Liberty in Mexico: Writings on Liberalism from the Early Republican Period to the Second Half of the Twentieth Century [1 ed.] 9781614879039, 9780865978423

Liberty in Mexico presents sixty-four essays and writings on liberty and liberalism, from the early republican period to

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Liberty in Mexico: Writings on Liberalism from the Early Republican Period to the Second Half of the Twentieth Century [1 ed.]
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Liberty in Mexico

Liberty in

Mexico ​

Writings on Liberalism from the Early Republican Period to the Second Half of the Twentieth Century Edited and with an Introduction by josé antonio aguilar rivera Translated​from​the​Spanish​by​​ janet​m.​burke​and​ted​humphrey

liberty​fund Indianapolis

This​book​is​published​by​Liberty​Fund,​Inc.,​a​foundation​established​to​​ encourage​study​of​the​ideal​of​a​society​of​free​and​responsible​individuals.

The​cuneiform​inscription​that​serves​as​our​logo​and​as​the​design​motif​for​our​ endpapers​is​the​earliest-​known​written​appearance​of​the​word​“freedom”​(amagi),​ or​“liberty.”​It​is​taken​from​a​clay​document​written​about​2300​b.C.​in​the​Sumerian​ city-​state​of​Lagash. Translations,​introduction,​editorial​additions,​and​index​©​2012​by​Liberty​Fund,​Inc. “La​tradición​liberal”​(The​Liberal​Tradition),​“La​literatura​y​el​estado”​​ (Literature​and​the​State),​and​“Poesía,​mito,​revolución”​(Poetry,​Myth,​Revolution)​ are​©​Octavio​Paz​and​are​translated​and​reprinted​here​by​permission​of​Marie​ Tramini​de​Paz. Cover​art:​Ceremony in Which Santa Anna Knights Manuel Lebrija to the New Order of Guadalupe,​by​Edouard​Pingret,​CONACULTA-INAH-MEX.​Reproduction​ authorized​by​the​Instituto​Nacional​de​Antropología​e​Historia,​Mexico​City. All​rights​reserved Printed​in​the​United​States​of​America C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 p 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Library​of​Congress​Cataloging-in-Publication​Data Liberty​in​Mexico:​writings​on​liberalism​from​the​early​republican​period​to​the​ second​half​of​the​twentieth​century/edited​and​with​an​introduction​by​José​Antonio​ Aguilar​Rivera;​translated​from​the​Spanish​by​Janet​M.​Burke​and​Ted​Humphrey.  p. cm. Includes​bibliographical​references​and​index. iSbn​978-0-86597-841-6​(hardcover:​alk.​paper) iSbn​978-0-86597-842-3​(pbk.:​alk.​paper) 1. Liberalism—Mexico—History—19th​century. 2. Liberalism—Mexico— History—20th​century. I. Aguilar​Rivera,​José​Antonio,​1968– II. Burke,​Janet,​ 1943– III. Humphrey,​Ted,​1941– jC574.2.m6l56 2012 320.510972—dc23​ 2012005442 liberty​fund,​inC. 8335​Allison​Pointe​Trail,​Suite​300 Indianapolis,​Indiana​46250-​1684

Contents Introduction:​Liberty​and​Liberalism​in​Mexico​/​ix ​ by José Antonio Aguilar Rivera Acknowledgments​/​xxxi 1 The Founding and Early Constitutional Experiments: 1821–1840 ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​

joSé​maría​luiS​mora​/​3 1​ Discourse​on​the​Independence​of​the​Mexican​Empire​/​5 2​ Discourse​on​the​Limits​of​Civil​Authority​Deduced​​ ​ from​Their​Source​/​17 3​ Discourse​on​the​Freedom​of​Thought,​Speech,​and​Writing​/​23 4​ Discourse​on​the​Means​Ambition​Uses​to​Destroy​Liberty​/​32 5​ Discourse​on​the​Civil​Liberties​of​the​Citizen​/​40 6​ Discourse​on​Laws​That​Attack​Individual​Security​/​50 7​ Discourse​on​the​Independence​of​Judicial​Power​/​60 8​ Discourse​on​Public​Opinion​and​the​General​Will​/​68 9​ Discourse​on​the​Nature​of​Factions​/​88

​ lorenzo​de​zavala​/​100 ​ 1​ Introduction​to​Historical Essay on the Mexican Revolutions from 1808 to 1830​/​102 ​ 2​ Conclusion​to​Historical Essay on the Revolutions of Mexico from 1808 to 1830​/​115 ​ 3​ Intervention​Regarding​the​Independence​of​the​Province​​ ​ ​ of​Guatemala​/​134 ​ valentín​Gómez​faríaS​/​137 ​ ​ Individual​Vote​of​Mr.​Gómez​Farías​on​the​Issue​of​the​​ ​ ​ Advisability​of​Convening​a​New​Congress​/​138

vi : ContentS

​ luCaS​alamán​/​150 ​ ​ Impartial​Examination​of​the​Administration​of​General​​ ​ ​ Vice​President​Don​Anastasio​Bustamante​/​151 2 Liberty in the Liberal Republic: 1845–1876 ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​

polemiC​between​El UnivErsal,​El siglo XiX,​ and​El Monitor rEpUblicano,​1848–1849​[anonymous]​/​181 1​ What​Might​Be​the​Causes​of​Our​Ills,​Part​1​/​183 2​ What​Might​Be​the​Causes​of​Our​Ills,​Conclusion​/​191 3​ What​Might​Be​the​Causes​of​Our​Ills,​Second​Article​/​197 4​ What​Might​Be​the​Causes​of​Our​Ills,​Third​Article​/​202

​ mariano​otero​/​206 ​ ​ Individual​Vote​in​the​Constituent​Congress​/​207 ​ ​ ​ ​

iGnaCio​ramírez​/​242 1​ The​National​Representation​/​243 2​ Speech​to​the​Constituent​Congress,​July​7,​1856​/​251 3​ Letter​to​Fidel​/​258

​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​

franCiSCo​zarCo​/​262 1​ The​Question​of​the​Veto​/​263 2​ The​Constitutional​Order​/​269 3​ Elections​/​274 4​ Progress​and​Innovation​/​279 5​ Laws​and​Customs:​The​Federation​and​Freedom​of​​ ​ Religion​/​285 6​ Manifesto​as​Preamble​to​the​Constitution​of​1857​/​291

​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​

iGnaCio​manuel​altamirano​/​298 1​ Against​Amnesty.​Speech​before​the​Second​Constitutional​​ ​ Congress,​July,​10,​1861​/​299 2​ Martyrs​of​Tacubaya​/​307 3​ Speech​by​Citizen​Manuel​Ignacio​Altamirano​on​the​Occasion​​ ​ of​the​Anniversary​of​Independence,​September​15,​1861​/​314

ContentS : vii

​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​

Guillermo​prieto​/​321 1​ In​Favor​of​the​Abolition​of​Internal​Duties​and​Customs​/​322 2​ Freedom​of​Commerce​/​324 3​ On​the​Laws​of​Reform​/​326 4​ On​Reforms​to​the​Law​of​Public​Instruction​/​333 5​ On​Freedom​to​Work​/​344

​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​

ConStitutional​Government​of​mexiCo,​1857–1861​ (benito​juárez,​melChor​oCampo,​manuel​ruiz,​ miGuel​lerdo​de​tejada)​/​353 1​ The​Constitutional​Government​to​the​Nation​/​355​ ​ (on​the​Laws​of​Reform) 2​ Declaration​to​the​Inhabitants​of​the​United​States​of​Mexico​​ ​ on​Freedom​of​Worship​/​372

3 Liberty and Order: 1876–1912 ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​

juSto​Sierra​/​381 1​ Emilio​Castelar​and​the​Program​of​La Libertad​/​382 2​ Reservations​/​385 3​ Liberals​and​Conservatives​/​388 4​ Polemic​with​José​María​Vigil​/​391 5​ Our​Battle​Plan​/​406

​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​

joSé​maría​viGil:​polemiC​with​Sierra​/​408 1​ Bulletin​of​El Monitor,​August​22,​1878​/​409 2​ Bulletin​of​El Monitor,​August​27,​1878​/​415 3​ Bulletin​of​El Monitor,​September​3,​1878​/​421 4​ Bulletin​of​El Monitor,​September​6,​1878​/​426 5​ Bulletin​of​El Monitor,​September​10,​1878​/​431 6​ Bulletin​of​El Monitor,​September​18,​1878​/​436 7​ Bulletin​of​El Monitor,​September​27,​1878​/​440 8​ Bulletin​of​El Monitor,​October​22,​1878​/​444 9​ Bulletin​of​El Monitor,​October​26,​1878​/​449 10​Bulletin​of​El Monitor,​October​30,​1878​/​454

viii : ContentS

​ 11​ Bulletin​of​El Monitor,​December​17,​1878​/​458 ​ 12​Bulletin​of​El Monitor,​December​27,​1878​/​462 ​ emilio​rabaSa​/​467 ​ 1​ The​Election​/​468 ​ 2​ Supremacy​of​Legislative​Power​/​486 4 Against the Current: 1930–1989 ​ ​ ​ ​

jorGe​CueSta​/​501 1​ Politics​in​the​University​/​502 2​ A​New​Clerical​Politics​/​509 3​ Crisis​of​the​Revolution​/​514

​ antonio​CaSo​/​518 ​ ​ Consciousness​of​Liberty​/​519 ​ ​ ​ ​

oCtavio​paz​/​541 1​ The​Liberal​Tradition​/​542 2​ Literature​and​the​State​/​548 3​ Poetry,​Myth,​Revolution​/​553

Index​/​563

Introduction Liberty and Liberalism in Mexico by​José​Antonio​Aguilar​Rivera1

After​their​independence​from​Spain​in​the​early​nineteenth​century,​all​of​the​new​nations​of​Spanish​America​(except​for​ the​brief​and​ill-​fated​Mexican​Empire)​adopted​the​same​model​of​political​organization:​the​liberal​republic.​At​the​beginning​of​the​twenty-​ first​ century​ all​ of​ these​ countries​ remain​ republics.​ Yet,​ at​ the​ same​ time,​the​Latin​American​dictator​became​a​hallmark​of​despotism​and​ brutality​during​the​past​century.​This​contradiction​between​ideal​and​ real​has​produced​a​vast​body​of​literature.​Historians,​political​scientists,​and​sociologists​have​tried​to​explain​the​pervasive​authoritarianism​of​Spanish​America. ​ One​key​peculiarity​of​Latin​America​among​developing​and​former​ colonial​regions​is​its​liberal​experience,​the​“ideas​and​institutions​that​ became​established​in​this​outpost​of​Atlantic​civilization.”2​Yet,​the​failure​of​written​constitutions​to​bring​about​the​rule​of​law​in​that​part​ of​the​world​is​well​documented.​This​skepticism​has​a​long​history.​Indeed,​on​December​6,​1813,​Thomas​Jefferson​wrote​to​his​friend​Baron​ Alexander​von​Humboldt: I​think​it​most​fortunate​that​your​travels​in​those​countries​were​ so​timed​as​to​make​them​known​to​the​world​in​the​moment​they​ were​about​to​become​actors​on​its​stage.​That​they​will​throw​off​ their​European​dependence​I​have​no​doubt;​but​in​what​kind​of​ government​their​revolution​will​end​I​am​not​so​certain.​History,​ I​believe,​furnishes​no​example​of​a​priest-​ridden​people​maintain​ 1.​The​author​wishes​to​thank​Fabiola​Ramírez​and​Roberto​Mostajo​for​their​assistance​with​suggestions​for​research. ​ 2.​Charles​A.​Hale,​“The​Reconstruction​of​Nineteenth-​Century​Politics​in​Spanish​ America:​A​Case​for​the​History​of​Ideas,”​Latin American Research Review​8​(summer​ 1973):​53–73. ix

x : joSé​antonio​aGuilar​rivera

ing​a​free​civil​government.​This​marks​the​lowest​grade​of​ignorance,​of​which​their​civil​as​well​as​religious​leaders​will​always​ avail​themselves​for​their​own​purposes.​The​vicinity​of​New​Spain​ to​the​United​States,​and​their​consequent​intercourse,​may​furnish​ schools​for​the​higher,​and​example​for​the​lower​classes​of​their​ citizens.​And​Mexico,​where​we​learn​from​you​that​men​of​science​ are​not​wanting,​may​revolutionize​itself​under​better​auspices​than​ the​Southern​provinces.3​These​last,​I​fear,​must​end​in​military​ despotisms.​The​different​casts​of​their​inhabitants,​their​mutual​ hatreds​and​jealousies,​their​profound​ignorance​and​bigotry,​will​be​ played​off​by​cunning​leaders,​and​each​be​made​the​instrument​of​ enslaving​others.4 ​ Likewise,​an​elderly​John​Adams​wrote​to​James​Lloyd​in​1815: The​people​of​South​America​are​the​most​ignorant,​the​most​bigoted,​the​most​superstitious​of​all​the​Roman​Catholics​in​Christendom.​.​.​.​No​Catholics​on​earth​were​so​abjectly​devoted​to​their​ priests,​as​blindly​superstitious​as​themselves,​and​these​priests​ had​the​powers​and​apparatus​of​the​Inquisition​to​seize​every​suspected​person​and​suppress​every​rising​motion.​Was​it​probable,​ was​it​possible,​that​such​a​plan​as​[Francisco]​Miranda’s,​of​a​free​ government,​and​a​confederation​of​free​governments,​should​be​ introduced​and​established​among​such​a​people,​over​that​vast​continent,​or​any​part​of​it?​It​appeared​to​me​more​extravagant​than​ the​schemes​of​Condorcet​and​Brissot​to​establish​a​democracy​in​ France,​schemes​which​had​always​appeared​to​me​as​absurd​as​similar​plans​would​be​to​establish​democracies​among​the​birds,​beasts,​ and​fishes.5 ​ 3.​Alexander​von​Humboldt​traveled​in​South​and​North​America​at​the​beginning​ of​the​nineteenth​century​and​wrote​important​books​on​the​geography​and​society​of​ the​nations​he​visited.​Jefferson​refers​in​this​letter​to​his​political​essay​on​New​Spain.​ See​Alexander​von​Humboldt,​Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain​(Norman:​University​of​Oklahoma​Press,​1988). ​ 4.​Thomas​Jefferson​to​Alexander​von​Humboldt,​in​Thomas​Jefferson,​Writings,​ed.​ Merrill​D.​Peterson​(New​York:​Library​of​America,​1984),​p.​1311. ​ 5.​Letter​to​James​Lloyd,​March​27,​1815,​in​John​Adams,​The Works of John Adams,

introduCtion : xi

​ The​independence​of​Spanish​America​did​not​make​Jefferson​more​ optimistic​regarding​the​future​of​those​nations.​On​May​14,​1817,​he​ wrote​to​the​marquis​de​Lafayette: I​wish​I​could​give​better​hopes​of​our​southern​brethren.​The​ achievement​of​their​independence​of​Spain​is​no​longer​a​question.​But​it​is​a​very​serious​one,​what​will​then​become​of​them?​ Ignorance​and​bigotry,​like​other​insanities,​are​incapable​of​self-​ government.​They​will​fall​under​military​despotism,​and​become​ the​murderous​tools​of​the​ambition​of​their​respective​Bonapartes;​ and​whether​this​will​be​for​their​greater​happiness,​the​rule​of​one​ only​has​taught​you​to​judge.​No​one,​I​hope,​can​doubt​my​wish​to​ see​them​and​all​mankind​exercising​self-​government,​and​capable​ of​exercising​it.​But​the​question​is​not​what​we​wish,​but​what​is​ practicable?​As​their​sincere​friend​and​brother​then,​I​do​believe​ the​best​thing​for​them,​would​be​for​themselves​to​come​to​an​accord​with​Spain,​under​the​guarantee​of​France,​Russia,​Holland,​ and​the​United​States,​allowing​to​Spain​a​nominal​supremacy,​with​ authority​only​to​keep​the​peace​among​them,​leaving​them​otherwise​all​the​powers​of​self-​government,​until​their​experience​in​ them,​their​emancipation​from​their​priests,​and​advancement​in​information,​shall​prepare​them​for​complete​independence.6

SpaniSh​ameriCa​and​the​liberal​tradition The​importation​of​liberal​constitutionalism​into​Spanish​America​has​ been​the​object​of​much​political​and​scholarly​debate.​Much​of​the​discussion​has​focused​on​the​performance​of​institutions.​As​Charles​Hale​ asserts: Second President of the United States,​ comp.​ Charles​ Francis​ Adams,​ 10​ vols.​ (Boston:​ Little,​Brown,​1856),​vol.​10,​pp.​143–45.​The​key​reason​for​Adams’s​skepticism​regarding​the​possibilities​of​democracy​in​South​America​was​the​deleterious​consequences​of​ religious​intolerance.​“They​[the​people​of​South​America]​believe​salvation​to​be​confined​to​themselves​and​the​Spaniards​in​Europe.​They​can​scarcely​allow​it​to​the​pope​ and​his​Italians,​certainly​not​to​the​French;​and​as​to​England,​English​America,​and​ all​other​Protestant​nations,​nothing​could​be​expected​or​hoped​for​any​of​them,​but​a​ fearful​looking​for​of​eternal​and​unquenchable​flames​of​fire​and​brimstone.”​Ibid.​ ​ 6.​Thomas​Jefferson​to​the​marquis​de​Lafayette,​in​Jefferson,​Writings,​pp.​1408–9.

xii : joSé​antonio​aGuilar​rivera

Much​of​the​skepticism​about​the​liberal​experience​has​focused​on​ constitutionalism—the​effort​to​guarantee​individual​liberty​and​ limit​central​authority​by​the​legal​precepts​of​a​written​code.​The​ strivings​of​liberal​legislators​to​establish​separation​of​powers,​federalism,​municipal​autonomy,​and​even​at​times​parliamentary​supremacy​or​a​plural​executive​typify​the​divergence​between​ideals​ and​reality​and​between​liberal​institutional​forms​and​political​ practice​that​is​the​hallmark​of​Latin​American​politics.7 ​ As​ a​ result,​ Latin​ America​ was​ excluded​ from​ the​ liberal​ experience​by​many​scholars.​Liberalism,​they​contend,​was​only​a​disguise​ for​traditional​practices.​One​of​the​supporters​of​this​view​argues​that​ “eighteenth-​century​political​liberalism​was​almost​uniformly​and​overwhelmingly​rejected​by​Spanish​America’s​first​statesmen.”8​These​authors​assert​that​liberalism​was​a​political​tradition​alien​to​the​Spanish​American​nations.​The​British​scholar​Cecil​Jane​identified​several​ contradictions​within​Spanish​culture.​Spaniards​were​idealistic​extremists​who​sought​both​order​and​individual​liberty​in​such​perfect​forms​ that​politics​went​from​one​extreme​(despotism)​to​the​other​(anarchy)​ rather​than​“finding​stability​in​constitutional​compromise​between​the​ two​contending​principles.”9​Conservatives​in​power​carried​the​“pursuit​ of​ order”​ to​ such​ an​ extreme​ as​ to​ provoke​ a​ violent​ reaction​ in​ behalf​ of​ liberty.​ Likewise,​ when​ liberals​ enacted​ “standard​ western​ liberal​protections​ of​the​individual,”​ Spanish​Americans​did​not​use​ these​liberties​with​the​responsibility​expected​by​the​“Englishmen​who​ had​developed​these​liberties,​but​rather​carried​them​to​the​extreme​of​ anarchy.”10 ​ Richard​Morse​finds​the​key​to​understanding​Spanish​America​in​ ​ 7.​Hale,​“The​Reconstruction,”​p.​55. ​ 8.​Glen​Dealy,​“Prolegomena​on​the​Spanish​American​Political​Tradition,”​Hispanic American Review​48​(February​1968):​43. ​ 9.​Lionel​Cecil​Jane,​Liberty and Despotism in Spanish America​(Oxford:​Clarendon​ Press,​1929).​I​follow​the​critical​review​of​cultural​approaches​of​Safford.​See​Frank​ Safford,​ “Politics,​ Ideology,​ and​ Society​ in​ Post-​Independence​ Spanish​ America,”​ in​ Leslie​Bethell,​ed.,​The Cambridge History of Latin America​(Cambridge:​Cambridge​University​Press,​1995),​vol.​3,​pp.​414–17. ​ 10.​Ibid.

introduCtion : xiii

the​ Spanish​ patrimonial​ state.11​ The​ state​ was​ embodied​ in​ the​ patrimonial​power​of​the​king,​who​was​the​source​of​all​patronage​and​the​ ultimate​arbiter​of​all​disputes.​Without​the​presence​of​the​king​the​ system​ collapsed.​ According​ to​ Morse,​ Spanish​ American​ leaders​ in​ the​nineteenth​century​were​constantly​trying​to​reconstruct​the​patrimonial​authority​of​the​Spanish​crown.​One​factor​obstructing​the​reconstruction​of​authority​along​traditional​Spanish​lines,​Morse​argues,​ was​the​meddling​of​Western​constitutional​ideas.​Anglo-​French​liberal​ constitutionalism—with​its​emphasis​on​the​rule​of​law,​the​separation​ of​powers,​constitutional​checks​on​authority,​and​the​efficacy​of​elections—stood​as​a​contradiction​to​those​traditional​attitudes​and​modes​ of​ behavior​ that​ lived​ in​ the​ marrow​ of​ Spanish​ Americans.​ Because​ liberal​constitutionalism​was​ill​adapted​to​traditional​Spanish​American​culture,​“attempts​to​erect​and​maintain​states​according​to​liberal​ principles​invariably​failed.”​The​authority​of​imported​liberal​constitutional​ideas,​while​insufficient​to​provide​a​viable​alternative​to​the​traditional​political​model,​was​often​sufficient​to​undermine​the​legitimacy​ of​governments​operating​according​to​the​traditional​model. ​ These​interpretations​are​wanting​in​several​respects.​For​one​thing,​ they​treat​culture​in​an​excessively​static​manner;​and​while​it​is​true​ that​liberal​constitutional​ideas​in​Spanish​America​failed​to​gain​the​ hegemony​that​they​enjoyed​in​other​parts​of​the​world,​they​did​have​a​ significant​effect​on​modes​of​political​thought​and​became​at​least​partially​incorporated​into​the​political​rules.12 ​ Never​ before​ were​ liberal​ constitutional​ procedures​ applied​ in​ so​ many​ places​ at​ the​ same​ time​ as​ in​ the​ first​ thirty​ years​ of​ the​ nineteenth​century.​To​assume​that​this​fact​says​nothing​about​liberal​constitutionalism​is​myopic​at​best.​Until​very​recently,​scholars​had​refused​ to​draw​any​lessons​from​the​Latin​American​liberal​experiment.​While​ it​is​true​that​many​liberal​principles​flew​in​the​face​of​Spanish​politi​ 11.​See​Richard​Morse,​“Toward​a​Theory​of​Spanish​American​Government,”​Journal of the History of Ideas​15​(1954):​71–93;​Morse,​“The​Heritage​of​Latin​America,”​in​ Louis​Hartz,​ed.,​The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia​(New​York:​Harcourt,​Brace​&​World,​ 1964);​and​Morse,​Soundings of the New World: Culture and Ideology in the Americas​(Baltimore:​Johns​Hopkins​University​Press,​1989).​ ​ 12.​Safford,​“Politics,​Ideology,​and​Society,”​pp.​416–17.

xiv : joSé​antonio​aGuilar​rivera

cal​traditions​and​the​realities​of​Spanish​America​at​the​time,​historians​ have​not​seized​the​opportunity​to​see​Spanish​America​as​the​laboratory​where​liberal​theories​were​put​to​the​test.​Until​then,​liberals​had​ little​ empirical​ evidence​ to​ support​ their​ claims​ of​ universal​ applicability;​the​historical​record​was​inconclusive​at​best.13​Why​was​the​evidence​from​Spanish​America​disregarded​by​liberal​pundits?​Embedded​ in​the​central​propositions​of​liberalism,​Joyce​Appleby​contends,​“was​ the​story​of​its​own​triumph,​but​it​was​a​peculiarly​ahistorical​one.”14​ The​idea​of​progress​helps​to​explain​why,​in​the​eyes​of​past​and​present​ liberals,​the​failure​of​liberalism​in​Spanish​America​was​dismissed​so​ easily.​“Shining​through​the​darkness​that​was​the​past,”​Appleby​asserts,​ “were​liberal​triumphs​to​be​recorded,​examined,​and​celebrated.​The​ rest​of​known​history​was​useless​to​an​enlightened​present,​its​existence​a​reproach​to​the​human​spirit​so​long​enshrouded​in​ignorance.”15​ Since​Latin​America​could​not​be​celebrated​as​a​liberal​triumph​it​was​ repudiated​from​the​liberal​pantheon. ​ Yet,​Spanish​America​constitutes​the​great​postrevolutionary​liberal​ constitutional​experiment.​After​independence​all​of​the​revolutionary​ leaders​moved​quickly​to​write​constitutions.​As​Frank​Safford​asserts,​ almost​all​of​these​constitutions​“proclaimed​the​existence​of​inalienable​natural​rights​(liberty,​legal​equality,​security,​property);​many​provided​ for​ freedom​ of​ the​ press​ and​ some​ attempted​ to​ establish​ jury​ trials.​Almost​all​sought​to​protect​these​rights​through​the​separation​ of​powers​and​by​making​the​executive​branch​relatively​weaker​than​ the​legislature.”16​Within​the​first​five​years​of​the​movement​for​independence​in​northern​South​America​approximately​twenty​constitutions​were​drawn​up​in​the​provinces​and​capitals​of​the​old​viceroyalty​ of​ New​ Granada​ (present-​day​ Ecuador,​ Colombia,​ Venezuela,​ and​ Panama).​By​the​time​Adams​voiced​his​skepticism​about​the​people​of​ South​America,​Spanish​America​had​already​begun​to​experiment​with​ ​ 13.​Even​theoretically,​the​general​applicability​of​the​liberal​constitutional​model​ was​problematic,​as​Montesquieu’s​small-​republic​theory​evidenced. ​ 14.​ Joyce​ Appleby,​ Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination​ (Cambridge:​Harvard​University​Press,​1992),​p.​8. ​ 15.​Ibid. ​ 16.​Safford,​“Politics,​Ideology,​and​Society,”​p.​358.

introduCtion : xv

the​institutions​of​representative​government,​and​highly​competitive​ elections​had​taken​place​in​New​Spain​in​1812.​Recent​historical​studies​ on​comparative​elections​in​the​early​nineteenth​century​show​that​one​ of​ the​ peculiarities​ of​ Spanish​ America​ was​ the​ precocious​ adoption​ of​ modern​ forms​ of​ representation​ and​ universal​ suffrage​ when​ voting​restrictions​were​predominant​in​Europe.​Studies​such​as​those​of​ Richard​Warren​on​popular​participation​in​early​elections​in​Mexico​ show​ that​ the​ selection​ of​ representatives​ by​ universal​ suffrage​ often​ had​ an​ impact​ on​ popular​ participation​ that​ challenges​ the​ usual​ depiction​of​elections​as​an​exclusive​and​elite​affair.​Indeed,​as​both​José​ María​Luis​Mora​and​Lucas​Alamán​argue​in​this​book,​one​of​their​key​ political​proposals​in​the​1830s​was​to​limit​broad​popular​participation​ in​elections​by​restricting​the​vote​to​property​holders.​Moreover,​even​ in​countries​where​formal​restrictions​for​voting​applied,​elections​still​ had​a​significant​effect​on​the​process​of​democratization.17 ​ The​“liberal​constitutional​moment”​denotes​the​moment,​and​the​ manner,​in​which​liberal​constitutionalism​made​its​appearance​in​the​ Hispanic​world​at​the​dawn​of​the​nineteenth​century.18​In​Spain​it​can​ be​traced​back​to​1808.​In​Rio​de​la​Plata,​New​Granada,​and​Venezuela​ the​moment​fell​between​1810​and​1827;​in​Bolivia​it​was​concentrated​in​ the​1820s;​and​in​Mexico​and​Guatemala​its​peak​occurred​between​1820​ and​1830.19​As​Frank​Safford​states,​this​“reformist​burst”​was​followed​ almost​everywhere​by​a​period​of​pessimism​and​conservatism. ​ One​of​the​main​weaknesses​of​the​intellectual​history​of​the​Iberian​ world​has​been​its​isolationism.​Historians​of​Spanish​America,​Anthony​ Pagden​ asserts,​ “generally​ study​ Spanish​ America​ as​ if​ neither​ New​ France​nor​the​Thirteen​Colonies​had​ever​existed.”​After​all,​America​ began​as​Europe​transplanted:​“The​intellectual​history​of​its​early​de​ 17.​See,​particularly,​Richard​Warren,​“Elections​and​Popular​Political​Participation​ in​Mexico,​1808–1836,”​in​Vincent​C.​Peloso​and​Barbara​A.​Tenenbaum,​eds.,​Liberals, Politics, and Power​(Athens:​University​of​Georgia​Press,​1996),​pp.​30–59. ​ 18.​On​the​roots​of​Spanish​liberalism,​see​Roberto​Breña,​El primer liberalismo hispánico y los procesos de emancipación de América 1808–1824​(Mexico:​El​Colegio​de​México,​ 2006). ​ 19.​This​periodization​corresponds​to​Safford’s​phase​of​initial​reform​in​Spanish​ America.​See​Safford,​“Politics,​Ideology,​and​Society,”​p.​353.

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velopment​is​a​history​of​transmission,​and​reinterpretation,​a​history​of​ how​traditional​European​arguments​from​classic​texts​were​adapted​to​ meet​the​challenges​of​new​and​unforeseen​circumstances.”20 ​ One​of​the​peculiarities​of​the​liberal​constitutional​moment​in​the​ Hispanic​world​is​that​the​sway​of​liberal​ideas​was,​for​the​most​part,​ uncontested.21​Absolutism​was​more​a​practice​than​an​ideology.​Moreover,​the​Bourbon​absolutism​that​preceded​the​liberal​revolutions​in​ Spain​and​its​colonies​was​an​enlightened​despotism.​There​was​a​continuity​between​absolutist​reform​and​liberal​revolution:​a​confidence​in​ the​power​of​reason​to​order​society.​Moreover,​liberalism​found​in​Spain​ native​support​in​the​theoretical​writings​of​Gaspar​Melchor​de​Jovellanos​and​of​schoolman​Francisco​Suárez.22​For​Spanish​liberals,​however,​ the​ “enlightened”​ character​ of​ the​ monarchy​ ceased​ when​ Charles​ IV​ ​ 20.​Anthony​Pagden,​The Uncertainties of Empire: Essays in Iberian and Ibero-American Intellectual History​(Great​Yarmouth:​Variorum,​1994),​p.​x. ​ 21.​According​to​Guerra,​in​Mexico​the​liberal​victory​was​complete.​François-​Xavier​ Guerra,​Mexico: Del antiguo régimen a la revolución​(Mexico:​Fondo​de​Cultura​Económica,​1991),​vol.​1,​p.​184. ​ 22.​ Jovellanos​ was​ the​ “major​ intellectual​ figure”​ in​ Spain​ from​ 1780​ to​ 1810.​ See​ Gaspar​Melchor​de​Jovellanos,​Obras,​2​vols.​(Madrid:​Atlas,​1951–52).​On​Jovellanos’s​arguments​regarding​the​ancient​constitution​of​Spain,​property​rights,​and​education,​see​ Charles​A.​Hale,​El liberalismo mexicano en la época de Mora, 1821–1853​(Mexico:​Siglo​XXI,​ 1972),​pp.​66–73.​See​also​John​R.​Polt,​Jovellanos and His English Sources​(Philadelphia:​ American​Philosophical​Society,​1964).​In​the​seventeenth​century,​the​Jesuit​Francisco​ Suárez​was​of​the​opinion​that​a​monarchy—or​rule​“by​one​head”—afforded​the​best​ form​of​political​government.​Yet,​the​source​of​the​king’s​power​was​an​act​of​transfer​ on​the​part​of​the​community​as​a​whole,​expressive​of​its​“own​consent.”​In​transferring​ its​power​to​a​monarch,​a​community​did​not​deliver​itself​into​“despotic​servitude.”​The​ transfer​was​made​“under​obligation,​the​condition​under​which​the​first​king​received​ the​kingdom​from​the​community.”​The​monarch​should​rule​“politically.”​One​who​ ruled​otherwise​ruled​tyrannically.​In​extreme​circumstances​such​a​ruler​might​lawfully​be​deposed.​See​Francisco​Suárez,​Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legislatore​(Madrid:​ Consejo​Superior​de​Investigaciones​Científicas,​1971–81).​Besides​his​Tractatus de Legibus​(1610),​Suárez’s​other​influential​works​include​Defensio Fidei Catholicae et Apostolicae Adversus Anglicanae Sectae Errores​(1613)​and​Opus de Triplici Virtute Theologico: Fide, Spe, et Charitate​(1621).​See​also​J.​H.​Burns,​ed.,​The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700​(Cambridge:​Cambridge​University​Press,​1991),​pp.​292–97.

introduCtion : xvii

and​his​favorite​minister,​Godoy,​showed​clear​signs​of​political​incompetence.23 ​ Several​developments​prepared​the​ground​for​the​uncontested​predominance​ of​ liberalism​ in​ the​ early​ nineteenth​ century.​ First,​ there​ was​no​classical​republican​tradition​to​dispute​the​field;​Spain​had​no​ equivalent​ of​ James​ Harrington.​ As​ the​ fifteenth-​century​ debate​ between​ Leonardo​ Bruni​ and​ Alonso​ de​ Cartagena​ over​ the​ merits​ of​ Bruni’s​ translation​ of​ the​ Ethics​ showed,​ the​ Italians​ saw​ Aristotle​ as​ an​author​whose​texts​had​some​literary​and​philosophical​merit,​while​ the​Spaniards​regarded​him​merely​as​“an​exponent​of​natural​virtue.”24​ Although​the​impact​of​humanist​Aristotelianism​was​felt​in​Spain​at​ about​the​same​time​as​it​was​in​Italy,​by​the​end​of​the​sixteenth​century​ Spain​had​reached​the​brink​“of​that​desperate​obscurantism​so​characteristic​of​the​seventeenth​and​eighteenth​centuries.”25​When​Florentine​ political​thought​was​flourishing​in​Italy,​the​School​of​Salamanca​was​ instead​devoted​to​new​scholasticism​and​speculative​thought. ​ The​ other​ historical​ development​ that​ proved​ crucial​ for​ Spanish​ liberalism​was​the​French​Revolution.​Hispanic​revolutionaries​would​ have​to​perform​two​different​tasks​at​the​same​time:​on​the​one​hand,​ to​ make​ the​ revolution,​ on​ the​ other,​ to​ avoid​ following​ the​ steps​ of​ France.26​The​terms​“liberalism”​and​“liberal”​were​coined​by​the​Spanish​Cortes​Generales27​in​Cádiz​while​drafting​the​1812​Constitution.28​ ​ 23.​François-​Xavier​Guerra,​Modernidad e independencias: Ensayos sobre las revoluciones hispánicas​(Mexico:​Fondo​de​Cultura​Económica/mapfre,​1992),​pp.​26–27. ​ 24.​Anthony​Pagden,​“The​Diffusion​of​Aristotle’s​Moral​Philosophy​in​Spain,​ca.​ 1400–ca.1600,”​in​Uncertainties of Empire,​p.​305.​See​also​Anthony​Pagden,​Spanish Imperalism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and Political Theory 1513–1830​(New​Haven:​Yale​University​Press,​1990). ​ 25.​Pagden,​Uncertainties of Empire,​p.​312. ​ 26.​Guerra,​Modernidad e independencias,​p.​251. ​ 27.​The​cortes​were​the​legislatures​in​Spain. ​ 28.​For​the​Spanish​origin​of​the​term​“liberal,”​see​Vicente​Llorens,​“Sobre​la​aparición​de​liberal,”​in​Literatura, Historia, Política​(Madrid:​n.p.,​1967).​“Liberal,”​as​a​political​label,​J.​G.​Merquior​asserts,​“was​born​in​the​Spanish​Cortes​of​1810,​a​parliament​ that​was​rebelling​against​absolutism.”​J.​G.​Merquior,​Liberalism Old and New​(Boston:​ Twayne,​1991),​p.​2.​Claudio​Véliz​asserts:​“It​is​fair​to​add​that​its​[the​term​“liberal”]​ international​career​was​actually​launched​by​the​poet​Robert​Southey,​who​in​1816,​

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To​recast​the​Spanish​American​revolutions​as​constitutive​elements​of​ the​liberal​experience​it​is​necessary​to​assess​the​effectiveness​of​the​institutional​strategies​designed​to​limit​the​power​of​absolute​sovereigns​ in​large​states​that​are​found​at​the​core​of​the​modern​liberal​republic.29 ​ Before​the​American​Revolution​there​was​no​historical​precedent​to​ predict​where​the​application​of​the​ideas​of​the​Enlightenment​would​ lead.​Abstract​thinking​was​much​more​important​in​the​American​and​ French​ cases​ than​ in​ the​ Iberian​ world.​ Furthermore,​ the​ impact​ of​ the​French​Revolution​on​Spanish​elites​was​mainly​negative.​Spanish​ American​revolutionaries​knew,​from​the​French​experience,​where​the​ revolutionary​logic​could​lead.30​These​fears​were​not​without​foundation:​a​large​population​of​these​countries​consisted​of​oppressed​Indians.​The​slave​revolt​of​Santo​Domingo​reminded​them​of​the​dangers​ of​a​social​revolution.​Thus,​the​reactionary​atmosphere​of​Europe​“both​ reinforced​these​fears​and​also​subjected​Spanish​American​leaders​to​ more​conservative​ideological​influences​than​they​had​known​before​ 1815.”31 ​ The​most​singular​trait​of​the​Spanish​American​revolutions​is​the​ absence​of​both​modern​popular​ mobilization​ and​Jacobinism.32​This​ assertion​ runs​ counter​ to​ a​ long-​established​ tradition​ that​ considers​ the​Spanish​American​revolutions​as​the​ideological​heirs​of​the​1789​ revolution.33​The​“decisive”​influence​of​Rousseau​over​Spanish​Ameriused​the​Spanish​form​as​a​scornful​epithet​addressed​to​the​British​Whigs​whom​he​ described​as​‘British​liberales’​in​an​obvious​reference​to​the​Spanish​political​faction​responsible​for​the​disorderly​and​ultimately​unsuccessful​reforms​initiated​by​the​cortes​ of​Cádiz​in​1812.”​Claudio​Véliz,​The New World of the Gothic Fox: Culture and Economy in English and Spanish America​(Berkeley:​University​of​California​Press,​1994),​p.​130. ​ 29.​As​Biancamaria​Fontana​asserts,​the​accent​of​the​liberal​republic​was​not​so​much​ on​hereditary​government​as​on​“the​limited,​moderate​character​of​the​power​that​any​ government​should​be​allowed​to​exercise.”​Biancamaria​Fontana,​“Introduction:​The​ Invention​of​the​Modern​Republic,”​in​Biancamaria​Fontana,​ed.,​The Invention of the Modern Republic​(Cambridge:​Cambridge​University​Press,​1994),​pp.​1–5. ​ 30.​Guerra,​Modernidad e independencias,​p.​35. ​ 31.​Safford,​“Politics,​Ideology,​and​Society,”​p.​359. ​ 32.​Terror​would​preclude​terror​from​happening​in​the​ensuing​revolutions.​Guerra,​ Modernidad e independencias,​p.​36. ​ 33.​See​José​Miranda,​Las ideas y las instituciones políticas mexicanas​(Mexico​City:​Universidad​ Nacional​ Autónoma​ de​ México,​ 1952);​ Solange​ Alberro,​ Alicia​ Hernández,​

introduCtion : xix

cans​is,​for​many​historians,​an​uncontested​fact.​Yet,​this​interpretation​misses​one​of​the​most​distinctive​features​of​the​Spanish​American​ revolutions.​Paraphrasing​J.​G.​A.​Pocock,​the​Spanish​American​revolutions​can​be​seen​less​as​the​last​political​act​of​Jacobin​radicalism​than​as​ the​first​political​act​of​modern​liberalism.​Not​Rousseau​but​Benjamin​ Constant​would​prove​to​be​the​most​relevant​influence​for​Spaniards​ and​Spanish​Americans​in​the​early​nineteenth​century.​The​universal​ influence​of​Constant​in​the​1820s​and​1830s,​Safford​states,​“is​only​one​ indication​of​the​hegemony​of​moderate​European​constitutional​ideas​ among​ Spanish​ American​ intellectuals.”34​ The​ influence​ of​ Constant​ is​important​because​modern​liberalism​owes​much​to​him.35​Many​of​ Constant’s​ideas,​particularly​those​developed​in​response​to​the​Terror​ and​its​Thermidorian​aftermath​(such​as​the​limited​nature​of​popular​ sovereignty,​the​freedom​of​the​press,​the​inviolability​of​property,​and​ the​restrictions​upon​the​military),​became​incorporated​into​the​liberal​theory​that​still​informs​many​of​the​constitutions​of​democratic​ countries​today. ​ Constant​provided​Spanish​Americans​with​a​practical​guide​to​conand​Elías​Trabulse,​eds.,​La revolucíon francesa en México​(Mexico​City:​El​Colegio​de​ México,​ 1992);​ Leopoldo​ Zea,​ ed.,​ América Latina ante la revolución francesa​ (Mexico​ City:​Universidad​Nacional​Autónoma​de​México,​1993);​and​Jacqueline​Covo,​“La​idea​ de​la​revolución​francesa​en​el​congreso​constituyente​de​1856–1857,”​Historia Mexicana​ 38​(July–September​1988),​69–79.​ ​ 34.​“[T]he​three​authors​most​frequently​encountered​were​Montesquieu,​Constant,​ and​Bentham.​Rousseau,​of​great​help​in​justifying​the​establishment​of​revolutionary​ governments​ between​ 1810​ and​ 1815,​ was​ decreasingly​ relevant​ to​ Spanish​ American​ concerns​after​1820.”​Safford,​“Politics,​Ideology,​and​Society,”​p.​367.​See​also​Ricardo​ Levene,​El mundo de las ideas y la revolución hispanoaméricana de 1810​(Santiago:​Editorial​ Jurídica​de​Chile,​1956),​pp.​179–218. ​ 35.​On​Constant,​see​Benjamin​Constant,​Political Writings​(Cambridge:​Cambridge​ University​Press,​1988);​Constant,​Principles of Politics Applicable to All Governments,​trans.​ Dennis​ O’Keeffe,​ ed.​ Etienne​ Hofmann​ (Indianapolis:​ Liberty​ Fund,​ 2003);​ Guy​ H.​ Dodge,​Benjamin Constant’s Philosophy of Liberalism: A Study in Politics and Religion​(Chapel​ Hill:​University​of​North​Carolina​Press,​1980);​Stephen​Holmes,​Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern Liberalism​(New​Haven:​Yale​University​Press,​1984);​Etienne​Hofmann,​Les “Principes de politique” de Benjamin Constant,​2​vols.​(Geneva:​Droz,​1980);​and​ Marcel​Gauchet,​ed.,​Benjamin Constant: De la liberté chez les modernes​(Paris:​Le​Livre​de​ Poche,​1980).

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stitution​making.36​The​political​elite​was​interested,​above​all,​in​works​ devoted​to​the​practical​arts​of​government​rather​than​in​“abstract​theoretical​treatises​on​the​foundation​of​sovereignty”;​thus,​Spanish​Americans​turned​to​Constant’s​Curso de política​for​its​usefulness​in​constitution​ writing.37​ Constant​ was​ also​ popular​ among​ Spanish​ readers,​ Hale​asserts,​because​they​found​themselves​in​a​similar​circumstance:​ José​María​Luis​Mora​and​other​liberals​faced​revolution​and​arbitrary​ power,​just​as​Constant​did​in​1815.​Therefore​they​shared​the​latter’s​ urgency​for​establishing​safeguards​for​individual​liberty,​an​urgency​ that​“was​not​felt​in​the​Anglo-​Saxon​world.”38 ​ Despite​ the​ decades​ of​ factional​ struggle​ and​ cyclical​ outbursts​ of​ dictatorship​that​followed​independence​in​many​Latin​American​countries,​the​search​for​a​constitution​and​the​reform​of​the​old​order​were​ the​main​motivations​behind​the​different​groups​in​dispute.​Later​on,​ as​most​countries​entered​a​phase​of​increasing​political​stability​by​the​ mid-​nineteenth​ century,​ the​ observance​ of​ constitutional​ norms​ and​ liberal​values​was​also​essential​to​understand​crucial​conflicts​among​ the​political​elite.

liberty​and​liberaliSm​in​mexiCo As​ political​ practice​ strayed​ from​ ideal,​ Mexican​ historians​ and​ politicians​ sought​ to​ reaffirm​ the​ country’s​ liberal​ past.​ Many​ books​ and​ articles​have​attempted​to​show​that​liberalism​was​at​the​core​of​the​ founding​ of​ the​ republic​ in​ spite​ of​ authoritarian​ practices.39​ Liberal​ theories​had​to​contend​with​traditional​ideas​and​practices,​such​as​the​ common​negotiation​among​actors​over​the​enforcement​of​laws,​as​well​ as​long-​established​patron-​client​relations.​For​years,​historians​debated​ ​ 36.​Translations​of​Constant​were​readily​available​to​Spanish-​speaking​readers.​The​ standard​translation​was​Benjamin​Constant,​Curso de política constitucional,​trans.​Marcial​Antonio​López​(Madrid:​Imprenta​de​la​Compañía,​1820).​In​his​translation,​López​ suppressed​the​part​of​the​book​devoted​to​religious​tolerance.​He​claimed​that​tolerance​was​irrelevant​to​Spanish​Americans​because​the​only​religion​practiced​there​was​ Roman​Catholicism. ​ 37.​Safford,​“Politics,​Ideology,​and​Society,”​p.​367. ​ 38.​Hale,​Liberalismo mexicano,​p.​72. ​ 39.​This​ scholarship​ is​ epitomized​ by​Jesús​ Reyes​ Heroles,​ El liberalismo mexicano,​ 3​vols.​(Mexico:​Fondo​de​Cultura​Económica,​1988).

introduCtion : xxi

whether​ modernity​ had​ lost​ to​ tradition​ or​ vice​ versa.​ Daniel​ Cosío​ Villegas,​in​his​well-​known​Historia moderna de México​(1955),​claimed​ that​political​practice​after​the​Reforma​and​the​República​Restaurada​ (the​era​of​liberal​dominance​in​the​nineteenth​century)​had​“betrayed”​ the​political​constitution​of​the​country.40​Jesús​Reyes​Heroles,​on​the​ contrary,​proposed​that​liberalism​had​been​successful​in​establishing​ an​alliance​between​the​middle​classes​and​the​lower​strata​of​the​population.​Whereas​Cosío​Villegas​focused​on​the​second​half​of​the​nineteenth​century,​Reyes​Heroles’s​optimism​was​grounded​in​an​analysis​ of​the​first​decades​after​independence. ​ In​contemporary​Mexico,​nineteenth-​century​liberalism​is​not​just​a​ historical​phenomenon.​It​is,​as​Charles​Hale​states,​an​ideological​landmark.​The​political​relevance​of​liberalism​has​often​obstructed​sound​ historical​research.41​National​histories,​as​Appleby​recognizes,​rest​on​ a​volatile​mixture​of​the​moral​and​the​instrumental.​Because​they​“aim​ to​establish​order​through​shared​sentiments,​they​seek​consensus,​but​ because​they​partake​in​scholarly​traditions​inimicable​to​propaganda,​ they​encourage​critical​reasoning.”42​Until​the​late​1960s,​the​historiography​on​liberalism​reflected​more​the​first​trait​than​the​second.​Reyes​ Heroles,​a​statesman,​was​far​from​a​detached​scholar.43​His​interpretation​of​liberalism​was​inevitably​partisan. ​ The​debate​on​liberalism​in​Mexico​centers​on​the​potency​ascribed​ to​inherited​intellectual​traditions.​Liberal​historians,​following​the​lead​ of​Cosío​Villegas,​have​constructed​an​ideal​picture​of​late-​nineteenth-​ century​Mexico​(1867–76).​Under​liberal​rule,​they​contend,​the​country​enjoyed​unparalleled​liberty,​and​individual​rights​flourished​as​they​ had​never​before—or​since.​In​order​to​establish​the​rule​of​law,​the​ country​must​look​back​to​its​liberal​past,​these​historians​claim.​This​ use​ of​ history​ by​ liberal​ intellectuals​ has​ been​ challenged.​ François-​ ​ 40.​ Daniel​ Cosío​ Villegas,​ Historia moderna de México,​ 7​ vols.​ (Mexico:​ Editorial​ Hermes,​1955);​and​Cosío​Villagas,​La Constitución de 1857 y sus críticos​(Mexico:​Editorial​Hermes,​1957). ​ 41.​Charles​A.​Hale,​“Los​mitos​políticos​de​la​nación​mexicana:​El​liberalismo​y​la​ revolución,”​Historia Mexicana​46,​no.​4​(April–June​1997),​p.​830. ​ 42.​Appleby,​Liberalism and Republicanism,​p.​31. ​ 43.​Jesús​Reyes​Heroles​was​minister​of​education​as​well​as​president​of​the​ruling​ party​in​Mexico,​the​pri,​in​the​1960s​and​1970s.

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Xavier​Guerra,​ Laurens​ Ballard​ Perry,​and​Fernando​ Escalante​ assert​ that​the​historical​record​does​not​support​the​rosy​picture​portrayed​by​ Cosío​Villegas​and​other​sympathetic​historians​of​the​Restored​Republic.44​Echoing​Morse,​these​three​scholars​claim​that​liberal​institutions​ presupposed​the​existence​of​a​body​of​citizens.​In​Mexico​these​were​ absent​from​the​political​scene:​the​relevant​actors​were​not​individuals​but​the​corporations,​the​army,​and​the​Church​as​well​as​the​Indian​ communities.​Traditional​practices​superimposed​liberal​forms.​Escalante​characterized​liberal​citizens​in​Mexico​as​“imaginary​citizens,”45​ but​other​scholars​have​not​given​up​the​effort​to​establish​historically​ the​roots​of​limited​and​constitutional​government​in​Mexico.46 ​ Against​ the​ nationalistic​ “official”​ history​ Charles​ Hale​ provides​ a​ more​objective​overall​view​of​liberalism​in​Mexico.​His​work​still​is​ ​ 44.​François-​Xavier​Guerra,​México: Del antiguo régimen a la revolución,​2​vols.​(Mexico:​ Fondo​de​Cultura​Económica,​1991);​Laurens​Ballard​Perry,​Juárez and Díaz: Machine Politics in Mexico​(DeKalb:​Northern​Illinois​University​Press,​1978);​and​Fernando​Escalante,​Ciudadanos imaginarios​(Mexico:​El​Colegio​de​México,​1993). ​ 45.​Escalante,​Ciudadanos imaginarios,​pp.​13–20.​For​a​survey​on​the​current​literature​ on​liberalism​in​Mexico,​see​Alfredo​Ávila,​“Liberalismos​decimonónicos:​de​la​historia​de​las​ideas​a​la​historia​cultural​e​intelectual,”​in​Guillermo​Palacios,​coord.,​Ensayos sobre la nueva historia política de América Latina​(Mexico:​El​Colegio​de​México,​2007),​pp.​ 117–18. ​ 46.​One​of​the​most​interesting​developments​in​the​literature​of​nineteenth-​century​ liberalism​is​the​interpretation​of​how​liberal​innovations​interacted​with​traditional​ political​structures.​Perhaps​liberal​institutions​did​not​work​as​they​were​expected​to,​ but​they​certainly​changed​the​political​scenario​of​the​time.​For​instance,​by​mandating​ the​formation​of​municipalities​in​territories​containing​more​than​one​thousand​persons,​the​liberal​Spanish​Cádiz​Constitution​changed​radically​the​traditional​structure​ of​representation​in​Spanish​America.​A​vast​constellation​of​townships​was​created​by​ this​liberal​reform.​After​independence,​national​leaders​had​to​contend​with​a​large​ number​of​newly​created​municipal​governments​that​had​been​organized​during​the​ last​years​of​Spanish​rule​and​were​reluctant​to​cede​their​power​to​a​national​state.​See​ Antonio​Annino,​“El​Jano​bifronte​mexicano:​una​aproximación​tentativa,”​in​Antonio​ Annino​and​Raymond​Buve,​eds.,​El liberalismo en México​(Amsterdam:​Asociación​de​ Historiadores​Latinoamericanistas​Europeos,​1993),​pp.​184–85.​On​representation,​see​ François-​Xavier​Guerra,​“The​Spanish-​American​Tradition​of​Representation​and​Its​ European​Roots,”​Journal of Latin American Studies​26​(1994):​1–35.​More​recently,​see​ Alfredo​Ávila,​En nombre de la nación: La formación del gobierno representativo en México​ (Mexico:​Cide/Taurus,​1999).​

introduCtion : xxiii

the​best​and​most​authoritative​account​on​the​subject.47​Prior​to​Hale’s​ work,​little​comparative​research​had​been​undertaken.48​Hale​argued​ that constitutionalism​in​Mexico​took​two​forms,​the​doctrinaire​and​ the​historical​or​traditional.​The​doctrinaire​tendency​reflected​a​ belief​that​rigid​adherence​to​or​imposition​of​the​precepts​of​the​ written​document,​however​general​or​abstract,​could​guarantee​ the​realization​of​constitutional​order.​Doctrinaire​constitutionalists​often​took​a​radical​and​democratic​political​stand,​believing​it​ was​necessary​to​change​society​to​conform​to​the​constitution.​Historical​or​traditional​constitutionalists,​arguing​that​a​constitution​ should​reflect​social​and​historical​reality,​tried​to​change​precepts​ they​found​abstract​and​unrealizable​in​Mexico.​They​tended​to​be​ politically​moderate​or​conservative​and​socially​elitist;​historical​ constitutionalists​called​for​“strong​government,”​at​the​same​time​ resisting​personal​presidential​power.​Historical​constitutionalism​ in​Mexico​drew​its​inspiration​from​a​current​of​French​political​ thought​that​had​its​origins​in​Montesquieu​and​was​put​forth​in​ the​nineteenth​century​by​Benjamin​Constant,​Alexis​de​Tocqueville,​and​Edouard​de​Laboulaye.​French​constitutionalists​idealized​ Anglo-​American​institutions​and​made​their​point​of​departure​a​ critique​of​the​French​Revolution​and​the​egalitarian​revolutionary​ tradition.49 ​ 47.​Hale’s​three​main​works​are​Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821–1853​(New​ Haven:​Yale​University​Press,​1968)​[The​references​are​from​the​Spanish​translation:​ Charles​A.​Hale,​El liberalismo mexicano en la época de Mora​(Mexico:​Siglo​XXI,​1972)];​ The Transformation of Liberalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Mexico​(Princeton:​Princeton​ University​Press,​1989);​and​Emilio Rabasa and the Survival of Porfirian Liberalism​(Stanford:​Stanford​University​Press,​2008).​ ​ 48.​A​short​article​comparing​Mexican​and​European​liberalisms​was​published​in​ 1959:​José​Miranda,​“El​liberalismo​mexicano​y​el​liberalismo​europeo,”​Historia Mexicana​8​(1959):​512–23. ​ 49.​As​Hale​further​develops:​“By​the​mid-​nineteenth​century​French​historical​constitutionalism​ was​ also​ receiving​ major​ influence​ from​ the​ German​ historical​ school​ of​law,​whose​key​figure​was​Frederic​Charles​de​Savigny.​Savigny’s​highly​influential​ manifesto​of​1814​rejected​the​tendency​toward​French-​inspired​legal​codification​in​ Germany​and​posited​‘the​spirit​of​the​nation’​as​the​only​source​for​all​law.​Edouard​

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​ After​1857,​the​principal​debates​between​doctrinaire​and​historical​ constitutionalists​in​Mexico focused​on​the​democratic​and​egalitarian​provisions​of​the​Constitution​of​1857—the​rights​of​man,​universal​male​suffrage,​a​single​ chamber​legislature,​parliamentary​government,​a​weakened​executive,​and​popular​election​of​judges.​The​debates​emerged​first​ in​1878​when​historical​constitutionalists,​led​by​Justo​Sierra​and​ his​colleagues​in​the​newspaper​La Libertad,​attacked​the​“dogma​ of​equality”​that​permeated​the​Constitution​and​called​for​conservative​reforms.​They​did​so​in​the​name​of​“scientific​politics,”​ since​by​the​1870s​the​new​scientific​philosophy​of​positivism​had​ melded​with​historical​constitutionalism.​They​called​themselves​ “new”​or​“conservative”​liberals​as​opposed​to​“old”​liberals,​such​ as​José​María​Vigil​and​Ignacio​M.​Altamirano,​doctrinaire​constitutionalists​who​defended​the​democratic​and​egalitarian​provisions​ of​the​1857​document.​The​debate​resurfaced​in​1893​over​an​effort​ by​the​historical​constitutionalists,​again​led​by​Justo​Sierra,​to​reform​the​Constitution​to​make​judges​irremovable,​instead​of​being​ popularly​and​periodically​elected,​and​thus​subject​to​political​manipulation.​The​measure​was​designed​to​limit​the​increasingly​personal​power​of​President​Porfirio​Díaz.​They​were​again​opposed​by​ doctrinaire​defenders​of​the​pure​Constitution​(who​did​not​necessarily​support​the​personal​power​of​Díaz).​In​the​course​of​the​ debate​the​historical​constitutionalists,​or​advocates​of​scientific​ politics,​came​to​be​labeled​“científicos”​and​the​doctrinaire​constitutionalists​“Jacobins,”​labels​that​became​embedded​in​the​political​ rhetoric​of​the​next​thirty​years.50

de​Laboulaye,​ who​wrote​an​appreciation​ of​Savigny​ in​1842,​ was​to​ become​ an​important​guide​for​Mexican​historical​constitutionalists​of​the​later​nineteenth​century.”​ Charles​A.​Hale,​“The​Civil​Law​Tradition​and​Constitutionalism​in​Twentieth-​Century​ Mexico:​The​Legacy​of​Emilio​Rabasa,”​Law and History Review​18,​no.​2​(2000),​4–7. ​ 50.​Ibid.​According​to​Hale,​“the​nineteenth-​century​current​of​historical​constitutionalism,​infused​with​scientific​politics​or​positivism,​was​perpetuated​after​1906​by​ the​jurist​and​historian​Emilio​Rabasa,​a​latter-​day​científico.”

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​ As​Hale​asserts,​the​major​enterprise​of​political​liberalism​in​Mexico​ during​the​first​ten​years​after​independence​was​the​construction​of​ a​ constitutional​ system.​ Mexico​ experienced​ in​ the​ 1820s​ what​ Reyes​ Heroles​termed​a​“constitutional​euphoria.”​The​constitution​became​a​ fetish,​a​magical​object​that​would​solve​all​the​social​and​political​ills​of​ the​country.​In​a​way,​this​faith​in​written​constitutions​was​new.​The​ constitution​was​not​considered​as​the​safeguard​of​an​ancient​form​of​ government​(as​the​mixed​constitution​that​preserved​liberty​by​securing​a​proper​equilibrium​among​the​one,​the​few,​and​the​many).​It​reflected​not​the​ancient​constitution​but​a​whole​new​set​of​maxims​and​ principles​that​would​create​a​free​civil​state.​The​constitution​was​thus​ an​instrument​of​the​future,​not​of​the​past.​In​the​midst​of​this​“euphoria”​some​writers​recommended​“prudence”​and​argued​that​reformers​ should​consider​the​“character”​and​the​particular​“needs”​of​the​people.​ One​ pamphleteer​ argued​ that​ “it​ is​ undeniable​ that​ the​ safety​ of​ the​ people​is​the​first​law​of​societies,​even​prior​to​the​best​meditated​constitution​and​even​older​than​society​itself.”51 ​ Mexican​liberals​followed​the​French​model​regarding​a​strict​separation​of​powers.​The​American​system​of​checks​and​balances​was​little​ known​ in​ Mexico​ when​ the​ first​ charters​ were​ drawn.​ The​ Federalist Papers​was​not​translated​or​published​until​1829.52​It​is​thus​not​surprising​that​Mora,​the​leading​liberal​figure​of​the​time,​discovered​that​the​ “law”​did​not​provide​for​adequate​boundaries​to​the​legislative​branch.​ That​“defect”​was​responsible,​in​his​eyes,​for​all​the​“woes​suffered​by​ the​ peoples​ of​ Europe”​ who​ had​ adopted​ a​ representative​ system.​ In​ support​of​his​ideas​Mora​cited​the​examples​of​Rome​as​well​as​those​ of​the​French​and​Spanish​revolutions.​Yet,​when​assessing​the​lack​of​ effective​restraints​on​legislative​invasion,​Mora​failed​to​acknowledge​ that​this​was​a​deficiency​of​a​particular​constitutional​model,​not​of​the​ constitutional​model​itself.​The​weakness​of​the​executive​under​a​system​of​strict​and​functional​separation​would​become​one​of​the​key​ ​ 51.​Juan​Wenceslao​Barquera,​La balanza de Astrea​(Mexico,​1820).​Barquera,​a​local​ representative​from​Querétaro,​argued​that​caution​should​be​the​fundamental​rule​of​ the​liberal​march.​Cited​by​Reyes​Heroles,​Liberalismo mexicano,​1:61. ​ 52.​Ibid.,​pp.​200–203.​In​1829​the​liberal​newspaper​El Atleta​translated​selections​of​ the​Federalist Papers.​Reyes​Heroles,​Liberalismo mexicano,​vol.​3,​p.​345.

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issues​in​Mexico​during​the​nineteenth​century.​This​development​was​ seen​as​a​failure​of​“liberal​constitutionalism,”​not​as​the​shortcoming​of​ a​specific​version​of​it.53 ​ In​1857​the​liberal​faction​drafted​a​new​constitution.​Although​it​followed​the​general​tenets​of​liberal​constitutionalism,​the​Constitution​ of​1857​was​an​original​creation.​The​mix​between​a​strong​parliament​ and​a​presidential​office​followed​the​model​of​the​French​constitution​ of​1848,​but​the​unicameral​organization​of​the​legislature​in​the​context​ of​a​federal​state​broke​with​the​models​adopted​by​the​vast​majority​of​ the​constitutions​at​the​time.​Innovations​also​included​the​juicio de amparo,​a​form​of​judicial​review,​and​the​inclusion​of​emergency​powers,​ which​previous​constitutions​in​Mexico​omitted.​The​provisions​of​the​ constitution​ were​ designed​ to​ cope​with​ specific​ political​ conditions:​ just​as​emergency​powers​were​needed​to​deal​with​chronic​political​instability,​the​unicameral​Congress​was​intended​as​a​safeguard​against​ the​previous​experience​of​executive​despotism.​These​were​perceived​ not​as​theoretical​but​as​tailor-​made​solutions​to​real​problems. ​ A​central​aspiration​of​the​new​constitution​was​the​elimination​of​ the​traditional​social​order,​which​for​Mexican​liberals​had​its​center​ in​the​corporate​rights​and​special​jurisdictions​( fueros)​of​the​military,​ the​ Catholic​ Church,​ economic​ guilds,​ and​ Indian​ communities.​ The​ most​powerful​of​these​corporations,​particularly​the​military​and​the​ Church,​soon​became​allies​in​the​violent​offensive​initiated​by​the​conservative​opposition.​Shortly​after​the​enactment​of​the​charter,​the​foes​ of​the​liberal​regime​issued​the​Plan​Tacubaya​in​1858.​For​three​years,​ from​January​1858​until​January​1861,​liberals​and​conservatives​killed​ each​ other​ with​ unprecedented​ ferocity.​ The​ Reform​ War​ (or​ Three​ Years’​ War)​ ended​ when​ the​ conservatives​ were​ defeated​ in​ January​ 1861,​yet​the​opposition​had​not​been​eliminated​and​its​members​sought​ other​means​to​destroy​the​liberal​regime.​The​conservatives​attempted​ to​reestablish​monarchical​rule​in​Mexico.​Conservatives’​pleas​found​an​ answer​in​Emperor​Napoleon​III​of​France,​who​wanted​a​Latin​empire.​ Maximilian,​an​Austrian​prince,​made​himself​available​for​the​adventure​and​was​recruited​by​Mexican​monarchists.​Maximilian,​however,​ had​little​more​success​than​the​dozens​of​caudillos​before​him.​In​Octo​

53.​José​Antonio​Aguilar​Rivera,​En pos de la quimera​(Mexico:​fCe,​2000).

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ber​1866,​when​Prussia​became​a​threat​to​France,​Napoleon​recalled​ his​troops​from​Mexico.​Without​foreign​military​support,​the​empire​ collapsed. ​ The​fall​of​the​empire​implied​the​complete​defeat​of​the​conservative​faction​and,​in​a​way,​the​end​of​the​conservative-​liberal​cleavage​ in​Mexico.​The​discrediting​of​conservatives​(blamed​for​their​alliance​ with​a​foreign​power)​inaugurated​an​era​of​liberal​hegemony​in​which​ most​ideological​conflicts​would​take​place​within​the​general​framework​of​the​liberal​project.​The​liberal​reform​became​a​reality.​Laws​ that​had​been​issued​during​the​Reform​War,​such​as​the​nationalization​ of​Church​property,​separation​of​church​and​state,​secularization​of​ society,​and​the​forced​sale​of​corporate​property,​were​now​backed​by​ a​legitimate​government​acting​in​the​name​of​the​Constitution​of​1857. ​ However,​ the​experience​ of​the​civil​ war​and​foreign​ intervention​ deeply​affected​the​perception​of​the​liberal​elite​about​the​institutions​ that​could​finally​stabilize​the​country.​Toward​the​end​of​the​French​ intervention​it​became​increasingly​clear​to​Mexican​liberals​that​the​ strengthening​of​presidential​power​was​a​necessity.​When​the​Republic​ was​finally​restored,​in​1867,​the​problem​of​political​order​was​far​from​ settled.​Political​turmoil​was​widespread,​and​local​bosses,​road​bandits,​ kidnappers,​and​small​groups​of​rebels​challenged​the​authority​of​the​ national​government. ​ At​the​dawn​of​the​twentieth​century,​Emilio​Rabasa,​a​political​historian​and​jurist,​pointed​out​that​by​making​governance​impossible,​the​ liberal​Constitution​of​1857​had​condemned​the​country​to​a​de​facto​ dictatorship.​Not​surprisingly,​Rabasa,​unlike​many​others,​was​well​acquainted​with​Anglo-​American​political​thought.54​Rabasa​asserted​that​ during​the​war,​between​1863​and​1867,​President​Juárez​de​facto​re​ 54.​Echoing​Madison,​Rabasa​argued​that​it​was​not​“sensible​to​pretend​that​the​ exercise​of​extraordinary​virtues​would​in​itself​correct​institutions,​and​to​think​at​the​ same​time​that​those​institutions​were​wise,​when​they​demanded​from​public​officials​ superhuman​qualities.”​He​added,​“since​the​physical​existence​of​government​is​incompatible​with​the​observance​of​the​constitution,​the​superior​law​prevailed​and​the​constitution​was​subordinated​to​the​supreme​necessity​of​survival.”​Rabasa​explicitly​cited​ Federalist​47​when​he​decried​the​rejection​of​the​executive​veto​by​the​1856​Constitutional​Assembly.​Emilio​Rabasa,​La constitución y la dictadura: Estudio sobre la organización política de México​(Mexico​City:​Editorial​Porrua,​1956),​pp.​67,​112,​173–74.

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placed​Congress​by​appropriating​for​himself​the​power​vested​in​Congress​ to​ enact​ laws,​ and​ he​ de​ facto​ replaced​ the​ voice​ of​ the​ people​ by​extending​his​term​in​office​without​a​popular​election.​While​the​ amount​of​power​concentrated​in​Juárez’s​hands​had​been​unsurpassed,​ he​used​that​power​vigorously​and​successfully​to​fulfill​his​high​purposes.​The​1857​constitution,​Rabasa​asserted,​“has​never​been​observed​ because,​had​it​been,​it​would​have​made​the​stability​of​government​impossible.” ​ As​ Hale​ indicates,55​ major​ political​ controversies​ during​ the​ long​ regime​of​Porfirio​Díaz​in​Mexico​(1876–1910)​reversed​the​interpretation​and​application​of​the​Constitution​of​1857.​While​a​fraction​of​ the​old​liberal​elite​saw​in​the​centralization​of​power​under​Díaz​as​a​ betrayal​of​the​principles​of​the​Constitution​of​1857,​“new,”​or​“conservative,”​liberals​defended​the​institutional​changes​of​the​regime​as​necessary​to​satisfy​the​demands​of​political​order​and​economic​progress. ​ The​first​half​of​the​twentieth​century​was​no​more​auspicious​for​ liberalism​in​Mexico​than​it​was​in​other​parts​of​the​world.​While​in​ other​ countries​ fascist​ and​ communist​ parties​ clashed​ against​ liberal​ parliamentary​ governments,​ in​ Mexico​ a​ revolutionary​ state​ existed​ that​was​neither​socialist​nor​liberal.​Mexico’s​regime​after​the​revolution​was​eclectic​in​ideology.​It​did​not​oppose​elections,​but​political​ legitimacy​was​not​grounded​on​them.​A​single​anticlerical,​populist,​ and​corporatist​party​ruled.​The​1917​Constitution​enacted​by​the​revolutionaries​embraced​both​individualism​and​collectivism.​The​Mexican​ regime​was​nationalistic​and​supported​the​intervention​of​the​state​in​ the​economy.​Through​the​years​the​government​nationalized​important​ foreign-​owned​industrial​assets​such​as​oil.​While​the​Mexican​regime​ shared​some​traits​with​several​ideologies,​it​identified​itself​with​none.​ For​ these​ reasons,​ the​ Mexican​ Revolution​ was​ a​ powerful​ source​ of​ illiberal​inspiration​for​the​rest​of​Latin​America.​While​nineteenth-​ century​liberalism​became​a​founding​myth​of​the​official​national​history,​liberal​practices​ and​ideas​languished​during​the​long​period​of​ postrevolutionary​hegemony​in​Mexico​(1929–2000).​Since​the​1930s​a​ few​lonely​voices​have​voiced​liberal​ideas​in​an​adverse​ideological​en​ 55.​ Charles​ A.​ Hale,​ The Transformation of Liberalism In Late Nineteenth-Century Mexico​(Princeton:​Princeton​University​Press,​1989).

introduCtion : xxix

vironment.​A​few​economists​and​some​poets,​historians,​and​philosophers​have​defended​liberty​against​its​many​foes.56 ​ This​book​presents​sixty-​four​essays​and​writings​on​liberty​and​liberalism​from​the​early​republican​period​to​the​late​twentieth​century​ by​key​authors.​The​first​period​(1820–40)​comprises​the​founding​of​ the​Republic​and​the​early​constitutional​experiments.​The​most​important​authors​in​this​creative​and​turbulent​period​were​José​María​Luis​ Mora,​Lorenzo​de​Zavala,​Valentín​Gómez​Farías,​and​Lucas​Alamán.​ During​the​era​of​liberal​hegemony,​in​the​second​half​of​the​century​ (1845–76),​the​most​significant​figures​included​Mariano​Otero,​Ignacio​Ramírez,​Francisco​Zarco,​Ignacio​Manuel​Altamirano,​Guillermo​ Prieto,​José​María​Lafragua,​and​Benito​Juárez.​The​rule​of​Porfirio​Díaz​ (1876–1912)​provided​lively​debates​over​the​nature​of​the​liberal​legacy.​ As​noted​above,​the​authors​more​relevant​for​this​period​were​Justo​ Sierra,​José​María​Vigil,​and​Emilio​Rabasa.​Important​authors​during​ the​twentieth​century​(1930–90)​include​Jorge​Cuesta,​Antonio​Caso,​ and​Octavio​Paz. ​ Unless​otherwise​noted,​all​footnotes​in​the​texts​are​those​of​the​authors. Tepoztlán,​Mexico,​January​2010

​ 56.​Besides​the​authors​featured​in​this​book,​a​lone​economist​preached​the​gospel​ of​the​free​market​in​the​hostile​environment​of​the​1960s​and​1970s.​See​Gustavo​R.​ Velasco,​“A​Program​for​a​Liberal​Party,”​in​Friedrich​August​von​Hayek,​Toward Liberty: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises on the Occasion of His 90th Birthday, September 29, 1971,​vol.​1,​ed.​F.​A.​Hayek,​Henry​Hazlitt,​Leonard​R.​Read,​Gustavo​Velasco,​and​F.​A.​ Harper​(Menlo​Park:​Institute​for​Humane​Studies,​1971).

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Acknowledgments I​would​like​to​thank​Emilio​Pacheco​for​his​ intellectual​encouragement​and​continued​criticism.​ Several​people​made​this​book​possible.​Laura​Goetz​ provided​valuable​editorial​insights.​Janet​M.​Burke,​ Arizona​State​University,​and​Ted​Humphrey,​Arizona​ State​University,​were​wonderful​colleagues,​and​I​was​ fortunate​to​work​with​them​because​they​are​among​ the​very​few​persons​able​to​proficiently​translate​ complex​legal​and​political​texts​from​the​nineteenth​ century.​Also,​I​am​indebted​to​Roberto​Mostajo,​ Fabiola​Ramírez,​and​Esteban​González​for​their​ invaluable​assistance​in​compiling,​reviewing,​and​ editing​this​volume. José​Antonio​Aguilar​Rivera Professor​of​Political​Studies Centro​de​Investigación​y​Docencia​Económicas​ (Cide) Mexico​City

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1

The Founding and Early Constitutional Experiments 1821–1840

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josé María luis Mora José​María​Luis​Mora​(1794–1850),​the​leading​liberal​thinker​ during​ the​ first​ federal​ republic​ (1824–53),​ was​ ordained​ as​ a​ priest​and​received​a​degree​in​theology.​Later​he​studied​law​ and​became​a​lawyer.​He​was​a​member​of​the​provincial​deputation​of​Mexico​and​later​was​elected​as​a​deputy​to​the​constituent​congress​of​the​state​of​Mexico.​He​participated​in​the​ making​of​the​state​constitution​and​in​the​drafting​of​important​laws. ​ Mora​ edited​ and​ published​ essays​ in​ newspapers​ such​ as​ Semanario Político y Literario, El Indicador,​and​El Observador de la República Mexicana.​He​played​an​important​role​as​an​adviser​ during​the​brief​Gómez​Farías​administration​(1833–34)​when​ the​government​put​in​place​the​first​reform​policies​against​the​ privileges​of​the​Catholic​Church. ​ The​essays​gathered​here​were​published​as​unsigned​newspaper​articles​between​1821​and​1830.​While​Mora’s​positions​ were​very​close​to​those​of​Benjamin​Constant​at​the​beginning​ of​his​career,​he​later​realized​that​fighting​the​privileges​of​the​ Church​and​the​military​required​an​active​government.​Two​ of​the​essays,​“Discourse​ on​Public​Opinion​and​the​General​ Will”​(Discurso​sobre​la​opinión​pública​y​voluntad​general)​ and​“Discourse​on​the​Nature​of​Factions”​(Discurso​sobre​los​ carácteres​de​las​facciones),​have​been​attributed​to​the​Spaniard​ Alberto​Lista​because​they​had​appeared​earlier​in​the​Spanish​ daily​Lista​edited,​El Espectador Sevillano.​However,​we​decided​ to​ include​ the​ essays​ because​ they​ received​ prominent​ placement​in​El Observador,​of​which​Mora​was​the​editor​and​the​ arbiter​as​to​what​to​include​and​where.​Clearly,​Mora​believed​ the​essays​expressed​important​ideas​with​which​he​agreed​and​ of​which​his​readers​should​be​aware.​That​is,​he​gave​the​essays​ his​imprimatur,​even​to​the​point​of​allowing​readers​to​assume​ that​the​essays​expressed​his​own​views,​inasmuch​as​he​did​not​ 3

4 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

attribute​them​to​someone​else​or​otherwise​suggest​that​they​ were​not​his​or​that​he​disagreed​with​them.​Furthermore,​the​ views​that​the​essays​express​are​integral​to​Mora’s​overall​argument​on​factions​and​on​the​proper​conception​of​how​public​political​and​social​opinion​is​to​be​formed​and​brought​to​ action. ​ We​ present​ nine​ newspaper​ articles​ written​ between​ 1821​ and​1827.

1



Discourse on the Independence of the Mexican Empire

The​custom​among​civilized​peoples,​in​making​some​ substantial​change​to​their​government,​has​been​to​reveal​and​clarify​ before​all​other​nations​the​reasons​that​justify​those​changes.​Inasmuch​ as​such​change​cannot​be​limited​to​the​internal​effects​that​constitutional​alterations​produce​in​a​state,​and​inasmuch​as​such​change​is​necessarily​very​important​to​foreign​societies​because​of​the​established​ relationships​that​unite​the​peoples​of​the​world​and​have​more​or​less​ influence​on​their​prosperity​or​decline,​the​right​of​self-​preservation​ indisputably​authorizes​ those​ other​ societies​ to​inform​ themselves​ of​ the​motives​that​drove​their​neighbors​to​establish​the​new​constitution​ and​also​to​remove​the​obstacles​that​the​constitution​might​pose​to​their​ just​aspirations. ​ The​Mexican​Empire,​upon​entering​into​the​enjoyment​of​the​rights​ that​fall​to​it​as​an​independent​nation,​could​not​feign​ignorance​of​ an​ obligation​ or​ consideration​ so​ important.​ It​ therefore​ endeavored​ to​make​clear​to​the​world,​through​explanations​ and​public​declarations,​ the​ justifications​ that​ supported​ it​ in​ requesting​ and​ effecting​ its​independence​from​the​Spanish​monarchy.​To​this​end,​its​deputies​ have​pursued​independence​with​firmness​and​persistence​in​the​cortes​ of​ Madrid,​ its​ writers​ have​ defended​ it​ in​ Mexico​ against​ the​ charge​ of​treason​and​rebellion,​and​its​soldiers​have​contended​for​it​on​the​ battlefield​with​arms​in​hand.​But​despite​not​having​been​able​to​give​ a​solid​and​satisfactory​response​to​the​arguments​that​justify​independence,​despite​having​now​proven​itself​by​the​force​of​arms,​a​necessary​effect​of​the​extent​and​rapidity​with​which​the​opinion​that​favors​ independence​has​spread,​many​consider​that​independence​unjust​and​ unlawful.​Even​the​legislators​of​the​[Iberian]​Peninsula,​those​illustri​ Original​ title:​ “Discurso​ sobre​ la​ independencia​ del​ imperio​ mexicano.”​ Source:​ Semanario Político y Literario de México,​Mexico,​November​21,​1821. 5

6 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

ous​patriots​who​have​known​how​to​liberate​their​own​country​from​ the​yoke​that​oppressed​them,​refusing​to​recognize​the​principles​sanctioned​in​their​Constitution​and​openly​proclaimed​to​the​world,​cannot​reconcile​themselves​to​the​fact​that​laws​deduced​immediately​from​ those​principles​have​their​effective​fulfillment​on​the​American​continent,​which​urgently​demands​they​be​observed. ​ Those​heroes​who​have​justly​been​admired​by​the​nations​of​Europe​ for​the​great​services​they​have​rendered​the​cause​of​liberty;​those​wise​ men​who​have​laid​out​the​road​and​smoothed​the​path​that​leads​to​independence;​those​patriots,​we​repeat,​are​the​ones​who​must​be​accused​ of​inconsistency,​because​loving​the​cause,​they​detest​and​abominate​ the​result;​because​establishing​a​principle,​they​reject​its​consequences;​ finally,​because​proclaiming​liberty​in​their​country​with​the​greatest​ firmness,​they​sustain​the​slavery​of​Mexico​with​the​same​tenacity. ​ Indeed,​without​looking​beyond​the​Spanish​Constitution​and​without​ outside​ assistance​ from​ the​ works​ of​ the​ most​ celebrated​ writers​ on​public​law,​the​Constitution​itself​supplies​us​with​enough​to​justify​ the​independence​of​our​empire.​The​Constitution​firmly​establishes,​ as​an​indisputable​principle​and​as​base​of​the​entire​constitutional​system,​the​essential​inalienable​sovereignty​of​the​nation,​and​the​laws​of​ that​code​proclaim​and​recognize​this​doctrine​in​the​most​legitimate​ way.​Through​those​laws​comes​recognition​of​the​incontestable​right​ that​all​peoples​have​to​establish​the​government​most​suitable​to​them,​ alter​it,​modify​it,​and​abolish​it​completely​when​their​happiness​requires​it.​Through​the​Constitution,​finally,​comes​the​recognition​that​ in​the​people​of​the​nation​lies​the​authority​to​dictate​the​fundamental​ laws​that​ought​to​rule​the​nation,​to​create​magistrates​that​apply​those​ laws​to​particular​cases,​settling​the​disputes​that​can​originate​in​the​ opposing​nature​of​interests​and​organizing​a​public​force​that​makes​ effective​the​observance​of​the​laws​and​the​enforcement​of​judicial​sentences.​ The​ consolidation​ of​ all​ these​ powers​ results​ in​ that​ supreme​ authority​that​exists​in​societies​and​that​we​know​by​the​name​of​sovereignty.​If,​then,​sovereignty,​in​those​stated​terms,​is​an​essential​and​ inherent​power​of​all​societies,​how​can​it​be​denied​to​this​totality​of​ individuals​that​make​up​what​we​call​the​Mexican​Empire?​If​the​legislators​of​the​Peninsula​wish​to​act​according​to​their​principles,​they​will​ have​to​do​one​of​two​things:​either​acknowledge​the​right​that​helped​

on​the​independenCe​of​the​mexiCan​empire : 7

us​to​effect​independence,​or​deny​that​we​have​the​capacity​to​create​ a​strong​government​that​can​sustain​that​independence​against​external​invasions,​to​enter​into​political​and​trade​relations​with​external​ powers,​and​to​combine​those​individual​interests​with​the​public​interest​in​such​a​way​that​internal​upheavals,​the​germ​and​origin​of​civil​ war​and​anarchy,​are​avoided.​In​a​word,​they​will​have​to​deny​that​our​ people​can​and​should​be​understood​in​the​sense​that​one​ascribes​to​ this​word​“society.” ​ To​proceed,​then,​with​accuracy​on​such​an​important​subject​and​to​ finish​off​the​disputes​between​the​Spanish​and​Mexican​people​from​ their​origin​at​one​stroke,​we​will​attempt​to​put​the​question​in​its​true​ perspective. ​ The​independence​proclaimed​in​Mexico​can​be​considered​either​ illegal​for​lack​of​authority​in​the​society​to​alter​its​government​or​untimely​because​the​individuals​who​make​up​this​empire​cannot​yet​be​ counted​among​the​company​of​societies​inasmuch​as​they​do​not​possess​the​totality​of​conditions​necessary​to​constitute​a​people.​The​first​ is​notoriously​opposed​to​the​principles​sanctioned​in​the​Spanish​Constitution,​of​which​we​have​made​mention,​and​contrary​to​the​rights​of​ all​humankind,​which​the​author​of​the​universe​did​not​create​to​be​a​ patrimony​of​one​or​of​many​men​or​nations.​So,​then,​the​only​possibility​that​remains​to​the​Spaniards​is​to​deny​the​status​of​people​or​nation​to​the​inhabitants​of​these​provinces.​To​argue​persuasively​against​ such​an​incorrect​view,​it​will​be​enough​to​give​an​exact​and​precise​ definition​of​the​ideas​corresponding​to​these​words​and​to​apply​them​ to​the​Mexican​Empire​in​a​way​so​clear​and​so​obvious​that​no​sensible​ man​can​deny​recognizing​in​the​totality​of​its​individuals​a​legitimate​ and​formally​constituted​people. ​ Those​writers​on​public​law​who,​to​their​great​honor​and​the​benefit​ of​humanity,​have​supported​and​clarified​the​sovereignty​of​the​people,​ placing​the​inalienable​rights​of​nations​within​reach​of​even​the​least​ informed​classes,​have​not​taken​equal​care​to​determine​the​conditions​ essentially​necessary​to​constitute​a​society.​In​our​judgment,​this​lack​of​ care​is​the​reason​why​all​the​good​effects​that​should​be​expected​from​ this​beneficent​principle​have​not​been​perceived.​Ignorant​people,​persuaded​of​their​sovereignty​but​lacking​precise​ideas​that​determine​in​ a​fixed​and​exact​way​the​sense​of​the​word​“nation,”​have​believed​that​

8 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

the​entirety​of​the​human​species,​without​other​qualities​and​circumstances,​should​be​considered​as​“nation”—mistaken​concepts​that​will​ surely​foment​discord​and​disunion​and​promote​civil​war! ​ What​is​it,​then,​that​we​understand​by​this​word​“nation,”​a​“people”​ or​a​“society”?​And​what​is​the​sense​that​writers​on​public​law​have​ given​to​the​word​“nation”​when​they​confirm​its​sovereignty​in​those​ stated​terms?​It​can​be​nothing​other​than​the​free​and​voluntary​coming​ together​ of​ men​ who​ can​ and​ want,​ in​ a​ legitimately​ possessed​ land,​ to​constitute​themselves​as​a​state​independent​from​the​rest.​Nor​is​it​ credible​that​the​nations​recognized​as​sovereign​and​independent​can​ allege​rights​other​than​the​inherent​power​to​constitute​themselves​as​ such​and​their​determined​intent​to​effect​it.​But​which​are​these​necessarily​essential​conditions​under​which​a​nation​can​constitute​itself?​ Indispensable​are:​(1)​The​legitimate​possession​of​the​land​it​occupies.​ (2)​ The​ appropriate​ enlightenment​ and​ resolve​ to​ come​ to​ know​ the​ rights​of​the​free​man​and​to​know​how​to​sustain​them​against​despotism’s​internal​attacks​and​the​external​violence​of​invasion.​Finally,​a​ population​sufficient​to​ensure,​in​a​steady​and​stable​way,​the​subsistence​of​the​state​by​establishment​of​an​armed​force,​which​both​avoids​ the​internal​convulsions​produced​by​the​discontent​of​the​unruly​disorderly​elements​and​contains​the​hostile​designs​of​ambitious​foreign​ countries.​In​a​word,​a​legitimately​possessed​land​and​the​physical​and​ moral​force​to​sustain​it​are​the​essential​components​of​any​society. ​ From​these​luminous​principles,​whose​palpable​and​manifest​evidence​must​make​a​strong​impression​even​on​the​most​dubious​man,​ one​immediate​and​legitimate​consequence​is​deduced:​that​the​individuals​of​this​empire​are​or​should​be​recognized​as​a​true​people.​They​ occupy​a​land​whose​possession​cannot​be​disputed​by​any​nation​in​the​ world;​ they​ have​ made​ clear​ to​ the​ world​ by​ explanations​ and​ public​ declarations​that​they​know​the​rights​of​the​free​man​and​the​justice​of​ the​cause​they​defend;​finally,​they​have​succeeded,​by​taking​up​arms,​ in​achieving​their​independence​with​no​assistance​other​than​their​own​ strength,​destroying​in​the​brief​space​of​seven​months​the​formidable​ power​of​an​established​government. ​ It​remains​for​us​to​put​each​of​these​propositions​to​the​test. ​ 1.​No​nation​in​the​world​can​dispute​with​us​the​land​we​occupy,​because​which​nation​would​it​be​and​which​the​rights​that​it​could​allege​ in​support​of​its​claims?​Would​it​be​Spain?​This​seems​to​be​the​only​

on​the​independenCe​of​the​mexiCan​empire : 9

one,​and​in​effect​no​other​nation​seeks​it.​Let​us​examine,​then,​the​ titles​to​its​dominion,​and​we​will​see​that​they​appear​to​be​unlawful.​ Neither​the​king,​in​particular,​nor​the​people​of​the​Spanish​nation​can​ revoke​the​right​of​property.​The​time​passed​when​it​was​accepted​as​ true​that​the​king​and​some​number​of​citizens​were​the​wealthy​proprietors​with​authority​to​dispossess​the​rest,​for​no​other​reason​than​their​ whim,​ from​ the​ land​ that​ the​ latter​ had​ made​ fruitful​ for​ cultivation​ through​their​hardships​and​personal​labor.​Since​the​fall​of​feudalism,​ every​man​has​a​sacred​right​not​to​be​dispossessed​of​legally​acquired​ land.​How,​then,​does​Spain​claim​to​have​rights​over​a​territory​that​in​ no​way​belongs​to​it,​that​it​gave​away​entirely​in​parceling​it​out​among​ the​colonists​from​whom​the​current​owners​descend,​and​who​perhaps​ never​possessed​it​legitimately? ​ Indeed,​ all​ the​ rights​ commonly​ alleged​ to​ justify​ this​ illegitimate​ possession​appear​unlawful​as​soon​as​they​are​examined.​Everything​ Spain​ can​ allege​ in​ support​ of​ its​ claims​ consists​ in:​ the​ donation​ of​ Alexander​ VI;​ the​ cession​ of​ Moctezuma;​ the​ right​ of​ conquest;​ the​ preaching​of​the​gospel;​the​establishment,​defense,​protection,​and​development​of​the​colony;​and,​finally,​the​oath​of​loyalty. ​ To​hold​ as​legitimate​ the​donation​ of​Alexander,​ it​is​necessary​ to​ assume​the​Roman​pontiff​was​the​proprietor​and​universal​lord​of​all​ the​earth.​Well,​having​no​more​reason​to​concede​him​this​property​in​ America​than​in​Europe,​Asia,​and​Africa,​if​his​dominion​is​admitted​in​ the​first,​it​cannot​be​denied​in​the​others.​And​what​would​be​the​result​ of​such​a​doctrine,​as​absurd​as​it​is​monstrous?​That​the​sacred​right​of​ property​would​be​revoked;​that​nothing​could​be​fixed​or​stable​on​this​ point,​and​that​all​the​peoples​and​nations​would​exist​at​the​discretion​ of​a​man​who,​with​no​other​reason​than​his​sovereignty​and​absolute​ will,​could,​as​can​any​proprietor,​dispossess​them​from​the​land​they​ occupy;​that​is​to​say,​he​could​exhaust​the​wellspring​of​wealth​and​dry​ up​the​fountains​of​public​happiness.​And​would​the​wise​and​liberal​ legislators​of​the​Peninsula​let​these​antisocial​doctrines​stand?​In​no​ way;​in​the​century​of​the​Enlightenment​and​Spanish​liberty,​none​of​ its​sons​thinks​so​absurdly​and​mistakenly. ​ The​cession​of​Moctezuma​is​just​like​that​of​Fernando​VII:​It​was​ snatched​by​force;​it​was​declared​null​by​the​peoples​of​the​empire,​who​ took​up​arms​to​resist​the​usurpations​of​the​invading​army,​which,​like​ the​French​in​Spain,​tried​to​legitimate​by​violence​a​renunciation​as​un-

10 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

lawful​as​that​of​Bayonne.​The​Spanish​censured​this,​and​they​cannot​ endorse​something​that​is​entirely​similar​to​it. ​ The​right​of​conquest​is​the​right​of​the​strongest,​which​can​be​and​ in​fact​has​been​suppressed​by​another,​equal​right. ​ The​proclamation​of​the​Gospel​cannot​be​a​legitimate​entitlement​ for​taking​possession​of​the​land​of​catechized​peoples.​Otherwise,​the​ apostles​in​the​first​centuries​of​the​church​and​the​missionaries​in​the​ following​centuries​would​be​legitimate​owners​of​the​land​of​the​converted​faithful,​and​the​sacerdotal​monarchy,​so​justly​censured​in​the​ catechists​of​Paraguay,​could​be​realized. ​ The​establishment,​protection,​and​development​of​the​colonies​have​ always​been​the​work​of​individuals,​and​the​Spanish​government​has​ played​no​part​in​this​except​to​impede​by​its​prohibitive​laws​and​exclusive​commerce​the​progress​of​agriculture,​violating​nature​in​a​land​ capable​of​producing​everything​and​causing​the​misery​and​discouragement​of​its​inhabitants.​These​inhabitants,​because​they​were​prohibited​ from​freely​exporting​their​surplus​fruits​and​importing​articles​of​luxury​and​comfort,​did​not​make​this​most​fertile​land​produce​anything​ but​what​was​necessary​to​sustain​a​paltry​commerce​or,​better​stated,​ monopoly,​ incapable​ of​ creating​ great​ wealth​ and​ therefore​ suitable​ only​for​holding​back​the​progress​of​this​nascent​colony.​And​will​it​be​ possible​that​what​has​caused​the​unhappiness​of​Mexico​be​precisely​ what​is​alleged​as​a​right​to​continue​oppressing​it?​What​person,​who​ is​not​ignorant​of​the​principles​of​natural​equity,​will​be​able​to​approve​ such​tyrannical​behavior?​The​facts​expressed​are​constant,​the​consequences​are​legitimate.​What​argument,​then,​can​stand​up​to​so​palpable​a​proof?​Will​it​perhaps​be​the​investment​of​wealth​in​the​establishment​and​defense​of​the​colony?​But​here​one​must​note​two​things:​ first,​that​Mexico,​although​oppressed,​has​produced​enough​to​cover​its​ expenses,​always​deducting​a​surplus​that,​until​the​beginning​of​the​insurrection,​never​has​been​less​than​five​million​duros,​which​Spain​has​ arranged​to​its​favor​and,​for​this​very​reason,​cannot​be​certain​it​has​ suffered​any​misappropriation​of​funds,​inasmuch​as​it​was​utilized​in​ the​establishment​of​the​colonies.​The​second​is​that​this​defense,​purely​ imaginary,​has​been​more​harmful​and​noxious​than​useful​and​beneficial​to​the​Mexican​territory,​whose​ports​and​cities​have​suffered​the​ horrors​of​an​invasion​and​the​violence​of​a​sacking​for​no​other​reason​ than​its​dependence​on​the​Peninsula,​dependence​contrary​to​the​intent​

on​the​independenCe​of​the​mexiCan​empire : 11

of​nature,​which​did​not​create​an​entire​world​to​subject​it​to​following​ the​fate​of​a​small​piece​of​Europe,​the​least​extensive​part​of​our​antipodean​hemisphere. ​ It​remains​for​us​only​to​make​this​illusion​of​a​loyalty​oath​disappear,​ an​oath​that​has​been​used​so​much​to​frighten​the​timid​consciences​ and​bewilder​the​minds​of​ignorant​men.​This​oath​is​compulsory​and​ necessarily​conditional,​that​is​to​say,​the​people​are​obliged​to​obey​the​ decisions​of​the​government​so​long​as​they​are​beneficial​to​the​community​and​fulfill​their​promise.​If​either​of​these​two​things​is​absent,​ the​government’s​right​to​command​and​the​peoples’​obligation​to​obey​ terminate,​and​the​social​contract​is​dissolved.​Every​act​emanating​from​ a​government​that​cannot​or​will​not​provide​for​the​happiness​of​the​ people​ that​ has​ put​ its​ trust​ in​ it​ is​ null,​ unlawful,​ of​ no​ value,​ and,​ for​ this​ very​ reason,​ unworthy​ of​ being​ obeyed,​ and​ this​ is​ precisely​ the​situation​in​which​the​Americas​find​themselves​with​respect​to​the​ Spanish​government.​Open​the​Constitution​of​the​Spanish​monarchy,​ and​ the​ slightest​ and​ most​ superficial​ examination​ will​ be​ enough​ to​ make​clear​the​commitment​of​its​authors​to​diminish​American​representation​and​obstruct​the​influence​that​the​native​born​of​those​countries​could​and​should​have​in​the​government​established​on​the​Peninsula.​At​each​step,​one​comes​across​articles​that​confirm​this​truth,​and​ this​code,​justly​admired​for​the​good​judgment,​common​sense,​and​ wisdom​of​all​its​measures​in​what​pertains​to​Spain,​does​not​lack​for​ injustices,​ inconsistencies,​ and​ puerilities​ in​ what​ concerns​ America.​ But​let​us​grant​that​the​constitutional​charter​contains​nothing​contrary​to​the​interests​of​America,​that​all​and​each​one​of​the​articles​ sanctioned​ in​ it​ are​ manifestly​ beneficial,​ and,​ if​ you​ wish,​ that​ they​ alone​are​capable​of​providing​their​happiness.​It​seems​that​no​more​can​ be​conceded.​Nonetheless,​Spain’s​cause​has​not​been​improved​by​this.​ And​why?​Because​despite​the​continuous​and​energetic​demands​that​ have​been​made​to​enforce​their​observance,​nothing​has​been​accomplished;​our​efforts​have​been​useless,​merit​has​been​forgotten,​virtue​ has​been​beaten​down,​incompetence​positioned​in​high​posts,​and​the​ outcries​of​a​people​reduced​to​misery​disregarded.​Well,​now,​either​ the​ Spanish​ government​ has​ tried​ to​ deceive​ us,​ observing​ a​ conduct​ entirely​contrary​to​what​is​provided​for​in​the​text​of​the​laws,​or​it​has​ not​had​energy​sufficient​to​see​that​they​are​observed.​In​either​case​we​ are​absolved​of​the​oath​of​loyalty​because​in​neither​have​the​conditions​

12 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

been​fulfilled​under​which​this​oath​was​offered,​conditions​that​are​the​ bond​of​union​between​the​people​and​the​government,​essentially​embedded​in​the​nature​of​these​contracts​and​the​fundamental​principle​ of​every​social​contract. ​ Given​that​neither​Spain​nor​any​other​power​has​a​right​to​the​land​ we​ occupy,​ we​ must​ make​ clear​ that​ this​ right​ resides​ in​ the​ general​ body​of​the​Mexican​people;​that​is​to​say,​in​the​individuals​born​and​ lawfully​domiciled​in​the​empire. ​ The​right​of​the​peoples​to​possess​the​land​they​occupy​must​necessarily​originate​in​one​of​these​three​principles:​origin,​birth,​or​residence,​because​the​donation​or​purchase,​if​it​is​of​occupied​land,​can​be​ made​legal​only​by​the​will​of​the​proprietors,​and​if​the​land​is​unoccupied,​no​right​whatsoever​authorizes​the​donor​or​seller​to​transmit​to​ the​purchaser​or​recipient​a​right​it​does​not​have. ​ A​generally​accepted​truth​is​that​the​legitimate​possessor​of​unencumbered​assets​can​transfer​the​dominion​he​enjoys​to​his​sons​and​ constitute​them​lawful​masters​of​the​paternal​inheritance,​and​this​is​ what​ we​ understand​ by​ right​ of​ origin​ or​ filiation.​ In​ the​ same​ way,​ every​individual​human​being​has​the​right​to​live​in​the​country​where​ he​was​born​and,​if​he​submits​to​the​laws​established​by​the​appropriate​authority,​to​enjoy​the​comforts​that​the​society​occupying​the​land​ offers;​and​this​is​what​we​know​as​right​of​birth.​Finally,​every​foreigner​ settled​ in​ a​ society,​ with​ the​ expressed​ or​ tacit​ consent​ of​the​ individuals​who​constitute​that​society,​can​acquire​property,​enter​into​ the​enjoyment​of​all​the​comforts​the​citizens​of​the​state​enjoy,​and​acquire​a​right​we​call​residency.​Because​the​right​of​society​to​the​land​ it​occupies​is​not​nor​can​be​anything​more​than​the​sum​of​the​individual​rights,​one​unquestionable​conclusion​follows​by​deduction:​that​ the​citizens​of​the​state,​which​consists​of​all​of​them​together​being​its​ lawful​proprietors,​must​have​a​true​dominion​over​the​occupied​land.​ Well,​now,​the​citizens​who​make​up​the​Mexican​Empire​fall​into​three​ classes:​the​descendants​of​the​old​inhabitants,​the​children​of​foreign​ origin​in​the​country,​and​the​Spaniards​and​other​foreigners​all​living​ together​there.​Each​one​of​them​is​the​lawful​proprietor​of​a​part​of​the​ land,​and​this​the​Spanish​government​has​never​questioned.​So​the​empire,​which​represents​the​totality​of​all​of​them,​is​the​owner​and​absolute​master​of​the​territory​they​possess.

on​the​independenCe​of​the​mexiCan​empire : 13

​ 2.​But​if​the​Mexican​people,​or​what​is​the​same,​the​people​who​ make​up​Mexico,​are​the​lawful​masters​of​the​land​they​occupy,​it​is​no​ less​certain​that​they​are​sufficiently​enlightened​to​know​their​rights​ and​the​great​benefits​independence​carries​with​it,​and​if​there​were​no​ other​evidence​of​this​truth​than​the​many​and​great​sacrifices​they​made​ to​achieve​independence,​these​alone​would​make​it​clear​in​a​conclusive​and​decisive​way.​Eleven​years​of​espionage,​prisons,​scaffolds,​and​ uninterrupted​ defeats​ demonstrate​ the​ difficulty​ of​ the​ endeavor​ and​ the​perseverance​of​the​Mexican​people,​which​has​known​how​to​sacrifice​its​most​precious​interests​in​order​to​achieve​liberty.​And​this​immutable​steadfastness,​this​invincible​perseverance​in​confronting​such​ powerful​obstacles,​are​they​not​proofs​guaranteeing​that​there​exists​in​ the​general​body​of​the​nation​an​intimate​conviction​that​everything​ must​be​sacrificed​to​the​interests​of​liberty?​Has​their​conduct​not​demonstrated​that​they​prefer​death​to​servitude​and​that​they​are​firmly​resolved​to​die​free​rather​than​live​as​slaves?​But​if,​despite​all​this,​even​ their​enlightenment​is​doubted,​peruse​their​writings​published​since​ the​year​1810​in​England,​France,​Spain,​North​America,​in​Mexico​in​ the​presence​of​masters,​and​not​only​will​one​find​many​documents​ that​would​do​honor​to​some​nations​that​pass​for​enlightened,​but​also​ a​total​and​absolute​uniformity​with​respect​to​the​principal​point;​that​ is​to​say,​each​one​cooperating,​by​the​means​in​his​grasp,​in​the​great​ work​of​emancipating​the​Mexican​Empire. ​ Take​in​your​hands​this​precious​code​sanctioned​amidst​the​noise​ and​clamor​of​arms​in​the​town​of​Apatzingán.​Examine​it​impartially​ and​you​will​find​inscribed​in​it​all​the​principles​characteristic​of​the​ liberal​ system:​ sovereignty​ of​ the​ people,​ the​ division​ of​ powers,​ the​ appropriate​jurisdiction​ of​each​of​them,​liberty​of​the​press,​mutual​ obligations​between​the​people​and​the​government,​the​rights​of​free​ man,​and​the​means​of​defense​that​must​be​provided​to​the​criminal.​In​ a​word,​you​will​find,​delimited​with​sufficient​precision​and​accuracy,​ the​limits​of​each​established​authority​and,​perfectly​combined,​the​liberty​of​the​citizen​and​the​supreme​power​of​the​society.​So​we​do​not​ hesitate​to​affirm​resolutely​that​this​code,​with​some​slight​adjustments,​ would​have​produced​our​independence​and​liberty​from​the​year​1815​if​ the​insidious​maneuvers​of​the​Spanish​government,​calculated​to​divide​ us,​ had​ not​ produced​ the​ pernicious​ consequence​ of​ separating​ from​

14 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

the​ common​ interests​ a​ portion​ of​ citizens​ who,​ although​ very​ small​ compared​with​the​rest,​was​the​most​necessary​because​it​had​taken​up​ arms. ​ But​ the​ happy​ day​ arrived​ when​ the​ dawning​ light​ of​ citizenship​ broke​throughout​the​land​of​Moctezuma,​and​the​activity​of​this​light​ penetrated​ the​ body​ of​ the​ Mexican​ army.​ The​ memorable​ twenty-​ fourth​of​February​arrived,​and​the​fields​of​Iguala​repeated​the​echoes​ of​the​liberty​pronounced​by​the​immortal​Iturbide.​At​that​voice,​the​ chains​that​bound​our​hemisphere​and​another​were​broken,​and,​free​of​ them,​we​put​into​place,​in​the​country​of​Anáhuac,​a​throne​to​the​liberty​that​had​been​exiled​from​it​for​three​centuries.​This​voice​resounds​ in​the​provinces​and​spreads​with​the​speed​of​light​into​all​corners​of​ the​empire.​The​hero​Negrete,​as​moderate​in​discussions​as​fearless​on​ the​battlefield,​dispels​the​force​of​the​tyrants​with​his​presence​alone​ and,​at​the​head​of​his​army,​frees​half​the​empire​in​two​months.​These​ generals,​aided​by​the​meritorious​leaders​Guerrero,​Andrade,​Bustamante,​ Echávarri,​ Herrera,​ Bravo,​ Barragán,​ Quintanar,​ Filisola,​ Santana,​and​others,​make​the​Spanish​domination​disappear​from​this​soil​ in​the​short​space​of​six​months,​giving​a​new​appearance​to​revolution,​ purging​it​of​some​stains​contracted​in​the​earlier​era​and,​through​moderation​and​concord,​making​it​appear​assured.​How​is​it,​then,​that​some​ men​who​have​made​the​most​deadly​and​destructive​war​against​each​ other​come​together​cordially​to​effect​the​liberty​and​independence​of​ their​country?​How​has​it​been​possible​that​the​voice​of​two​generals​ in​the​short​space​of​a​few​months​united​wills​so​discordant​through​ a​long​eleven​years​that​they​would​even​wage​a​devastating​war?​This​ admirable​phenomenon​is​the​inevitable​result​of​the​rapid​diffusion​of​ the​light,​originating​in​the​enlightenment​that​has​made​known​to​the​ people​their​true​interests. ​ And​ for​ a​ people​ who​ knew​ how​ to​ gain​ their​ independence,​ destroying​a​formidable​enemy​that​they​harbored​in​their​breast,​will​it​ be​impossible​to​repel​a​foreign​force?​A​people​to​whom​the​rights​of​ liberty​are​so​familiar​and​who​have​a​more​than​sufficient​knowledge​ of​the​eternal​maxims​of​justice,​will​they​be​oppressed​by​an​internal​ despotism?​In​no​way.​This​outcome​is​contrary​to​the​experience​of​all​ the​centuries​and​does​not​cohere​with​natural​reason.​It​is​certain​that​ the​enemies​of​independence​and​liberty​will​make​every​effort,​first,​ to​compel​us​to​enter​the​Spanish​dominion​and,​second,​to​impede​or​

on​the​independenCe​of​the​mexiCan​empire : 15

make​illusory​the​reforms​consequent​to​the​liberal​system.​But​each​of​ these​until​this​day​has​a​small​following​and,​with​passing​time,​no​following,​as​is​to​be​hoped​from​the​liberty​of​the​press​and​the​enlightenment​that​characterizes​the​meritorious​leaders​who​have​led​us​to​ liberty. ​ 3.​To​conclude​this​discourse,​it​remains​only​to​make​clear​that​to​ sustain​the​proclaimed​independence,​the​physical​force​we​have​is​sufficient.​This​physical​force​has​as​its​base​the​population​and​the​means​of​ sustaining​that​population.​With​the​population​numerous​and​the​state​ rich,​there​is​everything​necessary​to​raise​an​armed​force​capable​of​ checking​foreign​invasions,​especially​when​this​armed​force​is​inured​ to​war​by​having​been​on​campaign​a​considerable​time. ​ Our​ population​ is​ much​ superior​ to​ that​ of​ various​ independent​ states​of​Europe​and​is​indisputably​double​what​the​United​States​of​ America​had​when​it​pronounced​itself​independent,​a​force​that​made​ the​British​nation​tremble​and​frustrated​entirely​all​the​plans​of​subjugation​ that​ Britain​ had​ with​ respect​ to​ its​ American​ colonies.​ This​ nation,​whose​maritime​force​is​the​greatest​and​most​formidable​the​ world​has​known,​could​not​subject​three​million​unarmed​countrymen​lacking​in​military​knowledge​and​in​a​land​that,​as​the​least​fertile​ of​the​entire​continent,​could​not​provide​anything​but​the​scarcest​resources.​And​will​Spain​be​able,​threatened​by​foreign​armies,​shaken​ by​internal​upheavals,​and​with​a​navy​in​the​most​deplorable​state,​to​ reduce​to​its​dominion​the​Mexican​Empire,​which​has​a​population,​ according​to​the​lowest​estimate,​of​six​million,​an​army​inured​to​war,​ ready​to​sacrifice​itself​for​the​liberty​of​its​patria,​a​fertile​terrain,​rich​ and​abundant​in​every​type​of​crop​and,​for​this​very​reason,​capable​of​ raising​and​sustaining​an​army​ten​times​greater​than​whatever​the​most​ formidable​power​of​Europe​can​transport?​It​would​be​delirious​to​say​ so,​and​only​a​foolish​man​could​enter​into​the​ridiculous​undertaking​ of​supporting​such​a​paradox. ​ Nor​can​the​exigencies​we​have​experienced​in​these​days​be​avoided,​ for​they​are​the​inevitable​consequences​of​the​disorder​that​must​emerge​ at​the​outset​of​a​government​that​is​starting​to​establish​itself.​Drain​the​ water​from​the​mines,​establish​freedom​of​trade,​develop​agriculture,​ and​the​state,​by​means​of​direct​tax,​without​an​excessive​burden​on​ individuals​and​without​the​espionage​and​fetters​that​the​individual​and​ system​of​customs​carry​with​them,​will​have​what​is​necessary​for​all​

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the​expenses​of​state,​to​cover​its​letters​of​credit​and​establish​a​public​ bank​free,​if​possible,​of​taxes​on​individuals​“for​the​extinction​of​the​ debt”​or,​at​the​least,​noticeably​diminish​such​taxes. ​ From​the​principles​expressed​so​far​and​from​the​application​that​we​ have​made​of​them​to​the​Mexican​Empire,​one​can​deduce:​that​it​is​the​ legitimate​owner​of​the​land​it​has​and​currently​occupies;​that​it​has​in​ its​favor​and​in​support​of​its​sovereign​decrees​the​requisite​enlightenment,​the​necessary​population—that​is​to​say,​the​physical​and​moral​ power—to​ sustain​ them;​ that,​ for​ that​ very​ reason,​ it​ is​ and​ must​ be​ considered​and​recognized​as​a​true​nation;​and​that,​by​reason​of​such,​ it​has​an​unquestionable​right​to​alter,​modify,​and​abolish​totally​the​ established​forms​of​government,​substituting​for​them​those​it​judges​ suitable​for​achieving​the​ultimate​goal​of​society,​which​is​not​nor​can​ be​ anything​ other​ than​ the​ happiness​ of​ the​ individuals​ that​ make​ it​ up;​and​that​for​this​very​reason​the​Mexican​people​is​not​nor​can​be​ called​rebellious​for​having​pronounced​itself​independent​of​the​Spanish​monarchy,​for​in​this​it​has​done​nothing​other​than​use​the​powers​ conceded​by​the​author​of​nature​to​all​societies​to​provide​themselves​ with​their​happiness​by​the​means​they​judge​most​adequate​and​conducive​to​this​goal.

2



Discourse on the Limits of Civil Authority Deduced from Their Source

Surely​few​nations​have​been​in​such​fortunate​circumstances​for​creating​constitutions​with​all​possible​human​perfection​as​ are​the​American​nations,​which​a​half​century​ago​became​independent​ of​European​powers:​The​enlightenment​generally​disseminated​by​the​ freedom​of​the​press​established​in​England,​France,​Spain,​Portugal,​ and​ Naples;​ the​ spirit​ of​ liberty,​ rapidly​ diffused​ to​ all​ points​ of​ the​ globe;​the​enthusiasm​with​which​liberal​ideas​and​the​rights​of​peoples,​ which​have​gone​on​to​be​the​subject​of​a​general​discussion,​have​been​ proclaimed,​maintained,​and​elevated​to​the​highest​state;​the​conviction,​produced​by​the​disasters​of​the​most​recent​revolutions,​that​one​ cannot​ successfully​ implement​ certain​ theories,​ which,​ even​ though​ they​present​a​store​of​speculative​truths,​cannot​be​realized​in​practice;​ and,​finally,​being​entirely​free​of​the​obstacles​naturally​put​in​the​way​ of​any​reform​by​a​despotic​government​consolidated​through​hundreds​ of​years​on​stale​preconceived​notions​such​as​hereditary​nobility,​feudal​domain,​sovereignty​of​kings​derived​directly​from​God,​and​others​ of​the​same​sort,​which​practically​convinced​peoples​of​the​absurd​and​ monstrous​doctrine​of​natural​inequality​among​the​children​of​Adam​ and​ which​ have​ not​ permitted​ a​ total​ reform​ in​ the​ states​ of​ Europe​ through​the​slow​but​always​progressive​steps​enlightenment​has​made​ in​ them.​This​lack​ of​ obstacles,​ we​ repeat,​ and​ this​abundance​ of​resources​that​at​present​make​up​the​political​situation​of​the​American​ peoples,​provide​sufficient​grounds​for​expecting,​from​the​congresses​ established​on​their​vast​surface,​constitutions​much​more​perfect​than​ those​created​in​Europe. ​ In​effect,​the​outcome​has​been​completely​what​was​to​be​expected.​ The​Constitution​of​the​United​States​of​North​America​not​only​has​ ​ Original​title:​“Discurso​sobre​los​límites​de​la​autoridad​civil​deducidos​de​su​origen.”​Source:​El Observador de la República Mexicana,​Mexico,​December​19,​1827,​p.​231. 17

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been​highly​praised​by​the​most​celebrated​writers​of​Europe,​but​has​ also​created​glory​and​prosperity,​in​a​firm​and​stable​way,​in​the​freest​ people​ of​ the​ world,​ even​ putting​ that​ country​ almost​ at​ the​ level​ of​ England​in​its​navy,​and​of​France​in​its​arts​and​manufacturing.​It​has​ done​this​in​the​short​space​of​a​half​century,​when​those​other​nations​ have​not​been​able​to​get​to​their​current​level​of​prosperity​except​after​ hundreds​ of​ years​ and​ terrible​ political​ oscillations​ and​ fluctuations.​ We,​then,​desirous​that​our​country​take​advantage​of​the​happy​opportunity​that​has​come​within​its​reach​to​constitute​itself​with​peace​and​ tranquility,​have​proposed,​and​have​already​begun​to​carry​out,​placing​ before​our​fellow​citizens​the​constitutions​of​the​most​notable​peoples.​ At​the​end​of​all​of​them,​in​a​separate​discourse,​we​make​the​observations​and​reflections​that​seem​most​suitable​to​us.​But​before​our​proposal​takes​effect​with​respect​to​the​Anglo-​American​and​French​constitutions​that​we​have​just​published,​it​has​seemed​worthwhile​to​us​ to​determine​the​general​limits​within​which​the​authority​of​any​government​must​be​contained,​without​subjecting​ourselves​blindly​to​the​ doctrines​of​the​European​writers​on​public​law,​and​keeping​in​mind​ only​the​goal​of​social​institutions​and​the​nature​of​the​contract​that​ unites​peoples​with​governments. ​ Whatever​might​be​the​origin​of​societies,​it​is​completely​certain​ that​these​could​not​be​established​for​any​purpose​other​than​fostering​the​happiness​of​the​individuals​who​make​them​up,​securing​their​ persons,​their​interests,​and​their​civil​liberty,​insofar​as​limiting​these​ is​not​necessary​to​uphold​the​interests​of​the​community.​From​this​ luminous​principle​are​deduced​all​the​consequences​that​constitute​the​ science​of​government,​and​we​will​proceed​to​set​them​out.​It​follows,​ in​the​first​place,​that​the​authority​of​societies​is​not​absolutely​limitless​as​Rousseau​believed,​for​such​authority,​wherever​it​might​reside,​ is​necessarily​and​essentially​tyrannical.​For​what​does​it​mean​and​what​ do​we​understand​by​unlimited​authority,​if​not​the​power​to​do​whatever​one​might​wish?​And​cannot​he​who​believes​he​has​it,​by​virtue​of​ this​power,​commit​the​greatest​crimes,​depriving​an​innocent​person​of​ life,​divesting​the​legitimate​owner​of​his​property,​and​trampling​on​all​ the​safeguards​of​liberty​with​no​other​motive​than​his​whim?​No,​these​ are​not​the​simple​fears​of​an​overexcited​imagination.​They​are​outcomes​confirmed​by​experience,​for,​as​the​famous​Constant​observes,​ the​horrifying​crimes​committed​in​the​French​Revolution​against​indi-

on​the​limitS​of​Civil​authority​deduCed​from​their​SourCe : 19

vidual​liberty​and​the​rights​of​the​citizen​stemmed​in​great​part​from​ the​vogue​of​this​doctrine,​which​not​only​is​not​liberal,​but​rather​is​the​ fundamental​principle​of​despotism.​This​principle​does​not​consist,​as​ many​have​convinced​themselves,​in​the​abuse​the​monarch​makes​of​the​ authority​entrusted​to​him​or​that​he​has​usurped.​In​that​case,​it​would​ be​supremely​easy​to​cure​nations​of​their​political​ills​by​exiling​the​ monarchs​forever,​and​the​popular​government​would​always​be​justified​in​such​a​case.​But​reason​and​experience​agree​in​disproving​such​ an​unfounded​theory,​showing​us​despotic​peoples​like​those​of​France​ in​its​revolution​and​liberal​monarchs​like​those​of​England​and​Spain.​ Despotism,​then,​is​nothing​more​than​the​absolute​and​unlimited​use​ of​power,​without​subjection​to​any​rule,​no​matter​whose​hands​might​ be​driving​this​formidable​mass​that​makes​all​its​weight​felt​on​the​individuals​of​the​state.​It​follows​that​we​can​call​despotic​a​measure​that​has​ been​decreed​only​to​satisfy​the​will​of​the​one​who​commands.​But​if​all​ government,​considered​in​the​scope​of​the​three​powers,​must​exercise​ its​ functions​ within​ prescribed​ limits,​ determining​ those​ limits​ with​ the​greatest​precision​and​exactitude​is​an​absolute​necessity​to​avoid​ the​unfortunate​consequences​produced​by​the​erroneous​ideas​of​many​ writers​regarding​the​rights​of​the​people​over​the​government​and​of​ the​ government​ over​ the​ people.​ Let​ us​ return,​ then,​ to​ the​ original​ source​of​societies.​Let​us​examine​the​principles​of​the​social​contract​ with​attentive​impartiality​and​detailed​reflective​meditation,​and​with​ that​effort​alone​we​will​discover​the​solution​to​this​problem. ​ Men,​in​addition​to​the​divine​order​to​multiply,​have​in​their​nature​ strong​drives​for​propagating​their​species​and​such​inbred​self-​love​that​ these​do​not​disappear​even​in​the​least​of​their​actions.​Men​do​not​ enjoy​except​when​their​appetites​and​needs​are​satisfied;​nor​do​they​ become​sad​and​anguished​except​when​they​lack​something​that​is​necessary,​or​they​believe​is​necessary,​to​satisfy​their​needs​and​to​rest​in​ that​tranquility​and​repose​that​constitutes​human​happiness. ​ One​of​human​nature’s​strongest​inclinations​is​the​one​individuals​ have​to​preserve​themselves​in​the​state​of​natural​liberty​bestowed​on​ them​by​the​creator​of​all​things​and,​thus,​to​obtain​the​enjoyments​ analogous​to​their​natural​inclinations;​but​in​the​few​steps​they​made​ on​this​painful,​difficult,​and​risky​path,​they​became​convinced​that​ the​happiness​of​each​of​them​was​not​the​act​of​a​single​man,​but​rather​ the​result​of​common​efforts.​Surrounded​everywhere​by​enemies,​at-

20 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

tacked​by​hunger​and​reptiles,​pursued​by​ferocious​beasts,​and​feeling​ the​weakness​of​their​strengths,​they​agreed​to​give​each​other​aid​under​ certain​covenants​or​conditions.​Here​are​both​the​first​social​contract​ in​the​world​and​the​sovereignty​of​the​people,​which,​in​each​one​of​ the​contracting​parties,​is​nothing​but​the​right​one​has​over​oneself​to​ provide​for​one’s​happiness​in​accordance​with​the​rules​prescribed​by​ sound​reason​and,​in​the​association,​the​aggregate​of​individual​rights​ organized​to​the​same​end.​These​agreements​made,​what​came​about​ was​ what​ should​ have​ been​ feared—that​ many​ of​ those​ who​ entered​ into​the​agreements​received,​with​the​help​of​the​rest,​the​desired​benefit,​but,​when​it​came​to​fulfilling​the​terms​of​the​contract,​they​refused,​either​denying​the​agreement​or​resisting​its​taking​effect​or​interpreting​ it​ in​ their​ own​ favor​ despite​ the​ protests​ of​ the​ others.​ In​ light​of​these​drawbacks,​the​men,​united​as​described,​determined​to​ clarify​the​established​pacts​by​common​agreement,​making​use​of​categorical​and​decisive​phrases,​and​here​is​the​origin​of​the​laws.​But​despite​the​clarity​of​these​laws,​the​insistence​on​exempting​oneself​from​ them,​sustained​by​the​spirit​of​caviling,​rendered​them​empty​and​ineffectual,​those​who​acknowledged​their​existence​claiming​that​some​ individual​cases​were​not​comprehended​by​those​laws,​cases​believed​ useful​to​some​and​prejudicial​to​others,​so​it​was​necessary​to​create​a​ neutral​power​invested​by​the​common​authority​to​resolve​definitively​ disagreements​ that​arose,​and​this​is​the​origin​of​the​judicial​power.​ Finally,​men​refused​to​carry​out​the​intent​of​the​laws​and​the​declarations​of​the​judges,​and​it​was​necessary​for​everyone​to​combine​their​ physical​forces​to​compel​each​one​to​fulfill​the​obligations​entered​into​ through​the​original​pact,​and​what​resulted​was​what​we​call​the​executive​power.​By​this,​we​do​not​claim​that​those​distinct​powers​were​ divided​from​the​outset,​conferring​them​on​distinct​persons​or​bodies,​ for​it​is​clear​that​this​was​the​work​of​time​and​reflective​meditation.​ But​we​certainly​want​it​to​be​understood​that​these​powers,​distinct​in​ reality,​and​for​that​very​reason​separable,​were​acknowledged​from​the​ time​societies​were​founded,​although​they​were​vested​in​a​single​person​or​body.​For​this​very​reason,​the​doctrine​that​informs​this​division​ is​not​a​pure​theory​totally​unrealizable​in​practice,​as​a​writer​of​our​day​ claims.​But​let​us​continue​reflecting​on​this​society​that​moves​toward​ its​perfection.​When​members​of​the​society​created​these​powers,​it​

on​the​limitS​of​Civil​authority​deduCed​from​their​SourCe : 21

was​necessary​that​they​entrust​the​exercise​of​the​functions​typical​of​ these​powers​to​some​individuals​of​the​association​who​would​dedicate​ themselves​exclusively​to​their​fulfillment.​For​this​it​was​necessary​to​ assist​them​with​everything​that​their​personal​work​was​supposed​to​ produce,​and​here​is​the​origin​of​the​posts​of​judges​and​executors​of​ the​laws.​As​for​the​legislators,​who​were​themselves​members​of​the​ association,​they​exercised​the​legislative​power​for​themselves​so​long​ as​society​consisted​of​a​small​number​of​individuals;​but​the​number​of​ individuals​later​grew​to​such​a​degree​that​the​personal​attendance​of​ all​and​each​one​of​them​at​the​national​assembly​was​not​possible,​and​ he​who​could​not​[attend]​entrusted​his​vote​to​someone​who​was​ready​ to​assist.​But​as​these​difficulties​constantly​increased,​many​began​to​entrust​their​votes​to​a​small​number​of​individuals,​and​sometimes​to​only​ one,​so​that,​reflectively​and​maturely​considering​the​interests​of​each,​ they​might​prescribe​those​measures​that​would​be​most​advantageous​ to​the​maintenance​of​all,​and​this​is​the​origin​of​national​representation​and​legislative​congresses.​But​it​happened​that,​in​exercising​legislative​functions,​those​empowered​by​the​people​did​not​express​the​will​ of​their​constituents​but​rather​their​individual​wish​or​opinion,​seeking​to​limit​the​natural​liberty​of​the​citizens​more​than​was​necessary​ to​sustain​the​union.​Then​the​individuals​of​the​society​declared​that​ the​representatives​had​violated​the​boundaries​of​the​authority​that​had​ been​entrusted​to​them,​and​the​individuals​of​society​wrote​down​in​ a​solemn​and​positive​way,​in​laws​put​before​the​entire​public,​the​imprescriptible​rights​of​man​and​citizen,​working​out​the​three​acknowledged​powers​that​seemed​most​useful​for​the​preservation​of​the​liberty, property, security,​and​equality​of​citizens,​and​here​is​the​origin​of​these​ codes​and​collections​of​fundamental​laws​known​by​the​name​of​constitutions. ​ By​what​has​been​expressed​here​so​far,​one​sees​clearly​the​origin,​ development,​and​present​state​of​human​institutions,​the​goal​men​have​ proposed​in​establishing​them,​and​the​primary​reason​for​all​their​transactions,​that​is​to​say,​the​preservation​of​their​rights​to​the​extent​that​ allows​for​the​preservation​of​society.​From​this​follows​a​general​consequence,​and​it​is​that​all​authority,​of​whatever​kind​it​may​be,​has​limits​ to​the​exercise​of​its​functions,​within​which​it​must​be​contained,​and​it​ is​not​lawful​for​either​the​people​or​their​representatives​to​trample​on​

22 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

the​rights​of​individuals​on​the​pretext​of​preserving​society,​given​that​ men,​in​instituting​society,​had​no​other​intent​nor​proposed​any​other​ goal​than​the​preservation​of​their​liberty, security, equality,​and​property,​ and​not​to​relinquish​those​rights​to​a​moral​body​that​might​fully​and​ legally​exercise​the​most​despotic​tyranny​over​those​from​whom​it​had​ received​this​immense​and​formidable​power.

3



Discourse on the Freedom of Thought, Speech, and Writing Rara temporum felicitate ubi sentire Quoe veils, equoe sentias dicere licet. An​exceptionally​happy​time​when it​is​lawful​to​think​as​one​wants and​to​say​what​one​thinks. —​Tacitus,​Histories,​book​I

If,​ in​ the​ time​ of​ Tacitus,​ the​ ability​ to​ think​ as​ one​ wanted​and​to​speak​as​one​thought​was​an​uncommon​happiness,​in​ our​times​it​would​be​a​consummate​misfortune​and​a​quite​unfavorable​mark​on​our​nation​and​institutions​should​one​try​to​place​limits​ on​ freedom​ of​ thought,​ speech,​ and​ written​ expression.​ Tacitus​ and​ his​fellow​citizens​ were​ under​the​rule​ of​a​ master,​after​all,​ whereas​ we​are​under​the​leadership​of​a​government​that​owes​its​existence​to​ such​freedom,​which​can​last​only​because​of​this​freedom,​and​whose​ laws​and​institutions​have​given​this​freedom​all​possible​expanse​and​ breadth,​sparing​no​means​to​guarantee​citizens​this​precious​and​inestimable​right. ​ In​the​same​way​that​we​have​tried​to​demonstrate​in​our​first​issue​ the​importance​and​necessity​of​the​scrupulous,​faithful,​and​prompt​ observance​of​the​laws,​let​us​make​an​effort​in​this​issue​to​settle​the​ entire​and​absolute​freedom​in​opinions,​for​although​those​laws​must​ be​fulfilled​completely,​opinions​must​be​free​of​all​censure​that​precedes​or​follows​publication​of​the​laws,​because​one​cannot​justly​demand​that​the​laws​be​faithfully​observed​if​the​freedom​of​exposing​ their​problems​is​not​perfectly​and​totally​guaranteed. ​ Original​title:​“Discurso​sobre​la​libertad​de​pensar,​hablar,​y​escribir.”​Source:​El Observador de la República Mexicana,​Mexico,​June​13,​1827,​p.​23. 23

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​ It​is​not​possible​to​place​limits​on​the​faculty​of​thought;​it​is​not​ reasonable,​just,​or​advisable​to​prevent​one​from​expressing​by​word​or​ in​writing​what​one​thinks. ​ Precisely​because​in​the​metaphysical​order​acts​of​understanding​are​ necessary,​they​must​be​free​of​all​force​and​coercion​in​the​political​ order.​Human​understanding​is​a​power​as​necessary​as​is​sight;​it​does​ not​actually​have​an​ability​to​decide​for​this​or​for​that​doctrine,​to​keep​ from​inferring​legitimate​or​erroneous​conclusions,​or​to​adopt​evident​ or​false​principles.​ It​will​ be​able,​happily,​ to​ apply​ itself​ to​examining​objects​with​care​and​maturity,​or​with​carelessness​and​negligence;​ to​explore​questions​more​or​less​and​to​consider​them​completely​or​ only​under​one​of​their​aspects;​but​the​outcome​of​all​these​preliminaries​must​always​be​an​action​as​necessary​as​is​that​of​seeing​clearly​ or​vaguely,​or​with​more​or​less​perfection,​the​object​held​at​a​suitable​ distance.​In​effect,​the​analysis​of​the​word​“know”​and​that​of​the​complete​idea​it​indicates​cannot​do​less​than​yield​this​result. ​ Knowledge​in​the​soul​is​like​sight​in​the​body,​and​thus​as​each​individual​of​the​human​species​has,​according​to​the​different​construction​ of​his​visual​organs,​a​necessary​manner​of​seeing​things​and​does​so​ without​choice,​so​also,​depending​on​the​differences​among​intellectual​ faculties,​he​has​a​necessary​manner​of​knowing​to​know​them.​It​is​true​ that​both​powers​are​subject​to​perfection​and​augmentation;​it​is​true​ that​their​errors​can​be​corrected​or​prevented,​the​sphere​within​which​ they​operate​can​be​extended,​and​the​acts​proper​to​them​can​be​made​ more​active​or​intense;​not​just​one,​but​many​and​infinitely​varied​are​ the​means​of​attaining​them;​one,​many,​or​all​can​be​put​into​action;​ they​will,​in​their​turn,​give​perfect,​average,​and​sometimes​no​results,​ but​it​will​always​be​certain​that​choice​has​not​played​any​part​in​it,​nor​ can​it​be​counted​among​the​means​for​achieving​those​results. ​ Men​would​be​very​happy,​or​at​the​least​they​would​not​be​so​unhappy,​if​the​actions​of​their​understanding​were​the​product​of​free​ choice.​Then,​the​bitter​and​sad​memories​of​the​past​would​not​come​ to​renew​unhappinesses​that​no​longer​exist;​nor​would​they​arise​from​ nothingness​only​to​cause​us​pain.​Then,​forecasting​the​future​would​ not​ bring​ forward​ for​ us​ a​ thousand​ sorrows,​ presenting​ us​ ahead​ of​ time​ persons,​ events,​ and​ circumstances​ that​ either​ will​ not​ come​ to​ exist,​or​if​they​do,​give​in​advance​an​indefinite​extent​to​our​sufferings.​Then,​finally,​we​would​not​think​about​or​explore​through​reflec-

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tion​the​causes​and​circumstances​of​present​unhappiness,​nor​would​ we​worsen​its​intolerable​weight​with​reflection.​There​is​certainly​not​ one​single​man​who​does​not​wish​to​separate​from​himself​everything​ that​can​cause​him​annoyance​and​make​him​unhappy;​and​at​the​same​ time​there​is​not,​nor​has​been​nor​will​be​anyone​who​has​not​suffered​ a​great​deal​because​of​such​considerations.​And​what​does​this​prove?​ That​it​is​not​possible​for​him​to​put​limits​on​his​thoughts;​that​he​is​led​ necessarily​and​irresistibly​to​knowledge​of​objects,​good​or​bad,​perfectly​or​inadequately​grasped;​that​the​immediate​or​distant​choice​has​ no​part​whatsoever​in​the​actions​of​the​mental​faculties;​and​that,​consequently,​in​the​metaphysical​order,​the​understanding​is​not​free. ​ How,​then,​to​impose​rules​on​a​power​not​susceptible​to​them?​How​ to​effect​change​in​what​is​most​independent​in​man,​making​use​of​violence​and​coercion?​How,​finally,​to​put​order​into​the​class​of​crimes​ and​assign​punishments​to​an​act​that​by​its​essence​is​incapable​of​goodness​and​evil?​Man​will​be​capable​of​not​conforming​his​actions​and​ discourses​to​his​opinions;​he​will​be​able​to​give​the​lie​to​his​thoughts​ through​his​conduct​or​language,​but​it​will​be​impossible​for​him​to​ disregard​or​get​rid​of​those​thoughts​because​of​external​violence.​This​ method​is​unsuitable​and​at​the​same​time​tyrannical​and​illegal. ​ Whenever​one​attempts​to​attain​an​end,​no​matter​what​its​nature​ may​be,​prudence​and​natural​reason​dictate​that​the​means​one​uses​ to​ attain​ it​ be​ naturally​ suitable​ to​ it.​ Otherwise,​ the​ plan​ will​ come​ to​nothing,​the​nature​of​things​being​stronger​than​the​caprice​of​the​ agent.​Such​would​be​the​folly​of​the​one​who​tries​to​attack​firearms​ with​water​or​prevent​passage​through​a​moat​by​filling​it​with​grape​ shot.​When,​then,​it​comes​to​changing​our​ideas​and​thoughts,​or​inspiring​new​ones​in​us,​and​for​this​purpose​one​uses​rules,​prohibitions,​and​punishments,​the​natural​effect​is​that​those​who​suffer​such​ violence​adhere​more​tenaciously​to​their​opinion​and​deny​to​their​oppressor​the​satisfaction​he​might​get​with​victory.​Persecution​gives​an​ unfortunate​character​to​opinions​without​destroying​them,​because​destroying​them​is​not​possible.​Human​understanding​is​as​noble​in​itself​ as​it​is​miserable​for​the​ease​with​which​every​kind​of​passion​confuses​ it.​The​first​principles​undeniable​for​everyone​are​few​in​number,​but​ the​consequences​that​derive​from​them​are​as​diverse​as​the​multiplicand,​because​the​way​in​which​their​relationships​are​grasped​is​infinitely​varied.​Habits​and​customs​that​education​has​inspired​in​us,​the​

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way​of​life​we​have​adopted,​the​objects​that​surround​us,​and,​above​ all,​the​persons​with​whom​we​interact,​contribute,​without​our​even​ being​able​to​perceive​it,​to​the​formation​of​our​judgments,​modifying​ in​a​thousand​ways​the​perception​of​objects​and​making​them​appear​ clothed​in,​perhaps,​a​thousand​forms,​with​the​exception​of​the​natural​and​genuine​perception.​Thus,​we​see​that​what​is​for​him​obvious​ and​simple​is​obscure​and​complex​for​others;​that​not​all​men​can​acquire​or​dedicate​themselves​to​the​same​type​of​knowledge​or​excel​in​ it;​that​some​are​fit​for​the​sciences,​others​for​scholarship,​many​for​ the​humanities,​and​some​for​nothing;​that​with​age​the​same​person​ changes​opinion,​even​holding​as​absurd​what​he​previously​deemed​evident;​and​that​no​one,​as​long​as​he​lives,​is​fixed​and​unwavering​in​his​ opinions,​or​in​the​concept​he​has​formed​of​things.​As​the​intellectual​ faculty​of​man​does​not​have​a​precise​and​exact​measure​of​the​vitality​ with​which​it​carries​out​its​operations,​neither​does​it​have​a​measure​of​ the​amount​of​knowledge​it​needs​for​exercising​them.​To​expect,​then,​ that​the​majority​be​convinced​by​the​judgment​of​some​other​person,​ even​when​this​other​person​might​be​an​authority,​is​to​insist,​says​the​ famous​Spedalieri,​that​they​see​and​hear​through​another’s​eyes​and​ ears.​It​is​to​oblige​them​to​let​themselves​be​carried​blindly​and​with​ no​more​rationale​than​the​force​they​cannot​resist.​It​is,​to​put​it​succinctly,​to​dry​up​all​the​sources​of​public​enlightenment​and​to​destroy​ beforehand​and​radically​the​best​sources​they​might​have​been​able​to​ develop​over​the​course​of​time. ​ In​effect,​what​would​become​of​us​and​of​the​entire​human​race​if​ the​wishes​of​those​who​have​wanted​to​place​restraints​on​the​understanding​and​limits​on​freedom​of​thought​had​been​fulfilled?​What​ would​have​been​the​progress​of​the​arts​and​sciences,​the​improvements​ of​governments,​and​the​condition​of​men​in​the​state​of​society?​What,​ in​particular,​would​be​the​fate​of​our​nation?​Thanks​to​the​efforts​of​ the​extraordinary​creative​spirits​that​at​all​times​have​known​how​to​ throw​ off​ the​ chains​ that​ despots​ have​ sought​ to​ impose​ on​ thought,​ societies,​although​not​having​arrived​at​the​highest​level​of​perfection,​ have​made​considerable​progress.​Governments,​excluding​only​a​few​ that​are​called​free,​have​always​been​alert​to​anything​that​could​diminish​their​power​and​make​clear​their​excesses.​Therefore,​they​use​ every​means​to​put​thought​in​chains,​making​crimes​of​opinions​that​ do​not​conform​and​calling​those​who​profess​them​criminals.​But​have​

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they​had​the​right​to​do​so?​Have​they​proceeded​legally​when​they​have​ made​use​of​these​means?​Or,​rather,​have​they​trod​upon​the​sacred​ rights​of​man,​assuming​powers​that​no​one​could​give​them​or​that​they​ could​receive?​This​is​the​point​we​are​going​to​examine. ​ Governments​ have​ been​ established​ precisely​ to​ preserve​ public​ order,​ensuring​to​each​individual​the​exercise​of​his​rights​and​the​possession​of​his​goods​in​the​way​and​form​that​have​been​prescribed​by​ the​ laws,​ and​ not​ in​ any​ other​ manner.​ Their​ powers​ are​ necessarily​ determined​in​the​pacts​or​agreements​we​call​constitutional​charters​ and​are​the​result​of​the​national​will.​Those​who​draw​them​up,​and​ their​constituents,​cannot​make​provisions​in​them​that,​by​the​nature​of​ things,​are​beyond​their​powers,​such​as​the​condemnation​of​an​innocent​person;​making​crimes​of​such​truly​praiseworthy​acts​as​paternal​ love;​much​less​subjecting​to​laws​functions​that​by​nature​are​incapable​ of​morality,​such​as​the​circulation​of​the​blood,​the​movement​of​the​ lungs,​etc.​From​this,​it​follows​that​for​a​legislative,​executive,​or​judicial​measure​to​be​just,​legal,​and​equitable,​it​is​not​enough​that​it​be​ pronounced​by​the​competent​authority,​but​it​is​also​necessary​that​it​ be​intrinsically​possible​and​indispensable​for​preserving​public​order.​ Let​us​see,​then,​whether​those​measures​that​have​been​decreed​or​attempted​against​freedom​of​thought​are​of​this​type. ​ To​this​point​we​have​shown​that​opinions​are​not​free​and​consequently​are​not​capable​of​morality;​it​remains​only​to​show​that​they​ can​never​overthrow​the​public​order,​and​especially​not​in​the​representative​system.​In​effect,​public​order​maintains​itself​by​the​prompt​ and​faithful​observance​of​the​laws,​which​is​entirely​compatible​with​ total​and​absolute​freedom​of​opinions.​Nothing​is​more​common​than​ seeing​men​who​dislike​laws​and​whose​ideas​are​contrary​to​them,​but​ who​ at​ the​ same​ time​ not​ only​ observe​ them​ religiously​ but​ are​ personally​convinced​of​their​necessity.​To​say​this​law​is​bad,​it​has​this​or​ that​problem,​is​not​to​say​that​it​will​not​be​obeyed​or​carried​out.​The​ first​is​an​opinion,​the​second​is​an​action;​the​former​is​independent​ of​ all​ human​ power,​ the​ latter​ must​ be​ subject​ to​ the​ competent​ authority.​Men​have​the​right​to​mandate​that​something​be​done​in​this​ or​that​way,​but​not​in​order​to​make​doctrines​into​dogmas,​or​to​obligate​others​to​their​belief.​This​absurd​right​would​suppose​the​necessity​of​a​symbol​or​body​of​doctrine​comprehensive​of​all​truths,​or​the​ existence​of​an​infallible​authority​by​whose​decisions​one​would​have​

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to​abide.​Nevertheless,​nothing​is​more​lacking​in​foundation​than​such​ suppositions. ​ But​how​could​the​first​have​been​formed,​or​who​would​be​so​presumptuous​ and​ audacious​ that​ he​ would​ dare​ to​ appropriate​ the​ second​to​himself?​“A​body​of​doctrine,”​says​the​famous​Daunou,1​“supposes​that​human​understanding​has​made​all​possible​progress,​opposes​ itself​to​all​advancements​that​remain,​draws​a​circle​around​all​acquired​ understandings,​inevitably​includes​many​errors,​opposes​the​development​of​the​sciences,​the​arts,​and​all​type​of​industry.”​And​who​would​ be​capable​of​having​formed​it?​Even​if,​for​such​an​unattainable​project,​ the​most​celebrated​men​of​the​universe​had​been​gathered​together,​ nothing​would​have​been​achieved.​Should​their​writings​be​recorded​ anyway,​they​will​be​found​full​of​errors​in​the​midst​of​some​truths​ they​have​contributed​to​public​enlightenment.​The​daily​and​continuing​improvement​perceived​in​all​human​actions​is​demonstrable​proof​ that​the​perfectibility​of​human​mental​powers​has​no​limit​and​of​how​ much​would​have​been​lost​in​holding​back​their​advancement,​had​this​ been​possible. ​ We​are​persuaded​that​none​of​the​present​governments​will​boast​of​ their​inability​to​err.​They​and​the​people​entrusted​to​their​leadership​ are​too​enlightened​to​be​able​to​claim​and​grant​such​privileges,​but​ if​the​governments​are​composed​of​men​who​are​as​fallible​as​others,​ through​what​principle​of​justice,​or​by​what​legal​right,​will​they​proceed​to​determine​or​prohibit​doctrines?​How​would​they​dare​determine​for​us​those​opinions​we​are​to​follow​and​those​we​are​prohibited​ from​professing?​Is​this​not​an​act​of​aggression​with​an​unattainable​ end,​which​nothing​can​justify?​Without​doubt.​It,​nonetheless,​is​common​and​almost​always​serves​as​a​pretext​for​classifying​citizens​and​immediately​persecuting​them.​It​makes​men​responsible​for​the​opinions​ they​hold​or​assume,​and​these​are​converted​into​a​reason​for​hatred​ and​loathing.​In​this​way​factions​are​perpetuated,​given​that​the​triumphant​dogma​will​one​day​be​toppled,​and​it​then​comes​to​be​a​crime​ to​profess​it.​This​is​how​nations​become​demoralized,​and​a​forced​traf​ 1.​Pierre​Claude​François​Daunou,​1761–1840,​was​a​politician,​archivist,​and​French​ historian,​and​the​lifetime​secretary​to​the​Académie​des​inscriptions​et​belles-​lettres.​ (Editor’s​note)

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fic​in​lies​is​established​that​compels​the​weak​to​conceal​their​ideas​and​ makes​those​with​strong​spirits​the​targets​of​persecution. ​ Come,​now,​will​it​be​lawful​to​express​all​opinions?​Does​not​the​authority​have​the​right​to​prohibit​the​enunciation​of​some?​Will​many​ of​ them,​ inevitably​ mistaken,​ not​ be​ detrimental?​ Yes,​ but​ we​ assert​ resolutely​that​opinions​about​doctrines​must​be​entirely​free.​No​one​ doubts​that​the​surest​means,​or,​better​said,​the​only​means,​to​arrive​ at​knowledge​of​the​truth​is​examination​that​produces​free​discussion.​ Then​not​only​one’s​own​reflections​are​present​but​also​those​of​others,​ and​it​has​happened​a​thousand​times​that,​upon​criticism​and​perhaps​ error​or​someone’s​irrelevant​observation,​the​fate​of​a​nation​has​depended.​No​understanding,​no​matter​how​vast​and​universal​one​supposes​it​to​be,​can​embrace​everything​or​exhaust​any​subject​matter.​ From​this​it​follows​that​everyone,​in​all​subject​matters,​especially​those​ that​treat​of​government,​needs​the​help​of​everyone​else,​which​they​ will​certainly​not​obtain​if​freedom​of​speech​and​written​expression​is​ not​assured,​sheltering​the​opinions​and​their​authors​from​all​aggression​that​could​be​attempted​against​them​by​those​who​do​not​accept​ these​opinions.​The​government,​then,​cannot​proscribe​or​grant​protection​for​any​doctrine.​This​is​beyond​its​jurisdiction;​it​is​created​only​to​ observe​and​see​that​citizens​observe​the​laws. ​ It​is​true​that,​among​opinions,​there​are​and​must​be​many​erroneous​ ones;​it​is​equally​true​that​all​error,​of​whatever​kind​and​under​whatever​aspect​it​is​considered,​is​highly​harmful.​But​it​is​not​less​true​that​ prohibitions​are​not​means​of​remedying​error.​The​free​circulation​of​ ideas​and​the​differences​that​result​from​counterviews​constitute​the​ only​way​to​correct​opinions.​If​the​power​to​regulate​opinions​were​ conceded​to​some​authority,​this​latter​would​very​quickly​abuse​such​ power,​and​who​would​be​charged​with​restraining​us​from​error?​He​ who​is​exempt​from​it?​But​governments​do​not​find​themselves​in​this​ category;​very​much​the​opposite.​When​one​searches​for​causes​that​ have​most​spread​error​and​contributed​to​perpetuating​error,​they​are​ always​found​in​the​prohibiting​institutions.​On​the​other​hand,​if​governments​were​authorized​to​prohibit​all​errors​and​punish​the​foolish,​ the​world​would​very​soon​be​missing​a​large​portion​of​humanity,​the​ rest​being​reduced​to​eternal​silence.​We​will​be​told​that​not​all​opinions​have​to​be​subject​to​the​control​of​authority,​but​if​one​opinion​is​

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subject,​the​rest​are​not​safe.​Laws​cannot​make​precise​classification​or​ exact​enumeration​of​all​opinions.​Thus​it​is​that​such​a​power​is​necessarily​arbitrary​and,​most​of​the​time,​will​be​converted​into​a​reason​for​ persecution.​These​are​not​unfounded​suspicions.​Look​back​at​the​barbarian​centuries​and​it​will​be​seen​that​the​universities,​the​parliaments,​ the​chancelleries,​and​the​kings​were​determined​to​place​proscriptions​ on​the​learned​who​were​making​physical​discoveries​and​attacking​the​ doctrines​of​Aristotle.​Pedro​Ramos​Tritemio,​Galileo,​and​innumerable​ others​suffered​what​would​not​be​believable​if​it​were​not​made​obvious​to​us​beyond​any​doubt.​And​what​was​the​fruit​of​such​methods?​ Did​the​governments​succeed​in​what​they​were​attempting?​Not​in​the​ least.​Converts​increased​day​by​day,​perhaps​because​of​that​very​persecution. ​ In​effect,​if​one​wants​to​give​credence​to​a​doctrine,​nothing​else​is​ needed​but​to​forbid​it.​Men​naturally​suppose,​and​in​this​they​do​not​ deceive​themselves,​that​a​doctrine​cannot​be​fought​by​reason​when​ it​is​attacked​by​force.​Strong​spirits​and​courageous​souls​hold​fast​to​ forbidden​doctrines,​more​for​show​than​from​conviction,​because​the​ spirit​of​novelty​and​making​themselves​the​object​of​public​excitement,​ attracting​the​attention​of​everyone,​is​so​lively​a​passion,​and​as​a​final​ consequence​an​inappropriate​remark​that​might​have​remained​buried​ in​the​corner​of​a​house​degenerates​into​heresy​that​possibly​undermines​the​supports​of​the​social​edifice​because​of​the​importance​persecution​bestows​on​it. ​ But​does​not​discrediting​the​laws​make​them​contemptible​and​inspire​men​to​transgress​them,​depriving​the​laws​of​their​stature?​And​is​ this​not​the​outcome​of​the​frank​criticism​that​is​made​of​them?​When​ the​laws​have​been​dictated​with​calm​and​care,​when​they​are​the​outcome​of​a​free​discussion,​and​when​the​spirit​of​partisanship​and​the​ fears​that​it​instills​in​legislators​have​not​contributed​to​their​preparation,​making​the​general​interest​subordinate​to​the​private​interest​for​ reasons​external​to​them,​the​fear​of​such​outcomes​is​very​remote;​but​ to​prevent​it,​governments​must​be​very​alert​and​not​lose​sight​of​public​ opinion,​favoring​it​in​everything.​This​is​formed​only​by​free​discussion,​which​cannot​be​maintained​when​the​government​or​some​faction​is​granted​the​power​of​the​press​and​condemns,​with​no​sense​of​ shame,​those​who​either​impugn​the​dogmas​of​the​sect​or​throw​light​ on​its​abuses​of​authority.​On​the​contrary,​when​one​proceeds​without​

on​the​freedom​of​thouGht,​SpeeCh,​and​writinG : 31

prejudice​and​in​good​faith,​when​one​listens​attentively​and​impartially,​ everything​that​is​said​or​written​in​support​of​or​against​the​laws​is​certainly​on​the​road​to​being​right.​We​never​tire​of​repeating​it:​freedom​ of​opinions​regarding​doctrine​has​never​been​disastrous​for​any​people;​ but​all​the​events​of​modern​history​prove​with​the​greatest​certainty​the​ dangers​and​risks​that​nations​have​run​when​one​faction​has​managed​to​ take​possession​of​the​press,​has​dominated​the​government,​and,​availing​itself​of​it,​has​silenced​by​terror​those​who​could​educate​it. ​ But​ governments​ do​ not​ take​ warning​ despite​ such​ repeated​ examples.​Always​fixed​in​the​present​moment,​they​disregard​the​future.​ Their​principal​error​consists​in​believing​they​can​do​anything,​and​it​ is​enough​to​hint​at​its​will​for​it​to​be​promptly​and​faithfully​obeyed.​ Perhaps​they​turn​on​themselves​when​there​is​no​longer​any​remedy,​ when​they​have​been​discredited​and​have​precipitated​the​nation​into​ an​ abyss​ of​ evils.​ We​ conclude​ our​ reflections,​ then,​ recommending​ to​the​trustees​of​power​that​they​be​convinced​that​when​they​make​ crimes​of​opinions,​they​run​the​risk​of​punishing​talents​and​virtues,​ of​losing​the​idea,​and​of​making​famous​the​memory​of​their​victims.

4 ​

Discourse on the Means Ambition Uses to Destroy Liberty

Nothing​is​more​important​for​a​nation​that​has​adopted​ the​republican​system,​having​just​emerged​from​a​despotic​regime​and​ having​won​its​liberty​by​the​force​of​arms,​than​to​reduce​the​real​or​ apparent​reasons​that​might​allow​a​great​mass​of​authority​and​power​to​ accumulate​in​the​hands​of​a​single​man,​giving​him​prestige​and​ascendency​over​all​other​citizens.​The​downfall​of​popular​institutions​has​almost​always​originated​in​measures​imprudently​prescribed​to​preserve​ them,​not​because​this​preservation​was​not​seriously​and​effectively​attempted,​but​rather​because​the​natural​and​consistent​consequences​of​ causes​requisite​to​the​downfall​cannot​be​altered​by​the​will​of​whoever​ sets​them​in​motion. ​ The​misfortune​of​republics​consists​now,​and​has​always​consisted,​ in​the​very​limited​moral​and​physical​force​entrusted​to​the​depositaries​of​power.​This​necessity​that​naturally​comes​along​with​the​system​has,​as​with​all​human​institutions,​its​advantages​and​disadvantages.​ These​should​be​weighed​faithfully​before​their​adoption​because,​once​ accepted,​it​is​necessary​to​consider​the​whole​before​making​a​change​ that,​ no​ matter​ how​ superficial​ it​ may​ be​ or​ may​ be​ imagined​ to​ be,​ opens​ the​ door​ to​ the​ total​ change​ of​ the​ system​ and​ is​ a​ shock​ that,​ although​superficial,​if​repeated,​slowly​undermines​the​foundations​of​ the​social​structure​until​it​collapses.​What​is​more​attractive​than​being​ as​far​as​possible​from​the​control​of​authority​and​submitting​one’s​own​ person​and​actions​as​little​as​possible​to​the​vigilance​and​decrees​of​ the​agents​of​power?​And​in​what​system,​if​not​the​republican,​is​more​ space​enjoyed​and​greater​breadth​given​to​such​privileges?​In​none,​certainly. ​ Well​then,​this​inestimable​good​is​in​greater​danger​of​being​lost​ ​ Original​title:​“Discurso​sobre​los​medios​de​que​se​vale​la​ambición​para​destruir​la​ libertad.”​Source:​El Observador de la República Mexicana,​Mexico,​June​20,​1827,​p.​55. 32

on​the​meanS​ambition​uSeS​to​deStroy​liberty : 33

than​in​any​other​type​of​government​if​free​men​are​not​very​much​on​ the​alert​to​anticipate​every​kind​of​aspiration​that​tends,​if​only​for​a​ few​moments,​to​reduce​their​liberty​and​to​augment​with​these​losses​ the​power​of​the​one​who​begins​by​directing​them​and​will​unfailingly​ end​by​dominating​them. ​ The​love​of​power,​innate​in​man​and​always​progressive​in​government,​is​much​more​terrible​in​republics​than​monarchies.​The​one​who​ is​sure​he​will​always​rule​exerts​himself​little​to​increase​his​authority;​ but​the​one​who​sees,​even​from​afar,​the​end​of​his​greatness​if​the​immense​body​of​the​nation​and​irresistible​force​of​true​public​opinion​ do​not​curb​him,​always​works​indefatigably​to​occupy​the​highest​office​ if​he​believes​it​within​reach,​or​to​prolong​indefinitely​its​duration​and​ expand​its​limits​if​he​has​managed​to​gain​it. ​ The​means​one​can​put​into​play​to​arrive​at​this​end​are​infinite,​but​ among​the​most​commonplace​are​making​oneself​popular​to​promote​ one’s​rise,​presenting​oneself​as​necessary​so​as​to​maintain​oneself​in​ the​post,​and​suggesting,​so​as​to​destroy​the​Constitution,​the​impossibility​or​ineffectiveness​of​the​fundamental​laws. ​ Among​a​new​people​who​because​of​their​inexperience​have​never​ known​liberty,​demagogues​have​an​immense​field​on​which​to​exercise​ their​intrigues,​giving​free​rein​to​their​ambition.​Look​for​popular​passions​and,​once​found,​flatter​them​immoderately;​proclaim​principles,​ exaggerating​them​to​a​degree​that​makes​them​odious;​and​arouse​suspicion​of​all​those​who​have​not​advanced​this​far​and​profess​or​propound​ principles​of​moderation.​Here​is​the​means​of​making​oneself​popular​ in​a​nation​made​up​of​men​who,​for​the​first​time,​tread​the​difficult​and​ always​dangerous​path​of​liberty. ​ What​has​been​done​in​England,​in​France,​in​Spain,​and,​finally,​in​ all​the​former​Spanish​colonies,​now​independent​nations​of​America?​ Consider​carefully​the​first​period​of​their​revolutions.​Follow,​keeping​in​view​all​the​steps​of​those​who​afterward​have​been​their​masters,​ and​it​will​be​seen,​without​exception,​that​they​have​owed​to​no​other​ means​the​popularity​that​served​as​stepping-​stones​to​the​summit​of​ power. ​ In​ fact,​ people​ who​ have​ lived​ under​ an​ oppressive​ regime​ do​ not​ believe​themselves​free​when​they​shake​off​the​chains​that​held​them​ yoked​to​the​cart​of​the​despot.​Rather,​they​want​to​break​all​the​ties​ that​unite​them​with​authority​and​even​the​necessary​dependence​that​

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brings​with​it​inequality​of​classes,​an​inequality​owing​not​to​laws​but​ to​the​various​physical​and​moral​faculties​with​which​nature​has​endowed​each​man.​Because​of​this​they​listen​with​enthusiasm​and​elevate​to​all​the​public​offices​those​who​preach​that​chimerical​equality​ of​fortunes,​pleasures,​and​ability​to​be​anything,​and​they​become​inflamed​with​passion​against​all​those​who​try​to​cure​them​of​this​political​fever,​smearing​them​with​the​most​denigrating​nicknames,​the​ most​contemptuous​insults,​and​the​most​barbarous​persecutions,​and​ forging,​ without​ noticing​ it,​ the​ chains​ that​ must​ once​ again​ reduce​ them​to​servitude. ​ Robespierre​ and​ Marat​ did​ not​ become​ masters​ of​ the​ destiny​ of​ France​or​spill​so​much​blood​by​means​other​than​these,​and​they​were​ a​ thousand​ times​ more​ destructive​ than​ all​ the​ kings​ together​ whose​ lineage​they​overthrew.​In​the​end​they​fell,​as​all​those​of​their​kind​ will​fall,​but​leaving​the​way​open​for​the​rise​of​others​who,​although​ more​quietly​but​with​a​happier​outcome,​manage​for​some​more​time​ to​achieve​their​goals,​placing​themselves​at​the​peak​of​power,​violating​all​social​guarantees,​and​perpetuating​the​misfortune​of​the​people​ who,​because​of​a​prolonged​cycle​of​miseries​and​calamities,​return​to​ the​same​point​of​slavery​from​which​they​had​set​out​to​embark​upon​ the​path​of​liberty. ​ The​people,​after​a​thousand​oscillations​and​fluctuations,​the​terror​ of​anarchy​over,​create​a​poor​or​mediocre​constitution,​and​then​another​fate​awaits​them.​Soon​enough,​those​who,​by​chance,​have​owed​ their​promotion​to​the​rule​of​factions​try​to​give​themselves​excessive​ importance,​ affecting​ public​ esteem​ by​ means​ of​ all​ the​ externalities​ with​which​such​esteem​appears​to​be​in​agreement,​working​to​persuade​others​that​the​stability​of​the​republic​depends​on​the​adverse​ or​favorable​fate​of​their​personal​existence.​This​error​insinuates​itself​ with​extraordinary​ease​and​has​ready​success,​especially​among​people​ who​have​not​known​more​of​a​patria​than​ground​stained​by​servility​ and​slavery,​more​rights​than​the​gratuitous​and​mean​concessions​of​ a​lord,​or​more​laws​than​the​vain​and​unstable​caprices​of​an​absolute​ master.​From​the​moment​it​is​believed​or​feigned​to​be​believed​that​ the​fate​of​liberty​and​the​existence​of​the​republic​depend​on​the​political​existence​of​one​single​man,​they​find​themselves​on​the​verge​of​ ruin.​Then​he​will​be​granted​all​manner​of​condescension;​it​will​be​attempted​to​put​aside​all​the​goals​of​the​citizens,​of​the​laws​and​national​

on​the​meanS​ambition​uSeS​to​deStroy​liberty : 35

interests,​to​fix​them​to​the​ambitious​person​whose​aggrandizement​is​ sought;​the​sacred​names​of​patria​and​liberty​will​be​defiled,​and​the​ poisonous​root​will​be​cultivated,​which,​with​the​passing​of​time,​will​ bear​nothing​but​deadly​fruit. ​ Yes,​you​peoples​and​nations​that​have​adopted​a​system​of​government​as​beneficial​as​it​is​delicate,​be​very​much​on​guard​against​that​ one​who​tries​to​make​himself​necessary​and​to​assign​himself​greater​ importance​than​granted​by​those​who​occupy​public​posts,​the​Constitution,​and​the​laws.​He​will​begin​by​flattering​you,​promising​everything,​and​will​end​by​pushing​you​down​into​servitude,​superimposing​ himself​on​the​laws​that​guarantee​public​liberties​and,​if​possible,​ripping​from​your​hearts​all​the​generous​sentiments​that​the​independence​ of​a​truly​free​soul​might​have​rooted​in​them.​Plunge​those​detestable​ monsters,​those​disfigured​children,​into​the​abyss​of​nothingness,​their​ odious​memory,​weighed​down​by​the​public​curse,​transmitted​to​posterity. ​ Having​ acquired​ an​ unmerited​ importance​ and​ the​ destiny​ of​ the​ patria​entrusted​to​their​direction,​these​men​soon​fix​their​intentions​ on​expanding​their​power​by​putting​themselves​in​a​position​to​prolong​it​indefinitely.​But​what​means​do​they​use?​How​do​they​obtain​ this​from​a​people​that​has​enthusiastically​adopted​the​institutions​that​ destroy​any​arbitrary​regime?​Here​enter​all​the​tactics,​all​the​skill​and​ cunning​of​the​despots​of​new​designation​and​recent​origin:​the​protectors,​liberators,​directors,​etc. ​ There​ is​ no​ man​ so​ incautious​ that​ he​ endeavors​ at​ the​ outset​ to​ seduce​ an​ entire​ people​ or​ insult​ them​ openly​ by​ clear​ and​ manifest​ contempt​for​the​duties​to​which​he​has​just​submitted​himself.​This​ would​be​the​sure​way​to​frustrate​any​plan,​and​ambitious​persons​proceed​with​greater​circumspection.​What​is​it,​then,​that​they​do?​They​ try​to​create​a​large​faction,​accustom​the​public​to​the​transgression​of​ the​laws,​and​feign​or​stir​up​conspiracies. ​ It​is​impossible​that​a​man​reduced​to​his​individual​strengths​could​ acquire​either​the​prestige​or​the​power​necessary​to​superimpose​himself​on​an​entire​nation.​His​intentions​and​plans​will​always​be​mistrusted​ by​ the​ multitude,​ and​ they​ will​ never​ have​ any​ noteworthy​ success​except​with​the​help​of​an​organized​faction​that​is​replicated​ everywhere,​that​seizes​the​voice​of​the​nation,​that​attacks​all​who​oppose​its​interests​and​reduces​them​to​silence​and​inaction​by​stirring​up​

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feelings​of​fear​in​those​who​might​take​on​the​faction​by​the​gathering​ of​their​forces​and​the​legitimacy​of​their​cause.​So,​then,​the​first​necessity​of​an​ambitious​person​is​to​create​a​party​of​this​kind. ​ It​is​very​easy​to​effect​this​plan​after​a​revolution​lasting​many​years,​ in​which​the​belligerent​sides​have​calamitously​harassed​each​other.​At​ that​point,​the​elements​necessary​to​carry​out​the​plan​successfully​are​ spread​everywhere,​and​bringing​them​together​does​not​pose​a​major​ difficulty.​Many​men​are​left​with​neither​fortune​nor​employment,​and​ as​the​overbearing​necessity​for​daily​subsistence​is​greater​than​all​political​ considerations,​ they​ will​ have​ no​ option​ but​ to​ sell​ themselves​ to​the​first​one​who​might​purchase​them.​The​fear​that​all​unjust​persecution​brings​with​it​demoralizes​a​nation,​then​destroys​the​natural​ generosity​ of​ characters,​ obliges​ men​ to​ lie​ to​ themselves​ and​ others,​ to​hide​their​feelings​and​suppress​their​ideas​through​a​perpetual​and​ constant​contradiction​in​their​speech,​and​abjectly​prostrate​themselves​ before​all​those​from​whom,​in​principle,​they​hope​or​fear​something.​ A​nation,​then,​that​for​many​years​has​traveled​this​dangerous​path​and​ that,​moreover,​finds​itself​impoverished​because​of​the​accumulation​of​ properties​by​a​small​number​of​citizens,​because​of​its​lack​of​industry​ and​because​of​the​multitude​of​jobs​that​encourage​aspirationism,1​is​a​ field​open​to​the​intrigues​of​astute​and​enterprising​ambition​and​offers​ a​thousand​means​for​the​organization​of​audacious​factions. ​ On​these​foundations,​in​fact,​ambitious​persons​rise​up​and,​going​ on​from​here,​make​the​first​attempts​at​arbitrariness​on​persons​who​are​ little​known,​and​because​of​their​obscurity​do​not​attract​public​attention​or​focus​the​gaze​of​the​multitude.​Normally,​such​transgressors​remain​hidden,​either​because​of​the​ignorance​of​those​who​tolerate​them​ or​because​of​the​lack​of​means​for​exposing​and​denouncing​them​to​ public​opinion.​From​the​lowest​class​it​goes,​rising​gradually,​battering​ the​resistance​that​might​be​opposed,​taking​breaks​that​inspire​some​ confidence,​make​anxiety​disappear,​and​make​citizens​conceive​the​possibility​of​their​security​being​trampled​without​protests​or​in​spite​of​ them.​Here​is​where​the​faction​comes​in​to​support​the​one​who​pays​ it.​It​makes​accusations​that​it​repeats​ceaselessly,​exempting​itself​from​ ever​ proving​ them,​ feigning​ ignorance​ of​ any​ response​ to​ them,​ and​ ​ 1.​Aspirantismo,​for​which​there​is​no​clear​English​equivalent,​denotes​anyone​who​is​ power-​or​money-​hungry.​(Editor’s​note)

on​the​meanS​ambition​uSeS​to​deStroy​liberty : 37

suggesting​gratuitously,​although​constantly,​that​those​targets​of​persecution​are​criminals.​Sometimes​it​tramples​those​who​demand​social​ guarantees,​punishing​them​for​sedition.​Other​times​it​attacks​with​prohibited​weapons,​inserting​itself​even​into​the​sacredness​of​the​domestic​sanctuary​in​order​to​make​their​weaknesses​public​and​obvious.​If​ they​are​not​found​there,​it​does​not​matter;​they​are​suggested,​and​with​ this​it​gets​out​of​its​difficulty.​In​this​way,​public​attention​is​distracted​ from​the​matter​at​hand;​men​of​probity​and​merit​are​obliged​to​abandon​the​field;​terror​imprints​itself​on​almost​all​citizens,​isolating​them​ in​their​homes;​the​consolidation​of​efforts​that​would​make​factions​ tremble​is​impeded,​and​an​entire​people​is​dominated,​as​a​whole​province​gives​itself​over​to​a​gang​of​bandits.​Thus​is​formed​a​phantom​of​ public​opinion,​much​clamor​is​put​forward,​a​great​noise​is​made,​and​ new​levels​of​power​are​acquired,​which​lead​to​the​highest​levels,​and​ these​to​the​desired​end. ​ One​of​the​means​that​ambition​has​most​commonly​employed​and​ that​has​never​lost​its​effectiveness​despite​the​frequency​with​which​it​ has​been​used​is​feigning​conspiracies​or​stirring​them​up​so​that​they​ serve​as​a​pretext​for​the​expansion​and​augmentation​of​the​power​it​ seeks.​People​who​have​obtained​their​liberty​and​independence​at​the​ price​of​blood​are​very​easy​to​plunge​once​more​into​slavery​by​using​ their​very​desire​to​prevent​those​evils.​Of​course,​it​begins​by​making​a​ pretext​of​the​existence​of​powerful​and​terrible​conspiracies.​It​makes​ great​mystery​of​them,​sparing​no​effort​to​make​this​conviction​well​ known​and​popular.​When​this​has​been​achieved,​it​ventures​the​distinction​between​the​good​of​the​republic​and​observance​of​the​laws.​ Then​it​goes​on​to​maintain​that​the​former​should​be​preferred​to​the​ latter.​It​assures​that​the​laws​are​theories​insufficient​to​govern​and​ends​ by​openly​infringing​them,​seeking​their​total​abolition​as​its​outsized​ prize. ​ This​insidious​attack​on​public​freedoms​is​the​more​terrible​to​the​ extent​that​one​takes​them​as​a​pretext​and​hides​behind​the​mask​of​ their​preservation.​Almost​never​has​it​been​done​without​the​destruction​of​the​government​or​the​republic.​If​the​people​allow​themselves​to​ be​overtaken​by​fear​of​conspiracies​and​permit​the​system’s​principles​ to​be​destroyed​in​order​to​extinguish​or​prevent​them,​they​have​already​ fallen​into​the​trap,​and​they​themselves,​with​their​tolerance​or​positive​ concessions,​have​advanced​the​evil​for​which​they​seek​a​remedy.​The​

38 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

first​thing​sought​by​the​one​who​tries​to​establish​the​arbitrary​regime​ is​to​have​the​persons​of​citizens​entirely​at​his​disposal.​Once​attaining​ this,​he​moves​without​hindrance​until​he​arrives​at​his​goal.​To​achieve​ it,​he​suggests​the​need​to​increase​the​strength​of​the​government​by​ suspension​of​judicial​forms,​by​laws​of​exception,​and​by​establishment​ of​tribunals​that​are​all​loyal​to​the​power​and​are​under​his​direction​ and​ influence.​ For​ this,​ the​ system​ of​ exaggerating​ risks​ and​ dangers​ serves​admirably. ​ When​Bonaparte​disbanded​the​Consulate​of​France​and​destroyed​ the​Directory,​the​talk​in​Paris​was​of​an​immense​and​intricate​conspiracy​in​favor​of​royalism,​which​never​existed​except​in​the​minds​of​ the​people​of​his​faction.​Iturbide,​in​the​attacks​he​made​on​the​national​ representation​on​the​third​of​April​and​the​nineteenth​of​May,​when​ he​fell​upon​some​of​its​members​and​dissolved​it,​made​no​mention​of​ anything​other​than​the​conspiracies​he​supposed​had​even​penetrated​ the​ sanctuary​ of​ the​ laws.​ Nonetheless,​ time​ and​ subsequent​ events​ showed​with​the​greatest​clarity​that​the​motive​of​both​strategems​was​ not​the​good​of​the​patria,​or​devotion​to​or​concern​for​public​safety,​ but​rather​the​beginnings​of​ambition,​of​augmentation​of​power​and​ personal​aggrandizement. ​ It​matters​not​at​all​whether​this​augmentation​is​obtained​by​force​ or​by​spontaneous​concessions;​the​effect​is​always​the​same.​Liberty​is​ destroyed​by​events​contrary​to​principles,​whoever​might​be​the​agent​ to​whom​they​owe​their​origin.​Liberty​is​not​a​name​empty​and​devoid​ of​meaning​that​can​be​applied​to​any​system​of​government.​Liberty​ is​itself​the​result​of​a​conjunction​of​cautionary​rules​that​the​observation​and​experience​of​many​centuries​have​taught​men​are​necessary​ to​avoid​the​abuses​of​the​powerful​and​to​secure​the​persons​and​goods​ of​the​members,​not​only​from​the​oppressions​of​individuals,​but​also​ from​those​of​the​power.​And​although​intended​to​protect​them,​many​ or​most​times​the​power​degenerates​into​a​malefactor,​turning​weapons​ against​those​who​put​them​in​its​hands​so​that​it​might​defend​them. ​ Be​convinced,​then,​citizens​who​have​the​happiness​of​belonging​to​ a​republic​that​has​adopted​free​institutions​for​its​rule—be​convinced​ of​the​importance​of​putting​a​brake​on​a​government​that​goes​beyond​ or​tries​to​go​beyond​the​boundaries​that​limit​its​power;​destroy​by​ legal​means​all​those​who​show​aversion​to​the​principles​of​the​system​ and​who​have​the​audacity​and​brazenness​to​attack​them;​distrust​all​

on​the​meanS​ambition​uSeS​to​deStroy​liberty : 39

the​demands​relative​to​the​augmentation​or​concession​of​powers​that​ are​extraconstitutional​or​contrary​to​the​foundations​of​the​system,​no​ matter​what​their​title​or​name​might​be,​especially​if​to​attain​them​ the​existence​or​fears​of​conspiracies​is​alleged;​listen​with​the​greatest​ distrust​to​those​who​speak​to​you​about​them​for​the​purpose​of​provoking​you​into​disposing​of​the​common​rules​and​established​order;​ for​if​this​should​be​carried​out​at​some​time,​political​crimes​will​be​ reproduced​unceasingly​and​freedom​will​never​be​seated​on​its​throne​ in​a​nation​that​is​a​theater​of​reactions​and​of​persecution,​composed​of​ oppressors​and​oppressed,​and​that​carries​in​itself​the​germ​of​its​ruin​ and​de​struction. ​ Peoples​and​states​that​make​up​the​Mexican​Federation,​take​warning​from​France,​from​the​new​nations​of​America,​and​from​the​recent​ events​of​your​history.​Fear​the​power​of​the​ambitious​ones​and​of​the​ factions​they​call​to​their​assistance.​Unite​your​efforts​to​destroy​them,​ so​will​you​be​invincible;​isolated,​they​will​beat​you​bit​by​bit.​May​the​ law​and​the​national​will​preside​over​your​destinies​and​make​dominion​ of​factions,​etc.,​cease.

