wrong with it within the context of a rank-phonology. The descriptive problem seems to me complicated enough to demand this kind of dispersal.

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AUDITORY VERBS IN DUTCH Ineke Holierhoek University of Leiden

x) 0.

Verbs of physical perception

show several interesting

relationships. Rogers (1974) describes, among other things, the relationship between English verbs of cognitive perception (see hear, etc.) and the so-called flip-perception-verbs. The latter is a group of intransitively used verbs, taking as a subject the thing perceived and as a complement some kind of comment on the subject or on the act of perception as a whole. Cf

The music sounded loud to me

(R. 3.39)

Harry looked drunk to me

(R. 3.40)

^

In Dutch we find similar relationships: cognitives:

intransitives:

zien . (see)

eruitzien

(look)

horen

klinken

(sound)

aanvoelen

(feel)

(hear)

voelen (feel) proeven ruiken

(taste) (smell)

smaken

(taste)

ruiken

(smell)

(1) die man ziet er vermoeid uit

(that man looks tired)

(2) zijn stem klinkt boos

(his voice sounds angry)

(3) zijn voorhoofd voelt warm aan

(his forehead feels warm)

(4) de soep smaakt pittig

(the soup tastes savoury)

(5) dat drankje ruikt vies

(that drink smells awful)

I will focus on the auditory verb klinken (sound), because it has a special position in this category, as will be illustrated below. Firstly, in many sentences klinken can be used without the qualifying complement:

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(2a) er klinkt een stem (one can hear a voice) there-sounds-a-voice The other flip-verbs do not have this possibility; they usually 2)

are accompanied by a complement : (la) * er ziet een man uit there-looks-a-man (intrans.) (3a) * er voelt een voorhoofd aan there-feels-a-forehead (intrans.) Secondly, one cannot formally attest the relationship between the flip-verb klinken and its cognitive counterpart horen, whereas in eruitzien one finds the form of the cognitive verb zien (with a particle, eruit) and in aanvoelen one finds voelen (with the particle aan, of fairly recent date). ^ In a dialect spoken in the North-East of the Netherlands, in the surroundings of Groningen, horen can be used intransitively. So, in the Groningen dialect, we have: (6a) in deze kerk hoort een koor veel mooier but in Dutch: (6b) in deze kerk klinkt een koor veel mooier in-this-church-sounds-a-choir-more beautiful (the sound of a choir is much more beautiful in this church) and: Groningen (7a) wat ze van 't wicht verteilen, dat heurt goud Dutch (7b) wat ze over dat meisje zeggen klinkt goed (what-they-tell-about-that-girl sounds good) Thus, in standard Dutch, the intransivation of horen did not take place. In my view, this process was blocked because there was a verb available with the right properties for fulfilling the flip-function of the auditory perception verb, namely klinken. When, in the next section, we take a look at the history of this verb, it is not just to give a more detailed explanation of this presumed blocking process. Diachronic considerations are justified also by a parallel development of other verbs, with a meaning of "sensory impression". I intend to show that certain developments of the auditory verbs klinken and luiden, and of the visual verbs schijnen en blijken, went along parallel paths.

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Especially for the auditory verbs, the development will be followed until the situation in present-day Dutch, where things have not yet settled down definitely. X. In the first historical stage, during the middle ages, klinken and luiden almost mean the same thing, namely "to give a clear 4) sound, to resound". At the same time blijken and schijnen have similar meanings too: "shine, sparkle". In general, the meaning of these verbs conveys an impression, specifies as to the physical faculty involved, and completed with an element that specifies the particular kind of impression made. For schijnen and blijken this is the notion "glittering", for klinken and luiden it is the notion "sonority". In my terminology, the verbs at this stage have a "full" meaning; they say something about the physical sense involved Snd they give a further specification. At present, none of the four verbs mentioned retained this full meaning. They have lost at least the extra specification, and along with this, their syntactic possibilities became limited. Let us compare some verbs that now bear the predicate "full meaning", in the sense explained above. Any verb, indicating a specific sound, preferably takes as a subject a thing, animal or person that usually produces this sound. So, one will find: (8) de koeien loeiden (the cows lowed) (9) de muis piepte (the mouse squeaked) (10) de traptrede kraakte (the step of the stairs creaked) I consider it to be a special property of the "full meaning"verbs that they have a relatively free choice of subjects. The three auditory verbs mentioned can select less usual subjects too. The resulting sentence is still perfectly understandable, be it in a more or less creative speech act: (8a) de zangeres loeide the singer lowed (her singing made you think of a cow)

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de machine piepte the machine squeaked (produced a squeaking sound) (10a) de radio kraakte the radio-set creaked What I try to say is this: The three verbs each have their own preferred choice of subjects, but besides that, they can combine with a large group of less expected subjects. Accordingly, the "full meaning"-verb must give a large•part of the information: the verb describes the production of a special sound, it does not just say that the thing or person, denoted by the subject, makes itself audible. When, on the other hand, we take a look at luiden and schijnen, we see that these two verbs have, in the course of history, reduced their choice of subjects to a few special ones, namely klokken (bells, chimes) with luiden the sun, the moon, or an artificial source of light with schijnen. In the middle-ages we still find with luiden: (11) Menighe trompe ende basune, die daer luden met sulcker pine, dat die erde donderen dochte (14th cent.) subject: trumpet or basune (12) Har stimme in den verse veel bat ludde dan si te ludene plach (14th cent.) subject: voice ^ beside many realizations where a bell functions as a subject. Nowadays it is not possible any more to use luiden with an other subject than a bell. You cannot say for example, if you think that an orchestra produces a noise just like that of a bell: (13) * vind je ook niet dat het orkest een beetje luidt? (don't you think the orchestra LUIDEN) as you could say, as a criticism of the singer of the orchestra: (14) ik vind dat de zangeres een beetje loeit (I think the singer is lowing a little). In present-day Dutch, luiden is not a "full meaning"-verb any more: it doesn't give a description or mention a property of some (sound-producing) thing. It can only introduce a bell in its typical function, that is: producing a noise; which noise

- 85 is secondary. The same story holds for schijnen. In Middle-Dutch almost everything that is visible can be said to shine: weapons, helmets, precious stones, and the sun, the moon and so on. (15) Sy en hebben niet dan Sen oghe int middelste van den hoofde, schinende als een carbunkelsteen

(+ 1400)

(They only have one eye in the middle of the head that shines like a carbuncle) Now you can't say any more: (16) ? die steen schijnt

(that stone shines)

In that case one should use one of the "full meaning"-verbs as stralen (gleam), schitteren

(glitter), fonkelen

(glisten).

Here we find one development that can be stated in the same terms for an auditory verb of perception and impression, and a visual one, luiden and schijnen. Both verbs have restricted their choice of subjects to one or two specific ones. At the same time, the verbs have lost part of their meaning: They do not convey the message that the sun is radiating, or that the bells are giving a sonorous sound; they only say that the subject is perceptible in its most specific property: in other words they merely introduce their subjects. (17) de zon schijnt

(the sun is shining)

The speaker of (17) wants to draw attention at the warmth or the light that are produced bv the sun, and that he is for some *

6)

reason aware of. (18) de klok luidt

(the bell is ringing/tolling)

has been kept as a special combination because of the message communicated: "when you hear the bell it is time for church, for closing the gates or something else". Bells were and still are used to send messages all over the village or town. The second special property of the full-meaning use of a verb and the depleted use, that I want to describe, is the possibility of the first group to combine with a degree adverb. When you ascribe some special kind of noise to a subject, you can also indicate in which grade that sound is produced, like

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(9b) de muist piepte een beetje/verschrikkelijk (the mouse squeaked a bit/terribly) In the introductory combinations, one gives an absolute information and of course, a degree adverb makes the sentence unacceptable . (19) *er klonk nogal een stem there-sounded-rather-a-voice(20) de klok luidde een beetje the-bell-LUIDEN-a little The information of - de zon schijnt (the sun is shining) can be modificated by a grade-denotation, because its message is not exactly the establishment of the presence of the sun, but it communicates that the sun-rays come through the clouds, and they can do that fully or partly. So you can say: (17a) de zon schijnt een beetje (the sun is shining a bit) but not: (21) in de verte scheen er llcht een beetje) far away-there-shone-some-light-a little In the latter sentence there is an introductive situation again. In Middle-Dutch the verbs klinken and luiden had other meanings too. I will consider them and trace grossly their path through history. In my view it is a plausible presumption that their meaning "give a clear sound" brought them in a special relationship with the ringing of bells. And as bells were in the Middle-ages' society the means to communicate with a great number of people, they could easily get the meaning-specialization "to give information,to give a sign". For instance: (21) Den clinkers die clincten wedewen ende wesen to comene te Zeghards omme hare rente te rekene. (+ 1310) (The "clinckers" (=special official people who went around with bells to tell the messages) called up the widows and orphans to come to Z. to get their allowances) (22) Alse die vanden castele dat saghen, si deden een teken luiden (13th cent.) (When the people of the castle saw that, they made give a sign)

- 87 (23) So wie die coren coopt of vercoopt, voor die clocke ter maerct luud (+ 1325) (Whoever buys or sells grain, before the bell has given the starting-sign of the fair) The aspect of message, giving information, very early was a part of the meaning of luiden and already in the 13th century, this verb can take as a subject other kinds of information-bearers than bells, as a letter, a book, words. If such a subject is used, there is a complement that denotes the contents of the letter, book or words: (24) Desen brieven dier twee sijn alleens ludende (+ 1450) (These letters of the two LUIDEN the same) (25) Sine worde dinken luden ofte hi kerstijn ware (1285) (His words make the impression as if he were a christian) For an unknown reason, the information-aspect specialized on luiden and as the time went on, klinken lost it. (For an explanation one may perhaps consider the fact that in the middleages' communication-system the messages brought by the bells of churches, convents and castles, were of greater importance after all than the messages of the "klinkers" (21), but this is mere speculation.) Klinken also lost its full meaning. Nowadays this use is restricted to dialectal or archaic styles. In standard Dutch the full meaning "sound clearly" has been preserved in expressions like (26a) klinkende munt (lit: sounding coins) (26b) klinkende argumenten (sounding arguments = money) Klinken has lost its ability to tell of sounds that they are clear (the full meaning) and, just like we have seen with luiden and schijnen, it took an introductory function instead. Introductory klinken can select more words as subjects than klinken at its former stage, in fact all kinds of sounds, whether they are clear or not. Middle-Dutch klinken selected words denoting metals, weapons and such as subjects; modern introductory klinken does not do that any more:

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(27) ? er klinkt een zwaard there-sounds-a-sword (28) er klinkt een schot (one hears a shot; a shot is/can be heard) Klinken cannot introduce just any thing or being that could make a sound. Schot (shot) has an inherent feature (+sound), and zwaard does not. Apparently, the meaning-constellation of klinken is "depleted" so much that it cannot convey by itself the meaning 'sound'. As subjects of klinken one finds een stem ( a voice), een schreeuw (a scream), een gebrul (a howl), gebrom (buzzing) etc. etc.: there is no difference in acceptability when you use unclear sounds. The meaning of klinken in this construction is "x can be heard" or "x is heard". This kind of development, from a meaning "to give a specific sensory impression" to the meaning "subject can be perceived" is not restricted to klinken. With Middle-Dutch blijken and schijnen we find besides the basic full meaning "to give a specific visual impression: shine, sparkle" sentences in which the verb means "be, become visible". (29) Eens anders dages sagen si bliken een roke, daer op was geseten ene stat (+ 1260) (On another day they saw a loom up a cliff, on which there was situated a town). (30) Van buten so en sceen aen hooren lichame auetsinge engeen (+ 1400) (On the outside there was no visible wound on her body) When a verb loses its full meaning, that is, when it loses specifications regarding the kind of auditory or visual impression, then there is room for such information to be explicitly given elsewhere in the utterance, for instance by means of an adjective. Accordingly, in later stages, klinken is often combined with an adjectival complement e.g. (31) haar stem klonk helder (her voice sounded clear) Now this is very much the situation with 'regular' flip-percep-

- 89 -

tion verbs: they are intransitively used verbs, with the meaning "give a certain impression, specialised as to the physical faculty involved", and accompanied by a qualifying complement. We see that klinken, which in the auditory field gradually became a less specific intransitive verb, was perfectly equipped to function in the place where an intransitive form of horen (hear) could have been expected. To end the story of schijnen and blijken: After losing

their extra specification "glitter", they also 7) lost the restriction to visual facts . What was left was the meaning "make an impression". Now the two verbs are semantically divided along the line subjective/objective or perhaps uncertain/certain . (32a) ze scheen ongerust te zijn (she seemed to be worried) she could be worried, but the speaker isn't sure she is (32b) ze bleek ongerust te zijn (she appeared to be worried) she WAS worried, someone or something has established this 8 ) . Besides this modal function, blijken still has an introductory function, comparable with klinken. Here too, blijken has lost its restriction to visual facts. Consequently the meaning of introductory blijken is not any more "can be seen" but is approximately "become clear, can be established". (33) bij die gelegenheid bleek zijn schuld (at that occasion his guilt became clear/could be established) I will now return to luiden, that I left at a stage where, in the Middle-ages, a twofold specialisation (i) on bells and (ii) on the information-aspect in general. How did this verb develop further? For a time, it was possible to use luiden with a subject from its original "full meaning"-period (music-instruments, metals, voices etc.), but obligatorily accompanied by a complement. (34) Hoe luit zijn keel zoo heesch Van 't gillen (1642) (how hoarse sounds his voice (throat))

- 90 In present-day Dutch this is not possible any more; now the only subject with inherent feature (+sound) allowed is klok (bell). As to the information-aspect, the verb can still be used in sentences that describe a spoken or written piece of information; there are several possibilities for indicating the contents of the message: (35) Wilt gij weten, hoe deze twee woorden luiden? Het ene is: matiging, het andere: aanmatiging (Do you want to know, how these two words LUIDEN? One word is: matiging, the other is: aanmatiging.) (36) de brief luidt aldus: " " (the letter LUIDEN as follows: " ") (37) vermits sijne instructie maar luidede omme met de heer V.d.H alleen te besogneren (18th cent.) (as his instruction just LUIDEN to deal with Mr.v.d.H. alone) Thus: one can name the word(s) intended, one can cite the whole contents, or one can indicate the contents in an indirect way. I will focus on the combination luiden + adjective, because it is in this construction that something peculiar can be noticed regarding the relationship of luiden and klinken. Instead of one of the complements mentioned earlier, it is also possible to use an adjective as a complement, that can be interpreted as a comment upon the thing denoted by the subject. (38) Dat luydt my al vreemdt in mijn ooren, dat God de Vader kastijdt de kinderen die hy lief heeft (1557) (That LUIDEN me strange in the ears, that God castigates the children he loves) (39) Schoon het verhaal somber zal luiden als de toonen eener doodsklok (1857) (Although the story will LUIDEN gloomy like the tones of a passing bell) In the third section I will show how this use is gradually disappearing in favor of an objective interpretation of the adjective, that is to say an interpretation in which the adjec-

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tive is not a comment upon the contents of the act of speaking or writing, but merely a report of it. But first, in the second section, we will see how klinken could come in a position to be a competitor of luiden in the role of a verb conveying the information-aspect. 2. The meaning-element 'information' became part of the meaningconstellation of luiden in a special way, namely by means of the connection with the ringing of bells and the communicative function attached to that. However, all auditory verbs are, in principle, connected with the communication-aspect, because of the relationship of "sounds as such" (booms, music, screaming) and "sounds-withcontents", that is, sounds produced by a speaking person, who intends to communicate something, (cf Zwicky 1971) . This distinction is responsible for several peculiarities in the use of the cognitive verb horen (hear). In the simple sentence (40) I think I hear him it is indifferent whether you hear someone stumbling on the stairs or hear him speak. But in many situations one can distinguish between horen and horen g p (= horen at a speech act). Only in the latter case, horen can be regarded as the converse of a verb meaning "to iell something to somebody". In a Fillmorian case frame, used for the sake of clarity, horen g p has an extra case for the speaker: (41) horen A U D Hearer Sound horen

gp

Hearer

Message

(from) Speaker

The third (speaker)-case for horen g p is not always realized, but it often can be, in which case it is a constituent with the preposition van (from). (42) ik heb het nieuws van mijn buurman gehoord (I heard the news from my neighbor) The Message can be realized as a direct object, also preceded by the preposition van (of):

- 92 (43a) ik heb van het ongeluk gehoord (I heard about the accident = Somebody told me about it) Compare, as distinct from (43a): (43b) ik heb het ongeluk gehoord (I heard the accident = I heard the noise of the accident, the crash) In (43b) there is no preposition before the object, which means that the verb is horen A U D A third special property of horen has to do with the beliefs of the speaker with respect to the contents of the message. Compare (44) ik heb gehoord dat jij van de trap gevallen bent (I heard that you fell from the stairs) This sentence is ambiguous in Dutch. Its two possible readings are: a) I heard a noise, and from that I concluded that .... horen.AUD T7T_ b) somebody told me that horen^p This ambiguity disappears when one uses a different mood in the complement-sentence. (44a) ik hoorde dat jij van de trap gevallen zou zijn horen^p I-heard-that-you-from-the-stairs-should have been fallen (I heard it say that you fell from the stairs) For (44a) only the interpretation b) is possible. One can doubt a message from another person, but one usually takes for a fact a conclusion based upon your own sensory perception. One can also disambiguate (44) by adding a motive, which has the effect of excluding a Speaker as the source of information: (44b) ik hoorde aan het lawaai op de gang dat jij van de trap gevallen bent from the noise in the passage horen AUD When we see the possibilities of the cognitive auditory verb, we can understand the development in its intransitive counterpart klinken toward a choice of subjects which includes soundsas-such AND sounds-with-contents, e.g.: (45) haar woorden klonken bijna als een klacht (her words sounded almost like a complaint) And from spoken words to written words is not a big step, as we shall see in the next section.

- 93 I will now consider the relationship between the two auditory flip-verbs klinken and luiden in present-day Dutch. First I consider the properties they retained in the course of their semantic development, where the starting-point was almost the same. From the "full" use, luiden was restricted to the (semantically depleted) combination with bells and the like. Just in this combination luiden can also be used transitively: (46) de koster luidt de klokken (the sexton rings the bells) As klinken concerns, in a few expressions it can still be used in its full meaning (47) wat klinkt het hierl (what a sound/echo over hereJ) But this use is very restricted. (47) is an exclamatory sentence. Then, as we have seen, klinken can be used to introduce all kinds of sounds (28) er klinkt een schot And then we have the use of klinken and luiden with a necessary complement: If the subject has the feature (+ sound) and (- message), only klinken can be used: (48a) zijn stem klinkt hees (his voice sounds hoarse) (48b) * zijn stem luidt hees Sentences like (48b) were still acceptable in the 17th century's Dutch. Then luiden could still convey the meaning "auditory impression + specification-complement". The sound-element can still be found in the 19th century in (49) Die naam wekt mijn afschuw reeds, Omdat hij in uw ooren haatlijk luidt (1862) (That name evokes my disgust, already because it sounds hateful in your ears) Here luiden combines with in de oren (in the ears), the preposition-phrase that keeps alive the special relationship with the physical sense of hearing. This combination is impossible in present-day Dutch. With klinken it is a quite normal combination.

- 94 When, as we shall soon see, klinken comes in a position to select subjects with the feature (+ message), it still combines with the phrase in de oren although the sentence-meaning is far removed from an actual speech-act. Compare this quote from a newspaper (Volkskrant 11-7-74): (50)

De Britse Labour Party heeft een rapport gepubliceerd met ideeen en discussiepunten over pers, radio en televisie, die Britten meer reactionair in de oren zullen klinken dan Nederlanders, (The British Labour Party has published a report with ideas and discussion-items about press, radio and television, which will sound more reactionary in the ears of the British than of the Dutch,

)

With its concentration on the aspect of "message", luiden has lost its ties with its specific original meaning. It has become the verb to be used for all messages, whether spoken or written. Often, it is used in sentences of the following kind: (36)

de brief luidt aldus: "

"

Cf (35) and (37) as other instances of non-adjectival

comple-

mentation. In a prominent Dutch synchronic dictionary, as Van Dale's Groot Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal one finds sentences like: (51)

die verzen luiden niet kwaad . . . NP . . . tense operator in the above derivation.

18 This is a reasonable assumption, since there is nothing anomalous to sentences like John put his bicycle on the ground where the house was situated. This presupposes that the ground is larger than the house which stands on it. 19 In (42) bij would not be appropriate; unlike tegen, bij cannot express any prospect," it cannot look ahead.

- 159 20 Notice that in some South Netherlandic dialects the preposition tegen occurs in locative contexts too, e.g., Jan woont nu tegen Leuven. (John now lives near Louvain) 21 Clark (1971: 267) argues: "in front of is positive as it is used to describe the visible perceptual field, whereas its counterpart behind (vis a vis the speaker) is negative since it describes the area that is out of sight". 22 Cf. the analysis of the English verb get by Kimball (1973), who states that all readings of get contain an inchoative predicate. 23 For this procedure with CAUSE see Dowty (1972) and Ten Cate (1976) . 24 In similar instances Dowty (1972) only adds DO instead of DO-CAUSE. In my view this produces a semantic anomaly. Perhaps the mistake is due to the fact that in many languages the surface verb make, du. doen, fr. faire, as well as eng. cause, can be an amalgamation of DO + Cause, 'compare: I made him return = Ik deed hem terugkomen = Je le faisais revenir = I caused him to return. 25 After I had read an earlier version of this paper to the Amsterdam meeting of the 'Algemene Vereniging voor Taalkunde', Mr. Renaat Declerck informed me that in his forthcoming dissertation he had set up similar SR's for the corresponding English prepositions. 26 For comments on an earlier draft of this paper I wish to thank J. van Loon and A.P. ten Cate.