5



Discourse on the Civil Liberties of the Citizen Political​liberty​consists​of​security, Or​at​least​in​the​opinion​one​has​of​one’s​own​security​.​.​. When​the​innocence​of​the​citizens​is​not​secure, neither​is​liberty. —​Montesquieu,​The Spirit of Laws,​book​XII,​chapter​4

In​a​society​that​is​well​constituted​and​intends​to​destroy​all​the​abuses​that​have​perpetuated​the​existence​of​an​arbitrary​ regime,​it​is​necessary​to​accustom​its​members​not​to​be​enamored​of​ insignificant​voices​and​rather​to​concern​themselves​with​the​reality​of​ things.​The​abuse​of​unspecified​words,​especially​in​political​matters,​ has​been,​since​the​extinction​of​feudalism,​the​source​of​all​the​woes​of​ peoples​who​emerge​from​the​control​of​lords​only​to​become​slaves​of​ governments.​The​word​“liberty,”​which​has​been​used​so​often​for​the​ destruction​of​its​own​meaning,​has​been​the​usual​pretext​for​all​the​ world’s​political​revolutions.​People​have​been​moved​just​by​hearing​it​ pronounced​and​have​reached​out​their​hands​to​embrace​the​tutelary​ spirit​of​societies,​which​its​leaders​have​made​disappear​like​a​phantom​at​the​very​moment​it​ceased​being​necessary​for​the​attainment​ and​ successful​ outcome​ of​ their​ ambitious​ aims.​ Philosophical​ lovers​ of​humanity​have​raised​their​voice​in​vain​against​such​conduct.​The​ people​have​been​and​will​be​frequently​deceived​if​they​are​satisfied​ with​forms​of​government​and​neglect​to​ensure​the​most​important​ point​of​all​free​government,​the civil liberty of the citizen,​or,​what​is​the​ same,​the​power​to​do​without​fear​of​being​reprimanded​or​punished​ everything​that​the​law​does​not​expressly​prohibit. ​ The​precious​right​to​do​what​does​not​harm​another​cannot,​unfor​ Original​title:​“Discurso​sobre​la​libertad​civil​del​ciudadano.”​Source:​El Observador de la República Mexicana,​Mexico,​July​25,​1827,​p.​219. 40

on​the​Civil​libertieS​of​the​Citizen : 41

tunately,​be​put​into​effect​in​the​state​of​nature​in​which​man,​reduced​ to​his​individual​strengths,​would​inevitably​be​despot​or​slave,​depending​on​whether​these​strengths​are​adequate​to​suppress​the​rest​or​insufficient​ to​ resist​ their​ aggressions.​ Men,​ then,​ have​ regarded​ themselves​ as​ compelled​ to​ create​ societies​ and​ to​ organize​ a​ public​ force​ that,​being​superior​to​that​of​each​individual,​might​check​and​contain​ the​perpetrators​of​high-​handed​crime​against​helpless​innocents.​But​ before​ long,​ governments​ and​ the​ force​ put​ at​ their​ disposal,​ forgetting​ their​origin​ and​ feigning​ ignorance​ of​ the​purpose​ and​ ends​for​ which​they​have​been​instituted,​themselves​commit​those​crimes​that​ they​were​supposed​to​avoid​or​curb​in​individuals.​It​was​necessary,​ therefore,​to​place​limits​on​their​power,​to​request​and​seek​assurances​ that​these​limits​would​never​be​violated,​that​the​authority​could​be​ exercised​only​in​certain​and​specified​cases​and​under​fixed​rules​or​ conditions,​which,​when​they​have​been​well​and​religiously​observed,​ have​ created​ in​ men​ such​ confidence​ that​ they​ can​ act​ as​ they​ please​ within​legal​boundaries​without​fear​of​being​injured​or​disturbed​and​ which​we​know​by​the​name​of​individual​security.​Unfortunately,​this​ open​and​honest​conduct​among​the​agents​of​power​has​been​very​rare,​ and​its​lack​has​led​to​a​thousand​disturbances​because​of​the​prolonged​ struggle​between​governments​and​the​people,​a​struggle​that​depends​ on​the​diverse​interests​that​drive​different​groups​and​are​the​reason​for​ their​different​and​contrary​ways​of​acting. ​ It​is​in​the​nature​of​those​who​dominate,​whatever​might​be​their​ number​and​the​name​given​to​them,​to​seek​to​make​the​exercise​of​ power​as​advantageous​as​possible​for​themselves,​and​it​is​equally​in​the​ nature​of​those​who​become​subordinated​to​make​domination​a​heavy​ burden​for​those​who​exercise​it​and​the​lightest​it​can​be​for​those​who​ endure​it.​Whatever​may​be​the​name​of​those​who​govern,​the​question​ for​them​is​always​the​same.​Whether​they​be​called​presidents,​directors,​emperors,​or​kings;​be​they​five​or​be​they​three,​whether​there​ are​two​or​only​one;​whether​they​be​elected​or​hereditary,​usurpers​ or​legitimate,​their​interest​is​always​the​same:​to​have​persons​at​their​ disposal​in​the​most​absolute​way,​to​have​no​obstacle​to​the​exercise​of​ their​authority,​to​shake​off​the​grip​of​all​responsibility​or​censure.​To​ the​contrary,​those​who​are​subject​to​power,​whatever​may​be​its​form​ or​name,​are​concerned​to​make​themselves​safe​from​all​arbitrariness​ so​that​no​one​might​make​use​of​their​persons​without​rule​or​measure.​

42 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

They​are​equally​concerned​to​become​free​and​to​remain​so​with​respect​to​everything​that​does​not​infringe​upon​the​right​and​security​ of​another.​From​those​two​opposing​tendencies​results​a​conflict​that​ must​have​as​its​ultimate​end​either​the​establishment​of​despotism,​no​ matter​what​might​be​the​form​of​government,​or​the​destruction​of​all​ arbitrary​power.​There​will​be​no​rest​among​the​people​except​when​ one​of​those​outcomes​has​come​to​be​so​essential​and​inalterable​that​ every​hope​of​alteration​or​change​has​been​extinguished​in​the​heart​of​ men. ​ There​is​no​doubt​that​people​will​be​free​under​any​form​of​government​if​those​who​rule​them,​even​if​they​are​called​kings​and​are​ perpetual,​are​truly​powerless​to​make​use​of​the​person​of​the​citizen​ at​their​whim​and​without​subjection​to​any​rule;​and​republican​forms​ will​be​useless,​even​if​the​head​of​the​nation​is​called​president​and​ serves​for​a​fixed​time,​if​the​fate​of​the​citizen​depends​on​his​omnipotent​will. ​ The​wise​Montesquieu,​who​analyzed​political​powers​and,​making​ clear​their​driving​and​conserving​principles​placed​the​first​stone​of​ the​edifice​consecrated​to​civil​liberty,​does​not​hesitate​to​assert​that,​ although​the​form​of​government​has​some​influence​on​civil​liberty’s​ existence,​it​is​not​its​true​and​essential​component.​In​the​judgment​ of​this​great​man,​the​liberty​of​the​citizen​exists​uniquely​and​exclusively​in​individual​security​and​in​the​stillness,​repose,​and​tranquility​ that​the​conviction​of​its​existence​produces​in​each​of​the​members.​In​ effect,​all​these​words​contain​everything​that​a​peaceful​man,​free​of​ ambition,​can​desire​and​ask​of​society,​and​when​one​acts​in​good​faith​ and​with​the​spirit​of​doing​the​right​thing,​it​is​easy​and​simple​enough​ to​grant​such​assurances. ​ On​what,​then,​are​contingent​the​continuous​and​bitter​complaints​ that​are​heard​with​such​frequency​against​the​agents​of​the​power?​Why​ are​the​terms​“indifference,”​“indolence,”​“arbitrariness,”​“despotism,”​ and​“tyranny”​applied​with​such​frequency​to​the​acts​that​emanate​from​ the​ depositaries​ of​ the​ authority?​ How​ is​ it​ that​ they​ are​ accused​ by​ the​very​ones​who​have​an​extremely​lively​interest​in​the​repression​of​ crimes​that​are​being​committed​or​can​be​committed​against​the​individual​and​public​security?​To​resolve​these​questions​with​certainty,​it​ is​necessary​to​assert​that​all​the​depositaries​of​the​authority,​no​matter​ what​the​political​power​may​be,​have​the​strictest​obligation​to​prevent​

on​the​Civil​libertieS​of​the​Citizen : 43

unjust​aggressions​among​individuals​and​themselves​refrain​from​committing​them.​Whenever​the​citizen​suffers​or​endures​any​external​violence​without​having​infringed​any​law,​or,​what​is​the​same,​is​innocent,​ the​government​must​be​responsible​and​know​to​make​public​amends,​ for,​as​nothing​more​than​an​agent​of​the​nation,​established​precisely​ with​the​sole​and​unique​objective​of​ensuring​the​exercise​of​public​ and​private​rights,​to​fail​by​aggression​or​omission​in​such​duties,​as​ sacred​as​they​are​important,​is​to​commit​a​crime​of​lèse-​nation.​Thus​ it​is​when​highwaymen​and​murderers​have​the​support​of​the​authority​ or,​at​the​least,​guilty​tolerance;​when​libelers​damage​the​reputation​of​ the​honorable​citizen​with​impunity​and​lack​the​propriety​due​to​public​morality,​feeding​on​and​encouraging​malicious​defamation​through​ publication​of​private​defects,​true​or​supposed,​without​the​authority​ exercising​any​restraining​methods​whatsoever;​finally,​when​the​abuse​ with​impunity​of​men​who​have​no​other​crime​than​their​birth​or​the​ opinions​they​profess​is​permitted​or​tolerated,​it​is​evident​that​individual​security​does​not​exist​and​that​a​government​that​is​indifferent​ to​or​colludes​with​such​attackers​is,​at​best,​a​useless​burden​for​the​nation​that​created​it​and​onerous​for​the​people​that​maintain​it,​without​ serving​them​at​all.​In​effect,​from​the​moment​one​or​several​members​ of​society​have​just​and​well-​founded​reasons​to​fear​that​they​cannot​ count​on​the​protection​of​the​government,​and,​so​as​not​to​provide​that​ protection,​the​government​shields​itself​with​a​lack​of​energy​or​with​ the​ridiculous​excuse​that​public​opinion​is​against​the​persecuted​ones​ and​defying​that​opinion​is​imprudent,​from​this​point,​we​repeat,​individual​security​is​at​an​end​and​the​bases​of​authority​are​undermined. ​ This​indolent​inertia,​or​this​partisan​conduct,​is​not​only​destructive​to​those​wretched​who​endure​it,​it​is​so​for​the​persecutors​themselves​and,​above​all,​the​government.​Nor​will​those​who​today​attack​ the​rights​of​others​with​impunity,​riding​roughshod​over​the​reputation​and​persons​of​their​opponents​based​on​the​fact​that​the​authority,​ from​complicity​or​fear​that​these​opponents​have​instilled​in​it,​cannot​ or​will​not​curb​their​excesses,​should​their​fortune​be​adverse​tomorrow​ and​ should​ their​ misfortune​ make​ them​ a​ target​ of​ persecution,​ be​able​to​expect,​from​the​agents​of​power,​that​they​will​enjoy​security​and​stability.​For​the​same​reasons​that​it​has​been​a​cold​spectator​ to​the​crimes​committed​by​a​faction,​it​will​simultaneously​be​a​cold​ spectator​to​all​crimes​of​other​factions;​and​in​its​shadow​the​reign​of​

44 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

force​and​anarchy​will​be​forming,​which​sooner​or​later​will​topple​the​ social​edifice,​enmeshing​in​its​ruins​the​depositaries​of​the​authority.​ France,​in​its​revolution,​provides​us​with​conclusive​evidence​of​this​ truth.​From​the​installation​of​the​Estates​General,​the​spirit​of​persecution​broke​loose,​which​did​not​end​even​with​the​Restoration.​In​that​ nation,​the​destruction​of​a​previously​victorious​party​firmly​dragged​ the​government​along​with​it.​The​constitutionalists​banned​the​royalists;​the​republicans,​the​constitutionalists;​the​Girondists​were​banned​ by​the​committees​of​public​health​and​public​safety;​those​who​made​up​ these​bodies​went​in​succession​to​the​guillotine​by​the​orders​of​Danton​and​Robespierre.​These​famous​cannibals​fell​at​the​stroke​of​the​ Thermadorians,​and​in​all​these​convulsions​France​was​flooded​with​ blood,​anarchy​devastated​everything,​and​the​government,​which​did​ not​know​or​did​not​want​to​make​effective​the​guarantees​protective​of​ personal​security,​was​always​the​victim​of​the​rush​of​the​factions. ​ Until​ now​ these​ have​ been​ and​ will​ always​ be​ the​ deplorable​ outcomes​of​the​criminal​indifference​and​abandonment​with​which​those​ who​are​charged​with​curbing​attacks​on​individual​security​view​them.​ A​ government​ that​ deserves​ that​ name​ should​ shake​ off​ fear​ and​ not​ permit​itself​to​be​banished;​it​must​remain​firm​and​impassive​among​ the​factions.​To​abandon​the​principles​of​justice​in​order​to​seek​the​ support​of​the​dominant​faction​is​to​be​lost,​is​to​commit​a​crime​that​ is​more​than​atrocious,​ineffective,​and​not​conducive​to​the​end​it​is​ endeavoring​to​attain.​In​effect,​when​the​government​does​not​think​ about​governing,​but​rather​about​existing​through​criminal​tolerance,​ it​unfailingly​reconciles​the​hatred​of​those​who​suffer​with​the​scorn​ of​those​who​persecute.​The​first​cannot​avoid​becoming​exceedingly​ irritated,​especially​on​seeing​that​they​are​sacrificed​to​the​existence​of​ an​authority​that​they​created​to​protect​their​security.​The​second,​inwardly​convinced​that​they​owe​toleration​only​to​the​real​or​apparent​ strength​of​their​faction​and​that​tomorrow​the​same​toleration​will​be​ owed​by​another,​which​at​the​very​moment​it​replaces​them,​oppresses​ them,​ look​ with​disdainful​ scorn​ on​a​power​ so​debased​ that​it​loses​ the​value​of​a​just​severity​without​escaping​the​odiousness​of​criminal​toleration.​Unhappy​people​entrusted​to​such​a​government!​Public​ interests​will​be​meanly​sacrificed​to​the​interests​of​the​agents​of​the​ power,​peaceful​citizens​will​not​have​a​moment​of​tranquility​or​rest,​ becoming​ obliged​ to​ seek​ in​ themselves​ and​ by​ preventive​ measures​

on​the​Civil​libertieS​of​the​Citizen : 45

owing​to​their​individual​strengths,​the​security​that​cannot​or​will​not​ be​accorded​to​them​by​an​authority​that​does​not​think​about​them​except​to​deliver​them​defenseless​to​the​voracity​of​their​enemies.​In​vain​ will​they​invoke​the​principles​of​justice,​the​natural​feelings​of​compassion​for​them​and​for​their​families,​or​the​just​compensation​owed​for​ their​services.​No​other​recourse​remains​to​them​but​to​endure​their​ suffering​and​redouble​their​efforts​to​place​at​the​proper​time​the​sacred​ deposit​of​public​liberties​in​more​faithful​hands​and​to​entrust​the​reins​ of​government​to​expert​persons​of​known​probity. ​ The​ people​ have​ another,​ much​ greater,​ woe​ to​ fear​ from​ governments,​and​it​is​that​when​these​governments,​emerging​from​their​indifference,​enter​into​such​activity​that​they​themselves​commit​the​crimes​ they​should​prevent;​to​clarify,​transforming​themselves​from​protectors​ to​aggressors,​they​attack​individual​security​and​turn​against​the​citizens​the​same​weapons​they​accepted​for​their​defense.​This​abuse​is​the​ more​terrible​the​more​the​very​nature​of​the​political​powers​gives​way​ to​frequent​errors​in​such​a​delicate​matter.​The​authority​of​the​government,​says​the​wise​Bentham,​is​nothing​but​the​exception​to​the​general​ rule​that​individuals​must​observe.​You will not kill, you will not deprive anyone of his liberty:​this​is​the​obligation​of​an​individual.​The judge will condemn the murderer to death; he will imprison the criminal; the government will have the sentence executed:​here​we​have​the​powers​of​the​authority.​ Although​the​primary​benefit​of​society​is​providing​individual​security​ for​us​by​curbing​the​aggressions​of​others,​it​is​clearly​possible​to​attain​ this​only​when​the​person​of​each​citizen​remains​subject​to​the​action​ of​the​public​authority​in​the​event​of​an​attempt​against​the​security​of​ another.​This​act​of​submission​is​precisely​where​the​risk​is​run.​Here​ is​where​the​government​feigns​acting​as​protector​when​it​is​actually​ turning​into​an​aggressor;​and​as​the​dividing​line​between​these​two​ acts​is​so​fine​as,​in​general,​to​be​scarcely​perceptible​to​the​majority​of​ citizens,​it​is​not​strange​that​it​continues​to​confuse​them.​So​we​strive​ to​explain​so​important​a​subject​through​its​effects​and​outcomes. ​ From​the​moment​in​which​the​government​is​empowered​to​arrange​ the​fate​of​citizens​without​submission​to​any​rule,​all​of​them​are​its​ slaves.​The​citizen’s​state​is​that​of​governed,​the​slave’s​that​of​possessed,​ and​ the​ distance​ that​ separates​ such​ different​ conditions​ is​ immense.​ What​is​it,​then,​to​be​possessed?​It​is​to​be​entirely​and​absolutely​at​ the​disposition​of​another​and​dependent​on​his​will.​And​what​is​it​to​

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be​governed?​It​is​to​be​protected​against​all​forms​of​aggression,​reprimanded​oneself​when​one​commits​them,​and​obliged​to​concur​on​ the​means​of​preventing​them.​Any​other​sacrifice​that​might​be​called​ for​on​the​part​of​the​citizen,​and​any​other​influence​the​government​ claims​to​have​over​his​person,​is​an​act​of​oppression​and​tyranny.​A​ citizen,​ then,​ has​ no​ reason​ to​ complain​ when​ his​ imprisonment​ has​ been​provoked​by​an​act​committed​by​him,​an​act​declared​criminal​by​ an​existing​law​that​assigns​a​fixed​penalty​and​when​the​trial​directly​ follows​the​arrest.​These​methods​can​in​no​way​be​called​undermining​ of​individual​security;​on​the​contrary,​they​contribute​to​maintaining​ this​precious​right​and​are​indispensably​necessary​to​secure​it.​Such​a​ procedure​does​not​cause​alarm​or​lack​of​confidence​except​for​malefactors,​and​this,​far​from​being​an​evil​against​which​one​should​guard,​ is​for​a​society​a​good​for​which​legislators​should​always​strive. ​ Those​acts​of​the​authority​of​which​citizens​complain,​and​with​such​ justice​call​oppressive​and​tyrannical,​are​not​of​this​class.​They​are​those​ that​spread​mourning​and​consternation​in​the​family​of​the​peaceful​ citizen,​of​whose​innocence​the​authority​pretends​ignorance;​they are judicial persecutions without regular judgments, when the public power arrests and imprisons anyone it pleases, prolongs detentions indefinitely, exiles, and, finally, disposes of persons according to its whim,​like​a​master​over​slaves​he​ possesses​and​not​like​a​leader​over​citizens​he​governs;​they​are,​finally,​ those​acts​by​which​the​authority​itself​commits​an​outrage​against​the​ security​it​has​promised​and​is​obliged​to​maintain,​and​by​which​it​perpetrates​the​disorders​it​was​supposed​to​curb. ​ The​public​authority​in​a​nation​that​has​changed​institutions​for​the​ first​time,​passing​from​absolutism​to​liberty,​is​constantly​reactionary;​ it​has​no​other​idea​of​government​than​what​it​could​receive​from​the​ previous​regime,​nor​is​it​persuaded​that​curbing​crimes​and​taking​precautions​against​the​destruction​of​the​state​are​possible​by​any​means​ other​than​those​that​have​been​learned​in​the​school​of​despotism.​As​ the​principles​of​this​latter​school​are​openly​contrary​to​the​new​institutions,​the​complaints​are​not​only​frequent​and​repeated,​but​also​just,​ well​founded,​and​incontestable.​The​agents​of​the​power,​not​finding​a​ way​to​avoid​the​complaints,​appeal​to​the​preservation of the Republic,​to​ this​protective​god​of​tyrants​and​oppressors,​by​which​they​try​to​persuade​of​the​risk​the​government​runs​if​it​does​not​disregard​individual​ security.

on​the​Civil​libertieS​of​the​Citizen : 47

​ It​is​certain​that​the​first​necessity​of​a​people​is​the​existence​of​its​ government,​but​it​is​not​equally​so​that​this​be​incompatible​with​supporting​such​a​sacred​right​as​individual​security. ​ It​is​not​the​interests​of​the​authority,​but​rather​those​of​the​officials​they​are​trying​to​secure;​because​what​is​it​they​understand​as​the​ interests​of​the​government?​Things​not​capable​of​feeling​cannot​have​ interests​in​anything.​It​is​then​clear​that,​when​this​expression​is​used,​it​ signifies​only​the​impotence​of​the​agents​of​the​power​to​give​free​rein​ to​despicable​and​thieving​passions,​oppressing​those​who​overshadow​ them​or​make​evident​their​evil​acts.​Certainly,​it​would​be​as​rare​as​it​ would​be​difficult​to​persuade​those​who​neither​occupy​public​posts​ nor​can​get​any​use​of​them​that​the​arbitrary​regime​has​been​established​precisely​for​their​benefit,​to​have​their​persons​at​their​disposal​ without​submission​to​any​rule.​The​truth​is​that​it​greatly​pleases​those​ who​rule,​whatever​certain​people​may​want​to​say,​to​constitute​themselves​into​masters​of​the​people​who​have​been​entrusted​to​its​direction​ and​to​have​the​power​to​dispose​of​the​members​that​make​it​up​without​the​obligation​of​accounting​to​anybody​or​the​fear​of​answering​to​ anybody.​All​the​unhappiness​of​which​they​complain​is​thus​reduced​ to​the​fact​that​some​do​not​rule​everything​they​would​like;​but​what​is​ unhappiness​for​them​is​a​great​benefit​to​the​other​citizens​who​make​ up​the​society. ​ Let​us​openly​confess,​then,​that​illegal​and​arbitrary​prisons​push​ man​down​into​slavery,​and,​at​the​same​time,​they​prepare​an​interminable​series​of​misfortunes​for​a​people​that,​because​of​these​acts,​is​in​ a​permanent​state​of​revolution. ​ The​history​of​all​times,​both​ancient​and​modern,​shows​with​absolute​certainty​that​the​crimes​of​the​arbitrary​power​inevitably​end​in​ public​disorders.​It​will​be​useless​to​seek​in​these​political​oscillations​ the​ reestablishment​ of​ individual​ security;​ they​ will​ have​ had​ this​ as​ their​aim,​but​it​will​not​be​achieved​while​they​last.​Sometimes​ambition,​other​times​hatred​and​vengeance,​always​the​most​violent​passions​take​possession​of​and​empower​such​movements,​and​in​this​violent​whirlwind​they​are​surrounded​and​stifled​and​successively​become​ victors​and​vanquished.​Then​principles​are​abandoned​and​a​throne​is​ erected​to​the​empire​of​circumstance.​These​necessities​give​the​common​pretext​for​destroying​regular​laws​that​could​have​stopped​them,​ and​in​this​way​injustice​and​irregularity,​which​will​be​constantly​de-

48 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

manded​as​a​pledge​of​public​security,​will​periodically​renew​themselves.​See​here,​says​a​famous​writer,​how​the​generations​contemporary​to​these​catastrophes​never​gather​anything​but​bitter​fruit​and​how​ rare​it​is​that​the​following​generations​inherit​happier​ones.​Looking​ for​security​in​the​midst​of​convulsions​is​the​grossest​of​errors,​but​an​ active​and​sensitive​people​is​invincibly​impelled​toward​it​when​oppression​has​drained​its​patience. ​ Any​political​system​that​allows​arrest​and​exile​without​due​process​ carries​within​itself​the​germ​of​disturbances​that​sooner​or​later​will​ explode​with​a​deafening​noise. ​ So​governments​that​try​to​argue​that​the​means​of​containing​the​ disturbances​is​to​disregard​individual​security​with​protective​methods​deceive​themselves​and​deceive​others.​Public​indignation,​which​is​ the​precursor​of​all​disturbances,​becomes​stirred​up​in​so​indisputable​ a​way​that​it​can​be​hidden​from​no​one.​Among​a​moderately​refined​ people,​when​it​is​suspected​that​an​innocent​person​suffers,​the​liveliest​interest​is​taken​in​this​victim​of​arbitrariness,​and​the​particular​iniquities​of​the​power​are​publicly​and​vigorously​censured.​When​this​ happens,​discontent​and​alarm​spread​rapidly​through​all​members​of​ society,​who​from​this​moment​place​themselves​in​open​war​with​the​ government;​very​just​war,​but​at​the​same​time​the​most​dangerous​and​ harmful​that​can​be​undertaken,​because​through​it​the​social​bonds​are​ completely​destroyed​and​men​are​in​the​barbarian​state​of​nature. ​ We​never​advise​peoples​to​take​such​a​step,​but​they​move​to​adopt​ it,​as​if​through​instinct​and​without​deliberation,​when​the​crimes​of​ the​power​have​been​multiplied​to​such​a​point​that​they​have​destroyed​ in​the​heart​of​men​all​hope​of​an​alternative.​Then​hatred​and​revenge,​ driven​ strongly​ by​ the​ furor​ that​ oppression​ causes,​ inspire​ the​ most​ cowardly​and​place​a​dagger​even​in​the​hands​of​the​weakest.​The​irresistible​wrath​of​a​rebellious​people​causes​the​most​dreadful​damage.​It​ expresses​itself​in​the​sanctuary​of​the​laws,​hurling​from​it,​as​violently​ as​ignominiously,​both​those​who​have​usurped​the​most​majestic​power​ and​the​perfidious​agents​who,​betraying​their​duties,​ have​not​given​ less​thought​to​anything​than​maintaining​the​public​liberties​despicably​ sacrificed​to​the​interests​of​a​contemptible​and​criminal​favorite,​but​ also​the​honorable​men,​their​faithful​representatives,​who​have​learned​ to​sacrifice​everything,​including​their​existence​and​political​reputation,​to​the​public​good,​to​the​national​good.​The​canopied​throne​of​

on​the​Civil​libertieS​of​the​Citizen : 49

the​king​and​the​armchair​of​the​president​who​cannot​or​do​not​wish​to​ sustain​the​civil​liberty​of​the​citizen,​or​who​attack​his​individual​security,​see​them​collapse,​splattered​all​over​with​the​blood​spilled​through​ hatred​and​national​vengeance.​The​murderers​who​set​themselves​up​ in​tribunals​against​the​express​will​of​the​constitutive​law,​converting​ themselves​into​instruments​of​tyranny​and​oppressors​of​helpless​innocence,​expel​their​last​breath​in​the​hands​of​the​furor,​and​their​dreadful​cadavers,​covered​with​blood​and​wounds,​are​exhibited​through​the​ streets​and​placed​in​the​public​plazas,​unless,​to​prevent​this​catastrophe,​as​unfortunate​as​it​is​horrible,​the​promises​and​assurances​that​ their​masters​gave​to​those​despicable​and​contemptible​slaves​had​been​ effective.​ If​only​the​criminals​ who​instigated​such​excesses​ suffered,​ but,​in​the​net’s​dangerous​haul,​innocents​and​even​meritorious​citizens​ are​unfortunate​victims​of​the​power​of​anarchy. ​ Take​warning,​then,​oh​you​who​preside​over​the​destinies​of​peoples.​ There​is​a​moment​in​which​their​exhausted​suffering​makes​them​break​ up​like​an​avalanche​that​tears​to​pieces,​destroys,​and​drags​along​behind​it​everything​that​before​contained​its​strength​and​reigned​in​its​ spirit.​ If​you​open​ some​ gap​in​the​legal​ barriers,​ this​ immense​ mass​ will​rush​headlong​through​it​and​you​will​not​be​sufficient​to​resist​it.​ The​French​Revolution​is​a​practical​and​recent​example​that​you​should​ always​ keep​ in​ your​ sights.​ It​ teaches​ you​ that​ the public authority has never attempted a crime against the rights of free men with impunity, and the first step taken against individual security is the unfailing harbinger of the destruction of the nation and the government.

6



Discourse on Laws That Attack Individual Security In​popular​governments,​laws​of​proscription​​ have​never​saved​a​people. —​Montesquieu,​Considerations concerning the Greatness and Decline of the Romans

If​one​carefully​seeks​the​causes​of​anger​and​discontent​ that​one​observes​among​peoples​who​have​tried​various​systems​of​government,​passing​from​the​most​absolute​despotism​to​the​most​unrestrained​democracy,​one​will​find​that​always​or​almost​always​it​is​due​to​ the​obvious​opposition​and​the​continual​conflict​between​the​principles​ of​the​constitutive​law​and​the​character​of​secondary​laws.​When​the​ first​is​given​to​them​or​they​initiate​it​themselves,​they​receive​and​proclaim​it​with​enthusiasm;​they​imagine​the​most​agreeable​prospects​and​ they​consider​themselves​free​simply​from​the​fact​of​having​declared​ themselves​ so.​ But​ when​ experience​ makes​ them​ see​ that​ such​ declarations​have​been​futile,​that​despite​them​the​oppressor​regime​continues​and​what​is​most​sacred​and​independent​in​man​comes​to​be​the​ patrimony​of​the​authority,​they​are​annoyed​at​the​form​of​government​ they​have​adopted​and​tear​apart​the​governing​constitution​to​seek​in​ another​what​they​have​failed​to​find​in​it.​From​here​they​sometimes​ remove​those​who​hold​power,​substituting​for​them​others​with​the​ same​or​a​different​denomination​and​at​other​times​make​elective​what​ was​hereditary.​When​it​is​a​matter​of​shaking​off​the​yoke​of​a​king,​all​ social​bonds​are​loosened​successively​and​gradually​until​ending​in​anarchy,​but​when​one​tries​to​get​out​of​this​anarchy,​one​runs​the​scale​ in​an​inverse​order,​and​power​proceeds​to​concentrate​without​interruption​until​it​settles​entirely​and​fully​in​the​hands​of​a​single​person. ​ Original​title:​“Discurso​sobre​las​leyes​que​atacan​la​seguridad​individual.”​Source:​ El Observador de la República Mexicana,​Mexico,​August​8,​1827,​p.​287. 50

on​lawS​that​attaCk​individual​SeCurity : 51

​ At​the​extremes,​as​in​the​center,​the​same​thing​is​always​sought,​ that​is​to​say,​liberty,​but​always​to​no​avail,​for​the​set​of​declarations​we​ call​the​Constitution​is​not​what​provides​it,​but​rather​the​agreement​ secondary​laws​have​with​the​Constitution.​When​this​agreement​is​not​ sought,​it​will​continually​and​without​interruption​rise​and​fall​in​the​ fathomless​sea​of​political​systems​without​being​able​to​attach​itself​to​ any​of​them,​but​once​obtained,​public​tranquility​will​acquire​an​unshakable​firmness​and​solidity. ​ All​constitutions,​not​excepting​even​those​that​have​been​calculated​ in​support​of​the​interests​of​the​government,​contain​the​sum​of​the​ essential​principles​of​civil​liberty,​which​serve​as​the​base​of​the​entire​ social​order;​but​they​are​without​doubt​continually​and​frequently​violated​by​secondary​laws,​which,​far​from​being​a​consequence​of​their​ principles,​are​in​open​opposition​to​them,​by​virtue​of​which​is​destroyed​with​one​hand​what​has​been​built​with​the​other.​Thus,​then,​ freedom​of​the​press,​individual​security,​inviolability​of​property,​and​ the​division​of​powers​are​sanctioned​in​the​Constitution.​The​legislative​ body​will​be​prohibited​from​changing​the​constitutive​law,​the​government​will​be​prohibited​from​imposing​any​punishment​for​its​own​sake​ or​usurping​the​functions​of​judges​by​having​the​citizen,​directly​or​indirectly​at​their​disposal,​prescribing​to​the​tribunals​the​rigorous​observance​of​the​formulas.​All​this​and​much​more​will​be​in​the​constitutive​ law.​Afterward,​however,​will​come​other​secondary​laws​through​which​ the​government​remains​invested​with​extraordinary powers to move, from one point to another in the nation, anyone who seems to it suspicious; military commissions, war councils, and advisers will be created​that​judge​and​prescribe​as​it​appears​to​them​and​suits​their​interest;​it​will​try​to​make​ them​independent​of​the​supreme​judicial​authorities,​exempting​them​ from​responsibility​and​their​verdicts​from​review.​The​greatest​concern,​however,​will​be​that​they​are​completely​and​absolutely​under​the​ influence​of​the​government​so​that,​through​them​and​protecting​itself​ with​this​phantom​of​judicial power,​it​can​dispose​of​the​persons​who​ inconvenience​it​and​whom​it​would​outlaw​with​the​show​of​a​trial.​It​ will​authorize​these​tribunals​of​murderers,​as​a​celebrated​French​legal​ expert​calls​them,1​to​hear​exclusively​the​crimes​of​high​treason,​and​ it​will​exempt​them​from​observing​the​formulas.​They​will​serve​the​ ​

1.​Dupin,​Legislación Criminal.

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power,​lending​themselves​as​instruments​of​all​the​power’s​iniquities,​ and​this​power​in​its​turn​will​support​all​their​evil​acts,​rewarding​them​ sometimes​with​promotions,​pensions,​and​posts​and​exempting​them​ other​times​from​the​responsibility​and​punishment​with​which​they​ are​threatened. ​ By​this​horrific​picture​the​regime​of​the​terror​in​France​under​the​ committees​of​public health and public safety​will​be​recognized,​influenced​by​the​faction​of​sans culottes,2​at​whose​head​were​Danton​and​ Robespierre.​It​paints​a​portrait​also​of​the​empire​of​Napoleon​and​the​ state​of​other​nations​that,​by​paths​as​tortuous​and​misguided,​move​ rapidly​and​with​gigantic​steps​to​their​destruction​and​extermination. ​ When​it​is​a​matter,​then,​of​preventing​these​evils,​or​solving​them​if​ they​have​already​begun,​one​must​seek​their​origin​and​cut​their​root,​ which​in​representative​systems​will​always​be​found​in​the​laws​of​exception​through​which​civil​liberty​is​made​illusory,​attacking​individual​ security.​The​legislative​bodies,​a​constitution​assumed,​lack​powers​to​ decree​such​laws​and​are​truly​aggressors​when​they​lend​themselves​to​ doing​it.​Their​method​is​unjust​in​itself​because​it​tends​to​absolutism,​ it​is​illegal​because​it​infringes​on​the​constitution,​and​it​is​imprudent​ because​it​alarms​the​people,​destroys​confidence,​and​perpetuates​the​ barbarous​state​of​a​disastrous​revolution. ​ Despotism​does​not​consist,​as​the​majority​of​men​who​reflect​little​ persuade​themselves,​in​the​rule​of​one​only,​or​in​the​consolidation​of​ powers,​but​rather​in​what​is​unlimited​in​each​one​or​in​all​of​them​ together.​The​laws​of​exception​assume​in​one​aspect​the​existence​of​ such​a​power,​and​in​another​aspect​they​tend​to​strengthen​it.​In​effect,​ as​a​constitution​is​nothing​other​than​the​declaration​of​the​rights​of​ man​in​society​and​the​distribution​of​political​powers​with​a​view​to​the​ preservation​of​these​very​rights,​the​laws​of​exception,​which​consist​in​ the​total​or​partial​suspension​of​this​code,​can​do​no​less​than​deprive​ man​of​some​right​or​of​some​of​the​means​to​make​it​actual.​How​is​it​ possible​to​proceed​in​this​way​without​sanctioning​or​supposing​the​ omnipotence​of​deliberative​bodies?​What​limits​can​be​placed​upon​ the​action​of​a​body​that​does​not​recognize​these​limits​in​individual​ ​ 2.​The​sans culottes​were​extreme​radical​republicans​at​the​time​of​the​French​Revolution.​(Editor’s​note)

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rights​and​believes​itself​authorized​to​deprive​anyone​of​the​means​of​ maintaining​them?​If​there​are​injustices​in​the​world,​without​doubt​ this​is​the​greatest​of​all. ​ The​general​will​must​not​be​a​reason​that​justifies​such​ravaging;​it​ cannot​be​unlimited,​and​its​action​must​cease​where​the​right​of​another​begins.​Where​would​we​end​up​by​asserting​the​principle​that​ the​general​will​can​do​everything​and​is​sufficient​by​itself​to​legitimate​ doing​so?​The​most​repressive​and​tyrannical​acts,​the​most​barbarous​ proscriptions,​and​the​most​enormous​crimes​would​need​nothing​to​ convert​themselves​into​rights​except​a​certain​number​of​votes,​which​ could​not​even​be​fixed,​given​that​nations​cannot​consist​of​a​precise​ and​determinate​number​of​persons.​The​death​of​Socrates​and​Phocian,​ the​exile​of​Aristides​and​Miltiades,​and​a​thousand​other​loathsome​acts​ through​the​entire​human​lineage​would​remain​fully​justified​by​such​ an​absurd​and​antisocial​doctrine.​In​a​word,​the​ignominious​execution​ of​Jesus​of​Nazareth,​the​most​innocent,​the​most​beneficent,​the​most​ virtuous,​and​to​say​it​now,​the​greatest​of​the​whole​line​among​the​children​of​men,​would​be​nothing​other​than​a​lawful​act​and​the​exercise​ of​a​right​essential​to​all​society. ​ Nonetheless,​there​is​no​one​who​does​not​know​and​detest​such​injustices,​and​this​is​the​most​decisive​proof​that​there​does​not​exist​on​ earth​any​unlimited​power​or​authority,​and​even​were​the​votes​and​ opinions​of​the​entire​human​race​gathered,​they​would​not​be​sufficient​ to​justify​what​by​itself​and​by​its​nature​is​necessarily​unjust. ​ Well,​now,​if​the​gathering​of​all​rational​beings​cannot​bestow​this​ character​on​certain​acts,​can​some​fractions​of​it,​much​less​the​very​few​ called​representatives,​be​invested​with​such​power?​It​would​be​nonsense​and​the​height​of​absurdity​to​maintain​it. ​ But​ what​ rights​ are​ violated,​ it​ will​ be​ asked​ of​ us,​ by​ changing,​ through​laws​of​exception​in​certain​and​determinate​cases,​the​tribunals​ and​forms​of​trials,​omitting​some​proceedings​when​public​safety​is​in​ danger?​We​do​not​have​difficulty​in​asserting​that​many​and​almost​all​ rights​are​violated,​because​either​those​tribunals​and​forms​have​been​ considered​absolute​and​indispensably​necessary​to​guarantee​individual​ security​and​distinguish​the​innocent​from​the​guilty,​or​not.​If​they​are​ necessary,​in​no​case​can​the​tribunals​be​changed​or​the​forms​omitted​ without​attacking​the​most​sacred​right​of​man,​which​consists​of​the​in-

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dependence​of​his​person​and​in​the​free​use​of​the​indispensable​means​ to​make​clear​his​innocence.​If​they​are​not​necessary,​the​tribunals​must​ not​be​established,​nor​the​forms​agreed​to. ​ To​clarify.​When​the​ordinary​tribunals​were​established​they​had​to​ be​constituted​on​such​foundations​that,​at​the​same​time​they​threatened​crime​they​protected​innocence,​inspiring​in​this​way​confidence​ in​the​individuals​and​the​government.​They​had​to​be,​under​one​aspect,​ a​ bulwark​ of​ individual​ security​ and,​ under​ another,​ the​ maintainer​of​public​tranquility.​To​attempt,​then,​to​keep​them​from​exercising​their​functions​in​certain​cases​is​to​expose​the​one​or​the​other,​ and​sometimes​both,​to​being​trampled​and​destroyed.​There​will​be​a​ reason,​perhaps,​to​change​their​program​and​method​of​proceeding​if​ experience​proves​in​them​some​imperfections​inseparable​from​human​ institutions,​but​it​will​be​impossible,​at​any​given​time,​to​detect​these​ imperfections​in​order​to​deny​these​tribunals​jurisdiction​over​some​ crimes. ​ We​say​the​same​about​judicial​forms.​They​have​been​established​as​ an​essential​means​to​make​clear​the​innocence​or​guilt​of​an​accused​ person.​Thus​it​is​that​the​achievement​of​this​most​important​goal​depends​on​their​exact​and​faithful​observance,​and​to​abandon​the​goal​ is​to​be​rendered​absolutely​and​totally​powerless​to​rule​with​certainty​ and​obtain​a​happy​outcome​in​so​delicate​a​matter.​There​is​no​halfway.​ If​the​forms​do​not​lead​to​making​clear​the​truth​of​an​accusation​and​ the​certainty​of​a​crime,​they​should​be​dropped​altogether;​but​if​on​the​ contrary​they​are​considered​necessary​to​the​purpose,​they​must​never​ be​set​aside. ​ Nor​can​the​risk​of​threatened​public​security​be​given​as​an​excuse​ sufficient​to​justify​such​provisions​because,​besides​the​fact​that​public​ security​cannot​be​distinguished​from​individual​security​and​he​who​ attacks​the​interests​of​the​first​can​hardly​look​after​the​second,​we​have​ already​demonstrated​that​the​tribunals​and​procedures​in​which​one​ can​have​confidence​in​the​punishment​of​some​crimes​should​inspire​ confidence​that​the​tribunals​and​procedures​can​curb​them​all. ​ Nothing,​ then,​ can​ exonerate​ laws​ of​ exception​ from​ the​ mark​ of​ injustice​and​the​tendency​to​despotism;​not​the​authority​of​the​legislative​bodies​that​receive​ that​authority​ from​the​people,​nor​the​authority​of​the​people,​because​by​its​nature​and​essence​that​authority​ is​necessarily​limited​by​individual​rights;​nor​public​security,​because​

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public​security​can​be​provided​through​ordinary​means;​generally,​public​ security​ is​ not​ at​ risk​ except​ when​ the​ civil​ liberty​ of​ the​ citizen​ is​attacked,​and​fear​of​this​ceases​with​the​renunciation​of​extraconstitutional​methods.​A​procedure​of​that​kind​remains,​then,​nothing​ more​than​an​act​of​arbitrariness​and​despotism​by​legislative​bodies,​by​ means​of​which​they​overstep,​without​reason,​the​boundaries​imposed​ by​principles​of​natural​justice,​engraved​with​indelible​characters​in​the​ hearts​of​all​men.​But​it​is​not​the​only​error​from​which​these​agreements​that​are​incorrectly​called​laws​suffer;​illegality,​disloyalty,​and​ inconsistency​are​what​constitute​their​distinctive​character​and​make​ them​more​odious​to​all​men​in​general​because​they​grasp​more​clearly​ the​contrast​noted​between​promises​set​out​in​fundamental​laws​and​ the​violations​of​these​promises​by​laws​of​exception. ​ Any​ system​ in​ which​ one​ acts​ contrary​ to​ a​ compulsory​ law​ and​ through​which​a​previously​made​commitment​is​ignored​is​called​illegal​and​deceitful.​These​ideas​are​clear,​precise,​and​widely​accepted.​The​ wise​and​the​ignorant,​the​concerned​and​the​impartial​cannot​help​but​ know​their​truth.​We​come,​then,​to​the​application​that​can​be​made​of​ them​in​the​subject​with​which​we​are​dealing. ​ If​there​is​any​universal​and​preferentially​compulsory​law​in​society,​ it​is​the​fundamental​code.​A​constitution​is​clearly​nothing​if​it​is​not​ the​law​of​all​the​others​and​if​it​does​not​obligate​all​the​powers​of​a​nation​in​the​same​way​as​those​individuals​who​make​it​up.​As​soon​as​the​ subsidiary​laws​can​withdraw​from​the​rule​of​constitutive​law,​restrict​ it,​violate​it,​or​suspend​it,​it​becomes​reduced​to​a​magnificent​façade​ and​an​illusory​monument​behind​which​the​chains​of​despotism​are​ devised​and​forged.​If​the​constitution​is​the​only​ineffective​one​among​ all​the​laws,​and​if​it​can​do​nothing​against​the​other​laws​which​can​do​ anything​against​it;​if​it​exists​only​to​receive​insults,​what​kind​of​obligation​does​one​have​to​observe​it,​and​how​is​one​to​understand​that​ immutability​that​one​ventures​to​grant​it?​An​obligatory​and​immutable​law​is​one​that​binds​everyone​and​from​whose​observance​no​one​ is​exempt.​Its​destruction​begins​from​the​moment​any​one​of​its​literal​ provisions​is​disobeyed​or​thwarted,​even​by​acts​that​are​called​legislative,​and​it​remains​without​authority​if,​in​any​of​its​questions​that​have​ been​resolved​positively,​any​text​other​than​it​is​consulted. ​ When​ legislators​ enter​ into​ the​ exercise​ of​ their​ august​ functions,​ they​renew​by​a​public​and​authentic​act​the​commitment​that,​in​the​

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role​of​individuals,​they​contracted​to​observe​it,​and​at​the​same​time​ they​ assume​ another​ new​ commitment​ not​ to​ oppose​ it​ by​ acts​ that​ might​destroy​it.​This​solemn​affirmation​establishes​a​right​in​each​one​ of​the​citizens​to​object​not​only​to​their​nonobservance​but​also​to​their​ positive​infraction.​Those​who​dare​to​offer​this​proof​of​respect​and​ obedience​for​the​fundamental​law,​simply​by​confirming​it,​agree​that​ they​will​consider​null​and​illegal​all​acts​that​in​any​way​might​oppose​ it,​and​because​among​them​must​be​counted​the​laws​of​exception,​it​ is​as​clear​as​the​light​of​midday​that​its​provisions​share​in​these​judgments. ​ In​effect,​if​the​constitutional​law​of​a​nation​is​the​statement​of​the​ rights​that​the​entirety​of​citizens​should​enjoy​and​the​exercise​of​these​ should​be​specified​by​the​secondary​laws,​and​if​the​first​should​proclaim​the​principles​and​the​second​ensure​their​being​carried​out,​no​ people​who​obtain​a​fundamental​code​and​a​representative​government​ could​consider​legal​provisions​that​oppose​these​important​ends.​On​ the​contrary,​the​social​guarantees​demanded​in​the​name​of​the​principles​would​be​constantly​violated​or​evaded,​thanks​to​its​exceptions;​ and​this​continual​battle​would​make​the​fate​of​a​nation​more​unfortunate​than​if​it​had​remained​subject​to​the​arbitrariness​of​the​absolute​ power,​ which,​ deprived​ of​ all​ the​ appearances​ of​ philanthropy​ in​ its​ principles​and​regularity​in​its​action,​would​present​a​thousand​flanks​ and​weak​points​that​could​be​attacked​with​success. ​ The​endeavor,​then,​to​legalize​these​acts,​although​quite​natural​to​ their​perpetrators,​can​never​be​carried​out​or​have​a​lasting​and​durable​ effect.​The​fraud​in​the​long​run​cannot​be​hidden​from​anybody,​and​ the​contradiction​and​opposition​that​exist​between​the​fundamental​ law​and​those​that​have​as​their​goal​undermining​it,​making​it​illusory,​ reveal​naturally,​and​make​clear​even​to​the​least​sharp-​eyed​view,​this​ fraudulent​system.​We​cannot​give​another​name​to​declarations,​always​ repeated,​of​respect​for​individual​rights,​accompanied​by​the​most​insidious​attacks​that​reduce​these​rights​to​absolute​nothingness.​This​behavior​would​not​be​believable​if​it​were​not​so​well​known​in​public​ officials,​entrusted​in​a​special​way​with​the​depository​of​public​liberties.​They​proclaim​and​talk​constantly​about​the​most​liberal​principles,​ but​in​the​excessive​use​of​their​powers​they​sometimes​maintain,​and​ other​times​prescribe​and​issue,​decrees​so​barbarous​that​they​could​not​ pass​even​in​governments​branded​as​absolute.​The​inquisitorial​system​

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reestablishes​itself​from​the​moment​when​it​suits​their​ambitious​goals​ to​outlaw​a​faction.​Through​acts​they​call​laws,​all​those​who​make​up​ the​faction​are​delivered​to​military​commissions;​it​compels​them​to​ be​judged​by​people​who​have​already​irrevocably​decided​their​sentence;​and​it​subjects​them​to​a​barbaric​and​absolute​code​that​permits​ prolonging​arrests​and​solitary​confinement​indefinitely​and​delaying​ carrying​out​the​verdict.​It​is​true​that​all​this​is​always​in​opposition​ to​the​fundamental​law,​but​as​it​emanates​from​the​legislative body,​it​is​ called​law,​and​as​the​circumstances​demand,​it​cannot​be​other​than​legal. ​ In​this​way​the​people​and​the​laws​are​mocked​by​those​whose​position​it​is​to​sustain​the​laws​and​protect​the​people.​This​is​how,​through​ acts​that​they​call​circumstantial laws,​they​perpetuate​the​arbitrary​regime​ and​with​it​the​germ​of​disturbances​and​riots,​and​thus​they​overpower​ social​guarantees,​seeking​to​deceive​the​people​with​a​language​that​is​ fraudulent. ​ And​will​it​be​said​of​this​behavior​that​it​is​wise?​Inasmuch​as​it​is​not​ legal,​does​it​offer​security​to​the​freedoms​of​the​patria?​Will​it​calm​ public​disorders?​Not​in​the​least.​It​places​institutions​in​danger,​the​ spirit​of​persecution​is​perpetuated​and​takes​root​in​nations,​it​destroys​ confidence​in​one’s​own​security​and​provokes​revolutions. ​ It​is​difficult​to​find​a​means​less​suitable​for​strengthening​the​institutions​of​a​nation​than​that​of​violating​them,​and​it​would​seem​impossible​that​it​might​have​occurred​to​anyone​to​use​this​means​for​the​ attainment​of​this​end,​if​experience​did​not​prove​that​the​delusions​of​ men​can​reach​even​this​point.​The​simple​explanation​of​the​expressions​will​be​sufficient​to​convince​us​that​laws​of​exception​are​directed​ to​this​and​nothing​else.​If​one​asks​what​is​sought​with​them,​it​will​be​ said​that​it​is​the​salvation​of​the​patria.​As​this​is​not​distinct​from​the​ salvation​of​the​fundamental​laws,​in​the​end​we​will​come​to​deduce​ that​putting​these​laws​out​of​danger​is​what​is​intended.​But​if​one​asks​ again​what​a​law​of​exception​is,​the​only​response​can​be​that​it​is​the​ deprivation​of​either​a​right​or​a​means​of​sustaining​it,​both​set​out​in​ the​constitutional​charter,​and​from​this​can​be​deduced,​as​in​the​last​ analysis,​that​what​is​sought​is​to​save​this​charter​by​its​own​destruction.​Once​one​constitutional​article​is​violated,​the​rest​are​not​safe.​The​ guarantee​of​one​is​the​guarantee​of​all​the​others,​and​no​matter​how​ pressing​one​might​assume​the​reasons​presented​to​demolish​the​first​ article,​there​will​be​no​lack​of​other​reasons​that,​in​their​turn,​are​con-

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sidered​pressing​enough​to​attack​the​others.​If​the​legislative​body​manages​to​provide​this​pernicious​example,​the​government,​the​tribunals,​ and​even​individuals​themselves​will​not​be​long​in​imitating​it,​and​as​ everyone​is​prohibited​from​doing​so,​no​one​will​have​the​right​to​reprimand​the​rest. ​ A​ constitution​ violated​ by​ the​ legislative​ body​ offers​ no​ security​ whatsoever,​for​as​the​transgressor​is​the​supreme​authority,​it​cannot​ be​legally​reprimanded,​nor​are​there​means​to​stop​this​aggression​by​ punishing​the​guilty.​The​alarm,​then,​which​lack​of​confidence​follows​ is​more​lasting​and​permanent.​As​if​individual​security​can​have​protection​when​the​attack​comes​from​the​laws​themselves.​Men​become​ inflamed​in​such​cases​upon​seeing​that​they​do​not​gain​in​society​the​ equivalent​of​what​they​lose,​for​if​one​counts​the​value​of​the​sacrifices,​on​the​one​hand,​and​the​persecution​that​the​laws​cause​them​or​ the​protection​they​do​not​provide​them,​on​the​other​hand,​the​sum​of​ woes​comes​out​greater​than​that​of​the​goods,​or,​better​said,​the​latter​ disappear​completely,​and​the​former​remain​entirely. ​ But​the​effects​of​these​abusive​laws​in​the​judicial​order​are​worth​ closer​scrutiny.​When​one​wants​to​reduce​to​words​empty​of​meaning​ the​rights​set​down​in​a​constitution,​before​corrupting​ordinary​judges​ put​in​place​to​defend​those​rights,​one​attempts​to​create​special​tribunals,​whose​very​name​is​enough​to​imagine​what​must​be​expected​ from​them.​No​one​is​unaware​that​such​manner​of​administering​justice​does​not​have​as​its​purpose​the​protection​of​innocence.​Those​who​ requested​or​dictated​such​laws​hasten​to​make​use​of​them​to​get​rid​of​ their​enemies​through​the​verdict​of​judges​who​are​all​at​the​disposal​ of​whoever​appointed​them.​Their​decisions​will​be​repeated​and​confirmed​as​if​by​an​echo​wherever​they​are​brought.​But​public​opinion​ censures​them​with​a​firm​and​unanimous​voice​that​only​their​authors​ will​have​the​misfortune​not​to​hear,​because​lending​an​ear​only​to​the​ voice​of​the​man​on​whom​they​depend​or​of​those​he​has​at​his​service,​ they​are​concerned​only​with​supporting​a​faction​that​might​have​disappeared​much​earlier​from​the​heart​of​society.​This​regime,​whatever​ might​be​the​guise​under​which​it​attempts​to​present​itself,​is​at​its​heart​ one​of​deception,​shamelessness,​and​cruelty.​In​it,​without​any​exception,​all​questions​are​decided,​not​by​examining​the​facts,​but​rather​ on​the​basis​of​the​views​that​they​have​regarding​the​political​opinions​ of​the​accused.​And​when​the​most​atrocious​and​entirely​established​

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abuses​of​authority​remain​unpunished,​if​the​perpetrators​belong​to​the​ faction​classified​as​sound,​the​opinions​contrary​to​it​are​considered​unpardonable​crimes.​But​the​least​of​all​the​ills​that​laws​of​circumstance​ cause​is​the​obstinacy​that​their​authors​show​toward​leaving​the​tortuous​path​down​which​they​have​begun,​giving​dangerous​circumstances​ as​ their​ pretext,​ without​ wishing​ to​ understand​ that​ these​ dangerous​ circumstances​become​critical​only​when​a​constitution​struggles​with​ an​arbitrary​regime​and​when​the​securities​promised​by​fundamental​ laws​are​evaded​and​remain​without​effect​because​of​special​laws.​This​ is​how​the​very​principle​of​the​ill​that​foments​and​perpetuates​the​sickness​is​applied​as​remedy. ​ Any​moderately​reflective​man​will​be​able​to​anticipate​the​conclusion​of​this​fraudulent​regime.​It​must​end​either​in​the​total​loss​of​individual​security​or​in​political​fluctuations​that​do​not​offer​individual​ security​until​too​late.​What​is​astonishing,​says​a​celebrated​publicist3​ in​public​law,​is​that​such​laws​can​reestablish​themselves​and​that​people​ enlightened​enough​to​reclaim​individual​rights​and​strong​enough​to​ gain​recognition​for​them​take​thoughtlessness​and​negligence​to​the​ point​ of​ allowing​ these​ rights​ to​ be​ reduced​ to​ puerile​ illusions.​ But​ who​does​not​recognize​the​sway​that​words,​formulas,​and​appearances​ exercise​at​the​outset?​Constitutional​articles​in​which​these​rights​are​ proclaimed,​bodies​constituted​to​defend​them,​representatives,​voters,​ the​apparatus,​finally,​of​a​representative​system​appear​visible​to​everyone,​calm​the​spirits,​and​discredit​the​first​alarms​of​the​small​number​ of​citizens​it​has​not​been​able​to​seduce.​The​time​required​for​public​ opinion​to​develop​is​used​to​employ​all​the​means​of​usurpation​and​ imposture​ in​ corrupting​ public​ agents,​ in​ depriving​ those​ who​ resist​ them​of​all​influence,​and​in​forming​those​habits​and​customs​advantageous​to​a​system​of​this​kind​among​the​various​classes,​until​indiscretions​and,​what​is​worse,​excesses​bring​setbacks​that​upset​this​system​and​storms​that​tear​it​from​its​moorings.​Then​its​fall​is​as​rapid​as​ certain,​because​the​first​symptoms​that​announce​it​dissipate​the​illusions​and​return​to​public​opinion​its​enlightenment,​its​liberty,​and​its​ ​power.



3.​Berencer,​Justice Criminelle.

7



Discourse on the Independence of Judicial Power Ne quid nimis.​Nothing​in​excess. —​Fedro

The​inflamed​frenzy​that​has​been​observed​against​the​ defeated​dissenters​and​the​excessive​and​sometimes​immoderate​determination​with​which​their​punishment​is​urged,​seems​to​us​to​belong​to​the​number​of​those​excesses​that,​in​general,​are​not​subject​to​ a​noble​principle,​nor​do​they​have​favorable​outcomes,​especially​when​ the​judges​are​liable​to​lose​an​independence​on​which​social​order​rests.​ The​most​august​honor,​the​most​noble​privilege,​and​the​most​difficult​assignment​there​can​be​among​men​in​any​government​is​being​ the​arbiter​among​their​equals,​ending​their​differences,​and​being​able​ to​deprive​them​with​a​single​word​of​their​goods,​honor,​and​even​life.​ For​ this​ reason,​ in​ the​ first​ periods​ of​ the​ civilization​ of​ nations​ and​ in​the​infancy​of​societies,​it​was​the​supreme​leader​of​the​state​who​ fulfilled​such​important​functions,​administering​justice​to​the​people.​ Once​the​machine​of​government​became​complicated​and​the​attention​ of​the​rulers​was​distracted​by​many​goals,​it​was​necessary​to​dismember​this​branch​of​the​sovereign​authority​and​to​entrust​the​judiciary​to​ a​particular​class​of​magistrates.​The​government​still​reserved​for​itself​ their​selection,​the​charge​of​overseeing​them,​the​power​to​punish​their​ breaches​of​trust,​and​the​beneficent​right​of​mitigating​the​severity​of​ judicial​verdicts. ​ Nonetheless,​ it​ was​ observed​ that​ the​ government,​ as​ the​ one​ that​ selected​ the​ judges​ and​ the​ one​ that​ rewarded​ their​ zeal​ or​ punished​ their​negligence​and​intervened​directly​in​judicial​affairs​to​undo​errors​ or​mitigate​the​severity​of​sentences,​exercised​too​much​influence​over​ ​ Original​title:​“Discurso​sobre​la​necesidad​de​que​sea​efectiva​la​independencia​del​ poder​judicial.”​Source:​El Observador de la República Mexicana,​Mexico,​May​26,​1830. 60

on​the​independenCe​of​judiCial​power : 61

the​judges​and​could​abuse​that​influence​to​oppress​innocence​or​make​ judgment​tip​from​the​side​of​passion.​Since​then​it​was​sought​in​every​ good​ system​ of​ government​ to​ surround​ the​ judicial​ order​ with​ such​ guarantees​that​it​should​be​assumed​fundamentally​that​the​judges,​free​ of​all​dependence,​would​not​listen​to​another​voice​than​that​of​their​ conscience​or​have​another​regulator​of​their​transactions​than​the​law​of​ which​they​are​the​instruments​and​ministers.​In​the​nations,​then,​that​ are​governed​by​the​representative​system,​although​the​power​to​choose​ and​name​all​the​judges​is​left​to​the​government,​and​it​is​charged​with​ overseeing​their​conduct,​it​is​not​permitted​to​remove​them​from​office​ at​its​will.​Even​for​the​selection​itself,​qualities​and​circumstances​that​ persons​must​have​in​order​to​be​named​are​set;​and​with​these​or​similar​precautions,​what​the​writers​in​public​law​call​the​independence​of​ judicial​power​is​ensured​in​every​country​that​might​not​be​Constantinople​or​Morocco. ​ This​independence​is​one​of​the​primary​and​most​important​guarantees​the​fundamental​law​can​and​must​accord​the​citizen​so​that​his​ person​and​property​might​always​be​respected,​because​it​serves​a​mere​ individual​little​to​have​a​well-​organized​legislative​body​and​very​good​ laws​or​an​executive​power​whose​authority​has​been​greatly​curtailed​if​ he​has​good​reason​to​fear​that,​when​one​needs​to​defend​his​financial​ interests​before​civil​tribunals​or​his​innocence​before​criminal​judges,​ it​is​not​the​law​but​the​will,​caprice,​or​passion​of​men​that​decides​his​ fate​and​acquits​or​condemns​him​in​his​lawsuits.​What​do​all​the​doctrines​of​the​writers​in​public​law​on​the​division​of​powers​and​the​balance​of​political​forces​matter​to​the​individual​of​the​society​if,​despite​ all​of​them,​he​is​unjustly​deprived​of​his​goods​or​his​life? ​ Life​and​the​means​of​preserving​and​passing​it​in​an​agreeable​manner;​here​is​every​man;​here​is​everything​that​he​requires​and​the​only​ thing​that​interests​him;​and​here​is​why​the​greatest​benefit​society​can​ give​him​is​that​he​never​be​deprived​of​existence​or​the​things​that​can​ make​it​pleasant​except​when​he​has​made​himself​unworthy,​through​ his​crimes,​of​life​or​things​that​make​it​desirable.​But​this​benefit​cannot​exist​if​the​constitution,​the​laws,​and,​above​all,​the​vigor​of​the​ supreme​government​do​not​make​impossible,​insofar​as​it​is​given​to​ human​discretion,​partiality​in​judgments​or​verdicts​of​the​courts​and​ tribunals.​The​constitution​ensures​honesty​and​impartiality​in​judges​ when,​ through​ the​ qualities​ that​ it​ requires​ to​ become​ one​ and​ the​

62 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

method​of​their​selection,​it​can​be​hoped​that​this​selection​will​fall​ equally​to​persons​of​education​and​probity,​and​when,​through​the​unremovability​that​it​bestows​on​them,​it​shelters​them​from​arbitrary​ dismissal,​the​fear​of​which​could​make​them​instruments​of​the​self-​ interested​aims​of​the​government.​The​laws​augment​these​guarantees,​ assuring​them​appointments​with​which​they​can​live​without​having​ to​sell​justice​to​silence​the​voice​of​poverty,​a​temptation​so​powerful​ that​few​resist​it;​threatening​them​with​very​serious​penalties​should​ they​prostitute​their​august​ministry;​and​specifying​with​great​clarity​ the​circumstances​and​ways​of​demanding​responsibility​from​them​in​ the​event​of​breach​of​duty.​The​government,​finally,​completes​this​system​of​guarantees​and​independence,​creating​respect​for​the​persons​ of​judges,​which​are​sacred​during​the​time​in​which​they​exercise​their​ judgeship,​protecting​them​from​any​violence,​insult,​or​threat​that​is​ intended​to​extract​from​them​an​unjust​verdict​or​one​contrary​to​their​ opinion​in​whatever​the​matter​might​be. ​ Here​are​the​general​and​common​doctrines​on​which​all​writers​in​ public​ law​ agree,​ without​ a​ single​ one​ having​ expressed​ up​ to​ now​ a​ contrary​ opinion​ or​ having​ expressed​ the​ least​ doubt​ in​ even​ one​ of​ these​protective​principles;​and​what​is​more,​here​are​some​ideas​that,​ in​some​way,​can​be​called​innate​in​the​heart​of​man​because,​in​effect,​ in​it​the​instinct​for​his​own​preservation​has​written​them​with​indelible​characters.​Who​is​the​man​who,​led​into​the​presence​of​the​judge​ for​his​crimes,​or​perhaps​only​for​the​appearance​of​them,​would​wish​ a​tumultuous​multitude​to​be​present​in​the​audience​and,​with​raised​ knife,​shout​out​the​interpretation​of​the​law:​condemn​that​wretch​you​ are​looking​at,​and​if​not,​both​of​you​will​die​by​our​hands?​Well​now,​ if​no​one,​whether​defendant​or​accused,​would​want​the​one​who​was​to​ pronounce​the​terrifying​verdict​on​which​his​life​might​depend​threatened​in​this​way,​will​it​be​just​if​someone​dared​to​threaten​judges​to​the​ same​effect​when​they​are​about​to​pronounce​in​the​trial​of​another?​ And​will​they​be​lovers​of​the​constitution,​friends​of​the​laws,​and​adherents​of​liberty,​those​who,​in​a​free​government,​threaten​the​judges​ to​prejudice​their​verdict​and​do​what​would​not​be​tolerated,​not​permitted,​nor​has​ever​been​seen​under​an​arbitrary​regime?​If​such​threats​ are​overlooked,​they​will​end​in​open​violence,​and​if​these​go​unpunished,​they​will​be​repeated,​and​then​what​will​become​of​order​and​the​ rule​of​law?​For​what​is​it​to​speak​of​liberty,​of​enlightenment,​or​of​

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philosophy?​Has​it​not​repeatedly​been​the​case,​and​is​it​without​doubt​ very​certain​that​the​aim​of​political​constitutions​and​the​effect​of​enlightenment​and​philosophy​is​that​citizens​live​subject​only​to​law​and​ not​to​the​whims​or​passions​of​men?​For​how​can​those​who​endeavor​ to​substitute​their​will​for​what​is​predetermined​in​the​laws​and​who​ command​with​threats​the​prophecies​that​have​to​be​pronounced​in​the​ sanctuary​of​Themis​be​constitutionalists,​philosophers,​or​lovers​of​liberty​or​the​laws?​We​are​fully​persuaded​that​those​who​permit​such​sacrilegious​crimes​do​so​carried​away​by​a​zeal​very​laudable​in​itself​but​ very​unfortunate​in​its​consequences,​very​foolish,​and​reprehensible,​ and​for​this​very​reason​we​advise​them​with​confidence​that​once​they​ know​the​error,​they​would​be​the​first​to​detest​it,​to​repent,​and​to​be​ horrified. ​ Are​those​who​request​of​the​judges​in​this​way​that​an​accused​be​ condemned​to​death​sure​that​he​is​guilty​of​a​capital​offense?​Have​they​ fully​examined​the​act​of​which​he​is​accused?​Is​it​legally​proven​that​ he​is​the​perpetrator​of​that​crime?​Have​they​considered​and​weighed​ carefully​all​the​circumstances​of​that​deed?​Are​they​fully​convinced​ that​no​circumstance​extenuates​its​maliciousness​or​excuses​it​in​some​ manner?​Is​it​as​clear​as​the​light​of​day​that​the​law​condemns​him​to​ death?​Is​his​particular​case​decisively​foreseen​and​defined​in​the​penal​ code?​We,​they​say,​neither​know​nor​care​to​know​anything​about​these​ quibbles​ of​ a​ lawyer;​ the​ public​ voice​ says​ that​ the​ accused​ has​ committed​a​crime​that​everyone​considers​capital,​and​we​want​him​executed,​be​the​deed​proven​or​not,​and​be​there​or​not​an​express​law​that​ condemns​him. ​ Well,​now,​is​there​a​single​man,​not​yet​liberal,​humane,​and​enlightened,​but​one​who​preserves​in​his​soul​some​love,​some​respect​for​justice,​who​is​not​embarrassed​by​such​a​claim​and​by​giving​a​response​ that​one​would​not​even​find​in​the​mouths​of​those​who​make​up​the​ most​savage​tribe?​For​this​is,​in​sum,​the​behavior​of​those​who​demand​ the​head​of​an​accused​person​without​knowing​whether​he​is​guilty​because​they​have​not​studied​his​case,​and​the​response​they​tacitly​give​ when​they​are​told​that,​because​the​constitution​did​not​give​them​the​ right​to​apply​the​laws​but​rather​gave​it​to​the​judges​named​by​the​government,​they​must​leave​those​judges​in​full​freedom​so​they​might​ judge​according​to​the​circumstances​of​the​trial​and​what​their​consciences​tell​them,​and​that​to​intimidate​a​judge​with​threats​so​that​he​

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would​pronounce​a​verdict​dictated​to​him​is​the​greatest​crime​that​can​ be​committed​against​the​constitution,​for​it​tears​down​and​destroys​at​ a​single​blow​the​distribution,​division,​balance,​and​independence​of​ the​powers​that​have​been​established​in​it​for​the​benefit​of​all. ​ But​still​they​reply:​And​if​the​judge​has​been​bribed​to​acquit​a​criminal​or​impose​on​him​a​more​gentle​punishment​than​the​one​he​strictly​ deserves?​The​assumption,​generally,​is​false​and​slanderous​and​almost​ always​unfounded,​but​conceding​that​it​might​not​be,​the​solution​is​ very​simple​and​delimited​in​the​same​laws:​denounce​such​a​scandalous​and​criminal​breach​of​trust,​judicially​pursue​that​one​or​those​who​ have​sold​justice,​and​ensure​by​legal​means​that​a​sensational​example​ is​made​of​them​in​order​to​dissuade​all​others​who​are​in​that​situation​ from​imitating​their​iniquity.​But​to​threaten​with​taking​justice​into​ their​own​hands​and​killing​the​accused​on​the​pretext​that​the​judge​has​ treated​him​with​too​much​kindness,​and​to​intimidate​the​tribunal​that​ has​not​ruled​to​their​satisfaction,​more​than​being​the​greatest​affront,​ the​greatest​insult​that​can​be​made​to​humanity,​to​reason,​and​to​justice,​is​the​surest​way​to​put​an​end​to​the​constitutional​regime​and​the​ most​infallible​means​of​making​even​the​name​of​liberty​hateful. ​ In​the​first​place,​if​such​crimes​are​repeated,​there​would​not​be​a​ single​good​man​who​would​want​to​be​a​judge​in​a​country​in​which​ he​is​threatened​and​the​verdicts​he​is​to​pronounce​are​dictated​to​him,​ for​no​man​of​any​probity​wants​to​see​himself​reduced​to​the​difficult​ choice​of​committing​an​injustice​or​being​ridiculed​and​insulted.​In​the​ second​place,​what​sensible​man​would​want​to​live​under​a​government​ which,​were​he​to​have​the​misfortune​to​be​accused​justly​or​unjustly​ of​certain​crimes,​could​not​prevent​his​conviction,​even​when​the​tribunals​recognized​his​innocence?​Who​would​not​hasten​to​flee​from​ such​a​country​of​iniquity?​Who​would​not​blaspheme​free​institutions​ if​they​saw​that,​with​this​name,​the​upheaval​of​society,​the​subversion​ of​all​principles,​and​the​violation​of​the​most​sacred​rights​were​justified? ​ Among​all​injustices,​the​most​odious,​the​least​bearable,​is​that​which​ is​committed​with​judicial​forms​in​the​name​of​justice​and​by​the​very​ magistrates​who​were​supposed​to​administer​it.​And​if​this​is​so,​when​ the​injustice​is​the​result​of​the​error​or​maliciousness​of​the​judge,​how​ much​more​horrific​and​terrible​will​the​atrocity​be​when​it​is​born​of​ violence?​Against​the​errors​or​personal​arbitrariness​of​the​judges,​the​

on​the​independenCe​of​judiCial​power : 65

Constitution​and​the​laws​have​provided​us​with​a​solution,​authorizing​ appeals,​and​if​these​are​not​sufficient,​means​for​annulment;​but​against​ the​violence​of​threats​or​at​gunpoint,​what​means​will​the​unfortunate​ person​have​over​whom​this​storm​bursts?​None,​of​course.​Those​who​ applaud,​praise,​or​excuse​at​least​the​first​crimes​of​this​kind​can​now​ count​on​the​most​bitter​fruits,​for​they​serve​as​the​text​for​the​disrepute​and​slanders​with​which​our​enemies​seek​to​discredit​us​in​cultured,​powerful,​and​civilized​Europe. ​ It​is​time​now​that​those​who​heretofore​have​proceeded​in​this​way​ retrace​their​steps​and​consider​that​violating​justice,​trampling​on​the​ authority,​so​respectable,​of​the​tribunals,​and​intimidating​and​threatening​individuals​is​not​a​good​way​to​guarantee​and​make​amiable​the​ present​order​of​things.​It​will​have​served​nothing​to​have​removed​and​ eliminated​the​power​and​favor​that​resurrected​the​notable​extraordinary​authorities,​the​weak​influence​they​could​have​on​tribunals​and​ their​decisions,​if​an​influence​much​more​direct,​powerful,​and​terrible​ in​criminal​sentences​is​now​usurped​by​a​fraction​of​the​people. ​ No​good​intention,​no​motive,​however​noble​one​might​suppose​it​ to​be,​can​justify​the​threats​that,​in​private​conversations​and​gatherings​ and​in​some​public​papers,​are​poured​on​the​judges​and​other​constituted​authorities​because​they​do​not​venture​to​violate​the​forms,​upset​ the​order​of​trials,​or​apply​capital​punishment​to​those​who,​in​their​ judgment,​do​not​deserve​it;​on​this​point​reason​is​in​agreement​with​ the​Constitution​and​the​laws.​We​sincerely​desire​to​make​those​who​ are​thus​deluded​know​the​truth,​and​for​this,​without​insisting​more​on​ the​incontrovertible​truths​that​we​have​just​urged,​we​will​conclude​our​ discourse​with​one​single​observation. ​ They​say​that​they​are​lovers​of​justice​and​of​the​present​order​of​ things,​that​they​see​it​perishing​through​the​apathy​and​delay​of​the​ judges​in​accelerating​cases​and​for​their​kindness​in​the​application​of​ punishments;​arrange,​then,​the​judges​and​tribunals​in​the​desired​way​ and,​once​this​is​done,​let​us​ask​what​will​happen​when​these​judges​ acquit,​as​will​happen​many​times,​one​or​more​persons​accused​of​political​crimes?​Will​they​seek​them​out​to​take​their​lives​because​they​ have​not​ruled​as​they​wanted?​And​who,​after​all​this,​would​accept​the​ honorable​post​of​judge?​And​what​would​become​of​the​liberty​and​ independence​that​the​law​assures​them​in​their​deliberations​and​judgments​if​they​do​not​have​to​perform​according​to​their​conscience,​but​

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rather​at​the​whim​of​those​who​want​everyone​executed​whom​they​ suppose​deserving​of​the​ultimate​punishment?​We​say​that​many​of​ those​accused​of​political​crimes​would​be​fully​acquitted​because,​in​the​ moment​men​see​themselves​invested​with​the​august​character​of​the​ judgeship,​they​become​other​than​what​they​were​before,​and​they​see​ themselves​placed​under​an​obligation​to​follow​the​precise​letter​of​the​ law.​From​this​results​that,​not​being​able​to​get​out​of​the​case​material​ anticipated​in​the​law​that​serves​as​the​basis​for​the​accusation​of​guilt,​ and​this​many​times​not​being​the​same​as​the​law​designates,​they​have​ to​declare​him​not​guilty​of​the​crime​of​which​he​is​accused;​and​as​it​is​ very​difficult​for​the​law​to​anticipate​or​precisely​define​all​crimes,​for​ some​crimes​it​will​inevitably​come​about,​because​of​not​being​specified​in​the​code,​that​it​will​be​necessary​to​acquit​the​accused.​We​have​ many​examples​of​this​even​in​those​ tribunals​ disposed​absolutely​ to​ condemn​and​universally​recognized​as​barbarous​and​inhumane. ​ These​detestable​qualities​cannot​be​denied​in​the​revolutionary​tribunal​established​ in​the​very​sad​days​of​the​French​Convention​ and​ under​ the​ immediate​ influence​ of​ Robespierre;​ nonetheless,​ this​ tribunal,​although​in​reality​it​was​not​a​tribunal​nor​did​it​merit​such​a​ name​simply​because​it​had​the​appearance​of​one,​sometimes​did​not​ satisfy​the​revolutionaries​and​absolved​from​the​pain​of​death​various​ persons​accused​of​political​crimes​through​the​fury​of​the​revolutionaries.​One​must,​then,​be​convinced​that​it​will​not​be​possible​to​find​ a​ judge,​ even​ though​ deliberately​ sought,​ who​ would​ be​ sufficient​ to​ quench​that​rabid​thirst​for​blood​that​rises​in​those​moments​immediately​following​the​triumph​of​political​factions,​and​that​generally​is​ due​more​to​ignoble​revenge​than​to​impartial​justice. ​ And​will​it​be​a​great​misfortune​for​society​if​the​executioner​has​ fewer​occasions​to​exercise​his​odious​and​terrible​ministry?​If​sound​ philosophy​would​like​the​bloody​spectacle​of​an​execution​to​be​abolished,​even​for​common​atrocious​crimes,​will​this​show​itself​with​more​ profusion​and​fewer​formalities​in​political​crimes​that​are​only​crimes​ in​ specific​ places?​ If​ those​ actions​ that​ generally​ depend​ on​ opinion​ going​astray,​on​erroneous​concepts​and​wrong​ideas​must​be​punished​ with​the​loss​of​life,​what​punishment,​then,​will​be​imposed​on​murderers,​thieves,​and​the​other​vicious​people​whose​crimes​have​their​ source​in​the​heart’s​perversity?​Yes,​we​insist​that​it​be​kept​in​mind​ that​political​crimes​are​among​those​in​which​some​leniency​is​appro-

on​the​independenCe​of​judiCial​power : 67

priate,​because​ordinarily​they​are​born​of​an​error​in​understanding​ and​not​of​that​malignancy​of​an​incorrigible​heart​which,​when​a​man​ has​committed​a​series​of​atrocious​crimes,​makes​it​almost​necessary​to​ exterminate​him​like​a​wild​animal​from​which​society​can​expect​nothing​but​injury. ​ Such​a​man​is​today​the​enemy​of​the​present​order​of​things,​and​he​ works​to​destroy​it,​and,​corrected​by​an​imprisonment​or​exile​more​ or​less​extensive,​will​never​return​to​take​up​the​business​of​counterrevolution,​because​he​does​not​contract​the​habit​of​plotting​like​the​ one​who​kills​or​robs.​He​who​has​been​accustomed​to​being​a​thief​does​ not​easily​let​go​of​this​vicious​habit,​but​he​who​comes​out​badly​in​an​ attempted​revolution​generally​remains​forever​taught​by​punishment.​ This​rule​can​have​exceptions,​but​it​is​fairly​general. ​ If​we​did​not​observe​in​many​of​our​fellow​citizens​that​tendency​ to​accelerate​cases,​trials​of​conspiracy,​and​to​force​and​prejudice​in​a​ certain​way​the​verdicts​of​judges,​while,​on​the​other​hand,​they​do​not​ show​great​insistence​on​the​persecution​of​other​crimes;​if​we​do​not​ recognize​all​this,​we​repeat,​we​would​have​exempted​ourselves​from​ fighting​this​inclination,​which,​if​it​begins​to​grow​larger,​can​make​ itself​excessively​harmful​to​the​system​of​tribunals​and​put​social​guarantees​in​great​danger.​We​have​suffered​too​much​in​the​periods​of​our​ revolution,​and​it​is​now​time​for​us​to​reestablish​the​reign​of​harmony,​ moderation,​and​justice​in​a​shaking​up​that​has​taken​as​its​motto​the constitution and the laws.1

​ 1.​This​essay​was​written​in​May​1830.​Mora​was​referring​to​the​motto​(“Constitution​and​Laws”)​of​the​last​successful​rebellion.​The​government​of​Vicente​Guerrero​ was​toppled​in​1830​by​General​Anastasio​Bustamante.​(Editor’s​note)

8 ​

Discourse on Public Opinion and the General Will

Here​are​two​phrases​as​often​repeated​in​republics​as​ silenced​in​absolute​monarchies,​perhaps​because​their​true meaning​constitutes​the​compelling​strength​of​the​first​and​is​the​implied​censure​ and​most​constant​threat​against​the​existence​of​the​second.​But​see​at​ the​ same​ time​ two​ phrases​ humanity​ and​ philosophy​ will​ never​ pronounce​without​trembling,​because​in​their​name​horrible​crimes​have​ been​ perpetrated​ in​ the​ world,​ and​ because​ they​ have​ been​ and​ will​ always​be​the​cloak​of​demagogues,​the​deadly​defense​of​factions​and​ favorite​watchword​of​all​revolutionaries,​similar​to​the​comets,​innocent​stars​like​all​the​others,​but​which​lent​barbarism​the​occasion​to​ cause,​through​impassioned​imaginations,​damages​in​which​they​did​ not​take​any​part​whatsoever.​These​phrases​serve​malice​as​a​horrific​ weapon​ to​ get​ its​ way​ with​ their​ sacrilegious​ intentions,​ even​ when​ nothing​corresponding​to​the​phrases​exists​except​sound​devoid​of​all​ reality. ​ Just​ because​ the​ significance​ of​ these​ terms​ is​ so​ respectable,​ it​ is​ enough​to​pronounce​them​to​make​absolute governments​tremble​and​fill​ with​suspicious​distrust​and​silence​popular governments​and​make​them​ lower​their​heads;​but​be​careful,​be​careful​with​carrying​that​respect​ beyond​its​limits​in​such​a​way​that​it​prevents​us​from​approaching​the​ intended​object​that​must​produce​it​(as​almost​always​happens),​for​ that​way​an​illusion​will​generally​intimidate​us;​we​would​worship​a​ shadow​instead​of​the​divinity​we​imagine. ​ In​ no​ government​ is​ that​ examination​ more​ necessary​ than​ in​ the​ popular,​and​never​more​interesting​than​in​times​like,​unfortunately,​the​ present,​in​which​diverse​factions​argue​over​the​benefit​of​their​opposing​ interests.​As,​then,​each​one​of​them​defends​his​intentions​with​those​ ​ Original​title:​“Discurso​sobre​la​opinión​pública​y​voluntad​general.”​Source:​El Observador de la República Mexicana,​Mexico,​August​1,​1827. 68

on​publiC​opinion​and​the​General​will : 69

respectable​phrases,​it​is​indispensible​to​know​well​their​full​value​to​ determine​if​none,​some,​and​which​of​the​rivals​possesses​such​treasure. ​ Let​us​attempt,​then,​to​do​for​the​government​and​the​Mexican​public​ a​ most​ interesting​ service,​ examining​ what​ those​ terms​ signify;​ if​ what​they​signify​can​exist​and​in​which​cases;​if​there​will​be​sure​indications​to​recognize​their​existence;​and,​finally,​if​it​is​assumed,​whether​ there​will​always​be​an​obligation​to​yield​to​their​rule,​or​if​one​will​be​ able​to​or​even​should​resist​it​at​some​time. ​ These​questions​deserve​all​the​attention​and​study​of​our​fellow​citizens,​ particularly​ the​ legislators​ and​ public​ officials,​ because​ on​ their​ erroneous​resolution​rest​a​thousand​future​woes​of​the​patria​and​the​ noisy​or​silent​undermining​of​the​institutions​on​which​it​bases,​with​ reason,​its​stability​and​its​fate.​Let​us​now​get​to​the​subject​so​that​our​ reflections​might​contribute​abundant​material​to​whomever​can​speak​ with​greater​knowledge. What do these phrases signify? ​ In​metaphysics, opinion​is​adherence​of​the​understanding​to​a​proposition​or​propositions​through​solid​foundations​that​one​is​convinced​to​ be​the​truth,​but​not​so​clearly​and​evidently​that​they​free​it​completely​ from​the​fear​that​it​might​be​its​contradiction.​There​are,​for​example,​ reasons​for​believing​that​the​ebb​and​flow​of​the​sea​is​the​result​of​the​ attraction​of​the​moon,​but​there​are​other,​opposing​reasons.​He​who​on​ the​basis​of​the​first​set​of​reasons​decides​to​attribute​such​an​effect​to​ the​moon​without​completely​resolving​the​second​is​said​to​embrace opinion.​Of​him​who​repeats​that​proposition​for​no​reason​other​than​having​ heard​it,​what​can​be​said​with​accuracy​is​that​he does not know,​and​at​ most,​that​he​believes,​if​his​entire​foundation​for​regarding​the​proposition​as​certain​is​the​regard​he​has​for​the​person​from​whom​he​heard​it. ​ The​ significance​ of​ the​ word​ “opinion”​ does​ not​ change​ when​ it​ carries​over​into​the​political.​There,​the​same​as​anywhere​else,​the​term​ denotes​adopt, embrace​as​true​a​proposition​based​on​foundations​that​ seem​solid​to​the​understanding,​and​more​solid​than​those​foundations​ that​persuade​of​the​opposite,​although​it​cannot​provide​them​a​completely​satisfactory​response. ​ The​word​“will”​is​well​understood​by​everyone;​it​always​signifies​ the​ attachment​ of​ our​ soul​ to​ some​ object​ that​ the​ understanding​ has​

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conceived​as​good.​The​intensity​of​love​or​desire​is​proportionate​to​the​ degrees​of​goodness​that​we​apprehend​in​the​object​and​those​of​the​ clarity​with​which​the​understanding​presents​that​good​to​us. ​ These​ideas​are​very​clear;​they​are​those​that​all​philosophers​assert​ and​what​all​men​experience.​From​them​we​deduce,​then,​the​truths​ that​pertain​to​our​case. ​ To​this​point​we​are​proceeding​well,​and​we​will​not​be​contradicted.​ The​difficulty​begins​with​the​adjectives​in​these​phrases,​because​delving​deeply​into​what​“public”​means​in​the​first​and​“general”​in​the​ second,​it​is​necessary​that​the​spell​vanish​with​which​the​unwary​are​ deceived​so​as​to​make​them​blind​instruments​of​destruction,​who​will,​ in​their​turn,​be​destroyed. ​ These​ phrases,​ “public​ opinion,”​ and​ “general​ will,”​ either​ signify​ nothing​ that​ can​ serve​ demagogic​ purposes,​ or​ they​ must​ denote​ the​ opinion​ and​ the​ will,​ at​ least,​ of​ the​ greater​ number​ of​ citizens​ who​ make​up​a​republic,​but​not​the​absolute​total,​as​it​seems​it​should​be. ​ Notice​that​the​classical​authors,​when​they​use​these​phrases​to​establish​their​doctrines,​seem​not​to​give​so​much​latitude​to​their​meaning,​ but​rather​they​understand​by​them​the​opinion​and​will​more​generalized​among​those​who​are​capable​of​forming​it​with​respect​to​each​ subject;​but​we,​whose​intention​is​to​combat​the​frequent​anarchic​applications,​ give​ them​ generally​ the​ sense​ of​ coincidence​ of​ opinions​ and​ desire of all,​or​even​the​considerable majority​of​the​citizens regarding a specific object.​Having​given​this​warning​and​the​terms​now​defined,​let​us​ consider​the​second​question. Is there a subject regarding which a​uniformity​of opinions and the desire of the greater part of the citizens can be verified? ​ It​has​been​said​already​that​there​is​not​desire​or​love​with​respect​ to​objects​that​are​not​known,​and​that​there​is​no​opinion​as​long​as​the​ understanding​has​not​settled​on​foundations​whose​solidity​is​sufficient​ to​persuade​it.​So,​therefore,​there​will​not​be​uniformity​in​the​thinking​ and​desiring​of​the​greater​number​of​citizens​of​a​republic,​but​rather​ only​with​respect​to​those​objects​that​are​within​the​reach​of​that​majority,​that​is​to​say,​in​the​reach​of​all​men.​How​many​objects​of​that​ class​will​there​be?​Will​they​exceed​the​number​of​fingers​of​the​hands​ if​we​use​them​to​count?

on​publiC​opinion​and​the​General​will : 71

​ It​can​be​established​as​a​general​rule​that​only​certain​experimental​truths​and​simple​first​principles​can​be​conceived​uniformly​by​the​ majority;​but​at​the​moment​when​objects​become​complicated​in​their​ relationships,​and​in​proportion​to​how​these​relationships​multiply,​how​ they​get​in​the​way​of​each​other,​and​how​the​terms​recede​away​to​a​ greater​distance,​the​impossibility​of​uniformity​arises​and​grows.​The​majority​abandon​it,​and​their​examination​does​not​even​occur​to​them,​and​ the​few​who​have​an​ability​and​dedicate​themselves​to​the​examination​ see​them​from​different​angles​and,​for​that​reason,​establish​on​the​basis​ of​them​very​diverse​and​even,​many​times,​contradictory​principles. ​ All​men​have​the​same​faculties,​but​perhaps​no​two​apply​them​in​the​ same​way​to​their​aims,​from​which​grows​such​a​multitude​of​passions,​ such​a​diversity​of​desires,​and​the​infinite​variety​of​concepts.​Everyone​ experiences​pleasures,​but​each​in​his​own​way;​everyone​suffers​pain,​ but​in​how​different​a​way,​and​how​many​times​does​the​same​object​that​ provides​pleasures​to​some,​cause​anguish​and​repugnance​in​others!​So,​ about​the​only​agreement​we​have​is​on​the​vague and indefinite​desire​to​ be​happy,​child​of​abstract,​confused,​and​general​understanding​of​happiness.​But​when​it​comes​to​realizing​or​satisfying​that​desire,​each​one​goes​ by​a​very​different​road​and​believes​himself​able​to​find​this​treasure​in​ objects​very​distant​from​one​another.​Let​us​agree,​then,​that​if​the​truth​ is​not​practical and experimental​or​exceedingly simple,​we​waste​time​looking​ for​it​with​respect​to​the​true opinion and will​of​the​greater​number. ​ As​societies​and​republics​are​nothing​more​than​the​consolidation​of​ families,​and​these​of​individuals,​it​is​necessary​to​acknowledge​that​public opinion​and​general will,​if​they​exist,​must​have​the​same​sources​as​ individual​opinion​and​will,​and​those​can​be​verified​only​if​the​source​ of​these​others​is​identical.​Well,​now,​let​us​examine​the​men,​or​better​ let​each​man​examine​himself,​and​tell​us​which​were​the​sources​of​the​ opinions​they​embraced​in​their​lives,​which​have​produced​lasting​opinions​and​which​transient,​and​all​will​respond​that​their​opinions​have​ arisen​either​from​education​or​from​respectful habits​that​they​acquired​ from​their​education​or​from​their​perceptions​or​from​their​reflective meditations and study;​that​those​which​originate​from​this​last​source​are​generally​readily​changeable​because,​even​when​they​are​certain,​they​are​ accompanied​by​fear,​because​of​the​experience​of​other​errors​and​mistakes;​that​those​which​originate​in​the​other​three​primary​sources​create​ deep​roots​and,​even​should​they​be​false,​are​set​aside​with​difficulty.

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​ Assuming​this,​and​it​being​impossible​that​the​greater​part​of​the​ citizens​dedicate​themselves​to​reflective meditation​and​study,​there​only​ remains​to​us,​as​origins​of​public​opinion,​general education,​sensations,​ and respectful acquiescence,​repeating​in​regard​to​this​last​that​it​is​more​ likely​the​source​of​faith​than​of​opinion​because,​not​providing​us​with​ direct​foundations,​it​makes​us​defer​to​what​the​person​or​persons​to​ whom​we​give​credit​present​to​us​as​certain. ​ Sensations​provide​us​only​with​experimental truths,​for​example​that​ the​ sun​ gives​ light,​ that​ fire​ burns;​ and​ so,​ putting​ these​ to​ one​ side,​ there​can​be​public opinion​only​with​respect​to​those​objects​that​might​ have​been​subjects​of​general education. ​ From​ this,​ anyone​ will​ infer​ very​ correctly​ that,​ it​ being​ unfortunately​undeniable,​there​has​never​been​among​us​popular education;​that​ the​fruits​of​what​is​sown​today​will​be​gathered​twelve​or​twenty​years​ from​now;​that​the​majority​of​our​people​did​not​go​to​the​few​and​bad​ schools;​that​those​who​went​to​them​learned​only​and​at​most​the​catechism​of​Ripalda,​badly​explained​most​of​the​time;​and​that​popular​ instruction​has​been​relative​only​to​religion—and​would​that​they​presented​it​in​all​its​purity!—will​infer,​we​repeat,​that,​besides​the​truths​ of​immediate experience,​there​is​among​Mexican​citizens​uniformity​of​ thoughts​and​desires​only​in​matters​of​religion,​because​they​drink​it​ with​mother’s​milk,​and​in​independence of all foreign domination,​because​ it​ is​ such​ a​ simple​ object,​ so​ perceptible,​ and​ because​ of​ its​ deprivation​misfortunes​came​to​us​through​all​the​senses.​Excepted​from​this​ rule​are​neither​the​few​that​there​may​still​be​who​have​lost​their​sense​ of​civic​responsibility,​longing​for​the​sepulchral​calm​of​the​time​of​ slavery,​nor​some​who,​for​their​misfortune​and​ours,​detestable​books​ have​corrupted,​which​they​read​with​neither​principles​nor​criticism,​ and​those​books​have​made​them​waver​in​and​even​abjure​the​holy​religion​they​professed. ​ The​ well-​off​ class​ among​ our​ youth​ and​ the​ humblest​ and​ poorest​among​our​citizens​ provide​the​confirmation​ of​these​truths.​Observe​the​former​carefully​since​our​independence​and​you​will​note​ the​yearning​ with​ which​this​ class​ searches​ for​ works​ of​ the​sciences​ whose​names​we​did​not​previously​know;​the​promptness​with​which​ it​ adopts​ the​ principles​ of​ each​ new​ work​ that​ arrives;​ the​ ease​ with​ which​they​are​applied​despite​overrunning​everything;​and​the​equal​ ease​with​which​they​are​abandoned​with​the​arrival​of​another​work​

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that​establishes​different​principles.​From​what​does​this​changeability​ arise?​From​an​excess​of​ingenuity​and​a​lack​of​experience​in​scientific​ education.​The​desire​to​know​and​the​necessity​of​governing​ourselves​ make​us​devour​whatever​comes​to​our​hands,​and​not​being​well​rooted​ in​the​true​principles,​because​they​never​gave​them​to​us,​nor​did​we​ learn​them​ourselves,​we​wander​from​theory​to​theory,​and​the​same​ thing​ will​ happen​ to​ us​ until​ sufficient​ time​ has​ passed​ for​ reflective​ meditation​and​experience​to​root​us​in​the​solid​truths​which​we​still​ distrust.​Therefore,​for​now​we​must​not​allege​public​opinion​with​such​ satisfaction​and​generality,​not​even​in​speaking​of​the​well-​to-​do​and​ studious​class,​because​what​we​do​not​acquire​in​education​only​study​ and​experience​can​give​us,​and​those​require​a​greater​passage​of​time​ than​what​has​passed​since​we​have​become​free. ​ In​the​poorest​class,​which​is​incomparably​the​greater,​the​assertion​ is​still​more​palpable:​whoever​goes​out​to​deal​with​the​people​of​the​ country​ or​ enters​ into​ artisan​ workshops​ to​ explore​ what​ they​ think​ about​the​innumerable​questions​of​politics,​economics,​and​morality​ that​legislators​must​handle​daily,​will​see​that​some​respond​only​with​ the​smile of suspicion,​ indicating​that​they​fear​one​wants​to​make​fun​ of​them;​and​others,​more​simple,​respond:​And what do I know of that?​ There​is​no​need​to​give​this​too​much​thought.​Our​people​are​almost​ uniquely​generally satisfied​with​religion,​with​independence,​with​the​ desire​to​pay​as​little​as​possible​in​taxes​or​nothing​if​that​is​possible;​ with​whatever​will​allow​them​to​work​and​freely​pursue​their​lives;​that​ their​personal​security​be​stable;​that​they​can​enjoy​their​possessions​ in​peace;​and​they​become​involved​in​nothing​else,​not​even​to​inform​ themselves​about​government​provisions;​they​respect​their​legislators,​ the​government,​and​the​subordinate​authorities​and​let​them​do​their​ work. ​ It​seems​very​certain,​then,​and​it​is​among​us​even​if​it​might​not​be​ everywhere,​that​the​only​objects​of​common​opinion​are​those​that​derive​from​popular​education,​those​that​come​through​the​senses,​that​is​ to​say​empirical​truths,​or​that​are​directly​deduced​from​them,​and​those​ very​few​which,​because​of​their​simplicity​and​total​lack​of​relational​ complication​with​other​objects,​are​offered​to​the​majority​and​are​perceptible​to​everyone;​but​speculative​truths,​complex and difficult​truths​ like​those​the​science​of​government​embraces,​are​neither​objects​of​the​ opinion​of​the​greater​number,​nor​is​there​regarding​them​that​unifor-

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mity​of​the​majority,​except​in​the​case​in​which​they​adopt​them​by​tradition,​instilled​by​three​or​four​people​who​are​referred​to​as​entourage.​ Then,​the​majority​believes,​does​not​opine;​is​incited​mechanically,​does​ not​incite;​and​thus​their​thought,​as​their​desire,​does​not​generally​last​ longer​than​that​of​the​voices​with​which​those​who​have​set​themselves​ up​as​coryphaeuses​urge​them​on. ​ The law,​we​will​be​told,​is the expression of the general will;​then​how​ can​there​be​so​few​objects​of​public opinion​and​consequently​so​few​ objects​of​that​ will?​If​that​ maxim,​ taken​from​Rousseau,​ were​absolutely​ true,​ says​ the​very​ profound​ Bentham,1​“there​ is​ not​ a​country​ that​ would​ have​ laws,​ for​ neither​ in​ Geneva​ nor​ in​ the​ small​ democratic​cantons​does​the​right​of​suffrage​have​that​universality,​nor​is​that​ right​of​suffrage​of​the​true​majority​of​the​total​number​of​inhabitants​ ever​verified.”​If,​through​such​a​principle,​one​wants​to​indicate​that​ those​with​responsibility​for​making​the​laws​received​from​the​people​ that​very​august​investiture​or​that,​given​the​law,​the​citizens​accept​ it,​those​obligated​to​it​by​their​social​pacts,​then,​yes,​it​has​a​just​and​ true​meaning,​and​the​will​to​carry​out​what​the​law​prescribes​is​perfectly​understood​as​the​primitive​will​to​observe​what​those​whom​the​ peoples​elected​for​that​very​important​end​decree.​Everything​that​is​ not​this​is​neither​intelligible​ nor​philosophically​ sustainable​ and​is​the​ eternal​breeding​ground​of​anarchy​and​its​consequent​misfortunes. ​ It​ remains,​ then,​ to​ resolve​ the​ third​ question,​ and​ what​ has​ been​ said​until​now​will​shorten​much​of​the​road​that​we​have​to​walk​in​ ​examining ​ If there will be some fixed signs by which to recognize whether public opinion has been formed. ​ On​this​matter​it​is​easier​to​say​what​is​not​than​what​is;​the​negative​ rules​are​very​certain​and,​on​the​contrary,​the​positive​ones​are​ambiguous,​and​generally​their​application​to​the​practical​can​produce​only​ probabilities. ​ It​has​been​said​that​there​is​no​public opinion​if​the​question​or​proposition​with​which​it​deals​is​not​practical and experimental​or​so​simple​as​ to​be​within​the​reach​of​the​majority​of​people,​and​consequently​there​ ​ 1.​ Jeremy​ Bentham,​ Tactique des assemblées législatives,​ 2​ vols.​ (Geneva​ and​ Paris,​ 1816).

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is​not​public​opinion​except,​as​we​will​state​later​on,​over​propositions​ that,​although​practical,​ have​complication​ of​circumstances​ and​aims​ that,​in​order​to​combine​them,​require​more​than​trivial attention​and​ some​thorough​reflective​meditation,​for​it​is​clear​that​the​generality​of​ citizens​is​not​capable​of​this. ​ In​ questions​ and​ propositions​ that​ are​ speculative,​ complicated,​ and profound,​there​can​be​no​true​public​opinion​unless​these​questions​and​ propositions​have​been​the​object​of​popular,​constant,​and​generalized​ education,​in​which​case,​although​they​come​to​be​adopted​traditionally​ and​generally​without​proofs,​the​way of thinking​is​uniform,​although​it​ cannot​strictly​be​called​opinion,​given​what​has​just​been​said. ​ Self-​love​is​the​universal​passion​of​all​men,​and​in​the​judgment​of​ even​the​great​philosophers,​all​the​other​passions,​to​which​are​given​ different​names​according​to​the​object​to​which​it​applies,​are​the​very​ same.​What​is​beyond​doubt​is​that,​if​not​every​man​is​lascivious​nor​ vindictive,​etc.​.​.​.​every​man​loves​himself​and​seeks​his​well-being​wherever​it​may​be​and​in​all​his​actions,​so​that,​although​the​objects​of​the​ application​and​reflective​meditation​of​men​might​be​infinitely​varied,​ and​although​the​exercise​of​study​might​be​for​so​very​few,​there​is​ no​man​at​all​for​whom​his​individual​interest​does​not​require​of​him​ attention,​deliberations,​and​frequent​periods​of​thinking;​and​as​meditation​is​a​source​of​opinion,​it​follows​that​there​can​be​public​opinion​ on​objects​of​common​interest​or​utility. ​ The​wise​Bentham​was,​then,​quite​correct​when,​referring​to​legislation,​he​said​public utility was the surest criterion of public opinion,2​ an​ expression​that​we​convert​into​a​negative​maxim,​saying:​no​measure​ whatsoever​that​is​not​in​the​common​interest,​immediate​and​readily​ perceptible,​is​a​proper​object​of​true​public​opinion. ​ Focus​for​a​moment​on​the​expression​immediate and readily perceptible​ because​there​are​innumerable​measures​that​will​surely​produce​general​ well-​being​and​happiness;​but​because​this​has​not​been​their​immediate​ outcome​nor​has​it​yet​been​experienced,​they​do​not​have​in​their​favor​ the​majority​of​the​people,​for​whom​only​experience​is​the​foundation​ for​believing​and​thinking,​and​for​whom​good​and​evil​have​either​to​ enter​through​the​senses​or​they​enter​them​almost​never. ​

2.​Ibid.

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​ Bayle3​observed,​before​us,​that​it​is​almost​natural​in​men​not​to​think​ for​themselves​and​that​a​quasi-​innate​apathy​makes​them​form​an​idea​ of​one​or​some​individuals​to​allow​them​to​know​and​hold​for​certain​ what​those​individuals​tell​them​they​have​thought.​Generally​we​pay​ that​respectful deference​to​our​parents,​masters,​and​superiors,​in​whom​ we​are​accustomed​to​imagining​more​learning​and​talent.​Thus,​we​experience,​generally,​that​the​opinion​of​the​father​is​that​of​the​sons,​the​ opinion​of​the​master​that​of​his​servants,​and​the​opinion​of​a​leader​of​ a​community,​if​he​is​well​liked,​that​of​those​who​are​his​subordinates.​ Besides​these​relationships,​sources​of​opinion,​there​are​others​that,​in​ order​to​distinguish​them​from​those,​we​could​call​artificial.​Among​ every​people,​individually​if​the​people​is​not​very​numerous,​one​or​ some​inhabitants​acquire​a​following​because​of​their​generosity,​because​of​their​honesty,​because​of​their​beneficence,​and​even​sometimes​ because​of​some​reprehensible​vice.​Such​as​these​also​become​sources​ of​beliefs and persuasions,​and​their​way​of​thinking​spreads​among​their​ cronies,​who​by​tradition​embrace​it.​Opinions​adopted​and​generalized​ in​this​way​do​not​merit,​as​I​have​already​repeated,​the​name​of​opinion,​ but​it​is​appropriate​to​call​them​belief​or​persuasion;​and​we​say​that​it​ can​be​taken​as​common persuasion​what​is​felt​to​be​so​by​the​greater​part​ of​those​individuals​who​have​a​following​in​their​towns. ​ Nonetheless​the​previous​rule​is​very​open​to​ambiguities,​principally​ in​times​of​factions,​for​well​known​are​the​efforts​that​each​one​of​them​ makes​to​win​over​those​popular coryphaeuses,​those​who,​won​over​by​ fairly​well-​known​means​repeat,​many​times​against​their​conscience,​ the​favorite​axioms​of​the​faction​that​won​them.​Their​followers​hear​ them,​and​they​do​the​same​thing.​Be​advised,​however,​that​the​voices​ are​not​diverse;​it​is​one​voice​with​various echoes,​a​very​interesting​observation,​especially​for​legislators​whom​the​situation​always​subjects​ to​torments​from​which​they​will​not​emerge​well​except​with​rules​that​ we​will​present​in​the​fourth​question,​anticipating​them​now,​the​celebrated​maxim​and​eternal​truth​of​the​immortal​Bentham,​“Good​faith​ and​justice​are​the​most​healthy​politics​and​the​most​lasting.”4 ​ Neither​of​each​individual​alone,​nor​of​all​or​most​of​them​taken​ ​ 3.​Pierre​Bayle,​French​philosopher​and​critic,​founder​of​eighteenth-​century​rationalism.​(Editor’s​note) ​ 4.​Bentham,​op.​cit.

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together,​ can​ it​ be​ said​ that​ they​ have​ opinion,​ as​ long​ as​ understandings​vacillate​and​wander​uncertain​over​the​truths​under​discussion.​In​ order​that​there​be​opinion​it​is​necessary​that​the​understanding​be​decided,​and​not​willfully,​but​because​of​foundations​so​solid​that​they​ must​have​compelled​assent​despite​not​having​found​a​satisfactory​response​to​the​conflicting​ones;​and​when​the​understanding​has​been​ settled​for​reasons​of​this​nature,​neither​has​it​done​so​instantaneously,​ but​rather​by​a​slow and reflective​process,​nor​does it change opinion easily,​ and​so​long​as​another​reflective​meditation,​yet​slower​than​the​first,​ does​not​present​new​and​more​solid​reasons​in​opposition. ​ One​must​understand​that​constancy​is​not​the​same​as​invariability,​ and​thus​when​we​establish​as​a​rule​that​one​cannot​have​public​opinion​without​constancy,​that​is​to​say​without​the​majority​of​the​citizens​ being​constantly​advised​of​it​(which​is​known​either,​first,​when​the​ same​opinion​is​observed​despite​varying​circumstances​or,​then,​when​ it​ is​ being​ repeated​ notwithstanding​ the​ passage​ of​ time),​ we​ do​ not​ mean​that​the​public​cannot​change​its​opinions,​but​rather​that​it​has​to​ change​them​in​the​same​way​it​formed​them,​slowly​and​gradually​and​ (the​same​as​each​individual)​by​this​silent​examination​of​the​opposing​ foundations​with​which​public​opinion​can​sometimes​be​changed;​but​ this​is​neither​frequent​nor​the​work​of​a​moment,​but​rather​worked​ out​over​a​long​time. ​ This​ reliable​ rule​ should​ allow​ us​ to​ give​ their​ legitimate​ value​ to​ those​popular​and​tumultuous​surges,​principles​of​revolutions​and​exclusive​work​of​ambitious​demagogues.​They​will​never​be​the​mark​of​ public​opinion​and​the​general​will,​because​among​other​qualities​they​ are​lacking​stability and firmness;​they​will​be​passing​thoughts​and​desires,​because​always​suggested​by​the​depraved,​but​they​will​not​be​ the​public​desire.​A​stirred​up​and​deceived​multitude​will​applaud​the​ death​of​the​Gracii​in​Rome;​in​Paris​it​will​carry​off​to​the​guillotine​ the​most​enlightened​and​virtuous​men;​it​will​request,​in​Mexico,​the​ elevation​of​a​caudillo​to​the​throne,5​but​none​of​these​things​will​be​ the​effect​of​public opinion,​but​rather​“the​echo​of​seduction,​the​cry​of​ the​scoundrels​and​whores​who​will​climb​higher,​as​a​famous​journalist​ explains,​the​better​the​coryphaeuses​of​the​factions​have​paid​them.”6 ​ ​

5.​This​is​a​reference​to​Agustín​de​Iturbide’s​enthronement​in​1824.​(Editor’s​note) 6.​Espectador Sevillano,​no.​3.

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​ The​ most​ essential​ character​ of​ public​ opinion​ is​ liberty.​ Human​ understanding​is​the​power​most​jealous​of​its​independence,​it​does​not​ bear​fetters;​to​want​to​put​them​on​things​that​are​subject​to​its​ability​ is​the​greatest​and​most​intolerable​tyranny.​This​quality​of​public​opinion​is​deduced​from​the​definition​of​its​essence​in​the​same​way​as​the​ previous​one.​Can​there​be​opinion​in​the​particular​individual​when​he​ is​not​allowed​to​reflect​and​if​he​does​not​have​all​the​freedom​necessary​to​weigh​the​reasons​that​have​to​resolve​it?​Surely​not;​for​his​opinion​must​always​be​the​fruit​of​a​calm​reflective​meditation;​and​even​ regarding​faith,​although​he​cannot​reflect​on​its​immediate​object,​he​ should​do​so​on​the​foundations of credibility;​therefore​if​public opinion​is​ nothing​other​than​the​coming​together​of​individual​opinions,​it​is​necessary​to​acknowledge​that​there​is​not,​nor​can​there​be,​public opinion​ when​it​does​not​exist,​and​about​objects​relative​to​which​there​is​not​ liberty. ​ Infer​from​this​that,​in​a​time​of​bloody​factions,​during​which​not​ only​is​it​not​lawful​to​say​what​one​thinks​but​not​even​to​think​in​a​way​ other​than​what​suits​the​coryphaeus​of​the​dominant​faction;​that​when​ the​sobriquets​of​seditious,​enemy of the patria,​and​others​of​this​sort​that​ are​maliciously​invented​on​such​occasions​emerge​with​all​the​retinue​ of​calumnies,​abuses,​and​satires​to​stifle​the​voices​that​do​not​agree​to​ be​echoes​of​the​powerful​faction;​and​above​all,​that​when​the​government​declares​itself​for​one​of​the​factions,​the​allegation​public opinion​ is​to​present​an​illusion​beyond​all​reality.​No,​there​is​not​such​public​ opinion,​because​there​has​not​been​freedom​to​create​it.​On​the​contrary,​true​public​opinion​will​be​stifled;​it​will​triumph​in​the​long​run,​ and​the​same​people​will​take​revenge​for​it​on​their​oppressors;​but​in​ the​meantime​it​does​not​exist,​nor​can​it​be​alleged. ​ Well-​known​writers,​particularly​when​they​speak​of​the​benefits​of​ freedom​of​the​press,​consider​public papers​as​a​sure​thermometer​for​ knowing​public opinion,​and​this​is​one​of​the​benefits​with​which​they​ most​extol​that​institution.​No,​we​will​not​deny​an​assertion​so​authoritative​and​rational;​but​unfortunate​experiences​cause​us​to​assert​that,​ to​apply​it​without​immediate​fear​of​error,​some​criticism​is​needed. ​ Of​course,​public​papers​do​not​make​law​in​the​countries​where​the​ power​to​publish​thoughts​by​means​of​printing​is​not​free;​but​let​us​ note​that​that​is​proven​true​not​only​where​despotism​subjects​writers​ to​prior​censorship,​but​also​where​one​hinders​writing​by​direct​or​in-

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direct​means,​unless​it​is​in​a​specified​way.​What​does​it​matter​that​ the​constitution​of​a​country​establishes​freedom​to​publish​ideas​if​a​ dominant​faction​will​manage​with​certainty​to​ruin​anyone​who​writes​ against​its​interest?​What​does​it​matter​that​that​liberty​is​guaranteed,​ establishing​that​writings​can​be​judged​only​by​individuals​chosen​by​ the​people,​ who,​ it​is​supposed,​ will​ vote​ for​those​ of​greater​education​and​probity,​if​the​spirit​of​faction​alone​manages​to​preside​over​ the​election,​making​it​fall​to​the​members​most​attached​to​it,​and​that​ as​a​consequence,​they​will​let​pass​neither​a​statement​nor​a​truth​that​ hurts​the​faction?​This​happens​few​times​in​popular​governments​and​ in​which​the​laws​of​election​are​well​thought​out,​but​it​happens,​and​ when​the​circumstance​arises,​freedom​of​the​press​is​nominal.​It​should​ be​able​but​cannot​say​what​it​thinks;​the​fear​of​persecution​and​punishments​silences​most​of​the​citizens.​Few​are​those​who​have​all​the​courage​necessary​to​speak​the​truth​but​almost​never​with​impunity.​We​ say,​then,​that​when​there​is​no​true​freedom​of​the​press,​be​it​in​one​ way​or​another,​public​opinion​cannot​be​deduced​from​public​papers,​ which​of​course​must​express​only​the​judgment​of​the​tyrant,​be​this​ an​absolute​king,​a​vizier,​or​a​popular​faction.​Public​papers​can​be​a​ thermometer​of​public opinion​when​they​can​produce​it,​should​it​not​be​ formed,​and​when,​of​the​qualities​we​have​determined​public opinion​to​ have​and​to​serve​as​a​mark​to​recognize​it​when​it​does​exist,​are​derived​ directly​those​that​the​papers​must​have​in​order​to​produce​or​show​it.​ In​truth,​if​public​opinion​must​be​and​cannot​be​less​than​the​free​and​ spontaneous​outcome​of​calm​reflective​meditation​on​the​solid​foundations​that​persuade​one​of​a​truth,​almost​always​practical​and​generally​ simple and perceptible,​papers​will​produce​public opinion​only​if​they​were​ written​in​complete freedom,​with​simplicity,​impartiality,​firmness,​and circumspection,​showing​what​they​are​trying​to​prove,​not​threatening​and​ forcing​what​is​to​be​believed;​letting​reason​speak​through​them​and​ time​mature​their​assertions,​not​presenting​a​scimitar​to​cut​off​heads​ that​ do​ not​ bow​ at​ their​ voice.​ When​ the​ writers​ of​ a​ nation,​ or​ the​ greater​part​of​them,​especially​journalists,​see​themselves​as​respecting​ these​qualities​in​what​they​produce,​and​they​discover​uniformity​regarding​some​assertion,​they​can​believe​they​will​establish​public​opinion,​and​they​can​believe​that​they​speak​the​truth​if​they​announce​that​ it​now​exists.​On​the​other​hand,​if​the​nation​is​divided​into​bloody​ factions,​villainous​writers​sell​themselves,​dipping​their​pens​in​blood​

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and​black​bile,​hurling​sarcasms​and​threats,​shamefully​tearing​away​the​ always​respectable​veil​of​domestic​mysteries,​then​neither​is​there​public​opinion,​nor​can​the​writers​produce​it,​nor​can​it​be​known​through​ the​writings.​“A​writer,”​says​the​judicious​journalist​already​cited, who​provokes​the​struggle​of​the​factions,​who​shows​himself​attached​to​one​of​them,​who​wants​to​tyrannize​public​opinion,​lavishing​insults​on​those​who​do​not​think​as​he,​or​silencing​them​ by​means​of​threats,​is​a​man​who​presages​despotic​dispositions;​ he​is​a​man​unworthy​of​the​esteem​and​confidence​of​a​nation​that​ aspires​to​liberty​and​that​knows​that​the​most​sacred​right​is​that​of​ thought.​Much​more​odious​must​be​those​who,​in​their​writings,​ images​of​their​atrocious​souls,​sow​calumnies​and​satires​against​the​ virtuous​citizen​who​is​not​of​their​faction​and​try​to​make​those​ who​differ​from​them​in​their​public​opinions​look​like​enemies​of​ the​nation.​.​.​.​Where​there​are​certain​favorite​errors​of​a​dominant​ faction​against​which​it​is​not​lawful​to​speak,​where​it​is​not​lawful​ to​discuss​even​truths​themselves,​there​is​no​public opinion. ​ We​dwelled​on​this​third​question​more​than​we​intended,​but​its​ importance​excuses​us,​and​let​us​now​proceed​to​gather​the​fruit​in​the​ resolution​of​the​fourth. Is there always an obligation to submit oneself to public opinion and the general will? ​ We​have​already​indicated​that,​whenever​there​are​existing​parties,​ popular​factions,​an​inability​to​base​a​measure​or​resolution​that​one​ desires​in​solid​arguments​and​in​the​eternal​principles​of​equity​and​ justice,​the​defenders​appeal​to​public opinion;​they​cry​out​as​loud​as​they​ can,​the people want this, the people desire that,​and​always​the​clamoring​ faction​tries​to​identify​with​the​generality​of​the​nation,​secure​in​obtaining​its​aims​or,​at​least,​of​imposing​them. ​ “Let​us​distinguish​carefully​the​popular​voice​from​public​opinion:​ the​first​is​formed​with​the​same​ease​as​the​clouds​of​spring,​but​with​ the​same​ease​it​vanishes.​It​is​produced​by​violence,​terror,​factions,​ ignorance,​a​thousand​other​accidental​causes​that​can​be​destroyed​by​ opposing​interests.​.​.​.​[T]he​cries​of​a​people​deceived​or​subdued​by​

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terror​are​not​public​opinion;​they​are​their​ephemeral​and​false​images,​ invented​by​the​power​and​perfidy​to​delude​the​nations.”7​In​confirmation​of​truths​so​undeniable,​we​need​nothing​more​than​to​remember​ the​multitude​of​contradictory​cries,​unjust​and​of​all​manner​that,​with​ the​greater​appearance​of​universal,​we​have​heard​through​the​streets​ of​Mexico​since​1808​amidst​the​clamoring​of​the​bells,​the​noisy​din​of​ artillery,​etc.,​etc.,​demanding​first​.​.​.​and​then​.​.​.​Should​we​forget​the​ history​of​our​disgraces​it​will​serve​us​only​to​repeat​them​at​each​step.​ Take​care,​much​care,​in​believing​and​calling​public opinion and general will​what​commanded​and​brazen​bands​implore​on​certain​occasions. ​ It​has​already​been​understood​that​those​difficult​moments,​as​they​ do​ not​ contain​ public opinion,​ are​ not​ included​ in​ the​ present​ matter;​ nor​do​they​need​any​principle​other​than​unwavering firmness​so​as​not​ to​ give​ in​ to​ the​ disorganizing​ torrents.​ It​ is​ equally​ understood​ that​ neither​do​we​speak​here​of​the​multitude​of​occasions​on​which​the​application​of​the​principles​that​we​have​established​show​that​no​opinion​ exists​although​it​is​alleged​by​the​interested​parties.​Let​us​pass,​then,​ to​the​case​of​the​question​at​hand​and​we​see​what​the​obligation​of​a​ legislator​is​when​there​is​public opinion​or​at​least​much​probability​that​ an​opinion​is​generalized. ​ Those​who​argue​for​the​obligation​to​yield​to​it​and​always​to​follow​ it​appeal​to​the​sovereignty​of​the​nation​because,​they​say,​the​people​is​ sovereign,​and​the​will​of​the​sovereign​must​always​be​obeyed.​We​ask​ ourselves,​where​does​sovereignty​reside?​Is​it​not​true​that​it​resides​ not​in​some,​not​in​many,​nor​even​in​most,​but​rather​in​the​absolute totality​of​the​nation?​Therefore,​so​that​the​alleged​will​might​obligate​ as​sovereign,​it​was​necessary​to​show​in​each​case​that​all​and​each​one​ of​the​citizens​wanted​that​thing.​How​will​it​be​possible​ever​to​provide​such​a​proof​and,​much​less,​to​deliberating​bodies​in​whose​very​ breast​there​are​many​representatives​who​oppose​one​another?​Or​is​it​ only​the​will​of​the​deputies​that​should​be​counted​for​nothing​when​ the​suppositions,​perhaps​imaginary​and​always​indemonstrable​from​ outside,​count​for​so​much? ​ Seeing​ the​impossibility​ that​ there​ might​be,​and​setting​ aside​the​ impossibility​of​showing​that​universal will,​one​will​perhaps​appeal​to​ the​will​of​the​majority,​saying​that​the​lesser​number​is​obligated​to​ ​

7.​Espectador Sevillano,​no.​3.​

82 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

yield​to​the​greater.​If​there​is​no​more​than​this,​we​say​that​the​mind​of​ the​majority​alone,​without​other​aggregates,​cannot​produce​obligation to yield.​In​effect,​no​matter​how​much​the​defenders​of​those​doctrines​ rack​their​brains,​reason​will​never​see​in​the​majority alone​anything​but​ force and power,​inasmuch​as​it​is​normal​that​the​greater​number​can​ do​more​than​the​lesser.​But​is​force​alone,​or​does​force​give​legitimate​ right?​We​believe​that​free​republicans​will​not​even​have​to​grant​it​as​a​ hypothesis;​then​if​right​and​obligation​are​correlative,​and​in​the​majority​ as such​there​is​no​right​to​command,​in​the​minority​there​is​no​obligation​to​submit. ​ Some​considerations​and​circumstances​can​be​attached​to​the​preceding​case​that​alter​the​question​and​its​resolution;​for​example,​when​ in​a​rigorously democratic​government​there​has​been​an​explicit​social​ pact​to​submit​everyone​to​the​opinion​and​will​of​the​majority.​In​this​ case​there​will​be​an​obligation​proceeding​from​the​pact,​but​it​will​not​ be​the​case​in​question​nor​will​it​be​ours.​Perhaps​it​will​happen​that​ the​will​of​the​majority​can​be​resisted​only​violently​and​by​the​road of revolution,​and​then​the​obligation​to​preserve​social​order​and​that​of​ avoiding​truly​major​woes​can​compel​the​minority​to​tolerate,​endure,​ and​acquiesce​to​the​will​of​the​majority.​For​this​case​political moralists​give​very​good​rules​that​are​not​to​our​present​purpose,​and​those​ who​would​like​will​be​able​to​see​them​in​Locke,​Paley,​and​others.​We​ repeat,​then,​that​the​will​of​the​majority,​for its mere sake,​cannot​be​ obligatory. ​ This​being​so,​someone​will​say,​a​representative​of​the​general​congress,​a​government,​and​a​public​agent​are​not​bound,​even​when​opinion​and​generalized will​exist,​which​seems​incompatible​with​the​character​of​mandataries of the people,​and​no​other​rule​of​their​conduct​can​be​ conceived​if​it​is​not​that​from​which​they​always​operate​as​they​choose,​ which​truly​is​a​very​clear​despotism. ​ Before​responding​and​determining​the​rules,​we​must​dismiss​a​most​ unfortunate​error​that​the​demagogues and anarchists​have​spread​and​repeated​without​cease:​they,​ignoring​the​true​essence​of​the​representative system,​believe,​or​feign​to​believe,​that​a​representative​is​nothing​ more​than​a​mandatary of the people​that​elects​him;​that​he​has​to​receive​ instructions,​rules,​and​orders​from​them​that​he​cannot​violate;​that​ the​people​can​revoke​his​powers​when​they​consider​it​wise;​in​a​word,​ that​he​is​a​simple​passive​organ​of​the​desires​or​caprices​of​his​constitu-

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ents.​The​famous​Martinez​Marina​has​given​a​motive​for​some​of​this.​ Martinez​Marina​who,​completely​conversant​and​steeped​in​all​the​old​ courts​of​Spain​(where​the​agents​of​the​cities​who​had​a​vote​in​them​ went​not​to​deliberate​but​rather​to​present​petitions​of​the​city​councils​ and​to​promote​purely​municipal​interests,​and​at​times​as​ridiculous​as​ adding​a​figure​to​a​coat​of​arms,​etc.,​etc.),​called​deputies​mandataries​ and​wished​to​apply​to​them​some​of​the​attributes​that​civil​jurisprudence​gives​to​the​common​mandate. ​ It​is​neither​the​only​nor​the​principal​reason​for​the​establishment​ of​deliberative congresses​and​for​the​enthusiasm​of​the​politicians​in​examining​the​representative​system,​justly​regarding​it​as​the​most​sublime​endeavor​of​philosophy,​that​in​which​all​the​citizens​of​a​society,​ many​in​number​and​spread​over​immense​terrains,​could​not​assemble​ and​deliberate​to​decide,​and​it​was​necessary​to​adopt​the​expedient​ by​which​they​would​elect​some​from​among​themselves​so​that​in​the​ name​of​all​and​on​their​behalf,​they​would​take​part​in​the​creation​of​ laws​and​in​systematizing​all​public welfare.​The​true​origin​of​the​modern​representative​system​is​the​immense​division​of​labors​and​occupations​to​which​citizens​now​exclusively​dedicate​themselves​for​the​ civilization​and​progress​of​enlightenment​of​the​people;​each​industry,​ each​position,​has​been​divided​and​subdivided​into​different​branches,​ and​ each​ one​ of​ them​ is​ the​ sole​ occupation​ of​ a​ certain​ number​ of​ individuals​who,​dedicating​all​their​attention​to​them,​have​raised​the​ arts​ and​ sciences​ to​ the​ degree​ of​ perfection​ in​ which​ we​ see​ them.​ Since​then,​philosophy,​economics,​and jurisprudence​also​formed​separate​ branches,​whose​intense​study​the​multitude​of​citizens​left​to​a​very​ small​number,​and​since​then,​there​are​few​who​acquire​and​have​the​ capability​to​think​through​and​work​out​the​most​difficult​points​of​a​ civil​government​and​to​face​up​to​public​administration.​Few,​very​few,​ are​those​who​can​have​on​their​shoulders​the​charge​of​working​out​the​ laws,​and​of​those,​very​few​are​the​ones​the​people​elect​for​the​purpose​of​doing​so,​choosing​not​just​mouths​so​that​they​go​to​express​what​ their​constituents​suggest​to​them,​but​rather​their​consciences and minds,​ so​that​they​might​reflect​on​and​understand​what​the​constituents​are​ not​capable​of​understanding​or​even​of​giving​it​their​attention,​all​of​ them​employed​in​very​different​enterprises.​Their​conscience and wisdom,​ we​repeat,​are​what​peoples​elect,​so​that​without​ever​prostituting​the​ first,​and​guided​always​by​the​second,​they​discover​and​decide​what​is​

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best​and​most​suitable​for​the​common​good,​and​everyone​submits​to​ the​resolution​and​will​of​these​experts.​Here​is​the​theory​of​the​divine​ representative system,​which​we​have​fortunately​adopted,​for​which​the​ nations​that​have​it​are​happy,​and​for​which​all​those​who​lack​it​yearn. ​ The​democracy​of​modern​peoples​has​nothing​to​do​with​that​of​the​ ancients;​they​are​of​a​very​different​nature.​The​latter​was​barbarous,​ filled​with​all​the​vices​and​defects,​always​degenerating​into​anarchy​ and​involved​in​the​disorders​resulting​from​the​tumultuous​gathering​of​ dull​peoples​in​the​plazas​of​Athens​and​Rome,​where​they​all​cast​individual​votes​on​matters​of​great​seriousness.​The​democracy​of​the​modern​republics​is​now​purged​of​all​the​defects​that​discredited​it,​even​to​ the​extent​of​showing​it​as​horrible​among​the​Greeks​and​Romans— Everyone​a​legislator!​Everyone​giving​an​opinion​on​matters​over​which​ they​had​never​reflected​and​that​require​study​by​an​ordinary​man​for​ his​entire​life!​Let​us​distance​ourselves​for​that​reason​from​Greece,​ Rome,​small​cantons,​always​in​uprising,​always​in​disorder!​A​puzzling​ thing,​very​puzzling.​If​to​a​man​of​letters,​merchant,​etc.​one​proposes​ he​make​a​statue​or​some​other​artifact,​not​only​will​he​say​without​the​ least​shame,​and what do I understand of that, when did I learn that job?​But​ he​would​even​take​it​as​an​insult;​and​when​it​is​a​matter​of​making laws,​ the​most​sublime​work​of​wisdom,​everyone​considers​himself​fit,​and​ they​would​even​show​themselves​offended​if​one​said​to​them​that​they​ are​not​suitable​to​be​legislators!​Will​perhaps​a​bust​be​more​difficult​ than​a​good law,​or​will​it​require​having​had​greater​apprenticeship?​Distinguished​youth!​May​the​famous​social contract​of​the​very​profound​ Genevan​not​instill​its​errors​in​you,​but​rather​its​brilliant​truths.​Read,​ reread​once​and​many​times​Book​2,​chapter​7.​Learn​there​what​a​legislator​is​and​what​is​required​to​be​one;​and​far​from​seeking,​each​one​ will​tremble​if​the​honorable​misfortune​of​being​elected​deputy​falls​ to​him.​But​let​us​return​to​the​subject. ​ The​idea​of​mandatary​and​of​mandate​being​false​and​dangerous​applied​to​the​representatives​of​a​national​congress​(on​which​we​could​ expound,​ drawing​ obvious​ terrible​ consequences,​ which​ perhaps​ we​ will​do​another​time),​it​seems​to​us​that​if​one​wants​to​take​from​common​jurisprudence​some​idea​as​the​source​of​maxims​and​apply​it,​with​ less​danger​of​absurdities,​to​modern​congresses​and​their​members,​one​ should​rather​have​laid​one’s​hands​on​that​idea​of​independent arbiters​ through​whose​judgment​the​parties​to​a​lawsuit​are​obliged​to​pass​than​

on​publiC​opinion​and​the​General​will : 85

that​of​mandataries and mandates.​Nor​is​this​exact,​but​it​is​much​less​ dangerous. ​ Let​us​listen,​in​corroboration​of​everything​said,​to​one​of​the​greatest​ politicians​ that​ a​ nation​ fertile​ with​ them​ has​ had,​ the​ immortal​ Burke,​speaking​to​the​electors​of​Bristol​who​had​named​him​member​ of​Parliament​and​wanted​to​give​him​instructions​for​his​conduct: It​is​his​[the​representative’s]​to​sacrifice​his​repose,​his​pleasures,​ his​satisfactions,​to​theirs​[constituent];​and​above​all,​ever,​and​in​ all​cases,​to​prefer​their​interests​to​his​own.​But,​his​unbiassed opinion,​his​mature judgement,​his​enlightened conscience,​he​ought​not​to​ sacrifice​to​you;​to​any​man,​or​to​any​set​of​men​living.​These​he​ does​not​derive​from​your​pleasure;​no,​nor​from​the​Law​and​the​ Constitution.​They​are​a​trust​from​Providence,​for​the​abuse​of​ which​he​is​deeply​answerable.​.​.​.​If​Government​were​a​matter​ of​Will​on​any​side,​yours,​without​question,​ought​to​be​superior.​ But​Government​and​Legislation​are​matters​of​reason​and​judgement,​and​not​of​inclination;​and,​what​sort​of​reason​is​that,​in​which​ the​determination​precedes​the​discussion;​in​which​one​set​of​men​ deliberate,​and​another​decide;​and​where​those​who​form​the​conclusion​are​perhaps​three​hundred​miles​distant​from​those​who​hear​ the​arguments? ​ To​deliver​an​opinion​is​the​right​of​all​men;​that​of​Constituents​ is​a​weighty​and​respectable​opinion,​which​a​Representative​ought​ always​to​rejoice​to​hear;​and​which​he​ought​always​most​seriously​ to​consider.​But​authoritative​instructions;​Mandates​issued,​which​ the​Member​is​bound​blindly​and​implicitly​to​obey,​to​vote,​and​to​ argue​for,​though​contrary​to​the​clearest​conviction​of​his​judgement​and​conscience—these​are​things​utterly​unknown​to​the​laws​ of​this​land,​and​which​arise​from​a​fundamental​mistake​of​the​ whole​order​and​tenour​of​our​Constitution. ​ Parliament​is​not​a​Congress of Ambassadors​from​different​and​ hostile​interests;​which​interests​each​must​maintain,​as​an​Agent​ and​Advocate,​against​other​Agents​and​Advocates;​but​Parliament​is​ a​deliberative Assembly of one Nation,​with​one​Interest,​that​of​the​ whole;​where,​not​local​Purposes,​not​local​Prejudices​ought​to​ guide,​but​the​general​Good,​resulting​from​the​general​Reason​of​ the​whole.​You​choose​a​Member​indeed;​but​when​you​have​chosen​

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him,​he​is​not​Member​of​Bristol,​but​he​is​a​Member​of​Parliament.​ If​the​local​Constituent​should​have​an​Interest,​or​should​form​an​ hasty​opinion,​evidently​opposite​to​the​real​good​of​the​rest​of​the​ Community,​the​Member​for​that​place​ought​to​be​as​far,​as​any​ other,​from​any​endeavour​to​give​it​Effect. ​ These​truths​assumed,​and​the​pernicious​error​dismissed,​let​us​proceed​to​give​definite​rules​that​might​direct​the​legislator,​whether​it​is​ a​matter​of​adopting​a​bad measure​in​order​to​agree​with​the​common​ opinion​and​desire,​or​of​rejecting​a​good measure​to​go​against​it. ​ It​is​the​first​and​principal​rule​that,​even​if​it​be​possible​that​there​ is​true public opinion​on​a​measure​notoriously unjust and contrary​to​the​ eternal principles of equity and reason,​not​only​can​the​representative​not​ submit​to​such​opinion​and​vote​for​it,​but​rather​he​has​a​very​strict​obligation​to​oppose​it,​under​pain​of​committing​a​crime​before​God​and​ being​a​traitor​to​his​own​seduced​constituents,​who,​sooner​or​later,​ will​detest​him​and​make​him​suffer​the​penalty​of​his​criminal​complaisance.​This​truth​does​not​need​much​justification:​God​must​be​obeyed​ before​men;​no​unjust​command​deserves​the​name​of​such,​nor​should​ it​be​obeyed.​The​holy scriptures,​the​priests,​and​moral​and​political​philosophers​are​full​of​these​and​similar​maxims.​Well,​if​in​unjust​matters​ not​even​he​who​can​mandate​must​be​obeyed,​how​should​public opinion​ be​obeyed,​which,​as​we​have​shown,​must​not​be​the​compulsory​rule​of​ a​representative?​The​preconceived​notion,​says​Bentham,​“can​be​an​excuse​for​the​common​people​but​not​for​public​men:​it,​at​least,​will​not​ be​justified​when​it​might​be​the​source​or​occasion​for​errors,”​and​now​ this​same​profound​politician​warns​what​happens​in​those​assertions​of​ public​opinion:​“It​even​manages,”​he​says,​“to​remove​measures​from​ examination;​and​what​begins​to​demonstrate​the​bad​faith​is​that​they​ try​to​support​them​with​all​the​power​and​influence​of​government.” ​ The​second​very​definite​rule​is​that,​if​public​opinion​is​for​a​measure​which,​although​it​might​not​be​absolutely​contrary​to​the​immutable principles​of​reason​and​justice,​the​representative​believes​or​knows​ will​be​detrimental​to​the​nation​in​some​way,​he​must​not​approve​it​ but​rather​oppose​it.​For​this​he​was​elected;​his​obligation​is​to​examine​ and​decide​only​what​can​lead​to​the​common​good;​he​does​not​have​to​ answer​to​God​or​to​men​for​another’s​judgment,​but​only​for​his​own;​ and​he​must​say​to​those​arguing​the​contrary public opinion​what​Valen-

on​publiC​opinion​and​the​General​will : 87

tiano​said​to​the​army​that​had​just​elected​him​emperor​and​required​ him​to​join​with​Valente​in​rule:​Vestrum fuit, o milites, cum imperator nullis esset, imperii mihi habens tradere, sed postquam illud suscepi meum deinceps, non vestrum est publicis rebus prospicere. ​ The​third​maxim​is​from​the​same​very​profound​Bentham:​The​representative,​if​he​must​never​vote​for​a​measure​that​he​believes​unjust,​ never​for​one​he​considers​will​cause​public​misfortunes,​neither​must​ he​insist​on​the​adoption​of​a​measure​that,​although​in​his​judgment​ beneficial,​might​be​contrary​to​general​opinion;​in​this​case​he​should​ not​give​it​up​completely,​but​instead​defer​it​to​a​better​time.​“Public​ opinion,”​says​this​learned​man,​“being​only​that​of​the​greater​number,​ without​other​evidence,​is​an​argument​without​force:​for​the​legislator​ it​is​not​good​reasoning,​but​rather​respectable.​It​is​not​a​reason​to​renounce​the​measure,​but​rather​to​defer​it​in​order​to​enlighten​minds,​ using​legitimate​means​to​combat​the​error,​for​the​truth,​daughter​of​ time,​secures​it​all​from​her​father.”8 ​ To​these​three​rules​that​include​everything​we​will​add​now,​only​for​ light​in​dark​matters​of​factions,​two​maxims​from​the​same​author​repeated​also​by​Paley​and​various​others.​“It​is​always​boasting,”​he​says,​ “to​see​veracity​in​politics​as​the​morality​of​small​minds​and​proof​of​ simplicity​and​ignorance​of​the​world;​and​men​fearful​of​looking​like​ fools​adopt,​relative​to​their​conduct,​public​principles​that​they​condemn​in​the​ordinary​actions​of​their​life.​A​faction​is,​in​some​respects,​ a​very​vigilant​and​active​guard;​but​if​its​principal​aim​is​to​seize​power,​ it​will​be​in​its​interest​to​perpetuate​the​abuses​and​will​see​them​in​advance​as​fruits​of​its​victory.” ​ We​have​concluded,​if​not​with​the​dignity​that​the​matter​requires,​ or​ with​ the​ profundity​ with​ which​ we​ would​ like​ to​ have​ treated​ it,​ giving​more​than​enough​points​so​that​true​scholars​and​teachers​of​political​science​might​be​inspired​to​enlighten​us​in​these​very​important​ questions.​Neither​the​limits​of​the​journal​nor​our​competence​permits​ us​more;​but​what​we​have​said​is​enough​for​those​who​reflect​on​our​ assertions​with​maturity,​shedding​preconceived​notions​and​partialities​ unworthy​of​a​philosopher.



8.​Bentham,​op.​cit.,​Sophismes,​pp.​71ff.

9 ​

Discourse on the Nature of Factions The​most​perverse​have​the​greatest​power​to​stir​up​ seditions​and​discords;​peace​and​calm​alone​are​conserved​ for​the​virtues. —​Tacitus

Liberal​ institutions​ bring​ with​ them​ differences​ of​ opinion,​ because​ with​ each​ person​ making​ use​ of​ the​ precious​ right​ to​express​an​opinion​freely,​it​would​be​impossible​that​all​members​ of​society​would​agree​on​how​to​view​issues.​Thus,​with​reason​it​has​ been​said​that​this​division​and​balance​of​opinions​is​the​life​of​a​republic,​supports​the​vigilance​of​some​authorities​over​others​and​of​the​ people​over​all​authorities;​it​examines​the​truth​closely,​and​enlightenment​is​advanced,​through​which​the​legislator​and​government​discover​ appropriate​means​to​carry​out​the​high​aims​of​their​institution,​and​ the​craftiness​and​tortuousness​of​arbitrariness,​natural​enemy​of​free​ thought,​cannot​be​hidden. ​ But​ is​ this​ liberty​ indefinite,​ or​ are​ there​ bounds​ within​ which​ it​ must​be​confined?​If​there​are,​by​what​signs​will​we​know​when​these​ bounds​have​been​crossed​or​when​the​disputes​degenerate​into​dangerous​factions?​What​will​the​consequences​be?​Such​are​the​points​we​ propose​to​elucidate​at​a​time​in​which​abuse​of​words,​anarchical​doctrines,​and​political​absurdities​are​growing​into​an​intense​force​to​lead​ the​incautious​astray​and​justify​enormous​crimes. ​ In​an​already​constituted​society,​the​conflict​of​opinions​can​never​ be​about​the​truly​essential​foundations​of​society,​that​is​to​say,​about​ the​agreements​and​laws​that​secure​individual​guarantees.​For​all​men​ feel​deeply​embedded​in​their​being​the​need​to​preserve,​by​all​pos​ Original​title:​“Discurso​sobre​los​carácteres​de​las​facciones.”​Source:​El Observador de la República Mexicana,​Mexico,​October​17,​1827. 88

on​the​nature​of​faCtionS : 89

sible​means,​their​security,​their​liberty,​their​property,​because​they​ left​the​forests​and​formed​societies​only​with​this​preeminent​goal.​The​ unanimity​of​this​feeling​is​thus​immutable,​and​dissent​will​be​only​ the​most​offensive​degradation​or​the​most​foolish​ignorance.​Thus,​all​ opinion​that​openly​or​deceitfully​attacks​it​is​criminal​by​its​nature. ​ Nor​can​there​be​differences​over​clearly​constitutional​laws,​which​ are,​according​to​Lanjuinais,​“those​which,​created​or​agreed​to​by​the​ representatives​of​the​nation​or​by​the​nation​itself,​determine​the​nature,​the​extent,​the​limits​of​public​powers,​so​that​this​code​is​truly​ the​supreme​law​and​has​a​special​character​of​permanence​that​distinguishes​it​from​ordinary​laws.”​The​permanence​that​must​be​an​essential​characteristic​of​the​constitution​is​contrary​to​discussion​that​tends​ to​change​it,​for​otherwise​society​would​never​have​that​firm​and​permanent​repose​indispensable​for​achieving​its​goals,​and​the​continual​ fluctuation​would​end​in​destroying​society​and​making​it​the​prisoner​ of​tyranny. ​ Let​us​note​that​not​all​the​articles​of​a​constitution​are​constitutional,​ but​rather​only​those​that​sanction​national​independence,​the​form​of​ government,​the​division,​limitation,​and​sphere​of​public​powers.​Such​ sanctions​are​a​sanctuary​where​no​one​should​go​except​to​worship​the​ protector​deity​of​societies.​Even​when​a​better​worked​out​constitution​can​be​imagined,​the​one​that​exists,​established​by​the​vote​and​ respect​of​the​nation,​will​always​be​preferable,​and​the​difficulties​of​ the​change​can​never​be​counterbalanced​by​whatever​advantages​are​ imagined,​for​a​new​constitution​has​been​written​only​on​the​ruins​and​ ashes​of​the​nation​that​dictates​it;​and​as​long​as​the​guarantees​are​respected,​as​long​as​the​laws​are​observed​and​the​constitution​gives​security​to​some​and​energy​to​others,​the​people​are​happy,​they​will​live​in​ tranquility,​and​they​will​not​remember​the​terrible​right​of​resistance,​ whose​use​should​be​so​rare,​it​is​even​more​unusual​for​altering​the​constitution,​and​so​that​resistance​more​often​has​restoration​as​its​object​ than​change.​The​classes​that​actually​make​up​the​nation​will​never​risk​ their​fate​and​well-​being​to​the​setbacks​of​an​unfortunate​commutation.​Such​desires​are​from​those​who,​without​industry​or​love​of​work,​ pursued​relentlessly​by​poverty​and​provoked​by​fierce​ambition,​base​ their​hopes​on​the​upheaval​and​ruin​of​the​patria. ​ The​very​broad​field​of​combat​is​in​the​methods​of​administration;​ in​the​management,​investment,​and​good​use​of​public​revenues;​in​the​

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application​of​political​economy​to​the​needs​of​the​nation;​in​the​rules​ and​procedures​of​justice;​in​the​plans​for​education​and​national​instruction;​in​the​great​and​various​matters​that​the​legislative​body​examines;​.​.​.​the​political​subjects​that,​in​a​free​system,​can​be​clarified​by​ public​writings​cannot​be​enumerated;​in​them​each​one​can​and​must​ deploy​the​talents​and​knowledge​that​nature​and​his​work​have​afforded​ him,​keeping​what​is​most​useful​and​refuting​the​errors​of​his​opponents.​The​beneficial​truths​are​deepened​and​refined​in​these​disputes;​ and​if​one​wishes​to​give​them​the​name​of​parties,​these​are​necessary​ and​advantageous​for​the​people,​for​even​those​that​are​incorrect​are​ useful​at​least​occasionally​so​that​the​truth​can​be​recognized​and​triumph.​A​good​government​does​not​remain​indifferent​amidst​violence,​ and​it​makes​good​use​of​the​enlightenment​that​is​spread,​impartially​ chooses​the​better,​and​stimulates​the​discussion​necessary​for​success. ​ But​going​beyond​this​well-​defined​territory,​and​when​heightened​ and​base​passions​are​substituted​for​the​calm​and​sincerity​of​discussion,​inasmuch​as​they​cannot​openly​and​impudently​attack​those​primary​and​essential​aims,​they​seek​detours​and​tunnels​to​undermine​ them;​they​are​not​content​with​reasons;​they​take​hold​of​seduction,​ convert​error,​the​absurd,​to​practice;​they​set​out​as​their​sole​aim​that​ the​inventions​and​cunning​means​of​injustice​take​root.​Then​the​old​ resentments​are​unearthed,​the​bitterness​of​the​struggle​is​inflamed,​ hatred​explodes​like​a​volcano,​vomits​slanders​and​calumnies,​intellectual​darkness​grows,​and​they​do​not​consider​the​nature​of​the​methods​they​use​to​destroy​and​annihilate​the​opponent.​Unfortunate​nation​ that​carries​in​its​breast​these​frenzied​sons​who,​cutting​each​other​to​ pieces,​break​and​crush​the​nation.​These​are​the​true​parties​or​factions​ of​whom​the​dignified​Hume​justly​says, As​much​as​legislators​and​founders​of​states​ought​to​be​honoured​ and​respected​among​men,​as​much​ought​the​founders​of​sects​and​ factions​to​be​detested​and​hated;​because​the​influence​of​faction​ is​directly​contrary​to​that​of​laws.​Factions​subvert​government,​ render​laws​impotent,​and​beget​the​fiercest​animosities​among​men​ of​the​same​nation,​who​ought​to​give​mutual​assistance​and​protection​to​each​other.​And​what​should​render​the​founders​of​parties​ more​odious​is,​the​difficulty​of​extirpating​these​weeds,​when​once​ they​have​taken​root​in​any​state.​They​naturally​propagate​them-

on​the​nature​of​faCtionS : 91

selves​for​many​centuries,​and​seldom​end​but​by​the​total​dissolution​of​that​government​in​which​they​are​sown.​They​are,​besides,​ plants​which​grow​most​plentifully​in​the​richest​soil;​and​though​ absolute​governments​be​not​wholly​free​from​them,​it​must​be​confessed​that​they​rise​more​easily​and​propagate​themselves​faster​in​ free​governments,​where​they​always​infect​the​legislature​itself,​ which​alone​could​be​able,​by​the​steady​application​of​rewards​and​ punishments,​to​eradicate​them. ​ In​ truth,​ if,​ in​ a​ free​ government,​ the​ factions​ come​ to​ grow​ and​ progress​to​that​extreme,​one​can​infer​that​its​agents​are​either​imbeciles​or​depraved,​because​every​constituted​society​has​in​its​authorities,​in​its​laws​and​tribunals,​means​that​are​quite​sufficient​to​stifle​at​ their​outset​and​root​out​the​factions​that​disrupt​the​order.​No​excuse​ can​vindicate​a​government​that​sees​and​acquiesces​to​a​faction​that​increases​greatly​because​the​government​acquiesced​to​it,​for​if​it​had​not,​ the​faction​would​have​perished​when​it​was​first​arising. ​ But​ to​ what​ must​ this​ willingness​ to​ oblige​ be​ attributed?​ What​ interest​can​the​government​have​in​pretending​not​to​notice​destructive​factions?​This​is​clear​to​anyone​who​knows​that​in​free​governments​there​must​be​a​persistent​conflict​between​them​and​their​subjects.​The​power​exercised​by​men,​no​matter​how​broad​it​might​be,​ always​brings​with​it​an​irresistible​drive​to​extend​itself​more​and​more,​ becomes​annoyed​with​the​obstacles​that​the​law​puts​up​against​it,​and,​ like​a​torrent,​constantly​pushes​and​hollows​out​the​dikes​in​which​the​ general​will​keeps​it​contained,​always​watchful​and​ready​to​invade​if​ there​is​no​resistance.​As​it​cannot​openly​and​clearly​trample​on​the​ laws,​it​avoids​them,​glosses​them​in​accord​with​its​intentions,​varnishes​ its​transgressions​with​lovely​names,​hypocritically​takes​as​a​motto​what​ society​most​esteems,​that​is,​its​independence​and​tranquility,​pretends​ dangers,​feigns​or​exaggerates​conspiracies,​and​uses​the​vague​and​insignificant​name​of​circumstances​(when​it​is​not​possible​to​have​them​ because​of​injustice)​as​a​veil​to​hide​its​lies​and​as​a​weapon​to​destroy​ all​social​benefits. ​ But​the​personal​interest​of​each​member​of​society,​spurred​on​by​ the​danger​that​threatens​it,​claims​offenses​on​the​part​of​the​authority,​ demands​observance​of​the​laws,​cries​out​against​abuses,​criticizes​the​ conduct​ of​ those​ who​ govern,​ and,​ with​ the​ weapons​ of​ reason​ and​

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justice,​encircles​its​guarantees​against​the​assaults​of​the​power,​calls​ the​nation​to​its​aid,​and​because​of​this​valiant​resistance​they​end​up​ thwarted. ​ It​also​happens​that​in​their​weakness,​those​who​govern​never​believe​it​possible​to​advance​by​the​well-​worn​path​of​the​laws;​they​suppose​that​their​powers​are​not​sufficient​for​emergencies,​all​beneficial​ measures​are​paralyzed​in​their​trembling​hands;​they​do​not​dare​uphold​legal​methods​with​vigor​and​integrity,​fearful​of​everything​and​ everyone,​ and​ in​ vacillation​ and​uncertainty​ regarding​ all​and​ everything,​those​who​govern​lose​the​favorable​opportunity,​squander​the​ best​elements;​the​edifice​is​worn​away,​and​everything​dies​under​their​ slow​and​collapsed​administration,​those​being​the​first​who​are​submerged​in​nothingness,​where​they​should​always​hide​themselves. ​ In​both​cases,​which​are​common​among​recently​constituted​peoples,​ in​which​the​public​spirit​has​neither​progressed​nor​formed​customs,​ the​ government,​ not​ finding​ in​ itself​ means​ to​ triumph​ or​ resources​ not​to​die,​casts​its​covetous​eyes​on​the​various​classes​that​make​up​the​ nation;​but​the​virtuous​citizens​are​not​capable​of​helping​injustice​triumph,​and​they​are​also​very​open​in​telling​those​imbeciles​who​govern​that​the​only​thing​they​have​to​do​is​entrust​the​post​to​whomever​ knows​how​to​execute​it.​It​is,​then,​a​certain​consequence​that​an​evil​ or​weak​government​will​depend​on​factions​composed​of​corrupt​characters,​those​who,​in​exchange​for​commanding​the​government​itself,​ lend​themselves​to​the​most​iniquitous​goals,​and​as​a​reward​they​immediately​request​and​obtain​jobs,​pensions,​wealth​(all​spoils​of​a​sacrificed​nation);​as​collaborators,​they​set​themselves​up​as​essential,​they​ identify​themselves​with​the​government,​one​is​their​interest,​the​other​ their​goal;​disorder,​injustice,​oppression.​In​this​case​the​agitators​believe​and​consider​themselves​to​be​the​government​itself,​and​when​the​ public​voice​cries​out​against​their​lies,​they​respond​with​insolence​that​ doing​so​is​to​discredit​the​government,​that​to attack them is to attack it,​ as​if​the​name​of​government​could​justify​iniquities,​or​as​if​a​government​that​has​made​itself​factious​would​still​merit​respect​and​esteem,​ which​in​a​republic​is​the​reward​for​virtues.​Meanwhile​dull​or​perverse​ rulers​degrade​themselves,​making​themselves​blind​and​passive​instruments​of​their​own​and​the​general​ruin.​And​here​is​the​first​and​most​ terrible​characteristic​of​a​devastating​faction. ​ The​majority​of​a​nation​is​always​just​and​reasonable,​for​men,​al-

on​the​nature​of​faCtionS : 93

though​they​might​individually​be​bad,​gathered​together​or​collectively​ are​ virtuous,​ according​ to​ Montesquieu’s​ observation.​ Men​ gathered​ together​ inevitably​ identify​ themselves​ with​ what​ is​ useful​ to​ all,​ a​ clear​instinct​makes​them​sense​that​any​injustice​whatsoever​redounds​ against​them,​and​if​they​do​the​evil​deed​thinking​they​can​escape​its​ consequences,​they​never​put​into​practice​the​evil​deed​that​hangs​over​ their​heads. ​ Never,​then,​can​disastrous​projects​be​the​work​of​any​but​a​small​ group​ that,​ tenaciously​ pursuing​ its​ own​ prosperity,​ will​ impudently​ tread​on​the​laws,​do​away​with​all​barriers​that​oppose​virtue,​the​most​ wicked​methods​costing​it​nothing​so​long​as​they​lead​to​the​venting​ of​ its​ revenge​ or​ the​ insatiable​ yearning​ of​ its​ ambition​ or​ avarice,​ it​ will​defy​public​opinion​and​will​abjure​all​decency.​The​agitators​themselves​will​be​amazed​at​having​arrived​where​they​did​not​foresee,​for,​ drunken​with​their​first​triumphs,​they​will​have​embarked​upon​and​ achieved​excesses​that​cannot​have​happened​to​anyone,​except​when​ that​ one​ is​ involved​ in​ enormous​ crimes​ that​ it​ is​ necessary​ to​ cover​ over​with​other,​even​more​atrocious​crimes.​For​them,​morality​(the​ only​true​politics)​is​an​impediment​that​they​have​removed​from​their​ course,​growing​deaf​to​its​clamors,​and​by​force​of​combating​it,​they​ have​managed​to​harden​themselves​against​remorse​and​honor.​What​ must​be​the​fate​of​the​unhappy​nation​whose​destiny​is​in​such​hands?​ What​fortunes​will​be​enough​to​gratify​the​ravenous​swarm​of​catilinarians?​What​laws,​what​equity,​what​rights​will​be​respected​by​those​ who​forsake​order? ​ The​difference​between​the​methods​of​a​faction​and​those​of​a​sound​ part​or​majority​of​a​people​is​palpable.​This​latter​knows​no​other​methods​than​guarantees,​laws,​justice,​because​these​methods​can​never​ever​ be​contrary​by​their​nature​to​the​end​to​which​they​aspire;​there​are​ between​them​intimate​relations​that​can​hardly​exist​between​injustice​ and​benevolence,​which​is​universal​justice.​How​can​those​who​violate​ the​principles​of​justice,​then,​argue​that​they​love​the​nation,​that​they​ promote​the​general​good,​the​only​foundation​for​justice?​Are​people​ so​stupid​that​they​come​to​believe​that​they​can​be​saved​only​by​trampling​on​the​venerable​principles​of​virtue?​Will​those​who​offend​this​ essential​ principle​ and​ soul​ of​ the​ republic​ be​ republicans?​ Will​ the​ nation​ever​think​that​its​situation​is​such​that​the​political​dogmas​to​ which​it​has​consecrated​reason​and​experience​of​all​the​centuries​have​

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nothing​to​do​with​it?​Has​the​nature​of​things​changed?​And​so,​if​it​ suits​a​faction,​must​we​abjure​the​most​evident​and​holy​truths​and​violate​reason,​this​support​and​asylum​of​man?​You​who​make​a​show​of​ saving​us​by​crushing​the​rights​of​humanity,​know​that​if​it​were​possible​that​our​existence​and​honor​were​incompatible​with​justice,​we​ would​rather​choose​to​die​in​disgrace.​But​it​does​not​depend​on​you​to​ change​what​is​disinterested​and​eternal,​and​it​is​much​easier​to​believe​ and​even​feel​that​your​tricks​and​processes​are​what​is​incompatible​ with​the​good​and​honor​of​men;​their​future​will​depend​on​and​be​ secured​forever​by​justice.​If​you​were​fair​you​would​say​that​ambition,​ vengeance,​avarice​.​.​.​are​the​true​motives​for​your​conduct;​give​up​ fraud​and​histrionics​that​no​one​believes​and​everyone​detests. ​ But​despite​everything,​haughty​with​the​experiment​they​have​made​ of​their​power,​they​try​to​make​good​use​of​the​moments,​knowing​that​ their​fatal​influence​will​last​only​until​the​nation,​terrified​by​upheaval,​ deploys​its​irresistible​resources​against​this​handful​of​vipers​that​eat​ away​at​its​core;​so​they​try​to​lull​the​nation​with​deceitful​snares​and​ to​intimidate​and​persecute​those​men​who,​with​wisdom​and​character,​ can​unmask​them​and​make​their​crimes​evident​to​the​people,​lead​a​reaction​in​support​of​the​constitution​and​the​laws,​and​oust​them.​From​ here​emanates​the​spirit​of​intolerance​and​persecution,​another​innate​ characteristic​of​factions. ​ “Of​all​the​proscriptions,”​says​the​famous​Bignon,1​“the​most​terrible​are​those​stirred​up​by​a​minority.​The​majority,​which​knows​its​ strengths,​can​be​momentarily​cruel;​but​neither​is​it​for​a​long​time,​nor​ is​it​always.​The​minority,​on​the​contrary,​believes​that​it​increases​its​ number​by​multiplying​its​harsh​acts.​.​.​.​Proscription​has​a​frightening​ character​when​it​attempts​to​repress​the​dominant​spirit​of​nations,​for​ inasmuch​as​it​then​originates​from​a​fragment​that​wishes​to​subjugate​ the​majority,​it​is​inevitable​that​it​be​more​violent​and​expansive.​The​ nation​as​a​whole​needs​fixed​and​constant​laws,​the​minority​has​need​ of​laws​of​exception.” ​ In​a​free​and​civilized​nation,​it​is​not​the​same​to​seize​power​as​to​ capture​opinion;​on​the​contrary,​the​seizing​of​power​is​always​guarded​ against​and​opposed​by​those​who​fear​(and​that​is​everyone)​the​diminishment​of​their​rights.​A​just​government​respects​this​guarding​ ​

1.​Louis​Pierre​Edouard,​Baron​Bignon​(1771—1847),​French​diplomat​and​historian.

on​the​nature​of​faCtionS : 95

and​opposition​for​the​advantages​that​redound​to​it;​but​a​faction​or​a​ factious​government​that​cannot​bear​the​inspection​of​the​public​becomes​irritated​and​enraged​by​its​own​conscience,​for​it​knows​that​its​ errors​and​crimes​are​obvious​to​everyone,​and​in​the​inability​to​stifle​ the​truth​it​furiously​pronounces​the​maxim​of​tyrants:​Let them hate me, so long as they fear me.​Much​better​would​be​the​love​and​respect​of​ the​people​if​they​changed​course.​But​what​about​the​responsibility​of​ the​ministers?​How​is​it​possible​that​they​resign​themselves​to​giving​ up​their​posts​and​become​objects​of​contempt​and​cursing?​How​to​acknowledge​themselves​defeated​in​a​struggle​in​which​they​have​prostituted​their​consciences,​sold​their​honor,​assaulted​what​is​most​sacred?​ Will​they​not​then​reveal​their​dreadful​secrets,​and​will​there​not​come​ to​light​so​many​machinations,​treacheries,​depravities,​​atrocities​.​.​.​? ​ Thus,​they​see​themselves​committed​to​continuing​their​maneuvers​ at​any​price,​to​trampling​whatever​crosses​their​path,​to​aiming​their​ guns​at​whomever​might​have​the​courage​and​ability​to​oppose​them.​ The​first​shots​hit​persons​they​carefully​make​loathsome​beforehand,​ suggesting​to​people​that​they​are​their​enemies,​as​the​sans-​culottes​did​ in​France​with​those​they​called​aristocrats.​Distorted​equality​was​the​ popular​ idol,​ and​as​many​as​calumny​had​designated​ were​sacrificed​ to​it.​With​that​name​emphatically​pronounced,​several​thousand​were​ dragged​to​the​scaffold,​crushing​the​forms​and​all​rights.​It​would​be​ easy​to​cite​other​examples,​but​unfortunately​we​have​among​ourselves​ practiced​worse​trampling​underfoot,​for​there​is​no​proscription​more​ barbarously​unjust​than​that​which​besets​an​accidental​quality​that​has​ no​relation​to​the​crime​and​is​enough​nonetheless​to​fulminate​atrocious​ punishment​ with​ neither​ conviction​ nor​ any​ process​ against​ an​ industrious,​honorable​multitude,​whose​persecution​is​more​harmful​ to​the​nation​than​to​the​ones​proscribed. ​ By​this​the​people​are​deceived,​the​most​absurd​calumnies​breaking​loose,​but​repeated​by​a​thousand​filthy​and​hired​mouths.​Blackening​the​purest​reputation,​they​transform​innocence​and​merit​into​ guilt,​for​the​immorality​of​the​factions​cannot​pardon​them;​fantastic​ dangers​ are​ concocted​ and​ conspiracies​ revealed.​ In​ the​ workshop​ of​ the​faction​are​created​the​instruments​of​death,​and​in​the​darkness​of​ their​dens​are​woven​the​cords​in​which​one​wishes​to​seize​virtue.​The​ victims​pile​up,​they​are​denied​all​legal​resources,​they​are​deprived​of​ all​mercy,​and​the​cruelty​of​their​persecutors​feeds​their​torment.​Thus​

96 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

they​intend​to​intimidate​all​those​who​are​good.​Madmen!​They​do​not​ know​that​the​human​heart,​raised​by​virtue,​becomes​enthusiastic​in​ danger​and​is​triumphant​on​the​scaffold,​that​the​majority​of​a​nation​ can​be​calmed​by​flattery​but​never​subdued​by​violence. ​ Fear​is​always​cruel,​and​tyrants,​always​trembling​from​their​injustices,​stupidly​believe​they​are​diminishing​their​danger.​Crowding​tortures​ together,​ they​ wish​ to​ dominate,​ not​ over​ free​ men,​ who​ make​ them​tremble,​but​rather​over​the​cold​tomb​of​a​nation,​so​much​do​ they​desire​its​silence​and​inertia.​But​the​exact​opposite​happens,​because​if​the​clemency​and​moderation​of​Caesar​did​not​shield​him​from​ the​dagger​of​Brutus,​how​could​Caligula​hope​that​his​atrocities​were​ more​powerful​to​save​him?​To​attack​guarantees​is​to​call​to​arms​and​ to​incite​the​indignation​of​the​most​gentle​citizen;​it​is​the​same​as​saying​to​the​nation,​defend​yourself​from​my​aggressions;​and​who​would​ dare​say​it​to​whom?​A​faction,​a​handful​of​miserable​people,​to​the​ powerful​and​august​gathering​of​millions​of​citizens​who,​led​by​the​ constitution​and​the​laws,​go​forward​majestically​to​their​happiness,​ and​who​will​trample​those​destructive​insects​who​are​trying​ridiculously​to​frighten​it. ​ Because​ a​ faction​ never​ can​ be​ made​ up​ of​ illustrious​ and​ distinguished​men,​the​sensible,​the​property​owners,​never​enlist​under​the​ tattered​banner​of​demagoguery​or​band​together​against​the​common​ happiness​of​which​their​own​is​a​part,​and​here​we​have​the​third​characteristic​of​the​factions.​Vagrants​who​have​not​dedicated​themselves​ to​any​industry;​those​who,​fleeing​from​work​and​disdaining​frugality,​ have​not​known​how​to​acquire​or​preserve​an​honest​fortune;​those​ who​have​no​other​wealth​than​a​mind​capable​of​adapting​itself​to​all​ the​whims​of​the​powerful;​those​who​have​no​other​resource​than​employment,​wages​of​their​infamy;​those​who,​without​any​merit​whatsoever,​wish​to​be​prominent​and​stand​out;​those​who,​consumed​by​envy,​ try​to​knock​down​and​punish​virtue;​all​of​these​seek​in​a​faction​the​ support​and​protection​they​cannot​find​in​justice​and​order;​the​yearning​to​supplant​and​substitute​themselves​in​all​positions​stirs​them​up;​ they​can​only​and​wish​only​to​live​from​the​substance​of​the​nation.​ To​achieve​such​patriotic​ends,​it​is​necessary​to​destroy​the​established​ system,​turn​it​all​upside​down,​stir​up​discord,​and​foment​revolutions,​ whose​result​might​be​to​leave​them​masters​of​the​ungodly​spoils​of​the​ patria.

on​the​nature​of​faCtionS : 97

​ Those​who​have​produced,​through​their​talents​and​probity,​a​merit​ acknowledged​by​the​public;​those​who,​dedicated​to​agriculture,​the​ arts,​business,​have​acquired​a​precious​independence;​those​who​truly​ make​up​the​nation​(for​a​famous​author​called​the​rest,​with​reason,​ tenants​of​the​state);​those​who​carry​out​public​duties​and​actually​sustain​the​government​with​part​of​their​fortunes,​acquired​by​means​of​ zeal,​risk,​and​frugality;​those​whose​wealth​cannot​grow​or​be​maintained​ except​ in​ the​ tranquility​ and​ security​ of​ public​ order;​ those,​ finally,​who​are​the​nerve,​the​hope,​and​the​only​power​of​the​republic,​ will​never​be​agitators,​they​will​never​want​changes,​always​hazardous,​ they​will​never​foster​anything​but​the​rule​of​the​laws​under​whose​ protection​they​thrive​and​progress.​The​sources,​the​communication​of​ public​abundance​that​is​in​their​hands,​are​blocked,​are​interrupted​by​ disturbances;​confidence​disappears,​and​with​it​all​the​resources;​burdens​ are​ increased​ and​ products​ are​ weakened.​ Everything​ redounds​ against​the​property​owner,​while​the​idlers​view​the​ruin​with​the​coolness​of​those​who​lose​nothing,​or​with​the​complacency​of​those​who​ see​advancement​in​it. ​ For​that​reason,​in​times​of​danger,​the​patria​always​turns​its​eyes​ toward​the​property​owners,​who​are​those​with​effective​means​to​save​ it,​and​it​never​counts​on​the​egotistical​vagrants​who​will​sell​themselves​to​whomever​will​pay​them​the​most,​and​who​bring​their​patria​ and​all​their​duties​into​their​personal​interest.​The​property​holders​are​ one​and​the​same​with​the​patria,​and​thus​in​the​crisis​that​it​suffers​they​ silence​resentments,​abandon​personal​aspirations,​and​emulation​consists​in​looking​at​who​will​make​the​greatest​sacrifices​for​the​general​ happiness.​This​is​patriotism,​this​the​character​of​the​truly​free,​this​the​ public​spirit​that​must​always​be​generalized​among​us.​Thus,​one​has​ seen​at​various​times​in​England​that​the​Tories​and​Whigs​have​alternately​ceded​their​aims​and​their​positions​to​their​rivals​when​the​patria​ has​required​it,​and​it​would​be​for​the​patria​a​horrible​crime​to​seize,​ out​of​spite,​the​ministerial​seat​because​of​an​obstinacy​as​ridiculous​as​ it​is​fierce​and​foolish.​The​laws​in​representative​governments​have​prudently​and​justly​anticipated​that​the​destiny​of​the​nation​be​entrusted​ only​to​property​owners,​whose​progress​is​so​intimately​tied​to​it​that​ the​speculations​of​individual​interests​happily​coincide​with​the​general​ interest;​the​lack​of​these​laws​will​frequently​compromise​us. ​ Finally,​omitting​other​less​important​indicators,​which​can​be​re-

98 : joSé​maría​luiS​mora

duced​to​those​already​expressed,​the​last​is​the​impudence​of​violating​ all​ forms​ of​ legal​ equality.​ Neither​ the​ right​ and​ property​ of​ the​ professions,​very​effectively​supported​with​clear​reasons​by​Bentham,​ nor​innocence​and​virtue​will​be​free​from​violent​plundering​if​persons​have​not​bowed​their​heads​to​receive​the​seal​of​the​horrible​mysteries​of​the​faction.​Outstanding​merit,​the​most​distinguished​service,​ is​excluded​inexorably​from​every​position,​if​persons​lack​the​shameful​ mark;​but​with​it​is​obtained​security​to​violate​the​most​sacred​laws;​ the​impunity​of​the​most​atrocious​crimes​is​a​consequence​of​the​installation,​and,​under​this​protection,​the​constitution,​the​public​faith,​ whatever​is​respectable​and​holy​is​abused,​not​only​without​fear​of​punishment​but​instead​certain​of​reward.​The​important​jobs,​the​positions​ of​trust,​the​revenues​are​concentrated​in​the​hands​of​the​agitators.​The​ press​is​in​their​pay​and​at​their​service;​anarchic​writings​are​financed,​ bought,​lavished​profusely​with​public​wealth;​those​who​courageously​ support​social​rights​are​tenaciously​pursued.​In​this​way,​they​want​to​ keep​the​nation​chained​in​order​to​devour​it​in​peace. ​ If​factions​are​always​harmful,​they​are​much​more​so​in​a​people​ who,​just​having​emerged​from​slavery​and​devastated​by​it,​need​to​see​ as​evident​the​advantages​of​the​new​government​in​order​to​become​ enthusiastic​about​it​and​love​it​sincerely;​but​if​instead​of​the​magnificent​promises​that​were​made​to​them,​they​see​only​discord,​injustices,​ maltreatment,​disrepute​(in​a​very​great​way​we​have​fallen​compared​ with​all​nations),​burdens,​and​misery,​results​inseparable​from​the​factions,​it​follows​that​a​sense​of​emptiness​and​despair​is​engendered​in​ spirits,​which​scorns​a​system​that​the​unwise​common​man​regards​as​ the​source​of​woes​and​which​gives​rise​to​the​natural​desire​to​change​ it,​intending​to​improve​it.​So​broken​laws​are​viewed​with​disdain,​the​ authorities,​whose​prestige​consists​entirely​in​observing​them,​become​ suspect​and​distrusted​in​their​handling​of​things,​obedience​is​undermined,​impunity​encourages​insubordination,​and​as​it​progresses,​there​ is​not​yet​energy​or​resolve​that​might​contain​it.​The​contagion​progresses​rapidly,​and​the​government,​attacked​on​all​sides,​succumbs​or,​ what​is​the​same,​makes​concessions​to​the​troublemakers,​and​the​nation​terrifyingly​plunges​into​anarchy. ​ If​the​Mexican​nation​has​an​enemy​that​watches​it,​this​is​the​moment​that​it​awaited​to​clinch​its​chains​and​shackle​it,​perhaps​forever,​ to​its​bloody​cart.​The​people,​plagued​and​aggravated​by​the​greatest​of​

on​the​nature​of​faCtionS : 99

misfortunes,​which​is​anarchy,​prefer​to​be​victims​of​one​despot​and​ not​of​thousands;​they​prefer​to​fear​one​who​can​never​do​them​as​much​ harm​as​a​swarm​of​demagogues​who​humiliate​and​destroy​them​in​a​ thousand​ways.​Although​one​exhorts​them​then​to​take​up​arms​and​ repel​the​invader,​they​will​respond​indignantly:​“Execrable​traitors​of​ the​patria,​you​have​reduced​us​to​the​unhappy​extreme​of​seeing​despotism​as​a​relief​from​the​horrible​ills​with​which​your​ambition​and​ immorality​have​crushed​and​exhausted​us.​Will​we​consume​the​miserable​scraps​of​our​fortune​that​you​have​eradicated,​and​will​we​spill​ the​blood​that​has​escaped​your​cruelty​to​defend​your​power​that​you​ have​used​only​to​sacrifice​us?​What​benefit​could​we​expect​from​our​ efforts?​That​you​surely​continue​your​revenges​and​pillages,​and​that​ you​will​indefinitely​prolong​your​exterminating​rule!​But​you​have​not​ left​us​a​glimmer​of​hope,​and​you​have​cruelly​extirpated​us​and​made​ the​patria​disappear.​We​no​longer​have​it!​And​this​is,​barbarians,​all​the​ benefit​we​owe​you.​You​are​tranquil,​and​your​decision​is​made:​you​will​ fly​to​meet​the​tyrant​and,​prostrated​despicably,​you​will​worship​his​ footsteps;​you​will​buy​with​the​most​ignominious​prostitution​a​smile​ from​the​idol,​and,​infamous​informers,​you​will​top​off​all​your​crimes​ by​slandering​your​brothers​to​ingratiate​yourselves​with​your​masters.” ​ May​ the​ peoples​ of​ Anáhuac​ reflect​ on,​ confront,​ and​ apply​ these​ truths,​may​they​look​attentively​at​the​terrifying​aspect​that​the​Republic​presents​in​all​its​affairs;​confidence​has​fled,​and​peace​is​about​ to​flee​a​country​that​seeks​it​and​roots​out​all​of​its​supports.​Already​ Europe,​which​had​admired​us,​announces​our​downfall;​and​the​complexity​and​clashes​of​our​affairs​and​the​scorn​in​which​the​laws​are​seen​ must​hasten​it.​Our​independence​is​threatened,​our​liberty​abused,​our​ property​badly​secured,​and​we​sleep​in​a​fatal​confidence!​But​there​is​ still​time​to​save​the​patria​that​appeals​forcefully​to​us.​Let​us​not​feign​ ignorance​because​time​flies,​and​if​we​do​not​make​the​most​vehement​ efforts​and​all​the​sacrifices​it​demands​of​us,​a​piercing​regret​will​torment​us​much​more​than​the​loss​of​the​precious​goods​of​which​we​are​ going​to​be​stripped.

lorenzo de zavala Lorenzo​de​Zavala​(1788–1836),​a​politician​and​historian,​was​ born​in​Yucatán.​He​studied​in​the​city​of​Mérida​at​the​seminary​of​San​Ildefonso.​He​became​active​in​revolutionary​politics,​and​in​1814​he​was​imprisoned​by​the​Spanish​authorities.​ Once​released,​Zavala​returned​to​Yucatán,​where​he​edited​a​ newspaper.​He​was​elected​deputy​for​Yucatán​to​the​Spanish​ Cortes1​in​1820​and​took​his​seat​in​1821.​However,​he​promptly​ returned​to​Mexico,​where​the​military​leader​(and​later​emperor)​Agustín​de​Iturbide​(1783–1824)​had​won​independence​ for​Mexico​after​entering​Mexico​City​with​his​troops​on​September​27,​1821. ​ Zavala​was​a​member​of​the​first​constituent​congress,​in​1822,​ and​was​elected​senator​in​1825.​He​was​active​in​the​founding​of​ the​Lodge​of​York​in​Mexico.​In​1827​Zavala​was​elected​governor​of​the​state​of​Mexico.​In​the​1828​election​the​yorkino​candidate,​General​Vicente​Guerrero​(1782–1831),​lost​the​election.​ Nevertheless,​Zavala​and​others​maneuvered​to​seat​Guerrero​ in​the​presidential​chair,​and​subsequently​Guerrero​appointed​ Zavala​as​a​minister​in​his​cabinet.​When​an​opposing​faction​ deposed​Guerrero​in​1830,​Zavala​went​into​exile​in​the​United​ States​and​Europe.​While​in​exile​he​wrote​Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México, desde 1808 hasta 1830.​A​changing​political​situation​allowed​him​to​return​to​Mexico​and​reassume​his​ office​as​governor​in​1833. ​ Zavala​worked​with​the​reformist​administration​of​Gómez​ Farías,​and​when​the​government​was​toppled​at​the​end​of​1833​ went​again​into​exile​in​Europe.​Later,​he​returned​to​America​ and​went​to​Texas,​where​he​had​land​grants.​There​he​sided​ with​ the​ colonists​ and​ supported​ Texas’s​ independence​ from​ ​ 100

1.​The​“cortes”​were​the​legislatures​in​Spain.

introduCtion​to​Historical Essay on tHE MEXican rEvolUtions : 101

Mexico.​He​signed​the​Texas​declaration​of​independence​and​ was​elected​vice​president​in​1836. ​ We​present​the​introduction​and​conclusion​of​Zavala’s​Ensayo histórico​as​well​as​his​individual​vote​in​Congress​regarding​ the​separation​of​Guatemala​from​Mexico.

1



Introduction to Historical Essay on the Mexican Revolutions from 1808 to 1830

In​undertaking​the​publication​of​Ensayo histórico de la últimas revoluciones de México,​I​intend​to​elucidate​the​character,​customs,​and​different​situation​of​the​people​involved​rather​than​to​create​ weary​narratives​in​which,​as​Mr.​Sismondi​says​so​well,​one​encounters​ only​a​repetition​of​the​same​acts​of​cruelty,​evil​deeds,​and​baseness​ that​fatigue​the​spirit,​cause​boredom​in​the​reader,​and,​in​a​certain​ way,​degrade​the​man​who​spends​a​large​amount​of​time​going​over​the​ horrors​and​havoc​of​parties​and​factions.​“The​history​of​peoples,”​says​ this​same​writer,​“commences​only​with​the​beginning​of​life,​with​the​ spirit​that​animates​nations.”​As​the​time​prior​to​the​events​of​1808​is​a​ period​of​silence,​sleepiness,​and​monotony,​with​the​exception​of​some​ glimmers​that​appear​from​time​to​time​breathing​liberty,​the​interesting​history​of​Mexico​truly​commences​only​in​that​memorable​year.​ But​it​is​more​advisable​that​readers,​in​order​to​begin​reading​this​Ensayo histórico​with​understanding,​be​instructed​about​the​customs​of​the​ inhabitants​and​of​their​condition​before​the​referenced​epoch. ​ The​ discovery​ of​ the​ Americas​ that​ Christopher​ Columbus​ made​ at​the​end​of​the​fifteenth​century​and​the​conquest​of​those​regions​ carried​ out​ a​ short​ time​ later​ are​ among​ those​ events​ that,​ to​ a​ large​ degree,​have​contributed​to​changing​the​political​course​of​societies.​ My​goal​is​not​to​speak​of​the​influence​these​events​have​exercised​on​ Europe,​but​rather​of​the​course​that​political​matters​in​the​ancient​empire​of​the​Aztecs​have​taken,​not​in​the​time​immediately​subsequent​ to​the​conquest,​regarding​which​various​Spanish​and​foreign​scholars​ have​already​written.​In​their​writings,​one​can​encounter​repeated​facts​ that​will​confirm​those​that​form​the​picture​I​am​going​to​present​to​my​ readers​and​which,​perhaps,​will​shed​more​light​on​important​political​ ​ Original​title:​“Introducción.”​Source:​Lorenzo​de​Zavala,​Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México, desde 1808 hasta 1830,​vol.​1​(Paris:​P.​Dupont​y​Jaguionie,​1831). 102

introduCtion​to​Historical Essay on tHE MEXican rEvolUtions : 103

questions​which​will​doubtless​recur​successively​in​the​course​of​the​ coming​times.​Is​it​not​true​that​the​heterogeneity​of​the​elements​that​ have​made​up​European​societies​in​different​epochs​has​entered​into​ the​calculations​and​measures​of​their​legislators​and​leaders​in​organizing​their​progress?​The​history​of​the​middle​age,​of​this​period​of​ grand​vices​and​heroic​virtues,​of​ignorance,​energy,​and​universal​upheaval,​teaching​statesmen​what​the​basic​parts​that​make​up​the​nations​ they​governed​have​been,​showed​them​at​the​same​time​the​different​ sources​that​are​the​basis​of​the​rights​or​the​aspirations​of​each​class,​of​ each​hierarchy,​of​each​family.​In​Spanish​America,​where​there​were​no​ other​foreign​invaders,​nor​that​tumultuous​invasion​of​semisavage​nations,​we​must​assume​that​the​conquistador​laid​down​the​law​without​ conditions,​and​peaceably​used​the​right​of​force​with​no​restrictions​ except​those​to​which​he​would​subject​himself. ​ The​historians​of​the​conquest​of​Mexico​have​given​to​their​accounts​ an​air​of​exaggeration​that​has​been​the​origin​of​many​ridiculous​fables​ and​amusing​romances.​The​most​judicious​writers​have​not​been​able​ to​protect​themselves​from​giving​credit​to​some​entirely​false​and​even​ absurd​facts,​which​has​led​them​into​errors​of​great​consequence.​We​ can​affirm​that​no​history​has​been​more​adorned​with​illusions,​hyperbole,​romantic​stories,​and​episodes​than​that​of​those​far-​off​lands,​the​ distance​and​isolation​in​which​the​policy​of​the​Spanish​government​ maintained​ them​ causing​ almost​ the​ same​ results​ as​ those​ the​ heroic​ times​produced.​Cortés​himself,​in​his​letters​to​Carlos​V,​paints​pictures​so​flattering,​so​poetic​and​extraordinary​of​what​he​had​seen​and​ conquered​with​his​fearless​companions,​that​it​was​difficult​not​to​believe​oneself​transported​to​a​new​world,​to​a​land​similar​to​and​even​ superior​to​the​imaginary​Atlantis,​or​to​those​lands​of​gold,​incense,​ and​aromas​of​which​Eastern​writers​speak.​Magnificent​palaces​covered​ with​gold​and​silver;​kings​and​emperors​richer​than​the​most​powerful​ potentates​of​Europe;​temples​comparable​to​those​of​ancient​Greece;​ rivers​that​carried​grains​of​the​most​precious​metals​and​emeralds​and​ diamonds​instead​of​stones;​extraordinary​birds,​monstrous​quadrupeds;​ men​of​different​physiognomy​due​to​their​features,​color,​lack​of​beard,​ and​bristly​hair;​climates​in​which​one​breathes​a​fiery​atmosphere​or​ in​which​a​perpetual​spring​represents​the​closest​image​of​paradise.​A​ religion​made​up​of​the​most​ridiculous​and​horrible​ceremonies;​a​worship​whose​dogmas​are​a​monstrous​mix​of​everything​that​had​been​re-

104 : lorenzo​de​zavala

garded​as​the​most​bizarre.​All​of​this,​partly​true,​waxing​in​the​pens​ of​writers,​came​to​produce​indelible​impressions​in​Europe.​But,​how​ differently​were​these​same​things​seen​in​those​lands! The​Spanish​conquest​in​America​reduced​the​Indians​to​such​a​state​of​ slavery​that​each​white​man​considered​himself​to​have​the​right​to​be​ served​by​the​indigenous,​without​the​indigenous​having​either​courage​to​object​or​even​the​capacity​to​assert​any​right.​Those​who​escaped​ the​effects​of​the​first​slaughters​were​distributed​among​the​conquistadors.​In​the​beginning,​there​were​only​masters​and​servants.​The​authorities​did​not​govern​by​laws,​of​which​there​were​none,​but​rather​in​ the​name​of​the​king.​Later​they​were​given​those​ordinances​that​they​ called​the​Laws​of​the​Indies,​which​had​as​their​goal​moderating​the​ tyranny​of​the​descendants​of​the​conquistadors​and​of​the​chieftains​ who​ left​ Spain​ to​ govern​ those​ lands.​ But​ inasmuch​ as​ the​ only​ ones​ who​had​those​laws​or​royal​decrees​were​those​who​were​to​execute​ them,​in​reality​there​did​not​exist​anything​but​the​will​of​the​captains​ general,​viceroys,​or​governors.​Distributions​of​territories​were​in​part​ converted​into​encomiendas,​which​had​as​its​final​result​the​payment​of​ an​annual​tribute​to​the​holders​of​the​encomiendas,​who​were​like​the​borough mongers​in​England.​Later​the​kings​reduced​these​privileged​ones​ to​receiving​from​the​royal​treasury​the​amount​equal​to​the​annual​yield​ of​the​tributes​they​collected​from​the​Indians​who​were​their​share​in​ the​original​distributions,​eliminating,​in​this​way,​much​ill​treatment​ produced​by​the​method​of​collecting​it,​an​abuse​that​later​was​adopted​ by​the​subdelegates​and​chief​magistrates​charged​with​collecting​levies​ from​the​Indians,​who​were​obligated​ to​deliver​them​in​kind,​that​is​ to​say,​in​ordinary​fabrics​of​cotton​that​their​women​wore​or​in​other​ similar​manufactured​goods. ​ The​Indians​had​their​special​laws,​their​judges,​their​attorneys​and​ defense​counsels​that​the​government​named​for​them​because,​legally,​ they​were​considered​minors.​The​state​of​brutishness​in​which​it​kept​ them​ made​ them,​ in​ effect,​ unfit​ to​ demand​ any​ kind​ of​ rights​ or​ to​ enter​into​important​contracts,​which​assumed​the​need​for​some​complex​ideas.​Those​who​have​tried​to​defend​the​policy​of​the​Spanish​ government​with​respect​to​its​colonies​have​cited​the​existence​of​this​ Code​of​the​Indies​that​seems​to​have​been​formed​as​a​bastion​of​protection​on​behalf​of​the​Indians.​But​those​who​examine​the​questions​

introduCtion​to​Historical Essay on tHE MEXican rEvolUtions : 105

from​a​philosophical​point​of​view​have​considered​this​institute​only​as​ a​system​of​slavery​established​on​seemingly​indestructible​bases,​and​ from​whose​effects​those​governments​will​continue​to​suffer​for​some​ centuries.​In​effect,​those​laws​are​nothing​but​a​prescribed​method​of​ domination​over​the​Indians.​They​take​for​granted,​in​the​monarchs​ that​issued​them,​rights​over​the​goods and lives​of​the​conquered​ones,​ and​ consequently​ any​ act​ that​ was​ not​ absolutely​ an​ oppression​ was​ deemed​in​them​a​favor,​a​benefit​from​the​legislator.​There​were​laws​ that​determined​the​weight​with​which​they​could​be​burdened,​the​distances​they​could​go,​what​they​had​to​be​paid,​etc.​etc.​So​as​to​maintain​this​systematic​order​of​oppression,​it​was​necessary​that​the​oppressed​were​never​able​to​enter,​so​to​speak,​into​the​rational world,​into​ the​moral​sphere​in​which​other​men​live.​In​the​majority​of​the​provinces,​they​did​not​know,​nor​do​they​yet​know,​any​language​but​their​ own,​which​is​generally​different​from​the​others.​The​language​(without​excepting​Mexican,​which​some​novelists​have​pompously​praised)​ is​impoverished​and​lacks​words​to​express​abstract​ideas.​The​speeches​ historians​or​poets​imagine​to​have​come​from​the​mouths​of​the​Jicotencales,​Magiscatzines,​and​Colocolos​are​no​more​genuine​than​those​ that​Homer,​Virgil,​and​Livy​attribute​to​the​Agamemnons,​Turnuses,​or​ Scaevolas.​Those​Indian​chiefs​were​as,​or​perhaps​more​barbarous​than​ these​Greek​and​Roman​heroes,​and​their​language​could​not​lend​itself​ to​the​beautiful​oratories​that​a​long​sequence​of​centuries​of​civilization​ and​regular​governments​assume. ​ It​is​certain​that​Spanish​America​before​the​conquest​was​more​populated​than​today​and​that​the​Indians​under​their​national​governments​ began​to​develop​some​ideas.​They​had​confused​notions​regarding​the​ immortality​of​the​soul,​they​had​made​a​small​number​of​observations,​ although​highly​imperfect,​regarding​the​course​of​the​stars,​they​were​ not​completely​lacking​in​the​art​of​working​metal.​But​such​knowledge​ remained​ in​ its​ cradle,​ and​ now​ it​ is​ known​ how​ many​ centuries​ are​ necessary​for​peoples​to​attain​the​level​of​perfection​that​would​allow​ them​to​deserve​the​title​of​civilized.​The​conquest​destroyed​entirely​ this​movement​that​began​to​give​flight​to​the​spirit​of​invention​among​ those​indigenous​peoples.​A​new​worship​as​well​as​an​unknown​government​substituted​the​bloody​superstitions​of​Huitzilipoxtli​and​the​ patriarchal​regimes​of​the​Guatimocines​and​Moctezumas.​The​images​ of​the​saints​and​gods​of​the​Roman​Catholics​were​put​in​places​that​

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had​previously​been​occupied​by​the​horrible​idols​of​the​Aztecs;​and​ the​defenders​of​the​conquistadors​will​not​be​able​to​deny,​even​if​it​ is​painful​to​admit​it,​that​the​Indians​also​had​their​martyrs,​sacrificed​ because​of​the​religious​zeal​of​the​Roman​priests,​because​of​the​tenacious​adherence​of​many​of​them​to​their​ancient​worship.​But​eventually​force​and​terror​triumphed​over​fanaticism​for​a​religion​that​had​ against​it​the​horrific​dogma​of​demanding​human​victims.​On​the​other​ hand,​ the​ Indians​ encountered​ much​ more​ perfect​ images​ than​ their​ monstrous​idols,​and​the​change​was​not​very​difficult,​moving​to​our​ saints​the​ceremonies​and​tributes​that​they​made​to​their​gods.​The​assistance​of​miracles​came​about,​and​a​multitude​of​celestial​apparitions​ came​in​support​of​the​new​worship,​because​of​which​the​astonished​ Indians​could​not​but​believe​that​their​gods,​along​with​their​monarchs​ and​rulers,​had​been​defeated​in​a​just​war. ​ Missionaries​dedicated​themselves​and,​with​the​aid​of​troops,​made​ wondrous​conversions.​The​religious​constructed​their​convents​in​high​ places​like​forts​and​gave​those​buildings​all​the​solidity​necessary​to​resist​in​case​of​attack.​Very​rare​are​the​temples​and​houses​of​the​clergymen​that​do​not​suggest​the​reasons​that​led​the​founders​to​make​them​ works​of​fortification.​They​were​together​in​them​during​the​night,​and​ by​day​they​occupied​themselves​with​gathering​the​Indians​into​settlements.​It​is​clear​that​their​sermons​and​preachings​were​not​at​first​able​ to​have​any​effect,​because​as​they​did​not​have​the​gift​of​languages,​ it​was​not​easy​to​make​their​listeners​understand​dogmas,​mysteries,​ and​doctrines​that​assume​many​preliminary​lessons.​Catechisms​and​ small​books​of​rules​were​created​in​the​languages​of​the​land,​not​so​ the​Indians​could​read​them,​because​they​didn’t​know​how,​but​rather​ to​repeat​them​in​the​pulpits​and​to​make​the​people​memorize​them.​ There​is​not​a​single​version​of​the​sacred​books​in​any​language​of​the​ land;​ there​ is​ not​ a​ basic​ book​ that​ contains​ the​ fundamentals​ of​ the​ faith.​But​how​could​these​works​exist​for​the​Indians,​when​their​conquerors​themselves​could​not​read​them?​What​I​want​to​show​by​this​is​ that​the​religion​was​not​taught​to​those​men,​nor​did​they​become​convinced​of​its​divine​origin​through​proofs​or​reasoning;​the​entire​foundation​of​their​faith​was​the​word​of​their​missionaries,​and​the​reasons​ for​their​belief,​the​bayonets​of​their​conquerors.​The​Inquisition​could​ not​understand​the​motives​of​the​Indians.​Such​was​the​Indians’​state​ of​degradation​and​so​strong​the​idea​that​was​held​regarding​their​inca-

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pacity,​that​never​could​they​be​persuaded​that​an​Indian​was​able​to​be​ the​creator​of​some​heresy,​or​even​be​the​stubborn​sectarian​of​any​doctrine​whatsoever.​This​exception​came​to​be​a​protection,​as​a​concession​ in​favor​of​the​Indians,​owing​to​the​judgment​that​had​been​formed​of​ their​stupidity. ​ Besides​the​tribute​that​the​Indians​paid​to​the​royal​treasury,​or​to​ their​encomenderos,​other​ecclesiastical​contributions​with​the​name​of​ obvenciones​were​created.​They​were​exempted​from​the​tithe​and​the​ parochial​ fees​ because​ their​ exploiters​ had​ carefully​ calculated​ that​ a​ man​who​possesses​nothing,​nor​has​more​needs​than​the​basics,​could​ pay​little​of​the​tithe.​The​calculation​was​very​correct,​because​in​effect​ the​Indians​did​not​have​territorial​properties,​or​any​kind​of​industry,​ generally​speaking.​They​lived​and​live​in​huts​covered​with​thatch​or​ palm​fronds,​whose​size​is​generally​from​fifteen​to​sixteen​feet​in​length,​ by​ten​or​twelve​in​width,​oval​in​form.​There,​of​course,​are​gathered​ the​children,​the​domestic​animals,​and​an​altar​on​which​are​the​saints​ or​household​gods.​In​the​middle​is​a​fire​that​serves​to​heat​the​water​in​ which​corn​is​cooked,​their​sole​food,​with​few​exceptions.​There​are​not​ five​among​a​hundred​who​have​two​garments,​which​are​limited​to​one​ long​shirt​of​ordinary​cloth​and​some​sandals;​their​women​or​daughters,​ dressed​with​equal​simplicity​or​poverty,​do​not​know​that​inclination​so​ natural​to​their​sex​of​looking​good​in​front​of​others.​In​the​same​proportion​referred​to​previously,​there​are​not​property​owners,​and​they​ are​content​with​gathering​thirty-​five​or​forty​fanegas​of​maize​per​year,​ on​which​they​live​satisfactorily.​When,​because​of​some​labor​or​day​ work,​they​have​earned​a​small​amount​of​money,​they​go​to​make​some​ feast​to​the​saint​to​whom​they​are​devoted,​and​they​expend​their​small​ personal​money​on​fireworks,​ masses,​feasts,​and​intoxicating​drinks.​ The​rest​of​the​year​they​spend​in​idleness,​sleeping​many​hours​of​the​ day​in​the​warm​lands,​or​in​games​of​their​liking​in​the​delightful​climates​of​the​cordilleras.​Two​in​a​hundred​learned​to​read;​but​today​ their​situation​has​been​greatly​improved​in​this​regard.​In​several​provinces,​the​clergymen​had​such​power​and​exercised​such​authority​over​ the​Indians​that​they​ordered​them​whipped​publicly​when​they​did​not​ pay​the​obvenciones​on​time​or​committed​some​act​of​disobedience.​I​ have​frequently​seen​many​married​Indians​and​their​wives​whipped​at​ the​doors​of​the​temples​for​having​missed​mass​on​some​Sunday​or​feast​ day,​and​this​scandalous​act​was​customarily​authorized​in​my​province!​

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Those​who​were​whipped​were​obligated​afterward​to​kiss​the​hand​of​ the​person​who​whipped​them. ​ In​speaking​of​the​ecclesiastical​influence​in​the​land​and​of​the​moral​ situation​of​this​privileged​class,​it​is​impossible​not​to​collide​with​interests​sustained​by​superstition​and​created​by​despotism.​The​principle​ of​national​sovereignty,​recognized​subsequently​in​those​lands,​might​ have​uprooted​prejudices​destructive​of​liberty​and​made​presumptions​ to​blind​obedience​disappear​if​the​declarations​of​abstract​doctrines​ alone,​even​the​most​solemn,​were​sufficient.​The​force​of​habits​created​ for​three​centuries​will​still​remain​an​obstacle,​so​that​at​mid-​century,​ enlightenment​and​philosophy​have​to​triumph​over​this​colossus​after​a​ terrible​and​hard​battle.​In​those​lands,​the​persons​of​the​bishops​were,​ without​hyperbole,​as​reverenced​as​the​person​of​the​great​Lama​among​ the​Tatars.​When​he​went​out​into​the​street,​the​Indians​knelt​down​and​ bowed​their​heads​to​receive​his​blessing.​The​friars​in​the​towns​and​ small​ villages​ distant​ from​ the​ capitals​ were​ the​ teachers​ of​ doctrine​ and​the​masters​of​common​lands,​in​the​large​cities,​directors​of​the​conscience​of​landowners​and​women.​The​convents​of​the​Dominicans​and​ the​Carmelites​possessed​and​possess​riches​of​great​importance​in​rural​ and​urban​real​estate.​The​convents​of​the​religious​in​Mexico,​especially​ the​Conception,​the​Incarnation,​and​Saint​Theresa,​possess​in​property​at​least​three​quarters​of​the​individual​buildings​of​the​capital,​and​ the​same​happens​proportionally​in​the​other​provinces.​So​one​can​be​ assured​ without​ exaggeration​ that​ the​ wealth​ that​ the​ clergymen​ and​ religious​of​both​sexes​possess​amounts​to​the​annual​proceeds​of​three​ million​in​income.​Put​this​revenue​in​the​weight​of​the​balance​with​respect​to​their​influence,​and​one​is​able​to​calculate​approximately​what​ it​will​be​among​a​poor​population​where​properties​are​very​badly​distributed. ​ Now​I​enter​into​another​delicate​subject​that​can​be​considered​one​ of​the​elements​of​discord​in​those​countries​and​that​will​offer​great​ obstacles​ to​ their​ legislators,​ depending​ on​ the​ degree​ to​ which​ they​ abandon​infantile​and​frivolous​questions​and​concern​themselves​more​ deeply​with​the​true​interests​of​their​patria.​I​speak​of​the​distribution​ of​lands​that​the​Spaniards​made​and​the​way​those​lands​are​divided​ today. ​ The​Spanish​government​had​to​make​concessions​of​lands​to​those​ persons​who​had​contributed​most​to​the​conquest​of​that​rich​and​beau-

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tiful​territory.​Naturally,​the​conquerors​selected​the​best​situated​and​ most​fertile​plots​of​land​in​the​order​in​which​each​one​was​believed​ to​have​the​right​or​did​have​the​right​to​receive​this​kind​of​compensation.​The​rich​and​considerable​possessions​of​the​Counts​del​Valle,​de​ Santiago,​San​Miguel​de​Aguayo,​the​Marshall​de​Castilla,​the​Duke​of​ Monteleone,​and​others​occupy​an​immense​and​arable​territory.​The​ other​rural​farms​that​surround​the​towns​and​cities,​which​belong​to​ the​convents​and​pious​establishments,​have​their​source​in​royal​concessions,​others​in​testamentary​bequests,​gifts​inter vivos,​and​some​few​ come​from​contracts​of​purchase​and​sale.​The​third​class​of​large​landowners​is​that​of​families​descended​from​rich​Spaniards​who​bought,​ in​distant​times,​lands​from​the​government​or​from​Indians​when​they​ had​an​extremely​low​price,​and​they​were​successively​augmented​until​ they​formed​haciendas​that​today​are​worth​from​a​half-​million​pesos​to​ two​million,​like​those​of​the​Reglas,​Vivancos,​Vicarios,​Marquess​del​ Jaral,​Fagoagas,​Alcaraces,​and​others.​The​fourth​class​is​that​of​small​ landowners,​ who​ have​ rural​ farms​ whose​ value​ is​ not​ more​ than​ between​six​and​fifteen​thousand​pesos,​acquired​by​purchase​or​inheritance​or​other​similar​title.​Here​is​how​the​greater​part​of​the​lands​of​ the​Mexican​Republic​were​distributed,​especially​those​that​surround​ cities​or​great​population​centers.​All​these​possessions​are​in​the​hands​ of​ Spaniards​ or​ their​ descendants​ and​ are​ cultivated​ by​ Indians​ who​ serve​ as​ day​ workers.​ Of​ the​ seven​ million​ inhabitants​ that​ will​ now​ occupy​ that​ immense​ territory,​ at​ least​ four​ are​ Indians​ or​ people​ of​ color,​among​whom​nine-​tenths​are​reduced​to​the​state​I​have​discussed​ before.​Consequently,​there​does​not​exist​in​that​land​that​gradation​of​ fortunes​that​constitutes​a​common​scale​of​comforts​in​social​life,​principle​and​foundation​of​the​existence​of​civilized​nations.​It​is​an​image​ of​feudal​Europe​without​the​spirit​of​independence​and​the​energetic​ force​of​those​times. ​ During​the​three​hundred​years​of​colonial​government,​these​classes,​ reduced​to​subsisting​on​their​daily​labor,​had​no​notions​whatsoever​of​ a​better​condition​of​life,​or​at​least​did​not​even​suspect​they​could​be​ called​to​enter​into​the​pleasures​of​any​other​kind​of​existence​than​ the​ sad​ and​ mean​ one​ in​ which​ they​ remained.​ Their​ desires,​ on​ the​ other​hand,​were​proportionate​ to​their​ideas,​and​these,​as​has​been​ said,​occupied​a​sphere​so​small​that​one​could​say​with​accuracy​that​ they​knew​only​the​physical​side​of​life.​Those​activities​that​put​them​

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in​contact​with​white​people,​such​as​attendance​at​church​and​few,​very​ rare,​gatherings​for​some​public​act,​were​purely​mechanical,​and​it​was​ a​phenomenon​to​hear​a​reasoned​statement​from​the​mouths​of​those​ degraded​beings.​Many​travelers​have​said​that​the​indigenous​peoples​ of​America​are​reserved​and​silent,​mistaking​what​is​only​the​effect​of​ their​ignorance​for​contemplation​or​not​caring​to​speak.​But​if​by​some​ unknown​caprice​of​nature​a​genius​stood​out,​a​notable​character,​at​the​ moment​he​spoke​to​his​companions​with​the​language​of​desperation​ and,​exhorting​them​to​throw​off​their​enslavement,​he​was​sacrificed​ by​the​oppressors.​Tupac-​Amaro​in​Peru​and​Quisteil​in​Yucatán​can​be​ cited,​among​others. ​ “The​equality​or​inequality​among​the​different​orders​of​citizens​in​ a​new​and​semisavage​nation,”​says​a​famous​writer,​“depends​essentially​ on​the​distribution​of​territorial​property;​because​a​nation​that​is​not​ civilized​does​not​have​commerce,​or​accumulated​capital,​or​manufacturing​and​arts;​it​cannot​then​possess​other​riches​than​those​the​earth​ produces.​The​earth​is​the​only​one​that​feeds​men​in​a​land​without​ commerce​and​without​accumulated​riches,​and​men​consistently​obey​ the​one​who​can,​at​his​will,​give​them​or​take​from​them​the​means​of​ living​and​enjoying.​A​nation,”​continues​the​same​author, sometimes​without​revolution​and​without​conquest,​acquires​an​ imperfect​degree​of​civilization,​where​lands​are​cultivated​but​ commerce​and​the​arts​have​not​yet​made​any​progress​at​all:​then​it​ is​probable​that​the​lands​belonging​to​this​nation​were,​at​its​beginning,​divided​among​the​citizens​in​more​or​less​equal​portions,​or​ at​least​that​none​of​them​obtained​from​their​compatriots​permission​to​appropriate​an​amount​of​land​extremely​disproportionate​to​ the​abilities​of​the​family​to​cultivate​it.​The​haciendas​can​be​more​ or​less​large,​but​never​were​they​like​provinces,​and​the​inequality​ that​existed​in​this​case​among​individuals​would​not​be​such​that​it​ might​place​some​necessarily​in​dependence​on​others.​Citizens,​unequal​only​in​enjoyments,​would​not​forget​that​they​were​equal​by​ origin,​and​all​were​free.​Such​is​the​history​of​ancient​Greece​and​ ancient​Italy,​and​here​is​where​that​idea​originates​that,​from​the​ most​distant​times,​free​governments​are​seen​only​in​these​regions.​ In​our​times,​the​distribution​of​fortunes​in​the​colonies​of​North​ America​retain​some​analogy​with​the​early​establishment​of​agri-

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cultural​nations.​The​colonists​give,​it​is​true,​a​greater​expanse​to​ their​haciendas​than​we​give​in​Europe,​but​they​are​always​proportional​to​the​capacities​of​their​families.​Consequently,​there​exists​ among​them​a​kind​of​territorial balance,​as​Harrington​called​it​in​ his​work,​Oceana,​a​balance​that​contributes to the preservation​of​liberty​in​the​United​States​of​the​North.​For​the​rest,​even​without​ this​balance,​it​might​be​able​to​have​established​that​liberty;​because​the​Americans​have​accumulated​capital,​have​vast​commerce​ and​arts,​the​poor​and​the​rich​alike​finding​in​their​country​abundant​means​to​subsist​with​independence. ​ These​doctrines,​whose​accuracy​one​cannot​dispute,​lend​substance​ to​very​profound​reflections,​given​the​data​I​have​noted​in​an​orderly​ manner​regarding​the​state​of​territorial​riches​in​the​Mexican​Republic.​ What​ role​ will​ more​ than​ three​ million​ individuals,​ summoned​ suddenly​to​enjoy​the​broadest​rights​of​citizenship​from​the​state​of​the​ most​ignominious​enslavement,​with​no​real​property,​no​knowledge​ of​any​craft​or​office,​neither​commerce​nor​any​industry,​come​to​play​ in​ this​ society​ in​ which,​ appearing​ suddenly,​ they​ can​ be​ considered​ the​progeny​of​Deucalion​and​Pirra?​How​are​we​to​judge​them,​so​detached​from​the​desire​to​improve​their​fate​that,​having​in​their​hands​ the​ability​to​exercise​their​political​rights​in​the​assemblies​and​elective​ magistracies,​they​do​not​take​advantage​of​their​position?​More​to​the​ point:​What​should​the​conquered​families​do,​over​whom​ill​treatment​ of​all​kinds​has​been​exercised​for​three​centuries,​to​become​incorporated​by​the​constitutions​of​the​country​into​the​great​national​family?​ How​have​the​inexpert​directors​of​those​societies​been​able​to​forget​or​ close​their​eyes​to​what​has​happened​in​all​nations?​Which​have​been​ the​constant​movements​of​the​radicals​in​England,​the​liberals​in​continental​Europe,​and​particularly​in​France,​that​laid​the​foundation​for​ their​revolution​of​’89​over​the​distribution​of​feudal​properties?​Is​it​ perchance​believed​that​the​flight​taken​recently​by​the​project​of​the​bill of reform​in​England​is​in​order​to​have​a​few​more​deputies​or​​electors? ​ Every​government​has​its​principle​of​existence​for​which,​once​unsettled​or​distorted,​another,​analogous​to​the​changes​that​have​occurred​ in​the​country,​must​be​substituted.​The​colonial​system​established​by​ the​Spanish​government​was​founded:​(1)​On​the​terror​produced​by​ immediate​punishment​of​the​smallest​actions​that​might​lead​to​dis-

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obedience;​that​is​to​say,​on​the​blindest​passive​obedience,​without​permitting​the​examination​of​what​has​been​ordered​nor​by​whom.​(2)​On​ the​ignorance​in​which​one​must​keep​those​inhabitants​who​could​not​ learn​more​than​what​the​government​wanted,​and​only​to​the​degree​ agreeable​to​it.​(3)​On​religious​education​and,​most​of​all,​on​the​most​ despicable​superstition.​(4)​On​a​Jewish​isolation​from​all​foreigners.​(5)​ On​monopoly​in​commerce,​of​territorial​properties​and​of​positions.​ (6)​On​a​number​of​troops​ready​to​carry​out​in​a​moment​the​orders​ of​the​mandarins,​and​who​were​more​like​gendarmes​of​the​police​than​ soldiers​of​the​army,​to​defend​the​country. ​ After​the​Mexicans​had​secured​their​independence,​ the​terror​inspired​by​the​Spanish​authorities,​maintained​by​custom​passed​down​ from​fathers​to​sons,​disappeared,​and​the​broadest​declarations​of​liberty​and​equality​have​been​substituted.​Ignorance,​without​having​been​ able​to​disappear,​has​given​place​to​a​political​charlatanism​that​takes​ possession​of​public​dealings​and​leads​the​state​to​chaos​and​confusion.​ Popular​ superstition​ not​ ceasing,​ a​ large​ number​ of​ books​ have​ been​ introduced​ that​ corrupt​ the​ mores​ without​ enlightening​ the​ understanding.​There​is​now​no​monopoly​of​commerce,​positions,​or​territorial​properties,​and​this​item​requires​a​long​explanation. ​ Commerce​has​been​opened​to​all​foreigners,​and​speculators​have​ taken​out​great​profits,​as​was​to​be​expected.​Articles​of​merchandise​ conveyed​ by​ second,​ third,​ and​ fourth​ hand,​ passing​ from​ northern​ Europe​to​merchants​in​Cádiz,​and​from​them​to​Veracruz​in​Mexico,​ had​necessarily​to​arrive​much​more​expensive,​especially​with​no​competition​among​the​markets.​In​this​area​the​fate​of​the​country​has​improved​a​great​deal,​and​many​fewer​destitute​people​are​seen​than​in​ other​ times.​ But​ very​ few​ are​ the​ foreigners​ who,​ after​ having​ made​ great​earnings,​remain​in​the​country​and​join​with​Mexican​families.​ It​appears​that​they​see​themselves​in​the​country​as​in​tents,​ready​to​ break​camp​as​soon​as​they​have​concluded​their​business.​On​this​point,​ one​can​expect​much​improvement​with​time.​As​for​the​monopoly​of​ positions,​it​exists​only​among​the​factions​that​fight​among​themselves​ to​attain​them,​but​all​are​Mexicans.​The​territorial​properties​are​among​ the​great​objects​that​will​occupy​the​attention​of​those​governments.​ On​this,​I​have​already​said​how​it​is​enough​to​make​known​the​difficult​position​of​the​directors​of​those​towns,​and​I​have​not​intended​to​ make​a​treatise​on​insurrections.​I​reserve​giving​greater​consideration​

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to​these​ideas​in my memoirs​that​should​be​published​within​a​short​time,​ and​that​I​have​at​hand. ​ One​of​the​greatest​woes​that​will​afflict​those​peoples​for​some​time​ is​that​of​the​permanent​troops,​both​for​the​useless​expense​they​cause​ and​because​they​work​as​organized​masses​under​the​direction​of​ambitious​leaders,​so​the​civil​governments​cannot​offer​resistance​to​them​ and​are​consequently​their​instruments​or​their​victims.​Ten​or​twelve​ colonels​of​regimental​bodies​and​four​or​five​generals,​forming​a​united​ system,​oppress​the​country,​and,​without​altering​the​republican​forms,​ everything​proceeds​under​their​inspirations.​Foreign​businessmen,​who​ can​have​no​other​interests​than​their​profits,​which​depend​on​the​state​ of​tranquility​or​slavery,​favor​this​system​to​the​extent​they​can​unite​ with​Spaniards​who​desire​the​same,​and​it​is​very​common​to​see​many​ liberals​from​Europe​in​Mexico​enrolled​in​the​ranks​of​the​oppressors.​ This​explains​the​mystery​of​why​some​newspapers,​even​those​of​the​ party​of​liberty​in​Europe,​make​apologies​for​the​military​governments​ of​America.​Receiving​communication​and​news​from​overseas​agents,​ and​those​agents​always​speaking​in​the​sense​of​their​profits​and​interests,​it​is​clear​that​the​military​party​must​be​considered​most​useful​to​ their​speculation. ​ But​one​must​not​lose​sight​of​the​principles​I​have​set​forth​on​the​ well-​known​facts​to​which​I​have​also​referred.​The​greatest​and​most​ dangerous​errors​of​those​who​direct​public​affairs​is​not​to​think​about​ the​generations​that​will​be​following,​nor​about​their​advances​and​aspirations,​and​in​no​place​is​this​error​susceptible​of​easier​realization​ than​in​the​new​states​of​America.​From​the​year​1808​until​1830,​that​ is​to​say,​in​the​space​of​a​generation,​such​is​the​change​of​ideas,​opinions,​factions​and​interests​that​has​occurred,​that​it​is​enough​to​turn​ a​respected​and​recognized​form​of​government​upside​down​and​have​ seven​million​inhabitants​pass​from​despotism​and​arbitrariness​to​the​ most​liberal​theories.​Only​the​customs​and​habits​are​transmitted​in​ all​movements;​actions​and​continuous​examples​have​not​been​able​to​ change,​because​how​can​abstract​doctrines​make​the​course​of​life​suddenly​change?​Consequently​we​have​in​contradiction​to​the​theoretical​systems​of​established​governments​those​powerful​agents​of​human​ life,​and​the​founders​of​republican​forms​will​not​be​able​to​deny​that​ they​have​only​dressed,​with​the​clothing​of​declarations​of​rights​and​ principles,​the​old​man,​the​same​body​or​confluence​of​prejudices,​the​

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mass​ organized​ and​ shaped​ by​ previous​ institutions.​ What​ have​ they​ done​to​ substitute​ usages​ and​customs​ analogous​ to​the​new​order​of​ things? ​ There​is,​then,​a​continual​clash​among​the​doctrines​that​are​professed,​the​institutions​adopted,​the​principles​established;​and​among​ the​abuses​sanctified,​the​customs​that​dominate,​semifeudal​rights​that​ are​ respected;​ among​ the​ national​ sovereignty,​ equality​ of​ political​ rights,​freedom​of​the​press,​popular​government,​and​intervention​of​ the​armed​force,​laws​of​privilege,​religious​intolerance,​and​landowners​ of​immense​territories.​Might​the​conserving​principles​of​any​social​ order​whatsoever​at​least​be​made​harmonious?​If​a federal system,​which​ is​what​seems​to​me​most​suitable​to​those​countries,​is​adopted​by​conviction,​by​rationality,​by​a​judgment​formed​after​profound​reflection,​ not​for​that​reason​should​the​system​of​the​neighbors​of​the​North​be​ copied​exactly,​nor,​much​less,​literal​articles​from​the​Spanish​Constitution.​The​height​of​absurdity​and​the​absence​of​all​good​sense​is​the​ sanction​of​laws​of​privilege​and​privileges​in​a​popular​government.​ Let​there​be​established​an​ecclesiastical,​military,​and​civil​aristocracy​ if​one​wants​or​believes​it​useful​to​the​good​of​the​country;​let​the​republics​of​Genoa​or​Venice​be​imitated​if​it​is​possible;​then​might​there​ be​laws​of​privilege​and​privileged​classes;​might​there​be​laws​for​each​ hierarchy​or​for​each​corporation​or​each​person​if​it​is​judged​suitable.​ But​a​constitution​formed​on​the​foundations​of​the​broadest​liberty,​on​ the​model​of​that​of​the​North​Americans,​conserving​a​state​religion​ without​tolerance​for​another;​privileged​troops​and​military​leaders​in​ civil​commands;​convents​of​religious​of​both​sexes​instituted​in​conformity​with​the​canons​of​the​Roman​Church;​three​million​citizens​with​ no​property​at​all​nor​no​known​means​of​subsistence;​half​a​million​ with​political​rights​to​vote​in​elections​without​knowing​how​to​read​or​ write;​military​tribunals​judging​certain​privileged​cases;​finally,​all​the​ incentives​of​an​unlimited​liberty​and​the​absence​of​all​social​guarantees,​cannot​fail​to​produce​a​perpetual​war​among​such​heterogeneous​ factions​and​such​opposing​interests.​Make​disappear​that​confluence​of​ anomalies​that​mutually​contradict​each​other.​I​will​conclude​this​discourse​presenting​to​the​readers​the​state​of​income,​expenses,​and​resources​of​New​Spain,​omitting​minute​details​that​form​the​object​of​ my​work.

2 ​

Conclusion to Historical Essay on the Revolutions of Mexico from 1808 to 1830

I​have​completed​the​period​I​determined​to​examine​in​ providing​a​theoretical​basis​for​this​little​work.​The​reader​will​notice​ that,​although​I​have​passed​rapidly​over​the​events,​I​have​not​omitted​ any​of​the​circumstances​that​can​present​them​with​clarity​and​from​ the​genuine​point​of​view.​The​passions​at​work,​stirring​up​factions​and​ men​in​a​new​nation​where,​by​force​of​continuous​shocks,​the​bonds​ of​subordination,​the​greater​part​of​the​habits​of​order,​and​even,​to​a​ certain​point,​the​social​agreement​by​which​the​nation​is​maintained​ have​disappeared​together​with​the​chains​that​were​crushing​it,​cannot​ but​offer​for​some​time​the​spectacle​of​a​chaos​of​successive​episodes​ of​liberty​and​slavery​and​of​political​problems​that​make​the​writers​of​ Europe,​who​propose​to​resolve​our​great​questions​by​abstract​ideas​ and​general​principles​without​knowing​our​customs,​prejudices,​and​ circumstances,​form​absurd​theories.​I​am​going​to​venture​some​reflections​about​the​principal​considerations​that​will​bear​on​the​fate​of​our​ America​for​many​years​in​the​new​republics,​and​where​the​intentions​ of​those​who​might,​in​good​faith,​try​to​cut​off​their​disagreements​at​its​ root​the​source​should​be​directed.​Of​course,​the​fundamental​objective​ of​my​observations​is​the​Mexican​Republic​that​I​know,​to​which​I​owe​ the​existence​and​fruit​of​all​my​work. ​ What​does​it​mean​that​a​country​in​which​the​sun​is​so​brilliant​and​ warm​that​fecundity​spreads,​the​aspect​of​the​mountains​so​varied​and​ pleasant;​where​the​fields​are​irrigated​by​abundant​streams​or​by​torrents​that​fall​from​the​sky,​and​where​nature​offers,​in​its​greater​part,​a​ soil​covered​by​sumptuous​vegetation;​where​the​inhabitants​receive​at​ birth​a​lively​and​immediate​imagination,​susceptibility​to​impassioned​ ​ Original​title:​“Conclusión,”​from​Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México, desde 1808 hasta 1830.​Source:​Lorenzo​de​Zavala,​Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México, desde 1808 hasta 1830,​vol.​2​(New​York:​Elliot​and​Palmer,​1832). 115

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impressions,​a​disposition​of​the​mind​to​comprehend​easily,​and​a​keen​ spirit,​ is​ populated​ for​ the​ most​ part​ with​ poor,​ ignorant​ people​ deprived​ of​ the​ social​ advantages​ and​ enjoyments​ that​ civilization​ provides?​Why​is​it,​in​the​very​moment​of​entering​into​the​great​family​ of​cultured​peoples,​they​present​a​spectacle​of​interminable​civil​wars,​ acts​ of​ cruelty,​ and​ bloody​ scenes,​ instead​ of​ entering​ peacefully​ the​ road​of​liberty​they​have​begun​to​travel​and​to​which,​with​such​heroism,​they​have​given​a​beginning?​No​one​can​doubt​that​the​principal​ causes​of​this​situation​involve​the​course​this​society​followed,​incompatible​ with​ the​ circumstances​ referred​ to​ and​ which​ for​ three​ hundred​years​blocked​the​beginnings​of​life​and​activity;​hindered​since​ the​ revolution​ of​ independence​ by​ a​ totally​ opposed​ policy​ that​ has​ called​all​progeny,​so​to​speak,​to​renounce​their​old​habits,​customs,​ and​prejudices​to​adopt​others​analogous​in​the​new​social​system​that​ the​policy​was​trying​to​provide.​Let​us​look​at​how​this​people​was​created,​educated,​and​disciplined​under​colonial​domination,​and​in​the​ examination​of​this​question​we​will​see​the​origin​of​their​calamities. ​ Four​are​the​institutions​that​most​essentially​influence​the​fate​of​ a​society​and​that​almost​exclusively​determine​the​character​of​the​inhabitants​of​a​nation:​religion,​education,​legislation,​and​the​ideas​of​ honor​that​inspire​it.​Religion​is,​of​all​the​moral​forces​to​which​man​is​ subject,​the​one​that​can​produce​the​greatest​good​or​the​greatest​evil.​ All​opinions​that​refer​to​interests​superior​to​this​world;​all​beliefs​that​ have​eternity​as​a​goal;​all​sects​that​preach​a​religion,​exercise​a​prodigious​influence​over​moral​sentiments​and​human​character.​None,​ nevertheless,​penetrates​more​deeply​into​the​heart​of​man,​as​a​wise​ writer​very​well​observes,​than​the​Catholic​religion,​because​none​is​ more​strongly​organized;​none​has​subordinated​moral​philosophy​so​ completely;​none​has​enslaved​consciences;​none​has​established,​as​it​ has,​the​tribunal​of​confession,​which​reduces​all​believers​to​the​most​ absolute​dependence​on​their​clergy;​none​has,​as​it​does,​priests​more​ isolated​from​the​spirit​of​family​or​more​intimately​united​by​interest​and​esprit​de​corps.​The​unity​of​the​faith,​which​can​only​be​the​ result​of​the​subjection​of​reason​to​belief​and​which,​consequently,​is​ not​found​in​any​other​religion​to​the​high​degree​as​in​the​Catholic,​ tightly​binds​all​members​of​this​Church​to​accept​the​same​dogmas,​ to​submit​to​the​same​decisions,​and​to​be​formed​on​the​same​model​ of​instruction.​But​its​powerful​influence​has​been​exercised​in​vari-

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ous​ways,​according​to​whether​the​interests​of​its​primary​leaders​have​ been​more​in​agreement​with​the​people​or​with​the​kings.​During​the​ centuries​that​preceded​the​reigns​of​Carlos​V​and​Felipe​II,​from​the​ beginnings​of​the​tenth​century,​the​immense​moral​force​of​pontifical​ power,​then,​was​used​to​elevate​the​people​and​to​place​ideas​of​liberty​ and​civilization​in​opposition​to​attempts​by​the​emperors​of​Germany​ and​the​efforts​of​the​Ghibellines​who,​under​their​protection,​began​to​ establish​despotic​principalities​in​Italy.​Until​then,​says​Mr.​Sismondi,​ the​popes​had​contracted​a​type​of​alliance​with​the​people​against​the​ sovereigns;​they​had​made​conquests​only​over​the​kings.​They​owed​ their​elevation​and​all​the​means​of​resistance​to​the​power​of​the​spirit​ as​opposed​to​brutal​force;​and​for​policy,​even​more​than​for​recognition,​they​had​believed​themselves​obliged​to​expand​this​power​of​ the​spirit.​They​had​made​arise,​directed,​and​called​to​their​aid​public​ opinion;​they​protected​letters​and​philosophy,​and​they​even​permitted,​ with​liberality,​philosophers​and​poets​to​deviate​sometimes​from​the​ narrow​orthodox​line.​Finally,​they​proclaimed​themselves​protectors​of​ liberty​and​they​protected​the​republics.​But​as​soon​as​half​the​Church,​ raising​the​standard​of​reform,​shook​off​the​yoke;​as​soon​as​that​very​ philosophical​enlightenment​it​had​protected​was​turned​against​Rome,​ that​spirit​of​liberty​it​had​stimulated,​that​public​opinion​that​escaped​ from​it​and​that​already​had​come​to​be​a​power​in​Europe,​a​feeling​of​ profound​terror​made​the​popes​determine​to​change​their​entire​policy.​ Instead​of​remaining​at​the​head​of​the​opposition​against​the​monarchs,​ they​felt​the​need​to​make​common​cause​with​them​in​order​to​contain​adversaries​much​more​terrible​than​were​they.​They​contracted​the​ tightest​alliances​with​the​temporal​princes,​especially​with​Felipe​II,​ the​ most​ despotic​ among​ all​ of​ them,​ and​ they​ occupied​ themselves​ only​with​subordinating​consciences​and​enslaving​the​human​spirit.​In​ effect,​they​imposed​a​yoke​on​it,​and​at​no​time​had​it​endured​one​so​ terrible. ​ This​was​the​epoch​of​the​discovery​and​conquest​of​America​by​the​ Spaniards.​In​establishing​their​power​and​domination​among​us,​they​ brought​with​them​the​spirit​of​superstition,​intolerance,​and​blind​obedience​that​Don​Fernando​and​Doña​Isabel​were​trying​to​establish​on​ the​Peninsula,​preparing​the​unfortunate​days​of​Carlos​I​and​his​descendants.​Hernando​Cortés,​brave​caudillo​but​cruel​and​superstitious,​ impressed​ the​ conquered​ Indians​ so​ that​ they​ feared,​ honored,​ and​

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obeyed​him,​by​letting​himself​be​whipped​by​a​priest​publicly​in​order​ to​instill​in​the​minds​of​those​people​the​first​seeds​of​spiritual​power.​ On​this​base​the​Spaniards​raised​the​edifice​of​the​new​society​created​ in​Spanish​America.​The​power​of​arms​and​priestly​influence​bound​ the​government,​directed​the​morality,​the​sentiments,​the​character​of​ the​people.​There​was​nothing​outside​this​narrow​circle,​and​the​society​ moved​like​this​in​silence​from​generation​to​generation,​without​any​ other​people​hearing​even​the​sound​of​its​footsteps.​But​this​degrading​ situation​was​necessary​to​imprint​a​deep​seal​of​humility​and​slavery​on​ all​the​inhabitants.​The​few​ideas​of​all​kinds​that​they​had​were​lost;​the​ colonies​saw​only​through​the​eyes​of​their​directors,​and​they​understood​or,​better​said,​learned​only​what​they​taught​them.​The​priests​ took​control​of​public​instruction;​and​moral​philosophy,​which​is​the​ patrimony​most​inherent​to​human​happiness​and​which​belongs​to​the​ domain​of​the​conscience,​passed​entirely​into​the​hands​of​religion,​as​ happened​in​Spain.​Theology​took​control​of​this​science,​which​teaches​ men​their​rights​and​the​reasons​in​which​they​are​based,​and​the​vital​ principles​of​society​were​perverted​by​the​abuse​that​was​made​of​it. ​ I​do​not​in​any​way​propose​to​deny​that​there​is​a​close​connection​ between​religion​and​morality;​and​all​good​men​must​recognize​that​ the​most​noble​homage​the​mortal​can​render​to​his​Creator​is​that​of​ raising​himself​to​the​Creator​by​his​virtues.​But​moral​philosophy​is​ an​entirely​distinct​science​from​theology:​it​has​its​bases​in​reason​and​ conscience;​it​carries​with​it​proofs​that​produce​our​conviction;​and,​ after​having​cut​loose​the​spirit​through​investigation​of​its​principles,​it​ satisfies​the​heart​by​discovering​what​is​truly​beautiful,​just,​and​fitting.​ The​clergy​took​control​of​morality​as​a​science​exclusive​to​its​rule;​it​ substituted​the​authority​of​decrees​of​the​councils​and​the​Fathers​for​ the​enlightenment​of​reason​and​conscience,​the​study​of​the​casuists​ for​moral​philosophy,​and​replaced​the​most​noble​exercise​of​the​mind​ with​a​series​of​precepts​that​reduced​its​instruction​to​a​servile​routine. ​ But​morality​was​perverted​in​this​way​in​the​hands​of​the​casuists;​it​ became​like​a​foreign​thing​in​the​heart​and​understanding;​vices​were​ no​longer​judged​by​the​evil​consequences​they​produce,​by​the​sufferings​they​carry​with​them,​by​the​disregard​in​which​they​put​vicious​ men​into​society,​but​rather​uniquely​under​the​province​of​divine​laws.​ The​ foundation​ that​ nature​ had​ provided​ and​ put​ in​ the​ heart​ of​ all​ mortals​was​destroyed​in​order​to​substitute​another,​arbitrary​and​arti-

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ficial.​The​difference​between​venial​and​mortal​sins​erased​the​difference​that​exists​primordially​in​the​conscience​between​the​most​serious​offenses​and​the​most​pardonable;​it​appeared​to​place​in​a​certain​ order,​mixed​among​the​crimes​that​cause​the​greatest​horror,​the​faults​ that​our​weakness​could​hardly​avoid.​The​casuists​held​up​to​execration​among​the​most​guilty​men​of​the​first​category,​ heretics,​ schismatics,​and​blasphemers.​See​here​the​beginning​of​the​hatred​of​South​ Americans​for​foreigners,​hatred​that​will,​for​some​time,​be​an​obstacle​ to​their​prosperity.​But​this​horror​that​was​inspired​against​industrious,​charitable,​and​moral​men​was​the​greatest​misfortune​that​could​ have​befallen​national​customs,​as​much​because,​seeing​heretics​practice​good​deeds​they​became​accustomed​to​doubting​the​excellence​of​ virtue,​as​because​in​their​judgment​it​was​less​contagious​dealing​with​ the​criminal​and​vicious​men​who​were​Catholics,​heard​mass,​and​recited​the​rosary​than​with​people​who​had​refined​customs​and​a​conduct​beyond​reproach​but​were​not​subject​to​the​pope. ​ The​doctrine​of​penance​caused​a​new​subversion​of​morality,​continues​ Mr.​ Sismondi,​ now​ confused​ with​ the​ arbitrary​ distinction​ among​sins.​The​pardon​of​heaven​and​the​return​to​the​path​of​virtue​ is,​without​doubt,​a​consoling​doctrine;​and​this​idea​is​so​in​accord​with​ human​needs​and​weaknesses​that​it​has​become​an​essential​part​of​all​ religions.​But​the​casuists​have​distorted​this​doctrine,​imposing​precise​formulas​for​penance,​confession,​and​absolution.​A​single​act​of​ faith​and​fervor​was​regarded​as​sufficient​to​erase​a​long​list​of​crimes.​ Instead​of​holding​out​virtue​now​as​a​constant​and​perpetual​obligation,​it​was​nothing​other​than​a​settlement​of​accounts​at​the​last​moment​ prior​ to​ death.​ There​ was​ no​ sinner​ so​ obstinate​ that​ he​ would​ not​have​the​plan​of​dedicating​some​days​before​dying​to​the​care​of​ his​soul;​but​in​the​meantime,​he​gave​free​rein​to​all​his​passions,​and​ those​who​preached​against​these​doctrines​were​considered​Jansenists.​ Another​of​the​corrupting​principles​of​morality​were​indulgences​and​ the​scandalous​traffic​in​them.​The​kings​of​Spain​obtained​the​bulls​of​ dispensation,​which​were​sold​by​force​to​Americans,​who​did​not​receive​absolution​if​they​did​not​purchase​that​document​of​infamy,​ignominy,​and​superstition.​The​power​attributed​to​contrition,​to​religious​ ceremonies,​to​indulgences,​to​the​bulls​all​came​together​to​convince​ people​that​eternal​condemnation​or​salvation​depended​on​the​absolution​of​the​priest,​and​this​was​perhaps​the​most​lamentable​blow​dealt​

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morality.​Chance,​not​virtue,​had​to​decide​the​eternal​fate​of​the​soul​ of​the​dying​person.​The​most​virtuous​man,​whose​life​might​always​ have​been​pure,​could​be​attacked​unexpectedly​by​death​in​the​moment​when​pain,​anger,​surprise​might​have​made​him​utter​one​of​those​ profane​words​that​habit​has​made​so​common​and​that,​according​to​ the​decisions​of​the​councils,​cannot​be​pronounced​without​incurring​ mortal​sin.​Then​his​eternal​condemnation​was​inevitable,​because​there​ had​not​been​present​a​priest​to​receive​his​penance​and​open​for​him​ the​doors​of​heaven.​On​the​other​hand,​the​most​perverse​man,​loaded​ down​with​crimes,​could​experience​a​moment​of​remorse​and​of​transitory​desire​to​make​himself​virtuous;​with​a​good​confession​and​communion,​this​man​was​assured​of​heaven.​Thus,​the​morality​taught​to​ the​people​was​a​source​of​bad​doctrine,​because​the​enlightenment​of​ reason​and​the​constant​inspirations​of​the​conscience,​which​teach​to​ distinguish​always​the​good​from​the​corrupted​man,​were​contradicted​ by​theological​decisions,​which​condemned​the​first​and​beatified​the​ second,​only​because​of​the​unexpected​chance​of​receiving​absolution. ​ Yet​more;​in​the​catechisms​of​religious​instruction,​at​the​side​of​the​ great​index​of​virtues​and​vices,​whose​understanding​is​universal​and​ natural​to​man,​was​placed​another​index​of​the​mandates​of​the​Church,​ unsupported​by​a​sanction​so​terrible​as​the​mandates​of​the​divinity;​ without​making​eternal​salvation​depend​on​their​observance,​they​came​ to​have​the​formality​and​power​that​the​eternal​laws​of​morality​never​ managed​to​have.​The​murderer,​still​covered​with​the​blood​he​had​just​ spilt,​did​not​eat​meat​on​Friday​no​matter​how​much​there​was​in​the​ world;​the​prostitute​placed​the​image​of​the​virgin​by​her​bed,​before​ which​she​recited​the​rosary;​the​priest​who​got​up​from​the​gaming​ table​or​who​committed​crimes​without​scruple​would​not​dare​drink​ a​glass​of​water​before​saying​mass.​It​seemed​that​the​more​regularity​ man​put​into​observing​the​precepts​of​the​Church,​the​more​he​believed​himself​dispensed​from​observing​natural​law,​to​which​depraved​ inclinations​would​have​to​be​sacrificed.​Meanwhile​morality,​properly​ speaking,​never​stopped​being​the​object​of​the​Church’s​preachings,​ but​priestly​interest​has​corrupted​everything​it​has​touched​in​Spain​ and​its​colonies.​Mutual​benevolence​is​the​foundation​of​social​virtues;​ the​casuist,​reducing​it​to​a​precept,​has​declared​that​it​is​a​sin​to​speak​ badly​of​one’s​fellow​being.​With​this​he​has​impeded​everyone​from​ expressing​the​just​judgment​that​should​discern​virtue​from​vice​and​

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has​imposed​silence​on​the​language​of​truth.​But​becoming​accustomed​ in​this​way​to​the​fact​that​words​do​not​express​thought,​he​has​done​ nothing​ but​ increase​ the​ secret​ distrust​ of​ each​ man​ with​ respect​ to​ others.​Charity​is​the​most​excellent​virtue​in​the​Gospel,​but​the​casuist​ has​taught​to​give​to​the​poor​for​the​good​of​the​soul,​not​to​help​his​ fellow​creature;​he​has​put​into​use​alms​without​discernment,​which​ stimulates​vice​and​idleness;​finally,​he​has​taught​to​invest​in​the​mendicant​monk​funds​that​should​be​destined​for​public​charity.​Sobriety​ and​moderation​are​domestic​virtues​that​maintain​the​faculties​of​individuals​ and​ ensure​ peace​ within​ families;​ the​ casuist​ has​ put​ in​ their​ place​the​observance​of​Fridays,​fasts,​discipline,​the​vows​of​chastity,​ and​ virginity.​ Nevertheless,​ at​ the​ side​ of​ these​ virtues​ and​ monastic​ vows,​intemperance​and​libertinism​could​become​rooted​in​the​heart.​ Modesty​is​one​of​the​most​agreeable​qualities​of​the​better​man;​it​does​ not​exclude​a​just​pride​that​serves​as​an​aid​against​his​own​weaknesses​ and​consoles​him​in​adversity;​the​casuist​has​substituted​humility,​which​ allies​with​the​most​insulting​contempt​for​others. ​ Such​ has​ been​ the​ inexplicable​ confusion​ in​ which​ the​ Jesuits​ put​ morality​with​works​of​casuistry,​with​which​they​flooded​Spain​and​ its​ colonies.​ They​ took​ exclusive​ control​ of​ the​ schools,​ which​ afterward​passed​to​the​hands​of​the​friars.​It​was​not​permitted​to​do​philosophical​ research​ that​ established​ moral​ rules​ on​ foundations​ other​ than​theirs,​nor​enter​into​discussions​regarding​their​first​principles,​ nor​appeal​to​human​reason.​Pascal,​Malebranche,​Locke​had​spoken​as​ Christian​philosophers,​but​their​luminous​doctrines​could​not​penetrate​among​the​inhabitants​of​Mexico.​The​entire​store​of​ideas​was​in​ the​hands​of​confessors​and​directors​of​consciences;​the​conscientious​ Mexican​abdicated​the​power​most​essential​to​man,​that​is,​to​study​and​ know​his​duties.​How​many​times​did​he​find​himself​burdened​with​ difficult​matters​of​life;​whatever​doubt​occurred​to​him​in​complicated​ situations,​he​appealed​to​his​spiritual​guide.​In​this​way​the​tests​of​adversity,​which​are​those​that​elevate​man,​served​to​make​him​more​subject.​See​here​the​reason​why,​as​long​as​the​interests​of​the​clergy​were​ in​accord​with​dependence,​people​did​not​dare​raise​their​voice​against​ established​laws​preached​and​constantly​inculcated​as​a​dogma​of​blind​ obedience​to​the​king​and​Roman​pontiff.​Let​us​now​consider​the​kind​ of​education​that​was​given​to​Mexicans,​and​the​reader​will​deduce​the​ consequences​of​what​can​be​expected​in​the​future.

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​ In​some​chapters​I​have​spoken​in​passing​of​the​type​of​instruction​ that​was​and​still​is​given​in​many​academies​of​the​Mexican​Republic.​ But​in​this​chapter​I​am​going​to​speak​of​the​type​of​general​education​in​order​to​proceed​then​to​the​public​establishments.​Education​is​ one​of​the​most​powerful​resources​for​the​government​of​people.​But​ those​whom​a​bad​education​has​harmed​can​be​brought​back​to​the​noble​ sentiments​of​virtue​and​duty.​Religion​extends​its​healthy​or​unfortunate​influence​over​the​entire​course​of​life;​its​power​rests​on​the​imagination​of​youth,​on​the​enthusiastic​tenderness​of​the​weaker​sex,​on​the​ terrors​of​old​age;​it​accompanies​man​even​to​his​most​secret​thoughts​ and​is​present​even​in​the​acts​he​can​conceal​from​every​human​power.​ Nonetheless,​the​reciprocal​influence​of​education​over​religion,​and​of​ the​latter​over​the​former,​is​so​great​that​these​two​efficient​causes​can​ scarcely​be​separated​from​national​characters. ​ Mexicans​have​received​the​same​kind​of​physical,​moral,​and​religious​education​as​their​Spanish​conquerors.​But​as​I​have​observed​another​time,​three-​fifths​of​the​population​was​entirely​abandoned​to​a​ type​ of​ purely​ animal​ life.​ This​ numerous​ class​ of​ that​ great​ society,​ without​needs,​without​desires,​without​ambition,​and​without​passions,​ was​nothing​more​than​the​patrimony​of​priests​and​military​authorities​who​put​into​action​the​physical​forces​of​those​people​to​pull​out​ advantages,​without​even​employing​in​their​care,​in​their​instruction,​ the​careful​solicitude​that​the​owners​of​slaves​do​in​countries​where​ slavery​is​permitted.​The​education​of​the​Indians​was​consequently​nil,​ and​ there​ is​ very​ little​ one​ can​ say​ about​ a​ negative​ thing.​ The​ mental​dispositions​of​these​people​have​not​even​begun​to​develop​since​ the​new​social​amalgamation​and​their​nominal​incorporation​into​the​ great​Mexican​family.​Their​state​of​poverty,​their​dispersion​into​small​ population​centers,​the​scanty​incentive​they​have​for​their​children​to​ acquire​notions​about​hopes​inconceivable​to​them,​or​know​their​importance,​and​(I​must​say​it​even​if​it​be​shameful​for​us)​the​dereliction​ with​which​their​education​has​been​overseen​by​the​directors​of​the​ new​republics​are​the​reasons​why​so​few​advances​have​still​been​observed​in​their​social​improvement.​A​very​great​accusation​it​will​be​for​ Mexicans,​that​of​not​dedicating​special​attention​to​the​moral​advancement​of​the​Indians,​whose​education​is​today​entrusted​to​their​new​ governments.​In​Mexico​there​is​an​academy​named​San​Gregorio,​assigned​to​instruct​a​certain​number​of​indigenous​people,​and​in​Puebla​

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there​was​another​such.​But​those​establishments​are​useful​only​to​their​ administrators​and​their​teachers.​In​general,​nothing​is​instructed​or​ learned​under​the​routine​of​a​rector​who​only​cares​about​the​mass,​the​ rosary,​and​the​long​vestments​of​his​schoolboys.​What​is​necessary,​and​ I​consider​the​foundation​of​society​in​the​Mexican​states,​is​that​the​ schools​of​primary​instruction​be​multiplied​and​in​them​be​invested​ all​the​funds​that​were​squandered​on​other​things.​Now​I​will​move​to​ making​some​reflections​on​the​academies. ​ The​contradiction​in​the​United​States​of​Mexico​is​very​great​between​the​methods​of​education​adopted​in​its​literary​establishments​ and​ the​ kind​ of​ instruction​ young​ people​ must​ acquire​ to​ begin​ to​ carry​out​profitably​the​new​posts​to​which​they​will​be​called​under​ the​ present​ form​ of​ government.​ The​ same​ constitutions,​ drawn​ up​ by​the​bishops​more​than​two​centuries​ago​on​royal​orders​and​councils,​created​to​provide​clergymen​who​learn in order to teach​ the​elements​of​blind​obedience,​renouncing​all​use​of​reason​and​submitting​ to​the​authority​of​the​Holy​Fathers,​bulls,​and​councils,​exist​today​in​ the​seminaries​of​the​Republic.​Students​are​permitted​only​to​acquire​ a​ certain​ kind​ of​ knowledge​ that​ teachers​ do​ not​ judge​ dangerous​ to​ the​subversion​of​their​routinist​doctrines.​All​philosophy​is​subordinated​to​theology,​which​is​the​most​general​science;​and​with​respect​to​ other​systems,​nothing​more​is​learned​than​the​arguments​with​which​ theologians​ have​ refuted​ them.​ All​ moral​ philosophy​ is​ submitted​ to​ the​decisions​of​the​casuists,​without​it​being​permitted​to​seek​in​the​ heart​principles​other​than​those​the​authority​of​the​casuists​has​pronounced.​Political​science,​which​was​not​known,​has​remained​subordinated​to​those​decisions​that​destroy​all​sentiment​of​individual​independence,​also​becoming​a​science​of​formulas.​In​very​few​academies​ is​history​taught;​but​what​sublime​feeling​can​be​aroused​in​the​hearts​ of​young​ people​who​ receive​ only​dry​ narratives,​ without​ being​ able​ to​penetrate​the​profound​resources​that​move​the​passions​and​the​research​into​the​great​causes​that​produced​past​events?​Can​they​know​ well​history​taught​in​collections​of​formulas,​or​at​most​through​the​ jumbled​compilations​of​Rollin​or​Segur,​if​they​cannot​research​in​the​ precious​originals​that​ancients​left​us?​Investigate​Greek​or​Roman​history,​says​Mr.​La​Harpe1​to​a​young​man​who​knows​nothing​but​Rollin​ ​

1.​Jean-​François​de​La​Harpe​(1739–1803),​French​writer​and​critic.​(Editor’s​note.)​

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and​to​another​to​whom​the​decades​of​Livy​and​the​men​of​Plutarch​ have​been​given,​and​you​will​see​the​difference​between​the​ideas​and​ understandings​of​both.​Eloquence,​which​in​republican​governments​ is​the​most​necessary​branch​of​instruction,​is​abandoned​entirely,​and​ very​few​are​the​teachers​who​can​analyze​for​their​pupils​the​orations​ of​Cicero​or​the​brilliant​pages​of​Tacitus—what​impression​can​poetry​ make​when​the​religion​of​the​ancients​is​constantly​represented​as​a​ chaos​of​darkness​and​when​the​sentiments​of​an​impassioned​heart​are​ explained​by​a​man​who​has​taken​a​vow​of​chastity?​What​interest​can​ grow​from​the​study​of​the​laws,​of​the​customs,​of​the​uses​and​habits​of​ antiquity​when​they​are​not​compared​to​the​abstract​ideas​of​a​truly​free​ legislation,​of​a​pure​morality,​and​of​habits​that​arise​from​the​perfection​of​the​social​order?​Thus​it​is​that​the​study​of​antiquity,​in​the​few​ establishments​where​it​is​taught,​is​nothing​more​than​a​science​of​facts​ and​authorities,​where​reason​and​sentiment​have​no​part​and​where​one​ seeks​only​to​make​a​display​of​memory. ​ Pious​exercises​occupy​a​considerable​part​of​a​student’s​hours.​But​ they​are​limited​to​what​they​might​do​through​the​sound​of​their​voice​ to​ make​ evident​ their​ presence​ in​ the​ chapel.​ The​ vast​ tautologies​ of​ daily​prayers​cannot​fix​their​attention​on​what​is​being​said.​The​same​ formula,​repeated​one​hundred​times,​says​nothing​to​their​spirit​or​to​ their​heart;​and​while​a​short​exercise​of​devotion​could​serve​to​awaken​ religious​ sentiments​ in​ their​ conscience,​ rosaries,​ which​ are​ repeated​ many​times,​accustom​them​to​separate​completely​their​thoughts​from​ the​words​they​pronounce.​This​is​rather​an​exercise​in​useless​distraction​or,​what​is​worse,​an​act​of​hypocrisy.​What​instruction​for​young​ persons​destined​for​the​legal​profession​and​the​national​court! ​ From​the​heart​of​these​academies,​nonetheless,​men​have​been​seen​ emerging​ who,​ having​ been​ educated​ by​ themselves,​ elevated​ themselves​above​their​fellow​citizens​and​have​combated​their​errors,​ridiculed​their​prejudices,​and,​confronting​all​kind​of​dangers,​taught​their​ fellow​citizens​the​path​of​truth.​This​small​number​of​privileged​beings,​ sustained​by​the​strength​of​their​character​and​stirred​by​an​inner​feeling​that​they​have​a​great​mission​to​carry​out,​work​without​cease​to​ obtain​the​triumph​of​liberty​and​enlightenment.​The​undertaking​is​ arduous,​their​task​difficult​and​filled​with​impediments​that,​at​each​ step,​interest, egotism,​and​power​oppose.​They​encounter​a​youth​educated​under​the​old​discipline,​a​people​generally​infected​by​habits​of​

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passive​obedience,​on​the​one​hand,​and​by​incitements​to​subversion,​ on​the​other.​What​can​replace​the​primary​education?​Those​who​are​ currently​ present​ on​ the​ scene,​ launched​ into​ the​ labors​ of​ an​ active​ life,​cannot​possess​that​moral​flexibility​necessary​to​receive​the​culture​ they​did​not​acquire​earlier,​and​this​is​precisely​when​there​is​a​double​ need​to​educate​them.​Because​not​being​able​to​keep​their​desires​inactive,​it​happens​that​when​they​do​not​move​toward​the​good,​that​is​ to​say​toward​social progress,​left​to​themselves​they​will​inevitably​be​directed​toward​evil,​that​is,​toward​egoism. ​ Our​generation​has​been​transported​instantaneously​into​a​kind​of​ moral​sphere​distinct​from​that​in​which​our​fathers​lived.​Perhaps​history​presents​no​example​of​such​a​rapid​change,​if​those​in​which​the​ conquistadors​compelled​by​force​obedience​to​their​rule​and​adoption​ of​their​institutions​are​excepted.​But​we​must​not​make​a​mistake;​the​ transformation​is​not​complete,​and​there​still​remains​much​to​do.​With​ a​little​reflection,​it​will​be​noticed​that​the​change​that​occurred​is​only​ in​the​most​general​order​of​feelinGS​and​interests,​and​it​will​be​only​ after​much​time,​much​labor,​and​successively​that​change​in​the​order​ of​ideas, acts,​and​thought​will​be​fulfilled.​Thus​we​have​seen​depart​the​ generations​that​have​been​held​up​to​us​as​suddenly​converted,​without​being​able​for​very​long​fully​to​realize​the​state​of​society​that​the​ principles​they​adopted​create.​The​rule of physical force,​principle,​reason,​and​aim​of​the​colonial​administration​will​still​be​for​some​time​ what​dominates,​although​it​will​be​successively​acquiring​modifications​ more​ analogous​ to​ the​ progress​ of​ the​ moral​ education​ of​ the​ different​classes​into​which​the​interest​of​that​despotic​government​divided​ society.​The​education of those​numerous​classes​and​their​complete​amalgamation​into​the​general​mass​is​the​great​work​that​will​surely​lead​to​ perfection,​for​which​the​true​lovers​of​liberty​yearn.​It​is​true​that​one​ of​the​triumphs​of​the​revolution​has​been​to​destroy​the​most​visible​ classifications,​and,​getting​rid​of​the​shackles​they​had​before,​it​has​ proclaimed​the​rights​of​equality​so​that​each​one​can​occupy​the​place​ for​which​he​becomes​worthy.​But​what​has​been​done​to​give​reality​ to​that​right?​What​has​been​done​that​is​not​purely​negative?​The​obstacles​have​been​removed,​but​there​remain​many​to​conquer.​Without​ doubt​it​is​thus,​and​education,​without​whose​help​the​happiest​circumstances​are​altogether​sterile,​is​very​far​from​being​accessible​without​ distinction​to​everyone.​Education​is​still​a​privilege​that​depends​on​the​

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fortune​of​the​families;​and​fortune​is​a​privilege​that​is​very​far​from​ being​ proportional​ to​ the​ merit​ of​ the​ persons​ who​ have​ it.​ There​ is​ more;​for​the​small​number​of​citizens​who​can​aspire​to​the​benefits​of​ education,​nothing​has​yet​been​done​so​that​it​might​be​distributed​by​ reason​of​their​aptitudes​and​their​vocation.​In​sum,​despite​the​political​triumph​of​philosophical​ideas​among​Mexicans,​proclaimed​pompously​in​their​constitutions​and​repeated​even​to​boredom​in​their​periodicals,​education​still​remains​inaccessible​to​the​greater​number,​and​as​ for​the​scant​minority​who​receive​it,​unfortunately​it​is​not​adjusted​to​ the​institutions​adopted;​and​on​the​contrary,​it​puts​up​open​struggle​ against​the​momentum​given​to​society​by​the​solemn​declarations​of​ liberty and equality.​I​will​not​tire​of​repeating​it,​the​essential​object​of​ education​must​be​to​place​sentiments,​calculations,​transactions​of​each​one​ in​harmony​with​social​needs. ​ Popular​education​has​begun​to​take​a​new​direction​in​the​Mexican​ Republic.​ Liberty​ of​ the​ press,​ decisions​ by​ judges​ in​ matters​ of​ the​ press,​ the​ concurrence​ of​ discussions​ in​ the​ legislative​ chambers​ and​assemblies,​electoral​councils,​and​other​acts​similarly​originating​ in​changes​made​since​independence​have​had​a​considerable​effect​on​ diminishing​ the​ old​ inclinations​ to​ bullfights,​ to​ processions,​ to​ fiestas​that​were​in​another​time​the​only​spectacles​presented​to​infancy,​ youth,​and​old​age​to​distract​the​spirit​of​the​inhabitants​from​every​ kind​of​serious​responsibilities.​In​the​ancient​republics,​each​citizen,​ summoned​to​discuss​in​the​public​plaza​the​interests​of​the​community​ and​to​take​part​in​the​enterprises​that​these​interests​made​necessary,​ found​himself​called​to​conceive​the​relationship​between​his​personal​ actions​and​the​general​interest.​This​situation​has​changed;​our​republics​are​not​like​Athens,​Rome,​Florence,​and​others,​limited​to​the​area​ of​the​city,​and​the​people​today​could​not​be​gathered​in​a​public​plaza​ where​common​interests​can​be​discussed​by​or​in​the​presence​of​everyone.​But​electoral​councils,​the​representative​form,​the​press,​and​patriotic​societies,​or​orderly​meetings​of​citizens​to​examine​the​resolutions​ of​their​governments​and​express​peacefully​their​opinions,​have​more​ than​adequately​replaced​those​institutions.​In​England​and​the​United​ States,​the​meetings​or​councils​of​citizens​in​public​houses​appointed​ for​these​purposes​are​ordinarily​the​organs​of​public​opinion,​whose​repeated​expressions​come​finally​to​triumph​over​the​resistance​that​the​ interest​or​egoism​of​those​who​govern​sometimes​puts​up.

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​ Criminal​legislation​has​not​been​reformed​as​should​have​been​expected​ since​ the​ great​ changes​ occurred​ in​ the​ Mexican​ nation.​ The​ people,​accustomed​to​seeing​in​their​judges​and​courts​instruments​of​ tyranny,​found​the​results​that​the​salutary​examples​of​justice​should​ produce​on​morality​almost​extinguished.​The​series​of​cruel​acts​committed​under​judicial​forms​since​the​beginning​of​the​revolution​has​ produced​an​effect​entirely​the​opposite.​The​Mexican​coming​before​ an​authority​which​was​not​responsible​for​its​actions,​that​was​not​subject​to​any​law—and​it​was​not​rare​to​find​some​who​did​not​even​know​ honor—believed​himself​surrounded​at​all​times​by​informers,​spies,​ or​agents​provocateurs.​Not​being​able​to​find​a​sufficient​guarantee​in​ the​testimony​of​their​consciences,​the​inhabitants​felt​obligated​to​acquire​habits​of​covering​up,​adulation,​and​fawning.​The​punishment​ was​no​longer​regarded​as​a​consequence​of​the​crime;​torture​came​to​ be​in​their​eyes​like​illnesses,​a​calamity​inherent​in​nature,​so​the​fear​ of​suffering​did​not​keep​them​from​a​career​of​crime.​Without​burdening​myself​further​with​these​abuses​under​the​rule​of​the​factions,​nor​ with​those​atrocious​laws​destructive​of​every​social​guarantee​and​of​ all​morality​which​put​in​the​hands​of​the​victors​the​judgment​of​the​ vanquished,​and​limiting​myself​to​the​procedures​in​judgments​of​common​crimes,​penal​legislation​requires​immediate​and​effective​reforms.​ From​the​year​1826​I​presented​in​the​Senate​a​draft​of​a​law​establishing​ trial​by​jurors,​and​it​was​approved;​but​it​has​met​resistance​put​up​by​ those​lawyers​who​find​their​elements​of​existence,​their​reputation,​and​ their​clientele​in​the​defects​of​the​laws. ​ Criminal​jurisprudence​is​the​part​of​legislation​that​most​directly​ affects​the​liberty​of​the​citizen;​it​is​also​that​which​can​alter​his​character.​In​countries​where​trials​are​always​public,​every​criminal​trial​is​ a​great​school​of​morality​for​those​attending.​The​man​of​the​people​ who​many​times​has​need​of​protection​against​the​violent​temptations​ that​surround​him​and​that​arouse​him​to​commit​crimes​learns​in​the​ debates​before​jurors​and​judges​that​the​crime​committed​in​the​darkness​of​night​far​from​any​witness,​with​the​precautions​that​prudence​ can​suggest,​comes,​nonetheless,​through​a​series​of​unforeseen​circumstances​to​be​discovered;​that​the​perturbed​conscience​of​the​guilty​one​ is​his​first​accuser;​and​that​these​crimes​have​provided​no​enjoyment​ that​seemed​to​fulfill​the​desires​of​their​sad​executors.​The​persons​in​ attendance​know​that​the​authority​who​watches​over​the​conservation​

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of​the​social​order​is​benevolent​and​active;​that​it​is​educated,​that​it​ never​punishes​except​after​having​acknowledged​the​crime.​They​unite,​ they​join​together​sincerely​in​the​decision;​and,​convinced​in​this​way​ of​the​justice​and​integrity​of​the​judges,​they​abandon​without​regret​ the​guilty​person​to​the​rigor​of​the​laws. ​ But​ what​ happens​ among​ us,​ where​ that​ public​ openness​ is​ not​ known;​ where​ a​ judge​ of​ first​ instance​ shapes​ the​ process,​ examines​ the​witnesses;​where​there​is​not​that​oral​defense​in​the​first​trial;​and​ where​everything​is​done​in​the​secrecy​of​the​office?​The​people​become​accustomed​to​seeing​in​criminal​justice​only​a​persecuting​and​ odious​power;​all​join​together​to​remove​the​guilty​from​the​action​of​ the​laws,​and​they​have​secret​associations​whose​purpose​is​to​liberate,​as​they​explain,​the​poor​from​the​clutches of justice.​A​robbery​committed​publicly​and​murder​committed​in​the​public​plaza​do​not​generally​encounter,​in​the​people,​that​instinct​that​in​free​countries​leads​to​ seizing​the​delinquent;​and​there​are​many​examples​in​which​asylum​is​ sought​for​them,​other​than​the​one​churches​offer.​Witnesses​interrogated​about​a​crime​committed​in​their​presence​believe​they​should​ not​make​the​misfortune​of​the​accused​worse​by​telling​the​truth;​the​ compassion​for​him​is​so​lively,​the​distrust​in​the​justice​of​the​judge​is​ so​universal,​that​the​courts​many​times​fear​clashing​with​this​general​ feeling​and​fear​defying,​so​to​speak,​public​compassion​with​a​sentence​ of​death.​The​name​of​judge​is​among​those​labeled​with​a​mark​of​infamy.​This​league​against​criminal​justice​is​formed​in​many​places​of​the​ Republic,​and​it​has​its​origin​in​past​injustices,​in​the​lack​of​clarity​with​ which​criminals​and​the​unfortunate​ones​who​have​belonged​to​a​vanquished​faction​have​been​judged,​in​the​secret​manner​of​shaping​trials,​ and​in​the​scandalous​delay​in​sentencing​those​guilty​of​the​most​atrocious​crimes.​The​examples​are​very​frequent​of​highwaymen​and​murderers​who,​held​for​three​or​four​years​in​prisons,​avoid​with​flight​the​ delayed​punishment​that​was​reserved​for​them,​and​it​is​not​rare​to​see​ reapprehended​once​or​twice​the​same​criminals​who​have​committed​ new​crimes​since​their​escape.​The​great​number​of​prisoners​in​the​jails​ of​Mexico​City,​which​few​times​are​under​a​thousand,​is​a​melancholy​ proof,​although​obvious,​of​this​assertion.​Happily,​many​states​of​the​ federation​are​not​infected​with​this​epidemic​to​the​same​degree;​and​ in​some,​the​purity​of​customs,​scarce​contact​with​the​vices​of​the​capital,​activity​of​their​commerce​with​foreigners,​and​other​circumstances​

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have​preserved​them​from​the​defects​inherent​in​colonial​education​and​ the​unfortunate​influences​of​its​laws.​The​states​of​which​I​speak,​like​ Yucatán,​Tamaulipas,​Coahuila,​Sonora,​Sinaloa,​and​some​others,​are​ in​the​happy​condition​of​shaping​their​codes​as​soon​as​their​inhabitants​acquire​the​habits​of​morality​that​the​new​institutions​will​bring.​ Mexico​City,​where​all​the​judicial​chicanery​has​been​displayed;​where​ the​complexities​of​the​court​put​up​a​barrier​for​many​years​against​the​ simple​action​of​the​laws;​and​where​gold,​favor,​intrigue,​and​power​ were​employed​by​turns​or​at​the​same​time​to​obscure​justice​and​raise​ the​rule​of​force​over​the​ruin​of​the​laws;​in​Mexico,​I​say,​salutary​reforms​will​come​only​with​greater​slowness​and​after​violent​clashes​between​the​new​generation​and​the​past,​between​the​old man​and​the​new man. ​ The​moral​influence​of​civil​legislation​is​not​as​powerful​as​the​criminal,​but​it​is​more​universal​and​no​individual​can​avoid​it.​The​totality​ of​ properties​ is​ distributed​ among​ citizens​ in​ accordance​ with​ civil​ laws.​The​law​of​the​general​congress​in​1823​that​abolished​the​entailed​ states​ and​the​ laws​ of​ colonization​ that​ facilitated​ the​ distribution​ of​ lands​are​of​greatest​utility​and​influence​for​the​progressive​advance​ of​ national​ prosperity.​ But​ the​ shackles​ placed​ by​ subsequent​ provisions​for​the​purpose​of​impeding​the​sale​of​real​estate​to​foreigners​ will​be​the​source​of​many​issues​and​an​inexhaustible​fountain​of​lawsuits​if​they​are​not​repealed.​Civil​legislation​in​the​Mexican​Republic​ finds​itself​tied​up​in​an​infinite​number​of​contradictory​conditions​ and​with​the​innumerable​multitude​of​laws,​mandates,​rules,​decrees,​ royal​ordinances,​royal​orders,​records,​and​other​rules​that​under​different​titles​emanated​from​the​Institutes​of​Justinian​to​the​documents​ of​Carlos​IV.​It​is​sad​the​picture​the​litigants​present,​consumed​in​the​ expenses​of​interminable​ trials;​passing​months​and​years​in​the​sole​ exercise​of​moving​their​cases;​running​from​the​office​of​the​lawyer​to​ that​of​the​solicitor,​from​there​to​that​of​the​judge;​and,​moreover,​debasing​and​degrading​themselves​by​dint​of​repeated​acts​of​submission​ on​one​side​and​contempt​on​the​other.​For​these​reasons​the​totality​of​ rights​seems​unknown​among​the​citizens;​families​inherit​interminable​ trials​from​generation​to​generation.​I​have​cited,​at​the​beginning​of​the​ first​volume,​one​that​has​continued​more​than​one​hundred​years​since​ it​began.​The​more​time​runs​between​the​beginning​of​a​trial​and​its​ resolution,​evidence​becomes​more​difficult​to​obtain,​presumption​be-

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comes​less​perceptible,​wavers​more,​and​each​one,​sustaining​his​interest,​believes​himself​less​exposed​to​the​charge​of​bad​faith.​On​the​other​ hand,​the​prolongation​of​trials​multiplies​them​with​enormous​damage​ to​national​unity.​In​a​city​where​ten​trials​begin​every​year,​if​five​end​ in​six​months,​as​happens​in​Geneva,​not​more​than​five​are​pending​ at​a​time.​If​they​last​ten​years,​as​very​commonly​happens​in​Mexico,​ a​hundred​will​be​pending.​At​the​same​time,​if​they​last​thirty​years,​ there​will​be​three​hundred.​How​many​are​those​that,​unfortunately,​ have​this​long​duration!​See​here​the​reason​why​it​is​so​common​to​see​ almost​all​families​encumbered​by​some​pending​lawsuit,​and​why​it​is​ not​now​considered​a​stigma​being​occupied​in​litigation​and​continually​speaking​of​lawsuits. ​ One​of​the​great​woes​that​befell​the​nation​because​the​new​legislators​took​their​lessons​in​the​school​of​Spanish​reformers​was​being​ persuaded​that​the​congresses​were​what​the​kings​had​been​under​absolute​government.​The​abstract​principle​of​national​sovereignty​was​proclaimed;​but​instead​of​deriving​the​legitimate​conclusion,​by​which​the​ people,​ in​ delegating​ their​ powers​ to​ representatives​ gave​ only​ those​ faculties​that​were​absolutely​necessary​to​organize​the​new​society​in​a​ manner​expeditious​to​its​needs​and​rights,​the​legislators​appropriated​to​ themselves​the​fullness​of​the​selfsame​sovereignty,​and​the​congresses​ were​considered​arbiters​of​the​fate​of​the​Republic.​This​great​error​ originated​from​the​false​idea​that​the​nation​transmitted​all​its​faculties​and​powers​to​the​congresses​and​from​the​habit​it​had​of​obeying​ a​king​who​ruled​unconditionally.​From​here​have​sprung​those​laws​of​ exception,​annulling​equality​among​all​classes​of​citizens;​those​retroactive​laws,​like​those​we​have​seen​regarding​sales​to​foreigners​and​that​ of​the​entailed​estates,​whose​effects​were​made​to​go​back​two​years.​ From​this​originates​also​that​unfortunate​ease​with​which​extraordinary​powers​are​conceded,​especially​to​the​governors​of​various​states​ by​their​legislative​assemblies;​those​declarations​outside the law​that​destroy​in​their​foundations​every​guarantee;​those​banishments​and​another​multitude​of​arbitrary​acts​that​must​make​the​Mexicans​wary​of​ a​future​filled​with​hopes,​although​sown​with​dangers. ​ Another​equally​pernicious​error​has​emanated​from​the​same​false​ principle.​ The​ general​ congress,​ which​ they​ rhetorically​ call​ sovereign congress,​has​arrogated​to​itself,​or​I​will​say​more​exactly​has​usurped​

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the​faculty​of​reforming,​the​laws​of​the​states​and​that​of​interfering​ in​the​organization​of​their​legislative​assemblies.​It​has​been​seen​with​ frequency​that​one​or​more​deputies​or​senators​who​were​not​fond​of​ the​members​who​made​up​the​legislature​of​a​state,​made​a​motion​that​ elections​be​declared​null,​in​part​or​in​their​totality,​by​virtue​of​protests​made​in​the​electoral​councils;​and​both​chambers​have​been​seen​ to​ issue​ decrees​ which,​ interrupting​ the​ constitutional​ course​ of​ the​ states,​annul​the​elections​completely​or​in​part.​Why​has​this​been​tolerated?​Because​the​assemblies​of​the​states​have​been​considered​viceroys​and​the​general​congress​the​monarch!—Always​the​habits​of​the​ colonial​system! ​ Mention​would​not​have​to​be​made​of​the​point of honor​among​the​ great​motives​of​the​social​compact​in​referring​to​the​influences​that​ have​an​effect​in​the​Mexican​Republic​if​this​had​not​been​one​of​the​ great​Spanish​prejudices​most​used​to​the​detriment​of​the​liberty​and​ independence​of​the​patria.​I​do​not​speak​here​of​that​type​of​honor​ Mr.​Paley​defines​as​“a​system​made​up​of​rules​by​the​people​of​rank​ calculated​to​facilitate​their​social​commerce,​and​not​for​any​other​purpose.”​I​speak​of​that​honor​converted​by​the​Spanish​government​into​ one​of​the​supports​of​its​power​and​instilled​so​strongly​in​the​highest​ classes​of​society,​especially​among​the​military.​I​speak​of​it​also​because,​having​changed​government​since​independence,​the​education​ of​Mexican​politicians​must​tend​to​confuse​it​with​public​opinion​and​ substitute​this​basic​foundation​of​the​democratic​system​for​an​isolated​ and​abstract​rule​whose​principles​are​as​variable​as​undefined. ​ The​traditional​legislation​of​honor,​as​it​was​understood​for​some​ time​in​Europe,​had​its​origin​in​chivalric​times;​it​came​to​substitute​ the​noble​sentiments​of​liberty​that​animated​the​Greeks​and​Romans,​ when​the​spirit​of​individual​independence​was​disappearing,​to​make​ way​for​courtly​manners,​which​the​monarchs,​especially​the​Spanish​ kings,​knew​to​put​in​its​place.​They​converted​this​prejudice​to​their​ benefit,​which​replaced​that​inherent​fondness​of​man​for​defending​ his​rights​and​the​other​virtues​that​elevate​the​soul​and​lead​it​to​great​ actions.​But​the​law​of​honor​readily​allied​itself​with​the​corruption​of​ manners​and​came​to​be,​in​certain​respects,​the​basis​for​military​despotism.​Nonetheless,​as​it​prescribed​certain​rules​to​the​prince,​certain​respects​among​the​social​classes,​a​prominent​consideration​for​the​

132 : lorenzo​de​zavala

beautiful​sex,​and​reciprocal​politeness​and​civility,​it​was​in​a​certain​ way,​as​Montesquieu​observes,​a​brake​on​arbitrary​power.​But​what​a​ weak​brake! ​ In​conquered​America,​military​honor​and​that​of​the​other​classes​ of​society​brought​with​them​very​few​of​the​brilliant​qualities​of​their​ native​patria.​Among​the​first​became​defending​the​rights​of​the​kings​ of​Spain,​and​the​greatest​glory​of​an​official​was​to​say:​The​king,​my master; I am servant of the king,​which​was​equivalent​to​acknowledging​ himself​ as​ the​ blind​ instrument​ of​ an​ unknown​ deity​ and​ the​ terror​ of​society,​the​executioner​of​his​fellow​citizens.​But​these​influences​ were​profound;​they​were​inherited​and​they​were,​moreover,​sustained​ by​ religious​ doctrines.​ Point​ of​ honor​ in​ a​ military​ man​ was​ to​ sacrifice​his​father,​his​brother,​and​family​if​the​greater​service​of​the​king​ demanded​it;​point​of​honor​was​to​obey​blindly​the​orders​of​the​vice​ generals​of​the​king,​no​matter​how​atrocious​and​cruel​they​might​be.​ “Your​honor​is​jeopardized,”​said​the​Spanish​leaders​to​the​American​ officials;​“the​greater​service​to​His​Majesty​demands​of​you​that​with​ fire​and​sword​you​sustain​his​rights.​The​honor​of​the​Mexicans​must​be​ immaculate.”​With​these​and​other​phrases​he​made​our​valiant​military​ men​enthusiastic​to​exterminate​an​entire​generation.​Today,​the​name​ of​military discipline​is​used​wrongly​to​commit​the​same​acts​of​cruelty.​ But​this​is​not​the​occasion​to​speak​of​this​subject. ​ I​have​finished​the​history​that​comprehends​the​period​from​1810​to​ 1830.​I​believe​I​have​done​a​great​service​for​the​Mexicans,​presenting​ them​with​events​from​the​point​of​view​from​which​they​must​be​seen.​ No​principle​that​can​corrupt​their​customs;​no​doctrine​that​can​compromise​ their​ liberty;​ no​ maxim​ that​ excuses​ tyranny;​ no​ axiom​ that​ does​not​have​as​its​aim​the​advantage​of​the​majority;​no​fact​that​offends​decency;​nothing,​finally,​has​occupied​a​place​in​this​work​against​ the​ purpose​ that​ I​ have​ constantly​ proposed,​ and​ it​ was​ that​ of​ promoting​the​good​of​Mexicans,​teaching​them​to​know​themselves​and​ those​who​have​directed​their​affairs,​to​compare​them​among​themselves,​to​follow​them​in​all​their​steps​and​judge​them,​not​by​proclamations​of​circumstance,​or​by​pompous​offers,​or​by​appearances​of​virtue​ given​the​lie​by​facts,​or​by​false​modesty,​or​by​a​studied​popularity,​or​ by​a​prejudicial​and​dangerous​charlatanism,​but rather by a series of positive acts of patriotism and of constant efforts for social improvement, enlightenment of the people, and propagation of enjoyment in the masses.​Anything​

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that​does​not​have​these​points​as​its​aim​is​to​deceive​the​people​and​ want​them​to​be​content​with​words.​Little​has​independence​served​ the​great​part​of​the​nation,​because​those​who​succeeded​in​commands​ and​positions​have​believed​that​this​was​the​good​to​which​it​aspired.​ But​they​were​wrong.​The​people​want​positive goods​and​the​nourishment of the spirit.​Their​instinct​will​always​lead​them​to​the​attainment​of​ this​aim,​and​it​will​break​the​obstacles​that​egoism​and​interest​put​up​ against​their​progress.

3 ​

Intervention Regarding the Independence of the Province of Guatemala

Mr. Zavala:​Sir,​the​commission​to​draw​up​this​judgment​has​found​itself​in​major​conflict​because​it​dealt​with​a​new​question​of​public​law,​because​it​saw​the​gentlemen​deputies​of​Guatemala​ divided,​ and​ because​ the​ resolution​ of​ this​ matter​ is​ of​ great​ importance.1​It​was​not​about​a​nation​that​was​going,​like​Spanish​America,​ to​throw​off​the​yoke​for​the​first​time​after​three​hundred​years​of​oppression;​nor​was​it​about​American​colonies​established​by​commercial​ companies​ formed​ in​ different​ ways,​ which​ had​ carried​ on​ a​ terrible​ war.​It​is​about​a​province​or​provinces​that​were​joined​to​Mexico,​we​ do​not​know​whether​by​force​of​arms​employed​by​General​Iturbide​or​ voluntarily.​When​this​question​was​presented​last​year​in​Congress,​the​ majority​of​the​gentlemen​deputies​expressed​a​desire​that​the​provinces​ of​Guatemala​establish​a​separate​government,​and​many​of​the​gentlemen​who​expressed​this​opinion​now​have​changed​from​it,​perhaps​because​the​government​changed;​but​I​do​not​believe​it​is​honorable​for​ Congress​to​change​its​principles.​The​commission,​I​repeat,​has​found​ itself​in​the​greatest​difficulty​because​it​had​to​deliberate​about​a​matter​of​such​importance.​I​will​begin​by​replying​to​some​objections​that​ ​ Original​title:​“Sesión​del​día​18​de​octubre​de​1823.​Intervención​de​Zavala​sobre​la​ independencia​de​Guatemala.”​Source:​Águila Mexicana,​vol.​2,​nos.​189​and​190,​Monday,​ October​20;​and​Tuesday,​October​21,​1823. ​ 1.​The​Capitanía​de​Guatemala​(then​encompassing​the​present​republics​of​Honduras,​Nicaragua,​El​Salvador,​and​Costa​Rica)​declared​its​independence​from​Spain​on​ September​15,​1821,​a​day​before​Agustín​de​Iturbide​issued​the​declaration​of​independence​in​Mexico.​In​January​1822​Guatemala​voted​to​become​part​of​the​Mexican​empire​of​Iturbide.​However,​when​the​emperor​was​toppled,​in​1823,​Guatemala​peacefully​ decided​to​separate​from​Mexico​and​form​a​federal​republic​of​its​own:​the​Provincias​ Unidas​de​Centro​América.​The​issue​of​separation​was​debated​in​the​Mexican​Congress,​and​Zavala,​as​a​member​of​the​congressional​commission​overseeing​this​issue,​ took​an​active​part​in​that​process.​(Editor’s​note) 134

intervention​reGardinG​the​independenCe​of​Guatemala : 135

the​gentleman​minister​has​raised,​and​then​I​will​pass​to​the​gentlemen​ Terán​and​López​Plata.​The​first​bases​what​he​says​on​the​fact​that​the​ commission​should​not​have​begun​judgment​because​it​could​have​left​ this​question​for​the​coming​Congress,​this​one​being​just​about​to​close​ its​ sessions.​ The​ second​ reason,​ which​ has​ seemed​ stronger,​ is​ that​ if​ Congress​declares​that​the​province​of​Guatemala​has​a​right​to​constitute​itself​into​a​free​province,​the​government​of​Mexico​forsakes​those​ individuals​who​have​shown​themselves​devoted​to​the​union.​Neither​ the​one​nor​the​other​seems​to​me​to​have​force.​Not​the​first​because​ this​Congress,​having​expressed​and​even​declared​that​the​provinces​of​ Guatemala​had​the​right​to​constitute​themselves,​it​was​necessary​that,​ having​named​a​commission​for​this​and​presented​its​judgment,​this​ matter​is​resolved;​but​if​the​reasons​your​honor​has​given​regarding​the​ effects​on​the​government​of​Mexico​have​some​force,​Spain​could​say​ the​same​to​America.​Spain​had​many​devoted​people,​and​even​has​them​ still,​and​that​was​the​pretext​they​gave​for​not​absolutely​abandoning​ America,​because​they​said:​We​have​there​a​large​number​of​partisans​ that​the​new​government​will​persecute​everywhere.​Vain​subterfuge​ against​the​justice​of​our​cause,​but​much​less​with​respect​to​Guatemala​ because​it​has​never​belonged​to​the​Mexican​nation,​and​the​right​that​ Mexico​has​believed​itself​to​have​over​Guatemala​has​been​completely​ ephemeral​and​doubtful,​as​shown​by​the​conduct​of​Congress​and​the​ government,​which​have​given​orders​appropriate​for​the​assembly​of​ the​Congress​of​Guatemala;​and​the​government​has​ordered​General​ Filisola​to​withdraw.​So,​then,​what​does​the​commission​have​to​do?​It​ could​simply​say:​“The​deputies​who​are​here​can​withdraw.” ​ Thus​we​have​seen​monstrously​in​the​heart​of​this​sovereign​congress​an​individual​who​has​the​title​of​agent​and​deputy​of​Guatemala,​ something​not​found​in​any​of​the​representative​bodies.​Consequently,​ the​commission​has​believed​it​was​the​only​road​offered.​Neither​did​ it​say​that​the​independence​of​Guatemala​be​declared;​it​has​said​only​ that​the​deputies​could​withdraw​and,​once​the​Congress​of​that​nation​ is​convened,​it​could​declare​whether​it​was​to​unite​with​Mexico​or​not.​ The​question​that​the​previous​gentleman​speaker​has​proposed​with​respect​to​the​difficulties​Guatemala​has​in​organizing​its​government​has​ no​force.​For​all​new​governments​always​experience​these​upheavals​ and​suffer​these​difficulties.​If​these​arguments​were​valid,​Spain​would​ have​justice​in​claiming​a​right​to​intervene​in​our​affairs,​with​the​ex-

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cuse​that​we​are​not​succeeding​in​constituting​ourselves.​Buenos​Aires​ has​had​twelve​years​to​constitute​itself​and​has​not​managed​to​do​so.​ Why​ is​ this?​ Because​ revolution​ brings​ its​ difficulties.​ These​ are,​ sir,​ the​reasons​that​the​commission​has​had​in​saying​that​the​deputies​of​ Guatemala​can​withdraw.​I​go​on​to​respond​to​Mr.​López​de​la​Plata.​ His​honor​asks​what​reason​the​commission​had​for​including​the​province​of​Nicaragua​in​the​judgment​it​has​offered;​I​will​say​to​his​honor​ that​ the​ commission​ has​ included​ the​ province​ of​ Nicaragua​ because​ there​is​no​other​way​of​determining​the​will​of​peoples​except​through​ their​representatives.​The​people​of​Nicaragua​have​already​joined​in​ the​Congress​of​Guatemala,​electors​have​been​gathered,​etc.,​and​they​ have​sent​their​deputies.​Well,​sir,​if​the​Congress​of​Mexico​itself,​if​all​ are​of​the​view​that​this​Congress​represents​those​provinces,​how​can​ we​have​nothing​to​do​with​that​representation?​This​is​the​reason​why​ we​have​included​the​province​of​Nicaragua​which​has​sent​its​deputies​ to​the​Congress​of​Guatemala.​Now,​his​honor​has​said​that​the​opinion​of​the​deputies​of​his​province​in​the​Congress​is​different​from​the​ majority.​But​then​the​same​can​happen​in​Mexico​and​the​rest​of​the​ congresses.​Who​knows​what​public​opinion​would​be​in​this​case;​but​ what​is​certain​is​that​the​votes​of​the​majority​must​always​be​followed.​ The​commission​could​not​do​less​than​work​for​the​same​principles​it​ has​expounded,​the​same​that​have​led​Congress​since​last​year.​I​agree,​ sir,​ that​ in​ the​ heart​ of​ this​ sovereign​ congress​ they​ were​ crying​ out​ strongly​against​the​troops​that​were​about​to​attack​San​Salvador;​well,​ sir,​why​do​we​not​respect​the​rights​that​were​respected​then?​What​ right​was​there​in​Guatemala​before​to​constitute​a​government​and​not​ now?​I​believe​the​same.​Now​it​seems​to​me​that​the​objections​of​the​ previous​speakers​are​properly​answered.

valentín góMez Farías Valentín​ Gómez​ Farías​ (1781–1858)​ was​ a​ liberal​ politician​ born​in​the​city​of​Guadalajara.​He​studied​medicine​and​became​a​prominent​doctor​in​the​city​of​Aguascalientes,​where​he​ started​his​political​career.​Gómez​Farías​supported​Agustín​de​ Iturbide​after​independence​and​was​elected​deputy​to​the​First​ Constituent​Congress​in​1822.​He​soon​became​disaffected​with​ the​government,​and​after​the​regime​fell​supported​the​convocation​to​elect​a​new​constituent​congress​under​new​rules. ​ Gómez​Farías​was​a​reformist​and​a​federalist​with​radical​ ideas​concerning​education​and​the​role​of​the​Catholic​Church.​ He​was​elected​vice​president​in​1833,​when​General​Antonio​ López​de​Santa​Anna​was​elected​president.​Santa​Anna​soon​ requested​a​leave​of​absence​from​office​and​retired​to​his​hacienda​in​Veracruz,​leaving​his​vice​president​as​head​of​the​government.​Gómez​Farías​launched​several​political​reforms​that​ were​fiercely​opposed​by​his​political​foes,​such​as​closing​the​ church-​run​university.​He​also​challenged​the​privileges​of​the​ army.​Later​that​year,​Santa​Anna,​at​the​instigation​of​those​ who​opposed​Gómez​Farías’s​liberal​reforms,​returned​to​office​ and​terminated​the​brief​reformist​experiment.​Gómez​Farías​ was​once​again​vice​president,​in​1846,​and​was​elected​deputy​ to​ the​ 1856–57​ constituent​ congress,​ which​ drafted​ the​ 1857​ Constitution. ​ We​present​an​individual​vote​of​deputy​Gómez​Farías​regarding​the​need​to​summon​a​new​constituent​congress.

137

Individual Vote of Mr. Gómez Farías on the Issue of the Advisability of Convening a New Congress Individual​Vote​of​Mr.​Gómez​Farías, As an individual of the special committee appointed by the Sovereign Congress to examine the question of whether or not a new Congress should be convened. ​ Sir: ​ The​second​day​of​this​month,​Mr.​Muzquiz​and​I​presented​to​Your​ Sovereignty1​a​motion​reduced​to​these​terms:​We​request​that​a​notice​ of​ convocation​ be​ created​ for​ the​ meeting​ of​ another​ Congress,​ this​ Congress​named​before​dissolving​a​permanent​deputation,​which,​in​ agreement​with​the​supreme​executive​power,​would​temporarily​decide​ the​urgent​needs​of​the​state. ​ This​ motion,​ heard​ by​ Your​ Sovereignty​ and​ declared​ urgent,​ was​ ordered​passed​to​a​committee​of​which​I​have​the​honor​to​be​a​member.​In​the​first​session​we​had,​five​deputies​of​the​seven​that​make​up​ the​aforementioned​committee​were​of​the​opinion​that​the​notice​of​ convocation​should​be​prepared.​Nevertheless,​to​proceed​with​greater​ success​in​so​serious​a​matter​and​one​of​such​importance,​we​agreed​to​ summon​the​committee​members​who​were​in​this​capital​and​had​been​ convened​from​[the​city​of]​Puebla​by​a​written​communication​dated​ last​March​4,​which​the​gentlemen​the​marquis​of​Vivanco,​Don​Pedro​ Celestino​Negrete,​and​Don​José​Antonio​de​Echávarri​directed​to​all​ ​ Original​title:​“Voto​particular​del​Señor​Valentín​Gómez​Farías,​como​individuo​de​ la​comisión​especial​nombrada​por​el​soberano​Congreso​para​examinar​la​cuestión​de​ si​se​debe​ó​no​convocar​un​nuevo​Congreso,”​April​17,​1823.​Source:​Mexico,​Imprenta​ Nacional​(en​Palacio),​1823. ​ 1.​ Mexicans​ called​ their​ Congress​ “Sovereign​ Congress”​ as​ a​ consequence​ of​ the​ theory​of​legislative​supremacy​they​adopted​from​the​French​and​Spanish​constitutions.​(Editor’s​note) 138

vote​on​the​adviSability​of​ConveninG​a​new​ConGreSS : 139

the​provincial​deputations.2​By​virtue​of​this​summons,​those​delegates​ from​six​provinces​gathered,​and​everyone​unanimously​requested,​in​ the​name​of​those​provinces,​that​the​notice​of​convocation​be​created​ for​the​meeting​of​another​Congress;​others​have​subsequently​said​the​ same.​I,​on​hearing​that​the​provinces​might​wish​that​a​new​Congress​ be​convened,​hoped​that​the​committee​would​stand​more​firmly​in​its​ opinion;​it​has​not​happened​that​way,​and​I​attribute​this​fact​to​the​ arguments​Mr.​Tagle​and​Mr.​Bustamante​set​out​afterward​in​other​sessions​we​had​on​the​same​matter.​The​brilliant​learning​of​these​gentlemen​is​much​superior​to​mine;​I​respect​it,​but​as​I​am​not​convinced​of​ their​arguments,​I​proceed​to​explain​my​individual​opinion. ​ Everyone​knows,​sir,​that​the​notice​of​convocation​created​by​the​ provisionally​governing​junta​was​received​in​the​provinces​with​displeasure​and​that​it​was​generally​considered,​moreover,​absurd.​In​effect,​ it​restricted​liberty,​offended​equality,​and,​consequently,​was​unjust.​ It​restricted​liberty,​dividing​the​nation​into​classes​and​requiring​the​ electors​to​get​their​representatives​from​each​one​of​them.3​It​offended​ equality,​adjusting​the​number​of​deputies​by​the​number​of​municipalities​[partidos],​outlandish​thought,​which​resulted​in​the​province​of​Durango,​which​has,​according​to​the​last​census,​177,400​inhabitants,​being​ able​to​name​twenty-​two​deputies,​and​Querétaro,​which​has​almost​the​ same​population,​being​able​to​choose​only​one,​monstrous​inequality,​ which​gave​the​first​an​unjust​preponderance​over​the​second,​and​which​ encumbered​Durango​with​an​enormous​burden​of​taxes. ​ Nor​was​this​the​only​attack​that​equality,​so​proclaimed​among​free​ and​well-​governed​peoples,​suffered.​This​political​dogma​also​was​destroyed​by​granting​a​vote​to​town​councils​because,​by​virtue​of​this​ concession,​the​parishes​of​the​head​municipalities,​and​the​most​important​municipalities​of​the​provinces,​had​as​many​electors​as​there​were​ members​of​their​municipal​councils,​and​the​subordinate​parishes​and​ ​ 2.​ The​ provincial​ deputations​ (diputaciones provinciales)​ were​ local,​ representative​ bodies​created​by​the​1812​Spanish​Constitution.​(Editor’s​note) ​ 3.​Gómez​Farías​was​referring​to​the​convocation​of​a​constituent​congress​issued​ after​independence​by​the​Junta​Provisional​Gubernativa,​presided​over​by​Agustín​de​ Iturbide​in​1821.​Representation​by​classes​was​provided​in​that​convocatoria.​(Editor’s​ note)

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municipalities​did​not​have​more​than​one.​The​unhappiness​that​the​ notice​of​convocation​caused​for​the​two​reasons​indicated​was​general,​ and​it​has​been​believed​since​then​that​it​would​be​the​source​of​complaints​and​dissensions. ​ With​the​national​representation​established​on​such​unjust​foundations,​it​could​not​unite​the​opinion​of​the​people​in​its​favor.​The​past​ government,​which​knew​the​defects​of​the​notice​of​convocation​and​ was​perhaps​their​author,​converted​them​into​trouble​for​the​Congress,​ whose​destruction​it​meditated.​Caustic​writings​promoted​by​the​past​ government​made​the​provinces’​bad​frame​of​mind​worse;​discontent​ increased​everywhere,​and​as​the​people​came​to​know​of​some​misconduct​of​their​deputies,​lack​of​confidence​grew.​Opinion​against​the​ Congress​prepared,​the​tyrant​dissolved​it.4​This​act​was​generally​considered​despotic;​nonetheless,​the​people​did​not​think​of​summoning​ their​disbanded​representation.​They​thought​instead​of​taking​advantage​of​the​circumstances​to​improve​it.​So​it​cannot​be​certain​that​they​ were​upset​by​this​fact.​I​am​sorry​to​say​it,​I​am​a​member​of​this​august​ assembly,​justly​interested​in​its​honor. ​ Let​us​cast​a​rapid​glance​over​the​events​that​have​occurred​since​that​ epoch.5​On​the​second​of​December​the​city​of​Veracruz​gave​the​memorable​cry​of​liberty,​proclaimed​the​Republic​and​the​reestablishment​of​ the​Congress.​The​besieging​army,​no​less​zealous​for​glory​and​for​the​ liberty​of​the​patria,​decided​against​the​oppressor,​but​in​the​act​of​its​ military​uprising,​nothing​was​said​about​the​reinstatement​of​the​extinct​Congress.​On​the​contrary,​the​assembling​of​another​new​one​was​ expressly​requested.​Its​articles​are​clear,​conclusive,​and​do​not​admit​ interpretation.​ Veracruz​ itself​ supported​ this​ act,​ and,​ after​ Veracruz,​ all​the​provinces.​The​nation,​then,​has​decided​for​a​new​Congress,​or​ has​not​adopted​the​Plan​of​Casa​Mata.​Some​say​the​nation​adopted​ the​Plan​of​Casa​Mata​in​the​same​way​as​the​Plan​of​Iguala.6​This​is​not​ ​ 4.​Emperor​Iturbide.​(Editor’s​note) ​ 5.​ In​ December​ 1822​ General​ Antonio​ López​ de​ Santa​ Anna​ rebelled​ against​ the​ government​of​Agustín​de​Iturbide​in​the​city​of​Veracruz.​General​Echávarri,​charged​ by​the​government​with​suppressing​the​rebellion,​placed​the​city​under​siege​but​later​ changed​sides,​joining​Santa​Anna,​and​proclaimed​the​Plan​of​Casamata​against​Iturbide’s​empire​on​February​1,​1823.​(Editor’s​note) ​ 6.​The​Plan​of​Iguala,​proclaimed​in​February​1822​by​Iturbide,​declared​the​inde-

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because​it​requested​a​notice​of​convocation,​but​rather​because​it​was​ a​means​to​liberate​itself​from​its​new​oppressor,​focusing​opinion.​To​ these​gentlemen​ I​ask​whether​ the​Mexican​ nation,​ which​desired​ to​ govern​itself​and​made​very​costly​sacrifices​to​achieve​its​emancipation,​ has​given​positive​evidence​after​the​cry​of​liberty​that​it​wants​the​same​ Congress,​as​it​expressed​at​another​time​in​order​to​throw​the​Spanish​ yoke​from​its​neck.​Almost​all​the​evidence​demonstrates​the​contrary.​ Nonetheless,​if​it​has​given​this​evidence,​let​it​be​presented​and​the​dispute​come​to​an​end;​but​if​there​is​not​proof,​the​Plan​of​Casa​Mata,​the​ rest​of​the​acts,​and​other​official​documents​are​in​force,​whose​content​ is​supported​by​the​printed​pieces​that​are​circulating​and​by​the​public​ voice.​In​light​of​these​considerations,​I​do​not​understand​on​what​basis​ one​can​be​assured​that​the​will​of​the​nation​has​not​been​delivered​in​ favor​of​the​notice​of​convocation. ​ The​army​is​not​the​nation,​nor​are​the​provincial​juntas.​A​faction​ of​aristocrats​has​taken​possession​of​the​towns​and​wishes​to​convince​ everyone​that​its​voice​is​the​general​one;​so​I​hear​some​explain​it.​Sir,​ the​voice​of​the​army​is​certainly​not​that​of​the​nation;​but​will​it​be​ possible​to​say​that​the​voice​of​the​provincial​capitals,​the​voice​of​the​ municipalities,​and​the​voice​of​the​subordinate​towns​are​not​the​voice​ of​ the​ nation?​ In​ all​ these​ places,​ the​ bodies​ uniformly​ repeated​ the​ voice​of​the​army,​those​bodies​that​were​elected​popularly,​that​are​the​ depositories​of​public​confidence.​In​all​of​them,​the​persons​of​greatest​influence​and​opinion,​and​a​part​of​the​rest​of​the​people​openly​ joined​its​votes​to​theirs,​without​the​other​part​of​the​rest​of​the​people​ giving​any​evidence​of​resistance​to​its​adherence.​Moreover,​sir,​if​the​ rapidity​with​which​America​separated​itself​from​the​[Iberian]​Peninsula​was​owed​in​part​to​the​desire​everyone​had​to​emancipate​themselves,​could​not​the​marvelous​speed​and​uniformity​with​which​the​ act​of​Casa​Mata​was​proclaimed​be​attributed​to​the​fact​that​its​articles​ conformed​to​the​general​will? ​ If​what​was​expounded​is​not​sufficient​to​know​the​expression​of​ the​people,​tell​me​in​what​way​should​they​have​been​explained,​given​ their​situation?​What​better​means​than​the​press?​What​organs​more​ pendence​of​Mexico.​The​country​would​remain​a​monarchy,​and​the​throne​was​offered​ to​Ferdinand​VII​or​some​other​member​of​the​royal​family.​The​Spanish​Constitution​ would​remain​in​force​until​a​new​one​was​drafted.​(Editor’s​note)

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approximate​to​those​of​a​representative​system​than​town​councils​and​ deputations?​Not​for​this​reason​have​the​latter​already​been​raised​up​ to​the​status​of​provincial​congresses;​they​will​take​this​step​because,​ if​I​am​not​deceived,​the​progress​of​the​Americas​is​inevitable.​They,​ as​Mr.​de​Pradt​says,​will​be​constituted​into​republics​before​a​Europe​ divided​ into​ thrones.​ Just​ as​ the​ United​ States,​ that​ admirable​ model​ of​ government,​ that​ people​ who​ owe​ their​ prosperity​ and​ growth​ to​ their​ sublime​ institutions,​ has​ been​ a​ beacon​ for​ our​ brothers​ of​ the​ other​America,​it​will​also​be​so​for​us.​In​vain​will​forces​develop​to​ hold​this​event​back​for​very​long.​From​constitutional​monarchy​to​the​ American​government​there​is​a​distance​easily​traversed.​What​a​beautiful​perspective​is​offered​to​the​imagination​by​an​immense​territory​ divided​by​nature​itself​into​large​parts,​each​one​governed​according​to​ its​interests​without​the​others​feeling​oppressed,​by​men​who​know​its​ needs​and​who​merit​its​confidence,​retaining​separately​its​sovereignty,​ liberty,​and​independence,​and​all​parts​entering​into​a​firm​bond​of​reciprocal​friendship​for​their​common​defense,​the​security​of​their​liberty,​and​their​mutual​and​general​happiness.​In​an​alliance​of​this​nature​ society​is​not​in​danger,​but​rather​the​deep-​rooted​habit​of​dominating​ is!​The​provincialism​of​which​one​accuses​Querétaro,​Guanajuato,​San​ Luis​Potosí,​Zacatecas,​Guadalajara,​Valladolid,​etc.,​carefully​analyzed,​ is,​in​the​end,​the​very​just​desire​to​avoid​such​domination.​Sometimes​ some​province​resents​this​aspiration.​Maybe​the​aristocratic​faction​is​ in​another​part. ​ Considering​the​question​in​another​way,​I​will​ask,​with​Congress​ dissolved​and​the​nation​tied​to​the​cart​of​absolute​power,​could​the​ army​and​the​people,​without​seeing​the​need​to​reestablish​the​extinguished​national​representation,​create​a​courageous​force​to​break​the​ bonds​of​servitude,​or​could​they​not?​If​the​first,​why​does​one​think​ they​ are​ obligated​ to​ recognize​ the​ dissolved​ Congress,​ having​ proclaimed​the​Plan​of​Casa​Mata?​Why​will​this​sovereign​nation​and​master​of​itself​be​considered​bound​to​obey​a​body​that​it​desires​to​replace​ with​another?​If​the​second,​what​greater​despotism​than​supposing​this​ same​nation,​facing​the​difficult​choice​of​suffering​the​yoke​of​tyranny​ or​ of​ delivering​ itself​ to​ leaders​ whom​ they​ fear,​ will​ not​ honorably​ discharge​their​august​functions?​Is​there​no​halfway​for​Mexicans​between​being​slaves​for​Iturbide​and​restoring​their​representatives? ​ Sir,​political​bodies​are​like​physical​bodies.​All​of​them​die,​not​to​

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come​ back​ to​ life,​ and​ just​ as​ physical​ bodies,​ once​ dissolved​ or​ disorganized,​do​not​return​to​life​if​not​by​a​miracle​of​omnipotence,​so​ political​bodies​do​not​recover​their​political​existence​if​not​through​ the​power​of​public​opinion.​Do​all​deputies​enjoy​this​public​opinion?​ Certainly​not;​for​this​reason,​the​provinces​request​at​least​exclusion7​ or​reform,​a​measure​subject​to​very​serious​difficulties,​which​would​ increase​the​inequality​of​representation​in​those​provinces​where​some​ deputies​are​excluded,​or​where​it​could​make​those​provinces​proceed​ to​new​elections,​a​hateful​measure​that​would​not​be​sufficient​to​calm​ the​discontent​resulting​from​the​enormous​inequality​of​representation​and​that​would​increase​discontent​in​the​situation​if​all​the​persons​ charged​were​not​to​be​excluded;​a​measure,​finally,​in​which​the​judgment​of​Congress​would​be​considered​interested​or​partial.​The​best​ way,​then,​of​making​the​reform​is​through​the​notice​of​convocation;​ this​measure​is​the​most​discreet​and​decent​that​can​be​adopted.​Draw​ a​veil​over​the​misconduct​of​some​men;​it​is​not​advisable​to​disturb​the​ pure​pleasure​that​the​enjoyment​of​liberty​produces​with​the​unpleasant​memory​of​offenses​and​evils.​The​triumph​of​reason​and​enlightenment​should​be​marked​with​liberality​of​principles​and​moderation​of​ actions. ​ From​motives​like​those​I​just​explained​and​for​other​reasons​deduced​from​the​fundamentals​of​society,​the​provisional​junta​of​Madrid​ refrained​from​reinstating​the​Cortes​of​1814.​With​the​decree​by​Ferdinand​VII​issued,​which​called​for​the​representative​body​of​the​nation​ to​gather,​everyone​knows​that​the​junta​itself​proposed​the​following​ doubt,​ to​ wit:​ Should​ the​ Cortes​ that​ were​ gathered​ in​ 1814​ be​ summoned,​or​will​it​be​necessary​to​go​on​to​new​elections?​The​junta​decided​ for​ the​ latter,​ and​ its​ resolution​ was​ well​ received​ everywhere.​ I​ will​ relate​ the​ passage​ because​ it​ is​ very​ analogous​ to​ the​ matter​ in​ ​question. ​ The​king​of​Spain​dissolved​the​Cortes​before​they​had​concluded​ their​term​of​legislature;​Iturbide​destroyed​the​Mexican​Congress​before​it​completed​its​duties.​The​army​demanded​in​the​Peninsula​the​ constitutional​ regime;​ our​ troops​ here​ gave​ the​ cry​ that​ a​ congress​ should​be​brought​together​that​would​constitute​the​nation.​There,​a​ junta​created​during​the​last​difficulties​of​the​despotism​produced​the​ ​

7.​Of​some​deputies.​(Editor’s​note)

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notice​of​convocation​by​order​of​the​king;​here,​another​junta,​summoned​ by​ the​ generals​ of​ the​ liberating​ army​ and​ composed​ of​ persons​of​more​popular​representation,​was​destined​to​the​same​purpose.​ The​former​discharged​its​duty;​the​latter​did​not,​because​the​very​one​ [Iturbide]​who​dissolved​the​Congress​ordered​it​reinstated.​This​measure​hindered​that​of​the​generals;​but​leaving​aside​the​history​of​this​ event,​I​will​transcribe​the​arguments​of​public​law​on​which​the​junta​ of​Madrid​determined​not​to​reestablish​the​Cortes​of​1814. All​men​(say​the​members​of​that​junta​in​their​manifesto)​who​ have​studied​the​foundations​of​society​know​that​the​representative​system​is​nothing​other​than​a​way​to​concentrate,​in​a​certain​ number​of​individuals​elected​by​the​entire​people,​the​right​to​vote​ the​laws,​which​undeniably​resides​in​each​citizen,​given​the​impossibility​that​all​members​of​a​large​state​be​present​in​one​place​ to​make​use​of​that​right;​so​the​ancient​republics​did​not​know​ this​system,​because​the​citizens,​who​resided​in​a​single​city,​could​ come​together​and​be​present​themselves​at​the​assemblies.​If​this​ were​feasible​in​the​most​perfect​mechanism​of​modern​nations,​ in​which​the​parts,​united​with​common​laws​and​rights,​form​a​ large​body​equal​and​reciprocal​in​everything,​it​would​doubtless​be​ the​one​that​the​Spaniards​have​of​assembling​on​the​present​occasion;​but​carrying​this​out​not​being​possible,​and​delegating​their​ powers​to​their​representatives​being​inevitable,​it​is​also​evident​ that​their​will​must​be​consulted​and​they​must​be​allowed​the​exercise,​which​no​one​has​the​power​of​refusing​them,​of​electing​persons​worthy​of​their​confidence,​whether​they​be​those​the​system​ named​before,​or​whether​it​be​others​because​of​their​talent,​their​ virtues,​or​the​proofs​that​in​six​years​of​testing​they​have​given​of​ their​unswerving​character​and​their​adherence​to​the​constitutional​ system.​And​when,​if​not​now,​should​the​Spanish​people​make​use​ of​this​precious​right?​Will​we​deprive​them​of​exercising​it​at​the​ moment​in​which​the​questions​that​most​concern​their​future​happiness​are​going​to​be​aired?​In​the​moment​in​which​their​representatives​have​to​complete​the​political​generation​of​the​state?​In​ this​moment​that​perhaps​they​will​not​see​return​again​for​centuries,​in​which​the​eternal​foundations​of​their​greatness​and​their​

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glory​will​be​laid​down,​in​which​are​fixed,​perhaps​forever,​the​destinies​of​entire​generations? ​ Thus​those​learned​Spaniards​explained​that​they​now​had​a​constitution​and​they​demanded​nothing​more​than​its​observance.​And​we​ who​are​lacking​a​constitution,​we​who​find​ourselves​in​the​situation​of​ adopting​the​form​of​government​that​most​suits​the​nation​in​its​new​ political​aspect,​will​we​not​be​able​to​explain​ourselves​in​the​same​way​ and​with​greater​reason?​Let​us​be​fair,​sir,​and​because​we​are​free​of​ the​obligations​under​which​the​Plan​of​Iguala​and​the​Treaty​of​Córdova​placed​us,8​let​us​allow​the​nation​to​explain​its​will​openly.​Let​us​ not​ignore​its​desires;​let​us​listen​to​its​opinions.​The​provisional​junta​ that​preceded​us​certainly​had​no​power​to​order​the​deputies​to​constitute​the​nation​into​a​constitutional​monarchy;​nonetheless​the​peoples,​ although​insulted​by​this​limitation,​obeyed​it​and​named​as​representatives​ those​ whom​ they​ believed​ were​ capable​ of​ establishing​ with​ greater​success​the​form​of​government​that​was​prescribed​to​them.​If,​ as​it​should​have​been,​the​convocation​notice​had​been​comprehensive,​ do​I​really​believe​that​many​elections​would​have​devolved​on​other​ individuals?​Would​the​people,​fond​of​another​form​of​government,​ have​chosen​as​their​deputies​staunch​monarchists?​Consistent​with​the​ nature​of​the​work,​artifice​is​sought.​Let​us​allow,​then,​sir,​the​nation​ to​make​use​of​a​right​that​cannot​be​disputed,​which​is​that​of​freely​ electing​its​representatives.​The​newly​elected​deputies​will​bring​other​ powers​and​instructions​that​serve​them​as​a​guide​in​the​very​serious​ matters​being​prepared​for​deliberation​and​that​we​could​not​resolve​ without​greatly​risking​going​against​the​will​of​our​constituents. ​ It​is​said​that​the​nature​of​our​mission​demands​absolute​powers;​this​ assertion​is,​at​the​least,​very​doubtful.​Allow​me​to​quote​literally​on​ this​point​the​well-​known​Martinez​Marina. No​one​doubts​(says​this​author)​that​it​is​an​actual​evil,​although​ necessary​in​the​representative​system​and​a​very​costly​sacrifice,​ ​ 8.​The​Treaties​of​Córdova,​signed​by​the​Spanish​viceroy,​Juan​de​O’Donojú,​and​ Agustín​de​Iturbide​on​August​24,​1821,​recognized​the​independence​of​Mexico.​(Editor’s​note)

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that​the​citizens​are​obligated​to​entrust​the​authority​to​vote​and​ enact​relative​to​their​most​precious​interests​to​a​small​number​of​ individuals​and​be​deprived​of​a​right​that​nature​itself​has​granted​ to​each​individual​in​society.​As​far​as​possible,​by​means​of​wise​ institutions,​a​good​constitution​should​prevent​those​difficulties,​ at​least​the​most​dangerous​ones:​to​reconcile​the​contradictions​ from​which​political​philosophy​is​sown,​and​to​organize​the​national​representation​in​such​a​way​that​it​does​not​harm​the​liberty​ of​citizens,​and​not​to​demand​more​sacrifices​of​them​than​those​ that​the​essential​order​of​society​and​the​supreme​law​of​the​state,​ which​is​public​utility,​prescribes. ​ The​citizens,​then,​obligated​for​reasons​of​common​utility​to​ sacrifice​a​part​of​their​liberty​and​their​rights​for​the​benefit​of​the​ state,​must​freely​elect​representatives​who​carry​their​voice​in​the​ national​Congress,​commit​themselves​to​them,​and​confer​on​them​ ample​powers​to​deliberate​in​the​Cortes​and​to​decide​in​them​ whatever​they​judge​suitable​for​the​general​good​and​particularly​ the​good​of​the​provinces​they​represent;​I​say​ample​powers,​but​ not​unlimited,​absolute,​and​irrevocable.​To​demand​of​people​that​ they​grant​letters​of​proxy​with​these​exorbitant​circumstances​and​ characteristics​is​to​deprive​them​of​liberty,​it​is​to​dispossess​them​ of​an​act​of​which​they​are​the​absolute​owners,​it​is​to​upset​the​ essential​order​of​things.​What​use​is​the​part​of​sovereignty​that​is​ their​responsibility​and​the​right​to​participate​in​the​formation​of​ the​laws​to​the​people​if,​after​electing​deputies,​there​is​no​other​ act​for​them​than​obeying?​Is​it​believable​that​they​would​consent​ to​extending​the​powers​in​such​a​way,​if​their​will​were​examined?​ Who​will​be​persuaded​that​citizens,​knowledgeable​about​the​extent​and​worth​of​their​rights,​would​consent​and​want​to​transfer​ every​act​irrevocably​to​a​deputy​or​agent,​constitute​him​owner​and​ absolute​arbiter​of​their​fortune​and​their​fate​and​their​most​precious​interests,​and​deliver​blindly​to​his​will​the​destinies​of​the​ man​and​the​state?​Has​anyone​ever​seen​that​some​great​property​ owner,​businessman,​or​merchant​has​granted​to​his​agents​or​deputies​absolute​and​irrevocable​powers​to​execute​in​their​name​whatever​he​might​want,​without​asking​them​to​share​at​least​the​state​ of​their​interests​and​the​course​of​the​business​and​that​they​con-

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sult​them​on​doubts,​on​difficult​matters,​and​matters​of​great​importance? ​ I​acknowledge​that,​once​the​citizens​can​elect​deputies​to​the​ Cortes​to​their​satisfaction​and​freely,​the​election​and​appointment​done​with​appropriate​good​judgment​and​prudence,​it​is​just​ and​proper​to​trust​them​and​rely​on​the​credence​of​their​patriotism​and​talents.​Nonetheless,​there​is​no​doubt​that​it​would​be​ very​risky​and​hazardous​and​highly​dangerous​for​a​people​to​surrender​without​any​reserve​or​precaution​at​all​to​a​proxy​or​deputy,​ whatever​might​be​his​standing​and​reputation,​granting​him​absolute​authority​to​do​whatever​he​might​like​regarding​matters​of​the​ greatest​interest,​and​obligating​themselves​at​the​same​time​to​obey​ blindly​and​fulfill​without​objection​what​their​agent​might​execute​ and​order.​A​people​that​appreciates​its​liberty​and​its​rights​must​ make​use​of​prudent​management​in​granting​powers,​especially​because​it​just​fortunately​threw​off​the​yoke​of​despotism,​to​show​a​ certain​caution​and​distrust​and​take​certain​measures​so​that​ignorance​or​malice,​intrigue​or​the​spirit​of​faction​can​never​decide​the​ fate​of​men. ​ The​deputies​from​the​provinces​authorized​with​absolute​ powers,​as​soon​as​they​are​gathered​in​the​Cortes,​can​work​and​ proceed​with​total​independence​from​the​citizens,​establish​laws​ without​their​consent​and​approval,​and​decide​with​sovereign​authority​the​interests​of​the​citizen​and​the​state.​And​how​many​ times​will​it​happen​that​the​deputies,​abusing​the​confidence​of​ their​principals,​will​vote​against​their​opinions​and​rights?​And​ would​this​not​be​a​more​horrifying​despotism​than​that​of​our​old​ government?​I​will​say​nothing​of​the​intrigues​and​negotiations​of​ the​interested​and​ambitious​ones​to​surprise​and​attract​the​unwary​ to​their​opinion.​Nothing​of​the​justified​fear​that​parties​bought​by​ powerful​agents​of​the​executive​power​might​develop.​Nothing​of​ the​danger,​as​fatal​as​inevitable,​that​a​total​vote​on​matters​of​the​ greatest​consequence​might​be​lost​by​a​small​number​of​deputies,​ either​ignorant​of​or​unfaithful​to​their​ministry,​or​won​over​by​ the​government.​Nothing,​finally,​of​the​ease​with​which​the​contaminated​air​of​the​assembly​can​corrupt​the​virtue​of​the​deputies​ if​some​preventative​against​this​pestilence​is​not​used.​Will​society​

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not​be​able​to​apply​a​prompt​remedy​and​take​precautionary​measures​to​avoid​some​ills​that​naturally​conflict​with​national​liberty​ and​aim​at​the​destruction​and​dissolution​of​the​state? ​ It​is​a​very​much​repeated​thought​that​the​deputies​are​representatives​of​the​whole​nation,​not​proxies​or​agents​of​specific​provinces.​Is​ this​a​truth?​In​order​to​respond,​it​seems​to​me​that​a​constituted​nation​ must​ be​ distinguished​ from​ one​ that​ is​ not.​ A​ constituted​ nation​ has​ already​established,​by​means​of​its​deputies,​the​rules​of​the​social​pact​ with​which​the​constituent​parts​have​been​bound,​rules​that​include​ everyone​ equally​ and​ that​ are​ directed​ to​ their​ mutual​ and​ common​ happiness;​in​this​constituted​nation,​the​deputies​represent​everyone​ and​proportionately​each​one​of​the​contracting​parties.​In​the​nonconstituted​nation​they​represent​only​the​provinces​that​send​them​and​ elected​them​from​their​midst,​or​outside​of​it​on​condition​always​that​ they​be​natives​or​residents​for​some​time​in​the​province​so​they​know​ their​interests,​have​greater​fondness​for​them,​and,​consequently,​defend​them​and​promote​them​with​greater​efficacy​and​success.​This​is​ the​situation​in​which​we​find​ourselves;​we​are​at​absolute​liberty​to​ constitute​ourselves​but​we​have​not​yet​settled​the​foundations​of​our​ union. ​ I​will​finish,​sir,​my​opinion,​saying​to​Your​Sovereignty​that,​because​ the​notice​of​convocation​was​so​faulty,​because​the​nation​has​altered​its​ political​situation,​and​because​the​provinces​have​declared​themselves​ in​favor​of​a​new​Congress,​without​regretting​having​suffered​privations,​sarcasms,​and​other​misfortunes​for​having​defended​liberty​and​ the​imprescriptible​rights​of​men,​let​us​resolve​immediately​to​vacate​ the​seats​of​this​sanctuary​of​the​laws​and​return​to​our​houses​and​our​ fates,​ready​always​to​serve​the​patria​when​it​summons​us.​If​Your​Sovereignty​adopts​this​measure,​it​will​give​greater​proof​of​personal​disinterest,​obedience,​and​respect​for​the​sovereign​people;​it​will​silence​ the​critics​and​leave​the​discontented​ones​expectant;​on​the​contrary,​ if​you​resolve​to​continue,​the​anger​that​has​been​manifested​will​increase,​and​that​war​that​is​feared​if​you​do​not​continue​will​perhaps​ take​place​if​you​do​not​dissolve.​Sir,​let​us​not​give​occasion​to​what​ some​bold​spirits​might​say:​that Congress is occupied in constituting us and should not do so; if it had limited itself to working on what was necessary, on what the order of society and its conservation require, while another congress

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comes together, which, with broader powers and instructions creates the great charter of our pact, then it would merit our gratitude, but stepping over those boundaries, as we see, this very Congress forces us to disobey it.​In​this​case,​ our​situation​would​become​worse,​because​the​sources​of​public​wealth​ are​ obstructed,​ the​ course​ of​ affairs​ paralyzed,​ confidence​ is​ lacking,​ everything​is​lifeless,​and​this​sad​picture​that,​in​my​opinion,​cannot​be​ enlivened​with​the​continuation​of​this​Congress,​would​turn​out​more​ gloomy​if​you​continue​your​sessions.​So​I​fear​it,​and​for​this​very​reason​I​insist​on​the​motion​that​Mr.​Muzquiz​and​I​present​to​Your​Sovereignty. Mexico, April 17, 1823

lucas alaMán Lucas​Alamán​(1792–1853),​born​in​the​state​of​Guanajuato,​was​ a​leading​politician​and​a​historian​during​the​first​half​of​the​ nineteenth​ century.​ His​ best-​known​ work​ is​ his​ five-​volume​ Historia de Méjico​ (1849–52),​ published​ toward​the​end​of​his​ life.​Until​the​1840s​Alamán​shared​with​Mora​and​other​liberals​ many​ of​ their​ ideas.​ Alamán​ was​ a​ deputy​ to​ the​ Cádiz​ Cortes​before​independence​in​1821.​During​his​life​he​served​ three​times​as​minister​in​the​cabinet.​Alamán​was​minister​of​ internal​ and​ external​ relations​ in​ the​ administration​ of​ General​Anastasio​Bustamante​(1830–32).​During​his​tenure​in​office​ he​endeavored​to​check​the​military​revolts​in​the​country.​A​ military​coup​staged​by​Santa​Anna​deposed​Bustamante,​however,​and​Alamán​and​other​members​of​the​government​were​ charged​ with​ various​ crimes​ by​ the​ new​ government.​ Falsely​ accused​of​hiring​the​murderer​of​former​independence​hero​ Vicente​Guerrero,​Alamán​went​into​hiding​to​avoid​arrest. ​ While​ he​ remained​ underground​ he​ wrote​ a​ legal​ brief​ as​ his​ defense​ as​ well​ as​ an​ essay,​ a​ critical​ examination​ of​ the​ Bustamante​ administration,​ which​ we​ present​ here.​ In​ this​ text​Alamán​discusses​the​institutional​flaws​of​the​1824​charter.​ After​ the​ 1847​ Mexican-​American​ War​ of​ Independence​ Alamán​became​more​reactionary,​and​in​1849​he​founded​the​ Conservative​party.

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Impartial Examination of the Administration of General Vice President Don Anastasio Bustamante I​have​little​to​recommend​my​opinions​but​long​ observation​and​much​impartiality.​They​come​from​one​ who​has​been​no​tool​of​power,​no​flatterer​of​greatness;​ and​who​in​his​last​acts​does​not​wish​to​belie​the​tenor​of​ his​life.​They​come​from​one​almost​the​whole​of​whose​ public​exertion​has​been​a​struggle​for​the​liberty​of​others;​ from​one​in​whose​breast​no​anger,​durable​or​vehement,​ has​ever​been​kindled​by​what​he​considers​as​tyranny;​ they​come​from​one​who​desires​honors,​distinctions,​and​ emoluments​but​little,​and​who​expects​them​not​at​all;​who​ has​no​contempt​for​fame,​and​no​fear​of​obloquy;​who​ shuns​contention,​though​he​will​hazard​an​opinion;​from​ one​who​wishes​to​preserve​consistency,​but​who​would​ preserve​consistency​by​varying​his​means​to​secure​the​ unity​of​his​end,​and,​when​the​equipoise​of​the​vessel​in​ which​he​sails​may​be​endangered​by​overloading​upon​one​ side,​is​desirous​of​carrying​the​small​weight​of​his​reasons​ to​that​which​may​preserve​its​equipoise. —​Edmund​Burke,​Reflections on the French Revolution

If,​in​all​things,​past​experience​is​the​surest​guide​for​ what​is​to​come,​in​political​matters​it​is​almost​the​only​rule​that​can​ be​adopted​with​confidence,​because​the​science​of​government,​being​ a​practical​science​by​its​nature​and​destined​for​practical​ends​accord​ Original​title:​“Examen​imparcial​de​la​administración​de​General​Vicepresidente​D.​ Anastasio​Bustamante,​con​observaciones​generales​sobre​el​estado​presente​de​la​República​ y​ consecuencias​ que​ éste​ debe​ producir.”​ Source:​ Lucas​ Alamán,​ Documentos diversos (inéditos y muy raros),​vol.​3,​comp.​Rafael​Aguayo​Spencer​(Mexico:​Jus,​1946),​ pp.​235–75. 151

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ing​to​one​of​the​primary​experts​in​public​law​in​our​era,1​cannot​be​ learned​a​priori,​being​not​only​a​subject​that​requires​experience,​but​ even​more​experience​than​a​person​can​acquire​in​the​entire​course​of​ his​life;​for​this,​the​profound​study​of​history​will​always​be​indispensable,​not​only​for​those​who​take​upon​themselves​the​difficult​business​ of​governing​people,​but​for​the​people​themselves​who,​in​the​lessons​ history​teaches​them,​learn​to​recognize​what​suits​them​and​what​harms​ them​and​to​judge​with​impartiality​those​who​have​directed​them.​This​ study​is​even​more​beneficial​when​it​devolves​upon​events​closest​to​us​ and​that​interest​us​more​from​being​close​by,​whether​because​they​are​ about​our​own​country​and​our​days,​or​because​they​belong​to​peoples​ and​nations​that​have​greater​similarity​to​our​present​circumstances.​ From​all​these​points​of​view,​an​impartial​examination​of​an​administration​that​has​existed​in​the​Republic​for​two​and​one-​half​years​must​ seem​very​important;​an​administration​that​gave​luster​and​splendor​to​ the​nation,​rendering​it​esteemed​and​respected​in​foreign​countries;​ that​affirmed​and​increased​its​credit​in​those​countries;​that​mended​ internal​finances​in​a​way​that​had​not​been​seen​since​independence;​ that​developed​industry​and​created​hope​for​a​lasting​prosperity,​which​ nonetheless​disappeared​with​the​very​administration​that​produced​it,​ like​those​luminous​meteors​that​shine​in​the​obscurity​of​night​for​a​ few​moments​and​then​return​to​the​same​darkness​from​which​they​ emerged.​This​administration,​atrociously​calumnied​and​cruelly​persecuted​by​its​adversaries,​has​been​defended​many​times​with​anger​and​ sometimes​with​skill​by​various​writers,​but​never​has​it​been​judged​ with​the​calm​of​reason​and​the​impartial​seriousness​of​justice,​considering​the​totality​of​all​its​operations​and​the​basic​foundations​of​ its​conduct.​Neither​could​this​impartial​judgment​truly​develop​in​the​ midst​of​the​fervor​of​the​passions​and​the​tumultuous​cry​of​persecution,​ nor​ for​ this​ reason​ have​ I​ previously​ undertaken​ the​ writing​ of​ this​paper,​waiting​to​enter​into​this​examination​not​that​of​the​revolutionary​ spirit,​ which​ unfortunately​ has​ put​ down​ such​ profound​ roots​among​us,​might​have​been​calmed,​but​rather​that​it​might​have​ changed​course,​which​happens​with​sufficient​frequency,​for,​similar​ to​the​vapid​rich​of​Rome,​who,​as​Horace​describes​with​such​elegance​ ​

1.​Burke.

examination​of​the​adminiStration​of​anaStaSio​buStamante : 153

(diruit aedificat; repetit quod imper omisit),​today​destroys​the​edifice​that​ it​raised​up​yesterday​and​tomorrow​praises​publicly​the​same​individual​ who,​a​short​time​before,​was​the​object​of​a​terrible​persecution.​Now​ that​it​is​already​clear​that​the​administration​of​General​Bustamante​ has​been​only​the​pretext​and​not​the​cause​of​the​revolution,​that​the​ men​who​prepared​it​have​for​the​most​part​been​forgotten,​his​conduct​ can​be​judged​with​neither​hatred​nor​love,​completely​setting​aside​his​ people​in​the​examination​we​are​going​to​make​of​his​political​administration,​in​order​to​keep​in​view​only​his​actions​and​to​determine​from​ these​what​the​principles​have​been​that​drove​them,​to​what​point​these​ can​be​justified,​what​the​consequence​of​the​success,​of​the​error,​of​the​ circumstances,​or​of​the​crime​might​be.2 ​ To​judge​impartially​the​conduct​not​only​of​a​government​but​also​ of​an​individual,​whether​he​be​in​the​sphere​of​a​public​committee​or​ in​the​more​limited​sphere​of​a​private​post,​it​is​necessary​to​focus​on​ these​essential​points:​what​was​the​nature​of​the​assignment​entrusted​ to​him,​in​what​circumstances,​what​means​were​given​him​to​carry​it​ out,​and,​given​these,​to​what​point​did​he​learn​to​make​use​of​them​to​ fulfill​the​objectives​of​his​committee.​Without​giving​its​true​weight​to​ each​one​of​these​points,​any​judgment​that​might​be​formed​would​be​ precipitate​or​arbitrary,​and​therefore​I​will​be​excused​for​entering​at​ some​length​into​the​examination​of​each​of​them,​combining​them​at​ times​when​their​contact​might​be​so​intimate​that​it​might​not​be​possible​to​deal​with​them​separately​without​confusion. ​ The​ Republic,​ after​ a​ series​ of​ almost​ uninterrupted​ disturbances​ since​ the​ year​ 1826,​ found​ itself​ weary​ of​ this​ continuous​ motion​ in​ which​the​factions​had​kept​it:​its​forces​had​been​drained,​its​treasury​ was​not​only​exhausted​but​also​overloaded​with​obligations,​its​foreign​ credit​destroyed,​and​commerce​and​industry​weakened,​inevitable​outcomes​as​much​from​these​very​disturbances​as​from​the​legislative​mea​ 2.​On​December​4,​1829,​the​reserve​army​of​the​city​of​Jalapa,​commanded​by​the​ vice​ president,​ General​ Anastasio​ Bustamante,​ revolted​ against​ the​ government​ of​ Vicente​Guerrero.​In​a​little​less​than​a​month,​Bustamante​ousted​Guerrero​and​seized​ power.​Lucas​Alamán​was​then​appointed​minister​of​internal​and​external​relations​in​ the​new​administration.​The​role​played​by​Alamán​was​so​central​in​the​government​ that​people​came​to​call​it​the​“Alamán​administration.”​(Editor’s​note)

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sures​the​general​Congress​felt​compelled​to​dictate​because​of​them.​Of​ the​old​parties​that​had​divided​the​Republic,​the​one​had​remained​entirely​disorganized​and​destroyed​by​the​events​of​Tulancingo,3​the​other​ had​been​internally​divided​on​the​occasion​of​the​election​of​the​president;​one​part​of​it,​united​to​the​remnants​of​the​crushed​party,​had​ formed​a​new​party​that,​supported​by​a​very​pronounced​but​inactive​ general​opinion​and​because​of​the​very​effective​strength​of​the​army,​ gathered​in​Jalapa,​produced​a​revolution​that​was​generally​desired;​the​ other​part​of​that​same​party,​tarnished​by​the​blemish​of​the​triumph​ that​it​obtained​in​the​Acordada,4​found​itself​detested​in​public​opinion​and​judgment​but​had​in​its​support​the​Chamber​of​Deputies,​composed​largely​of​individuals​from​that​party​and​various​congresses​of​ the​states.​Others​of​these​congresses​and​the​Senate​were​loyal​to​the​ plan​promulgated​in​Jalapa​and​very​quickly​generalized​to​the​entire​ Republic.​The​general​discontent​had​begun​to​show​itself​before​the​ proclamation​of​this​plan,​and,​seeking​the​remedy​for​public​woes​in​ an​essential​change​in​the​Constitution,​some​individuals​in​Jalisco​had​ proclaimed​the​centralized​form​of​government;​in​Yucatán​a​more​important​movement​had​taken​place​with​the​same​objective. ​ Such​was​the​state​of​things​when​General​Bustamante​took​the​reins​ of​government​in​his​hands​on​January​1,​1830;​a​few​days​later​he​named​ his​cabinet,​and​the​appointments​were​generally​well​received.​Public​ confidence​was​reestablished​almost​immediately​just​with​the​reputation​of​the​individuals​who​made​up​the​new​administration,​and​for​the​ nation​a​new​epoch​of​prosperity​seemed​to​begin​from​that​moment. ​ As​the​revolution​had​not​changed​the​Constitution​and​established​ ​ 3.​The​“old​parties”​were​the​Scottish​(considered​aristocratic)​and​the​Yorkist​(considered​more​popular),​both​with​origins​in​the​Masonic​lodges.​On​January​6,​1828,​the​ leader​of​the​Scottish​party,​General​Nicolás​Bravo,​who​rebelled​against​the​government​of​President​Guadalupe​Victoria,​was​defeated​in​the​town​of​Tulancingo​by​troops​ loyal​to​the​government​commanded​by​the​Yorkist​Vicente​Guerrero.​(Editor’s​note) ​ 4.​The​Scottish​candidate,​Manuel​Gómez​Pedraza,​won​the​1828​presidential​elections​and​defeated​the​Yorkist​candidate,​Vicente​Guerrero,​whose​supporters​refused​ to​acknowledge​the​results​and​revolted​in​several​cities.​In​Mexico​City​a​pro-​Guerrero​ mob​stormed​the​Acordada​prison,​a​colonial​building.​The​popular​riots​forced​Gómez​ Pedraza​to​flee​the​country,​and​Guerrero​became​president.​(Editor’s​note)

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laws​in​any​way,​the​observance​of​and​compliance​with​the​one​and​the​ others​had​to​be​the​objective​of​the​new​government,​and​the​means​ it​had​to​fulfill​their​duties​were​solely​those​that​this​Constitution​and​ these​laws​in​current​force​provided.​The​desire​and​most​urgent​necessity​of​the​nation​was​the​preservation​of​peace,​and​any​fundamental​ innovation​whatsoever​could​produce​nothing​other​than​new​and​more​ disastrous​convulsions;​therefore​duty,​suitability,​and​public​opinion​ equally​compelled​the​government​to​submit​to​conserving​and​consolidating​what​existed. ​ If​it​has​been​possible​to​state​briefly​what​the​objective​was​of​the​ office​ entrusted​ to​ the​ new​ administration​ and​ to​ present​ at​ a​ glance​ what​ the​ state​ of​ the​ nation​ was​ in​ the​ epoch​ of​ its​ installation,​ it​ is​ not​equally​possible​to​explain​briefly​the​means​that​were​placed​in​its​ hands​for​this,​because​those​involve​very​extensive​considerations​on​ the​exercise​of​constitutional​powers​and​require​a​more​specific​examination​of​the​moral,​political,​and​physical​state​in​which​the​Republic​ found​itself​than​what​is​presented​by​the​picture​that​I​have​only​outlined​with​a​few​light​strokes.​If​the​length​that​might​be​necessary​to​ give​to​these​considerations​seems​excessive,​thinking​men​capable​of​ understanding​fully​the​importance​of​this​subject​matter​will​readily​ pardon​what​will​seem​prolix​to​the​less​reflective​person,​and​in​order​ not​to​depend​solely​on​my​own​opinion,​I​will​be​permitted​also​to​ support​myself​with​the​opinion​of​the​man​who​has​been​able​to​comprehend​better​the​tendency​and​outcomes​of​political​movements​in​ our​era.​This​man,​Edmund​Burke,​in​his​profound​reflections​on​the​ revolution​in​France,​has​announced,​with​a​spirit​that​might​be​called​ prophetic,​the​entire​series​of​events​that​we​have​seen​in​our​country​ and​in​foreign​countries,​and,​as​his​observations​are​so​relevant​to​our​ circumstances,​what​I​take​from​his​brilliant​pen​will​enrich​and​support​ this​paper. ​ The​entire​force​of​government,​all​the​means​that​are​in​its​hands​ to​conserve​public​order,​suppress​and​contain​unsettled​and​seditious​ persons,​prevent​the​misappropriation​of​national​wealth,​and,​in​short,​ carry​out​the​necessary​functions​of​an​authority​that​must​be​active,​ vigilant,​and​foresightful​are​derived​from​the​division​of​powers​that​ the​Constitution​established​and​from​the​powers​that​in​this​division​ are​settled​on​the​executive.​The​model​that​was​in​mind​for​the​writing​

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of​our​federal​Constitution​was​the​Constitution​of​the​United​States​ of​the​North,​but​it​is​a​mistake​to​believe​that​the​executive​of​our​Republic​is​constituted​in​the​same​way​as​that​of​the​United​States,​and​ another​still​greater​mistake​to​think​that​that​Constitution,​even​were​it​ copied​exactly,​would​produce​the​same​results​operating​over​dissimilar​ elements. ​ The​United​States​of​the​North​were​independently​formed​in​the​ beginning​because​of​the​different​migrations​of​English​colonists​who,​ for​different​reasons—some​political,​some​religious—felt​they​had​to​ abandon​their​country​and​settled​on​the​coasts​of​America,​giving​to​ each​colony​a​particular​constitution,​modeled​generally​on​the​principles​ adopted​ in​ England.​ These​ colonies​ not​ only​ did​ not​ mix​ and​ blend​ with​ the​natives​ of​ the​country,​ but​ rather​ they​expelled​ them​ from​their​ settlements​ to​the​point​ of​wiping​ them​ out.​They​all​depended​on​the​English​government,​and​the​authority​constituted​by​ it​was​the​bond​that​united​them​to​each​other​and​to​the​metropolis.​ When​independence​came​to​break​this​bond,​all​the​legislators​had​to​ do​was​substitute​a​national​union​for​this​common​bond​of​foreign​rule,​ and​this​is​what​was​done​with​the​federal​Constitution.​This​did​not​ alter​in​any​way​the​particular​existence​of​the​states,​it​did​not​change​ their​individual​constitutions,​and​these​constitutions​to​which​the​English​colonists​were​habituated​from​their​patria​were,​rather​than​written​codes,​the​habitual​customs,​the​ordinary​way​of​life​of​all​individuals;​and​as​they​were​derived​from​that​of​England,​they​had​established​ on​the​experience​of​England​the​division​and​balance​of​powers​with​ neither​shock​nor​collision​among​them.​Independence,​then,​did​not​ change​anything​in​that​Republic​except​a​nonessential​property,​but​it​ left​existing​everything​that​constituted​the​essence​of​the​original​constitution.​From​this​it​follows​that,​since​the​era​of​its​independence,​ the​United​States​have​moved​forward​every​day​without​impediment​ on​the​path​of​their​prosperity.​They​did​not​have​more​than​one​single​ difficulty​to​overcome​to​constitute​themselves​as​a​nation,​and​this​difficulty​is​the​most​minor​for​a​people,​which​is​to​shake​off​the​rule​of​a​ distant​nation,​no​matter​how​powerful​it​might​be. ​ Our​ fate​ in​ this​ regard​ has​ been​ different:​ independence​ came​ by​ means​very​different​from​that​of​the​United​States,​and​while​the​United​ States​were​constituted​from​the​very​moment​they​found​themselves​ free,​we,​destroying​everything​that​existed​before,​found​ourselves​in-

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dependent​and​in​anarchy.​We​congratulated​ourselves​for​the​liberty​ we​had​acquired,​much​more​when​the​Plan​of​Casa​Mata5​opened​the​ field​for​the​establishment​of​institutions​absolutely​different,​or​rather​ entirely​opposite​to​everything​that​was​known​and​had​existed​until​ then.​We​began​to​count​the​epoch​of​liberty​from​that​event,​but​we​ should​not​have​congratulated​ourselves​on​it​“until​[we​were]​informed​ how​it​had​been​combined​with​government,​with​public​force,​with​ the​discipline​and​obedience​of​armies,​with​the​collection​of​an​effective​and​well-​distributed​revenue,​with​morality​and​religion,​with​the​ solidity​of​property,​with​peace​and​order,​with​civil​and​social​manners.​ All​these​(in​their​way)​are​good​things,​too,​and​without​them​liberty​is​ not​a​benefit​whilst​it​lasts,​and​is​not​likely​to​continue​long.”6​All​these​ delicate​but​necessary​combinations​had​to​be​the​objective​of​the​Constitution,​and​the​results​we​continually​see​prove​clearly​that​these​important​objectives​have​not​been​fulfilled​with​the​Constitution. ​ The​ model​ that​ was​ taken​ to​ constitute​ the​ nation,​ as​ I​ have​ said​ above,​was​the​United​States,​but​one​hardly​had​any​slight​knowledge​ of​this​model,​and​what​one​had​seen​practiced​in​some​way​was​the​ Spanish​Constitution,​which​in​itself​was​nothing​other​than​an​imitation​of​the​Constituent​Assembly​of​France,​and​this​latter​the​result​ of​all​the​metaphysical​errors​of​the​speculative​philosophers​of​the​last​ century.​Thus​it​is​that,​without​noticing​it,​the​entire​spirit​of​the​Spanish​Constitution​was​transmitted​into​our​federal​Constitution,​which​ had​the​structure​of​the​Constitution​of​the​United​States,​and​this​influence​was​yet​more​characterized​in​the​constitutions​of​some​states.​ The​constitution​that​the​Constituent​Assembly​gave​to​France​and​that​ the​Cortes​of​Cádiz​servilely​copied​not​only​did​not​properly​distinguish​the​powers,​not​only​did​not​establish​a​suitable​balance​between​ them,​but​rather​weakened​the​executive​excessively,​transferred​all​authority​ to​ the​ legislature,​ creating,​ in​ place​ of​ the​ absolute​ power​ of​ the​monarch,​a​power​as​absolute​as​the​monarch​but​entirely​arbitrary,​ without​any​of​the​brakes​to​contain​it​that​could​in​some​way​restrain​ ​ 5.​On​February​1,​1823,​Santa​Anna​issued​the​Plan​of​Casa​Mata,​which​called​for​the​ reinstatement​of​the​constituent​congress​disbanded​by​Emperor​Iturbide.​The​rebellion​ extended​throughout​the​country​and​was​the​beginning​of​the​end​for​the​short-​lived​ first​Mexican​empire.​(Editor’s​note)​ ​ 6.​Burke.

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the​ arbitrariness​ of​ the​ monarchs.​ France​ and​ Spain,​ through​ similar​ constitutions,​did​nothing​more​than​pass​from​the​tyranny​of​one​to​the​ infinitely​more​unbearable​tyranny​of​many,​and​among​us​we​have​seen​ the​same​results.​To​this​principle​and​not​to​any​other​must​be​attributed​the​excesses​that​we​have​recently​seen​in​Zacatecas:​a​Congress​ that​declares​war​on​the​general​government,​that​enters​into​relations​ with​the​congresses​of​other​states,​that​condemns​to​exile​its​deputies​ in​the​general​Congress​because​they​have​not​supported​these​errors,​ is​an​institution​most​opposite​to​the​idea​that​all​the​theories​have​us​ form​of​a​representative​body,​and,​on​the​contrary,​an​institution​most​ similar​to​those​oligarchic​corporations​which,​in​the​Italian​republics​ of​the​sixteenth​century,​exercised​the​most​horrible​tyranny​alternately​ with​the​despots​who​from​time​to​time​dismissed​them​to​concentrate​ authority​in​themselves.​This​imperfect​division​of​powers,​or​rather​ this​ monstrous​ accumulation​ of​ power​ in​ bodies​ called​ legislative,​ is​ that​much​more​prejudicial​when​these​bodies​in​some​state,​like​the​ already​cited​Zacatecas,​are​composed​of​only​one​chamber​made​up​of​ a​small​number​of​individuals​and​do​not​even​have​a​time​limitation​in​ the​exercise​of​their​omnipotence,​so​their​sessions​last​the​entire​year.​ Thus,​we​have​seen​the​Zacatecan​oligarchy​dominated​by​two​active​intriguers​followed​blindly​by​nine​simple​men​who,​with​the​sincerest​intention​in​the​world,​have​let​those​two​evil​spirits​precipitate​their​state​ into​all​the​misfortunes​of​war​and​stir​up​those​misfortunes​of​anarchy​ in​the​rest​of​the​Republic. ​ There​is​a​very​serious​circumstance​that​increases​even​more​disproportionately​the​power​of​the​general​Congress​and,​in​its​proper​proportion,​that​power​of​the​state​legislatures,​and​it​reduces​the​executive​ to​the​greatest​nullity,​and​it​is​the​following​that​I​see​has​never​been​ given​proper​attention.​The​Constituent​Congress​believed​it​had​finished​its​work​with​dividing​the​Republic​into​states​and​establishing​ two​chambers​and​a​president,​and​it​said​pompously​on​taking​its​leave:​ I have given you a Constitution;​but​it​did​not​reflect​that​this​Constitution​ it​had​written,​infusing​the​form​of​the​United​States​Constitution​with​ the​complete​spirit​of​the​Constitution​of​the​Cortes​of​Cádiz,​destroying​at​their​roots​everything​that​existed,​did​nothing​more​than​put​ the​form​of​government​in​contradiction​with​all​the​sound​legislation​ of​the​nation,​and​because​this​sound​legislation​was​coherent​with​the​ nation’s​habits​and​customs,​the​application​of​that​very​Constitution​

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came​to​present​great​difficulties.​The​constituents​without​doubt​believed​this​work​would​be​carried​out​by​their​successors,​but​they​did​ not​consider​that​it​was​absolutely​impossible​for​an​ordinary​Congress,​ overloaded​with​the​duties​that​the​Constitution​imposes​on​it,​to​dedicate​itself​to​the​giant​work​of​revising​all​the​old​legislation​to​adapt​it​ to​the​new​form​that​had​been​given​to​the​nation.​Thus​it​is​that​such​a​ work​has​not​been​undertaken,​and​a​few​other​isolated​measures​have​ done​nothing​more​than​make​the​state​of​things​worse,​and​the​nation​ remains​with​a​legislation​totally​contrary​to​its​institutions,​which​not​ only​causes​supreme​difficulty​in​the​administration​of​justice​and​in​ public​finance,​but​also​subjugates​the​exercise​of​executive​power​even​ more​to​legislative​authority. ​ In​effect​this​contradiction​between​the​laws​and​the​Constitution​ encountered​ at​ every​ step​ in​ the​ political​ and​ judicial​ administration​ necessitates​frequent​consultations​to​Congress,​even​regarding​those​ points​that​according​to​the​Constitution​pertain​to​the​executive.​Procrastination​in​attending​to​these​questions​infinitely​delays​tending​to​ matters,​and,​at​times,​resolutions​suffer​from​legislative​omnipotence.​ Thus,​for​example,​in​the​noisy​matter​of​General​Inclán,7​as​it​was​very​ clear​that​there​was​no​existing​law​for​such​a​case​inasmuch​as​the​law​ established​by​the​Cortes​of​Spain​could​not​be​applied​among​us,​Congress​ declared,​ at​ the​ very​ time​ it​ made​ a​ new​ law,​ that​ this​ law​ had​ always​been​in​force​and​was​made​a​crime​of​the​government​because,​ lacking​prophetic​spirit,​the​administration​had​not​executed​the​law​before​it​existed. ​ In​the​Constitution,​certain​powers​and​many​duties​are​in​fact​assigned​to​the​government,​but​this​demarcation​of​obligations​has​been​ made​ without​ calculating​ at​ all​ whether,​ in​ order​ to​ carry​ them​ out,​ the​powers​with​which​it​was​vested​were​sufficient,​and​this​is​another​ very​essential​point​of​difference​between​the​organization​of​our​executive​and​that​of​the​United​States,​in​spite​of​the​claim​that​ours​has​ ​ 7.​General​Ignacio​Inclán,​commander​of​the​Guadalajara​garrison,​abused​his​powers​ as​military​commander​and​was​dismissed​from​his​command​by​Bustamante​in​December​1831​but​was​not​prosecuted.​The​government​claimed​that​there​was​no​law​under​ which​to​charge​and​convict​Inclán.​He​was​considered​a​centralist​and​a​loyal​supporter​ of​the​administration​by​the​Yorkist​opposition.​The​opposition​accused​the​government​ of​unduly​protecting​him.​(Editor’s​note)​

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been​modeled​on​that​one.​One​power​alone,​with​which​the​president​ of​ the​ United​ States​ of​ the​ North​ is​ vested​ and​ which​ the​ president​ of​the​United​States​of​Mexico​lacks,​is​sufficient​to​constitute​an​authority​of​so​different​a​kind​that​a​comparison​of​one​with​the​other​is​ not​possible.​The​president​of​the​United​States​of​the​North​can​dismiss​by​his​will​alone,​without​cause​or​even​having​to​state​the​reason,​ all​military,​political,​and​financial​employees​of​the​federation,​with​ the​sole​exception​of​the​judges,​without​granting​them​any​pension​or​ retirement;​and​he​can​use​this​power​however​and​whenever​it​seems​ best​to​him.​Imagine​for​a​moment​an​executive​power​armed​with​this​ important​authority.​What​would​its​influence​not​be?​From​the​moment​this​authority​is​conceded​to​it,​all​employees​depend​exclusively​ on​the​president.​They​become​as​many​supports​as​he​can​have​to​sustain​his​authority;​but​this​authority,​being​exercised​with​the​discretion​with​which​it​has​been​used​in​the​United​States—only​the​present​ president,​General​Andrew​Jackson,​has​been​accused​of​any​arbitrariness—is​enough​to​avoid​the​disloyalty​or​extravagance​of​the​employee​ in​finance,​to​impose​respect​and​fear​in​the​military,​and​to​instill​in​ everyone​a​sense​of​regard​toward​that​person​on​whose​will​they​absolutely​depend;​while​among​us,​the​president​wonders​who​the​official​ of​the​ministry​is,​who​is​selling​government​secrets​to​the​intriguers​ and​rebellious​persons.​He​knows​positively,​although​without​proofs​ that​can​be​presented​judicially,​who​the​employee​of​the​customs​office​ is​who​allows​contraband,​without​being​able​to​do​anything​other​than​ take​the​ridiculous​and​useless​measure​of​suspending​that​employee​for​ up​to​three​months,​leaving​him​with​half​his​salary.​Thus​it​is​that​the​ government​can​do​nothing​to​correct​the​woes​it​sees​as​self-​evident​ and,​instead​of​being​an​object​of​regard​and​respect,​is​nothing​more​ than​an​object​of​derision​and​scorn,​even​to​its​most​immediate​subordinates. ​ If,​then,​the​president​of​the​United​States​of​the​North​is​considered​vested​with​this​power​and,​moreover,​exercising​his​authority​by​ virtue​of​a​Constitution​incorporating​all​the​habits​and​customs​of​the​ country,​which​could​be​described​as​innate​in​the​country,​entirely​in​ accord​with​the​civil​and​criminal​legislation,​which​therefore​presents​ almost​no​impediment​to​the​fulfillment​of​the​Constitution,​one​will​ see​how​different​his​power​is​from​that​with​which​the​first​magistrate​ of​our​Republic​is​vested;​but​there​are​still​other​differences​no​less​im-

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portant.​The​president​of​the​United​States​of​the​North​has​the​power​ to​commute​or​pardon​completely​penalties​imposed​by​tribunals​except​in​the​case​of​high​treason​against​the​nation.​How​much​confusion,​how​many​difficulties​would​be​avoided​among​us​if​our​Constitution​had​given​this​power​to​the​president!​And,​in​fact,​there​is​no​part​ of​our​political​organization​more​defective.​The​constituent​congress,​ blindly​following​the​theoretical​principles​of​the​speculative​philosophers,​believed​that​only​the​one​who​makes​the​law​can​reform​it,​even​ in​cases​when​the​law​could​establish​the​manner​of​granting​individual​ pardons,​and​under​this​principle​it​reserved​to​Congress​the​power​to​ grant​this​kind​of​pardon.​It​did​not​keep​in​mind​that,​in​this​way,​those​ condemned​to​death​during​the​recess​had​to​suffer​this​punishment​irremediably​whatever​the​merits​that​their​cases​might​show​to​commute​ the​sentences,​and​that,​on​the​contrary,​none​of​those​sentenced​during​the​sessions,​no​matter​how​atrocious​their​crimes​might​be,​would​ have​to​suffer​the​punishment​because​of​the​excessive​ease​with​which​ the​collegial​and​unaccountable​bodies​grant​this​type​of​pardon;​for​ although,​through​a​law,​the​restriction​was​set​by​which​only​the​requests​that​the​government​informs​and​supports​could​be​taken​into​ consideration,​this​law​has​been​eluded​completely​by​means​of​a​subtle​ distinction​based​in​the​unlimited​right​of​initiative​and​the​omnipotence​of​the​legislative​body.​The​consequences​have​been​what​might​ have​been​expected​and​no​less​unfortunate​in​what​is​moral​than​in​ what​is​political:​there​is​not​a​criminal​who​does​not​hope​for​pardon​ up​to​the​very​moment​of​execution​when​he​has​seen​that​it​is​enough​ that​the​porter​in​the​Chamber​of​Deputies​can​scribble​a​motion​for​ pardon,​collecting​signatures​that,​for​this​and​other​things,​are​given​ with​blameworthy​ease;​and​so​if​the​execution​takes​place,​the​criminal​who​suffers​it​has​not​been​sufficiently​prepared​and​presents​himself​before​the​Tribunal​of​the​Eternal​Judge​where​things​do​not​go​as​ lightly​as​in​our​congresses,​not​carrying​in​his​heart​the​penitence​that​ must​save​him,​but​rather,​perhaps,​the​despair​that​causes​him​to​presume​that​he​has​suffered​for​lack​of​sufficient​resources.​This​is​how​the​ most​solemn​and​fitting​act​for​the​exercise​of​national​power​has​come​ to​be​a​kind​of​legerdemain,​and​the​life​or​death​of​men​depends​on​ mere​chance.​On​the​great​occasions​in​which​a​reprieve​or​general​amnesty​can​save​a​nation​from​the​horrors​of​civil​war​with​an​opportune​ and​well-​arranged​stroke,​the​harm​in​this​way​of​proceeding​is​even​

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greater.​Sometimes​a​member​of​either​chamber,​ignorant​of​the​state​of​ things​or​because​it​suits​the​faction​to​which​he​belongs,​inopportunely​ grants​a​general​pardon​and​occasionally,​when​the​government​puts​it​ forward,​the​Congress​lets​pass​the​opportunity​of​granting​it​to​its​advantage​with​useless​or​awkward​discussions​that​lessen​the​value​of​the​ pardon​when​it​has​been​agreed​to​and​that,​when​it​is​granted,​influence​ crimes​to​multiply​with​the​probability​of​obtaining​the​pardon. ​ If​the​Constitution​of​our​neighbors​differs​so​essentially​from​ours​ in​the​two​great​powers​it​grants​to​the​government​to​suspend​positions​and​grant​pardons,​it​differs​even​more​in​the​methods​it​provides​ for​the​success​of​its​workings.​Our​Constitution​leaves​the​government​ entirely​isolated,​with​no​one​to​advise​its​decisions​or​inform​it​on​the​ points​of​fact​and​law​in​the​serious​pieces​of​business​that​must​apply​ to​it​frequently​for​its​decision.​In​the​United​States,​just​as​in​England,​ there​is​a​type​of​adviser​with​the​title​of​attorneys​of​the​nation​or​of​the​ crown,​with​whom​ministers​discuss​their​measures,​and​these​can​be​ issued​not​based​on​the​rough​report​of​the​officer​of​a​board,​but​rather​ based​on​the​considered​opinion​of​a​lawyer,​to​whom​theoretical​and​ practical​knowledge​must​lead​correctly.​In​this​part,​the​constitution​ of​these​states​moved​away​absolutely​from​its​two​models,​that​of​the​ United​States​of​the​North​and​the​Spanish,​and​produced​its​own​creation,​the​Council of the government,​and​in​truth​this​original​invention​ does​not​do​the​greatest​honor​to​the​creative​genius​of​its​authors.​This​ Council​is​composed​of​one-​half​of​the​Senate;​it​exists​in​the​interval​between​the​ordinary​sessions​and,​by​an​erroneous​interpretation​ of​the​Constitution,​also​ceases​during​the​extraordinary​sessions,​and​ among​its​duties​are​advising​the​government​in​whatever​the​government​discusses​with​it.​It​will​be​noticed​very​quickly​that​this​Council​ is​entirely​inadequate​to​fulfill​the​objectives​of​a​consultative​body.​The​ act​of​consulting​a​person​or​corporation​supposes​necessarily,​on​the​ part​of​the​one​who​consults,​confidence​in​the​knowledge​and​sincerity​ of​the​one​consulted.​In​order​to​have​this,​it​is​necessary​that​the​one​ who​consults​have​had​at​least​some​part​in​the​selection​of​the​consultant;​this​is​how,​even​in​the​Spanish​Constitution,​which​is​the​one​that​ has​set​forth​the​greatest​restrictions​on​the​selection​of​the​consultative​ body​of​government,​the​Cortes​presented​on​a​short​list​the​advisers​of​ the​state,​but​the​king​could​freely​select​among​these​short-​listed​persons.​ Here,​ the​ government​ finds​ itself​ in​ the​ situation​ of​ consulting​

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persons​who​are​perfect​strangers​to​it,​who​many​times​will​be​indifferent​to​its​successes,​and​when​the​majority​of​that​Council​consists​ of​individuals​from​what​is​called​the​opposition,​their​consultants​will​ be​positively​interested​in​ruining​it​with​their​counsel,​for​among​us​ opposition​and​sedition​are​entirely​synonymous.​Must,​then,​the​government​seek​counsel​from​someone​who​will​either​give​advice​with​indifference​or​might​give​it​with​malice?​And​this​last​case​is​so​far​from​ being​hypothetical​that,​inasmuch​as​following​the​opinion​of​the​Council​does​not​in​any​way​preclude​the​responsibility​of​the​minister,​the​ Council,​governed​by​self-​interest​in​holding​the​government​accountable,​will​not​let​the​opportunity​pass​to​lay​a​trap.​But,​supposing​that​ nothing​of​this​happens​and​the​government​can​count​on​the​integrity​ and​learning​of​its​counselors,​will​the​need​it​has​of​its​counselors​be​ limited​only​to​some​months​of​the​year​and​not​continue​in​the​time​in​ which​the​most​important​business​of​the​nation​must​be​debated​in​the​ chambers?​One​must​agree​that​this​part​of​the​Council​of​the​government​and​its​operation​in​the​meeting​of​extraordinary​sessions​is​what​ was​least​thought​out​in​the​Constitution. ​ We​ maintain,​ then,​ through​ the​ examination​ and​ comparison​ we​ have​made​of​the​executive​of​the​United​States​of​the​North​with​ours​ in​the​Constitution,​that​the​latter​is​infinitely​weaker​than​the​former​ in​its​vested​powers​and,​moreover,​is​deprived​of​that​kind​of​counsel​ that​among​our​neighbors​contributes​to​the​success​and​prestige​of​their​ operations,​and​so,​accumulating​weakness​upon​weakness,​our​government​has​all​the​weaknesses​inherent​in​the​nature​of​an​elective​government​and​all​the​weaknesses​that​come​from​the​restrictions​and​ties​ with​which​the​somber​and​distrustful​legislators​of​Cádiz​bound​and​ restrained​the​phantom​of​the​king​they​created​in​their​Constitution.​Is​ it,​then,​a​wonder​that​a​government​so​weakly​organized​cannot​fulfill​ the​objective​of​its​creation,​suppressing​the​wicked,​protecting​the​good​ and​peaceful,​ensuring​order,​strengthening​military​discipline,​and​enabling​the​nation​to​enjoy​the​benefits​of​society,​primordial​objective​ of​all​human​institutions?​And​is​it​a​wonder​that​the​government​of​Sr.​ Esteva8​should​have​endeavored​to​place​itself​at​the​head​of​a​faction​to​ ​ 8.​The​government​is​called​“the​government​of​Mr.​Esteva”​and​not​“the​government​of​General​Victoria”​because​it​is​known​how​small​a​role​Victoria​played​in​what​ was​done​in​his​name​and​that​everything​was​the​doing​of​that​minister.​

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be,​in​this​way,​what​it​could​not​be​by​means​of​the​laws​because,​among​ us,​the​government​can​do​nothing​and​the​factions​can​do​everything?​ Is​it​a​wonder​that​the​minister​of​war,​Gómez​Pedraza,​should​want​all​ the​leaders​of​the​army​to​be​provisional​and​as​if​on​assignment,​so​they​ might​thus​remain​necessarily​dependent​on​the​government?9​When​ the​hands​of​the​government​are​so​tied​that​it​cannot​move​them​in​any​ direction,​it​should​not​seem​strange​that​it​seeks​some​means​to​make​ these​ties​somehow​looser. ​ This​habitual​weakness​of​the​government,​although​always​harmful​ to​the​interests​of​the​nation,​would​be​less​so​if​it​existed​only​in​ordinary​and​tranquil​times,​giving​way​in​times​of​danger​and​revolution​ to​greater​energy.​This​is​why​in​England,​despite​the​fact​that​the​authority​of​the​government​is​in​all​times​greater​than​among​us,​as​much​ because​of​its​form​as​for​its​powers,​it​is​still​not​judged​sufficient​in​ times​of​public​unrest,​during​which​those​laws​protective​of​personal​ security​known​by​the​name​of​“law​of​habeas​corpus”​are​suspended.​ This​is​also​why​in​modern​France,​constituted​according​to​all​the​enlightenment​of​the​century,​it​has​been​necessary​very​quickly​to​have​ recourse​to​empowering​its​government​with​a​dreadful​military​law,​ which​it​puts​into​use​when​the​frequent​unrest​of​its​not​very​peaceful​subjects​requires​it.​But​the​Constitution​not​only​did​not​foresee​ anything​of​this,​but​it​also​would​be​very​doubtful​or,​better​said,​very​ clear​to​a​person​of​rigorous​principle​that,​in​accord​with​the​Constitution,​it​might​not​have​had​recourse​to​the​expedient​of​which​it​has​ made​use​already​on​more​than​one​occasion,​of​vesting​the​government​ with​extraordinary​powers​in​urgent​cases.​These​powers,​because​they​ carry​this​mark​of​extraordinary,​already​have​the​stamp​of​odiousness​ in​addition​to​the​impediment​of​the​untimeliness​with​which​they​are​ usually​granted,​in​accord​with​the​general​order​of​our​political​upheavals,​ which​ is​ the​ following:​ any​ ambitious​ person​ whatsoever,​ as​ soon​as​he​can​become​the​leader​of​some​faction​or​take​possession​of​ some​ stronghold,​ raises​ the​ banner​ of​ rebellion​ under​ whatever​ pretext,​but​always​proclaiming​something​very​different​from​what​constitutes​the​true​aim​of​his​movement;​of​course,​conferences​between​ the​government​and​its​rebellious​subject​are​entered​into,​and​mean​ 9.​ Alamán​ is​ referring​ to​ cabinet​ politics​ during​ the​ administration​ of​ General​ Guadalupe​Victoria​(1824–28).​(Editor’s​note)

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while,​more​precious​time​to​act​is​lost;​in​the​meantime,​the​revolution​ grows,​the​forces​of​the​government​weaken,​in​Congress​various​laws​ of​circumstance​are​discussed,​each​more​inadequate​than​the​others;​ and,​ finally,​ extraordinary​ powers​ are​ resorted​ to​ when​ the​ opportunity​has​passed​for​granting​them​and​when​they​are​already​becoming​ useless.​If,​on​the​contrary,​it​were​established​by​a​general​rule​in​the​ Constitution​or​by​subsequent​laws​what​must​be​done​in​the​not​rare​ instances​of​public​disturbances,​the​government​could​make​use,​at​the​ appropriate​occasion,​of​an​amplitude​of​powers​that​would​come​to​be​ ordinary,​ although​ applicable​ only​ in​ determinate​ times​ and​ circumstances,​and​revolutions​would​cease​to​be​so​frequent​and​dangerous,​ having​a​strong​hand,​ready​and​always​armed​with​a​power​sufficient​ to​curb​them.​Because​of​this​large​and​notable​void​in​our​legislation,​ each​revolution​requires​a​series​of​partial​and​ineffective​provisions,​ and​conspiring​has​come​to​be​a​true​joke​inasmuch​as​all​the​advantages​ and​no​risk​are​on​the​side​of​those​who​conspire.​We​see​them​calmly​ taking​walks​and​putting​all​their​plans​to​work​in​the​middle​of​the​ population​centers​where,​although​everybody​knows​them,​the​hand​ of​the​weak​authority​can​never​get​to​them. ​ In​modern​institutions,​it​has​almost​always​passed​from​one​extreme​ to​the​other:​the​abuses​of​the​absolute​power​made​people​believe​that​ restraining​the​powers​of​those​who​until​then​had​been​depositaries​of​ that​power​was​enough​to​ensure​liberty,​but​these​restraints​have​been​ carried​so​far​that​all​power​has​been​reduced​to​the​inability​to​do​any​ good​and​many​times​to​the​need​to​do​evil​by​indirect​means,​while,​ because​of​one​of​those​contradictions​so​frequent​in​the​administrators​ of​systems,​at​the​same​time​that​accumulation​of​power​that​constituted​ absolutism​in​the​hands​of​one​individual​was​destroyed,​this​same​absolutism​was​transferred​to​the​collegial​bodies,​in​which​its​exercise​came​ to​be​much​more​dangerous.​Liberty​came,​then,​to​be​lost​by​the​same​ road​by​which​it​tried​to​become​secure,​and​with​it​has​also​been​lost​ public​order,​security​of​property,​personal​security,​and​all​the​goods​ that​society​should​produce​and​that​had​been​enjoyed​in​the​old​order​ of​things. ​ In​the​United​States​of​the​North,​this​power​of​the​Congress​is​far​ from​being​absolute.​It​has​necessary​limitations​not​only​in​the​text​ of​the​Constitution,​which​are​always​illusory​when​the​same​one​who​ is​subject​to​them​has​the​liberty​of​interpreting​them,​but​principally​

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in​ the​ short​ duration​ of​ its​ sessions,​ there​ being​ not​ more​ than​ one​ single​instance​since​the​epoch​of​independence​in​which​extraordinary​ powers​have​been​given​to​it;​in​the​greater​power​of​the​executive;​and,​ above​all,​in​the​organization​and​functions​of​the​Supreme​Court​of​ Justice.​The​members​of​this​court,​unlike​the​one​that​has​been​established​among​us,​are​named​by​the​president​as​are​all​other​employees​ of​the​federation,​and​in​all​matters​of​right,​one​appeals​to​this​court​the​ acts​of​the​general​Congress,​which,​acting​simply​as​a​party,​appoints​ its​lawyers​and​agents​and,​in​an​opposing​action,​is​going​to​defend​its​ resolutions​against​whoever​has​filed​a​lawsuit​against​it;​and​in​almost​ all​the​cases​that​have​occurred​until​now,​Congress​has​been​rebuffed.​ Among​us​it​was​believed​better​to​leave​the​selection​of​the​individuals​who​should​make​up​this​supreme​tribunal​to​the​congresses​of​the​ states,​being​based​also​in​the​principle​that,​because​those​individuals​ would​have​to​judge​the​ministers,​these​ministers​should​not​have​any​ part​in​their​appointment.​In​the​United​States​of​the​North,​they​have​ believed​that​this​last​objection​was​overcome​more​than​enough​by​the​ removability​of​ministers10​and​the​perpetuity​of​judges,​and​they​did​ not​fear​entrusting​to​magistrates​named​by​the​president​the​power​of​ judging​the​president​himself​who,​in​that​Republic,​is​personally​responsible​in​many​more​matters​than​in​ours,​although​in​order​to​make​ effective​that​responsibility,​ the​complete​unanimity​of​the​House​of​ Representatives​is​needed.​But​it​is​not​only​in​matters​of​responsibility​ that​the​Supreme​Court​of​Justice​has​to​judge​the​government,​but​just​ as​one​appeals​to​it​the​decisions​of​Congress​in​matters​of​right,​the​ same​is​done​in​cases​involving​decisions​of​the​executive;​and​with​this​ executive​having​to​act​as​a​party,​that​tribunal​has​had​frequent​occasion​ to​show​its​integrity,​pronouncing​judgment​on​the​very​one​to​whom​ some​ of​ its​ members​ owe​ their​ appointment.​ In​ this​ way​ it​ has​ been​ confirmed​by​experience​that​the​partiality​of​judges​in​favor​of​the​government​that​named​them​was​not​to​be​feared,​and​the​wisdom​of​the​ appointment​has​been​proven,​just​as​appointments​have​always​fallen​ to​the​men​most​respectable​for​their​knowledge​and​virtues,​and​I​find​ that​more​is​always​to​be​expected​from​this​method​of​selection​than​ from​the​one​adopted​among​us,​according​to​which​the​congresses​of​ the​states​have​to​be​guided​by​rudimentary​knowledge​gathered​about​ ​

10.​By​Congress.​(Editor’s​note)​

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persons​whom​they​do​not​know​and​by​recommendations​sent​to​them​ from​the​capital. ​ How​ different​ must​ then​ be​ the​ power​ of​ a​ congress​ that​ in​ some​ matters,​and​unfortunately​among​us​and​in​the​rather​frequent​times​ of​disturbances,​has​to​submit​many​of​its​actions​to​the​judgment​of​an​ immovable​tribunal​and,​for​this​very​reason,​one​less​sensitive​to​the​ shocks​of​the​moment!​If​this​practice​existed​among​us,​would​we​have​ seen​those​decrees​of​expatriation​of​individuals​and​families​without​ their​being​heard​or​judged,​those​measures​of​sequestration,​those​resolutions​of​confiscation,​one​more​shameful​than​the​other?​The​law,​as​ impartial​toward​corporations,​whatever​might​be​their​title,​as​toward​ individuals,​ would​ have​ sheltered​ those​ individuals​ from​ the​ fire​ of​ the​passions​of​the​corporations,​and​an​impartial​verdict​would​have​ honored​the​Mexican​magistrates​as​it​has​made​the​reputation​so​many​ times​of​the​magistrates​of​the​States,​our​neighbors.​I​have​said​if​this​ practice​existed​among​us​because,​in​substance​in​the​text​of​the​Constitution,​not​only​is​there​nothing​that​conflicts​with​it​but​rather​quite​ a​bit​that​supports​it;​but​this​idea​that​the​Congress​is​sovereign​and​that​ nothing​but​the​weak​obstacle​of​the​very​limited​veto​of​the​president​ can​provide​resistance​to​their​absolute​wills,​would​cause​an​outcry​to​ rise​to​the​clouds​if​a​judicial​body​tried​to​put​shackles,​although​working​very​much​in​the​sphere​of​its​powers,​on​their​resolutions​of​whatever​type.​The​new​sovereigns​have​taken​from​the​old​even​the​habit​of​ adulation,​and​thus​we​see​that​they​accept​without​embarrassment,​and​ are​given​without​reserve,​the​treatment​of​sovereignty,​which​belongs​ to​them​only​to​the​degree​that​it​belongs​to​any​other​constituted​authority​who​exercises​by​virtue​of​the​Constitution​a​part​of​the​national​ sovereignty​that​resides​only​in​the​total​body​of​the​nation​and​whose​ sole​sovereign​act​has​been​to​issue​a​Constitution.​Because​of​these​same​ bizarre​and​fawning​ideas​of​sovereignty,​it​will​not​be​surprising​that​ they​take​these​observations​badly,​although​in​the​depths​of​his​heart,​ each​one​finds​them​justified,​and​it​might​be​considered​a​crime​the​way​ some​parts​of​the​Constitution​have​been​critiqued,​because,​through​ another​of​the​strange​contradictions​of​the​human​spirit,​in​the​very​ epoch​in​which​the​infallibility​of​the​pope​is​most​ridiculed,​the​principle​of​the​infallibility​of​congresses​has​been​consecrated,​and​when​ the​greatest​scope​is​given​to​liberty​of​the​press,​permitting​the​exercise​ of​a​purulent​criticism​on​everything​that​existed​and​produced​the​wis-

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dom​of​the​past​centuries,​any​doubt​shown​about​what​the​learning​of​ our​century​has​produced​is​least​tolerated.​Inevitable​result​of​the​pride​ of​self-​love​that,​sustained​by​ignorance​and​presumption,​it​cannot​bear​ any​contradiction​at​all​nor​criticism,​no​matter​how​restrained​it​might​ be,​regarding​what​it​believes​to​be​a​masterpiece​of​its​knowledge​and​ profound​understandings. ​ Everything​that​has​been​expressed​until​now​shows​not​only​what​ kind​of​authority​was​placed​in​the​hands​of​General​Bustamante​and​ what​the​means​were​by​which​the​Constitution​equipped​him​to​provide​for​the​happiness​of​the​people,​but​also​that​it​is​extensive​and​ equally​applicable​to​the​governments​that​preceded​it​and​to​the​one​ that​has​followed​it.​For​this​reason​I​have​expanded​somewhat​on​this​ matter,​and​I​will​also​do​so​in​some​of​the​considerations​that​will​follow,​for​it​seems​important​to​me​that​those​who​read​this​understand​ fully​the​true​situation​of​their​government,​and​that,​knowing​the​very​ narrow​limitation​of​its​powers​and​the​dependence​for​all​its​actions​ on​the​legislative​power,​they​might​demand​less​of​those​who​can​do​ little​and​be​more​disposed​to​look​with​compassion​than​to​incriminate​those​who,​vested​with​an​authority​almost​null,​find​themselves​ charged​with​an​immense​responsibility.​Moreover,​those​who​are​inclined​to​believe​that​a​change​of​system​would​be​the​good​fortune​of​ the​Republic,​understanding​by​this​change​replacing​the​one​that​presently​rules11​for​central​government,​might​become​convinced​that​evil​ does​not​exactly​consist​in​what​they​believe​it​to​consist,​but​rather​in​ a​much​more​effective​and​profound​cause,​which​works​as​much​in​the​ general​government​as​in​the​governments​of​the​individual​states,​and​ that​as​long​as​one​does​not​attend​to​this​cause,​any​other​change​would​ be​useless.​This​cause​is​nothing​other​than​the​impotence​of​the​executive​to​fulfill​the​obligations​necessary​for​all​government​and,​if​at​some​ time​Mexicans,​tired​of​the​misfortunes​of​anarchy​which​necessarily​ increase​every​day,​might​think​seriously​of​remedying​them,​the​first​ step​they​should​take​is​to​invigorate​the​government,​give​energy​and​ strength​where​now​there​is​nothing​but​languor​and​weakness,​in​sum​ that​there​be​a​government,​because​they​now​have​nothing​more​than​a​ shadow​or​illusory​appearance​of​it. ​ Inasmuch​as,​following​the​error​committed​by​the​Spanish​legisla​

11.​Federalism.​(Editor’s​note)​

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tors​who​created​the​Constitution​of​Cádiz,​absolute​power​was​transferred​ from​ individuals​ to​ corporations,​ it​ seems​ that​ the​ most​ foresighted​ measures​ should​ have​ been​ taken​ so​ that​ the​ composition​ of​ these​corporations​would​be​such​that​they​would​provide​the​greatest​ assurances​for​success​and​so​that​the​method​of​exercising​this​terrible​ power​might​guard​against​the​abuse​that​could​be​made​of​it.​When​a​ power​is​very​extensive,​the​good​or​bad​use​made​of​it​can​depend​only​ on​the​personal​qualities​of​the​men​in​whom​it​is​deposited,​for,​especially​when​these​men​are​gathered​in​a​numerous​corporation,​nothing​ on​earth​can​contain​their​misconduct:​“Besides,​they​are​less​under​responsibility​to​one​of​the​greatest​controlling​powers​on​the​earth,​the​ sense​of​fame​and​estimation.​The​share​of​infamy​that​is​like​to​fall​to​ the​lot​of​each​individual​in​public​acts​is​small​indeed,​the​operation​ of​opinion​being​in​the​reverse​ratio​to​the​number​of​those​who​abuse​ power.​Their​own​approbation​of​their​own​acts​has​to​them​the​appearance​of​a​public​judgment​in​their​favor.​A​perfect​democracy​is,​therefore,​the​most​shameless​thing​in​the​world.​As​it​is​the​most​shameless,​ it​also​the​most​fearless.​No​man​apprehends​in​his​person​that​he​can​ be​made​subject​to​punishment.​Quidquid multis peccatur inultum est.12​It​ is​therefore​of​infinite​importance​that​they​should​not​be​suffered​to​ imagine​that​their​will,​any​more​than​that​of​kings​is​the​standard​of​ right​and​wrong.” ​ The​only​positive​quality​that​can​exist​in​a​democracy​and​that​can​ most​ensure​the​restrained​exercise​of​such​a​gigantic​power​is​property,​yet​certainly​nothing​is​less​in​accord​with​modern​theories,​for​ if​political​society​is​nothing​more​than​a​conventional​company,​each​ individual​must​represent​in​this​association​whatever​the​capital​is​that​ he​might​have​brought​into​it.​Against​the​soundness​of​this​principle​is​ frequently​opposed​the​claimed​ignorance​of​the​propertied​class,​which​ presents​them​as​unsuited​to​carry​out​a​charge​that​also​requires​learning,​and​we​have​recently​seen​these​arguments​expressed​in​a​very​bitter​manner​in​the​tribunal​of​the​Senate​in​a​discussion​over​jurors.​But​ these​arguments​are​very​far​from​being​established​to​the​fullest​extent​ that​one​has​wanted​them​to​be​given,​and,​in​truth,​if​we​relinquish​for​ one​moment​the​intolerable​presumption​that​has​us​continually​calling​ourselves​a​very​learned​nation,​perhaps​because​in​our​saying​it,​ ​

12.​“The​sin​of​thousands​always​goes​unpunished,”​Lucan,​Civil War.