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CONTRAST MOVEMENT RECONSIDERED Willem J. Meys University of Amsterdam

A. In Postal (1971) a rather special transformation, the 'contrast movement transformation' was proposed to account for certain apparent counterexamples to the 'cross-over principle'. The rather special character of this transformation derived from the fact that, unlike most types of transformational rules, it would have the effect of moving an NP down into a lower S. In Postal's more recent book On Raising (= Postal 1974) this transformation no longer figures at all, and the cross-over type of approach to reflexivization is no longer considered viable by the author (cf. Postal, 1974, pp. 12-13) . 'Emphatic reflexives' - which is what the 'contrast movement' rule was all about - do crop up now and again in On Raising, this time mainly in arguments designed.to show the reality of the 'raising' rule. Thus Postal points out that emphatic reflexives can only 'float away', as he puts it, from their NPs if the latter are not themselves deleted (for instance by 'Equi-NP-deletion') in the course of the derivation. Thus the grammaticality of (1) Jack seems to have himself called Sylvia, as opposed to the ungrammaticality of (2) *Jack wants to himself call Sylvia. can be explained, Postal argues, by assuming that in (1) the 'emphatic reflexive' himself has floated away from its NP Jack which has been made surface-structure subject by means of 'raising', whereas in (2) the reflexive has been stranded in the complement structure while its NP (the deep-structure subject Jack of the verb call) has been deleted by Equi-NP. It seems, then, that 'floating emphatic reflexives' are about the only remnants in Postal (1974) of the 'contrast movement' rule in Postal (1971). Nevertheless I believe that a reconsideration of Postal's original account of 'contrast movement' may

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be useful to show that there are different kinds of emphasis as well as different ways to express them. B. It is particularly contrasts such as those between (3) and (4) that prompted Postal to devise his 'contrast movement' rule: (3) * Harry was shaved by himself. (4) Harry was shaved by himself. Following Lees and Klima (1963), Postal considers (3) ungrammatical, and (4) grammatical. Postal argues that the ungrammatical sentence (3), with weak-stressed himself, derives from (5) via, first, passive, and then reflexivization. Violation of this correct order of transformations would result in an even more glaringly ungrammatical product, (6): (5) Harry^ shaved Harry. (6) *Himself^ was shaved by Harry Postal argues that the deep structure of the well-formed sentence (4), on the other hand, contains two S, as represented in (7). The subscripts _i and j indicate that within S^ and S^ there is no strict co-reference ('binding' in Postal's terminology) , but an inferred, indirect kind of co-reference (to which Postal applies the term 'predicational co-reference'), via the identity-predicate BE in S^. (7) can then lead to (8), in which the bracketed form (HSrry) (himsSlf) is meant to indicate the three possible emphatic forms HSrry, HSrry himsSlf, or just himsSlf. However, if what Postal calls the 'contrast movement transformation' (optionally) applies, Harry^ 'descends' from the higher sentence S^^ to the lower sentence S2, the result being (9). If there is passivization in S2 we get (10) , of which sentence (4) above is a surface-realization. (7)

[the one. 1

b2

[ one. shaved Harry. ] c 1 J

was Harry. ] c 3 1

(8) The one who shaved Harry was (HSrry) (himsSlf). (9) HSrry (himsSlf) shaved Harry. (10) Harry was shaved by (HSrry) (himsSlf).

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Postal gives (11) as another example of a structure that can be affected by 'contrast movement', yielding the alternatives (12), (13), and (14): (11) (12) (13) (14)

The one Charley Charley Charley

who Charley shaved was (ChSrley) (himsSlf). shaved ChSrley. shaved himsSlf. shaved ChSrley himsSlf.

Postal's account of 'contrast movement' is fairly sketchy. As a result, a number of questions arise to which Postal (1971) does not provide conclusive answers. Thus Postal's representation of the form ChSrley himself, which suggests strong stress on both Charley and himself is problematic. I would argue that it is not normal for the head-noun to be stressed when it is followed by an emphatic reflexive. If we read (14) with strong stress both on (the second) Charley and on himself, the reflexive is felt to belong in fact to the subject-Charley, not to the object-Charley (which is what Postal is suggesting). In order to link the reflexive with the object-Charley, we must pronounce this sentence as in (15), with both Charley's weakstressed: (15) Charley shaved Charley himsSlf. Notice that Postal does not consider (15) to be ungrammatical, in spite of the fact that it contains two occurrences of the proper name Charley with identical intended referent. It is therefore strange to find that Postal marks (16) as ungrammatical : (16) 'ChSrley himsSlf cut Charley. Especially if we 'adjust' the stress-pattern the same way we did with (14), the resultant sentence, (17), does not seem to differ in its degree of grammaticality from (15): (17)

Charley himself cut Charley.

Another difficulty with Postal's account of 'contrast movement'

- 163 is in fact the origin of the emphatic reflexive. It is not clear whether the emphatic reflexives (which, as Postal remarks on p. 12, can probably not be derived by means of the rule which produces weak-stressed 'ordinary reflexives') find their origin in the contrast movement transformation, or whether they must be supposed to be already present, somehow or other, in the kind of deep structures to which contrast movement can apply. One gets the impression that the former is the case, and that Postal therefore considers (for instance) Hgrry, Harry hims€lf, and hims61f simply alternative ways of emphasizing a particular NP. I shall demonstrate that this cannot be correct, and that Postal's account lumps together rather indiscriminately a number of different processes, notably those underlying cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences as well as strong-stressed NPs on the one hand, and those having to do with the occurrence of emphatic compound personal pronouns and their distribution in sentence-structure on the other. C. Notice, first of all, that if the three emphatic forms, as Postal seems to suggest, have the same origin, they must presumably have the same meaning. But this does not appear to be the case. Cf. (18) and (19): (18) (19)

The President asked her to come. The President himself asked her to come.

There is a subtle difference in meaning between (18) and (19), which might perhaps be related to different presuppositions; (19) suggests the presupposition that someone else (lower in rank) would be expected to ask her, while (18) does not. Furthermore, when the NP is indefinite, the emphatic reflexive is not possible. Cf.: (20) A cSll-girl answered the phone. (21)* A call-girl herself answered the phone. Notice that the restriction of emphatic reflexives to definite Noun Phrases is not affected by the syntactic function (subject, object, etc.) of the Noun Phrase concerned: Thus, while in

- 164 (18) - (21) the Noun Phrases concerned function as subject, they are object in the following cases: (22) (23) (24) (25)*

We We We We

saw saw saw met

the Président. the President himsélf. a cSll-girl. a call-girl herself.

From the differences in meaning and distribution noted above it follows, I think, that strong-stressed NPs and emphatic reflexives (which I would prefer to call emphatic compound personal pronouns, to avoid any suggestion that we are dealing with REFLEXIVITY here) are in fact two different ways of emphasizing Noun Phrases. If names are required, the first process could be called (following tradition) T-EMPHASIS, the latter T-CONTRAST. It could even be argued that the two are mutually exclusive; i.e. we can emphasize an NP either by giving it strong stress (T-EMPHASIS), OR by adding an emphatic compound personal pronoun (T-CONTRAST), in which case the strong stress can no longer fall on the NP itself, but has to fall on self - that is also why I think (14) and (16) should in fact be stressed as indicated in (15) and (17) respectively. A combination of T-EMPHASIS and T-CONTRAST is possible only when the former is realized by syntactic rather than phonological means. D. Thus I would argue that what is achieved in (18) and (20) by means of stress, is reinforced syntactically in the corresponding cleft sentences (26) and (27), and in the pseudo-cleft sentences (28) and (29): (26) (27) (28) (29)

It was the President who asked her to come. It was a call-girl who answered the phone. The one who asked her to come was the President. The one who answered the phone was a call-girl.

(Similar 'paraphrases' could of course be given for (22) and (24)). Notice now that emphatic compound personal pronouns can occur in such cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences, again with the

- 165 restriction that they can only be added to Noun Phrases that are definite. Cf.: (30) It was the President hims§lf who asked her to come. (31) • It was a call-girl hersilf who answered the phone. (32) The one who asked her to come was the President himself. 2) (33) »The one who answered the phone was a call-girl herself. From the above it appears that strong-stressed NPs, cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences are alternative ways of realizing T-EMPHASIS, with the pseudo-cleft sentences arguably (cf. e.g. Bach, 1968) reflecting their shared underlying structure most directly. In view of the fact that cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences can both occur with or without emphatic compound personal pronouns and in view of the restriction of the latter to definite NPs, we must conclude that T-EMPHASIS and T-CONTRAST are two independent processes, and hence it will not do to consider the underlying structure corresponding to such sentences as the SOURCE of emphatic compound personal pronouns (as Postal 1971 seems to be suggesting). E. Part of the problem in Postal's account of 'contrast-movement' is that he does not sufficiently distinguish between compound personal pronouns used emphatically only and compound personal pronouns used both emphatically AND reflexively. (That his use of the term 'emphatic reflexive' is not meant to cover only the latter, can be seen from the fact that he also uses this term in connection with the compound personal pronoun in Harry himself offered her a chair.- Postal, 1971, p. 12) Postal might have profited from a consideration of a quotation in Sonnenschein (1921) (also mentioned in Jespersen, 1949) . (34)

"A. I had good sport in Schotland this season. "B. I think I shall go and shoot myself there next year.

The joke here, clearly, is due to the fact that the NON-REFLEXIVE emphatic myself qualifying the subject has been moved, by what I would call contrast movement, to a position following the verb in which it could be interpreted as an emphatic

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REFLEXIVE form. If contrast movement had not applied we would have a perfectly unambiguous sentence, as (35) illustrates: (35) F.

I think I myself shall go and shoot there next year. Having established now that emphatic compound personal pro-

nouns have nothing to do, basically, with the various realizations of T-EMPHASIS, we can sum up the situation as follows: There is a process

(call it T-CONTRAST) which allows us to

emphasize an NP in a contrastive way, subtly different from the effect of T-EMPHASIS. This process involves adding an appropriate strong-stressed self-pronoun to the NP

(in 'apposition'),

and does not require a reflexive context. Thus a sentence like (36) can be affected by T-CONTRAST in two ways, as shown in (37) and (38) : (36)

Charley cut the meat.