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the​rest,​who​are​far​from​giving​us​that​praise,​might​believe​it​of​us,​ and​if​we​examine​with​impartiality​who​makes​up​the​small​number​of​ men​who​possess​general​understandings​and​the​even​smaller​number​ who​have​demonstrated​the​necessary​aptitude​for​business,​whether​in​ the​court,​whether​in​the​office,​we​will​see​that​the​propertied​class​is​ not​inferior​to​the​rest​because​“let​those​large​proprietors​be​what​they​ will—and​they​have​their​chance​of​being​amongst​the​best—they​are,​ at​the​very​worst,​the​ballast​in​the​vessel​in​the​commonwealth.”​On​ the​contrary,​if​we​have​seen​men​of​property​distinguish​themselves​by​ their​talents​and​aptitude​in​the​management​of​businesses,​we​have,​unfortunately,​seen​by​the​hundreds​those​who,​filled​with​pretensions​of​ knowing​and​scorn​toward​that​class,​have​committed​the​most​horrendous​blunders​and,​with​them,​have​submerged​us​in​an​abyss​of​misfortunes.​If​errors​and​ignorance​were​definitely​the​lot​of​the​propertied​ class,​the​law​that​regulates​relations​between​masters​and​servants​in​ the​state​of​Tamaulipas​and​some​other​laws​of​that​state​would​be​sufficient​to​persuade​one​that​that​legislature​is​made​up​of​millionaires,​ and​this​same​could​be​justly​thought​of​some​other​legislatures​when​ what​in​fact​happened​was​that​everything​that​sounded​like​property​ was​persistently​excluded​from​them. ​ It​should​not​be​understood​by​this​that​one​is​trying​here​to​close​the​ door​of​legislative​bodies​to​all​who​are​not​property​owners.​Nothing​ less​than​that. There​is​no​qualification​for​government​but​virtue​and​wisdom,​ actual​or​presumptive.​Wherever​they​are​actually​found,​they​have,​ in​whatever​state,​condition,​profession,​or​trade,​the​passport​of​ heaven​to​human​place​and​honor.​Woe​to​the​country​which​would​ madly​and​impiously​reject​the​service​of​the​talents​and​virtues,​ civil,​military,​or​religious,​that​are​given​to​grace​and​to​serve​it,​ and​would​condemn​to​obscurity​everything​formed​to​diffuse​luster​and​glory​around​a​state.​Woe​to​that​country,​too,​that,​passing​ into​the​opposite​extreme,​considers​a​low​education,​a​mean​contracted​view​of​things,​a​sordid,​mercenary​occupation​as​a​preferable​title​to​command. ​ Nothing​is​a​due​and​adequate​representation​of​a​state​that​does​ not​represent​its​ability​as​well​as​its​property.​But​as​ability​is​a​vigorous​and​active​principle,​and​as​property​is​sluggish,​inert,​and​

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timid,​it​never​can​be​safe​from​the​invasion​of​ability​unless​it​be,​ out​of​all​proportion,​predominant​in​the​representation.​[It​must​ be​represented,​too,​in​great​masses​of​accumulation,​or​it​is​not​ rightly​protected.]13​The​characteristic​essence​of​property,​formed​ out​of​the​combined​principles​of​its​acquisition​and​conservation,​ is​to​be​unequal.​The​great​masses,​therefore,​which​excite​envy​and​ tempt​rapacity,​must​be​put​out​of​the​possibility​of​danger.​Then​ they​form​a​natural​rampart​that​naturally​protects​the​lesser​properties​in​all​their​gradations.14 ​ I​have​expanded​on​these​principles​not​only​to​demonstrate​how​insufficient​are​the​scant​restrictions​that​the​Constitution​establishes​for​ the​composition​of​our​legislative​bodies,​but​also​to​show​the​need​to​ give​property,​above​all​landed,​which​is​the​most​stable​and​the​most​ closely​ related​ to​ the​ prosperity​ of​ the​ nation,​ a​ direct​ influence​ on​ legislation,​which​has​not​seemed​to​me​a​superfluous​concern​in​circumstances​where,​because​of​very​prejudicial​concerns,​in​some​states​ above​all,​a​war​to​the​death​has​been​declared​on​property.​It​will​be​ said​perhaps,​and​it​is​an​objection​I​must​foresee,​that​Burke​wrote​according​to​the​principles​of​a​monarchy​and​that​these​cannot​be​adaptable​to​a​republic,​but​the​form​of​the​executive​is​nothing​more​than​ an​accident​in​a​constitution,​and​the​bases​on​which​the​stability​of​society​is​supported​is​the​same​in​all​countries​and​in​all​systems,​for​it​is​ based​on​the​inclinations,​emotions,​and​interests​of​men​that​arise​from​ their​hearts,​which​are​not​moved​by​systems​of​convention​established​ for​their​government.​These​principles​are​those​of​all​centuries,​and​in​ them​alone​can​be​established​the​stability,​peace,​calm,​order,​and​prosperity​of​political​societies;​but​as​we​will​be​seeing​in​the​course​of​this​ paper,​these​principles​are​not​the​benefits​to​which​the​instigators​of​ public​unrest​aspire,​but​rather​to​the​privation​and​lack​of​them​all. ​ These​precautions​against​the​abuse​of​a​power​as​extensive​as​the​one​ our​legislative​bodies​have,​that​can​come​only​from​the​individual​qualities​of​their​members,​the​Constitution​has​claimed​to​establish​through​ ​ 13.​The​bracketed​passage​is​found​in​Burke’s​original​text​but​was​omitted​by​Alamán.​ (Translators’​note) ​ 14.​From​Edmund​Burke’s​“Speech​to​the​Electors​of​Bristol,”​November​3,​1774.​We​ have​used​the​original​English​text​for​this​passage.​(Editor’s​note)

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the​division​of​the​general​Congress​into​two​chambers,​but​this​division​can​never​fulfill​this​objective​as​long​as​those​two​chambers​differ​ only​in​the​method​of​their​selection​and​by​some​accident​in​the​length​ of​their​term​but​do​not​represent​essentially​distinct​interests​whose​ combination​must​produce​the​general​utility​of​the​laws.​Thus​it​is​that​ two​chambers​can​at​most​represent​only​two​different​opinions,​and​as​ opinions,​unlike​the​positive​interests​of​society,​they​soon​move​to​become​political​parties​or​factions​with​all​their​ardor​and​acrimony,​and​ from​this​we​have​seen​our​two​chambers​almost​constantly​transformed​ into​two​enemy​fortresses​occupied​by​opposing​belligerents​and​taking​ shots​that​are​that​much​more​constant​the​more​the​dependence​of​the​ two​chambers​on​each​other​is​no​longer​essential,​as​we​will​see​further​ on.​By​the​order​in​which​these​ideas​have​been​expounded,​one​will​be​ able​to​see​clearly,​of​course,​the​supreme​preponderance​of​legislative​ power​over​the​other​powers,​the​consequent​incapacity​or​impotence​ of​the​executive,​and​the​insufficiency​of​the​restrictions​that​the​Constitution​establishes​for​the​composition​of​this​legislative​power​itself,​ so​that​in​the​final​outcome​everything​depends​on​the​judgment​of​the​ electors​who​concur​with​their​votes​on​its​makeup,​and​on​the​will​of​ the​individuals​to​whom​this​election​falls.​This​gives​greatest​importance​to​the​functions​of​the​electors,​and​therefore​we​must​look​attentively​at​how​these​functions​are​carried​out. ​ Nothing​ requires​ such​ generally​ broad​ learning​ and​ such​ a​ well-​ formed​public​spirit​as​exercising​the​right​of​election,​and​these​two​ qualities​should​work​with​that​much​more​effectiveness​the​fewer​the​ restrictions​the​Constitution​sets​out​regarding​the​persons​to​whom​the​ election​can​fall.​It​is​necessary​that​the​elector​be​in​a​position​to​formulate​an​exact​idea​of​the​political​state​of​his​country​and​that,​knowing​the​opinions,​integrity,​and​education​of​the​individual​or​individuals​to​whom​he​is​going​to​give​his​vote,​he​would​give​the​first​impetus​ to​the​decisions​of​Congress​through​the​men​for​whom​he​opens​the​ door​of​this​Sanctuary​of​the​Laws.​From​this,​the​inevitable​preventive​ measures​originate​that​various​nations​have​set​out​limiting​the​right​ of​suffrage​to​property​holders​according​to​the​sum​they​verify​having​ paid​in​full​as​direct​taxes.​These​or​other​restrictions​never​seem​to​be​ more​necessary​than​when,​passing​from​one​system​in​which​there​is​ not​the​least​idea​regarding​popular​elections​to​another​in​which​everything​depends​on​them,​such​an​important​right​is​going​to​be​given​to​a​

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people​who​have​not​formed​any​concept​whatsoever​of​the​purpose​of​ elections,​of​their​consequences,​or​of​the​very​importance​of​that​power.​ In​the​civil​order​more​than​in​the​natural,​everything​is​graduated,​because​the​civil​order​is​nothing​other​than​the​natural​order​modified​by​ movements​of​yet​slower​effect​such​as​religion,​morality,​and​enlightenment.​Never​do​we​see​nature​work​by​sudden​movements;​the​only​ things​in​it​that​are​momentary​are​earthquakes​and​storms,​and​those​ are​not​means​of​creation​but​rather​of​destruction.​To​avoid​this​problem​and​continue​to​save​the​metaphysical​fiction​of​the​general​will,​the​ artifice​has​been​appealed​to​that​elections​are​not​to​be​direct,​but​instead,​through​diverse​graduations​and​reelections,​the​appointment​of​ the​deputies​comes​to​be​the​work​of​few​persons;​but​as​no​conditions​ have​been​established​regarding​these​persons,​the​problem​remains​at​ its​feet​and​is​made​much​greater​by​the​intrigue​that​is​easily​exercised​ among​few​persons,​but​that​perhaps​would​not​have​the​opportunity​ among​many​persons.​This​right​of​suffrage,​then,​is​exercised​in​the​ first​place​by​a​mass​of​people​who​give​their​vote​to​certain​individuals​without​knowing​who​they​are​nor​for​what​it​designates​them​and,​ then,​for​other​individuals​who​many​times​have​no​knowledge​of​the​ persons​ whom​ they​ elect,​ toward​ whom​ all​ resources​ of​ intrigue​ are​ put​into​play,​stimulated​by​interest​in​the​salaries​that​provide​an​easy​ and​relaxed​way​of​living​for​many​who​do​not​have​any​other.​Solely​to​ this​principle​of​the​electors’​ignorance,​whether​it​be​of​the​personal​ character​and​opinions​of​the​elected​ones​or​whether​it​be​of​the​importance​of​the​functions​they​are​going​to​perform,​can​be​attributed​ the​singular​discord​that​is​found​in​the​behavior​of​deputies​from​the​ same​state​appointed​by​the​same​electoral​council;​or​if​the​electors​ know​the​personal​character​and​opinions​and​are​informed​about​the​ importance​of​the​functions,​one​would​have​to​say​they​are​betraying​ their​consciences,​casting​into​the​heart​of​Congress​all​the​elements​of​ discord​to​make​a​plaything​of​the​contrary​opinions​of​their​deputies​ and​amuse​themselves​with​the​disputes​of​the​Jansenist​and​the​Jesuit,​ the​exalted​philosopher​and​the​man​of​judgment,​the​impious​one​and​ the​moral​and​religious​man​to​whom​they​have​indiscriminately​given​a​ vote.​If​I​were​permitted​to​designate​the​persons​by​name​in​this​writing,​with​the​lists​of​deputies​of​some​states​in​hand,​it​would​be​very​ easy​for​me​to​prove​the​truth​of​what​has​been​said​so​far.​What​opinion,​then,​should​we​have​of​electors​who​behave​in​this​way?​The​kind-

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est,​certainly,​is​that​they​frequently​appoint​without​knowing​whom,​ or,​not​having​any​idea​about​the​workings​of​a​Congress,​they​do​not​ try​to​give,​as​they​should,​the​first​impetus​to​opinion​through​the​elections.​Among​the​people,​it​is​no​surprise​that​they​do​not​view​elections​ with​commitment,​not​knowing​their​importance,​and​thus​we​see​the​ indifference​they​have​toward​taking​part​in​them,​this​being​noted​most​ obviously​in​all​places​where,​in​some​way,​elections​have​been​regularized​in​a​way​that​ensures​individual​casting​of​the​vote,​for​when​this​ was​not​the​case​and​a​considerable​number​of​votes​appeared,​it​was​not​ because​there​really​was​that​number​of​votes,​but​rather​because​the​ factions,​making​the​cruelest​mockery​of​this​solemn​act,​had​thousands​ of​lists​presented​for​some​few​persons​and​had​many​entire​infantry​ and​cavalry​regiments​vote​as​a​body. ​ Chosen​in​this​entirely​casual​manner,​the​workings​of​the​congresses​ finally​depend​solely​on​the​disposition​of​their​members​because​of​the​ breadth​of​power​the​Constitution​gives​them.​Even​the​fetter​that​the​ division​into​two​chambers​and​the​sanction​of​the​executive​establishes​ for​the​general​Congress​comes​to​be​illusory,​for​as​has​been​said​before,​this​dependency​of​the​two​on​each​other​and​on​the​president​is​ not​absolute.​It​is​sufficient​that​in​one​chamber​two-​thirds​of​the​individuals​are​united​even​if​they​are​not​in​the​other,​because​those​two-​ thirds​can​constitute​the​legislative​body,​and​if​the​president,​because​ of​weakness​or​some​other​motive,​joins​with​them,​they​exercise​the​ most​despotic​power​that​has​ever​been​known​on​earth.​They,​without​ the​agreement​of​the​other​chamber,​can​make​anything​they​want​pass​ as​law.​If​the​president​does​not​accede​to​their​wills,​they​can​deprive​ him​ of​ the​ service​ of​ his​ ministers​ by​ an​ arbitrary​ declaration​ of​ responsibility;​they​can​subject​members​of​the​Supreme​Court​of​Justice​ and​even​members​of​the​other​chamber​to​the​same​action​of​responsibility,​and,​in​sum,​they​can​shatter​society​to​its​foundations,​without​there​being​a​human​power​that​can​prevent​it.​If,​to​this​terrible​ power​that​the​majority​of​one​chamber​can​exercise​without​any​dependence​at​all​on​the​other​chamber​or​on​the​president,​one​adds​the​not-​ insignificant​power​that​each​chamber​can​exercise​individually​with​the​ name​of​economic​powers​and​to​which​an​unlimited​breadth​has​been​ given​without​any​dependence​on​anyone,​there​will​result​a​body,​in​its​ totality​or​in​its​parts,​vested​with​an​authority​such​as​the​most​despotic​ institutions​have​never​constituted.​If,​moreover,​there​are​two-​thirds​in​

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the​other​chamber​in​accord​with​those​in​the​first,​the​very​person​of​ the​president​can​be​removed​by​an​arbitrary​declaration​of​ineptitude​ or​of​whatever​physical​or​moral​impediment.​The​Constitution​seemed​ to​have​required​the​concurrence​of​three​elements​for​the​creation​of​ laws​and​created​these​three​elements,​but​immediately​it​destroyed​its​ own​ work,​ reducing​ the​ practice​ of​ legislation​ to​ the​ cooperation​ of​ only​two​of​these​elements,​and​in​order​to​give​greater​range​to​arbitrariness,​these​two​elements​can​concur​by​chance,​whether​it​be​the​ president​with​two-​thirds​of​one​chamber​alone​against​the​other​chamber,​or​whether​two-​thirds​of​the​two​chambers​against​the​president,​ who​is​in​this​case​compelled​to​execute​what​is​contrary​to​his​opinion​ or​conscience​and​to​which​he​has​made​formal​opposition,​negating​his​ approval. ​ In​the​United​States​of​the​North,​one​does​not​see​this​very​powerful​ and​independent​influence​of​one​Chamber​over​the​other​in​any​possible​event,​and​this​circumstance,​together​with​the​other​differences​ we​have​been​noting​between​that​Constitution​and​ours,​is​sufficient​to​ make​them​so​different,​the​one​from​the​other,​that​there​does​not​remain​in​their​most​essential​parts​even​a​shadow​of​similarity.​The​Constitution​of​the​Constituent​Assembly​of​France​was​the​first​that​established​the​independence​of​operations​of​the​legislative​power​from​the​ veto​of​the​executive;​the​legislators​of​Cádiz​followed​this​model​with​ certain​restrictions​and,​as​implemented,​having​been​the​tacit​but​very​ effective​model​of​ours,​it​received​even​greater​breadth,​establishing​ the​independence​not​only​of​the​legislative​power​with​respect​to​the​ executive,​but​also​of​the​two​branches​of​the​legislative​from​each​other,​ with​fewer​restrictions​than​those​that​in​their​case​the​Spanish​constitutors​made​necessary.​This​is​how​everything​the​Constitution​puts​in​ place​to​safeguard​persons,​properties,​and​everything​dear​to​man​and​ society,​everything​that​constitutes​the​harmony​and​even​the​existence​ of​this​society,​can​disappear​at​the​voice​of​a​factious​majority​of​one​ single​chamber,​very​easily​formed​through​an​election​in​which,​because​it​is​almost​accidental,​the​factions​have​such​room;​this​is​how​ that​complexity​of​institutions​intended​to​protect​the​rights​of​man​in​ society​falls​in​a​moment​as​a​result​of​the​abuse​of​the​theories​that​contributed​to​forming​the​institutions;​and​this​is​how,​fleeing​from​despotism,​society​will​fall​directly​into​it.​A​sententious​verse​of​Horace​ might​literally​be​relevant​to​this​case,​although​without​intending​to​

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offend​the​learning​and​persons​of​the​authors​of​the​Constitution,​Dum vitant stulti vitia, in contraria currunt.​Wishing​foolishly​to​avoid​one​extreme,​one​comes​to​fall​directly​into​the​opposite​one. ​ For​this​reason,​the​advantage​that​the​chamber​in​which​a​law or decree​is​initiated​(two​things​that​it​seems​should​be​different​but​that​the​ Constitution​has​nonetheless​not​distinguished)​has​over​the​reviewing​ chamber​as​well​as​the​function​attached​to​the​right​of​initiative​that​ both​chambers​have​equally​and​of​which​all​their​members​have​unrestricted​benefit,​gives​way​to​competition​among​both​in​which​that​ spirit​of​schoolboy​prank​is​fully​exercised​that,​unfortunately,​is​preserved​among​us​even​in​the​most​serious​functions.​Those​who​carry​ the​banner​of​the​party​which​dominates​in​one​or​the​other​chamber​ are​spying​on​one​another​to​take​advantage​of​an​opportune​time,​a​ carelessness​ of​ the​ opposition,​ to​ launch​ a​ proposal​ which,​ adopted​ quickly​by​a​sufficient​majority,​could​put​the​other​chamber​in​a​bind,​ for​which,​if​there​is​no​other​recourse,​it​appeals​to​the​same​miserable​ tricks​to​prevent​them​from​having​a​quorum,​by​separating​on​whatever​ pretext​such​or​such​individual​from​the​committee,​by​speeding​up​or​ delaying​discussion​depending​on​the​hopes​or​fears​of​the​moment​and​ by​it​win​the​selection​of​president​at​the​time​of​renewal,​all​this​creating​a​spirit​of​miserable​and​base​intrigue​inherited​and​learned​from​ the​Cortes​of​Cádiz​in​Madrid,​capable​of​degrading​I​do​not​say​an​assembly​of​legislators,​but​rather​a​social​gathering​of​vapid​dandies.​The​ august​act​of​lawmaking​is​many​times​the​work​of​these​improper​dealings,​and​the​more​important​and​transcendent​the​subjects​of​which​ they​deal,​the​more​they​customarily​are​so.​Is​it​surprising​ that​laws​ created​in​this​way​are​what​so​many​times​we​have​seen​they​are? ​ If​ the​ supreme​ importance​ of​ the​ functions​ of​ Congress​ and​ the​ breadth​ of​ its​ power​ require​ much​ circumspection​ in​ the​ use​ of​ this​ power,​ the​ multiplicity​ of​ those​ same​ functions​ demands​ hard​ work​ and​continuous​application.​With​the​congresses​transformed​into​efficient​elements​from​which​everything​arises,​thus​reversing​the​nature​ of​legislative​bodies,​which​is​not​nor​can​be​other​than​the​nature​of​ conservative​masses​and​resistance,​the​entire​time​of​ordinary​sessions,​ even​extended​for​the​thirty​working​days​that​the​Constitution​permits,​can​barely​suffice​for​the​dispatch​of​even​those​extraordinary​and​ nonetheless​very​frequent​matters​to​which,​as​we​have​seen,​what​is​incomplete​and​contradictory​in​the​Constitution​gives​way​every​day,​but​

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even​for​the​dispatch​of​matters​that​constitute​the​periodic​and​ordinary​operations.​It​was​then​necessary​that​the​committees​persistently​ work​to​instruct​and​prepare​the​pieces​of​business​in​such​a​way​that,​ directed​perfectly​by​the​committees,​the​discussion​might​be​facilitated​ and​abbreviated;​it​was​necessary​that,​in​the​sessions,​not​a​moment​be​ lost​and​that​the​members​of​both​chambers,​considering​their​duties​as​ sacred,​carry​them​out​with​that​respect​and​attention​that​the​fate​of​the​ nation​or​thousands​of​individuals​who​depend​on​their​vote​deserve.​ Unfortunately,​none​of​this​happens.​The​pieces​of​business​pass​to​the​ committees,​where​they​remain​an​eternity;​these​committees​have​difficulty​getting​together,​everything​is​seen​quickly​in​them​during​some​ little​time​that​is​stolen​from​presence​at​the​session,​and​very​commonly​ allowing​only​one​of​the​members​to​assert​his​authority​on​the​matter,​ and​with​the​opinion​rendered,​the​rest​swear​in verba magistri,​or,​if​ someone​dissents​from​the​opinion,​he​frequently​creates​the​scandal​of​ saying​he​was​not​summoned​and​did​not​agree​with​the​committee,​this​ sometimes​being​one​of​the​miserable​snares​employed​to​delay​a​piece​ of​business​which​is​being​dealt​with​in​that​moment​and​that​does​not​ suit​the​faction​to​which​the​protester​against​the​committee​belongs.​The​ sessions​never​open​at​the​hour​that​the​regulations​anticipate,​but​this​ is​certainly​observed​punctually​for​the​hour​of​closing​the​session,​thus​ defrauding​the​public​of​very​many​hours​of​work​that​the​same​public​pays​for​in​excess.​During​the​session,​few​are​the​men​earnest​about​ fulfilling​their​duty​who​are​present​at​the​session​with​reflective​meditation,​with​the​desire​to​inform​themselves​about​matters​in​order​to​ vote​correctly.​Most​of​them​pass​the​entire​time​of​the​debate​outside,​ and​the​greater​number​of​members​is​always​found​in​the​recreation​ halls​of​both​chambers,​and​when​the​hour​for​voting​arrives,​in​vain​the​ unfortunate​president​rings​the​bell​with​the​greatest​violence​he​can;​in​ vain​he​assigns​one​after​another​of​the​porters​and​secretaries​to​gather​ some​members;​some​answer​that​they​are​busy,​as​if​at​that​hour​they​ should​have​any​other​business​than​being​present​at​the​session,​the​ others​are​waiting​to​finish​smoking,​and​some,​more​bold,​respond​that​ they​do​not​want​to​go​in;​those​who​do​go​in​enter​asking​those​who​are​ with​them​what​has​been​discussed​or​what​is​being​voted.​And​without​ instruction​and​without​background​and​sometimes​without​knowing​ what​they​are​speaking​of,​they​toss​off,​without​remorse​of​conscience,​ a​hasty​vote​on​which​perhaps​depends​the​fate​of​hundreds​of​families​

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or​very​serious​interests​of​the​nation.​If​ministers,​out​of​zeal​to​fulfill​an​obligation​or​from​some​other​motive,​get​worked​up​about​some​ matter,​they​have​to​turn​themselves​into​brokers​and​go​around​begging​as​a​personal​favor​that​the​committee​gather​and​that​it​take​under​ consideration​this​or​that​action;​and​if,​on​the​contrary,​they​want​to​ delay​some​piece​of​business,​and​they​do​not​know​how​to​dispose​of​it​ in​another​way,​they​do​not​have​to​do​anything​but,​with​whatever​of​ the​frequent​motives​or​pretexts​that​lends​complication​to​legislation,​ send​it​for​consultation​ to​Congress,​secure​in​knowing​that,​but​for​ some​rare​accident,​it​is​going​to​be​buried​eternally​in​the​committee​ to​which​it​is​passed.​This​is​how​the​expression​“it​is​necessary​to​consult​Congress”​has​come​to​be,​in​every​office,​the​terror​of​the​people​ in​those​offices​who​have​matters​pending;​this​is​how​matters​of​business​have​been​accumulating​more​and​more​every​day​with​no​hope​ whatsoever​of​expediting​them.​In​this​way​the​most​serious​matters​are​ discussed​and​voted,​and​this​is​how​this​immense​power​that​the​Constitution​has​entrusted​to​the​Congress​is​exercised,​proving​that​classic​ verse,​Nec color inperii, nec frons erat ulla Senatus.15 ​ Do​not​say​that​this​is​an​exaggerated​harangue​against​the​body​that​ exercises​almost​absolute​power​in​the​nation.​It​would​have​been​desirable​not​to​have​to​show​these​defects,​but​there​is​not​one​of​the​many​ who​have​assembled​in​Congress,​whether​as​members​of​it​or​as​spectators,​who​does​not​know​the​truth​of​what​has​been​said,​and​many​ members​of​both.

​ 15.​Neither​the​dignity​of​the​supreme​command​nor​some​appearance​of​Congress​ was​seen.​[This​is​Alamán’s​note,​and​his​translation​into​Spanish​of​the​Latin​phrase.​ Editor’s​note.]​

2

Liberty in the Liberal Republic 1845–1876

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PoleMic between El UnivErsal, El siglo XiX, and El Monitor rEpUblicano, 1848–1849 After​the​war​with​the​United​States​(1846–48)​and​the​loss​of​ more​than​half​of​the​country,​Mexicans​became​increasingly​ pessimistic​regarding​the​future.​As​they​searched​for​the​causes​ of​the​problems​that​had​plagued​their​nation​since​independence,​some​conservatives​argued​that​liberalism​and​representative​government​were​out​of​touch​with​the​realities​of​the​ people.​Between​1848​and​1849​the​conservative​newspaper​El Universal​wrote​strong​editorials​criticizing​such​ideas​as​popular​sovereignty,​equality​before​the​law,​individual​rights,​and​ modern​ natural​ right​ in​ general.​ The​ paper​ argued​ not​ just​ for​the​establishment​of​monarchical​rule​in​Mexico​but​also​ against​ limited,​ modern​ constitutional​ government.​ The​ liberals​answered​these​arguments​in​articles​in​their​own​dailies,​ El Monitor Republicano​and​El Siglo XIX.​The​polemic​raged​in​ the​press​for​more​than​a​year​and​comprised​dozens​of​editorial​articles. ​ We​present​a​sample​of​this​exchange.​El Universal​(1848–55)​ was​established​in​1848​by​the​Catalan​editor​Rafael​de​Rafael​ y​Vilá.​It​was​the​principal​conservative​daily​of​the​Santa​Anna​ era​(1853–55),​representing​the​values​of​aristocratic​and​centralist​factions.​Favoring​the​imposition​of​monarchy,​El Universal​supported​the​Santa​Anna​regime​and​engaged​in​heated​ debates​with​its​contemporaries,​especially​El Siglo XIX​and​El Monitor Republicano. El Universal​ceased​publication​in​August​ 1855,​ when​ the​ conservative​ regime​ was​ defeated.​ First​ published​on​December​22,​1844,​El Monitor Republicano​(1846–95)​ was​founded​and​directed​by​Vicente​García​Torres​under​the​ 181

182 : polemiC,​1848–1849

original​title​El Monitor Constitucional.​The​name​was​changed​in​ 1846​to​align​the​paper​more​closely​with​republican​principles.​ Liberal​in​stance,​El Monitor​strove​to​defend​the​laws​revoked​ by​General​Santa​Anna​and​conserve​the​integrity​of​the​state​of​ the​Republic.​El Siglo XIX​(1841–96)​was​founded​on​October​8,​ 1841,​by​Ignacio​Cumplido​and​overseen​by​Mariano​Otero​and​ Juan​ Bautista​ Morales.​ Although​ publication​ was​ suspended​ twice,​the​newspaper​continued​until​1896.​From​1848​to​1856​ it​was​led​by​Francisco​Zarco.​During​this​period​the​paper​was​ characterized​by​its​moderate​liberalism.​It​was​also​one​of​the​ first​and​principal​opposition​newspapers​of​its​era.

1 ​

What Might Be the Causes of Our Ills, Part 1

El Siglo XIX​entitled​its​lead​article​of​the​twenty-​first​ of​this​month​in​this​way​[What​Might​Be​the​Causes​of​Our​Ills],​and​ we​congratulate​ourselves​that​periodicals,​even​those​that,​like​El Monitor​and​El Siglo,​show​themselves​fierce​defenders​of​a​system​now​instinctively​censured​by​our​people,​lower​themselves​to​serious​and​impartial​analysis​of​the​cause​of​our​ills,​because​the​duration​of​these​ills​ can​be​determined​only​by​the​time​we​delay​in​understanding​the​origin​and​true​source​that​produces​them,​if,​as​is​to​be​hoped,​such​understanding​inspires​in​us​all​the​sincere​desire​to​remedy​the​ills;​because​ with​our​forces​united,​we​will​remove​all​obstacles,​and​the​difficulties​ that​vile​interests​and​despicable​passions​place​in​opposition​will​yield​ to​the​united​force​of​the​true​lovers​of​our​unfortunate​patria. ​ Our​ colleagues​ fashion​ the​ first​ paragraphs​ of​ their​ editorial​ with​ comic​sentences,​ironic​phrases,​ambiguous​expressions,​and​false​imputations​ about​ our​ writings,​ without​ reflecting​ that,​ even​ if​ we​ deserved​all​that,​it​was​in​the​interest​of​their​honor​to​conceal​it,​at​least​ when​it​came​to​attacking​us,​because​otherwise​they​snatch​from​their​ triumph,​if​they​obtain​it,​the​glory​they​might​have​acquired,​and​they​ prepare​greater​confusion​and​shame​for​their​defeat​if​some​mischance​ of​the​war​leads​them​to​it.​The most beautiful ideas of human genius​can​ gather​no​glory​from​reducing to dust the products of the creative intellect of writers​who,​by​comparison​with​them,​are less significant than an atom.​ Encouraged,​then,​by​the​very​humble​position​in​which​our​adversaries​ place​us,​let​us​continue​with​greater​delight​our​efforts​to​defend​the​ doctrines​and​principles​we​have​expressed;​for​when​the​enemy​with​ whom​one​fights​is​powerful​and​strong,​if​in​the​end​one​succumbs,​ ​ Original​title:​“Polémica​entre​El Universal,​El Siglo XIX,​y​El Monitor Republicano,​ entre​1848​y​1849:​‘Cual​sea​la​causa​de​nuestros​males’ ”​[primer​artículo].​Source:​El Universal,​Mexico,​January​24,​1849. 183

184 : polemiC,​1848–1849

it​is​not​as​shameful​as​when​one​fights​with​greater​or​equal​strength.​ Therefore,​in​return​for​this​advantageous​position,​we​gladly​pass​by​ whatever​neither​concerns​nor​directly​affects​the​essence​and​substance​ of​the​question. ​ The​gentlemen​of​El Siglo​say​that​we​of​El Universal,​inquiring​into​ the​causes​of​our​ills,​have​believed​we​found​them​in​the​adoption​of​ the​system​that​governs​us​today.​This​is​true,​and​now​we​add​that,​even​ if​we​had​neither​said​it​nor​even​imagined​it,​reading​the​editorial​that​ engages​our​attention​now,​we​would​have​thought​it​immediately,​and​ we​would​say​it​and​defend​it​with​all​the​force​of​which​we​are​capable.​ For​that​reason,​we​insert​next​the​greater​part​of​that​writing,​for​it​ seems​to​us​that​all​of​our​writings​together​do​not​throw​half​the​light​ on​the​question​that​is​shed​by​that​editorial​alone,​without​it​being​necessary​to​add​more​than​a​few​simple​and​minor​reflections​to​provide​ an​absolute​and​total​conviction.​It​says: 1.​When​our​patria​was​the​colony​and​property​of​Spain,​the​ideas​ that​for​a​long​time​prevailed​on​the​old​continent​were​completely​ unknown​in​our​country.​Those​ideas,​above​all​those​of​liberty​and​ independence,​had​an​epoch​of​general​excitement;​all​their​renown​ was​necessary​to​liberate​the​world​from​the​domination​of​a​daring​ conqueror​whom​fortune​seemed​to​have​taken​under​its​special​protection.​The​cry​of​liberty​that​resounded​in​all​Europe​had​echoes​ in​our​patria;​valiant​men​rose​to​liberate​it​from​Spanish​domination;​at​the​end​of​eleven​years​they​were​successful,​and​since​then​ the​nation​has​occupied​a​place​among​independent​peoples. ​ Here​a​historical​error​of​our​colleagues​slipped​out.​In​the​first​place,​ the​cry​of​Dolores1​was​not​an​echo​of​the​cry​of​liberty​that​resounded​ in​all​Europe;​the​mother​patria​was​invaded​by​the​foreigner,​and​it​was​ feared​that​the​domination​might​be​extended​to​the​colonies.​It​was​said​ then:​Let​the​sovereign​establish​his​throne​in​the​colonies.2​This​is​how​ ​ 1.​On​September​16,​1810,​the​local​priest​of​the​town​of​Dolores,​Miguel​Hidalgo,​ called​on​the​people​to​revolt​against​the​colonial​authorities​in​the​name​of​the​deposed​ Spanish​king,​Ferdinand​VII.​(Editor’s​note) ​ 2.​It​is​certainly​lamentable​how​ignorant​we,​the​majority​of​Mexicans,​still​are​of​ the​principal​and​most​important​events​of​our​own​history.​The​cry​of​Dolores​was​not​

the​CauSeS​of​our​illS,​part​1 : 185

the​people​were​aroused​and​thrown​into​revolution;​and​it​would​not​ be​groundless​to​believe,​because​of​the​tenaciousness​and​invincible​resistance​the​nation​put​up​when​that​pretext​disappeared,​that​without​ that​pretext,​the​nation​could​not​possibly​have​been​moved​with​only​ the​goal​of​independence​and​with​no​other​prop.​Contemporary​history​reveals​to​us,​and​our​eyes​see​that,​of​the​brave​men​who​rose​up,​ only​not​the​echo​of​liberty​as​we​have​said,​but​moreover​it​was​enabled​and​spread​in​ our​country​because​Ferdinand​VII​was​proclaimed​in​it,​the​fiction​being​carried​to​ the​extreme​that​the​leader​of​that​uprising,​when​he​entered​into​Guadalajara,​drove​in​ his​car​an​unknown​person​who​was​said​to​be​Ferdinand​himself.​The​manifesto​to​the​ Europeans​by​the​person​commissioned​by​the​junta​of​Zitácuaro,​Don​José​María​de​ Cos,​delivered​in​the​Real​de​Sultepec​March​16,​1812,​says​in​paragraph​12:​“You​have​ had​the​temerity​to​claim​the​supreme​power,​unjustly​and​in​the​august​name​of​the​ king,​to​rule​haughtily​and​despotically​over​a​free​people​who do not recognize any sovereign but Ferdinand VII.” ​ Articles​1​and​4​of​the​plan​that​accompanied​this​proclamation​say​the​following: ​ Art.​1.​That​the​Europeans​yield​the​command​and​armed​force​to​a​national​ and​independent​congress​of​Spain,​representative of Ferdinand VII,​which​affirms​his​rights​in​these​domains. ​ Art.​4.​That​with​independence​declared​and​sanctioned,​all​past​grievances​ and​incidents​are​forgotten​everywhere,​taking​the​most​energetic​measures​ toward​this​end;​and​all​the​inhabitants​of​that​soil,​creoles​as​well​as​Europeans,​ constitute​without​distinction​a​nation​of​American​citizens,​vassals of Ferdinand VII,​pledged​to​promote​public​happiness. ​ Article​2​of​the​plan​of​war​that​accompanies​the​same​proclamation​is​as​follows: ​ Art.​2.​The​belligerent​factions​recognize Ferdinand VII.​The​Americans​ have​given​obvious​proofs​of​this,​swearing​allegiance​to​him​and​proclaiming​ him​everywhere,​raising​his​portrait​as​a​standard,​invoking​his​name​in​their​ patents​and​judgments,​stamping​it​on​their​coins​and​currency.​On this supposition was based everybody’s enthusiasm, and on this foundation the party of insurrection has always operated.​(Cuadro histórico​of​Don​Carlos​María​Bustamante,​2nd​ed.​ vol.​1,​pp.​393ff.) It​can​be​seen​by​those​documents​how​flippantly​our​adversaries​proceed​to​set​down​ the​facts​from​which​their​strongest​arguments​come.​To​avoid​this​and​a​thousand​other​ errors​of​that​type,​which​have​brought​and​are​causing​woes​of​the​greatest​gravity​and​ importance,​we​would​like​Sr.​Alamán​to​hasten​publication​of​his​history​of​the​war​of​ independence,​even​if​the​preliminary​essays​that​he​has​offered​should​be​postponed.​ We​believe​that​by​doing​this​he​would​perform​a​service​of​the​highest​importance​to​ the​nation,​and​therefore​we​encourage​him​to​carry​this​out.​(Original​editors’​note)

186 : polemiC,​1848–1849

only​some​did​it​to​free​our​patria​from​Spanish​domination.​The​few​of​ those​very​men​who​remain​speak​about​this,​and​they​escaped​the​personal​vigilance​of​those​called​patriots​with​more​difficulty​than​they​did​ the​persecution​of​the​viceregal​government.​At​the​end​of​eleven​years,​ independence​was,​in​fact,​achieved;​but​one​must​not​forget​that​it​was​ achieved​thanks​to​a​plan,​whose​principal​basis​was​bringing​to​America​ Ferdinand​or​another​of​the​individuals​from​the​ruling​house​in​Spain. 2.​We​see​now​what​was​to​be​expected​in​the​new​order​of​things,​ given​the​state​of​political​education​among​the​people.​The​Spanish​domination,​which​had​as​its​objective​enriching​the​peninsula​ with​the​products​of​our​soil,​completely​neglected​the​education​ of​the​people,​both​morally​and​politically.​There​was​lacking,​then,​ in​the​immense​majority​of​the​nation,​public​habits​that​formed​ their​character​and​knowledge​of​the​simplest​social​principles.​Because​Mexicans​were​accustomed​to​obeying​blindly​the​orders​of​ a​mysterious​and​terrible​power,​far​from​any​participation​in​government​and​public​affairs,​habituated​to​suffering​the​hatred​and​ scorn​of​the​Spaniards,​whose​ideas​of​nobility​and​superiority​had​ hindered​the​moral​fusion​of​the​two​races,​it​was​to​be​expected​ that​their​feelings​and​ideas​would​go​astray.​The​division​between​ Mexicans​and​Spaniards​had​also​exerted​the​same​kind​of​influence​among​the​former;​that​is​to​say,​Mexicans,​instead​of​forming​ a​compact​and​unified​people​through​the​bonds​of​feeling,​habits,​ and​interests,​formed​only​a​people​whose​unity​was​based​exclusively​on​the​power​they​all​obeyed.​However,​such​a​bond​was​by​ its​nature​violent,​and​it​was​to​be​expected​that​at​the​same​time​it​ failed,​the​many​dissolving​elements​that​had​germinated​in​silence​ during​a​period​of​several​years​would​have​their​effect. ​ In​the​preceding​paragraph,​historical​impartiality​was​certainly​lacking​where​it​is​asserted​that​the​Spanish​government​neglected​moral​ education;​we are speaking of Catholic morality.​Let​us​appeal​to​the​judgment​of​those​who,​witnesses​to​the​uses​and​customs​of​those​times,​ might​even​be​witnesses​to​ours. It​was​to​be​expected​that,​at​the​same​time​the​unity​based​exclusively​on​the​unity​of​the​power​failed​in​our​people,​the​many​

the​CauSeS​of​our​illS,​part​1 : 187

dissolving​elements​that​had​germinated​in​silence​during​a​period​ of​several​years​would​have​their​effect. ​ Gentlemen​editors,​what​greater​proof​can​we​adduce​to​justify​that​ the​cause​of​our​ills​is​the​federal​system​than​those​words​of​yours?​It​ was​“to​be​expected,”​you​say​with​much​discernment​and​good​sense,​ that​the​unity​of​power​failing,​the​unity​of​our​people​fails,​because​they​ have​no​other​bonds​of​union​than​the​bond​of​obedience.​Well,​how​ do​you​even​fight​against​such​a​conviction!​Neither​you​nor​any​person​ who​might​have​even​a​slight​notion​of​social​science​has​denied,​nor​ will​ever​be​able​to​deny,​the​necessity​of​bonds​that​link​the​peoples​of​ a​nation​to​each​other​to​be​able​to​form​a​truly​sovereign​and​independent​body​that​figures​among​the​nations​of​the​globe.​Without​forming​such​bodies,​these​nations​would​not​distinguish​themselves​from​ one​another.​Otherwise,​it​would​be​necessary​to​conclude​that​all​the​ nations​spread​over​the​vast​surface​of​the​earth​are​nothing​more​than​ a​single​nation,​groups​of​men​scattered​here​and​there​without​any​relationships,​without​uniformity,​unity,​or​agreement,​that​is​to​say,​without​any​bonds​that​tie​and​join​them​to​each​other;​either​they​do​nothing​at​all​or​all​the​nations​of​the​globe​are​only​one​nation. ​ But​such​arguments​offend​simple​common​sense;​and​without​insulting​the​learning​and​knowledge​of​our​adversaries,​it​would​not​be​ becoming​to​push​to​the​limit​all​the​consequences​deduced​from​them.​ The​ gentlemen​ editors​ of​ El Siglo​ know​ very​ well,​ or​ perhaps​ better​ than​we,​that​the​entire​science​of​a​wise​legislation,​of​a​patriotic​and​ just​government,​consists​in​conserving,​developing,​and​creating​by​all​ possible​means​the​bonds,​the​relationships​most​suitable​and​best​for​ binding​the​individuals​who​form​families​to​the​families​who​make​up​ the​towns​and​to​the​towns​that​constitute​nations.​Take​a​look​over​the​ history​of​all​the​centuries,​and​you​will​see​confirmed​in​all​areas​and​ in​all​times​that​the​rise​and​decline​of​empires​and​republics​is​proportional​to​the​increase​and​decrease​of​such​bonds.​The​barbarians​came​ down​from​the​north​and​took​over​the​great​and​cultured​nations​of​ Europe​because​they​came​united;​a​handful​of​adventurers​conquered​ the​greatest​of​the​empires,​but​it​was​a​divided​empire;​the​bonds​of​the​ Mexicans,​broken​and​shattered​by​fanaticism,​tyranny,​and​barbarity,​ presented​to​the​Spaniards,​instead​of​a​nation,​only​a​large​countryside,​ which​confirms​the​truth​of​what​we​are​saying.​The​Anglo-​Saxon​pha-

188 : polemiC,​1848–1849

lanx​came​to​write​it​down​in​the​pages​of​our​own​history​only​a​few​ days​ago. ​ Mexico,​ then,​ independent​ of​ Spain​ and​ independent​ in​ seven​ months​(prematurely)​because​of​the​irresistible​strength​that​the​bonds​ established​by​the​Plan​of​Iguala​imparted​to​it;​Mexico,​we​say,​the​great​ work​of​its​emancipation​completed,​had​to​endeavor​before​everything​ else,​in​order​to​figure​among​the​independent​and​sovereign​nations,​ to​tighten​the​bonds​among​its​members​and​find​out​how​much​they​ might​bind​them​to​form​a​compact​and​homogeneous​people​capable​of​ resisting​the​vicissitudes​to​which,​for​the​first​time,​its​elevated​position​ exposed​it. ​ Well​then,​according​to​our​adversaries,​the​Mexicans​were​united​ only​by​obedience​based​in​the​unity​of​the​power,​and​our​colleagues​ did​not​hesitate​to​state​that,​lacking​such​unity,​“it​was​to​be​expected​ that​the​many​dissolving​elements​that​had​germinated​in​silence​during​ a​period​of​several​years​would​have​their​effect.” ​ And​will​it​be​possible​to​doubt,​will​it​be​possible​to​attribute​to​ any​ other​ cause​ but​ the​ representative​ and​ federal​ system​ we​ have​ adopted,​all​the​ills​that​weigh​us​down?​Only​one​bond​tied​the​Mexicans​together,​unity​of​power;​one​single​thing​is​lacking​in​the​representative,​federal​republican​system,​unity​of​power.​What​had​to​happen?​That​the​nation​would​turn​into​a​country​whose​inhabitants​were​ strangers​to​one​another​because​no​ties,​no​bonds,​link​them​to​each​ other​to​form​a​compact​body;​that​as​a​consequence​they​would​fall​ prey​to​the​factions,​plaything​of​the​parties,​victims​sacrificed​to​the​ whim,​ the​ ignorance,​ the​ ambition​ of​ the​ presumptuous​ and​ wicked​ ones​and,​the​unity​of​power​unraveled,​absolutely​broken,​“the​dissolving​elements​that​had​germinated​in​silence”​developed​completely;​that​ once​those​elements​that​the​unity​of​power​would​have​suffocated​in​ their​germ​developed,​there​will​hardly​be​a​human​power​that​can​suppress​them;​that,​finally,​once​those​elements​had​developed,​strongly​ and​noisily​clashing​with​each​other,​the​absolute​division​in​which​we​ find​ourselves​would​be​produced.​The​federation,​then,​is​not​only​the​ cause​of​our​ills,​but​rather​the​precise,​inevitable,​and​inexcusable​cause​ of​all​our​misfortunes,​because​it​destroyed​by​its​very​nature​the​one​ bond​of​union​that​linked​Mexicans,​if​it​is​certain,​as​El Siglo​assures,​ that​it​was​founded​uniquely​in​the​unity​of​power.

the​CauSeS​of​our​illS,​part​1 : 189

3.​Independence​completed,​the​nation​was​told:​“You​are​free,​you​ can​constitute​yourselves​in​the​way​that​most​pleases​you;​the​laws​ that​from​now​on​will​govern​you​will​be​solely​the​expression​of​ the​national​will.​From​today​on,​the​odious​distinctions​will​cease​ between​nobles​and​plebeians,​between​masters​and​slaves;​there​ will​be​a​single​law​to​govern​the​actions​of​all;​the​same​rights​will​ be​protected​by​that​law;​there​will​be​a​single​legitimate​and​just​ authority​to​decide​disputes,​punish​infractions,​and​defend​citizens​ in​the​exercise​of​their​rights.​And​you,​all​of​you​born​on​this​soil,​ you​will​form​a​single​family,​a​family​of​brothers​who,​united​by​ tight​bonds,​will​labor​in​unison​on​the​great​work​of​public​happiness,​of​national​happiness.”​Well,​now,​is​the​nation,​the​immense​ majority​of​citizens,​disposed​to​appreciate​the​true​value​of​this​ language?​Surely​not.​Only​education,​experience,​and​the​practical​understanding​of​events​are​capable​of​valorizing​those​principles,​principles​that,​when​they​have​not​put​down​deep​roots​in​ an​innermost​conviction,​serve​only​to​dazzle​the​imagination​and​ carry​off​the​spirit.​This​is​why​the​nation,​removed​from​the​orbit​ in​which​it​had​moved​for​so​long​and​placed​on​a​path​totally​unknown​but​glittering​and​captivating,​began​to​move​uncertainly,​ developing​along​its​path​the​many​elements​of​dissolution​accumulated​over​a​long​time. ​ That​is​to​say,​the​unity​of​power​in​which​was​based​the​only​bond​of​ union​that​existed​among​Mexicans​was​broken;​but​if,​instead​of​saying​ to​the​nation:​“You​are​free,​you​can​constitute​yourself​in​the​way​that​ most​pleases​you,”​etc.,​it​had​been​said,​“You​are​independent”;​but​this​ event,​ however​ glorious,​ does​not​instill​ the​aptitude​ and​knowledge​ necessary​to​appreciate​the​republican​form​properly;​“only​education,​ experience​and​the​practical​understanding​of​events​are​capable​of​valorizing​those​principles,​principles​that,​when​they​have​not​put​down​ deep​roots​in​an​innermost​conviction,​serve​only​to​dazzle​the​imagination​and​carry​off​the​spirit”;​you​must​not,​then,​go​out​“from​the​orbit​ in​which​for​so​long”​you​have​moved,​nor​enter​“on​a​path​totally​unknown,”​no​matter​how​glittering​and​captivating​it​might​be,​because​ you​will​move​uncertainly,​and​“the​many​elements​of​dissolution​accumulated​over​a​long​time”​will​develop.​If​the​nation​had​been​spoken​

190 : polemiC,​1848–1849

to​of​this​fate,​we​say,​“the​Mexicans,​accustomed​to​obeying​blindly​ the​orders​of​the​power,”​not​because​“mysterious​and​terrible,”​for​the​ physical​force​in​which​it​was​based​was​in​its​greater​part​that​of​Mexicans,​but​rather​because​of​the​moral​force​that​gave​it​its​unity,​they​ would​have​conserved​that​same​obedience,​strengthened​with​the​love​ of​independence,​acquired​in​seven​months​(prematurely)​by​the​unity​ produced​by​the​bonds​that​so​properly​established​the​memorable​Plan​ of​Iguala.​To​think,​then,​as​the​gentlemen​of​El Siglo​think,​that​whatever​might​have​been​the​political​system​adopted​after​independence​ was​completed​would​have​produced​the​same​ills​that​we​are​lamenting,​ is,​it​seems​to​us,​the​same​as​thinking​that​an​infant,​when​it​begins​to​ walk,​left​without​any​support​in​its​freedom​of​action​and​decision​on​ broken​and​slippery​ground,​will​suffer​the​same​falls​as​when​sustained​ by​the​hand​of​its​wet​nurse.

2 ​

What Might Be the Causes of Our Ills, Conclusion

4.​Because​Mexicans​were​accustomed​to​not​having​ any​influence​at​all​in​public​administration—continues​El Siglo— once​the​doors​of​the​magistracy,​the​offices,​and​the​army​were​ open​to​all​ambitions,​mania​for​public​office​spread​its​fatal​influence,​public​posts​were​stormed​by​persons​scarcely​worthy​of​ them,​offices​were​filled​with​useless​and​burdensome​people,​and​ in​the​army​promotions​multiplied​astonishingly,​until​those​promotions​came​to​the​state​of​sad​degradation​in​which​we​find​them.

​ All​ of​ that​ better​ proves​ the​ inappropriateness​ of​ the​ federal​ representative​system​for​Mexico​and​explains​in​a​more​satisfactory​way​ the​ills​that​are​lamented​even​today.​Who​opened​wide​to​Mexicans​ the​doors​of​public​administration,​the​magistracy,​the​offices,​and​the​ army?​It​was​certainly​not​independence,​but​rather​the​systems;​but​ among​systems,​none​opens​the​path​more​to​public​administration,​the​ magistracy,​the​offices,​and​even​the​army​than​the​federal​representative​ system,​for​that​characteristic​is​precisely​the​quality​that​has​earned​it​ the​preference​of​liberals.​It​must,​then,​be​foreseen​that​the​mania​for​ public​office​would​extend​its​fatal​influence,​that​public​posts​would​ be​stormed​by​persons​scarcely​worthy​of​them,​that​offices​would​be​ filled​with​useless​and​burdensome​people,​and​that​in​the​army​promotions​would​be​multiplied​astonishingly.​All​that​was​very​easy​to​foresee,​recognizing​the​principle​of​popular​sovereignty,​equality​of​rights,​ removability​of​authorities,​absolute​liberty​of​the​press,​the​division​ of​powers,​of​elections,​etc.,​on​which​the​system​is​based,​recognizing​ ​ Original​title:​“Polémica​entre​El Universal,​El Siglo XIX,​y​El Monitor Republicano,​ entre​1848​y​1849:​‘Cual​sea​la​causa​de​nuestros​males’ ”​[concluye].​Source:​El Universal,​ Mexico,​January​25,​1849. 191

192 : polemiC,​1848–1849

at​the​same​time​the​lack​of​education,​experience,​and​unifying​bonds​ from​which​we​Mexicans​suffered. 5.​Accustomed​to​seeing​power​in​the​hands​of​foreign​authorities​and​of​considering​the​law​as​an​expression​of​the​will​of​a​despotic​and​absolute​power,​they​acquired​the​habit​of​obeying​both​ but​with​a​passive​obedience,​child​of​terror.​When​they​were​told,​ then,​that​in​the​future​the​authority​that​had​to​rule​the​destinies​ of​the​country​should​come​from​their​own​hearts​and​should​govern​with​laws​that​the​national​will​dictated,​the​prestige​that​terror​gave​to​the​authorities​was​lacking,​passive​obedience​to​the​laws​ was​lacking,​and​moral​obedience​based​in​innermost​conviction​did​ not​and​could​not​replace​it.​From​this​has​come,​then,​the​little​regard​for​men​who​have​successively​governed​us;​from​this​also​the​ discredit​of​the​laws,​powerful​only​with​the​weak,​impotent​with​ the​strong. ​ Although​we​do​not​understand​how​the​habit​of​obedience​comes​ from​“seeing​power​in​the​hands​of​foreign​authorities​and​of​considering​the​law​as​an​expression​of​the​will​of​a​despotic​and​absolute​power,”​ because​this​consideration​and​that​view​are​biting​and​violent​and​consequently​make​it​difficult​for​them​to​produce​in​man​the​docility​and​ indifference​that​the​habit​of​obeying​requires,​the​gentlemen​of​El Siglo​ tender​their​reasons​for​believing​it​so,​and​that​point​does​not​interest​ us​now.​It​is​enough​for​us​to​know​that​there​was​a​habit of obedience​in​ Mexicans​and​that​they​broke​this​habit​the​moment​it​was​said​to​them​ “that​ in​ the​ future​ the​ authority​ that​ had​ to​ rule​ the​ destinies​ of​ the​ country​should​come​from​their own hearts​and​should​govern​with​laws​ the national will dictated.”​And​this​you​say,​this​you​acknowledge​so​explicitly,​expressly,​and​formally,​you​gentlemen​editors​of​El Siglo,​you​ the​same​ones​who​sometimes​mocked,​other​times​became​irritated​and​ even​became​infuriated​with​us​because​we​have​proclaimed​and​maintained​that​the​principles​of​popular​sovereignty,​equality​of​rights,​etc.,​ are​as​absurd​as​they​are​disastrous?​What​is​it,​then,​that​we​have​done​ to​you,​what​profound​insult​have​we​inflicted​on​you​so​that​you​fight​ us​even​against​your​own​convictions?​Well,​put​aside​your​scowl,​let​ that​hand​of​friendship​extend;​let​us​arrive​at​the​place​where​it​was​ necessary​to​join​together;​look​now​at​the​usefulness​of​the​discussion​

the​CauSeS​of​our​illS,​ConCluSion : 193

when​one​lets​oneself​guide​reason​by​the​light​of​truth​to​an​examination​of​the​facts.​El Siglo​and​El Universal​now​have​a​point​of​contact,​a​ principle​will​now​be​the​same​point​of​departure​for​both​combatants:​ “popular​sovereignty​is​a​diSaStrouS​maxim.”​Yes,​indubitably,​disastrous​and​a​thousand​times​detestable,​given​that​just​the​announcement​ that​the​authority​that​in​the​future​should​rule​the​destinies​of​a​people,​ the​most​docile​and​gentle​of​peoples,​just​the​announcement,​we​say,​ that​the authority​would​proceed​from​their​own​hearts​was​enough​to​ break​and​rend,​instantly,​the​habit of obedience​it​had​acquired​so​that​ insubordination​might​occupy​that​place,​so​that​impudence,​rebellion,​ tumult,​and​restlessness​were​from​then​on​its​insignia​and​character.​ Disastrous​and​a​thousand​times​detestable,​loaded​down​with​the​execration​and​curses​of​thousands​of​victims​whose​blood​has​dyed​our​ fields,​ turned​ our​ lakes​ red,​ stained​ our​ buildings,​ violated​ even​ our​ churches,​at​just​the​announcement​that​the​laws​the​national will​dictated​would​govern.​Let​our​adversaries​now​judge​if​we​are​going​off​ the​road​when​we​affirm​that​the​adoption​of​the​system​that​today​rules​ the​nation​is​the​cause​of​our​ills,​given​that​the​soul,​the​foundation​of​ that​system,​is​popular sovereignty. 6.​It​was​said​to​Mexicans​that​all​were​equal,​that​as​citizens​all​had​ equal​duties​and​identical​rights;​the​defenders​of​the​new​ideas​ raised​their​voices​against​stale​statutes​granted​to​the​privileged​ classes;​they​did​more,​they​carried​their​boldness​even​to​open​the​ doors​of​the​monasteries​of​the​religious​and​tried​to​destroy​the​ monastic​institutions.​What​has​been​the​result?​We​all​feel​it;​society​divided​into​enemy​classes,​one​against​the​others;​dismal​division,​which​has​been​the​source​of​so​many​ills​in​the​country! ​ And​who​told​Mexicans​that all were equal, that as citizens all had equal duties and identical rights?​Was​it​independence​or​the​federal​system?​ And​if,​as​cannot​be​denied,​it​was​the​latter​and​not​the​former​that​ made​such​unfortunate​remarks,​and​if,​as​El Siglo,​unimpeachable​witness,​maintains​here,​the​unfortunate​consequences​to​which​El Siglo​ refers​with​great​exactitude​come​from​this,​to​what,​if​not​the​federation,​must​the​cause​be​attributed?​But​as​interesting​as​that​so​necessary​conclusion​might​be​for​our​opinions​and​doctrines,​it​is​more​than​ interesting,​it​warms​our​heart,​because​it​reveals​that​the​desirability​of​

194 : polemiC,​1848–1849

the​dogma​of​equality​enjoys​as​much​standing​in​the​convictions​of​the​ gentlemen​editors​of​El Siglo​as​it​does​in​the​convictions​of​the​editors​ of​El Universal,​and​consequently,​when​reason​speaks​they​are​not​so​ opposed​as​they​are​when​interest​takes​possession​of​ideas. 7.​Finally,​so​as​not​to​increase​the​number​of​such​observations​like​ those​that​go​before,​seeing​the​state​of​notable​backwardness​in​ which​the​nation​found​itself​at​the​beginning​of​its​political​existence,​one​wanted​to​give​it​a​violent​push,​one​wanted​to​place​it​at​ the​level​of​the​civilized​European​nations;​but​our​nation​was​not​ ready​to​respond​to​that​movement,​and​in​attempting​to​launch​ itself​along​the​new​path,​a​new​element​of​dissolution​was​created. 8.​From​all​this​we​infer​that​the​multitude​of​ills​that​the​nation​has​ suffered​during​twenty-​eight​years​is​an​inevitable​consequence​of​ the​state​in​which​it​found​itself​on​beginning​the​new​march​of​its​ political​existence.​When​our​patria​abandoned​the​name​of​colony​ to​take​that​of​independent​nation,​it​could​not​change​habits​and​ customs​as​it​had​changed​its​name;​the​ground​was​not​prepared​to​ receive​the​new​seeds​that​were​required​to​make​it​bear​fruit;​they​ sprouted,​perhaps,​but​the​underbrush​with​which​they​mixed​when​ they​came​up​quickly​weakened​them. ​ We​ fear​ that​ our​ subscribers​ might​ believe​ that​ the​ two​ previous​ paragraphs​are​unauthentic;​for​that​we​ask​that​they​compare​them​with​ the​original​and​be​persuaded​that,​although​the​language​in​which​they​ are​conceived​is​the​same​as​that​of​El Universal,​it​is​none​other​than​El Siglo​that​has​pronounced​them. 9.​Might​one​infer​from​all​this​that​independence​has​been​detrimental​to​us?​Will​we​be​accused​of​having​made​a​lamentable​gift​ to​the​brave​men​who​toiled​so​hard​to​give​us​patria​and​died​in​ honor​of​our​liberty?​No,​certainly,​in​no​way.​Independence​was​ achieved​and​had​to​be​achieved​because​it​was​inevitable,​because​it​ was​just,​because​it​had​to​be​beneficent. ​ Might​one​infer​from​all​of​this—ask​our​colleagues—that​independence​has​been​detrimental​to​us?​To​answer​this​question,​we​will​first​ transcribe​the​conclusion​of​the​article​that​concerns​us.

the​CauSeS​of​our​illS,​ConCluSion : 195

Whatever​might​have​been,​say​those​gentlemen​then,​the​system​ that​the​nation​might​have​adopted​for​its​government,​the​results​ would​have​been​the​same,​the​same​disorder,​the​same​confusion,​ the​same​upheavals;​because​these​ills​are​not​the​particular​result​ of​a certain system, but rather the inevitable consequence​of​the​antecedents​we​have​related;​and​it is probable​that​under​another​system​the​ damages​might have been worse. ​ Well​then,​under​the​assumption​that​our​present​misfortunes​are​ “the​inevitable​consequence”​of​the​related​antecedents;​under​the​assumption​that​these​misfortunes​are​the​lightest​that​we​might​experience,​given​that​with​other​systems​it is probable that they would have been worse,​ under​ these​ assumptions,​ we​ repeat,​ assumptions​ that​ are​ not​ ours,​but​rather​those​of​the​gentlemen​of​El Siglo,​we​do​not​hesitate​to​ respond​to​their​question—“Does​one​infer​from​all​this​that​independence​has​been​detrimental​to​us?”—stating​openly​that,​yes,​because​ the​conclusion​seems​correct​to​us.​In​our​language​we​call​“detrimental”​ what​is​damaging​and​causes​ruin​and​discredit.​It​is​thus​that​independence​has​damaged​us,​has​ruined​and​discredited​us;​so​independence​ has​been​damaging​to​us.​That​we​have​been​damaged,​ruined,​and​discredited​is​a​proposition​that​does​not​require​proof,​because​we​are​all​ in​agreement​with​it;​even​El Siglo​notes​the​following​in​its​antepenultimate​paragraph: One​will​ask​us:​“In​what,​then,​are​the​benefits​resulting​from​ that​independence?​Compare​the​year​1810,​which​excites​such​sad​ memories​in​the​minds​of​liberals,​with​the​year​1849​in​which​we​ live,​and​tell​us​frankly​if​such​a​comparison​is​favorable​to​the​era​ called​one​of​liberty​and​progress​.​.​.”​It​is​certain,​we​acknowledge,​ we​have​said​it​repeatedly:​from​independence​until​today,​everything​has​been​a​chain​of​ills​that,​following​one​after​the​other​ without​interruption,​have​exhausted,​have​beaten​down​the​youthful​vigor​of​the​Republic. ​ Now,​that​independence​is​the​reason​we​have​been​damaged,​ruined,​ and​discredited,​El Siglo​itself​proves,​if​it​is​certain,​as​it​assures​us,​that​ our​ills​have​been​the​inevitable​consequence​of​our​antecedents​and​not​ the​particular​outcome​of a certain system.​For​if​under​whatever system​

196 : polemiC,​1848–1849

we​had​to​have​been​damaged,​ruined,​and​discredited​after​independence,​“independence​has​been​damaging​to​us​indubitably.”​Our​weak​ minds​do​not​follow,​then,​why​independence was sought​and​why​it had to be achieved;​what​was​the​necessity​that​compelled​us​to​worsen​our​ condition;​why was it just,​and​how​had it to be beneficent​if​there​was​not​ a​system​in​the​world​that​could​avoid​our​miseries. ​ Such​is,​to​our​way​of​thinking,​the​consequence​that​one​deduces​ from​the​propositions​of​El Siglo,​and,​as​shameful​to​reason​as​denigrating​to​the​authors​of​independence,​the​extreme​to​which​it​drags​ along​the​caprice​of​denying​that​the​federation​is​the​cause​of​our​ills.​ If​the​blind​partisans​of​that​system​considered​how​much​more​is​lost​ in​attributing​to​independence​rather​than​to​their​favorite​system​the​ misfortunes​of​the​patria,​we​believe​they​would​abandon​their​theme​ and​would​work​with​us​in​restoring​good​principles,​thus​preparing​the​ nation​for​fundamental​reforms,​but​peaceful​and​gradual​ones,​which​ might​restore​its​youthful vigor. ​ Independence,​say​what​you​might,​is​a​good,​and​a​precious​good​that​ we​know​how​to​respect​in​all​its​worth;​we​are​therefore​very​sensitive​ to​the​fact​that​fanaticism​for​a​certain​system​of​government​blinds​the​ understanding​in​such​a​way​that​it​makes​the​understanding​see​in​independence​the​origin​of​all​our​misfortunes.​What​would​become​of​ the​system​itself​if​such​an​opinion​were​generalized?​Is​it​not​enough​ to​ have​ destroyed​ the​ unity​ of​power​ in​which​ obedience​ was​ based,​ the​sole​bond​that​linked​Mexicans,​but​do​we​also​have​to​dispel​the​ spirit​of​independence,​stirring​up​common​prejudices​that​only​a​crass​ ignorance​has​been​able​to​introduce,​breaking​in​this​way​the​connection​of​union​that​might​provide​that​bond?​It​will​not​be​El Universal​ that​does​this!​It​will​paint​the​misfortunes​of​the​patria,​yes,​but​it​will​ never​look​for​their​cause​in​independence,​but​rather​in​the​bad​choice​ of​principles,​in​the​disastrous​adoption​of​the​means​to​enjoy​the​true​ and​precious​good​of​our​independence.

3



What Might Be the Causes of Our Ills, Second Article

Regretful,​ like​ every​ good​ Mexican,​ for​ the​ series​ of​ calamities​that​have​afflicted​the​country​since​the​time​of​our​political​ emancipation,​wishing​to​ascertain​the​causes​that​have​provoked​those​ ills,​and,​most​of​all,​anxious​to​dam​up​so​much​disaster,​attacking​the​ illness​at​its​source,​we​proposed,​in​our​editorial​of​January​21,​to​ascertain​the​causes​of​the​ills​we​have​suffered,​and​to​do​that​we​tried​ to​analyze​the​facts​and​delineate​the​state​in​which​the​country​found​ itself​at​the​beginning​of​its​new​course​as​an​independent​nation.​Our​ article​has​suffered​the​severe​censure​of​our​illustrious​antagonists,​the​ gentlemen​editors​of​El Universal.​These​gentlemen​have​done​us​the​ honor​of​believing​our​observations​just​but​have​judged​as​spurious​our​ arguments;​they​have​agreed​on​the​facts​but​not​on​the​consequences​ we​deduced​from​them.​We​pursue​this​question​because​it​seems​to​us​ of​vital​importance​and​because​we​are​not​yet​convinced​of​the​truth​of​ our​adversaries’​opinions;​and​one​should​not​understand​by​this​that​we​ gainsay​the​persuasive eloquence​that​reigns​in​their​luminous writings;​no,​ sir,​we​are​not​yet​convinced,​because​.​.​.​what​is​one​to​do?​.​.​.​Our​concerns,​the​obligations​to​our​ideas,​and​who​knows​how​many​other​motives​hinder​our​desire​to​get​to​the​truth,​which,​finally​and​at​last,​we​ will​have​to​acknowledge​when​we​come​to​understand​the​lamentable​ error​ writers​ on​ topics​ of​ public​ interest​ have​ made​with​ the​strange​ notion​of​believing​and​saying​that​civil​societies​have​had​the​social​pact​ as​their​original​foundation.​But​let​us​get​to​our​topic. ​ We​will​begin​by​frankly​demonstrating​to​our​adversaries​that​we​ refuse​to​believe​they​have​so​poor​an​opinion​of​us​when​they​ascribe​ to​us​lamentable​ignorance​regarding​the​principal​and​most​important​ ​ Original​title:​“Polémica​entre​El Universal,​El Siglo XIX,​y​El Monitor Republicano,​ entre​1848​y​1849:​‘Cual​sea​la​causa​de​nuestros​males’ ”​[segundo​artículo].​Source:​El Universal,​Mexico,​February​3,​1849. 197

198 : polemiC,​1848–1849

facts​of​our​own​history.​We​said,​and​we​repeat​today,​that​the​cry​of​ liberty​that​resounded​throughout​Europe​had​echoes​in​our​patria;​but​ we​do​not​say​with​assurance,​nor​do​we​think​of​saying​with​assurance,​ that​the​masses​that​arose​at​the​voice​of​the​parish​priest​of​Dolores​ were​ moved​ by​ that​ cry,​ which​ they​ neither​ heard​ nor​ could​ understand.​We​know,​at​least​as​well​as​our​illustrious antagonists,​that​not​the​ name​of​liberty,​but​others​very​different,​among​them​that​of​the​Virgin​ of​Guadalupe,​were​the​ones​invoked​the​memorable​night​of​September​15,​1810.​We​know​equally​well​that​if​the​caudillos​of​that​glorious​ revolution,​in​declaring​war​on​the​Spanish​power,​had​thrown​forth​the​ names​of​liberty​and​independence,​they​probably​would​have​achieved​ nothing;​those​watchwords​would​have​died​without​finding​echoes​in​ the​multitude​for​which​they​had​no​significance​whatsoever.​We​know,​ lastly,​that​the​revolution​was​completed​thanks​to​the​Plan​of​Iguala,​ one​of​whose​bases​was​the​transfer​to​America​of​Ferdinand​or​other​ individuals​ of​ the​ reigning​ house;​ but​ we​ know​ also​ that​ the​ leaders​ of​the​revolution,​in​its​first​and​last​epoch,​used​the​watchwords​they​ invoked​only​to​move​the​multitude.​We​know​as​well​that​the​merit​ of​the​famous​Plan​of​Iguala,​whose​realization​is​the​holy​grail​of​our​ very esteemed compatriots​and​colleagues,​the​gentlemen​of​El Universal,​ did​not​consist​in​its​intrinsic​goodness,​but​rather​in​having​been​the​ most​convenient,​the​most​suitable​to​the​circumstances,​because​only​ by​ unifying​ the​ opposing​ interests​ that​ divided​ public​ opinion​ could​ one​direct​this​public​opinion​to​a​single​end.​This​the​author​of​the​ above-​mentioned​plan​tried,​and​he​attained​it,​as​was​to​be​expected.​ But​it​will​not​appear​that​we​have​known​all​this​after​the​gentlemen​of​ El Universal​undertook​the​enormous​task​of​digging​up​the​documents​ of​the​history​of​our​country​to​throw​in​our​faces​the​lamentable​ignorance​in​which​we​find​ourselves​with​respect​to​the​most​important​ facts​of​history.​We​will​explain,​then,​in​what​sense​we​said​that​the​ cry​of​liberty​that​resounded​throughout​all​Europe​had​echoes​in​our​ patria. ​ When​the​Peninsula​struggled​with​the​French​troops​that​had​invaded​it,​the​writings,​proclamations,​manifestos,​etc.,​multiplied​there,​ in​which​were​invoked​the​eternal​principles​of​liberty​and​independence​of​nations.​A​portion​of​those​writings​found​their​way​to​us,​and​ some​Mexicans​had,​by​this​means,​the​first​news​of​the​doctrines​that​

the​CauSeS​of​our​illS,​SeCond​artiCle : 199

establish​equality,​sovereignty,​and​independence​of​peoples.​These​were​ the​first​germs​of​the​new​ideas,​and​this​made​some​of​our​compatriots​ think​about​justice​and​the​possibility​that​Mexico​had​to​become​an​ independent​people,​a​project​that​the​priest​Hidalgo​began​in​Dolores​ and​that​Iturbide​completed​eleven​years​after​that​first​event.​For​this​ reason,​then,​we​said​that​the​cry​of​liberty​throughout​all​Europe​had​ had​echoes​among​us.​But​we​feel​we​have​expounded​excessively​on​this​ matter​when​the​discussion​calls​us​to​a​more​worthy​and​comprehensive​ field. ​ We​stated​that​the​Mexicans,​in​the​epoch​when​independence​was​ achieved,​did​not​form​a​compact​people​united​by​bonds​of​feeling,​ habits,​ and​ interests,​ but​ rather​ a​ people​ whose​ unity​ was​ exclusively​ based​on​that​of​the​power​everybody​obeyed;​we​said​also​that​such​a​ bond​was​by​its​nature​violent,​and​that​once​it​was​lacking,​the​dissolving​elements​that​had​germinated​over​some​years​had​to​produce​their​ natural​outcome.​Gentlemen​editors,​in​order​to​succeed​in​making​you​ understand​us,​we​will​explain​ourselves​by​means​of​a​little​example.​ Let​us​suppose​a​bad​father​of​a​family,​despotic​and​absolute​with​his​ own​children,​as​the​Spanish​power​was​with​the​unfortunate​children​ of​this​soil.​Let​us​suppose,​then,​that​such​a​man​directs​the​business​of​ his​house​and​sometimes​uses​his​children​as​passive​instruments.​Let​ us​suppose​furthermore​that​such​a​one​has​completely​neglected​the​ education​of​his​family​to​such​an​extent​that​no​feeling,​no​interest,​no​ bond​unites​its​members.​Nonetheless,​the​business​of​the​house​goes​ on​with​regularity;​everyone​obeys​the​leader,​not​because​they​are​convinced​they​have​to​do​so,​but​because​at​the​slightest​mistake​the​whip​ falls​on​them,​and,​intimidated​and​made​brutish,​they​tremble​at​the​ sight​of​the​one​they​see​as​an​insufferable​tyrant. ​ Well,​when​that​man​is​missing,​what​will​happen​to​the​supposed​ family?​Will​the​members​continue​united?​Will​they​labor​on​into​the​ future​for​the​common​good?​Surely​not.​Should​we​then​counsel​the​ family​that,​to​avoid​the​new​ills​that​irremissibly​threaten​it,​it​search​ for​another​man,​no​less​despotic​and​tyrannical​than​the​first,​so​that​ everything​continues​as​before?​Or​do​we​advise​it​that​it​manage​itself​ by​itself,​that​it​not​be​frightened​by​the​ills​that​might​befall​it,​that​it​ try​to​create​and​tighten​bonds​that​unite​its​different​members,​that​it​ profit​by​the​experience,​that​inevitably​events​will​afford​it,​and​that​in​

200 : polemiC,​1848–1849

this​way,​despite​the​difficulties​over​which​it​stumbled​at​first,​it​will​ come​to​be​at​some​time​rich​and​happy?​And​so,​how​does​this​comparison​seem​to​you,​gentlemen​of​El Universal?​It​is​very​poor,​very​ weak​ with​ respect​ to​ the​ picture​ the​ Mexican​ nation​ presents​ under​ Spanish​domination.​The​unity​of​power​the​nation​obeyed​is​not​the​ unity​that​is​sought​and​that​must​form​the​foundation​of​any​type​of​ government.​That​obedience​was​not​based​on​a​moral​conviction,​but​ on​terror;​there​were​not​citizens​who​obeyed,​but​rather​slaves​made​ brutish​and​degraded​who​submissively​lowered​their​heads​on​hearing​ pronounced​the​name​of​the​king.​When​it​was​said,​then,​to​the​Mexicans​that​that​tyrannical​power​no​longer​existed,​that​they​were​free​and​ brothers,​that​New​Spain​had​disappeared​to​give​way​to​the​free​and​ independent​Mexican​nation,​the​difficulties,​the​stumblings,​the​setbacks​were​inevitable.​Yet​these​ills​had​to​produce​the​beneficial​effect​ of​experience.​Thanks​to​it,​the​nation​that​at​first​had​to​encounter​difficulties​of​every​kind​in​its​path,​had​to​emerge​with​time​from​these​ difficulties,​advance​with​order​and​regularity,​and​at​some​time​come​ to​be​as​rich,​as​powerful,​and​as​happy​as​the​magnificent​elements​that​ nature​put​at​its​disposal​promised.​But​instead​of​profiting​from​the​experience,​instead​of​developing​the​natural​elements,​it​appears​that​we​ pledged​ourselves​to​follow​fatally​the​course​of​apathy,​disorder,​waste,​ demoralization,​in​short,​what​we​have​followed​until​now.​It​appears​ we​pledged​ourselves​to​extinguish​completely​our​powerful​elements​ of​wealth.​For​this​reason,​the​Republic​presents​everywhere​the​sad​picture​of​a​rich​and​fertile​nature​struggling​with​a​poor​and​aged​society​ because​of​disorders. ​ Our​colleagues​at​El Universal​make​a​charge​against​us​that​we​must​ not​pass​over​in​silence.​They​say​that,​fanatically​pledged​to​the​defense​ of​the​federal​system,​we​have​attributed​the​cause​of​our​ills​to​the​independence​of​the​nation,​and​they​cannot​conceive​how​we​said​later​ with​assurance​that​this​had​to​be,​because​it​was​just,​because​it​was​ necessary,​because​it​had​to​be​beneficent.​Gentlemen​of​El Universal,​ we​know​how​to​appreciate​the​independence​of​the​Republic​as​much​ as​or​more​than​you.​We​have​not​accused​independence​of​having​produced​our​ills.​We​said,​and​we​repeat​it​today,​that​the​state​in​which​the​ nation​found​itself,​thanks​to​the​stupid​policies​of​the​kings​of​Spain,​ had​to​produce​great​upheavals​at​the​time​when​the​nation,​abandoning​ the​ ancient​ yoke,​ would​ appear​ among​ free​ peoples.​ This​ change​

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alone​had​to​produce​great​upheavals,​whatever​might​be​the​system​the​ nation​adopted.​For​that​reason,​we​said​it​had​indeed​been​a​very​great​ inanity​to​believe​that​the​nation​would​be​happy​just​by​adopting​the​ federal​system;​it​is​no​less​an​inanity​to​attribute​the​cause​of​our​ills​to​ the​adoption​of​that​system.

4 ​

What Might Be the Causes of Our Ills, Third Article

In​our​editorial​of​the​third,​we​replied​to​some​of​the​ observations​ the​ gentlemen​ of​ El Universal​ made​ regarding​ the​ first​ article​we​published​with​the​title​at​the​head​of​this​one;​today​we​go​ on​with​our​task,​and​we​will​explain​our​ideas​about​the​causes​that​have​ contributed​secondarily​to​the​development​of​the​ills​Mexican​society​ has​suffered​in​the​short​period​it​has​existed. ​ We​have​said​that​the​ills​the​Republic​has​suffered​are​owed​principally​to​the​state​in​which​the​Republic​found​itself​upon​achieving​ independence;​this​glorious​change,​which​elevated​the​old​colony​to​ the​status​of​independent​and​sovereign​nation,​was​not,​nonetheless,​ enough​to​make​it​happy,​although​it​must​be​considered​the​first​step​ it​had​to​take​on​the​path​to​happiness.​The​gentlemen​of​El Universal​ have​insulted​us,​an​injustice​we​do​not​accept;​nor​can​we​pass​over​it​in​ silence,​and​for​this​reason​we​will​insist​today​on​our​ideas,​reproducing​ without​fear​what​we​have​said​other​times.​They​have​asserted​that​we​ accused​independence​of​having​caused​all​our​ills,​and​with​this​motive​ they​declare​emphatically​that​El Universal​would​not​do​such​a​thing!​ You,​gentlemen​editors,​you​who​long​so​much​for​the​year​1810,​you​ who​defend​so​much​the​system​of​the​Spaniards​when​they​ruled​these​ countries,​you​who​mocked​the​liberty,​sovereignty,​and​independence​ of​the​nation,​you​say​with​assurance,​seemingly​filled​with​a​prideful​ satisfaction,​that​independence​“is​a​precious​good​that​you​know​how​ to​value​in​all​its​worth.”​We​do​not​know​how​to​reconcile​such​an​explicit​acknowledgment​ with​what​you​assert​in​the​same​article,​ correspondent​to​January​25,​when​responding​to​our​question,​“might​it​ be​inferred​ from​all​this​that​independence​ has​been​ harmful​ to​us,”​ ​ Original​title:​“Polémica​entre​El Universal,​El Siglo XIX,​y​El Monitor Republicano,​ entre​1848​y​1849:​‘Cual​sea​la​causa​de​nuestros​males’ ”​[tercer​artículo].​Source:​El Universal,​Mexico,​February​7,​1849. 202

the​CauSeS​of​our​illS,​third​artiCle : 203

you​do​not​hesitate​to​say​frankly,​yes.​There​it​said​independence​had​ harmed​us,​had​ruined​and​discredited​us,​and​consequently​has​been​ detrimental​to​us;​and​we,​gentlemen​editors,​we​have​not​asserted​such​ things.​We​said​that​the​upheavals​the​country​has​suffered​were​an​inevitable​ consequence​ not​ of​ independence,​ but​ rather​ of​ the​ state​ in​ which​the​country​found​itself​in​achieving​independence,​of​the​defective​ education​ the​ Spaniards​ provided​ to​ our​ fathers,​ of​ the​ignorance,​of​the​brutalization​to​which​the​masses​had​been​condemned​ by​the​viceregal​power;​those​are​the​facts​to​which​we​allude​when​we​ assert​that​the​ills​that​have​overwhelmed​the​country​were​a​powerful​ consequence​of​the​aforementioned​antecedents.​Thus,​then,​independence,​producing​such​an​important​change​in​our​situation,​placing​the​ Republic​on​a​new​and​little-​known​path,​put​us​in​a​difficult​position​ from​which​only​some​men​of​noble​sentiments​and​uncommon​abilities​could​have​saved​us.​Unfortunately,​such​men​were​lacking,​and​difficulties,​obstacles,​and​upheavals​marked​the​first​steps​of​the​Republic​ in​its​halting​advance.​But​this​does​not​mean​that​our​ills​are​the​inevitable​consequence​of​independence;​if​it​were​so,​they​would​last​as​long​ as​independence​did;​and​reason,​the​experience​of​what​has​happened​ among​other​peoples​of​the​world,​the​natural​order​of​things,​assure​us​ that​more​or​less​quickly​they​must​end,​that​more​or​less​quickly​the​ Republic​has​to​occupy,​among​the​free​and​happy​people​of​the​earth,​ the​place​that​providence​has​designated​for​it.​The​seriousness​of​this​ matter,​the​injustice​with​which​the​gentlemen​of​El Universal​have​accused​us​of​being​enemies​of​our​independence,​have​compelled​us​to​ deal​with​it​in​this​article,​despite​having​explained​our​ideas​already​in​ the​correspondent​of​the​third​of​this​month.​We​will​continue,​then,​ the​task​we​began. ​ After​having​achieved​independence,​the​men​who​had​contributed​ to​it​tried​to​find​recompense​for​their​efforts​in​the​public​posts​the​new​ order​ of​ things​ made​ accessible​ to​ all​ legitimate​ ambitions.​ Unfortunately,​the​men​were​few,​very​few,​who,​like​the​liberator​of​the​North​ American​republic,​were​happy​with​enjoying​the​sweetness​of​private​ life,​the​most​beautiful​recompense​for​good​actions,​which​the​man​ who​is​truly​great​and​virtuous​finds​in​the​testimony​of​his​conscience.​ Very​ much​ to​ the​ contrary,​ our​ men​ wanted​ to​ appear​ on​ the​ public​ stage,​and​as​there​was​no​competent​judge​who​could​designate​for​each​ one​the​place​he​merited​according​to​his​shareholdings,​the​result​was​

204 : polemiC,​1848–1849

that,​so​many​private​ambitions​not​being​satisfied​even​if​legitimate,​ they​did​not​for​that​reason​cease​being​detrimental,​emulation​was​converted​into​envy,​and,​once​the​torrent​of​private​passions​ran​wild,​the​ public​good​served​as​pretext​and​powerful​lever​for​sustaining​mean​ interests. ​ This​was​the​start​of​the​general​demoralization​in​which​all​classes​of​ society​found​themselves​submerged.​Ambitions​had​no​end,​those​who​ had​ambitions​threw​themselves​into​revolution​to​satisfy​them,​and​the​ first​triumph​of​the​revolutionaries​expanded​the​field​of​ambition;​and​ since​then​all​those​who​have​wanted​to​prosper​at​little​cost​have​had​ to​do​no​more​work​than​hoist​a​revolutionary​standard.​This​system​ continuing​for​twenty-​eight​years,​we​have​seen​the​country​constantly​ involved​in​internal​wars;​changes​have​followed​one​another​without​ interruption,​barely​have​some​men​taken​possession​of​public​posts,​ dispossessing​from​them​those​who​occupied​them,​when​others​in​turn​ have​ousted​and​replaced​them;​these​latter​have​ceded​their​place​to​ those​who​have​come​after,​and​in​this​interminable​chain​of​changes,​in​ this​continual​series​of​revolutions,​the​country​has​not​only​not​been​ able​to​prosper,​but​it​has​not​even​been​able​to​remain​stationary.​In​ our​history​of​disorders​there​is​a​fact​we​must​note,​and​it​is​the​following:​generally,​a​minority,​an​insignificant​faction,​has​managed​to​ take​possession​of​the​public​posts,​holding​them​against​the​opinions​ of​the​majority​of​the​nation.​Nonetheless,​there​is​nothing​strange​in​ this​fact,​and​in​order​to​recognize​it,​it​is​enough​to​analyze,​although​ superficially,​the​history​of​our​disorders​and​consider​the​effects​that​ these​would​inevitably​produce. ​ In​that​continual​ change​of​persons,​ of​principles,​ and​of​systems,​ the​nation​has​not​seen​any​positive​good;​on​the​contrary.​Today,​as​a​ consequence​of​a​change​of​system,​great​goods​are​promised​the​nation,​it​came​to​conceive​brilliant​hopes​for​improvements,​and​tomorrow​everything​continues​the​same:​the​same​system,​the​same​abuses,​ the​same​waste​in​the​administration,​the​same​lack​of​morality​in​the​ functionaries.​For​this​reason,​all​the​principles,​all​the​systems,​have​ been​brought​into​disrepute;​for​this​reason​the​proclamations​of​many​ generals,​the​manifestos​and​programs​of​our​governments,​are​considered​ ridiculous​ documents​ in​ which​ no​ one​ believes.​ This​ disrepute,​ which​ began​ through​ persons​ but​ then​ continued​ through​ principles​ and​systems,​has​contaminated,​in​the​end,​the​laws​themselves,​making​

the​CauSeS​of​our​illS,​third​artiCle : 205

them​impotent​and​ridiculous.​And​this​terrible​ill​that​our​legislators​ have​not​even​been​able​to​foresee​has​developed​the​most​complete​demoralization​in​all​classes​of​society,​loosening​the​most​powerful​social​ bonds.​The​result​has​been​that​the​majority​of​the​nation,​which​has​ seen​itself​sacrificed​a​thousand​times​to​the​interests​of​the​ambitious​ ones,​that​has​seen​mocked​the​most​agreeable​hopes,​the​most​brilliant​ promises,​has​lost​its​faith​in​all​the​constitutions,​has​suffered​with​indifference​all​the​changes,​and​a​miserable​minority,​taking​advantage​of​ that​political​indifference,​has​played​at​its​whim​with​the​destinies​of​ the​country. ​ We​could​expand​upon​this​particular​ matter​a​great​deal,​but​the​ fatal​results​of​our​revolutions​are​clear​to​everybody.​For​that​reason,​ one​voice​alone,​one​single​cry,​is​to​be​heard​throughout​the​entire​Republic:​everyone​clamors​for​peace;​commerce​wants​peace;​agriculture​ demands​peace,​industry​needs​peace,​the​entire​Republic,​finally,​calls​ for​peace​to​ensure​its​existence,​to​prevent​the​ills​with​which​our​past​ disorders​threaten​us​still.

Mariano otero Mariano​ Otero​ (1817–50),​ born​ in​ Guadalajara,​ Jalisco,​ was​ a​ lawyer​and​a​liberal​politician.​Otero​was​editor​of​the​newspaper​ El Siglo XIX​ and​ a​ firm​ believer​ in​ liberal​ reform.​ He​ played​a​prominent​role​as​a​constitution​maker​in​the​1840s. ​ The​ writings​ of​ Alexis​ de​ Tocqueville​ influenced​ Otero’s​ thinking​ regarding​ the​ role​ of​ the​ judiciary,​ federalism,​ and​ particularly​judicial​review.​Otero​proposed​in​Mexico​a​legal​ recourse​ to​ protect​ individual​ rights​ against​ the​ state​ called​ juicio de amparo.​Otero​was​acutely​aware​of​some​of​the​institutional​flaws​of​the​1824​federal​Constitution.​When,​in​1847,​the​ liberal​faction​in​Congress​considered​restoring​the​Constitution,​Otero,​a​deputy,​wrote​a​dissenting​vote​in​which​he​elaborated​on​the​reforms​that​were​necessary​to​amend​that​charter.​ Otero’s​individual​vote​so​influenced​the​deputies​in​Congress​ that​when​the​1824​Constitution​was​finally​restored,​an​“act​of​ reforms”​(basically​Otero’s​recommendations)​was​attached​to​ it.​He​served​as​minister​of​internal​and​external​relations​under​ President​Herrera​in​1848.​His​untimely​death​from​cholera​at​ thirty-​three​years​of​age​prevented​him​from​participating​in​ the​1856–57​Constituent​Congress,​which​drafted​the​1857​liberal​charter.​We​present​Otero’s​individual​vote​submitted​to​ Congress​on​April​5,​1847.

206

Individual Vote in the Constituent Congress Sir: When​I​received​from​Congress​the​difficult​assignment​of​taking​part​ in​shaping​the​constitution​project,​I​did​not​think​I​would​find​myself​ in​the​painful​situation​in​which​I​am,​required,​unfortunately​for​me,​ to​provide​my​individual​opinion​in​disagreement​with​the​considerable​majority​of​the​commission.​I​hoped,​on​the​contrary,​that​all​of​us,​ agreeing​on​the​principles​regarding​the​work​that​had​been​entrusted​ to​us,​would​understand​each​other​perfectly​and,​after​discussing​the​ form​and​details​rather​than​the​cardinal​points,​we​would​be​able​to​ present​to​Congress​a​report​that,​corrected​by​its​wisdom,​might​fulfill​ the​principal​objective​for​which​Congress​was​convened.​The​conservation​of​the​federal​system,​the​establishment​of​the​liberal​and​philosophical​principles​that​belong​to​our​century,​and​the​rapid​and​sure​ development​of​democracy​are​and​have​always​been​unanimously​accepted​in​Congress.​Because​of​the​press​of​circumstances,​the​sad​results​ of​ our​ past​ discords,​ the​ various​ opinions,​ inevitable​ in​ matters​ equally​as​difficult​as​they​are​important,​they​have​not​managed​to​come​ to​an​agreement​on​any​differences​other​than​the​ones​relative​to​the​ best​means​of​making​those​principles​triumph​and​those​that​consist​in​ some​questions​of​a​secondary​and​even​a​transitory​nature. ​ My​ hopes,​ nonetheless,​ have​ not​ been​ realized:​ our​ division,​ for​ which​some​incidents​beyond​the​subject​of​my​report​were​the​reason,​ became​inevitable​and​has​put​me​in​the​disadvantageous​position​of​entrusting​to​my​powers​alone​the​support​of​an​opinion​that​is​sensitive​ because​of​the​matter​with​which​it​deals​and​much​more​so​by​reason​ of​the​circumstances. ​ But​precisely​because​of​the​circumstances,​it​is​in​my​judgment,​sir,​ ​ Original​title:​“Voto​particular​presentado​al​congreso​constituyente​en​la​sesión​de​ 5​de​abril​de​1847.”​Source:​El Republicano,​Mexico,​nos.​105​and​106,​April​15​and​16,​1847. 207

208 : mariano​otero

extremely​advisable​that​as​soon​as​possible​the​political​organization​of​ the​country​be​settled​definitively​by​means​of​the​fundamental​code.​ The​advisability​of​adopting​the​code​of​1824​with​reforms​cannot​be​ disputed.​The​points​of​improvement​that​the​security​and​progress​of​ our​institutions​demand​are​clear;​and​to​decree​them​there​are,​in​the​ patriotism​of​the​Congress​and​in​the​true​state​of​public​affairs,​the​elements​required​to​fulfill​our​assignment​honorably.​But​with​the​very​ tight​deadline​that​has​been​set​for​us,​and​distracted​by​other​very​urgent​ assignments,​I​scarcely​have​time​to​indicate​the​reasons​on​which​I​base​ my​opinion.​I​am​consoled​that​my​desire,​more​than​registering​an​individual​opinion,​is​explaining​my​convictions​without​any​presumption​ that​they​would​be​approved. ​ That​the​present​state​of​the​Republic​urgently​demands​the​definitive​ establishment​of​the​constitutional​order​is​a​truth​one​sees​to​be​self-​ evident​just​by​contemplating​that​very​state.​A​war​in​which​Mexico​ struggles​for​nothing​less​than​its​existence,​half​its​territory​occupied​ by​its​enemy,​which​already​has​seven​states​in​its​power,​our​primary​ maritime​city​having​just​yielded,​and​even​our​capital​itself​seriously​ threatened,​nothing​would​be​better​than​the​existence​of​some​political​ organization​that,​avoiding​internal​difficulties,​leaves​for​later​the​debate​over​fundamental​principles.​But​this​organization​does​not​exist,​ and​to​carry​that​very​war​through​to​its​conclusion​it​is​necessary​as​ soon​as​possible​to​end​the​complications​that​stand​in​its​way.​In​war,​ with​even​more​reason​than​in​peace,​a​people​cannot​live​and​resist​ except​when​they​have​the​use​of​all​elements​of​their​power,​and​inasmuch​as​their​political​organization​is​the​only​one​that​unites,​directs,​ and​regulates​them,​it​is​not​possible​for​the​people​to​survive​if​they​are​ maintained​under​an​entirely​defective​organization.​It​is​not​our​fault,​ but​ rather​ a​ consequence​ of​ the​ past,​ that​ the​ complexity​ of​ circumstances​is​as​great​as​it​is.​The​weakness​of​what​exists​is​obvious,​and​ there​is​no​reason​to​hope​otherwise. ​ Nothing​is​solid​and​organized.​Everything​we​have​is​from​yesterday:​it​was​the​difficult​work​of​a​movement​that,​as​national​as​it​might​ have​been,​could​not​produce​the​security​that​time​and​order​do.​The​ federal​government​has​just​organized​itself,​and​already​it​is​struggling​ with​a​thousand​difficulties:​with​the​violence​of​every​type​of​reaction,​ the​lack​of​means​to​command,​the​inexperience​of​an​almost​new​system,​ the​ spirit​ of​ foreboding​ so​ characteristic​ of​ these​ moments,​ the​

individual​vote​in​the​ConStituent​ConGreSS : 209

alarm​of​all​those​who,​seeing​their​fate​linked​to​the​institutions,​do​ not​know​whether​their​interests​will​be​sacrificed​or​respected.​The​ states​test​their​power​with​lack​of​confidence;​the​center​sees​that​it​is​ not​as​respected​as​it​should​be;​and​the​revolution​has​just​taken​possession​of​the​most​beautiful​of​all​our​hopes,​the​Guard,1​which​in​a​ moment​of​dizziness​has​given​an​example​that​the​lovers​of​institutions​ hope​will​not​repeat​itself​again.​In​short,​we​have​today​a​public​power​ overwhelmed​with​the​difficulties​of​a​necessary​war​and​with​the​difficulties​of​an​organization​in​which​everything​is​transitory,​in​which​no​ power​has​consciousness​of​its​stability,​in​which​are​noted​very​alarming​tendencies​toward​disunion,​in​which​certain​conditions​of​order​are​ lacking,​and​all​this​when​the​civil​war​has​been​a​fact,​when​it​still​is,​ perhaps,​a​threat. ​ In​view,​then,​of​so​dangerous​a​situation,​I​have​believed​that​every​ transitory​ state,​ just​ because​ it​ is​ such,​ would​ not​ have​ the​ necessary​ force​to​dominate​the​circumstances​and​that​the​best​of​all​remedies​ would​be​to​resolve​the​problem​at​once,​take​direction​of​affairs​with​a​ firm​hand,​adopt​the​reforms​that​are​clamored​for,​provide​institutions​ with​the​power​they​need,​and​make​the​nation​enter,​without​the​least​ delay​ and​ with​ all​ haste,​ the​ tranquil​ path​ of​ a​ constitutional​ system,​ which,​not​threatened​by​change,​might​give​all​social​interests​order,​ quiet,​and​security. ​ I​am​confirmed​in​this​judgment​that​much​more​when​I​see​that​the​ revolution​of​August2​and​public​opinion​have​preceded​us​in​indicating​the​most​appropriate​means​to​attain​that​end.​Because,​in​effect,​it​ is​necessary​to​consider​that​that​movement​has​not​been​so​solemnly​ accepted,​except​because​it​effected​two​great​goods:​it​put​an​end​to​an​ order​of​things​that​conspired​against​republican​forms,​and​it​returned​ to​ Mexico​ the​ only​ institutions​ with​ which​ the​ Republic​ and​ liberty​ could​be​a​reality​among​us.​Thus,​the​reestablishment​of​the​federation,​ decreed​simply​as​a​provisional​organization​and​submitted​to​the​decision​of​this​Congress,​has​been​confirmed​and​exists​as​a​consummated​ and​unassailable​fact.​The​old​states​of​the​federation​have​again​exer​ 1.​The​National​Guard.​On​February​27,​1847,​the​National​Guard​revolted​against​ the​national​government​in​Mexico​City.​(Editor’s​note) ​ 2.​In​August​the​federalist​faction​managed​to​gain​power,​restored​the​federation,​ and​reenacted​the​1824​federal​Constitution.​(Editor’s​note)

210 : mariano​otero

cised​their​sovereignty,​have​recovered​the​full​exercise​of​that​right,​ according​to​the​express​declaration​of​some​and​the​way​of​operating​ of​all​of​them,​it​being​evident​that​no​one​is​trying​to​oppose​that​fact​ and​that​nothing​today​would​be​so​useless​as​to​set​out​to​demonstrate​ the​need​for​and​appropriateness​of​the​federal​system.​Why,​then,​not​ end​ by​ recognizing​ that​ fact,​ sheltering​ the​ federal​ institutions​ from​ the​dangers​that​its​apparent​state​of​near​provisionality​brings​with​it?​ The​manner​of​doing​it​seems​to​me​perfectly​indicated​by​the​press,​ the​ legislatures,​ and​ the​ considerable​ number​ of​ gentlemen​ deputies​ who​have​requested​“the​reestablishment​of​the​Constitution​of​1824​ with​the​appropriate​reforms.” ​ The​only​idea​from​this​proposal​that​might​be​able​to​divide​us,​the​ determination​to​make​a​new​federal​constitution​or​alter​that​one​substantially,​is​a​gratifying​but​lamentable​idea,​a​temptation​seductive​to​ self-​love​ but​ whose​ dangers​ should​ dissuade​ us.​ Since​ 1835,3​ with​ the​ Republic​dominated​by​the​force​of​a​revolution,​the​crime​was​committed​ of​ destroying​ a​ constitution​ whose​ legitimacy​ has​ never​ been​ questioned​and​which​had​the​immeasurable​advantage​of​being​the​first​ and​ having​ lasted​ eleven​ years.​ How​ many​ who​ have​ wanted​ to​ construct​another​one​on​the​ruins​of​that​edifice​have​received​the​saddest​ disappointment?​The​discussion​of​fundamental​laws,​most​productive​ amidst​dangers,​has​come​to​be​our​normal​state.​All​who​had​the​illusion​of​believing​that​they​were​going​to​settle​the​question​by​means​of​ their​respective​systems​have​seen​in​very​little​time​their​works​ripped​ from​their​foundations​by​the​torrent​of​revolutions.​Before​this,​and​ without​ considering​ that​ the​ Constitutional​ Congresses​ have​ been​ ceaselessly​occupied​with​discussing​reforms,​four​constituent​assemblies​have​been​gathered​in​only​twelve​years​without​advancing​a​single​ step​down​the​road​of​our​reorganization​and​placing​us,​at​the​end​of​ this​time,​in​the​same​situation​we​were​in​1835,​but​with​the​sad​fruits​of​ that​disorder,​with​the​territory​dismembered,​civil​war​converted​into​ a​habit,​society​being​dissolved​by​corruption. ​ Is​this​not​a​vivid​and​indelible​lesson​on​the​respect​with​which​the​ original​institutions​of​a​people​should​be​regarded?​If​we​yield​today​ to​the​temptation​of​forming​a​new​code​in​order​to​offer,​in​its​literary​ ​ 3.​In​1835​the​Constitution​of​1824​was​annulled;​a​new​centralist​constitution​known​ as​the​Seven​Laws​was​enacted​in​1836.​(Editor’s​note)

individual​vote​in​the​ConStituent​ConGreSS : 211

and​scientific​point​of​view,​advantages​that​are​very​obvious​over​the​ Constitution​of​1824,​who​would​assure​us​that​this​work,​child​of​our​ sad​circumstances,​published​in​the​midst​of​civil​discords​and​exposed​ to​the​judgment​of​so​many​opinions,​to​the​clash​of​so​many​interests,​ could​rise​above​that​habit​of​contempt,​of​inconstancy​and​destruction​ that​respects​nothing?​What​hope​could​we​have​that​it​would​not​pass​ into​oblivion​like​the​earlier​ones,​after​a​short​and​tempestuous​reign,​ during​which​neither​were​its​principles​popularized​nor​the​practical​ advantages​of​its​application​felt?​The​first​condition​of​life​for​fundamental​laws,​after​their​suitability,​is​the​people’s​love​and​veneration. ​ But​this​condition​does​not​come​to​the​people​from​the​Constitution’s​scientific​and​literary​perfection,​because​there​are​few​judges​of​ that​and​these​are​divided​on​so​controversial​a​subject,​but​rather​from​ the​memories​that​are​aroused,​from​the​opinions​that​are​transmitted​ about​it​from​fathers​to​sons.​In​this​regard,​duration​is​in​itself​a​recommendation;​and​the​best​code​that​might​be​drawn​up​by​us​today​could​ not​compete​with​respect​to​those​advantages​with​the​code​of​1824,​superior​to​all​in​veneration​and​legitimacy.​In​the​epoch​of​its​formation​ no​one​contested​the​powers​of​deputies​elected​in​the​midst​of​a​profound​peace;​all​the​states​concurred​on​that​solemn​pact,​and​it​was​also​ confirmed​in​the​midst​of​the​emotions​of​a​people​who​had​just​won​ their​ independence​ and​ who​surrendered​ their​ most​ happy​ future​ to​ dreams.​The​entire​nation​accepted​the​code​of​1824​as​the​reward​for​its​ past​sacrifices,​as​the​symbol​of​its​future​hopes,​and​retained​such​a​love​ for​it​that​deception​and​oppression​were​necessary​to​wrench​it​from​ the​nation’s​hands,​and​it​has​never​stopped​fighting​for​that​code.​On​ the​other​hand,​the​memory​of​that​Constitution​is​linked​to​the​establishment​of​the​Republic​and​the​representative​system,​for​which​that​ Constitution​became​the​security;​to​local​liberties,​so​beloved​by​the​ nation;​to​our​respectability​abroad,​which​remained​inviolable​during​ its​reign;​to​the​only​tranquil​and​happy​days​we​have​ever​enjoyed.​The​ most​cursory​examination​of​our​present​circumstances​should​convince​ us​that​we​are​very​far​from​being​able​to​have​such​favorable​omens;​it​ should​persuade​us​that​nothing​today​will​be​as​patriotic​as​organizing​ the​fundamental​laws​of​the​Republic​under​the​protection​of​all​those​ positive​influences. ​ In​order​to​understand​the​complete​importance​of​this​observation,​ it​is​necessary​to​remember​that​peoples​are​governed​by​habits​and​be.

212 : mariano​otero

liefs,​ by​ imagination​ and​ customs.​ From​ the​ point​ of​ view​ of​ a​ skillful​ plan​ and​ a​ brilliant​ exposition,​ the​ constitutions​ of​ revolutionary​ France​will​always​serve​as​admirable​models.​There​the​principles​were​ expressed​with​energy​and​concision,​the​ideas​developed​in​all​their​ details,​the​most​profound​and​ingenious​plans​followed​with​mastery;​ and​nonetheless,​one​after​another​was​passed​without​taking​hold​of​ society,​while,​despite​its​unfavorable​origin,​the​Constitution​of​1815​ has​lasted​thirty​years​simply​because​it​came​to​be​regarded​as​the​compromise​ between​ the​ old​ and​ new​ states,​ simply​ because​ it​ made​ the​ influences​of​the​past​serve​the​realization​of​hopes​for​the​future.​The​ example​of​England​is​still​more​obvious.​That​nation,​cradle​of​representative​institutions,​has​for​two​centuries​maintained​its​Constitution​ disseminated​ among​ a​ multitude​ of​ laws,​ many​ of​ them​ obscure​ and​ badly​written,​and,​nonetheless,​such​is​the​love​of​all​English​citizens​ for​their​institutions​that​reforms​are​initiated​only​around​special​items​ that​require​improvement​and​that​if​one​were​to​announce​a​project​to​ reduce​those​original​foundations​to​a​code​as​perfect​as​that​wise​nation​ would​so​easily​be​able​to​do,​all​parties​would​unite​against​the​unhappy​ instigator​of​the​perfection.​The​Constitution​of​the​United​States​itself​ is​very​far​from​being​a​finished​work.​In​large​part​it​has​a​relation​to​ the​social​customs​of​that​people,​and​precisely​because​it​is​in​perfect​ harmony​with​them,​it​has​presided​over​the​most​admirable​advance​ recorded​in​ancient​and​modern​history.​From​this​it​follows​that​an​intelligent​legislator​will​always​prefer​a​constitution​in​which​the​people​ see​their​glory,​their​nationality,​and​their​liberty​symbolized,​although​ it​might​not​be​perfect​compared​with​another​that​might​be​but​lacks​ memories​and​influences. ​ Finally,​and​to​express​with​loyalty​to​the​Congress​the​motives​that​ have​made​me​decide​in​favor​of​the​continuation​of​the​Constitution​of​ 1824,​I​will​say​that​I​consider​the​advantage​of​its​legitimacy​invaluable,​ which​seems​of​little​importance​to​some​others.​Earlier​I​stated​that​the​ result​of​the​destruction​of​our​original​pact​was​to​proclaim​that​the​society​was​not​constituted​and​so​to​abandon​it​to​the​turbulent​struggle​ of​all​those​who​believed​they​possessed​the​secret​of​securing​its​stable​ organization​on​various​foundations.​And​to​end​this​lamentable​movement,​what​means​would​be​better​than​returning​to​the​starting​point,​ recognizing​that​the​nation​has​been​and​is​constituted,​condemning​the​ results​of​a​crime​in​which​we​would​appear​equally​complicit​by​adopt-

individual​vote​in​the​ConStituent​ConGreSS : 213

ing​its​outcomes,​announcing​solemnly​on​behalf​of​the​Union​that​in​ Mexico​there​are​no​rights​other​than​those​created​by​the​Constitution​ of​1824,​and​requiring​of​everybody​the​fulfilling​of​correlative​obligations?​Only​in​that​way​will​we​be​able​to​say​that​we​have​returned​ respectability​to​the​laws,​and​this​type​of​renunciation​of​the​omnipotence​of​constituent​power​before​the​legitimacy​of​our​original​pact​ would​be​an​example​as​useful​for​the​Republic​as​it​would​be​honorable​ for​the​Congress. ​ I​insist,​then,​on​the​opinion​I​have​declared​other​times,​that​we​ourselves​must​limit​our​powers​and​our​task​only​to​making,​in​the​Constitution​of​1824,​the​reforms​that​its​own​stability​requires,​and​this​for​ reasons​that​are​in​the​grasp​of​everyone​and​are,​to​my​way​of​thinking,​ incontestable. ​ The​necessity​of​reforming​the​Constitution​of​1824​has​been​as​generally​recognized​as​its​legitimacy​and​appropriateness.​Regarding​it,​all​ learned​men​of​the​Republic​have​been​in​agreement,​and​they​corroborated​the​strength​of​the​best​arguments​with​the​irresistible​evidence​ of​the​facts.​Who,​remembering​that​under​that​Constitution​our​civil​ discords​began​and​that​it​was​so​impotent​against​the​disorder​that,​instead​of​suppressing​it​and​governing​society,​the​Constitution​had​to​ yield​in​the​face​of​the​disorder,​will​be​able​to​doubt​that​the​Constitution​contained​within​itself​the​causes​of​its​weakness​and​the​elements​ of​dissolution​that​undermined​its​existence?​And​if​this​is​so,​then,​as​ it​is​in​fact,​will​it​be​a​good​for​our​country​to​establish​that​Constitution​with​no​more​strength​or​force​than​it​had​before,​so​that​its​name​ again​becomes​only​an​illusion?​Would​not​reestablishing​the​federal​ system​under​the​same​conditions​with​which​experience​has​demonstrated​it​cannot​exist​decree​its​ruin,​and​precisely​today​when​much​ more​unfavorable​conditions​exist​than​those​that​were​enough​to​destroy​it?​Nor​can​the​situation​of​the​Republic​now​endure​any​longer​ an​uncertain​and​provisional​state.​The​seriousness​of​its​ills,​the​force​ with​which​events​are​rushing​toward​us,​demand​prompt​and​effective​ remedy;​and​because​this​remedy​consists​in​establishing​the​constitutional​order,​no​less​than​in​the​appropriateness​and​solidity​of​the​way​it​ is​resolved,​it​seems​totally​beyond​doubt​that​it​is​completely​necessary​ to​proceed​immediately​to​the​reforms. ​ In​ days​ much​ less​ unfortunate,​ reforms​ were​ the​ constant​ desire​ of​the​nation,​expressed​through​all​the​legitimate​means​of​which​it​

214 : mariano​otero

usually​makes​use​to​enunciate​its​will.​Never,​from​1834​until​now,​has​ the​restoration​of​the​federal​system​been​proclaimed​without​requesting​as​a​necessary​condition,​in​order​to​give​stability​to​the​federative​ principle​and​to​bring​its​consequences​into​line,​important​reforms​in​ the​old​Constitution.​No​one​has​advocated​that​it​should​once​again​ govern​in​the​country​and​remain​intact​contrary​to​the​indications​of​ experience.​ On​ this​ point,​ I​ understand​ for​ this​ very​ reason​ that​ the​ fullness​of​our​powers​works​in​all​its​force.​Thus,​wanting​nothing​to​ do​with​refuting​an​opinion​that​does​not​have​partisans,​I​am​going​to​ show​Congress​what​might​be,​from​my​point​of​view,​the​indispensable​and​most​urgent​modifications​our​situation​requires​and​the​best​ means​of​facilitating​other​new​modifications​for​later​when​we​arrive​ at​that​degree​of​perfection​that​present​circumstances​do​not​permit​us​ to​attempt,​but​whose​attainment​will​also​be​credited​to​us​if​we​know​ to​prepare​for​it,​starting​now,​with​the​foresight,​prudence,​and​insight​ that​must​distinguish​legislators​of​nations.​For​the​rest,​time​does​not​ permit​me​to​be​excessive.​I​propose​passing​over​each​point​with​only​ simple​suggestions,​and​what​I​am​going​to​say​about​the​proposed​reforms​will​prove​they​cannot​be​deferred,​neither​for​another​epoch​nor​ another​Congress,​no​matter​what​its​proximity​might​be. ​ In​1832​it​began​to​be​observed​that​the​federal​Constitution​had​to​ put​ the​ exercise​ of​ citizens’​ rights​ in​ order,​ and​ I​ have​ believed​ that​ this​must​be​the​first​of​the​reforms,​persuaded​as​I​am​that​it​is​on​this​ point​that​the​principle​of​the​form​of​governments​is​characterized​and​ guaranteed,​depending​on​how​those​rights​are​extended​or​limited.​For​ that,​it​has​been​said​with​reason​that​“in​the​popular​states​the​laws​that​ establish​the​right​of​suffrage​are​fundamental​and​as​important​as​those​ that​in​monarchies​establish​who​is​the​monarch”;4​and​the​Constitution​must​never​leave​to​secondary​laws​the​power​to​destroy​them.​The​ method​copied​from​the​institutions​of​the​north,​and​adopted​by​ours​ of​1824,​of​leaving​that​arrangement​to​each​one​of​the​states​seems​to​me​ dangerous​and​of​little​import:​dangerous​because​in​this​way​an​objective​as​essential​as​the​very​form​of​government​is​abandoned​by​the​federal​power​to​other​outside​powers​and​exposes​the​Republic​to​a​very​ terrible​irregularity,​from​which​only​its​customs​have​been​able​to​preserve​the​Americans;​and​of​little​import​by​reason​of​which​(and​this​ ​

4.​[Montesquieu​1748],​Spirit of the Laws,​book​2,​chapter​2.​

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is​the​principal​one)​the​federal​system​in​its​final​state​of​perfection,​as​ we​wanted​to​adopt​it,​is​not​as​it​was​earlier—a​simple​society​of​societies—but​rather,​through​the​most​admirable​political​mechanism,​the​ citizens​of​a​state​form​a​perfect​society​among​themselves​for​the​matter​of​their​internal​administration,​and​united​with​those​of​the​other​ states​themselves​form,​but​without​the​intervening​of​its​local​powers,​ another​nation,​no​less​perfect,​whose​government​is​general;​the​result​ of​which​is​that​the​action​of​the​citizen​on​the​government​and​of​the​ government​on​the​citizen​in​everything​relative​to​the​Union​is​exercised​directly​without​any​intervention​whatsoever​from​the​authority​ of​the​states.​This​principle,​marvelous​step​forward​of​social​science,​is​ observed​in​comparing​the​mechanism​of​the​American​Constitution​ with​the​weak​confederations​of​old,​which​succumbed​perhaps​because​ of​this​defect,​and​surely​dominated​the​thought​of​the​authors​of​that​ Constitution​when​they​promulgated​it​in​the​name​of​the​people​of​ the​United​States.​Well​then,​once​this​truth​is​established​and​once​the​ fact​demonstrated​that​the​government​of​the​Union​is,​from​a​certain​ point​of​view,​a​truly​national​government,​and​once​it​is​characterized​ through​its​form​as​a​popular​representative​republic,​it​is​necessary​to​ agree​that​to​it,​and​only​to​it,​belongs​the​responsibility​of​preserving​ this​character​and​regularizing​its​own​organization​through​the​fundamental​law. ​ Once​the​rule​on​this​point​is​introduced,​Congress​will​see​that​it​ could​ not​ be​ more​ liberal.​ Granting​ the​ right​ of​ citizenship​ to​ every​ Mexican​who​has​reached​the​age​of​twenty,​who​has​not​been​sentenced​ in​a​legal​process​to​any​shameful​punishment​and​has​an​honest​means​ of​living,​the​democratic​principle​is​established​and​guaranteed​in​all​ the​states​of​the​Union​in​the​most​open​way​that​could​be​desired.​The​ idea​of​requiring​a​certain​income​as​necessary​to​enjoy​the​rights​of​the​ citizen,​an​idea​recommended​by​some​writers​of​reputable​liberalism​ and​also​adopted​in​some​of​our​constitutional​laws,​does​not​seem​appropriate​to​me,​because​never​can​a​reason​be​given​that​justifies​one​ amount​over​another;​and​principally​because​estimating​that​amount​ as​a​guarantee​of​morality​and​independence​in​order​for​it​to​be​just,​it​ would​be​necessary​to​vary​it​with​respect​to​the​diverse​professions​and​ the​different​localities​of​the​Republic,​which​would​be​so​difficult​as​to​ be​impossible.​Apart​from​this,​so​that​this​right​has​the​importance​due​ it,​and​so​that​its​exercise​would​be​the​fundamental​foundation​of​pub-

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lic​order,​it​is​indispensable​that​a​secondary​law​regulate​the​procedure​ by​which​it​should​be​guaranteed,​exercised,​and​suspended. ​ In​my​judgment,​in​the​Constitution,​once​the​foundation​is​established,​only​the​privileges​inherent​in​that​quality​remain​to​be​determined;​ and​ Article​ 2​ that​ I​ propose​ establishes​ that​ the​ right​ of​ citizenship​carry​ with​it​the​right​ to​vote​in​popular​elections,​ the​right​ to​exercise​the​right​of​petition,​the​right​to​gather​in​order​to​discuss​ public​affairs,​and​finally​the​right​of​belonging​to​the​National​Guard,​ all​in​accordance​with​the​laws.​No​mention​had​been​made​in​any​of​ our​earlier​constitutions​of​these​three​last​privileges,​and​nonetheless​ they​are​of​the​greatest​importance.​If​the​entire​theory​of​representative​democracy​were​reduced​to​summoning​the​people​one​day​in​order​ to​elect​their​mandataries​and​relinquish​to​them​afterward​the​direction​of​their​affairs,​it​would​be​certain,​as​some​writers​claim,​that​the​ representative​system​had​not​been​able​to​replace​the​old​procedures,​ whereas​leaving​to​the​people​constant​participation​in​and​direction​ of​public​affairs​through​peaceful​discussions​places​the​representatives​ under​ the​ influence​ of​ their​ own​ constituents,​ business​ affairs​ under​ the​power​of​public​opinion;​and​in​this​way​the​peaceful​and​reasoned​ action​of​the​people​is​substituted,​with​a​thousand​advantages,​for​the​ sudden​rush​of​passions​of​the​multitude,​deceived​in​the​forum​by​the​ intrigues​of​ambition​or​the​spellbinding​eloquence​of​political​speakers.​ Even​under​monarchical​governments,​where​the​democratic​element​is​ subject​to​a​thousand​hindrances​and​subordinated​to​other​adverse​authorities,​one​admires​how​the​majority,​supported​by​those​powerful​ resources,​comes​to​take​direction​of​affairs​and​advances​every​day​in​ greatness​and​power.​These​means​are​the​essence​of​the​representative​ system.​The​National​Guard​is​the​most​solid​guarantee​of​republics,​and​ this​guarantee​must​also​be​set​down​in​the​fundamental​code. ​ Congress,​ called​ to​ establish​ these​ principles​ that​ by​ themselves​ alone​amount​to​an​enormous​advance,​cannot​disregard​them​because​ the​first​attempts​are​naturally​weak​and​imperfect.​This​is​the​natural​ progress​of​all​human​affairs.​It​matters​not​at​all​that​the​right​of​petition​is​exercised​under​the​direction​of​the​passions​of​our​epoch,​that​ the​first​popular​gatherings​do​not​offer​all​the​interest​of​their​great​ purpose,​or​that​the​National​Guard,​still​limited​to​much​less​than​it​ should​be,​displays​some​defects.​In​the​wise​combination​of​all​these​ peaceful​methods​of​government​there​is​an​excellent​intensity​of​ad-

individual​vote​in​the​ConStituent​ConGreSS : 217

vancement:​that​once​public​affairs​are​taken​from​the​field​of​riots​to​ deliver​them​to​democratic​institutions,​these​institutions​will​come​to​ prevail,​ even​ more​ because​ it​ is​ true​ in​ our​ country​ they​ do​ not​ encounter​ those​ obstacles​ that​ have​ made​ violent​ upheavals​ and​ bloody​ revolutions​necessary​in​other​places.​To​depict​the​defects​of​the​attempt​in​order​to​make​the​institution​hateful​is​the​sophism​of​the​hidden​enemies​of​liberty;​but​history​rejects​this​sophism.​“Even​the​Roman​people,”​says​a​profound​writer,​“this​model​of​all​free​people,​was​ not​capable​of​governing​itself​when​it​emerged​from​the​oppression​of​ the​Tarquins.​Degraded​by​the​slavery​and​ignominious​labors​the​Tarquins​had​imposed,​the​people,​in​the​beginning,​were​no​more​than​a​ stupid​rabble,​which​had​to​be​flattered​and​governed​with​the​greatest​ wisdom​so​that,​accustoming​themselves​little​by​little​to​breathing​the​ salubrious​air​of​liberty,​these​souls​weakened,​or​more​correctly​brutalized​under​tyranny,​might​gradually​acquire​that​austerity​of​customs​ and​that​noble​and​indomitable​pride​that​made​it,​in​the​end,​the​most​ respectable​of​all​peoples.”5 ​ In​most​of​the​known​constitutions,​not​only​are​the​principles​relative​to​the​organization​of​public​powers​fixed,​but​also​the​foundations​ of​ individual​ guarantees​ are​ established,​ probably​ because​ the​ social​ condition​of​the​members​is​the​original​objective​of​the​institutions​ and​one​of​the​most​distinctive​characteristics​of​the​true​nature​of​governments;​ and​ notwithstanding​ the​ fact​ that​ these​ guarantees,​ in​ the​ reality​of​things,​depend​on​the​individual​measures​of​the​states,​our​ federal​constitution​declared​that​the​nation​was​obligated​to​protect​ the​rights​of​the​citizen​by​wise​and​just​laws;​and,​in​imitation​of​the​ code​of​the​United​States,​in​various​of​its​articles​are​found​truly​philosophical​provisions​directed​to​that​very​end.​I​have​not​yet​found​a​solid​ argument​against​this​means​of​putting​the​guarantees​of​man​under​the​ protection​of​the​general​power,​and​those​that​should​have​convinced​ me​in​their​favor​are​not​few.​On​this​point,​the​lack​of​precision​in​constitutional​declarations​does​not​present​any​disadvantage,​because​the​ principles​dictated​by​reason​are​the​same​in​all​countries​and​under​all​ climates.​But​without​them,​how​could​the​general​government​protect​ those​rights​or​strengthen​the​reality​of​democratic​institutions​in​all​the​ ​ 5.​J.​J.​Rousseau,​in​his​The Government of Poland​(Indianapolis:​Hackett​Publishing​ Company,​1985).

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states;​how​could​it​make​effective​the​principles​of​liberty?​It​is,​on​the​ other​hand,​incontestable​that,​in​the​present​state​of​our​civilization,​ such​an​interesting​arrangement​could​not​be​left​to​the​absolute​discretion​of​the​states.​Consequently,​I​understand​that​the​present​constitution​ must​ establish​ individual​ guarantees,​ and​ on​ foundations​ so​ stable​that​no​man​who​inhabits​any​part​of​the​territory​of​the​Republic,​ without​distinction​between​citizens​and​foreigners,​would​have​on​this​ point​anything​to​ask​of​the​best​laws​of​the​land. ​ Swayed​by​this​thought,​I​propose​that​the​constitution​specify​the​ individual​rights​and​ensure​their​inviolability,​leaving​to​a​subsequent​ law,​but​general​and​of​a​lofty​character,​to​specify​them​in​detail.​Because​the​gentlemen​deputies​will​have​already​observed​in​this​matter​ that,​even​being​reduced​to​fundamental​principles,​it​is​necessary​to​ give​them​a​breadth​little​suited​to​the​limits​and​character,​so​to​speak,​ essential​to​the​constitution;​and​if​one​authority​had​to​proclaim​the​ principle​in​its​vague​and​abstract​generality,​and​another​authority​had​ to​specify​the​details​on​which​its​reality​depends,​the​former​will​have​ done​nothing.​In​order​to​recognize​in​this​matter​the​inadequacy​of​ general​principles,​it​is​enough​to​choose​some​point,​as​if​at​random;​ for​example,​security:​all​our​constitutions​established​a​certain​length​ of​time​between​detention​and​formal​imprisonment,​anticipating​that​ in​this​period​of​time​the​statement​of​the​accused​might​be​taken;​and​ all,​forgetting​the​instance​of​the​apprehension​of​the​confirmed​criminal​in​a​site​different​from​that​of​its​judge,​have​allowed​an​exception​in​ which​the​infraction​of​the​law​becomes​inevitable.​The​same​can​be​observed​with​respect​to​property:​the​broadest​declarations​have​not​been​ sufficient​to​stop​the​system​of​forced​loans​and​taking​possession​of​ beasts​of​burden,​which​are​nothing​more​than​crimes​against​property.​ A​more​extensive​law​that​sets​forth​the​principles​exactly,​that​recognizes​the​exception​and,​above​all,​establishes​the​means​of​making​them​ effective,​is​the​only​way​it​will​be​able​to​fulfill​this​very​important​ need.​In​the​constitution,​I​propose​that​only​the​general​principle​be​ stated,​that​its​inviolability​be​declared,​and​the​only​situation​in​which​ the​guarantees​can​be​suspended​be​set​forth,​not​all​the​guarantees,​but​ only​those​respective​to​the​detention​of​the​accused​and​the​searching​ of​ homes.​ If,​ with​ more​ tranquil​ times​ coming,​ Congress​ could​ concern​itself​with​the​creation​of​that​law,​seemingly​a​work​for​it​alone,​it​ would​raise​a​monument​of​very​agreeable​recognition​to​its​memory.

individual​vote​in​the​ConStituent​ConGreSS : 219

​ Passing​from​these​matters​to​the​organization​of​the​federal​powers,​ primary​object​of​the​Constitution,​the​legislative​function​is​presented​ as​carried​out​by​a​Congress​composed​of​two​chambers.​The​one,​popular​and​numerous,​represents​the​citizenry​and​expresses​the​democratic​ principle​in​all​its​energy.​The​other,​smaller​and​slower,​has​a​very​difficult​double​character,​because​it​represents​at​the​same​time​the​political​bodies​considered​equal,​and​it​comes​to​fulfill​the​urgent​need​that​ every​social​organization​of​a​body​has,​storehouse​of​wisdom​and​sound​ judgment​that​moderates​the​impetuousness​of​unthinking​democracy​ and,​in​the​incessant​personnel​change​of​popular​institutions,​preserves​ the​science​of​government,​the​memory​of​traditions—the​treasure,​so​ to​speak,​of​a​national​policy.​On​this​point,​more​than​on​any​other,​I​ feel​the​lack​of​the​possibility​to​work​out​my​ideas​calmly​and​to​express​ thoroughly​to​Congress​the​reasons​for​the​reform​I​am​proposing. ​ With​respect​to​the​popular​chamber,​having​set​firmly​as​a​principle​ that​it​should​represent​individuals,​there​remain​only​three​objects​of​ reform:​its​number,​the​conditions​of​eligibility,​and​the​form​of​election. ​ Regarding​the​first,​the​Constitution​of​1824,​setting​the​base​of​one​ deputy​for​each​eighty​thousand​inhabitants,​established​a​less​numerous​popular​chamber​than​we​have​had,​and​in​this​it​must​be​reformed.​ The​chamber​of​deputies​in​the​best​constitutional​countries​has​a​growing​ number​ of​individuals,​ because​ only​ in​ this​ way​ does​ it​ manifest​ the​democratic​element,​unite​great​quantity​of​learning,​represent​all​ interests,​all​opinions,​and​is​not​exposed​to​some​few​rising​to​the​top​ and​ the​ will​ of​ this​ minority​ ruling​ it​ without​ difficulty.​ A​ chamber​ elected​on​the​same​base​on​which​our​current​Congress​has​been,​even​ in​a​country​where​the​general​business​might​not​be​less​important​for​ each​individual,​where​the​public​functions​might​not​be​held​in​little​ regard,​could​scarcely​bring​together​one​hundred​representatives,​with​ the​consequence​that​the​law​might​come​to​have​only​fifty-​one​votes​ among​the​democratic​representation. ​ With​regard​to​conditions​of​eligibility,​my​opinion​is​very​clear:​I​ consider​them​a​very​sad​measure​of​good​sense.​I​believe​that​the​paramount​condition​is​to​obtain​the​confidence​of​the​people​and​that,​in​ this​matter,​there​cannot​be​guarantees​more​important​than​the​organization​ of​ the​ electorate.​ In​ effect,​ all​ the​ desired​ conditions​ of​ eligibility​should​be​set​down;​a​mature​age,​a​respectable​profession,​a​

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comfortable​income,​residence​or​birth​in​a​specified​place.​By​chance,​ will​ everyone​ who​ has​ these​ qualities​ be​ good​ as​ deputies?​ And​ will​ the​people​have​elected​them​because​they​have​them?​No.​A​distinguished​writer​in​public​law6​observes​that​“elections​fall​to​specific​persons​precisely​because​they​have​qualities​that​are​lacking​in​the​greater​ part​of​those​who​have​the​legal​qualities”;​and​experience​teaches​us​ that,​although​the​law​speaks​of​age,​income,​and​residence,​the​elector​ looks​for​the​opinion​he​believes​patriotic,​the​interest​he​estimates​as​ national,​and​the​capability​most​suitable​for​making​those​very​opinions​and​those​very​interests​triumph.​The​law​does​not​surpass​customs​ or​have​an​effect​on​facts;​in​a​word,​it​is​useless. ​ Nor​can​it​prevent​persons​little​worthy​from​entering​into​the​sanctuary​of​the​laws,​because​the​abilities​it​requires​will​never​be​more​ than​probable,​and​remotely​probable​with​respect​to​certain​qualities;​ and​when​the​misguided​electoral​body​makes​a​bad​choice,​all​those​ stipulations​will​be​powerless,​because​there​will​always​be​individuals​who​meet​the​requirements​the​law​establishes​as​a​measure​without​ having​the​qualities​it​seeks;​this​makes​for​a​bad​choice.​Who​does​not​ know​that​frenzied​demagogues​can​be​found​with​all​the​strictest​requirements​of​eligibility,​just​as​men​of​order​among​enthusiastic​youth​ without​resources?​In​Rome​the​tribunes​of​the​people​were​patricians,​ and​in​the​Convention​the​highest​nobility​concurred​in​destroying​the​ monarchy​and​putting​the​king​to​death.​There​is​still​more:​just​as​there​ are,​among​those​the​law​admits,​some​who​are​not​worthy​of​suffrage,​ some​are​found​among​the​excluded​ones​who​are​more​than​worthy​of​ it.​The​result​is​that​the​system​I​oppose​either​keeps​capable​men​from​ the​matters​of​business​or​contravenes​the​law​approving​invalid​elections.​Of​this,​the​greater​part,​if​not​all​our​chambers,​has​given​an​example;​and​in​England​it​is​known​that​Pitt​and​Fox​entered​Parliament​ only​by​means​of​a​deceitful​supposition​that​mocked​the​law.​The​best​ is,​then,​that​we​separate​ourselves​from​the​routine​and​recognize​the​ truth.​Later​I​will​talk​about​the​arrangement​of​the​electoral​power. ​ Moving​on​to​deal​with​the​organization​of​the​Senate,​no​man​moderately​educated​in​these​matters​is​ignorant​of​the​fact​that​this​is​the​ most​difficult​and,​at​the​same​time,​the​most​important​point​of​republican​constitutions.​“Each​day​we​must​be​more​convinced,”​says​one​of​ ​

6.​Pinhetro​Ferreira,​Curso de derecho público.

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the​most​illustrious​thinkers​of​the​century,​“that​the​ancient​peoples​ understood​infinitely​better​than​we​liberty​and​the​nature​of​free​governments​.​.​.​above​all,​they​entrusted​the​sacred​cult​of​the​patria,​the​ priesthood​of​liberty,​the​spirit​of​life​and​durability,​the​guardianship​ of​traditions,​of​glory​and​the​fate​of​the​nation,​the​constant​foresight​ of​the​future​to​a​senate​in​which​they​make​an​effort​to​concentrate​ everything​that​is​good​and​great​of​the​aristocracies,​rejecting​at​the​ same​time​whatever​there​is​in​them​of​the​defective.”7​Villemain,8​analyzing​the​Roman​Constitution,​attributes​all​the​glory​and​liberty​of​ the​ first​ republic​ of​ ancient​ times​ to​ the​ organization​ of​ the​ Senate,​ which,​gathering​together​all​the​eminent​men,​governed,​through​centuries,​the​pieces​of​business​with​the​greatest​wisdom.​In​the​United​ States,​observes​the​author​of​Democracy in America,​that​“Senate​gathers​ together​the​most​distinguished​men,​ensuring​that​all​the​words​that​go​ out​of​that​body​would​do​honor​to​the​greatest​parliamentary​debates​ of​Europe.” ​ In​our​country,​the​need​for​this​kind​of​body​has​made​itself​felt​ in​such​a​way​that​the​organization​of​the​senate​is​precisely​where​our​ constitutional​ efforts​ have​ been​ most​ varied,​ and​ where,​ whenever​ it​ has​been​a​matter​of​reforms,​the​greater​number​of​plans​has​been​presented;​ the​ idea​ of​ summoning​ there​ the​ landowning​ class​ enjoying,​ finally,​neither​a​small​nor​insignificant​favor.​But​is​this​idea​really​fair?​ Permit​me,​sir,​to​say​no,​because​we​seek​by​other​measures​that​institution​we​need​so​urgently.​It​seems​to​me​that​in​a​republic,​the​representation​of​certain​classes​that​do​not​have​political​privileges​lacks​ the​foundation​with​which​it​exists​in​other​institutions​and​sacrifices​ all​the​other​eminent​conditions​of​wisdom​and​patriotism​required​in​ the​conservative​body​to​one​condition​only,​a​certain​love​of​order.​If​ there​were​no​landowners,​in​a​country​where​the​public​path​produces​ misfortunes​and​sometimes​misery​rather​than​probity,​if​the​Constitution​summons​to​the​Senate​the​most​capable​and​meritorious​men,​ these​men​will​contribute​to​public​order,​to​the​stability​of​the​laws,​ and​to​the​respect​for​the​legitimate​interests​of​minorities,​which​it​is​ necessary​neither​to​eliminate​nor​damage,​but​rather​to​make​effective​ those​guarantees​sought​with​the​summoning​of​certain​classes,​in​the​ ​ ​

7.​Sismonde​de​Sismondi,​Ensayo​.​.​.​ 8.​In​his​discourse​on​the​Republic​of​Cicero.

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sense​of​the​general​good;​and,​moreover,​they​will​unite​in​themselves​ ardent​love​of​the​patria,​worship​of​liberty,​and​the​science​of​public​affairs​that​the​simple​assets​of​fortune​do​not​give​and​that​are​absolutely​ indispensible​in​that​elevated​post,​leaving​this​path​of​honor​open​also​ to​the​propertied​class,​and​more​readily​than​to​any​of​the​other​classes​ if​it​combines​those​very​abilities​without​which​it​can​have​no​right​to​ govern​its​country. ​ To​support​this​opinion,​since​it​is​not​given​to​me​to​expound​to​ the​chamber​some​observations​about​the​influence​that​the​organization​of​property​has​in​the​political​order,​because​this​would​take​us​ to​the​most​abstract​and​broadest​theories​of​social​science,​let​me​be​ permitted​to​observe​that​in​the​first​and​most​brilliant​of​the​modern​ aristocracies,​that​of​the​English​Constitution,​this​prerogative​has​been​ possible​only​inasmuch​as​the​public​path​has​been​the​primary​preoccupation​of​the​British​nobility​because​it​constantly​provided​the​most​ eminent​men​for​the​administration,​for​Parliament,​and​for​the​profession​of​arms,​and​because,​like​the​patrician​rank​of​Rome,​it​has​always​ been​eager​to​be​honored,​admitting​into​its​breast​all​great​men​who​ arose​from​the​people.​The​idea​that​property​owners,​simply​for​being​ such,​would​be​devoted​to​the​administration​of​public​affairs​seems​to​ me​neither​just​nor​appropriate.​The​only​aristocracy​in​democracies​is​ the​aristocracy​of​knowledge,​of​virtue,​of​service;​and​if​this​is​not​improvised​nor​can​be​found​readily​in​a​nation​that,​assailed​by​revolutions,​has​seen​immorality​corrupt​everything,​neither​are​constitutions​ works​of​a​single​generation;​it​is​necessary​to​create,​from​this​moment,​ what​must​exist​someday. ​ Without​ceasing​to​appreciate​the​difficulty​that​this​reform​presents,​ I​understand,​sir,​that​preserving​the​representation​of​the​confederated​ bodies​in​the​Senate​as​a​whole,​the​problem​can​be​resolved​by​simple​ methods,​as​are​all​those​of​the​better-​arranged​institutions​we​know.​ If​ the​ term​ of​ office​ of​ this​ chamber​ is​ longer​ than​ that​ of​ the​ other​ bodies​and​the​other​authorities​of​the​state,​with​this​we​will​have​ensured​that​its​action​is​the​most​permanent​and​regularized.​If,​besides​ participating​in​the​legislative​power,​its​functions​can​be​extended​to​ other​equally​interesting​purposes,​if​it​is​permitted​to​be,​in​part​or​ as​a​whole,​a​consultative​body​so​that​it​is​always​available​to​the​great​ affairs​of​interior​and​exterior​policy,​it​will​also​become​the​power​of​ greatest​influence.​If​it​is​replaced​partially,​always​leaving​a​consider-

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able​majority,​it​will​have​no​difficulty​in​preserving​a​national​policy.​If​ a​prior​public​career​is​required​to​belong​to​it,​which​supposes​expertise​in​public​affairs,​the​Senate​will​be​made​up​of​experienced​men,​ and​it​will​be​considered​the​honorable​end​of​a​civil​career.​Finally,​if,​ after​having​made​it​in​that​way​the​most​important,​the​most​influential,​lasting,​and​respectable​body​of​the​state,​for​the​success​of​the​election​it​has​recourse​to​that​admirable​means​that​democratic​institutions​ include​and​both​ancient​and​modern​writers​on​public​matters​extol,​ and​if,​in​a​fixed​period​in​each​state,​public​spirit​is​moved​and​produces​the​decisive​electoral​moment​for​no​other​reason​than​to​select​a​ very​high​magistrate,​then​only​a​distinguished​reputation​will​be​able​to​ win​the​votes​of​the​majority​of​citizens.​Trusting,​then,​in​these​means,​ I​have​the​hope​of​believing​that,​without​denaturing​democracy,​with​ neither​hateful​exclusions​nor​unmerited​privileges,​we​will​have​succeeded​with​the​principal​point​of​our​political​organization. ​ Consistent​with​these​ideas,​I​propose​that​the​Senate​be​composed​ of​a​number​three​times​the​number​of​states​in​the​federation,​so​that,​ having​sixty-​nine​senators,​they​might​have​a​quorum​with​thirty-​five,​ and​resolutions​might​have​at​least​eighteen​votes;​I​propose​as​well​that​ every​two​years​a​third​be​replaced;​I​request​a​prior​public​career​as​advisable,​as​easy​to​be​certified​without​danger​of​fraud;​and​meanwhile,​ so​ that​ the​ direct​ election​ of​ senators​ might​ enter​ into​ our​ constitutional​practices​and​be​perfected​by​them,​I​recognize​the​need​for​each​ one​of​the​states​electing​two,​thereby​guaranteeing​the​federal​principle,​another​third​being​named​by​the​authorities​most​appropriate​to​ summon​eminent​men​to​the​management​of​public​affairs.​Giving​the​ right​to​put​forward​this​third​to​the​executive,​the​Senate​itself,​and​ the​Chamber​of​Deputies,​and​to​this​last​the​right​of​selecting​definitively,​a​very​substantial​step​occurs;​because​this​chamber​is​the​pure​ expression​of​democracy​and​of​the​federation,​it​has​great​guarantees​of​ success,​and​it​takes​from​the​Senate​the​formidable​right​of​electing​its​ members,​a​right​that,​forgetting​the​doctrine​of​a​profound​writer​on​ public​affairs,9​was​conferred​on​the​Senate​by​one​of​our​constitutions.​ So,​in​only​three​articles,​I​expressed​as​many​reforms​as​seemed​to​me​ appropriate​for​the​organization​of​the​legislative​power. ​ In​ measures​ of​ the​ federal​ Constitution​ relative​ to​ the​ creation​ of​ ​

9.​Montesquieu,​in​Spirit of the Laws,​book​2,​chapter​3.

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laws,​much​attention​is​called​to​what​is​needed​for​a​resolution​to​become​law,​the​vote​of​two-​thirds​of​the​initiating​chamber​combined​ with​the​vote​of​a​little​more​than​one-​third​of​the​reviewing​chamber,​ because​ in​ this​ way​ the​ advisable​ equilibrium​ in​ both​ bodies​ is​ destroyed;​and​even​further​attention​is​called​to​the​fact​that​in​this​ situation,​the​objections​of​the​government​might​not​require​a​greater​ number​of​votes​to​reproduce​this​outcome,​as​happens​when​the​majority​of​the​two​chambers​has​approved​it.​An​example​perfectly​clarifies​the​contradiction​in​this​inexplicable​theory:​suppose​a​resolution​ comes​out​of​Congress​with​all​the​votes​of​one​chamber​and​a​majority​ of​the​other,​if​the​government​makes​objections​to​it​and​the​same​vote​ is​reproduced,​it​is​not​yet​law,​because​there​is​not​two-​thirds​of​the​ vote​in​both​chambers;​and​if​that​same​resolution​had​had​fewer​votes​ in​its​favor,​that​is​to​say​fewer​guarantees​ of​success,​ if​its​approval,​ instead​of​unanimous,​had​been​by​those​two-​thirds​of​the​initiating​ chamber,​and​not​by​the​majority​of​the​reviewing​chamber,​but​rather​ only​by​a​little​more​than​a​third,​then,​despite​the​objections​of​the​executive,​it​would​have​become​law.10​To​avoid​this​unfortunate​circumstance,​which​can​be​serious,​one​article​of​the​reforms​sets​forth​that​ the​approval​of​the​majority​in​both​chambers​is​necessary​for​all​laws. ​ With​ respect​ to​ the​ executive,​ the​ reforms​ that​ seem​ necessary​ to​ me​are​few​but​very​obvious​ones.​Nowhere​does​the​Constitution​of​ 1824​appear​as​defective​as​in​the​part​that​established​the​post​of​vice​ president​of​the​Republic.​It​has​been​said​many​times​now,​and​without​argument,​that​placing​over​against​the​supreme​magistrate​another​ standing​magistrate,​one​who​has​the​right​to​succeed​him​in​whatever​ situation,​was​a​creation​only​a​people​like​those​of​the​United​States​ could​adopt,​where​respect​for​the​decisions​of​the​law​is​the​primary​ and​strongest​of​all​customs,​where​the​progress​of​constitutional​order​ ​ 10.​Permit​me​a​calculation​that​makes​that​contradiction​even​more​palpable.​Let​us​ suppose​that​the​Senate​consists​of​30​individuals​and​the​Chamber​of​Deputies​of​75:​if​ a​resolution​initiated​in​the​Chamber​of​Deputies​has​in​its​favor,​in​the​first​and​second​ discussion,​the​vote​of​75​deputies​and​19​senators,​it​takes​only​the​vote​of​the​executive​ for​it​not​to​become​law;​if​the​same​resolution,​initiated​in​the​Chamber​of​Senators,​ had​in​its​favor​the​vote​of​20​and​of​26​deputies,​it​would​be​law​despite​the​objections​ of​the​executive;​in​the​first​case,​the​law​that​is​not​passed​has​94​votes​in​favor​and​11​ against;​in​the​second​case,​the​law​that​is​passed​had​46​votes​in​favor,​59​against.

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during​more​than​sixty​years​has​not​been​disturbed​by​a​single​revolution,​but​completely​inadequate​for​a​country​where​political​questions​have​always​been​decided​by​revolutions​and​not​by​the​peaceful​ methods​ of​ the​ representative​ system,​ in​ which​ possession​ of​ the​ supreme​command​has​been​the​first​motive​of​all​disputes,​the​reality​ of​all​changes.​And​when​one​observes​that​the​electoral​method​was​ settled​in​the​Constitution​of​[1]824​in​such​a​way​that​the​votes​were​not​ cast​separately​for​president​and​vice,​but​rather​it​was​agreed​to​confer​ this​latter​post​on​the​one​who​had​fewer​votes,​declaring​in​that​way​ that​the​vice​president​of​the​Republic​would​be​the​vanquished​rival​of​ the​president,​one​must​be​astonished​that​such​an​unfortunate​combination​would​be​allowed.​Thus,​it​has​had​an​effect​on​not​a​few​of​our​ dissensions​and​civil​wars​and​has​generalized​the​opinion​that​the​post​ should​be​eliminated.​I​have​been​of​the​belief​that​this​reform​was​one​ of​the​most​necessary​because​it​was​essential​to​free​our​first​and​next​ constitutional​periods​from​this​danger,​leaving​for​later​other​improvements​that​I​do​not​consider​to​be​absolutely​indispensable.​I​also​advise​ reform​in​the​vital​area​of​responsibility. ​ In​this​area​I​consider​essential​resolving​a​multitude​of​difficult​questions​and​settling​the​true​moral​character​of​the​chief​of​the​executive​ power,​declaring​him​inviolable​as​long​as​he​acted​through​a​responsible​minister,​who​would​be​responsible​for​any​infraction​of​the​law,​ whether​it​consist​of​acts​of​commission​or​mere​omission.​With​respect​to​procedure,​according​to​the​federal​Constitution,​either​of​the​ chambers​could​hear​the​accusation​as​two-​thirds​of​the​grand​jury​was​ necessary​to​decide​on​bringing​the​lawsuit,​the​matter​then​passing​to​ the​Supreme​Court​of​Justice.​This​system​has​made​responsibility​illusory.​To​the​Chamber​of​Deputies,​because​more​impassioned​in​its​love​ for​the​institutions,​must​belong​the​pronouncement​of​whether​or​not​ there​is​cause​for​bringing​the​case,​and​for​this​a​simple​majority​should​ suffice,​because​the​respect​owed​to​the​laws​and​the​interests​of​society,​ directly​affected​in​the​cases​of​responsibility​of​public​functionaries,​ demand​that​acts​or​omissions​of​these​functionaries​be​examined​whenever​any​doubt​might​be​raised​with​respect​to​the​infraction;​they​require​that​a​lawsuit​then​be​heard,​and​this​step​is​the​only​result​of​that​ pronouncement.​It​falls​to​the​Senate,​which​will​combine​justice​with​ the​love​of​institutions,​to​give​a​verdict​on​the​matter,​because​political​ crimes,​by​their​very​nature,​must​be​judged​differently​from​common​

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crimes:​in​them,​the​procedures​require​less​waiting​and​greater​reputations​and​scope​of​action​in​the​judges;​innocence​is​guaranteed​by​requiring​three-​fifths​for​censure;​and​determination​of​the​punishment​ is​left​to​the​judicial​power,​or​the​entire​lawsuit​in​common​crimes.​All​ these​reforms​are​contained​in​three​articles.​I​must,​finally,​warn​the​ chamber​that,​in​this​matter,​I​have​differed​from​some​of​my​fellow​ committee​members,​who​wanted​to​establish​an​impeachment​procedure,​not​only​for​the​crimes​designated​by​the​law,​but​also​in​general​to​ remove​the​president​and​his​ministers​from​office​because​of​ineptitude​ or​bad​conduct​and​declare​them​unfit​for​other​employment,​basing​my​ opinion​on​two​arguments.​In​the​first​place,​I​do​not​believe​that​one​ should​treat​those​high​functionaries​from​a​state​inferior​to​that​of​the​ least​man,​violating​in​their​case​the​principle​of​natural​justice,​according​to​which​no​one​can​be​punished​for​a​deed​if​this​deed​has​not​been​ defined​precisely​beforehand​and​prohibited​as​a​crime.​In​the​second​ place,​it​seems​to​me​that​that​arbitrary​power​would​be​a​tremendous​ weapon​in​the​hands​of​the​factions,​one​more​hindrance​that​will​keep​ honorable​men​without​ambition​from​power​and​will​be​a​seed​of​incessant​convulsions.​In​a​nation​where​there​have​been​so​many​crimes​ and​no​punishment,​we​congratulate​ourselves​if​we​succeed​in​ensuring​ that​those​crimes​that​have​been​clearly​defined​do​not​go​unpunished. ​ The​reforms​I​propose​in​the​judicial​power​will​be​better​explained​ further​on.​For​now​I​will​only​say​something​about​the​electoral​system. ​ I​have​already​said​that,​in​my​judgment,​the​electoral​system​is​the​ foundation​and​guarantee​of​every​constitution,​and​most​especially​of​ democratic​constitutions,​which​make​all​the​powers​of​the​state​derive​ from​election,​because​whether​public​functionaries​are​good​or​bad,​ whether​they​represent​the​entire​nation​or​only​a​more​or​less​numerous,​vanquishing,​and​exclusive​faction​depends​on​elections.​But​as​this​ final​outcome​depends​not​only​on​the​general​statement​that​establishes​ who​has​the​right​of​suffrage,​but​also​on​all​the​measures​that​regulate​ the​ way​ suffrage​ is​ exercised,​ all​ the​ details​ are​ of​ interest,​ and​ from​ this​it​follows​that​in​this​matter,​as​in​that​of​individual​guarantees,​not​ everything​can​be​reduced​to​fundamental​principles,​sole​property​of​ the​constitution,​and​that​only​an​extensive​and​well-​worked-​out​law​ can​bring​about​the​longed-​for​reform. ​ Unfortunately,​in​this​matter,​our​constitutional​right​is​beginning​to​ weaken​from​the​most​lamentable​backwardness.​We​have​barely​made​

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any​progress​with​respect​to​the​flawed​system​adopted​by​the​Spanish​Cortes,​which​was​the​one​through​which​we​came​to​understand​ the​representative​system;​and​I​dare​maintain​that,​to​the​extent​we​do​ not​correct​that​part​of​our​Constitution,​major​reforms​regarding​the​ rest​will​be​useless,​because​the​indispensable​condition​for​realizing​all​ those​reforms​will​be​lacking,​electing​the​most​worthy​citizens​to​carry​ out​public​functions. ​ Because​of​a​defect​in​our​laws,​the​primary​elections,​whether​they​ are​as​tumultuous​as​when​all​the​votes​are​admitted​without​demanding​any​previous​requirement,​votes​that,​to​ensure​victory,​the​multitude​repeats​as​many​times​as​it​wants,​or​whether​it​be​more​regulated​ through​previous​distribution​of​ballots,​they​are​always​verified​without​citizens​coming​together​as​a​body​and​with​only​a​simple​majority​ of​ votes.​ Passing​ these​ elections​ through​ two​ further​ levels,​ then,​ in​ which​an​absolute​majority​for​the​formation​of​the​electoral​college​ and​the​appointment​of​the​elector​or​deputy​are​now​required,​we​have​ in​this​way​made​our​elections​indirect​at​the​third​level,​without​taking​ into​account​moral​causes​that​contribute​so​powerfully​to​producing​ very​bad​results;​and​submitting​this​procedure​to​a​very​simple​calculation,​it​comes​out​that​a​deputy​can​represent,​as​a​vote​of​the​majority,​ the​vote​of​two​out​of​one​hundred​or,​at​most,​three​votes​out​of​the​ same​number,​a​very​favorable​and​extraordinary​supposition.11 ​ 11.​As​dry​as​this​calculation​is,​the​importance​of​this​matter​obligates​me​to​express​ it​here,​because​the​force​of​its​demonstration​seems​incontestable​to​me.​Given​the​procedure​of​the​elections,​any​number​can​be​taken​to​work​with,​12,001​for​example;​if,​ then,​only​the​relative​majority​is​needed,​supposing​that​the​primary​election​is​decided​ by​a​third,​without​counting​omitted​votes​or​dispersed​votes,​that​is​to​say​by​4,001,​is​ not​to​calculate​too​low,​which​number​represents​the​primary​elector;​but​as​all​of​them​ are​never​united,​and​the​majority​is​sufficient,​an​electorate​that​represents​2,001​citizens​can​elect​also,​by​simple​absolute​majority​of​those​present,​a​secondary​elector​who​ does​not​represent​more​than​1,001.​In​its​turn,​and​for​the​same​reasons,​the​secondary​ electorate,​with​a​majority​that​represents​only​501,​can​elect​a​deputy​who​represents​ 251​citizens​from​among​12,001,​which​is​the​ratio​of​2,998/12,001​to​100.​The​simple​possibility​of​this​case​is​sufficient​to​impugn​and​discard​such​an​absurd​system.​But​I​do​ not​want​to​go​to​extremes,​and​so​that​one​sees​what​such​a​system​of​indirect​election​ at​three​levels​and​absolute​majority​is​in​its​best​combinations,​I​am​going​to​suppose​ a​very​favorable​case,​in​which​the​primary​election​was​decided​by​two-​thirds,​and​in​ which​in​all​the​electoral​bodies​and​all​the​elections​two-​thirds​of​electors​and​votes​

228 : mariano​otero

​ So​dreadful​is​the​progression​of​the​calculation​in​this​fatal​system;​ so​much​is​the​true​national​will​led​astray​and​falsified​by​the​will​of​ factions​ and​ personal​ aspirations​ passing​ through​ each​ one​ of​ those​ levels.​Here​the​numeric​observations,​the​theories​of​writers​on​public​ matters,​and​all​examples,​including​the​example​of​the​very​nation​that​ left​us​that​system,​concur​in​showing​us​that​we​must​take​another​road,​ much​more​so​when​experience​now​convinces​us​that​this​has​produced​ the​worst​consequences​in​our​country.​We​have​all​seen​elections,​and​ we​have​all​contemplated​with​pain​that,​in​each​one​of​them,​public​ spirit​has​appeared​less​energetic,​that​sanctions​and​incentives​have​not​ brought​to​the​electoral​booths​citizens​whose​fate​was​at​stake​in​them,​ and​thus​what​occurs​is​very​natural.​“Among​a​well-​run​city,”​says​an​ eminent​thinker,​“each​one​flies​to​the​assemblies;​under​a​bad​government,​no​one​takes​a​step​to​go​to​them,​because​no​one​takes​an​interest​ in​what​happens,​because​everyone​anticipates​that​the​general​Will​will​ not​prevail,​and​domestic​concerns​absorb​everything.​Good​laws​bring​ others​better;​bad​laws​produce​others​worse.”12​Among​us​the​imperfection​of​the​electoral​system​has​made​the​representative​system​illusory.​ Because​of​it,​minorities​have​taken​the​name​of​majorities,​and​because​ of​it,​instead​of​Congresses​having​represented​the​nation​with​all​its​ opinions​and​interests,​they​have​frequently​represented​only​a​fraction,​ and,​leaving​the​rest​without​legal​action​and​without​influence,​they​ have​hastened​them​into​revolution. ​ However​much​it​might​be​wished,​sir,​this​last​misfortune​is​of​grave​ importance.​The​need​to​summon​all​the​interests​to​be​represented​is​ today​a​truth​so​universally​recognized​that​only​through​ignorance​of​ the​present​state​of​the​science​[of​government]​can​the​hard​and​absolute​rule​of​the​majority​without​the​balance​of​minority​representation​ be​ proclaimed.​ “We​ believe,”​ says​ Sismondi,​ “that​ the​ representative​ always​come​together.​The​calculation​is​the​following:​of​12,001​citizens,​8,001​elect​the​ primary​elector;​two-​thirds​of​the​primary​electors​gather​together,​the​electoral​college​ represents​5,534​citizens,​and​the​secondary​elector,​who​obtains​two-​thirds​of​the​votes,​ represents​3,556​citizens.​Then​the​last​college,​composed​of​two-​thirds,​represents​2,371​ citizens,​and​if​the​deputy​elected​by​a​series​of​such​considerable​majorities​obtains​the​ votes​of​two-​thirds,​he​represents​only​1,581​citizens​out​of​12,001,​which​is​a​ratio​of​ 132,087/12,001​to​100. ​ 12.​[Jean-​Jacques​Rousseau]​Social Contract,​book​3,​chapter​15.

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system​is​a​happy​creation,​because​it​brings​eminent​men​to​the​fore,​ gives​them​opportunities​to​win​and,​above​all,​to​earn​the​confidence​ of​the​people,​and​it​leads​them​to​the​goal​of​controlling​the​rudder​of​ state.​And​we​understand​that​it​is​an​institution​still​happier​because​ it​puts​some​interests,​sentiments,​and​opinions​before​all​others,​providing​the​means​for​discussing​those​opinions​and​of​rectifying​those​ sentiments,​of​balancing​those​interests,​of​uniting,​finally,​the​opinions,​interests,​and​sentiments​of​all​citizens​in​a​single​center​that​can​ be​considered​the​intelligence,​interests,​and​sentiment​of​the​nation​ .​.​.​and​we​believe​that​skillful​measures,​although​difficult,​can,​with​ the​aid​of​representative​government,​protect​all​localities,​all​opinions,​ all​classes​of​citizens,​and​all​interests.”​Examining,​in​the​development​ of​European​civilization,​the​all-​powerful​influence​of​the​institutions​ and​admiring​the​English​Constitution,​Guizot​has​said:​“Only​in​the​ exercise​of​all​rights,​the​expression​of​all​opinions,​the​free​development​ of​ all​ forces​ and​ all​ interests​ is​ there​ permanence​ and​ life:​ the​ legal​existence​of​all​the​elements​and​systems​ensures​that​no​element​ dominates​exclusively,​that​no​single​system​arises​to​destroy​the​rest,​ that​free​examination​redounds​to​everyone’s​benefit​and​advantage.”​ Simple,​natural​reason​tells​us​that​the​representative​system​is​better​ the​more​closely​the​body​of​representatives​resembles​the​nation​represented.​The​theory​of​the​representation​of​minorities​is​nothing​but​ a​consequence​of​universal​suffrage,​because​it​matters​not​at​all​that​no​ one​is​excluded​from​the​right​to​vote​if​many​remain​without​representation,​which​is​the​objective​of​the​suffrage. ​ Congress​ will​ pardon​ me​ for​ placing​ emphasis​ on​ a​ point​ whose​ interest​ seems​ to​ me​ above​ all​ the​ others,​ and​ that​ to​ strengthen​ the​ force​of​my​suggestions​I​sought​authorities,​never​so​necessary​as​when​ one​is​introducing​something​new.​As​for​the​means​of​ameliorating​the​ flaws​I​have​attacked,​I​would​set​out​what​seems​to​me​most​suitable,​if,​ on​emerging​from​the​adopted​system,​we​were​to​write​the​new​system​ into​the​Constitution,​which​in​my​opinion​would​be​very​dangerous.​ Because,​in​fact,​whether​Congress​adopts​the​means​agreed​to​in​[1]842​ for​the​representation​of​all​interests,​or​whether​it​might​prefer​some​ other​method,​it​is​obvious​that​we​are​going​to​enter​onto​the​road​of​ innovation,​that​there​will​be​trials,​and​this​is​enough​for​me​to​opine​ that​we​not​affirm​those​means​in​the​Constitution​but​rather​through​a​ law.​Because​I​believe​firmly,​sir,​and​this​can​be​applied​to​many​other​

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points,​that​the​Constitution,​in​order​that​it​be​respectable​and​lasting—that​is​to​say,​so​that​it​have​a​solid​existence—must​contain​very​ few​principles​only,​all​fundamental,​and​if​possible,​none​disputable.​ With​the​principle​safeguarded​in​the​Constitution​that​elections​must​ necessarily​be​popular,​if,​in​seeking​the​best​among​the​measures​that​ this​foundation​specifies,​we​come​upon​this​law,​which​will​be​a​most​ precious​adoption​for​the​Republic,​it​will​come​to​be​as​immutable​and​ respected​as​the​fundamental​code​itself​because​of​its​practical​effectiveness.​If,​on​the​contrary,​successive​changes​and​improvements​must​ be​made​in​it,​this​will​not​open​anew​the​discussion​of​the​Constitution​nor​hasten​its​destruction.​For​these​reasons,​I​propose​to​Congress​ that​it​leave​to​a​law​the​regulation​of​the​electoral​system​and​the​designation​of​the​way​in​which,​on​constitutional​foundations,​elections​of​ president,​senators,​deputies,​and​ministers​of​the​Court​of​Justice​must​ be​carried​out. ​ But​as​this​law,​the​law​of​guarantees,​the​law​of​responsibility,​and​ the​rest​of​the​laws​that​regulate​the​action​of​the​supreme​powers​should​ not​be​equal,​but​rather​superior​to​all​other​secondary​laws,​it​is​established​that​they​are​characterized​and​distinguished​by​the​special​term​ “constitutional”​and​that​they​not​be​amended​except​when​a​period​of​ six​months​has​elapsed​between​the​presentation​of​the​report​that​proposes​it​and​its​discussion.​This​measure​will​free​laws​of​such​interest​ from​the​ill​effects​of​haste​and​will​provide​Congress​the​assistance​of​a​ thorough​discussion​through​the​press​and​all​organs​of​the​public​will.​ Would​that​similar​measures​could​be​adopted​for​all​laws! ​ Having​explained​what​seems​to​me​essential​to​change​in​the​Constitution,​it​seems​necessary​to​be​concerned​with​another​very​interesting​ point​omitted​in​the​Constitution,​or​at​least​treated​very​superficially.​ What​are​the​respective​limits​of​the​general​power​and​the​power​of​the​ states?​And​once​these​limits​are​known,​what​are​the​best​ways​to​take​ precautions​against​reciprocal​invasion,​so​that​neither​does​the​central​ power​attack​the​sovereignty​of​the​states​nor​do​the​states​dissolve​the​ Union,​not​understanding​its​powers​or​usurping​them?​No​other​matter,​sir,​seems​to​me​today​more​urgent​than​this​one​because​we​have​ the​evil​before​us,​and​it​is​so​serious​an​evil​that​it​threatens​the​institutions​with​death.​At​one​time​we​saw​the​general​Congress​converted​ into​arbiter​of​the​factions​of​the​states​to​decide​the​most​important​ questions​ of​their​internal​ administration;​ and​now,​with​the​federa-

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tion​scarcely​reestablished,​we​see​already​symptoms​of​the​dissolution​ because​of​the​opposite​extreme.​Some​legislatures​have​suspended​the​ laws​of​this​Congress,​another​has​declared​expressly​that​in​its​territory​no​general​law​will​be​obeyed​that​has​as​its​objective​altering​the​ current​state​of​certain​goods;​one​state​announced​that​it​was​going​to​ reassume​the​sovereignty​of​which​it​had​been​divested;​with​the​best​ intentions​a​coalition​is​being​formed​that​will​establish​one​federation​ within​another,​and​we​have​just​been​informed​of​the​law​by​which​a​ state,​in​certain​circumstances,​would​confer​the​power​of​the​entire​ Union​on​the​deputies​of​that​coalition;​and​perhaps​attempts​even​more​ disorganized​ and​ criminal​ are​ being​ pondered.​ With​ such​ principles,​ federation​is​unattainable,​it​is​absurd,​and​for​that​reason​those​of​us​ who​have​constantly​defended​it,​those​of​us​who​see​encoded​in​it​the​ hopes​of​our​country,​raise​our​voices​to​warn​of​the​danger.​And,​in​ view​of​this​danger,​will​there​still​be​anyone​who​maintains​that​it​is​ not​urgent​to​expedite​the​constitution?​Or​that​we​can​wait​for​it​until​ the​conclusion​of​a​war​as​long​as​the​one​we​now​endure?​Or​rather​that​ we​will​have​finished​by​publishing,​in​isolation​and​without​reforms,​a​ Constitution​that​does​not​contain​in​it​any​remedy​for​this​misfortune,​ and​that,​perhaps​for​this​reason,​has​yet​again​succumbed,​yielding​to​ the​force​of​some​incomparably​less​powerful​elements?​No,​these​facts​ clearly​demonstrate​the​imperative​necessity​that​we​settle​the​fate​of​ our​country,​decree​the​reforms,​whatever​might​be​the​dangers,​so​long​ as​it​is​physically​possible​for​us​to​do​so. ​ And​ this​ duty​ is​ that​ much​ more​ sacred​ the​ more​ obvious​ are​ the​ means​to​fulfill​it,​because​to​tell​the​truth,​these​unfortunate​ symptoms​of​dissolution​that​are​already​being​observed​have​been​able​to​ appear​only​because​the​true​principles​that​should​be​generally​known​ are​forgotten.​Article​14​of​the​draft​of​reform,​establishing​the​maxim​ that​the​powers​of​the​Union​are​exceptional​powers​and​limited​only​ to​the​purposes​expressly​designated​in​the​Constitution,​gives​to​the​ sovereignty​of​the​states​all​the​breadth​and​security​that​might​be​desired.​But​for​this​very​reason,​and​because​of​the​fundamental​theory​ I​already​pointed​out​in​expressing​the​reasons​by​which​it​fell​to​the​ general​power​to​establish​the​rights​of​the​citizen,​it​is​also​necessary​to​ declare​that​none​of​the​states​has​power​over​the​goals​agreed​to​by​all​ the​states​of​the​Union,​and​that​not​being​in​this​regard​more​than​parts​ of​a​constituted​whole,​members​of​a​great​Republic,​in​no​instance​can​

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they​by​themselves,​in​exercising​their​individual​sovereignty,​make​any​ resolution​regarding​those​goals​nor​provide​for​their​regulation​except​ through​federal​powers,​nor​demand​more​than​the​fulfillment​of​the​ exemptions​the​Constitution​grants​them.​Given​these​assertions,​it​remains​only​to​establish​the​means​of​making​them​effective,​and​for​this​ it​is​necessary​to​distinguish​the​abuses​that​can​be​committed​according​ to​whether​they​affect​the​rights​of​persons​or​the​authority​of​public​ powers. ​ For​this​last​contingency,​it​is​indispensable​to​give​the​Congress​of​ the​Union​the​right​to​declare​null​those​laws​of​the​states​that​amount​ to​a​violation​of​the​federal​pact​or​that​might​be​contrary​to​the​general​ laws,​because​otherwise​the​power​of​a​state​would​be​superior​to​that​of​ the​Union,​and​the​power​of​the​Union​would​become​a​mere​mockery.​ But​to​avoid​making​imprudent​declarations,​it​is​advisable​that​these​ laws​be​initiated​only​in​the​Senate,​which​represents​the​federative​system​in​all​its​strength​and​provides​the​greatest​guarantees​of​calm​and​ circumspection;​moreover,​it​is​established​that​the​majority​of​the​legislatures​of​the​states​have​the​right​in​every​case​to​decide​whether​the​ resolutions​of​the​general​Congress​are​or​are​not​unconstitutional.​In​ this​way,​each​state​individually​is​subject​to​the​Union,​and​the​totality​ of​all​will​be​the​supreme​arbiter​of​our​differences​and​the​true​conserving​power​of​institutions.​If​there​is​yet​another​more​effective​means​ of​strengthening​the​federative​principle,​if​another​better​guarantee​of​ the​liberties​of​the​confederated​bodies​is​known,​I​do​not​propose​it​ because​I​do​not​know​it. ​ The​attacks​made​by​the​powers​of​the​states​and​by​the​same​powers​ of​the​federation​on​individuals​have​among​us,​unfortunately,​numerous​models,​so​it​might​not​be​urgent​beyond​measure​to​accompany​the​ reestablishment​of​the​federation​with​a​guarantee​sufficient​to​ensure​ that​those​attacks​will​not​be​repeated.​This​guarantee​can​be​found​only​ in​the​judicial​power,​inherent​protector​of​the​rights​of​individuals​and,​ for​this​reason,​the​only​suitable​one.​Even​in​absolute​monarchies,​liberty,​having​taken​refuge​in​the​precincts​of​tribunals,​has​forced​justice​ to​find​there​a​support​when​political​guarantees​have​been​lacking.​A​ profound​writer​has​observed​that​the​breadth​and​respectability​of​the​ judicial​power​was​the​surest​sign​of​the​liberty​of​a​people,​and​for​this​ reason​I​have​not​wavered​in​proposing​to​Congress​that​it​greatly​elevate​the​judicial​power​of​the​federation,​giving​it​the​right​to​protect​all​

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the​inhabitants​of​the​Republic​in​the​enjoyment​of​the​rights​that​the​ Constitution​and​constitutional​laws​assure​them​against​all​incursions​ of​the​executive​or​the​legislative,​whether​of​the​states​or​of​the​Union.​ In​North​America​this​saving​power​originated​in​the​Constitution​and​ has​produced​the​greatest​results.​There​the​judge​has​to​subject​his​verdicts​above​all​to​the​Constitution;​and​from​this​results​that​when​he​ finds​it​in​conflict​with​a​secondary​law,​he​applies​the​former​and​not​ the​ latter,​ so,​ without​ making​ himself​ superior​ to​ the​ law​ or​ putting​ himself​in​opposition​to​the​legislative​power​or​disparaging​its​resolutions,​in​each​individual​case​in​which​it​would​have​caused​harm,​he​declares​it​null.​Such​an​institution​is​completely​necessary​among​us,​and​ as​it​requires​that​the​federal​tribunals​be​organized​in​a​corresponding​ way,​the​proposed​reforms​leave​to​the​constitutional​laws​the​determination​of​this​point.​Concerning​it,​finally,​I​will​show​that,​also​in​my​ judgment,​it​is​necessary​to​extend​a​bit​more​the​action​of​the​federal​ power​of​the​Union,​very​imperfectly​organized​in​the​federal​Constitution,​and,​above​all,​to​raise​the​status​and​ensure​the​independence​of​ a​tribunal​called​to​represent​in​the​political​body​so​important​a​role​as​ that​of​supreme​judicial​power. ​ With​these​reforms​proposed,​it​only​remains​for​me​now​to​speak​ to​the​Congress​about​one​single​reform,​the​one​relative​to​the​method​ that​should​be​adopted​to​provide​constant​improvement​of​the​institutions.​On​this​point,​no​one​doubts​that​the​effectiveness​of​a​fundamental​ code​ essentially​ consists​ in​ its​ being​ the​ best​ possible​ for​ the​ circumstances​ in​ which​ it​ is​ issued​ and​ that​ it​ contain,​ furthermore,​ the​most​adequate​means​for​advancing​the​society​and​the​consequent​ perfection​of​its​institutions.​The​difficulty​of​the​problem​consists​in​ reconciling​the​respect​owed​to​those​institutions​with​the​possibility​ of​legitimately​making​the​necessary​changes​that​experience​indicates;​ and,​because​this​alone​manages​to​distinguish​in​the​institutions​the​ fundamental​from​the​secondary,​I​think​that​every​general​rule​is​bad.​ To​declare,​as​the​Bases​Orgánicas13​did,​that​the​entire​Constitution​can​ be​reformed​at​any​time,​although​this​is​a​matter​without​danger​when​ speaking​of​a​constitution​as​solid​as​England’s,​among​us​it​would​be​to​ proclaim​that​the​country​must​remain​eternally​unconstituted,​that​the​ change​of​society’s​primary​principles​should​be​the​subject​of​discus​

13.​A​centralist​constitution​enacted​in​1843.​(Editor’s​note)

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sion​and​the​constant​work​of​the​Mexican​people,​and​with​this​supposition​peace​is​impossible.​On​the​other​extreme,​to​subject​the​least​ important​and​minute​detail​to​the​same​impediments​as​a​fundamental​ principle​is​to​hinder​the​reform​even​to​the​extreme​of​fearing​that​the​ obstacle​might​lead​to​destruction.​Guided​by​these​observations,​I​distinguish​three​parts​of​the​Constitution.​With​respect​to​the​primordial​ principles​and​those​prior​to​the​Constitution,​like​the​independence​ of​the​nation,​its​form​of​federal,​popular,​representative,​republican​ government,​and​the​consequent​division​of​powers,​principles​that​are​ identified​with​the​very​existence​of​the​nation,​reform​is​not​appropriate,​and​they​must​be​declared​permanent.​For​what​has​to​do​with​the​ limits​of​the​general​power​and​the​sovereignty​of​the​states,​it​is​unquestionable​that​some​modifications​can​be​made;​but​in​this​event,​besides​ the​vote​of​two-​thirds​of​each​chamber​or​the​consecutive​ratification​ of​a​reform​by​two​legislatures,​I​require​the​consent​of​the​majority​of​ these​ legislatures​ for​ the​ purpose​ of​ giving​ all​ imaginable​ guarantees​ to​ local​ liberties.​ On​ all​ other​ points​ I​ permit​ reforms​ provided​ that​ two-​thirds​of​both​chambers​or​the​simple​majority​of​two​consecutive​ Congresses​ consent,​ providing​ also​ to​ the​ constitutional​ reforms​ the​guarantee​of​calm​and​reflective​meditation​established​by​laws​of​ that​kind.​This​last​method​of​reform​was​that​established​by​the​Constitution​of​1824,​and​its​preservation​seems​to​me​that​much​more​appropriate​the​more​we​avoid​in​this​way​all​dispute​over​its​legitimacy;​ because​finally,​if​the​nation​does​not​want​them​or​desires​others,​we​ always​leave​in​the​hands​of​its​representatives​the​same​power​they​had​ before​to​serve​its​will.​There​is​no​reason​to​mistrust​the​future.​Those​ who​might​come​after​us​will​not​give​up​good​intentions,​and​under​ auspices​less​destructive​and​with​the​elements​we​have​now​left​them,​ they​will​progress​a​great​deal​in​the​perfection​and​consolidation​of​our​ noble​institutions. ​ For​now,​sir,​I​have​completed​my​arduous​task.​What​I​expressed,​ and​even​more​the​plan​with​which​I​conclude,​will​show​Congress​the​ way​in​which,​in​my​judgment,​the​great​question​that​has​shaken​our​ country​for​thirteen​years​should​be​resolved.​Quite​convinced​of​the​ difficulties​ of​ the​ undertaking,​ I​ am​ very​ far​ from​ having​ feelings​ of​ intolerance​or​fanaticism​for​my​ideas,​and​I​deliver​them​to​the​judgment​ of​ the​ chamber​ with​ that​ much​ greater​ lack​ of​ confidence,​ the​ more​the​constraints​of​time​have​compelled​me​to​present​them​with-

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out​having​reviewed​them​beforehand​and​without​being​able​to​correct​ them​afterward;​nonetheless,​Congress,​in​its​wisdom,​will​examine​the​ articles​more​than​their​foundations,​will​consider​my​observations​despite​the​lack​of​method​and​style.​I​only​request​for​them​an​act​of​justice​in​the​moment​in​which​I​leave​them​to​the​monumental​judgment​ of​thinking​men,​to​the​intense​and​impassioned​opinion​of​the​factions.​ If​I​deceive​myself​in​believing​that​my​plan​has​been​eminently​democratic​and​federal,​there​is​no​doubt​that​these​ideas​are​the​ones​I​have​ always​maintained​in​the​good​as​well​as​in​the​bad​days​of​the​federation.​In​this​Congress​I​myself​proposed​them​to​the​committee​well​ before​the​terrible​circumstances​of​last​month​arose.​The​plan​is​not​ my​work​alone,​although​today​I​might​have​no​other​support​than​my​ isolated​signature​and​my​feeble​voice.​I​formed​it​during​very​extended​ discussions​with​another​of​the​gentlemen​of​the​committee​(Mr.​Cardoso),​whose​vast​knowledge​of​this​subject​matter​is​well​known,​and​ who​today​differs​from​this​vote​only​with​respect​to​the​question​of​its​ timeliness,​and​Mr.​Espinosa​de​los​Monteros,​whose​very​name​is​authority,​ discussed​ and​ corrected​ it.​ The​ work​ having​ been​ concluded​ about​two​months​ago,​I​do​nothing​more​than​present​it​to​Congress​ just​as​it​was​conceived​earlier,​so​that​it​might​be​seen​that​in​some​way​ it​can​be​called​a​work​of​circumstance,​and​for​this​reason​I​even​leave​ for​later​the​article​regarding​the​regulation​of​the​territory. ​ Above​ all,​ I​ say​ it​ would​ be​ disgraceful​ to​ compromise​ the​ sacred​ interests​of​the​patria.​My​intention,​sir,​is​ending​the​crisis​in​which​we​ find​ourselves.​I​desire​that​Congress​bring​the​difficulties​under​control​ and​that,​putting​a​stop​to​the​disorder,​it​constitute​the​Republic,​determining​the​improvements​that​its​institutions​might​require,​and​which​ are,​to​my​way​of​thinking,​encompassed​in​the​few​articles​to​which​I​ have​referred.​Everything​warns​us​that​this​need​is​more​urgent​each​ day​and​that​neither​our​internal​unrest​nor​our​foreign​war​can​justify​ delay.​We​cannot​wait​until​circumstances​improve,​because​it​is​a​question​of​Congress​making​the​circumstances​change​promptly;​nor​would​ it​be​honest​and​patriotic​that,​losing​hope​in​the​fate​of​our​country,​ we​abandon​it​to​the​struggle​of​all​the​elements​of​anarchy,​which,​if​ they​present​and​strengthen​themselves,​it​is​only​because​everything​is​ provisional​and​nothing​stable,​because​doubt​and​uncertainty​drain​the​ strength​from​the​power​and​its​restorative​hopes​from​the​future;​and​ this​we​would​do​if​we​set​aside​our​work​until​a​time​when​there​might​

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not​be​any​more​difficulties.​The​difficulties​of​today​are​at​least​known​ to​us;​who​might​foresee​those​of​tomorrow?​Who,​above​all,​does​not​ tremble​just​at​the​idea​of​exposing​the​fate​of​the​country​and​the​institutions​to​the​fickle​and​drawn-​out​outcome​of​the​war?​Ah,​sir,​perhaps​now​the​only​days​are​drawing​to​a​close​during​which,​for​some​ time,​we​will​have​had​the​power​to​constitute​our​country​and​save​the​ institutions.​Let​it​be​thus,​that​preference​be​given​to​whatever​bears​ on​the​war,​and​that​Congress​continue​working​on​it​with​the​courage,​ perseverance,​and​good​faith​that​have​so​much​honored​it​and​through​ which​it​will​do​justice​by​us;​but​that​if​the​fulfillment​of​the​principal​objective​of​our​mission​is​still​possible,​we​not​abandon​it​from​this​ moment​on​or​delay​it​more,​because​this​is​equivalent​to​renouncing​ it​and​leaving​our​ills​without​remedy,​with​so​much​less​excuse,​given​ that​we​do​not​need​to​undertake​a​new​labor,​but​rather​that​discussing​ fifteen​or​twenty​articles​of​reform​will​suffice.​Let​us​remember​that,​in​ the​opening​of​the​Cortes​of​Cádiz,​the​noise​of​foreign​cannonballs​was​ mixed​with​the​pomp​of​the​oaths​that​solemnized​that​act,​and​that​that​ Congress​in​a​few​months​gave​the​monarchy​a​complete​constitution.​ The​confidence​of​the​people​in​the​solemn​days​of​their​misery​imposes​ on​us​the​duty​of​struggling​with​the​difficulties​even​to​the​furthest​extreme.​With​pleasure,​I​dispense​with​showing​why​we​have​sufficient​ liberty​for​our​labors;​on​this​each​consults​his​own​conscience.​For​me,​ I​do​not​have​difficulty​dealing​with​all​the​questions,​and​so​I​will​do​it​ whenever​Congress​wishes​to​occupy​itself​with​these​matters. ​ And​so​today​I​must​give​Congress​only​an​account​of​the​labors​I​ undertook​by​its​order​and​explain​my​dissenting​vote​on​the​propositions​and​initiatives​regarding​which​the​definitive​reestablishment​of​ the​Constitution​of​1824​has​been​requested;​I​do​it​submitting​to​your​ enlightened​deliberation​the​following:

plan in​the​name​of​God,​Creator​and​preserver​of​societies,​the​Extraordinary​ Constituent​ Congress,​ considering:​ that​ the​ Mexican​ states,​by​a​spontaneous​act​of​their​own​and​individual​sovereignty,​and​ in​order​to​consolidate​their​independence,​secure​their​liberty,​provide​ for​the​common​defense,​establish​peace,​and​seek​the​good,​confederated​themselves​in​1823​and​constituted​afterward​in​1824​a​political​system​of​union​for​their​general​government​under​the​form​of​popular​

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representative​republic​and​on​the​preexisting​foundation​of​their​natural​and​reciprocal​independence;​that​that​pact​of​alliance,​source​of​ the​first​Constitution​and​only​legitimate​source​of​the​supreme​power​ of​the​Republic,​endures​in​its​original​vigor​and​is​and​had​to​be​the​ first​principle​of​every​fundamental​institution;​that​that​same​constitutive​principle​of​the​federal​Union,​if​a​superior​force​has​been​able​to​ oppose​it,​has​neither​been​able​nor​is​able​to​be​altered​by​a​new​constitution;​and​that​in​order​to​consolidate​it​further​and​make​it​effective,​the​reforms​that​experience​has​demonstrated​to​be​necessary​in​ the​Constitution​of​1824​are​urgent,​has​deClared​and​deCreed​and,​ using​its​comprehensive​powers,​deClareS​and​deCreeS: ​ 1.​That​the​states​that​make​up​the​Mexican​Union​have​regained​the​ independence​and​sovereignty​that,​for​their​internal​administration,​ are​reserved​in​the​Constitution. ​ 2.​ That​ said​ states​ continue​ associated​ in​ accordance​ with​ the​ pact​ that​once​constituted​the​mode​of​political​existence​of​the​people​of​the​ United​Mexican​States. ​ 3.​That​the​Constitutive​Act​and​the​federal​Constitution,​sanctioned​ on​January​31​and​October​24​of​1824,​form​the​only​political​Constitution​of​the​Republic. ​ 4.​That​besides​those​codes,​the​following​must​be​observed:

aCt​of​reform Art.​1.​Every​Mexican,​through​birth​or​through​naturalization,​who​has​ arrived​at​the​age​of​twenty,​who​has​an​honest​means​of​living,​and​who​ has​not​been​condemned​in​a​legal​action​to​a​shameful​punishment,​is​ a​citizen​of​the​United​States​of​Mexico. ​ Art.​2.​It​is​the​right​of​citizens​to​vote​in​popular​elections,​exercise​ the​right​of​petition,​gather​to​discuss​public​affairs,​and​belong​to​the​ National​Guard,​all​in​accordance​with​the​laws. ​ Art.​3.​The​exercise​of​the​rights​of​a​citizen​is​suspended​for​being​ habitually​intoxicated,​or​a​gambler​by​profession,​or​a​vagrant,​because​ of​religious​status,​because​of​the​status​of​legal​interdiction,​by​virtue​ of​trial​on​those​crimes​by​which​the​attribute​of​citizen​is​lost,​and​for​ refusing​to​serve​the​public​duties​of​popular​appointment.​By​means​of​ a​law​the​exercise​of​these​rights,​the​manner​of​proving​possession​of​ the​attribute​of​a​citizen​and​the​procedures​suitable​for​declaring​its​loss​ or​suspension​will​be​regulated.

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​ Art.​4.​To​ensure​the​rights​of​man​that​the​Constitution​recognizes,​ a​ law​ will​ set​ forth​ the​ guarantees​ of​ liberty,​ security,​ property,​ and​ equality,​ which​ all​ the​ inhabitants​ of​ the​ Republic​ enjoy,​ and​ it​ will​ establish​the​means​of​making​them​effective. ​ These​guarantees​are​inviolable,​and​only​in​the​case​of​a​foreign​invasion​or​an​internal​rebellion​will​the​legislative​power​be​able​to​suspend​the​established​procedures​for​the​apprehension​and​detention​of​ individuals​and​searching​of​homes,​and​this​for​a​specified​time. ​ Any​assault​on​these​guarantees​is​an​occasion​for​liability,​and​neither​ exemption​nor​amnesty​nor​any​other​measure​will​be​able​to​fall​to​the​ favor​of​the​guilty,​even​should​it​emanate​from​the​legislative​power,​ which​removes​it​from​the​tribunals​or​prevents​the​punishment​from​ being​effective. ​ Art.​ 5.​ For​ every​ fifty​ thousand​ souls,​ or​ for​ a​ fraction​ that​ passes​ twenty-​five​thousand,​a​deputy​will​be​elected​to​the​general​Congress.​ To​do​so,​he​is​required​only​to​be​twenty-​five​years​old,​be​in​exercise​ of​the​rights​of​the​citizen,​and​not​be​included​at​the​time​of​the​election​in​the​exceptions​of​Article​23​of​the​Constitution. ​ Art.​6.​Besides​the​two​senators​each​state​elects,​a​number​equal​to​ the​number​of​states​will​be​chosen​by​nomination​of​the​Chamber​of​ Deputies​voting​by​deputations,​of​the​Senate,​and​of​the​executive.​The​ persons​who​garner​these​three​votes​will​be​elected,​and​the​Chamber​ of​Deputies,​voting​as​persons,​will​name​those​that​lack​the​three​from​ among​the​other​candidates. ​ A​third​of​the​Senate​will​be​replaced​every​two​years. ​ Art.​7.​To​be​a​senator​one​must​be​thirty​years​old,​have​the​other​ characteristics​required​to​be​a​deputy,​and​in​addition​must​have​been​ constitutional​president​or​vice​president​of​the​Republic,​or​for​more​ than​ six​ months​ secretary​ of​ the​ department​ or​ governor​ of​ state,​ or​ member​of​the​chambers,​or​twice​of​a​legislature,​or​for​more​than​five​ years​diplomatic​envoy,​or​minister​of​the​Supreme​Court​of​Justice,​or​ for​six​years​judge​or​magistrate. ​ Art.​8.​It​belongs​exclusively​to​the​Chamber​of​Deputies​to​establish​ itself​as​a​grand​jury​in​order​to​declare,​by​a​simple​majority​of​votes,​ whether​it​has​reason​or​not​to​indict​the​high​functionaries​to​whom​ the​Constitution​or​the​laws​grant​this​privilege. ​ Art.​9.​The​Chamber​of​Deputies,​having​declared​that​it​has​reason​ for​building​the​case,​if​the​crime​is​general,​it​will​move​to​the​dossier​of​

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the​Supreme​Court;​if​it​is​prosecuted​de oficio,14​the​Senate​will​be​established​as​the​jury​of​verdict​and​will​be​limited​to​declaring​whether​the​ defendant​is​or​is​not​guilty.​For​this​declaration​the​vote​of​three-​fifths​ of​the​current​members​is​needed.​This​declaration​made,​the​Supreme​ Court​will​determine​the​punishment​according​to​what​the​law​advises. ​ Art.​ 10.​ For​ every​ law​ the​ approval​ of​ the​ majority​ of​ the​ current​ members​of​both​chambers​is​needed. ​ Art.​11.​The​articles​of​the​Constitution​that​established​the​office​of​ vice​president​of​the​Republic​are​repealed,​and​the​temporary​absence​ of​the​president​will​be​covered​in​the​way​the​Constitution​establishes​ for​the​situation​in​which​both​functionaries​are​absent. ​ Art.​12.​The​president​is​liable​for​the​public​crimes​he​commits​during​the​exercise​of​his​position​and​even​those​that​are​prosecuted​of​its​ own​initiative​(de oficio),​excluded​by​the​Constitution,​provided​that​ the​action​involved​is​not​authorized​by​the​signature​of​the​responsible​ minister. ​ Ministers​ answer​ for​ all​ the​ infractions​ of​ the​ law​ they​ commit,​ whether​they​consist​of​acts​of​commission​or​pure​omission. ​ Art.​13.​The​elections​of​deputies,​senators,​president​of​the​Republic,​ and​ministers​of​the​Supreme​Court​of​Justice​will​be​regulated​by​laws,​ adoption​of​direct​election​allowed,​the​only​exception​being​the​third​ of​the​Senate​that​Article​6​of​this​act​establishes.​The​law​will​also​establish​and​organize​the​courts​of​first​and​second​instance,​which​must​ hear​matters​reserved​to​the​judicial​power​of​the​federation. ​ Art.​14.​All​powers​of​the​Union​are​derived​from​the​Constitution​ and​are​limited​only​to​the​exercise​of​the​faculty​expressly​designated​ in​the​Constitution​itself,​without​other​faculties​understood​to​be​permitted​through​absence​of​an​expressed​restriction. ​ Art.​15.​No​state​has​rights​over​the​aims​subordinated​to​the​power​ of​the​Union,​other​than​those​expressly​set​forth​in​the​Constitution,​or​ any​legitimate​way​of​taking​control​of​them​other​than​the​way​established​by​the​general​powers​of​the​Constitution.​The​Constitution​alone​ recognizes​as​legitimate,​among​all​or​some​of​the​states,​the​relationship​ that​their​federation​constituted​and​currently​constitutes. ​ Art.​16.​Every​law​of​the​states​that​attacks​the​Constitution​or​the​ ​ 14.​De oficio​refers​to​crimes,​such​as​murder,​that​are​prosecuted​by​the​authority​ even​without​a​plaintiff.​(Editor’s​note)

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general​laws​will​be​declared​null​by​the​Congress;​but​only​the​Senate​ will​be​able​to​initiate​this​declaration. ​ Art.​17.​If,​within​a​month​of​publication​of​a​law​of​the​general​Congress,​it​is​protested​as​unconstitutional​either​by​the​president​in​agreement​with​his​ministry​or​by​ten​deputies​or​six​senators​or​three​legislatures,​ the​ Supreme​ Court​ before​which​ the​ objection​ will​ be​made​ will​submit​the​law​to​the​examination​of​the​legislatures,​which,​within​ three​months​and​precisely​on​the​same​day,​will​issue​their​vote. ​ The​ declarations​ will​ be​ remitted​ to​ the​ Supreme​ Court,​ and​ this​ court​will​publish​the​result,​the​resolution​being​what​the​majority​of​ the​legislatures​say. ​ Art.​18.​In​the​matter​of​the​two​previous​articles,​the​general​Congress​and​the​legislatures,​in​their​turn,​will​decide​solely​whether​the​ law​whose​invalidity​they​are​discussing​is or is not unconstitutional;​and​ in​every​affirmative​declaration,​the​words​of​the​annulled​law​and​the​ text​of​the​Constitution​or​general​law​to​which​it​is​opposed​will​be​inserted. ​ Art.​19.​In​the​exercise​and​preservation​of​the​rights​that​this​Constitution​and​the​constitutional​laws​grant,​the​tribunals​of​the​federation​ will​protect​any​inhabitant​of​the​Republic​against​every​attack​by​the​ legislative​and​executive​powers,​whether​of​the​federation​or​the​states,​ said​tribunals​being​limited​to​giving​their​protection​to​the​particular​ case​with​which​the​process​deals,​without​making​any​general​declaration​at​all​regarding​the​law​or​the​act​that​might​motivate​it. ​ Art.​20.​The​laws​of​which​Articles​3,​4,​and​13​of​this​act​speak,​that​ of​liberty​of​the​press,​the​organic​law​of​the​National​Guard,​and​all​the​ laws​that​regulate​the​general​measures​of​the​Constitution​and​of​this​ act,​are​constitutional​laws​and​cannot​be​altered​or​repealed​without​a​ period​of​six​months​intervening​between​the​presentation​of​the​decree​and​its​discussion. ​ Art.​21.​The​articles​of​the​Constitution​can​be​reformed​at​any​time,​ provided​that​two-​thirds​of​both​chambers​or​the​simple​majority​of​ two​distinct​and​consecutive​Congresses​agree​to​it.​The​reforms​that​ limit​in​some​way​the​extension​of​the​powers​of​the​states​need,​moreover,​the​approval​of​the​majority​of​the​legislatures.​But​in​no​case​can​ there​be​alteration​to​the​primordial​principles​and​those​antecedent​to​ the​Constitution,​which​established​the​independence​of​the​nation,​its​ form​of​federal,​popular,​representative,​republican​government,​and​

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the​division​both​of​the​general​powers​and​of​the​states.​In​every​plan​ of​reform​the​intervening​period​established​in​the​previous​article​will​ be​observed. ​ Art.​22.​With​this​act​of​reforms​published,​all​public​powers​will​be​ regulated​by​it.​The​general​legislative​power​will​continue​entrusted​in​ the​current​Congress​until​the​chambers​meet.​The​states​will​continue​ observing​their​individual​constitutions​and,​according​to​them,​will​replace​their​powers​within​the​time​periods​and​terms​they​designate. Mexico,​April​5,​1847.—M. Otero

ignacio raMírez Ignacio​Ramírez​(1818–79),​born​in​Guanajuato,​was​a​writer,​ poet,​journalist,​lawyer,​and​politician.​Along​with​Guillermo​ Prieto,​he​founded​the​newspaper​Don Simplicio​in​1845.​Ramírez’s​pen​name​was​El​Nigromante​(the​necromancer).​Early​in​ his​life​he​was​imprisoned​because​of​his​satirical​writings.​A​ formidable​orator,​Ramírez​was​elected​deputy​to​the​1856–57​ Constituent​Congress​and​became​part​of​the​radical​wing​of​ the​liberal​party.​Ramírez​struggled​to​end​the​privileged​status​ of​ the​ Catholic​ Church​ and​ the​ army.​ He​ contributed​ to​ the​ drafting​of​the​reform​laws,​which​separated​church​and​state,​ forced​the​church​to​sell​its​property,​secularized​public​services​ such​as​marriage,​and​established​the​civil​registry. ​ When​the​conservative​faction​was​temporarily​defeated​at​ the​ end​ of​ the​ Three​ Years’​ War​ (1857–61),​ President​ Benito​ Juárez​ (1806–72)​ appointed​ Ramírez​ secretary​ of​ justice​ and​ public​ instruction.​ During​ his​ term​ Ramírez​ established​ the​ National​Library​and​reorganized​primary​education.​Ramírez​ fought​against​the​imperial​armies​in​the​state​of​Sinaloa​during​ the​French​intervention​and​was​exiled​to​the​United​States.​He​ returned​to​Mexico​before​the​fall​of​the​empire​and​was​imprisoned.​After​the​fall​of​Emperor​Maximilian,​Congress​appointed​him​to​the​Supreme​Court,​and​he​served​a​long​tenure​ there. ​ We​present​two​of​his​writings​from​the​Constituent​Congress​ period:​ the​ poem​ “The​ National​ Representation”​ (La​ representación​nacional)​(1845)​and​a​speech​delivered​to​the​ Constituent​Congress​on​July​7,​1856.​Also,​we​present​a​letter​ to​Guillermo​Prieto​(“Fidel”)​written​at​the​time​of​the​French​ intervention,​between​1863​and​1865.

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The National Representation

Representative,​open​your​books, And​say​if​the​patria​mercantile​be, Industrial​or​agricultural. ​ —Agricultural​Mexico​is, The​matter​decided​a​long​time​ago; —But​will​urban​dwellers​be​wise When​a​city​so​populous​is, If​they​plant​the​rooftops​and​streets And​close​every​one​of​their​ports? ​ Friend​deputy​do​not​believe​it, For​the​good​of​the​country​I​beg​you, Seek​industry​where​you​see​houses. ​ —Deputy,​doctor​of​Tampico​am​I. I’ve​not​seen​the​port,​but​from​letters​I’ve​read From​my​niece​I​know​it​is​not​very​rich. If​the​port​had​been​closed,​foreign​hordes, Who​from​Paris​and​Europe​have​come​with​stuffed​bags, Would​not​make​us​soup​and​a​suit, And​their​boats​would​not​carry​our​gold Nor​our​eyes​nor​our​feet​nor​our​teeth​’fore​the​wind. ​ The​Tampico​forum​is​silent,​their​fault; And​no​one​plants​olive​or​wheat, Although​the​fertile​ground​is​a​treasure. ​ Nor​on​the​beach​is​there​any​maize​field; But​here​is​a​part​of​a​mule​load​they​left, And​there​is​a​barrel,​and​luckily​some​fish. The​town,​very​poor,​scarcely​a​third​will​be​ours; ​ Original​title:​“La​representación​nacional.”​Source:​Don Simplicio, periódico crítico, burlesco y filosófico,​vol.​1,​no.​1,​p.​6,​1845. 243

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My​niece​closed​her​shop And​a​new​business​has. Someone​who​customs​duty​can​get Is​the​only​one​with​daily​bread​guaranteed. The​foreigner,​I​repeat,​the​reason​for​such​ruin​is. ​ —All​that​news​I​had​yesterday From​Blas,​your​muleteer.​And​I​have​known From​that​very​same​Blas​what​I’m​talking​about. ​ —What!​Is​a​representative​thus​so​informed About​the​country​that​he​represents? —What​more​can​I​know?—Your​pardon​I​beg. Exact​account​should​you​have Of​the​farms​and​their​crops, Of​the​people​who​feed​themselves​there, And​in​the​same​way​you​should​know Something​of​workshops,​and​even​for​sure What​the​poor​small​shops​do​spend. ​ How​many​ships​there​are​in​the​port,​not​only​if​ships​there​be. —Come​on,​do​you​want​that​a​deputy​be An​expert​in​statistics​of​sorts? ​ Yes,​that​and​in​other​things.—I​have​faded​away As​a​jurist,​but​as​statistician​I’ve​not: To​know​all​to​what​mortal​is​it​given? But​then​if​a​sophistical​orator A​challenge​to​me​from​the​rostrum​should​give, The​syllogistic​system​to​me​matters​more, The​bar​and​the​royal​decrees, Than​the​ranches,​the​ships,​and​the​shops That​in​my​district​might​be. To​create​wise​and​marvelous​laws, Is​it​not​sufficient​for​me,​and​by​a​wide​margin,​the​maneuver, that​might​get​me​two​revered​tassels? ​ —To​formulate​laws​platonic,​more​than​enough​do​you​have; But​to​formulate​laws​that​produce​genuine​wealth, You​must​learn​them​from​people,​and​no​other​work. ​ —Responsibility​for​general​laws​lies​with​Congress And​your​theory​we​study​in​immortal​works. ​ In​Tocqueville,​knowledge​easy​and​cheap​we​can​find,

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In​Montesquieu,​and​in​Ferrier, And​followed​by​every​person​these​days. ​ —Of​Solons,​we​thus​have​a​bunch, But​the​people​consumptive​become Because​Congress’s​system​so​philosophical​is, ​ Studying​politics​as​if​it​were​physics, It​learned​with​thermometers​painted, And​metaphysics​without​seeing​any​objects. ​ What​can​speeches​as​sermons​prepared​generate In​the​rostrum?​Decrees​not​begot​but​aborted. Among​the​people​they​do​well,​it’s​true, To​the​extent​that​the​people​sovereign​be​called, They​applaud​and​ask​not​if​the​king​might​be​fasting. ​ Haughty​Fraud,​in​a​salon,​rises​up​from​her​knees And​with​poetic​style​maintains That​man​is​immortal​and​that​gold​is​vain; But​dying​she​fears​and​gold​she​has, And​at​the​end​of​her​discourse,​with​“Happy​they​make​you, Patria,​your​mines,”​comes​Don​Maimed​Mummy​to​us, ​ Who​dares​not​to​speak,​even​in​his​defense, If​he​has​not​a​text To​close​his​most​tiresome​sermon: ​ In​all​the​sessions​Don​Bothersome Just​one​impertinence​blasts, In​an​endless,​indigestible​sermon; ​ President​they​make​him​to​silence​him, A​post​he​occupies​with​his​voice​and​his​pen. Fool​arrives,​swears,​a​leave​of​absence​requests. ​ He​allows​Dog​his​knowledge​consumed In​a​law​the​president​orders To​use​Moctezuma’s​costume​and​name. ​ Don​Schemer​in​great​misery​is, For​to​manage​his​wealth​he​knew​not, And​the​treasury​he​wanted​in​his​very​hands, ​ Don​Gut​the​just​means​recommends So​to​both​parties​he​can​belong And​ascend​with​the​one​who​ascends. ​ In​his​speeches​are​always​two​meanings,

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And​he​makes​of​the​just​means​a​ball To​play​with​and​punish​the​losers. ​ Fool,​in​order​to​speak,​does​not​logic​exhaust. “The​sixth​of​December​it​was;​to​cast​off​the​government In​vain​you​attempt,”​he​says​and​he​votes; And​always​on​all​fours​he​says​this, With​his​hands​on​the​railing,​his​feet​on​the​ground, Whether​of​contracts​one​speaks​or​bulls​from​the​pope. ​ Stupidity,​how​much​can​there​be​in​one​room! The​parties​are​growing​each​day; But​the​people​lose​only​in​war. ​ The​parties​increase,​still The​stake​has​its​friends,​despotism: Federation​for​despotism​heresy​is. ​ And​freemasonry​the​juri​for​that. Joe​saw​in​Paris​constitution​and​kings, And​in​Mexico​he​might​want​the​same. ​ Another​would​like​to​revive​Spanish​laws, And​I​indignantly​Imams​demand As​well​as​Janissaries​and​beys. ​ What​is​our​liberty?​It​is​pure​lie. —Are​you​seeking​the​cause?​The​man​pointed​to​you; But​as​a​slave​of​the​law​he​looks​upon​you. ​ —A​syringe​with​a​different​cylinder​is​the​law That​enslaves​instead​of​the​man, For​me,​the​evil​is​being​a​slave. ​ Is​there​some​rational​being​who​does​not​astound Seeing​in​revolution​the​crowd To​change​of​their​woes​only​the​name? ​ The​light​of​the​law​is​not​always​pure; To​sacrifice​helots​as​lambs, A​law​gave​to​Eurotas​the​custom. ​ To​the​Romans,​cultured​and​strict, The​law​of​property​power​did​give To​feed​breeding​grounds​with​their​serfs. ​ And​the​law​the​cursed​fire​ignited That​fanaticism​three​centuries​might​nourish With​Iberian​and​American​blood.

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​ Do​we​not​know​the​banishment​laws And​many​others​of​tax? About​centralism​the​Seven​Laws1​were. ​ —Your​arguments​nothing​but​sophisms​are: The​place​constitutions​will​give​to​reproach at​every​step​I​know​well. ​ But​law​plunders​not​for​the​carriage, Nor​has​a​mistress​of​it​been​seen, Nor​even​for​this​does​it​haphazardly​choose. ​ —What​does​it​matter​if​the​law​has​not​life? —The​birth​of​knowledge​it​is.​—I​confess I​would​like​to​see​the​multitude​as​one​brought​to​life. ​ Laughter​is​caused​by​the​source​of​a​congress; To​name​wise​electors,​intelligence I​have,​but​for​deputies​not: ​ And​the​electors,​they​give​no​assurance Of​voting​for​only​those​unblemished​men Who​might​be​trustees​of​my​good. ​ —The​ballot​box​you​want​to​make​useless And​the​registration​list​too?—At​the​hour​designated I​run​to​vote,​but​only​a​chair For​the​commission​is​taken: Ten​and​twelve​strikes​the​clock,​and​three​only​have​gathered, And​at​five​there​were​four​and​after,​no​more. ​ But​the​members​of​the​junta​we’ve​had Are​feeling​burdened​I​would​suppose; And​more​than​one​cannot​read​or​write. ​ —Whether​a​woman,​a​servant,​a​boy, A​ballot​box​makes​them​annoyed; The​council​shuts​up​until​drunk. ​ And​then​what​enthusiasm​reigns! Secondary​elections​follow​this​path; Their​usefulness​I​do​not​fathom. ​ —Ah!​So​pigheaded​are​they,​these​can​be​so​essential, A​thousand​intrigues​they​avoid.​But​I​see​before ​ 1.​Ramírez​refers​to​the​1836​centralist​constitution​known​as​the​Seven​Laws.​(Editor’s​note)

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Intrigues​secondary,​and​primary​intrigues​as​well. ​ If​the​masses​could​elect,​which​is​what​I​desire, The​election​would​much​more​be​pleasing​to​them, And​success​there​would​be,​I​firmly​believe. ​ —Illusions​and​systems!​What​kind​of​man Tries​to​put​saddles​on​donkeys​instead​of​a​horse? The​multitude​doesn’t​know​who​obeys​it. ​ Give​boots​to​an​Indian​and​you​just​give​him​corns, As​if​the​doctor​would​patiently​hear From​his​water​bearer​verdicts​judicial. ​ Ixtacalco​would​scarcely​be​seen With​a​theater,​and​goodbye​to​its​gardens​that​float It​would​say,​and​to​its​roses​and​cabbages​too. ​ It​will​barter​its​boats​for​engravings. —That​would​be​a​sign​it​was​rich; And​the​doctor,​learned​traps​he’d​not​fear; ​ For​though​never​a​holy​judge​will​be​seen, But​the​justice​that​you​now​despise, From​a​water​bearer​might​not​cost​so​much. ​ The​multitude​you​deprecate You​flattered​so​as​a​deputy​to​be. —For​its​own​good​it​was​deceived—it​was​you​who​did​the​deceiving! ​ You​are​like​Joe,​who​from​soldier​to​general​went, But​not​on​campaign; Finding​himself​mocked​by​his​friends, ​ For​being​faithful​to​the​standards​of​Spain. It​is​true,​he​responded:​but​also​I​ran, Against​the​Iberian​I​used​this​trick. ​ If​more​philosophy​you​had And​your​Gómez​you​forgot​and​your​laws And​you​descended​one​day​to​the​earth, ​ You​will​find​ten​rich​men​like​kings, A​thousand​leagues​under​their​rule, But​ten​maguey​plants​a​thousand​Indians​have. ​ With​what​right?​Given​it​by​the​theft Of​the​conquest.—The​conquest​is​the​original​way​of​such​acquisition. Venio​you​should​read.

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​ —The​Indian​pulls​pulque​and​maize​from​the​mud; The​rich​not​a​footprint​they​make​on​the​soil; Nothing​does​the​former​enjoy,​but​the​latter​everything​does. ​ To​protect​agriculture​with​jealousy And​to​deliver​to​four​feeble​men​the​earth, Is​to​wish​that​Satan​to​heaven​would​carry​us. ​ The​poor​man​makes​war​on​the​thieves: What​do​the​poor​have​to​lose?​Them​I​prefer To​a​farmer​who​goes​and​locks​himself​up ​ In​the​city,​and​because​he​was​heir, Without​even​knowing​his​ranch​or​its​place​on​the​map, Floods​of​money​from​it​he​pulls. ​ His​cloak​he​doesn’t​remove​in​the​streets, Without​risking​confronting​all​classes: Without​risking,​a​successor​gets​what’s​not​his. ​ —With​your​blasphemies​you​now​pass​from​here, Oh​Nigromante​of​Jacobinism! Property​is​one​of​the​foundations. ​ —Unfortunately​it​is​true;​but​likewise​to​live is​another​foundation​with​which​the​first​I​attack; And​the​government​does​the​same. ​ From​us​does​it​not​collect​taxes?​Does​it​not​snatch​away Tobacco​from​all​the​old​women?​Does​it​not​use​notes​promissory And​from​us​a​cigarette​in​each​tlaco2​take? ​ —You​only​think​of​material​goods, And​the​Congress​only​to​glory​aspires. —Well​such​congresses​like​church​councils​would​be. ​ To​every​junta​that​knowledge​might​breathe The​tumultuous​juntas​of​Rome​I​prefer, And​with​adornment,​and​it​is​not​a​lie. ​ On​a​dusty​plaza​the​people​so​proud Deliberated,​loudly​it’s​true, But​among​arid​voices​the​kernel​it​came. ​ And​also​there​the​kings​it​dethroned, And​their​existence​to​combat​delivered; ​

2.​Ancient​Mexican​coin.​(Editor’s​note)

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But​rich​plunder​it​did​enjoy. ​ Never​to​science​was​it​sacrificed Which​a​nation​sparingly​creates, Nor​showing​a​terrible​omnipotence Did​it​remain​satisfied​beating​a​drum. The Necromancer

2



Speech to the Constituent Congress, July 7, 1856

Gentlemen: The​project​of​Constitution,​submitted​to​the​enlightenment​of​your​sovereignty​today,​reveals​in​its​authors​a​not​insignificant​understanding​of​the​political​systems​of​our​century,​but​at​the​ same​time​an​inconceivable​neglect​of​the​positive​needs​of​our​patria.​ Inexperienced​ politician​ and​ unknown​ orator,​ I​ make​ such​ serious​ charges​to​the​committee​not​because​I​foolishly​claim​to​instruct​it,​but​ because​I​wish​to​hear​its​lucid​responses;​perhaps​in​them​I​will​find​ that,​because​of​my​confusion,​my​reasonings​reduce​themselves​to​some​ solemn​admissions​of​my​ignorance. ​ The​social​pact​that​has​been​proposed​to​us​is​based​in​a​fiction;​here​ is​how​it​begins:​“In​the​name​of​God​.​.​.​the​representatives​of​the​different​states​that​make​up​the​Republic​of​Mexico​.​.​.​fulfill​their​lofty​ charge​.​.​.” ​ With​these​words​the​committee​elevates​us​to​the​priesthood;​and,​ placing​us​in​the​sanctuary,​whether​we​set​forth​the​rights​of​the​citizen,​whether​we​organize​the​exercise​of​public​powers,​it​obliges​us​to​ move​from​inspiration​to​inspiration​until​turning​an​organic​law​into​a​ genuine​dogma.​It​would​be​very​gratifying​for​me​to​announce,​like​a​ prophet,​or​rather​playing​the​role​of​augur,​the​good​news​to​the​peoples​ who​have​entrusted​their​destinies​to​us​that​on​the​fourth​of​July​some​ gentlemen​ of​ the​ committee​ discharged​ their​ duty​ with​ considerable​ skill;​but​in​the​century​of​the​disillusioned​ones,​our​humble​mission​is​ to​discover​the​truth​and​apply​to​our​ills​the​most​mundane​remedies.​I​ know​well​what​there​is​of​the​fictitious,​the​symbolic,​and​the​poetic​in​ ​ Original​ title:​ “Discurso​ ante​ el​ Congreso​ Constituyente​ del​ 7​ de​ julio​ de​ 1856.”​ Source:​Francisco​Zarco,​Historia del Congreso Extraordinario Constituyente (1856–1857),​ Estracto de todas sus sesiones y documentos parlamentarios de la época,​vol.​2​(Mexico:​Imprenta​de​Ignacio​Cumplido,​1857). 251

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known​legislation;​some​of​this​legislation​has​lacked​nothing​to​remove​ it​from​reality,​not​even​the​meter;​but​I​judge​it​is​more​dangerous​than​ ridiculous​to​suppose​ourselves​interpreters​of​the​Divinity​and,​without​ a​mask,​to​parody​Acmapichtli,1​Mohammed,​Moses,​and​the​Sibyls.​The​ name​of​God​has​produced​divine​right​everywhere,​and​the​history​of​ divine​right​is​written​by​the​hand​of​the​oppressors​with​the​sweat​and​ blood​of​the​peoples;​and​we,​who​presume​ourselves​free​and​enlightened,​are​we​not​still​struggling​against​divine​right?​Do​we​not​tremble​ like​children​when​it​is​said​to​us​that​a​phalanx​of​petty​women​will​ assault​us​in​discussing​tolerance​of​worship,​all​of​them​armed​with​ divine​right?​If​a​revolution​casts​us​from​the​rostrum,​it​will​be​divine​ right​that​drags​us​to​the​prisons,​to​exile,​and​to​the​scaffolds.​Leaning​on​divine​right,​man​has​divided​the​heaven​and​the​earth​and​has​ said—I​am​absolute​owner​of​this​land;​and​he​has​said—I​have​a​star,​ and​if​he​has​not​monopolized​the​light​of​the​upper​spheres,​it​is​because​no​speculator​has​been​able​to​soar​to​the​stars.​Divine​right​has​ invented​public​punishment​and​the​executioner.​Shielding​himself​in​ divine​right,​man​has​considered​his​brother​a​commercial​object​and​ has​sold​him.​Gentlemen,​for​my​part,​I​declare​that​I​have​not​come​to​ this​spot​prepared​by​raptures​or​revelations;​the​only​mission​I​carry​ out,​not​as​a​mystic​but​as​a​profane,​is​in​my​credential,​you​have​seen​ it,​it​has​not​been​written​like​the​tables​of​the​law​on​the​crest​of​Sinai​ amidst​lightning​and​thunder.​The​task​of​creating​a​constitution​is​very​ worthy,​so​I​begin​it​by​deceiving. ​ Why​did​the​committee,​from​the​sublime​heights​to​which​it​has​ been​able​to​raise​itself,​not​direct​a​quick​glance​toward​our​troubled​ territory?​One​of​its​members​has​said​that​the​territorial​division​is​not​ a​panacea;​oh!​certainly,​in​politics,​in​the​same​way​as​in​medicine,​the​ cure-all​has​not​been​discovered;​but​that​is​no​reason​for​the​physician​ not​to​be​vain​about​his​discoveries,​as​the​politician​is​with​his:​the​inventor​of​vaccine​and​the​inventor​of​penitentiaries​have​equal​glory.​ What​misfortunes​come​to​us—it​has​been​asked—from​the​fact​that​ populations​are​still​distributed​in​the​way​the​Plan​of​Ayutla2​found​ them?​It​has​gone​as​far​as​denying​the​need​for​a​new​organization​of​ ​ 1.​A​pre-​Hispanic​deity.​(Editor’s​note) ​ 2.​ The​ Plan​ of​ Ayutla​ in​ 1854​ called​ for​ the​ overthrow​ of​ the​ regime​ of​ General​ Antonio​López​de​Santa​Anna.​The​revolt​was​successful.​(Editor’s​note)

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local​ public​ offices​ based​ on​ the​ demands​ of​ nature.​ The​ committee,​ finally,​judges​that​the​discontented​peoples​do​not​know​their​interests,​and​the​reason​it​gives​is​convincing​because​it​does​not​know​them​ either. ​ Whether​I​take​men​as​my​basis​or​the​lands​they​inhabit,​with​my​ humble​intelligence​I​can​see​that​a​new​territorial​division​is​a​pressing​necessity.​The​physical​elements​of​our​soil​are​distributed​in​such​ a​way​that​they​by​themselves​bid​the​nation​to​divide​in​large​sections​ with​very​marked​characteristic​features.​That​Yucatán​Peninsula,​connected​to​the​continent​by​a​narrow​and​unpopulated​strip​of​land,​has​ the​ independence​ that​ the​ high​ mountains,​ the​ deserts,​ and​ the​ seas​ offer.​From​the​Isthmus​of​Tehuantepec​to​the​borders​of​Guatemala,​ we​have​a​division​drawn​by​nature.​From​the​vicinity​of​the​isthmus​to​ the​frontier​of​the​United​States,​three​strips,​one​temperate​and​two​ hot,​suggest​to​us​three​different​series​of​territorial​combinations.​In​ the​Pacific​Ocean​we​have​another​peninsula.​On​the​coasts​of​the​Gulf​ of​Mexico​I​can​see​a​vast​land​irrigated​by​fast-​flowing​rivers​and​extensive​lakes;​the​abundance​of​navigable​water​moves​closer​to​and​jumbles​ together​its​populations.​Where​nature​formed​a​single​people,​we​form​ fractions​of​five​others?​Between​Tuxpan​and​Tampico​we​can​improvise​a​bridge​of​vapor;​but​if​I​am​not​deceived,​we​have​already​given​ Tuxpan​to​Puebla​instead​of​Tlaxcala.​And​that​island​lost​in​an​ocean​of​ savages,​that​northern​frontier,​does​it​not​demand​from​us​in​the​name​ of​humanity​the​unity​of​its​government?​Why​preserve​in​Chihuahua​ and​Durango​populations​separated​from​their​capitals​by​a​dangerous​ desert​and​an​impassable​mountain​range,​and​more​when​their​separation​is​a​genuine​theft​of​Sonora​and​Sinaloa?​And​why​not​extend​the​ limits​of​Colima?​And​why​is​the​state​of​the​Valles​not​established​in​ the​old​Anáhuac?​The​state​of​Querétaro​is​reduced​to​a​single​population​center​of​the​many​that​are​sown​throughout​the​fertile​Bajío. ​ The​territorial​division​appears​still​more​interesting​considering​it​ in​relation​to​the​inhabitants​of​the​Republic.​Among​the​many​illusions​ with​which​we​sustain​ourselves,​one​of​them,​not​the​least​unfortunate,​is​the​one​that​originates​by​supposing​in​our​patria​a​homogeneous​ population.​Let​us​lift​that​light​veil​from​the​mixed​race​that​spreads​ out​everywhere,​and​we​will​find​a​hundred​nations​that​in​vain​we​attempt​today​to​put​together​into​one​only,​because​that​undertaking​is​ assigned​ to​ the​ constant​ and​ energetic​ labor​ of​ individuals​ and​ well-​

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worked-​out​institutions.​Many​of​those​peoples​still​preserve​the​traditions​of​a​diverse​origin​and​of​an​independent​and​glorious​nationality. ​ The​Tlaxcaltecan​shows​with​pride​the​fields​that​the​wall​separating​him​from​Mexico​oppressed.​The​Yucatecan​can​ask​the​Otomi​if​ his​ancestors​left​monuments​as​admirable​as​those​preserved​in​Uxmal.​ And​near​us,​gentlemen,​that​sublime​cathedral​that​makes​us​arrogant​ reveals​less​knowledge​and​less​talent​than​the​humble​stone​preserving​ the​calendar​of​the​Aztecs​that​seeks​a​support​in​the​cathedral.​Those​ races​still​preserve​their​nationality,​protected​by​the​domestic​hearth​ and​by​the​language.​Marriages​between​them​are​very​rare,​between​ them​and​the​mixed​races​occur​less​frequently​every​day;​the​means​of​ facilitating​their​bonds​with​foreigners​has​not​been​found.​In​the​end,​ love​preserves​the​territorial​division​from​before​the​conquest. ​ Also​the​diversity​of​languages​will​make​any​amalgamation​fictitious​ and​unrealizable​for​a​long​time.​The​American​languages​consist​of​significant​roots,​not​in​the​eyes​of​science​but​rather​in​common​usage;​ these​roots,​genuine​parts​of​the​sentence,​never​or​rarely​are​presented​ alone​and​with​a​consistent​form​as​in​the​languages​of​the​Old​World;​ thus​it​is​that​the​American,​instead​of​detached​words,​has​sentences.​ From​this​comes​the​notable​phenomenon​that,​in​constructing​a​term,​ the​new​element​is​put​by​preference​in​the​center​through​a​proper​ interposition​ of​ organic​ bodies,​ while​ in​ the​ languages​ of​ the​ other​ hemisphere,​ the​ new​ element​ is​ placed​ by​ juxtaposition,​ a​ character​ peculiar​to​inorganic​combinations.​In​these​languages,​where​the​least​ member​of​the​word​palpitates​with​a​life​of​its​own,​the​loving​heart​ and​the​ardent​imagination​cannot​manifest​themselves​except​with​the​ lively​ and​ seductive​ forms​ of​ poetry.​ But​ these​ treasures​ each​ nation​ enjoys​as​a​family,​hidden​by​fear,​decayed​through​ignorance,​the​last​ hieroglyphics​that​Bishop​Zumárraga​cannot​burn​nor​the​sword​of​the​ conquistadors​destroy.3​Enclosed​in​his​hut​and​in​his​language,​the​indigenous​person​does​not​communicate​with​the​other​indigenous​tribes​ or​with​the​mixed​race​except​through​the​Castilian​language.​And​in​ this,​to​what​are​his​thoughts​reduced?​To​the​sterile​formulas​for​the​ thought​of​a​mean​mercantile​usage​and​to​the​odious​expressions​that​ are​exchanged​between​the​tycoons​and​their​servants.​Do​you​want​to​ ​ 3.​Juan​de​Zumárraga​(1468–1548)​was​a​Spanish​bishop​during​early​colonial​times.​ As​Protector​of​the​Indians​he​ordered​pagan​religious​artifacts​burned.​(Editor’s​note)​

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form​a​stable​territorial​division​with​the​elements​the​nation​possesses?​ Elevate​the​indigenous​people​to​the​sphere​of​citizen,​give​them​a​direct​ interposition​in​public​affairs,​but​begin​dividing​them​by​languages,​ otherwise​your​sovereignty​will​only​distribute​two​million​free​men​ and​six​million​slaves. ​ If​what​I​have​expressed​says​nothing​to​the​committee,​at​least​direct​ your​gaze​at​the​unrest​in​which​the​Republic​finds​itself.​Cuernavaca​ and​Morelos​want​to​belong​to​the​state​of​Guerrero,​and​against​their​ wishes​the​interests​of​a​hundred​feudal​proprietors​are​prevailing.​The​ Valley​of​Mexico​has​been​working​to​organize​itself​for​many​years.​La​ Huasteca​has​suffered​plundering​for​having​requested​its​local​independence.​Tabasco​is​requesting​possession​of​its​territory,​presenting​legal​ titles.​Sinaloa​claims​Tamazula.​And​the​frontier​calls​us​weak​in​order​ not​to​call​us​traitors.​To​all​these​demands​of​the​peoples​we​answer:— now​ is​ not​ the​ time.​ It​ is​ not​ time​ yet!—The​ peoples​ will​ answer​ us​ tomorrow,​if​we​want​finally​to​accommodate​their​desires​in​order​to​ contain​the​horrors​of​anarchy. ​ The​most​serious​of​the​charges​that​I​make​to​the​committee​is​having​ preserved​the​servitude​of​day​workers.​The​day​worker​is​a​man​who,​ by​force​of​painful​and​continuous​labor,​pulls​from​the​earth,​now​the​ wheat​that​nourishes,​now​the​silk​and​gold​that​adorn​the​people;​in​his​ creative​hand​the​rude​instrument​is​converted​into​a​machine,​and​he​ shapes​stone​into​magnificent​palaces.​The​prodigious​inventions​of​industry​are​owed​to​a​small​number​of​learned​men​and​to​millions​of​day​ laborers.​Wherever​there​might​exist​value,​there​is​found​the​sovereign​ effigy​of​work. ​ Well​then,​the​day​worker​is​a​slave.​Originally​he​was​a​slave​of​the​ man;​he​was​reduced​to​this​condition​by​the​right​of​war,​terrible​sanction​of​divine​right.​As​a​slave,​nothing​belongs​to​him,​neither​his​family​ nor​his​existence;​and​nourishment​is​not​a​right​for​the​man-​machine,​ rather​an​obligation​to​preserve​himself​for​the​service​of​owners.​In​ different​epochs​the​laboring​man,​emancipating​himself​from​the​persons​who​lived​off​the​income​from​their​investments​or​real​estate,​continued​subject​to​the​service​of​the​earth;​the​feudalism​of​the​Middle​ Ages,​ of​ Russia,​ and​ of​ tropical​ lands​ are​ well​ known​ enough​ that​ it​ is​not​necessary​to​paint​their​horrors.​The​laborer​succeeded​also​in​ breaking​ the​ chains​ that​ tied​ him​ to​ the​ land​ as​ a​ product​ of​ nature;​ and​today​he​finds​himself​a​slave​of​capital,​which,​requiring​only​brief​

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hours​of​his​life,​speculates​even​with​his​very​nourishment.​Before,​the​ serf​was​the​tree​cultivated​in​order​to​produce​abundant​fruits;​today​ the​laborer​is​the​sugar​cane​that​is​squeezed​dry​and​abandoned.​Thus​ it​is​that​the​great,​the​true,​social​problem​is​to​emancipate​day​laborers​ from​capitalists;​the​resolution​is​very​simple​and​comes​down​to​converting​work​into​capital.​This​operation,​urgently​demanded​by​justice,​ will​assure​the​day​laborer​not​only​the​salary​appropriate​for​his​subsistence,​but​a​right​to​divide​the​profits​proportionally​with​every​businessman.​The​economic​school​is​correct​in​claiming​that​capital​in​hard​ cash​must​produce​a​return​like​capital​in​mercantile​assets​and​in​real​ estate.​The​economists​will​complete​their​work,​moving​forward​to​the​ aspirations​of​socialism,​the​day​they​concede​the​unquestionable​rights​ to​an​income​from​work-​capital. ​ Learned​economists​of​the​committee,​in​vain​you​proclaim​the​sovereignty​of​the​people​so​long​as​you​deprive​each​day​laborer​all​the​ fruit​of​his​work,​you​oblige​him​to​use​up​his​capital,​and​in​return​you​ put​a​ridiculous​crown​on​his​brow.​As​long​as​the​laborer​consumes​his​ funds​in​the​form​of​a​salary​and​yields​his​income​with​all​the​profits​of​ the​business​to​the​capitalist​associate,​the​savings​bank​is​an​illusion,​the​ bank​of​the​people​is​a​metaphor,​the​direct​producer​of​all​the​wealth​ will​not​enjoy​any​mercantile​credit​in​the​market,​he​will​not​be​able​ to​exercise​the​rights​of​citizenship,​he​will​not​be​able​to​become​educated,​he​will​not​be​able​to​educate​his​family,​he​will​perish​of​misery​ in​his​old​age​and​in​his​illnesses.​In​this​lack​of​social​elements​you​will​ find​the​real​secret​why​your​municipal​system​is​a​chimera. ​ I​have​dispelled​the​illusions​to​which​the​committee​has​given​itself​ over;​no​scruple​plagues​me.​I​know​well​that,​despite​deceit​and​oppression,​many​nations​have​raised​their​reputation​to​a​glittering​sphere;​but​ today​the​people​do​not​desire​either​the​glittering​throne​of​Napoleon​ swimming​in​blood​or​the​rich​booty,​won​by​pirates​and​conserved​by​ slaves,​that​the​United​States​divides​each​year.​They​do​not​want,​no,​the​ splendor​of​their​masters,​but​rather​a​modest​well-​being​spread​among​ all​individuals.​The​instinct​for​personal​conservation​that​moves​the​ lips​of​the​child​seeking​nourishment​is​the​last​plunder​we​deliver​to​ death;​here​is​the​base​of​the​social​edifice. ​ The​Mexican​nation​cannot​be​organized​with​the​elements​of​the​old​ political​science,​because​they​are​the​expression​of​slavery​and​worries;​ it​needs​a​constitution​that​organizes​progress​for​it,​that​puts​order​in​

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motion.​To​what​is​this​Constitution​reduced,​which​establishes​order​in​ absolute​immobility?​It​is​a​tomb​prepared​for​a​living​corpse.​Gentlemen,​we​bring​to​mind​with​enthusiasm​a​privilege​that​introduces​a​ breed​of​horses​or​creates​a​deadly​weapon;​let​us​create​a​constitution​ that​ is​ founded​ in​ the​ privilege​ of​ the​ needy,​ of​ the​ ignorant,​ of​ the​ weak,​so​that​in​this​way​we​can​improve​our​race​and​so​that​public​ power​will​not​be​anything​other​than​organized​beneficence.

3 ​

Letter to Fidel

Ures,​March​1865 Dear​Fidel: Do​you​remember​that​in​one​of​my​last​letters​I​spoke​ to​you​of​a​woman​of​some​years,​but​of​much​talent​and​a​well-​preserved​ beauty?​Well,​she​knows​you​and​has​insisted​on​writing​to​you;​I​enclose​her​letter.​As​ever​yours.—The​Necromancer Señor​Fidel:—You​were​so​gallant​to​me​when​I​was​in​Mexico​ that,​without​fear​of​bothering​you,​I​take​the​liberty​of​asking​ some​news​of​you,​because​your​friend,​the​Necromancer,​does​not​ answer​my​questions​without​caricaturing​the​persons​who​deserve​ from​me​the​liveliest​and​most​affectionate​compliments. ​ Is​Mr.​X​still​a​specialist​in​history?​Does​he​still​preserve,​among​ his​Mexican​antiquities,​the​ring​of​Acatempan? ​ Why​have​some​rectors​and​professors​around​you​become​so​enamored​when​they​abandoned​the​studious​youth? ​ From​Mexico​to​Chihuahua​you​have​acted​as​a​Tyrtaeus;1​do​you​ believe​that​the​brave​ones​who​accompany​you​will​be​enthusiastic​to​the​point​of​fighting​after​arriving​at​the​Paso​del​Norte,​not​ having​done​it​before?2 ​ Two​years​ago,​with​deputies​and​other​functionaries,​you​were​ more​than​a​thousand,​you​who​represented​the​nation;​now​there​ ​ Original​title:​“Carta​a​Fidel​[Guillermo​Prieto],​marzo​de​1865.”​Source:​El Semanario Ilustrado,​vol.​1,​September​25,​1868,​pp.​341–42. ​ 1.​Tyrtaeus​of​Sparta​was​a​poet​who​composed​elegies​to​courageous​warriors.​(Editor’s​note) ​ 2.​Ramírez​was​at​the​time​traveling​with​the​Juárez​republican​government​in​its​ march​to​the​north,​withdrawing​as​imperial​troops​closed​on​them.​(Editor’s​note) 258

letter​to​fidel : 259

are​not​even​thirty,​counting​Romero,3​who​is​helping​out​so​much​ in​the​United​States​so​that​the​states​of​the​South​might​be​ruled​ by​those​of​the​North;​what​would​become​of​both​republics​without​our​diplomacy?​Do​you​believe,​my​sweet​friend,​that​eight​million​Mexicans​are​well​represented​in​a​foreign​war​by​thirty​persons​who​play,​make​love,​and​intrigue​when​they​are​not​running? ​ These​questions​will​surprise​you​when​you​do​not​know​what​I​ am​going​to​confide​in​you:​Have​I​become​an​imperialist?​Only​the​ love​of​my​sex​has​committed​me​to​this​change;​you​see​how​I​reason. ​ The​great​caprice​of​Mexicans,​which​has​been​such​a​misfortune​ for​them,​consists​of​the​adoption​of​that​system​they​call​representative.​They,​who​make​a​war​to​the​death​on​the​clergy,​have​delivered​themselves​body​and​soul​to​a​theocratic​system!​Do​not​laugh​ or​feel​scandalized.​Who​does​the​pope​represent?​God.​Who​does​ the​lord​bishop​represent?​The​pope.​Who​do​the​priests​represent?​ The​lord​bishop.​Who​do​the​sextons​represent?​The​priests.​And​ that​whole​hierarchic​machine,​who​does​it​represent?​God​and​ the​Christian​people.​God​is​the​law;​the​people​are​the​beneficiaries.​But​in​reality,​neither​does​the​people​gain​anything​nor​is​God​ obeyed.​If​God​and​the​people​understood​each​other​directly,​our​ affairs​would​go​better,​and​I​would​ask​him​for​the​eternal​youth​of​ Chavito​and​those​eloquent​words​with​which​you​charmed​me. ​ Who​does​Don​Benito​represent?​(I​say​the​same​of​the​other​ powers​when​there​are​some.)​The​states.​Who​do​the​states​represent?​The​prefectures​and​municipalities.​And​those?​The​electors.​And​that​whole​representative​retinue?​The​Constitution​and​ the​sovereign​people.​The​result​is​that​you​are​organized​like​the​ Church;​you​have​done​nothing​more​than​parody​it;​and​you​treat​ the​law​and​the​people​as​the​others​do​God​and​the​Christians.​ I​would​like​to​represent​myself​myself,​because​in​doing​that​it​ interests​and​amuses​me​so​much​more,​no​one​can​humanly​represent​me,​not​the​priest,​not​the​deputy,​not​my​own​husband. ​ Both​systems​of​social​organization​can​exist​only​under​this​sup​ 3.​Matías​Romero,​President​Juárez’s​ambassador​to​the​United​States​at​the​time​of​ the​French​intervention.​(Editor’s​note)

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position:​some individuals were born to represent and others to be represented.​But​what​does​it​mean​to​represent?​It​is​to​play​the​role​of​ another;​it​is​to​pretend​to​be​another​person;​it​is​to​substitute​the​ mask​for​the​face.​And​can​a​system​that​is​necessarily​based​in​the​ lie​be​successful?​Between​a​Congress​and​a​Council​there​is​no​difference;​if​the​Holy​Spirit​in​whichever​of​the​two​bodies​was​not​ sold​to​the​pope​or​to​Don​Benito,​it​would​be​relegated​to​the​minority​and​excluded​from​great​affairs,​and​would​be​prosecuted​by​ the​law​against​conspirators​and​plagiarists.4 ​ I​do​not​know​if​you​have​come​to​put​that​famous​representative​ system​into​effect,​but​I​believe​it​impossible​in​Sonora,​and​not​because​representatives​are​lacking,​but​because​in​no​constitution​are​ those​who​represent​the​majority​here​recognized.​Tell​me,​my​life,​ in​what​law​have​you​seen​the​following​proclamation?​In​Sonora,​ Gándara​represents​his​relatives;​Tánori​his​tribe;​the​Chato​Almada​ half​of​Alamos;​Tomasito​half​of​Guaymas;​the​cacique​of​the​Yaqui​ the​yaquis;​and​the​greater​part​of​the​young​women​their​boyfriends.​Such​is​the​situation​of​our​state,​despite​the​fact​that​divine​ and​human​laws​say​something​else. ​ And​since​I​have​touched​on​a​point​that​interests​me,​I​can​do​ no​less​than​show​you​that​perhaps​I​would​tolerate​such​a​representative​system​if​women​could​figure​as​representatives.​Why​exclude​us?​I​think​of​it​in​terms​of​the​ancient​drama,​when​among​ the​Greeks​and​Romans,​as​later​in​the​academies,​men​played​the​ parts​of​women.​I​do​not​tolerate​it​now​that​both​sexes​appear​on​ the​stage.​And​since​I​can​play​with​applause​the​role​of​Elizabeth​ of​England​or​Catherine​of​Russia,​I​do​not​see​why​I​could​not​play​ the​Mayos​and​the​Ópatas5​in​that​theater​you​call​the​temple​of​the​ laws.​Temple!​No​doubt​to​remember​its​monkish​origin. ​ You​know​me​very​well,​Fidel;​tell​me,​what​do​all​of​you​do​that​ is​not​within​my​grasp?​Above​all,​the​ministerial​majority,​what​ secrets​does​it​have​that​some​time​ago​I​might​not​have​discovered?​ Does​it​have​some​weaknesses?​I​have​mine.​Does​it​chat​about​all​ matters?​You​see​how​I​chat.​And​in​matters​of​finance,​they​will​ ​ 4.​A​contentious​criminal​law​passed​earlier​by​the​republican​government.​(Editor’s​ note) ​ 5.​Mayos​and​Ópatas​were​Indian​tribes​from​the​state​of​Sonora.​(Editor’s​note)

letter​to​fidel : 261

not​leave​the​taxpayers​as​content​as​I.​The​adoption​of​my​idea​ would​bring​with​it​the​advantage​that​many​deputies​would​accustom​themselves​to​representation​by​women,​leaving​them​free​for​ carrying​out​the​rest​of​the​household​matters. ​ These​convictions​that​I​hold​have​helped​me​compare​your​system​with​that​of​Maxmilian.​The​Austrian​also​represents​the​nation,​but​in​his​way;​he​shares​power​with​his​wife,​and​as​long​as​ she​lives,​a​favorable​star​will​shed​its​light​on​him.​The​ladies​in​ waiting​are​thus​as​close​to​power​as​their​husbands. ​ Nonetheless,​from​the​North​an​arm​will​reach​out​to​save​you,​ in​the​same​way​someone​pulls​out​by​the​tail​a​dog​that​has​fallen​ in​the​fountain,​and​return​you​to​the​capital​of​the​Republic.​Then​ you​will​return,​adding​to​your​lyre​the​string​of​pure​patriotism.​ Poet,​you​could​not​do​for​the​nation​more​than​sing​the​battles​ and​the​glory;​and​you​have​sung,​making​each​verse​sparkle​before​enemy​eyes​like​an​avenging​sword.​You​are​called​to​be​the​ first​of​the​pure​ones;​your​influence​is​guaranteed.​To​it​I​appeal​so​ that​you​might​initiate​and​defend​the​women’s​cause​in​the​coming​ council​of​representatives. ​ I​will​go​back​to​being​republican​and​always​yours.—A Sonoran6​ woman. To​Fidel: I​have​seen​the​letter​that​our​friend​wrote​to​you;​we​have​lost​ everything,​for​the​women​lavish​their​sarcasm​on​us.​Let​us​not​ lose​heart;​faith​in​representative​system;​and​I​do​not​know​for​the​ present​who​represents​us​legally​in​Chihuahua;​but​would​you​believe​that​Rosales,​of​his​own​accord,​has​proposed​himself​to​represent​us​once​again​on​the​fields​of​battle?​If​he​lives​and​we​once​ again​come​to​be​deputies,​we​will​grant​him​a​pardon. ​ For​the​present,​we​have​lost​the​port​of​Guaymas;​soon​I​will​ write​you​the​details.​Your​very​affectionate—Necromancer.



6.​From​the​state​of​Sonora.​(Editor’s​note)

Francisco zarco Francisco​ Zarco​ (1829–69)​ was​ a​ liberal​ politician​ and​ writer​ born​in​the​state​of​Durango.​He​was​the​editor​in​chief​of​the​ liberal​newspaper​El Siglo XIX.​Zarco​was​considered​one​of​the​ most​important​liberal​writers​of​his​time,​writing​on​many​subjects,​not​only​politics,​and​agitating​for​reform​in​his​articles. ​ In​1856​he​was​elected​deputy​to​the​Constituent​Congress.​ As​a​deputy​Zarco​not​only​participated​in​the​parliamentary​ debates​but​also​wrote​and​published​chronicles​of​its​sessions​ from​which​he​composed​a​history​of​the​1856–57​Constituent​ Congress​that​was​published​in​1857. ​ After​the​enactment​of​the​Constitution,​President​Ignacio​ Comonfort​was​sworn​into​office,​but​he​ultimately​decided​not​ to​enforce​the​charter.​This​coup​started​the​Three​Years’​War.​ Zarco​opposed​the​Comonfort​government​and​was​imprisoned​ until​the​victory​of​the​liberal​ faction​ in​1861​brought​ Juárez​ into​power.​Juárez​appointed​Zarco​as​a​minister​in​his​cabinet.​ During​the​French​intervention​Zarco​was​exiled​to​the​United​ States. ​ We​present​six​of​Zarco’s​articles​published​in​El Siglo XIX​ between​ 1856​ and​ 1867,​ the​ period​ in​ which​ the​ Constituent​ Congress​met.

262

1



The Question of the Veto

Having​been​the​first​to​call​public​attention​to​the​need​ for​resolving​conclusively​the​question​of​the​veto,​which​arose​when​ the​Ministry​of​War​objected​to​the​decree​of​Congress​that​declared​ null​the​articles​of​the​law​of​Santa​Anna​regarding​rewards​for​services​ lent​in​the​war​with​the​United​States,​we​have​little​wanted​to​provoke​ a​conflict​between​the​government​and​the​Congress​or​try​to​humiliate​ one​of​the​two​powers.​Our​intention​has​been​only​that​a​question​of​ order​be​resolved,​that​the​assembly​preserve​intact​its​prerogatives,​and​ that​serious​difficulties​be​avoided​that​hereafter​might​present​themselves. ​ We​have​always​been​convinced​that​public​order​consists​not​in​one​ power​holding​the​rest​subservient,​but​rather​in​each​one​being​limited​to​its​functions​without​overstepping​them​or​encroaching​on​the​ functions​of​the​rest.​In​the​same​way​we​oppose​enlarging​the​powers​of​ the​executive​and​extending​them​even​to​having​the​veto;​we​would​be​ opposed​to​the​constituent​body​appropriating​to​itself​legislative​power​ that​the​people​did​not​grant​it. ​ There​are​no​other​means,​no​matter​how​hard​one​looks​for​them,​ to​preserve​equilibrium​among​the​powers​and​to​maintain​peace,​than​ the​assiduous​and​precise​observation​of​the​law​to​which​each​authority​ owes​its​origin​and​which​at​the​same​time​designates​its​functions.​From​ the​moment​in​which​an​authority​aspires​to​enlarge​its​powers,​it​violates​the​legal​title​of​its​existence​and​takes​the​first​step​toward​subversion​of​the​very​principles​that​might​be​able​to​serve​it​as​support. ​ We​have​said​a​thousand​times,​and​we​do​not​tire​of​repeating​it,​ that​at​the​present​time​there​is​no​cause​for​disagreement​between​the​ government​and​the​congress,​and​that​the​Plan​of​Ayutla,​instead​of​ desiring​perpetual​antagonism​between​the​two​powers,​wanted​on​the​ ​

Original​title:​“La​cuestión​del​veto.”​Source:​El Siglo XIX,​Mexico,​June​28,​1856. 263

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contrary​to​establish​between​them​the​most​perfect​harmony,​so​that​in​ this​way​the​promises​of​the​revolution​might​be​fulfilled​and​the​hopes​ of​the​people​realized.​Whatever​the​difficulty,​the​slightest​disagreement​ paralyzes​ the​ forward​ movement​ of​ the​ administration,​ which​ must​be​active,​intelligent,​and​progressive,​and​holds​back​the​work​of​ the​congress,​which​must​be​about​redress,​justice,​and​morality​in​exercising​its​power​of​oversight,​and​about​liberty,​reform,​and​civilization​ in​drawing​up​the​fundamental​code.​In​periods​of​transition​and​revolution,​which​is​essentially​what​we​are​going​through,​to​waste​time​is​ to​go​backward,​and​it​is​an​incontestable​truth​that​revolutions​that​go​ backward​are​distorted,​denatured,​and​lost,​and​they​lose​the​people​ with​them. ​ This​conviction,​which​is​very​dear​and​sincere​to​our​mind,​is​what​ makes​ us​ ardently​ desire​ the​ rapid​ and​ satisfactory​ settlement​ of​ all​ questions​created​by​lack​of​foresight​or​imprudence,​and​that​if​it​is​ necessary,​ even​ at​ the​ cost​ of​ mutual​ sacrifices,​ the​ liberal​ union​ be​ maintained​and​the​accord​between​the​government​and​Congress. ​ The​conservative​press,​which​was​despicably​at​the​mercy​of​the​oppressors​of​the​country​and​which​does​not​understand​that​the​friends​ of​a​government​can​have​sufficient​loyalty​and​good​faith​to​tell​it​the​ truth;​the​conservative​press,​which​persisted​in​calling​us​ministerial​ and​in​attributing​to​our​newspaper​a​semiofficial​character,​accusing​ us​of​defending​a​government​that​professes​our​same​principles,​jumps​ with​ joy​ announcing​ that​ we​ have​ had​ differences​ with​ the​ ministry,​ that​we​have​passed​to​the​ranks​of​the​opposition,​that​our​aims​are​ ignoble​and​self-​interested,​and,​taking​for​granted​that​we​are​attacking​the​cabinet,​begins​its​defense,​forgetting​that​we​have​been​among​ those​ who​ have​ defended​ it​ with​ the​ greatest​ ardor​ from​ the​ unwarranted​accusations​of​that​reactionary​and​inconsistent​press,​which​does​ not​even​have​the​virtue​of​giving​the​names​of​its​writers,​who​always​ hide​behind​a​despicable​professional​who​will​sign​anything. ​ With​respect​to​the​question​of​the​veto,​they​have​said​that​we​want​ the​omnipotence​of​Congress,​the​dictatorship​of​the​assembly,​a​coup​ d’état​against​the​cabinet,​the​tutelage​of​the​government​to​the​caprices​ of​the​parliamentary​majority.​Not​at​all.​What​we​want​is​simply​that​ no​one​leave​the​orbit​of​his​power;​that​the​Plan​of​Ayutla​be​observed​ as​the​sole​political​law​of​the​country;​and​that​the​government​and​the​ Congress,​each​in​its​sphere,​can​fulfill​the​mission​appropriate​to​them.​

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If​the​Congress,​going​beyond​its​powers,​produced​common​laws,​assuming​powers​that​only​the​president​of​the​Republic​has​today,​we​ would​be​the​first​to​condemn​such​an​act​of​usurpation.​In​the​same​ way,​and​without​giving​such​a​harsh​assessment​of​the​government’s​ undertakings,​it​is​our​duty​to​oppose​them,​because​as​revolutionary​as​ is​the​present​order​of​things,​it​is​based​in​genuine​and​clear​principles​ of​legality. ​ We​will​not​pause​to​refute​the​exaggerated​laments​of​the​absolutist​press,​which​is​talking​nonsense​dreaming​of​a​coup​d’état​without​ understanding​that​the​caudillo​who​today​exercises​the​supreme​magistracy​of​the​nation​is​the​steadfast​supporter​of​the​representative​system​ and​the​democratic​cause. ​ In​vain​those​writers​called​him​bandit​and​partisan​of​larceny​when​ in​the​fields​of​battle​he​faced​death​in​order​to​liberate​their​patria​from​ the​conservative​yoke,​in​vain​they​will​seek​to​lead​him​astray​now​with​ their​vain​adulations;​the​sincere​voice​of​the​truth​in​his​spirit​has​to​be​ worth​more.​They​very​much​wanted​to​flatter​him​when​he​ascended​to​ the​presidency​so​that​he​would​nullify​the​reforms​that​the​administration​of​General​Álvarez​completed;​they​did​not​achieve​anything,​and​ Mr.​Comonfort​was​somewhat​later​the​power​and​force​of​the​liberal​ party​in​suppressing​the​reaction.​It​is​a​wasted​effort​by​those​who​want​ to​separate​him​from​the​Constituent​Congress​and​remove​him​from​ the​liberal​party,​which​has​faith​in​his​oaths​and​which​expects​from​ his​administration​splendid​and​positive​political,​social,​and​economic​ reforms. ​ But​in​the​liberal​press​it​has​been​said​vaguely​and​without​adducing​the​slightest​argument​that​it​is​prudent​to​grant​to​the​government​ the​power​of​raising​objections,​that​the​executive​in​other​countries​has​ such​a​function,​and​that​our​executive​has​had​it​in​institutional​times.​ Those​who​reflect​in​this​way​have​very​good​intentions;​but​the​government​itself,​through​the​gentleman​minister​of​war,​has​declared​in​ the​heart​of​Congress​that​it​does​not​believe​it​has​the​right​to​raise​objections​to​the​decrees​of​the​assembly,​and​when​this​has​happened,​we​ have​only​to​warn​some​of​our​colleagues​that​it​is​neither​prudent​nor​ wise​to​be​more​royalist​than​the​king​nor​more​papist​than​the​pope. ​ But​it​will​be​said,​“If​the​government​itself​declares​that​it​does​not​ have​powers​to​raise​objections,​what​need​is​there​for​Congress​to​deliver​an​opinion​on​the​same​matter?”​To​this​we​answer​that​although​

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we​have​the​greatest​confidence​in​the​declarations​of​the​worthy​minister​of​war​because​we​know​his​honorable​record,​his​sincerity,​and​his​ political​consistency​on​this​question,​considerations​of​public​interest​ must​be​worth​more​than​purely​personal​considerations,​and​as​the​real​ and​actual​fact​is​that​the​executive​has​not​published​a​decree​of​Congress,​it​is​indispensible​that​Congress​be​jealous​of​its​own​prerogatives​ so​that​this​does​not​occur​in​the​future​and​so​as​to​overcome​every​difficulty.​If​public​questions​had​to​be​treated​like​purely​private​ones,​the​ declaration​of​the​gentleman​minister​of​war​would​be​more​than​sufficient​for​calling​this​matter​finished,​but​when​it​is​about​principles,​ when​it​is​about​ensuring​public​order​and​the​permanence​of​legality,​ there​is​no​precaution​that​is​excessive,​and​it​is​necessary​to​arrive​at​ definitive​results. ​ In​defense​of​the​veto,​until​now,​it​has​been​contended​only​that​ other​governments​have​it,​that​some​constitutions​grant​it.​But​this​very​ fact​proves​that​there​are​great​differences​between​a​constitutional​and​ a​transitory​order​in​which​the​constituent​power​exists. ​ Constitutions,​more​or​less​democratic,​more​or​less​based​on​distrust,​can​limit​the​legislative​power,​can​enlarge​the​executive,​can​give​ to​this​latter​a​part​in​the​formation​of​laws​and​even​authorize​him​to​ terminate​assemblies,​as​happens​in​some​moderate​monarchies;​they​ can​also​give​him​the​power​of​raising​objections​to​the​laws​and​establishing​certain​conditions​so​that​the​project,​once​voted,​can​become​ law​ despite​ the​ resistance​ of​ the​ executive,​ as​ happens​ in​ the​ United​ States​and​as​happened​among​us​when​the​Charter​of​1824​was​in​force.​ But​all​these​rules​arise​from​the​written​law,​arise​from​the​Constitution​ that​demarcates​the​functions​of​all​the​powers,​and​we​are​certain​that​ there​cannot​be​cited​a​single​example​of​a​constituent​assembly​subject​ to​the​absolute​or​suspensive​veto. ​ It​is​as​absurd​to​expect​today​that​the​government​have​this​function​ as​ it​ would​ be​ to​ impose​ on​ it​ any​ of​ the​ shackles​ our​ constitutional​governments​have​had,​like​not​being​able​to​decree​taxes​and​the​ president​not​being​able​to​put​himself​at​the​head​of​the​army​without​ prior​authorization​from​Congress.​What​would​one​respond​to​those​ who​maintain​such​expectations?​Simply​that​there​is​no​constitution​in​ force,​and​the​Plan​of​Ayutla,​which​is​today​the​only​rule​of​our​public​ law,​has​conferred​discretionary​powers​on​the​head​of​state.​Well,​we​

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answer​the​same​to​the​defenders​of​the​veto;​there​is​no​constitution​in​ force,​and​the​Plan​of​Ayutla​does​not​put​the​slightest​restriction​on​the​ resolutions​of​the​assembly. ​ It​is​necessary​to​observe​that​where​the​veto​exists,​it​is​based​precisely​on​the​fact​that​the​government​is​the​executor​of​the​law​and,​for​ that​reason,​can​know​better​than​anyone​its​difficulties,​and​in​the​fact​ that​the​legislative​power​resides​in​the​representatives​of​the​people.​In​ monarchies​there​is​another​reason​for​the​existence​of​the​veto,​and​it​is​ that​the​legislative​power​resides​at​one​and​the​same​time​in​the​crown​ and​in​the​cortes​and​that​the​suspension​is​the​direct​means​the​throne​ has​to​nullify​laws​that​seem​to​it​to​be​in​error. ​ From​this​observation,​which​can​be​proven​by​examining​all​the​constitutions​and​studying​their​commentaries,​it​follows​that​such​rules​ are​not​nor​can​be​applicable​to​our​present​situation,​because​here​the​ government​is​not​executor​of​the​law,​but​rather​a​true​legislator,​and​ Congress​does​not​have​the​legislative​power​but​rather​the​constituent,​ which​it​cannot​divide​with​any​other​power,​and​the​oversight​power​ to​examine​the​acts​of​the​past​and​present​government.​If​the​veto,​according​to​its​defenders,​has​as​its​objective​to​restrain​the​inclination​ of​the​assemblies​to​overstep​and​to​avoid​the​misconduct​of​the​legislative​power,​then​according​to​this​theory,​which​is​that​of​the​writers​of​ public​law​of​all​the​schools,​who​today​in​Mexico​should​be​subject​to​ the​veto?​The​government​or​Congress?​The​second​is​not​the​legislative​ power.​Indeed,​the​first​is;​this​one​is​the​one​that​should​have​some​limitation.​And​the​roles​reversed,​as​it​is​said,​the​Plan​of​Ayutla,​by​establishing​the​oversight,​established​in​truth​a​type​of​veto​for​the​acts​of​ the​executive,​absolute​veto,​veto​with​no​more​guide​than​public​advisability,​veto​that​perhaps​is​more​consistent​with​democratic​principles,​ given​that​it​is​not​the​power​that​is​opposed​to​parliamentary​decrees​ but​rather​the​people​who​reject​the​impolitic​or​mistaken​acts​of​the​ government. ​ The​present​question​is​not​a​question​of​party;​it​is​not​a​struggle​ between​the​government​and​Congress;​it​is​rather​a​theoretical​question​that​must​be​examined​with​calm​and​circumspection,​according​ to​democratic​principles​and​according​to​the​legal​order​that,​however​ provisional,​established​the​Plan​of​Ayutla. ​ It​is​not​a​matter,​then,​of​crushing​the​dignity​of​the​government,​but​

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rather​of​setting​properly​the​functions​of​the​powers​that​exist​today,​ with​ no​ other​ intention​ than​ to​ make​ possible​ the​ fulfillment​ of​ the​ principles​that​the​democratic​revolution​proclaimed. ​ The​day​after​tomorrow​is​the​day​designated​for​the​discussion​of​ this​matter​in​Congress,​and​we​hope​it​agrees​upon​a​resolution​as​prudent​as​proper,​as​suitable​to​its​dignity​as​consistent​with​the​principles​ of​democracy.

2



The Constitutional Order

We​ have​ already​ said​ the​ issuing​ of​ the​ fundamental​ code​is​the​strongest​blow​the​reactionary​party​has​suffered​in​its​defeat,​because​it​ends​all​pretext​for​continuing​to​promote​the​civil​war.​ If​ the​ reaction​ is​ the​ work​ of​ some​ political​ party,​ if​ this​ party​ has​ a​ program,​if​this​program​can​be​shown​openly​to​the​nation​in​order​to​ seek​converts,​such​a​party​should​give​up​its​weapons,​should​stop​the​ crimes​committed​by​those​who​are​active​under​its​banner,​direct​itself​ to​opinion,​seek​support​in​the​electoral​college,​and,​once​in​power,​if​ it​is​favorable​to​the​majority,​carry​out​the​reforms​that​constitute​the​ symbol​of​its​faith.​For​us,​and​we​believe​for​the​entire​Republic,​what​ the​conservative​party​wants​and​does​not​want​is​a​mystery.​We​have​ asked​it​many​times​in​vain.​When,​however,​it​has​been​triumphant,​it​ has​answered​with​fines​and​threats.​When​it​has​been​victorious,​it​has​ always​been​conspiratorial,​and​neither​the​acts​of​its​statesmen,​nor​the​ expression​of​its​periodicals,​nor​its​banner​of​religion​and​privileges,​ nor​its​government​of​General​Paredes,​nor​its​famous​Seven​Laws​shed​ light​on​its​program​or​its​inclinations. ​ Talking​incessantly​of​religion,​of​order,​of​the​family,​and​of​property,​ it​ sometimes​ defends​ the​ principle​ of​ authority​ without​ saying​ from​where​it​should​be​derived;​other​times​it​seems​to​long​for​Spanish​domination​or​something​like​it;​other​times​it​dreams​of​erecting​ a​throne​for​a​foreign​prince;​and​other​times,​finally,​it​implores​the​ protectorate​of​foreign​powers.​If​its​doctrines,​if​its​aspirations,​leave​ its​program​shrouded​in​mystery,​there​is​nonetheless​reliable​information​for​knowing​it​and​for​appraising​what​it​is​worth​as​a​party​of​government​and​morality.​This​action,​which​it​cannot​deny,​is​the​recent​ dictatorship​of​Santa​Anna,​based​on​perjury,​treason,​and​perfidy,​sup​ Original​title:​“El​orden​constitucional.”​Source:​El Siglo XIX,​Mexico,​February​14,​ 1857. 269

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ported​by​brutal​force,​sustained​by​atrocity​and​barbarism,​grandiose​ action​in​which​the​conservative​party​took​pleasure,​for​it​could​then​ calmly​carry​out​all​its​intentions​and​managed​to​establish​the​Order​of​ Guadalupe​as​an​institution​only​amidst​streams​of​blood,​and​it​amused​ itself​by​legislating​incessantly​over​liveries,​uniforms,​and​court​ceremonies.​ That​ unforgettable​ state​ of​ affairs,​ with​ its​ odor​ of​ sacristy,​ guardroom,​and​gambling​den,​concealed​in​its​cloaks,​its​embroideries,​ and​its​fiestas​a​den​of​malefactors.​In​the​middle​of​its​carnival​pageantry​there​was​something​of​corruption,​immorality,​and​rottenness​ that​recalled​the​decadent​epoch​of​the​late​[Roman]​empire.​That​order​ of​business​sensed​that​it​was​tottering,​and​so​it​thought​of​the​protectorate,​or​it​sought​Swiss​armies,​and​so​also​the​party​of​the​authority​ principle,​the​party​that​calls​to​the​silent​people,​that​party,​in​order​to​ perpetuate​itself​in​power,​in​order​to​prolong​the​harvest​time​of​its​ notables,​that​party​had​no​shame​in​appealing​to​the​parody​of​universal​suffrage​to​say​that​the​autocratic​power​of​His​Serene​Highness1​was​ derived​from​the​will​of​the​people. ​ If​the​restoration​of​that​dictatorship​is​the​desire​of​the​reactionary​ party,​it​is​right​in​accepting​the​legal​order​because​the​will​of​the​Mexican​people​can​never​tolerate​infamy,​insult,​and​servitude;​but​it​is​now​ time​that​it​consider​that​it​will​not​achieve​anything​with​the​rebellion​ other​than​ruining​and​uselessly​making​Mexican​blood​run. ​ The​party​that​created​and​supported​the​tyranny​of​twenty-​seven​ months2​cannot​accept​the​constitutional​order,​and​this​does​not​surprise​ us​ because​ in​ this​ order​ it​ is​ not​ possible​ for​ speculators,​ bad​ priests,​treasonous​soldiers,​and​riffraff​to​succeed​as​an​organized​party,​ obscene​assemblage​that​gives​itself​the​title​of​aristocracy. ​ But​if​there​is​a​party​that​from​respect​for​the​traditions​of​the​past​ believes​in​good​faith​that​our​people​is​not​yet​ready​for​liberty​or​for​ the​free​discussion​of​its​affairs,​if​there​is​a​party​that​would​like​to​ strengthen​the​power,​restrict​local​liberties,​and​limit​certain​rights,​ that​party​will​enthusiastically​accept​the​constitutional​order;​it​will​ appeal​to​legal​weapons,​to​the​press,​to​elections,​to​the​floor​to​defend​ and​disseminate​its​ideas​with​openness​and​loyalty. ​ 1.​Alteza serenísima​(serene​highness)​was​the​title​Santa​Anna​gave​himself.​(Editor’s​ note) ​ 2.​Santa​Anna’s​rule.​(Editor’s​note)

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​ It​is​necessary​to​reiterate​that​the​new​constitution​does​not​exclude​ any​party,​any​opinion,​any​creed,​but​rather​that​it​calls​all​of​them​to​ the​ legal​ sphere,​ without​ any​ condition​ other​ than​ submitting​ themselves​to​the​will​of​the​majority.​Getting​to​be​the​majority​depends​ on​the​morality​and​the​ability​of​each​party.​And​this​constitution​has​ over​the​earlier​ones​an​advantage​that​makes​it​acceptable​to​all​political​ convictions.​Its​authors​have​not​declared​themselves​infallible,​they​do​ not​present​their​work​as​perfect,​they​do​not​establish​a​status​quo​that​ one​can​leave​only​through​rebellion.​Far​from​this,​it​opens​the​doors​ to​reform​in​every​sense;​there​is​not​a​single​constitutional​article​that​ is​not​subject​to​official​notice3​if​the​national​will​wishes​it​so.​And​for​ reform,​they​do​not​establish​long​procedures​or​great​obstacles.​In​few​ months,​the​most​substantial​innovation​can​be​carried​out.​Given​this​ ease,​ no​ party​can​ reject​ the​ constitutional​ order,​ but​ rather​can​ embrace​it​in​good​faith​as​the​only​way​to​put​its​principles​into​practice​ in​a​legal​and​peaceful​manner​without​having​to​resort​to​civil​war​and​ bloodshed. ​ Those​ who​ do​ not​ accept​ the​ new​ constitution​ declare​ themselves​ outside​ the​ law,​ confess​ their​ impotence​ before​ public​ opinion,​ turn​ themselves​into​enemies​of​peace,​and​admit​that​they​can​achieve​power​ only​through​upheavals​and​rebellion,​that​is,​through​harassment,​surprise,​violence,​and​not​through​the​will​of​their​fellow​citizens. ​ When​the​constitution​excludes​no​one,​when​it​delivers​power​to​ the​people​so​the​people​govern​themselves,​there​is​no​pretext​for​not​ accepting​the​new​legal​order.​In​it​fit​all​programs,​all​legitimate​aspirations,​and​in​it​is​possible​the​struggle​of​all​men​who,​partially​yielding​their​political​principles,​do​not​forget​that​they​are​compatriots​and​ brothers​ and​ that​ the​ vanquished​ today​ can​ be​ the​ victors​ tomorrow,​ without​defiling​themselves​with​hatreds,​atrocities,​or​persecutions. ​ We​do​not​believe​in​the​merging​of​parties,​nor​do​we​desire​it,​because​if​it​were​possible​it​would​put​a​halt​to​all​spirit​of​progress​and​ innovation.​The​fundamental​charter​cannot​produce​the​never-​before-​ seen​phenomenon​in​which​all​parties​are​fused​into​only​one;​but​it​ certainly​can​give​to​their​discussions,​to​their​differences​and​even​their​ struggles,​a​character​of​temperance​and​moderation​that​could​maintain​ the​public​peace,​might​avoid​civil​war,​and​could​revive​in​everyone​the​ ​

3.​Debated​and​amended.​(Editor’s​note)

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feeling​of​nationality.​This​is​as​far​as​it​can​go;​to​think​of​other​mergers​ is​to​pursue​one-​sided​agreements,​accept​humiliating​conditions,​and​ have​faith​in​the​kiss​of​Judas. ​ The​ constitutional​ order​ is​ acceptable​ for​ all​ men​ who​ love​ their​ country​and​wish​to​see​it​free​of​upheavals.​Our​convictions​would​be​ lacking​and​we​would​be​inconsistent​if​we​said​that​the​constitution​is​ a​perfect​work​when​many​of​its​measures​have​been​openly​and​vigorously​attacked​by​us​in​the​press​and​in​the​rostrum.​We​have​said​that​ the​new​constitution​is​not​the​symbol​of​the​progressive​party;​we​believed​that​the​time​had​come​to​put​into​practice​all​the​principles​of​ democracy​with​all​their​consequences.​We​made​mistakes;​there​were​ still​compromises,​obstacles,​delays,​and​half​measures.​We​must​bow​ respectfully​before​the​majority;​we​accept​the​new​constitution​as​the​ source​of​legality​and​as​a​means​by​which​one​day​progressive​ideas​ might​triumph,​because​the​future​belongs​to​them. ​ We​insist​on​the​idea​that​the​new​fundamental​charter​not​exclude​ any​political​faith,​and​this​noble​conduct​of​the​liberal​party​offers​a​ notable​ contrast​ with​ the​ one​ the​ conservatives​ always​ observe.​ The​ Revolution​of​Jalisco,4​which​they​distorted,​proclaimed​the​existence​ of​the​federal​system​and​the​reform​of​the​Charter​of​1824​by​means​of​a​ congress​elected​by​the​people.​The​conservatives,​holders​of​the​power​ thanks​to​the​most​indecent​intrigues,​evaded​all​the​promises​and​arrived​at​the​dictatorship​for​life​of​Santa​Anna,​giving​liberals​only​jail​ cells​and​exile.​The​revolution​of​Ayutla​promised​a​democratic​constitution,​and​this​promise​has​been​faithfully​kept,​and​the​new​legal​ order​does​not​depend​on​party​denominations​but​rather​calls​to​all​ Mexicans. ​ Up​to​now,​no​one​has​attacked​the​new​constitution​directly.​When​ the​debates​in​Congress​have​had​the​greatest​publicity,​there​are​periodicals​that​feign​not​to​know​what​it​is​about​and​await​news​as​if​they​ had​to​consider​events​ in​Peking​ or​Ispahan.​Other​periodicals​ ask​if​ there​is​liberty​to​express​opinions​freely​about​the​new​fundamental​ code.​And​there​is​no​lack​of​those​who​insist​on​expressing​the​opinion​that​the​constitution​will​not​be​promulgated,​and​they​advise​that​it​

​ 4.​José​María​Blancarte​revolted​in​Guadalajara,​Jalisco,​against​the​government​of​ Mariano​Arista​in​July​1852.​(Editor’s​note)

the​ConStitutional​order : 273

be​published​only​as​a​curious​document​so​that​the​approval​it​finds​in​ public​opinion​and​the​reforms​that​it​needs​can​be​understood. ​ The​press​should​truly​act​with​greater​openness.​No​one​in​the​country​can​be​ignorant​of​what​the​new​constitution​is.​The​law​does​not​ prohibit​its​free​examination​by​the​press,​and​the​writer​who​makes​ evident​ the​ imperfections​ from​ which​ it​ suffers​ will​ do​ a​ service​ to​ the​country​and​has​nothing​to​fear.​Because​the​constitution​has​been​ sworn​ by​ the​ president​ of​ the​ Republic,​ doubting​ whether​ it​ will​ be​ promulgated​is​to​insult​this​magistrate.​To​those​who​are​gratified​by​ stirring​up​these​doubts,​we​can​assure​them​that​the​constitution​has​already​been​sanctioned​by​the​executive​and​will​be​published​very​soon.​ As​for​reforms,​the​country​can​make​them,​but​in​a​legal​manner,​and​if​ public​opinion​longs​for​certain​modifications,​it​can​achieve​them​immediately,​sending​to​the​first​congress​and​the​legislatures​of​the​states​ men​who​vote​those​reforms. ​ From​now​on,​the​press​can​judge​very​well​with​ample​freedom​the​ new​constitution,​which,​despite​its​imperfections,​is​accepted​by​the​ country​as​the​end​of​the​dictatorship​and​of​arbitrariness,​as​the​end​of​ the​civil​war,​and​as​the​foundation​of​the​legal​order.

3 ​

Elections

Before​long​the​battle​among​the​parties​on​the​electoral​ field​ for​ the​ selection​ of​ the​ constitutional​ powers​ must​ begin.​ With​ the​ representative​ system​ established​ and​ the​ decision​ regarding​sovereignty​delegated​to​the​general​powers​and​the​states,​no​other​ action​but​the​elections​remains​for​the​people​to​exercise​their​sovereignty​for​themselves.​For​this​very​reason​they​must​watch​the​elections​ with​the​greatest​interest,​understanding​that​on​their​votes​depend​the​ organization​of​the​government,​success​in​the​public​administration,​ and​the​fate​of​the​country.​If,​because​of​a​lamentable​abandonment,​ the​majority​of​our​fellow​citizens​had​not​almost​always​regarded​the​ elections​with​indifference,​abandoning​them​to​turbulent​factions​that,​ as​masters​of​the​terrain,​distorted​the​national​will,​it​is​evident​that​the​ country​would​have​been​saved​many​errors,​many​mistakes,​and​many​ crimes,​that​it​would​have​lacked​pretext​for​many​rebellions,​and​that​ the​governments​deriving​from​the​people​would​have​found​support​ among​the​same​people. ​ This​abandonment,​this​indifference​that​we​lament,​are​not​inexplicable​phenomena.​In​order​for​the​election​to​be​of​interest​and​to​attract​the​citizens,​it​is​necessary​that​the​citizen​feels,​perceives,​that​his​ vote​has​some​influence​on​the​fate​of​the​country,​that​his​will​counts​ as​much​as​that​of​each​of​his​compatriots,​and​that​if​the​majority​of​ them​participate,​the​men​who​deserve​their​confidence​can​be​elevated​ to​high​offices.​Explaining​our​thinking​with​more​precision,​we​will​say​ that​the​indifference​with​which​the​people​regard​electoral​acts​results​ from​having​adopted​the​system​of​indirect​election,​of​the​progressive​ delegation​of​the​suffrage,​which​can​never​produce​as​an​outcome​the​ legitimate​expression​of​public​opinion. ​ What​ faith,​ what​ interest,​ can​ the​ people​ have​ in​ naming​ electors​ ​ 274

Original​title:​“Elecciones.”​Source:​El Siglo XIX,​Mexico,​February​15,​1857.

eleCtionS : 275

who​have​to​name​other​new​electors,​who​have​still​to​go​to​select​a​ new​electoral​body?​What​faith​can​the​people​have​in​all​these​operations,​whose​outcome​they​cannot​even​predict​and​that,​as​experience​ teaches,​will​be​the​most​unexpected,​if​not​the​most​contrary​to​their​ desires?​To​proclaim​popular​sovereignty,​to​recognize​that​all​power​ derives​from​the​people,​and​to​appeal​to​indirect​election,​which​distorts,​corrupts,​and​denaturalizes​the​suffrage,​is​to​fall​into​a​monstrous​ inconsistency​that​immediately​produces​the​evil​of​distracting​citizens​ from​public​affairs,​putting​public​affairs​at​the​mercy​of​the​audacity​ and​intrigue​of​small​factions​and​imprudent​candidates. ​ We​are​supporters​of​direct​and​universal​suffrage​because,​when​we​ accept​a​principle,​we​conform​to​all​its​consequences​without​vacillation​and​timidity;​we​cannot​approve​the​indirect​system​that​the​new​ constitution​ establishes,​ nor​ much​ less​ the​ severe​ restriction​ that​ the​ circle​of​eligible​ones​has​undergone​thanks​to​the​triumph​of​the​mean​ spirit​of​provincialism​over​the​democratic​principle​and​over​the​sentiment​of​national​unity​and​the​fraternity​of​all​Mexicans. ​ We​recognize​nonetheless​that,​in​the​constitution,​a​step​has​been​ taken​toward​progress,​reducing​the​stages​of​indirect​election,​and​it​ seems​to​us​that​the​division​of​the​country​into​electoral​districts​will​ make​the​expression​of​the​will​of​the​people​more​genuine​and​will​ keep​away​official​influences​and​the​intrigues​of​factions. ​ Having​one​single​stage​of​election,​the​naming​of​high​functionaries​moves​closer​to​the​people,​who​can​become​more​interested​in​the​ electoral​struggle. ​ If​the​people​wish​to​conserve​their​liberty,​if​they​wish​to​maintain​ order,​if​they​wish​to​have​morality​and​intelligence​in​public​posts,​they​ must​take​an​active​part​in​elections​without​letting​themselves​be​led​by​ any​guide​other​than​their​conscience. ​ The​ electoral​ struggle​ is​ appropriate​ so​ that​ all​ parties​ that​ accept​ the​legal​order​carefully​measure​and​organize​their​strengths,​which​ should​consist​of​the​moral​influence​they​exercise​on​public​opinion.​ We​would​look​with​pleasure​at​our​adversaries​being​disposed​to​enter​ into​the​electoral​dispute​with​no​weapons​other​than​their​program​and​ their​principles​and​openly​proclaiming​their​candidacies. ​ Leaving​ elections​ to​ chance​ is​ one​ of​ the​ most​ unfortunate​ errors​ of​people.​To​think​only​about​the​electors​is​to​be​left​in​the​middle​ of​the​road.​Above​all,​opinion​must​seek​which​citizens​are​worthy​of​

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rising​to​legislative​seats,​the​highest​magistracies,​and​the​presidency​ of​the​Republic.​Otherwise,​one​would​see​what​has​already​happened,​ that​a​party​that​believes​it​has​won​the​primary​elections​loses​the​elections​of​the​deputies.​So​as​not​to​move​blindly,​at​least​in​what​concerns​our​political​communion,​we​believe​that​the​labors​on​behalf​of​ the​elections​should​have​the​greatest​publicity,​that​before​one​decides​ for​certain​men,​it​is​necessary​to​take​their​records​into​account​and​be​ assured​of​the​resoluteness​of​their​convictions.​And​as​there​is​no​one​ who​does​not​fear​some​inconsistency,​it​seems​to​us​indispensable​that​ the​progressive​party​should​demand​of​its​candidates​clear​and​explicit​ programs​in​order​to​be​able​to​reproach​turncoats​for​their​defections​ and​to​have​a​pledge​that​places​the​honor​of​the​elected​ones​under​an​ obligation​not​to​abandon​democratic​principles. ​ Without​a​program​there​cannot​be​candidacies​or​nominations​who​ inspire​confidence.​It​will​be​said​that​what​we​want​clashes​a​bit​with​ our​customs,​that​here​there​is​a​false​modesty​that​dissuades​the​citizen​ from​acknowledging​that​he​aspires​to​public​posts.​We​know​this​difficulty,​but​we​believe​that​the​open,​public,​sincere​aspiration,​the​complete​commitment​of​the​man​of​honor​to​a​party,​is​worth​much​more​ than​the​shameful​intrigue​of​one​who​begs​for​votes,​of​one​who​gets​ them​by​wicked​means​and,​in​order​to​obtain​them,​lavishes​promises​ with​the​most​conflicting​meanings. ​ The​man​who​longs​to​serve​his​country​cannot​be​ashamed​of​acknowledging​ it;​ his​ aspiration​ is​ noble​ and​ patriotic,​ and​ eligibility​ is​ one​ of​ the​ rights​ of​ the​ citizen.​ The​ deserters,​ the​ ones​ that​ resist​ change,​the​timid,​the​fickle,​those​who​always​want​to​serve​circumstances,​are​those​who​can​remain​aloof​from​formulating​a​program,​ from​entering​into​a​solid​commitment.​It​is​the​majority​of​these​men​ who​almost​always​have​been​elevated​to​regions​of​power;​when​each​ administration​has​taken​power​the​greatest​uncertainty​about​its​policy​ has​predominated,​and​afterward​this​policy​has​been​uncertain​and​as​ changeable​as​the​seasons.​From​this​comes​that​unfortunate​system​of​ governments​consecrated​to​the​thankless​task​of​Penelope;​from​this​ comes​that​habit​of​weaving​and​unweaving​and​of​retracing​steps​on​the​ path​of​reform​and​progress. ​ The​ same​ when​ the​ legislative​ assemblies​ have​ appeared.​ The​ puff​ of​ministerial​favor,​the​threat​of​presidential​ire,​and​reasons​perhaps​ more​disgraceful​have​been​sufficient​to​make​the​majority​today​be-

eleCtionS : 277

come​the​minority​tomorrow,​and,​with​scandal,​one​has​sometimes​seen​ that​the​principles​that​form​the​creed​of​an​entire​party​can​scarcely​be​ sustained​by​a​few​individuals,​because​men​of​the​same​communion​ turn​their​backs​on​those​principles​and​cover​their​desertion​with​the​ outward​show​of​prudence​and​good​judgment,​pronouncing,​“it​is​not​ time,”​the​eternal​refrain​that​is​always​on​the​lips​of​the​timid​and​inconsistent. ​ So​that​this​political​immorality​might​stop,​so​that​there​might​be​ men​of​firm​principles,​it​is​necessary​that​there​be​the​greatest​openness​ in​elections​and​that​the​people​demand​strict​programs​from​the​candidates.​For​the​deserters,​for​the​obstinate​ones,​for​those​who​abandon​ their​cause​in​the​supreme​hour​of​misfortune,​there​is​not​a​punishment​in​the​written​codes;​they​are​not​subject​to​review​before​ordinary​courts,​but​on​them​must​fall​the​verdict​and​anathema​of​public​ opinion,​which​will​be​limited​to​leaving​them​in​the​obscurity​of​private​life,​from​which​they​should​never​have​emerged. ​ A​sad​experience​dictates​to​us​these​words​that​we​wish​the​progressive​party​would​accept.​Trusting​in​past​history,​in​private​promises,​in​ declarations​that​seemed​sincere,​we​have​more​than​once​loaned​our​ support​to​some​candidacies,​and​when​they​have​triumphed,​we​have​ almost​always​received​some​bitter​disappointment,​and​we​have​had​to​ condemn​terrible​attacks​on​our​principles​by​the​very​ones​who​feigned​ to​profess​them.​And​as​there​was​not​a​solemn​commitment​before​public​opinion,​we​have​not​been​able​to​throw​their​disgraceful​inconsistencies​in​the​faces​of​those​men. ​ Taught​by​experience​to​take​warning​from​the​lessons​of​the​past,​ we​will​be​more​cautious​in​the​future,​and​from​now​on​we​declare​ that​in​the​next​elections,​no​candidate​will​have​our​support​so​long​as​ he​does​not​formulate​a​program​whereby​he​enters​into​solemn​contracts​with​the​progressive​party.​Otherwise,​we​will​always​proceed​by​ chance,​and​in​the​electoral​campaign​we​will​always​proceed​in​the​dark​ and​as​though​delivered​to​the​whims​of​a​game​of​chance. ​ We​venture​to​provoke​our​coreligionists​in​the​press​to​adopt​the​ same​behavior​we​propose​to​follow,​because​we​believe​it​suitable​to​ the​public​interest​in​the​cause​of​democracy. ​ If​there​are​other​candidacies​that​stand​without​a​program,​we​will​ examine​them​with​the​greatest​impartiality,​turning​our​eyes​always​to​ the​records​of​the​public​life​of​all​the​candidates.​And​if​we​find​incon-

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sistencies​and​defections,​we​will​not​be​silent​about​them,​because​in​ electoral​times​it​is​appropriate​that​the​country​know​its​public​men.​ We​will​be,​then,​more​severe​with​those​who​call​themselves​progressives​than​with​those​who​present​themselves​as​our​adversaries,​because​ in​these​latter​there​will​be​more​openness​and​fewer​vacillations. ​ Soon​there​will​be​elections​of​deputies​to​the​constituent​legislatures​ of​the​states,​bodies​that​have​to​carry​out​an​arduous​and​difficult​mission,​that​of​working​out​the​interior​rule​of​the​localities​in​such​a​way​ that​they​enjoy​all​the​privileges​the​constitution​grants​them​without​ going​against​the​foundations​of​the​federal​pact​in​the​slightest​way. ​ Following​them​are​the​elections​for​the​general​Congress,​which​has​ to​develop​the​principles​of​the​constitution,​drawing​up​the​organic​ laws​that​the​constituent​assembly​cannot​issue.​Those​elected​by​the​ people​must​represent,​in​the​first​constituent​congress,​the​opinion​of​ the​country​regarding​the​new​constitution​and​the​reforms​it​needs,​ which​can​be​initiated​immediately.​These​are​circumstances​that​make​ it​indispensable​that​men​whose​political​ideas​are​not​a​mystery​to​their​ fellow​citizens​come​to​the​assembly. ​ The​people​have​also​to​elect​the​seven​magistrates​of​the​Supreme​ Court​and​the​president​of​the​Republic.​In​conferring​such​lofty​positions,​it​must​be​remembered​that​it​is​not​a​matter​of​rewarding​them​ for​their​services,​but​of​seeking​the​best​and​most​worthy​servants​of​ the​country​for​their​patriotism,​for​their​morality,​and​for​their​ability. ​ We​sincerely​desire​that​the​people,​being​persuaded​that​the​happiness​of​the​country​depends​on​the​success​of​the​elections,​take​the​ appropriate​part​in​them​without​abandoning​them​to​the​intrigues​of​a​ few​candidates. ​ The​press​is​within​its​right,​attempting​to​guide​and​enlighten​the​ public​spirit​in​the​electoral​struggle,​and​we​believe​that​the​progressive​ press,​for​the​interest​of​its​principles​and​for​the​public​good,​must​refrain​from​making​spontaneous​nominations​and​from​supporting​candidacies​when​it​does​not​have​evidence​of​what​the​cause​of​democracy​ has​to​expect​from​each​candidate,​for​which​it​is​necessary​that​the​candidate​have​very​clear​and​very​definite​programs. ​ That​is,​at​least,​the​conduct​we​propose​to​follow,​advised​by​the​lessons​of​a​sad​experience.

4



Progress and Innovation

The​Eco Nacional​has​published​a​lead​article​with​this​ title​to​complete​the​refutation​of​our​ideas​in​opposition​to​the​amalgamation​of​parties. ​ Our​colleague​agrees​that​our​society​cannot​remain​static​and​recognizes​that​the​need​for​movement,​the​tendency​to​perfect​oneself​and​ to​improve​conditions,​is​inherent​in​man,​whom​God​endowed​with​all​ the​powers​necessary​to​elevate​his​destiny.​It​pleases​us​beyond​measure​ to​be​entirely​in​agreement​with​the​view​of​our​colleague,​and​that​need​ for​movement,​that​necessity​to​improve​conditions,​being​obvious​and​ insuperable,​we​think​that​in​order​to​develop​it,​to​make​it​beneficial,​ and​not​to​misdirect​it,​it​is​necessary​that​laws,​institutions,​and​governments​do​not​become​an​obstacle​to​the​progressive​movement​of​society,​and​that​it​is​thus​appropriate​to​leave​human​activity​free,​to​trust​ individual​liberty,​not​to​be​alarmed​by​the​right​of​association,​and​to​ free​industry,​commerce,​and​agriculture​from​all​shackles​to​make​possible​the​material​progress​of​the​people.​For​this​we​believe​it​appropriate​that​the​most​extensive​liberty​for​all​opinions​should​exist​in​the​ legal​order,​and​we​do​not​judge​it​necessary​that​the​political​parties​ sacrifice​their​principles​with​base​compromises. ​ Material​progress​cannot​be​considered​to​be​independent​of​political​ institutions.​ Liberty​ creates​ new​ needs,​ and​ liberty​ facilitates​ the​ means​of​satisfying​them.​If​trade​and​exchange​are​not​subject​to​absurd​ restrictions,​the​need​for​new​ways​of​communication​will​be​felt,​and​if​ the​spirits​of​association​and​enterprise​do​not​encounter​obstacles​because​of​the​distrust​of​authority​or​because​of​administrative​centralization,​opening​pathways​will​be​easier.​The​same​analogy​we​have​just​ indicated​can​always​be​found​between​material​progress​and​political​ ​ Original​title:​“Progreso​e​innovación.”​Source:​El Siglo XIX,​Mexico,​February​26,​ 1857. 279

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institutions.​For​there​to​be​progress,​it​seems​to​us​that​the​best​system​consists​in​what​the​economists​have​called​laissez faire.​We​do​not​ know​up​to​what​point​the​Eco​will​share​these​ideas;​but​for​us​there​is​ no​doubt​that​the​excessive​expansion​of​authority,​its​distrustful​vigilance​felt​everywhere,​the​restrictive​system​with​its​passports​and​prohibitions​and​fiscal​investigations,​etc.,​constitute​the​most​unfortunate​ hindrance​to​all​progress.​Where​no​one​can​move​without​the​permission​of​the​authority,​where​the​spirit​of​enterprise​encounters​barriers​ in​everything​and​for​everything,​material​improvements​come​to​be​ impossible,​and​in​our​country​it​is​well​known​which​party​it​is​that,​in​ order​to​maintain​itself​in​control,​has​resorted​to​the​most​absurd​restrictions. ​ So,​laissez faire.​We​agree​with​the​Eco​in​that​the​peace​and​stability​of​ governments​are​the​principal​elements​for​achieving​material​progress.​ This​peace​and​this​stability​will​be​found​in​the​legal​order​and​in​the​ peaceful​struggle​of​parties,​not​in​their​impossible​mergers.​The​same​ can​be​said​of​intellectual​progress​and​of​every​type​of​progress,​that​is​ to​say,​they​are​impossible​without​the​broadest,​the​most​complete​liberty;​and​as​for​the​dissemination​of​public​instruction,​it​will​be​easier​ with​the​freedom​of​instruction​and​with​administrative​decentralization,​for​in​that​way​instruction​without​cost​will​be​provided​from​the​ municipal​school​up​to​the​great​national​establishments. ​ Our​colleague​believes​that​enlightened​men​are​in​agreement​on​this​ point,​ without​ difference​ of​ opinions,​ and​ he​ reminds​ us​ that​ to​ the​ party​we​consider​the​enemy​of​progress​is​owed​the​restoration​of​the​ Academia​de​Nobles​Artes,​the​institution​of​the​College​of​Agriculture,​and​the​creation​of​the​Ministry​of​Economic​Development,​and​ he​adds​that​the​laws​that​have​been​decreed​in​matters​of​instruction​ by​men​who​are​not​of​the​progressive​party​demonstrate​that​they​are​ not​indifferent​to​public​instruction,​although​they​believe​that​it​must​ be​regulated​in​a​suitable​manner. ​ We​recognize​that​the​restoration​of​the​Academia,​the​creation​of​ the​School​of​Agriculture​and​that​of​the​Ministry​of​Economic​Development​are​from​the​time​of​the​conservatives;​but​we​can​say​that​the​ Academia​de​Nobles​Artes​has​been​protected​by​all​governments,​that​ the​School​of​Agriculture​has​received​very​important​improvements​ from​the​present​government,​that​the​Ministry​of​Economic​Development​was​created​at​the​request​of​many​men​of​the​liberal​party,​and​

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that​its​creation​was​opposed​only​by​the​most​recognized​organ​of​the​ conservatives,​by​the​old​Universal,​which​feared​the​increase​of​candidates​for​state​ministries. ​ In​the​laws​and​rules​of​the​conservatives,​there​was​a​great​deal​of​restrictive​spirit​and​of​tendencies​not​to​disseminate​instruction.​The​plan​ of​studies​of​Lares​put​shackles​on​instruction​and​drove​a​large​part​of​ the​youth​away​from​literary​careers.​Although​it​is​certain​that,​through​ the​Ministry​of​Economic​Development,​some​measures​were​generally​ decreed​in​support​of​instruction​in​this​capital​alone,​the​Eco​cannot​ deny​that​to​the​conservative​domination​of​the​twenty-​seven​months​ were​ owed:​ the​ abolition​ of​ the​ National​ College​ of​ San​ Gregorio,​ which​was​devoted​to​the​education​of​the​indigenous​race​and​which​ was​replaced​with​a​house​of​Jesuits,​but​we​do​not​know​whether​it​has​ rendered​services​to​public​instruction​or​to​the​poor​classes​of​society;​ the​closing​of​the​School​of​Medicine​of​Puebla,​which​compelled​many​ students​to​abandon​their​career;​the​closing​of​the​Instituto​Literario​ of​Toluca,​where​young​people​from​all​the​municipalities​of​the​state​of​ Mexico​were​instructed;​the​closing​of​the​Liceo​and​of​the​Instituto​de​ Guadalajara,​which​was​carried​out​even​though​the​professors​offered​ to​continue​serving​without​pay;​the​closing​of​the​Instituto​de​Ciencias​of​Oaxaca,​out​of​hatred​for​its​reformer​and​director,​Don​Benito​ Juárez;​the​closing​of​the​Instituto​de​Zacatecas;​the​closing​of​the​college​of​Durango.​This​was​the​appropriate​way​of​regulating​instruction​ that​the​conservatives​had:​eliminate​it. ​ Many​ of​ these​ establishments​ were​ converted​ to​ barracks,​ and​ the​ physics​and​chemistry​laboratories​were​destroyed​by​an​uncontrolled​ army​rabble​that​recalled​the​day​of​the​most​horrifying​barbarism. ​ And​the​lack​of​trust​was​such​that​when​the​literary​academy​of​San​ Juan​de​Letrán​came​together​to​prepare​the​apotheosis​of​the​distinguished​Ruiz​de​Alarcón,​it​could​not​examine​poetic​compositions​except​in​the​presence​of​a​guard​sent​by​the​authority. ​ The​organ​of​the​dominant​party​maintained​then​that​the​people​ could​not​be​given​any​instruction​or​code​other​than​the​catechism​of​ Father​Ripalda. ​ If​this​is​what​secondary​instruction​owed​to​conservative​domination,​we​must​say​that,​under​the​rule​of​the​liberals,​all​the​establishments​that​the​dictatorship​closed​have​been​restored.​The​contrast​does​ not​need​commentary.

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​ Primary​instruction​did​not​come​out​any​better.​With​the​municipal​ power​destroyed​and​the​people’s​funds​in​the​possession​of​the​military​ commanders,​the​councils​totally​eliminated​in​some​parts​and​named​ by​the​government​in​the​large​population​centers,​they​could​do​nothing.​The​great​rage​for​regulating​instruction​in​an​appropriate​manner​ inspired​that​very​famous​decree​on​primary​schools​that,​among​other​ things,​ limited​ the​ materials​ of​ instruction​ in​ private​ establishments;​ fixed​ the​ invariable​ time​ limit​ of​ two​ and​ a​ half​ years​ to​ teach​ reading,​writing,​and​the​four​primary​rules​of​arithmetic;​imposed​fines​on​ teachers​who​taught​anything​more;​and​prepared​for​the​catechism​to​ be​recited​one​hour​daily​by​the​pupils​while​they​were​in​the​school.​ The​conservatives​limited​and​held​back​instruction,​magnifying​the​restrictions​and​showing​themselves​to​be​entirely​ignorant. ​ Apart​from​this,​closing​schools​was​the​order​of​the​day,​and​those​ of​ Tabasco​ and​ the​ other​ states​ were​ closed​ because​ the​ government​ ordered​that​all​municipal​funds​be​used​for​the​passage​of​troops​and​ for​the​transfer​of​replacements,​the​levy​forcibly​plucked​from​industry​ and​agriculture. ​ More​than​enough​reason​for​us,​then,​in​view​of​the​notorious​facts,​ to​consider​the​conservative​faction​as​the​enemy​of​intellectual​progress​ and​ to​ believe,​ based​ on​ experience,​ that​ such​ progress​ is​ impossible​ with​limitations​and​restrictions.​We​said​before​that​the​colleges​the​ conservatives​closed​have​been​restored​by​the​progressive​party,​and​we​ believe​that​the​liberty​of​instruction​the​constitution​establishes​is​the​ best​way​to​facilitate​intellectual​progress. ​ Our​colleague​is​occupied​continuously​with​moral​progress,​which​ he​describes​as​superior​to​all​the​rest,​and​whose​sole​source​he​finds​ in​the​gospel​dogma;​he​asks​us​if​what​we​want​is​to​destroy​religious​ unity,​to​attack​Catholicism​in​its​dogmas,​in​the​persons​of​its​ministers,​in​the​regulations​and​laws​of​its​church,​and​to​introduce​religious​ anarchy​by​allowing​all​sects.​The​question​of​freedom​of​worship​in​the​ fundamental​code​forgotten,​the​gentlemen​of​Eco​must​be​proud​of​the​ triumph​of​intolerance.​Nonetheless,​we​say​to​them​that​the​progressive​party​does​not​wish​to​destroy​a​religious​unity​that​does​not​exist​ where​a​Protestant,​foreign​population​lives,​and​where,​according​to​ what​some​bishops​say,​entire​towns​of​idolators​exist;​that​the​progressive​party​does​not​attack​Catholicism​in​its​dogmas,​or​in​its​ministers,​ or​in​the​regulations​and​laws​of​the​church;​and​that​it​only​wants​those​

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ministers​to​fulfill​their​duty​and​not​to​confuse​dogmas​with​matters​of​ simple​discipline.​The​progressive​party​does​not​believe​that​the​society​ where​different​forms​of​worship​exist​is​demoralized,​and​it​bases​its​ belief​on​the​fact​that​the​Roman​pontiff,​the​visible​head​of​the​Church,​ most​interested​as​he​is​in​maintaining​Catholic​unity,​does​not​find​it​ inappropriate​as​temporal​sovereign​to​permit​in​his​states​the​free​exercise​of​Protestant​and​Jewish​worship. ​ Our​colleague​tells​us,​and​in​this​he​does​very​well,​what​services​ the​moral​progress​of​the​country​owes​to​the​conservative​party;​our​ colleague​is​very​enlightened​in​presenting​himself​as​satisfied​with​the​ recitation​of​the​catechism​in​the​schools​and​believing​that​this​compensates​ for​ the​ excessive​ immorality​ of​ the​ government​ of​ twenty-​ seven​months.​Neither​morality​nor​religion​was​served​by​those​who​ degraded​the​priest,​converting​parish​priests​into​police​agents;​those​ who​passed​judgment​on​the​ones​who​ate​meat​during​holy​week;​those​ who​in​Chiapas​imposed​fines​on​the​ones​who​did​not​hear​mass​or​did​ not​go​to​confession.​This​pharisaical​spirit​of​persecution​and​espionage​ is​not​the​spirit​of​the​sublime​law​of​Christianity;​it​was​the​hypocritical​cloak​with​which​the​men​of​the​reactionary​faction​wanted​to​cover​ their​wretchedness,​their​perjuries,​and​their​iniquities.​Those​who​persecuted​the​innocent,​those​who​sold​men,​those​who​breathed​hatred​ and​vengeance,​those​who​established​the​compulsory​denunciation​as​a​ point​of​moral​progress,​carried​us​back​to​the​times​of​the​Inquisition.​ Moral​progress,​like​all​progress,​is​derived​from​liberty,​and​the​authority​with​its​restrictive​laws​can​invent,​if​it​wants,​new​crimes;​but​it​ cannot​change​the​indelible​ideas​of​good​and​evil​engraved​in​the​hearts​ of​all​men. ​ Our​colleague​rants​continuously​against​demoralization,​decadence,​ misery,​the​ruins​of​the​epoch;​he​makes​fun​of​the​word​“philanthropy”​ and​misses​the​past,​decrying​the​fact​that​theaters​are​being​built​and​ railways​designed​and​the​development​of​commerce,​industry,​and​the​ arts​secured;​that,​finally,​what​is​referred​to​as​the​material​order​and​ the​intellectual​culture​is​being​urged​on,​without​anything​being​done​ in​what​the​jeremiad​of​our​colleague​refers​to​as​true​instruction.​But​ if​religious​instruction​is​neglected,​the​charge​is​not​against​the​progressive​party,​and​the​Eco​must​direct​it​where​it​belongs,​to​that​faction​that​invokes​the​august​name​of​religion​to​stir​up​civil​war,​commit​murders​like​that​of​the​priest​of​Tuto​and​robberies​like​that​of​

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the​two​hundred​forty​thousand​pesos​of​San​Luis​Potosí;​to​some​misguided​priests,​who​leave​the​modest​parish​priesthood​in​order​to​become​leaders​of​factions;​to​the​sincere​part​of​the​clergy​that​does​not​ roundly​condemn​these​excesses.​With​such​examples,​it​is​not​strange​ that,​among​an​innocent​and​simple​people,​religious​and​moral​instruction​goes​astray. ​ The​Eco​declares​itself​finally​a​partisan​of​progress,​but​of​a​progress​ organized​under​a​prudent​and​wise​direction​and​within​the​bounds​ that​order,​justice,​and​morality​demarcate.​We​believe​that​true​progress​ is​incompatible​with​disorder,​with​injustice​and​immorality,​and​we​are​ persuaded​that​it​results​from​the​combination​of​order​with​liberty. ​ Progress​must​be​the​work​of​the​people;​it​must​be​the​work​of​all​ the​spirits,​of​all​the​intelligence,​of​all​the​aspirations;​it​must​satisfy​ all​needs;​it​is​possible​within​the​legal​order​when​in​it​one​encounters​ neither​shackles​nor​restrictions.​And​we​do​not​know​from​where,​if​ not​from​the​people​themselves​and​the​force​of​society​itself,​must​come​ that​prudent​and​wise​direction​that​orders,​that​regulates​progress. ​ Always​enigmas,​always​rules.​Progress​is​in​liberty;​it​is​necessary​not​ to​oppose​useful​innovations​with​barriers,​and​the​appropriate​system​ is​laissez faire.

5



Laws and Customs the​lawS​and​CuStomS:​the​federation​ and​freedom​of​reliGion

The​laws​must​conform​to​customs,​and​not​customs​ to​ laws.​ Such​ is​ the​ maxim​ the​ gentlemen​ of​ the​ Eco Nacional​ have​ established​in​the​most​absolute​terms​in​order​to​say​afterward​that​in​ Mexico​the​liberal​party​wants​social​customs​to​conform​to​the​laws,​ from​which​it​can​only​follow​that​the​political​and​religious​opinions​ of​the​great​majority​of​citizens​are​opposed​to​its​work,​and​that​consequently​it​finds​invincible​resistance​everywhere. ​ Of​course,​for​our​colleague​the​new​constitution​is​in​conflict​with​ the​social​customs​of​the​Mexican​people,​above​all​in​two​main​points,​ namely,​the​reestablishment​of​the​federal​system​and​the​incomplete​ resolution​of​the​question​relative​to​freedom​of​worship. ​ Without​denying​the​principle​our​colleague​establishes,​that​the​laws​ must​conform​to​customs,​but​also​not​admitting​it​in​an​absolute,​invariable,​and​general​way,​we​permit​ourselves​to​observe​that,​for​the​ solution​to​questions​of​political​science,​the​most​gifted​talents​have​ not​been​able,​nor​will​be​able,​to​find​maxims​that​in​legislation​are​ equivalent​to​algebraic​formulas​that​serve,​in​all​countries​in​all​epochs,​ for​the​same​problem.​The​day​when​such​formulas​are​found,​politics​ would​be​converted​into​a​simple​mechanical​art,​ceasing​to​be​a​science​of​observation​and​experimental​science​susceptible​to​improvement​and​progress.​If​the​unknown​everywhere​is​the​well-​being​and​ prosperity​of​societies,​the​means​of​facilitating​the​attainment​of​that​ aspiration​to​perfectibility,​aspiration​in​which​our​colleagues​and​with​ them​the​greatest​philosophers​of​the​world,​have​recognized​to​be​the​ ​ Original​title:​“Las​leyes​y​las​costumbres:​La​federación​y​la​libertad​de​cultos.”​ Source:​El Siglo XIX,​Mexico,​March​30,​1857. 285

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seal​of​divinity​in​man;​the​day​when,​to​explain​this​unknown,​one​encounters​an​x = a + b​or​some​other​formula,​all​social​questions​would​ cease​to​be​that,​and​humanity​would​have​arrived​at​the​height​of​its​ perfection.​But​should​there​be​anyone​who​believes​in​such​an​unrealizable​dream​and​a​country​that​seeks​it​in​practice,​the​most​probable​ would​be​the​reign​of​the​status​quo​and​the​hindrance​of​all​progress.​ People​would​suffer​the​torment​of​that​tyrant​of​whom​the​pagan​myths​ speak,​who​compelled​men​of​all​types​to​accommodate​themselves​to​a​ bed​[lecho]​of​fixed​dimensions. ​ There​are​not,​then,​in​our​opinion,​political​maxims​invariably​applicable​to​all​countries​and​all​ages.​Although​those​maxims​seem​to​ contain​great​truths​and,​as​they​say,​adages​of​men​of​state,​when​one​ probes​them​deeply—and​for​theories​the​best​examination​is​the​practical—one​sees​very​often​that​it​is​necessary​to​depart​from​them. ​ The​laws​must​conform​to​customs.​It​would​be​well​and​good​if​this​ meant​that​the​legislator​must​not​clash​openly​with​the​customs​of​the​ people​or​try​to​transform​them​as​if​by​magic​or​resorting​to​violence.​ But​not​for​this​should​the​legislator​renounce​all​major​innovation,​all​ progress,​and​much​less​have​a​worship​blind​to​customs​or​yield​to​the​ most​absurd​fears. ​ The​lesson​of​history​says​more​about​this​than​all​arguments.​There​ is​not​a​legislator,​a​founder​of​nations,​one​of​those​men​who​has​personified​the​vital​forces​of​humanity,​who​has​been​held​back​by​the​ status quo.​If​they​had​behaved​in​that​way,​they​would​not​be​the​glories​ of​humanity​and​the​world​would​still​be​immersed​in​barbarism.​Moses​ makes​of​a​mob​of​Pharaoh’s​slaves​a​strong​people,​warlike​and​filled​ with​faith​in​God,​going​against​the​customs​of​captivity​and​idolatry.​ Solon​imprinted​his​spirit​on​the​republic​of​Athens,​radically​modifying​ the​ established​ customs​ that​ he​ found.​ Lycurgus,​ the​ Spartan,​ respects1​the​customs​that​make​people​effeminate.​Of​all​the​advances,​ of​all​the​innovations,​of​all​the​great​revolutions​of​the​human​spirit,​ the​most​extraordinary,​the​most​admirable​without​a​doubt​is​Christianity.​Well​then,​the​law​of​the​Messiah,​the​law​of​grace,​is​the​one​that​ most​departs​from​the​rule​that​laws​must​conform​to​customs,​and​so​ it​had​to​be,​because​to​overthrow​paganism​and​idolatry​with​all​their​ ​

1.​Disrespects,​most​likely.​(Editor’s​note)

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errors,​it​was​necessary​to​combat​them​at​their​foundations​ and​not​ come​to​terms​with​them. ​ The​ idea​ of​ national​ unity​ supported​ much​ later​ in​ various​ European​countries​could​triumph​only​by​attacking​the​customs​that​gave​ strength​to​feudalism. ​ The​ French​ Revolution​ would​ not​ have​ had​ such​ influence​ on​ humanity​ if​ there​ had​ not​ been​ the​ tremendous​ struggle​ of​ progress​ and​reform​against​tradition​and​custom. ​ The​emancipation​of​all​the​Americas​fought​against​the​custom​of​ centuries. ​ It​will​be​said​to​us,​perhaps,​that​it​is​a​matter​of​laws​and​not​revolutions.​We​answer​that,​for​us,​there​are​no​greater​revolutions​than​those​ that​come​about​by​virtue​of​the​laws. ​ It​seems​to​be​a​law​of​history​that​all​progress​finds​existence​in​the​ traditions​of​the​past,​in​that​force​of​inertia​that​one​wants​to​make​venerable​by​calling​it​custom.​But​it​is​also​a​law​of​history​that​the​new​ triumphs​over​the​old​and​that​custom​changes,​modifies​itself,​and​perfects​itself​in​a​progressive​sense,​never​resisting​the​law​of​the​consummate​action. ​ These​are​observations​based​not​only​in​the​history​of​politics,​of​ legislation,​and​of​revolutions,​but​also​in​the​history​of​philosophy​and​ science.​When​the​pagan​world​heard​for​the​first​time​talk​of​the​unity​ of​God,​this​truth​upset​it​so​much​in​its​institutions,​in​its​beliefs,​and​in​ its​manner​of​being​that​it​wanted​to​kill​the​new​idea,​making​the​man​ who​had​favored​it​finish​off​the​hemlock​at​one​draught.​But​ideas​do​ not​die,​and​polytheism,​even​with​the​force​of​custom,​had​to​succumb​ to​truth. ​ When​a​man​who​speaks​in​the​name​of​God​confounds​the​doctors​ of​the​law,​pulling​the​mask​from​their​hypocrisy;​calls​to​the​children,​ thus​ preferring​ candor​ and​ innocence​ to​ the​ splendors​ of​ the​ world;​ teaches​the​love​of​all​men,​the​forgiveness​of​enemies,​humility,​charity,​ disdain​for​riches;​when​he​emancipates​the​woman,​raising​her​to​the​ status​of​companion​to​man;​when​he​throws​the​merchants​from​the​ temple;​when​he​teaches​the​separation​between​the​mean​interests​of​ the​earth​and​the​future​destinies​of​heaven,​all​those​ideas,​all​those​ lessons​supported​by​example,​clash​in​such​a​way​with​tradition,​with​ custom,​that​the​conservative​spirit,​that​spirit​of​immutable​laws,​that​

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spirit​that​wants​the​perfect​alliance​of​law​and​custom​to​protect​the​ past,​sacrifices​the​innovator​in​torment—and​this​innovator​was​Christ!​ The​redemption​that​struggled​with​custom,​is​there​any​doubt​that​it​ was​the​great​revolution​in​morality​and​philosophy? ​ Centuries​later,​tradition​and​custom​want​our​planet​to​be​the​center​ of​the​universe​and​condemn​as​criminal​the​one​who​has​explored​the​ mystery​of​creation;​but​the​cry​of​Galileo,​E pur si muove!,​is​the​cry​of​ humanity​against​errors​of​the​past​and​oppression​by​custom. ​ Custom​also,​commanding​with​the​apparatus​of​theology​and​flowing​with​the​authority​of​Saint​Augustine,​denies​the​curvature​of​the​ earth​and​declares​Columbus​crazy​because​he​divines​the​existence​of​ this​continent.​The​discovery​of​America​is​for​custom,​for​tradition,​for​ the​beliefs​of​the​past,​a​mortal​blow​that​should​have​reduced​them​to​ perpetual​silence. ​ And​understand​well,​there​is​no​physical,​moral,​intellectual,​political,​ economic,​ social​ progress​ that​ has​ not​ come​ about​ through​ open​ war​against​custom.​The​plow,​social​life,​matrimony,​free​inquiry,​all​ the​sciences,​political​freedom,​commerce,​industry,​steam,​the​railroad,​ the​telegraph,​the​press,​the​abolition​of​slavery,​poorhouses,​vaccination,​the​penitentiary—in​a​word,​everything​great,​everything​useful,​ everything​beautiful—has​been​the​triumph​of​progress​over​custom.​ And​it​had​to​be​so​because​God,​in​bestowing​intelligence​and​free​will​ on​man,​wanted​that​man​might​travel​toward​his​perfection​himself. ​ To​want​custom​to​be​the​up-​to-​now​of​the​law​is​to​want,​Oh​holy​ God!​that​the​sun​not​give​light​at​the​hour​of​dawn​because​it​must​respect​the​custom​of​the​shadows​of​the​night. ​ See,​then,​that​if​laws​must​always​conform​to​customs,​any​progress,​ any​improvement,​would​be​impossible,​and​human​societies​would​be​ failing​to​keep​the​divine​law​of​unceasingly​working​for​their​perfection. ​ The​gentlemen​of​the​Eco​who​want​the​law​always​and​forever​to​ adapt​itself​to​custom​bring​upon​themselves​a​palpable​contradiction,​ no​ matter​ who​ might​ be​ the​ author​ they​ use​ to​ support​ themselves,​ claiming​that​if​the​people​are​apathetic​and​weak​of​character,​the​constitution​must​carry​stamped​and​printed​a​seal​of​life​and​energy​that​ neutralizes​that​character,​and​that​if​the​people​are​bellicose​and​irascible,​the​constitution​must​breathe​calm​and​gentleness.​Our​colleague,​ in​wishing​stimulants​for​the​listless​and​phlegmatic​and​sedatives​for​

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the​sanguine,​moves​himself​away​from​his​own​maxim​and​agrees​that,​ at​times,​the​laws​can​fight​a​little,​not​only​with​the​customs​but​with​ the​character​of​the​people. ​ Assuming​that​the​new​constitution​fights​to​a​certain​degree​with​ our​ customs,​ this​ would​ not​ be​ sufficient​ reason​ to​ describe​ as​ great​ nonsense​ the​ plan​ of​ the​ constituents,​ accusing​ them​ of​ having​ been​ ignorant​of​the​differences​that​matters​of​government,​race,​traditions,​ customs,​and​even​geographic​situation​ and​physical​ configuration​ of​ countries​occasion. ​ Our​colleague​did​not​examine​the​constitution​deeply,​he​does​not​ specify​which​are​the​measures​that​do​not​conform​to​customs,​and​he​ limits​himself​only​to​federation​and​the​freedom​to​worship,​feigning​ not​to​know​about​the​bill​of​rights​that​is​opposed​to​certain​customs​ everyone​describes​as​abuses. ​ The​federation​does​not​fight​with​customs​because,​of​all​the​forms​ of​government,​it​is​the​one​that​has​been​in​force​for​the​most​time​in​ the​country​and​the​one​that​has​allowed​it​to​enjoy​the​greatest​prosperity,​which​explains​why,​as​our​colleague​noted​another​time,​it​might​ have​left​welcome​memories​in​a​great​number​of​Mexicans. ​ The​Eco​repeats​that​appreciation​of​differences​between​the​origins​ of​Mexico​and​the​United​States,​appreciation​answered​many​times​in​ this​old​polemic. ​ The​federation​of​Mexico​is​not​the​breaking​up​but​rather,​on​the​ contrary,​the​bond​of​unity​that​leaves​appropriate​administrative​freedom​to​the​localities.​The​federation​is​necessary​precisely​if​it​attends​ to​the​geographic​situation​and​the​configuration​of​the​country,​and​it​ has​to​its​credit​the​contrast​between​it​and​the​central​form​of​government,​this​latter​being​powerless​with​respect​to​the​good​of​the​people​ although​always​oppressive. ​ The​federation​has​the​prestige​of​the​Charter​of​1824,​a​prestige​that​ our​colleague​has​recognized,​and,​practiced​in​the​country​for​many​ years,​it​cannot​be​said​that​it​is​in​conflict​with​our​customs;​much​less​ in​accord​with​our​customs​were​the​attempts​to​centralize​everything,​ the​crazy​eagerness​to​improvise​aristocratic​classes​and​knightly​orders,​ and​the​sad​insistence​on​dividing​Mexicans​into​more​or​less​privileged​ castes​when​here​equality​is​the​child​of​custom​and​tradition,​and​when​ those​who​as​colonists​were​equal​cannot​stop​being​so​with​the​formation​of​an​independent​nation.

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​ With​respect​to​liberty​of​worship,​comparison​between​Mexico​and​ the​United​States​is​unnecessary;​every​attack​on​the​new​constitution​ is​unnecessary​because​it​does​not​establish​such​liberty.​The​exercise​of​ this​liberty​guaranteed​by​political​institutions​would​surely​be​an​innovation​in​the​Republic.​But​on​this​point​the​Eco Nacional​must,​at​least,​ recognize​that​the​law​conformed​strictly​to​custom​without​offending​ it​in​the​slightest​way.​When​the​assembly​and​the​government​recoil​before​this​innovation,​it​is​the​height​of​injustice​to​accuse​them​of​being​ innovators.​We​do​not​find,​then,​the​least​motive​that​justifies​the​fear​ that​the​new​constitution​is​in​conflict​with​the​customs​of​the​Mexican​ people.​It​does,​indeed,​authorize​some​innovations​that​tend​to​correct​ lamentable​abuses​and​affirm​liberty. ​ The​constitution​is​very​far​from​being​an​empirical​work,​for​it​accommodates​itself​to​the​needs​of​the​people,​and​if​perhaps​it​does​not​ satisfy​all​of​them,​it​leaves​open​the​door​to​reform​without​committing​the​most​serious​error​of​setting​tradition​and​custom​against​true​ progress,​that​is​to​say,​the​satisfaction​of​social​needs.

6



Manifesto as Preamble to the Constitution of 1857

Mexico,​February​5,​1857 Mexicans: Today​the​great​promise​of​the​regenerative​Revolution​ of​Ayutla​to​return​the​country​to​the​constitutional​order​is​fulfilled.​ This​noble​demand​of​the​people,​so​energetically​expressed​by​them​ when​they​rose​up​to​break​the​yoke​of​the​most​menacing​despotism,​ is​satisfied.​Amidst​all​the​misfortunes​that​tyranny​made​them​suffer,​ they​knew​that​people​who​lack​institutions​that​are​the​legitimate​expression​of​their​will,​the​invariable​rule​of​their​mandataries,​are​exposed​to​continual​upheavals​and​the​harshest​servitude.​The​will​of​the​ entire​people​cried​out​for​a​constitution​that​would​ensure​the​guarantees​of​man,​the​rights​of​the​citizen,​the​regular​order​of​society.​To​ this​ sincere,​ innermost​ wish​ of​the​brave​ people​who,​ in​better​days,​ won​their​independence;​to​this​aspiration​of​people​who,​in​the​violent​ shipwreck​ of​ their​ liberties,​ anxiously​ sought​ some​ plank​ that​ might​ save​them​from​death​and​something​worse,​infamy;​to​this​will,​to​this​ aspiration,​the​Revolution​of​Ayutla​owed​its​triumph,​and​from​this​victory​of​the​people​over​their​oppressors,​of​right​over​brute​force,​was​ derived​the​meeting​of​the​Congress​called​to​bring​about​the​burning​ hope​of​the​Republic:​a​political​code​adequate​to​its​needs​and​to​the​ rapid​progress​that,​despite​its​misfortunes,​it​has​made​on​the​path​of​ civilization. ​ Divine​providence,​blessing​the​noble​efforts​that​have​been​made​on​ behalf​of​liberty,​has​allowed​Congress​to​end​its​work​and​today​offer​ the​country​the​promised​Constitution,​awaited​like​the​good​news​to​ ​ Original​ title:​ “Manifiesto​ formulado​ por​Francisco​ Zarco​ como​ preámbulo​ de​ la​ Constitución​ de​ 1857.”​ Source:​ Francisco​ Zarco,​ Historia del Congreso Extraordinario Constituyente (1856–1857).​Estracto de todas sus sesiones y documentos parlamentarios de la época,​vol.​2​(Mexico:​Imprenta​de​Ignacio​Cumplido,​1857). 291

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reassure​agitated​souls,​calm​the​uneasiness​of​spirits,​heal​the​wounds​ of​the​Republic,​be​the​peacemaker,​the​symbol​of​reconciliation​among​ our​ brothers,​ and​ put​ an​ end​ to​ that​ painful​ uncertainty​ that​ always​ characterizes​difficult​periods​of​transition. ​ The​Congress​that​you​freely​chose,​in​concluding​the​arduous​task​ you​entrusted​to​it,​understands​the​duty,​feels​the​necessity​of​addressing​the​word​to​you,​not​to​extol​the​fruit​of​its​deliberations​but​to​exhort​you​to​union,​to​harmony,​and​so​that​you​yourselves​might​be​the​ ones​who​perfect​your​institutions​without​abandoning​the​legitimate​ pathways​from​which​the​Republic​should​never​have​departed. ​ Your​representatives​have​passed​through​the​most​critical​and​difficult​circumstances,​have​seen​the​agitation​of​society,​have​heard​the​ deafening​noise​of​fratricidal​war,​have​contemplated​liberty​threatened,​ and​in​such​a​situation,​in​order​not​to​lose​hope​in​the​future,​their​faith​ in​God​has​inspired​them,​in​God​who​protects​neither​iniquity​nor​injustice,​and​nonetheless​they​have​had​to​make​a​supreme​effort​to​obey​ humbly​the​mandates​of​the​people,​to​resign​themselves​to​every​type​ of​sacrifice​in​order​to​persevere​in​the​work​of​constituting​the​country. ​ They​took​public​opinion​as​guide,​made​good​use​of​the​bitter​lessons​of​experience​to​avoid​the​stumbling​blocks​of​the​past,​and​the​ hope​ of​ improving​ the​ future​ of​ the​ country​ has​ smiled​ tenderly​ on​ them. ​ For​that​reason,​instead​of​restoring​the​only​legitimate​charter​that​ the​United​States​of​Mexico​had​previously​had,​instead​of​reviving​the​ institutions​of​1824,​venerable​work​of​our​fathers,​they​undertook​the​ formation​of​a​new​fundamental​code​that​would​not​have​the​unfortunate​seeds​that,​in​days​of​sad​memory,​proscribed​liberty​in​our​country,​and​that​would​correspond​to​the​visible​progress​achieved​through​ the​spirit​of​the​century​since​that​time. ​ Congress​regarded​national​unity​as​the​foundation​of​all​prosperity,​ of​all​enhancement,​and​therefore​it​has​endeavored​to​make​the​institutions​serve​as​a​bond​of​fraternity,​a​sure​means​of​arriving​at​stable​ harmonies,​and​has​tried​to​remove​whatever​might​produce​clashes​and​ resistance,​collisions,​and​conflicts. ​ Congress,​persuaded​that​for​society​to​be​just,​without​which​it​could​ not​be​lasting,​it​must​respect​the​rights​granted​to​man​by​his​Creator,​ and​convinced​that​the​most​brilliant​and​dazzling​political​theories​are​ clumsy​delusions,​bitter​derision,​when​they​do​not​ensure​those​rights,​

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when​civil​liberty​is​not​enjoyed,​has​defined​clearly​and​precisely​individual​guarantees,​sheltering​them​from​every​arbitrary​attack.​The​bill​ of​rights​that​stands​at​the​head​of​the​Constitution​is​an​homage​honoring,​in​your​name,​by​your​legislators,​those​imprescriptible​rights​of​ humanity.​You​are,​then,​free;​use​all​the​powers​you​have​received​from​ the​Supreme​Being​for​the​development​of​your​intelligence,​for​the​ achievement​of​your​well-​being. ​ Moreover,​from​today,​equality​will​be​the​great​law​of​the​Republic:​ there​will​be​no​greater​merit​than​that​of​the​virtues;​slavery,​the​disgrace​of​human​history,​will​not​defile​the​national​territory;​the​home​ will​be​sacred;​property​inviolable;​work​and​industry​free;​the​expression​of​thought​with​no​other​fetters​than​respect​and​morality,​public​peace​and​private​life;​transit,​movement​without​difficulties;​commerce,​agriculture​without​obstacles;​the​affairs​of​state​examined​by​all​ citizens:​there​will​not​be​retroactive​laws,​or​monopolies,​or​arbitrary​ prisons,​or​special​judges,​or​confiscation​of​wealth,​or​opprobrious​punishments;​nor​will​justice​be​paid​for,​nor​will​correspondence​be​violated;​and​in​Mexico,​for​its​glory​before​God​and​before​the​world,​the​ inviolability​of​human​life​will​be​a​practical​truth​as​soon​as​the​penitentiary​system​can​achieve​the​repentance​and​rehabilitation​of​the​man​ whom​crime​has​led​astray. ​ Such​are,​fellow​citizens,​the​guarantees​that​Congress​believed​must​ be​fixed​firmly​in​the​Constitution​in​order​to​make​equality​effective,​ in​order​that​no​right​will​be​violated,​so​that​institutions​reach​down​ by​themselves​and​beneficently​to​the​most​destitute​and​unfortunate​ classes​to​pull​them​from​their​dejection,​to​carry​the​light​of​truth​to​ them,​to​enliven​them​with​knowledge​of​their​rights.​Thus​will​their​ spirit​awake,​which​servitude​made​lethargic;​thus​will​their​activity​be​ stimulated,​which​abjection​paralyzed;​thus​will​they​enter​into​the​social​community,​and,​ceasing​to​be​miserable​serfs,​redeemed,​emancipated,​they​will​bring​new​energy,​new​strength​to​the​Republic. ​ Not​for​an​instant​could​Congress​waver​with​respect​to​the​form​ of​government​that​the​nation​was​yearning​to​be​given.​Clear​were​the​ manifestations​of​the​opinion,​evident​the​needs​of​the​country,​certain​the​traditions​of​legitimacy,​and​eloquently​persuasive​the​lessons​ of​experience.​The​country​wanted​the​federal​system,​because​it​is​the​ only​one​suitable​to​its​population,​spread​over​a​vast​territory;​it​alone​ is​adequate​to​so​many​differences​in​products,​climates,​customs,​needs;​

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it​alone​can​extend​the​life,​the​movement,​the​wealth,​the​prosperity​to​ all​the​borders;​and​it​is​the​one​that,​distributing​the​exercise​of​sovereignty,​is​the​most​suitable​for​making​the​rule​of​liberty​permanent​and​ for​providing​zealous​defenders​for​it. ​ The​federation,​banner​of​those​who​have​struggled​against​tyranny,​ reminder​of​happy​eras,​strength​of​the​Republic​to​sustain​its​independence,​symbol​of​democratic​principles,​is​the​only​form​of​government​ that​in​Mexico​has​the​love​of​the​people,​the​prestige​of​legitimacy,​the​ respect​of​the​republican​tradition.​Congress,​then,​had​to​recognize​the​ free​and​sovereign​states​as​preexistent;​it​proclaimed​their​local​liberties,​and,​concerning​itself​with​its​limits,​it​made​no​changes​other​than​ those​urgently​demanded​by​public​opinion​or​for​public​convenience​ so​ as​ to​ improve​ the​ administration​ of​ the​ people.​ Desiring​ that​ in​ a​ democracy​there​not​be​people​subjected​to​tutelage,​it​recognized​the​ legitimate​right​of​different​localities​to​enjoy​their​own​life​as​states​of​ the​federation. ​ Congress​loudly​proclaimed​the​doctrine​of​the​sovereignty​of​the​ people​and​wanted​the​entire​constitutional​system​to​be​a​logical​consequence​ of​ this​ brilliant​ and​ incontrovertible​ truth.​ All​ powers​ are​ derived​from​the​people.​The​people​are​governed​by​the​people.​The​ people​legislate.​It​is​up​to​the​people​to​reform,​to​change​their​institutions.​But,​it​being​necessary,​given​the​organization,​given​the​size​of​ modern​societies,​to​resort​to​the​representative​system,​in​Mexico​no​ one​could​exercise​authority​except​through​the​vote,​the​trust,​the​explicit​consent​of​the​people. ​ The​states,​enjoying​very​extensive​liberty​in​their​internal​rule​and​ tightly​united​by​the​federal​bond,​the​powers​that​must​represent​the​ federation​before​the​world​retain​the​capabilities​necessary​to​sustain​ independence,​to​take​care​of​all​general​necessities;​but​they​will​never​ be​an​alien​entity​that​conflicts​with​the​states​unless,​on​the​contrary,​ they​will​be​the​creature​of​all​the​states.​The​electoral​field​is​open​to​all​ aspirations,​to​all​intelligences,​to​all​parties;​the​suffrage​has​no​restrictions​other​than​those​that​were​believed​absolutely​necessary​for​the​ genuine​and​true​representation​of​all​localities​and​the​independence​ of​electoral​bodies.​But​the​Congress​of​the​Union​will​be​the​country​ through​ its​ delegates;​ the​ Court​ of​ Justice,​ whose​ lofty​ functions​ are​ directed​ to​ maintaining​ harmony​ and​ preserving​ right,​ will​ be​ instituted​by​the​people;​and​the​president​of​the​Republic​will​be​the​one​

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chosen​by​Mexican​citizens.​There​is​not,​then,​any​possible​antagonism​ between​the​center​and​the​states,​and​the​Constitution​establishes​the​ peaceful​and​conciliatory​method​for​resolving​difficulties​that​might​ arise​in​practice. ​ One​ seeks​ harmony,​ agreement,​ fraternity,​ all​ means​ of​ reconciling​liberty​with​order,​a​happy​combination​from​which​true​progress​ springs. ​ In​the​midst​of​the​turbulence,​hatreds,​and​resentments​that​have​ imprinted​such​a​sad​character​on​contemporary​events,​Congress​can​ boast​ of​ having​ elevated​ itself​ to​ the​ height​ of​its​ grand​ and​ sublime​ mission.​It​has​not​paid​attention​to​these​or​those​political​epithets;​it​ has​not​let​itself​be​pulled​along​by​the​impetuous​whirlwind​of​the​passions;​it​has​not​seen​only​Mexicans,​brothers,​in​all​the​children​of​the​ Republic.​It​has​not​created​a​Constitution​for​a​party,​but​rather​a​Constitution​for​an​entire​people.​It​has​not​tried​to​pass​judgment​on​behalf​of​whomever​is​responsible​for​the​errors,​the​mistakes​of​the​past;​ it​has​tried​to​avoid​repeating​them​in​the​future;​clearly,​it​has​opened​ the​gates​of​legitimacy​for​all​men​who​wish​to​serve​the​patria​loyally.​ No​exclusivity,​no​proscriptions,​no​hatreds:​peace,​union,​liberty​for​ everyone;​this​is​the​spirit​of​the​new​Constitution. ​ Public​ discussion,​ the​ press,​ the​ rostrum,​ are​ for​ all​ opinions.​ The​ electoral​field​is​the​terrain​on​which​the​parties​must​struggle,​and​thus​ the​Constitution​will​be​the​banner​of​the​Republic​in​whose​preservation​all​citizens​take​an​interest. ​ The​great​proof​that​Congress​has​not​nourished​resentments,​that​ it​has​wished​to​be​the​echo​of​magnanimity​of​the​people​of​Mexico,​ is​that​it​has​sanctioned​the​abolition​of​the​penalty​of​death​for​political​crimes.​Your​representatives,​who​have​suffered​the​persecutions​of​ tyranny,​have​pronounced​the​pardon​of​their​enemies. ​ The​work​of​the​Constitution​must​naturally,​Congress​knows​it,​be​ weakened​by​the​hazardous​circumstances​in​which​it​has​been​created​ and​can​also​contain​errors​that​might​have​escaped​the​perceptiveness​ of​the​assembly.​Congress​knows​very​well​that​in​the​present​century​ there​is​no​barrier​that​can​keep​a​people​static,​that​the​current​of​the​ spirit​does​not​stagnate,​that​immutable​laws​are​a​weak​barricade​against​ the​progress​of​societies,​that​it​is​a​vain​undertaking​to​want​to​legislate​ for​future​ages,​and​that​the​human​species​advances​day​by​day​necessitating​continual​innovation​in​its​mode​of​political​and​social​being.​

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For​this​it​has​left​the​road​clear​to​reform​of​the​political​code​without​ any​precaution​other​than​the​certainty​that​the​changes​be​demanded​ and​accepted​by​the​people.​Reform​being​so​easy​to​satisfy​the​needs​of​ the​country,​why​resort​to​new​upheavals,​why​devour​ourselves​in​civil​ war​if​the​legal​means​neither​cost​blood​nor​destroy​the​Republic,​nor​ dishonor​it,​nor​put​its​liberties​and​existence​as​a​sovereign​nation​in​ danger?​Be​persuaded,​Mexicans,​that​peace​is​the​first​of​all​goods​and​ that​your​liberty​and​your​happiness​depend​on​the​respect,​on​the​love,​ with​which​you​maintain​your​institutions. ​ If​you​want​liberties​more​extensive​than​those​the​fundamental​code​ grants​you,​you​can​obtain​them​by​legal​and​peaceful​means.​If​you​believe,​on​the​other​hand,​that​the​power​of​the​authority​needs​greater​ extension​and​robustness,​you​can​also​arrive​at​this​outcome​peacefully. ​ The​ Mexican​ people​ who​ had​ heroic​ strength​ to​ overthrow​ Spanish​domination​and​join​the​sovereign​powers;​the​Mexican​people​who​ have​vanquished​all​tyrannies,​who​always​yearn​for​liberty​and​constitutional​order,​now​have​a​code​that​is​the​full​recognition​of​their​rights​ and​that​does​not​hold​them​back,​but​rather​encourages​them​on​the​ road​of​progress​and​reform,​of​civilization​and​liberty. ​ On​the​path​of​revolutions​there​are​deep​and​dark​precipices,​despotism,​anarchy.​The​people​who​constitute​themselves​on​the​foundations​ of​liberty​and​justice​rise​above​those​abysses.​They​do​not​have​them​ before​their​eyes,​neither​in​reform​nor​in​progress.​They​leave​them​behind,​they​leave​them​in​the​past. ​ It​falls​to​the​Mexican​people​to​maintain​their​precious​rights​and​ improve​the​work​of​the​constituent​assembly,​which​relies​on​the​assistance​that​will​be​lent​it,​without​doubt,​by​the​legislatures​of​the​states​ so​that​their​particular​institutions​might​strengthen​national​unity​and​ produce​ an​ admirable​ completeness​ of​ harmony,​ strength,​ fraternity​ among​all​the​parts​of​the​Republic. ​ The​great​promise​of​the​Plan​of​Ayutla​is​fulfilled.​The​United​States​ of​ Mexico​ returns​ to​ constitutional​ life.​ Congress​ has​ sanctioned​ the​ most​democratic​constitution​the​Republic​has​had,​has​proclaimed​the​ rights​of​man,​has​worked​for​liberty,​has​been​faithful​to​the​spirit​of​ the​epoch,​to​the​inspirations​radiating​from​Christianity,​to​the​political​and​social​revolution​to​which​it​owed​its​origin;​it​has​built​on​the​ doctrine​of​the​sovereignty​of​the​people,​and​not​so​that​they​will​be​excited​by​it,​but​rather​to​leave​to​the​people​the​full​exercise​of​their​sov-

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ereignty.​May​the​Supreme​Regulator​of​societies​make​the​new​Constitution​acceptable​to​the​Mexican​people​and,​acceding​to​the​humble​ prayers​of​this​assembly,​put​an​end​to​the​misfortunes​of​the​Republic​ and​dispense​to​it​with​a​generous​hand​the​benefits​of​peace,​justice,​ and​liberty! ​ These​are​the​wishes​of​your​representatives​as​they​return​to​private​ life​to​mix​with​their​fellow​citizens.​They​hope​that​their​errors​will​be​ forgotten​and​that​a​day​might​shine​when​the​Constitution​of​1857,​as​ the​banner​of​liberty,​might​do​justice​to​their​patriotic​intentions.

ignacio Manuel altaMirano Ignacio​Manuel​Altamirano​(1834–93),​a​liberal​politician,​writer,​ lawyer,​teacher,​and​noted​orator,​was​born​in​the​state​of​Guerrero,​of​humble​origins.​Altamirano​was​a​student​of​Ignacio​ Ramírez​at​the​Instituto​Literario​de​Toluca​and​taught​at​several​schools​and​institutes.​With​Ramírez​and​Guillermo​Prieto​ he​started​a​newspaper,​El Correo de México. ​ Altamirano​joined​the​liberal​faction​and​fought​against​the​ conservatives​ in​the​ Three​ Years’​War,​ and​after​ the​triumph​ of​ the​ liberals​ was​ elected​ a​ deputy​ to​ Congress.​ During​ the​ French​intervention​Altamirano​became​a​colonel​in​the​republican​army​that​fought​against​the​empire.​His​military​career​ ended​in​1867,​when​the​Republic​was​restored.​Later,​Altamirano​was​elected​to​Congress​on​three​occasions.​He​also​served​ as​ attorney​ general,​ chief​ justice​ of​ the​ Supreme​ Court,​ and​ consul​ in​ the​ foreign​ service.​ Altamirano​ was​ a​ writer​ in​ the​ Romantic​literary​style​and​devoted​much​effort​to​his​literary​ pursuits.​He​wrote​several​novels,​including​El Zarco,​and​essays​ on​a​wide​variety​of​topics. ​ We​ include​ two​ of​ his​ speeches​ on​ the​ civil​ war​ from​ the​ 1860s​and​an​article​published​in​1880.

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1 ​

Against Amnesty. Speech before the Second Constitutional Congress, July 10, 1861

Sir: With​the​full​conscience​of​a​pure​man,​with​the​full​ heart​of​a​liberal,​with​the​just​energy​of​the​representative​of​an​outraged​nation,​I​here​raise​my​voice​to​request​that​the​chamber​reject​ the​report​in​which​the​decree​of​amnesty​for​the​reactionary​party​is​ proposed.1 ​ And​I​request​this​because​I​judge​that​this​decree​would​today​be​too​ untimely​and​highly​impolitic. ​ Let​me​begin​by​saying​that​I​very​much​respect​the​virtues​of​the​ gentlemen​deputies​who​have​endorsed​the​report,​that​I​recognize​in​ them​excellent​hearts,​filled​with​sensitivity​and​mercy;​but​I​believe​ that​they​have​erred​in​believing​that​the​nation​should​pardon​its​enemies​ with​ the​ same​ ease​ that​ these​ gentlemen,​ because​ of​ their​ magnanimous​nature,​pardon​theirs.​That​is​to​say,​they​have​confused​their​ individual​selves​with​the​entire​nation,​and​in​that​lies​the​error,​in​my​ opinion. ​ With​this​duty​fulfilled​that​my​openness​imposed​on​me,​I​am​now​ going​to​broach​the​question. ​ I​have​said​that​the​decree​would​be​untimely​and​impolitic.​Here​are​ my​reasons: ​ It​would​be​untimely​because​mercy,​like​all​virtues,​has​its​hour.​Beyond​that,​mercy​has​no​good​outcome,​or​speaking​in​all​truth,​it​produces​the​opposite​of​what​might​be​desired. ​ Original​title:​“Contra​la​amnistía”​[intervención​en​la​Cámara​de​Diputados​durante​ la​sesión​del​10​de​julio​de​1861].​Source:​Felipe​Buenrostro,​Historia del Segundo Congreso Constitucional de la República Mexicana,​que funcionó en los años de 1861, 62 y 63. Extracto de todas las sesiones y documentos relativos de la época,​vol.​1​(Mexico:​Impresa​Políglota,​1875). ​ 1.​The​Three​Years’​War​between​liberals​and​conservatives​had​just​ended​with​the​ victory​of​the​liberal​faction.​(Editor’s​note) 299

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​ Amnesty,​sir,​is​the​completion​of​victory,​but​it​must​follow​victory​ immediately.​The​history​of​all​nations​tells​us​this,​and​it​is​in​the​nature​ of​these​very​things. ​ A​ victor​ who​ has​ just​ defeated​ his​ enemies,​ who​ still​ holds​ in​ his​ hands​the​bloody​sword​of​battle,​whom​one​supposes​is​still​enraged​ and​thirsty​for​vengeance,​and​whom​one​sees​suddenly​put​aside​the​ terrible​expression​on​his​face,​throw​away​that​threatening​sword,​open​ his​arms​to​embrace​against​his​chest​his​humiliated​enemies,​trembling​ with​fright,​this​man,​I​say,​is​to​be​admired​and​loved. ​ The​greatness​of​soul​captivates,​because​the​human​heart​instinctively​admires​everything​that​is​great​and​sublime.​Gaius​Caesar​won​ more​ sympathy​ with​ his​ generosity​ in​ Rome​ than​ with​ his​ sword​ in​ Pharsalia,​and​the​Romans,​intoxicated​with​enthusiasm​and​gratitude,​ dedicated​the​temple​of​clemency​in​his​honor. ​ Henry​IV,​the​Huguenot,​made​himself​loved​by​his​old​enemies​with​ his​general pardon. ​ But​Caesar​and​Henry​IV​were​timely. ​ Because​ in​ effect,​ sir,​ amnesty​ is​ forgetting​ the​ past​ completely,​ it​ is​an​absolute​pardon.​Amnesty​must​be​granted​as​a​gift​of​mercy,​as​a​ concession​that​strength​makes​to​weakness;​it​is​rage​that​absolves​repentance.​But​we,​are​we​in​the​time​for​pardoning?​Here​is​the​question.​And​it​can​it​be​answered​with​equal​precision: ​ “Now​is​not​the​time​or​it​is​still​not​time.” ​ If​after​the​triumph​of​Calpulalpan​ the​government​had​come​out​ with​a​word​of​amnesty,​if​it​had​opened​its​arms​to​the​enemies​of​public​peace,​this​would​have​been​immoral,​but​perhaps​it​would​have​been​ successful,​because​I​am​sure​that​two​roads​were​open​then​to​the​liberal​government,​that​of​absolute,​open​amnesty,​or​terrorism,​that​is​to​ say,​righteous​power. ​ The​government​did​not​take​either​of​those​paths,​but​rather,​wavering​ in​ its​ steps,​ uncertain​ in​ its​ decisions,​ adherent​ to​ routine​ in​ its​ methods,​was​half​magnanimous​and​half​severe,​with​the​result​that​it​ made​everyone​discontent​and​it​came​to​be​censured​by​opposing​factions. ​ Never​let​it​be​said​that​I​slander:​the​nation​knows​it;​Mexico​has​ seen​ it.​ When​ plain​ and​ firm​ justice​ was​ expected,​ the​ government​ exiled​bishops​instead​of​hanging​them,​as​these​apostles​of​iniquity​deserved;​it​fired​some​employees​and​others​no,​of​those​who​had​served​

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the​reaction;​it​pardoned​Díaz,​whose​skull​should​now​be​white​on​the​ pillory;​it​had​Trejo​shot​because,​although​he​was​guilty,​he​belonged​to​ the​rabble;​and​it​pardoned​the​murderer​Casanova​because​he​was​respectable​and​had​someone​who​interceded​for​him;​it​absolved​Chacón;​ it​tolerated​Caamaño;​it​was​Montaño’s​plaything;​it​was​going​to​employ​Ismael​Piña;​and​finally,​it​has​the​guilt​that​many​of​those​bandits​ might​have​gone​with​Márquez;2​and​it​has​shown​sufficiently​that​it​has​ neither​the​gift​of​opportunity​nor​the​merit​of​justice. ​ The​result​you​are​now​seeing,​legislators;​I​will​not​say​anything​to​ you​about​it.​Well​then,​what​was​not​done​after​Calpulalpan​is​now​impossible. ​ The​government​with​its​errors​caused​the​revolution​not​to​end​definitively​ at​ that​ time;​ it​ caused​ it​ to​ lose​ more​ in​ six​ months​ than​ it​ lost​in​three​years,​because​the​constitutional​vessel​that​has​traveled​so​ serenely​in​the​time​of​storms​is​close​to​sinking​as​it​reaches​port.​Yes,​ sir,​today​it​lies​heavy​on​the​optimists.​We​find​ourselves​in​full​revolution;​we​have​suffered​serious​setbacks;​the​reaction​is​imposing;​it​will​ not​win,​but​it​battles​with​a​terrible​ferocity;​the​great​victory​is​not​ very​close,​the​reactionaries​who​are​not​in​the​field​provide​every​kind​ of​resource​to​those​who​are;​those unhappy ones who groan in hiding places,​ as​Señor​Montes​says,​conspire​from​there​in​a​thousand​ways;​the​hopes​ of​this​cursed​faction​are​reborn;​the​bevies​of​Márquez​have​just​visited​ the​streets​of​the​capital​and​.​.​.​is​now​when​we​are​to​offer​amnesty? ​ A​beautiful​opportunity,​to​be​sure! ​ Amnesty​ now​ would​ not​ be​ the​ word​ of​ pardon;​ it​ would​ not​ be​ the​caress​of​a​victorious​force​to​conquered​weakness;​it​would​be​.​.​.​ a​shameful​capitulation,​a​parachute,​a​miserable​cowardice. ​ No,​the​national​representation​will​not​abandon​its​dignity​in​that​ way,​it​will​not​go​on​its​knees​to​put​its​law​in​the​hands​of​the​bandits,​ it​will​not​surrender​those​pariahs​to​the​Moloch​of​the​clergy. ​ If​such​should​happen,​I​would​curse​the​hour​in​which​the​people​ have​named​me​their​representative. ​ Think​about​it,​legislators.​If​today​we​decree​the​amnesty,​the​reactionary​party​would​say,​and​with​reason:​“They​are​afraid​of​us​and​ they​flatter​us.”​“The​Congress​fixes​its​gaze​with​terror​on​the​gloomy​ Mount​of​the​Crosses​and​on​the​scaffold​of​Ocampo,​and​it​fears​for​ ​

2.​Leonardo​Márquez,​conservative​general.​(Editor’s​note)

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itself.”​And​no,​by​God!​the​Congress​does​not​fear,​because​the​Congress​is​the​nation,​and​the​nation​that​has​struggled​for​so​long​against​ great​hosts​of​these​outlaws​would​not​come​now​to​tremble​before​just​ one. ​ You​now​see,​then,​that​the​occasion​is​not​right,​and​for​that​reason​ the​decree​would​be​untimely. ​ I​have​said​that​it​would​also​be​impolitic​because​everything​that​ does​not​lead​to​public​happiness,​everything​that​does​not​extend​to​the​ good​government​of​the​people,​is​impolitic. ​ Until​now,​sir,​it​has​been​believed​in​Mexico​that​politics​consists​of​ shameful​compromise​with​all​acts​of​treason,​with​all​crimes;​until​now​ the​motto​of​the​greater​part​of​our​governments​has​been​today for you, tomorrow for me.​Well​then,​sir,​that​is​disgusting,​that​will​be​a​form​of​ politics​but​a​misleading​and​contemptible​form​of​politics. ​ We​belong​to​the​liberal​party,​which​is​the​party​of​the​nation,​and​ we​must​not​here​imitate​the​old​sea​god,​taking​different​forms​and​disguises;​here​we​must​take​our​own​color​and​follow​our​own​program​ honestly.​Enough​of​these​political​Proteuses​influencing​opinion. ​ Either​we​are​liberals​or​we​are​liberticides;​either​we​are​legislators​ or​we​are​rebels;​either​judges​or​defense​counsel. ​ The​nation​has​not​sent​us​to​preach​union​with​criminals​but​to​punish​them. ​ The​opposite​would​be​to​pull​it​down​into​an​abyss​of​afflictions​and​ horrors. ​ Pardoning​the​conservative​party​in​Mexico​has​never​produced​good​ results;​it​would​be​impolitic,​then,​to​pardon​it​again. ​ Clemency​in​theory​is​very​beautiful,​I​agree;​but​in​practice​it​has​ always​been​fatal​for​us.​It​will​be​enough​for​us​to​cast​a​retrospective​ eye​on​our​last​years.​I​will​relate​individual​deeds​to​you,​and​I​will​relate​them​because​personal​deeds​characterize​the​collective​individual,​ because​they​are​the​result​of​the​program​of​a​faction. ​ After​the​Revolution​of​Ayutla,​the​celebrated​general​Alvarez​decided​to​pardon​all​the​followers​of​Santa​Anna,​who,​not​being​able​to​ vanquish​Alvarez,​carried​conflagration​and​murder​to​the​poor​peoples​ of​the​South.​Never​had​clemency​been​carried​to​such​a​degree​of​selflessness.​Being​in​Cuernavaca​he​called​Don​Severo​del​Castillo,​and​ this​ gentleman​ of​ the​ Middle​ Ages,​ this model of military delicacy,​ responded​to​the​call​after​a​thousand​requests​and​orders.​General​Alva-

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rez​reminded​him​of​the​infamous​deed​of​having​burned​his​modest​ country​farm.​Trembling,​Castillo​begged​pardon;​then​the​general​said​ to​him​that​in​return​for​that​action​he​entrusted​to​him​the​command​ of​his​old​battalion​of​sappers.​Castillo,​moved​or​feigning​to​be​moved​ by​this​noble​action,​went​to​prostrate​himself​at​the​feet​of​the​old​caudillo​when​this​latter​held​him​back,​saying​to​him​that​these​acts,​which​ degraded​men​and​debased​soldiers,​did​not​please​him. ​ Castillo,​ grateful,​ swore​ eternal​ faithfulness​ to​ the​ government​ of​ Ayutla,​and​what​happened?​You​already​know.​In​a​few​days,​with​the​ brigade​that​Comonfort​had​entrusted​to​him,​he​pronounced​himself​ against​the​government. ​ And​Osollo​pardoned​and​shamefully​indulged​by​Comonfort?​And​ Miramón​pardoned​also?​And​Gutiérrez,​and​a​long​list​of​others,​what​ have​ they​ done?​ They​ believed​ clemency​ was​ weakness​ and​ bit​ the​ hand​that​was​extended​to​them.​I​have​referred​a​while​ago​to​Chacón,​ to​Caamaño,​to​Montaño,​and​to​others​who​are​with​Márquez,​and​I​ should​still​add,​what​did​the​prisoners​do​whom​González​Ortega​saved​ in​Silao?​Did​he​perhaps​not​meet​them​again​in​Calpulalpan?​Sir,​ingratitude​characterizes​the​reactionary​party,​and​to​be​generous​to​ingrates​is​to​sow​on​rocks,​here​and​among​all​peoples. ​ I​said​that​Caesar​and​Henry​IV​had​been​timely,​and​despite​this,​ingratitude,​not​love​of​their​country,​armed​Brutus​and​Cassius​against​ their​ benefactor,​ who​ had​ pardoned​ them​ and​ honored​ them​ with​ a​ praetorship;​and​fanaticism​put​a​dagger​in​the​hands​of​Ravaillac.​Well​ then,​here​we​meet​precisely​with​ingratitude​and​fanaticism. ​ And​do​we​go,​without​even​chastising,​to​offer​the​enemies​of​the​ nation​the​opportunity​to​do​harm​to​us? ​ Above​all,​sir,​is​it​about​pardoning​trivial​political​offenses?​No.​It​is​ about​pardoning​a​crime,​the​greatest​one​of​all,​high​treason. ​ The​Mexican​Republic​has​been​constituted;​it​has​elected​its​government​by​popular​and​voluntary​vote,​and​it​has​been​given​a​fundamental​law.​Well​then,​these​men​have​attempted​a​crime​against​that​ government​and​against​that​law,​and​they​have​attempted​a​crime,​filling​the​entire​nation​with​sorrow,​desolation,​and​blood.​There​is​not​ a​place​in​the​Republic​not​marked​with​the​savage​trace​of​that​rebellious​faction.​There​is​not​a​crime​it​has​not​committed.​Will​it​be​necessary​to​bring​to​mind​the​murderers​of​Tacubaya,​of​Cocula,​and​of​the​ Esperanza?​Will​it​be​necessary​to​invoke​the​bloody​images​of​Larios,​

304 : iGnaCio​manuel​altamirano

of​Ocampo,​of​Degollado,​and​of​Valle?​Will​it​be​necessary​for​you​to​ see​the​destroyed​properties,​the​devastated​fields,​the​people​dying​of​ misery,​bankruptcy​in​the​treasury,​and​our​entire​soil​stained​with​the​ blood​of​our​brothers?​And​observe​that,​in​all​this,​not​only​the​leader​ who​commands​has​the​blame,​but​also​the​subordinate​who​obeys,​because​all​are​wheels​and​parts​of​that​horrible​machine​of​destruction. ​ And​are​we​going​to​pardon​those​men?​Are​we​not​going​to​notice​ the​national​indignation? ​ Is​it​that​we​do​not​know​what​justice​is? ​ No,​let​us​for​once​be​honorable;​let​us​for​once​be​just.​Enough​now​ of​compromises​and​of​sterile​generosity.​Justice​and​not​clemency! ​ It​is​shameful,​sir.​Many​criminals​are​being​acquitted​in​our​presence,​and​we​are​not​raising​our​voice.​Isidro​Díaz,​Casanova,​and​many​ of​those​accused​are​still​alive.​Their​cause​seems​to​have​no​end.​National​ justice​ cries​ out​ for​ their​ punishment.​ The​ executioner​ should​ have​finished​them​off​some​time​ago,​and​one​might​believe​that,​far​ from​suffering​the​deserved​punishment,​within​a​short​time​they​might​ go​strolling​through​Paris​if​you​will​not​encounter​them​one​day​in​ those​streets. ​ This​is​disgusting.​Finally,​does​the​national​majesty​have​to​continue​ being​the​king​of​mockery​of​all​rogues?​Is​there​no​respect​here​for​ virtue​and​hatred​of​crime?​Is​the​murderer​of​a​man,​a​horse​thief,​punished,​but​not​a​punishment​for​the​one​who​sets​fire​to​entire​villages,​ for​one​who​robs​the​public​coffers,​for​one​who​spills​torrents​of​Mexican​blood? ​ Instead​of​organic​laws,​instead​of​prompt​punishments,​instead​of​ raising​the​guillotine​for​the​traitors,​a​timid​law​of​amnesty​is​presented​ to​us. ​ And​this​in​moments​of​seeing​the​bodies​of​our​distinguished​men​ with​their​skulls​cut​to​pieces,​with​the​horrible​ecchymoses​that​the​ cord​with​which​they​were​hanged​produced? ​ Oh​manes3​of​our​sacrificed​friends​.​.​.​ask​vengeance​of​God​.​.​.​!​We​ think​of​pardoning​your​executioners​and​the​friends​of​your​executioners! ​ I​know​well​that​expressing​myself​thus​with​this​frank​and​fervent​ energy​displeases​certain​people.​I​know​that​these​are​not​the​feelings​ ​

3.​Mythological​spirits​of​death.​(Editor’s​note)

aGainSt​amneSty : 305

of​ those​ armchair​ politicians​ who​ stood​ there​ indifferent​ during​ the​ struggle,​taking​no​pity​on​the​anguish​of​the​patria​but​taking​pleasure​ in​the​horrors​occurring​outside​the​capital. ​ But​I​do​not​like​compromises;​I​am​a​child​of​the​mountains​of​the​ South​and​descend​from​those​men​of​iron​who​have​always​preferred​ eating​roots​and​living​among​wild​beasts​to​bowing​their​heads​before​ tyrants​and​embracing​traitors. ​ Yes,​I​belong​to​that​phalanx​of​partisans​who​can​be​called,​without​ fear​and​without​blemish,​“the​Bayards​of​liberalism.”4 ​ Since​I​left​the​coasts​to​come​to​this​post​I​have​been​stoically​resigned​to​not​knowing​how​to​act,​and​while​I​may​not​have​my​head​ very​securely​on​my​shoulders,​I​do​not​have​to​grant​a​single​pardon​to​ the​executioners​of​my​brothers.​I​have​not​come​to​compromise​with​ any​reactionary​or​to​weaken​myself​with​the​softness​of​the​capital,​and​ I​understand​that​if​all​the​deputies​seated​on​these​benches​do​not​decide​to​risk​their​lives​in​defense​of​the​national​majesty,​we​have​nothing​good​to​do. ​ But​I​believe​the​Congress​will​know​how​to​show​the​nation​that​it​ is​at​the​high​level​of​its​desires​and​that​it​understands​its​holy​mission.​ I​believe​that​the​legislative​will​say​frequently​to​the​executive,​in​the​ presence​of​each​evildoer,​what​Marius​said​to​Cinna​in​the​presence​of​ each​enemy:​“He​must​die.” ​ We​must​have​a​principle​in​place​of​a​heart.​I​have​many​reactionary​acquaintances;​with​some​I​cultivated​friendly​relations​in​another​ time,​but​I​declare​that​the​day​they​fall​into​my​hands,​I​would​have​ their​heads​cut​off,​because​before​friendship​comes​the​patria;​before​ feeling​comes​the​idea;​before​compassion​comes​justice. ​ And​what!​.​.​.​Señor​Ocampo,​one​man​alone,​would​have​the​greatness​of​soul​to​say,​“I​break​but​I​do​not​bend.”​And​the​Congress,​that​ is​to​say​the​entire​nation,​would​now​say:​“I​do​indeed​break,​and​I​do​ bend​and​I​do​lower​myself ”? ​ It​is​an​insult​to​the​national​representation​to​suppose​so. ​ I​beg​you​legislators​to​put​your​hand​on​your​heart​and​tell​me:​Can​ there​be​any​friendship​between​the​liberal​party​and​the​reactionary​ ​ 4.​Pierre​Terrail,​seigneur​de​Bayard,​was​a​French​military​hero​known​for​his​fearlessness​and​chivalry​in​the​Italian​campaigns​of​Charles​VII,​Louis​XII,​and​Francis​I.​ A​cavalier​“without​fear​and​without​blemish.”​(Editor’s​note)

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party?​Will​the​men​of​the​fifteenth​century​be​joined​with​the​men​of​ the​nineteenth​century?​Men​and​wild​beasts? ​ No.​We​or​they;​there​is​no​middle​ground. ​ If​you​think​that​party​is​weak,​you​are​wrong;​certainly​it​lacks​moral​ force,​ but​ it​ has​ physical​ force.​ They​ have​ taken​ the​ wealth​ from​ the​ clergy​but​they​cannot​take​from​them​their​hopes;​and,​above​all,​those​ bandits​that​Márquez​leads,​having​just​chewed​on​the​last​bread​of​the​ clergy,​hurl​themselves​now​over​the​property​of​the​citizens,​and​you​ see​what​future​awaits​Mexico​for​some​years​to​come​if​the​terrible​ hand​of​an​energetic​and​powerful​government​does​not​come​to​save​ the​situation. ​ No,​censure​that​opinion;​to​pardon​would​be​to​make​oneself​an​accomplice.​Jesus​Christ​pardoned​his​executioners​on​his​scaffold,​but​he​ was​dealing​with​personal​offenses​and​not​those​of​an​unhappy​nation​ .​.​.​Do​not​imitate​that​noble​martyr,​because​you​are​not​in​his​situation,​ and​with​your​exaggerated​evangelism​you​would​lose​the​Republic.​Rise​ up​just,​severe,​terrible,​and​say​to​the​rebels​what​God​said​through​the​ mouth​of​the​prophet:​you​used​the​sword​.​.​.​and​the​sword​will​fall​on​ you!