(37)

Charley himsSlf cut the meat.

(38)

Charley cut the meat itself.

Application of T-CONTRAST to two NPs within one and the same sentence seems only marginally acceptable, as (39) shows: (39) PCharley himself cut the meat itsSlf. When the NP affected by T-CONTRAST is the subject, the selfpronoun may be moved to the right, away from the subject, to final position, or to a position following the first auxiliary, by CONTRAST MOVEMENT.

3)

(40)

Charley

(41)

Charley has himsSlf cut the meat.

(has) cut the meat himself.

T-CONTRAST may also apply when subject and object have identical referents, as in (15) and (17), here repeated as (42) and (43) respectively: (42)

Charley shaved Charley himself.

(43)

Charley hims€lf cut Charley.

- 167 Notice that CONTRAST MOVEMENT applied to (43) would give a sentence superficially like (42) except for the verb cut. Neither the self-pronoun in (42), nor the one in (43) are to be considered REFLEXIVE pronouns. Reflexivization can still apply to (42) and

(43) , yielding

(44) and (45) respectively:

(44) »Charley shaved himself himsSlf. (45)

Charley himsSlf cut himself.

The two adjacent self-pronouns in (44) apparently necessitate a further structural change, viz. the deletion of the first self-pronoun. In the resultant sentence (46) himsglf now combines the functions of the two self-pronouns in (44), i.e. reflexiveness and (contrastive) emphasis. (46)

Charley shaved himsSlf.

Finally, of course, we must consider the possibility that CONTRAST MOVEMENT applies to (45). This would give (47) as 'intermediate stage", and, after deletion,

(48), which is superficial-

ly like (46): (47) «Charley cut himself himsSlf. (48)

Charley cut himself.

Poutsma

(1916) gives a convincing example of this kind of con-

flation of elements from subject and object: "Sometimes the emphatic reflective pronoun represents the emphatic pronoun (attached to the subject) + the reflective pronoun (or personal pronoun used in a reflective meaning). Thus I must introduce myself, as the girl has deserted me (Rid. Haggard, Mr. Mees. Will, Ch. IV, 36) stands for * I mysglf must introduce myself 4) etc." (p. 871). On the same page Poutsma also provides a good illustration of the difference between ordinary and emphatic reflexives with the following quotation from Punch: "HE: 'Nellie, you look at that man standing behind me. I don't think I ever saw any one so plain.' - SHE: 'Hush, dear; you forget yourself:'"

5)

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168

-

Notes 1. The incompatibility of passives and reflexives was also observed, as Lees and Klima (1963) point out, in Jespersen (1927). A similar observation can be found in Poutsma (1926) , p. 108. 2. Notice that (33) is ungrammatical only in the interpretation here intended, with herself belonging to a call-girl. There is a grammatical reading of (33) , however, in which hersSlf must be considered to belong to the one who answered the phone. This corresponds to: (a) The one who answered the phone herself was a call-girl, and: (b) The one who answered the phone was hersSlf a call-girl. Sentence (b) above and (33) can be considered to derive from (a) above by means of the rule called CONTRAST MOVEMENT in the final section of this article. 3. Whether CONTRAST MOVEMENT can also apply to self-pronouns belonging to object-NPs cannot be determined on the basis of a sentence like (38), since there the self-pronoun is already in final position and CONTRAST MOVEMENT would thus have no observable effect. Consideration of the doubtful grammatical status of sentences such as (e) and (f) below, however, suggests that CONTRAST MOVEMENT is restricted to subject NPs: (c) Peter kicked the ball itsSlf away. (d) John sent the book itself to his brother. (e)??Peter kicked the ball away itsglf. (f)??John sent the book to his brother itsSlf. 4. Poutsma1s marking * I mysglf must introduce myself as ungrammatical, and my own misgivings about the grammaticality of sentence (39) perhaps points to a general surface-structure constraint blocking the occurrence of more than one selfpronoun in the same simple sentence. Where (by CONTRAST MOVEMENT or otherwise) two such pronouns end up adjacent to one another (as in (44) and (47)) the ungrammaticality can no longer be doubted. This seems to hold even when the two adjacent self-pronouns are not co-referential, as in (g), which derives from (39) by CONTRAST MOVEMENT: (g) * Charley cut the meat itsSlf himself. Compare also Meys (1975), p. 50. 5. The quotations from Poutsma may go to show that this traditional grammarian had a very acute awareness of the intricacies of English syntax. Further evidence for this can be found in Meys (1976a) and (1976b).

- 169 -

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY OF ANGLED BRACKETS Wim Zonneveld University of Utrecht

0. Introduction As a linguist one is confronted before everything else with sets of linguistic data within which to distinguish the accidental and the non-accidental, the non-coherent facts and the generalizations. Given a set of data there is, of course, no a priori method to establish which are the generalizations and which are not. The simplest, least "costly" way to describe the facts may capture the correct generalizations, but this is only true to the extent that the native speaker analyses the data in the simplest manner himself. Often one has intuitions about what constitutes the optimally generalizing analysis. One will eventually, however, always seek for external evidence outside the original set of data in order to have ones intuitions confirmed or, as the case may be, disconfirmed. Having succeeded in finding external evidence, one will have found proof not only for one's particular analysis, but also for that theory of linguistics •that enables one to express the correct generalization as a generalization. That is to say, the tools made available by the theory to express the generalization as such will have been shown to be "psychologically real". In the next few pages I will be occupied with a case of external evidence for the psychological reality of a means of making generalizations provided by the standard theory of phonology (embodied as usual by Chomsky and Halle's Sound Pattern of English). This case is, in fact, the standard example of external evidence for so-called abbreviatory devices, in fact for "braces". I hope to show in a purely formal discussion that the particular case should not be seen as external evidence for braces, but more so for a rather less known abbreviatory conven-

- 170

-

t i o n d e f i n e d b y the s t a n d a r d t h e o r y as l e g i t i m a t e in e x p r e s s i n g generalizations,

the s o - c a l l e d " a n g l e d b r a c k e t "

notation.

1. B r a c e s A s is g e n e r a l l y a s s u m e d . O l d E n g l i s h h a d t w o v o c a l i c l a x i n g r u l e s of t h e f o l l o w i n g (1)

V — M

(2)

V

-tense ]

/

C C C

» [ -tense ]

/

C C V CQ

T h u s w e f i n d f o r m s s u c h as g o d s p e l l ( [ -tense ] V — » [ -tense ]

/ /

C C C V Co V

exemplified in alternations such as vain/vanity, severe/severity, keep/kept and so on. These two rules bear, of course, a striking resemblance to the rules (1) and (2), and like these rules can be collapsed into schema (3), rules (8) and (9) can be taken together as (10). (10)

V — » [ -tense ]

/

But if we look at the pair of rules (l)-(2) more closely, comparing it with the pair (8)-(9), there is something else that strikes us. In the course of some ages of time two phonological rules have simultaneously undergone the same simplification, they have, so to speak, both lost one C. Moreover, with the help of the abbreviatory convention of braces we are able to express this modification in two rules as in actual fact one single simplification: schema (3) has lost one C in becoming schema (10). We seem to have evidence, then, for the reality of a generalization made in the phonologies of Old and Middle English, and at the same time for the reality of that specific part of linguistic theory that enables us to express the generalization as a generalization, that is, for braces. 4. The case reconsidered. The point I wish to make in this paper is the following. The case of linguistic change discussed in the previous section has become a standard example in generative phonological works of the psychological reality of abbreviatory conventions, in fact of the reality of braces (see also SPE, pp. 330 ff.). However, the generalization made by braces in (3) and (10) could as well be expressed by means of angled brackets, in a manner very similar to that in which this abbreviatory convention is put to use in the English Explanation Rule. In order to see this, con-

- 174 -

sider (11). (11)

v —>[-tense ] /

C C

[ ]

Schema (11) is an abbreviation of the two subrules of (12), which in fact correspond to rules (2) and (1), respectively. (12) (i) (ii)

V — > [ -tense]

/

C C

[-cons]

V—-tense]

/

C C

[+cons]

CQ V

Assuming (11) as the Old English rule of laxing, we are still able to account for the difference with the Middle English rule as loss of one consonant. Note that the single feature [-cons] angled in (11) is negated in obtaining subrule (12ii), while 4) the sequence C V is omitted en bloc. Given formuiations such as those in (10) and (11), the choice between angled brackets and braces as the correct device for collapsing rules such as (l)-(2) and (8)-(9) appears to be rather poised. A point in favour of angled brackets, however (for what this observation is worth), may be that the subrules of (10) and (11) never need apply both to the same form. That is to say, although braces define a conjunctive application on the subrules they abbreviate, this conjunction is in fact completely vacuous in this particular case. Therefore, disjunctive application defined by angled brackets may be selected as more appropriate. Notes 1. See Luick (1964: 187/8; and after him Kiparsky (1968: 180). 2. I am aware of a note precisely on this point in Anderson (1971: 98/9). Although the factual evidence presented there is rather thin, it may be the case that the present discussion is valid only within a theory of "local" ordering. 3. I have slightly simplified this rule in ways irrelevant to the present discussion. Cf. SPE: 240.

- 175 4. It may be that in cases such as this one, where the angled feature is on its own within segmental brackets, the single feature is not negated but rather omitted in obtaining the shorter rule. There may be some evidence pointing in this direction. In that case, we will have to add a feature to the segment containing [-cons]. Although any feature will in principle do, finding one is actually complicated by the fact that we will have to find a feature common to .both consonants and vowels. A feature coming readily to mind is of course [+segment], but the inclusion of this feature in the structural description of a phonological rule is otherwise unknown. A more realistic candidate is, curiously enough, [-stress], under two assumptions: (i) the specification of the post-cluster vowel in (12i) as unstressed is in accord with the facts of Old and Middle English (this feature is not specified by Kiparsky, but features in many traditional accounts, see also Malsch, 1972); and (ii) there is an "early phonological rule" specifying every unit, that is, boundary and segment, as [-stress] (cf. SPE: 66).