2 ​

Martyrs of Tacubaya

Today,​April​11,​1880,​makes​twenty-​one​years​since​the​ clerical​party​committed​a​great​crime​that​horrified​the​Republic​and​ drew​down​on​itself​the​condemnation​of​the​people​and​the​anathema​ of​history. ​ The​savage​and​infamous​murder​committed​on​the​persons​of​young​ physicians​and​prisoners​at​the​very​gates​of​Mexico​City,​far​from​instilling​terror,​made​the​liberals,​worked​up​by​indignation,​acquire​new​ spirit,​and​alienated​from​the​murderers​the​sympathies​of​all​people​ who​value​honor​and​generosity​in​anything. ​ Since​the​eleventh​of​April​1859,​the​clerical​reactionaries​have​only​ traveled​a​road​of​hatred​and​curses.​In​vain​they​appealed​to​extreme​ means;​in​vain​they​armed​phalanx​after​phalanx,​compelling​by​force​ the​unfortunate​ones​they​snatched​from​the​workshops​and​fields​to​ train​them​to​fight​against​the​soldiers​of​Liberty;​in​vain​the​bishops​ and​friars​exhausted​the​resources​of​their​churches​to​pay​the​highwaymen​of​fanaticism;​in​vain​they​stirred​up​the​frenzy​from​the​pulpit,​ preaching​ a​ ferocious​ crusade​ against​ the​Constitution​ of​ ’57​ and​ the​ men​who​supported​it;​in​vain​the​factions,​which​called​themselves​government​here,​compromised​the​national​honor,​throwing​themselves​ on​the​money​of​the​English​Legation​to​equip​new​expeditions;​in​vain,​ finally,​they​infuriated​society​with​their​levies​and​their​outrages,​and​ they​carried​everywhere​the​standard​of​the​Cross​stained​with​blood​ and​presiding​over​killing​and​extermination. ​ They​ were​ condemned​ to​ fall​ vanquished,​ and​ eight​ months​ later​ were​thrown​out​in​Calpulalpan​by​the​blast​of​the​avenging​people​and​ disappeared​from​this​city,​which​they​had​infested​with​their​presence​ for​three​years. ​ Original​title:​“Los​mártires​de​Tacubaya.”​Source:​La República,​Mexico,​April​11,​ 1880. 307

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​ Since​that​time​also,​the​torment​of​Tacubaya​has​been​held​up​to​the​ eyes​of​the​nation​as​a​constant​reproach,​as​a​stain​of​eternal​ignominy​ for​the​enemies​of​public​liberties,​as​a​protest​of​an​outraged​humanity​ against​those​who​did​not​learn​to​respect​science,​philanthropy,​and​ youth. ​ The​ picture​ of​ that​ abominable​ killing​ still​ presents​ itself​ to​ our​ memory​with​all​its​frightening​reality. ​ It​was​the​tenth​of​April​1859.​The​famous​caudillo​Don​Santos​Degollado,​so​constant​in​the​struggle​for​the​Reform​but​so​unfortunate​ in​it,​had​brought​a​new​army,​reorganized​after​ten​defeats,​to​threaten​ Mexico,​which​had​a​limited​garrison​at​that​time​because​Miramón1​had​ marched​to​Veracruz​with​the​cream​of​the​reactionary​army​to​besiege​ that​stronghold​where​the​constitutional​government​was. ​ Señor​Degollado,​always​unlucky​in​his​measures​and​his​plans,​had​ remained​inactive​in​Tacubaya,​letting​the​troops​of​Callejo​and​Mejía,​ which​ had​ come​ to​ reinforce​ the​ garrison,​ enter​ freely​ into​ Mexico.​ Moreover,​he​did​not​intend​anything​serious​against​the​stronghold,​be​ it​because​the​number​of​his​forces​was​insufficient,​be​it​for​their​lack​ of​discipline,​or​be​it,​finally,​because​his​sole​mission​was​reduced​to​ distracting​the​attention​of​the​enemy,​attracting​the​army​of​Miramón​ to​the​center​of​its​military​action,​which​was​Mexico. ​ This​ last​ was​ accomplished​ fully.​ Miramón​ besieged​ in​ vain​ the​ stronghold​ of​ Veracruz,​ aided​ by​ a​ squadron​ under​ the​ command​ of​ Marín,​who​tried​to​block​the​port​and​deprive​it​of​the​resources​it​ could​receive​by​sea.​With​this​squadron​destroyed​and​seized​in​a​heroic​ combat​in​which​the​valiant​generals​La​Llave​and​Juan​José​de​la​Garza​ commanded​ the​ boarding,​ Miramón,​ despite​ his​ persevering​ efforts​ by​land,​had​no​recourse​but​to​retreat​confused​and​make​his​way​to​ Mexico​in​haste,​threatened​as​this​stronghold​was​by​the​liberal​troops​ under​the​command​of​Degollado. ​ As​soon​as​he​arrived,​the​best​forces​of​the​garrison,​under​the​orders​ of​Márquez​and​Mejía,​seeing​the​inaction​of​the​liberals,​resolved​to​ attack​them​on​their​field​of​Tacubaya​itself. ​ The​ rest​ is​ well​ known.​ The​ reactionary​ columns,​ ready​ to​ march​ from​ the​ night​ of​ the​ tenth,​ began​ the​ attack​ on​ the​ morning​ of​ the​ ​ 1.​Miguel​Miramón,​conservative​general​who​fought​for​Maximilian​and​was​shot​in​ June​1867​after​the​defeat​of​the​imperial​troops​in​Querétaro.​(Editor’s​note)

martyrS​of​taCubaya : 309

eleventh,​ and​ although​ they​ encountered​ a​ stubborn​ resistance,​ they​ were​victorious​and​entered​Tacubaya​a​little​after​noon.​The​troops​of​ Señor​Degollado​retreated​in​disorder​following​a​rout,​leaving​their​ artillery,​their​baggage,​their​wounded,​and​a​great​number​of​prisoners​ in​the​hands​of​the​enemy. ​ That​was​the​moment​of​carnage​and​blind​ferocity.​The​reactionary​leaders​exemplified​cruelty​and​lack​of​restraint.​It​seemed​as​if​the​ hatred​of​the​clerical​faction​had​let​loose​over​Tacubaya​all​its​Maenads,​ frenetic​and​eager​to​kill. ​ Among​the​prisoners​had​fallen​General​Lazcano,​who​belonged​to​the​ old​army,​and​some​other​officers​and​leaders​such​as​Dionisio​Bello,​and​ a​young​lawyer​who​had​the​position​of​military​adviser,​Manuel​Mateos. ​ Manuel​ Mateos​ was​ an​ arrogant​ young​ man​ of​ twenty-​seven​ and​ the​incarnation​of​liberal​youth​of​that​era.​Gifted​with​a​great​talent,​a​ poetic​and​enthusiastic​imagination,​and​an​exalted​liberal​faith,​he​had​ taken​part​as​a​writer​and​as​a​soldier​in​all​the​fights​that​had​opened​ the​great​drama​of​the​Reform​since​the​time​of​Comonfort.​Profound​ and​elegant​writer,​even​before​finishing​his​career​as​lawyer,​he​had​ already​been​noted​in​the​journalistic​press​for​his​impassioned​writings,​in​which​the​fire​of​a​young​and​ardent​heart​was​felt.​Poet,​he​ had​played​his​lyre​not​so​much​to​sing​about​love,​the​noble​passion​ of​his​age,​but​rather​to​extol​the​glories​of​the​patria​and​to​arouse​the​ people​to​the​fight​for​Liberty.​Gifted,​moreover,​with​a​majestic​stature,​a​Dantonian​face,​and​a​robust​and​sonorous​voice,​he​had​appeared​ many​times​in​the​popular​tribunal​as​a​conventional​orator,​thundering​ against​tyranny​and​preaching​the​rights​of​man.​Finally,​understanding​ that​in​a​time​of​Reform​the​writer,​the​poet,​the​tribune​must​become​ the​armed​champion,​Mateos​had​worn​the​sword​when​he​left​Mexico​ in​1857​with​Juárez,​Ocampo,​Prieto,​Guzmán,​and​Ruiz,​and​had​formed​ with​Leandro​Valle​and​other​spirited​young​men​the​first​guard​of​that​ government,​which​was​called​to​make​the​Decalogue​of​the​Constitution​and​the​Reform​triumph​amidst​the​tempests​of​war. ​ But​Manuel​Mateos,​although​an​ardent​partisan​of​these​great​ideas​ and​of​the​law,​had​never​stained​his​hands​with​blood.​He​had​not​made​ himself​responsible​for​those​acts​that​carry​reprisal​as​a​consequence.​In​ sum,​he​was​a​brave​and​noble​partisan. ​ After​these​shackles,​others​were​ordered.​On​soldiers?​No,​on​doctors. ​ Some​ young​ men​ accompanied​ the​ liberal​ army​ as​ doctors,​ and​ as​

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such​they​were​tending​to​the​wounded;​they​did​not​think​about​running​when​they​learned​of​the​rout.​They​understood​that​their​duty​was​ beside​the​beds​of​the​wounded.​They​knew​moreover​that​their​profession​was​a​priesthood,​that​it​was​respected​in​the​entire​civilized​world​ as​a​holy​thing,​and​that​for​this​very​reason​they​could​not​even​anticipate​a​crime​against​them.​Duval,​Portugal,​and​Sánchez​were​those​ three​friends​of​Humanity.​To​them​was​added​Juan​Díaz​Covarrubias,​ a​young​student​of​medicine,​who​had​also​come​from​Mexico​with​the​ objective​of​lending​his​humanitarian​services​to​the​liberal​army,​believing​that​the​number​of​men​of​his​profession​would​be​scarce. ​ Juan​Díaz​was​a​gentle​and​melancholy​poet​whose​verses​had​shown​ simultaneously,​from​very​early​on,​an​ardent​and​sad​inspiration,​an​excellent​organization,​and​a​spirit​enamored​of​the​ideal.​Ay!​Who​would​ have​said​a​few​days​before,​on​seeing​that​young​student​pass​through​ the​streets,​dreaming​and​gentle,​inoffensive​and​agreeable,​that​he​was​ going​to​be​sacrificed​like​a​terrible​evildoer​by​a​stupid​army​rabble​precisely​because,​moved​by​his​fine​sentiments,​he​had​gone​to​help​suffering​humanity! ​ The​young​physicians​tended​the​wounded​and​occupied​themselves​ with​the​philanthropic​chores​of​military​surgery​beside​the​beds​of​the​ dying. ​ From​there​the​brutal​claw​of​the​executioners​of​Márquez​seized​him​ to​enclose​him​in​barracks,​incommunicado​with​the​other​prisoners​of​ war,​in​the​same​way​the​licenciado​Juáregi​was​seized​from​the​domestic​hearth. ​ Miramón​had​just​arrived​in​Mexico,​and,​still​covered​with​the​dust​ of​the​road​from​Veracruz,​presented​himself​on​the​field​of​the​bloody​ victory.​ He​was​ furious​ with​indignation,​ and​to​ him​ the​triumph​ of​ Tacubaya​seemed​barely​a​weak​compensation​for​the​rout​of​Veracruz. ​ Márquez​gave​him​an​account​of​the​battle​and​requested​orders​from​ him​regarding​the​fate​of​the​prisoners.​Miramón​conferred​a​moment​ with​ Mejía​ and​ then​ gave​ the​ order​ to​ execute​ them​ all​ by​ shooting.​ Miramón​ was​ brave​ but​ he​was​ never​ magnanimous,​ and​ he​was​ still​ driven​by​an​implacable​hatred​of​the​liberal​party,​without​understanding​well,​because​he​was​of​very​middling​intelligence,​the​ideas​the​liberals​defended​and​he​opposed. ​ The​order​was​carried​out,​the​night​already​gloomy.​The​rabble​of​ murderers​pulled​the​prisoners​from​their​prison​and​led​them​in​single​

martyrS​of​taCubaya : 311

file​to​the​outskirts​of​Tacubaya.​The​prisoners​believed,​at​first,​that​ they​were​leading​them​to​Mexico;​but​when​they​saw​that​they​were​ taking​them​by​out-​of-​the-​way​paths​in​the​countryside​between​the​ ravines​that​wound​through​the​hills​where​Tacubaya​is​situated,​they​ no​longer​doubted​their​fate.​They​were​going​to​be​killed!​Then​they​ asked​to​write,​to​give​a​final​goodbye​to​their​families,​to​speak​to​some​ friend.​Everything​was​denied​to​them.​It​was​necessary​that​mystery​ and​shadow​completely​cover​the​crime;​it​was​necessary​that​the​clamp​ of​silence​close​the​mouths​of​those​martyrs;​it​was​indispensable​that​ it​have​the​appearance​of​an​ambush​and​not​the​glory​of​the​political​ gallows.​Be​quiet​and​die!​That​was​the​fate​of​the​enemies​of​clerical​ tyranny.​The​inquisition​still​had​the​show​of​the​auto-​da-​fé;​the​gallows​ of​the​viceroyalty​still​had​the​testimony​of​the​notary​and​of​the​mob.​ The​cruelty​of​the​clerical​party​went​much​further;​it​bit,​like​rabid​ dogs,​in​silence.​It​is​not​known​exactly​what​happened​at​that​frightful​scene.​It​is​known​only​that​the​squad​formed​itself​around​the​victims.​Dionisio​Bello​has​recounted​that​he​escaped,​slipping​away​into​ the​depth​of​a​ravine,​and​that​he​was​not​seen​thanks​to​the​darkness​of​ the​night​that​the​torches​scarcely​rent.​It​is​known​also​that​O’Horan​ and​Daza​Argüelles​ordered​the​execution,​that​Ángel​Buenabad​created​ the​list​of​those​to​be​shot,​that​Manuel​Mateos​gave​the​word​to​the​soldiers​in​a​clear​voice,​that​Díaz​Covarrubias​embraced​Sánchez​and​that​ he​wanted​to​die​like​that,​and​then​.​.​.​that​were​heard​various​continuous​explosions​and​that​the​hired​killers​returned​to​Tacubaya,​now​in​ the​early​morning​hours,​bringing​the​shattered​bodies​of​the​victims,​ and​that​they​threw​them​in​the​great​hall​De profundis​of​the​San​Diego​ convent.​Some​were​thrown​completely​nude​onto​the​patio. ​ There​we​saw​them​on​day​twelve​when,​mixed​in​with​the​crowd,​ we​could​look​for​our​friends​who​could​scarcely​be​recognized,​torn​to​ pieces​as​they​were​by​the​bullets.​Mateos​had​his​skull​cut​to​pieces​and​ the​right​eye​bulging​out;​Díaz​Covarrubias​also​with​his​skull​and​eye​ and​part​of​a​cheek​mangled,​and​a​hand​in​shreds.​The​heads​of​the​rest​ were​a​shapeless​combination​of​dust​and​blood. ​ Next​to​those​bodies,​the​soldiers​drank​and​smoked​indifferently,​ and​ the​ disgusting​ camp​ followers,​ accustomed​ to​ those​ spectacles,​ laughed​and​frolicked​like​a​band​of​harpies. ​ At​noon,​some​soldiers,​assisted​by​various​disguised​students,​took​ the​bodies​on​stretchers​to​the​small​and​humble​church​of​San​Pedro​

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in​the​south​of​Tacubaya,​almost​in​the​countryside.​There,​a​long​and​ shallow​ditch​was​dug​in​which​the​bodies​were​placed,​one​next​to​the​ other,​covering​them​with​a​light​layer​of​earth.​A​reactionary​leader​in​ a​white​jacket​watched​the​labors​with​repugnance​and​surliness. ​ Later,​ the​ army​ of​ Márquez​ prepared​ to​ make​ its​ triumphal​ entry​ into​Mexico,​parading​by,​in​fact,​in​a​few​minutes​and​entering​into​the​ great​city​at​four​in​the​afternoon. ​ And​then​began​the​clerical​orgy,​the​saturnalia​of​blood,​the​dance​of​ the​scalps,​frenetically​danced​in​duet​by​the​uniforms​and​the​cassocks. ​ The​Catholic​churches,​beginning​with​the​holy​cathedral,​were​bedecked​for​a​fiesta;​enormous​red​draperies​hung​from​the​towers​and​ belfries;​the​bells​dazed​the​city​with​a​thundering,​senseless​ringing;​ the​aristocratic​families​threw​flowers​and​garlands​from​the​balconies​ to​Márquez​and​his​companions,​who​passed​by​self-​satisfied​on​their​ battle​steeds,​and​to​the​troops​that​had​vanquished​the​heretics. ​ The​escaped​prisoners,​among​whom​came​our​friend,​today​General​Chavarría,​wounded​but​saved​by​a​friendly​intervention,​marched​ among​the​ranks​with​the​sad​but​not​beaten​down​aspect​of​the​liberal​ soldiers.​The​crowd​silently​watched​pass​by​this​army​of​bloodthirsty​ soldiers,​for​whom​there​was​no​sympathy​whatsoever​in​the​town. ​ Thus​ended​this​unfortunate​day. ​ .​.​.​.​.​.​.​.​.​.​.​.​.​.​. ​ The​eye​of​the​historian​could​not​absorb​the​details​of​the​tremendous​crime,​but​the​eye​of​the​people​who​sympathized​with​the​victims​ took​note​of​the​names​of​the​executioners​and,​implacable​as​Fate,​have​ now​punished​them​one​by​one. ​ Popular​justice​is​slow​at​times,​but​it​is​certain​and​terrible. ​ A​few​months​from​that​day,​Daza​Argüelles​fell​into​the​hands​of​ Carbajal’s​ soldiers​ in​ Tulancingo,​ and​ his​ body​ was​ dragged​ over​ the​ stones​of​the​streets​and​trampled​by​maddened​horses.​That​was​one! ​ Later,​in​1867,​Buenabad​was​run​through​by​republican​bullets​while​ going​over​the​Mount​of​the​Crosses​with​the​troops​of​the​traitor​Tavera,​ beaten​ by​ the​ soldiers​ of​ Riva​ Palacio.​ And​ Buenabad​ died​ devoured​by​worms​and​regrets​a​few​days​later.​And​that​was​two! ​ In​June​of​the​same​year,​Miramón,​the​one​who​ordered​the​killings,​ was​executed​on​the​Hill​of​the​Bells​and​atoned​for​the​long​series​of​his​ crimes​in​that​place​in​which​national​justice​gleamed​with​all​its​august​ majesty.​And​that​was​three!

martyrS​of​taCubaya : 313

​ And​Mejía,​the​one​who​had​helped​with​the​decision​made​in​Tacubaya,​fell​also​in​the​same​place.​And​that​was​four! ​ O’Horan,​the​executor,​fell​a​few​days​later​in​Mexico​at​the​hands​of​ General​Díaz,​and​the​small​plaza​of​Mixcalco​saw​the​expiation​of​the​ crime​of​Tacubaya.​And​that​was​five! ​ One​remains,​he​who​has​borne​the​entire​burden​of​the​hatred​produced​by​the​atrocious​event.​The​truth​is​that​Márquez​only​obeyed​ Miramón’s​ order.​ Nonetheless,​ the​ entire​ nation​ has​ given​ him​ the​ dreadful​name​Hyena​of​Tacubaya,​a​name​that​follows​him​everywhere​ like​a​curse. ​ He​has​escaped​punishment,​but​he​has​not​escaped​from​the​hatred,​ from​the​dishonor;​from​the​hatred​even​of​his​party,​which​calls​him​ traitor​because​he​abandoned​Maximilian​in​Querétaro;​from​the​dishonor,​because​he​is​a​pariah​condemned​to​drag​out,​in​a​foreign​land,​ a​life​of​nostalgia,​tedium,​and​self-​contempt,​condemned​to​the​punishment​of​Tantalus​of​second-​guessing,​of​feeling​the​beaches​of​the​patria​ very​close​without​ever​being​able​to​touch​them,​and​of​seeing​in​every​ wave​that​arrives,​impelled​by​the​current​from​our​coasts,​an​unending​ curse. ​ The​execrable​old​man​has​thus​arrived​at​a​septuagenarian​age,​devouring​the​bitter​bread​of​the​usury​to​which​he​has​had​to​appeal​so​as​ not​to​die​of​hunger,​and​he​slithers​along​like​an​old​reptile​amidst​the​ mire​to​die​devoured​by​the​ants​of​humiliation​and​of​misery.​What​ worse​punishment? ​ Such​is​the​justice​of​the​People!​Another​would​say,​“Such​is​the​justice​of​God!” ​ For​us,​the​eleventh​of​April​1859​is​the​great​reason​for​being​implacable​with​the​clerical​faction​and​for​having​given​justification​to​the​ tremendous​punishments​imposed​on​their​caudillos,​who​were​executioners​and​enemies​of​humanity. ​ Later,​we​have​pardoned​it​en​masse,​even​despite​the​treason​to​the​ patria.​But​to​pardon​is​not​the​same​as​to​forget. ​ The​ great​ liberal​ party​ must​ understand​ it​ always.​ Between​ pardoning​and​forgetting​exists​an​abyss.​Pardoning​puts​the​sword​in​the​ sheath,​but​remembering​must​keep​the​sword​ready​to​pull​out​on​the​ least​occasion.

3 ​

Speech by Citizen Manuel Ignacio Altamirano on the Occasion of the Anniversary of Independence, September 15, 1861

Citizens: You​have​called​me​to​the​rostrum​on​this​solemn​night,​ and​I​thank​you​for​it.​You​have​esteemed​my​poor​talent​too​kindly;​but​ you​have​done​justice​to​my​patriotism,​and​I​will​never​forget​so​distinguished​an​honor. ​ We​have,​then,​gathered​here​to​celebrate​our​great​family​holiday.​It​ is​here​that​the​divine​star​of​1810​reappears​in​our​heavens,​today​dark​ and​cloud​covered.​But​its​light​dissipates​the​shadows​and​makes​the​ space​shine;​but​its​appearance​counsels​us​in​our​sorrows,​if​only​for​a​ moment,​and​even​the​thousand​hecatombs​in​which​the​blood​of​our​ patricians​still​smolders​seem​to​us​today​so​many​other​altars​offered​to​ the​God​of​free​peoples. ​ Yes,​this​memory​of​our​old​glories​is​sweet,​whether​it​be​that​it​surprises​us​on​the​fields​of​battle​or​on​foreign​beaches,​whether​it​be​that​ the​shackles​of​our​tyrants​oppress​us​or​the​errors​of​our​friends​sadden​ us,​or​whether​it​be​that​the​weight​of​our​setbacks​afflicts​us​or​the​sterility​of​our​victories​disillusions​us. ​ Yes,​in​whatever​situation​fate​places​us,​all​of​us​turn​our​eyes​to​our​ glorious​year​’10​to​revive​our​political​faith,​just​as​the​Persians​turned​ theirs​to​the​east​to​revive​their​religious​faith. ​ And​who​does​not​forget​in​this​moment​his​misery​and​animosities​ to​give​one​another​a​brotherly​embrace?​Who​does​not​acknowledge​ his​smallness​before​the​majesty​of​our​fathers?​Who​does​not​glorify​ those​who​gave​us​patria​at​the​cost​of​their​lives? ​ Only​the​clergy​and​its​party​do​not​share​our​happiness,​and​they​ have​ reason.​ They​ are​ the​ last​ expression​ of​ Spanish​ tyranny​ in​ our​ ​ Original​title:​“Discurso​pronunciado​en​el​Teatro​Nacional​de​México​la​noche​del​ 15​de​septiembre​de​1861​por​el​ciudadano​Ignacio​M.​Altamirano.”​Source:​El Monitor Republicano,​Mexico,​September​20,​1861. 314

SpeeCh​on​the​anniverSary​of​independenCe,​September​15,​1861 : 315

country.​Thanks​to​God​that​they​withdraw​from​our​national​holidays,​ some​with​somber​faces,​others​brandishing​the​fratricidal​dagger.​Their​ spite​and​their​rage​are​for​us​new​reasons​for​elation,​and​one​day​we​ will​make​them​cry​in​vain,​from​foreign​soil,​for​this​patria​that​they​ wanted​to​see​enslaved​and​that​today​they​view​with​so​much​rancor​ because​it​is​free. ​ As​for​us,​liberals,​today​we​give​each​other​a​cordial​handshake,​today​ we​ present​ ourselves​ closely​ united,​ today​ we​ forget​ our​ disappointments​in​order​to​make​room​only​for​hopes;​today​we​should​gather​ together​filled​with​veneration​around​the​glorious​standard​of​Dolores;​ it​does​not​matter​which​hand​grasps​it​so​long​as​it​be​the​hand​of​a​ democrat,​because​only​the​hand​of​a​democrat​is​worthy​of​hoisting​it. ​ Yes,​Mexicans,​today​it​is​not​a​matter​of​praising​this​or​that​political​method,​this​or​that​small​personality;​here​the​great​principle​of​ national​sovereignty​is​to​be​extolled,​and​“as​diverse​as​might​be​our​ opinions​in​politics,​the​love​of​the​patria,​of​national​honor,​of​independence,​and​of​the​freedom​of​the​country,​is​a​general​sentiment​for​ which​everyone​is​ready​to​sacrifice​up​to​the​last​drop​of​blood,”​as​said​ Kossuth,​the​great​Hungarian​patriot,​on​July​11,​1848,​in​the​Assembly​ of​Pest. ​ This​is​a​sacred​night,​fellow​citizens,​a​sacred​night​because​in​it,​the​ tribunes​of​the​people​not​only​have​the​mission​of​recounting​the​glorious​epic​of​our​insurrection,​like​the​ancient​rhapsodists​and​the​troubadours​of​the​Middle​Ages,​but​rather​principally​the​mission​of​speaking​ in​the​name​of​that​very​people,​of​setting​forth​their​sorrows,​of​giving​ an​account​of​their​sacrifices,​and​of​being​placed​at​the​summit​of​their​ desires. ​ Thus,​the​orators​who​the​Greek​people​named​to​offer​the​panegyric​ of​their​heroes​would​understand​this​priesthood. ​ Thus​will​I​also​speak​to​you;​I​will​make​myself​here​the​faithful​interpreter​of​that​poor​people​whose​affection​is​bought​with​promises​ and​whose​blood​is​repaid​with​excuses. ​ I​ can​ speak​ in​ their​ name​ because​ I​ identify​ with​ them,​ because​ I​ carry​in​my​heart​all​their​pains,​all​their​disillusions,​all​their​indignation,​all​the​feeling​of​their​power.​Because​I​am​a​true​man​of​the​ people,​descending​from​twenty​unfortunate​races​that​have​bequeathed​ me,​together​with​their​love​of​liberty,​all​the​sorrows​of​their​ancient​ humiliation.

316 : iGnaCio​manuel​altamirano

​ What​ the​ people​ have​ suffered!​ You​ know​ it.​ The​ martyrology​ of​ Mexican​democracy​is​very​long.​Before​the​Spanish​adventurers​brought​ us​their​friars​and​their​executioners,​the​Mexican​people​had​already​ suffered​the​oppression​of​their​autocratic​kings​and​their​bloodthirsty​ teopixquis.​The​conquest,​making​colonists​of​the​Mexicans,​made​their​ slavery​more​bitter;​but​Moctezuma​had​been​the​worthy​predecessor​of​ Charles​V. ​ The​poor​people​changed​masters.​The​encomenderos​were​the​successors​to​the​caciques,​the​friars​to​the​Indian​pontiffs,​the​bonfire​of​the​ Inquisition​replaced​the​stone​of​sacrifices,​the​bloody​cross​that​Father​ Olmedo​planted​atop​a​pile​of​cadavers​and​ashes​was​the​successor​to​ the​bloody​Huitzilopoxtli. ​ What​civilization​did​they​have​to​bring,​those​who​had​in​Spain​a​ Jiménez​de​Cisneros,1​who​had​the​scientific​riches​of​the​Arabs​burned,​ those​who​had​in​Mexico​a​Zumárraga​who​had​the​scientific​riches​of​ the​Aztecs​burned! ​ What​humanitarian​idea​did​they​have​to​make​germinate,​those​who​ raised​a​scaffold​in​Spain​for​the​courageous​Padilla,​those​who​burned​ a​pyre​in​Mexico​for​the​heroic​Cualpopoca! ​ But​it​will​be​said​to​me:​and​liberty?​and​democracy?​From​where​ did​they​come?​By​chance,​did​those​ideas​not​arrive​incubated​in​the​ religious​ideas​of​our​conquistadores? ​ Oh,​liberty!​.​.​.​But​liberty​is​prior​to​Christianity,​because​liberty​ was​born​with​man,​because​the​love​of​liberty​lives​in​the​heart​of​the​ human​species,​and​there​it​stirs,​continually​boiling,​like​the​fire​at​the​ center​of​the​earth. ​ This​is​how​liberty​has​exploded​among​our​people,​this​is​how​we​ owe​our​liberty​only​to​God,​who​ignited​in​the​human​soul​that​flash​ of​his​infinite​Being. ​ We​were​free​finally,​but​now​you​see,​before​being​so​other​martyrs​ were​still​needed,​because​that​is​the​fatalism​that​accompanies​the​defenders​of​liberty,​like​all​initiators​of​a​magnificent​idea:​martyrdom! ​ As​for​democracy,​it​has​done​nothing​more​than​transmigrate.​Exhausted​in​Greece,​prostituted​in​Rome,​suffocated​in​the​Italian​republics​of​the​Middle​Ages,​it​seemed​to​have​been​extinguished​forever​ ​ 1.​Francisco​Jiménez​de​Cisneros​(1436–1517)​was​a​Spanish​cardinal​and​inquisitor.​ (Editor’s​note)

SpeeCh​on​the​anniverSary​of​independenCe,​September​15,​1861 : 317

because​the​age​of​kings​came​to​take​possession​of​the​world​when​it​ appeared​suddenly​and​shamefaced​in​Holland​and​Switzerland,​terrible​ although​fleeting​in​England,​tempestuous​and​omnipotent​in​France,​ and​young,​vigorous,​and​restless​in​the​New​World. ​ And​ that​ is​ the​ destiny,​ that​ the​ tendency​ of​ civilization,​ that​ the​ future​of​humanity:​Democracy! ​ But​wishing​to​be​democratic,​I​repeat,​how​much​have​the​Mexican​ people​suffered! ​ What​sacrifices​yours! ​ The​ people​ have​ sacrificed​ their​ sovereign​ dignity​ for​ many​ centuries,​the​burning​tears​of​their​shame,​and​then​their​most​precious​ interests​and​their​most​heroic​sons. ​ From​the​great​men​of​independence​who​almost​all​ascended​to​the​ gallows​or​fell​dead​on​the​fields​of​battle​to​the​obscure​martyrs​of​San​ Martin​whom​the​murderer​Gutierrez​hanged​not​many​days​ago. ​ The​people​have​now​passed​half​a​century​amidst​streams​of​blood,​ amidst​conflagration​and​misery;​is​this​not​sacrifice​enough? ​ And​why​so​long​a​struggle?​Because​in​all​the​countries​of​the​world,​ and​also​in​ours,​the​tyrannical​and​theocratic​elements​have​been​in​ conflict​with​the​liberal​element,​with​as​much​stubbornness​and​persistence​as​the​gods​of​good​and​the​gods​of​evil​of​the​ancient​Manicheans. ​ Political​tyranny​and​religious​fanaticism​in​monstrous​alliance​have​ wielded​against​the​people​the​double​weapons​of​iron​and​anathema​ in​such​a​way​that​they​attacked​man​in​his​heart​and​in​his​conscience.​ Never​was​any​war​so​cruel​or​so​costly. ​ And​we​have​the​proof​in​our​ancient​history​and​in​our​contemporary​history.​The​viceroys​allied​themselves​with​the​bishops​to​combat​ the​insurgents. ​ Independence​was​won,​the​Spaniards​were​cast​from​our​soil;​but​on​ leaving​our​shores​they​directed​at​us​a​gaze​of​angry​satisfaction,​a​look​ that​said,​“We​are​going,​but​you​are​left​with​the​clergy.” ​ And​ they​ were​ right.​ The​ clergy​ has​ avenged​ them​ of​ their​ defeat​ from​1821​until​now. ​ The​clergy​made​a​despot​of​a​hero;​it​erected​an​imperial​throne​to​ convert​it​into​a​scaffold;​the​clergy​slipped​in​a​traitorous​hand​in​order​ to​write​in​the​constitution​of​’24;​the​clergy​through​Alamán,​the​cowardly​murderer​whom​the​conservative​party​so​much​glorifies,​erected​ another​scaffold​for​the​great​insurgent​of​the​South​and​treacherously​

318 : iGnaCio​manuel​altamirano

led​him​to​it;​the​clergy​deified​Santa​Anna​and​corrupted​the​miserable​ Comonfort;​the​clergy,​finally,​supplying​arms​and​money​to​the​young​ rogues​who​were​put​in​high​positions​in​Mexico​in​1858,​has​made​the​ soil​of​the​patria​overflow​with​blood. ​ The​clergy,​accumulating​riches​with​the​insatiable​voraciousness​of​ the​she-​wolf​that​Dante​encountered​in​his​inferno,​has​been​able​to​be​ a​political​force​.​.​.​until,​exasperated,​the​people,​taking​the​bandage​ from​their​eyes,​have​fought​with​fierceness​and​resolution​against​their​ oppressors​and​have​attained​victory. ​ The​ clergy!​ The​ conservative​ party!​ Watch​ those​ miserable​ titans​ wanting​to​ascend​to​the​heaven​of​liberty! ​ And​they​are​still​moving,​and​they​still​fight;​but​the​people​have​not​ yet​thrown​their​last​thunderbolts​.​.​.​Beware!​Not​all​times​have​to​be​ like​these;​the​chalice​of​popular​patience​overflows​and​.​.​.​The​people,​ irate,​will​be​able​someday​to​go​to​the​old​cathedrals​to​trample​on​their​ pagan​idols​and​to​stab​their​traitorous​pontiffs. ​ The​nineteenth​century​is​not​the​fifteenth​century.​France​showed​ us​ the​ way​ in​ [17]93,​ and​ its​ example​ is​ still​ affecting​ the​ world.​ The​ people​make​the​pope​in​the​Vatican​tremble;​the​old​Catholicism​of​the​ friars​is​in​the​throes​of​death. ​ Soon​evangelical​democracy​will​prevail​in​all​its​fullness​.​.​.​Yes,​we​ will​realize​the​pure,​the​holy,​the​divine​religious​liberalism,​such​as​the​ virtuous​Son​of​the​Carpenter​of​Nazareth​conceived​it. ​ But​.​.​.​I​fail​to​speak​to​you​of​what​the​people​desire. ​ The​people​desire​that​the​promises​of​their​leaders​not​be​like​the​ mirages​of​the​African​deserts,​always​promising​but​always​deceiving.​ The​people​suffer,​the​people​fight,​the​people​triumph,​and​then?​.​.​.​ Then,​after​their​victories,​they​have​to​go,​like​Belisarius,2​saying,​“Give​ me​a​small​contribution,​because​after​having​aged​in​the​war,​I​do​not​ see​and​I​am​dying​of​hunger.” ​ What​ does​ the​ reform,​ until​ now​ placed​ in​ a​ plan,​ mean​ for​ the​ people?​The​humiliation​of​the​clergy,​it​is​true;​but​the​clergy​could​ ​ 2.​Flavius​Belisarius​was​one​of​the​greatest​generals​of​the​Byzantine​Empire.​Justinian​is​said​to​have​ordered​Belisarius’s​eyes​to​be​put​out​and​to​have​made​him​a​beggar​near​a​gate​of​Rome,​condemning​him​to​ask​passersby​to​give​him​an​obolus.​(Editor’s​note)

SpeeCh​on​the​anniverSary​of​independenCe,​September​15,​1861 : 319

have​been​destroyed​and​pauperism​alleviated,​that​ulcer​that​eats​away​ at​us​and​annihilates​us. ​ The​ great​ Lerdo​ died​ when​ his​ thought​ had​ been​ half-​developed.​ What​a​shame!​And​who​will​complete​the​great​end​that​was​proposed?​ Probably​no​one.​We​have​many​owners​of​books​but​few​economists. ​ In​this​way,​what​is​being​called​reform​is​nothing​but​pure​destruction.​Destruction​of​monastic​buildings,​destruction​of​the​estates​of​the​ clergy.​Nonetheless,​when​I​consider​that​this​destruction​takes​away​a​ weapon​from​the​enemies​of​humanity,​when​I​consider​that​this​destruction​was​a​few​years​ago​a​utopia​that​was​anathematized,​I​admire​ those​demolishers,​I​canonize​those​who​have​seized​the​wealth​of​the​ clergy,​because​at​least​they​are​gambling​their​heads​for​liberty. ​ I​continue.​The​people​desire​that​their​anger​no​longer​be​played​ with,​as​until​now.​Tremble​that​upon​awakening,​they​will​say​some​day​ what​the​populace​of​Aristophanes​said,​“What?​.​.​.​they​treat​me​thus​ and​I​had​not​noticed​it!” ​ Franklin​ played​ with​ lightning,​ but​ he​ dressed​ in​ silk.​ Those​ who​ play​with​the​anger​of​the​people,​what​do​you​dress​in​to​dare​so​much?​ Consider​that​it​is​dangerous​to​abuse​the​weapons​of​God. ​ But​meanwhile,​on​this​sublime​night,​anniversary​of​that​night​in​ which​our​emancipation​was​begun,​the​Mexican​people​make​fervent​ vows​for​the​liberty​of​all​peoples. ​ Yes,​today​we​the​sons​of​Mexico​pray​to​God​that​he​permit​you​to​ be​free​.​.​.​oh!​you,​unfortunate​Magyars​on​whom​is​avenged​the​glory​ of​Attila,​you​who​still​tremble​with​the​holy​words​of​Kossuth​and​with​ the​sublime​poems​of​Petofi! ​ Oh​you,​poor​sons​of​Koskiusco,​who​cry​when​comparing​the​feats​ of​Sobieski​with​the​“Finis Poloniae”​that​your​tyrants​decreed,​who​today​ the​Russian​despotism​prohibits​from​even​the​drink​of​your​patria! ​ Oh​you,​valiant​Cubans,​who,​without​trembling​at​the​disaster​of​ López,​are​soon​to​explode​against​your​Spanish​executioners! ​ Oh​French​Republicans,​you​who​have​seen​with​sadness​your​dreams​ of​’48​eclipsed​by​the​imperial​shadow​of​a​soldier​of​fortune! ​ Oh​sons​of​Cato​and​Spartacus,​whom​the​tyranny​of​a​crowned​hermit​still​oppresses! ​ Also​you,​magnanimous​Spaniards,​whom​the​first​smile​of​liberty​ has​now​touched​lightly​in​the​gallows​of​Loja.

320 : iGnaCio​manuel​altamirano

​ All​you​on​the​earth​who​suffer​from​despots​and​await​the​blessed​ hour​in​which,​face​to​face,​you​can​pull​the​sword​of​free​men​from​the​ monarchs​and​say​to​it,​like​the​Almovogares,​“Iron, wake up!” ​ Oh!​do​not​despair;​have​faith​that​the​sweet,​the​beautiful,​the​holy​ liberty​will​come! ​ And​as​for​you,​Mexicans,​I​will​repeat​to​you​the​words​that​Pericles​addressed​to​the​Athenians:​“And​you​also,​follow​in​the​footsteps​ of​your​ancestors,​convinced​happiness​is​in​liberty,​liberty​in​valor,​and​ do​not​be​afraid​to​confront​the​dangers​of​war.”—i​have​Spoken.

guillerMo Prieto Guillermo​Prieto​(1818–97)​was​born​in​Mexico​City.​He​was​ a​ liberal​ politician​ and​ a​ poet,​ and​ he​ worked​ with​ Valentín​ Gómez​Farías​and​Anastasio​Bustamante​in​the​1830s.​In​1838​ Prieto​enlisted​in​the​National​Guard.​He​wrote​literary​criticism​ for​ El Siglo XIX​ and​ served​ as​ secretary​ of​ the​ treasury​ and​in​the​administration​of​President​Benito​Juárez​during​the​ Three​Years’​War.​In​the​latter​capacity​he​helped​to​draft​the​ reform​laws. ​ At​the​end​of​the​civil​war​Prieto​was​elected​to​Congress​ for​the​period​1861–63.​At​the​time​of​the​French​intervention​ (1863),​ French​ and​ imperial​ troops​ held​ most​ of​ the​ country​ and​forced​the​republican​government,​including​Prieto,​to​flee​ to​the​north.​When​ his​ term​as​president​ expired​ in​1866,​ in​ the​midst​of​the​war,​Juárez​decided​to​stay​in​office​because​of​ the​extraordinary​circumstances.​Prieto,​however,​thought​that​ Juárez​should​step​down​and​let​the​chief​justice​become​president.​As​a​result​of​this​disagreement​with​Juárez,​Prieto​went​ into​exile​in​the​United​States. ​ When​the​Republic​was​restored​in​1867,​Prieto​returned​to​ Mexico​and​served​for​ten​years​in​Congress.​Later,​during​the​ era​of​Porfirio​Díaz,​he​was​again​elected​to​Congress​for​sixteen​years​(1880–96).​He​continued​publishing​articles​in​the​ daily​press​at​the​same​time. ​ We​ present​ some​ of​ his​ parliamentary​ speeches​ and​ one​ article​from​the​period​1857–74.

321

1

In Favor of the Abolition of Internal Duties and Customs. Report on the Speech before Congress on January 28–31, 1857 (excerpt)

Mr.​Prieto​says​that,​although​the​committee​does​not​ respond​to​those​who​oppose​it,​he​has​the​duty​of​sustaining​an​appeal,​ because​he​has​been​working​tirelessly​for​many​years​and​he​will​strive​ to​have​it​written​down​in​the​Constitution. ​ The​abolition​of​the​internal​customs​[alcabalas]1​will​be​an​improvement,​it​will​be​a​victory​for​liberty,​it​will​also​be​the​fulfillment​of​one​ of​ the​ promises​ of​ the​ Revolution​ of​ Ayutla.​ Agriculture,​ commerce,​ and​industry​believed​in​that​gratifying​promise.​The​Revolution​was​ economic,​as​it​was​social,​as​it​was​political,​and​the​principle​of​freedom​of​commerce​cannot​be​a​point​neglected​in​a​Constitution​that​is​ derived​from​the​Plan​of​Ayutla​and​that​is​the​testament​to​democracy,​ the​proclamation​of​all​its​principles. ​ The​federation​will​be​impossible​if​state-​to-​state​rivalries​must​exist​ and​if​all​of​them​must​wage​the​war​of​taxes​that​reduces​them​to​misery​ in​atonement​for​their​errors.​If​the​salts​of​San​Luis​must​find​the​markets​of​Zacatecas​closed,​if​the​pigs​of​Morelia​cannot​enter​Toluca,​if​the​ struggle​between​the​prohibitive​system​and​that​of​the​free-​trader​must​be​ perpetuated​between​Puebla​and​Veracruz,​unfortunate​germs​of​discord​ will​remain,​finally,​which​will​sooner​or​later​put​an​end​to​institutions. ​ The​committee​resolves​nothing.​It​limits​itself​to​saying​that​before​ destroying​one​must​build,​and​it​does​not​see​that​it​is​easy​to​replace​ the​duty​with​the​direct​tax. ​ A​tax​is​untenable​that​weighs​heavily​on​the​necessities​of​the​poor,​ that​ falls​ on​ consumption,​ that​ introduces​ inequality​ into​ commerce​ ​ Original​title:​“En​favor​de​la​abolición​de​las​alcabalas​y​aduanas​interiores”​[extracto;​pronunciado​durante​el​Congreso​Extraordinario​Constituyente​en​la​sesión​permanente​del​28​al​31​de​enero​1857].​Source:​El Siglo XIX,​Mexico,​February​3,​1857. ​ 1.​Alcabalas​were​internal​duties​merchants​paid​for​transporting​their​merchandise​ from​one​part​of​the​country​to​another.​(Editor’s​note) 322

in​favor​of​the​abolition​of​internal​dutieS​and​CuStomS : 323

and​is​accompanied​by​denunciation,​espionage,​and​the​most​odious​ and​absurd​obstacles. ​ It​is​necessary​to​understand​that​revolutions​are​the​expression​of​the​ aspirations​of​the​people,​and​that,​if​their​hopes​are​thwarted,​it​throws​ them​into​incessant​upheavals. ​ The​danger​in​which​national​unity​remains,​the​principles​of​true​ liberty,​the​irrelevance​of​feudal​institutions​in​a​democracy,​the​injustice,​the​wickedness​of​the​tax,​all​lead​to​the​idea​that​the​principle​must​ remain​written​down​in​the​Constitution.​The​abolition​of​internal​customs​is​worth​more​than​other​principles​to​which​great​importance​has​ been​given.​It​is​worth​more​to​give​bread​and​clothes​to​the​people​than​ to​offer​them​dazzling​theories.​[.​.​.] ​ Mr.​Prieto​says​it​is​not​certain​that​the​internal​customs​is​established​ everywhere​and​that​this​unevenness​gives​a​more​odious​character​to​ and​makes​more​serious​the​inequality​of​rates​of​exchange​and​municipal​excise​duties. ​ As​Mr.​Gamboa​has​said​that​the​decree​issued​by​the​speaker​when​ he​was​minister​of​finance​did​not​have​the​desired​effect,​to​respond​to​ this​inaccuracy​it​is​sufficient​to​refer​to​what​happened​in​the​states​of​ México,​Jalisco,​and​some​others.​If​one​had​persisted​in​the​measure,​ the​good​would​have​been​achieved​without​harming​the​treasury. ​ Internal​customs,​by​their​very​nature,​offer​more​difficulties​of​collection​and​require​the​greatest​number​of​employees.​From​this​comes​ the​fact​that​the​greater​part​of​their​profit​is​put​into​administrative​expenses,​and​this​fact​should​be​kept​in​mind​by​the​gentlemen​deputies. ​ It​has​been​said​that​this​is​a​matter​of​fulfilling​a​solemn​promise​of​ the​Revolution​and​truly​that​the​realization​of​the​Plan​of​Ayutla​concerns​the​honor​and​morality​of​the​liberal​party.​To​await​the​gathering​ of​data​and​information​is​to​delay​the​reform​by​more​than​forty​[sic],​ as​those​who​know​the​difficulty​of​creating​fiscal​statistics​understand,​ and​as​the​fact​that​the​fiscal​statistics​of​France​are​still​imperfect​despite​the​most​persevering​and​enlightened​efforts​of​its​economists​and​ statesmen​confirms. ​ If​the​committee​finds​reasons​for​doing​so,​it​should​extend​the​time​ limit,​but​under​no​circumstances​should​it​avoid​the​question. ​ He​concludes​by​requesting​that,​in​so​serious​a​matter,​the​debate​be​ extended​so​that​reasons​that​might​lead​to​a​correct​resolution​might​be​ heard.

2 ​

Freedom of Commerce. Report on the Speech before Congress on January 6, 1869 (excerpt)

Citizen​Prieto,​in​a​passionate​speech,​lamented​with​ pain​that​the​educated​youth,​of​whom​the​citizen​mayor​is​one,​supports​restrictive​views​on​freedom​of​trade​and​industry,​views​that​not​ even​Don​Lucas​Alamán​himself,​some​of​whose​paragraphs​he​read,​ was​ever​the​champion. ​ To​the​definition​of​the​value​of​articles​of​merchandise​that​the​citizen​mayor​gave,​Mr.​Prieto​answered​that​the​asking​price,​the​offer,​and​ their​market​circulation​constituted​the​value​of​things. ​ With​respect​to​wealth,​he​said​that​its​value​is​relative. ​ Sonora​is​filled​with​rich​veins​of​gold​that​are​worth​nothing​because​ that​wealth​is​abandoned​and​does​not​circulate.​That​glass​of​water​that​ costs​nothing​in​the​city​will​be​worth​a​great​deal​in​the​desert.​A​savage​exchanges​sums​of​gold​for​a​little​bit​of​powder. ​ This​demonstrates​that​the​value​of​things​depends​on​many​circumstances. ​ That​metals​go​out​and​return​only​in​cash​is​not​a​loss;​it​is​an​exchange,​because​money​is​an​article​of​merchandise​like​any​other. ​ The​commission​is​accused​of​wanting​to​protect​individual​interests.​ What​the​commission​wants​is​to​put​into​practice​truly​progressive​economic​principles​and,​in​doing​so,​give​life​to​an​industry​that​is​today​ dead.​A​mine​worked,​whose​products​enter​into​vast​circulation,​will​ make​agriculture​and​other​branches​of​human​industry​progress,​and​ the​benefits​are​for​all​the​people;​while​if​its​products​are,​as​now,​unprofitable,​paralysis​dominates​all​the​rest.

​ Original​title:​“Durante​la​consideración​de​las​medidas​restrictivas​a​la​libertad​de​ comercio”​[pronunciado​en​el​Cuarto​Congreso​Constitucional,​durante​la​sesión​del​ 6​de​enero​de​1869].​Source:​Pantaleón​Tovar,​Historia parlamentaria del Cuarto Congreso Constitucional,​vol.​3​(Mexico:​Imprenta​de​Ignacio​Cumplido,​1874). 324

freedom​of​CommerCe : 325

​ We​are​not​a​manufacturing​or​agricultural​country;​we​are​a​mining​ country,​and​we​must​give​expansion​and​flight​to​the​wealth​of​our​soil. ​ It​ is​ said​ that​ the​ benefit​ will​ be​ for​ foreigners.​ When​ one​ speaks​ of​political​economy,​there​are​not​Mexicans,​there​are​not​foreigners,​ there​are​numbers;​it​amounts​to​the​same​here​as​in​France​and​England. ​ Moreover,​if​the​benefit​is​for​foreigners,​the​truth​is​that​they​are​the​ ones​who​have​spent​immense​sums​to​work​our​mines​and​that​many​ have​been​ruined​in​that​speculation. ​ The​ speaker​ concluded​ by​ showing​ that​ export​ of​ precious​ stones​ is​not​profitable​and​by​requesting​that​Congress​approve​the​project​ under​discussion.

3 ​

On the Laws of Reform. Report on the Speech before Congress on April 28, 1873 debatinG​the​report​to​elevate​the​ lawS​of​reform​to​the​StatuS​of​ ConStitutional​preCeptS

Citizen​Prieto:​Sir,​I​am​certainly​surprised​to​see​that​ the​discussion​has​gone​awry​and​that​it​is​desired​to​determine,​with​ respect​to​this​article​and​the​committee’s​addition,​whether​this​matter​ is​special​or​if​it​is​a​regulatory​law.​As​some​references​to​history​are​ made​and​other​circumstances​brought​forward​that​demonstrate​the​ zeal​of​some​representatives​in​favor​of​the​interests​of​the​states,​all​this​ makes​me​call​the​attention​of​the​chamber​to​the​fact​that​this​is​not​one​ of​those​ordinary​pieces​of​business;​this​is​not​a​piece​of​business​with​ which​one​can​deal​by​means​of​special​circumstances​and​in​accordance​ with​constitutional​laws,​but​rather​by​means​of​how​it​came​about​historically​and​so​that​Congress​understands​what​the​nation​desires.​The​ historical​conditions​are​as​follows:​With​the​Constitution​proclaimed​ in​the​year​1857,​including​within​it​the​declaration​of​the​political​rights​ of​the​nation,​a​problem​of​the​highest​importance​lurked​in​the​shadows;​the​issues​denominated​Reform​remained,​as​though​asleep​under​ the​burden​of​the​administration​that​found​itself​then​facing​the​destinies​of​the​country,​going​down​a​road​of​transitions.​The​leader​of​the​ power​himself,​intimidated​before​the​great​work​that​presented​itself​ to​him,​went​along​a​path​of​difficulties​and​dangers​whose​only​results​ were​half-​concessions,​words​of​double​meaning,​social​errors​that​since​ then​had​to​be​accounted​for​to​the​nation​after​having​cost​torrents​of​ blood.​The​Constitution​of​1857​has​very​serious​flaws​because​it​was​ ​ Original​title:​“Al​debatirse​el​dictamen​para​elevar​al​rasgo​de​preceptos​constitucionales​las​Leyes​de​Reforma”​[pronunciado​en​el​Sexto​Congreso​Constitucional,​durante​ la​sesión​del​28​de​abril​de​1873].​Source:​Diario de los debates. Sexto Congreso Constitucional,​vol.​2​(Mexico:​Imprenta​F.​Díaz​de​León​y​Santiago​White,​1872). 326

on​the​lawS​of​reform : 327

simultaneously​an​exhortation​of​the​rule,​the​doctrine,​and​the​axiom;​ it​was​the​consecration​of​the​historical​antecedent;​it​was​the​consecration​of​the​innermost​conviction​of​the​representatives​of​the​people.​ For​that​reason​there​is​much​ill-​defined,​much​generalization​in​the​ way​the​constitutional​articles​were​drawn​up,​very​few​precepts​that​ have​the​character​of​absolute​imperative​as​a​code​should​contain.​The​ country​progressing​thus,​much​had​been​won,​but​the​political​revolution​was​scarcely​completed.​The​national​party​had​a​symbol;​there​ was​not​yet​room​for​the​sad​lament​that​the​liberal​party​had​no​symbol​ and​ that​ we​ were​ progressing​ without​ a​ compass​ amidst​ shadows​ and​fanaticism,​nor​that​we​found​ourselves​without​direction​in​the​ difficult​consideration​of​the​fate​of​the​country​in​relation​to​its​future​ fortunes.​This​symbolic​program​had​been​achieved.​In​the​Constitution​of​1857​the​political​matter​was​to​a​large​degree​dealt​with,​but​ as​for​the​clerical​matter,​attention​was​riveted​on​this​mistake,​on​this​ unfortunate​mistake​of​immense​importance.​The​wealth​of​the​nation​ was​the​property​of​certain​individuals,​but​only​those​individuals​could​ enjoy​their​own​property.​These​concessions​to​individuals,​in​moments​ when​the​famous​gentleman​Don​Miguel​Lerdo​was​at​the​head​of​the​ ministry,​made​the​Reform​die,​so​to​speak.​They​made​it​stumble,​it​ remained​in​impossible​contradiction​and​produced​all​the​irregularities​ that​ some​ call​ the​ inconsistencies​ of​ the​ Revolution​ of​ 1857.​ The​ social​needs​were​others.​The​social​needs​required​the​proclamation​ of​a​gospel​for​humanity​in​which​civil​marriage​might​be​instituted,​in​ which​the​ecclesiastical​bodies​had​no​wealth,​in​a​word,​the​heightening​of​civil​power,​the​elevation​of​human​dignity,​so​that​the​immense​ horizon​of​progress​might​open​before​the​eyes​of​the​patria.​This​was​ the​Reform,​and​this​Reform,​by​the​nature​of​things,​was​proclaimed​ on​the​fields​of​battle​at​the​sound​of​an​arsenal,​a​gun​carriage​serving​ many​times​as​a​rostrum.​And​it​was​in​fact​proclaimed​by​the​will​of​ the​nation;​it​was​a​law​as​great​as​the​Constitution,​as​venerated​as​it,​as​ dogmatic​as​it,​and​as​much​considered​the​will​of​the​nation​as​it. ​ Establishing​a​parallel​between​the​two,​so​as​to​determine​to​which​ of​the​two​preference​is​to​be​given,​would​be​to​work​in​an​inconsistent​ way.​The​Constitution​of​1857​has​the​revolutionary​tradition​and​the​ will​of​the​people.​The​Laws​of​Reform​have​the​revolutionary​tradition​ and​the​will​of​the​entire​nation.​The​one​has​the​laurel​crown​of​the​parliamentary​triumphs,​and​the​other​has​the​palm​crown​of​the​martyrs​of​

328 : Guillermo​prieto

our​independence.​All​these​contradictions,​all​these​particularities,​and​ these​thousand​trifles​that​are​weighing​us​down​have​the​grandeur​of​ the​will​of​the​nation,​and​on​this​point​of​departure​we​should​stand.​To​ set​the​Constitution​against​the​Laws​of​Reform,​to​seek​this​contraposition​in​this​childish​game​of​the​governing​articles​of​secondary​laws,​is​ to​want​what​is​already​done​to​be​done.​And​it​was​done​by​a​supreme​ authority​that​we​represent​and​to​which​we​cannot​be​opposed;​this​is​ as​if​to​wish​that​we​might​have​the​logic​of​the​school​but​not​the​logic​ of​statesmen.​The​Laws​of​Reform​have​a​loftiness​as​great​as​the​Constitution;​the​Laws​of​Reform,​by​the​very​nature​of​things,​have​been​ embedded​in​the​Constitution,​have​been​made​a​permanent​part​of​it.​ They​have​become​inviolable​and​great​in​such​a​way​that​we​cannot​ make​changes​in​them​unless​it​is​with​the​danger​of​resurrecting​the​ civil​war. ​ For​these​reasons,​when​Mr.​Lemus​has​asked​that​the​Laws​of​Reform​form​part​of​the​fundamental​code,​he​has​not​necessarily​wanted​ them​to​figure​into​all​and​each​one​of​the​governing​articles​of​these​ Laws​of​Reform.​He​has​not​wanted​it​because,​in​scholastic​terms,​it​ would​produce​a​deformity,​because​one​is​the​political​code​and​the​ others​are​the​secondary​provisions.​The​legal​disposition​provides​the​ rule,​and​the​secondary​provision​develops​the​idea.​The​constitutional​ disposition​must​be​the​political​axiom,​and​all​the​details​the​development​of​these​original​ideas.​It​is​from​this​that,​by​the​nature​of​things,​ Mr.​Lemus​wanted​in​this​sixth​section​[of​a​constitutional​article]​that​ the​governing​laws​and​the​complementary​provisions​of​the​constitutional​articles​form​part​of​the​Constitution​as​organic​laws.​This​was​ consistent​ with​ history,​ this​ was​ consistent​ with​ political​ principles,​ this​was​the​rigorous​logical​deduction​from​those​antecedents;​it​was​to​ stand​in​the​true​path,​having​nothing​to​do​with​the​governing​particularities​and​the​scholastic​discussions​that​have​since​arisen. ​ What​was​the​political​rationale​Mr.​Lemus​had​in​mind​to​support​ these​provisions​and​to​regard​them​as​an​article​of​our​code?​Having​ said​this,​by​drawing​this​comparison,​I​intend​to​bring​to​the​chamber​ the​true​assessment,​the​comparison,​so​that​it​might​see​what​the​likeness​was,​what​the​resemblance​was,​what​the​symmetry​of​soundness,​ and​what​the​reason​was.​The​reason​cannot​be​found​in​any​way​in​the​ artifices​of​the​subterfuges​of​the​laws.​The​reason​must​be​sought​in​ a​great​political​question​that​has​the​authority​of​history,​the​historic​

on​the​lawS​of​reform : 329

consecration​it​might​contain.​What​was​the​reason?​The​argument​is​ very​obvious.​These​declarations​[the​Laws​of​Reform]​have​been​made​ on​the​field​of​battle​and​by​the​men​who​attained​the​palm​of​martyrdom​in​the​struggle​of​the​[war​of]​Reform.​They​had​come​to​create​ laws​that​were​no​longer​discussed​or​disputed​and​that​the​will​of​the​ entire​nation​had​already​set​down.​These​laws​could​be​defective​in​ their​ details,​ some​ others​ in​ their​ form;​ but​ they​ were​ embedded​ in​ the​sentiment​of​the​people​in​such​a​way,​they​lived​with​the​affection​ and​tenderness​of​the​entire​nation​in​such​a​way,​that​the​will​of​the​ nation​and​not​ours​is​what​makes​them​prevail.​To​its​loftiness​and​its​ sublimity,​and​in​no​way​to​our​aspirations​and​to​our​wishes,​did​they​ owe​it​this​kind​of​fanaticism,​this​kind​of​monumental​existence​that​ determined​historic​facts​must​have​and​that​is​considered,​so​to​speak,​ the​genealogy​of​the​glories​of​a​nation.​Thus,​by​the​consent​of​the​entire​nation​the​Laws​of​Reform​have​remained​undamaged.​These​laws,​ without​trampling​on​any​right,​without​violating​any​guarantee,​with​ the​consent​of​the​men​who​sealed​the​Reform​with​their​blood,​are​ now​set​down​unharmed​in​the​fundamental​code.​These​laws,​sir,​are​ the​history​of​the​sentiments​of​all​nations;​this​is​the​history​of​the​most​ profound​sacrifices;​this​is​the​generation​of​ideas​that​arose​in​a​mysterious​and​undefined​manner​in​the​heart​of​man​that​end​up​as​the​goal​ to​which​all​their​aspirations​are​directed;​this​constitutes,​if​one​will,​ the​mysterious,​indefinable​reservoir​that​is​creating​the​great​fountain​ of​the​nationality​of​a​people​that​respects​itself,​that​grows,​and​that​ strives​for​its​future. ​ What​ would​ we​ say​tomorrow​ if​we​ were​ to​ say​ to​ the​ Spaniards,​ break​up​your​tree​of​Guernica,​destroy​that​rotten​and​dry​trunk,​that​ rigid​cadaver​of​the​desert,​as​Calderon​says.​They​will​tell​us​no,​because​here​is​our​glory,​our​liberty.​What​would​we​say​if​we​were​told​ that​one​of​our​towns​is​more​beautiful​than​another:​Tacubaya​has​more​ fertility,​for​example,​has​more​parks,​more​mansions​than​the​humble​ town​of​Dolores​where​we​celebrate​our​independence;​so​blot​out​the​ name​of​Dolores.​No,​sir,​no,​because​there​lies​the​cradle​of​our​independence,​and​with​its​crooked​streets,​with​its​shapeless​nature,​with​ all​this​it​constitutes​a​greatness,​a​glory,​a​poetry,​it​is​the​poetry​of​the​ nation,​and​however​much​might​be​said​in​its​greater​good,​it​is​the​ beacon​that​illuminates​the​nation’s​future.​In​dealing​with​the​Laws​ of​ Reform​ we​ can​ no​ longer​ change​ anything​ because​ it​ is​ no​ longer​

330 : Guillermo​prieto

debatable,​because​they​were​sealed​with​the​blood​of​our​martyrs,​because​when​one​deals​with​them​there​appears​the​bravery​of​León,​the​ heart​of​Ocampo,​the​brilliant​oratory​of​Arriaga,​the​invincible​spirit​ of​Degollado,​the​irreproachable​probity​of​Zamora,​because​we​have​ in​the​Laws​of​Reform​the​genealogy​of​the​greatest​events​of​our​history,​because​we​feel​ourselves​being​stirred​by​the​glory​of​the​men​of​ 1857.​(Applause)​To​take​this​away,​destroy​it,​break​it,​humiliate​it,​are​ matters​of​chicanery.​(Applause)​No,​by​God,​let​us​not​touch​the​sacrosanct​Laws​of​Reform,​which​are​the​glory​of​our​patria.​(Frenetic applause)​[.​.​.]​. ​ Sir,​I​will​be​brief​in​what​I​am​going​to​explain​to​Congress,​and​I​ cannot​have​a​better​introduction,​because​the​chamber​is​very​tired.​ The​gentleman​who​was​the​previous​speaker​has​said​that​the​Laws​of​ Reform​cannot​be​considered​constitutional​and​cannot​be​included​in​ the​Constitution.​Neither​the​committee​nor​those​of​us​who​have​defended​its​report​want​them​to​be​included​in​the​Constitution.​We​do​ not​want​to​add​them​to​the​Constitution,​nor​do​we​want​to​create​a​ code​of​a​thousand​and​some​articles;​we​want​only​that​they​appear​in​ the​Constitution​as​constitutional​laws.​No​constitutional​law​forms​part​ of​the​Constitution.​The​Constitution​contains​the​political​principles​ necessary​for​the​public​powers​to​function,​marking​their​orbits​and​ keeping​them​from​clashing​with​each​other.​The​others​are​the​secondary​laws,​the​unfolding​of​the​precepts​the​Constitution​contains,​and​ they​do​not​form​part​of​it,​they​are​not​indivisible.​So​I​do​not​believe​ that​the​learned​Mr.​García​de​la​Cadena​in​presenting​this​distortion​ has​judged,​in​a​consistent​way,​either​the​sentiments​of​the​committee​ or​the​defense​that​those​of​us​who​are​in​agreement​with​its​ideas​have​ made. ​ Mr.​García​de​la​Cadena​has​said:​“If​these​laws​are​set​down​by​the​ people,​why​should​we​make​an​innovation​that​could​become​dangerous?”​This​innovation​is​made,​sir,​because​once​the​Laws​of​Reform​are​ declared​constitutional,​because​once​written​down​in​the​code,​it​is​an​ inevitable​consequence​that​these​Laws​of​Reform​will​have​to​run​the​ same​fate​as​the​Constitution.​Being​superimposed​on​it,​being​made​ more​powerful​than​the​Constitution​itself,​they​will​have​been​constituted​not​in​an​uncertain​situation,​but​as​a​social​complement​to​the​ political​code. ​ For​this​reason​the​Laws​of​Reform​must​run​the​same​course.​This​

on​the​lawS​of​reform : 331

is​the​powerful​reason​why​the​individuals​who​have​sought​the​consecration​of​the​principles​ of​reform​have​wanted​that​the​governing​ part​of​these​articles​not​be​subject​to​vicissitudes,​leaving​them​in​the​ category​of​secondary​laws.​What​has​happened,​sir,​in​fact?​That​in​defending​the​prerogatives​of​the​states,​the​Laws​of​Reform​have​been​ thwarted.​What​has​happened​to​the​alienation​of​the​lands​that​were​ for​ the​ Indians?​ What​ would​ happen​ to​ public​ worship​ entrusted​ to​ specified​authorities?​Believing​it​would​be​a​matter​of​their​jurisdiction,​they​would​destroy​the​security​of​the​principles​of​reform.​These​ principles​could​be​terminated​or​completely​rejected,​and​we​have​to​ be​most​cautious​on​this​point,​because​it​is​a​matter​that,​having​proclaimed​tolerance,​we​must​respect​the​manifestation​of​this​tolerance,​ but​we​must​take​care​always​that​they​do​not​fight​against​us​and​take​ our​ sword​ by​ the​ fist​ to​ wound​ the​ heart​ of​ the​ institutions​ we​ have​ wished​to​save.​Why,​sir?​Because​it​is​not​possible​that,​once​a​specific​ liberty​is​proclaimed,​we​seek​the​thousand​ways​that​the​beliefs​have​ to​ work​ with​ specific​ political​ aspirations;​ it​ is​ not​ possible​ for​ us​ to​ establish​a​policy​of​the​confessional;​it​is​not​possible​that​we​carry​our​ gaze​to​the​interior​of​consciences;​it​is​not​possible​that​we​put​specific​ preachings​that​are​in​conformity​with​the​interests​of​the​clergy​in​harmony​with​the​principles​of​Reform​that​proclaim​the​guarantees​of​all​ opinion. ​ To​detach​the​constitutional​principles​already​accepted​by​the​committee​from​the​laws​that​establish​regulations​for​them​was​to​repudiate​ the​success​of​the​Reform​with​the​pretext​of​the​states,​regaining​the​ liberty​the​Constitution​gives​them.​The​states​would​make​of​the​Constitution​an​instrument​to​destroy​the​Reform.​Here​is​why,​sir,​those​ who​have​defended​the​report​and​the​gentlemen​of​the​committee​have​ wanted​to​make​indivisible​the​constitutional​principles​and​the​regulatory​matter,​marking​in​a​perfect​way​what​was​constitutional​precept​ and​what​was​governing​matter. ​ To​make​synonyms​of​the​word​“Constitution”​and​the​word​“regulating”​seems​to​me​to​seek​deliberately​a​reason​to​distort​the​matter. ​ These​reasons​seem​to​me​so​conclusive​that​they​will​remove​every​ one​of​Mr.​García​de​la​Cadena’s​scruples.​Mr.​García​de​la​Cadena​has​ said​that​we​are​going​to​put​into​the​fundamental​code​a​thousand​and​ some​articles​that​the​Laws​of​Reform​contain.​This​is​not​true;​what​we​ have​wanted​is​that​they​be​officially​recorded​as​governing​articles​of​

332 : Guillermo​prieto

the​constitutional​law.​We​have​not​wanted​even​the​explanatory​parts​ that​the​Laws​of​Reform​contain​to​be​declared​constitutional​articles.​ Neither​have​we​wanted​complete​laws​to​come​to​form​part​of​the​Constitution,​because​this​was​divergent​from​the​Constitution;​it​was​to​ pass​over​the​Constitution​without​taking​it​into​account​on​a​subject​ approved​and​deliberated​by​the​revolutionary​matter.​This​was​what​ Mr.​García​de​la​Cadena​should​have​kept​in​mind. ​ Whether​there​were​many​or​few​articles,​we​have​to​pass​by​them​ because​it​would​be​a​subterfuge​of​bad​law​to​discuss​them​now.​To​approach​the​matter​of​the​Laws​of​Reform,​it​is​necessary​to​think​about​ how​delicate​this​subject​is,​because​in​this​matter​of​rights​and​liberties,​we​are​constantly​conspiring​against​these​very​liberties.​We​in​the​ powers​of​the​states​see​a​conspiracy​against​the​Laws​of​Reform;​under​ the​pretext​of​specific​rights​for​specific​classes​we​are​accepting​a​permanent​conspiracy​in​our​own​bosom​against​the​declarations​the​liberal​party​has​made.​We​are​placing​the​flag​of​Reform​in​contraposition​ to​the​principles​of​liberty,​and​we​have​absolutely​no​means​to​defend​ ourselves,​and​we​are​suckling​that​terrible​social​hydra,​that​terrible​ hydra​that​tomorrow​we​would​have​to​drown​once​more​in​blood,​and​ this​against​all​these​trifles​that​are​being​placed​on​us.​We​are​seeing​the​ resurrection​ of​ fanaticism,​ of​ backward​ movement​ and​ evils​ without​ number,​still​sheltered​by​the​altar​and​clerical​prerogatives.​We​are​seeing​the​attempt​of​the​terrible​reaction,​the​reaction​that​strives​toward​ infamy​as​a​final​outcome.​The​clerical​party​believes​that​it​still​lives,​ the​clerical​party​believes​that​it​still​can​dominate​the​liberal​party,​the​ clerical​party​wants​us​to​bow​before​the​crisis​to​see​if​they​could​sacrifice​us.​One​is​the​political​issue​of​the​country​and​the​other​is​the​clear​ and​final​issue;​one​is​the​pharisaical​and​formulaic​issue,​and​the​other​ is​the​philosophical​issue;​one​is​the​dishonest​and​ridiculous​issue,​and​ the​other​is​the​issue​of​the​future​of​the​patria.​Those​who​want​this​ future,​those​who​seek​its​well-​being,​should​vote​for​the​article​under​ discussion.

4 ​

On Reforms to the Law of Public Instruction. Report on the Speech before Congress on January 2, 1874

Citizen Prieto:​ In​ such​ moments​ of​ necessity​ as​ the​ present,​a​discussion​is​begun​that​positively​concerns​the​future​of​the​ Republic​and​that​in​all​countries​of​the​world​has​been​the​object​of​ attention​of​parliaments​in​order​to​achieve​the​future​prosperity​of​the​ nation.​The​present​matter​is​of​the​highest​importance,​and​I​could​not​ have​been​more​surprised​to​hear​the​argument​that​one​of​the​previous​ speakers​has​given,​declaring​that​the​committee​had​no​reason​whatsoever​for​having​submitted​its​new​report​once​certain​foundations​were​ in​agreement​with​the​opinion​of​the​executive. ​ This​ is​ not​ true.​ In​ sections​ VI​ and​ VII​ of​ Article​ 70​ of​ the​ Constitution,​it​says​that​if​a​project​is​contested​completely​or​in​part,​a​ new​report​subject​to​discussion​might​be​drafted​with​the​objective​of​ seeking​all​the​wisdom,​all​the​study,​that​is​indispensable​when​he​who​ has​knowledge​of​the​facts,​he​who​has​a​definite​awareness​of​how​the​ law​was​brought​about,​must​be​brought​into​agreement​so​that​the​law​ might​have​every​probability​of​success.​So​it​will​not​be​strange​that​the​ committee​enters​into​the​discussion​of​articles​that​have​not​been​impugned​by​the​executive​and​of​some​other​articles​that,​without​having​ been​challenged​by​the​executive,​come​up​in​the​report.​A​sad​and​painful​experience​has​opened​our​eyes​to​the​direction​the​law​of​public​instruction​might​follow​regarding​the​plans​we​have​proposed​in​directing​the​fate​of​the​youth. ​ It​seems​to​me​that​the​first​foundation​affirms​the​victory​that​the​ Constitution​wanted​to​make,​that​of​instruction​being​free. ​ Everyone​has​the​ability​to​teach,​everyone​that​of​learning,​so​the​ ​ Original​title:​“Sobre​reformas​a​la​Ley​de​Instrucción​Pública”​[pronunciado​en​el​ Séptimo​Congreso​Constitucional,​durante​la​sesión​del​2​de​enero​de​1874].​Source:​ Diario de los debates, Séptimo Congreso Constitucional,​vol.​1​(Mexico:​Imprenta​F.​Díaz​de​ León​y​Santiago​White,​1874). 333

334 : Guillermo​prieto

business​of​public​instruction​should​not​be​a​business​of​determinate​ persons.​Public​instruction​is​a​religion​of​conscience,​this​is​the​unanimous​view​in​all​nations,​it​does​not​belong​to​any​person,​it​does​not​ belong​to​determinate​individuals,​it​is​strictly​a​matter​of​humanity​in​ which​the​fate​of​the​patria​takes​interest. ​ It​is​the​right​of​the​child,​which​we​have​the​duty​to​demand​at​this​ rostrum;​it​is​the​highest,​the​most​sublime​of​the​social​matters​that​can​ be​presented​for​our​scrutiny. ​ I​would​like​to​bring​to​my​conscience​all​the​laws,​purify​my​lips​as​ did​the​prophets,​and​touch​the​hearts​of​the​citizen​deputies,​because​ this​is​the​greatest​matter​that​can​be​presented. ​ To​guarantee​freedom​of​instruction,​to​convert​the​promise​of​the​ Constitution​into​truth,​is​a​triumph​for​human​reason,​it​is​an​eternal​ break​with​backward​movement. ​ Unfortunately,​sir,​proceeding​as​we​are​doing​is​not​the​most​proper​ way.​We​are​not​in​complete​agreement​with​the​point​of​view​of​the​ executive,​so​the​addition​of​an​article​in​which​it​is​stated​that​the​law​ returns​ to​ our​ scrutiny​ with​ the​ goal​ that​ our​conscience​ be​ tranquil​ seems​very​good​to​me.​Why?​Because​although​the​Constitution​proclaims​liberty​of​instruction,​this​liberty​is​thwarted​by​sad​experience. ​ One​says​liberty​of​instruction.​That​is​to​say​that​everyone,​wherever​and​however​and​in​the​time​that​doing​so​might​be​possible,​in​the​ manner​it​is​convenient,​can​pick​up​instruction,​and​that​the​state​has​ the​duty​to​respect​knowledge​that​has​been​obtained​in​the​midst​of​ the​occupations​of​the​countryside,​in​the​midst​of​the​roadways,​in​the​ midst​of​the​deepest​misery,​or​in​the​midst​of​the​most​majestic​mansions. ​ The​ hour,​ the​ plan,​ the​ regulation,​ this​ last​ is​ a​ passport​ so​ that​ knowledge​might​be​reaped​by​any​man​who​has​the​necessary​comprehensions,​in​a​word:​be​he​a​stranger​to​learning,​be​there​obstacles,​be​ it​that​the​knowledge​is​not​for​everyone.​Thus​it​is​that​in​this​first​part,​ it​appears​that​the​intent​is​to​destroy​all​those​obstacles​the​regulation​ poses. ​ There​is​an​individual​who​has​not​wished​to​be​tested​in​anything​ whatsoever,​and​who​one​day​wants​to​acquire​the​title​of​lawyer,​taking​ the​four​or​five​exams.​He​must​be​admitted​to​examination​without​ anyone​having​to​know​where​he​has​acquired​the​knowledge,​whether​a​ village​school​teacher​has​taught​him,​whether​an​old​woman​who​might​

on​reformS​to​the​law​of​publiC​inStruCtion : 335

have​some​knowledge.​What​falls​to​us​is​to​appraise​this​knowledge,​respect​it​as​it​is,​and​accept​all​those​who​might​be​worthy​of​the​scientific​ fellowship. ​ So​this​entire​first​part​of​the​report,​as​we​understand​it,​does​not​ have​the​necessary​features​so​long​as​it​has​not​seeped​into​the​hearts​of​ all​inhabitants​to​bear​fruit.​So​long​as​this​is​not​so,​free​instruction​is​ an​illusion​and​a​lie,​and​we​cannot​proceed​in​agreement,​understanding​instruction​as​the​light,​as​the​air​that​the​lungs​of​humanity​breathe,​ and​the​Ministry​of​Justice​speaking​to​undermine​it,​putting​obstacles​ before​those​who​do​not​have​the​requirements​and​knowledge​drawn​ up​according​to​the​law. ​ Thus​it​is​that​in​this​first​part​there​is​no​greater​objection​to​make​ than​to​recall​the​last​suggestion​that​Citizen​Pacheco​has​made.​As​for​ the​second​section​[of​the​proposed​law],​I​have​said​that​a​sad​experience​has​made​us​distrustful​about​what​would​be​the​result​of​this​second​foundation,​which​says​this:​“Divide​studies​into​general​secondary​ schools​and​special​secondary​schools.” ​ When​the​discussion​between​us​began,​an​attempt​was​made​to​create​an​antagonism​between​those​of​us​who​wanted​an​end​to​specific​ hindrances​and​those​who​demanded​a​certain​type​of​knowledge.​As​ Congress​will​remember,​there​were​some​moments​in​the​discussion​ when,​ as​ though​ in​ the​ midst​ of​ a​ storm,​ things​ moved​ uncertainly,​ bringing​one​almost​to​doubt​whether​the​plan​was​under​discussion. ​ We​have​wanted​one​of​two​systems​be​followed:​either​acquire​specific​ knowledge​ to​ pursue​ professional​ studies,​ or​ the​ other​ system,​ which​consists​of​forming​a​depository​of​all​possible​human​knowledge​so​that​everyone​might​have​access​to​it​and​it​be​within​the​reach​ of​all​levels​of​intelligence. ​ To​proceed​in​this​way,​we​had​to​keep​in​mind​that,​however​much​ in​Germany​and​in​England​a​system​of​instruction​is​followed​in​which​ special​knowledge​flows​from​the​first​basic​principles,​however​much​ in​ Germany​ there​ might​ be​ another​ system​ of​ instruction​ leading​ to​ the​completion​of​special​schools,​however​much​in​the​United​States​ the​success​of​a​system​of​instruction​with​political​knowledge​has​been​ achieved,​we​seek​not​a​system​but​a​route,​a​sure​direction,​with​the​goal​ of​not​going​astray​with​either​the​principles​of​encyclopedism​or​the​ old​exclusivity.​The​matter​of​the​old​exclusivity​has​been​debated​since​ the​end​of​the​eighteenth​century.​It​will​be​remembered​that,​because​

336 : Guillermo​prieto

of​the​exigencies​of​the​studies,​the​advantages​of​knowledge​in​men​became​clear;​intelligence​to​grasp​all​knowledge,​to​grasp​all​the​successes,​ in​order​to​discover​all​the​horizons,​in​order​to​let​the​soul​soar​into​ the​infinite​of​its​being​was​made​known.​But​then,​after​many​debates,​ these​two​schools​have​appeared:​one​that​makes​the​study​of​mathematics​and​practical​knowledge​necessary,​and​the​other​that​seeks​human​ knowledge​in​moral​science​and​metaphysics. ​ Well​then,​sir,​we​move​away​from​these​two​systems.​Without​taking​ part​ourselves​in​such​a​heated​discussion​about​the​knowledge​that​can​ be​called​purely​scholastic,​I​would​have​desired,​following​the​United​ States​for​example,​that​children​have​the​aptitude​for​being​good​citizens,​ that​ democracy​ be​ converted​ into​ a​ reality,​ that​ men​ by​ means​ of​their​wisdom​come​to​fulfill​those​functions​on​which​the​future​of​ nations​depends.​The​child​forming​his​interests​in​the​school,​the​child​ acquiring​specific​practical​knowledge,​the​child​acquiring​the​quality​of​ being​and​his​individual​dignity​was​the​republican​who​later​ruled​the​ fate​of​his​patria;​he​was​the​man​who​threw​away​the​tailor’s​shears​to​ grasp​the​reins​of​government;​he​was​the​man​who​left​the​field​of​the​ farm​to​be​called​Grand,​the​redeemer​of​humanity. ​ Thus​ we​ understand​ the​ school,​ and​ thus​ we​ seek​ specific​ knowledge​in​what​is​called​political​instruction​and​in​what​the​beneficent​ influence​of​democracy​provides.​But​the​way​in​which​the​article​has​ been​ written​ means​ this:​ it​ means​ moving​ backward​ from​ what​ has​ been​called​the​preparatory​school;​it​means​this​confusion,​this​corrupt​ whirlpool​of​knowledge. ​ We​do​not​want,​like​the​father​of​the​family,​to​have​a​boy​who​narrates​a​fable​by​memory;​nor​do​we​want​dilettantes.​What​we​want​is​ that​everyone​have​the​human​knowledge​that​is​taught,​some​languages,​ that​all​knowledge,​all​the​wealth​of​human​knowledge,​be​an​inexhaustible​torrent​of​enlightenment,​and,​from​this​whole,​the​knowledge​indispensable​for​all​careers​be​extracted.​This​is​what​has​been​desired.​ We​want,​for​example,​what​is​done​in​a​pharmacy,​where​every​type​of​ medicine​is​made,​and​these​are​applied​to​different​illnesses​according​ to​what​the​makers​advise.​If​there​is​pain​in​the​side,​a​medicine​is​applied,​and​if​there​is​another​type​of​pain,​another​type​of​medicine​is​ applied. ​ The​same​happens​in​a​printer’s​shop;​there​are​periods,​commas,​and​

on​reformS​to​the​law​of​publiC​inStruCtion : 337

letters​distributed​among​all​the​cases,​and​when​they​are​needed,​the​ appropriate​types​are​taken​but​not​all. ​ If​the​article​is​not​rewritten​and​specified​in​a​certain​way,​an​educational​institution​will​be​established​where​all​human​knowledge​is​cultivated​and​where​specific​knowledge​is​stipulated​for​certain​careers;​ as​long​as​the​article​is​not​written​in​this​way,​we​will​return​to​our​old​ disputes,​we​will​return​to​hearing​a​clamor​against​the​reactionaries​and​ over​whether​knowledge​is​useful. ​ No​one​can​doubt​this;​nor​can​anyone​dispute​progress​or​knowledge.​We​are​sufficiently​experienced​to​seek​the​truth;​this​is​the​work​ of​a​Congress.​So​it​seems​to​me​that​the​second​of​the​foundations,​if​ it​does​not​have​an​application,​is​in​danger​of​falling​again​into​the​unhappiness​that​the​chamber​has​wished​to​eliminate​for​the​good​of​the​ youth. ​ Another​of​the​matters​that​has​been​put​into​the​present​report​is​ the​following:​secondary​education​will​be​free,​uniform,​and​obligatory.​Uniformity​refers​to​establishing​one​or​more​normal​schools​for​ teachers.​Here​the​matter​of​primary​instruction​and​the​matter​of​secondary​instruction​are​confused,​to​my​way​of​seeing.​Primary​instruction​is​indispensable​for​the​happiness​of​the​people,​for​democracy,​and​ for​the​realization​of​their​ideas​of​liberty.​Reference​to​this​primary​ instruction​is​made​as​if​by​chance,​and​for​me​it​is​of​such​importance​ and​of​such​high​consequence​that​the​sacrifice​of​secondary​instruction​ can​definitely​be​made​provided​primary​instruction​is​spread​everywhere.​This​is​so​true​that,​when​this​subject​has​been​discussed,​what​ has​been​desired​is​that​instruction​be​spread​everywhere,​that​no​means​ be​omitted,​that​by​means​of​itinerant​teachers,​by​means​of​oral​classes,​ in​whatever​way,​instruction​be​spread. ​ When​the​Emperor​Iturbide​entered​triumphant,​he​understood​the​ importance​of​instruction,​and​he​designated​Dr.​Mora​for​this​work,​ and​he​said:​Doctor,​we​are​going​to​create​instruction​because​it​is​necessary.​This​was​said​in​the​year​1824;​afterward,​when​in​the​year​1853,​ point​ of​ departure​ for​ the​ Reform​ in​ the​ time​ of​ Farías​ and​ Atilano​ Sánchez​and​various​others​who​headed​public​instruction,​these​fathers​ of​instruction​said:​Primers,​not​guns,​is​what​we​have​to​send​to​the​ people. ​ So​our​Congress​being​so​diligent,​our​government​being​so​perse-

338 : Guillermo​prieto

vering,​we​were​taking​the​first​steps​with​respect​to​primary​instruction.​I​would​wish​that​the​conditions​for​primary​instruction​might​be​ based​on​this​foundation. ​ The​matter​of​primary​instruction​has​been​raised,​the​matter​that​ even​today​has​been​the​object​of​very​special​study​especially​in​France​ when,​after​the​disasters​France​has​suffered,​in​the​midst​of​the​debris​ of​the​Commune,​crying​over​ruined​buildings,​in​the​midst​of​these​circumstances,​eyes​have​been​turned​in​a​very​preferential​way​to​public​ instruction.​There​has​been​a​man​who​has​dedicated​himself​to​public​ instruction,​who​has​created​a​sort​of​Congress,​where​the​noteworthy​ personages​of​the​academies​of​science​meet,​and​in​this​assembly​one​ deals​with​the​matter​of​whether​the​fathers​of​the​family​have​the​specific​obligation​to​provide​education​to​their​children​in​a​certain​way,​ providing​them​with​instruction​as​if​it​were​corporal​bread. ​ But​at​what​point​can​the​government​enter​into​the​domestic​home?​ Can​it​search​like​the​one​who​remedies​an​evil,​like​the​one​who​enters​ to​remove​a​rotting​body,​because​that​is​how​the​man​who​deprives​his​ children​of​all​social​goods​must​be​considered,​putting​obstacles​in​the​ way​of​the​development​of​their​intelligence,​like​that​weight​that​it​is​ said​the​Abbot​Faria​had​on​one​of​his​feet,​which​trapped​him​in​the​ depths​of​the​sea​no​matter​how​much​of​an​effort​he​made​to​rise? ​ This​ is​ the​ ignorance​ of​ five​ million​ men​ who​ turn​ liberty​ and​ progress​into​futility. ​ How​do​we​conceive​of​uniformity​of​instruction?​To​us​it​is​not​important​that​some​learn​logic​through​Balmes​and​others​through​Mill.​ What​is​important​to​us​is​that,​in​saying​that​one​knows​logic,​it​be​ true.​This​is​another​of​the​difficulties,​and​the​principal​difficulty​with​ oral​lessons​is​the​speaking,​the​preaching​of​knowledge;​oral​lessons​are​ principles​thrown​to​all​the​winds.​Those​who​are​greatly​enamored​of​ the​brilliance​of​the​eloquence​of​an​orator,​how​is​a​person​going​to​be​ examined​on​oral​lessons? ​ Nothing​has​been​touched​upon​more​thoroughly​than​tariffs;​everyone​has​put​his​five​senses​into​this​matter,​yet​it​is​not​possible​that​ there​are​even​three​deputies​who​can​take​an​examination​on​it. ​ Oral​lessons​are​publicity​for​knowledge,​creating​a​revolution​regarding​history.​Oral​lessons​are​Guillaumen​giving​his​doctrines;​oral​ lessons​are​the​wise​men​seducing​with​their​words,​attracting​the​multi-

on​reformS​to​the​law​of​publiC​inStruCtion : 339

tude​with​their​eloquence​to​the​terrain​of​knowledge.​Then​one​who​is​ moved​goes​to​seek​knowledge. ​ It​cannot​be​done​this​way​with​oral​lessons.​How​does​one​take​an​examination​on​oral​lessons?​In​the​oral​lesson​the​professor​struts​about,​ praises​himself​for​the​triumphs​he​obtains​with​his​word. ​ Thus​it​is​that​oral​lessons​are​given​to​the​entire​secular​and​sacred​ world​so​that​the​light​of​knowledge​might​enlighten​everyone,​dispelling​the​shadows​of​ignorance,​that​everyone​might​enjoy​its​beneficent​ influence,​that​everyone​might​feel​in​his​brain​the​fresh​aura​of​knowledge,​that​he​might​sense​in​his​intellect​the​maternal​kiss​of​scientific​ education. ​ Very​good,​sir,​perfectly,​but​within​a​college​where​degrees​are​going​ to​be​issued,​where​responsibilities​are​going​to​be​entered​into,​this​ cannot​be.​I​beg​the​committee​that​it​amend​its​report​in​the​sense​we​ have​discussed,​and​if,​by​any​chance—which​I​do​not​expect​because​ the​persons​who​make​up​the​committee​are​very​intelligent—if​by​any​ chance,​I​repeat,​it​does​not​accept​our​suggestions,​then​we​will​not​follow​the​committee​on​the​path​it​has​taken. ​ A​final​point​remains​which,​because​it​is​troublesome,​I​have​left​ until​last.​It​is​about​the​matter​of​the​governing​board.​I​will​not​make​ allusion​to​any​of​the​persons​who​make​up​the​governing​board.​They​ are​for​me​very​respectable,​very​beloved​persons,​so​I​will​not​speak​ about​persons.​The​governing​board​should​be​abolished​because​it​is​ useless,​because​it​is​a​hindrance,​and​because,​if​tomorrow​there​were​ not​ a​ staff​ member​ like​ the​ current​ one,​ it​ would​ be​ infinitely​ more​ harmful​for​the​youth.​I​say,​sir,​that​it​is​useless​because​this​board​does​ not​deliberate​for​itself,​because​this​board​has​to​limit​its​regulations,​ because​this​board​does​not​exercise​its​powers.​It​is​a​board​that​has​all​ the​conditions​for​bad​and​none​for​good.​It​is​a​board​that​can​regulate;​ it​is​a​board​that​can​create​all​kinds​of​hindrances.​Of​all​the​useless​ bodies,​it​is​a​board​that​does​everything​such​bodies​do.​These​bodies​ have​ one​ standing​ order​ to​ enter​ the​ house,​ another​ to​ carry​ a​ dress​ sword,​another​to​take​the​fork,​another​to​whisper,​in​short,​a​body​of​ regulations​that​has​no​importance​whatsoever​because​of​the​nature​of​ the​matters,​the​more​so​to​the​degree​that​it​is​not​made​up​of​legal​experts​like​Justinian,​of​doctors​like​Hippocrates,​because​all​their​labors​ are​reduced​to​directing​copied​communications​to​you​for​the​conse-

340 : Guillermo​prieto

quent​ends,​and​the​sessions​of​the​board​are​useless.​So​we​have​ten​ calluses​on​the​hand​and​they​place​on​us​only​five,​but​they​are​double​ in​size​of​the​others.​Inasmuch​as​the​report​the​committee​presents​us​ is​not​acceptable,​I​request​the​Chamber​to​declare​it​without​reason​to​ vote.​[.​.​.] ​ Citizen Prieto:​I​would​have​no​objection​at​all​to​put​up​against​the​ brief​words​of​the​previous​citizen​speaker​if​he​had​not​expressed​a​ doubt​that​absolutely​makes​it​impossible​for​us​to​give​him​this​vote​of​ confidence​to​a​certain​extent​very​necessary​for​the​committee. ​ If​the​idea​is​discarded​that​the​report​return​for​the​review​of​the​ chamber;​if​we,​after​relinquishing​our​powers,​do​not​have​any​opportunity​to​see​whether​we​are​in​agreement​with​the​executive​or​not,​for​ this​the​previous​citizen​speaker​will​see​that​it​is​imperative​to​insist​ that​the​law​come​back​for​the​review​of​Congress. ​ On​ the​ other​ hand,​ although​ my​ observations​ have​ been​ directed​ especially​at​specific​articles​with​the​objective​of​fostering​amplifications​or​modifications​to​these​same​articles,​nonetheless,​regarding​this​ it​ seemed​ to​ me​ more​ agreeable​ to​ make​ all​ the​ observations​ so​ that​ whatever​corrections​might​be​necessary​be​made,​or​to​make​seven​or​ eight​additions​after​the​law​is​declared​with​time​to​vote.​For​this​reason,​it​is​not​possible​for​me​to​accept​the​suggestion​that​is​made​to​me,​ notwithstanding​his​promises​that​for​me​carry​much​weight,​and​perhaps​they​will​convince​me​to​vote​in​favor​of​the​report​if​I​have​the​ guarantee​that​one​of​the​members​of​the​committee​has​given​me. ​ With​much​emotion,​with​genuine​sorrow,​I​am​going​to​make​some​ observations​to​Citizen​Frías​y​Soto,​more​as​a​testimony​to​respect​for​ his​opinions​than​because​I​believe​mine​have​more​strength​than​his,​he​ being​a​person​of​such​talent,​and​if​I​insist​on​the​observations​I​have​ made​previously,​it​is​because​in​my​humble​opinion​he​has​distorted​ what​I​have​said​in​the​heat​of​his​extemporization. ​ No​one​spoke​here​about​the​first​article,​absolutely​no​one,​so​it​is​to​ have​such​a​strong​champion​in​a​cause​that​has​absolutely​no​reason​for​ existing.​No​one​made​objections​to​the​first​article​and​consequently​to​ the​constitutional​article,​and​if​no​objections​were​made​with​respect​ to​the​liberty​of​professions,​it​is​because​there​is​very​advanced​work​on​ this​subject. ​ I​am​sorry​to​remind​Citizen​Frías​y​Soto​that​the​gentlemen​Dublán,​ Saborío,​and​I​are​the​authors​of​this​plan​with​the​goal​of​seeking​the​

on​reformS​to​the​law​of​publiC​inStruCtion : 341

advancement​of​youth,​that​we​had​as​a​foundation​what​the​previous​ citizen​speaker​just​asserted,​that​it​is​not​possible​for​human​intelligence​to​encompass​all​branches​of​human​knowledge​in​their​entirety. ​ A​ short​ time​ ago,​ absolutely​ nothing​ was​ known​ about​ the​ life​ of​ insects;​ today,​ with​ the​ discovery​ of​ the​ microscope,​ this​ matter​ has​ changed​completely.​A​few​years​ago​the​twitching​of​a​frog​on​a​railing​ aroused​Galvani’s​first​awareness​of​galvanism,​and​with​this​the​hosanna​ to​the​Lord​of​the​Heavens​can​be​sung​in​the​depths​of​the​waves. ​ We​have​not​wanted​to​put​a​limit​on​the​sciences,​we​have​wanted,​ in​treating​of​instruction,​to​respect​all​human​knowledge,​and​might​ Citizen​Frías​y​Soto​allow​us​to​come​to​an​agreement​so​that​I​not​be​an​ adversary​of​a​person​I​esteem. ​ When​I​have​spoken​of​primary​instruction​in​Mexico,​I​have​not​ spoken​ of​ examinations​ but​ rather​ of​ other​ things,​ because​ notwithstanding​the​keen​desire​of​the​municipality,​notwithstanding​the​dedication​of​the​government,​notwithstanding​that​we​can​say​with​pride​ that​we​spend​more​than​three​million​pesos,​as​in​the​epoch​of​some​ administrations,​notwithstanding​this,​there​are​very​great​voids,​voids​ that​Citizen​Frías​y​Soto​knows​better​than​I​because​my​baptismal​faith​ has​a​much​earlier​date,​to​my​misfortune.​So​it​is​that​Citizen​Frías​y​ Soto,​while​he​might​tell​me​that​the​children​are​educated​well​and​in​ great​numbers,​I​will​say​to​him​that​there​are​schools​where​there​seems​ to​be​sufficient​room​for​all​the​pupils,​as​in​Bitterness​Street,1​where​ there​seems​to​be​room​for​more​than​two​hundred​children,​who​are​ not​being​educated​but​are​only​becoming​ill​in​this​oven​of​human​flesh​ that​is​called​school. ​ There​ are​ a​ multitude​ of​ schools​ like​ the​ one​ I​ have​ mentioned,​ which,​because​of​the​latest​efforts​of​Citizen​Frías​y​Soto,​have​an​endowment​of​twenty-​five​to​thirty​pesos. ​ Citizen​Frías​y​Soto​knows​that​there​are​schools​where​the​children​ have​to​relieve​themselves​at​the​entrance​to​the​classrooms,​and​it​seems​ to​me​that​it​is​not​one​of​the​best​examples​of​morality​to​offer​those​ ​ 1.​In​Spanish,​calle de la amargura​[“traer​por​la​calle​de​la​amargura”],​according​to​ Christian​tradition​“Bitterness​Street,”​was​the​path​Jesus​walked​with​the​cross​during​ one​of​the​cruelest​moments​of​his​passion.​Since​the​Middle​Ages​it​has​been​common​ to​use​the​expression​to​depict​figuratively​a​painful​and​desperate​situation​created​by​ the​actions​of​others.​(Editor’s​note)

342 : Guillermo​prieto

pictures​(laughter)​to​the​view​of​passersby,​with​a​different​system​of​ teaching​that​makes​impossible​that​public​instruction​have​its​proper​ development.​And​in​this,​Citizen​Frías​y​Soto​must​remember​that​the​ word​ “centralization”​ in​ dealing​ with​ public​ instruction​ is​ a​ genuine​ blasphemy,​because​instruction​must​be​for​everyone,​and​this​is​a​true​ democracy.​This​is​perfectly​underlined​by​the​principle​that​says​the​ government​has​no​more​obligation​than​to​set​the​conditions​for​the​ development​of​the​natural​elements​of​the​people. ​ This​is​what​they​have​to​do.​Governments​do​not​educate,​neither​ do​governments​have​heart,​nor​are​governments​anything​but​the​conservers​of​society,​which​have​to​provide​conditions​of​life​for​the​development​of​the​elements​of​society;​they​must​provide​peace,​justice,​ order,​ and​ liberty,​ and​ these​ are​ the​ conditions​ that​ the​ government​ must​have. ​ In​the​moment​when​it​is​desired​that​a​government​support,​that​a​ government​intrude​in​everything,​liberty​is​dead,​individual​initiative​ is​lost,​men​are​minors,​they​have​the​liberty​of​tyranny​because​they​do​ not​know​liberty.​This​is​administrative​centralization;​it​is​not​liberty​ as​democratic​peoples​have​understood​it. ​ In​the​United​States​the​child​is​placed​in​conditions​suitable​for​becoming​a​citizen.​This​child​has​his​flag​to​attend​festivities.​The​day​ when​a​great​orator​speaks,​the​children​go​to​the​chamber​to​listen​to​ him.​They​give​the​history​of​their​country​in​front​of​the​monuments​ of​Washington. ​ This​is​the​people,​this​is​liberty,​this​is​democracy;​and​this​liberty,​ free​as​the​wind,​as​thought,​as​God,​is​not​the​text;​they​are​not​the​authors.​From​the​moment​there​is​a​text,​from​the​moment​a​restriction​is​ placed,​from​this​moment​the​safeguard​of​liberty​of​instruction​is​broken;​from​this​very​moment​the​seeds​of​the​life​of​man​are​blunted. ​ How​does​intelligence​proceed?​It​proceeds​either​by​hypothesis​or​ by​experience.​What​is​the​history​of​human​discoveries?​Did​industry​ perhaps​ flourish​ when​ men​ were​ dominated​ and​ reduced​ to​ slavery?​ The​same​can​be​asked​about​commerce​and​agriculture;​advancements​ do​not​date​from​the​epoch​of​oppression. ​ This​is​the​emancipation​of​the​government.​The​government​guides,​ develops,​ protects,​ but​the​government​ does​not​oppose,​ because​ the​ contrary​position​is​the​backwardness​of​the​people,​so​that​what​Citi-

on​reformS​to​the​law​of​publiC​inStruCtion : 343

zen​Frías​y​Soto​has​said​about​this​subject​of​the​administrative​centralization​accords​with​my​ideas. ​ Citizen​Frías​y​Soto​said​that​I​have​tried​to​satisfy​what​in​the​matter​ of​primary​instruction​in​Mexico​are​precarious​conditions​because​they​ do​not​have​their​proper​fulfillment.​When​one​wants​to​make​obligatory​education​in​some​towns​that​do​not​have​all​the​elements,​one​is​ following​a​misconception.​In​Germany​education​is​obligatory​in​some​ principalities​and​in​others​is​not.

5 ​

On Freedom to Work. Report on the Speech before Congress on November 5, 1874

Citizen Prieto:​Gentlemen,​I​am​going​to​follow,​with​ the​thoroughness​that​is​possible​for​me,​the​young​orator​who​has​just​ spoken,​making​use​of​his​excellent​method​and​with​the​confidence​ that​is​inspired​by​such​a​gentlemanly​and​loyal​adversary​as​he​to​whom​ it​has​fallen​to​me​to​oppose. ​ Let​us​read​the​constitutional​article.​It​states: Every​man​is​free​to​take​on​the​industry​or​labor​that​suits​him,​ being​useful​and​honest,​and​in​order​to​avail​himself​its​profits.​ Neither​the​one​nor​the​other​can​be​prevented,​except​by​judicial​ruling​when​he​attacks​the​rights​of​a​third,​or​by​governmental​ resolution​pronounced​in​the​terms​that​this​law​designates​when​he​ offends​members​of​society. To​explain​this​article,​the​regulation​we​debate​says:​“The​fact​of​not​ working​is​not​a​crime,”​and​the​present​question​is​limited​to​this;​that​ is,​to​discover​whether​or​not​vagrancy​is​a​crime. ​ A​crime​is​the​breaking​of​the​law,​and​this​principle​is​so​absolute​ that​there​is​no​crime​whatsoever​prior​to​the​designation​of​the​law;​the​ crime​arises​from​the​law,​the​law​creates​it,​so​that,​to​begin​by​judging​ vagrancy​as​if​it​were​made​by​declaration​of​the​law​is​a​flaw​in​logic​that​ perverts​the​matter. ​ We​are​now​are​going​to​make​law​independently​of​all​tradition​and​ all​legislation;​nothing​of​that​exists​for​us.​Preliminary​to​that​law​is​this​ question:​Should​we​consider​vagrancy​a​crime?

​ Original​title:​“Sobre​el​proyecto​de​libertad​de​trabajo”​[pronunciado​en​el​Séptimo​ Congreso​Constitucional,​durante​la​sesión​del​5​de​noviembre​de​1874].​Source:​Diario de los debates, Séptimo Congreso Constitucional,​vol.​3​(Mexico:​Imprenta​F.​Díaz​de​León​y​ Santiago​White,​1874). 344

on​freedom​to​work : 345

​ Which​article​of​the​Constitution​imposes​the​obligation​or​duty​to​ work?​Which?​None. ​ So,​not​working,​the​simple​fact​of​not​working,​is​not​a​crime. ​ The​article,​in​the​last​analysis,​respects​the​right​of​choice​of​work.​ It​respects​the​free​will​of​man,​without​which​all​liberty​is​chimerical​ and​conscience​becomes​inconceivable.​But​the​article​supposes​the​will​ to​work;​if​he​does​not​have​that​will,​his​right​is​respected​also,​because​ without​those​two​phases​of​the​will,​the​existence​of​liberty​is​not​possible.​Why,​then,​the​anathemas​for​the​exercise​of​a​perfect​right?​Can​ it​not​be​seen​that​the​ideas​of​free​choice​and​obligatory work​are​incompatible? ​ The​right​in​this​case​is​the​consecration​of​full,​absolute​liberty,​as​ must​be​in​order​that​it​exist​complete,​without​conditions;​and​that​liberty​disappears​the​instant​work​is​imposed​by​force. ​ What​would​we​say​if​we​had​the​liberty​to​speak​but​not​to​keep​ quiet,​to​move​an​arm​but​not​to​hold​it​in​repose,​to​open​the​eyes​but​ not​to​close​them?​Liberty​is​the​suppression​of​all​bonds​that​are​not​ those​that​guarantee​the​liberty​of​others.​Obligation​is​a​link​that​tightens.​To​confuse​the​one​with​the​other​is​to​rush​headlong​into​absurdity. ​ With​the​liberty​of​man​consecrated,​with​man​free​to​choose​to​work​ or​not,​if​he​does​not​opt​for​the​first​of​these,​why​consider​him​criminal?​How​to​tell​him,​first,​you​are​free​to​choose​the​road​you​like,​but​ if​you​do​not​choose​some​road​I​will​punish​you?​Who​would​be​satisfied​when​they​say​to​him,​you​can​do​what​you​think,​and​then​awaken​ him​with​blows,​because​sub pectore​the​one​who​made​the​proposal​kept​ secret​the​intention​of​not​letting​him​sleep? ​ To​ enlarge​ on​ these​ ideas​ as​ the​ regulation​ does​ is​ not​ to​ confuse​ them​or​pervert​them​or​corrupt​them;​it​is​to​perfect​them.​In​the​critical​sense,​in​the​literary,​the​explanation​will​be​redundant​but​not​incongruous.​Being​explained,​the​article​is​strengthened,​it​is​made​more​ practical.​At​the​same​time​as​it​breaks​with​tradition,​it​recognizes​liberty,​giving​to​each​person​responsibility​for​his​actions. ​ Not​to​explain​it​is​to​leave​its​development​exposed​to​the​contingencies​of​tradition;​it​would​inevitably​come​through​persecution​of​ leisure​to​obligatory​work,​to​the​organization​of​labor,​to​the​right​to​ work,​to​the​national​workshop,​to​socialism;​that​is​to​say,​to​a​reactionary​revolution,​highly​disastrous​and​unconstitutional,​to​the​substitution​of​force​for​liberty,​of​paramount​order​for​individual​effort,​to​the​

346 : Guillermo​prieto

gendarme​as​an​active​expedient​of​social​progress​instead​of​nature​and​ the​interest​in​preservation. ​ Looking​over​history,​although​very​superficially,​we​find​leisure​demanded​as​a​right​of​the​privileged​castes​of​nobles,​priests,​and​warriors;​ work​ offended,​ anathematized,​ considered​ degrading​ and​ relegated​to​the​plebeian​and​the​slave. ​ Thus​Greek​writers​of​loftiest​renown​heaped​real​curses​on​manual​ labor:​Plato​and​Xenophon​in​Greece​as​well​as​Cicero​in​Rome.​Even​ trade​entered​into​that​excommunication,​and​only​Carthage​seems​to​ defy​the​universal​prejudices. ​ Greco-​Roman​civilization​is​saturated​with​that​spirit,​and​the​slave​ revolts​and​mass​desertion​of​the​eternal​city​by​the​plebeians​in​order​ to​situate​themselves​on​the​Sacred​Hill​are​nothing​more​than​attempts​ at​emancipation,​efforts​to​divorce​work​from​abject​slavery. ​ In​the​warlike​Middle​Ages,​the​slave​was​little​more​than​a​beast.​The​ feudal​lord​either​lived​from​the​booty​of​the​enemy​or​from​the​work​ of​his​slave​or​by​begging​for​his​subsistence​with​a​sword​in​his​hand. ​ In​those​conquests​the​man​who​worked​for​himself​was,​for​the​conquistador,​like​a​complete​oaf,​vaco vacante,​and​this​was​called​vagrant​ or​vagrancy​afterward. ​ The​emancipation​of​the​slaves,​the​affluence​of​the​newcomers​who​ inundated​ Europe​ after​ the​ Crusades,​ the​ woes​ that​ these​ swarms​ of​ adventurers​produced​made​the​idea​of​vagrancy​adhere​indivisibly​to​ bothersome​begging​and​harmful,​bad​amusement;​and​so​the​ideas​have​ since​been​confounded​in​history,​in​the​laws,​and​even​in​common​language.​Vagrancy​was​in​fact​made​blameworthy;​it​was​assumed​always​ to​have​offended​a​third​person;​it​included​the​vagrant,​the​beggar,​and​ the​evildoer​in​an​anathema. ​ The​English​demand​the​stock,​or​post,​on​which​the​vagrant​or​beggar​is​tied​to​expose​him​to​public​shame.​Other​times​it​passes​him​from​ parish​to​parish.​Edward​VI​condemns​them​to​whippings​and​death. ​ In​the​Spanish​town​councils,​the​correctives​against​vagrancy​and​ false​mendacity​were​centuplicated. ​ The​Ordinance​of​1745​attacks​vagrants​as​true​criminals;​and​only​ in​1775,​in​the​wise​Ordinance​of​Charles​III,​the​order​indicates​philosophical​principles​of​modern​civilization;​education,​mores,​and​liberty​ appear,​opening​their​broad​horizons​to​human​activity​and​making​man​

on​freedom​to​work : 347

master​of​them,​endeavoring​that​he​might​unfold,​dignified,​the​wings​ of​his​free​will. ​ Drinking​from​these​fountains,​the​law​in​the​old​times​always​characterizes​ the​ person​ who​ does​ not​ work​ as​ badly​ occupied;​ it​ always​ matches​the​idea​of​vagrancy,​of​inaction,​with​the​idea​of​a​vice​or​a​ crime. ​ More​philosophical,​the​administrative​law​in​Spain​itself​is​in​the​ hands​of​Colmeiro,​the​Gayóns,​Díaz​Cerna,​and​others.​They​tried​to​ classify​willful​idleness​and​forced​idleness,​temporary​idleness​and​habitual​idleness,​simple​idleness​or​designated​idleness,​and​doing​so​calls,​ in​support​of​the​law,​questions​of​legal​charity​as​an​appeal​to​the​conscience​actually​clouded​by​confused​notions​about​idleness. ​ Glancing​ through​ the​ Diccionario de la lengua española,​ one​ reads:​ “Vagar.​ Wander​ through​ various​ places​ without​ specifying​ place​ or​ location​or​without​a​special​stop​anywhere.​To​wander​aimlessly,​with​ neither​occupation​nor​benefice.” ​ What​kind​of​crime​is​that?​What​rights​are​violated​in​that​meaning​ of​the​word?​What​third​person​comes​out​harmed​by​a​man​wandering​ from​one​point​to​another​without​offending​anyone? ​ The​ dictionary​ says,​ “One​ who​ wanders​ from​ one​ part​ to​ another​ without​stopping​in​any​place.​The​man​without​a​trade​and​badly occupied.” ​ We​see​in​this​sense​of​the​word​the​relapse​into​injurious​historical​ interpretation;​that​is​to​say,​a​qualifying​evil​that​has​corrupted​legislation​is​resurrected,​authorizing​arbitrariness;​but​even​so,​the​man​without​a​trade​and​occupied​badly​is​now​not​only​the​idle​man​but,​moreover,​he​who​employs​or​occupies​himself​doing​something​bad. ​ If​one​could​use​a​word​to​mean​“without​trade”​or​“badly​occupied,”​ the​one​would​be​punishable,​the​other​not,​but​to​draw​the​inference​ that​a​“vagrant”​has​to​be​“occupied​badly”​is​outrageous.​It​is​to​deduce​ that​ he​who​passes​ by​the​ mansion​ conspires​ or​that​ a​pharmacist​ by​ virtue​of​that​fact​is​a​poisoner.​That​is​an​absurdity. ​ From​what​has​been​explained​it​follows​that,​if​the​article​stated​the​ fact​that​not​working​is​not​a​crime,​it​would​cause​less​repugnance​than​ with​the​introduction​of​the​word​“vagrancy,”​a​reason​for​alarm. ​ In​ fact,​ a​ friend​ and​ not​ a​ friend​ says​ something​ different​ from​ a​ friend​and​an​enemy.​To​know​and​not​to​know​is​not​the​same​as​to​

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know​and​to​be​ignorant​of.​A​believer​and​not​a​believer​is​not​the​same​ as​a​believer​and​an​impious​one.​Work​and​not​work​is​not​the​same​as​ work​and​vagrancy,​because​a​twisted​meaning​is​given​to​this​last​word​ that​perverts​it. ​ Why,​then,​is​the​word​preserved?​It​is​preserved​precisely​to​kill​the​ tradition,​ because​ that​ tradition​ is​the​root​ deeply​ embedded​ in​millions​of​abuses​that​still​hound​us,​that​corrupt​us,​and​that​inexorably​ eat​away​at​liberty. ​ The​word​is​preserved​because​it​contains​the​practical​part​of​the​ question​that​everywhere,​in​the​[Federal]​District​most​especially,​has​ the​greatest​importance. ​ Here​the​vagrant,​capriciously​classified​as​such​because​the​article​of​ the​code​lends​itself​to​it,​is​placed​outside​the​law​through​corrective​ punishment.​From​the​vagrant​can​be​made​a​justification​of​the​levy,​of​ exile,​of​revenge. ​ In​various​parts,​vagrancy​is​the​great​cause​of​electoral​prostitution.​ We​have​seen​that​law,​as​a​party​weapon​in​some​state,​dissolve​electoral​colleges,​destroy​town​councils,​and​convert​the​presumed​right​of​ persecuting​vagrancy​into​a​party​weapon. ​ Who​is​so​shortsighted,​who​so​apathetic​about​the​most​sacred​rights​ of​the​people,​that​he​is​satisfied​with​seeing​in​this​an​academic​discussion​and​not​the​most​important​of​all​matters,​because​nothing​is​more​ important​than​liberty? ​ Halfway​is​not​possible.​The​declaration​of​obligatory​work​imposes​ on​the​state​the​inevitable​obligation​of​producing​work​for​the​one​who​ does​not​have​it,​and​there​you​have​the​state​converted​into​a​colossal​ manager​of​all​branches​of​human​activity,​and​the​tailor​without​customers,​the​lawyer​without​clients,​the​doctor​without​ill​people,​requesting​from​the​government,​their​protector​and​agent,​an​honest​way​ of​living.​That​is​absurdity,​that​is​socialism​in​its​most​absurd​and​most​ harmful​phase.​And​such​ideas​infest​and​contaminate​the​people​who​ are​said​to​be​more​enlightened,​who​generally​say,​“The​government​is​ not​protecting,​the​government​does​not​provide​work.”​What​ideas​do​ such​ignorant​people​have​of​what​government​is? ​ Returning​to​matters​of​usefulness​and​honesty,​let​us​examine​this​ matter​under​another​light. ​ Utility​is​everything​that​serves​to​meet​our​needs.​It​is​an​idea​tightly​

on​freedom​to​work : 349

connected​to​those​needs,​so​for​a​being​with​few​or​no​needs,​there​are​ few​useful​things. ​ Well​ now,​ the​ Stoics,​ for​ example,​ living​ on​ abstractions,​ feeding​ themselves​very​humbly,​disdaining​the​goods​of​the​earth,​needed​little​ to​meet​their​physical​needs​and​would​have​warranted​persecution​for​ vagrancy.​Christianity​disdains​what​is​of​this​world,​paints​the​present​ life​ as​ transitory,​ its​ goal​ is​ eternal​ life;​ for​ this,​ manual​ work​ is​ not​ needed,​ poverty​ is​ virtue,​ inactivity​ leads​ to​ ecstasy,​ prayer​ is​ almost​ meeting​with​God.​Dante​called​Saint​Francis​second​spouse​of​poverty.​ A​raven​feeds​the​hermit​Saint​Onofre.​The​angels​yoked​oxen​to​Saint​ Sebastian.​The​nudity​of​Saint​Jerome​is​praised​.​.​.​In​a​word,​it​is​confirmed​in​everything​that​work​is​the​curse​of​the​Lord​.​.​.​and,​nonetheless,​abstention​from​work​is​considered​so​useful​that​it​is​for​them​ nothing​less​than​the​agent​of​the​sublime​perfection​of​man. ​ Work​is​an​idea​indivisible​from​the​idea​of​property,​and​how​is​this​ to​exist​where​the​renunciation​of​all​terrestrial​good​is​the​goal​of​the​ beautiful​ideal?​.​.​.​These​are​the​points​of​contact​of​asceticism,​communism,​and​socialism. ​ Even​ the​ physiocrats,​ precursors​ of​ Smith,​ lost​ their​ way​ because​ they​did​not​know​how​to​determine​the​extent​of​utility​and​they​limited​the​sphere​of​work.​Smith​himself​cut​short​his​doctrine​with​the​ exclusion​of​intellectual​work. ​ Yes,​sirs,​because​like​work,​it​is​assistance​for​the​production​of​intelligence​and​strength.​This​first​part​(the​intelligence)​can​escape​and,​ in​fact,​does​escape​the​inquiry,​not​only​of​the​authority​but​also​of​ the​entire​world.​For​that​reason​I​have​said​that,​for​the​police,​Homer​ would​have​been​a​vagrant,​the​same​as​Columbus,​although​the​stanzas​ of​the​one​run​through​the​centuries​honoring​humanity,​and​the​other​ sublime​vagrant​had​brought​to​the​eyes​of​science​and​humanity,​with​ his​surprising​discovery,​the​world​where​we​live​.​.​. ​ Here​is​stupid​preoccupation​with​regulations​in​the​face​of​victorious​truth. ​ Were​one​to​begin​the​assessment​of​“honest,”​one​would​arrive​at​the​ ridiculous. ​ Let​us​try​it​out.​The​dictionary​says:​“Honest.​Decent,​decorous.​Pure,​ demure.” ​ In​these​last​meanings​the​universal​intelligence​has​been​established.

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​ Armed​with​these​meanings,​the​police​can​condemn​as​not​honest​ work​that​of​the​painter​and​sculptor​who​copy​from​the​natural,​the​ teacher​of​swimming​who​does​not​require​his​students​to​swim​clothed,​ surgeons,​teachers​of​obstetrics​.​.​.​folk​healers​of​hospitals​.​.​.​Gentlemen,​that​is​the​height​of​the​ridiculous,​and​nonetheless,​that​is​the​constant​path​of​regulationism. ​ Being​a​matter​of​good​faith,​the​matter​of​honesty​can​only​be​given​ the​meaning​of​the​legitimate,​of​the​authorized​.​.​.​Well​then,​let​us​see​ in​this​terrain​the​absurdities​of​regulationism. ​ Prostitution​of​the​woman​is​regulated;​it​is​a​licit​industry.​The​pimps​ of​that​merchandise​cannot​be​unknown​to​the​authority​that​created​ the​industry. ​ The​shyster​is​declared​vagrant.​The​folk​healer​the​same.​As​among​ the​pimp​of​love​affairs,​the​executioner​(creation​of​the​law),​the​shyster,​and​the​folk​healer,​will​it​be​punishment​and​excommunication​for​ the​last​ones? ​ Thus,​by​driving​out​the​drones​of​laziness​from​the​beehive​of​work,​ this​matter​has​been​turned​into​a​moral​matter,​and​that​is​another​absurdity.​The​article​does​not​say​that​vagrancy​is​good;​the​article​says​ that​it​is​not​a​crime,​which​is​very​different.​It​will​be​a​sin,​but​we​are​ not​here​to​sanction​Father​Ripalda. ​ That​disorder​of​ideas,​that​meddling​of​legislator​in​the​domain​of​ morality,​has​brought​him​in​all​times​to​tyranny​and​the​inquisition. ​ At​one​time​he​hurled​his​lightning​rays​against​the​innocent​child,​ punishing​it​as​a​bastard​or​sacrilege;​he​looked​into​the​conjugal​mysteries​in​the​sacred​home,​making​atrocious​revelations;​he,​in​that​meddling​of​the​temporal​power​with​the​conscience,​ignited​the​bonfires​ of​the​holy​office,​and​it​was,​for​centuries,​the​ignominy​and​blemish​of​ humanity. ​ In​the​economic​terrain,​in​the​social,​the​matter​of​salary​cannot​be​ considered,​for​example,​unless​as​the​result​of​a​contract,​of​I give to you because you give to me​or​I do to you because you do to me;​it​is​the​result​of​ an​exchange​of​two​commodities,​work​for​money​or​money​for​work. ​ What​will​come​of​this​exchange​if​the​most​complete​liberty​does​ not​preside​over​it?​In​the​matter​of​the​strike,​when​it​is​not​disorderly,​ when​it​is​reduced​simply​to​the​worker​rejecting​the​rate​for​his​work,​ why​should​the​authority​intervene?​What​would​we​say​if​those​workers​

on​freedom​to​work : 351

who​used​their​right​to​withdraw​from​the​tyranny​of​the​overseer​were​ declared​vagrant? ​ Among​our​people​of​the​country,​the​work​teams​are,​without​doubt,​ the​ most​ free.​ Various​ workers​ gather​ together​ and​ go​ where​ it​ suits​ them​in​search​of​work;​what​happens​when​they​do​not​find​it​or​when​ the​open​market​is​not​suitable​for​their​abilities?​Do​we​declare​them​ vagrants? ​ One​bad​calculation​alone​in​the​export​duties​of​the​Mexican​railway​ has​brought​about​the​ruin​of​many​property​owners,​the​vagrancy​of​a​ multitude​of​working​men,​and​we​have​no​other​remedy​to​amend​the​ evil​produced​by​us​than​prison​and​persecution​by​the​police? ​ Among​free​people​as​in​the​United​States,​vagrancy​is​pursued​tenaciously​and​effectively​with​education,​with​customs,​with​the​ennoblement​of​work,​with​the​ease​with​which​man​exercises​his​liberty,​above​ all,​ by​ making​ him​ from​ childhood​ responsible​ for​ his​ own​ actions.​ Without​responsibility​man​is​an​automaton,​man​is​a​chess​piece​that​ exists​in​the​square​in​which​the​hand​of​the​player​places​him.​How​can​ it​be​believed​that​there​is​liberty​when​such​absurdities​are​agreed​to? ​ Tutelage,​eternal​tutelage,​the​insistence​on​making​ourselves​happy​ even​when​it​be​against​our​will.​This​is​the​certainty​of​tyrannical​governments,​and​for​that​I​call​the​restriction​that​my​adversaries​defend​ highly​reactionary. ​ Citizen​Obregón​González,​after​exhausting​his​ammunition​combating​the​article,​and​as​if​he​might​surprise​vagrancy​in​flagrante​delicto,​ cites​Article​34​of​the​Constitution,​saying​that​in​order​to​be​a​citizen​ one​must​have​an​honest​means​of​making​a​living,​and,​calling​the​deprivation​of​citizenship​punishment​for​idleness,​finds​the​article​cited​ of​our​pact​contradictory​to​the​article​we​are​discussing. ​ As​for​the​matter​in​the​abstract,​what​the​quote​by​the​previous​citizen​speaker​would​prove​uniquely​is​that​he​did​not​reflect​carefully​on​ the​limitation​of​the​article,​but​no​incompatibility​exists​in​the​existence​of​the​constitutional​articles​once​the​fourth​and​the​fifth​were​ developed,​as​the​committee​has​done. ​ Why?​Because​in​the​first​case,​the​rights​of​man​are​proclaimed;​they​ touch​on​his​being​as​belonging​to​the​human​lineage.​Better​said,​they​ recognize​preexisting​rights​in​every​man​outside​of​any​pact.​The​second​point​treats​of​the​contract,​of​conditions​that,​because​of​the​nature​

352 : Guillermo​prieto

of​things,​are​changeable.​Thus,​for​example,​a​state​could​order​that,​to​ be​a​citizen​of​the​state,​one​would​have​to​know​how​to​read​and​write,​ but​it​would​not​be​able​to​compel​such​a​man​to​follow​a​specific​religion.​Work​is​a​matter​of​natural​law.​The​laws​of​citizenship​are​in​the​ class​of​positive​laws;​they​are​not​created​by​God,​because​we​involve​ ourselves​in​the​chaos. ​ And​why​is​the​constitutional​precautionary​measure​called​punishment​and​not​seen​as​stimulus​to​work​itself? ​ Citizen​Obregón​González,​giving​proof​of​the​good​faith​with​which​ he​deals​with​this​and​all​matters​that​merit​the​attention​of​his​judgment,​explains​that​he​believes​simple​vagrancy​is​not​a​crime​but​should​ fall​under​the​rule​of​the​authority​as​smoking​in​theaters​is​prohibited,​ notwithstanding​that​it​is​not​a​crime​to​smoke. ​ My​young​adversary​might​remember​that​the​strength​of​our​defense​is​based​on​the​fact​that​laziness​or​vagrancy​neither​harms​nor​ bothers​anyone,​because​in​that​case​the​instigator​of​the​trouble​or​damage​would​deserve​admonition.​And​this​is​exactly​what​happens​with​ the​one​who​smokes​in​a​theater;​he​is​not​prohibited​from​making​use​ of​his​liberty​except​when​he​assaults​the​liberty​of​others,​when​he​infests​the​air​that​others​breathe. ​ In​this​discussion,​what​undermines​the​true​sense​of​the​article​is​the​ preoccupation​with​which​the​word​is​considered.​From​this​comes​the​ accusation​that​we​want​impunity​for​laziness,​its​reward,​its​apotheosis,​ and​the​article​says​nothing​about​that.​It​simply​declares​that​the​man​ who​does​not​want​to​be​occupied​in​anything,​for​that​fact​alone​is​not​ guilty. ​ I​am​certain​that​the​article​would​have​approval​in​these​or​similar​ terms:​“Man,​free​to​work​or​not​work,​is​free​also,​in​conformity​with​ Article​4​of​the​Constitution,​to​choose​the​work​that​suits​him.” ​ But​be​advised​that​that​compromise​with​retrogression​is​to​compromise​with​the​entire​system​of​backwardness​and​shame​that​the​colonial​ system​bequeathed​us. ​ In​the​name,​then,​of​human​dignity,​highly​compromised​in​this​discussion,​in​the​name​of​the​positive​progress​of​our​people,​above​all​in​ the​holy​name​of​liberty,​I​request​this​chamber​to​honor​with​its​vote​ of​approval​the​article​that​is​being​discussed.

constitutional governMent oF Mexico, 1857–1861 (benito juárez, Melchor ocaMPo, Manuel ruiz, Miguel lerdo de tejada) A​new​constitution​was​enacted​in​1857,​but​both​the​Catholic​ Church​and​the​conservative​faction​opposed​it.​Civil​war​was​ imminent.​At​the​end​of​that​year​(in​spite​of​the​fact​that​he​ had​sworn​to​uphold​the​charter),​President​Ignacio​Comonfort​decided​not​to​enforce​the​constitution​and​instead​called​ on​all​factions​to​discuss​a​new​fundamental​law​that​would​be​ acceptable​to​all​parties. ​ Conservatives​ were​ not​ satisfied​ with​ Comonfort’s​ actions​ and​deposed​ him,​ and​ in​1858​ conservative​ general​ Félix​ Zuloaga​became​president.​These​events​started​the​Three​Years’​ War.​ Benito​ Juárez,​ who​ at​ the​ time​ of​ Comonfort’s​ coup​ against​the​new​constitution​was​chief​justice,​became​president​ in​the​absence​of​the​executive​according​to​constitutional​provisions.​Juárez​managed​to​escape​from​the​conservatives,​who​ held​Mexico​City,​and​set​up​his​government​in​the​port​town​ of​Veracruz.​From​there​he​conducted​the​war​effort. ​ The​struggle​between​liberals​and​conservatives​was​bloody​ and​ferocious.​No​side​seemed​to​have​a​critical​advantage​over​ the​other.​In​mid-​1859​the​Juárez​government​issued​a​set​of​decrees​known​as​the​Laws​of​Reform​that​separated​church​and​ state.​The​property​of​the​Catholic​Church​was​to​be​confiscated​ and​sold;​the​civil​registry​was​established,​and​freedom​of​worship​was​secured.​In​1860​the​military​standoff​was​finally​broken​and​the​liberal​armies​defeated​the​conservatives. ​ We​present​a​proclamation​from​the​constitutional​govern353

354 : ConStitutional​Government​of​mexiCo

ment​signed​by​Benito​Juárez,​Melchor​Ocampo,​Manuel​Ruiz,​ and​Miguel​Lerdo​de​Tejada,​in​which​they​make​the​case​for​ the​Laws​of​Reform.​This​text​was​written​in​July​1859,​a​month​ after​these​laws​were​issued.​Likewise,​we​present​the​1860​decree​on​freedom​of​worship.

1 ​

The Constitutional Government to the Nation (on the Laws of Reform). Proclamation, Veracruz, July 7, 1859

In​the​difficult​and​compromised​situation​in​which​the​ Republic​has​found​itself​for​the​last​eighteen​months​as​a​consequence​ of​the​scandalous​insurrection​that​exploded​in​Tacubaya​at​the​end​of​ 1857,​and​in​the​midst​of​the​confusion​and​disorder​introduced​by​that​ outrage,​as​unjustifiable​in​its​ends​as​in​its​means,​the​public​power,​ which​by​virtue​of​the​political​code​of​the​same​year​has​the​imperative​ duty​of​preserving​legal​order​in​cases​like​the​present,​had​judged​it​appropriate​to​keep​silent​about​the​intentions​it​harbors​to​treat​radically​ the​ills​that​afflict​society.​Because​once​the​armed​struggle​between​an​ immense​majority​of​the​nation​and​those​who​seek​to​oppress​it​was​ begun,​the​public​power​believed,​it​fulfilled​its​mission​by​supporting​ the​rights​of​the​people​by​the​means​that​were​in​its​scope,​secure​in​ that​the​very​goodness​of​a​cause​that​has​reason​and​justice​in​its​favor​ and​that​the​repeated​disillusions,​because​of​their​powerlessness​to​triumph​over​that​cause,​their​adversaries​had​to​accept​at​every​step​would​ make​them​desist​from​their​criminal​intent​or​succumb​quickly​in​such​ a​struggle. ​ But​when,​unfortunately,​it​has​not​been​thus;​when,​despite​the​prolonged​resistance​society​is​putting​up​against​the​triumph​of​that​insurrection​the​authors​of​this​insurrection​continue,​determined​to​sustain​ it,​supported​solely​by​the​resolute​protection​of​the​high​clergy​and​ the​strength​of​the​bayonets​they​have​at​their​service;​when,​as​a​result​of​that​disgraceful​and​criminal​stubbornness​the​Republic​seems​ condemned​to​continue​suffering,​even​for​some​time,​the​disasters​and​ calamities​that​form​the​horrible​history​of​such​a​scandalous​rebellion,​ ​ Original​title:​“El​gobierno​constitucional​a​la​nación​[sobre​el​sentido​de​las​leyes​ de​Reforma]”​(7​de​julio​de​1859).​Source:​Benito​Juárez,​El Gobierno Constitucional, á la Nación​(Veracruz:​s.p.i.​[unknown​editor],​1859). 355

356 : ConStitutional​Government​of​mexiCo

the​government​would​believe​itself​failing​in​one​of​the​primary​duties​ that​the​very​situation​imposes​on​it​if​it​withheld​any​longer​the​public​ declaration​of​its​ideas,​not​only​just​about​the​serious​questions​being​ aired​today​in​the​sphere​of​armed​events,​but​also​over​the​course​it​ proposes​to​follow​in​the​various​branches​of​public​administration. ​ The​nation​finds​itself​today​in​a​solemn​moment,​because​its​entire​ future​depends​on​the​outcomes​of​the​fierce​struggle​that​the​partisans​of​obscurantism​and​abuses​have​stirred​up​this​time​against​the​ clearest​principles​of​liberty​and​social​progress.​In​such​a​supreme​moment,​the​government​has​the​sacred​duty​to​address​itself​to​the​nation​ and​to​make​heard​in​it​the​expression​of​its​most​beloved​rights​and​ interests,​not​only​because​public​opinion​in​the​appropriate​sense​will​ thereby​become​more​and​more​uniform,​but​also​because​the​people​ will​thereby​value​more​the​cause​of​the​great​sacrifices​they​are​making​ in​fighting​with​their​oppressors,​and​because,​in​short,​all​the​civilized​ nations​of​the​world​will​thereby​see​clearly​what​the​true​objective​of​ this​struggle​is​that​touches​the​Republic​so​deeply. ​ To​fulfill​this​duty​today,​the​government​needs​to​say​nothing​with​ respect​to​its​intentions​about​the​political​organization​of​the​country,​ because,​being​an​emanation​of​the​Constitution​of​1857​and​being​considered,​moreover,​the​legitimate​representative​of​the​liberal​principles​ set​down​in​it,​it​must​naturally​be​understood​that​its​aspirations​would​ be​directed​to​ensure​that​all​citizens,​without​distinction​of​classes​or​ considerations,​enjoy​as​many​rights​and​guarantees​as​might​be​compatible​with​the​good​order​of​society;​that​rights​and​guarantees​always​ be​made​effective​through​the​good​administration​of​justice;​that​the​ authorities​all​faithfully​fulfill​their​duties​and​obligations​without​ever​ extending​beyond​the​circle​delimited​by​the​laws;​and,​finally,​that​the​ states​of​the​federation​make​use​of​the​powers​that​fall​to​them​to​administer​their​interests​freely​in​such​a​way​as​to​promote​everything​ leading​to​their​prosperity​to​the​extent​that​it​does​not​oppose​the​general​rights​and​interests​of​the​Republic. ​ But​inasmuch​as​those​principles,​despite​having​already​been​written​ down​at​greater​or​lesser​length​in​the​various​political​codes​the​country​has​had​since​its​independence​and​ultimately​in​the​Constitution​ of​1857,​have​not​been​able​nor​will​be​able​to​take​root​in​the​nation​as​ long​as,​in​their​social​and​administrative​character,​the​diverse​elements​ of​despotism,​hypocrisy,​immorality,​and​disorder​that​oppose​them​are​

to​the​nation​on​the​lawS​of​reform : 357

preserved,​the​government​believes​that,​without​moving​away​essentially​from​the​constitutive​principles,​it​is​obligated​to​be​engaged​very​ seriously​in​making​those​elements​disappear,​fully​convinced​now​by​ the​extensive​experience​of​everything​that​has​occurred​until​now,​that​ as​long​as​those​elements​continue​to​exist,​order​and​liberty​are​not​possible. ​ To​make​order​and​liberty​actual,​then,​giving​unity​to​the​intention​ of​the​social​reform​by​means​of​the​measures​that​produce​the​solid​and​ complete​triumph​of​the​good​principles,​here​are​the​measures​the​government​intends​to​carry​out. ​ In​the​first​place,​to​put​a​definitive​end​to​that​bloody​and​fratricidal​ war​that​a​part​of​the​clergy​has​been​fomenting​in​the​nation​for​some​ time​for​the​sole​reason​of​preserving​the​interests​and​prerogatives​it​ inherited​from​the​colonial​system,​scandalously​abusing​the​influence​ that​the​riches​it​had​in​its​hands​gave​it​and​the​exercise​of​its​sacred​ ministry,​and​to​disarm​for​once​this​class​of​elements​that​serve​as​support​for​its​disastrous​rule,​the​government​believes​it​indispensable​to: ​ 1.​Adopt​as​a​general,​invariable​rule,​the​most​complete​separation​of​ the​affairs​of​state​from​those​that​are​purely​ecclesiastical. ​ 2.​Suppress​all​the​bodies​of​regular​clergy​of​the​masculine​sex,​without​any​exception​whatsoever,​secularizing​the​priests​who​are​currently​ in​them. ​ 3.​Destroy​uniformly​the​confraternities,​archconfraternities,​brotherhoods,​and,​in​general,​all​the​bodies​or​congregations​of​this​kind​that​ exist. ​ 4.​Close​the​novitiates​in​the​convents​of​nuns,​keeping​those​who​at​ present​live​in​them​with​the​wealth​or​dowry​that​each​one​might​have​ brought​in​and​with​the​allowance​of​what​is​necessary​for​the​service​ of​worship​in​their​respective​churches. ​ 5.​Declare​that​all​the​property​the​secular​and​regular​clergy​administer​today​with​various​titles​has​belonged​and​does​belong​to​the​nation,​ as​well​as​the​excess​that​the​convents​of​nuns​might​have,​deducting​ the​amount​of​their​dowries,​and​selling​that​property,​accepting​as​payment,​for​a​part​of​its​value,​bonds​of​the​public​debt​and​of​the​capitalization​of​investments. ​ 6.​ Declare,​ finally,​ that​ the​ remuneration​ the​ faithful​ give​ to​ the​ priests​both​for​the​administration​of​the​Sacraments​and​for​all​the​rest​ of​the​ecclesiastical​services,​and​whose​annual​yield,​well​distributed,​is​

358 : ConStitutional​Government​of​mexiCo

enough​to​cover​amply​the​maintenance​of​worship​and​its​ministers,​is​ the​object​of​free​agreements​between​both,​without​the​civil​authority​ interfering​with​them​at​all. ​ Besides​these​measures,​which,​in​the​judgment​of​the​government​are​ the​only​ones​that​can​result​in​the​submission​of​the​clergy​to​the​civil​ power​in​its​temporal​affairs,​leaving​it,​nonetheless,​with​all​the​means​ necessary​so​that​it​might​consecrate​itself​exclusively,​as​it​should,​to​the​ exercise​of​its​sacred​ministry,​it​believes​also​indispensable​the​protection​of​religious​liberty​in​the​Republic,​with​all​its​authority,​this​being​ necessary​for​its​prosperity​and​expansion,​as​well​as​a​necessity​of​current​civilization. ​ In​ the​justice​ branch,​ the​ government​ understands​ that​ one​ of​ the​ most​urgent​needs​of​the​Republic​is​the​formation​of​clear​and​simple​ codes​concerning​civil​and​criminal​affairs​and​concerning​procedures,​ because​only​in​this​way​will​we​be​able​to​remove​our​legislation​from​ the​confused​labyrinth​in​which​it​now​finds​itself,​standardizing​it​in​ the​entire​nation,​facilitating​the​action​of​the​courts​and​placing​knowledge​of​the​laws​within​reach​of​everyone;​and​inasmuch​as,​for​carrying​out​this​important​work​it​will​be​sufficient​that​the​legal​experts​to​ whom​it​has​been​entrusted​dedicate​themselves​to​it​with​determination,​the​government​proposes​to​make​an​effort​that​this​improvement​ not​be​postponed​any​longer,​so​that​society​might​begin​to​enjoy​the​ numerous​benefits​it​will​surely​produce. ​ The​establishment​of​de​facto​jurors​for​all​common​crimes​is​also​ one​of​the​needs​of​the​nation,​and​the​government​will​do​whatever​ might​be​its​part​to​establish​such​an​interesting​reform. ​ Until​this​innovation​is​realized​and​the​codes​promulgated,​the​government​proposes​to​facilitate​without​delay​those​means​it​judges​pressing​to​make​actual​the​primary​guarantees​of​the​citizens​and​destroy​the​ errors​or​abuses​that​are​opposed​to​the​free​circulation​of​public​wealth. ​ With​respect​to​justice​being​administered​free​of​cost,​the​Constitution​of​1857​has​now​established​this​principle​as​a​fundamental​precept;​ but​because​it​is​essential​that​payment​of​the​salaries​of​the​magistrates,​ judges,​and​employees​of​the​judicial​branch​be​given​very​punctually​ for​such​a​precept​to​produce​the​good​effects​that​the​legislator​proposed,​the​government​proposes​to​attend​to​this​matter​with​the​priority​it​merits,​because​it​is​convinced​that,​lacking​this​circumstance,​ that​precept,​instead​of​good,​would​cause​society​great​misfortune.​On​

to​the​nation​on​the​lawS​of​reform : 359

this​point​the​government​also​proposes​to​pronounce​the​ruling​it​believes​ most​suitable​ for​preventing​ the​multiplication​ of​pleadings​ to​ which​this​important​reform​can​give​rise. ​ On​the​abolition​of​class​privileges​regarding​common​crimes,​the​ government​ has​ nothing​ to​ say​ because​ this​ is​ already​ expressly​ prevented​in​the​Constitution,​and​it​will​certainly​not​be​the​present​administration​ that​ might​ ever​ think​ of​ reestablishing​ such​ unjust​ and​ odious​distinctions. ​ On​the​subject​of​public​instruction,​the​government​will​endeavor,​ with​the​greatest​determination,​to​have​the​number​of​establishments​ of​free​primary​public​instruction​increased,​and​to​have​all​of​them​be​ directed​by​persons​who​combine​instruction​and​morality,​which​are​ required​in​order​to​carry​out​with​success​the​responsibility​of​teachers​ of​the​young,​because​it​has​the​conviction​that​instruction​is​the​first​ foundation​of​the​prosperity​of​a​people,​at​the​same​time​the​surest​ means​of​making​impossible​the​abuses​of​power. ​ With​that​same​objective,​the​general​government,​on​its​own​and​ stimulating​the​individuals​of​the​states,​will​sponsor​and​develop​the​ publication​and​circulation​of​simple​and​clear​manuals​concerning​the​ rights​and​obligations​of​man​in​society​as​well​as​those​sciences​that​ might​most​directly​contribute​to​their​well-​being​and​enlighten​their​ understanding,​arranging​for​those​manuals​to​be​studied​even​by​the​ children​who​attend​the​establishments​of​primary​education,​so​that​ from​their​most​tender​age​they​will​be​acquiring​useful​basics​and​forming​their​ideas​in​the​way​that​is​appropriate​to​the​general​good​of​society.​With​respect​to​secondary​and​higher​education,​the​government​ proposes​creating​a​new​plan​of​studies,​improving​the​financial​position​ of​the​teachers​who​are​employed​in​this​area​of​public​instruction​as​ well​as​the​system​for​public​instruction​currently​followed​in​the​colleges;​and,​adapting​to​the​principle​the​Constitution​contains​regarding​this,​the​system​of​the​broadest​liberty​with​respect​to​every​kind​ of​studies​as​well​as​to​the​exercise​of​careers​or​professions​that​will​be​ created​with​them​will​be​introduced,​so​that​every​individual,​national​ or​foreign,​once​he​demonstrates​the​ability​and​necessary​knowledge​in​ the​respective​examination,​without​inquiry​into​the​time​and​place​he​ might​have​acquired​that​knowledge,​can​dedicate​himself​to​the​scientific​or​literary​profession​for​which​he​is​competent. ​ With​respect​to​relations​of​the​general​government​with​the​indi-

360 : ConStitutional​Government​of​mexiCo

viduals​of​the​states,​the​current​administration,​far​from​opposing​their​ interests​and​just​needs,​is​on​the​contrary​resolved​to​support​them​as​ much​as​is​in​its​power,​aiding​them,​moreover,​in​anything​that​in​any​ way​might​lead​to​improving​their​situation,​in​order​thus​to​tighten​the​ ties​of​union​that​should​exist​between​the​localities​and​the​center​of​ the​Republic. ​ One​of​the​first​needs​of​the​Republic​today​is​to​attend​to​the​security​of​the​roads​and​population​centers,​to​get​rid​of​the​evildoers​who​ are​encountered​in​both,​not​only​for​the​immense​woes​that​the​existence​ of​ that​ scourge​ causes​ internally​ in​ the​ nation,​ paralyzing​ the​ movement​of​its​population​and​wealth​and​keeping​in​constant​alarm​ and​danger​the​life​and​interests​of​its​inhabitants,​but​also​because​it​ discredits​the​country​more​and​more​every​day​abroad,​and​it​prevents​ from​coming​to​settle​in​it​the​multitude​of​wealthy​and​hardworking​ persons​who,​for​that​reason,​are​going​to​establish​themselves​in​other​ places.​For​such​reasons​the​government​is​firmly​resolved​to​work​tirelessly​to​remedy​this​serious​woe​with​all​the​means​that​are​in​its​reach. ​ As​for​the​odious​system​of​demanding​passports​of​travelers​or​wayfarers,​ it​ is​ useless​ to​ say​ it​ will​ be​ abolished​ when​ the​ Constitution​ has​already​done​so,​and​the​present​government​could​scarcely​think​ about​reestablishing​it​when​its​ideas​set​out​specifically​to​destroy​all​ the​obstacles​that​oppose​the​free​transit​of​persons​and​interests​in​the​ national​territory. ​ Spreading​ideas​through​the​press​must​be​as​free​as​the​ability​to​ think​is​free​in​man,​and​the​government​does​not​believe​it​should​impose​fetters​on​it​other​than​those​that​tend​solely​to​prevent​the​publication​of​immoral,​seditious,​or​subversive​writings,​and​those​that​contain​calumnies​or​attacks​on​private​life. ​ The​civil​register​is,​without​a​doubt,​one​of​the​measures​our​society​ urgently​demands​in​order​to​remove​from​the​clergy​that​compulsory​ and​exclusive​interference​that​it​has​exercised​until​now​in​the​principal​acts​of​the​lives​of​citizens,​and​for​this​reason​the​government​resolves​that​that​reform​be​adopted,​the​great​principle​that​such​a​measure​must​have​as​its​objective​finally​triumphing,​that​is,​establishing​ that​once​these​acts​are​entered​into​before​the​civil​authority,​all​legal​ consequences​already​apply. ​ With​respect​to​relations​of​the​Republic​with​friendly​nations,​the​

to​the​nation​on​the​lawS​of​reform : 361

government​ proposes​ to​ cultivate​ them​ always​ with​ the​ same​ painstaking​care,​avoiding​on​its​part​any​reason​for​disagreement.​For​this​it​ believes​sufficient​observing​faithfully​the​treaties​concluded​with​them​ and​the​general​principles​of​the​law​of​nations​and​international​right​ and​to​abandon,​above​all,​forever,​as​it​has​until​now,​that​system​of​ loopholes​and​moratoriums​that,​with​serious​harm​to​the​nation,​has​ been​followed​frequently​in​the​official​dispatch​of​the​affairs​of​this​ branch;​on​the​contrary​paying​attention​to​every​claim​in​the​action​that​ arises​with​the​greatest​determination​and​resolving​it​without​delay,​ in​view​of​the​circumstances​of​the​case,​according​to​the​principles​of​ fair​justice​and​mutual​convenience​that​form​the​solid​foundation​of​ friendly​relations​between​civilized​peoples​of​the​world. ​ Also​the​government​believes​it​will​be​very​appropriate​to​establish​ clearly,​by​a​general​provision​and​in​agreement​with​the​rules​and​practices​established​in​other​countries,​the​intervention​that​foreign​consuls​ and​vice​consuls​in​the​country​might​take,​as​much​in​the​affairs​of​their​ respective​nationals​as​in​their​relations​with​the​authorities,​in​order​to​ avoid​in​this​way​the​repetition​of​problems​that​have​arisen​more​than​ once​over​this​point. ​ As​ for​ the​ appointment​ of​ legations​ in​ the​ foreign​ countries​ with​ which​relations​of​friendship​link​us,​the​government​believes​that​the​ current​state​of​these​relations​with​those​countries​is​very​far​from​requiring​a​minister​resident​in​each​of​them,​and​its​opinion​is​that,​for​ now,​they​should​be​limited​to​two:​one​in​the​United​States​of​America​ and​another​in​Europe,​this​last​establishing​his​residence​in​Paris​or​ London,​from​where​he​can​be​moved,​in​case​of​necessity,​to​the​point​ assigned​ him.​ In​ the​ remaining​ capitals​ of​ Europe​ and​ America,​ because​no​business​takes​place​which,​by​its​very​seriousness,​demands​ the​presence​of​a​minister​plenipotentiary,​it​will​be​enough​that​there​ be​consuls​general​with​the​standing​of​chargé​d’affaires.​These​agents,​ according​to​the​new​law​that​for​the​purpose​must​be​expedited,​will​ necessarily​be​born​in​the​Republic. ​ As​for​the​national​treasury,​the​opinion​of​the​government​is​that​ very​radical​reforms​must​be​made,​not​only​in​order​to​establish​a​system​of​taxes​that​does​not​impede​the​development​of​wealth​and​that​ destroys​the​serious​errors​the​colonial​regime​left​us,​but​also​to​put​a​ definite​end​to​the​bankruptcy​that​the​mistakes​committed​later​in​all​

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branches​of​public​administration​have​introduced​into​it,​and​above​all​ to​create​great​interests​that​identify​themselves​with​social​reform,​contributing​effectively​to​the​liberal​and​progressive​advance​of​the​nation. ​ In​the​first​place,​internal​duties​and​customs​[alcabalas],​tolls,​and​in​ general​all​taxes​collected​in​the​interior​of​the​Republic​on​the​movement​of​wealth,​persons,​and​the​means​of​transport​that​carry​both,​ must​be​abolished​forever,​because​such​taxes​are,​from​any​point​of​ view,​contrary​to​the​prosperity​of​the​Republic. ​ In​a​similar​circumstance,​although​without​all​the​unfortunate​consequences,​the​fees​for​transfer​of​possession​of​rural​and​urban​properties​are​encountered,​and​for​that​reason​they​must​also​be​abolished​ completely. ​ The​fees​of​three​percent​on​gold​and​silver​extracted​from​mines​and​ the​fees​of​one​real​per​half​pound,​called​de minería,​are​at​their​base​ truly​unjust​and​odious​taxes,​because​they​do​not​fall​on​the​earnings​ of​the​miner,​but​rather​on​the​gross​product​of​the​mines,​which​most​ times​represents​only​a​small​part​of​what​has​gone​into​these​businesses​ before​arriving​at​the​sought-​after​wealth.​For​this​reason,​and​because​ those​taxes​are​genuinely​in​open​contradiction​to​the​protection​that,​ in​the​present​state​of​the​Republic,​the​government​must​give​to​that​ type​of​industry,​the​present​administration​believes​it​appropriate​to​ reform​them​in​such​a​way​that​speculators​in​risky​mining​businesses​ do​not​suffer​any​encumbrances​until​they​begin​to​receive​profits,​and​ with​such​an​objective​it​can​be​adopted​as​established​and​invariable,​ the​foundation​that​on​the​dividends​or​portion​of​the​profits​made​in​ each​mining​transaction,​the​government​receive​what​corresponds​to​ two​ingots​of​the​twenty-​four​into​which​they​are​divided,​conforming​to​the​ordinance,​all​other​encumbrances​that​weigh​on​them​being​ abolished. ​ With​respect​to​foreign​trade,​the​government​is​resolved​to​do​its​ part​to​facilitate​the​development​of​this​element​of​wealth​and​civilization​in​the​Republic,​whether​simplifying​the​requirements​exacted​for​ it​by​the​laws​in​force,​or​whether​regulating​its​current​encumbrances.​ One​of​the​measures​it​proposes​to​issue​with​this​very​objective​is​establishing​some​ports​of​deposit​on​the​coasts​of​the​Gulf​and​the​Pacific​ with​the​authority​to​reexport​merchandise​when​it​is​advantageous​to​ the​interested​parties,​as​is​practiced​in​all​the​countries​where​there​are​ ports​of​this​kind.

to​the​nation​on​the​lawS​of​reform : 363

​ The​different​laws​that​until​now​have​been​issued​over​the​classification​of​income,​to​designate​which​belongs​to​the​states​and​which​to​ the​general​government,​suffer​from​the​defect​of​not​resting​on​a​secure​ foundation​that​clearly​marks​the​separation​of​the​one​from​the​other,​ because​more​attention​ has​been​paid​to​proceeds​ than​to​the​nature​ of​the​taxes,​which​has​given​rise,​moreover,​to​questions​and​quarrels​ that​ should​ be​ avoided​ between​ the​ authorities​ of​the​ center​ and​ the​ states.​For​these​reasons,​and​to​establish​the​complete​separation​of​the​ income​of​the​states​and​the​center​on​a​well-​known​principle​of​justice​and​agreement,​the​government​believes​that​the​concept​must​be​ adopted​as​a​fixed​base​that​all​direct​taxes​on​persons,​properties,​establishments​of​business​and​industry,​professions,​and​the​rest​of​the​taxable​items​belong​to​the​states,​and​the​indirect​to​the​center.​The​fundamental​reason​for​this​separation​cannot​be​clearer​or​more​perceptible,​ because​it​is​supported​by​the​obvious​principle​that​only​the​supreme​ government,​which​is​the​one​that​focuses​on​the​expenses​and​obligations​of​the​nation,​is​also​the​one​that​has​the​right​to​collect​taxes​that​ encumber​all​its​inhabitants​in​general,​while​the​governments​of​the​ states​have​only​the​right​to​encumber​those​who​are​in​their​respective​ territories,​given​that​those​governments​focus​only​on​the​expenses​of​ those​inhabitants.​Besides​that​reason,​there​are​many​others​of​general​ agreement​that​without​doubt,​all​who​examine​the​matter​thoroughly​ will​understand;​and​it​is​also​easy​to​understand​that​only​by​adopting​ this​idea​will​the​states​see​themselves​truly​free​from​the​power​of​the​ center​in​the​matter​of​resources,​which​is​the​foundation​of​liberty​in​ all​other​branches​of​internal​administration.​By​adopting​this​system,​ there​will​no​longer​be​any​obligation​on​the​part​of​the​states​to​contribute​a​quota​of​their​income​toward​the​expenses​of​the​general​government. ​ One​of​the​most​serious​ills​the​treasury​of​the​nation​suffers​today​ as​ a​ consequence​ of​ the​ measures​ of​ the​ Spanish​ government​ during​ the​colonial​regime​and​of​the​confusion​with​which​subsequently​advantage​has​been​taken​of​them,​is​that​multitude​of​pensioners​from​ the​civil​and​military​branches​who​seek​to​live​on​the​public​treasury​ with​the​titles​of​retired​persons,​jobless​employees,​old-​age​pensioners,​ widows,​and​other​denominations.​The​size​to​which​this​ill​has​progressively​grown​and​the​pernicious​consequences​it​is​producing​at​every​ step​demand​a​prompt​remedy,​and​this​can​be​nothing​other​than​im-

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mediately​capitalizing​those​rights,​which,​acquired​properly​or​improperly,​cannot​be​disavowed​as​long​as​they​have​been​granted​according​ to​the​laws​and​by​qualified​authorities.​The​government,​then,​proposes​ to​proceed​without​delay​to​the​capitalization,​not​only​of​the​rights​of​ whatever​pensioners​there​are​in​the​civil​and​military​branches,​but​also​ of​the​rights​of​the​employees​who​are​redundant​by​virtue​of​the​new​ law​made​in​the​offices​of​any​branch,​and​even​in​those​branches​that,​ conforming​to​the​laws​in​effect​before​the​law​of​May​1852,​might​have​ individuals​who​remain​employed​in​these​offices,​in​order​to​stop​the​ ill​in​this​way​so​that​it​can​never​again​reappear.​This​capitalization​will​ be​represented​by​government​bonds​that​will​be​called​“bonds​of​capitalization,”​and​they​will​be​issued​on​the​bases​of​and​with​the​circumstances​and​requirements​that​a​law​will​establish. ​ With​that​measure​having​suppressed​the​system​of​reductions​that​ employees​and​soldiers​bore​in​their​respective​salaries​with​the​objective​of​guaranteeing​a​pension,​almost​always​illusory,​for​their​old​age,​ or​assistance​for​their​family​in​case​of​death,​all​of​them​will​be​able​in​ the​future​to​attain​that​outcome​with​greater​assurance,​depositing​their​ savings​in​savings​banks​and​mutual​aids​that,​without​doubt,​will​be​ established​throughout​the​Republic,​the​government​making,​as​it​has​ in​effect,​the​resolution​to​support​those​establishments​and​the​funds​ gathered​in​them​with​all​the​tax​exemptions​within​its​capacity.​Those​ establishments,​besides​being​a​very​effective​means​of​ensuring​the​inheritance​of​the​families​of​the​employees,​like​the​inheritance​of​all​ types​of​scarce​resources,​will​produce​for​society​immense​advantages​ in​other​ways,​because​the​capital​accumulated​successively​in​them​will​ serve​to​carry​out​a​multitude​of​useful​enterprises​advantageous​for​the​ entire​nation. ​ The​disposal​of​the​clergy’s​farms​and​capital,​which,​as​has​already​ been​said​in​another​place,​should​be​declared​property​of​the​nation,​ will​be​by​allowing​the​payment​of​three-​fifths​parts​in​certificates​of​ capitalization​or​of​internal​or​foreign​public​debt​without​any​distinction,​and​the​remaining​two-​fifths​parts​in​cash,​payable​in​monthly​installments​over​forty​months,​with​the​aim​that​the​acquisition​of​those​ assets​can​be​made​even​by​those​persons​least​well​off,​the​purchasers​ or​redeemers​giving,​for​the​cash​part,​promissory notes​to​the​order​of​ the​bearer​with​a​mortgage​on​the​sold​farm,​or​on​that​farm​that​the​

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redeemed​capital​identified,​and​delivering​the​share​of​certificates​or​ bonds​in​the​act​of​formalizing​the​contract​of​sale​or​redemption. ​ The​vacant​or​national​lands​that​currently​exist​in​the​Republic​will​ also​be​applied​to​the​amortization​of​the​interior​or​foreign​debt,​linking​these​operations​with​projects​of​colonization. ​ The​government​believes​that,​with​these​two​great​means​of​amortization​for​all​pending​obligations​of​the​treasury​applied​practically,​a​ large​part​of​the​certificates​of​capitalization​will​disappear,​as​will​the​ public​debt​in​general.​With​respect​to​foreign​debt​and​debt​that​has​ been​arranged​by​diplomatic​conventions,​the​government​will​persistently​seek​their​extinction,​whether​with​transfer​of​national​assets​or​ transfer​of​vacant​lands;​but​if​this​is​not​achieved,​it​will​continue​respecting,​as​it​does​today,​what​has​been​agreed​with​the​creditors,​delivering​punctually​the​assigned​part​to​the​payment​of​interest​and​amortization​of​capital,​because​it​has​the​conviction​that​only​in​this​way​will​ the​nation​be​able​to​recover​the​credit​and​good​name​it​has​lost​by​not​ faithfully​observing​that​conduct. ​ To​ complete​ the​ most​ urgent​ reforms​ with​ respect​ to​ national​ finance,​and​by​whatever​means​it​will​carry​out​the​desired​arrangement​of​this​important​branch​of​public​administration​for​the​realization​of​intentions​already​indicated,​it​is​indispensable​that​it​also​proceed,​at​the​same​time,​to​the​arrangement​of​its​offices​and​employees;​ and​this​operation,​so​full​of​stumbling​blocks​in​other​epochs,​will​now​ be​facilitated​by​the​capitalization​of​all​redundant​employees,​whose​ rights​and​aspirations​created​those​difficulties.​On​this​point​the​government​has​the​intention​of​reducing​the​number​of​offices​and​employees​to​the​purely​necessary,​neither​more​nor​less,​simplifying​as​ much​ as​might​ be​possible​ the​current​ system​ of​bookkeeping.​With​ respect​to​personnel,​adopting​the​system​of​a​certain​percentage​in​all​ the​tax-​gathering​offices​is​proposed,​and​in​those​offices​of​bookkeeping​only,​the​system​of​providing​employees​with​salaries​in​proportion​ to​the​general​needs​of​life​among​our​populations,​because​only​in​this​ way​will​these​offices​be​able​to​have​few​and​good​employees.​For​the​ provision​of​employees,​the​government​will​pay​attention​to,​above​all,​ aptitude​and​honesty,​and​not​to​favor​or​the​blind​spirit​of​partisanship,​ which​so​unfortunately​have​been​and​will​always​be​in​the​administration​of​public​income.

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​ In​the​branch​of​war,​the​government​proposes​to​regulate​the​army​ in​such​a​way​that,​improved​in​its​personnel​and​the​flaws​removed​that​ are​noted​in​its​current​organization,​it​can​worthily​carry​out​its​mission. ​ The​national​guard​is​one​of​the​institutions​for​which​the​government​will​care,​because​it​understands​that​the​national​guard​is​also​the​ support​of​public​liberties,​and​for​this​reason​it​will​try​with​persistence​to​organize​it​in​the​way​most​appropriate​for​corresponding​completely​with​its​objective. ​ As​for​the​navy,​Mexico,​lacking​all​the​elements​needed​to​create​ it​and​it​already​being​well​demonstrated​by​experience​that​expenditures​made​in​this​branch​constitute​a​genuine​extravagance,​the​government​believes​that​all​our​naval​forces​on​both​coasts​should​be​reduced​ for​now​to​some​small​armed​boats,​whose​primary​objective​would​be​ serving​as​protection​and​maritime​postal​service. ​ With​respect​to​the​various​branches​of​which​the​Ministry​of​Development​is​charged,​inasmuch​as​they​all​involve​the​material​progress​of​ society,​the​current​government​proposes​using​all​the​means​it​has​in​ its​capacity​to​attend​to​this​part​of​public​administration​as​it​deserves. ​ The​main​roads​that​depend​directly​on​the​government​require​not​ only​that​some​important​works​be​undertaken​right​away​to​put​them​ in​good​condition,​but​also​constant​care​to​preserve​them​well​in​the​ future.​To​attain​the​first​of​these​objectives,​the​government​believes​ that​the​system​of​carrying​out​those​works​by​agents​of​the​government​ itself​should​be​abandoned,​and​that​of​contracting​with​specific​enterprises​ be​ adopted,​ the​ government​ being​ limited​ to​ looking​ after​ its​ punctual​fulfillment​by​the​engineers​who​participate​in​the​works​and​ watch​over​their​execution.​As​for​local​roads,​although​they​are​under​ the​immediate​direction​of​the​governments​of​the​states,​the​general​ government​will​make​the​commitment​that​those​that​currently​exist​ will​be​improved​and​that​other​new​ones​will​be​constructed,​helping​ them​on​its​part,​as​much​as​it​can,​to​facilitate​in​this​way​the​increase​ in​new​ways​of​communication​that,​like​arteries​in​the​human​body,​are​ what​must​give​life​and​movement​to​our​uninhabited​country. ​ As​for​railroads,​it​must​be​attempted​at​all​costs​that,​as​quickly​as​ possible,​ the​ one​ now​ projected​ from​ Veracruz​ to​ one​ of​ the​ Pacific​ Ocean​ports,​passing​through​Mexico,​be​constructed;​and​as​this​is​a​

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work​of​incalculable​importance​for​the​future​of​the​Republic,​there​ is​ no​ effort​ the​ government​ is​ not​ disposed​ to​ make​ to​ accelerate​ its​ completion​and​overcome​the​difficulties​put​up​against​it.​Moreover,​ in​order​to​promote​effectively​the​construction​of​other​railroads​in​ various​places​and​to​remove​these​enterprises​from​the​hands​of​the​ schemers​who​have​been​speculating​with​the​titles​or​partial​concessions​made​by​the​government​for​specific​lines,​that​system​of​special​ decrees​on​this​subject​will​be​abandoned,​and​a​law​will​be​issued​that​ serves​as​a​general​regulation​for​all​roads​of​this​type​that​can​be​constructed​ in​ the​ country,​ more​ ample​ and​ generous​ concessions​ being​ made​in​the​law​in​order​thus​to​stimulate​national​and​foreign​capitalists​to​enter​into​those​useful​speculations. ​ Regarding​ public​ works​ of​ utility​ and​ embellishment,​ the​ government​will​endeavor​to​hasten​the​conclusion​of​all​those​which​are​already​begun​and​the​carrying​out​of​others,​because​it​is​convinced​that​ in​this​way​it​will​fulfill​one​of​the​duties​every​government​of​a​civilized​people​has​today.​Among​the​works​ready​for​completion,​it​will​ pay​preferential​attention​to​the​penitentiaries​of​Guadalajara,​Puebla,​ and​Morelia,​abandoned​for​some​time​because​of​political​upheavals,​ and​whose​completion​will​influence​so​effectively​the​improvement​of​ our​penal​and​prison​system,​which​is​one​of​the​great​needs​of​the​Republic.​In​order​to​pay​close​attention​to​the​works​on​the​roads​and​the​ carrying​out​of​all​other​public​works,​a​body​of​civil​engineers​will​be​ organized​in​the​Ministry​of​Development​who​will​also​serve​for​all​the​ tasks​with​which​the​government​charges​it. ​ The​immigration​of​active​and​industrious​men​from​other​countries​ is​without​doubt​one​of​the​primary​needs​of​the​Republic,​because​on​ the​increase​of​its​population​depends​not​only​the​progressive​development​of​its​wealth​and​the​consequent​internal​well-​being,​but​also​ the​preservation​of​its​nationality.​For​these​reasons,​the​government​ proposes​working​very​tenaciously​on​making​it​effective;​and​so​that​ it​be​carried​out​in​an​advantageous​way,​more​than​creating​or​writing​special​laws​of​colonization​with​sterile​offerings​of​lands​and​more​ or​less​broad​exceptions​for​the​colonists,​it​will​take​care​to​overcome​ the​practical​difficulties​that​stand​in​the​way​of​their​entry​and​stay​in​ the​country.​These​difficulties​consist​principally​in​the​lack​of​immediate,​lucrative​occupation​for​the​new​colonists​and​in​the​scant​security​

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that​exists​among​our​own​populations.​To​make​this​last​obstacle​disappear,​I​have​already​indicated​in​another​place​the​resolution​to​organize​a​good​preventive​police​force​and​security;​and​in​order​to​remove​ the​first​obstacle,​the​government​by​itself,​and​stimulating​wealthy​and​ speculative​men,​will​cause​public​and​private​works​to​be​undertaken​ of​the​type​that,​like​roads,​canals,​and​others​of​various​nature,​require​ many​laborers,​in​order​that​a​multitude​of​immigrant​persons​come​ to​be​employed​in​them​who,​once​established​for​a​certain​time​in​the​ Republic,​will​settle​down​in​it​to​dedicate​themselves​to​some​type​of​ occupation​or​industry;​and​they​will​in​turn​attract,​with​their​example​ and​ with​ their​ invitations,​ many​ other​ individuals​ and​ families​ from​ their​respective​countries.​Moreover,​arrangements​will​be​made​right​ away​with​some​property​owners​of​vast​terrains​in​the​central​and​most​ populated​part​of​the​Republic​by​which,​for​their​own​interests​and​ for​the​general​good​of​the​nation,​they​will​cede​some​lands​to​the​immigrants​who​come​to​establish​themselves​on​them,​entering​in​effect​ into​mutually​advantageous​contracts​of​sale​or​lease.​Only​with​these​ and​ other​ measures​ of​ a​ similar​ nature​ alone,​ with​ the​ consolidation​ of​public​peace,​with​the​arrangement​of​the​administration​of​justice,​ with​ liberty​ of​ worship,​ and​ with​ the​ facilities​ that​ at​ the​ same​ time​ the​government​must​provide​for​moving​immigrants​to​our​ports,​will​ our​population​be​augmented​and​improved​quickly;​because​if​it​is​not​ done​in​this​way,​the​business​of​colonization​will​continue​being,​as​it​ has​been​for​thirty-​eight​years,​a​cause​of​empty​oratory​for​all​the​political​traffickers​who​spring​up​from​our​revolutions​and​who,​with​the​ sole​objective​of​deceiving​the​nation,​speak​always​of​its​very​serious​ woes​without​having​the​intelligence​or​will​required​to​remedy​them. ​ Another​of​the​great​needs​of​the​Republic​is​the​subdivision​of​the​ territorial​property,​and​although​this​operation​cannot​be​made​to​the​ extent​desired​except​through​the​natural​stimulus​that​the​progressive​ improvement​our​society​will​continue​experiencing​might​produce​as​ a​consequence​of​the​reforms​that​must​be​carried​out​in​it​as​well​as​ improvements​in​the​actual​means​of​communication​and​the​increase​ in​population​and​consumption,​the​government​will​attempt​to​overcome​quickly​the​great​obstacle​that​the​laws​that​govern​mortgages​on​ rural​farms​present​for​such​subdivision,​issuing​a​new​law​by​which​the​ landowners​of​these​rural​farms​are​empowered​to​subdivide​them​into​ the​fractions​that​suit​them​for​the​purpose​of​facilitating​their​sale,​the​

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value​of​the​mortgage​that​each​farm​has​being​distributed​proportionally​in​these​instances​among​the​parts​into​which​it​is​subdivided.​Besides​this​measure,​which​will​surely​contribute​effectively​to​dividing​ up​the​territorial​property​with​advantage​for​the​entire​nation,​the​government​will​also​encourage​with​the​current​owners​of​large​holdings​ what,​by​means​of​mutually​advantageous​sales​or​leases,​will​improve​ the​situation​of​farming​peoples. ​ With​respect​to​the​businesses​with​which​the​general​government​ must​deal​in​agriculture,​manufacturing,​the​arts,​commerce,​means​of​ transport,​and,​in​general,​every​type​of​work​or​occupation​useful​to​ society,​the​current​administration​will​give​to​these​matters​whatever​ protection​is​in​its​reach,​working​always​with​the​aim​of​supporting​ their​growth​and​progressive​development,​fully​convinced​that​protecting​those​branches​is​to​work​for​the​prosperity​of​the​nation,​supporting​and​increasing​by​that​means​the​number​of​legitimate​interests​that​ are​identified​with​the​preservation​of​public​order. ​ In​the​development​of​statistics,​the​general​government,​working​in​ accord​with​those​of​the​states,​will​constantly​gather​whatever​information​is​possible​in​order​to​know​fully​the​true​state​of​the​nation​in​all​ its​branches;​and​it​does​not​seem​necessary​to​suggest​the​importance​ of​this​work,​because​no​one​is​unaware​that,​without​such​knowledge,​ it​is​impossible​for​a​government​to​proceed​with​certainty​in​its​determinations.​These​data​will​be​published​periodically​through​the​press,​ because​knowledge​of​them​is​not​only​important​to​the​government,​ but​also​to​all​and​each​of​the​individuals​in​the​society. ​ Such​ are,​ in​ sum,​ the​ ideas​ of​ the​ current​ administration​ on​ the​ course​that​it​is​appropriate​to​follow​in​order​to​affirm​order​and​peace​ in​the​Republic,​guiding​it,​by​the​secure​path​of​liberty​and​progress,​ to​its​enhancement​and​prosperity;​and​to​formulate​all​its​intentions​in​ the​way​it​presents​them​here,​it​does​not​believe​it​does​anything​more​ than​interpret​faithfully​the​feelings,​desires,​and​needs​of​the​nation. ​ In​another​time,​the​openness​with​which​the​current​government​ declares​ its​ideas​for​resolving​ some​of​the​serious​ questions​ that​for​ such​a​long​time​have​disturbed​our​unfortunate​society​could​perhaps​ have​been​considered​imprudent;​but​today,​when​the​rebel​faction​has​ brazenly​defied​the​nation,​denying​the​government​even​the​right​to​ improve​ its​ situation;​ today,​ when​ that​ very​ faction,​ letting​ itself​ be​ guided​solely​by​its​savage​instincts​in​order​to​preserve​the​errors​and​

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abuses​in​which​it​has​placed​its​heritage,​has​trampled​the​most​sacred​ rights​of​the​citizens,​stifled​all​discussion​of​public​interests,​and​despicably​misrepresented​the​intentions​of​all​men​who​do​not​offer​to​ respect​ its​ brutal​ domination;​ today,​ when​ that​fatal​ faction​ has​ now​ carried​its​excesses​to​an​extreme​of​which​no​example​is​found​in​the​ annals​of​the​most​unrestrained​despotism,​and​which,​with​an​insolent​ disdain​for​the​serious​woes​its​obstinacy​is​causing​society,​its​seems​resolved​to​continue​its​course​of​crimes​and​evil​deeds,​the​legal​government​of​the​Republic,​like​the​numerous​majority​of​the​citizens,​whose​ ideas​it​represents,​can​win​only​by​showing​clearly,​to​the​face​of​the​ entire​world,​what​its​intentions​and​tendencies​are. ​ Thus​will​it​manage​to​make​disappear​victoriously​the​clumsy​imputations​with​which,​at​each​step,​its​opponents​tried​to​discredit​it,​ attributing​to​it​ideas​disruptive​of​all​social​order.​Thus​will​it​let​the​ entire​ world​ see​ that​ its​ intentions​ regarding​ all​ business​ relating​ to​ politics​and​the​public​administration​set​out​only​to​destroy​the​errors​ and​abuses​opposed​to​the​well-​being​of​the​nation.​And​thus​it​will​be​ demonstrated,​finally,​that​the​program​of​what​is​entitled​the​liberal​ party​of​the​Republic,​whose​ideas​today​the​government​has​the​honor​ of​representing,​is​not​the​standard​of​one​of​those​splinter​groups​that,​ in​the​midst​of​internal​upheavals,​appear​in​the​political​arena​to​work​ exclusively​for​the​advantage​of​the​individuals​who​create​it,​but​rather​ the​symbol​of​reason,​order,​justice,​and​civilization,​and​at​the​same​ time​is​the​open​and​genuine​expression​of​the​needs​of​society. ​ With​the​awareness​that​it​proceeds​down​a​good​road,​the​current​ government​ proposes​ issuing,​ in​ the​ sense​ that​ it​ demonstrates​ now,​ all​those​measures​that​might​be​most​opportune​for​terminating​the​ bloody​struggle​that​afflicts​the​Republic​today,​and​to​guarantee​immediately​the​solid​triumph​of​good​principles.​To​proceed​in​this​way,​ it​will​do​so​with​the​blind​confidence​inspired​by​a​cause​as​holy​as​that​ it​is​charged​with​sustaining,​and​if,​to​the​misfortune​of​the​men​who​ today​have​the​honor​of​personifying​as​the​government​the​intention​ of​that​very​cause,​they​are​not​successful​in​having​their​efforts​result​in​ the​triumph​that​one​day​must​unfailingly​succeed,​they​will​be​able​to​ console​themselves​always​with​the​conviction​of​having​done​their​part​ in​achieving​it;​and​whatever​might​be​the​success​of​their​zeal,​whatever​ might​be​the​vicissitudes​that​must​be​suffered​in​the​pursuit​of​their​ patriotic​and​humanitarian​commitment,​they​believe​at​least​that​they​

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have​the​right​to​have​their​good​intentions​valued​in​some​way,​and​that​ all​honest​and​sincere​men​who,​fortunately,​still​abound​in​our​unfortunate​society,​might​even​say,​in​remembering​them:​Those men desired the good of their country, and they did whatever it was possible for them to do to obtain it. Heroic​Veracruz,​July​7,​1859.​—Benito Juárez.—Melchor Ocampo. —Manuel Ruiz.—Miguel Lerdo de Tejada.

2



Declaration to the Inhabitants of the United States of Mexico on Freedom of Worship, December 4, 1860 Citizen​benito​juárez,​interim​ ConStitutional​preSident​of​the​ mexiCan​united​StateS,​to​all​the​ inhabitantS​i​deClare:

Exercising​ the​ comprehensive​ powers​ with​ which​ I​ have​been​invested,​I​have​seen​fit​to​decree​the​following: ​ Art.​1.​The​laws​protect​the​exercise​of​Catholic​worship​and​of​the​ others​established​in​the​country​as​the​expression​and​result​of​religious​ liberty,​which,​as​a​natural​right​of​man,​has​not​and​cannot​have​limitations​other​than​the​right​of​another​and​the​requirements​of​public​ order.​In​everything​else,​the​separation​between​the​state,​on​the​one​ hand,​ and​ religious​ beliefs​ and​ practices,​ on​ the​ other,​ is​ and​ will​ be​ complete​and​inviolable.​For​the​implementation​of​these​principles​it​ will​be​observed​what​the​laws​of​the​Reform​and​this​document​have​ declared​and​determined. ​ Art.​2.​A​church​or​religious​society​is​formed​of​the​men​who​have​ voluntarily​desired​to​be​members​of​it,​declaring​this​decision​by​themselves​or​through​their​parents​or​guardians​whose​dependents​they​are. ​ Art.​3.​Each​one​of​these​societies​has​the​liberty​to​regulate,​by​itself​ or​by​means​of​its​priests,​the​beliefs​and​practices​of​the​religion​that​ it​professes​and​to​specify​the​conditions​with​which​it​admits​men​to​ its​association​or​removes​them​from​it,​provided​that​neither​by​these​ measures​nor​by​their​application​to​individual​cases​that​might​occur​is​ it​influenced​by​any​misdeed​or​transgression​prohibited​by​the​laws,​in​ ​ Original​title:​“Bando​por​el​que​se​decreta​la​libertad​de​cultos,​4​de​diciembre​de​ 1860.”​Source:​Benito​Juárez,​Presidente interino constitucional de los Estados-Unidos mexicanos, á todos sus habitantes, hago saber, que, con acuerdo unánime del consejo de ministros . . .​ (Veracruz:​s.p.i.,​1860). 372

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which​case​the​procedure​and​verdict​that​those​laws​prescribe​will​take​ precedence​and​the​general​intent​be​carried​out. ​ Art.​4.​The​authority​of​these​religious​societies​and​their​priests​will​ be​purely​and​absolutely​spiritual​without​any​coercion​of​another​kind,​ whether​ it​ be​ exercised​ over​ men​ faithful​ to​ the​ doctrines,​ counsels,​ and​rules​of​a​religion,​whether​over​those​who,​having​accepted​these​ things,​might​later​have​a​change​of​mind.​Popular​action​is​granted​to​ accuse​and​denounce​violators​of​this​article. ​ Art.​5.​In​the​civil​order​there​is​no​obligation,​punishment,​or​coercion​of​any​type​with​respect​to​purely​religious​matters,​misdeeds,​ and​offenses.​As​a​consequence,​no​judicial​or​administrative​procedure​ because​of​apostasy,​schism,​heresy,​simony,​or​any​other​ecclesiastical​ offenses​will​take​place,​even​if​some​church​or​its​directors​demand​it.​ But​if​some​misdeed​or​offense​contained​in​the​laws​now​in​force​is​ attached​to​them​and​not​repealed​for​this​reason,​the​appropriate​public​authority​will​know​of​the​case​and​will​resolve​it​without​taking​ into​consideration​its​status​and​quality​in​the​religious​order.​This​same​ principle​ will​ be​ observed​ when​ the​ indicated​ misdeeds​ or​ offenses​ might​ come​ about​ from​ an​ act​ judged​ proper​ and​ authorized​ by​ any​ religion​whatsoever.​As​a​consequence,​the​declaration​of​ideas​on​religious​points​and​the​publication​of​papal​bulls,​briefs,​rescripts,​pastoral​ letters,​commands,​and​any​writings​whatsoever​that​also​treat​of​those​ matters​are​things​to​be​enjoyed​in​complete​liberty​unless​order,​peace,​ or​public​morality​is​attacked​by​them,​or​private​life,​or​in​whatever​ other​way​the​rights​of​a​third​person​or​when​some​crime​or​offense​is​ provoked;​for​in​all​these​cases,​leaving​aside​the​religious​element,​the​ laws​that​prohibit​such​abuses​will​be​applied​irremissibly,​keeping​in​ mind​what​is​laid​out​in​Article​23. ​ Art.​6.​In​the​internal​economy​of​the​churches​and​the​administration​of​the​wealth​whose​acquisition​the​laws​permit​to​religious​societies,​these​societies​will​have,​in​what​corresponds​to​the​civil​order,​all​ the​powers,​rights,​and​obligations​of​any​legitimately​established​association. ​ Art.​7.​Any​recourse​to​force​is​abolished.​If​some​church​or​its​directors​carries​out​an​individual​act​reserved​to​public​authority,​the​author​ or​authors​of​this​illegality​will​suffer​respectively​the​punishments​that​ the​laws​impose​on​those​who​separately​or​as​a​body​commit​it.

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​ Art.​8.​The​right​of​asylum​in​churches​ends,​and​force​can​and​should​ be​used​that​is​judged​necessary​to​seize​and​remove​from​the​churches​ those​ persons​ declared​ or​ presumed​ culprits​ in​ accordance​ with​ the​ laws,​without​the​ecclesiastical​authority​being​able​to​intervene​in​this​ judgment. ​ Art.​9.​Oaths​and​their​retractions​are​not​the​concern​of​the​laws.​ All​ rights,​ obligations,​ and​ legal​ punishments​ are​ declared​ valid​ and​ consequent​without​the​need​to​consider​the​oath​sometimes​related​to​ acts​of​the​civil​order.​Consequently,​the​inherited​obligation​ceases​of​ swearing​observance​of​the​Constitution,​the​faithful​discharge​of​public​and​various​professional​duties,​before​entering​into​their​exercise.​ In​the​same​way,​the​legal​obligation​ceases​of​swearing​certain​and​determinate​statements​before​agents​of​the​public​treasury​and​the​pleas,​ testimonies,​opinions​of​experts,​and​whatever​other​declarations​and​ assertions​made​within​or​outside​the​courts.​In​all​these​cases​and​in​ whatever​others​in​which​the​laws​mandate​taking​an​oath,​this​will​be​ replaced​from​now​on​by​the​explicit​promise​to​tell​the​truth​in​what​is​ witnessed,​to​fulfill​well​and​loyally​the​obligations​contracted;​and​the​ omission,​negation,​and​violation​of​this​promise​will​cause​in​the​legal​ order​the​same​results​as​if​it​were​a​question​consistent​with​the​preexisting​laws​of​an​oath​omitted,​negated,​or​violated. ​ In​the​future,​the​swearing​of​an​oath​will​have​no​legal​effect​on​contracts​concluded;​and​never,​by​virtue​of​the​oath​or​the​promise​that​replaces​it,​will​an​obligation​be​confirmed​of​those​that​previously​necessitated​swearing​of​an​oath​to​secure​force​and​consistency. ​ Art.​10.​He​who,​in​a​church,​insults​or​ridicules​by​speech​or​in​another​way​expressed​by​external​acts​the​beliefs,​practices,​or​other​objects​ of​ the​ religion​ to​ which​ that​ building​ was​ intended,​ will​ suffer,​ according​to​the​situation,​the​punishment​of​imprisonment​or​exile,​ whose​maximum​will​be​three​months.​When,​in​a​church,​an​injury​is​ inflicted​or​some​other​crime​is​committed​in​which​violence​or​dishonesty​occurs,​the​punishment​of​the​culprits​will​be​one-​half​greater​than​ that​imposed​by​the​laws​on​the​crime​of​which​it​treats,​considering​ that​it​is​committed​in​a​public​and​frequented​place.​But​this​augmentation​in​punishment​will​be​applied​in​such​a​way​that,​in​the​secular​ prison,​deportation​or​forced​labor​will​not​be​generated​for​more​than​ ten​years. ​ In​these​arrangements​the​old​law​regarding​sacrilege​is​revised,​and​

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the​rest​of​the​offenses​to​which​this​name​is​given​will​be​subject​to​ what​the​laws​prescribe​for​identical​cases​without​the​purely​religious​ circumstance. ​ Art.​11.​No​solemn​religious​act​will​take​place​outside​the​churches​ without​written​permission​granted​in​each​case​by​the​local​political​ authority​according​to​the​regulations​and​orders​that​the​governors​of​ the​[Federal]​District​and​states​might​enact,​in​agreement​with​the​following​requirements: ​ 1a.​The​preservation​of​public​order,​above​all,​must​be​secured. ​ 2a.​These​permissions​need​not​be​granted​if​it​is​feared​they​might​ produce​ or​ give​ occasion​ to​ some​ disorder,​ either​ from​ disrespect​ for​the​practices​and​sacred​objects​of​the​religion​or​for​reasons​of​ another​nature. ​ 3a.​If,​because​of​not​harboring​fears​in​this​sense,​said​authority​ grants​a​permission​of​this​kind​and​some​disorder​on​the​occasion​of​ a​permitted​religious​act​should​occur,​this​will​be​ordered​stopped,​ and​authorizing​it​in​the​future​outside​the​churches​will​not​be​possible.​Failure​to​obey​in​these​cases​will​not​be​punishable​except​if​it​ degenerates​into​force​or​violence. ​ Art.​12.​It​is​prohibited​to​establish​the​spiritual​director​of​the​testator​as​heir​or​legatee,​whatever​might​be​the​religious​communion​to​ which​he​belongs. ​ Art.​13.​It​is​similarly​prohibited​to​name​mendicants​to​beg​for​and​ collect​alms​intended​for​religious​objectives​without​the​express​approval​of​the​respective​governor,​who​will​grant​or​deny​it​in​writing​as​ he​deems​appropriate;​and​the​persons​who​practice​those​acts​without​ presenting​a​certification​of​approval​will​be​held​as​vagrants​and​will​ answer​for​the​frauds​they​have​committed. ​ Art.​14.​The​privilege​called​obligation​[competencia]​ends,​by​virtue​of​ which​Catholic​clerics​can​hold​back​with​detriment​to​their​creditors​ a​part​of​their​wealth.​But​if,​when​sequestration​for​debt​of​the​priests​ of​whatever​religion​takes​place,​there​is​no​other​wealth​on​which​distraint​should​fall​in​accord​with​the​law​except​some​fixed​salary,​only​a​ third​part​of​their​periodic​income​can​be​seized.​The​books​of​the​interested​party​will​not​be​considered​subject​to​seizure,​nor​things​he​possesses​that​are​considered​as​belonging​to​his​ministry,​nor​other​goods​ that​as​a​rule​the​laws​except​from​sequestration. ​ Art.​15.​The​testamentary​clauses​that​stipulate​the​paying​of​tithes,​

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perquisites,​ or​ pious​ bequests​ of​ whatever​ type​ and​ denomination​ will​be​executed​solely​insofar​as​they​do​not​go​against​the​obligatory​ hereditary​fee​according​to​the​laws,​and​in​no​case​will​the​payment​be​ made​with​property. ​ Art.​16.​The​action​of​the​laws​will​not​be​exercised​over​grants​of​the​ faithful​for​maintenance​of​a​religion​and​its​priests​unless​those​consist​ of​real​estate,​or​unless​force​or​deceit​intervenes​to​demand​or​accept​ them. ​ Art.​17.​The​official​title​usually​given​to​various​ecclesiastical​persons​ and​corporations​ends. ​ Art.​18.​The​use​of​bells​will​continue​subject​to​policy​regulations. ​ Art.​19.​The​priests​of​all​religions​will​be​exempt​from​the​military​ and​from​all​restrictive​personal​service,​but​not​from​taxes​or​remunerations​that​the​laws​impose​for​these​exemptions. ​ Art.​20.​The​public​authority​will​not​intervene​in​the​religious​rites​ and​practices​concerning​matrimony.​But​the​contract​from​which​this​ union​ arises​ remains​ exclusively​ subject​ to​ the​ laws.​ Whatever​ other​ matrimony​might​be​contracted​in​the​national​territory​without​observing​the​formalities​that​the​laws​themselves​prescribe​is​null​and,​ consequently,​incapable​of​bringing​about​any​of​those​civil​outcomes​ the​law​confers​only​on​legitimate​marriage.​Outside​of​this​punishment,​ no​ other​ will​ be​ placed​ on​ unions​ disapproved​ by​ this​ article​ unless​ force,​adultery,​incest,​or​deceit​is​involved​in​them,​for​in​those​cases,​ what​the​laws​mandate​relative​to​these​transgressions​will​be​observed. ​ Art.​21.​The​governors​of​the​states,​district,​or​territories​will​take​ care,​in​accord​with​their​strictest​responsibility,​to​put​into​practice​the​ laws​issued​with​respect​to​cemeteries​and​mausoleums,​and​in​no​circumstance​is​the​dignified​interment​of​bodies​forfeit,​whatever​might​ be​the​decision​of​the​priests​or​their​respective​churches. ​ Art.​22.​The​laws​that​punish​outrages​made​on​bodies​and​their​graves​ remain​in​full​force. ​ Art.​23.​The​minister​of​a​religion​who,​in​the​exercise​of​his​functions,​orders​the​carrying​out​of​a​crime​or​exhorts​someone​to​commit​ it​will​suffer​the​punishment​of​this​complicity​if​the​above-​mentioned​ crime​is​carried​out.​In​the​opposite​case,​the​judges​will​take​into​account​the​circumstances​in​imposing​up​to​half​or​less​of​said​punishment​whenever​the​laws​do​not​designate​a​greater​punishment. ​ Art.​24.​Although​all​public​functionaries​in​their​status​as​men​will​

to​CitizenS​on​freedom​of​worShip : 377

enjoy​a​religious​liberty​as​broad​as​all​the​inhabitants​of​the​country,​ they​will​not​be​able,​in​an​official​capacity,​to​take​part​in​the​acts​of​a​ religion​or​of​deference​to​their​priests,​whatever​might​be​their​place​ in​the​hierarchy.​The​standing​army​is​included​in​the​foregoing​prohibition. ​ Therefore,​ I​ order​ it​ printed,​ published,​ circulated,​ and​ given​ the​ proper​fulfillment. ​ Issued​in​the​palace​of​the​national​government​in​Veracruz,​December​4,​1860.—Benito Juárez—to​C.​Juan​Antonio​de​la​Fuente,​Minister​ of​Justice​and​Public​Instruction.

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3

Liberty and Order 1876–1912

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justo sierra Justo​Sierra​(1848–1912),​born​in​Campeche,​was​a​writer,​lawyer,​politician,​and​historian.​Sierra​was​one​of​the​“new”​liberals​influenced​by​positivism​in​the​second​half​of​the​nineteenth​ century.​ He​ started​ his​ literary​ career​ at​ a​ very​ young​ age,​publishing​essays​and​reviews​in​newspapers,​and​eventually​became​the​chief​editor​of​the​influential​daily​La Libertad.​ Some​ of​ the​ key​ proposals​ of​ the​ new​ liberals​ regarding​ institutional​reform​were​published​in​this​newspaper.​He​was​ elected​to​Congress​on​several​occasions.​As​a​representative,​ Sierra​worked​to​improve​public​education​in​the​country.​He​ also​wrote​important​books​on​political​and​social​history,​such​ as​La evolución política del pueblo mexicano. ​ Sierra​was​a​believer​in​the​power​of​science​and​in​efficient​ public​administration.​He​was​a​critic​of​“metaphysical”​liberalism,​a​form​of​liberalism​that​enshrined​natural​rights.​As​we​ shall​see,​he​debated​with​“doctrinaire,”​older​liberals​such​as​ José​María​Vigil​on​the​true​nature​of​liberalism.​He​believed​in​ strong​but​not​unlimited​government.​While​Sierra​supported​ Porfirio​Díaz​(he​held​high​positions​in​his​administration),​his​ support​was​not​unconditional.​He​strove​for​important​institutional​reforms​that​would​limit​the​power​of​the​president,​such​ as​the​permanent​tenure​of​the​justices​of​the​Supreme​Court. ​ We​present​some​of​his​newspaper​essays​and​the​polemic​ with​Vigil​from​the​years​1878–79.

381

1 ​

Emilio Castelar and the Program of La Libertad

La Libertad,​in​honoring​its​columns​with​the​program​ of​El Globo​of​Madrid,​has​as​its​principal​aim​not​only​to​demonstrate​ its​complete​adherence​to​the​principal​ideas​expressed​by​Mr.​Castelar,1​ but​also​to​show​the​close​harmony​with​which​that​program​and​the​ thinking​that​governed​the​creation​of​our​daily​newspaper​are​united.​ La Libertad​prides​itself​in​having​found​such​a​brilliant​expression​of​its​ principles,​and​in​the​shelter​of​the​most​eloquent​voice​of​the​modern​ rostrum​it​dares​to​reproduce​them​in​categorical​formulas. ​ We​do​not​have​a​person​as​our​standard​but​rather​an​idea:​to​rally​ all​those​who​think​that​the​epoch​of​wanting​to​realize​their​aspirations​ through​revolutionary​violence​has​now​passed​for​our​country,​all​those​ who​believe​that​the​definitive​moment​has​now​arrived​for​organizing​ a​party​friendlier​to​liberty​practiced​than​liberty​declaimed,​and​profoundly​convinced​that​positive​progress​depends​on​the​normal​development​of​a​society,​that​is​to​say,​on​order. ​ At​the​end​of​a​half​century​of​painful​experiences,​it​seems​to​us​that​ the​present​hour​will​not​repeat​itself​again​in​our​history.​We​sense​ that,​if​the​strengths​of​men​of​peace​and​work​are​not​sufficient​in​a​ brief​period​to​make​the​will​of​the​country​triumph​over​the​appetite​ for​anarchy—to​deflect,​in​a​word,​the​direction​of​our​political​life​and​ make​it​take​the​course​not​only​of​right,​which​ends​by​being​converted​ ​ Original​title:​“Emilio​Castelar​y​el​programa​de​La Libertad.”​Source:​La Libertad,​ Mexico,​February​14,​1878. ​ 1.​Emilio​Castelar​(1832–99)​was​a​Spanish​republican​and​the​first​president​of​the​ Spanish​Republic​(1873–74).​He​advocated​establishing​a​federal​republic​and​abhorred​ bloodshed​and​mob​rule.​He​disapproved​of​military​revolts,​or​pronunciamientos.​While​ advocating​free​popular​elections​and​parliamentary​government​he​also​gave​due​consideration​to​religious​traditions​and​national​unity.​This​conservative​strain​did​not​endear​him​to​the​more​radical​liberals.​(Editor’s​note) 382

emilio​CaStelar​and​the​proGram​of​la libErtad : 383

into​disturbing​protests,​but​also​of​duty,​whose​more​elevated​political​formula​is​the​inviolability​of​the​law—we​will​cast​ourselves​down​ a​slope​on​which,​just​as​we​have​relinquished​the​national​wealth,​we​ will​relinquish,​torn​asunder​and​dying,​the​nationality​itself. ​ More​fortunate​than​the​Spanish​republicans​in​arriving​at​our​objective,​we​do​not​have​to​change​our​institutions,​but​rather​seek​them​ in​the​sense​of​their​practical​realization.​For​that​it​is​necessary​for​us​ to​make​the​foundations​of​public​instruction​more​rational​and​extensive​every​day;​to​approach​steadfastly​the​truth​of​the​suffrage,​seeking​ the​conditions​under​which​it​can​become​rooted​in​our​customs,​and​ accepting​these​conditions​without​hesitation​even​if​they​might​disagree​with​our​ideal​conception​of​democracy;​demanding​of​our​moral​ awareness,​as​free​men,​the​civic​conscience​sufficient​to​make​the​responsibility​of​every​official​and​the​punishment​of​every​criminal​not​a​ legal​truth​but​rather​the​actual​foundation​of​our​political​mechanism. ​ We​are​individualists​in​the​sense​that​we​put​human​right​above​all​ action​of​the​state,​but​not​because​we​believe​that​everything​called​ individual​right​is​absolute;​on​the​contrary,​our​opinion​is​that,​as​society​is​not​a​fiction​but​rather​a​genuine​organism​subject​to​laws​more​ complex​than​those​of​individuals,​its​action​can​in​specific​cases​serve​ as​the​limit​to​some​human​rights,​like​that​of​property;​and​we​believe​ that,​starting​from​this​foundation,​a​part​of​the​solution​to​the​social​ problem​can,​in​conditions​of​the​highest​justice,​be​requested​of​a​legislation​that​would​extend​in​a​prudent​and​firm​manner​the​disentailment​of​territorial​property.​We​believe​this​is​the​means​of​pulling​the​ most​numerous​of​our​classes​from​the​situation​in​which​it​finds​itself​ and​of​developing,​rapidly,​the​great​improvements​from​which​agriculture,​industry,​and​commerce​expect​a​new​life. ​ Mr.​ Castelar​ has​ condensed​ into​ a​ few​ words​ the​ new​ face​ of​ the​ democratic​evolution.​We​are​entering,​he​says,​the​scientific​and​experimental​period;​the​epoch​of​springlike​dreams​has​passed.​Here​is​ what​we​strive​always​to​keep​in​mind;​these​are​the​words​that​we​try​ constantly​to​make​the​quarrelling​factions​hear.​Will​they​hear​us?​Will​ we​ourselves​always​know​how​to​fulfill​our​intention​with​a​calm​spirit​ without​allowing​ourselves​to​be​dragged​along​by​the​passions​of​the​ moment,​the​more​ardent​as​the​more​fleeting? ​ The​future​will​say.​In​the​meantime,​it​is​clear​that,​in​demonstrating​our​complete​consent​to​the​program​of​the​Spanish​democrat,​we​

384 : juSto​Sierra

have​not​had​difficulty​in​declaring​that​we​desire​the​creation​of​a​great​ conservative​party,​composed​of​all​those​elements​of​order​that​in​our​ country​ have​ sufficient​ ability​ to​ emerge​ into​ political​ life.​ And​ this​ ability​is​measured​by​the​open​and​complete​acceptance​of​the​foundations​of​modern​society. ​ Our​readers​will​not​insult​us​by​supposing​that​we​have​reproduced​ the​ words​ of​ the​ great​ political​ speaker​ for​ the​ foolish​ arrogance​ of​ showing​that​his​political​thought​coincides​with​ours,​but​rather​because​we​would​like​to​empower​our​modest​ideas​with​those​of​Emilio​ Castelar,​who​has,​without​doubt,​an​irreproachable​conscience​and​an​ incomparable​talent.

2 ​

Reservations

When​we​speak​of​the​Constitution,​when​we​demand​ respect​and​honor​for​it,​when​we​assign​this​as​the​first​of​our​political​ duties,​we​do​not​claim​that​constitutional​principles​should​be​accepted​ as​articles​of​faith;​nor​do​we​believe​they​are​a​perfect​work,​no.​In​our​ judgment,​the​Constitution​of​’57​is​a​fine​liberal​utopia​but​destined,​ by​the​prodigious​amount​of​political​lyricism​it​contains,​to​be​realized​ only​slowly​and​painfully.​The​same​thing​happens​with​it​that​has​happened​with​all​laws​made​to​transform​customs​that​permeate​the​social​ masses,​provoking​conflicts​and​incessant​struggles,​and​sometimes​society​suffers,​other​times​the​law​is​discredited​until,​when​the​definitive​work​of​amalgamation​has​occurred,​society​and​the​Constitution​ are​transformed. ​ The​principles​of​political​emancipation,​the​bright​prospects​for​liberty​and​regeneration,​and​more​than​all​that,​the​destruction​of​clerical​ rule,​fired​up​the​enthusiasm​of​our​fathers​for​that​code​promulgated​ as​a​new​Decalogue​in​the​name​of​God.​That​was​yesterday;​today,​principles,​dreams,​and​theories​are​coming​to​the​discussion​anew.​All​the​ precepts​of​the​fundamental​law​are​destined,​because​of​the​fatal​demands​of​history,​to​suffer​severe​revision​before​the​tribunal​of​new​ ideas.​This​could​not​be​done​in​a​moment​of​storm​and​struggle,​so​it​ was​necessary​to​affirm,​from​the​stormy​summits​of​the​liberal​party,​ our​religious​dogma​(constitutional​dogmas​are​nothing​other​than​that)​ and​point​out​from​the​seats​of​the​Constituent​[Congress],​in​the​loftiest​and​purest​region​of​the​heavens,​our​ideal​of​citizens​and​men. ​ Our​fathers​believed​they​had​made​a​work​profoundly​practical​because​they​took​our​institutions​from​a​practical​people,​and​this​idea​ was​ radically​ erroneous.​ What​ the​ practical​ consists​ of​ in​ American​ people​is​not​having​consigned​in​the​federal​code​such​and​such​prin​

Original​title:​“Reservas.”​Source:​La Libertad,​Mexico,​February​23,​1878. 385

386 : juSto​Sierra

ciples,​but​rather​that​those​principles​are​perfectly​appropriate​to​the​ social​medium​in​which​they​had​to​unfold. ​ We​believed​that,​in​copying​the​principles,​we​were​imitating​their​ practical​sense,​and​this​was​not​true;​what​we​should​have​done,​what​ would​have​been​true​imitation,​was​to​give​ourselves​institutions​that​ could​unfold​not​in​the​heart​of​our​corrupted​habits,​but​of​those​habits​ that​our​history,​our​material​necessities,​our​climate,​and​even​our​geographical​conformation​imposed​on​us.​This​examination​was​impossible,​we​recognize,​in​the​epoch​of​passion​and​combat​that​was​present​ at​the​advent​of​the​Constitution. ​ We​do​not​reason​without​proof.​An​induction​based​on​the​cruelest​ experiments​can​take​us​gradually​to​these​conclusions,​and​we​claimed​ those​experiments​in​the​saddest​hours​of​our​history,​from​’57​until​ now.​Our​fundamental​law,​created​by​men​of​the​Latin​race​who​believe​that​something​is​certain​and​realizable​to​the​degree​it​is​logical,​ who​tend​to​humanize​brusquely​and​through​violence​any​ideal,​who​ pass​in​one​day​from​the​rule​of​the​absolute​to​that​of​the​relative​without​transition,​without​nuances,​and​wishing​to​obligate​the​people​to​ practice​what​is​true​in​the​region​of​pure​reason;​these​men,​we​are​ among​them,​perhaps,​who​confuse​the​heavens​with​the​earth,​made​us​ a​lofty​and​noble​code​of​union,​but​one​in​which​everything​tends​to​ differentiation,​to​individual​autonomy​carried​to​its​maximum;​that​is​to​ say,​to​the​level​at​which​the​action​of​social​duties​stops​and​everything​ is​converted​into​individual​rights. ​ Thus​each​one​of​the​political​powers​tends​to​include​the​sphere​of​ action​of​the​others,​basing​itself​on​the​Constitution;​each​state​tends​ to​weaken,​to​nullify,​the​federal​bond,​based​also​on​the​Constitution;​ it​tends​to​declare​its​absolute​independence​from​the​social​group​in​ which​it​lives.​But​as,​in​order​to​carry​out​each​one​of​those​ideas,​we​ find​ ourselves​ with​ a​ nation​ at​ two​ or​ three​ centuries’​ distance​ from​ the​constitutional​ideal,​everything​miscarries​into​political​convulsions,​ into​muffled​tremblings​of​the​unsettled​society,​and​into​that​unconquerable​apprehension​that​puts​in​the​depths​of​all​our​consciousnesses​ I​do​not​know​what​vague​and​tenacious​skepticism​with​respect​to​the​ next​day. ​ But​ why,​ then,​ do​ we​demand​ respect​ for​ the​Constitution?​ If​ we​ do​not​believe​it​to​be​good,​why​have​we​made​it​our​standard?​Why​ yesterday​in​its​name​have​we​battled​a​government​that​had​begun​by​

reServationS : 387

calling​ us​its​friends​ and​today​ we​embrace​ another​ government​ that​ began​by​treating​us​as​enemies?​Here​is​the​reason:​the​Constitution​is​a​ rule,​it​is​a​law,​it​is​the​impersonal​authority​of​a​precept,​supreme​guarantee​of​human​liberty;​beyond​it,​there​is​nothing​but​arbitrariness,​ personal​despotism,​and,​in​a​word,​the​rule​of​one​man​over​the​others.​ And​as​we​believe​that,​given​our​present​mode​of​being,​there​is​nothing​worse​than​the​absence​of​rule​and​limits;​as​we​believe​that​what​is​ established​in​this​way,​although​it​might​be​a​marvel,​will​remain​established​on​a​crumbly​base​of​sand​and​will​be​destroyed,​not​only​for​our​ love​of​liberty—which​is,​in​the​last​analysis,​human​dignity—but​also​ for​our​love​of​order,​a​principal​factor​of​progress,​we​have​to​maintain​ that​it​is​necessary​to​place​the​Constitution​above​everything​else.​It​ will​be​a​bad​law,​but​it​is​a​law;​let​us​reform​it​tomorrow;​let​us​obey​it​ always.

3 ​

Liberals and Conservatives

In​our​country​there​have​been​neither​liberals​nor​conservatives,​but​rather​only​revolutionaries​and​reactionaries.​This​refers​ to​the​factions,​not​the​men.​The​revolutionary​faction,​to​be​liberal,​ has​lacked​the​knowledge​that​liberty​considered​as​a​right​cannot​be​ realized​outside​of​the​moral​development​of​a​people,​which​is​order;​ and​the​reactionaries,​to​be​conservatives,​lacked​even​the​instinct​for​ progress​characteristic​of​our​epoch,​outside​of​which​order​is​only​immobility​and​death.​In​large​part​this​has​not​been​their​fault,​and​it​is​ absurd​to​demand​of​a​country​born​and​raised​in​conditions​so​unsuitable​for​social​life​what​people​better​endowed​with​long​experience​ and​the​dissemination​of​scientific​instruction​demand​today,​not​always​ with​good​success. ​ Our​existence​has​gravitated​toward​two​extremes.​The​colonial​system​based​on​isolation​is​one​extreme;​the​other​is​the​constitutional​ regime​based​on​this​dogma:​the​individual​is​an​absolute​sovereign.​The​ first​gave​us​a​reality​without​an​ideal;​the​second​offers​us​an​ideal​without​reality;​and​this​is​an​error,​because​it​is​necessary​to​be​concerned​ simultaneously​with​the​power​of​attraction​that​an​idea​exercises​on​a​ people​and​with​the​conditions​in​which​that​people​live​and​up​to​what​ point​those​conditions​permit​the​people​to​approach​that​ideal. ​ When​ our​ fathers​ promulgated​ the​ Charter​ of​ 1857,​ they​ believed​ themselves​ called​ to​ exercise​ a​ function​ more​ priestly​ than​ political;​ that​time​has​passed.​New​ideas​gain​ground​every​day​over​the​old​verbal​principles​of​liberty,​and​these​ideas​are​inflexible​because​they​are​ scientific​ laws.​ They​ teach​ us​ that​ the​ individual​ and​ society​ are​ two​ large​organic​realities​that​cannot​be​separated​without​destroying​them.​ These​ laws​ teach​ us​ that​ nothing​ is​ definitively​ improved​ by​ revolu​ Original​ title:​ “Liberales-​Conservadores.”​ Source:​ La Libertad,​ Mexico,​ May​ 10,​ 1878. 388

liberalS​and​ConServativeS : 389

tions​because​inevitable​ reactions​follow​them,​and​that​the​result​of​ this​oscillation​is​precisely​to​attain​a​progress​equal​to​the​progress​that​ would​have​been​obtained​by​the​regular​activity​of​peaceful​means.​So​ it​is​that​there​is​always​too​much​blood​shed​and​vitality​wasted. ​ What​is​it,​then,​that​we​want?​To​alienate​forever​from​the​mind​of​ our​country​the​idea​that​it​can​be​regenerated​by​violence;​to​study​the​ conditions​in​which​we​live,​the​obstacles​placed​in​our​advance,​with​ such​a​desire​to​arrive​at​the​truth,​with​such​a​profound​determination​ to​speak​it,​that​we​might​manage,​even​at​the​risk​of​being​victims​of​the​ rhetoric​of​fools,​to​find​what​our​true​needs​might​be​and​try​to​resolve​ them;​thus​it​might​be​necessary​to​pass​over​a​principle​in​our​path​or​ erase​an​ideal​from​our​heavens. ​ Liberty!​ And​ where​ is​ the​ social​ force​ that​ secures​ us​ sufficiently​ against​the​violence​of​others?​Democracy!​And​where​are​the​people​ who​govern,​where​is​the​enlightenment​that​directs​their​vote?​Where​ is​ the​ faithful​ mandatary​ who​ collects​ it?​ Is​ our​ democracy​ perhaps​ something​other​than​a​shattered​ballot​box​into​which​only​fraud​puts​ its​hand?​Who​would​be​able​to​prevent​it?​The​sovereign.​We​do​not​ know​it.​This​sovereign​is​a​word.​It​is​not​a​man.​And​how​will​it​come​ to​be?​With​work,​with​peace,​with​instruction. ​ Can​this​be​a​living​fact,​here​where​individual​initiative​is​null​except​for​the​efficient​action​of​the​public​authority​of​the​state?​Can​this​ action​be​exercised​without​subjecting​the​strength​of​the​state’s​momentum​to​rules,​without​giving​it​the​right​to​do​good​where​today​it​ does​evil,​because​it​does​it​arbitrarily?​To​this​study​we​consecrate​ourselves. ​ We​are​young​and​we​arrived​at​public​life​yesterday,​still​filled​with​ dreams.​We​have​been​returned​to​reality​by​the​spectacle​of​our​disgraced​country,​which,​however​much​it​has​inscribed​beautiful​ideas​ in​its​laws,​continues​along​as​disgraced​as​always;​the​spectacle​of​the​ other​people​who,​not​wishing​to​lose​their​prosperity,​withdraw​into​ themselves​and​create​what​suits​them,​what​is​useful​to​them,​without​ worrying​about​political​dogmas;​the​voice​of​science​that​tells​us​that​ nothing​absolute​is​given​to​man​to​realize,​man​being​subject​irremissibly​to​the​inflexible​laws​of​nature;​and​the​voice​of​our​conscience​that​ compels​us​to​sacrifice​a​world​of​illusions​in​order​to​obtain​an​atom​of​ well-​being​for​our​country. ​ We​declare,​consequently,​not​to​understand​liberty​if​it​is​not​real-

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ized​within​order,​and​for​that​we​are​conservatives;​nor​order​if​it​is​not​ the​normal​impulse​toward​progress,​and​we​are,​therefore,​liberals. ​ Immense​is​the​seriousness​of​our​social​and​political​problems.​We​ do​not​presume​to​present​a​solution;​certainly,​we​have​the​assurance​of​ advancing​along​the​only​road​by​which​it​can​be​found.

4 ​

Polemic with José María Vigil mr.​viGil​and​artiCle​5​​ of​the​ConStitution

The​bulletin​El Monitor Republicano1​of​Thursday​is​dedicated​to​a​critical​examination​of​the​recent​interpretations​of​Article​5​ of​ the​ Federal​ Constitution2​ made​ by​ the​ Supreme​ Court.​ Its​ author,​ Mr.​Vigil,​takes​advantage​of​the​opportunity​to​add​some​dark​and​vigorous​brushstrokes​to​the​picture,​so​many​times​repeated,​of​the​profound​ lack​of​respect​for​individual​rights,​the​chronic​illness​of​our​country. ​ As​a​result​of​these​eloquent​ideas,​the​journalist​refutes​the​Court’s​ interpretation​by​virtue​of​which​legally​required​public​services​are​not​ understood​in​the​words​“personal​labors,”​of​which​Article​5​of​the​fundamental​law​makes​use. ​ No​one​respects​Mr.​Vigil​more​than​we​do,​and​we​regret​being​in​ disagreement​with​him.​The​eminent​journalist​of​El Monitor,​we​are​ sorry​to​assert,​belongs​to​the​old​liberal​school​that,​as​the​French​say,​ a fait son temps.3​It​is​what​we​would​call​literary​literalism,​which​is​more​ pleased​with​a​sonorous​sentence​and​a​well-​turned​phrase​than​with​ one​of​those​straightforward​and​positive​truths​that​we​are​condemned​ ​ Original​title:​“Polémica​ con​don​José​María​Vigil.”​ Source:​La Libertad,​ Mexico,​ August​23,​1878;​August​30,​1878;​September​6,​1878;​October​23,​1878;​and​October​30,​ 1878. ​ 1.​In​1878​the​editor​in​chief​of​El Monitor Republicano​was​Vicente​García​Torres,​and​ José​María​Vigil,​an​old​liberal,​was​a​contributing​editor.​(Editor’s​note) ​ 2.​Article​5​of​the​1857​Constitution​states:​“No​one​can​be​compelled​to​render​personal​services​[trabajos]​without​due​compensation​and​without​his​full​consent.​Law​ cannot​authorize​a​contract​that​aims​at​the​loss​or​irrevocable​sacrifice​of​a​man’s​liberty,​be​it​for​work,​education,​or​religious​vows.​Neither​can​it​authorize​compacts​in​ which​a​man​accepts​his​banishment​or​exile.”​(Editor’s​note) ​ 3.​“Has​had​its​day.”​(Editor’s​note) 391

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to​encounter​in​the​street​at​any​time,​and​that​we​trip​over,​at​the​risk​ of​injuring​ourselves,​because​we​are​looking​at​the​sky​while​walking. ​ All​our​authorities​have​tyrannical​instincts,​says​Mr.​Vigil.​We​ask​ him,​do​these​authorities​fall​to​us​from​the​clouds?​No.​They​rise​up​ from​society​and​are​genuine​products​of​our​defective​Constitution;​ they​are​the​scrofula​that​reveals​the​destructive​poverty​of​our​temperament. ​ And​how​to​correct​the​illness?​By​means​of​Article​5​interpreted​ at​the​gallop​of​the​imagination?​Respect​for​individual​rights!​But​in​ what​tree​of​our​fields​does​that​fruit​grow?​Does​Mr.​Vigil​not​observe​ the​hatred​for​the​different​life​and​the​disdain​for​liberty​that​every​ Mexican​left​to​his​instincts​has?​What​does​it​come​to,​then,​to​take​ up​the​sonorous​horn​of​the​revolutionary​declamation​so​as​to​cry​out:​ Article​5​must​be​an​absolute​article​because​the​democratic​revolution​ has​won​that​great​principle​by​virtue​of​which​neither​the​army​nor​the​ municipality​nor​the​penitentiary​regime​is​possible? ​ No,​this​is​not​true;​it​is​not​to​penetrate​into​the​facts​and​take​notice​ of​them​simply​and​frankly;​it​is​not​to​put​the​probe​in​the​wound,​but​ rather​to​cover​it​with​a​veil​that​hides​with​the​golden​warping​chain​ of​the​academic​term​the​innermost​and​disgusting​evil​that​is​killing​ us.​The​violation​of​guarantees,​the​insult​to​right,​comes​because,​when​ the​legal​precept​does​not​accord​with​the​needs​of​life,​arbitrariness​ and​despotism​are​the​only​possible​regime​in​societies​like​ours​that​are​ barely​embryonic. ​ And​ then​ does​ Mr.​ Vigil​ believe​ that,​ because​ he​ has​ said​ that​ the​ interpretation​of​the​Court​is​dangerous,​it​has​already​been​refuted?​ Frankly,​we​have​not​found​any​strength​in​the​journalist’s​reasoning.​ We​would​like​to​see​him​descend​from​generalities​and​approach​the​ fundamentals​of​the​interpretation​mentioned​under​its​triple​aspect:​ historical,​constitutional,​and​philosophical.​Mr.​Vigil​believes​that​the​ application​of​Article​16​is​useless​because​slavery​has​been​abolished.4​ Well,​it​is​the​coercion​of​the​Indian​constable,​it​is​the​servitude​of​the​ ​ 4.​“Nobody​can​be​disturbed​in​his​person,​family,​place​of​abode,​papers,​and​possessions​ without​ a​ written​ warrant​ issued​ by​ a​ competent​ authority​ based​ on​ legal​ grounds.​When​an​offense​is​committed​in​flagrante​delicto,​any​person​can​arrest​the​ criminal​and​his​accomplices​by​placing​them​without​delay​in​the​custody​of​the​nearest​authority.”​(Editor’s​note)

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peon,​ it​ is​ that​ slave​ of​ a​ piece​ of​ ground,​ the​ serf​ of​ the​ glebe,​ as​ it​ was​called​in​the​Middle​Ages,​that,​like​an​instrument​of​redemption,​ Article​4​intends​to​rectify. ​ As​was​natural,​Mr.​Vigil​recommends​to​us​the​example​of​the​United​ States​in​organizing​its​army​in​the​recent​civil​war.​An​American​would​ laugh​to​himself​at​this​charming​idea.​Precisely​by​violence,​breaking​ the​contracts​of​the​volunteers​and​compelling​them​to​remain​in​the​ encampment,​was​Sherman​able​to​organize​the​Army​of​the​Potomac​ and​ thus​ save​ the​ cause​ of​the​ North.​ And​ this​ is​because​ the​ Saxon,​ who​so​much​respects​individual​right,​when​the​hour​of​social​danger​ sounds,​makes​the​right​of​the​individual​yield​to​everything​necessary​ to​counteract​the​danger. ​ Mr.​Vigil​is​correct​to​condemn​that​horrible​abduction​of​the​levy​ that​has​drawn​the​young​blood​from​the​veins​of​our​country,​and​that​ is​one​of​the​causes​of​our​incurable​anemia;​but​let​his​anathema​not​ move​from​there​if​he​wants​his​arrows​to​go​to​the​target​and​no​further.

la libErtad​and​mr.​viGil

The​journalist​of​El Monitor​does​us​the​honor​of​answering​some​of​the​ observations​we​directed​to​his​criticism​of​a​ruling​in​which​the​Court​ of​Justice​expresses​a​new​interpretation​of​Article​5​of​the​fundamental​law.​It​was​our​objective​to​stimulate​debate​over​the​basics​of​this​ interpretation,​which​Mr.​Vigil’s​bulletin​left​untouched.​We​have​not​ succeeded,​and​we​are​going​to​reply​for​the​purpose​of​making​a​second​ attempt​on​the​same​point,​rescuing,​in​any​case,​our​respect​and​sympathy​for​a​writer​before​whose​intellectual​and​moral​worth​we​have​long​ been​accustomed​to​bow. ​ We​sense​that​Mr.​Vigil​might​ have​taken​poorly​the​classification​ that​we​make​of​the​school​in​which​the​character​of​his​writings​places​ him.​In​truth,​our​intention​could​be​only​to​express​a​fact:​We​call​that​ school​old​because​in​Mexico​it​tends​to​be​replaced​by​another​so​different​that,​although​it​might​well​be​considered​a​historical​consequence​ of​the​revolutionary​school,​it​is​not,​nor​is​it​by​far​its​scientific​consequence.​Let​us​explain. ​ The​old liberal school that has passed its time,​as​Mr.​Vigil​says,​or​has​accomplished​its​mission,​as​we​said,​availing​ourselves​of​a​French​locution,​is​the​school​that​believes​that​a​society​regenerates​itself​thanks​to​ political​dogmas​linked​with​metaphysical​dogmas;​that​without​taking​

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into​account​the​truth​of​the​facts,​or​the​experience,​or​the​conditions​ in​which​a​people​lives,​it​makes​factitious​laws​that​are​not​the​product​ of​social​needs,​but​rather​that​tend​by​means​of​false​propositions​to​ reduce​societies​to​a​specific​way​of​being,​which​is​a​scientific​error;​it​ is​the​school​that​believes​that​the​way​to​mold​the​people​to​those​dogmas​is​violence,​that​is​to​say,​revolution,​which​is​a​moral​error;​it​is​the​ school​that​believes,​with​Mr.​Vigil,​that​the​men​of​[17]93​established​ forgotten​or​unknown​rights​on​eternal​foundations,​which​is​a​historical​error. ​ That​school,​born​in​disturbance​and​for​disturbance,​needed​eloquence​and​rhetoric​to​stir​up​the​passions​of​a​part​of​society​and​hurl​ it​like​a​formidable​battering​ram​on​the​other​part;​from​here​come​its​ methods,​essentially​literary​and​sentimental,​which​consist​in​replacing​ what​should​be​a​rigorous​scientific​proof​with​a​poetic​turn​of​phrase.​ For​example,​an​impartial​man​observes​that​when​all​sensible​Mexicans​acknowledge​that​“only​with​difficulty​can​there​be​a​people​that​ lives​in​more​anarchic​conditions,​in​which​the​authority​has​lost​more​ of​ its​ prestige,​ in​ which​ political​ passions​ ferment​ more​ actively​ (?),​ and​ that​ it​ is​ necessary​ to​ recognize​ with​ sadness​ that​ our​ country​ is​ very​backward”​(Mr.​Vigil’s​text),​and​that​observation​is​followed​by​ this​other:​Given​that​Mexico​finds​itself​in​that​state,​how​is​it​that​it​ has​a​Constitution​in​which​there​are​one​hundred​times​fewer​conservative​elements,​elements​of​stability​and​order,​than​in​the​most​liberal​of​the​countries​that​march​at​the​forefront​of​civilization?​How​is​ it​that​in​France,​where​the​men​of​’93​made​the​marvels​that​Mr.​Vigil​ attributes​to​them,​it​has​been​recognized​that​only​an​ultraconservative​republic​is​possible?​How​is​it​that​England,​the​classical​country​ of​self-​government,​has​an​aristocratic​constitution?​How​it​is​that​Germany​maintains​semifeudal​institutions?​Why​in​the​United​States​does​ individual​right​yield​every​day,​every​minute,​before​society,​whether​ the​government​represents​society​confiscating​the​goods​of​the​Confederate,​whether​the​inhabitants​of​a​town​who​lynch​the​criminal,​setting​aside​the​judge​and​the​Constitution?​And​here,​in​a​backward​and​ essentially​anarchic​country,​we​have​a​fundamental​law​that​assumes​a​ state​of​progress​ten​times​superior​to​that​of​those​peoples? ​ And​this​is​not​talking​for​the​sake​of​talking.​Mr.​Vigil,​for​example,​ maintains​that​the​article​in​the​Constitution​that​says,​“No​one​can​be​

polemiC​with​joSé​maría​viGil : 395

compelled​to​give​personal​labor,”​must​be​understood​in​an​absolute​ way,​the​same​for​private​labor​as​for​public​service.​Mr.​Vigil​does​not​ linger​over​this​distinction;​ let​us​move​on.​Logic​makes​terrible​ demands;​what​human​action​does​not​involve​the​idea​of​effort,​and​what​ effort​is​not​labor?​Then​who​has​the​right​to​compel​nothing​or​nobody​in​this​blessed​country?​And​what​Constitution,​even​be​it​that​of​ ’93,​has​proclaimed​such​an​enchanting​and​practical​liberty​above​all?​ This​is​the​absurdity,​Mr.​Vigil​will​say.​Well,​before​this​absurdity​the​ majority​of​the​Court​has​backed​down​and​has​sought​an​interpretation​ that​not​only​reason​authorized,​but​also​that​the​historical​sources​of​ the​Constitution​demanded,​the​voice​of​the​Ponciano​Arriagas,​of​the​ Léon​Guzmáns,​of​the​Ignacio​Ramírezes,​who​expressed​the​spirit​of​ the​constituent. ​ This​is,​among​others,​the​historical​point​of​view​from​which​we​ invited​the​illustrious​journalist​to​study​the​question.​For​this​study,​ it​was​sufficient​to​appeal​to​the​texts​and​to​reason​within​everyone’s​ grasp​without​soaring​to​abstractions​which,​being​abstractions,​had​to​ be​unintelligible​as​Mr.​Vigil​seems​to​believe,​falling​into​a​banality​unworthy​of​his​talent. ​ Well​ then,​ to​ all​ those​ observations,​ what​ does​ literary​ liberalism​ answer?​Purely​and​simply​that​the​Constitution​is​holy,​that​the​people​ have​ spilled​ their​ blood​ for​ it,​ that​ to​ destroy​ the​ woes​ that​ trouble​ us​it​is​necessary​to​observe​the​Constitution​faithfully.​The​Republic​ has​seen​pass​through​power​the​whole​liberal​party​in​all​its​faces​and​ nuances;​it​has​seen​pass​with​their​partisans​branched​out​throughout​ the​country​the​Juarista​party,​guided​by​an​eminently​practical​citizen;​ the​Lerdista​party,​presided​over​by​one​of​the​most​intelligent​men​we​ have​known;​the​Porfirista​party,​led​by​a​caudillo​of​incorruptible​probity;​and​when,​in​what​day,​in​what​moment,​has​the​Constitution​been​ observed? ​ Will​this​not​mean​that​there​are​impractical​things​in​our​political​ code​because​it​is​not​in​harmony​with​our​social​conditions?​Between​ the​rigorously​inductive​argument​that​can​be​supported​with​an​infinite​ series​of​facts​and​the​deduction​of​Mr.​Vigil,​imperfect,​without​proven​ foundation,​based​in​simple​a​priori​truths,​that​is,​in​dogmas,​which​is​ it​to​be?​What​is​it​that​reason​demands? ​ Two​brief​caveats​fit​here.​When​we​said​that​our​Constitution​was​

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flawed,​a​printing​error​that​consisted​of​changing​a​lowercase​c​for​an​ uppercase,​Mr.​Vigil​suggested​that​we​were​referring​to​the​Constitution​of​’57.​No,​we​were​speaking,​as​the​other​sentence​indicated,​of​ the​general​state​of​our​particular​organization,​of​our​aptitude​for​life.​ What​the​esteemed​writer​has​said​regarding​the​matter​has​therefore​ been​in​vain.​The​second​caveat​is​directed​to​a​willful​error​of​Mr.​Vigil.​ We​have​not​said​in​absolute​terms​that​arbitrariness​and​despotism​are​ the​only​regimes​possible​in​this​embryonic​society;​the​writer​himself​ transcribes​the​proposition​that​preceded​this​one:​When​the​legal​precept​is​not​in​accord​with​the​needs​of​social​life,​then​arbitrariness​is​the​ only​possible​regime.​And​this​is​a​truth​of​such​a​nature​that​it​is​enough​ to​cast​a​glance​around​us​to​be​overwhelmed​with​its​proof. ​ Far​from​desiring​arbitrariness,​we​are​its​most​convinced​enemies;​ for​that​reason​we​want​practical​legal​rules,​so​that​not​one​single​reason​for​despotism​remains​alive. ​ But​not​for​this​reason​is​our​disagreement​with​Mr.​Vigil​less​radical.​ He​believes​that​when​a​law​like​three​[burying​one’s​head​in​the​sand]​ cannot​be​carried​out,​it​is​necessary,​to​correct​the​ill,​to​change​the​ three​into​ten,​but​this​is​a​dream,​it​is​an​infantile​illusion;​this​is​not​ done,​nor​has​it​ever​been​done.​History​has​never​seen​such​an​undertaking​realized. ​ Ay!​We​are​culprits​in​that​offense.​So​we​have​spoken​in​prose​and​ verse​until​the​day​when​at​last​we​were​men,​and​when​the​fundamental​importance​of​identifying​an​ideal​with​bitter​reality​was​revealed​ to​us​in​hours​of​supreme​anguish​and​we​took​off​the​old​vestments.​ We​understood​then​that​in​a​country,​no​matter​how​strong​and​great​ it​might​be,​civil​divisions​cannot​be​prolonged​indefinitely,​and​that​ either​ the​ energy​ of​ good​ men​ imposes​ silence​ on​ the​ others​ or​ foreign​domination​imposes​silence​on​everybody.​In​the​spirit​of​helping​ the​good​men,​we​remember​those​words​of​a​Greek​historian​from​the​ times​in​which​the​civil​wars,​ignited​in​the​name​of​liberty​and​democracy,​had​put​an​end​to​Greece: ​ “Some​will​wonder​that​I​speak​with​this​bitterness​when​it​was​incumbent​on​me,​more​than​on​any​other,​to​palliate​the​failings​of​the​ Greeks.​But​I​am​of​the​opinion​that,​in​the​eyes​of​sensible​persons,​the​ sincere​friend​is​not​the​one​who​fears​being​frank,​nor​is​the​good​citizen​the​one​who​is​unfaithful​to​the​truth​so​as​not​to​hurt​some​of​his​

polemiC​with​joSé​maría​viGil : 397

contemporaries:​he​writes​not​to​praise​the​hated​ones​but​rather​to​correct​evil​ways​and​prevent​repetition​of​the​same​faults”​(Polybius).

our​prinCipleS We​said​that​the​old​liberal​school​based​its​principles​on​metaphysical​dogmas,​and​El Monitor,​in​its​Tuesday​bulletin,​takes​it​upon​itself​ to​give​us​the​reason​in​the​most​explicit​terms.​The​columnist​and​colleague​declares​that​he​belongs​to​the​radical​democratic​school,​“that​he​ starts​from​the​absolute​and​returns​to​it;​that​he​rests​on​the​a​priori​of​ certain​ideas​that​do​not​come​from​experience;​that​the​radical​democratic​ school​ is​ the​ child​ of​ Rousseau;​ that​ it​ originates​ from​ the​ Social Contract,​etc.”​El Monitor​is,​then,​classified,​and,​we​confess,​the​ category​of​liberalism​in​which​it​places​itself​surprised​us​not​a​little.​ We​did​not​expect​that​the​defender​of​absolute​individual​right​would​ fix​on​the​sect​of​Rousseau,​whose​fundamental​principles​are​the​existence​of​a​happy​primitive​state​from​which​the​current​state​is​a​degeneration,​of​a​“contract”​that​is​the​foundation​of​social​relations,​which​ means​that​society​is​something​purely​contractual,​and,​above​all,​of​ the​famous​dogma​of​the​absolute​power​of​the​people​to​whose​right​ are​subordinated​those​of​the​individual.​This​school,​which​is​the​one​ that​Madame​Staël​condemns​in​the​eloquent​phrases​cited​by​the​journalist,​is​in​poor​agreement,​truthfully,​with​the​theories​of​individual​ supremacy​adopted​by​our​colleague. ​ But​Mr.​Vigil​goes​further.​Imitating​a​talented​“rhetorician,”​who​is​ certainly​not​a​radical​democrat,​he​takes​on​the​mission​of​remaking​ man​immediately​on​the​standard​of​these​three​absolutes:​the​absolute​ of​right,​the​absolute​of​equality,​and​the​absolute​of​liberty. ​ There​ the​ confusion​ of​ doctrines;​ here​ the​ war​ of​ words​ and​ absurdity.​What​does​this​thing​about​the​three​absolutes​mean?​The​absolute​either​is​one​or​is​not​one.​To​say​three​absolutes​is​like​saying​three​ infinities,​which​is​a​piece​of​nonsense,​given​that​the​idea​of​plurality​ and​that​of​limitation​are​coincident.​Absolute​right,​which​arises​only​ from​the​relationship​of​individual​to​individual​and​which​is​limited​ by​the​right​of​another;​absolute​equality​(a​delirium​proven​false​by​ everything​ that​can​and​might​exist)​ when​this​absolute​would​be​in​ contradiction​with​the​previous​one,​given​that,​in​this​case,​everyone​ would​have​right​over​everything,​which​is​the​same​thing​as​denying​

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right;​absolute​liberty​when,​just​as​with​society,​the​individual​and​in​ the​individual​what​is​called​spiritual​and​what​is​called​material​are​subject​to​invariable​laws​that​govern​the​universe​in​which​they​are​atoms,​ man,​and​society! ​ The​journalist​sees​that​to​shape​the​eminently​positive​structure​of​ social​relations​on​a​metaphysical​foundation​is​like​using​the​sea​as​a​ foundation​for​a​pyramid.​These​dogmas,​to​which​one​does​not​come​by​ experience,​are​not,​cannot​be​the​object​of​human​science;​they​are​the​ object​of​faith,​which​is​the​most​personal​that​exists​beneath​the​sun,​ and​consequently​the​most​arbitrary,​the​most​variable,​the​most​irreducible​there​is.​How​to​extract​from​this​immense​void​the​complicated​ mechanism​of​a​political​constitution? ​ Continuing​in​pursuit​of​Mr.​Caro​and​making​use​of​his​analysis,​intentionally​incomplete,​the​journalist​has​the​kindness​to​tell​us​what​it​ is​we​want​and​where​we​are​going.​“We​are​aristocrats​and​we​are​going​ to​the​dictatorship​to​deliver​society​to​the​arbitrary​will​of​a​supreme​ ruler.”​We​appeal​to​the​uprightness​of​the​journalist​to​show​us​whether​ he​believes​in​all​conscience​to​have​found​in​our​assertions​any​that​ might​authorize​him​to​infer​such​an​extraordinary​conclusion,​or​if​it​ is​only​in​the​interest​of​winning​that​he​is​led​to​set​us​up​by​so​absurd​ a​remark​with​the​goal​of​providing​himself​with​an​easy​victory. ​ If,​instead​of​letting​himself​be​transported​by​the​interested​and​artificial​criticism​of​the​French​professor,​the​journalist​had​gone​to​the​ sources,​he​would​not​attribute​to​us,​neither​to​the​masters​nor​to​us​ the​disciples,​those​bizarre​and​brutal​ideas.​The​new​school,​the​school​ of​the​future,​as​Mr.​Caro​ironically​calls​it,​the​experimental​English​ school,​which​cannot​be​confused​with​that​of​Auguste​Comte,​proceeds​ in​a​more​serious​way​and​with​more​forceful​methods​than​the​school​ with​which​El Monitor​deals.​An​example​suffices:​the​radical​democratic​ school​declares​itself​child​of​the​Social Contract.​We​ask,​is​there​any​ book​in​which​individual​right​is​more​systematically​disavowed​than​ in​this​one?​The​positive​school​counts,​among​the​best​of​its​productions,​the​book​by​[John]​Stuart​Mill,​On Liberty.​Have​individualism​ and​positive​liberty​been​defended​anywhere​more​admirably​than​in​ that​work?​Well​then,​to​compare​those​two​books​is​almost​like​comparing​the​two​schools. ​ But​let​us​proceed​to​something​more​concrete.​Which​are,​in​their​ general​features,​the​ideas​of​that​school​we​believe​called​to​replace​the​

polemiC​with​joSé​maría​viGil : 399

old​liberalism​in​Mexico?​It​is​necessary​to​spell​them​out​so​that​someone​else’s​liabilities​do​not​continue​being​attributed​to​us. 1.​Society,​like​all​concrete​existence,​is​the​product​of​a​development​subject​to​fixed​laws.​Guiding​investigations,​in​the​sense​ of​knowing​these​laws​and​conforming​the​positive​laws​to​them,​ must​be​the​work​of​the​statesman,​the​legislator,​the​public​writer.​ Everything​that​might​be​contrary​to​these​laws​is​artificial,​can​be​ maintained​only​by​physical​or​moral​violence,​and​is​condemned​to​ perish​irremissibly.​This​violence​is,​as​a​general​rule,​what​receives​ the​name​of​revolution​or​reaction.​We​call​the​organic​development​of​human​groups​“the​social​evolution.” 2.​Right,​not​being​able​to​have,​outside​of​metaphysical​arbitrariness,​a​foundation​other​than​the​principle​of​utility​with​respect​to​ the​progressive​interests​of​the​human​species,​and​progress​being​ the​result​of​the​growing​activity​of​each​individual,​it​is​the​duty​of​ everyone,​expressed​in​the​law,​to​facilitate​the​development​of​this​ activity.​This​is​what​we​understand​by​“individual​right.” 3.​The​function​of​the​state​consists​in​protecting​those​rights;​that​ is​what​we​call​social​justice.​But​as​the​state​is,​whatever​might​be​ its​form​or​legal​appearance,​a​product​of​the​sentiments​that​prevail​in​a​society,​to​the​degree​to​which​these​sentiments​are​more​ antisocial,​let​us​say,​the​state​has​to​be​more​conservative,​the​authority​more​vigorous,​to​prevent​the​dissolution​of​the​national​ group;​in​which​case​individual​right​must​yield​and​has​yielded​and​ will​always​yield​in​order​not​to​perish. ​ This​is​the​irrefutable​truth​sanctioned​by​all​constitutions.​For​absolute​individualists,​like​the​writer​we​are​combating,​the​constitutional​ power​to​suspend​guarantees​is​a​contradiction.​Come​now,​the​right​ based​in​the​three​absolutes​can​cease​to​be,​even​if​temporarily?​But,​ we​will​repeat​it​a​hundred​times,​logic​makes​terrible​demands,​and​ social​ needs​ ruin​ the​ most​ sacred​ dogmas​ of​ radical​ democracy.​ This​ is​the​reality;​all​of​us​are​aware​of​it,​except​that​some​of​us​declare​it​ and​others​keep​quiet​about​it​in​order​to​flatter​we​do​not​know​what​ ephemeral​idol​of​lies​and​dementia. ​ So​certain​is​this​that​the​article​writer,​in​his​defense​of​the​Constitution,​ such​ as​ it​ is,​ and​ in​ his​ ill​ will​ toward​ the​ system​ of​ friars,​

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has​ thrown​ out​ individual​ right.​ Why​ can​ the​ friars​ not​ consociate?​ Where​are,​gentlemen​knights​of​the​ideal​and​of​eternal​and​indescribable​right,​where​are​your​resonant​principles​here?​The​most​lay​of​the​ secularized​laypeople​could​exclaim,​“How​do​you​remake​man​on​the​ standard​of​absolute​liberty,​of​absolute​equality,​and​prevent​us​from​ joining​together?​Well,​perchance​are​we​friars​not​men?​Why​do​you​ not​permit​us​to​gather​even​a​leftover​scrap​from​that​feast​of​absolutes​ which​ your​ political​ metaphysics​ gives​ us​ as​ a​ gift?”​ Well​ then,​ if​ El Monitor​is​faithful​to​its​church,​neither​now​nor​ever​will​it​give​to​this​ reproach​an​answer​worth​the​trouble. ​ We​have​too​long​continued​these​notes,​but,​on​the​other​hand,​we​ have​set​down​some​of​the​cardinal​fundamentals​of​our​program,​providing​our​objectors​a​more​extensive​and​firmer​ground​for​their​attacks.​What​consequences​do​we​extract​from​these​premises?​How​do​ we​try​to​reduce​them​to​practice​and​formulate​them​into​law?​It​is​a​ question​ regarding​ which​ we​ will​ not​ lack​ an​ opportunity​ to​ discuss​ later;​probably​the​illustrious​journalist​of​El Monitor​will​provide​us​the​ occasion​to​do​so. ​ One​observation​and​we​will​conclude. ​ Not​because​we​are​guided​by​the​facts,​not​because​we​deny​that​ there​are​demonstrable​truths​other​than​those​that​internal​or​external​ experience​teaches​us,​do​we​lack​an​ideal.​We​pride​ourselves​on​placing​ the​ideal​higher​than​the​revolutionary​school.​Enough​to​say​that,​for​ us,​progress​is​a​necessity,​it​is​an​immutable​law;​that​the​knowledge​of​ this​law​permits​us​to​assure​that​a​day​will​come​when​the​constraint​of​ the​moral​law​in​the​human​spirit​will​replace​all​positive​laws​and​the​ state​will​be​reduced​to​its​functions​of​protection,​that​is​to​say,​to​administer​justice.​Democracy​is​also​an​ideal​for​us,​not​because​we​see​in​ the​government​of​the​greater​number​anything​rational​or​good​in​and​ of​itself,​but​rather​because​it​is​what​provides​greater​expanse​to​individual​development. ​ No,​we​are​not​the​ones​who​deny​the​marvelous​power​of​the​idea;​it​ is​a​principal​factor​in​the​improvement​of​societies.​If​our​worthy​colleague​had​contented​himself​with​showing​us​the​ideal,​our​disagreement​would​have​been​less,​perhaps.​But​faithful​in​this​to​the​methods​ of​the​revolutionary​party,​he​wants​that​that​ideal,​that​those​principles,​ be​forcibly​reduced​to​positive​laws,​and​this​happened​in​the​Constitution,​and​to​this​we​owe​the​fact​that​the​Constitution​is​not​practiced​

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and​that​there​is​in​reality​another​constitution​in​force,​the​only​one​ that​a​people​in​the​conditions​of​ours​can​have,​but​that,​because​in​ contradiction​with​the​written​law,​leaves​a​wide​space​for​arbitrariness​ and​despotism. ​ When​men​have​wanted​to​convert​an​ideal​into​reality​and​impose​it​ by​compulsion​of​law,​it​opens​to​nations​the​era​of​bonfires​of​the​Inquisition​to​realize​a​religious​ideal;​that​of​the​guillotine​to​realize​a​political​ideal;​that​of​tarring​to​realize​a​social​ideal.5​It​was​fifty​years​ago​ that​the​radical​democratic​school​and​the​reactionary​school,​in​order​ to​realize​their​ideals,​opened​wide​the​gates​of​Mexico​to​civil​battles.​ Do​we​deserve​the​terrible​anathemas,​those​of​us​who​believe​the​time​ to​close​those​gates​has​arrived?

Some​wordS​to​El Monitor

In​his​bulletin​of​yesterday,​Mr.​Vigil​deals​with​refuting​the​ideas​of​ La Libertad​with​the​same​arguments​of​which​he​has​constantly​made​ use.​Nor​did​Mr.​Vigil​even​think​about​entering​into​the​editing​room​ of​the​worthy​colleague​of​the​street​of​Letrán,6​when​La Libertad​had​ already​ explained​ at​ length​ what​ it​ understood​ by​ the​ word​ “conservative,”​basing​its​principal​attribute​on​opposition​to​revolution​and​ its​ absolute​ opposition​ to​ the​ word​ “reactionary.”​ Then​ we​ said​ that,​ in​Mexico,​there​had​not​properly​been​either​liberals,​because​in​the​ hands​of​these​liberty​had​been​a​myth,​or​conservatives,​because​those​ who​are​called​thus​were​radically​incapable​of​shoring​up​order.​There​ has​not​been,​then,​in​our​country,​anything​but​revolutionaries​and​reactionaries.​It​would​suffice​for​us​to​show​this,​with​regard​to​the​liberals,​simply​by​pointing​out,​among​the​opinions​of​the​most​sensible​ and​moderate​of​them,​political​creeds​like​that​of​the​radical​democracy​ adopted​by​Mr.​Vigil. ​ Revolutionaries​wish​to​make​progress​by​ax​blows,​imposing​it​by​ violence,​not​understanding​that​progress​is​not​at​the​mercy​of​dreamers​ or​ made​ by​ means​ of​ political​ codes,​ but​ rather​ is​ brought​ about​ ​ 5.​Tarring​was​a​form​of​corporal​punishment​that​entailed​smearing​a​person’s​body​ with​tar.​It​was​sometimes​inflicted​by​a​mob​on​an​unpopular​or​scandalous​character.​ (Editor’s​note) ​ 6.​The​offices​of​El Monitor Republicano​were​in​the​street​of​San​Juan​de​Letrán​in​ Mexico​City.​(Editor’s​note)

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slowly​and​laboriously.​The​result​is​that​when,​by​virtue​of​a​revolution​constitutions​are​drawn​up,​these​float​on​the​surface​of​the​societies​like​aquatic​palms​on​the​currents,​without​touching​bottom​with​ their​roots.​It​happens​then​that​between​the​written​institutions​and​the​ natural​institutions​there​is​no​connection​whatsoever;​and​as​they​injure​and​hurt​each​other​mutually,​the​reality​is,​as​a​consequence,​that​ a​people​lives​without​institutions​and​is​the​plaything​of​political​and​ social​ventures.​This​is​what​happens​with​the​Mexican​Republic,​as​we​ will​not​tire​of​repeating,​as​we​will​show​only​too​well. ​ Mr.​Vigil​sees​that​he​does​not​have​to​appeal​to​“distinctions”​with​ our​epithet​of​conservatives:​the​literal​significance​and​the​political​significance​ are​ blended​ for​ us;​ for​ him,​ “conservative”​ means​ conserve​ the​Constitution;​for​us,​it​means​to​conserve​the​social​order,​the​only​ means​of​acclimatizing​liberty,​exotic​plant​in​our​history.​And​the​wonder​that​this​causes​Mr.​Vigil​surprises​us;​he​does​not​live​so​distant​ from​the​political​movement​in​the​modern​world​to​be​unaware​that​ the​word​has​been​transformed​and,​without​losing​its​original​meaning,​ has​been​enriched​with​first-​rate​scientific​elements.​When​American​ conservatives​dominate​definitively​in​the​United​States,​and​in​England​ the​conservative​party​also​dominates;​when​the​young​republican​generation​in​France,​thanks​to​political​ability​acquired​in​hours​of​terrible​ dangers,​calls​itself​conservative​and​supports​an​ultraconservative​constitution;​when​Emilio​Castelar​proclaims,​as​the​only​possible​one​in​ Spain,​a​conservative​republican​constitution​also,​why​is​he​reproaching​us​for​calling​ourselves​the​same​and​requesting,​not​in​the​name​of​ the​divinity​in​years​past,​but​rather​in​the​name​of​science​and​truth,​ order​in​a​disordered​country? ​ Another​mistake​Mr.​Vigil​makes​in​attempting​to​show​our​lack​of​ scientific​method​is​that​of​saying​that​our​solution​to​the​social​problem​is​provisioning​a​strong​government,​that​is​to​say,​one​capable​of​ preserving​order.​Not​a​letter,​not​a​tilde​of​La Libertad​authorizes​such​ an​assertion.​The​authors​of​social​panaceas​disgust​us,​and​never​have​ those​ who​ speak​ of​ the​ prosperity​ of​ a​ people​ by​ virtue​ of​ infallible​ means,​kept​in​enchanted​bottles,​seemed​to​us​anything​but​charlatans.​ The​problem​of​the​happiness​of​Mexico​is​complex​in​the​extreme;​we​ need​many​things​and​much​time​to​resolve​it.​We​beg​Mr.​Vigil​to​lend​ us​two​minutes​more​of​attention. ​ In​reality​we​have​neither​institutions​nor​rights​nor​guarantees;​all​

polemiC​with​joSé​maría​viGil : 403

this​is​at​the​mercy​of​the​revolutionary​man.​What​is​the​practical​way​ to​make​this​condition​disappear?​Adapt​individual​right​to​the​conditions​of​our​existence,​invigorate​the​principle​of​authority,​give​us​a​ strong​government. ​ What​we​want,​then,​with​a​strong​government,​around​which​the​ conservative​elements​of​society​can​assemble,​is​to​combat​revolutions,​ is​to​make​them​gradually​impossible.​From​this,​peace​would​come,​and​ that​certainly​is​a​condition​to​realize​material​improvements,​the​only​ path​that​guides​us​to​the​solution​to​the​problem. ​ Do​we​have​here​some​sin​against​the​scientific​method,​that​is​to​say,​ against​experience​and​reason?​Is​there​a​just​reason​for​so​much​scandal​in​our​affirmation​that​constitutions​that​have​as​their​objective,​like​ ours,​to​do​the​good​of​humanity​and​that​begin​only​by​admitting​the​ constitutions​that​are​good​for​the​Italians,​for​the​French,​for​the​Chileans,​etc.,​have​ended​in​all​civilized​countries?​If​every​country​encounters​itself​in​itself​and​studies​its​needs​and​tries​to​satisfy​them,​without​ setting​itself​to​ascertain​which​are​the​rights​of​man​and​which​are​not,​ by​what​strange​misfortune​has​Mexico​been​eternally​unable​to​do​the​ same?​Why​are​the​doors​closed​to​this​healthy​and​comforting​egoism?​ Does​it​not​seem​to​El Monitor​that​it​is​now​time​that​the​wisdom​tooth​ might​come​through?

the​laSt​word​of​El Monitor

The​journalist​of​El Monitor​has​spoken​his​last​word​in​the​polemic​that​ he​began​with​La Libertad.​This​last​word​is​exactly​like​the​first.​We​will​ overlook​everything​Mr.​Vigil​insisted​on​attributing​to​us,​probably​applying​the​art​of​discussing​the​scientific​method​of​which​he​has​an​idea;​ thus​it​is​that​the​journalist​insists​that​our​ideal​in​the​matter​of​national​ prosperity​is​a​strong​government​despite​the​fact​that​his​own​reference​ contradicts​it.​We​have​explained​that​we​do​not​claim​to​have​discovered​ a​panacea​or​system​to​cure​all​the​ills​of​the​country,​but​rather​simply​ that​one​of​our​most​urgent​needs​is​establishing​a​robust​government,​ not​because​in​satisfying​it​our​ills​will​be​cured​as​if​by​enchantment,​ but​rather​because​in​the​midst​of​a​society​that​every​day​loses​an​element​of​union,​that​lives​as​if​for​a​short​time,​that​“is​going​out,”​as​an​ ancient​said,​speaking​of​the​anarchy​in​a​country​of​the​Orient,​it​is​necessary,​it​is​indispensable,​it​is​of​an​inexpressible​importance​to​form​ a​strong​nucleus​capable​of​attracting​some​powerful​interests​in​their​

404 : juSto​Sierra

turn​and​trying​to​save,​in​that​way,​what​the​constituents​considered​the​ supreme​objective​of​their​labors:​the​unity​of​the​patria. ​ Despite​the​fact​that​we​have​been​clear​and​conclusive​as​much​as​is​ possible​in​the​matter,​Mr.​Vigil​responded​that​we​were​maintaining​ vaguenesses.​This​is​a​polemical​retort,​it​is​not​a​sincere​truth.​We​do​ not​know​what​is​vague​about​requesting​the​establishment​of​a​conservative​ government.—That​ is​ dictatorship,​ they​ have​ said​ to​ us.— Calumny,​we​have​responded;​dictatorship​is​arbitrariness​and​we​want​ order,​and​as​a​condition​for​getting​there,​the​reform​of​the​Constitution,​widening​the​sphere​of​the​authority​and​arming​it,​not​with​the​ prohibited​arms​of​despotism,​of​intrigue,​and​of​chicanery,​child​of​an​ impracticable​constitution,​but​rather​with​those​that​put​in​their​hands​ a​law​reconciled​with​our​true​needs​and​that​would​be​sufficient​to​promote​the​progress​of​all​and​look​after​the​right​of​each​one,​today​at​the​ mercy​of​force​and​corruption. ​ Is​this​clear?​Is​this​vague? ​ Ah,​no;​but​Mr.​Vigil​certainly​is​a​staunch​enemy​of​vagueness;​he​ certainly​supports​a​very​clear,​very​fecund,​very​precise​program,​a​great​ practical​program.​What​is​the​remedy​for​our​ills?​Comply​with​the​ Constitution.​Has​nothing​clearer​been​seen?​Yes,​this​is​the​sun.​How​ could​I​be​cured,​Doctor?​By​curing​yourself.​Comply​with​the​Constitution!​And​what​does​one​do​to​comply​with​it?​Enough​of​wanting​it,​ Mr.​Vigil​will​tell​us;​it​is​purely​a​matter​of​good​will.​Certainly,​men​of​ good​will​would​save​us;​but​as​there​are​none​here,​to​judge​by​the​history​of​the​Constitution,​it​will​be​necessary​to​have​them​made​somewhere​else. ​ But​we​have​a​classic​example​of​the​way​in​which​the​journalist​understands​that​the​Constitution​must​be​fulfilled.​To​bring​it​to​mind​is​to​ bring​to​mind​also​the​first​word​of​this​polemic.​It​dealt​with​Article​5​ of​the​Constitution,​which,​according​to​El Monitor,​must​be​understood​ thus:​no​inhabitant​of​the​Republic​is​obliged​to​lend​his​personal​labor​ to​society​without​his​full​consent.​The​article​does​not​say​that,​according​to​the​interpretation​of​the​highest​court​of​the​country;​but​that​is​ what​Mr.​Vigil​wants​it​so​say,​forgetting​that​the​Letter​kills.7 ​ 7.​“The​Letter​kills​but​the​spirit​gives​life”​(2​Cor.​3:6).​In​this​context​the​phrase​ refers​to​the​fact​that​under​the​Old​Covenant,​the​Law/Letter​given​in​Sinai​brought​ condemnation​and​debt​as​no​one​could​obey​it​perfectly​and​be​saved.​(Editor’s​note)

polemiC​with​joSé​maría​viGil : 405

​ The​journalist​wants,​as​we​do,​that​authority​be​respected;​but​when​ it​comes​to​the​army,​well​that​is​another​matter,​because​from​the​moment​the​citizen​does​not​consent​to​serve,​no​one​can​compel​him;​he​ wants​the​democratic​institutions​to​be​a​fact,​but​it​is​necessary​to​pay​ the​gentlemen​councilmen,​a​very​easy​thing​in​the​Republic,​because​ the​day​their​full​consent​ is​ lacking,​ who​can​compel​ them​to​serve?​ And​the​work​in​the​penitentiaries,​how​will​it​be​demanded?​And​the​ tax,​how​will​it​be​collected?​Is​not​money​a​representative​value​of​personal​labor?​Doesn’t​the​taxpayer​give​a​form​of​personal​labor​to​the​ state​in​the​form​of​money?​And​if​he​does​not​wish​to​give​it?​Article​5​ will​protect​him. ​ As​one​sees,​nothing​is​more​positive​and​nothing​can​bring​the​country​more​benefits​than​this​precept!​Will​Mr.​Vigil​not​want​to​reform​ it​in​the​sense​of​“increasing​liberties”?​Because​according​to​his​theory,​ the​more​a​liberty​is​stretched,​the​more​practical​it​is.​In​truth,​in​France​ and​in​England​such​liberty​does​not​exist;​but​why​be​concerned​with​ England​and​France?​Let​us​be​concerned​with​Mexico;​here​is​where​ that​liberty​has​been​strengthened;​here​is​where​it​is​admirably​adequate​for​what​we​need.​We​already​have​too​much​order,​we​have​done​ too​much​to​preserve​ourselves.​Liberty,​lots​of​liberty.​Evohe!8 ​ But​let​us​descend​the​resounding​steps​of​enthusiasm,​and​let​us​conclude​with​this​humble​and​pedestrian​observation.​The​Constitution​ has​existed​for​twenty​years​and​no​one​has​put​it​into​practice.​Does​our​ worthy​opponent​believe​that,​only​because​he​says​no​one​has​wanted​ to​put​the​Constitution​into​practice,​it​is​suddenly​going​to​be​put​into​ practice?​If​the​illness​is​in​men,​does​it​not​seem​to​him​that​the​illness​might​spread?​Does​not​Mr.​Vigil​have​in​reserve​some​remedy​for​ this​epidemic?​And​it​can​happen,​not​that​he​recovers​virginity​for​the​ Constitution,​as​in​Marión​Delorme,​Victor​Hugo,​but​that​he​fertilizes​ it​and​gives​us,​finally,​the​desired​child,​the​Messiah​of​the​social​regeneration​of​Mexico.

​ 8.​Interjection.​The​cry​of​the​Bacchae​(in​Greek​mythology,​the​priestesses​of​Bacchus)​in​honor​of​Dionysius.​(Editor’s​note)

5 ​

Our Battle Plan

No​one​is​in​a​better​situation​than​we​to​choose​positions​in​the​face​of​future​events.​We​have​maintained,​supported​by​ the​good​sense​of​the​country​(of​this​we​have​more​conclusive​proofs​ every​day),​that​it​was​necessary​to​reform​the​Constitution​in​the​sense​ of​creating​elements​of​governmental​energy​in​order​to​preserve​social​ interests.​Political​events​subsequent​to​our​first​affirmations​have​demonstrated​ that​ we​ were​ right​ when,​ in​ a​ society​ that​ is​ unsettled,​ we​ maintained​that​it​was​necessary​to​strengthen​the​center​of​cohesion. ​ A​ legitimate​ consequence​ of​ the​ principles​ in​ which​ we​ have​ believed,​that​every​effective​attempt​at​political​reconstruction​must​be​ supported,​has​been​this,​which​we​hold​as​an​incontrovertible​truth:​ there​ is​ nothing​ to​ hope​ from​ revolutions​ now;​ every​ revolution​ is​ essentially​antipatriotic​and​criminal. ​ Two​laws​derive​from​this​for​us:​to​support​at​all​costs​the​present​ administration​against​revolutionary​attacks;​to​combat​those​attacks​in​ whatever​form​they​present​themselves.​For​that​reason,​we​fight​at​all​ costs​against​the​candidacy​of​Mr.​Benítez.1​He​was​a​man​who​had​the​ unanimous​abhorrence​of​the​country;​everything​that​might​be​done​in​ his​favor​had​to​be​artificial;​to​put​official​resources​at​his​disposal​was​ to​solicit​boldly​an​uncontainable​revolution,​because​it​gave​him,​more​ than​a​pretext,​a​reason​for​being. ​ Thanks​to​the​good​sense​shown​this​time​by​the​president​of​the​Republic,​Mr.​Benítez​has​given​up​his​candidacy,​and​this​relinquishment,​ even​though​it​might​not​be​sincere,​the​circumstances​will​make​irremediable.​The​new​tendencies​that​start,​if​not​from​the​center,​certainly​ from​the​circle​that​immediately​surrounds​it,​seem​to​us​to​show​that​ ​ Original​title:​“Nuestro​programa​de​combate.”​Source:​La Libertad,​Mexico,​May​16,​ 1879. ​ 1.​Justo​Benítez​wanted​to​be​a​candidate​for​the​presidency​in​1880.​(Editor’s​note) 406

our​battle​plan : 407

the​idea​of​creating​a​candidacy​with​official​means,​without​the​support​ of​ opinion,​ has​ not​ been​ abandoned.​ We​ must​ oppose​ that​ tendency​ with​all​our​strength. ​ We​do​not​delude​ourselves.​We​know​perfectly​that​the​country​will​ not​take​part​in​the​election;​that​our​parties​are​not​political​groups​ but​rather​personal​factions;​that​our​country​needs​them​to​wait​on​its​ table;​what​is​necessary,​and​in​this​the​eternal​error​of​Mexican​governments​has​consisted,​is​to​serve​the​country​a​meal​it​likes.​This​is​the​ secret:​a​question​of​cuisine,​like​the​majority​of​political​questions.​For​ that​we​have​requested​in​all​the​annotations​of​the​registry​of​supplications​[registro deprecatorio]​to​the​gentleman​president,​that​he​settle​on​ one​citizen​that​the​country​accepts,​and​he​will​see​how,​without​appeals​to​force,​the​election,​or​what​is​called​such,​deserves​the​applause​ of​all​honorable​citizens. ​ It​is​not​hidden​from​us​that​the​profound​work​of​decomposition​ that​ undermines​ and​ wears​ down​ this​ society,​ not​ now​ muffled​ but​ rather​visibly,​necessitates​in​the​crises​in​which​the​latent​anarchy​will​ rise​from​the​muck​heap​to​the​street,​men​of​extreme​energy,​incapable​ of​tyrannizing​but​trained​to​repress.​So​as​much​for​the​country​as​for​ the​future​president,​the​effective​collaboration​of​General​Díaz​would​ be​very​fortunate,​and​all​these​circumstances​increase​greatly​the​responsibility​of​the​current​leader​of​the​executive.​Men​have​little​influence​on​the​current​of​human​events,​ruled​by​inevitable​laws;​but​a​man​ can​hold​back​or​hasten​the​advance​of​this​current,​and​General​Díaz​is​ in​that​situation. ​ Our​role​in​the​future​is,​then,​very​simple.​To​support​the​administration;​to​combat​the​official​efforts​on​behalf​of​candidates​not​accepted​by​opinion.​If​these​efforts​continue,​we​will​contribute​with​all​ our​strength​to​the​consolidation​of​a​group​of​unofficial​parties​that​ might​bring​to​the​electoral​field​the​possible​struggle​against​the​forces​ of​the​government. ​ Nonetheless,​and​even​if​this​is​equivalent​to​the​most​serious​of​admissions,​subject​to​making​it​more​explicit​in​a​subsequent​article,​we​ declare​that,​in​any​case,​we​will​fight​against​the​revolution​and​we​will​ bow​before​the​resolutions​of​Congress,​be​they​in​agreement​with​our​ aspirations​or​not,​because​outside​of​this​we​do​not​see​salvation.

josé María vigil José​María​Vigil​(1829–1909),​born​in​Jalisco,​was​a​professor,​ writer,​ and​ journalist.​ He​ belonged​ to​ the​ older​ generation​ of​liberals​who​held​the​1857​Constitution​in​high​regard.​He​ wrote​articles​for​several​newspapers,​among​them​El Siglo XIX​ and​El Monitor Republicano.​Vigil​served​two​terms​in​Congress​ after​the​Republic​was​restored​in​1867​and​later​became​a​justice​on​the​Supreme​Court.​Vigil​taught​at​the​Escuela​Nacional​ Preparatoria​and​was​the​director​of​the​National​Library.​He​ was​a​critic​of​positivism,​believing​that​it​corrupted​the​nature​ of​liberalism.​In​1878,​in​the​daily​El Monitor Republicano,​Vigil​ countered​Sierra’s​arguments​published​in​La Libertad​by​criticizing​the​practice​of​limiting​constitutional​rights​in​order​to​ make​the​government​stronger. ​ We​present​some​of​Vigil’s​essays​as​well​as​his​contributions​ to​that​polemic.

408

1



Bulletin of El Monitor, August 22, 1878

The​great​objective​of​the​democratic​revolution,​for​ which​the​Mexican​nation​has​suffered​long​years​of​bloody​struggles,​ is​the​rights​the​Constitution​of​’57​set​down​in​section​1​of​title​1​and​ those​ designated​ generally​ by​ the​ name​ of​ constitutional​ guarantees.​ All​the​rest—the​political​system​that​governs​us,​the​form​adopted​of​ federative​republic—do​not​intend​any​end​other​than​the​strengthening​of​those​guarantees,​the​inviolability​of​those​rights,​without​which​ not​a​single​step​would​have​been​taken​on​the​road​of​progress​and​true​ liberty​for​the​people. ​ Our​ society,​ like​ French​ society​ before​ the​ famous​ revolution​ of​ ’80,​found​ itself​ deprived​ of​the​greater​ part​ of​those​ precious​ rights​ set​down​in​our​Constitution.​The​absolute​regime​that​ruled​throughout​the​entire​colonial​epoch​professed​doctrines​radically​opposed​to​ those​that​dominate​today;​and​it​is​worth​noting​that,​among​the​first​ methods​adopted​by​the​revolution​of​independence,​one​finds​the​consecration​of​certain​guarantees​that,​once​Mexico​won​its​national​sovereignty,​came​to​be​expanded​progressively​until​the​year​’57,​when​the​ nation​saw​those​saving​principles​of​life​and​liberty​included​in​its​fundamental​law. ​ It​ is​ sad,​ nonetheless,​ to​ acknowledge​ that,​ among​ the​ reforms​ of​ which​the​Republic​is​so​proud,​the​full​and​absolute​respect​for​individual​guarantees​cannot​be​counted.​The​theories​are​proclaimed,​the​ principles​have​been​elevated​to​the​category​of​constitutional​prescriptions,​it​being​declared​solemnly​in​Article​1​of​the​fundamental​law​ that​“the​rights​of​man​are​the​foundation​and​the​objective​of​social​ institutions.”​But​despite​that,​the​habits​of​tyranny​our​ancestors​bequeathed​us​are​perpetuated​among​us​in​the​specter​of​the​ignorance​of​ ​ Original​title:​“Boletín​del​Monitor,”​22​de​agosto​de​1878.​Source:​El Monitor Republicano,​August​22,​1878. 409

410 : joSé​maría​viGil

the​masses​with​regard​to​making​their​rights​respected​and​of​the​arbitrariness​of​mandarins,​who,​putting​on​airs​as​liberals,​are​nothing​more​ than​odious​petty​dictators​disposed​to​abuse,​everywhere​they​can,​the​ poor​and​the​helpless. ​ The​ guarantee​ most​ frequently​ violated​ is​ the​ one​ contained​ in​ Article​5​of​the​Constitution;​on​the​other​hand,​that​guarantee​is,​perhaps,​the​most​precious,​because​it​has​as​its​objective​the​person​himself,​his​time,​his​work,​his​will,​and​even​his​life;​that​is​to​say,​it​is​about​ man​in​the​entire​breadth​of​the​word,​physically​and​morally​speaking.​ The​number​of​amparos1​filed​for​violation​of​Article​5​is​incomparably​ higher​than​those​lodged​for​other​abuses,​without​having​diminished​ even​up​to​this​time,​as​would​be​desired​by​all​of​us​who​are​interested​ in​having​the​observance​of​the​Constitution​come​to​be​a​genuine​practice. ​ The​reason​for​such​a​difference​is​explained​by​keeping​in​mind​the​ innumerable​quantity​of​victims​that​the​barbarous​system​of​the​levy​ sacrifices;​for​the​effort​of​maintaining​a​growing​army​that​absorbs​the​ greater​part​of​the​budget,​the​ill​will​that​our​republican​governments​ profess​for​the​national​guard,​and​that​type​of​systematic​forgetfulness​ to​concern​itself​with​the​creation​of​a​law​of​recruitment​make​it​resort​to​the​savage​method​of​uprooting​the​most​helpless​class​from​their​ homes​so​they​might​wield​arms​with​the​most​enormous​detriment​to​ their​families​and​interests. ​ It​is​right​to​add​that​the​Supreme​Court​has​protected,​in​the​majority​of​cases,​those​unfortunate​people​who​appeal​to​it​requesting​the​ liberty​of​which​they​have​been​deprived,​without​our​recalling​that​not​ once​has​it​permitted​condemnation​of​the​levy’s​odious​abuses​in​the​ most​explicit​way.​Nonetheless,​in​these​last​days,​it​has​introduced​in​ the​explanatory​part​of​some​sentences​certain​doctrines​that​come​to​be​ an​innovation,​in​which​we​would​find​nothing​unusual​if,​at​the​same​ time,​we​did​not​see​that​a​door​opens​slightly,​through​which​abuse​and​ arbitrariness​can​readily​be​introduced. ​ Certainly,​the​levy​continues​to​be​condemned,​but​not​yet​for​violation​of​Article​5,​because​the​guarantee​of​not​giving​personal​labor​ ​ 1.​The​writ​of​amparo​is​filed​by​persons​who​claim​that​their​individual​rights​have​ been​violated​by​an​authority.​(Editor’s​note)

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​auGuSt​22,​1878 : 411

without​ just​ compensation​ and​ without​ full​ consent​ refers​ only​ to​ person-​to-​person​activities​and​does​not​speak​of​duties​to​the​patria,​ but​ rather​ because​ such​ a​ system​ violates​ the​ constitutional​ requirement​that​demands​proportionality​and​equity​in​giving​public​service​ to​ which​ Article​ 312​ subjects​ Mexicans.​ Thus​ it​ is​ that​ from​ the​ obligation​ that​ Article​ 31​ imposes​ on​ every​ Mexican​ to​ defend​ the​ independence,​territory,​honor,​etc.,​of​the​patria​and​to​contribute​to​the​ public​expenses​of​the​federation,​the​state,​and​the​municipality,​one​ deduces​that,​in​a​question​of​public​service​and​taxes,​the​Mexican​can​ be​obliged​to​give​personal​labor​even​without​there​being​just​compensation​and​full​consent,​“provided​only​that​these​services​are​demanded​ of​him​in​the​proportional​and​equitable​manner​that​the​laws​set​out.” ​ It​occurs​to​us,​of​course,​that​the​new​interpretation​the​Supreme​ Court​ has​ thought​ it​ wise​ to​ give​ Article​ 5​ is​ somewhat​ useless​ and​ ridiculous;​given​that​Article​2​abolished​slavery,​no​inhabitant​of​the​ Republic​has​run​the​risk​that​his​neighbor​might​compel​him​to​give​ him​some​service​against​his​will​and​without​fair​compensation.​If​every​ man​who​steps​on​our​territory​is​free,​if​no​individual​has​the​power​to​ demand​forced​service​from​anyone,​then​Article​5​is​totally​superfluous​ in​the​Constitution,​since​it​was​intended​to​guarantee​rights​that​no​one​ thinks​of​attacking​because​the​horrible​institution​of​slavery​was​abolished. ​ It​is​said​in​support​that​such​was​the​mind​of​the​constituents​in​approving​the​article​cited.​That​may​be​so,​but​that​does​not​eliminate​the​ fact​that​the​interpretation​the​Supreme​Court​had​previously​adopted​ is​more​natural,​ more​in​conformity​ with​ the​written​ text,​ and​more​ in​the​spirit​of​our​institutions.​In​effect,​and​here​is​where​we​see​the​ danger,​it​is​necessary​to​keep​very​much​in​mind​that​the​primary​enemies​ the​ Mexican​ people​ have​ with​ respect​ to​ their​ liberty​ are,​ with​ rare​and​honorable​exceptions,​the​authorities.​From​the​highest​officials​ to​the​lowest​policemen,​from​the​illustrious​young​men​who​command​ ​ 2.​Article​31​of​the​1857​Constitution​states:​“The​obligations​of​Mexicans​are​(1)​to​ defend​the​independence,​the​territory,​the​honor,​the​rights,​and​interests​of​the​homeland;​(2)​to​contribute​to​the​public​expenditures​of​the​federation,​and​the​state​and​ municipality​in​which​they​reside,​in​the​proportional​and​equitable​manner​provided​ by​law.”​(Editor’s​note)

412 : joSé​maría​viGil

the​ship​of​state​to​the​obscure​mayor​of​a​village,​all​seem​inspired​by​ the​same​despotic​sentiment​for​abusing​power,​oppressing​the​weak,​ harassing​the​helpless,​sometimes​by​the​shameless​use​of​brute​force,​ other​times​by​means​of​chicaneries​and​subtleties,​very​ingenious,​if​ you​ will,​ but​ that​ reveal​ the​ complete​ lack​ of​ respect​ that​ those​ who​ should​be​faithful​guardians​of​its​rights​profess​to​society. ​ If​the​abuse​ceases​to​be​such​simply​by​coming​to​be​encompassed​ by​certain​legal​formulas;​if​man​can​be​deprived​of​his​individual​liberty,​ “even​ without​ there​ being​ fair​ compensation​ and​ full​ consent,”​ by​means​of​general​measures,​it​can​then​be​said​that​the​guarantees​ granted​by​the​Constitution,​where​they​reside​mostly​as​simple​theories,​have​received​a​death​blow,​the​simplest​way​having​been​discovered​to​perpetuate​abuses​and​tyranny,​of​which​the​people​have​been​ victims​despite​the​principles​attained. ​ But​it​is​said​that​those​involuntary​services​cannot​be​demanded​except​in​a​proportional​and​equitable​way;​we​like​the​words,​except​that​ they​have​such​elasticity​that​they​fit​within​concepts​diametrically​opposed​to​those​they​express.​If​those​among​us​who​manage​to​exercise​ power,​almost​always​by​evil​means,​would​be​inspired​by​the​desire​to​ act​well;​if​society​feels​itself​completely​sure​that​its​will​would​always​ be​respected​and​its​opinion​dutifully​paid​attention​to,​some​appearance​ of​ reason​ would​ be​ conferred​ on​ the​ theory​ we​ are​ combating;​ but​when​the​complete​opposite​happens,​when​we​live​in​the​midst​of​ abuse​and​corruption,​to​proclaim​such​a​principle,​false​according​to​ the​liberal​point​of​view​and​of​such​injurious​consequences,​seems​to​ us​so​absurd​and​dangerous​that​we​harbor​the​hope​that​the​Supreme​ Court​will​retrace​its​steps​and​dispense​with​proclaiming​it​in​similar​ cases​that​come​before​it. ​ To​deduce​the​new​interpretation​of​the​duties​imposed​by​Article​31​ seems​to​us​a​not-​very-​clever​sophism.​From​the​fact​that​the​Mexican​ citizen​has​the​obligation​to​“defend​the​independence,​territory,​honor,​ rights,​and​interests​of​his​patria,”​one​does​not​logically​deduce​that​ someone​can​be​obliged​to​give​personal​labor​without​fair​compensation​and​without​his​full​consent. ​ Let​us​suppose​an​extreme,​exceptional​case;​let​us​suppose​the​case​of​ a​foreign​war.​Well,​not​even​so​would​it​be​just,​rational,​or​appropriate​ to​appeal​to​those​methods​of​violence​and​tyranny.​And​this​is​not​an​ opinion​exclusively​ours;​it​is​the​feeling​of​well-​known​experts​in​pub-

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​auGuSt​22,​1878 : 413

lic​law,​as​it​will​be​easy​for​us​to​demonstrate​despite​the​little​fondness​ we​have​for​citing​authorities. ​ “As​soon​as​war​is​threatened,”​says​Filangieri, one​turns​to​violence.​What​a​sad​spectacle!​What​an​unfortunate​omen!​Those​citizens​who​have​not​been​able​to​hide,​who​ have​not​been​able​to​flee​or​withdraw​themselves​with​the​help​of​ some​privilege​or​with​money​to​despotic​recruiters,​are​bound​and​ dragged​before​a​subdelegate​whose​functions​are​always​odious​and​ whose​sense​of​probity​is​always​suspect​by​the​public.​The​parents​ of​those​unfortunate​ones​accompany​them;​they​deliver,​trembling,​ the​names​of​their​sons​to​the​subdelegate​and​await​their​fate.​ Then​a​black​ball​shoots​from​the​fateful​urn​and​marks​the​victims​ whom​the​prince​sacrifices​to​war.​This​ceremony,​accompanied​by​ the​tears​of​the​fathers,​the​desperation​of​the​mothers,​the​sobs​of​ the​wives,​what​value​can​inspire​those​new​combatants​for​whom​ everything​foretells​a​certain​death? ​ No,​that​is​not​the​price​with​which​true​soldiers​are​obtained;​it​ is​not​thus​that​the​peoples​of​the​North​are​called​to​go​to​war.​.​.​.​ Such​a​sad​and​dismal​apparatus​did​not​precede​then​the​horrors​of​ combat,​and​without​doubt,​war​would​not​begin​today​under​such​ terrible​auspices​if​soldiers​pledged​voluntarily​to​defend​the​patria,​ if​no​violence​at​all​were​used​against​them,​and​if​it​were​not​fate​ that​determined​their​destiny. “It​is​important,”​says​Fritot, that​a​forced​recruitment,​that​an​odious​law​of​conscription​not​ violently​uproot,​from​their​labors​and​their​families,​men​whose​ natural​inclination​distances​them​from​the​noble​career​of​bearing​ arms,​and​that​they​not​drag​them​in​chains​like​criminals​or​slaves​ beneath​the​standards​of​the​patria​and​liberty.​.​.​. ​ In​society,​those​who​are​not​called​by​a​natural​vocation​to​embrace​the​career​of​bearing​arms​can​be​honorable​and​useful​citizens,​industrious​artisans,​hardworking​proprietors,​but​they​will​ almost​always​be,​in​more​than​one​way,​bad​soldiers. ​ Men​compelled​by​violence​to​take​on​the​job​of​bearing​arms,​ enlisted​and​led​under​the​standards​against​their​will,​are​easily​

414 : joSé​maría​viGil

persuaded​that​injustice​and​force​are​the​only​regulators​of​the​ world,​and​they​themselves​very​quickly​have​no​other​rule​of​conduct​or​rule​of​law;​very​soon​they​breathe​nothing​more​than​disorders,​wars,​conquests​and​pillages. ​ One​sees,​then,​how​far​from​being​acceptable​in​good​philosophy​ is​that​violence​the​Supreme​Court​today​seems​to​want​to​convert​into​ a​duty​of​Mexican​citizens.​If​one​wishes​to​know​what​a​civilized​and​ democratic​government​does​in​such​emergencies,​one​should​look​at​ the​way​the​United​States​of​the​North​organized​its​armies,​both​in​the​ war​of​independence​and​in​that​of​secession.​But​nothing​of​the​brutal​ violence​that​attacks​the​most​sacred​personal​rights;​nothing​of​those​ savage​practices​that​tend​to​enslave​free​men​by​nature​and​by​law,​because​that​would​be​as​much​as​to​regress​to​the​darkest​epochs​of​absolutism,​ eradicating​ with​ the​ stroke​ of​ a​ pen​ the​ most​ precious​ victories​of​a​democratic​revolution.​For​all​these​reasons,​we​hope​that​the​ Supreme​Court​relegates​to​oblivion​the​strange​theory​it​has​recently​ proclaimed​ and​ continues​ on​ this​ point​ the​ practice​ it​ had​ adopted,​ which​is​the​most​fair,​most​liberal,​and​most​appropriate​in​every​way.

2



Bulletin of El Monitor, August 27, 1878

We​have​received​the​following​letter​that​we​are​publishing,​acceding​to​the​wishes​of​its​illustrious​author. Mexico,​August​22,​1878.—Mr.​José​María​Vigil,​editor​of​the​El Monitor Republicano.—My​very​dear​sir:​Whereas​for​some​time​I​ have​had​the​pain​of​maintaining​in​the​press​the​opposite​of​what​ you​defend,​the​great​satisfaction​falls​to​me​today​of​congratulating​you​for​your​brilliant​article​of​today,​with​which​I​agree​completely​because​it​contains​the​ideas​I​have​professed​since​I​have​ been​able​to​concern​myself​with​politics,​which​I​have​maintained​ and​practiced​to​the​extent​it​has​been​possible​for​me​and​which​ you​explain​with​every​elegance,​with​every​lucidity​and​a​lovely​ style​that​corresponds​to​your​well-​established​literary​reputation. ​ I​believe​that​you​will​not​scorn,​because​they​emanate​from​me,​ these​expressions​of​applause​and​interest,​and​that​you​will​be​kind​ enough​to​publish​them,​because​although​the​voice​of​approval​is​ humble,​it​is​very​much​meritorious​and​very​sincere.—Eduardo F. Arteaga.

​ The​preceding​letter​has​given​us​genuine​satisfaction,​for​if​once​we​ have​disagreed​with​the​opinions​of​Mr.​Licenciado​de​Arteaga,​we​have​ always​recognized​in​our​worthy​adversary​the​capable​jurist​and​sincere​republican​who​seeks​in​observance​of​the​Constitution​the​natural​means​for​strengthening​the​peace​and​liberty​of​the​citizens.​Accept​ then,​Mr.​de​Arteaga,​in​the​present​lines,​the​frank​expression​of​our​ gratitude​for​such​a​spontaneous​demonstration​that​lends​valuable​sup-

​ Original​title:​“Boletín​del​Monitor,”​27​de​agosto​de​1878.​Source:​El Monitor Republicano,​August​27,​1878. 415

416 : joSé​maría​viGil

port​to​the​opinions​expressed​by​us​in​our​Bulletin​of​Thursday,​the​ twenty-​second​of​this​month. ​ We​are​now​going​to​take​on​the​observations​that​our​worthy​colleague,​La Libertad,​has​directed​to​us​with​respect​to​the​same​Bulletin. ​ Of​course,​we​must​confess​that​we​do​not​know​what​that​old​liberal​ school​is​that​has​passed​its​time,​and​to​which​our​colleague​said,​with​a​ certain​tone​of​sorrow,​that​we​belong.​If​seeking​social​liberty​in​securing​individual​rights,​if​striving​for​those​rights​to​be​protected​from​the​ attacks​of​the​authority​by​means​of​respect​for​the​fundamental​law​ of​the​Republic,​is​an​old​liberal​school,​we​declare​that​we​belong​to​it​ body​and​soul,​and​that​far​from​being​ashamed,​we​have​pride​in​professing​its​principles​and​dedicating​our​weak​intelligence​to​rooting​it​ in​the​country​with​faith​that​it​might​inspire​an​irrevocable​conviction. ​ It​matters​very​little​to​us​whether​these​doctrines​are​old​or​new;​ what​ is​ relevant​ to​ our​ intention​ is​ that​ they​ be​ genuine​ and​ beneficial,​and​as,​until​now,​we​have​had​no​reason​to​believe​the​contrary,​it​ follows​naturally​that​we​are​not​greatly​concerned​with​counting​the​ years.​The​label​of​new​development​is​not​sufficient​in​our​eyes​to​lend​ prestige​to​a​school​and​to​persuade​us​of​its​intrinsic​excellence,​and​ we​believe,​on​the​contrary,​that​there​are​many​new​things​eminently​ bizarre​and​ridiculous. ​ We​have​said,​and​it​is​true,​that​all​our​authorities,​with​rare​exceptions,​have​tyrannical​instincts;​and​our​colleague​asks​us,​“Do​these​authorities​fall​to​us​from​the​clouds?”​answering​immediately,​“No;​they​ rise​up​from​society​and​are​genuine products of our defective Constitution;​ they​are​the​scrofula​that​reveals​the​destructive​poverty​of​our​temperament.” ​ As​ to​ whether​ these​ authorities​ are​ genuine products of our defective Constitution,​ we​ deny​ it​ categorically,​ because​ if​such​ a​ thing​ were​ to​ happen​they​would​not​be​tyrannical,​because​they​would​proceed​from​ the​law​and​adjust​their​behavior​to​it.​With​respect​to​the​epithet​defective​applied​to​our​fundamental​law,​we​will​observe​in​passing​that,​ without​believing​that​it​is​a​perfect​work​in​every​way,​it​seems​to​us​ that​it​is​sufficient​to​bring​about​the​prosperity​of​the​Mexican​people​ if​it​is​observed​faithfully,​subject​to​correcting,​by​the​means​it​itself​ indicates,​the​defects​to​which​experience​is​pointing. ​ But​it​is​not​observed!​And​from​this​La Libertad​seems​to​deduce​ that,​far​from​opinion​bending​in​the​sense​of​keeping​the​law,​far​from​

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​auGuSt​27,​1878 : 417

inculcating​that​saving​principle​of​a​civilized​society,​it​must,​on​the​ contrary,​put​to​one​side​the​legal​precept​because​“it​does​not​accord​ with​the​needs​of​life,”​and​in​such​a​case,​“arbitrariness​and​despotism​ are​the​only​possible​regime​in​societies​like​ours​that​are​barely​embryonic.” ​ Decidedly,​our​disagreement​with​La Libertad​cannot​be​more​radical​ or​more​profound.​Our​colleague​establishes​the​cold​bare​fact,​somewhat​exaggerated​as​we​will​see​later,​and,​paying​attention​exclusively​ to​it,​considers​the​demand​that​the​law​be​carried​out​as​a​revolutionary declamation.​We,​reflecting​in​a​different​way,​recognize​the​sad​truth​of​ the​appalling​legacy​that​our​ancestors​created​for​us;​but​instead​of​conforming​ourselves​to​it,​we​try​to​hasten​the​day​the​regeneration​will​be​ completed.​We​continue​struggling​without​stopping​for​a​moment​to​ destroy​the​monstrous​system​of​subjection​and​servility,​and​we​do​not​ hesitate​to​take​that​sonorous horn​of​the​democratic​revolution​in​order​ to​cry​out​in​all​keys​that​the​authorities​that​infringe​on​individual​guarantees​are​tyrannical,​that​the​doctrine​that​tends​to​justify​the​violation​ of​the​law​that​has​consecrated​the​rights​of​man​as​foundation​of​our​ institutions​is​tyrannical​and​antiliberal. ​ Our​colleague,​without​wanting​to,​perhaps,​is​going​to​place​himself​ in​the​terrain​of​the​reactionary​party,​because​accepting​his​theory,​it​is​ a​blunder​to​concede​superior​rights​to​the​general​needs​of​the​people,​ and​as,​in​a​society​barely embryonic​as​ours,​the​only​possible​regime​is​ arbitrariness​and​despotism,​it​comes​about​that​“the​violation​of​the​ guarantees,​the​insult​to​right​comes​because,​when​the​legal​precept​ does​not​accord​with​the​needs​of​life,”​it​follows​that​the​best​means​of​ avoiding​the​violation​of​guarantees​and​outrage​to​the​law​is​to​suppress​ the​law​and​the​guarantees,​because​in​effect,​no​one​can​violate​or​outrage​what​does​not​exist.​This​is​no​more,​no​less​the​reactionary​dogma. ​ But​that​doctrine​that​tends​to​confine​the​people​to​an​indefinite​status​ quo,​ that​ implicates​ the​ democratic​ revolution​ in​ a​ general​ anathema,​ cannot​be​accepted​by​the​liberal​party,​and​we​now​understand​the​disdain​with​which​our​colleague​treats​it​in​calling​it​old,​although,​according​to​all​appearances,​the​ideas​he​is​praising​are​no​less​old. ​ A​thousand​times​the​Mexican​liberal​party​has​been​treated​as​visionary,​utopian,​theoretical,​etc.,​etc.​But​these​unjust​charges​that​the​conservatives​have​made​at​all​times​regarding​the​parties​that​represent​a​ progressive​ principle​ are​ clichés​ contradicted​ by​ the​nature​ of​things​

418 : joSé​maría​viGil

themselves​and​by​the​general​advance​of​human​societies.​The​Christians​who​rose​up​against​the​corruption​of​ancient​Rome​were​visionaries;​visionaries​the​reformers​of​the​sixteenth​century​who​laid​the​ foundations​for​modern​liberty;​visionaries​the​men​of​’93​who​established,​on​eternal​foundations,​forgotten​or​unknown​rights;​visionaries​ the​Mexicans​who​proclaimed​the​independence​of​the​patria;​visionaries​the​liberals​who​founded​the​Republic;​and​visionaries​the​reformers​who​ended​the​preponderance​of​the​privileged​classes. ​ And​ what!​ From​ what,​ in​ a​ society​ dominated​ by​ certain​ interests​ and​certain​corruptions​contrary​to​reason​and​justice,​can​be​deduced​ something​ against​ the​ doctrines​ of​ the​ militant​ parties​ that​ are​ proclaiming​precisely​the​destruction​of​those​interests​and​those​corruptions?​The​Mexican​liberals​distinguish​themselves​in​no​way​from​the​ liberals​of​the​rest​of​the​parties​of​the​world.​Party​of​struggle,​party​ of​promise,​it​cannot​conform​to​palliatives​that​perpetuate​the​ills​it​is​ trying​to​eradicate​or​wait​patiently​for​tyrants​to​yield​good-​naturedly​ the​position​they​usurp​and​the​people​to​be​enjoying​rights​perfectly​ understood,​both​by​reason​of​a​slow​and​impossible​evolution.​All​that​ will​be​very​beautiful​in​theory​but​radically​impractical. ​ Our​ colleague​ insults​ the​ Mexican​ people​ when​ he​ notes,​ “Every Mexican, left to his instincts, has hatred for the different life and disdain for liberty.”​ No,​ that​ is​ not​ true;​ it​ is​ an​ unsustainable​ paradox​ from​ any​ point​of​view​to​claim​that​every​Mexican​might​be​by​instinct​murderer​ and​slave,​the​literal​translation​of​the​words​we​have​transcribed. ​ That​demagogic​spirit​that​flatters​the​people,​hiding​from​it​the​truth​ and​canonizing​its​defects,​is​far​from​our​purpose.​We​recognize​with​ sadness​that​our​country​is​very​backward,​that​it​is​still​very​far​from​ having​eliminated​the​flawed​habits​it​inherited​from​the​long​regime​ of​despotism​under​which​it​developed;​but​to​suppose​from​this​that​ Mexico​is​a​country​in​full​barbarity,​in​which​only​feelings​of​destruction​ and​ servility​ rule,​ there​ is​ an​ immense​ distance.​ If​ we​ examine​ the​truth​coldly,​if​we​examine​the​Mexican​people​without​any​prejudice—their​nature,​their​tendencies,​the​circumstances​in​which​they​ are​gathered,​the​conditions​of​the​country​they​inhabit,​etc.—it​will​ be​necessary​to​acknowledge,​against​what​La Libertad​claims,​that​in​ Mexico​a​certain​sweetness​of​character,​a​certain​pride​and​independence​dominate,​which​are​very​far​from​the​ferocity​and​servility​gratuitously​supposed​of​them.

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​auGuSt​27,​1878 : 419

​ The​narrow​limits​to​which​we​have​to​confine​ourselves​do​not​permit​us​to​enter​into​details​as​we​would​like,​but​we​will​make​just​one​ general​observation.​Only​with​difficulty​can​a​people​present​itself​that​ live​in​more​anarchic​conditions,​in​which​the​authority​has​lost​more​ of​its​prestige,​in​which​political​passions​ferment​more​actively;​and​ nonetheless​only​with​difficulty​also​can​a​people​be​seen​in​whom​revolutions​offer​fewer​repugnant​and​bloody​episodes,​very​common,​unfortunately,​in​nations​that​boast​of​being​more​civilized.​This​simple​ observation​proves​sufficiently​that​the​Mexican​people​are​not​at​all​like​ the​figure​our​colleague​sketches​of​them​and​that​they​are​worthy​for​ this​reason​of​something​more​than​arbitrariness​and​despotism. ​ In​sum,​we​believe​the​democratic​party​must​not​lose​sight​of​the​ ideal​that​forms​its​standard​and​must​work​constantly​so​that​it​maintains​unharmed​the​rights​the​Constitution​consecrates,​for​that​will​be​ the​only​way​the​nation​will​regenerate​itself;​that​is​to​say,​that​it​will​ emerge​ from​ that​ abyss​ of​ traditional​ servility​ that​ fortunately​ is​ not​ now​so​profound,​thanks​to​the​constant​publicity​of​the​visionaries,​as​ our​colleague​imagines. ​ La Libertad​wants​us​to​refute​the​interpretation​the​Supreme​Court​ has​given​to​Article​5​of​the​Constitution​under​the​triple​historical,​constitutional,​and​philosophical​points​of​view.​It​seems​to​us​that,​without​the​need​to​rise​to​the​region​of​unintelligible​abstraction,​what​we​ have​said​before​and​what​we​add​now​clarify​our​thought,​which​is​limited​to​the​idea​that​the​interpretation​cited​opens​the​door​to​the​abuse​ of​authority​and​that​it​nullifies,​for​that​reason,​a​precious​guarantee,​ without​which​we​can​say​that​the​conquests​of​the​reformist​revolution​ are​ worth​ nothing.​ Our​ colleague​ seems​ to​ indicate​ that​ the​ absolute​ observance​of​said​article​makes​impossible​the​army,​the​municipality,​ and​the​penitentiary​regime;​this​last​we​do​not​understand,​but​as​for​ the​first,​we​will​say​simply​that,​far​from​sharing​in​the​opinion​stated,​ we​have​the​opposite​opinion,​for​we​harbor​the​innermost​conviction​ that​the​day​in​which​Article​5​might​be​a​practiced​truth,​we​will​have​ a​genuine​army​and​a​genuine​municipality.​Our​colleague​will​then​see​ if​we​will​sustain​the​observance​faithfully. ​ We​hasten​to​conclude,​because​we​have​expounded​at​greater​length​ than​we​had​intended.​It​has​seemed​to​us,​nonetheless,​that​we​had​to​ offer​the​fundamentals​of​our​opinion,​making​known​at​the​same​time​ those​points​on​which​we​differ​from​the​colleague​who​impugns​us.​We​

420 : joSé​maría​viGil

do​not​know​if​we​will​have​made​a​bad​interpretation​of​the​ideas​of​ La Libertad,​but​to​the​degree​we​believe​ourselves​to​have​understood​ them,​it​seems​to​us​that​we​depart​from​very​different​points​and​that​ it​is​difficult,​for​that​reason,​for​us​to​understand​each​other.​Our​program​is​clear,​simple,​well​specified:​to​reduce​to​practice​the​precepts​of​ the​Constitution,​to​respect​without​restrictions​of​any​type​the​rights​ it​ consecrates,​ attacking​ without​ respite​ all​ tyranny,​ whether​ it​ takes​ the​historical​character​or​whether​the​scientific.​Civilized​peoples​have​ secured​the​liberties​they​enjoy​in​the​shelter​of​those​principles;​this​is​ what​we​desire​for​our​patria. J.​M.​Vigil

3 ​

Bulletin of El Monitor, September 3, 1878

Our​esteemed​colleague​at​La Libertad​has​replied​to​the​ response​we​made​to​him,​saying​that​he​had​as​his​objective​to​stimulate​ this​debate​over​the​basics​of​the​new​interpretation​that​the​Supreme​ Court​of​Justice​has​given​to​Article​5,​basics​we​have​left​intact.​We​will,​ of​course,​give​an​explication:​If​it​is​a​matter​of​discussing​the​reasons​ the​Supreme​Court​might​have​had​for​its​new​interpretation,​which​are​ found​in​the​explanatory​part​of​the​ruling​with​which​we​concerned​ ourselves​in​our​Bulletin​of​the​twenty-​second​of​last​month,​we​believe​we​have​said​enough​to​support​our​disagreement​without,​until​ now,​having​been​attacked​directly​by​La Libertad​or​by​any​other​periodical​we​know.​Consequently,​we​did​not​believe​nor​do​we​believe​it​ opportune​to​linger​over​what​we​have​since​then​expressed;​however,​ we​needed​to​follow​our​colleague​on​the​ground​he​himself​had​chosen,​ which,​strictly​speaking,​produces​the​same​result. ​ The​question​La Libertad​has​raised​is​much​more​important​than​ the​one​that​might​have​been​maintained​in​the​strictly​constitutionalist​sphere.​The​discussion​of​Article​5​comes​to​be​a​secondary​matter​in​ the​face​of​the​critical​meaning​our​colleague​develops​and​that​has​as​its​ objective​the​Constitution​of​’57​itself​and​even​the​institutions​that​govern​us.​It​would​be​useless,​for​that​reason,​to​linger​over​simple​details​ when​the​debate​must​rise​to​a​higher​sphere​into​which​we​will​go​with​ enthusiasm,​although​always​having​to​collide​with​the​narrow​limits​to​ which​our​pen​is​constrained​to​confine​itself. ​ La Libertad​begins​by​giving​us​a​description​of​that​old​liberal​school,​ whose​mission,​it​declares,​is​worn​out;​that​school​is​the​one​that​believes​.​.​.​but​our​colleague​should​excuse​us​for​quoting​the​following​ passage​from​an​excellent​article​by​M.​E.​Caro,​inserted​in​the​Revue de ​ Original​title:​“Boletín​del​Monitor,”​3​de​septiembre​de​1878.​Source:​El Monitor Republicano,​September​3,​1878. 421

422 : joSé​maría​viGil

deux Mondes​of​November​1,​1875,1​in​which,​between​parentheses,​La Libertad​can​find​a​profound​examination​of​the​scientific​theories​of​ that​new​school​called​to​replace,​as​it​is​claimed,​the​old​liberalism,​and​ of​which​it​appears​to​have​constituted​itself​champion.​Well,​then: ​ “Radical​democracy,”​says​Mr.​Caro, is​essentially​rationalist;​it​is​that​in​its​origin,​in​its​history,​in​its​ principles;​it​is​an​application​of​pure​reason;​it​goes​out​from​the​ absolute​and​returns​to​it;​it​rests​on​the​a​priori​of​certain​ideas​that​ do​not​come​from​experience,​of​certain​axioms​whose​character​ and​origin​it​would​deny​in​vain.​It​is​truly​the​child​of​Rousseau;​it​ was​born​with​the​Social Contract.​Still​today​we​see​it​accept,​without​discussion,​the​terms​in​which​Jean-​Jacques​has​set​forth​the​ problem:​“Find​a​type​of​association​that​depends​on​and​protects​ with​all​general​strength​the​person​and​wealth​of​every​member,​ and​for​which​each​one,​joining​together,​does​not​obey,​nonetheless,​anything​but​himself​and​remains​as​free​as​before.”​If​there​is​a​ problem​of​social​geometry,​this​is​certainly​it.​With​Rousseau,​this​ school​establishes​that​sovereignty​resides​in​the​general​will​and​ laws​are​nothing​but​the​authentic​acts​of​this​will.​With​it​is​established​in​principle​that​the​will​of​all​people​is​infallible,​that​no​ portion​of​it​can​be​delegated​or​alienated​or​subjected​to​another​ sovereign.​With​him,​it​believes​in​the​equivalency​of​all​the​members​of​the​city,​of​their​equal​right​to​participate​in​the​expression​of​the​general​will.​It​believes,​finally,​like​him,​in​the​original​ goodness​of​man,​which​cannot​desire​more​than​the​general​good,​ except​in​situations​in​which​its​reason​goes​astray​from​lack​of​ knowledge​or​prejudices,​which​it​is​necessary​to​combat​at​all​costs​ and​uproot​at​whatever​price​from​the​Republic. ​ With​the​fundamental​principles​known​on​which​rests​the​old​liberalism,​declared​quite​dead​and​buried​by​La Libertad,​let​us​see​what​ ​ 1.​Elme-​Marie​Caro​(1826–87),​a​popular​and​fashionable​philosophy​professor,​and​ later​ a​ member​ of​ the​ French​ Academy,​ was​ concerned​ with​ defending​ Christianity​ against​modern​positivism.​Caro​saw​the​rage​and​despair​in​which​the​French​Commune​ended​as​the​logical​result​of​the​moral​dissolution​and​indiscipline​that​prevailed​ in​French​intellectual​life​during​the​nineteenth​century.​(Editor’s​note)

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​September​3,​1878 : 423

this​other​scientific​school​is​that​is​called​to​replace​it​and​that​rejects​ with​horror​the​metaphysical​dogmas,​the​laws,​artificial,​paying​attention​only​to​the​facts,​to​experience,​etc. ​ “The​social​classes,”​we​continue​translating​Mr.​Caro, have​been​formed​in​each​society​in​the​same​way​and​by​action​of​ the​same​law​as​the​races​in​the​heart​of​the​species.​Who​would​ dare​rationally​complain​about​it?​.​.​.​By​a​series​of​strongly​linked​ deductions,​one​manages​to​establish​these​two​fundamental​propositions:​(1)​There​is​no​inequality​of​right​that​cannot​find​its​reason​ in​an​inequality​in​fact;​there​is​no​social​inequality​that​should​not​ have​and​does​not​originally​have​in​its​point​of​departure​a​natural​inequality.​(2)​Correlatively,​all​natural​inequality​produced​in​ an​individual,​established​and​perpetuated​in​a​race,​must​have​as​a​ consequence​a​social​inequality,​above​all​when​the​appearance​and​ establishment​of​that​inequality​in​the​race​correspond​to​a​social​ need,​to​an​ethnic usefulness​more​or​less​enduring. ​ This​is​enough​to​see​that​there​can​be​no​point​of​contact​between​ the​two​schools,​and​it​pleases​us​that​our​colleague​acknowledges​and​ recognizes​it​as​such.​In​effect,​what​can​a​theory​that​denies​everything​ the​ democratic​ school​ affirms,​ “the​ absolute​ of​ right,​ the​ absolute​ of​ equality,​the​absolute​of​liberty,​and​the​need​to​remake​man​immediately​on​the​standard​of​these​three​absolutes,”​have​in​common​with​ the​democratic​school?​For​where​can​a​doctrine​that​proclaims​liberty,​ equality,​and​right​for​everyone​come​into​contact​with​another​entirely​ aristocratic​doctrine​“that​entrusts​everything,​the​integrity​of​rights,​ the​direction,​the​initiative,​and​the​highest​of​all​the​functions,​that​of​ progress,​to​the​privileged​classes”? ​ We​understand​now​the​great​disdain​with​which​our​colleague,​from​ his​scientific​point​of​view,​regards​the​Constitution​of​’57​and​the​guarantees​it​sets​out.​If​our​people​are​backward,​if​they​are​incapable​of​ practicing​the​liberties​the​fundamental​law​grants​them,​the​remedy​is​ very​easy:​take​those​liberties​away​from​them,​give​them​a​legislation​ appropriate​to​the​needs​of​their​backwardness,​sacrifice​the​individual​ to​society,​and​lynch​the​criminal,​“setting​aside​the​judge​and​the​Constitution.” ​ But​why​are​we​wasting​time​on​so​little?​“Logic​has​terrible​require-

424 : joSé​maría​viGil

ments”;​let​us​condemn​once​and​for​all​what​those​old​liberals​call​victories​of​the​revolution,​those​to​whom​the​great​misfortunes​we​are​ suffering​must​be​attributed,​let​us​return​to​the​privileged​classes​or,​ if​one​would​prefer,​to​the​colonial​epoch.​But​for​a​backward,​ignorant​people​like​ours,​who​do​not​understand​liberty​nor​are​capable​ of​practicing​it,​the​most​suitable​regime​is​the​paternal​government​of​ the​friars,​the​humanitarian​Laws​of​the​Indies.​Are​privileged​classes​ desired?​There​is​the​clergy​that​at​least​had​an​ideal​to​offer​to​the​disinherited​classes​and​inspires​in​us,​for​that​reason,​less​antipathy​than​ the​learned​men​who​aspire​to​constitute​the​aristocracy​of​the​future​ republic.​It​is​necessary​not​to​linger​on​the​road,​nor​is​politics​reduced​ to​the​arid​ground​of​criticism​acceptable. ​ No​one​more​than​us​recognizes​the​deplorable​state​of​our​society;​ but​ what​ is​ the​ remedy?​ Take​ a​ step​ backward​ under​ the​ pretext​ of​ putting​the​law​into​harmony​with​our​practical​needs?​And​on​what​ foundations​would​such​a​reaction​be​brought​about?​Will​we​suppress​ the​popular​suffrage,​which​is​nothing​more​than​a​farce?​And​then​who​ would​govern​and​with​what​qualifications?​Will​we​establish​a​military​ dictatorship​like​that​of​Santa​Anna​in​his​last​epoch?​Will​we​suppress​ all​the​artificial​rights​set​out​in​that​Constitution​that​“has​never​been​ observed,”​and​will​we​deliver​society​to​the​arbitrary​will​of​a​supreme​ ruler?​It​seems​to​us​that​a​school​that​proceeds​scientifically​must​have​ specific​and​categorical​solutions​for​all​those​problems,​and​we​desire​ with​longing​to​know​them,​not​so​much​to​satisfy​our​curiosity​as​because​the​nation​will​be​shown​the​correct​road​that​will​lead​it​to​its​ well-​being​and​on​which​the​very​contented​people​will​continue​because​they​will​find​the​means​to​satisfy​their​practical​needs. ​ While​that​happens,​we​will​continue​using​our​rhetoric​so​that​that​ Constitution​that​is​not​observed​is​practiced;​so​that​the​defects​observed​in​it​can​be​reformed,​always​in​the​liberal​sense;​and​above​all,​ so​that​the​rights​set​down​in​it​might​be​profoundly​respected​by​the​ petty​sultans​who​exercise​authority​in​the​name​of​the​people. ​ Our​colleague​considers​this​an​unrealizable​dream.​We​think​it​is​ the​result​we​must​achieve​on​pain​of​death;​it​is​a​question​of​values​ that​time​will​be​charged​with​confirming.​Our​colleague​gives​primary​ importance​to​the​facts;​we​subordinate​them​to​the​ideal,​which​is​the​ true​reality.​Our​colleague​has​understood​“that​in​a​country,​no​matter​ how​strong​and​great​it​might​be,​civil​divisions​cannot​be​prolonged​in-

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​September​3,​1878 : 425

definitely​and​that​either​the​energy​of​good​men​imposes​silence​on​the​ others​or​foreign​domination​imposes​silence​on​everybody”;​we​think​ the​same,​with​the​exception​that,​in​order​for​that​energy​to​be​effective,​it​must​be​exercised​within​the​limits​of​the​law​and​justice,​because​ in​the​contrary​case,​instead​of​putting​an​end​to​internal​discords,​it​will​ only​prolong​them​indefinitely,​because​in​the​final​analysis,​every​revolution​expresses​unknown​rights​that​try​to​realize​themselves​in​facts.​ In​sum,​we​believe​that​a​state​not​based​in​justice,​and​justice​for​all,​is​ a​building​that​rests​on​false​foundations​that​must​collapse​unfailingly;​ and​that​to​sacrifice​individual​right​to​the​common​good,​according​to​ the​theory​recommended​to​us,​is​the​sure​means​of​opening​the​door​ to​tyranny,​for​as​Madame​Staël​very​correctly​stated,​when​once​it​has​ been​said​that​it​is​necessary​to​sacrifice​right​to​national​interest,​it​is​ very​close​to​narrowing​from​day​to​day​the​meaning​of​the​word​“nation”​and​to​make​of​it​first​its​partisans,​then​its​friends,​then​its​family,​ which​is​nothing​other​than​an​honest​term​for​designating​oneself.

4 ​

Bulletin of El Monitor, September 6, 1878

Reading​an​article​with​the​title​“Truths,”​published​by​ our​colleague​La Libertad​in​its​issue​the​day​before​yesterday​because​of​ the​defense​we​have​made​of​the​democratic​party​and​the​constitutional​ order,​has​caused​us​profound​pain.​We​say​that​that​article​has​caused​us​ profound​pain​not​so​much​because​of​the​question​itself,​but​because​ we​see​in​it​a​revelatory​symptom​of​the​devastation​that,​in​the​spirit​ of​the​greater​part​of​our​studious​youth,​certain​doctrines​have​caused,​ which,​with​scientific​ostentation​of​very​debatable​value,​tends​to​extinguish​everything​there​is​of​greatness​and​importance​in​the​human​ soul,​reducing​us​to​a​brutal​materialism,​which,​to​be​realizable,​would​ bring​us​directly​to​tyranny​and​barbarism. ​ It​is​sad​that​persons​of​intelligence​and​courage​like​the​young​author​ of​ the​ cited​ article,​ in​ whom​ the​ call​ of​ faith​ and​ enthusiasm​ should​ blaze​to​signal​to​society​in​its​days​of​conflict​the​dawning​of​happier​ days,​let​themselves​be​crushed​under​the​weight​of​a​fictitious​realism,​ and​instead​of​maintaining​the​sacred​fire​transmitted​by​the​martyrs​of​ democracy​and​justice,​conclude​by​opening​their​breasts​to​the​icy​inspirations​of​a​pessimistic​philosophy,​scoffing​at​the​idea​of​right,​treating​as​dreamers​its​altruistic​champions,​and​pronouncing​these​horrible​ words​that​surround​an​impious​paradox:​“Now​we​are​going​to​try​a​ little​tyranny,​but​an honorable tyranny,​to​see​what​results​it​produces.” ​ We​are​not​surprised,​moreover,​by​this​type​of​moral​contagion​that​ makes​the​best​minds​ill​and​debilitates​and​degrades​the​noblest​characters.​This​is​a​common​phenomenon​of​the​great​social​crises​that​nations​suffer​in​their​days​of​trial.​In​epochs​of​disorder,​of​anarchy,​of​ derangement,​in​which​all​ideas​are​confused,​all​rights​shipwrecked,​in​ which​injustice​and​force​take​possession​as​absolute​owners​of​human​ ​ Original​title:​“Boletín​del​Monitor,”​6​de​septiembre​de​1878.​Source:​El Monitor Republicano,​September​6,​1878. 426

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​September​6,​1878 : 427

destinies,​men​like​Machiavelli​and​Hobbes​spring​up,​who​proclaim​the​ philosophy​of​evil,​who​convert​pessimism​into​a​system,​and​who​put​ at​the​service​of​their​false​and​destructive​theories​all​the​resources​and​ all​the​subtleties​of​their​dialectic.​It​is​not​surprising,​then,​we​repeat,​ that​when​we​go​through​a​period​of​social​anxiety​and​political​dissolutions,​when​we​see​ineptitude​exalted,​cynicism​deified,​corruption​and​ immorality​triumphant,​somber​doctrines​like​those​of​Schopenhauer​ and​Hartmann​find​an​echo​in​generous​souls,​which,​deeply​affected​by​ the​present​ills,​see​as​of​the​essence​what​is​only​a​passing​accident,​and​ judge​as​the​definitive​fate​of​the​people​what​is​nothing​more​than​an​ episode​in​its​long​historical​peregrination. ​ Let​us​try,​nonetheless,​by​means​of​our​small​strengths,​to​face​that​ new​enemy​that​presents​itself​and​that​has,​of​course,​the​advantage​of​ being​supported​by​a​reality​whose​ugly​nakedness​we​do​not​claim​to​ conceal.​The​matter​is​worthy​of​being​discussed,​and​we​will​need​to​go​ into​details​even​at​the​risk​of​going​on​longer​than​we​wanted. ​ Our​colleague​begins​by​stating​this​maxim​which​we​accept​in​all​ its​breadth:​“There​is​no​greater​teacher​for​nations​than​experience,”​ and​then​adds​by​way​of​commentary,​“whereas​no​matter​how​good​the​ teacher​might​be,​his​instruction​produces​no​fruit​if​the​student​does​ not​wish​to​learn;​thus,​experience,​as​hard​as​it​might​be,​serves​for​ nothing​certain​people​who​pay​no​attention​to​the​terrible​lessons​they​ have​received.”​This​observation,​true​in​general,​deserves,​nonetheless,​ a​small​corrective. ​ It​is​not​accurate​that​some​people​stop​paying​attention​to​the​lessons​ of​experience;​for​that​it​would​be​necessary​that​they​find​themselves​ on​a​rung​lower​than​the​beasts.​Between​the​ill​that​experience​makes​ evident​and​the​will​to​remedy​it​are​often​interspersed​causes​that​will​ inevitably​develop,​no​matter​what​the​effort;​but​from​this​it​cannot​be​ deduced​that​the​people​scorn​the​lessons​of​experience,​nor​much​less​ that​they​follow​lovingly​the​ill​that​experience​has​exposed. ​ Our​ colleague​ is​ surprised​ at​ first​ to​ see​ that​ “after​ half​ a​ century​ of​constantly​battling​for​an​ideal​that​once realized​has​produced​only​ unfortunate​consequences​for​the​country,​our​notable​men​still​insist​ on​putting​it​into​practice​.​.​.”​Will​our​colleague​La Libertad​have​the​ kindness​to​tell​us​when​and​how​that​beautiful​ideal​has​been​realized​ and​how,​from​its​realization​alone,​the​country​has​harvested​unfortunate​consequences?​Only​a​few​days​ago​the​same​periodical​told​us​that​

428 : joSé​maría​viGil

the​Constitution​has​never​been​observed;​and​if​this​is​so,​what​is​that​ beautiful​ideal​that,​to​the​country’s​misfortune,​has​been​realized?​Let​ us​listen​a​little​and​perhaps​we​will​learn​it. ​ The​surprise​of​our​colleague​is​changed​into​profound​sadness​in​ seeing​that,​“with​the​atrocious​wounds​that​the​revolutions​and​civil​ war​have​inflicted​on​the​Mexican​Republic​still​bleeding,​the​revolutionary ideal​still​finds​those​who​defend​it​among​us,​and​that​writers​ of​worth​who,​in​the​course​of​its​existence​have​witnessed​the​constant​ ruin​toward​which​the​patria,​victim​of​those​revolutions,​travels,​speak​ as​one​of​those​did​yesterday​in​El Monitor,​of​the​rights of the revolution,​ unknown​rights​that​attempt​to​be​realized​in​facts.”​Here​we​have​to​ make​various​explanations​and​corrections,​for​our​colleague​seems​not​ to​have​understood​our​thought​sufficiently,​a​result,​perhaps,​of​our​not​ having​expressed​ourselves​with​sufficient​clarity. ​ Of​ course​ we​ make​ a​ profound​ differentiation​ between​ the​ great​ democratic​revolution​and​the​insurrections​and​shameful​disturbances​ that,​although​they​have​taken​the​name​of​revolution,​have​served​only​ to​dishonor​it.​We​must​distinguish,​moreover,​between​the​democratic​ ideal​and​revolution​used​as​an​instrument​to​destroy​the​obstacles​opposed​to​the​triumph​of​that​ideal.​Thus​it​is​that,​speaking​with​precision,​there​is​no​revolutionary​ideal,​because​revolution​is​a​means,​ not​an​end;​nor​could​we​defend​the​disturbances​when,​with​obstacles​ overcome​and​democratic​principles​achieved,​only​its​taking​root​and​ development​have​been​lacking,​things​that​cannot​be​attained​except​ by​means​of​peace​and​respect​for​law. ​ We​have​said​that​every​revolution,​and​we​request​of​our​colleague​ that​he​watch​carefully​the​meaning​we​have​given,​indicates​unknown​ rights​that​are​trying​to​realize​themselves​in​facts,​and​we​believe​we​ have​ stated​ a​ truth;​ but​ that​ is​ an​ idea​ entirely​ different​ from​ those​ claimed​ rights of the revolution​ whose​ defense​ is​ attributed​ to​ us,​ for​ neither​does​the​revolution​have​rights,​because​it​is​one​thing​to​mean​ and​another​to​have,​nor​could​we​defend​such​rights,​which​in​the​sense​ that​our​colleague​gives​them​are​for​us​genuine​crimes. ​ After​ having​ brought​ upon​ itself​ such​ unfortunate​ confusions,​ La Libertad​ gives​ free​ rein​ to​ its​ eloquence,​ making​ a​ caricature​ of​ the​ rights​that​the​democratic​school​proclaims​and​defends,​giving​itself​a​ bit​of​permission​to​identify​them​with​the​abuses​and​crimes​that​violate​them.​It​speaks​to​us​of​the​widow​whose​spouse​died​on​the​fields​of​

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​September​6,​1878 : 429

battle​in​defense​of​an​ideal​he​could​never​understand,​of​the​hacienda​ owner​who​saw​the​property​that​gave​bread​to​his​children​set​on​fire,​ etc.,​arguments​that,​referring​to​the​genuine​revolution,​have​the​same​ value​as​the​reproaches​reactionaries​have​made​to​insurgents​because​ they​did​not​win​independence​without​shedding​blood. ​ But​then​is​added​as​an​apothegm:​“After​sixty​years​of​making​revolutions,​the​political​and​social​condition​of​the​Mexican​is​the​same,​ with​slight​difference,​as​it​was​in​the​beginning.”​Yes,​in​effect,​it​is​the​ same,​with​the​slight​difference​of​being​very​distinct.​Does​our​colleague​now​see​how​bad​we​are?​Well​then,​neither​he​nor​we​wish​to​be​ as in the beginning,​and​the​reason​for​that​anyone​who​takes​the​trouble​ of​leafing​through​a​little​of​our​history​can​know. ​ “None​of​those​rights,”​continues​our​worthy​adversary,​“has​been​ realized​in​facts”;​then​the​ills​we​suffer​cannot​come​from​those​rights,​ and​this​luxury​of​declaiming​against​a​thing​that​is​yet​to​be​realized​is​ useless.​“The​facts​are​there​in​plain​sight,”​continues​La Libertad,​“the​ complete​ruin​of​the​country,​the​paralysis​of​all​sources​of​wealth,​arbitrariness​ruling​imperiously​under​the​mask​of​liberty​and​right.”​Magnificent!​Our​colleagues​should​exclaim,​given​that​what​rules​is​tyranny,​ which​has​all​its​preferences​against​that​cursed​right​that​causes​it​such​ a​bad​outcome. ​ “I​would​like​to​ask,”​says​our​attacker,​“those​tireless​defenders​of​ the​right​of​the​revolutions”​(this​is​not​directed​to​us,​because​we​have​ never​defended​such​a​right,​nonetheless​we​will​attempt​to​answer),​ “if,​given​that​all​men,​individually,​have​the​right​to​sacrifice​the​patria​ as​they​please”​(we​are​unaware​who​has​granted​to​all,​individually,​that​ barbarous​right),​“the​patria​would​not​have​in​its​turn​the​right​to​defend​itself​as​best​it​could​against​its​enemies”​(undoubtedly​yes,​even​ against​tyrants,​who,​according​to​the​sense​of​La Libertad,​seem​to​be​ the​best​friends​of​the​patria),​“if​the​good​of​the​majority​is​not​more​ worthy​of​being​paid​attention​to​than​the​whim​and​caprice​of​a​few”​ (here​we​must​differ​from​our​colleague:​provided​that​those​few​do​not​ belong​to​the​privileged​classes),​“and​if​the​most​brilliant​idea​lodged​ in​the​head​of​a​dreamer​is​worth​more​than​an​hour​of​well-​being​of​ an​entire​people”​(let​it​be​understood​that​here​one​is​not​speaking​of​ pessimistic​dreamers​but​rather​of​old​liberals).​“Rights!​Society​rejects​ them​still;​what​it​wants​is​bread.”​Society​is​quite​right​since​it​has​been​ persuaded​that​bread​and​rights​are​incompatible​and,​as​in​order​to​eat​

430 : joSé​maría​viGil

bread​it​is​necessary​not​to​have​rights,​it​follows​logically,​according​to​ our​colleague,​to​reject​the​second​in​order​to​obtain​the​first​.​.​. ​ “This​singular​claim​of​our​dreamers,​who​want​the​people​to​suffer,​ resigned​and​even​content,​all​the​ills​that​befall​them,​in​order​to​have​ the​sweet​compensation​of​being​governed​by​a​Constitution​that​is​incapable​of​satisfying​any​of​their​desires​.​.​.”​And​who​are​those​stupid​ or​evil​dreamers​who,​convinced​that​the​Constitution​is​the​sower​of​all​ the​ills​that​befall​the​people,​want​the​people​to​suffer​resigned?​Our​ colleague​has​to​prove​two​things:​that​the​Constitution​is​incompatible​ with​the​happiness​of​the​people,​and​that​we​liberals​want​the​people​ to​support​it​despite​that​fact.​Both​seem​difficult​to​us​but,​in​the​end,​ we​will​see. ​ La Libertad​concludes​its​article​with​these​words​which,​frankly,​we​ cannot​take​seriously:​“We​have​now​realized​an​infinity​of​rights”​(keep​ in​mind​that​earlier​it​has​been​said​to​us​that​none of those rights have been realized)​“that​produce​nothing​more​than​misery​and​discontent​in​ the​society.​Let us now try a bit of tyranny, but​honorable​tyranny”​ (this​is​something​like​our​saying,​“honest​criminal”​or​“civilized​barbarism”).​“It​will​produce​evils”​(is​it​possible?​an​attempt​in anima vile​ can​be​used​by​science)​“no​greater​than​those​our​constitutions​and​our​ rights​have​caused​the​country.”​(Notice​that​it​speaks​of​the​constitutions​that​have​not​been​observed​and​of​the​rights​that​have​not​been​ realized​in​facts,​although​later​it​says​otherwise.) ​ Decidedly,​either​our​colleague​has​tried​to​joke​or​the​blackest​misanthrope​has​confused​its​clear​intelligence.​Apart​from​this,​we​believe​ that,​from​the​analysis​we​have​made,​it​will​be​seen​that​our​colleague​ has​confused​all​the​ideas,​has​fallen​into​the​strangest​contradictions,​ and​ has​ attributed​ to​ us​ the​ most​ singular​ propositions.​We​ suppose,​ nonetheless,​that​this​time​we​will​have​been​more​explicit​and​that,​in​ the​future,​if​the​debate​continues,​it​will​be​on​more​established​foundations​and​on​clearer​and​more​definite​ideas.​Be​that​as​it​may,​we​can​ say​for​now​that​what​La Libertad​so​pompously​called​truths​cannot​be​ more​than​gratuitous​affirmations,​risky​deductions,​unsustainable​paradoxes,​and​deplorable​forgetfulness​of​our​history​and​of​the​legitimate​ aspirations​of​Mexican​society.

5



Bulletin of El Monitor, September 10, 1878

Two​of​the​worthy​editors​of​La Libertad​have​taken​as​ their​task​opposing​us,​or​better​said,​refuting​the​principles​of​a​school​ beloved​by​us,​this​last​consideration​being​the​one​that​makes​us​continue​the​polemic​begun;​for​were​it​only​about​our​person,​we​would​ cede​the​ground​with​pleasure​to​such​worthy​writers,​but​because​this​ matter​deals​with​an​interest​of​the​greatest​importance​to​the​country,​ we​consider​it​a​duty​on​our​part​to​continue​along​the​road​our​adversaries​themselves​have​set​out. ​ We​will​have​to​note,​of​course,​that​between​the​two​editors​of​La Libertad​to​whom​we​referred,​deep​contradictions​exist​that​we​will​ not​attempt​to​explain,​much​less​reconcile;​but​it​is​indeed​necessary​to​ bear​in​mind​in​our​respective​responses​because,​it​being​impossible​ to​reduce​them​to​one​single​point​of​view,​it​is​inevitable​for​us​to​appeal​to​different​categories​of​reasoning.​This,​so​far​as​it​can​be​understood,​always​produces​its​difficulties​and​obstacles,​but​finally​we​will​ endeavor,​as​best​we​can,​to​play​the​double​role​that​has​been​imposed​ on​us. ​ In​effect,​while​on​the​one​side​tyranny​is​praised​as​the​loveliest​form​ of​ government​ (!)​to​which​ we​might​ be​able​ to​ aspire;​ on​ the​ other​ it​tells​us​that​democracy​“is​the​only​possible​government,​because​it​ is​ what​ provides​ greater​ expanse​ to​ individual​ development.”​ While,​ on​the​one​hand,​every​ideal​is​condemned,​those​who​harbor​it​being​ treated​as​dreamers;​on​the​other,​having​a​higher​ideal​than​the​revolutionary​school​is​affirmed,​which​would​signify​being​more​of​a​dreamer​ in​the​language​of​the​former.​Finally,​on​one​side,​even​the​word​“right”​ is​condemned​as​a​sort​of​satanic​invention​that​has​served​only​to​cultivate​the​misfortunes​of​the​country;​on​the​other,​it​is​prophesied​that​“a​ ​ Original​title:​“Boletín​del​Monitor,”​10​de​septiembre​de​1878.​Source:​El Monitor Republicano,​September​10,​1878. 431

432 : joSé​maría​viGil

day​will​come​when​the​constraint​of​the​moral​law​in​the​human​spirit​ will​replace​all​positive​laws​and​the​state​will​be​reduced​to​its​functions​of​protection,​that​is​to​say,​to​administer​justice,”​something​that,​ frankly,​seems​to​us​to​cross​the​boundaries​of​the​most​fantastic​dreams.​ But​in​the​end,​be​this​as​it​may,​as​we​said​before,​once​we​respond​to​ the​truths​of​La Libertad,​we​are​now​going​to​say​some​words​about​the​ article​that​the​periodical​itself​addressed​to​us​on​Thursday​the​sixth​of​ this​month. ​ When​we,​in​answering,​made​use​of​Mr.​Caro’s​magnificent​article​ in​order​to​make​manifest​the​profound​disagreement​within​the​liberal​school,​called​revolutionary​by​our​colleague,​and​the​new​positivist​ doctrines,​it​was​very​far​from​our​intention​to​turn​ourselves​into​defenders​of​all​and​every​one​of​the​words​of​the​famous​French​writer.​ We​wanted​to​point​out​the​antagonism​that​exists​among​the​ideas​both​ schools​profess,​antagonism​our​colleague​has​acknowledged,​apart​from​ this​and​disagreeing​with​its​European​coreligionist,​that​in​accepting​ the​new​creed,​they​have​not​renounced​the​old​democratic​denomination.​We​will​not​linger,​then,​on​“the​three​absolutes,”​a​phrase​which,​ incidentally,​ although​ our​ colleague​ may​ strictly​ be​ philosophically​ right,​our​colleague​is​mistaken,​nonetheless,​in​the​sense​Mr.​Caro​used​ it,​so​that​it​is​neither​a​war​of​words​nor​absurd​to​speak​of​three​truths​ with​reference​to​three​ideas​even​when​we​know​very​well​that,​metaphysically​speaking,​there​is​no​more​than​one​truth. ​ We​can​say​the​same​thing​of​the​surprise​he​shows,​imagining​that​ we​have​enrolled​in​the​sect​of​Rousseau.​To​establish​that​the​democratic​school​is​essentially​rationalist,​that​it​is​the​child​of​the​philosopher​of​Geneva,​from​whom​it​has​retained​many​principles,​and​that​it​ has​arisen​with​the​Social Contract,​is​simply​to​assert​a​historical​truth,​ without​that​fact​signifying​that​the​school​referred​to​accepts​in​every​ way​the​theories​and​applications​of​Rousseau.​It​would​be​to​go​too​far,​ and​a​subject​better​of​a​book​than​a​periodical​article,​to​examine​the​ relationship​of​the​political​ideas​that​form​the​creed​of​modern​liberalism.​It​is​enough​for​our​purposes​to​note​that​even​though​we​are​ admirers​of​the​French​Revolution,​and​recognizing​the​immense​services​that​it​lent​to​the​liberty​of​peoples,​we​are​very​far​from​sharing​ the​ideas​regarding​the​state​that​were​dominant​at​that​time.​A​classical​ conception​derived​from​the​doctrines​contained​in​the​Social Contract,​

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​September​10,​1878 : 433

in​which,​on​the​other​hand,​individual​right​was​not​sacrificed​so​completely,​as​is​seen​in​these​words:​“the​establishment​of​liberty​would​ be​ bought​ too​ expensively​ if​ it​ cost​ the​ life​ of​ one​ single​ man.”​ Our​ colleague,​in​his​hatred​for​metaphysical​principles,​which​we​already​ know​of​him,​manages​even​to​make​a​sad​commentary​on​the​words​of​ Caro,​assuming​that​the​tendency​to​remake​man​on the type​of​right,​of​ equality,​and​of​absolute​liberty​is​to​wish​to​establish​absolute​liberty,​ equality,​and​right;​fashioning​on​this​mistake​a​series​of​fantastic​rationalizations,​he​tells​us​that​“these​dogmas​[he​calls​thus​the​principles​ established​a​priori]​to​which​one​does​not​come​by​experience​are​not,​ cannot​be,​the​object​of​human science; they are the object of faith,​[?]​which​ is​the​most​personal​that​exists​beneath​the​sun,​and​consequently​the​ most​variable,​the​most​irreducible​that​there​is.”​That​must​be​a​very​ wise​philosophy​that​nonetheless​does​not​recognize​one​of​the​immanent​tendencies​of​the​human​spirit,​the​transcendental,​which​it​obeys​ despite​itself,​making​an​obvious​contradiction,​as​we​have​seen​before,​ and​expanding​in​a​thoughtless​way​the​domains​of​that​faith,​with​its​ personal,​variable,​and​irreducible​character. ​ Coming​ to​ something​ more​ concrete,​ La Libertad​ formulates​ in​ three​paragraphs​the​foundations​of​the​school​which,​in​its​judgment,​ is​called​to​replace​the​old​liberalism​in​Mexico.​If​we​are​not​mistaken,​ such​foundations​are​just​so​many​other​dogmas​of​faith,​following​the​ language​of​our​colleague,​because​those​established​laws​that​lay​down​ rules​for​the​development​of​society​are​a​purely​subjective​concept​like​ social​evolution,​invoked​as​it​seems​to​suppress​all​movement​of​revolution​or​reaction;​and​as​one​does​not​come​to​those​dogmas​through​ experience,​inasmuch​as​experience​demonstrates​the​complete​opposite,​it​follows​that​our​colleague​has​given​“the​sea​as​a​foundation​for​a​ pyramid.” ​ According​to​that​doctrine,​right​has​no​other​foundation​“than​the​ principle​of​utility​with​respect​to​the​progressive​interests​of​the​human​ species,​and​progress​being​the​result​of​the​growing​activity​of​each​ individual,​it​is​the​duty​of​everyone,​expressed​in​the​law,​to​facilitate​ the​development​of​this​activity.”​This​is​what​is​called​individual right.​ Notice​that​here​the​utilitarian​principle​of​Bentham​seems​to​be​established​as​the​foundation​of​right;​that​is,​it​brings​us​to​the​full​morality​ of​interest.​This​means​that,​fleeing​from​metaphysical​principles,​we​are​

434 : joSé​maría​viGil

going​to​end​in​egoism,​which,​making​use​of​the​phrasing​of​our​adversary:​“is​the​most​personal​that​exists​beneath​the​sun,​and​consequently​ the​most​arbitrary,​the​most​variable,​the​most​irreducible​there​is.” ​ “The​function​of​the​state,”​it​continues,​“consists​in​protecting​those​ rights,​this​is​what​we​call​social​justice.​But​as​the​state​is,​whatever​might​ be​its​form​or​legal​appearance,​a product​of​the​sentiments​that​prevail​ in​a​society,​to​the​degree​to​which​these​sentiments​are​more​antisocial,​ let​us​say,​the​state​has​to​be​more conservative,​the​authority​more​vigorous,​to​prevent​the​dissolution​of​the​national​group,​in​which​case​individual right must yield,​and​has​yielded​and​will​always​yield​in​order​not​ to​perish.” ​ If​we​are​not​mistaken,​here​it​is​claimed​that,​when​in​a​society​antisocial​sentiments​dominate—that​is​to​say,​sentiments​that​do​not​facilitate​the​development​of​individual​activity—the​state,​which​is​nothing​ more​than​the​product​of​those​sentiments​that​thus​attack​the​right​of​ the​individual,​must​be​more​vigorous​in​order​to​repress​the​very​sentiments​of​which​it​is​the​product,​in​which​case​it​must​yield​individual​ right,​which,​as​it​appears,​it​was​trying​to​protect.​That​doctrine,​thus​ understood,​seems​to​us​illogical,​and​we​hope,​in​order​to​formulate​our​ judgment,​it​might​be​explained​to​us​a​bit​more. ​ As​ we​ distinguish​ between​ the​ absolute​ type​ and​ its​ relative​ realization,​we​do​not​understand​the​contradiction​one​claims​there​is​in​ the​constitutional​power​of​suspending​guarantees.​We​said​much​the​ same​with​respect​to​the​baseless​affirmation​by​which​we​defended​the​ Constitution​such as it is.​No,​colleague,​we​acknowledge,​and​have​acknowledged,​ that​ our​ fundamental​ law​ has​ defects,​ and​ we​ maintain​ for​that​reason​the​necessity​that​it​should​be​reformed,​but​that​this​be​ by​the​means​that​it​itself​indicates​and​according​to​the​needs​experience​designates.​This​will​explain​to​our​worthy​antagonist​that​we​have​ not​thrown​out​individual​right​from​ill​will​toward​the​system​of​the​ friars.​The​provision​to​which​the​colleague​refers​is​of​a​purely​transitory​character,​which​will​disappear​sooner​or​later​when​the​institutions​no​longer​have​anything​to​fear​from​the​communities​suppressed​ by​the​Laws​of​Reform. ​ La Libertad​assumes​that​the​democratic​party,​to​which​it​attributes​ a​permanent​revolutionary​tendency,​has​wanted​to​reduce​its​principles​ to​positive​laws​by​means​of​violence;​that​this​happened​with​the​Constitution,​ to​ which​ we​ owe​ the​ fact​ that​ it​ is​ not​ practiced;​ “and​ that​

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​September​10,​1878 : 435

there​is​in​reality​another​Constitution​in​force,​the only one that a people in the condition of ours can have,​but​that,​because​in​contradiction​with​ the​written​law,​it​leaves​a​wide​space​for​arbitrariness​and​despotism.” ​ In​this​our​colleague​proceeds​in​accordance​with​the​false​idea​that​ has​been​created​of​the​democratic​party,​a​matter​over​which​we​will​ not​ linger​ because​ we​ have​ already​ started​ to​ treat​ it​ separately.​ We​ would​certainly​like​to​be​told​which​might​be​that​other​constitution​in​ force​that​conflicts​with​the​written​law,​and​inasmuch​as​our​colleague​ possesses​the​secret​of​the​laws​that​lay​down​the​rules​for​the​development​of​social​groups,​we​would​also​like​our​colleague​to​explain​to​us​ what​it​is​that​makes​an​idea,​political​or​social,​able​to​conquer​the​obstacles​in​opposition​to​it,​and​which​might​be​the​people​happy​enough​ that,​without​need​of​jolts​or​revolutions,​have​effected​great​reforms​by​ responding​only​to​social​evolution. ​ Very​ far​ are​ we​ from​ defending​ the​ horrors​ of​ the​ guillotine​ and​ tarring;​ but​ we​ can​ certainly​ say​ that​ pausing​ to​ lament​ the​ disasters​ to​which​humanity​is​subject​without​taking​into​account​the​wealth​ produced​ from​ these​ disasters​ is​ to​ be​ ignorant​ of​ the​ condition​ of​ humanity.​ It​ is​ always​ curious​ to​ see​ the​ partisans​ enragés1​ of​ the​ experience,​the​untiring​detractors​of​the​metaphysical​principles​putting​ themselves​in​opposition​to​the​experience​of​all​the​centuries​and​reforming​the​world​from​the​depths​of​their​office​by​reason​of​laws​and​ formulas​discovered​through​a​single​rationality,​giving​in​this​way​“the​ sea​as​a​foundation​for​a​pyramid.” ​ Finally,​ we​ anxiously​ await​ the​ consequences​ extracted​ from​ the​ premises​that​have​been​made​known​to​us,​and​how​it​is​sought​to​reduce​them​to​practice​and​formulate​them​into​law.​No​one​more​than​ we​deplores​the​state​in​which​we​find​ourselves,​and​if​our​colleague​has​ found​the​way​to​appease​all​ambitions,​to​guarantee​all​rights,​and​this​ with​neither​shocks​nor​unrest​nor​bloodshed,​we​will​be​the​first​to​put​ ourselves​at​its​side,​joining​our​poor​efforts​to​that​great​work​of​closing​ forever​the​gates​of​our​country​to​civil​struggles.​But​no​tyranny,​no​ dictatorship,​no​lynching,​is​that​not​so?



1.​Fanatics.​(Editor’s​note)

6 ​

Bulletin of El Monitor, September 18, 1878

In​the​very​moment​we​are​writing​these​lines,​cannon​ shots,​music,​and​rapidly​pealing​bells​announce​the​celebration​of​the​ sixty-​eighth​ anniversary​ of​ Mexican​ independence,​ an​ unforgettable​ date​in​the​annals​of​liberty​because​it​commemorates​the​first​efforts​ of​a​people​who,​from​the​depths​of​the​most​profound​abjection,​when​ everything​conspiring​to​rise​up​against​the​established​power​should​be​ described​as​foolish,​did​not​weigh​the​magnitude​of​the​task​they​were​ undertaking,​but​rather,​obeying​the​voice​of​their​conscience,​threw​ themselves​into​an​unequal​struggle​whose​outcome​was,​nonetheless,​ the​triumph​of​the​patriotic​idea​proclaimed​in​the​town​of​Dolores​the​ night​of​September​15,​1810. ​ We​know​well​everything​that​has​been​said​and​that​continues​to​be​ said​against​that​famous​movement​and​its​old​leader.​Unfortunately​for​ Mexico,​since​the​first​attempt​at​its​emancipation,​the​hydra​of​discord​ reared​its​terrible​head;​the​spirits​of​the​sons​of​this​soil​were​deeply​ divided,​and​from​that​instant​it​was​easy​to​foresee​that​the​struggle​that​ was​begun​would​then​take​on​a​civil​character;​that​is​to​say,​that​interests​rooted​in​the​new​ideas​would​begin​to​clash,​among​which​emancipation​from​the​Spanish​metropolis​was​no​more​than​a​detail,​even​ though​essential​and​of​the​highest​importance. ​ The​flag​hoisted​by​the​powerful​arm​of​Hidalgo​hid​among​its​folds​ an​entire​world​of​pleasing​promises,​an​entire​future​filled​with​the​ most​ agreeable​ hopes.​ The​ people,​ and​ we​ construe​ this​ word​ in​ the​ sense​ of​ the​ disinherited​ classes,​ glimpsed,​ without​ understanding​ exactly​what​it​meant,​the​prospect​of​a​way​of​being​unknown​by​them​ until​then,​in​which​they​would​enjoy​liberties​and​rights​whose​possession​had​been​kept​constantly​remote​from​them. ​ Original​title:​“Boletín​del​Monitor,”​18​de​septiembre​de​1878.”​Source:​El Monitor Republicano,​September​18,​1878. 436

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​September​18,​1878 : 437

​ This​ explains​ that​ murky​ and​ disorderly​ impulse​ that​ cast​ numerous​and​amorphous​masses​into​the​vicissitudes​of​a​gigantic​battle;​at​ the​same​time​it​explains​the​panic​with​which​the​truly​conservative​ interests,​grounded​in​the​privileged​classes,​contemplated​such​a​storm.​ Those​who​considered​that​outburst​an​imprudent​and​premature​attempt​ at​ emancipation,​ and​ even​ more,​ those​ who​ allege​ for​ it​ truly​ mean​reasons,​are​deplorably​mistaken​about​the​significance​of​those​ great​jolts​that​arouse​societies​in​solemn​epochs​like​the​omens​of​profound​transformations​against​which​no​human​force​can​prevail. ​ The​unity​of​thought​that​invigorated​the​Mexican​Revolution​begun​ by​the​venerable​parish​priest​of​Dolores​appears​throughout​the​years​ in​the​entire​period​that​includes​our​contemporary​history.​Independence,​the​Republic,​the​Reform​have​been​nothing​more​than​so​many​ other​ steps​ on​ the​ same​ ladder,​ stopping​ points​ on​ a​ single​ road​ the​ Mexican​people​have​traversed​in​a​straight​line​to​arrive​at​securing​ those​three​great​ideas​synthesized​in​the​idea​of​their​regeneration. ​ For​this​reason,​the​liberal​party​sees​in​the​insurgents​of​1810​their​ natural​direct​ancestors,​given​that​they​and​the​constituents​of​’24​and​ the​reformers​of​’57​and​the​defenders​of​independence​in​’62​constitute​ nothing​more​than​a​single​political​entity​that,​under​different​names,​ has​been​guided​by​the​same​idea​and​inspired​the​same​goals.​For​the​ opposite​reason,​the​current​enemies​of​the​institutions​do​not​conceal​ their​sympathies​for​those​who,​in​the​first​decade​of​the​century,​supported​the​colonial​regime​with​all​their​strength;​who​later​accepted​ independence​on​the​condition​of​perpetuating​the​predominance​of​ the​privileged​classes;​who,​when​they​could​not​suppress​the​republican​ movement,​contented​themselves​with​centralism​and​military​dictatorship;​who,​nourishing​the​illusion​of​establishing​a​monarchy,​did​not​ waver​from​provoking​the​most​evil​of​foreign​interventions;​and​who​ today,​reduced​to​absolute​impotence,​content​themselves​with​caricaturing​the​anarchy​into​which​the​liberal​party​has​fallen​as​a​consequence​of​the​sordid​ambition​of​some​false​democrats,​and​put​themselves​ under​ the​ protection​ of​ some​ candidate​ of​ bad​ character​ who​ cherishes​ the​ crazy​ idea​ of​ creating​ a​ personal​ party​ that​ might​ raise​ him​to​the​highest​magistracy​in​a​country​fed​up​with​suffering​the​results​of​ineptitude​and​immorality. ​ In​vain​one​seeks​to​make​some​break​in​the​parallel​course​followed​ by​ the​ two​ ideas​ whose​ clashes​ and​ simultaneous​ development​ shape​

438 : joSé​maría​viGil

our​entire​contemporary​history.​He​who​today​condemns​the​democratic​revolution,​pointing​to​it​as​the​efficient​cause​of​all​our​misfortunes,​he​who​dreams​of​a​modification​in​the​conservative​sense​for​our​ institutions,​must​return​to​1810​to​condemn​as​criminal​stupidity​the​ undertaking​of​Hidalgo,​Allende,​and​Abasolo,​continued​by​Morelos​ and​Bravo,​by​Guerrero​and​Iturbide,​by​Pedraza​and​Gómez​Farías,​and​ completed​in​our​days​by​Juárez,​Ocampo,​Degollado,​Zaragoza,​and​all​ the​other​leaders​of​the​Reform,​ultimate​consequence​of​the​idea​proclaimed​at​Dolores. ​ But​that​anathema​necessarily​carries​with​it​the​complete​and​unconditional​acceptance​of​the​system​that​Calleja1​and​the​high​dignitaries​ of​the​Church​supported​and​that,​preserving​deep​down​the​same​tendencies,​was,​with​the​passage​of​time,​taking​on​the​different​shades​ of​centralist,​Cuernavaquist,2​reactionary,​interventionist,​all​names​that​ are​understood​in​the​most​general​epithet​of​conservative​and​that,​by​ their​historical​antecedents​and​their​never-​denied​doctrines,​will​never​ be​able​to​join​together​and​be​mistaken​for​the​party​that​has​kept​the​ banner​of​Hidalgo​elevated​on​high,​banner​that​has​always​signified​all​ liberties​and​all​rights. ​ One​sees,​by​what​we​have​just​said,​that​the​revolution​whose​anniversary​the​Republic​celebrates​on​September​16​has​been​a​work​of​true​ social​and​political​regeneration,​that​in​each​one​of​its​advances,​if​it​ has​sown​the​soil​with​the​debris​of​some​vexatious​fear,​it​has​also​left​a​ great​conquest​standing,​that​in​its​vitality​and​robustness​has​been​able​ to​resist​the​combined​forces​of​its​enemies,​while​these​enemies​have​ been​abandoning​little​by​little​the​terrain​of​which​they​were​previously​the​absolute​possessors. ​ Apart​from​this,​the​liberal​party​finds​itself​so​closely​identified​with​ the​existence​and​future​of​the​Mexican​people​that​its​errors,​its​divisions,​and​its​anarchy​are​what​have​brought​about​the​deplorable​situation​the​Republic​is​in​today;​that​having​lost​its​compass​in​the​midst​of​ the​chaos​where​the​mean​aspirations​of​some​false​democrats​have​cast​ it,​it​sees​independence​threatened,​the​social​edifice​deeply​shaken,​un​ 1.​Félix​María​Calleja​was​a​viceroy​of​New​Spain​who​fought​the​insurgents.​(Editor’s​note) ​ 2.​In​1834​a​revolt​was​launched​in​Cuernavaca​that​ended​the​rule​of​the​liberal​vice​ president,​Valentín​Gómez​Farías.​(Editor’s​note)

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​September​18,​1878 : 439

able​to​perceive​in​the​future​anything​other​than​the​unleashing​of​all​ the​evils​that​accompany​great​catastrophes. ​ But​if​this​is​a​truth,​as​painful​as​it​might​be​to​acknowledge​it,​it​ is​not​less​so​that​the​salvation​of​the​patria​is​based​exclusively​on​the​ reconstruction​of​that​party​on​its​legitimate​foundations,​eliminating​ every​spurious​element,​flinging​from​its​breast​those​baneful​personalities​that​strive​only​for​their​individual​aggrandizement,​even​when​to​ do​so​might​make​it​necessary​to​sacrifice​all​principles​and​compromise​ the​very​existence​of​the​Mexican​people. ​ On​this​solemn​day,​when​the​rejoicing​patria​recalls​with​pride​and​ gratitude​the​memory​of​its​liberators​and​its​martyrs,​we​make​a​formal​ appeal​to​liberals​of​good​faith,​to​Mexicans​in​whose​soul​is​preserved​ intact​the​love​of​the​people​to​which​they​belong,​that,​whatever​might​ have​been​the​accidental​denominations​that​have​divided​them​in​the​ last​years,​they​unite​in​a​single​intention,​that​of​saving​the​country,​that​ of​maintaining​national​independence,​a​very​holy​cause​identified​with​ the​institutions​that​govern​us,​with​the​liberty​they​proclaim,​with​the​ rights​they​guarantee.​Here​is​the​only​saving​plank​in​the​midst​of​the​ shipwreck​that​threatens​us.​Only​force​of​will,​energetic​and​unshakable,​to​commit​itself​to​that​intention​of​greatest​social​and​political​ interest​will​be​enough​to​quell​all​those​criminal​and​ridiculous​ambitions​that​stop​at​nothing​in​order​to​be​satisfied,​even​at​the​cost​of​ the​ruin​of​the​Republic​and​the​destruction​of​our​race.​That​effort,​ we​repeat,​will​make​the​confidence​lost​today​rise​again,​and​the​entire​ country​will​willingly​accept​all​the​sacrifices​the​circumstances​require​ of​it,​because​it​will​know​that​those​efforts​will​not​be​made​unfruitful​by​impure​hands​and​base​passions.​Unification​around​this​saving​ intention​on​the​part​of​honorable​and​sincere​liberals​is​the​only​way​ to​provide​a​favorable​outcome​to​the​horrible​crisis​that​we​are​going​ through​and​that,​in​the​serious​state​to​which​it​has​come,​no​longer​ permits​either​going​back​or​delaying.​The​work​of​Hidalgo​will​thus​ remain​worthily​crowned,​and​on​future​anniversaries​of​independence​ the​liberal​party​will​be​justly​able​to​pride​itself​on​having​saved,​with​ its​selflessness,​the​cause​of​the​patria​and​of​liberty.

7



Bulletin of El Monitor, September 27, 1878

One​of​the​facts​that​has​characterized​the​current​administration​has​been​a​marked​tendency​to​favor​the​old​reactionary​ party,​summoning​many​of​its​men,​to​whom​it​has​entrusted​positions​ of​greater​or​lesser​rank,​and​even​placing​them​in​the​legislative​bodies​ and​in​the​tribunals​and​courts​of​justice.​What​is​the​thinking​that​has​ determined​that​policy?​What​is​the​objective​the​government​has​put​ forward​in​setting​out​that​plan​of​management?​What​is​the​intention​ of​the​individuals​who​enter​into​the​service​of​an​administration​that,​ although​ in​name​only,​ declares​ ideas​diametrically​opposed​ to​those​ that​form​its​politico-​religious​creed?​The​question​is​serious​and​worth​ the​trouble​of​being​examined,​although​it​might​be​in​the​briefest​possible​way. ​ We​must,​of​course,​show​that​we​are​not​among​those​who​believe​ that,​in​order​to​be​liberal,​a​necessary​condition​is​not​to​have​religious​ ideas,​and​we​are​so​far​from​thinking​that​true​Christianity​is​opposed​ to​democratic​opinions​that,​on​the​contrary,​we​find​in​the​first​the​fundamental​foundations​of​the​second.​In​this​sense​we​recall​that​when​it​ was​a​matter​of​constitutional​affirmation,​we​maintained​that​it​did​not​ conflict​with​the​religious​beliefs​of​any​person,​and​we​considered​as​a​ partisan​weapon​the​great​hullabaloo​that​was​raised​then​by​conservative​periodicals.​Time​has​proved​us​completely​right,​given​that​today​ the​ecclesiastical​authority​has​permitted​the​affirmation​to​the​Constitution​and​Laws​of​Reform​to​be​accepted,​dispelling​in​this​way​the​ scruples​that​so​distressed​the​timid​souls. ​ We​must​also​show​that,​considering​the​conservative​group​simply​ as​a​political​party​inasmuch​as​between​it​and​the​liberal​party​we​find​ only​disagreements​of​this​nature​and​not​that​conflict​of​religious​ideas​ ​ Original​title:​“Boletín​del​Monitor,”​27​de​septiembre​de​1878.​Source:​El Monitor Republicano,​September​27,​1878. 440

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​September​27,​1878 : 441

that​some​attempt​to​set​out,​we​have​not​considered​it​impossible​that​ the​ conservative​ group,​ yielding​ to​ the​ demands​ of​ the​ times,​ might​ modify​its​exaggerated​tendencies​and​accept​the​constitutional​order​ sanctioning​the​Reform,​the​conservative​group​might​renounce​the​abstention​to​which​it​has​confined​itself​since​the​downfall​of​the​empire​ and​might​begin​to​fight​openly​on​legal​ground.​Although​this​has​not​ been​ completely​ realized,​ it​ does​ not​ appear​ to​ us​ that​ the​ day​ is​ far​ off​when​we​might​see​it,​given​that​now​a​considerable​number​of​old​ conservatives​appear​in​political​posts​of​greater​or​lesser​importance,​ which​equates​to​accepting​an​order​based,​as​it​is​said,​in​the​Constitution. ​ We​must​show,​finally,​that​the​liberal​party​does​not​belong​to​the​ number​ of​ those​ intolerant​ exclusivists​ who​ systematically​ keep​ men​ who​profess​certain​political​or​religious​ideas​out​of​all​participation​ in​public​matters.​Here,​nonetheless,​we​have​to​make​a​necessary​distinction.​In​the​matter​of​posts,​we​find​a​great​difference​between​those​ that​are​tied​directly​to​the​development​of​political​ideas​that​form​the​ program​of​the​government​and​those​that​are​purely​administrative.​It​ is​clear​that​we,​professing​the​principles​of​the​liberal​party,​will​not​ support​for​the​former​posts​any​but​men​who​have​a​perfectly​clear​and​ defined​democratic​character,​and​we​will​never​concede​our​trust​to​an​ enemy​of​the​institutions,​even​if​he​is​flexible​enough​to​consent​to​play​ the​role​of​liberal. ​ We​consider​this​point​so​sensitive​that,​even​dealing​with​the​diverse​ factions​of​the​republican​party,​we​find​it​neither​strange​nor​reprehensible​that​governments​surround​themselves​on​the​first​line​with​men​of​ their​circle​who​inspire​in​them​more​confidence​because​of​their​intelligence,​their​honor,​and​their​personal​loyalty.​To​attack​a​government​ as​exclusivist​because​the​ministries,​for​example,​include​individuals​ identified​with​the​leader​of​the​executive​branch​in​political​principles​ and​on​the​course​he​proposes​to​carry​out​is​the​worst​kind​of​weapon,​ which​simple​common​sense​condemns. ​ The​same​does​not​happen​with​respect​to​other​branches​of​the​administration​where​the​political​ideas​of​the​persons​have​no​influence.​ Individual​opinions,​party​commitments,​should​not​in​any​case​be​preferred​to​honesty,​ability,​industriousness,​and​education.​Good​public​ service,​the​demands​of​order​and​morality,​impose​on​governments​the​ duty​of​seeking​the​most​suitable​persons​to​occupy​the​posts​without​

442 : joSé​maría​viGil

making​merit​consist​of​ideas,​often​purely​theoretical,​that​those​who​ seek​to​ingratiate​themselves​profess.​We​will​not​say​anything​about​ those​whose​naming​is​popular​in​origin,​because​assuming​that​they​ should​be​perfectly​free,​that​the​authorities​must​not​control​them​in​ any​way,​it​is​understood​that​both​the​liberal​and​the​conservative​find​ the​way​clear​to​attain​them​by​means​of​the​formalities​established​by​ law,​and​they​cannot​be​the​object​of​censure​by​an​administration​that​ knows​how​to​fulfill​its​obligations. ​ These​ general​ ideas,​ which​ in​ our​ judgment​ are​ the​ most​ acceptable​in​the​matter​with​which​we​are​dealing,​are​very​far​from​having​ been​practiced​by​the​current​administration.​One​of​its​first​acts,​on​ the​triumph​of​the​revolution,1​was​to​dismiss​en​masse​all​the​old​employees,​proceeding​immediately​to​fill​the​vacant​posts​with​individuals​who​earned​its​special​consideration.​The​letter​of​convocation​that​ was​immediately​issued​for​the​election​of​authorities,​both​in​the​federation​and​in​the​states,​was​so​full​of​restrictions​that​it​could​have​ been​summed​up​in​this​article​alone:​“Only​Porfirian​revolutionaries​ can​ elect​ or​ be​ elected.”​ The​ scandalous​ pressure​ that​ since​ then​ has​ been​ exercised​ on​ the​ popular​ vote​ has​ ended​ by​ demonstrating​ that​ the​most​intolerable​exclusivism​is​the​most​pronounced​feature​that,​ among​others,​distinguishes​the​current​administration. ​ One​cannot​find​in​a​principle​of​lofty​policy,​in​a​noble​inspiration​ of​impartiality​and​resolve​for​good​public​service,​what​it​has​done​in​ recruiting​from​the​ranks​of​the​old​reactionary​party​the​many​servants​ who​figure​in​the​Tuxtapecano​government.​What​can​be,​then,​that​predilection​for​the​traditional​enemies​of​democratic​doctrines?​Why​that​ unjust​preference​with​discredit​and​offense​to​honorable​liberals​who​ have​ consecrated​ their​ entire​ lives​ to​ the​ defense​ of​ the​ institutions?​ This,​to​our​way​of​thinking,​has​only​one​explanation,​and​it​is​the​following: ​ The​enthronement​of​the​circle​that​dominates​today​never​signified​ the​triumph​of​any​idea​or​political​principle.​The​partisans​themselves​ of​the​Plan​of​Tuxtepec​have​described​it​in​the​end​as​an​unrealizable​ absurdity,​so​no​one​now​takes​seriously​the​promises​contained​in​it.​ Personal​interests,​poorly​veiled​with​a​disguise​of​liberalism,​are​the​ ​ 1.​The​1876​Revolution​of​Tuxtepec​placed​General​Porfirio​Díaz​in​power.​(Editor’s​ note)

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​September​27,​1878 : 443

only​motive​that​can​be​pointed​out​clearly​and​resolutely​in​the​midst​ of​the​anarchy​that​envelopes​the​current​administration. ​ In​such​circumstances,​it​is​natural​that​one​seeks,​not​men​of​strict​ principles​who​do​not​accept​violating​them​easily,​but​rather​those​who,​ enemies​of​such​principles,​regard​with​pleasure​their​vilification​and​ disparagement​and​happily​cooperate​in​the​ruin​of​the​institutions,​because​they​could​not​prevail​against​them​fighting​them​face​to​face​on​ the​field​of​battle​or​in​the​terrain​of​politics. ​ No​one​is​more​fitting​to​help​in​this​liberticidal​undertaking​than​the​ faction​traditionally​opposed​to​democracy​and​the​Reform.​There​the​ little​Caesars​can​find​all​the​elements​necessary​to​realize​their​work​of​ regeneration;​there​the​men​are​who,​because​of​an​episcopal​permission,​ have​ no​ obstacle​ to​ accepting​ that​ tremendous​ affirmation​ that,​ not​very​many​years​ago,​constituted​one​of​the​most​serious​and​terrible​mortal​sins.​To​produce​chaos,​systematically​undermine​the​institutions,​try​to​introduce​into​society​the​feeling​that​the​Constitution​is​ impractical,​that​this​people​is​not​made​for​liberty,​that​democracy​is​ an​odious​farce,​preparing​in​this​way​the​road​to​a​dictatorship,​here​ is​the​only​idea​released​in​the​midst​of​this​confusion​and​this​general​ unhinging​that​seems​produced​deliberately​by​men​who​should​march​ with​a​firm​step​along​the​path​of​the​law,​securing​the​glorious​conquests​of​the​Mexican​Revolution.​The​congeniality​between​the​current​administration​and​the​conservative​group​does​not​admit​another​ explanation,​given​that​neither​the​intolerant​exclusivism​of​the​first​nor​ the​tenacious​intransigence​of​the​second​would​have​permitted​them​to​ draw​near​to​one​another​were​it​not​that​a​point​of​contact​existed​that​ might​link​their​contact​and​unite​their​efforts.

8 ​

Bulletin of El Monitor, October 22, 1878

Our​esteemed​colleague​La Libertad,​taking​personally​ a​paragraph​of​our​bulletin​of​the​sixteenth,​pauses​to​explain​its​opinions​in​the​article​entitled​“Idealism,”​about​which​we​will​in​turn​say​ some​words,​having​first​to​offer​a​little​clarification. ​ La Libertad​finds​it​strange​that​we​have​abandoned​the​field​of​discussion​that​we​maintained​not​very​long​ago;​in​this​there​is​some​inaccuracy.​As​will​be​remembered,​the​polemic​was​initiated​by​our​colleague​because​of​one​of​our​bulletins;​we​responded,​it​replied​to​us,​we​ responded​again,​and​then​it​replied​to​us​a​second​time​in​two​articles​ by​two​different​editors​of​said​daily,​taking​the​question​in​two​entirely​different​senses;​for​our​part,​we​answered​the​two​opposing​replies​separately,​and​our​double​answer​received​only​a​single​response.​ We​believed​it​then​appropriate​to​remain​silent,​both​to​await​the​other​ answer,​which​has​not​come,​and​because​in​the​response​it​had​given​ us​we​seemed​to​notice​a​certain​humorous​style​that​made​the​polemic​ truly​degenerate,​for​although​the​spirit​of​our​rival​pleases​us​greatly,​ we​find​it​out​of​place​in​a​question​as​serious​as​the​one​upon​which​we​ have​touched. ​ One​sees​by​this​that​it​was​not​exactly​we​who​abandoned​the​field​ of​discussion,​because​if​we​did​not​again​address​La Libertad,​it​was​ because​of​the​attitude​assumed​by​our​attackers.​Apart​from​this,​no​ polemic​ must​ cross​ certain​ bounds​ because​ it​ would​ run​ the​ risk​ of​ becoming​interminable;​with​rationales​expressed​from​both​sides,​in​ which​each​supports​its​respective​opinion,​it​is​appropriate​to​end​the​ debate,​letting​the​public​pass​judgment,​for​otherwise​it​will​only​continue​to​incur​innumerable​repetitions,​making​the​discussion​take​on​ the​character​of​an​angry​altercation. ​ Original​title:​“Boletín​del​Monitor,”​22​de​octubre​de​1878.​Source:​El Monitor Republicano,​October​22,​1878. 444

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​oCtober​22,​1878 : 445

​ Our​colleague​laments​that​we​have​not​understood​its​political​ideas,​ confusing​“the​aspiration​to​establish​a​strong​government​with​conspiracy​against​public​liberties.”​But​what​is​it​that​La Libertad​understands​by​“strong​government”?​What​sort​of​political​form​does​it​expect​when​it​makes​the​Constitution,​with​the​rights​and​guarantees​it​ grants,​the​constant​object​of​acerbic​criticism?​Even​now​it​says​that​ “the​consciousness​of​the​duties​and​rights​of​man​and​citizen​does​not​ exist​in​the​great​majority​of​the​people,”​and​further​on​it​adds​that​a​ reform​of​the​Constitution​in​the​conservative​sense​is​necessary. ​ From​this​one​deduces​that​what​La Libertad​wants​is​for​the​government​to​be​strengthened​at​the​expense​of​the​liberties​and​rights​of​man​ and​citizen​or,​what​is​the​same,​that​those​rights​and​those​liberties​be​ reduced​to​the​benefit​of​the​governmental​authority,​and​this​is​what​ it​calls​reforms​in​the​conservative​sense.​It​is​claimed​nonetheless​that​ in​operating​in​that​way,​it​is​because​it​is​desired​“that​the​country​acquire​the​practical​use​of​public​liberties,”​believing​that​the​opposing​ theories,​that​is​to​say​the​theories​of​those​of​us​who​support​maintaining​the​Constitution,​will​necessarily​lead​the​country​“to​an​abyss​ from​which​it​will​surely​not​emerge​except​to​fall​into​another​that​is​ deeper.” ​ Our​colleague​throws​in​our​face​for​the​hundredth​time​our​empiricism,​our​absolute​lack​of​practical​spirit​and​scientific​method,​in​sum,​ our​idealism,​metaphysical,​as​it​has​done​in​calling​the​opinions​constitutionalist.​Might​La Libertad​permit​us​to​say​to​it​that,​because​of​a​ rare​contradiction,​it​is​falling​into​the​very​faults​that​it​attributes​to​its​ opponents,​as​it​is​easy​for​us​to​prove​in​a​few​words. ​ To​suppose​possible​the​reform​of​the​Constitution​in​the​conservative​ sense​so​that​the​country​might​acquire​the​practical use​of​public​liberties​is​a​paradox​that​good​sense​rejects​and​that​demonstrates​the​most​ complete​lack​of​practical​spirit​and​scientific​method.​The​word​“conservative”​has​a​double​meaning,​the​literal​and​the​political;​which​of​ them​does​our​colleague​take​it​to​be?​In​the​first,​we​the​constitutionalists​are​the​true​conservatives​because​we​try​to​preserve​the​fundamental​law,​the​political​institutions​that​govern​us,​and​whatever​innovation​ is​made​to​alter​these​institutions​at​their​foundation​cannot​properly​ be​called​conservative​because​the​ideas​of​preserving​and​destroying​ mutually​exclude​each​other.​In​the​second​sense,​we​have​no​need​to​say​ a​word;​everyone​knows​what,​among​us,​the​party​called​conservative​

446 : joSé​maría​viGil

wants​and​claims​so​that​it​might​be​able​to​reconcile​its​theories​with​ the​practice​of​public​liberties. ​ On​the​other​ hand,​ to​suppress​ constitutional​ liberties​ in​order​ to​ broaden​the​sphere​of​a​strong​government,​and​this​with​the​purpose​of​ “the​country​acquiring​the​practical​use​of​public​liberties,”​is​so​contradictory​and​absurd​a​theory​that​the​flight​of​the​loftiest​metaphysics​ cannot​reach​it.​To​suppress​liberty​in​order​to​acquire​the​practical​use​ of​liberty​is​to​condemn​the​individual​for​many​years​to​the​most​complete​inaction​so​his​limbs​might​be​developed​and​strengthened;​it​is​ to​enclose​him​in​profound​darkness​so​he​might​acquire​perspicacious​ sight;​it​is​to​deprive​him​of​all​instruction​so​he​might​become​a​learned​ man​of​the​first​order.​Now​we​are​not​surprised​by​the​story​of​the​student​who,​as​Calderón​de​la​Barca​tells​it,​not​knowing​how​to​swim​ threw​himself​into​a​pond​and,​having​been​on​the​verge​of​drowning​ emerged​from​there​protesting​that​he​would​not​again​go​into​the​water​ until​he​knew​how​to​swim. ​ In​the​course​of​such​contradictions,​which​reveal​neither​a​very​practical​spirit​nor​a​very​scientific​or​logical​method,​the​idea​constantly​ arises​that​that​pitiless​mutilation​of​useless​liberties​because​the​people​ do​not​know​how​to​make​use​of​them,​and​that​creation​of​a​strong​government​as​if​the​ilk​were​unknown​to​us,​have​as​their​objective​saving​ society,​putting​a​brake​on​anarchy,​protecting​all​legitimate​interests​ profoundly​threatened​by​disorder​and​immorality.​Here​indeed​appears​ empiricism​in​its​full​development,​the​complete​absence​of​all​practical​ spirit,​of​all​scientific​method,​etc. ​ To​entrust​the​solution​to​the​great​problem​troubling​Mexican​society​to​purely​political​innovations​is​absolutely​not​to​see​what​is​in​ front​of​our​eyes,​it​is​not​to​live​in​this​world,​it​is​to​go​off​one’s​rocker. ​ Let​ us​ suppose​ that​ the​ conservative​ theories​ of​ La Libertad​ have​ been​realized;​that​we​now​do​not​have​that​jumble​of​useless​rights​and​ guarantees;​that​in​place​of​that​shallow​prattle​of​the​periodicals,​fruit​ of​the​useless​liberty​of​the​press,​we​have​a​gazette​of​a​half​sheet​each​ month,​as​in​the​time​of​the​viceroys;​that​the​authority​can​make​use​at​ its​will​of​the​lives​of​Mexicans;​that​all​those​idle​formalities​have​been​ set​aside​that​serve​only​to​encourage​criminals,​and​one​imprisons​and​ shoots​without​ceremony;​finally,​that​we​have​a​political​regime​adequate​to​the​needs​of​our​people​as​they​are​depicted.​Does​our​colleague​

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​oCtober​22,​1878 : 447

believe​that​it​has​now​obtained​the​supreme​good​of​peace​and​happiness​of​the​nation?​Does​it​believe​we​have​entered​into​that​ideal​era​of​ concord​and​tranquility,​leaving​everyone​content​in​his​place,​the​entire​ society​gathered​around​that​strong​government,​venerable​model​of​the​ familiar​father​of​the​peoples,​who​distributes​rewards​and​punishments​ to​his​obedient​subjects​in​accord​with​his​good will?​If​it​believes​all​that,​ its​idealism​is​incurable​and​we​need​to​present​to​it​the​reality​of​what​ would​be. ​ That​retrograde​evolution,​because​it​cannot​have​another​sense,​that​ La Libertad​ seeks​would​be​the​beginning​ of​a​period​of​horrendous​ calamities​for​the​country,​because​we​would​see​begin​again,​in​great​ proportions,​the​fratricidal​struggles​that​have​bloodied​our​soil,​and​the​ only​result​they​would​produce​would​be​to​precipitate​the​final​dissolution​of​our​unfortunate​society.​But​let​us​grant​for​a​moment​that​the​ new​order​of​things​succeeds;​what​would​happen?​We​would​see​ignorance​and​brutal​force​take​possession​of​the​situation,​the​most​opprobrious​tyranny​would​touch​the​furthest​extremes,​and​we​would​watch​ one​of​those​repugnant​and​ridiculous​spectacles,​because​it​is​beyond​ doubt​that​the​men​who​will​play​the​lead​role​in​the​tragicomedy​would​ not​have​the​stature​of​a​Caesar​or​a​Cromwell.​Is​this​what​La Libertad​ wants? ​ Let​us​acknowledge​the​truth:​the​evils​we​suffer​and​the​still​more​ serious​ones​that​threaten​us​neither​come​from​political​questions,​nor​ can​a​radical​remedy​be​sought​in​them.​Let​us​exploit​our​sources​of​ wealth,​let​us​stimulate​work,​let​us​offer​a​wide​field​to​activity,​to​honesty​and​intelligence​of​all​the​inhabitants​of​the​country,​and​we​will​ see​change,​as​if​by​magic,​the​scene​that​surrounds​us.​Then​politics​will​ cease​being​an​office​that​everyone​wants​to​exploit,​because​it​will​cease​ being​ synonymous​ with​ the​ mania​ for​ public​ employment.​ Then​ the​ authorities​will​fulfill​their​duties,​because​they​will​not​see​themselves​ under​constant​pressure​from​those​who​want​to​topple​them​in​order​to​ avail​themselves​of​the​post​into​which​they​enter​exclusively​and​with​ rare​exceptions​to​make​money,​because​they​know​that​sooner​or​later​ they​will​be​put​to​one​side​so​that​others​might​come​to​do​the​same.​ Then​the​elections​will​be​free,​the​selection​falling​to​the​most​worthy​ because​popular​representation​will​cease​being​a​sinecure​for​whose​ fulfillment​neither​science​nor​conscience​is​required.​Then,​finally,​the​

448 : joSé​maría​viGil

complete​opposite​of​what​happens​now​will​happen,​because​the​social​ circumstances​will​have​changed,​and​men,​it​is​necessary​not​to​forget,​ work​according​to​the​circumstances​in​which​they​find​themselves. ​ This​is​what​must​be​done.​Toward​this​end,​effort​must​be​directed​ without​provoking​conflicts,​without​occasioning​new​complications,​ as​would​happen​irremissibly​if​in​some​empirical​way​one​attempts​to​ modify​the​institutions​for​the​reduction​of​liberties​that​are​in​no​way​ responsible​for​what​is​happening.​To​do​otherwise​is​to​yield​to​the​impulses​of​an​ugly​and​contradictory​idealism,​because​there​are​also​ugly​ idealisms;​it​is​to​be​made​an​instrument​of​preconceived​judgments,​ seeing​evil​where​it​is​not,​basing​the​solution​where​it​does​not​exist. ​ To​conclude,​we​will​say​to​our​esteemed​colleague​that​if​it​wishes​to​ continue​this​discussion,​we​beg​it​to​explain​to​us​the​scientific​method​ it​has​followed​to​deduce​scientifically​the​conclusion​that​the​ills​that​ oppress​Mexican​society​come​from​the​institutions​that​now​govern,​ and​that​the​way​to​end​those​ills​is​to​destroy​said​institutions,​or,​what​ is​the​same,​to​reform​them​in​the​conservative​sense.​For​our​part​we​ commit​ourselves​to​demonstrate​that​it​is​not​in​the​political​order​that​ the​radical​cure​of​our​suffering​should​be​sought,​and​that,​on​the​contrary,​it​is​to​make​these​sufferings​deeper​and​more​injurious,​detracting​in​this​way​from​the​questions.​We​believe​that,​with​the​point​of​ the​debate​reduced​in​this​way,​we​will​be​able​now​to​understand​each​ other​and​will​be​able​to​proceed​in​full​knowledge​of​the​issue.