- 176 THE FEATURES 'LONG' AND 'TENSE1 AND THE PLACE OF STRESS RULES IN GERMAN* W.U.S. van Lessen Kloeke University of Utrecht

Summary; 1. Although there is still disagreement in the literature as to the relative status of the features 'long' and 'tense' in German vowels, it is argued that only the latter is distinctive phonologically. 2. The [+tense ] specification occurs in some morpheme structure conditions, but there are also rules which actually change this feature specification in a number of derivations. Because of the conditions on which they operate they must be seen as morphological rules. 3. Internal and external evidence is given for the claim that the word stress rules are previous to phonology and are part of morphology. 1. In German phonology, the discussion about what constitutes the phonological difference between the italicized vowels in the minimal pairs in (1) (1)

barsch schoß Bruch weg irren

('gruff') ('shot') ('breach') (1 away') ('err')

Barsch Schoß Bruch Weg Iren

('perch') ('lap') ('brook') ('way') ('Irish')

has been going on for more than thirty years. While the concept of 'juncture' as a conditioning factor for quality and quantity of the preceding vowel seems to have been abandoned (cf. Marga Reis, 1974: 185-90 for an evaluation of the argumentation in question) there appear to be basically two features at issue, viz. [ +long ] and [ +tense ] (for further references see Werner, 1972; Weiss, 1977; and, more extensively, Reis, 1974: 176-92). Some teaching guides and pronunciation dictionaries indicate that quantity and quality are concomitant features - tense vowels are long, lax vowels are short, and vice versa. Siebes (1961: 35) states that it is a peculiarity of non-native German words

- 177 that they can contain a third type of vowel: one that is both short and tense. This view is reflected in Wurzel (1970a: 89) who formulates a (reversible) redundancy relationship between the two features (2) (2)

[a tense ]

-[along]

/

The redundancy conditions in non-native words, on the other hand, being of a different, less general nature, are in Wurzel's formulation accounted for by (3) (3)

[ -tense ] [ +long ]

-»• [ -long ] [ +tense]

However, the occurrence of short tense vowels is not exclusively limited to (historically) non-native words; Siebs mentions a few "exceptions" like Fo'relle, Ho'lunder which are of Germanic origin. Wurzel (1970a: 102) duly labels them [ -native ] just as Herme'lin, Hor'nisse, Wa'cholder because of their stress pattern which he feels is "intuitively" non-German, even though all the nouns in question had initial stress in an earlier stage of the language. Meanwhile, most phonological literature considers either [+tense] or [+long] as a feature on which other features depend. Thus, some regard the quantity of vowels as distinctive (most recently Marthe Philipp, 1974), others, following Moulton who stated this tentatively (1947: 217) for the first time, see the feature of tenseness as such (most recently Ungeheuer, 1977) . The latter choice is based on the observation that "...though the opposition 'long - short' is a striking phonetic feature of the German vowel system, it affects vowels only when they are stressed. The one constant feature which distinguishes the two sets of vowels in both stressed and unstressed position is the opposition 'tense - lax'" (Moulton, 1962: 64). Wurzel (1970b: 150) somewhat ambiguously assumes underlying vowels to be distinct in quality: "Alle deutschen Vokale außer [a] und f ä ] kommen jeweils gespannt ('lang') und ungespannt ('kurz') vor" but he does not elaborate on this any further. Finally, Weiss

-

178

-

(1977: 275) concludes that both features are necessary, and interact in the following way: "High vowels are distinguished primarily by quality (length is secondary). Low vowels are distinguished primarily by length (quality is secondary). Mid-vowels are distinguished by both length and quality factors". Yet, it should be mentioned that only stressed vowels were investigated. With all those contradictory views a definite choice between either feature seems to be precluded. Reis (1974: 190 ff.) surveys the arguments which have been adduced for either feature as the primary factor, quality versus quantity. According to her there are basically two arguments for using the former as a distinctive feature: (la) in unstressed position the difference of quantity is neutralized but not that of quality, as can be seen in the following examples (4) taken here from the Wörterbuch der deutschen Aussprache (WDA). All italicized vowels, whether or not stressed, are tense: (4)

1

kritisch 'physisch 'Muse 1 lebend •Möbel ' so 'Fatum

t i:l I y=]

[ u:] [ e:] [ Ö:] [ o:]

[ »:]

Kri ' tik Phy' sik Mu' sik le' bendig mö'blieren so1 fort fa'tal

[ i] [ y] [ u] [ e] [ ö] [ o] [04

Thus, vowel quantity is dependent on stress and indirectly on vowel quality (whereas vowel quality is independent of both quantity and stress) . (Ib) There is a distributional., phonotactic regularity in German: a lax vowel precedes a tense consonant, a tense vowel is followed by a lax consonant. The two basic arguments for using quantity as a distinctive feature are the following. (Ila) In some variants of High German there exists only a distinction in quantity of /a/:/a/ and if there are qualitative differences they are not of the same nature as in the other vowel pairs. (lib) There is a distributional, phonotactic rule which requires that a long vowel be followed by a single consonant and a short vowel by a consonant cluster.

- 179 Reis reasons as follows: by reversing the argument one can examine whether the respective pieces of evidence provide counterevidence to any of the other alternatives. Argument (Ila) as a counterargument against quality depends on the variant of High German one chooses and is debatable at best. As for (lb) and (lib), there exist counterexamples in such monomorphemic words as Mond, Probst, Schwert etc. and Kater, Takel, Egge, Robbe etc., respectively. Thus, either argument is disputable, each is equally relevant as evidence, and therefore they nullify each other. Only argument (la), on vowels in unstressed position, cannot be refuted, irrespective of the variant or subdialect of High German or mode of speech one chooses - let alone that one would choose not to accept evidence from unstressed position, because that would preclude the possibility to find the definitive underlying vowel system. That means that for German [ +long ] has to be given up as a distinctive feature in favour of the feature [ +tense ], even though it should be noted that there is still no general agreement which precisely are the consistent (universal) physical correlates of the tense/lax distinction (cf. Patricia Miller, 1974 for a critical survey of the literature).

2. In German there exist morpheme structure conditions (MSC) which refer to tenseness. One of them is of the following form (5)

[ +tense ] which means that underlying vowels before voiced obstruents usually are tense e.g. Trab, Bad, Tag, 'Möwe, 'Hase, 'Kleinod, 'Herzog, 'Orlog (cf. also~Leys7 1975). This MSC reflects thi phonotactic regularity (lb) mentioned in section 1, but its counterpart - a lax vowel is followed by a voiceless consonant can hardly be seen as a MSC because of numerous exceptions.

-

180

-

Another MSC is (6) (6)

MSC

if:

V

+

C

son

t J2

[ -tense ] which means that a vowel before two or more consonants is generally lax, a reflection of part of the phonotactic regularity in (lib). Again, its counterpart exhibits too many exceptions as to be stated as a MSC. A third MSC, one which states that the first vowel in diphthongs is always lax, is mentioned by Wurzel (1970b: 247) and can be formulated as (7):

4[-tense] Provided one accepts Wurzel's analysis that /j/ and /w/ are derived from underlying glides, then there are a few exceptions like Boje and Lowe which have to be marked for the tense vowel in their roots. If, on the other hand, one adheres to Kiparsky's alternation condition, those segments simply are analyzed as underlying consonants and, moreover, words like jiddisch or injizieren don't have to be regarded as exceptions either. In other words, Wurzel's rule (K 12) 'Glide-Konsonantisierung' (:247) could be dispensed with altogether and MSC (12) would be without exceptions. Counterexamples to MSC (5) are mainly words of Low German origin like Ebbe, Kladde, Egge and some non-native words. Counterexamples to MSC (6) are words like Magd, Obst, Krebs which in the course of their linguistic history underwent syncope, as well as Schwert, Erz and some others. Virtually no exceptions are found to the rule that no lax vowels are found before either a boundary or another vowel (cf. Moulton, 1956: 378). On the one hand it could be a MSC, but on the other

-

181

-

it would be very convenient if it could be ordered as a phonological rule in such a way that it applies after the assignment of word stress. In this case it could be a phonological rule such as (8) (8)

[+syll

]_> [ + t e n s e ]

([+syll ]1 ^

(a)

(b)

In fact, schwa has to be prevented from being subject to subrule (b). This could well be stated (cf. Wurzel, 1970a: 92 FN) but such an addition is somewhat suspicious, because of the exceptional status of schwa in phonology and because of its particular role in German morphology (cf. Kloeke, 1978). The exact place of rule (8) cannot be decided upon in a non-ad hoc manner for the moment. Another rule pertaining to tenseness has been stated by Wurzel (1970a: 92) for a small number of non-native words which at the same time exhibit stress alternation in their derivations, e.g. (9) 'Japan Cha1rakter 'Casar E'lektron ' Cicero

[a]

[•] [a] [a] [o-]

ja1panisch Charak'tere Ca'saren elek'tronisch cice1ronisch

[a:] [e: ] [eu] [OS] [o: ]

The rule which converts underlying short vowels of these and similar cases into tense ones is formulated by Wurzel as follows (10) :

(10)

+cons -obstr +cont a back a high

[ +syll }—»

+syll +suffix ) [+f lexivej

However, the sonorant consonant and the preceding vowel turn out to be overspecified as can be seen in the following example (11) (11)

'Darwin 'Israel Suri'nam

[ I ] [ £. ] [ a ]

dar'winisch isra'elisch suri'namisch

[ i: ] [ e: ] [ ou ]

-

182

-

and also the specification [ -obstr] has to be dropped in order to ensure that the u in tal'mudisch (vs. 'Talmud [U] ) is tensed. Even the specification [ -native] can be omitted, because of an isolated [ +native] case of vowel tensing in the plural form Städte [6:1 (from Stadt [ a] ). Also lu'therisch (i.e. the denomination) as opposed to 'lutherisch (i.e. Luther) has to undergo this rule. At first glance one might be tempted to think that this rule is a stress rule rather than a tensing rule, but the pairs in (12) show that only the feature 'tense' is involved: (12) (a) 'Japan 'Darwi.n Cha'rakter 'Konsul 'Cherub 'Senegal

[a] (b) Ja'paner [a,:] (c) [ I] dar'w^nisch [ i:] [ a] Charak'tere [ e:1 [U] [U] [ a]

Japano'loge [a] Darwi'nismus [ i] charakterischf e] Konsu'lat [ u] cheru'binisch[ u] senega'lesischfc]

and that stress is assigned by a different rule. The tensing rule (10) may now be reformulated as in (13) (13)

[ +syll] —* [ + tense]/ X

C*

+ [ +syll]

Condition: Charakter, Cherub, Darwin,... The words that have to undergo this rule are not marked with a special rule feature but, instead, the conditions are stated on the base, which means that all items in question are listed together with the rule. Although rule (13) involves an alternation in only one segment, it is not a phonological but a morphological rule in terms of Aronoff (1976: 99), for the alternation is restricted to specific morphemes (words like tyrannisch [ a ], Snobismus [ o ]» bolschewistisch [ 3 ] are not subject to the rule) - which is to say that the rule is root-governed and thus an instance of allomorphy. Since no disjunction and no negation is allowed in the specification of morphological rules, all the items of its base have to be listed in the condition.

- 183 Another rule which has to do with vowel quality is rule (P 5) formulated by Wurzel (1970b: 75): the feature for tenseness changes its value in a number of verb stems depending on which syntactic feature appears in its environment. In the next section it will be claimed that, just as in the case of rule (13), this rule is morphological in nature by virtue of its conditions. Thus, apart from the morpheme structure conditions, it has been claimed so far that there are two morphological tensing c.q. de-tensing rules in German, rules (13) and (P 5), whereas the exact status of rule (8) has to remain undecided for the moment. The lengthening rules in German are clearly phonological by any standard: they change segment specifications and their environments contain the features [ +tense ] and [ +stress ] as conditioning factors. According to WDA vowels are always found to be "halblang" when in word-final position. Secondly, vowels are "halblang" in the first syllable if it is open and at least four syllables away from the stressed syllable. The latter rule accounts for the difference in quantity of the following pairs: univer'sal [ u ] vs. Universali'tat [ u'] , prazipi'tieren [£ ] vs. Prazipita'tion [ ]. But the principal^rule for lengthening can be formulated as follows (14) (14)

[ +long

3. Reference to word stress plays a crucial role in the rules which delete the prefixes be+ and ge+. In Kiparsky's formulation (1966) these prefixes contain a vowel with the feature [ +unbetonbar ] and they are deleted before a syllable which contains a vowel with the feature [ -stress ]. By cyclical application of the stress and deletion rules forms like lieb'kost and ge'liebkost but also miß'gönnt and 'mißverstanden get their correct prefixes and stress patterns. Archaisms like gebene'deit and presumably also geoffen'bart, gefroh'lockt or 'liebgekost should

- 184 be viewed as exceptions. It should be noted, in this respect, that the specification of the sequence that has to be deleted seemingly refers to segments but in fact represents two specific morphemes. This fact is underlined by comparison with the similar deletion rule in Dutch that Schultink (1973: 412) formulates, because there only ge+ but not be+ is deleted. This begs the question whether morphological variants - even if they are archaisms - can be exceptions to phonological rules. In the definition of Anderson (1975: 42-3) "morpholexical" rules refer essentially to morphemes, lexical items, or classes of morphemes, whereas phonological rules "are those whose environments involve reference only to the phonological composition of elements of the string, to boundary elements, and perhaps to major lexical classes.., and which furthermore operate so as to alter the categorical (+/-) value of some feature which is distinctively specified in underlying forms of the language ..." Clearly, the "major lexical class" is the odd one out. One would rather expect it in the former list under the heading "classes of lexical items'. Stress assignment rules operate with changes of +/- values but they often refer to major lexical categories or classes of morphemes, so indeed one might be lead to expect that word stress rules belong into the morphological rather than into the phonological component. There is some evidence from other languages for the claim that rules for the assignment of words stress may be ordered before the phonological rules. An example of this is Gothic (cf. Wurzel, 1975: 330). Kiparsky and Halle (1977) explicitly claim that properties pertaining to stress in Slavic, Lithuanian, Vedic and Classical Greek are lexically specified, i.e. there are three basic classes of morphemes: unaccented morphemes, accented morphemes and preaccenting morphemes, and stress assignment in

185

words is in part predictable morphologically. As for French, for purely formal reasons Mayerthaler (1977: 8) rejects the idea that stress rules are phonological. According to him word stress assignment has to be stated as a redundancy condition of the following form (15): (15)

.

Sn +tense I U

([ +segm] ) *

Joan Bresnan (1971) suggests that the assignment of English word stress has to occur either in deep structure or in the lexicon. Evidence that word stress rules are cyclically ordered with respect to one type of affixation rule, but are irrelevant to (i.e. prior to the attachment of) another class of suffixes, is given by Dorothy Siegel (1974) . Furthermore, rules for +al derivation as in acquittal, rental make crucially reference to primary stress in the base. Dutch noun plural formation in either +s or +en primarily depends on whether the last syllable is stressed or not (cf. van Haeringen, 1947) . When turning back to the stress rules in German one finds that Wurzel (1970b: 272) orders them among the phonological rules. At second glance one observes, however, that the eleven rules which have to apply before the stress rules are liable to some doubt as to their respective status. The following arguments will be numbered (i) - (xi) for sake of conveniency. (i) Rule (P 3) 'U-Senkung' (:74) applies to a restricted set of strong verbs which undergo lowering of the stem vowel when there is a syntactic specification of [ +past ] or [ +past part. ], e.g. schmolz, geboren. This makes the rule a morphological one by definition. (ii) Rule (P 5) 'Diphthongdissimilation' (:166) is not crucially ordered before or after any of the rules listed, but it has to apply after (morphological) Umlaut, and it turns /ow/^/aw/, /ej/ -/aj/, /oy/-Voy/.

-

186

-

(iii) Rule (K 10) 1Wechsel vor t' (:241) is restricted to the class of verbs which forms nouns with the affix +t, and accounts for the 0/x alternation in a few words (e.g. Macht, brachte, nachst). (iv) Rule (K 11) 'Velare Spiranten' (: 243) is specified for a derivative after adjectival suffixes (heit + keit / +X ) , which means it is morphological, and case (c) (/x/^/h/) even has the feature [+stress ] in its environment, so at least that part has to be ordered after the stress rules. (v) Rule (K 9) 'Stimmlose palatale Spirans' (: 23 7) is ordered before (vi) rule (K 8) 'Uvulares r' (:236) because of the required underlying [ -back ] environment, but both rules together can be ordered anywhere before rule (K 13) 'Stimmlosigkeit1 (:260), not necessarily before the stress rules. The mirror subrule (K 9a) which turns /x/ -*-/c/ apparently is a phonological rule, the dissimilation subrules (b) and (c), on the other hand, apply to the sequence /ig/ before word boundary and derivational affixes beginning with an obstruent, but the presence of the [ -stress ] feature in their environment suggests that stress rules have applied earlier. (vii) Rule (P 4) 'Gespanntheit der Ablautvokale' (:75) carries syntactic features and is by all definitions a morphological rule. The same goes for rule (S-2) mentioned in a footnote on page 284 - and ordered before (P 4) - since it only applies to three lexical items. (viii) Rule (P 1) 'die/sie Regel' (:62) is also typically morphological (in the same way as rule (P 2) 'Dehnung im Pronomen, das/was Regel' (:62), very similar to this one, but ordered curiously far away in the list). (ix) As for rule (SV 1) 1e-Epenthese' (:171, 192) there is not much that can be said about it. In fact, all the rules for epenthesis and deletion of schwa call for closer examination. Isacenko (Issatschenko, 1974) is perhaps overly critical of Wurzel's phonological epenthesis rules. On the other hand, there is evidence that at least some of the deletions of schwa are morphological (cf. Kloeke, 1978). It is also clear that rule

- 187 -

(SV 5b) which deletes final schwa in the collectival derivations Gefäß, Gebein, Gebräu but not in Gefilde (: 181) is morphological by Anderson's definitions because it refers to a specific class of nouns; it cannot be phonological anyway as all nouns in question have a plural in +e. (x) and (xi), counterarguments concerning rule (K 6) and (K 7) which derive /s/ from underlying /sk/ (:231-2), have been given by Robinson (1974). The abstract representation violates Kiparsky's alternation condition; moreover, it adds to predictive indeterminacy in contrastive linguistics, as is argued by Eliassen (1976) . Wurzel orders the stress rules after (K 7) but before the schwadeletion rules. Indeed, he does not see any a priori reason not to order them somewhere earlier: "Wenn wir diese Regeln hier zwischen (K 7) und (SV 2) in das Regelsystem einordnen, so ist diese Lokalisierung allerdings dennoch relativ arbiträr, da es im Deutschen keine segmental-phonologischen Regeln gibt, die voraussetzen, da3 die Akzentregeln noch nicht operiert haben dürfen" (:270). In sum, there is reason to suspect that German word stress rules apply before the phonological rules. Moreover, the stress conditions for deletion of the prefixes be+ and ge+, velar spirantization in the ending /ig/ and (in Wurzel's formulation) glide formation from initial /x/ suggest that word stress rules are ordered among the morphological rules and thus belong to the morphological component.

* I am grateful to H. Schultink and C. Soeteman for helpful comment on some of the topics treated in this paper. In particular, I wish to thank W. Zonneveld for criticism and invaluable suggestions.

- 1-88 MARKED COORDINATION IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SOV - SVO PROBLEM * Anneke Neijt University of Utrecht

Dutch word order is both SOV and SVO. In embedded clauses, it is SOV - in main clauses, it is SVO: (1) (2)

Als hij tulpen plant, ... If he plants tulips, ... Hij plant tulpen He plants tulips

For Dutch, both underlying SOV and underlying SVO superficially appear to be supported by the facts. By exploring coordination phenomena, it will be shown that surface SVO cannot be argued to support deep SVO in Dutch. Therefore, by indirect demonstration, it will follow that Dutch is SOV in deep structure. Moreover, striking differences between English and Dutch SVO-structures are explained by the existence of a Verb Fronting Rule in Dutch. Coordination Consider the following coordinations: (3)

(4)

Gisteren en vandaag heeft het geregend Yesterday and today it rained Jan, (noch) Piet, noch Karel heeft dat gedaan John, (nor) Peter, nor Charles has done so Je bent rustig of je gaat de kamer uit You are quiet or you leave the room En gisteren en vandaag heeft het geregend Both yesterday and today it rained Noch Jan, noch Piet, noch Karel heeft dat gedaan Neither John, nor Peter, nor Charles has done so

-

189

-

Of je bent rustig of je gaat de kamer uit Either you are quiet or you leave the room The only difference between (3) and (4) is that the coordinations in (4) start out with an "extra" coordinator immediately to the left of the first conjunct. Henceforth, the first type is called unmarked coordination and the second type marked coordination. It is worthwhile to make a distinction between these two types at all, since they behave very differently with respect to Forward Conjunction Reduction. Forward Conjunction Reduction is the rule which deletes identical first parts in coordinative conjunctions as shown in (5) (5)

groene appels en groene peren green apples and green pears

=» groene appels en peren =» green apples and pears

Some linguists (e.g. Hankamer, 1971) assume that Forward Conjunction Reduction is a reduction in place, others (e.g. Ross, 1967) assume that it is a raising-and-deletion-transformation. For unmarked coordination, these different assumptions result in different output structures, not in different output strings Consider (6) and (7). (6)

NP NP Adj

NP N

Reduction in place

en

Adj

I

N

- 190 -

Reduction in place

Sentences that fit the outputs of (8) and (9),however, are ungrammatical, although those that fit the underlying structure are correct. Compare (10) and (11) , that correspond to (8) and (9), respectively, with the unreduced phrase (12). (10)* En groene appels en peren * Both green apples and pears ^

- 191 -

(11)* Groene en appels en peren * Green both apples and pears (12) En groene appels en groene peren Both green apples and green pears Both versions of Forward Conjunction Reduction do not work in 2)

marked coordination. this point.

(13) contains more examples illustrating

(13) Reduction in place; * En de hongerige jongens en meisjes begonnen te eten * Both the hungry boys and girls started to eat * Karel heeft noch winterhanden noch -voeten * Charles has neither chilblained hands nor feet Raising-and-deletion: * De hongerige en jongens en meisjes begonnen te eten * The hungry both boys and girls started to eat * Karel heeft winter noch -handen noch -voeten * Charles has chilblained neither hands nor feet If there is no Forward Conjunction Reduction in marked coordinations, it will be possible to conclude from the material between the coordinators which categories are conjoined in a 3) certain coordination. Combined with the commonly accepted claim that only strings that together form a constituent, may be coordinated, one can derive the required information about constituent structure that leads to a choice as regards the SOV - SVO question. Surface VP-structures Consider the following subordinate clauses: (14)

Omdat Jan en de rozen snoeit en de tulpen plant, ... Because John both prunes the roses and plants the tulips,... Omdat Jan en de rozen zal snoeien en de tulpen zal planten, ... Because John both will prune the roses and will plant the tulips, ...

- 192 -

(14) shows that object and verb (and modal) form one constituent together: VP. Now consider the following main clauses: (15)» Jan en snoeit de rozen en plant de tulpen John both prunes the roses and plants the tulips (16)* Jan en zal de rozen snoeien en zal de tulpen planten John both will prune the roses and will plant the tulips (17) Jan zal en de rozen snoeien en de tulpen planten John will both prune the roses and plant the tulips The English examples in (15) , (16) and (17) show that English VP-structure is (roughly) that of (18): (18)

English VP-structure in main and subordinate clauses

(15) and (16) show the existence of VP 2 , and (17) shows the existence of VP^. Dutch is different: obviously, finite verbs do not form one single constituent with the other daughters of the VP in main sentences. The finite verb in (15) and (16) is awkward in comparison with the English examples. In Dutch subordinate clauses, however, such as (14), finite verbs are contained within the VP. These differences are schematized in (19) and (20): 4)

Dutch VP-structure in main clauses

- 193 (20)

S

Dutch VP-structure in subordinate clauses The awkward role of the finite verb in Dutch main clauses (cf. the ungrammaticality of (15) and (16)) can be described by virtue of a Verb Fronting Rule which moves the finite verb outside of the VP in main sentences. Note that it is impossible to explain (15) and (16) by referring to Forward Conjunction Reduction, because that rule does not work in marked coordinations, as shown above. ^ Dutch deep structure Hitherto it has been assumed that for Dutch both underlying SOV and underlying SVO are supported by the facts. Subordinate clauses were assumed to support the SOV-hypothesis and main clauses were assumed to support the SVO-hypothesis. I have argued above that there exists a surface VP in main and subordinate clauses (see (14) and (17)). This implies that VP exists in deep structure as well. I take it for granted that this deep VP contains all verbs. Then it follows that surface SVO cannot be argued to support deep SVO: the VP of surface SVO does not contain all verbs. Therefore, the structure of surface SVO (see (19)) is incompatible with the characteristics of deep structure. Thus, by indirect demonstration, it follows that Dutch is SOV in deep structure. Further evidence for Verb Fronting The conclusion that Dutch is SOV in deep structure entails the existence of a Verb Fronting Rule. This Verb Fronting Rule would make it possible to construe for Dutch surface VP's without a verb, namely in case the deep VP contains only one verb. In English, which has no Verb Fronting, those examples would be

- 194 ungrammatical. This prédiction is born out: (22)

Jan gaf en Marie een appel en Piet een peer * John gave both Mary an apple and Peter a pear Jan gaf of een appel aan Marie of een peer aan Piet * John gave either an apple to Mary or a pear to Peter

Notes * I wish to thank Arnold Evers, Ger de Haan, Henk Schultink, Kees Stevens en Wim Zonneveld for valuable suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks go to Arnold Evers, who showed me how to look at linguistic data. This work was supported by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.). 1. Of course (10) is grammatical in a sense different from (12) but equal to (i): (i) en peren en groene appels both pears and green apples 2. Different explanations are imaginable for this fact. I think the simplest explanation for the fact that Forward Conjunction Reduction does not work in marked coordinations would be to ban Forward Conjunction Reduction from the grammar, both for marked and for unmarked coordination. Phrasal conjunctions would then be base generated. The difference between marked and unmarked coordination could be accounted for in the base, by postulating different phrase structure rules for both types of coordination . 3. Disregarding Backward Conjunction Reduction, which is of little concern here. 4. One might want to explain the ungrammaticality of (15) and (16) by arguing that the verb in main sentences must occupy the second position in an absolute sense. In (15), the verb occupies the third position, after Jan en en. Then, (15) would be ungrammatical for the same reason as (i) is: (i) * Jan morgen snoeit de rozen (John tomorrow prunes the roses) This explanation, however, would predict that (ii) is just as ungrammatical as (iii). (ii) En hij snoeit de rozen en hij plant de tulpen (Both he prunes the roses and he plants the tulips) (iii)*Morgen hij snoeit de rozen (Tomorrow he prunes the roses) But it is not. Therefore, this potential explanation must be rejected.

-

195

-

5. Besides, the Verb Fronting Rule must be an across-the-board movement:

The output is ungrammatical in case the finite verbs happen to be not identical. Therefore, (22) is ungrammatical, though its superficially identical subordinate variant is grammatical : (22) * Jan of lacht of huilt John either laughs or cries (23)

..., dat Jan of lacht of huilt ..., that John either laughs or cries

In this respect, marked coordination is entirely different from unmarked coordination . The latter coordinates all kinds of constituents, even minor constituents, such as finite verbs. See footnote 2.

- 196 LES NOMS DE NOMBRES- CARDINAUX EN FRANÇAIS (APPROCHE ARITHMÉTICO-GÉNÉRATIVE) J.J. Spa University of Amsterdam

1. Introduction Les grammaires des noms de nombres français, offertes jusqu'ici au public scientifique,

s'inspiraient toutes plus ou

moins du modèle de description syntaxique décrit dans Chomsky 1965. Si ces grammaires spécifient les structures numériques possibles de façon relativement adéquate, aucune d'entre elles n'a poussé la description jusqu'à englober l'aspect sémantique. Van Katwijk 1968 fut le premier, à notre connaissance, à intégrer, ne fût-ce qu'en passant, l'aspect sémantique dans sa grammaire consacrée aux noms de nombres néerlandais, mais cette dernière présente, tout comme les grammaires précédemment mentionnées, certains défauts tyniques du modèle "Asoectual": 2) usage abusif d'accolades , introduction multiple de catégories identiques ^

etc.

Ayant l'intention de pallier ces incorrections, nous voudrons présenter ici une grammaire des nombres, oui s'inspire du cou4) rant de pensée, connu sous le nom de sémantique générative Aussi, pour toute expression numérique, spécifierons-nous d'abord une représentation sémantique (qui, puisqu'il s'agit de noms de nombres, ne peut être qu'arithmétique). La spécification arithmétique se fera à l'aide d'un petit nombre de règles de production, après quoi les structures arithmético-sémantiques sont transformées progressivement en structures plus superficielles, aptes à recevoir une interprétation lexicale. Celle-ci est réalisée à l'aide d'une série de règles qui semblent devoir s'appliquer de fajon ordonnée. De nouvelles transformations attribueront ensuite aux structures lexicalisées une forme syntaxique superficielle, point de départ de l'interprétation phonologique.

2.

Les

A.

rêcles

197

règles de

production

1. Expression

numérique

2.

> # #

Nua ( N a m ) # #

Num

*

• 4.

A

5-

S

(1)

[A] X

i o L E L l Ì

Jr

j

7.

S

BX103 I1'2'

règles

R

n>/i >/l

->

6.

B.

-

3

9

]

prëlexicales

( s v s t è m e moderne) fa

_

f [ A j

o

J X

10* { x = 15,21,27,35

8.

(système

9.

HiJLï-^5 1 (en f r a n ç a i s C

10.

12.

X

1 '5

+

2 3 standard)

10 1

4

5

5

Çc-l]

X 10°]*

(en f r a n ç a i s 8 X 101 1

13.

X 101 X 10°

14. 15.

moderne)

X 10 1 +

I X

10 1

-{c = 7,

( f ai c u l t aa tt iiff, ^ £ l

11.

nj

* 1

X

10 5 + h

standard) 4 X +

I

y

10 2

2

^

1D

I X

10 3

^

£1

X io1

+

10 z

^

10 Z

X 10

X IO 1 «Ç D = 1 , 2 , 3

0 IO 5

B|

^8=1,2,3 J

é]

- 198 C. première insertion lexicale Nom.

/fam»/,

Nom-

/3m»/,

Nom

/fljô/,

E

/1thfcne latin

nom nombre I maso J

+ nom "1 - nombreI + maso + nom "1 - nombra I - maso I

- lijn/,|i - 2,3,4,

+ nom "j + nombre! + maso J

/ miliar /,

10

r nj + nom "I + nombre] + maso _J

(Dans le système ancien, applicable avant l'introduction de la règle 7 dans la langue, les deux dernières règles doivent être remplacées Dar: n/, ^i = 3,4,5 ! Q- ~ -flth&me latin - l i a

10'

/ milian/,

/ «il /,

2 10

nom

I

mase

J

n j +p nombre

+ nom + nombre 1 + maso J

'+ adj + nombre | - variable 1

/sant/, 1

9 * IO

^ /nj nanta /,

8 * Î O 1 ^ ^ /j ktantj ,-yr

formes dialectales

7 X- Î O 1 « ^ /s iptant 9 /, 6 x 101

/svasante/,

5 x 101

/sinkanta /,

4 x 101

/tarant 3 /,

3 x 1Ô1

/tranfd/,

2 x k^V/^a* /vint/,

"+ adj + nombre I + variable I

-

199

-

l6 v^N^ /s Í s >/,

A

15 KAA^» /k±nz »/, 14

/ k a t j rz 3 /,

13 W

/trt i » / ,

12

/duz*/,

11

/h D nz a/, + adj + nombre - variable

IO1.**** /diz/, 9 vA^ /noe v/, 8 7 -W 6 5 4 3 ? 1^

/^it/, /sfct/, /siz/f /sink/, /katra/, /trwaz/, /djiíz/, /yn/,

^I+ 0

íf Num

Nom

D. règles transformationnelles

101

ici r

16.

17.

18.

M

[

=»

+ nombre-] -> 1 J

M

k d J

1#

Conj#

X

X 2

3 = 2,3,4,.

2

*

2 19.

+

'+ adJ "J + nombre + variable I

[

+ nom + nombre_J 3

Num

> 1

-

20.

21.

-

+ nom J nombre I a

Num

[

+ nom

#

+ nombre J

22.

200

^Num

l

+

L~

M

2

|_-maBoJ

^ o

J

1 2 E. deuxième insertion lexicale ConJ

M

A - •/

/«/

Prip

T/W - maac

^/va^

/yn - 3

/

(règles phonologiques)

3. Commentaire La règle 1 spécifie qu'une expression numérique en français comporte un numéral suivi d'un nom facultatif. La règle 2 engendre la somme d'un nombre infini de termes R (premier terme R

dernier terme R^)

Aucun de ces termes n'est

obligatoire, c'est ce qu'indiquent les parenthèses qui entourent le i souscrit, mais si l'on opte pour deux ou plusieurs termes, le symbole Z indique que les valeurs qu'ils représentent doivent être additionnées. La règle 3 spécifie la valeur de chacun des termes engendrés par 2. Dans cette règle j symbolise le chiffre souscrit de chacun des termes R. L'exposant a été souligné pour exprimer que sa valeur arithmétique doit être calculée pour que l'exposant et

-

201

-

sa base puissent recevoir sous C l'interprétation lexicale appropriée. Le soulignement est, à proprement parler, superflu parce que dans les transformations lexicales les symboles [ ,] , de la règle 3 ne se trouvent jamais à gauche de la flèche. Les crochets droits: [],C3°nt été utilisés à la place des symboles arithmétiques: ( ) pour éviter qu'on n'attribue à ces derniers la signification qu'ils ont ordinairement en linguistique génërative, à savoir 1'optionalité. Voici un exemple qui illustrera mieux le fonctionnement de la règle 3. Supposons que R. soit R. . La règle 3 exprime alors l'instruction: Réécrivez 4 3 r T 9 R^ comme c'est-a-dire comme |AJ x 10 . x ^3 [4-1] La règle 4 engendre la somme de 3 termes S, dont l'introduction dans la dérivation est également facultative (premier terme S^, deuxième terme S^, troisième terme Sg). La règle 5 spécifie la valeur de chacun des termes S. Cette valeur est présentée comme le produit de B par 10-* où j représente le chiffre souscrit de chacun des termes S. La règle 6 enfin spécifie la valeur de B. Les six premières règles ont engendré la représentation sëmantico-arithmétique. Les règles 7 à 14 convertissent cette structure en une autre structure arithmétique, qui, elle, recevra une interprétation lexicale. La règle 7 est uniquement applicable dans le système de numération moderne. Traditionnellement les noms de nombres français au-dessus du million changeaient d'appellation toutes les fois que les exposants de 10 étaient divisibles par 3. 9 Soit: 109 égale billion 10 12 10

trillion

15

quatrillion (ou quadrillion)

10 1 8

quintillion

10 2 1

sextillion etc.

Dans le système actuellement en vigueur, il n'en est plus de g meme: 10 est appelé milliard et au-dessus du milliard les noms de nombres changent d'appellation toutes les fois que les expo-

-

202

-

sants de 10 sont divisibles par 6. Soit: 10 12 égale billion 10 1 8 24 10 30 10

"

trillion

"

quatrillion (ou quadrillion)

"

quintillion

10 3 6

"

sextillion

etc. La formulation des règles 1 à 6 présente un maximum de simplicité si on leur fait spécifier les structures sémantico-arithmétiques d'après l'ancien système. Aussi la règle 7 doit-elle les convertir en d'autres structures si l'on veut les rendre aptes à recevoir l'interprétation lexicale moderne. La structure x ÎO 1 ^ (dont la valeur aurait été exprimée en quatrillions dans l'ancien système) est donc convertie par la règle 7 en £ £A

x 103]

x 10 1 2 (dont la valeur sera exprimée en milliers

de billions dans le système moderne). La règle 8 réunit sous une seule appellation les 10 à exposant identique, dont le premier est le résultat 5) de la règle 7 et dont le second a été engendré indépendammant : supposons que les règles 1 à 6 aient engendré la structure: £2 x 101 + 3 x 10°J

x 10 1 5 +

£9 x 102 + 1 x 101 + 2 x 10°J x 10

En vertu de la règle 7 cette structure est convertie en: £ C 2 x 101 + 3 x 10°] x 1 0 3 ]

x 10 1 2 +

£9 x 102 + 1 x 101 + 2 x 1 0 ° ] x 10 1 2 Ensuite la règle 8 la convertit en: [ ^ 2 x 101 + 3 x 10°] x 10 3 + 9 x 102 + 1 x 101 + 2 x 10°} x 10 1 2 laquelle structure sera lexicalisée en: vingt-trois mille neuf cent douze billions. La règle 9, applicable en français standard seulement, doit générer les structures constituant les vestiges de l'ancien système vicêsimal.

12

- 203La règle 10, dont l'application est facultative, sert à remplacer les structures qui seraient lexicalisées plus tard comme: mille x cents

etc. par des structures où le même nombre

est exprimé en centaines. La règle 11 décompose la structure arithmétique fondamentale 80 en ses constituants 4x20. Cette règle ne vaut que pour le français standard, puisque dans les parler français de la Suisse cette décomposition n'est pas de mise. La règle 12 assure la restructuration des noms de nombres situés entre 10 et 17 afin qu'ils puissent être lexicalisés ensuite par des morphèmes uniques. La règle 13 supprime toutes les occurrences du signe de la multiplication suivi de 10^ parce que ces deux symboles ne jouent plus de rôle dans le processus de la lexicalisation. La règle 14 supprime les crochets droits qui entourent le chiffre 1 dans certains contextes. La règle 15 enfin supprime certaines occurrences de 1 suivi du signe de la multiplication. Dans la plupart des cas l'ordre indiqué est conforme aux exigences de l'ordonnance dite intrinsèque. Cela est évident pour les règles 1 à 6 mais cela vaut également pour certaines règles prélexicales. Exemples: a) Les règles 7 et 8 doivent être appliquées dans cet ordre parce que sans la règle 7 il n'y aurait pas de structure arithmétique où deux 10 à exposants identiques se succéderaient et auxquels la règle 8 pourrait s'attaquer. b) La règle 9 doit précéder la règle 11 pour que la structure 80^, issue de certaines applications de la règle 9, puisse être décomposée en ses constituants 4x20 par la règle 11. Aux 15 premières règles succède l'insertion lexicale qui, dans notre modèle, se fait de manière ordonnée: les noms de nombres sont lexicalisés par ordre décroissant pour empêcher qu'une structure telle que 3x101 par exemple ne soit lexicalisée comme

* trois-dix. La première insertion lexicale concerne

les noms communs. Il va de soi que leurs structures sémantiques ont été spécifiées auparavant. Ensuite viennent les lexicalisa-

- 204 tions des noms de nombres élevés du système moderne. Le symbole i , , , . , mentionné après la première barre oblique, inditheme latin que qu'il fait phonologiser le chiffre qui représente le i, par le radical qu'il comportait en latin: 2

égale

3

"

bitri-

4

"

quatri-(ou quadri-)

etc. de sorte que ÎO1^ (= 10

18

sera phonologisé comme

(= 10

3x6

/bi-lion/

) comme /tri-lion/

etc. Dans le système ancien par contre 12 4x3 10 (= 10 ) sera phonologisé comme /tri-li n/ ÎO1^ (=

comme /katri-lian/ ou /kadri-lion/

6)

etc. (N.B. - indique la frontière de morphème) Les indications [ +nom, +nombre, +masc, etc. ] qui suivent les lexèmes phonologisés sont des traits syntaxiques qui jouent un rôle dans les règles transformationnelles. Les formes phonologiques attribuées aux lexèmes sont exprimées en segments sousjacents, lesquels recevront leur interprétation phonétique par le jeu des règles phonologiques. A la fin de l'insertion lexicale certains symboles arithmétiques sont remplacés par des frontières de syntagme ou de mot, puis une frontière de mot est insérée entre le numéral et le nom commun. La règle 16, qui est une véritable règle transformationnelle en ce sens qu'elle tient compte de l'histoire dérivationnelle, insère une conjonction (lexicalisée plus tard sous forme de /e/) à la place du signe

+

quand il se trouve dans un entourage

déterminé (spécifié par la règle). Cet entourage exige que la catégorie E soit précédée de

+

ou de [ pour que la conjonc-

tion ne soit pas insérée dans des structures telles que

- 205 4 x 2 x 101 + 1(1). L 1 indication J est nécessaire parce que la conjonction ne doit pas être insérée dans une structure où le _1 est immédiatement suivi d'un autre chiffre comme par exemple dans la séquence: 6 x 101 + 16 La règle 17 supprime toutes les occurrences des crochets droits. La règle 18 assure la pluralisation de certains adjectifs numéraux lorsqu'ils sont précédés du signe de la multiplication et d'un nombre plus élevé que JL. L'indication 1 N u m qui relève de la parenthétisation étiquetée et qui marque la fin de la catégorie Num, empêche la pluralisations d'adjectifs se trouvant quelque part à l'intérieur de la séquence clôturée par ] N u m Ainsi on trouve: deux cents] „, — Num deux cents] », — Num mais

hommes

deux cent quatre] N u m deux cent quatre] „, ^ Num

hommes

La règle 19 assure la pluralisation des noms numéraux (tels que million, milliard, billion etc.) lorsqu'ils sont précédés du symbole de la multiplication et d'une séquence dont la valeur est plus élevée que 1. La formulation de cette règle diffère légèrement de celle de la règle 18 parce que le chiffre qui précède immédiatement le signe de la multiplication peut très bien avoir la valeur de ^ sans qu'il empêche pour autant la pluralisation. cf. trois millions vingt et un million^ La règle 20 assure la pluralisations des noms communs précédés d'un nombre plus élevé que La règle 21 place une préposition (lexicalisée plus tard sous forme de /d»/) devant le nom commun lorsqu'il est immédiatement

-

206

-

précédé d'un numéral, qui est un nom commun. cf. vingt-trois millions de livres vingt-trois millions deux cent quinze mille livres La règle 22 attribue à l'adjectif numéral /yn/ la forme féminine au cas où il est immédiatement suivi d'un nom féminin. La deuxième insertion lexicale sert à donner les phonologisations appropriées aux catégories syntaxiques introduites par les règles transformationnelles. 4. Exemoles

Symbole initiale

Expression

1 2

3

4

numérique

Num R2 + Rx

fr*

##Ta3 *io? + £a3 * io°

FJ

X

105 + £ s 2 + SJ + s j

3

2

X

10°

1

5 tfit Tb X ÎO^ X 10 + £b * 10 + B x 10 + B x 10°3 x 10° # # 6

7

t non

1

*

1 0

°J

*

1C>5

+

£2 X 1 0 2 + 9 ^ Î O 1 + 1 X 10°J|