9 ​

Bulletin of El Monitor, October 26, 1878

The​article​in​which​La Libertad​responded​to​our​bulletin​of​the​twenty-​second​has​caused​us​true​disappointment​because,​ while​we​were​hoping​our​colleague​would​explain​to​us​the​scientific​ method​it​has​followed​to​deduce​scientifically​that​the​ills​overwhelming​ Mexican​ society​ stem​ from​ the​ institutions​ that​ now​ govern​ and​ that​the​way​to​put​an​end​to​those​ills​is​to​destroy​said​institutions,​all​ we​encounter​is​the​repetition​of​words​and​vague​concepts​that​have​ been​expressed​to​us​since​the​beginning​without​our​moving​forward​a​ single​step​in​the​debate.​We​have​reason​to​believe​that​the​discussions​ should​not​go​beyond​certain​limits. ​ The​qualification​we​placed​on​the​word​“conservative”​was​not​a​scholastic​pedantry,​as​La Libertad​seems​to​indicate,​because​in​every​debate​ it​ is​ highly​ necessary​ to​ establish​ the​ significance​ of​ words;​ and​ so​much​has​that​qualification​not​been​useless,​that​we​already​know​ our​colleague​does​not​belong​to​any​of​the​political​entities​that​have​ existed​and​exist​in​the​country,​for​it​is​not​liberal,​because​in​the​hands​ of​this​party​liberty​has​been​a​myth,​nor​conservative​either,​because​ those​who​are​called​such​are​incapable​of​strengthening​order;​rather​ it​constitutes​a​third​type​that​goes​neither​backward​nor​forward,​that​ likes​neither​revolutions​nor​reactions,​but​rather​“to​conserve​the​social​ order,​the​only​means​of​acclimatizing​liberty.” ​ Our​colleague​probably​believes​after​this​that​it​has​said​something;​ to​us​it​appears​that​it​has​said​nothing,​for​the​vagueness​of​its​ideas​ amounts​to​this.​“To​conserve​the​social​order,​the​only​means​of​acclimatizing​liberty”​is​a​truism​of​Perogrullo1​that​nobody​denies​or​places​ in​ doubt.​ For​ what!​ Is​ there​ some​ party​ that​ has​ tried​ to​ destroy​ the​ ​ Original​title:​“Boletín​del​Monitor,”​26​de​octubre​de​1878.​Source:​El Monitor Republicano,​October​26,​1878. ​ 1.​“Verdad de Perogrullo”:​to​be​patently​obvious.​(Editor’s​note)​ 449

450 : joSé​maría​viGil

social​order?​We​do​not​know​of​it,​at​any​rate;​and​from​the​most​recalcitrant​conservative​to​the​most​exalted​liberal,​no​one​will​hesitate​to​ accept​our​colleague’s​opinion.​One​sees,​then,​that​on​this​point​nothing​ new​is​said​to​us,​nor​have​we​advanced​a​single​step. ​ But​this​is​not​the​issue.​“To​conserve​the​social​order”​is​a​truth​beyond​discussion.​What​we​need​is​to​be​told​the​means​of​conserving​ that​order.​Here​is​the​difficulty,​and​this​is​what​we​have​wanted​our​ colleague​to​specify​for​us,​for​the​method​of​our​esteemed​contradictor​ is​on​a​par​with​that​of​the​physician​who,​called​to​cure​a​sick​person,​ declared​himself​completely​satisfied​with​pronouncing​to​him​the​great​ principle​that​what​he​needed​was​good​health. ​ Let​us​see,​nonetheless,​if​some​effective​prescription​is​furnished​to​ us​to​“conserve​the​social​order.”​Before,​we​were​told​that​the​means​of​ attaining​that​attractive​outcome​was​the​creation​of​a​strong​government;​now​such​a​thing​is​denied,​and​it​is​affirmed​that​“neither​a​letter​ nor​a​syllable​of​La Libertad​authorizes​such​an​assertion.”​We​have​read,​ nonetheless,​in​the​issue​of​the​seventeenth​of​this​month,​“the​idea​of​ a​strong government​endowed​with​abundant​means​of​action,​placed​by​ the​law​itself​in​a​wide​sphere​of​power,​does​not​necessarily​presuppose​ tyranny.​.​.​.​There,​where​greater​liberty​exists,​that​force​of​public​power​ becomes​even​more​necessary.​.​.​.​The​idea​of​a​strong​government​not​ only​does​not​imply​a​reactionary​spirit,​but​rather,​on​the​contrary,​it​ can​be​sustained​with​success​by​the​sincerest​defenders​of​public​liberties.​.​.​.​There,​where​the​individual​can​enjoy​a​great​amount​of​liberty,​ is​exactly​where​the​public​power​must​have​greater​vigor.​.​.​.​Most​particularly​this​can​be​said​of​Mexico.” ​ One​sees​by​this​that​some​tittles​and​bits​exist​that​give​license​to​the​ assertion​that​our​colleague​bases​the​solution​of​the​problem​on​the​ creation​of​a​strong​government.​Now​the​opposite​is​said​to​us,​and​ the​following​shot,​with​which​we​are​in​total​agreement,​is​launched​at​ that​kind​of​government:​“The​authors​of​social​panaceas​disgust​us,​and​ never​have​those​who​speak​of​the​prosperity​of​a​people​by​virtue​of​ infallible​means,​kept​in​enchanted​bottles,​seemed​to​us​anything​but​ charlatans.” ​ Very​ good,​ perfectly​ good.​ But​ then,​ “what​ is​ the​ practical​ way​ to​ make​this​condition​disappear?”​Let​us​listen​to​the​colleague​who​has​ been​charged​with​asking​and​responding​itself,​“Adapt​individual​right​ to​ the​ conditions​ of​ our​ existence,​ invigorate the principle of authority,​

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​oCtober​26,​1878 : 451

Give​uS​a​StronG​Government.​What​we​want,​then,​with​a​strong​ government,​around​which​the​conservative​elements​of​society​can​assemble,​is​to​combat​revolutions,​to​make​them​gradually​impossible.​ From​this,​peace​would​come,​and​that​certainly​is​a​condition​to​realize​material​improvements,​the​only​path​that​guides​us​to​the​solution​ to​the​problem.”​We​have,​then,​the​solution​already,​although​it​must​ be​understood​that​it​does​not​belong​to​social​panaceas​or​to​infallible​ means​kept​in​enchanted​bottles,​and​despite​the​fact​that,​some​lines​ above,​it​has​been​said​to​us​that​neither​a​word​nor​a​tilde​of​La Libertad​authorized​the​assertion​that​it​might​have​entrusted​the​solution​of​ the​social​problem​to​the​creation​of​a​strong​government. ​ Next,​this​extraordinary​question​is​put​to​us:​“Do​we​have​here​some​ sin​against​the​scientific​method,​that​is​to​say,​against​experience​and​ reason?”​Yes,​we​say,​there​is​a​sin,​and​a​very​great​one,​and​it​consists​ in​that​that​solution​resolves​nothing,​because​to​a​vagueness,​“to​conserve​ the​ social​ order,”​ are​ presented​ three​ other​ vaguenesses:​ “adapt​ individual​right​to​the​conditions​of​our​existence,​invigorate​the​principle​of​authority,​give​us​a​strong​government.”​All​of​that​will​be​very​ good;​but​we​do​not​find​it​very​scientific​to​establish​commonplaces​ whose​discussion​would​be​entirely​useless,​making​a​point​that​neglects​ the​only​one​that​should​be​the​object​of​debate:​the​means​by​which​to​ realize​the​great​outcomes​that​are​preached. ​ Let​La Libertad​be​aware​of​the​truth:​the​ground​on​which​it​has​ placed​itself​is​unsustainable.​Gratuitous​affirmations,​general​principles,​ abstract​maxims—this​is​all​we​have​encountered​up​until​now​in​what​ can​ be​ called​ its​ political​ program.—Constitutions​ should​ be​ appropriate​to​the​needs​of​the​peoples;—no​one​denies​such​a​truth.—Our​ ​Constitution​is​not​made​for​the​people​of​Mexico;—and​from​what​is​ such​an​affirmation​deduced?​Where​are​the​scientific​data​on​which​it​ rests? ​ Let​us​suppose,​nonetheless,​that​that​were​true;​what​is​offered​to​ us​in​its​place?​Where​is​the​Constitution​or​the​scientific​regime​that​ presents​itself​to​resolve​all​problems,​to​calm​all​ambitions,​to​dissipate​ all​ errors​ that​ have​ complicated​ the​ situation​ to​ an​ unbelievable​ extreme?​ A​strong​ government!​ And​ what​ does​ a​ strong​ government​ mean?​A​government​that​does​what​it​feels​like​doing,​that​has​no​law​ to​which​to​subject​itself,​that​applies​its​will​arbitrarily​in​the​sense​that​ seems​best​to​it?​Invigorate​the​principle​of​authority!​And​how​to​real-

452 : joSé​maría​viGil

ize​that​phenomenon​when​the​authority​is​the​first​to​bring​about​its​ own​discredit​with​its​ineptitude,​its​lack​of​respect​for​society,​its​little​ tricks,​and​its​mean​intrigues​in​which​nothing​grand​or​elevated​appears. ​ That​kind​of​compromise,​which​La Libertad​dreams​of​realizing,​is​ a​true​paradox:​between​the​conservative​reaction,​with​all​its​old​attributes​and​traditional​habits,​and​constitutionalist​liberalism,​with​its​ aspirations​for​progress,​there​is​no​middle​ground.​The​first,​the​conservative​reaction,​is​not​now​possible;​the​great​interests​it​defended​have​ been​ destroyed,​ the​ ideas​ it​ represented​ have​ lost​ all​ their​ influence.​ There​remains,​then,​only​the​liberal​party,​which,​if​it​wants​to​save​the​ situation​and​return​to​its​political​mission,​has​to​become​attached​to​ the​Constitution,​advance​with​it,​be​inspired​by​its​spirit,​reform​it​if​ desired,​but​by​means​that​it​itself​indicates. ​ We​also​wish​to​conserve​the​social​order;​we​wish​to​extirpate​forever​the​revolutionary​fever​that​devours​us​and​that​no​longer​has​any​ reason​for​being.​But​those​exactly​are​the​very​powerful​motives​that​ make​us​sustain​at​all​costs​support​of​the​fundamental​law,​because​we​ have​the​innermost​and​profound​conviction​that​the​first​injudicious​ step​taken​against​it​will​be​the​signal​for​a​new​civil​war​that​will​end​ by​annihilating​the​few​elements​that​remain​to​us,​by​casting​shame​and​ infamy​on​the​name​Mexican,​seriously​compromising​national​independence. ​ This​is​what​makes​us​insist​tirelessly​on​sustaining​the​constitutionalist​idea.​If,​unfortunately,​the​current​government​pays​attention​to​ the​doctrines​of​La Libertad​and​other​periodicals​that​produce​antiliberal​propaganda​and​tries​to​make​a​scientific​attempt​to​strengthen​ itself,​attempting​to​adapt​the​rights​of​the​Mexican​people​to​the​needs​ of​their​existence​calculated​by​its​criteria,​we​would​see​the​drama​in​ which​ President​ Comonfort​ was​ the​ lead​ actor​ played​ out​ in​ greater​ scope,​ with​ the​ difference​ that​ the​ conservatives​ of​ today​ could​ not​ offer,​to​the​one​who​will​try​to​follow​in​that​person’s​footsteps,​either​ the​pecuniary​elements​or​the​social​and​political​influence​the​conservatives​of​that​epoch​had.​La Libertad​should​study​a​little​our​history​ and​our​situation​rather​than​being​preoccupied​with​what​is​being​done​ in​France​and​Spain,​for​it​can​very​well​happen​that​what​might​be​conservative​there​would​be​turned​into​revolutionary​here,​and​we​are​sure​ that​it​will​come​to​concede​scientifically​to​our​side,​for​as​is​very​well​

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​oCtober​26,​1878 : 453

said,​it​is​now​time​that​we​arrive​at​the​age​of​reason,​and​we​should​not​ go​amusing​ourselves​with​dangerous​games,​because​it​is​no​less​a​matter​than​the​public​peace​and​the​existence​of​the​nation. ​ Otherwise,​convinced​of​the​uselessness​of​prolonging​any​longer​the​ present​discussion,​which​only​led​us​to​countless​repetitions​and​rectifications,​let​us​call​an​end​to​it,​hoping​that​our​colleague​will​become​ convinced​by​the​experience​that​the​road​it​has​taken​is​not​the​one​that​ can​lead​to​the​fulfillment​of​its​desires.

10 ​

Bulletin of El Monitor, October 30, 1878

We​ have​ noted​ that​ a​ certain​ antagonism​ frequently​ establishes​itself​between​the​guarantees​the​Constitution​grants​to​all​ inhabitants​of​the​Republic​and​the​needs​of​society​to​ensure​citizens​ the​ enjoyment​ of​ their​ life​ and​ their​ interests,​ even​ managing​ to​ attribute​to​the​first​some​protection​of​evildoers,​in​seeking​to​find​the​ source​of​the​exceptional​growth​criminality​has​come​to​acquire​among​ us.​Nothing​can​be​more​false​or​more​dangerous​than​that​rationale,​as​ it​is​easy​to​become​convinced​by​examining​the​question​a​little. ​ The​ force​ of​ the​argument​ consists​ in​ saying​ that​ the​ law​ protects​ wicked​persons​because​once​the​authority​has​apprehended​them,​the​ formulas​ of​ a​ protracted​ legal​ action​ are​ followed,​ while​ the​ man​ of​ good​will,​who​has​been​the​victim​of​the​criminal,​has​nothing​to​defend​him​against​the​blows​of​the​criminal,​who​proceeds​ceremoniously​ to​commit​his​misdeeds.​It​seems,​according​to​this,​that​the​ideal​of​justice​would​be​for​society​to​adopt​with​evildoers​the​very​conduct​they​ observe,​applying​punishment​with​rapidity​and​unusual​lack​of​forethought. ​ Nonetheless,​ if​ one​ pauses​ to​ think​ that​ the​ guarantees​ have​ been​ established​precisely​to​protect​the​man​of​good​will,​one​will​readily​see​ that​the​argument​collapses​of​its​own​weight,​and​that,​far​from​seeking,​in​the​suppression​of​the​protective​formulas​that​should​surround​ all​criminal​justice,​the​means​of​attacking​disorder​and​immorality​at​its​ root,​it​will​succeed​only​in​creating​a​great​number​of​innocent​victims,​ on​whom​the​consequences​of​unjust​proceedings​would​often​weigh​ heavily. ​ It​is​unquestionable​that​society​is​highly​interested​in​the​suppression​ of​ criminal​ offenses,​ in​ their​ punishment,​ in​ their​ eradication;​ ​ Original​title:​“Boletín​del​Monitor,”​30​de​octubre​de​1878.​Source:​El Monitor Republicano,​October​30,​1878. 454

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​oCtober​30,​1878 : 455

but​inasmuch​as​this​latter​is​not​possible,​all​their​forces​should​be​directed​to​seeing​that​the​punishment​being​administered​carries,​as​far​ as​human​weakness​permits​it,​the​characteristics​of​strict​justice,​so​that​ the​guilty​one​might​suffer​appropriate​punishment​for​the​crime​he​has​ committed,​because​everything​that​might​depart​from​this​principle​is​ to​commit​a​true​iniquity,​which​must​be​avoided​in​any​country​that​ boasts​of​being​civilized. ​ But​in​order​to​attain​that​objective,​two​things​are​absolutely​indispensable:​the​identification​of​the​person​of​the​offender​and​the​substantiation​of​the​deed​imputed​to​him,​with​all​those​circumstances​that​ can​increase​or​diminish​his​guilt.​Well​then,​this​will​never​be​obtained​ if​it​is​not​by​means​of​a​series​of​procedures,​more​or​less​drawn​out,​ that​our​laws,​inspired​by​a​lofty​philosophical​spirit,​have​established. ​ The​investigation​of​a​criminal​deed​always​presents​extraordinary​ difficulties​that​cannot​be​overcome​with​the​speed​that​would​be​desired.​The​individual​on​whom​an​accusation​of​that​type​weighs​tries,​as​ is​natural,​to​defend​himself​as​far​as​his​strengths​allow,​confusing​the​ inquiries​of​the​judge,​mocking​his​wisdom,​trying​to​erase​or​corrupt​ all​traces​of​his​crime,​with​the​goal​of​hindering​as​much​as​possible​ the​imposition​of​the​punishment​he​deserves.​In​such​a​case,​a​singular​ struggle​is​entered​into​between​the​accused,​who​appeals​to​as​many​ means​as​his​intelligence​suggests​to​him,​deeply​spurred​on​by​an​interest​so​important​to​him,​and​the​unyielding​course​of​the​judge,​who​ follows​the​trail​of​the​crime,​taking​advantage​of​the​slightest​evidence​ to​establish​with​precision​the​deed​he​is​investigating​and​bring​to​full​ light​the​innocence​or​guilt​of​the​accused. ​ Is​there​in​this​something​to​reprove,​something​to​censure,​as​long​ as​the​functionary​charged​with​the​lofty​mission​of​administering​justice​fulfills​the​very​important​charge​entrusted​to​him?​Definitely​not;​ but​will​it​not​be​to​offer​protection​to​criminals,​giving​them​occasion​ to​avoid​the​punishment​or,​at​least,​not​receive​the​ideal​punishment​ they​deserve​with​the​timeliness​that​the​victims​and​society​in​general​ are​right​to​demand?​In​no​way;​because​as​we​have​said​before,​the​objective​of​the​guarantees​is​to​protect​the​honorable​citizen,​who​can​ become​implicated​in​false​accusations​or​be​the​victim​of​lamentable​ errors​that​would​have​subjected​him​to​an​iniquitous​judgment​if​he​did​ not​have​all​the​means​necessary​to​prove​his​innocence. ​ It​will​be​said,​nonetheless,​that​the​criminal​can​sometimes​go​un-

456 : joSé​maría​viGil

punished,​that,​taking​advantage​of​all​the​resources​the​laws​grant​him​ and​by​force​of​cunning,​will​possibly​free​himself​from​punishment​or,​ at​least,​that​this​punishment​might​be​much​less​than​what​he​justly​deserves.​It​is​true,​but​from​this​cannot​be​inferred​in​any​way​the​need​ to​suppress​the​protective​formulas​that​accompany​justice​because​of​a​ preoccupation​solely​with​the​idea​of​harming​the​delinquent,​even​if​ by​doing​this​it​would​be​necessary​to​sacrifice​the​innocent,​for​in​that​ alternative,​ philosophers​ and​ experts​ in​ public​ law​ have​ not​ wavered​ in​establishing​the​principle​that​it​is​preferable​that​a​guilty​person​be​ saved​than​that​an​innocent​person​perish. ​ When​one​pauses​to​think,​on​the​other​hand,​about​the​fallibility​of​ human​decisions,​when​one​brings​to​mind​some​memorable​decisions​ when,​because​of​a​conjunction​of​fatal​circumstances​and​despite​all​ the​scrupulousness​that​can​be​applied​in​the​investigation​of​a​crime,​ innocent​persons​have​been​condemned​to​death,​persons​whose​innocence​has​come​to​be​proven​when​it​is​no​longer​possible​to​undo​the​ evil​caused,​a​genuine​anguish​takes​hold​of​the​heart​to​contemplate​ the​fate​that​would​befall​the​inhabitants​of​a​rather​unfortunate​country​because,​in​it,​ears​will​be​closed​to​the​wise​principles​of​a​rational​ legislation,​making​prevail,​in​the​spheres​in​which​only​serene​and​impartial​justice​should​predominate,​the​savage​harshness​suitable​only​to​ barbarous​epochs. ​ If​to​this​is​added​the​special​situation​our​country​has,​in​which​political​passions​poison​everything,​availing​themselves​of​the​flimsiest​ pretexts​for​carrying​out​terrible​revenges,​and​when​we​see​the​disdain​ with​ which​ some​ authorities​ regard​ human​ life,​ leaving​ unpunished​ the​crimes​they​commit​against​their​political​enemies,​then​one​senses​ with​absolute​certainty​how​very​cruel,​how​very​dangerous​it​would​ be​to​suppress​or​even​diminish​the​guarantees​that​protect​the​accused​ and​that​are​violated​with​such​frequency​by​the​very​functionaries​who​ should​be​the​first​to​respect​them. ​ We​are​far​from​denying​the​scandalous​increase​that​criminality​has​ acquired​in​our​country​and​the​widely​known​urgency​ for​adopting​ effective​means​to​place​a​strong​restraint​on​it,​reestablishing​the​confidence​with​which,​in​every​civilized​country,​peaceful​citizens​live​in​ the​protective​shadow​of​a​foresightful​and​intelligent​government;​but​ these​evils​we​all​deplore​will​not​disappear​in​the​way​the​enemies​of​ constitutional​guarantees​indicate,​but​rather,​on​the​contrary,​they​will​

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​oCtober​30,​1878 : 457

assume​greater​proportions​the​day​one​appeals​to​those​absurd​and​extreme​means,​leaving​society​in​worse​condition​than​it​is​now.​Expedite​at​the​right​time​the​action​of​justice​by​means​of​speedier​procedures,​ but​ do​ not​ forget​ the​ social​ objective​ of​ punishment​ or​ the​ natural​means​of​defense​the​laws​grant. ​ Everyone​ knows​ the​ causes​ that​ have​ produced​ the​ increase​ in​ crimes—crimes​that​deservedly​have​scandalized​and​struck​fear​into​ the​entire​Republic,​and​the​only​effective​means​that​can​be​successfully​employed​to​improve​the​situation​are​also​known;​but​one​will​ object​that​those​methods​are​slow,​and​to​cure​the​evil​that​exists​requires​prompt​and​active​remedies.​The​first​is​the​work​of​time​and​reflection,​while​the​second​is​the​urgent​need​to​prevent​present​dangers,​ to​root​out​acute​ills​that​seriously​threaten​the​most​respectable​and​ sacred​social​interests.​We​repeat,​for​our​part,​that​we​do​not​excuse​the​ magnitude​of​the​evil,​but​we​deny​and​will​always​deny​that​violence​ can​be​advantageously​substituted​for​reason​and​law​and​that​it​would​ be​wise​to​flee​from​a​hidden​danger​in​order​to​throw​oneself​into​an​ abyss,​as​would​certainly​happen​if​we​managed​to​suppress​completely​ the​beneficial​fetters​legislation​has​established​so​that​the​punishment​ of​evildoers​might​provide​all​its​moral​effects. ​ If​ one​ examines​ a​ little​ the​ elements​ that​ come​ together​ to​ create​ the​current​state​of​affairs;​the​sad​conditions​to​which​our​people​find​ themselves​reduced;​the​multitude​of​deleterious​germs​disseminated​in​ our​social​atmosphere;​the​ignorance;​the​abandon;​and,​above​all,​the​ misery​in​which​the​destitute​classes​find​themselves,​a​feeling​of​sadness​and​bitterness​will​replace​the​indignation​caused​by​the​frequency​ of​crimes​that​today​have​alarmed​society,​and​will​make​gazes​focus​a​ little​higher​instead​of​wanting​to​impose​without​mercy​the​iron​and​ the​fire​on​the​cancer​that​is​devouring​us.​“He​who​commits​a​crime​to​ increase​his​riches,”​says​Mr.​Pastore,​“and​he​who,​unfortunately,​lacking​bread​for​himself,​for​his​wife​and​his​children,​determines​after​ long​struggles​to​demand​the​nourishment​without​which​all​will​die,​ have​not​committed​an​equally​guilty​deed.​.​.​.​The​crimes​that​arise​ from​corruption​are​the​most​vile;​those​that​the​passions​produce​are​ the​most​dangerous;​those​that​arise​from​misery​the​most​excusable.”

11 ​

Bulletin of El Monitor, December 17, 1878

Knowing​a​few​of​the​most​important​facts​about​our​ history,​their​intimate​relationship​and​their​social​and​political​significance,​one​must​acknowledge​the​inevitable​necessity​for​the​Reform,​ as​well​as​the​fact​that​the​Reform​could​not​have​occurred​except​in​a​ revolutionary​manner. ​ That​the​clergy​had​been​the​principal​obstacle​to​the​nation​being​ constituted​in​the​form​of​government​most​appropriate​to​its​circumstances​is​a​fact​no​one​can​deny​without​contradicting​the​evidence.​The​ conservative​party,​political​incarnation​of​the​clerical​idea,​was​the​one​ that​inspired​in​General​Santa​Anna​the​coup​d’état​of​1834,​first​offense​ against​the​legitimately​constituted​authorities,​that​opened​the​door​to​ the​civil​war,​initiating​the​most​turbulent​period​of​our​history. ​ In​reestablishing​the​Constitution​of​1824​in​1846,​it​was​found​that​ that​law​could​no​longer​satisfy​the​demands​of​the​situation,​for​it​was​ understood​that​it​was​necessary​to​move​forward,​to​overcome​resolutely​ the​ difficulties​ that​ prevented​ consolidation​ of​ peace,​ to​ enter​ fully​on​the​road​of​a​radical​reform​that​would​nullify​forever​the​elements​of​the​party​that​had​openly​declared​itself​the​enemy​of​the​nation’s​peace​and​liberty. ​ From​this​comes​the​division​in​the​heart​of​the​liberal​party​into​ purists​and​moderates,​for​while​the​first,​knowing​completely​the​situation​and​its​demands,​wanted​to​proceed​immediately​to​set​about​the​ great​work​of​regeneration,​the​second,​more​timid,​postponed​resolution​of​the​problem,​believing​that​an​evolution​could​be​slowly​effected,​that​avoiding​disastrous​jolts​would​result​in​the​consolidation​ of​democratic​institutions. ​ Original​title:​“Boletín​del​Monitor,”​17​de​diciembre​de​1878.​Source:​El Monitor Republicano,​December​17,​1878. 458

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​deCember​17,​1878 : 459

​ The​clergy​itself​undertook​to​make​evident​the​chimerical​quality​of​ this​ideal​that​left​nothing​to​desire​in​the​field​of​philosophy​but​was​ entirely​impractical​on​the​terrain​of​facts.​The​audacity​of​the​clerical​ party​in​overthrowing​the​administration​of​General​Arista​and​creating​ the​despotic​dictatorship​of​Santa​Anna​persuaded​those​who​were​most​ deluded​that​conciliation​was​not​in​any​way​possible​with​a​faction​that​ stopped​at​no​means​to​realize​its​goals,​and​from​that​moment​it​was​ necessary​to​begin​a​struggle​without​quarter,​leaving​clearly​established​ the​alternative​between​reaction​and​reform,​between​the​clerical​and​ the​progressive​idea,​without​middle​ground​and​without​any​means​of​ negotiation. ​ Such​was​the​character​the​struggle​assumed​until​the​revolution​initiated​in​Ayutla​in​the​first​months​of​1854.​The​provisional​administration​of​General​Comonfort,​despite​the​moderate​character​of​that​ leader,​marks​a​period​of​transition,​very​worthy​of​study,​toward​the​ new​ era​ that​ would​ end​ with​ the​ Reform.​ Each​ one​ of​ the​ measures​ taken​in​that​temporary​period​shows​the​general​tendencies​to​the​conclusive​solution​that​was​in​the​conscience​of​all​liberals. ​ The​Constituent​Congress,​meeting​in​1856,​encouraged​very​enlightened​discussions​that​touched​the​entire​nation;​nonetheless,​despite​the​ very​advanced​principles​set​down​in​the​Constitution​of​1857,​the​last​ word​has​not​been​spoken,​for​great​events​are​never​brought​to​completion​except​through​more​or​less​slow​preparations​that​make​the​opportune​moment​finally​arrive. ​ It​was​the​clergy​itself​that​took​charge​of​hastening​that​moment.​ Trusting​in​its​moral​power​and​wealth,​it​believed​it​would​be​easy​for​it​ to​destroy​its​antagonist,​and​instead​of​accepting​agreements​that​might​ have​delayed​its​fall,​it​rejected​with​the​greatest​insolence​all​those​measures​that​tended​to​diminish​its​influence,​and​while​in​the​press​and​in​ the​pulpit​the​most​inflammatory​protests​and​the​most​violent​polemics​ persisted,​in​Puebla,​in​San​Luis​Potosí,​and​in​other​parts​of​the​country,​threatening​insurrections​broke​out​against​liberal​institutions​in​ which​torrents​of​Mexican​blood​ran. ​ In​the​midst​of​that​immense​disturbance,​discussion​and​approval​of​ the​Constitution​were​completed,​it​being​immediately​solemnly​sanctioned;​but​the​clerical​labor​continued​more​actively​than​ever,​managing​in​the​end​to​ensnare​in​its​nets​the​chief​of​the​nation​himself,​

460 : joSé​maría​viGil

who,​forgetting​the​serious​obligations​he​had​contracted,​executed​a​ coup​d’état​and​delivered​to​the​clerical​reactionaries​the​considerable​ resources​the​government​had​at​its​disposal. ​ But​the​work​of​the​democratic​revolution​was​already​too​far​advanced​for​retreat​to​be​possible.​The​states​faced​the​reaction​in​possession​of​the​capital​of​the​Republic.​The​national​government​took​refuge​ in​Veracruz​and​entered​into​the​struggle​of​three​years,​during​which​ the​clergy​exhausted​its​resources,​not​sparing​any​means​to​destroy​its​ antagonist​and​subdue​the​nation. ​ Then,​in​the​midst​of​the​heat​of​combat,​the​Reform​pronounced​ its​final​word,​proclaiming​the​great​principles​that​would​now​make​ possible​the​existence​of​a​government​in​Mexico,​destroying​forever​ the​disorganizing​element​that​had​brought​so​many​days​of​sorrow​to​ the​patria.​The​nationalization​of​ecclesiastical​wealth,​the​separation​of​ church​and​state,​with​all​its​consequences,​were​the​result​of​that​tremendous​struggle​that,​during​three​years,​stained​the​territory​of​the​ Republic​with​blood. ​ Can​it​be​said,​after​this,​that​the​work​of​the​Reform​was​premature​ and​violent,​that​it​was​one​of​those​inopportune​convulsions​that​could​ occasion​ ills​ without​ number,​ not​ bringing​ in​ exchange​ any​ positive​ benefit​at​all​for​society?​Those​who​say​so​are​either​unaware​of​the​ history​of​the​country​or​try​to​lead​opinion​astray,​driven​by​base​interests. ​ To​criticize,​on​the​other​hand,​that​very​important​event​because​ it​ did​ not​ provide​ a​ use​ for​ the​ ecclesiastical​ wealth​ that​ could​ have​ brought​the​nation​one​or​another​advantage​in​a​determinate​direction,​ is​not​to​understand​the​nature​of​the​revolution​in​which​one​sought,​ above​all,​to​destroy​the​weapons​of​a​powerful​enemy,​creating​deep​ interests​that​can​oppose​it,​and​making​it​impossible​for​the​wealth​to​ be​recovered,​as​would​have​happened​had​one​kept​it​entirely. ​ Nationalization​ had​ two​ objectives,​ one​ political​ and​ the​ other​ economic,​and​both​were​attained​completely,​for​at​the​same​time​it​ stripped​the​clergy​of​its​most​powerful​weapon,​which​it​had​employed​ so​harmfully​against​the​country,​nationalization​was​successful​in​releasing​that​immense​wealth,​putting​it​under​the​control​of​individuals,​ and​consequently​making​it​more​productive​for​the​general​benefit​of​ the​nation. ​ Apart​from​this,​the​Reform​so​satisfied​the​most​imperative​needs​

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​deCember​17,​1878 : 461

of​society​that,​when​the​foreign​intervention​took​place​and​the​empire​was​born​in​its​shadow,​both​devised​by​the​clergy​to​recover​its​ wealth​or​influence,​the​clergy​had​the​most​bitter​disappointment,​for​ the​new​order​of​things,​established​under​such​unfavorable​auspices,​ let​the​Reform​remain,​protecting​it​well​from​coming​into​contact​with​ the​powerful​interests​it​had​created. ​ And​this​was​in​the​nature​of​things;​the​intervention​and​the​empire​ understood​at​first​sight​the​essence​of​the​matter,​and​they​could​not,​ if​they​aspired​to​create​something​lasting,​reestablish​the​obstacles​that​ had​been​destroyed​at​such​cost​and​against​which​they​would​have​had​ to​collide​if​they​had​managed​to​establish​an​administration​that​would​ function​with​complete​order.​Because,​we​repeat,​the​Reform​was​not​a​ matter​of​political​format,​but​rather​one​of​those​fundamental​matters​ that​affected​the​very​existence​of​society,​that​above​all​needed​not​to​ live​on​borrowed​time,​not​to​remain​subordinate​to​hostile​powers​that​ changed​it​completely​at​the​hour​it​suited​their​interests​to​do​so,​not​ to​permit,​in​sum,​that​it​remain​a​state​within​the​state,​an​independent and disorderly sovereignty​within​the​great​national​sovereignty. ​ What​has​been​said​is​sufficient​so​that,​historically​and​politically​ speaking,​the​cause​of​the​Reform​remains​justified,​the​Reform​against​ which​formidable​tempests​have​been​raised​in​vain,​not​having​been​ able​ even​ to​ touch​ the​ very​ firm​ base​ on​ which​ it​ definitively​ rested​ from​the​moment​of​its​appearance.​The​Reform​was​not​one​of​those​ unconsidered​and​premature​steps​that​compromise​the​peace​of​nations​ for​ the​ simple​ desire​ of​ trying​ absurd​ theories,​ but​ rather​ the​ saving​ measure​of​the​Republic​that​cut​out​the​cancer​that​was​destroying​it​ and​put​the​“this​far​and​no​farther”​on​the​unfortunate​power​that​had​ erected​disobedience​and​rebellion​as​a​sacred​doctrine​and​that,​with​ its​words​and​its​actions,​had​shown​itself​to​be​incompatible​with​the​ peace,​order,​and​progress​of​the​Mexican​nation.

12



Bulletin of El Monitor, December 27, 1878

We​have​seen​that​the​principal​author​of​our​public​ misfortunes,​the​one​that​kept​the​country​submerged​in​civil​war​and​ anarchy​for​many​years,​the​one​that​slackened​every​principal​of​authority,​providing​the​example​of​contempt​for​the​laws​and​the​functionaries​charged​with​executing​them,​was​the​clergy,​whose​antipatriotic​ conduct​ will​ present​ it​ before​ the​ tribunal​ of​ history​ as​ the​ one​ greatly​responsible​for​the​woes​that​weigh​heavily​on​Mexico.​We​have​ seen​ also​ how​ its​ unwise​ conduct​ precipitated​ events,​ ensuring​ that​ its​power​would​collapse​in​the​midst​of​its​terrifying​cataclysm.​Now​ is​the​time​to​examine​the​effects​that​such​events​produced​on​public​morality,​so​that​this​will​help​explain​to​us​the​situation​in​which​ the​country​remains​and​the​great​amount​of​work​it​has​still​to​do​in​ order​to​get​through​its​difficulty​if​the​instincts​for​its​own​preservation​rise​above,​as​we​expect,​the​dissolving​elements​that​endlessly​fight​ against​it. ​ To​put​this​matter​in​its​true​perspective,​it​seems​to​us​opportune​to​ remember​the​astute​and​wise​observations​that​a​Mexican​of​great​talent​made​in​1836,​when​the​clerical​party​had​just​destroyed​the​institutions,​regarding​the​state​of​public​morality​in​our​country​during​those​ times.​Those​observations​constitute​a​precious​revelation​that​gives​us​ the​key​to​the​fundamental​problem​whose​solution​we​must​strive​to​ find​at​all​costs.​Here​is​how​Dr.​Mora​expressed​himself​on​this​important​topic: Among​every​people​in​which​social​duties​are​confused​with​religious​duties​it​is​almost​impossible​to​establish​foundations​for​ ​ Original​title:​“Boletín​del​Monitor,”​27​de​diciembre​de​1878.​Source:​El Monitor Republicano,​December​27,​1878. 462

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​deCember​27,​1878 : 463

public​morality.​Sins​and​crimes​are​by​their​very​nature​things​of​ different​orders,​although​many​or​most​of​man’s​actions​have​this​ double​character​at​the​same​time.​Society​must​recognize​as​crimes​ only​actions​that,​properly​so-​called,​are​infractions​of​laws​that​disturb​the​social​order​begun​and​established​by​them.​Religion​considers,​and​must​consider​as​sins​not​only​actions,​but​even​the​most​ hidden​movements​of​the​soul​opposed​to​divine​precepts.​Society​ must​be,​as​a​general​rule,​inflexible​in​the​punishment​of​crimes,​ even​when​the​repentance​of​the​criminal​and​his​resolve​to​mend​ his​ways​are​clear.​In​religion,​on​the​other​hand,​from​the​moment​the​sinner​sincerely​repents,​he​is​pardoned,​whatever​might​ be​the​evils​that​have​resulted​from​his​sins,​which​many​times​will​ not​be​in​his​own​power​to​repair.​The​result​of​these​different​aspects​under​which​religion​and​society​consider​man​and​his​actions​ is​that​the​speed​and​means​by​which​these​powerful​agents​have​ an​effect​on​him​must​be​entirely​different,​and​when​they​are​confused,​there​must​necessarily​be​in​one,​in​the​other,​or​in​both,​a​ disorder​very​detrimental​to​the​religious​and​political​moral​order. ​ At​ once​the​ author​ makes​ clear​ that​ the​confusion​ that​had​ disappeared​completely​in​Europe​still​existed​in​Mexico​and​that​the​masses​ were​convinced​that​political​and​civil​duties​received​their​only​force​ from​religious​sanction. ​ Then​he​adds: As,​on​the​other​hand,​these​same​masses​do​not​have​a​fundamental​knowledge​of​the​religion​they​profess​nor​are​capable​of​distinguishing​the​opinions​of​the​clergy​from​religious​duties,​they​ confuse​the​ones​with​the​others,​they​believe​themselves​obliged​to​ do​blindly​whatever​the​priests​or​confessors​order​them,​and​they​ believe​themselves​dispensed​from​social​duties​when​a​minister​of​ worship​in​the​public​exercise​of​preaching​or​in​the​confessional​ gives an opinion​on​it.​From​this​state​of​things,​it​results​that​the​ force​of​the​laws​depends​on​the​opinion​the​clergy​forms​of​them,​ and​as​this​can​be​mistaken​sometimes​and​other​times​is​contrary​ to​what​said​laws​prescribe,​it​is​clear​that,​on​the​one​hand,​a​thousand​pernicious​errors​will​be​incurred​regarding​social​duties,​and,​

464 : joSé​maría​viGil

on​the​other,​society​will​have​to​receive​its​strengths​from​an​alien​ power​that,​sometimes​with​reason​and​other​times​without​reason,​ will​not​be​disposed​to​lend​it​and​it​will​be​negated. ​ When​this​happens,​men​who,​in​the​infraction​of​civil​laws,​see​ only​an​offense against God​because​the​clergymen​tell​them​they​are​ not,​in​conscience,​obligated​to​carry​out​the​civil​laws,​nor​are​such​ offenses​against​God​in​the​infraction​of​civil​laws,​they​become​ angry​at​the​civil​laws​and​at​the​legislator​who​has​imposed​unjust​ obligations​on​them,​and​then​they​rise​up​if​they​can,​and​if​not​ they​elude​civil​laws​by​subterfuges​that​those​who​proceed​thus​in​ bad​faith​are​accustomed​to​making.​The​clergy,​it​is​true,​does​not​ establish​as​a​maxim​or​general​principle​that​it​is​lawful​to​disobey​ the​authority​or​its​laws,​but​in​fact​it​reserves​and​exercises​the​ power​in​individual​cases​of​giving its opinion,​in​the​classroom​and​ the​confessional,​on​the​validity​or​nullity​of​such​and​such​a​law​or​ on​the​interpretation​of​its​meaning,​and​as​such,​an​opinion​is​a​true​ rule​of​conduct​for​the​one​who​requests​it​or​receives​it;​when​it​is​ not​in​conformance​with​the​law​or​the​authority,​the​law​is​undermined​in​its​primary​principles​and​authority​in​its​fundamental​ foundations. ​ As​the​clergy​is​a​corporation​made​up​of​men,​as​these​men​live​ in​society,​and​as​considered​individually​or​as​a​civil​corporation​ they​can​demand​a​reform​also​civil,​because​the​force​of​the​laws​ depends​on​them,​it​is​clear​that,​even​when​the​reform​is​assumed​ necessary,​as​it​will​be​and​has​been​many​times​by​the​acknowledgment​of​the​men​themselves,​the​government​will​not​have​the​ means​to​carry​out​the​reform,​because​the​laws​that​stipulate​it​will​ be​considered​unjust​and​their​execution​an​act​of​tyranny. ​ The​clergy,​then,​will​always​weaken​the​action​of​the​government​in​all​its​judgments,​whether​they​are​adverse​or​whether​indifferent​to​their​interests,​just​for​the​fact​of​being​the​only​creator​and​regulator​of​social​duties,​and​because​there​is​no​political​ conscience​that,​like​the​religious,​establishes​the​need​to​carry​out​ those​social​duties.​But​not​only​the​government,​the​individuals​ will​also​have​to​suffer,​and​a​great​deal,​from​this​lack​of​political​conscience.​Why​is​this​so?​Because​the​clergy​will​convert​into​ social​duties​not​only​purely​religious​precepts​but​also​practices​that​ cannot​be​considered​obligatory​even​in​the​religious​order.

bulletin​of​El Monitor,​deCember​27,​1878 : 465

​ The​author​then​sets​out​some​consequences​deduced​from​such​pernicious​antecedents,​like​hatred​for​dissenters​in​the​matter​of​religion,​ the​double​intrigue​of​the​clergy​teaching​one​thing​in​the​classrooms​ and​universities​and​inculcating​in​the​masses​practical​errors​that​have​ made​them​confuse​religion​itself​with​vain​and​superstitious​beliefs.​ “With​this​double​intrigue,”​he​adds,​“the​ravings​of​the​multitude​are​ sustained​as​religious​principles​and​the​discredit​that​could​result​to​the​ body​from​conveying​as​religious​principles​those​that​are​only​popular​ errors​is​avoided.​In​sum,​one​is​the​religion​taught​in​the​schools​by​the​ books,​and​the​other​the​one​insinuated​in​practice​in​the​churches.” ​ Directly,​ we​ find​ this​ observation​ of​ profound​ and​ incontestable​ accuracy: The​principles​of​morality​are​always​overstated,​and​through​ theory​or​practice​they​are​made​to​consist​of​obligations​that​transcend​the​common​forces​of​nature;​the​people​become​immoral​ because,​breaking​the​overstated​principles,​they​dispense​as​easily​ with​those​that​are​not​overstated,​and​the​society​that​easily​functions​without​the​overstated​principles​cannot​exist​without​those​ principles​that​are​not​overstated.​For​that​reason​there​are​no​ people​less​law​abiding​than​those​that​establish​more​austere​principles​as​a​rule​of​conduct,​because​the​number​of​violators​increases​in​the​same​proportion​as​difficulties​presented​by​their​ observation​arise.​Well​then,​this​happens​and​must​happen​to​all​ peoples​among​whom​the​clergy​is​the​exclusive​teacher​of​morality. ​ The​preceding​quotes​have​seemed​important​to​us​for​various​reasons:​because​they​portray​with​admirable​accuracy​the​state​that​public​morality​had​some​years​after​independence;​because​they​show​the​ pernicious​ influence​ exercised​ on​ the​ Mexican​ people​ by​ the​ clergy;​ and,​finally,​because​it​is​necessary​to​know​those​antecedents​in​order​ to​form​a​complete​judgment​of​the​current​situation.​This​knowledge​ provides​the​explanation​for​our​revolutions​and​of​their​inevitable​consequences,​and​it​will​temper​a​little​the​indignation​that​seethes​in​some​ breasts​before​the​spectacle​of​our​woes​and​that​overflows​in​invectives​ against​the​Mexican​people. ​ In​effect,​when​a​people​like​ours​has​been​systematically​led​astray​ by​those​who​have​the​mission​to​guide​and​moralize​it,​it​is​necessary,​to​

466 : joSé​maría​viGil

be​just,​to​direct​the​censure​with​all​its​bitterness​not​on​the​people​who​ has​been​the​victim,​but​rather​on​the​teachers​of​perdition,​on​the​false​ apostles​who,​inspired​by​the​spirit​of​sordid​ambitions,​did​not​hesitate​ to​corrupt​the​religious​principle,​to​poison​the​fountains​of​private​and​ public​morality.​When​this​is​known​and​seen,​feelings​of​a​very​different​nature​have​to​clear​the​way,​and​if​there​is​a​place​for​admiration,​it​ will​not​be​for​the​many​woes​that​exist​among​our​people,​but​rather​ for​the​few​goods​that​have​been​able​to​survive​that​violent​shipwreck​ of​all​the​wise​principles​of​order​and​morality​that​preserve​and​protect​ human​societies.

eMilio rabasa Emilio​Rabasa​(1856–1930),​born​in​Chiapas,​was​a​jurist,​novelist,​diplomat,​journalist,​and​historian​who​opposed​the​Mexican​ Revolution.​During​the​Porfirio​Díaz​era​Rabasa​was​governor​ of​Chiapas.​After​Díaz​fell​he​supported​the​coup​of​Victoriano​ Huerta​ (1913)​ and​ agreed​ to​ enter​ the​ diplomatic​ service.​ He​ spent​the​years​1914–20​in​exile​but​later​returned​to​Mexico.​A​ “new”​liberal,​Rabasa​believed​in​a​liberalism​based​on​scientific​ politics​drawn​from​positivism​and​rejected​the​abstract​doctrines​of​natural​rights.​His​emphasis​was​on​a​strong,​centralized,​yet​constitutionally​limited​authority.​Rabasa’s​main​work​ is​La Constitución y la dictadura,​a​theoretical​and​historical​indictment​of​the​1857​Constitution.​He​argued​that​by​making​ governance​ impossible,​ the​ Constitution​ had​ condemned​ the​ country​to​de​facto​dictatorship.​While​the​amount​of​power​ concentrated​in​Juárez’s​hands​had​been​unsurpassed,​Rabasa​ claimed​that​he​used​such​power​vigorously​and​successfully​to​ fulfill​his​high​purposes. ​ We​present​two​chapters​from​La Constitución y la dictadura.

467

1



The Election (excerpt) i

When​ an​ adolescent​ first​ becomes​ aware​ of​ what​ a​ popular​election​is​and​the​goal​it​has,​the​idea​presents​itself​to​his​spirit​ in​its​simplest​form;​it​is​like​a​revelation​of​justice​that​seduces​him​ and​wins​over​his​will.​The​idea​is​annoying​mainly​because​of​its​simplicity,​the​simplicity​of​the​immaculate​theory.​On​the​eve​of​the​election,​each​citizen​reflects​on​the​individual​most​suitable​for​the​position​ with​which​the​election​is​concerned,​rejects​some,​puts​others​aside,​ chooses,​and​classifies​until​fixing​his​preference​on​that​one​who​combines​the​greatest​talents​and​offers​the​most​because​of​his​civic​and​private​virtues.​How​could​one​not​do​it​in​this​way,​when​good​judgment​ affects​his​own​interest​and​error​his​own​liability?​When​the​hour​of​ action​arrives,​the​citizens​file​in​before​the​ballot​box,​depositing​their​ ballots;​the​inspectors​read​and​count;​the​president​makes​the​numbers​ known​and​proclaims​the​one​elected​by​the​people.​Nothing​more​just,​ nothing​more​natural,​nothing​more​simple. ​ Although​ this​ idea​ assumes​ a​ great​ number​ of​ virtues​ in​ practice,​ much​greater​still​is​the​number​its​consequences​assume.​The​innocence​ of​the​adolescent,​developing​the​theory​of​government​emanating​from​ the​people​from​the​theory​of​election,​believes​that​each​elected​person,​already​virtuous​in​himself,​feels​the​force​of​public​opinion,​simultaneously​his​strength​and​his​menace,​and​he​will​be​unable​to​be​less​ than​a​zealous​guardian​of​general​interests​and​an​active​promoter​of​the​ common​good.​The​man​invested​with​the​dignity​that​election​confers​ on​him​and​elevated​by​the​delegation​of​popular​power,​which​is​the​ only​legitimate​power,​divests​himself​of​common​passions,​gets​inspi​ Original​title:​“La​elección.”​Source:​Emilio​Rabasa,​La Constitución y la dictadura,​ chapter​10,​in​Estudio sobre la organización política de México​(Mexico:​Tipografía​de​“Revista​de​Revistas,”​1912). 468

the​eleCtion : 469

ration​from​justice,​forgets​or​does​not​know​from​the​beginning​who​ gave​him​their​vote,​who​rejected​him,​and,​with​only​the​fulfillment​of​ duty​and​the​subordination​of​his​acts​to​the​laws,​he​satisfies​the​broadest​program​of​good​in​the​government​and​equity​in​the​administration.​ Thus​it​has​to​be;​but​if​it​were​not​thus,​if,​through​an​error​very​remote​ from​the​electors,​the​one​designated​by​the​majority​should​disappoint​ public​confidence,​the​force​of​opinion​or​the​action​of​the​law​put​into​ practice​ will​ dismiss​ him​ from​ the​ post​ to​ replace​ him​ with​ another​ more​worthy. ​ It​is​not​an​innovation​that​has​need​of​proof​that,​as​the​peoples​are​ less​cultured,​they​resemble​children​more​in​their​way​of​thinking.​Between​them​they​have​in​common​a​simple​spirit​without​malice​that,​in​ good​faith,​falls​into​error​and​innocently​produces​failure​in​the​individual​and​catastrophes​in​the​peoples.​Uniformity,​for​which​an​embryonic​logic​is​sufficient,​seems​typical​of​the​state​of​nature;​children​ conjugate​all​the​verbs​as​regular,​and​in​new​peoples,​all​political​ideas​ are​turned​into​syllogisms.​The​former​would​take​us,​if​we​would​permit​it,​to​the​most​solid​Esperanto,​as​the​latter​have​gone,​whenever​they​ have​been​able​to​dominate,​to​the​most​disastrous​Jacobinism. ​ The​way​of​conceiving​of​an​election​and​calculating​its​consequences​ that​we​have​shown​in​the​adolescent​is​also​the​way​of​our​people,​the​ way​of​the​limited​part​of​the​nation​capable​of​perceiving​its​electoral​ right,​if​we​deduct​from​it​the​very​scant​number​of​citizens​with​specific​education​who​reflect​on​the​problems​of​our​political​existence.​ The​summary​of​this​idea​is​contained​in​two​entirely​false​suppositions:​ the​first,​that​popular​election​is​easily​realizable;​the​second,​that​the​ actual​election​will​instill​order​in​the​whole​political​organism.​And​if​ the​number​of​those​who,​because​exceptional,​do​not​accept​the​first​is​ very​small​to​begin​with,​there​are​still​among​them​many​who​believe​ in​the​extraordinary​virtue​of​the​actual​election. ​ The​ common​ conception​ to​ which​ we​ first​ alluded​ produces,​ as​ a​ great​error,​serious​consequences.​If​there​is​the​conviction​that​citizens​ will​carry​out​the​election​with​order,​with​disinterest,​and​even​with​ wisdom​if​only​the​liberty​of​suffrage​is​not​obstructed,​and​that​such​an​ election​certainly​produces​the​public​good,​every​intervention​that​obstructs​that​liberty​must​correctly​be​considered​a​criminal​offense​that​ has​neither​extenuations​nor​other​explanation​than​the​despotic​egoism​ of​whoever​has​the​elements​of​force​at​his​disposal.​When,​from​a​false​

470 : emilio​rabaSa

premise,​a​logical​inference​is​made,​the​legitimacy​of​the​consequence​ gives​to​this​consequence​glints​of​truth​sufficient​to​dazzle​the​common​people,​and​the​common​people​are​the​great​majority.​Any​badly​ thought​out​and​poorly​written​newspaper,​generally​a​work​of​noxious​ tendencies,​makes​use​of​the​logic​of​the​consequences​applied​to​principles​invoked​from​the​fundamental​law​in​order​to​acquire,​through​ the​voice​of​anonymous​writers​on​public​affairs,​because​little​known,​ greater​prestige​among​the​masses​than​the​most​sensible​government​ with​the​greater​proven​patriotism.​But​as​the​false​premise​is​nothing​ less​than​a​constitutional​precept​that​bases​a​right​in​the​democratic​ system​established​by​the​Constitution,​the​accusations​appear​legally​ reasonable,​however​much​satisfying​them​might​bring​the​country​to​ greater​danger. ​ This​ situation​ causes​ the​ perpetual​ conflict​ between​ popular​ aspiration​and​the​action​of​governments,​which​must​be​guided​by​needs​ rather​than​principles,​because​principles​do​not​obey​needs,​nor​were​ they​inspired​by​the​realities​that​in​the​end​dominate​in​spite​of​all​the​ chimeras.​All​revolts​have​invoked​electoral​right,​seeking​to​base​their​ action​in​the​propensities​of​the​masses​and​to​cause​the​men​in​power​to​ lose​prestige;​but​all​revolts,​in​becoming​government,​have​responded​ to​the​supreme​need​for​stability​and​have​had​to​thwart​the​aspiration​ of​the​people,​which,​realized,​would​make​national​life​impossible.​As​ long​as​the​people​have​the​right​to​do​what​the​government​has​the​need​ to​resist,​the​country​will​remain​in​a​state​of​latent​revolution,​capable​ of​showing​itself​in​any​moment​of​weakness​in​the​organism. ​ It​ is​ useless​ to​ attempt​ the​ reconciliation​ of​ two​ contradictory​ extremes.​For​this​reason​all​effort​dedicated​to​calming​the​public​conscience​is​wasted,​that​is​to​say,​all​effort​to​make​the​only​true​peace​ neither​by​election​nor​by​repression.​If,​in​Mexico,​should​there​be​an​ election​realized​by​universal​suffrage,​the​first​concern​of​the​government​emanating​from​it​(if​it​can​endure)​would​be​to​prevent​such​a​ phenomenon​from​repeating​itself,​for​universal​suffrage​is​necessarily​ the​ enemy​ of​ all​ established​ government,​ the​ disorganizer​ of​ every​ ordered​mechanism,​because​of​a​need​that​springs​from​the​articles​of​ our​Constitution​that​created​the​incompatibility.​As​for​repression,​it​ can​make​peace​but​not​constitute​it,​because​something​can​be​constituted​even​on​a​movable​sediment​provided​it​is​permanent,​and​repres-

the​eleCtion : 471

sion​is​a​condition​but​not​a​substance,​and​this​condition​is,​if​one​permits​the​image,​the​troubled​result​of​two​variable​forces. ​ All​the​conservative​elements​of​a​society​are​on​the​side​of​the​government​that​ensures​order​because​they​live​from​order;​they​prefer​ authority​to​the​exercise​of​rights​that,​at​most,​would​lead​them​to​the​ tranquility​they​now​enjoy​without​the​need​of​securing​it​or​putting​ it​in​danger.​But​the​conservative​elements,​which​are​always​found​in​ the​highest​strata​of​the​people,​if​they​are​excellent​with​respect​to​passivity​and​resistance,​they​are​less​than​useless​in​the​activity​of​political​ struggles,​in​which​they​have​much​to​lose​and​little​or​nothing​to​gain.​ So​general​is​this​truth​that,​among​people​as​intensely​democratic​and​ as​broadly​institutional​as​the​North​American,​the​electoral​corruption​ that​perverts​the​parliament​and​decays​the​tribunals​is​owed​principally​ to​the​abstention​of​the​higher​classes​who​feign​disdain​to​hide​their​ egoism. ​ On​the​other​hand,​the​appeal​to​right​and​to​absolute​truths,​which​ are​held​out​as​ideals​to​arouse​the​people,​move​and​exalt​the​conscientious​ majority,​ which​ lives​ on​ aspirations​ because​ the​ realities​ of​ existence​make​the​impatient​ones​incline​toward​a​new​condition​that​ always​assumes​better. ​ Here​one​discovers​a​new​unhappiness:​the​social​field​is​divided​into​ two​parts​that​should​have​the​same​interests​and​that​do​not​collide​in​ well-​constituted​ countries,​ at​ least​ regarding​ the​ general​ idea​ of​ suffrage​as​a​foundation​for​the​stability​of​the​nation.​The​remedy​consists​of​making​of​the​election​not​a​threat​to​the​order,​but​rather​the​ foundation​of​security.​In​this​way​the​conservative​elements​and​those​ who​proclaim​the​right​will​have​a​common​interest​in​guaranteeing​the​ suffrage.​And​as​for​the​governments,​they​will​have​relief​from​duties​ when,​ proceeding​ from​ the​ election,​ they​ know​ that,​ in​ the​ popular​ suffrage,​ they​ find​ the​ release​ from​ many​ responsibilities​ and,​ in​ the​ strength​of​the​parties,​a​solid​foundation​of​support.

ii Far​from​being​easy​and​simple,​the​electoral​act​is​the​most​difficult​step​ for​peoples​ruled​by​a​system​more​or​less​democratic,​or​that​aspires​ to​that​government.​The​honest​and​simple​election​we​have​assumed​ in​ the​ preceding​ section​ is​ impossible​ in​ any​ society,​ because​ in​ any​

472 : emilio​rabaSa

human​social​unit,​great​or​small,​there​are​distinct​interests​that​soon​ become​antagonistic,​fight​to​prevail,​and​come​inevitably​to​dispute​and​ struggle.​When​there​are​no​opposing​ideas​of​government,​the​interests​ that​act​are,​at​least,​tendencies​to​put​authority​in​favorable​hands,​and,​ lacking​parties​of​programs,​one​arrives​at​parties​of​persons,​which​are​ fruitless​for​the​good.​The​struggle​of​opposing​interests​does​not​occur​ without​winning​over​partisans,​convincing,​seducing,​imposing,​and​ bribing,​that​is​to​say,​denying​to​as​many​as​it​can​the​absolute​and​paradisiacal​liberty​pure​theory​gives​them.​Among​the​sought​after,​some​ resist​because​they​have​personal​ideas,​which​are​blank​ballots​in​the​ dispute;​others​yield;​the​timid​hide;​the​arrogant​abstain;​and​the​few​ who​initiated​or​took​the​active​and​effective​part​of​the​movement​have​ thus​ designed​ the​ political​ parties,​ although​ only​ in​ a​ temporary​ and​ transitory​way.​When​the​repetition​of​successive​electoral​events​and​ the​ results​ of​the​ government​ they​establish​ characterize​ the​ ideas​ of​ both​sides​and​define​the​limits​of​their​propensities;​when,​in​addition,​ the​directing​groups​classify​themselves​and​acquire​a​genuine​individuality,​each​faction​is​a​system​and​each​system​an​organized​party.​Having​ arrived​at​this​point,​the​ideal​liberty​of​the​citizen​in​the​election​is​reduced​practically​to​the​liberty​of​choosing​the​party​in​which​he​would​ like​to​register​and​to​whom​he​has​to​submit​himself.​He​preserves​the​ right​to​vote,​but​he​has​lost​the​right​to​choose. ​ The​creation​of​parties​is​a​necessity​that​arises​from​the​nature​of​ things;​it​is​not​an​invention​of​ingenuity,​but​rather​a​natural​and​inevitable​product​of​electoral​liberty.​For​this​reason,​to​invent​political​ parties​that​are​simply​electoral,​to​arrive​through​them​at​the​liberty​of​ elections,​is​to​claim​that​nature​inverts​its​processes,​and​nature​does​ not​lend​itself​to​such​inversions.​If​the​general​principle​that​necessity​ creates​the​organ​can​still​be​doubtful,​it​is​not​doubtful​that​there​is​absurdity​in​creating​the​organ​to​produce​the​necessity​for​the​function.​ The​invention​of​the​railroad​would​be​impossible​if​commerce​had​not​ existed​before;​and​in​the​social​order,​it​is​useless​to​create​the​Central​American​union,​which,​nonetheless,​would​be​constituted​spontaneously​if​Colombia​or​Mexico​tried​to​absorb​the​five​little​republics​ by​violence. ​ The​ works​ realized​ as​ a​ result​ of​ natural​ forces​ are​ impossible​ for​ human​effort;​the​intervention​of​man​is​useful,​in​such​cases,​only​to​ put​natural​forces​in​working​condition.​Thus,​for​example,​if​an​ele-

the​eleCtion : 473

vated​temperature​is​required​for​two​bodies​to​combine​chemically,​it​is​ useless​to​force​the​phenomenon,​but​this​phenomenon​will​be​realized​ inevitably​if​the​chemist​intervenes,​heating​the​flask​to​make​possible​ the​action​of​the​mysterious​forces​of​the​atom. ​ To​create​a​party​for​electoral​purposes​in​Mexico​is​pure​political​dilettantism.​What​is​important​is​making​the​election​possible,​suppressing​ disruptive​causes​that​make​impossible​the​spontaneous​action​of​social​ forces.​These​social​forces​are​responsible​for​producing​the​parties,​creating​their​mechanism​for​them,​giving​them​movement,​and​arming​ them​for​the​efficacy​of​their​functions.​The​disruptive​causes​are​in​the​ very​Constitution​that​one​is​trying​to​carry​out​and​not​in​the​governments​that​have​always​been​blamed. ​ The​organization​of​political​parties​in​democratic​countries​is​very​ complicated,​even​in​those​countries​where​it​seems​simpler,​only​because​the​weft​of​the​thread​is​not​immediately​apparent​at​a​mere​glance​ during​the​election;​and​it​cannot​be​otherwise,​given​that​all​uniform​ action​of​multiple​and​complex​elements​suppose​subordinations​and​ disciplines​that​are​not​acquired​except​by​processes,​established​rules,​ recognized​sanctions,​and​they​require​unity​that​necessitates​directors​ and​even​almost​renouncing​personal​ideas. ​ No​organization​has​been​created​without​an​evolutionary​process​ and​without​it​being​urgent​for​the​operational​need​of​the​parties.​Let​ us​take​the​most​characteristic,​the​one​we,​for​powerful​reasons,​incline​ to​imitate—that​of​the​North​American​parties. ​ It​ is​ known​ that,​ when​ Washington​ retired​ from​ public​ life,​ the​ great​lines​of​the​two​national​parties​were​marked​out:​the​Federalist​(today​Republican)​and​the​Republican​(today​Democrat);​the​first,​ with​Hamilton,​aspiring​to​federal​unity​to​give​strength​to​the​nation;​ the​second,​with​Jefferson,​defending​local​independence​against​an​absorption​dangerous​to​the​states​and​to​the​lofty​right​of​the​individual.​ It​is​also​known​that​these​two​elements,​representing​the​centripetal​ and​centrifugal​forces​that​create​balance​in​the​system​and​that​so​marvelously​served​to​constitute​the​nation​on​its​constitutional​principles,​ have​managed​to​blur​their​differences​when​the​federal​equilibrium,​ definitively​established,​made​them​disappear​as​if​by​automatic​action;​ but​the​life​of​the​two​parties​remained​as​an​integral​part​of​the​institutions,​and​[the​parties]​are​maintained,​despite​the​evolution​that​has​ come​to​blend​their​dogmas,​because​of​the​simple​need​to​renew​the​

474 : emilio​rabaSa

power,​with​the​primarily​personal​aims​of​their​followers,​but​in​the​ end,​and​above​all,​as​indispensable​wheels​of​the​political​machinery.​ So​necessary​thus​is​the​establishment​of​parties​for​constitutional​life! ​ In​ 1796​ Adams​ and​ Jefferson​ were​ candidates​ of​ both​ parties​ by​ a​ spontaneous​sentiment​that​did​not​require​express​declarations.​Four​ years​later,​the​then​Republicans,​unanimous​in​the​candidacy​of​Jefferson,​were​not​unanimous​with​respect​to​the​designation​of​vice​president,​and​to​agree​upon​it,​the​deputies​and​senators​of​the​party​met​ in​the​first​nominating​caucus.​This​system​continued​without​any​great​ obstacle​until​1816.​In​1820​the​nominating​caucus​of​deputies​and​senators,​which​came​under​attack​as​usurpers​of​the​right​of​the​people,​ although​it​met,​did​not​dare​nominate​a​candidate;​and​in​1824​the​one​ nominated​came​in​third​in​the​polls,​which​ended​up​discrediting​the​ system.​The​system​had​to​change,​and​so​in​1828​the​candidacy​of​Jackson​ was​ recommended​ by​ the​ Tennessee​ legislature​ and​ by​ meetings​ of​the​people,​giving​rise​to​the​practice​that,​one​year​before​the​next​ election,​conventions​would​meet,​composed,​for​both​parties,​of​delegations​from​the​states;​and​for​the​same​election,​a​convention​of​young​ people,​ accepting​ the​ nomination​ of​ the​ new​ national​ Republicans,​ adopted​ten​resolutions​that​constituted​the​first​party​platform.​In​1836​ only​the​Democratic​party​had​a​convention,​but​in​1840​there​was​a​convention​of​both​parties​and​the​process​was​regularized.​Bryce,​whom​ we​follow​in​this​account,​adds:​“This​precedent​has​been​followed​in​ all​subsequent​contests,​so​the​national​nominating​conventions​of​the​ major​parties​are​today​as​much​a​part​of​the​regular​political​machinery​ as​the​rules​the​Constitution​prescribes​for​the​election.​The​establishment​of​the​system​coincides​with​(and​represents)​the​complete​social​ democratization​of​politics​in​the​time​of​Jackson.” ​ Forty-​four​years​were​consumed​and​twelve​electoral​exercises​spent​ to​arrive​at​the​organization​of​the​system​that​prepares​each​party​and​ brings​it​into​agreement​for​the​campaign;​this​for​a​Saxon​people​who​ were​ preparing​ themselves​ for​ democratic​ life​ since​ before​ thinking​ about​their​independence.​One​sees,​then,​in​what​was​just​expounded,​ the​complexity​of​the​mechanism,​and​we​have​confined​ourselves​only​ to​the​presidential​election,​assuming​the​nominating​convention​created;​ but​ for​ the​ convention​ to​ meet,​ a​ mechanism​ prepared​ in​ each​ party​is​needed,​and​as,​besides​the​deputies,​the​officials​of​the​state,​ those​of​the​district,​those​of​the​county,​and​those​of​the​city​must​be​

the​eleCtion : 475

elected,​all​of​which​put​the​mechanism​into​action​very​frequently,​this​ requires​having​a​permanent​committee​in​every​locality​and​a​perfectly​ defined​process,​commonly​practiced,​better​known​even​than​the​electoral​laws​of​public​order,​so​that​the​foundation​of​every​election​and,​ consequently,​of​every​nomination​of​candidates​might​be​the​will​of​ the​primary​electors. ​ The​permanent​committee​convokes​in​each​case​the​primary​caucus,​ which​in​theory​is​composed​of​all​citizens​qualified​to​vote​in​the​smallest​electoral​district.​The​primary​caucus​selects​the​candidates​of​the​ party​as​officials​of​their​own​locality​and​names​delegates​to​gather​in​ their​delegation​at​larger​electoral​district​conventions​that​include​delegates​of​various​primaries;​this​convention​of​secondary​electors​must​ designate​candidates​for​higher​posts​of​the​state.​But​there​is​still​more;​ the​secondary​convention​has,​at​times,​the​task​of​naming​new​delegates​ to​a​third​and​higher​convention,​the​national​convention,​which​nominates​candidates​for​the​presidency​and​vice​presidency​of​the​Republic.​Consider​the​complexity​of​this​mechanism​with​all​the​details​each​ stage​requires,​and​bear​in​mind​that​the​work​begins​in​the​meeting​of​ the​primary​assembly,​in​which​is​discussed​the​right​of​each​person​in​ attendance​to​vote,​his​status​as​party​member,​his​conduct​toward​the​ party​in​preceding​elections,​labors​that​provide​occasion​for​the​danger​ of​fraud,​bribery,​the​influence​of​the​professionals​to​commence​from​ the​beginning,​and​the​alienation​of​men​of​good​faith​who​do​not​wish​ to​expose​their​electoral​district​to​such​a​game. ​ This​system​is​not​rigorously​uniform​in​the​entire​country,​but​the​ local​modifications​do​not​alter​its​essence.​It​was​not​created,​but​rather​ was​formed​over​a​half​century​by​experiences​and​efforts​at​accommodation.​It​is​not​an​emanation​of​race,​for​all​that​the​conditions​of​race​ helped​its​development,​but​rather​a​derivation​of​the​vitality​of​parties.​ But​the​parties​were​started​and​strengthened​because​there​was,​from​ the​beginning,​respect​for​electoral​right​and​a​field​of​free​action. ​ This​is​where​we​need​to​start.​When​there​is​confidence​in​electoral​ liberty,​one​will​think​about​going​to​the​polls;​one​will​go​to​them.​It​ will​be​necessary​to​report​the​misfortunes​of​the​first​attempts,​which​ would​not​be​trivial.​The​parties​will​be​established​in​the​American​way​ because​there​will​be​no​other,​given​our​form​of​government,​and​the​ parties​will​rest​on​a​mechanism​as​complex,​difficult,​and​exposed​to​ fraud​and​corruption​as​that​of​the​United​States.​Democracy​and​fed-

476 : emilio​rabaSa

eral​government​are​very​difficult.​Their​fundamental​foundation,​popular​election,​is​very​far​from​responding​to​the​dream​of​purity​of​the​ adolescent​and​the​childlike​people.

iii When​ liberty​ in​ the​ election​ is​ ensured,​ in​ the​ sense​ that​ the​ public​ power​does​not​restrict​it​with​persecutions​or​obstruct​it​with​critical​ influences,​ citizens​ go​ spontaneously​ to​ the​ polls,​ and​ soon​ with​ growing​interest,​but​with​the​help​of​two​conditions:​that​they​have​ an​awareness​of​the​purpose​of​the​event,​and​that​they​surmise​a​real​ value​in​their​vote​to​the​results​of​the​election.​Against​both​conditions,​the​Constitution​established,​in​deference​to​French​handbooks​ of​democracy,​universal​suffrage​and​the​indirect​vote,​the​first​because​ all​the​sons​of​the​country​have​a​right​to​take​part​in​naming​their​mandataries,​given​that​all​are​equal,​and​the​second​because​Mexican​citizens,​with​that​universality,​are​incapable​of​electing​well,​and​even​of​ electing​poorly. ​ The​ Drafting​ Committee​ of​ ’57​ had​ not​ committed​ such​ an​ error;​ with​the​good​sense​that​always​placed​it​so​much​above​Congress​as​ a​whole,​it​ended​the​article​that​expressed​the​conditions​of​citizenship​with​this​sentence:​“From​the​year​1860​forward,​besides​the​conditions​expressed,​knowing​how​to​read​and​write​will​be​required.”​But​ the​deputy​Peña​y​Ramírez​“declares​himself​against​the​requirement​ of​knowing​how​to​read​and​write,​because​it​does​not​seem​to​him​to​ conform​ very​ well​ with​ democratic principles,​ and​ because​ the indigent and needy classes​are​not​to​blame,​but​rather​the​governments​that​have​ overseen​public​instruction​with​such​carelessness”​[Ponciano].​Arriaga,​ to​whom​it​seems​that​the​continuous​attacks​of​his​own​coreligionists​ since​the​meetings​of​the​commission​have​cast​doubt​on​his​own​criteria,​responded​“that​he​did​not​agree​to​answer​the​objections​of​the​ previous​ speaker,”​ met​ with​ his​ fellow​ committee​ members,​ and​ this​ committee​withdrew​the​final​sentence​of​the​article.1​Thus,​so​simply​ and​briefly,​without​awareness​of​the​seriousness​of​the​resolution​and​ by​a​unanimous​vote,​Congress​closed​the​doors​on​possible​democracy​ in​the​name​of​theoretical​democracy.​The​government​was​guilty​of​the​ fact​that​indigents​did​not​know​how​to​read​or​write—that​govern​

1.​Zarco,​Historia del congreso constituyente 7,​Session​of​September​1.

the​eleCtion : 477

ment,​which​in​thirty-​five​years​of​independence,​revolts,​and​penury,​ had​not​disseminated​instruction​to​all​parts—and​the​exclusion​of​the​ illiterate​was​unanimously​seen​by​the​deputies​not​as​a​measure​of​political​order​but​rather​as​an​article​of​penal​code​that​punished​ignorance​unjustly. ​ Suffrage​is​not​simply​a​right;​it​is​a​function,​and​it​requires,​as​such,​ conditions​of​aptitude​that​society​has​the​right​to​demand,​because​the​ function​is​nothing​less​than​the​primordial​function​for​the​ordered​life​ of​the​Republic.​It​is​as​much​a​function​as​that​of​the​inhabitant​who​ serves​as​a​juror,​and​who,​within​free​institutions,​has​the​right​to​be​ registered​on​the​lists​of​judges​of​the​people;​but​for​the​task​to​be​given​ to​him,​he​must​meet​certain​conditions​that​ensure​his​suitability.​The​ vote​is​not​exercised​to​the​detriment​of​the​citizen,​but​rather​at​the​expense​of​the​destiny​of​the​social​body,​and​only​an​incomprehensible​ aberration​of​criteria​and​common​sense​can​have​placed​the​right​of​ each​man​above​the​interests​of​the​nation​to​oppress​it,​to​stifle​it,​and​ to​overwhelm​it. ​ Universal​suffrage​produces​in​all​countries​the​appearance​of​disruptive elements,​that​is​to​say,​elements​that​obstruct​the​genuine​expression​ of​ the​ conscious​ will​ in​ popular​ election.​ But​ in​ advanced​ countries,​ although​such​elements​are​harmful,​they​are​dominated​by​the​actively​ free​population,​which​is​the​majority,​or​they​cause,​in​the​end,​a​tolerable​misfortune.​In​the​United​States​the​black​people​and​the​new​ and​poor​immigrants​are​electors​that​are​won​by​the​bribes​of​political​professionals​or​by​the​trickery​of​the​jongleurs​at​the​polls;​they​are​ a​minority,​but​all​American​treatise​writers​still​regard​them​as​very​ dangerous.​In​England​the​influence​of​the​great​landowners​creates​a​ disruptive​element​in​the​tenants​and​farmers.​In​France​the​disruptive​ element​is​the​workers​in​the​great​factories,​through​the​intervention​of​ the​well-​liked​employers.​But​these​subordinate​groups​do​not​generally​ manage​to​prevail​in​the​election,​and​therefore​they​are​simply​disruptors.​For​us,​seventy​percent​of​illiterates​is​not​a​disruptive​element​in​ the​expression​of​the​will​of​the​people,​but​rather​destroyer​of​the​election​itself.​If​the​cities​of​importance​are​excepted,​which​are​very​few,​ the​rest​of​the​country​has​electoral​districts​in​which​the​great​majority​ is​unlettered,​completely​ignorant​of​the​system​of​government;​and​it​ is​not​venturesome​to​maintain​that,​in​a​fifth​of​the​total​electoral​districts​the​greater​number​of​the​so-​called​citizens​belong​to​the​indige-

478 : emilio​rabaSa

nous​race​and​do​not​have​the​slightest​notions​of​the​law,​nation,​president,​Congress,​or​state.​That​there​be​the​will​of​the​people,​which​is​the​ obligatory​phrase​of​all​known​theorizers,​each​citizen​must​have​will,​ and​will​is​impossible​without​knowledge​of​the​matter​that​must​activate​it. ​ In​these​conditions,​seventy​percent​of​the​electors​are​nothing​but​ material​on​hand​for​the​violation​of​the​will​of​the​citizens​who​do​actually​have​a​will;​and​as​those​citizens​are,​because​of​an​age-​old​flaw,​submissive​and​obedient​to​an​authority​that​commands​them​from​close​by,​ they​have​been,​without​exception​of​place​or​time,​the​force​with​which​ governments​have​served​themselves​in​order​to​avoid​free​elections​and​ make​the​election​benefit​their​purposes.​The​weapon​is​a​double-​edged​ sword:​when​the​central​power​employs​it,​it​subdues​the​states;​when​ the​local​government​uses​it,​the​federal​government​does​not​have​the​ opinion​of​its​partisans​in​the​state​to​balance​or​bring​down​the​aggressive​force​of​the​rebellious​local​power.​The​election​has​always​been​ (with​very​rare​exceptions​that​occur​only​in​revolutionary​periods)​in​ the​hands​of​the​general​government​or​those​of​the​governor;​but​still​ today​theories​of​democracy​are​invoked​to​sustain​this​shameful​and​ lamentable​condition;​and​one​blames​the​power​for​using​such​a​process,​without​considering​that​it​is​the​least​unfortunate​process​that​can​ result​from​the​absurd​institution,​given​that​it​would​be​much​worse​for​ the​country​if​greedy​agitators,​always​of​a​mean​disposition,​replaced​ the​power​in​the​privilege​of​making​and​unmaking​governments,​congresses,​and​tribunals. ​ The​truly​democratic​principle​of​universal​suffrage​consists​of​extending​the​right​to​vote​to​the​greatest​number​of​members​of​the​social​body​qualified​by​their​fitness,​and​without​making​exclusions​by​ reasons​of​birth,​social​or​pecuniary​condition,​or​any​other​that​constitutes​privilege.​As​there​are​no​external​signs​that​reveal​electoral​suitability,​and​laws​must​provide​general​rules,​qualities​have​been​sought​ that​presume​the​probability​of​fitness,​with​not​only​knowledge​of​the​ act​and​its​objective​being​considered​within​the​condition​of​suitability,​ but​also​interest​in​carrying​it​out​well.​In​France​the​general​culture​and​ the​democratic​spirit​have​extended​the​law​up​to​the​suffrage​of​all​adult​ men;​the​limited​number​of​illiterate​people​cannot​appreciably​influence​the​election.​In​England,​which​had​elections​during​five​centuries​

the​eleCtion : 479

before​arriving​at​the​nineteenth​century​in​its​present​democratic​state,​ social​ status​ based​ on​ income​ is​ required;​ but​ this​ is​ so​ low​ that​ the​ United​Kingdom​has​around​seven​million​electors.​In​the​United​States​ the​constitutional​amendment​that​gave​the​vote​to​black​people​is​still​ considered​by​native​and​foreign​treatise​writers​as​a​grave​error​that​ will​threaten​the​great​nation​with​very​serious​dangers,​and​has​certainly​imposed​on​southern​politicians​the​need​to​resort​to​games​of​intrigue​in​order​to​deceive​people​of​color​and​make​a​joke​of​their​right​ to​elect. ​ The​requirement​of​knowing​how​to​read​and​write​does​not​guarantee​knowledge​of​the​electoral​act,​but​it​gives​probabilities​of​it​and​ abilities​for​acquiring​it;​and​at​any​rate​the​electors​are​encouraged​and​ the​politicians​animated​by​the​assurance​that​the​fight​to​exclude​the​ ignorant​masses,​in​whom​only​the​action​of​force​can​work​for​carrying​out​their​mechanical​function,​is​possible.​When​free​and​possible​ elections​give​birth​to​parties,​even​if​they​might​be​at​heart​parties​of​ personality,​they​will​be​charged​with​instructing​the​elector​by​means​ of​publications​that​not​only​bring​the​elector​up​to​date​on​the​function​ and​its​objective,​but​also​bring​to​him​through​their​discussions,​even​if​ exaggerated​and​intense,​information​about​their​purposes,​knowledge​ of​their​methods,​and​features​of​their​men. ​ No​restrictive​quality​more​liberal​than​this​to​which​we​refer,​given​ that​it​can​be​acquired​with​ease​and​in​some​months;​and​if​we​should​ not​expect,​in​a​people​apathetic​about​the​existence​of​political​right,​ that​each​man​would​intend​to​learn​to​read​and​write​out​of​eagerness​ to​be​an​elector,​it​is​not​an​illusion​to​suppose​that​interest​in​increasing​ the​number​of​votes​might​induce​the​parties​to​increase​the​number​of​ schools​for​adults​in​the​regions​where​they​have​followers.​The​progress​ of​instruction,​which​in​the​last​twenty​years​has​been​notable,​will​increase​the​elector​body​from​day​to​day​and​will​expand​the​democratic​ system​naturally​and​spontaneously.​Thus​it​happened​in​England​with​ the​income​requirement,​much​less​dependent​on​the​will​of​the​individual:​in​the​fifteenth​century,​the​amount​of​required​annual​income​ was​twenty​shillings;​but​the​increase​of​wealth​in​currency​and​the​development​ of​ agriculture​ and​ industries​ lowered​ the​ value​ of​ money​ gradually​and​constantly,​and​the​income​of​twenty​shillings​was​becoming​less​significant​and​ended​by​being​laughable,​making​the​num-

480 : emilio​rabaSa

ber​of​electors​who​were​persons​of​independent​means​grow​notably.​ English​writers​maintain​that​twenty​shillings​in​the​fifteenth​century​ meant​at​that​time​as​much​as​eighty​pounds​now. ​ The​expression​“universal​suffrage”​is​one​of​the​many​hyperboles​ that​political​language​has​invented,​to​the​detriment​of​the​health​of​ democracies;​the​word​“universal”​was​chosen​because​another​of​greater​ breadth​was​lacking,​and,​nonetheless,​in​all​countries,​requirements​for​ the​elector​are​established​that​do​not​permit,​for​the​suffrage,​the​less​ promising​adjective​of​“general.”​Words​like​that,​like​“sovereignty”​of​ the​state-​divisions​within​the​federal​state,​make​people​ill​with​hallucination,​bring​them​to​the​disorderly​trembling​of​delirium,​and​damage​the​discernment​even​of​the​good​part​of​the​directing​class​of​the​ country.​The​suffrage​that​democratic​principles​imply​is​not​right-ofman​suffrage,​attributed​to​all​the​inhabitants,​nor​to​all​the​natives,​or​ even​to​all​the​men,​or,​finally,​to​all​the​adult​men;​but​rather​politicalright-and-function​suffrage,​guarantee​of​the​community,​which​must​be​ extended​to​all​those,​and​only​those,​who​have​sufficient​knowledge​of​ the​function​to​perceive​the​responsibility​of​exercising​it.​To​this​condition,​the​restriction​of​knowing​how​to​read​and​write,​which​has​the​ advantage​of​opening​the​doors​of​current​citizenship​to​all​who​would​ like​to​pass​through​them,​approaches​the​possible;​this​is​not​to​exclude​ anyone​ or​ to​ establish​ a​ suffrage​ less​ universal​ than​ that​ of​ the​ most​ democratic​peoples. ​ The​preceding​arguments​will​seem​pointless,​if​they​are​not​seen​ as​ foolish,​ to​ anyone​ who​ might​ be​ a​ stranger​ to​ the​ way​ our​ political​ideas​develop.​It​will​seem​unbelievable​that​it​is​necessary​to​discuss​exclusion​from​the​polls​of​men​who​are,​because​of​their​ignorance,​as​incapable​of​voting​as​crazy​people​and​idiots;​of​men​who​have​ not​entered​into​the​community​of​conscious​life;​for​whom​there​is​no​ epoch;​who​have​no​sense​of​evolution​at​all,​whether​or​not​the​government​is​at​fault;​that​there​are,​among​those,​entire​peoples​who,​not​ knowing​the​national​language,​have​not​yet​even​been​put​in​contact​ with​the​civilized​world,​and​they​have​today​the​same​notion​of​a​national​government​as​they​had​in​the​sixteenth​century​of​the​privileges​ of​the​crown.​And​nothing,​nonetheless,​more​urgent​than​the​need​for​ this​discussion,​because​men​of​government,​persons​called​to​exercise​ influence​in​the​order​of​political​ideas,​still​declare​themselves,​either​ because​of​Jacobin​vices​or​because​of​conventional​democratism​or​be-

the​eleCtion : 481

cause​of​malevolent​mumbo-​jumbo,​maintainers​of​good​faith​of​universal​suffrage,​whose​modification​they​see​as​an​outrage​on​the​rights​ of​the​people. ​ Democracy​has​no​worse​enemies​than​men​of​the​upper​classes​who,​ courtiers​of​the​errors​of​the​people,​court​common​fears​that​are​the​ means​of​trading​in​applause​and​obedience.​Thus,​religious​faith​has​no​ more​harmful​enemy​than​the​priest​without​a​conscience,​who,​to​ensure​the​faith​of​the​humblest​followers,​nourishes,​instead​of​fighting,​ the​most​miserable​worries​and​preaches​words​he​does​not​believe​but​ that​contribute​to​ensuring​him​the​dull​submission​he​cultivates. ​ The​true​citizen​should​mistrust​any​public​man​who​fights​against,​ and​any​government​that​objects​to​restriction​of,​the​suffrage.​Defense​ of​universality​of​the​vote​reveals​the​underhanded​purpose​of​excluding​ all​people​from​the​public​interests.

iv Succession​in​the​highest​power​has​been​the​primary​problem​in​constituting​peoples,​including​primitive​peoples.​Wandering​tribes,​nomadic​ peoples,​recognize​as​leader​the​one​who​leads​them​in​war​and​devotes​ himself​to​victory;​conquered,​they​submit​to​the​rule​of​the​conquering​leader.​Succession​is​determined​by​the​murder​of​the​caudillo​or​by​ his​defeat​in​the​daring​rebellion​ of​a​conspiratorial​ group,​and​then​ the​people​have​as​general​and​king​the​murderer​or​rebel​who​imposes​ himself​and​who​is​acclaimed​because​of​admiration​and​fear,​and​because​his​very​action​shows​that​he​meets​the​conditions​of​valor​and​ fierceness​that​are​the​ones​the​horde​needs​in​its​captain.​When​the​ leader​arrives​at​the​level​of​prestige​sufficient​to​elevate​himself​over​ his​tribes​until​coming​to​be​seen​as​of​superior​lineage,​he​establishes​ hereditary​succession,​which​is​the​first​form​of​peaceful​transmission​ of​power;​the​rebel,​to​supplant​him,​kills​him​and​also​puts​an​end​to​ his​sons,​but​by​doing​so​he​confirms​the​right​of​succession​in​popular​ sentiment,​because​he​makes​the​heirs​disappear​in​order​to​establish​his​ right,​now​secondary​to​ferociousness​and​strength. ​ Later​ nationalities​ are​ begun,​ and​ the​ conquering​ and​ prestigious​ leaders​ link​ their​ authority​ and​ their​ right​ to​ rule​ with​ the​ religious​ principle,​which​gives​it​a​new​prestige​and​a​sacred​origin.​The​succession​takes​place​in​the​laws​of​the​people,​and​ruling​families​begin.​Rebellions​are​not​now​made​against​a​man,​nor​is​disappearance​of​the​di-

482 : emilio​rabaSa

rect​descendants​sufficient;​it​is​necessary​to​overthrow​the​dynasty.​At​ any​rate,​the​establishment​of​political​societies​has​entered​a​new​stage​ that​means​an​important​advance.​The​succession​is​legal;​the​usurper​ makes​use​of​the​law,​avails​himself​of​the​religious​principle,​and​bases​ his​own​dynasty​on​both.​The​evolution​that​operates​since​with​respect​ to​the​royal​power,​until​arriving​at​the​limitations​of​modern​monarchies,​gives​no​importance​for​purposes​of​succession​to​the​supreme​ leader,​who​continues​to​be​merely​and​purely​legal,​given​that​he​only​ obeys​preestablished​rules​to​find​title​to​the​crown. ​ In​the​third​and​final​stage,​the​supreme​power​is​conferred​by​popular​election​and​for​a​determinate​period;​the​law​does​not​provide​rules​ to​define​on​whom​the​succession​of​the​power​falls,​but​rather​to​establish​by​whom​and​in​what​form​the​successor​should​be​designated.​The​ succession​enters​into​a​new​period​that​the​constitutional​system​perfects,​leading​it​to​secure​the​advantages​of​renewal​and​the​stability​that​ public​opinion,​which​has​authorized​and​must​sustain​him,​should​give​ to​the​leader​of​the​government. ​ Such​ has​ been,​ in​ the​ general​ movement​ of​ the​ world,​ the​ successional​evolution​of​the​power,​and​although​human​history​has​many​ centuries​now,​the​forms​of​succession​are​reduced​essentially​to​those​ that​characterize​the​three​great​stages:​usurpation​by​force,​designation​ by​law,​election​by​the​people. ​ As​happens​with​all​general​classifications​that​arise​from​the​analytical​observation​of​history,​what​has​been​expounded​is​not​uniform​in​ all​epochs​or​among​all​the​peoples​of​the​world​if,​in​attempting​to​find​ the​pure​type​of​each​stage,​it​is​sought​in​particular​cases.​There​are​in​ antiquity​peoples​of​elective​rule,​but​incomplete​and​above​all​fleeting,​ and​which​is​lost​later,​as​if​in​order​for​the​exceptional​people​to​obey​ the​inevitable​law​of​progressive​evolution. ​ In​modern​times​what​happens​with​all​the​great​classifications​happens​also​with​the​law​of​progressive​evolution:​there​is​hybridization,​ like​ that​ of​ languages​ on​ the​ borders​ of​ peoples​ who​ speak​ different​ ones;​there​are​shades,​like​those​of​the​colors​in​contact​with​one​another;​finally,​there​are​confusions​between​the​laws​and​the​practices,​ between​the​supposed​and​the​realized,​and​between​the​temporary​and​ permanent​that​mislead​the​criteria​of​analysis.​Careful​and​calm​observation​always​discovers​the​essential​character​of​the​stage. ​ Among​the​Latin​peoples​of​America,​who​did​not​develop​sponta-

the​eleCtion : 483

neously,​but​rather​were​influenced​by​others​more​advanced​in​history​ and​saw​themselves​subject​to​an​anomalous​form​of​government​not​ produced​by​their​own​evolution,​forward​movement​suffered​disruptions​that​still​persist​after​having​them​break​the​orderly​advance​of​the​ model​peoples​of​Europe.​During​the​centuries​of​the​viceroyalty,​they​ did​not​pass​to​the​second​stage,​but​rather,​their​growth​force​nullified,​ they​remained​without​evolutionary​action,​and,​upon​gaining​their​independence,​found​themselves​filled​with​the​most​advanced​ideas​of​ the​transformed​peoples,​but​lacking​the​harmonious​development​that​ gives​strength​and​equilibrium​to​whomever​has​exercised,​in​the​normal​struggles​of​nature,​all​the​muscles​of​the​body​and​all​the​psychic​ faculties.​From​this​arises​the​fact​that​the​Latin​nations​of​the​continent​ have​laws​from​the​last​stage​and​have​not​yet​emerged,​for​the​realization​of​the​succession​of​the​government,​from​the​period​of​primitive​ peoples. ​ Argentina,​Brazil,​and​Chile​are​barely​managing​to​provide,​to​their​ transmission​of​power,​a​character​less​similar​to​the​first​stage,​because​ the​changes​owing​to​violence​are​less​frequent​in​the​three​nations.​An​ abrupt​modification,​and​for​that​reason​little​deserving​of​confidence,​ has​shown​in​Peru​the​legitimate​succession​of​recent​presidents,​not​ without​attempts​at​revolt​that​threaten​the​constitutional​order.​Only​ the​little​republic​of​Costa​Rica,​for​reasons​that​for​us​do​not​have​sufficient​explanation,​presents​an​exception​that​could​not​be​taken​into​ account​without​studying​in​depth​its​history​and​the​internal​process​ of​its​political​practices​and​customs. ​ As​for​Mexico,​it​is​clearly​and​fully​in​the​first​stage.​In​order​not​ to​go​to​the​confusion​of​the​epoch​of​daily​revolutions,​let​us​take​the​ series​of​governments​from​[18]55​to​now:​Santa​Anna​was​thrown​out​ by​the​Revolution​of​Ayutla;​Comonfort​was​defeated​by​the​Revolution​of​Tacubaya;​Juárez​attacked​by​the​Revolution​of​the​Noria,​which​ failed;​Lerdo​de​Tejada​deposed​by​the​Revolution​of​Tuxtepec;​General​Díaz​deposed​by​the​Revolution​of​the​North.​After​each​triumphant​revolution,​the​leader​of​the​rebellion​becomes​the​president​of​ the​Republic.​Although​the​processes​have​changed​during​the​time​that​ has​elapsed​since​the​Christian​era,​the​fact​is,​at​heart,​the​same​that​ occurred​more​than​twenty​centuries​ago​in​the​forests​of​the​north​of​ Europe.​In​the​succession​of​power,​the​people​does​not​express​its​will​ to​elect​a​new​president,​but​rather​to​depose​the​one​who​governs,​and​

484 : emilio​rabaSa

expresses​it​by​taking​up​arms​and​fighting.​Once​the​victory​is​obtained,​ the​election​is​unnecessary​because​there​is​no​candidate​other​than​the​ leader​of​the​subversive​movement.​In​these​cases​the​election​is​free​of​ physical​coercion​precisely​because​no​one​has​moral​liberty. ​ The​man​who​assumes​power​in​those​cases,​not​because​they​give​ it​to​him​but​rather​because​he​takes​it,​does​not​come​to​his​rule​with​ strong​ideas​of​democracy,​nor​less​does​he​think​of​them​as​rules​of​government.​The​defects​of​origin​continually​extend​to​mentality​and​conduct,​because​of​the​necessity​that​it​appear​logical​and​that​only​a​spirit​ more​than​superior,​exceptional,​capable​of​infringing​laws​of​human​ nature​can​break. ​ He​who​overthrows​a​president​and​imposes​himself​in​his​place​does​ not​feel​himself​to​be​mandatary​or​leader​of​the​government;​he​feels​ himself​master​of​the​laws​and​leader​of​the​nation,​because​it​is​not​ natural​that​he​would​superimpose​juridical​theories​on​the​deep​impression​left​by​the​events​from​which​his​authority​is​derived.​The​imposition​having​sprung​spontaneously​from​him,​he​does​not​tolerate​ obstacles;​limitations​irritate​him,​and,​as​a​consequence,​he​subordinates​to​his​will​all​elements​that​must​intervene​in​managing​public​affairs,​and​before​long​he​arrives,​if​it​did​not​begin​with​a​dictatorship,​ at​a​dictatorship​so​much​less​benevolent​the​more​resistance​is​opposed​ to​it.​Perpetuity​comes​right​away,​which​is​the​highest​condition​of​dictatorial​force​and,​consequently,​its​necessary​company,​and​with​perpetuity​established​without​law,​the​succession​of​power​can​be​operated​ only​through​violence.​Here​we​are,​then,​in​the​first​stage​of​successional​theory,​condemned​to​have​dictatorship​as​a​form​of​government,​ and​as​an​end​for​each​dictatorship​a​revolution. ​ We​are​not​trying​to​deny​in​an​absolute​manner​the​charges​made​ against​our​race​and​our​education​as​being​the​cause​of​our​deplorable​ and​backward​political​condition.​Perhaps​it​might​be​true​that​we​put​ “in​the​conquest​of​power​the​same​ardor​free​of​scruples​that​the​companions​of​Pizarro​put​into​the​conquest​of​gold,”2​obeying​hereditary​ impulses,​but​there​is​less​observation​and​clemency​in​condemning​us​ without​extenuation​when​we​are​within​the​historical​laws​which​the​ old​peoples​of​Europe​have​obeyed​over​long​centuries. ​ We​are​going​to​arrive​at​the​third​stage​of​the​successional​evolution​ ​

2.​Barthélemy,​Le Rôle du Pouvoir Exécutif dans les républiques moderns,​p.​204.

the​eleCtion : 485

without​having​prepared​ourselves​in​the​second;​it​obliges​us​to​force​ the​law​of​gradual​development,​and​the​violation​of​natural​laws​has​ inevitable​and​harsh​sanctions.​Every​effort​of​public​men​of​patriotic​ conscience​must​be​consecrated​with​loyalty​and​disinterest​to​helping​ the​evolutionary​movement​so​that​it​might​be​realized​in​practice,​since​ it​is​operating​in​theories​and​in​public​sentiment.​The​perspective​of​ the​Republic​presents​itself​in​this​simple​and​hard​dilemma:​Either election or revolution. [​.​.​.​]

2 ​

Supremacy of Legislative Power i

The​ actual​ election​ establishes​ the​ government​ but​ does​not​regulate​it,​and​precisely​in​the​harmonious​operation​of​the​ branches​created​by​the​Constitution​lies​the​secret​of​the​stability​of​the​ government,​the​guarantee​of​liberties,​and​the​foundation​of​the​tranquility​and​success​of​the​nation.​The​peoples​who​have​already​passed​ their​political​infancy​and​have​liberated​themselves​from​fear​of​usurpations,​because​they​have​the​disposition​sufficiently​superior​not​to​ tolerate​ them,​ take​ up​ the​ real​ problem​ of​ government​ organization,​ which​ consists​ of​ the​ balance​ among​ the​ powers​ that​ constitute​ it​ in​ order​that​the​superiority​of​one​not​come​to​destroy​the​others,​degenerating​into​an​oppressive​power.​Each​of​those​peoples​has​given,​to​the​ complex​problems​of​political​organization,​the​solution​to​which​their​ history,​their​idiosyncracy,​and​their​needs​have​led​them,​in​such​a​way​ that,​if​well​within​the​general​common​principles​founded​in​human​ nature​and​analyzed​by​reason,​each​has​found​the​special​solution​it​has​ consecrated​in​its​laws​and​embodied​in​its​customs.​For​this​reason,​no​ two​nations​have​equal​institutions​in​practice,​despite​the​fact​that,​besides​general​common​principles,​some​among​them​certainly​have​similar​histories​and​origins,​and​despite​the​fact​that​commerce​in​ideas​and​ study​of​foreign​experience​have​also​caused​reciprocal​imitation. ​ The​ old​ classification​ of​ systems,​ which​ could​ have​ had​ scientific​ merit​one​hundred​years​ago,​reveals​today​only​the​external​appearance​ of​ the​ governments,​ but​ it​ misleads​ with​ respect​ to​ the​ intrinsic​reality.​There​is​greater​similarity​between​the​governments​of​the​ North​ American​ republic​ and​ the​ German​ empire​ than​ between​ the​ ​ Original​title:​“Supremacía​del​poder​legislativo.”​Source:​Emilio​Rabasa,​La Constitución y la dictadura,​ chapter​ 11,​ in​ Estudio sobre la organización política de México​ (Mexico:​Tipografía​de​“Revista​de​Revistas,”​1912). 486

SupremaCy​of​leGiSlative​power : 487

republics​of​the​United​States​and​Switzerland​or​between​the​empires​ of​Germany​and​Russia.​The​essence​of​the​classification​takes​root​in​ the​strength​and​constitution​of​the​executive​power,​which​directs​and​ regulates​the​community’s​interior​and​exterior​life,​and​which​varies​ from​absolute​rule​in​Russia​to​the​balance​of​powers​in​North​America​ and​the​almost​complete​abrogation​of​powers​in​Switzerland. ​ But​in​order​to​speak​only​about​the​type​of​government​in​which​the​ popular​element​participates​by​means​of​the​suffrage,​a​type​to​which​all​ peoples​of​the​world​are​tending​to​accommodate​themselves,​we​focus​ on​the​great​division​between​parliamentary​governments​(the​English​ model)​and​the​balance​of​powers​(North​American​model).​The​first​ is​based​in​the​theory​that​national​sovereignty​resides​in​the​assembly​ elected​by​the​people,​whose​will​it​represents​exclusively;​the​second​ rests​on​the​principle​of​a​plurality​of​powers,​to​which​the​people​delegates​its​sovereignty​(executive​and​legislative),​giving​them​jurisdictions​that​should​keep​their​activities​separate​and​in​a​balance​that​guarantees​against​omnipotence​that​not​even​the​people​themselves​should​ have.​European​experts​in​public​law​attribute​great​superiority​to​the​ parliamentary​system,​which​predominates​on​the​Old​Continent,​but​ the​grand​model​of​the​American​type​does​not​permit​them​to​condemn,​or​even​declare​the​system​of​the​New​Continent​definitively​inferior. ​ With​the​intent​of​speaking​about​parliamentarianism​later,​we​confine​ourselves,​in​order​to​limit​our​subject​matter,​to​the​system​that,​ with​reference​to​republics,​is​now​called​“presidential.”1 ​ The​presidential​system​establishes​power​and​national​sovereignty​in​ its​three​departments:​legislative,​executive,​and​judicial,​with​jurisdictions​and​limitations​that​ensure​their​independent,​balanced,​and​harmonious​action.​The​first​two​represent​the​will​of​the​people​and​have​ authority​to​interpret​it​in​order​to​“require”​in​the​name​of​the​constituent​and​determine​according​to​suggestions​of​the​nation​or​accord​ 1.​The​systems​should​be​called:​European​the​one,​which​arose​in​Europe​and​has​ spread​throughout​the​entire​continent,​and​American​the​other,​which​had​its​origin​in​ the​United​States​and​is​the​foundation​of​all​the​constitutions​of​this​hemisphere.​Such​ designations​would​have​the​advantage​of​avoiding​the​words​of​specific​connotation​ that​are​used​today​and​that​are​all​inappropriate​because​of​this​very​connotation​they​ have​from​beforehand.

488 : emilio​rabaSa

ing​to​their​own​ideas​that​they​have​because​of​ideas​from​the​nation;​ as​a​consequence,​the​officials​who​represent​those​agencies​must​necessarily​originate​from​popular​election.​The​judicial​is​an​organ​of​the​ nation​that​enters​into​certain​elevated​functions​as​a​great​equalizer​of​ elements,​but,​limited​to​applying​the​law​(declaration​already​made​by​ the​will​of​the​people),​it​cannot​“require”​in​the​name​of​the​people​because,​in​the​administration​of​justice,​the​people​itself​is​inferior​to​the​ law​and​must​subject​itself​to​it;​consequently,​to​appoint​the​holders​of​ this​function,​public​election​is​not​only​not​necessary,​it​is​not​logical. ​ In​every​constitution​of​this​system,​what​is​essential​and​delicate​lies​ in​the​balance​of​the​two​powers​that​represent​the​will​of​the​people;​ the​ theory​ of​ parliamentarianism​ rejects​ precisely​ that​ double​ representation​of​a​single​and​indivisible​will.​But,​leaving​to​theoretical​conceptions​the​limited​value​that​falls​to​them​in​the​practical​sciences,​it​ is​necessary​to​recognize​that​the​fact​of​two​distinct​agencies​sharing​ the​representation​of​the​will​of​the​people​creates​between​them​an​ inevitable​antagonism​and​causes​the​major​difficulty​of​keeping​them​ constantly​ within​ established​ limits.​ Each​ one​ fighting​ to​ expand​ its​ activity​at​the​expense​of​the​other,​the​legislative​tends​toward​converting​the​government​into​congressional​anarchy,​and​the​executive​ toward​taking​it​to​dictatorship;​and​if​neither​of​the​two​extremes​is​ reached,​at​the​very​least​the​expansion​of​one​of​the​two​powers​deforms​the​constitution​that​the​country​has​desired,​and​always​with​the​ danger​of​going​further.​The​president​of​the​French​Senate​reproached​ a​member​of​the​chamber,​interrupting​him​with​applause​from​his​colleagues,​because​the​member​alluded​to​the​constitutional​power​of​the​ executive​ to​ have​ reconsidered​ a​ project​ voted​ by​ the​ chambers.​ The​ allusion​seemed​to​dishonor​the​sovereignty​of​the​assembly,​when​in​ reality​it​was​the​Senate​that​disrespected​the​constitution.​In​France​ the​legislative​has​gained​such​ground​on​the​executive​that,​in​official​ acts,​the​legitimate​powers​of​the​executive​are​not​recognized.2​In​the​ United​States​the​succession​of​presidents​without​great​character​made​ the​constitutional​balance​vacillate​in​favor​of​Congress,​in​the​opinion​ of​Wilson,​to​the​point​that​the​distinguished​writer​considered​that​the​ nation​was​threatened​by​parliamentarianism;3​ and​later,​Barthélemy,​ ​ ​

2.​Barthélemy,​Le Rôle du pouvoir exécutif dans les républiques modernes,​p.​678. 3.​Wilson,​Congressional Government.

SupremaCy​of​leGiSlative​power : 489

writing​ in​ 1906​ after​ the​ administration​ of​ MacKinley​ [sic]​ and​ during​that​of​Roosevelt,​saw,​on​the​contrary,​the​already​insuperable​tendency​of​the​American​government​toward​the​personal​influence​of​the​ holder​of​the​executive.​It​is​certain​that,​in​the​events​of​1906​until​now,​ neither​the​American​people​nor​President​Taft​has​permitted​the​confirmation​of​this​tendency,​which​seems​not​to​have​shown​itself​except​ in​specific​circumstances. ​ Outside​the​legal​order,​the​president​possesses​elements​of​strength​ that​give​him​superiority​in​the​struggle​with​Congress.​He​has​the​public​force​materially​at​his​disposal,​has​the​army​of​employees​who​depend​on​him,​has​on​his​side​the​interest​of​those​who​hope​for​his​favors,​and​generally​attracts​popular​sympathies,​which,​only​in​moments​ of​intense​unrest,​the​collective​and​almost​anonymous​personality​of​a​ legislative​assembly​gains.​But,​within​the​constitutional​order,​which​is​ what​we​must​take​into​account​in​examining​the​makeup​of​the​government,​the​superiority​of​the​Congress​is​unquestionable​because​of​its​ sole​power​to​prescribe​the​laws​to​which​the​entire​nation​and​even​the​ executive​power​must​submit.​The​danger,​then,​of​encroachment​that​ alters​the​stability​of​the​institutions​is​principally​in​the​abuse​Congress​ can​make​of​its​legitimate​powers,​for​all​that​this​seems​paradoxical​in​ our​country​because​we​have​never​lived​under​the​constitutional​system,​and,​consequently,​the​preponderance​has​been​on​the​side​of​the​ executive. ​ The​complete​separation​of​the​two​powers​would​not​ensure​their​ balance.​It​would​give​them​an​antagonistic​independence​in​which​each​ would​exert​itself​to​reach​the​maximum​expanse,​and​both​would​become​unbearable​for​the​governed.​It​is​required,​on​the​contrary,​that​ one​serve​as​a​limitation​to​the​other​by​means​of​specific​intervention​ in​their​activities;​and,​as​the​legislative​already​has​as​its​specific​function​the​great​means​of​prescribing​laws​in​order​to​regulate​the​course​ of​public​affairs,​the​attention​of​the​fundamental​law​directs​itself​primarily​to​arming​the​executive​against​the​encroachments​and​excesses​ of​the​legislative​power,​strong​because​of​its​faculties,​immune​because​ of​its​absolute​lack​of​responsibility,​bold​because​of​its​nature​as​representative​of​the​people​that​it​wants​exclusively​to​claim​for​itself,​and​ impassioned​because​of​its​crowdlike​nature,​which​subjects​it​more​to​ oratorical​efforts​than​to​the​value​of​reasoning. ​ In​the​form​of​government​the​Mexican​Constitution​adopted,​there​

490 : emilio​rabaSa

is​another​element​of​complication​and​another​force​to​take​into​account​for​the​balance​of​the​whole:​the​legal​status​of​the​independent​ states,​which​confers​on​them​a​freedom​of​internal​activity​to​which​ has​been​given​the​improper​name​of​sovereignty,​which​we​use​in​this​ specific​sense​for​the​sake​of​brevity.​The​federal​powers​are​limited,​by​ local​independence,​to​everything​that,​and​to​only​what​concerns​the​ interest​of​the​nation,​leaving​to​the​governments​of​the​federal​divisions​the​care​and​management​of​the​interests​of​each,​which​assumes​ for​them​the​characteristics​of​an​autonomous​people.​A​new​distribution​of​jurisdictions​is​added​to​what​the​division​of​powers​entails​and​ demands,​and​in​this​distribution,​the​fundamental​law​again​seeks​the​ counterweights​that​might​guarantee,​of​course,​the​liberty​of​the​federal​entities,​but​in​the​end,​and​most​important,​all​the​liberties​of​the​ people​against​the​tyrannical​power​and​the​never-​ending​tendency​to​ absolutism;​because​the​federal​system,​if​it​was​created​with​the​goal​of​ preserving​their​rights​for​the​English​colonies​that​formed​the​North​ American​ Republic,​ proves​ to​ be​ in​ every​ instance​ excellent​ for​ reducing​the​power​of​the​government,​with​advantages​for​the​security​ of​public​liberties,​always​in​danger​before​a​formidable​power. ​ The​legal​ status​of​the​states​ is​ manifest​ in​two​forms​ to​limit​ the​ omnipotence​of​the​national​government.​The​first​is​their​internal​independence,​which​puts​local​interests​beyond​the​authority​of​the​national​government;​the​second​is​their​status​as​political​entities,​which,​ on​the​one​hand,​gives​them​the​right​to​constitute​a​chamber​of​Congress,​with​an​equal​number​of​representatives​for​all,​and,​on​the​other,​ gives​them​the​right​of​voting​as​units​for​the​highest​laws,​those​that​ modify​the​fundamental​pact​of​the​nation. ​ The​liberty​of​action​of​the​states,​as​electors​of​the​federal​chamber​and​as​legislative​agency​in​constitutional​matters,​depends​on​their​ strength​and​their​independence,​and​it​cannot​give​cause​for​legal​conflicts;​not​so​their​liberty​of​internal​rule,​which​can​be​violated​by​laws​ or​acts​that​encroach​upon​or​restrict​it.​The​agency​of​equilibrium​is,​ for​those​situations,​the​judicial​department​of​the​nation,​which,​without​abandoning​the​forms​of​procedure​appropriate​to​the​administration​of​justice,​without​general​declarations​that​would​convert​it​into​ the​ omnipotent​ power​ it​ is​ trying​ to​ combat,​ prevents​ the​ execution​ of​every​act​of​violation​and​defends​the​independence​of​the​state​or​ division​from​every​threat.​If​the​balance​is​broken​by​the​state​to​the​

SupremaCy​of​leGiSlative​power : 491

detriment​of​the​federal​jurisdiction,​the​judicial​agency​of​the​nation​ reestablishes​it​by​the​same​procedure,​limited​to​preventing​the​simple​ execution​of​isolated​acts. ​ Such​is​the​coordination​of​powers​and​the​mechanism​of​balances​ on​which​the​American​system​of​government​is​based,​established​with​ simplicity​and​mastery​in​the​Constitution​of​Philadelphia,​“the​most​ admirable​work,”​according​to​Gladstone,​“that​human​understanding​ has​produced.”​ From​it,​our​[Constitution]​ took​ an​organization​ that​ our​constituents​managed​to​improve​on​certain​points,​but​that​proved​ to​be​profoundly​modified​by​the​very​different​criteria​it​used​for​the​ work​of​adaptation. ​ Did​the​modifications​made​in​that​work​leave​the​balance​that​is​the​ goal​of​the​presidential​system​ensured​in​our​political​organization?​ Certainly​not.​The​elimination​of​the​Senate​broke​it,​as​much​by​increasing​the​power​of​the​unitary​chamber​as​by​depriving​the​states​of​ their​equal​representation​in​an​assembly​of​the​legislative​power.4​With​ the​Senate​established​in​a​subsequent​epoch,​some​errors​remain​in​the​ supreme​law​that,​in​the​free​practice​of​its​precepts,​will​cause​serious​ conflicts​among​the​powers;​the​preponderance​of​the​legislative​over​ the​executive​remains,​which​will​result​in​any​of​the​extremes​to​which​ the​ omnipotence​ of​ Congress​ leads:​ the​ submission​ of​ the​ executive,​ which​ establishes​ the​ dictatorship​ of​ an​ assembly,​ or​ the​ coup​ d’état,​ which​enthrones​the​dictatorship​of​the​president.​And​after​any​of​these​ dictatorships,​revolution​again.​We​do​not​yet​know​what​the​outcome​ of​our​Constitution​will​be​in​full​practice​because​we​have​never​realized​it,​and​foresight​is​insufficient​for​calculating​it​in​the​complexity​ of​elements​that​enters​into​the​physiology​of​a​people​that​lives​by​its​ agencies.​The​machinery​constructed​to​make​a​new​product​is​not​free​ from​the​danger​of​malfunctioning​at​the​moment​of​connecting​it​to​ the​motor​that​must​set​all​its​parts​in​motion,​and​only​the​flying​asunder​of​a​part​will​reveal​the​error​of​calculation​that​must​be​corrected​ so​that​the​entire​mechanism​meets​its​objective.​Our​political​organization,​written​in​the​Charter​of​’57,​needs​to​be​connected​to​the​actual​ suffrage,​which​is​the​force​that​must​set​it​in​motion.​Only​then​will​we​ know​which​is​the​work​that​produces​and​the​effort​that​provides,​but​ ​ 4.​The​1857​Constitution​suppressed​the​Senate,​but​a​constitutional​amendment​restored​it​in​1874.​(Editor’s​note)

492 : emilio​rabaSa

through​the​experience​of​other​similar​mechanisms​we​already​know​ what​parts​are​going​to​fly​asunder​if​they​are​not​adjusted​beforehand. ​ There​is​also​another​reason​why​the​Constitution​might,​for​the​most​ part,​be​an​enigma​as​long​as​it​is​not​put​into​free​practice,​to​which​it​ arrives​only​through​the​genuinely​popular​origin​of​the​two​powers,​ which​are​not​possible,​neither​the​interpretation​nor​the​adaptation.​ The​interpretation,​which​determines​the​scope​that​must​be​granted​ to​each​precept,​is​not​possible​as​long​as​the​constitutional​agencies​are​ not​free​to​use​their​judgment,​to​discuss​with​the​others​their​limits​of​ activity,​and​to​establish​their​sovereignty​as​an​insurmountable​barrier​ to​disruptive​encroachment. ​ For​the​interpretation,​the​adaptation​is​made​first;​but​the​adaptation​ is​essentially​evolutionary​and,​in​our​judgment,​as​inevitable​as​useful.​ If​two​peoples​of​analogous​origins​and​situations​were​to​adopt​identical​written​constitutions,​ten​years​after​putting​them​into​practice​with​ equal​liberty,​they​would​have​different​actual​constitutions,​and​fifty​ years​later,​it​is​probable​they​would​have​totally​distinct​ones.​Not​only​ has​the​English​common-​law​constitution​made​the​admirable​evolution​ from​ruling​aristocracy​to​broad​democracy​in​a​century​without​altering​the​visible​organization​of​its​government,​but​also​the​inflexible​ (written)​ constitutions,​ have,​ without​ modifying​ their​ texts,​ changed​ their​principal​ideas​through​slow​transformation.​The​American​Constitution​was​established​on​the​greatest​respect​for​independence​and​ for​the​almost​real​sovereignty​of​the​states,​which​the​states​required​to​ accept​it.​Jefferson,​the​zealous​sustainer​of​such​a​principle,​dedicated​ eight​years​of​government​to​its​development,​and​nonetheless,​at​the​ end​of​the​separatist​war,​the​absolute​and​sole​sovereignty​of​the​nation​remained​the​unquestionable​foundation​of​the​federal​union,​and​ this​new​principle​has​produced​the​effect​of​giving​the​central​government​a​preponderance​that​is​neither​written​in​the​law​nor​would​have​ been​accepted​by​the​free​colonies.​The​French​Constitution​of​1875​was​ voted​by​a​Congress​with​monarchical​tendencies​and​with​the​view​to​a​ restoration,​and​it​tried​to​preserve​in​the​president​of​the​Republic​the​ prerogatives​that​should​not​be​denied​a​monarch.​It​was​based​on​the​ division​of​powers​and​on​the​limitations​of​balance,​and​nonetheless,​ keeping​to​its​texts,​it​has​permitted​the​transition​to​the​most​complete​ parliamentary​ government,​ with​ a​ near​ nullification​ of​ the​ executive​ under​the​unlimited​sovereignty​of​the​popular​assembly.

SupremaCy​of​leGiSlative​power : 493

​ The​persistent​action​of​the​social​constitution​imposes​little​by​little​ and​day​by​day​its​characteristic​forms​and​makes​the​political​constitution,​which​always​has​much​of​the​artificial​and​mathematical,​yield.​ The​modifications​that,​in​general​ideas,​produce​the​changing​needs​of​ life,​the​progress​of​ideas,​and​all​the​forces​of​national​growth​do​not​ adjust​themselves​conveniently​to​the​unchanging​mold​that​a​past​generation​forged,​and​it​is​preferable​that​the​mold​yield​slowly​and​permit​less​rectilinear​forms​than​that​the​mold​shatter​in​pieces​under​the​ strength​of​irresistible​forces.

ii To​Congress​can​be​applied,​in​the​abstract,​the​expressions​of​Wilson,​ “Congress​is​the​aggressive​spirit,”​and​of​Bagehot:​“Congress​is​a​despot​ that​has​unlimited​time,​that​has​unlimited​vanity,​that​has​or​believes​ it​has​an​unlimited​ability,​whose​pleasure​is​in​action​and​whose​life​is​ work.”5​So​that,​having​faculties​superior​to​those​of​the​other​branches​ of​the​power,​an​instinct​for​attack,​and​not​only​capacity​but​organic​ need​to​work,​it​brings​together​the​most​complete​conditions​for​disturbing​the​harmony​of​the​government​and​frustrating​the​best​calculated​precautionary​measures​of​the​fundamental​law.​But​there​is​more​ that​Bagehot​in​his​phrases,​cited​and​written​for​comparison​with​the​ limitations​ that​ fatigue,​ pleasures,​ sociability,​ and​ his​ individual​ psychology​impose​on​the​president,​should​not​take​into​account:​the​lack​ of​responsibility​of​the​Congress​(especially​the​most​numerous​chamber)​makes​it​bold​and​careless;​its​method​of​election,​in​which​demagogic​elements​play​more​than​any​other,​give​it,​generally,​a​majority​ inferior​to​the​task;​individually,​its​members​do​not​have​an​opinion​on​ the​matters​submitted​to​their​vote;​together,​it​lets​itself​be​carried​off​ by​the​coarse​eloquence​that​fascinates​it​with​greater​docility​than​by​ the​serious​reasoning​suitable​for​persuading​it. ​ In​the​House​of​Representatives​of​Washington,​the​representatives​ frequently​request​that,​at​the​moment​of​the​vote,​the​session​be​suspended,​because​they​do​not​know​what​to​do​and​they​need​to​go​to​ the​people​best​informed​about​the​matter​to​orient​themselves.​Their​ personal​opinion​is​null,​the​work​abundant​and​rapid,​and​thus​made​ impossible​for​the​deliberation​of​a​body​whose​value​depends​precisely​ ​

5.​W.​Wilson,​Congressional Government;​Bagehot,​Principles of Constitutional Law.

494 : emilio​rabaSa

on​the​fact​that​it​is​constituted​to​deliberate.​The​discussion,​and​even​ the​vote​of​the​chamber,​has​been​replaced​by​the​discussion​and​vote​ of​the​permanent​committees,​about​which​it​should​not​be​said​that​ they​give​an​opinion,​but​rather​that​they​themselves​alone​resolve​the​ affairs​of​state.​In​each​committee​the​“chairman”​who​presides​over​it​ prevails,​and​notwithstanding​the​transcendental​importance​of​his​exceptional​functions,​the​“chairmen”​are​named​directly​and​exclusively​ by​the​Speaker​of​the​House,​who​thus​assumes​an​enormous​power​in​ the​functions​of​the​state.​If​we​have​to​speak​of​being​guided​by​general​cases,​we​must​say​that​the​sole​serious​and​reliable​function​of​the​ House​is​exercised​in​the​election​of​the​Speaker,​which​is​done​through​ the​majority​of​votes​.​.​.​of​the​party​that​dominates​in​the​assembly. ​ Thus​ we​ refer​ to​ the​ most​ learned​ democracy​ of​ those​ that​ have​ adopted​the​presidential​system​of​government. ​ Among​those​subject​to​the​parliamentary​system,​the​most​numerous​chamber​is​of​a​much​higher​intellectuality​because​the​prominent​ participation​that​it​takes​in​the​government​of​the​nation​makes​of​the​ election​of​the​deputies​the​act​of​greatest​importance​for​the​country,​ and​the​subject​matter​of​the​participation​attracts​persons​from​the​serious​elements​of​society​and​especially​of​the​political​world.​In​the​chambers​of​representatives​of​England​and​France​are​seated​many​men​of​ the​first​order,​deep​thinking​in​political​science,​masters​of​diplomacy,​ consummate​jurists,​famous​soldiers​and​sailors,​eloquent​orators.​Personal​opinion​can​be,​if​not​entirely​general,​in​the​great​majority,​but​ subject​to​the​needs​of​the​party​and,​within​the​party,​to​the​group,​to​ the​factions,​which​in​France,​above​all,​give​to​the​deliberations​of​the​ assembly​its​particular​appearance​and​to​the​votes​their​definite​direction.​The​importance​of​the​vote​that​in​one​day​changes​the​government​ and​determines​all​the​acts​of​the​executive—that​is​to​say,​all​the​daily​ life​of​the​nation—makes​the​discussion​impassioned,​intense,​more​of​a​ dispute​than​a​deliberation,​and​arrives​at​the​moment​of​deciding​with​ the​“yes”​or​the​“no”​of​the​sovereignty​of​the​people​in​an​atmosphere​ charged​with​ill​will​and​threats,​that​still​vibrates​with​the​rude​words​ of​the​interrupters​and​the​strikes​of​the​president’s​gavel,​and​maybe​a​ raised​fist​agitated​in​order​to​slap​a​face​or​some​inkwells​hurled​some​ distance​in​order​to​wound. ​ There​is​no​way​to​choose​between​an​assembly​like​the​American,​ which​ is​ more​ or​ less​ satisfied​ by​ mediocrities​ and​ incompetents,​ in​

SupremaCy​of​leGiSlative​power : 495

which​the​custom​of​speaking​is​deteriorating​more​and​more,​which,​ subject​to​the​committees,​is​at​the​point​of​completely​abdicating​its​ functions​as​a​deliberating​body,​and​another​assembly​like​the​French,​ in​which​there​are​representatives​of​great​quality​by​talent​and​knowledge,​but​who​are​ceaselessly​stirred​up​in​the​struggle​against​the​government​and​make​of​it​the​preferred,​almost​only,​occupation,​turning​ discussion​into​a​combat​of​eloquence,​at​times​drowned​out​by​clamors,​insults,​and​affronts.​The​American​nation​tolerates​and​rewards​the​ unhappiness​with​the​strength​that​it​takes​from​its​incomparable​and​ healthy​youth,​as​a​well-​nourished​and​vigorous​body​supports​and​restores​the​local​illness​of​a​member.​The​French​superimposes​its​well-​ being​of​accumulated​wealth,​its​superior​culture,​and​the​patriotism​ that​ constitutes​ its​ saving​ virtue​ upon​ constant​ threats​ from​ reaction​ and​from​international​complexities.​But​neither​the​one​nor​the​other​ nation​has​the​assembly​conceived​by​the​constituent​legislators​for​the​ loftiest​functions​that​popular​sovereignty​confers,​and​each​one​on​its​ path​follows​a​course​that​does​not​yet​give​signs​of​stopping​or​deviating​and​that​can​lead​the​country​to​profound​alterations​in​the​system​ of​government. ​ What​will​be​the​tendency​in​Mexico​of​a​Congress​freed​from​controls​by​the​actual​election​from​the​electoral​districts?​What​its​influence​in​the​specific​system​of​government​that​will​have​to​arise​from​ the​letter​of​the​Constitution​combined​with​our​character,​our​education,​and​our​idiosyncrasy?​It​is​not​possible​to​conjecture​correctly​in​ the​responses,​if​what​is​desired​is​to​determine​details​with​precision​or​ nuances​with​subtlety,​but​the​most​serious​dangers​can​indeed​be​determined​with​the​certainty​of​not​erring​greatly​on​the​side​of​foreboding,​ and​consequently​suggesting​the​means​of​preventing​the​greatest​and​ most​certain​ills​so​as​to​minimize​the​influence​of​possible​surprises​ from​experience. ​ The​ natural​ reaction​ the​ unfortunate​ effects​ of​ a​ current​ situation​ cause​in​the​public​spirit​make​it​see​poorly​the​good​effects​that​it​also​ carries​with​it​and​incline​it​completely​in​favor​of​a​situation​diametrically​contrary,​whose​unsuitable​aspects​it​refrains​from​perceiving.​The​ absolute​preponderance​of​the​executive​in​our​political​system​raises​ hope​in​the​legislative​and​fills​it​with​the​prejudice​of​all​saviors​in​waiting.​The​nation​aspires​to​a​system​in​which​Congress​predominates,​and​ by​shaking​the​omnipotence​from​the​president​of​the​Republic,​it​does​

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not​fear​his​nullification,​because​it​does​not​see​it​as​an​evil,​nor​does​ it​assume​the​omnipotence​of​the​chambers,​of​which​it​has​no​experience​whatsoever.​This​support​of​public​opinion,​which​a​free​Congress​ would​suddenly​have,​is​what​makes​it​most​dangerous​for​the​balance​ of​national​powers​and​the​stability​of​institutions. ​ If​the​country​is​lacking​electoral​agencies,​which​only​the​exercise​ of​the​suffrage​creates​and​perfects,​one​cannot​expect​in​the​first​elections​that​the​conservative​elements,​which​are​the​masters​of​wealth,​ culture,​and​the​good​judgment​there​is​in​the​entire​nation,​would​vigorously​take​part;​but​it​is​even​difficult​for​such​agents​to​be​very​useful​ for​the​good​designation​of​representatives,​because​in​countries​of​the​ presidential​system​interest​is​in​the​election​of​the​president,​and,​as​in​ the​United​States,​the​election​of​deputies​is​left​officially​to​the​politicians,​who​are​generally​men​of​second​order​if​one​classifies​by​learning​and​patriotism.​Our​Congresses​(the​first​ones​without​any​doubt)​ will​be​made​up,​in​their​majority,​of​men​gathered​through​the​spell​of​ small​localities​or​by​clever​intrigues​in​which​a​local​competence​triumphs;​of​politicians​from​the​states​who​usually​become​confident​and​ seize​great​opportunities​in​the​broad​and​favorable​medium​of​the​capital;​of​some​experienced​in​legislative​tasks​by​some​previous​service,​ ready​to​use​a​liberty​they​did​not​have​before,​and​who​it​is​probable​ owe​their​credentials​to​the​influence,​that​will​not​come​to​be​null,​of​ the​governors.​A​Congress​composed​of​such​personalities​will​probably​ have​qualities​of​good​faith,​of​interest​in​the​states,​and​of​preferential​ dedication​ to​ their​ tasks,​ and​ it​ will​ provide​ moreover​ the​ advantage​ of​bringing​to​light​men​who​renew​the​ranks​of​politics,​owing​to​the​ spontaneity​of​the​medium,​which​is​the​great​revealer​of​characters​and​ talents.​On​the​other​hand,​even​when​it​has​men​of​note,​the​common​ intellectual​standard​in​such​assemblies​will​be​very​narrow,​and​the​instruction​in​political​science​and​in​the​various​types​of​knowledge​that​ enrich​and​support​it,​very​scarce. ​ Skeptics​will​say​that​this​Congress​will​subject​itself​to​the​executive,​ like​the​previous​ones,​through​promises​or​habit;​we​will​not​assert​the​ contrary,​but​in​such​a​case,​the​assumption​of​independent​chambers​ would​not​hold,​and​we​will​not​have​advanced​at​all​in​the​development​ of​the​institutions.​No​danger,​but​no​progress! ​ The​free​Congress​is​one​that​takes​note​of​its​important​role,​that​ studies​its​faculties,​that​senses​itself​the​first​of​the​powers​and​immedi-

SupremaCy​of​leGiSlative​power : 497

ately​makes​itself​invader,​provoker,​and​aggressor.​If​its​general​culture​ is​low,​as​in​what​we​have​foreseen,​hostility​is​impulsive​because​it​proceeds​from​erroneous​ideas​that​give​it,​as​its​first​and​even​as​its​only​ conviction,​that​of​its​own​omnipotence​and​the​feeling​of​its​lack​of​responsibility.​The​resistance​of​the​executive​to​the​invasion​of​its​jurisdictional​ground​seems​to​it​rebelliousness,​and​the​eloquence​of​the​ orators​overflows,​always​convincing​for​the​mute​benches.​And​after​ some​time​of​burdening​itself​with​excitements​of​pride,​stimulants​of​ greed,​it​ends​up​by​being​persuaded​that​it​must​unconditionally​subjugate​the​leader​of​the​executive​power​or​compel​him​to​resign. ​ In​September​1861​the​Congress​that​began​meeting​in​May,​which​ harbored​a​great​number​of​distinguished​men,​found​it​very​natural,​ almost​like​the​exercise​of​one​of​its​simpler​legitimate​faculties,​to​request​President​Juárez​to​resign​from​the​government​in​order​to​deliver​ the​power​to​General​González​Ortega.​The​form​employed​had​nothing​ in​common​with​parliamentary​processes,​for​it​was​done​by​a​petition​ that​fifty-​one​deputies​endorsed.​To​it​was​opposed​another,​signed​by​ fifty-​four​representatives,​which​supported​the​president.​So​if,​of​the​ total,​the​hostile​ones​had​attained​three​more​adherents,​the​position​ of​Juárez​would​have​been​so​weak​that​the​president​would​have​had​to​ resign​or​attempt​a​coup​d’état.​And​if​one​considers​that​Juárez​had​just​ accomplished​the​triumph​of​the​Constitution​and​the​Reform,​worthy​ of​the​laurels​the​nation​has​not​scrimped​on​giving​him,​that​his​recent​ election​was​a​vote​of​confidence​of​the​Republic,​which​should​not​be​ proven​false​by​the​representatives​of​the​people,​and​that,​on​the​other​ hand,​the​country​continued​to​be​in​disarray​and​was​still​threatened​ by​enemies​of​the​liberal​party,​it​will​be​seen​in​this​lamentable​fact,​ of​what​errors​of​judgment​and​lack​of​loyalty​and​even​patriotism​the​ collectivity​of​men​of​good​and​patriotic​judgment​are​capable​when​the​ omnipotence​of​their​legislative​faculties​dazzles​them. ​ If​ it​ does​ not​ arrive​ at​ such​ extremes,​ the​ Congress​ will​ not​ stop​ claiming​the​supremacy​that​its​sovereign​authority​to​make​the​laws​ from​which​the​nation​lives​and​its​influence​that​the​threat​of​paralyzing​the​government​originates​and​sustains​offers​it​at​such​little​cost.​ It​will​surreptitiously​introduce​a​kind​of​forced​parliamentarianism,​ made​at​the​expense​of​the​liberty​of​the​executive​and​thanks​to​the​ timid​complacencies​of​the​executive​or​to​concessions​that​the​fear​of​ violent​clashes​between​the​two​powers​extracts​from​him.​This​degen-

498 : emilio​rabaSa

eration​of​the​established​constitutional​system​has​come​to​be​introduced​even​in​the​American​government,​better​prepared​than​ours​because​of​its​supreme​law​and​so​openly​sustained​by​the​people.​With​ what​ease​would​it​not​prevail​in​the​weak​organism​of​ours,​and​how​ much​would​it​not​advance​in​its​effort​to​dominate​the​executive,​even​ making​of​it​a​simple​instrument! ​ Earlier​we​spoke​of​the​legislative​power​of​the​Congress,​because​ the​two​assemblies​that​form​it​take​part​in​the​enactment​of​the​laws​ in​exercising​ almost​all​the​faculties​ in​the​scope​of​their​powers.​At​ times​the​Senate​will​also​be​able​to​be,​in​its​specific​faculties,​invader​ and​oppressor​of​the​executive,​but​it​is​an​unalterable​fact​that​the​predominance​of​the​Congress​is​summed​up​in​the​specific​supremacy​of​ the​Chamber​of​Deputies.​In​parliamentary​governments​it​is​the​popular​chamber​that​makes​and​unmakes​governments;​the​Senate,​reduced​ to​the​mere​status​of​reviewer,​rarely​dares​to​reshape​a​project​the​other​ chamber​sent​it,​and​little​by​little​cedes​its​most​important​prerogatives.​ In​France​the​Senate​has​a​first-​line​role;​in​England​the​House​of​Lords​ has​been​ceding​the​terrain​to​the​democratic​advances​of​the​Commons​ for​a​century,​and​recently​it​surrendered​to​it,​subjected​by​force,​the​ right​of​veto​in​the​budgets​voted​by​the​lower​chamber. ​ The​danger​of​the​single​chamber​is​thus​implicated​in​the​predominance​of​the​Congress,​threatening​by​all​the​evils​inherent​in​it​and​ with​the​violation​of​the​constitutional​system.​Perhaps​the​subordination​of​the​Senate,​in​the​European​countries​ruled​by​cabinet​governments,​depends​greatly​on​the​hereditary​or​less​popular​origin​of​their​ members,​but​that​is​not​the​only​nor​probably​the​main​reason.​The​ primary​cause​is​that​the​more​numerous​a​body,​the​more​imprudent,​ bold,​and​irresponsible​it​becomes;​the​Senate​must​take​refuge​in​prudence​to​avoid​clashes​of​serious​consequences,​and​prudence​is​always​ on​the​frontiers​of​weakness.

4

Against the Current 1930–1989

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jorge cuesta Jorge​Cuesta​(1903–42),​born​in​Veracruz,​was​a​chemist,​poet,​ and​writer.​He​was​a​friend​and​collaborator​of​Aldous​Huxley.​ Although​Cuesta​was​a​scientist​by​training,​he​was​an​artist​at​ heart​and​joined​a​group​of​writers​in​the​first​half​of​the​twentieth​century.​The​members​of​this​group,​among​them​Xavier​ Villaurrutia,​ José​ Gorostiza,​ and​ Gilberto​ Owen,​ published​ a​ magazine​called​Contemporáneos​and​came​to​be​known​by​this​ name. ​ In​the​1930s​a​wave​of​nationalism​swept​Mexico​that​had​a​significant​impact​on​the​artistic​and​cultural​currents​of​the​country.​Art,​it​was​believed,​should​reflect​national​traits.​However,​ as​cosmopolitans,​the​Contemporáneos​defied​the​ruling​consensus​regarding​art​and​sought​to​connect​with​artistic​currents​ outside​Mexico.​They​published​and​wrote​on​French​poets​at​a​ time​when​there​was​a​vogue​for​all​things​Mexican.​Cuesta​was​ also​an​essay​writer​who​published​articles​on​various​subjects​ in​the​daily​press.​His​pieces​on​politics​are​remarkable​because​ he​challenged​prevailing​ideas​in​ideological​matters​just​as​he​ did​in​art.​In​the​1930s​collectivism​was​at​its​highest​point​in​ Mexico​and​the​world.​Liberalism​seemed​outdated​and​dying.​ Against​this​mood​Cuesta​defended​and​extolled​the​liberal​tradition​and​criticized​illiberal​policies​and​ideas. ​ We​present​three​newspaper​articles​published​between​1933​ and​1934.

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Politics in the University

A​few​months​ago,​in​two​articles​published​in​El Universal,​I​took​the​liberty​of​criticizing​some​ideas​that​Lic.​Don​Vicente​ Lombardo​Toledano​has​about​the​university,​because​they​are​not​very​ academic​in​that,​under​the​pretext​of​serving​the​university,​in​reality​ they​wish​its​ruin.​Those​ideas​have​had​good​luck;​now​not​only​are​ they​uniquely​the​ideas​of​Lic.​Lombardo​Toledano,​they​are,​in​addition,​held​by​other​important​persons,​the​official​dogma​of​the​university,​and,​if​we​consider​the​recent​Congress​of​University​Students,​a​ near​philosophy,​at​least​of​the​sector​of​university​activity​of​the​nation​ represented​there.​It​seems,​then,​that​my​criticism​now​turns​out​to​be​ unfounded,​given​that​the​university​finds​its​law​and​its​prosperity​in​ the​ideas​that,​according​to​that​criticism,​lead​it​only​to​its​corruption​ and​ruin.​I​would​be​disposed​to​recognize​it​as​such​and​beg​the​pardon​ of​Lic.​Lombardo​Toledano​and​the​authorities​who​are​the​echo​or​the​ very​substance​of​his​voice​if​the​first​evidence​that​today​springs​to​the​ eyes​were​not​evidence​of​the​university’s​corruption​and​ruin. ​ To​judge​by​the​development​of​the​above-​mentioned​congress,​its​ objective​was​none​other​than​the​political​one​of​having​it​pronounce​ that​profession​of​faith,​thanks​to​which,​by​means​of​a​maneuver​that​ represented​its​goals​as​strictly​academic,​a​commitment​to​the​political​ order​is​created​for​the​university.​That​profession​of​faith,​according​to​ the​way​it​reads,​is​a​socialist​profession​of​faith.​Its​mission​is​nonetheless​exclusively​political,​but​this​does​not​prevent​the​most​serious​consequences​for​the​university​being​expected​from​it.​Without​ignoring​ politics,​it​is​university​politics​we​are​interested​in​bemoaning. ​ From​the​point​of​view​of​socialism,​nothing​worse​can​happen​to​it​ for​its​revolutionary​ends​than​to​be​turned​into​the​official​doctrine​of​ ​ Original​title:​“La​política​en​la​universidad.”​Source:​El Universal,​September​21,​ 1933. 502

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an​academy;​there,​simply,​its​revolution​ends.​Nonetheless,​if​this​happens,​and​it​is​not​possible​to​know​which​of​the​two​is​showing​itself​ in​reality—a​corruption​of​socialism​or​a​corruption​of​the​academy—it​ would​have​as​its​only​outcome​that​of,​putting​aside​its​revolutionary​ sense,​killing​socialism​in​the​academy​by​starvation;​it​would​not​be​so​ serious,​then,​if​socialism​is​effectively​a​vital​and​revolutionary​act​of​ thought,​that​by​going​to​seek​its​nourishment​somewhere​else,​it​can​ save​itself​from​the​death​the​university​is​preparing​for​it.​But​if​the​ university​remains​within​itself​without​nourishment,​I​do​not​believe​ it​will​find​outside​any​other​opportunity​for​living.​Now,​certainly,​it​ could​perhaps​still​have​the​opportunity​in​some​independent​schools,​ but​it​is​absolutely​certain​that​within​a​few​moments​the​secretary​of​ education​will​already​have​gotten​rid​of​them. ​ That​“the​ideology​of​the​university”​manifests​itself​at​the​moment​ of​birth​as​a​political​ideology​and​not​as​a​university​ideology​is​a​fact​ that​manifests​the​total​lack​of​consciousness​that​the​university​has​regarding​its​own​existence.​Its​internal​symptoms​of​corruption​are​already​ well​ known,​ having​ been​ made​ public​ by​ the​ university​ itself:​ lack​of​scholarly​discipline,​lack​of​seriousness​of​studies,​ineffectiveness​of​exams,​and,​finally,​the​“lack​of​a​university​philosophy.”​Whoever​frequently​spends​time​with​university​professors,​with​those​who​ still​have​a​personal​consciousness​of​university​responsibility,​also​finds​ out​about​the​lamentable​fate​that​this​rare​responsibility​has,​preserved​ by​those​professors​having​to​divide​not​only​the​practice​but​even​the​ preparation​of​scholarly​programs​with​a​number​three​times​greater​ than​theirs​of​professors​who​are​absolutely​unthinking​and​irresponsible.​As​a​consequence,​each​field​of​study​drags​along​a​miserable​university​life,​which​already​has​no​other​objective​than​dividing​up​the​ budget​of​the​university​among​anyone​who​without​merit​squabbles​ over​it,​nor​other​justification​than​authorizing​the​student​to​dispute​ other​budgets​that​flourish​in​the​economic​world,​where​in​the​spiritual​sense​the​university​languishes,​and​even​the​spirit​of​the​university​ itself.​And​it​cannot​justify​more​nor​can​it​give​to​this​field​of​study​a​ reason​to​perfect​itself,​as​the​university​itself​perceives​it​with​an​admirable​but​wasted​playfulness,​which​this​field​of​study​might​work​ to​serve​the​student​in​his​professional​life​so​he​might​earn​a​living​in​ an​economic​system​like​that​of​the​university;​this​is​to​say​that​it​does​ not​even​manage​to​seem​philosophical​to​those​benefited,​and​less​to​

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the​university,​which​always​has​the​reasonable​impression​that​it​does​ not​benefit​the​university​enough.​Without​a​philosophy,​in​effect,​each​ one​of​the​university​fields​of​study​becomes​corrupt,​and​students​and​ professors​desert​and​defraud​it.​It​is​only​reasonable​that​the​university​ seek​and​adopt​a​philosophy. ​ But​if​their​meaning​and​value​come​to​the​sciences​and​the​arts​from​ the​philosophy,​no​political​maneuver​will​provide​them​with​this​philosophy,​but​rather​its​study.​Philosophy​means​nothing​but​seriousness.​ To​make​philosophical​the​study​of​a​science​and​the​teaching​of​an​art​ means​only​to​study​and​teach​it​with​seriousness.​The​philosophy​cannot​ be​known,​that​is​to​say​the​nature​and​perfection​of​a​field​of​study,​as​ long​as​it​is​not​practiced;​of​an​instruction,​as​long​as​it​is​not​performed.​ University​instruction,​as​the​university​demands​it,​lacks​a​philosophy;​ but​if​philosophy​of​instruction​means​knowledge​of​its​nature​and​perfection,​what​is​lacking​in​university​instruction​to​be​philosophical​is,​ exclusively,​having​a​nature​and​perfection​of​instruction;​it​is,​solely,​to​ instruct.​To​seek​the​philosophy​of​grammar​in​a​political​practice​is​to​ end​up​corrupting​the​practice​of​teaching​grammar.​To​seek​in​a​political​ position,​whatever​it​might​be,​the​sense​of​the​philosophical​functions​ of​the​university​is​to​complete​the​corruption​of​the​university. ​ In​effect,​the​socialist​thesis​of​the​university​cannot​be​more​absurd​ or​more​depraved,​for​to​attribute​the​university’s​failure​and​the​lack​ of​ philosophy​ to​ the​ existence​ of​ a​ not-​very-​philosophical​ economic​ system,​from​which​the​university​thinks​its​norms​and​its​philosophy​ should​come,​so​that​as​a​consequence​the​university​could​benefit​from​ it,​is​to​be​unaware​of​the​nature​of​economic​life,​the​nature​of​the​university,​and​the​nature​of​philosophy.​The​university​is​not​unaware​that​ economic​ life​ is​ not​ the​ product​ of​ a​ philosophy,​ of​ a​ reflection,​ but​ rather​of​an​incalculable​diversity​of​passionate​acts;​and​it​cannot​be​ accepted​that​if​the​university​sees​itself​incapable​of​giving​philosophical​meaning​to​the​reflective​acts​of​its​own​spirit,​it​sincerely​believes​it​ will​be​able​to​give​philosophical​sense​to​the​unreflective​passions​that​ economic​life​produces​and​that​are​beyond​its​material​reach.​This​university​thinking​is​already​little​philosophical,​is​already​not​the​product​ of​a​reflection,​and,​if​it​is​a​passion​as​unreflective​as​any​other​of​the​ passions​of​economic​life,​let​us​wonder​how​the​university​will​have​ obtained​its​objective​of​making​that​life​philosophical​when​this​very​ objective​begins​by​lacking​philosophy​and​moral​conscience.

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​ Nonetheless,​it​is​not​so​absurd,​although​from​another​point​of​view,​ that​the​university​might​want​its​philosophy​to​be​that​of​the​economic​ system;​for​it​escapes​nobody​that​what​the​university​means​by​“economic​system”​is​nothing​other​than​“political​system.”​The​university​ knows,​because​economic​science​knows,​that​the​laws—that​is​to​say,​ that​properly​economic​systems—are​the​same​in​a​capitalist​system​as​ in​the​purer​communist​system,​and​that​if​they​were​not​the​same,​economic​science​would​have​no​meaning,​nor​would​socialist​doctrines​ that​derive​their​deductions​of​the​economy​from​economic​nature​have​ meaning.​From​one​system​to​another,​the​nature​of​the​system​does​ not​change,​but​rather​the​politics.​It​is​absolutely​certain​that​what​the​ university​means​is​that​it​is​not​in​agreement​with​the​current​political​ regime,​perhaps​because​one​of​its​virtues,​which​is​a​lasting​glory​of​Lic.​ Don​Emilio​Portes​Gil,1​has​been​to​deliver​the​university​to​the​regime​ of​its​own​nature,​of​its​own​philosophy,​declaring​it​autonomous.​It​is​ altogether​explicable​that​the​act​of​the​government​that​gives​it​liberty​ to​have​a​philosophy​and​personal​responsibility​now​seems​to​the​university​little​philosophical,​when​it​must​admit​its​inability​to​achieve​it. ​ When​the​university​was​run​by​the​state,​it​could​be​explained​that​ the​university​did​not​resign​itself​to​suffering​over​its​philosophy,​the​ rule​of​politics,​the​rule​of​the​state;​it​was​explained​that,​in​the​face​of​ the​political​demand​of​directing​the​university​with​a​philosophy​not​ its​own,​the​university​could​be​abandoned​and​corrupted,​holding​only​ the​state​responsible​for​the​consequences​of​acts​that​were​of​the​state​ and​not​of​the​university.​But​with​the​university​now​autonomous,​if​it​ itself​creates​another​political​slavery​and​abandons​the​philosophy,​the​ nature​belonging​to​it,​it​is​because​the​university​itself​wants​to​be​falsified​and​corrupted.​Now​the​state​has​no​blame​at​all,​even​if​it​is​called​ “economic​system”​in​order​to​burden​it​with​the​blame;​now​all​the​ blame​is​the​university’s.​And​if​the​university​is​now​going​to​continue​ subjecting​itself​to​a​political​demand​of​the​state,​with​the​aggravating​ circumstance​that​the​will​that​now​desires​it​merits​the​name​of​traitor​ to​the​state​and​the​university,​it​follows​that​the​blame​is​the​university’s. ​ A​socialist​doctrine,​whatever​might​be​its​origin​or​source,​is​a​political​doctrine.​Its​ideas​are​appropriate​for​anyone​who​aspires​to​govern​ ​

1.​Emilio​Portes​Gil​(1890–1978)​was​president​of​Mexico​in​1928–30.​(Editor’s​note)

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and​not​to​instruct​or​to​learn.​The​sphere​in​which​such​persons​have​a​ concrete​action​is​the​sphere​of​government,​while​they​are​incapable​of​ having​any​natural​influence​in​the​strictly​university​sphere.​The​physical​sciences​are​absolutely​immune​to​socialist​doctrines.​Even​in​the​ mind​of​a​socialist​physicist,​the​physical​laws​do​not​change​their​nature​ if​the​mind​does​not​change​its.​Language​and​literature,​like​the​other​ belles​lettres,​precisely​because​they​can​serve​to​express​even​socialist​ doctrines,​maintain​intact​their​capacity​for​expression​even​be​it​for​ opposing​and​different​doctrines,​because​the​nature​of​their​language​ does​not​change.​But​politics,​on​the​contrary,​is​not​the​same​after​it​becomes​socialist​as​it​was​before​becoming​it;​in​it,​socialism​certainly​has​ natural​consequences​that​can​be​felt. ​ Well​then,​the​university​cannot,​in​accordance​with​any​logic​whatsoever,​aspire​to​having​politics​emanate​naturally​from​the​university,​ that​is​to​say,​to​be​an​agency​of​government,​besides​which​no​juridical​law​authorizes​it,​very​wisely​and​philosophically.​And​although​it​is​ legitimate​that​the​officials​of​the​university​aspire​to​that​other​more​ enviable​ function​ of​ governing,​ it​ is​ immoral​ that​ they​ try​ to​ govern​ from​ their​ chair,​ preserving​ their​ role​ as​ citizens​ and​ compromising,​ in​a​political​struggle​that​brings​them​nothing,​their​university​functions​that,​in​designating​a​political​objective,​always​betray​and​corrupt.​ This​immorality​is​already​confirmed​in​the​maneuver​we​mentioned,​ that​being​feigning​an​academic​congress​to​compromise​the​university​ in​a​political​affirmation.​And​the​dignified​resignations​to​congress​by​ Lic.​Don​Antonio​Caso​and​Lic.​Rodolfo​Brito,​this​latter​director​of​ the​Faculty​of​Jurisprudence,​effectively​made​that​immorality​evident,​ something​that​honors​them​greatly​and​that​the​university​will​not​be​ able​to​thank​sufficiently,​nor​the​state​to​value​as​their​action​deserves. ​ For,​on​the​other​hand,​university​autonomy​is​also​an​interest​of​the​ state.​For​the​integrity​of​this​latter’s​authority,​and​not​only​because​it​ benefits​the​university,​it​suits​the​state​that​the​university​not​abandon​ its​learned​functions​to​engage​in​ignorant​politics.​It​suits​it​as​much,​ and​for​the​same​reason,​that​the​church​not​engage​in​politics.​And​the​ state​has​as​much​right​to​demand​from​the​two,​the​university​and​the​ church,​that​they​not​commit​such​an​outrage​against​the​state​as​that;​ because​ the​ nation​ pays​ them,​ functions​ useful​ to​ the​ nation​ are​ expected​of​them,​not​criminal​acts​against​its​sovereignty.​And​to​what​ point​is​the​political​party​of​the​university​treason​for​the​state,​what-

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ever​ party​ it​ may​ adopt,​ when​ the​ state​ pays​ to​ maintain​ the​ university​within​the​sphere​of​its​usefulness​and​autonomy;​it​is​conceived​ in​considering​the​importance​of​the​political​maneuver,​by​means​of​ which,​not​only​is​the​ruin​of​the​university​completed,​but​that​ruin​is​ also​blamed​on​the​state,​with​the​result​of​discrediting​it​and​favoring​ a​change​of​political​regime. ​ So​serious​is​this​political​aspect​of​the​question​that​one​does​not​ know​how​to​clear​up​the​confusion​that​results​from​the​state​or,​more​ appropriately,​the​secretary​of​education,​who​is​seeming​to​patronize​ and​protect​the​act​that​is​making​clear​its​purpose​in​obtaining,​along​ with​that​of​the​university,​the​ruin​and​discrediting​of​the​state.​Even​if​ this​act​attempts​only​to​commit​an​outrage​against​university​autonomy,​ without​immediate​political​ends,​the​state​ends​up,​as​we​already​saw,​ seriously​hurt​by​it.​But​perhaps​that​political​confusion​that​is​produced​ now​is​not​different​from​the​confusion​one​sees​in​some​part​of​the​ Annual Report of the Secretary of Education​of​1932,​in​the​current​programs​of​the​Department​of​Fine​Arts​of​the​same​secretary​and​in​some​ speeches​of​his​current​citizen​secretary,​in​which​generally​occurs​an​ idea​like​the​idea​of​the​university,​to​wit:​that​the​failure​of​education​is​ owed​to​the​ruling​political​regime​and​not​to​the​secretary​of​education.​ At​any​rate,​it​is​not​explainable​that,​although​the​very​ideas​of​the​secretary​are​used​for​such​a​thing,​the​secretary​has​not​noticed,​given​that​ it​seems​to​protect​and​patronize​the​university,​the​discredit​that​the​ criticism​the​university​makes​of​the​political​regime,​from​which​the​ secretary​of​education​should​not​feel​himself​separate,​is​hurled​at​it. ​ Let​us​not​be​concerned​for​now​with​clearing​up​this​political​confusion.​What​can​always​be​lamented,​as​much​from​the​point​of​view​of​ the​state​as​from​the​point​of​view​of​the​university,​is​that​the​autonomy​ of​the​university​is​being​lost.​It​does​not​matter​on​whose​part,​whether​ the​state​or​some​political​party,​that,​as​a​consequence​of​the​political​ determination​of​the​university,​the​state​might,​for​its​part,​suspend​ its​autonomy;​it​is​not​improbable​that​it​occur.​Once​the​current​citizen​ secretary​ of​ education,​ Lic.​ Bassols,2​ informed​ me​ personally​ his​ ideas​regarding​university​autonomy,​which​are​none​other​than​those​ that​permitted​Mussolini​to​silence​the​Italian​press,​to​wit:​that​the​autonomy​of​the​university​represents​a​serious​danger​for​the​university​ ​

2.​Narciso​Bassols​was​secretary​of​education​in​1931–34.​(Editor’s​note)

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and​for​the​state,​because​it​gives​the​opportunity​for​the​enemies​of​the​ citizen​secretary​of​education​to​convert​that​institution​into​their​political​rostrum.​And​as​things​are​presented,​it​is​only​very​probable​that​ the​citizen​secretary—who​is​part​of​the​government,​despite​his​fear​ and​his​political​and​public​demonstrations​to​the​contrary—might​see​ himself​compelled​to​consent​to​the​suspension​of​university​autonomy​ as​a​task​of​the​government,​although​now​not​taking​into​account​his​ personal​ideas,​but​rather​because​of​political​force​of​circumstance,​inasmuch​as,​on​this​occasion,​the​enemies​of​the​university​and​the​government​are​the​friends​of​the​citizen​secretary​and​express​nothing​but​ his​same​ideas.

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A New Clerical Politics

In​two​previous​articles​I​have​pointed​out​the​political​ depth​that​exists​in​the​official​tendency​to​impose​a​communist​dogma​ on​the​school,​a​tendency​that,​although​originating​in​the​heart​of​the​ state​itself​inasmuch​as​it​is​systematically​supported​by​the​secretary​of​ education,​who​finds​in​it​the​superior​standard​of​his​acts,​represents​ also​an​opposition​to​the​state.​In​this​political​contradiction,​which​pits​ the​state​against​the​state,​the​rivalry​of​two​politics​that​vie​for​the​government​is​manifested​only​superficially,​a​rivalry​in​which​the​communist​alleges​a​greater​right​to​possess​it​completely​given​that,​if​it​is​the​ one​with​a​most​certain​revolutionary​sense,​the​direction​of​a​state​that​ is​or​claims​to​be​revolutionary​belongs​to​it.​With​the​question​presented​in​this​way,​it​is​logical​that​a​doubt​is​produced​within​the​state,​ of​which​communist​doctrines​take​advantage​in​order​to​make​themselves​felt,​at​least​in​educational​policy,​and​that​seems​to​enjoy​an​official​favor,​which,​nonetheless,​is​very​far​from​representing​a​definitive​ inclination​to​convert​those​doctrines​into​the​standard​for​all​national​ politics.​The​state​has​a​revolutionary​origin​and​wishes​to​be​revolutionary.​It​is​natural​that,​in​the​face​of​the​political​trend​that​claims​to​govern​it​and​that​presents​itself​with​the​prestige​of​the​most​revolutionary​ trend,​the​state​might​have​numerous​reasons​for​hesitating​and​for​not​ immediately​rejecting​it;​inasmuch​as​considering​itself​a​philosophical​ doctrine​closer​to​the​field​of​education​than​its​own​field​of​politics,​it​ leaves​in​liberty,​for​the​moment,​those​other​objectives​of​politics,​dissembling​and​softening​in​this​way​its​dissenting​and​profoundly​oppositional​character. ​ But​ at​ heart,​ the​ sense​ of​ that​ opposition​ is​ very​ different​ from​ a​ struggle​between​the​revolutionary​left​and​right;​its​true​nature​corresponds​to​the​natural​opposition​between​a​romantic​outlook​and​a​real​

Original​title:​“Una​nueva​política​clerical.”​Source:​El Universal,​October​9,​1933. 509

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istic​outlook.​The​communist​trend​in​the​school,​precisely​because​it​is​ presented​in​the​school,​lacks​positive​political​significance,​lacks​true​ political​roots;​so​to​speak,​it​does​not​represent,​for​the​political​life​of​ the​country,​an​“I​want​to​be,”​but​rather​barely​the​“I​would​like​to​be”​ characteristic​of​vague​minds​detached​from​reality,​which​are​a​natural​ product​of​student​life.​But​if​the​positive​aspect​of​this​outlook​lacks​ reality​because​of​its​own​nature,​the​same​cannot​be​said​of​its​negative​ aspect,​for​the​fact​that​this​outlook​is​detached​from​reality​is​a​real​fact​ that​has​calamitous​real​consequences.​The​“I​would​like​to​be”​of​our​ student​spirits​does​not​have​a​positive​reality,​but​its​lack​of​reality​is,​in​ turn,​a​perfectly​tangible​and​dangerous​reality​because​it​does​not​represent​anything​other​than​groundless​nonconformity,​which​does​not​ consist​in​preferring​anything​different​from​what​has​been​rejected,​ but​rather​in​a​pure​rejection,​in​a​pure​nonconformism​and​a​pure​aimless​opposition. ​ This​is​the​aspect​of​the​question​that​cannot​be​disavowed,​because​ it​is​what​reveals​its​true​significance​to​the​communist​doctrines​with​ which​this​deals.​Communism​does​not​have​any​importance​at​all​here;​ it​is​only​the​pretext​or​vessel​of​the​romantic​nonconformity​of​our​ student​spirits.​What​has​real​importance,​to​explain​it,​is​the​student​ nature​of​this​oppositional​romanticism.​It​makes​clear​that​the​citizen​ secretary​of​education​is​not​dissatisfied​with​the​ruling​political​regime,​ and​for​that​reason​with​his​own​person,​because​he​is​communist;​but​ rather,​on​the​contrary,​he​is​a​communist​because​he​is​dissatisfied​with​ his​own​person​and​with​the​rest​of​the​national​politics.​The​student​ nature​of​oppositional​romanticism​explains,​in​the​same​way,​the​passionately​blind​communism​of​Lic.​Vicente​Lombardo​Toledano.1​For​if​ the​contrary​happened,​the​natural​thing​would​be​that​the​two​would​ not​ take​ their​ oppositionism​ to​ the​ school​ but​ rather​ to​ politics,​ and​ neither​the​secretary​of​education​nor​Lic.​Lombardo​Toledano​would​ accept—the​first​to​be​minister​of​the​regime​that​does​not​please​him;​ the​second​seems​to​want​to​be​a​minister. ​ I​say​that​this​oppositionist​outlook​has​been​preferred​by​the​stu​ 1.​Vicente​Lombardo​Toledano​(1894–1968)​was​a​leftist​politician​and​intellectual​ who​belonged​to​the​revolutionary​leadership​that​ruled​Mexico​after​the​revolution.​He​ was​the​founder,​in​1948,​of​the​Mexican​socialist​party,​or​Partido​Popular​Socialista.​ (Editor’s​note)

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dent​spirit​of​Mexico​for​many​years​now,​and​that​the​communism​in​ it​does​not​have​an​essential​significance.​In​effect,​everything​here​is​ in​nonconformity​with​“the​Mexican​reality,”​whose​base​is​absolutely​ religious,​as​is​the​base​of​all​nonconformity​with​reality;​its​objective​ is​only​to​be​nonconformist,​with​the​goal​of​making​felt​the​superiority​of​the​state​of​things​that​does​not​exist​over​the​existing​state​of​ things,​objective​that​is​the​foundation​of​all​clerical​politics.​It​is​easy​ to​see​that​not​just​now​with​communism,​but​rather​for​many​years,​a​ romantic​tendency​presents​itself​in​the​history​of​Mexico​to​erect​the​ school​in​the​church​of​the​state,​in​the​church​of​politics,​with​the​goal​ of​subordinating​every​kind​of​authority​to​the​authority​of​its​dogma,​ with​the​goal​of​subordinating​politicians​to​the​priests,​or​holders​of​the​ official​doctrine.​The​base​of​this​doctrine​has​its​support​in​Plato,​government​by​the​philosophers,​and​its​tradition​in​the​entire​history​of​ the​Catholic​Church.​In​its​new​form​it​could​be​called,​if​it​were​not​a​ contradiction,​scientific​clericalism.​Perhaps​its​Mexican​roots​should​be​ sought​in​Ignacio​Ramírez,​who​could​not​distinguish​between​a​clear​ critical​spirit​and​a​confused​romantic​soul.​Perhaps​its​first​ecclesiastical​ experience​presents​itself​with​Gabino​Barreda​and​his​positivist​religion.​But​until​José​Vasconcelos,2​this​new​clericalism​did​not​have​the​ threatening​proportions​it​has​had​since. ​ Someday​ we​ will​ analyze​ more​ thoroughly​ the​ responsibility​ that​ falls​to​José​Vasconcelos,​which​is​so​great​that​it​merits​a​special​chapter;​ let​it​be​sufficient​for​us​now​to​observe,​in​order​to​have​an​approximate​ idea​of​it,​that​his​cronies​in​the​clericalization​of​revolutionary​politics​ are​nothing​but​his​servile​imitators​without​the​least​personality.​The​ use​of​Marx​and​the​communist​doctrines,​in​this​respect,​is​certainly​ subsequent​to​Vasconcelos​and​foreign​to​him,​but​we​now​see​that​in​ this​clerical​movement​what​has​least​importance​is​the​internal​foundation​of​the​doctrine;​the​only​thing​that​has​a​real​importance​is​the​will​ that​the​school​have​an​ecclesiastical​function​with​respect​to​politics,​ or​that​it​be​the​source,​as​one​is​accustomed​to​say,​of​“the​revolution​ 2.​José​Vasconcelos​(1882–1959)​was​a​philosopher,​teacher,​and​politician​who​served​ as​minister​of​education​in​the​early​revolutionary​governments.​He​sought​to​enlighten​ Mexican​society​by​reprinting​the​basic​works​of​Western​civilization​and​distributing​ them​in​the​remotest​parts​of​the​country.​He​was​the​author​of​a​very​influential​book,​ La raza cósmica​(The Cosmic Race)​(1925).​(Editor’s​note)

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ary​ideology,”​with​no​other​objective​than​making​the​revolutionaries​ the​unreflective​blind​and​obedient​arms​of​a​holy​father,​whose​identity​is​not​yet​known:​the​secretary​of​education,​the​rector​of​the​university,​or​the​director​of​the​preparatory​school.​Without​a​doubt​that​ would​have​been​Vasconcelos​if​he​had​not​preferred​to​pursue​a​personal​adventure,3​as​generally​happens​with​all​mystical​temperaments​ to​a​great​degree,​and​constituting,​with​respect​to​the​church​founded​ on​his​word​and​on​his​example,​a​prenatal​and​admirable​heresy. ​ But​whatever​might​be​the​fascinating​personal​destiny​of​Vasconcelos,​his​influence​in​Mexican​politics​and​primarily​in​the​politics​of​ education​has​not​ceased​to​be​ever​deeper​and​ever​more​nefarious.​It​ does​not​matter​that​he​condemns​it​and​that​he​does​not​recognize​himself​reflected,​as​now​no​one​could​recognize​him,​in​the​miserable​student​products​of​his​truly​demonic​thought.​It​is​during​the​passage​of​ Vasconcelos​through​the​Secretariat​of​Public​Education​when​this​new​ clerical​politics​reaches​full​awareness​of​itself.​Since​then​the​school​ assumes​the​Platonic​function​of​giving​birth​to​a​perfect​state​based​ in​wisdom​and​virtue,​nourished​by​science​and​philosophy,​but​with​ no​other​objective​than​being​the​motive​for​showing​itself​in​nonconformity​with​the​imperfect​states​we​contemplate,​and​whose​ideal​also​ has​the​undeniable​advantage,​for​the​secretaries​of​education​who​worship​it,​of​making​the​school​and​the​secretaries​of​education​forget​the​ most​tangible​and​immediate​commitment​to​convert​it​into​a​better​ school,​because​it​seems​that​this​better​world​admits​of​being​it,​even​ if​the​schools​have​become​worse​by​then.​Rural​schools,​cultural​missions,​the​university​for​the​people,​the​university​ideology​of​the​Revolution,​the​propaganda​art,​the​civilizing​function​of​art,​the​redemption​ of​the​Indians,​“For​My​Race​the​Spirit​Will​Speak,”4​etc.,​all​these​Vasconcelist​notions​contain​nothing​but​religious​aspirations,​which,​if​in​ Vasconcelos​they​could​respond​to​a​mystical​sentiment,​in​his​cronies​ are​nothing​but​a​will​to​take​over​political​consciousness​by​means​of​ the​school.​On​the​base​of​student​thinking​following​Vasconcelos​lies​ ​ 3.​As​a​presidential​candidate,​Vasconcelos​opposed​Pascual​Ortíz​Rubio,​the​official​ candidate​of​the​president,​Plutarco​Elías​Calles,​in​1929.​He​lost​but​later​claimed​that​ the​election​was​rigged.​(Editor’s​note) ​ 4.​This​is​the​motto,​given​by​Vasconcelos,​of​the​National​University​of​Mexico.​ (Editor’s​note)

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nothing​but​this​ecclesiastical​ambition,​which​is​the​same​that​today,​ through​Lic.​Narciso​Bassols,​current​secretary​of​education,​compromises​the​school​in​the​official​adoption​of​a​political-​religious​faith— the​communist—whose​nature​since​its​origin​has​been​to​join​with​a​ false​philosophical​prestige.

3 ​

Crisis of the Revolution

A​notable​change​has​taken​place​in​Mexican​political​ thinking​with​respect​to​the​epoch​immediately​following​pacification​ of​the​Republic.​Then,​the​political​horizon​was​much​more​expansive​ than​now;​the​future​was​rich​in​prospects,​and​the​activity​that​flourished​in​politics​was​that​of​the​imagination.​Today​exactly​the​opposite​ happens;​the​political​horizon​is​narrow​and​shallow;​the​future​is​fashioned​after​a​simple​outline​of​an​unchanging​prospect,​and​the​most​ prized​action​is​the​faithful​observation​of​the​facts.​The​prior​epoch​ gravitated​toward​the​future​and​was​freer;​the​present​epoch​begins​ to​gravitate​toward​the​past,​linked​together.​The​reign​of​facts​has​succeeded​the​reign​of​acts.​To​be​successful​today​in​public​life,​a​good​ memory​and​no​imagination​are​necessary.​That​is​to​say,​the​young​have​ few​opportunities,​for​youth​has​almost​nothing​to​remember. ​ This​ disheartening​ phenomenon​ is​ not​ exclusively​ Mexican;​ the​ world​has​aged​uniformly;​everywhere​one​perceives​an​equal​fear​of​ events​and​the​desire​to​determine​them​beforehand.​Fathers​take​charge​ of​the​future​of​their​sons​and​rob​them​of​the​right​to​create​and​govern​ their​own​destiny.​Political​programs​and​doctrines​have​the​tone​and​ gravity​of​wills.​Everything​is​an​absolute​and​zealous​determination​of​ tomorrow​so​as​to​prohibit​it​from​being​in​any​way​different​from​the​ way​it​is​thought​it​should​be​from​now​on.​The​idea​of​changing​ideas​is​ detested;​one​has​horror​of​imagination,​and​there​is​something​like​the​ proposal​to​suspend​the​advance​of​thought,​which​is​unpredictable​and​ full​of​surprises.​The​words​that​enjoy​the​favor​of​the​world​are​“dictatorship,”​“control,”​and​“plan,”​the​three​signifying​testament​or​last​ will.​On​the​other​side,​liberal​ideas​no​longer​know​where​to​hide​the​ embarrassment​of​their​loss​of​prestige. ​ It​would​be​interesting​to​determine​the​causes​of​this​phenomenon,​ ​ 514

Original​title:​“Crisis​de​la​revolución.”​Source:​El Universal,​June​25,​1934.

CriSiS​of​the​revolution : 515

which,​fortunately,​is​exclusive​to​politics​and​has​no​parallel​in​other​ aspects​of​social​activity.​For​example,​in​science​the​opposite​happens.​ An​even​greater​liberalism​has​succeeded​the​scientific​dogmatism​of​ the​past​century,​so​that​it​can​be​said​that,​in​actuality,​the​objective​of​ scientific​thought​is​not​to​establish​its​conclusions​in​a​definite​way​in​ order​to​determine​by​them​future​thought,​but​rather​to​grant​to​this​ thought​the​greatest​liberty​possible,​allowing​it​to​be​established​on​ its​own​experimental​proofs​and​to​get​rid​of​historical​chains.​In​contemporary​art,​as​long​as​it​is​not​mixed​with​politics,​a​similar​liberty​ is​observed.​In​philosophy​also,​as​long​as​politics​does​not​confuse​it,​ a​radicalism​is​observed​that​has​not​had​its​equal​in​the​history​of​the​ world.​Thus,​then,​political​dogmatism​is​presented​as​an​isolated​product,​although​the​most​voluminous​in​modern​culture.​In​other​words,​ politics​seems​to​have​been​detached​from​the​progress​of​the​culture​ and,​for​many​years,​to​have​lagged​behind.​Many​social​and​psychological​reasons​influence​this​universal​depravity​of​politics,​but​surely​all​ can​be​expressed​as​a​deficiency​of​selection.​Art,​science,​and​philosophy​are​the​products​of​select​minorities,​laboriously​cultivated.​Politics,​ on​the​contrary,​is​the​product​of​improvisation,​of​vanity,1​and​of​violence,​and​from​this​comes​its​intellectual​inferiority;​from​this​comes​ its​dogmatic​and​arrogant​character;​from​this​comes​its​repugnance​for​ liberty;​from​this​its​fear​that​the​future​might​reveal​its​inability​and​ destroy​its​feeble​structures;​from​here​the​fever​for​“controlling,”​for​ “planning,”​for​“rationalizing,”​for​strengthening,​finally,​from​now​on,​ the​edifices​that​it​raises​and​that,​abandoned​to​themselves,​would​inevitably​collapse,​owing​to​their​lack​of​roots​in​the​consciousness​of​ society. ​ Returning​ to​ Mexico,​ it​ is​ interesting​ to​ note​ that​ the​ change​ has​ taken​place​in​a​few​years,​giving​it​the​strange​spectacle​that​the​generation​that​was​liberal​in​1917​appears​today​to​be​converted​into​a​dogmatic​one,​so​that​in​1934​it​seems​to​begin​to​obtain​as​political​fruit​ precisely​everything​contrary​to​what​it​was​proposing​in​1917.​But​the​ heart​of​the​phenomenon​is​even​more​surprising​in​that​it​consists​of​ the​ gradual​ penetration​ the​ lamentable​ products​ of​ depraved​ universal​politics​have​made​in​Mexican​politics,​a​penetration​that​has​taken​ ​ 1.​The​Mexican​revolutionaries​convened​a​constituent​congress​in​1916,​and​a​new​ constitution​was​enacted​in​1917.​(Editor’s​note)

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place​across​the​succeeding​generations,​corrupted​by​the​ease​they​have​ found,​thanks​to​the​political​doctrines​in​fashion,​in​eluding​the​responsibility​of​constructing​the​authentic​national​destiny​to​which​the​ Revolution​aspired. ​ The​ political​ thinking​ of​ 1917​ knew​ what​ it​ wanted;​ it​ had​ a​ profound​awareness​of​its​responsibility;​it​had​been​matured​over​a​long​ and​painful​reflection​in​the​midst​of​an​intense​struggle​that​compelled​ it​each​day​to​justify​and​strengthen​itself;​it​was​a​thought​prepared​to​ confront​ the​ most​ dangerous​ and​unexpected​ experiences​ and​ to​ become​enriched​by​them.​From​here​it​comes​that,​with​the​pacification​ of​the​country,​the​political​horizon​was​broad​and​full​of​incitements.​ Youth​never​had​a​more​admirable​opportunity.​They​counted​on​it.​The​ creation​and​enhancement​of​their​future​was​placed​in​their​hands. ​ But​in​vain​the​young​people​had​unlimited​access​to​power.​Youth​ did​not​find,​in​that​marvelous​liberty​the​Revolution​had​so​painfully​ won​for​it,​anything​but​an​authorization​to​improvise​and​satisfy​its​ vanity​easily.​To​the​profound​and​sincere​revolutionary​intuition​a​false,​ vain,​and​fatuous​action​was​returned,​more​prepared​to​benefit​from​ the​triumph​of​the​Revolution​than​to​make​itself​worthy​of​it.​But​the​ most​disastrous​consequence​is​that,​in​order​to​hide​its​inability​and​ its​failure,​this​action​has​blamed​the​liberty​itself​that​it​did​not​know​ how​to​use,​but​rather​to​corrupt​it,​claiming​immediately​that,​because​ liberty​is​corrupted,​the​inability​and​failure​have​been​from​the​Revolution​because​it​became​attached​to​a​liberal​Constitution. ​ It​is​not​necessary​to​seek​another​purpose​in​the​antiliberalism​that​ currently​flourishes​in​Mexico​than​that​of​excusing​a​political​action​ that​has​not​been​able​to​rise​to​the​height​of​its​responsibility.​If​in​the​ contemporary​prosperity​of​the​antiliberal​political​doctrines​it​seems​ to​find​a​justification​and​even​an​opportunity​to​ennoble​itself,​presenting​ itself​ as​ the​ most​ advanced​ tendency​ like​ the​doctrine​ of​the​ “present​moment,”​it​is​not​impossible​to​perceive​that​the​antiliberalism​of​other​nations​is​satisfying​the​same​end​of​hiding​and​justifying​a​ similar​moral​incapacity.​For,​the​absolutely​contrary​direction​contemporary​thought​in​science,​art,​and​philosophy​follows​is​showing​what​ is,​when​not​subject​to​violence​that​disfigures​it,​the​true​sentiment​of​ advanced​ideas.​And​in​any​place​where​political​antiliberalism​preponderates,​ the​ intellectual​ divorce​ is​ observed​ between​ politics​ and​ the​

CriSiS​of​the​revolution : 517

superior​culture​that​has​taken​hold​in​Mexico,​with​the​thought​of​university​instruction​getting​out​of​touch​critically​with​politics. ​ The​current​situation​of​Mexican​political​thought​is​clear;​constitutional​liberalism​is​dangerously​threatened​by​this​passionate​dogmatic​ attitude​of​recent​origin.​This​situation​has​been​created​and​is​maintained​in​the​shadow​of​an​intellectual​confusion​that​allows​any​new​ liberal​trend​and​the​constitution​of​’17​to​be​considered​reactionary,​ and​the​acts​that​reflect​indiscriminately​the​priesthood​of​Stalin,​the​ priesthood​of​Hitler,​or​the​priesthood​of​Mussolini​as​revolutionary​ and​advanced.​Nonetheless,​it​is​not​daring​to​declare​that​Mexican​liberalism​will​have​to​survive​the​confusion​that​endangers​the​authentic​ radical​aspirations​of​the​nation,​which​have​made​imperative​that​the​ Revolution​be​considered​the​legitimate​continuation​of​the​Reform​and​ that​it​not​be​confused​with​the​backward​motion​of​politics​toward​unreflecting,​sentimental,​and​primary​forms.

antonio caso Antonio​ Caso​ (1883–1946),​ born​ in​ Mexico​ City,​ was​ a​ philosopher​and​university​professor.​As​a​young​man​he​became​ dissatisfied​with​the​prevailing​philosophical​ideas​of​his​time.​ Indeed,​during​the​first​decade​of​the​twentieth​century​positivism​was​the​official​doctrine​supported​by​the​minister​of​education,​Justo​Sierra. ​ Caso​ joined​ like-​minded​ luminaries​ such​ as​ José​ Vasconcelos,​Alfonso​Reyes,​and​Pedro​Henríquez​Ureña​and​in​1909​ founded​ a​ literary​ club​ called​ El​ Ateneo​ de​ la​ Juventud.​ The​ group​criticized​positivism​and​developed​a​philosophy​based​ on​intuition​and​emotion​that​was​influenced​by​the​thinking​ of​Henri​Bergson. ​ Caso​ was​ president​ of​ the​ National​ University​ between​ 1920​and​1923.​In​the​1930s​he​vigorously​opposed​the​project​ of​adopting​socialism​as​the​official​doctrine​of​the​university​ and​debated​the​key​proponent​of​this​idea,​Vicente​Lombardo​ Toledano.​Caso​defended​the​role​of​the​university​as​an​institution​devoted​to​the​pursuit​of​truth​and​knowledge​through​ research​and​teaching.​He​argued​that​teachers​should​be​free​to​ teach​what​they​considered​to​be​true​and​relevant.​Liberty​was​ required​to​sustain​the​quest​for​truth​and​knowledge.​Around​ that​time​Caso​also​wrote​on​socialism​and​fascism​and​on​the​ challenges​these​doctrines​posed​to​the​“human​person.” ​ We​present​a​selection​from​his​essay​La persona humana y el estado totalitario,​from​the​1940s.

518

Consciousness of Liberty 1.​the​attributeS​of​the​Century Our​epoch,​which​begins​with​the​war​of​the​nations,​ possesses​ attributes​ that​ differentiate​ and​ characterize​ it.​ The​ great​ industrial​development,​like​the​scientific​unfolding,​does​not​constitute,​ certainly,​ an​ exclusive​ attribute​ of​ the​ period​ of​ human​ history​ to​which​we​refer,​because​during​the​entire​nineteenth​century,​the​ apogee​of​science​and​industry—its​immediate​corollary—was​already​ brought​about​as​a​characteristic​element​of​this​other​period​of​history. ​ Nevertheless,​the​development​of​the​physical​sciences​has​continued​ in​our​time,​manifesting​itself​in​the​elaboration​of​the​electric​theory​of​ matter.​The​great​hypotheses​of​physics​have​expanded​the​complexity​ of​scientific​knowledge​in​such​a​way​that​it​is​a​problem​today​for​the​ middle​level​of​instruction,​the​pedagogy​of​modern​physics.​How​to​ make​young​minds,​necessarily​lacking​in​higher​mathematical​culture,​ understand​the​hypothesis​of​physicists​about​the​constitution​of​matter?​.​.​.​The​discovery​of​radium​began​the​forward​movement​of​the​ development​of​contemporary​thinking​with​respect​to​the​structure​of​ the​atom.​In​reality,​just​as​the​cell​changes​into​a​very​complex​organism​ for​those​who​study​biology,​the​atom​is​converted​into​a​solar​system​ for​those​who​investigate​the​structure​of​the​universe. ​ The​ great​ names​ of​ Einstein​ and​ Planck​ dominate​ the​ theories​ of​ modern​physics,​and​one​comes​to​think​about​a​certain​indeterminacy​ that​rests​at​the​base​of​reality,​so​that​scientific​laws​would​mean​only​“a​ limitation​of​possibilities”​according​to​the​perfect​expression​of​Mach​ in​his​book​on​scientific​knowledge.1 ​ Original​title:​“Conciencia​de​la​libertad.”​Source:​Antonio​Caso,​La persona humana y el estado totalitario​(Mexico:​unam,​1941). ​ 1.​Ernst​Mach​(1838–1916)​was​an​Austrian​physicist​and​a​philosopher​of​science.​ (Editor’s​note)​ 519

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​ Dr.​Carrel​makes​note,​in​agreement​with​the​opinion​of​many​other​ scientists,​of​the​lack​of​proportion​that​occurs​between​the​progress​ of​the​physical​sciences​and​that​of​the​biological​and​moral​sciences.​ Tolstoy​already​declared​that​“modern​man​resembles​a​child​who​plays​ with​ dangerous​ toys​ of​ nitroglycerin.”​ In​past​ epochs,​ man​ made​ use​ only​of​animal​energy​and​some​of​the​physical​forces​to​put​machines​ into​motion.​Today​he​has​managed​to​make​use​not​only​of​heat​and​ electricity,​ but​ also,​ breaking​ down​ matter​ into​ its​ atomic​ elements,​ makes​use​of​fabulous​energies​that​he​will​be​able​to​use​someday,​without​doubt,​to​economize​on​his​effort,​achieving​fantastic​results.​Therefore,​one​of​the​differentiating​attributes​of​our​century​is​the​incomparable​development​of​the​physical​sciences. ​ What​can​such​an​extraordinary​apogee​of​science​signify​in​the​advance​of​the​culture?​.​.​.​Science​is​the​final​fruit​in​the​development​ cycle​of​cultures.​Scientific​knowledge​prospered​in​Greece,​not​in​the​ classical​epoch,​but​rather​in​the​days​of​Hellenism​and​Alexandrianism.​ From​the​Museum​of​Alexandria​sprang​the​scientific​movement​of​antiquity.​When​for​centuries​letters​and​history​had​already​flourished,​ science​inaugurated​its​splendor.​This​indicates​that​the​great​epochs​of​ scientific​development​do​not​correspond​to​the​creative​moments​of​ humanity,​but​rather​to​the​twilight​instants​of​decline.​Alexandria​was​ the​magnificent​evening​twilight​of​Greek​culture. ​ Philosophy​also​achieves​in​our​time​an​admirable​development,​and​ this​only​confirms​the​thesis​of​decline.​Because​to​philosophize​is​a​type​ of​reflection​at​the​second​level,​a​reflection​on​reflections,​a​universal​ meditation​on​the​world​and​the​I​already​explored​in​other​branches​of​ the​culture.​The​philosopher​is​also​a​late​fruit.​The​values​he​creates​can​ produce​only​after​human​meditation​has​been​exercised​directly​on​life​ and​history.​Socrates,​Plato,​and​Aristotle​are​for​Nietzsche​symptoms​of​ decadence.​After​the​great​Greek​century​of​drama​and​politics,​the​great​ Aristotelian​synthesis​appears,​coinciding​with​the​life​of​Alexander. ​ Great​ philosophers,​ comparable​ to​ the​ most​ distinguished​ names​ of​human​thought,​are​Bergson,​Husserl,​and​Scheler.​Bergsonianism​ and​phenomenology​coincide​with​Einstein​and​the​theory​of​relativity.​ Therefore,​ at​ the​ apogee​ of​ philosophical​ development​ can​ be​ seen,​ sometimes,​ another​ symptom​ of​ the​ great​ twilight​ of​ the​ European​ culture.​There​are​neither​great​lyric​nor​dramatic​poets,​nor​brilliant​

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artists​like​those​that​other​centuries​begat.​What​certainly​exists​and​ honors​our​century​is​the​philosophical​and​scientific​meditation,​undeniable​differentiating​attribute​of​our​age. ​ Finally,​politics,​unquestionably​renewed,​brands​contemporary​life​ with​its​creation.​Two​great​struggles​are​begun​between​democracy​and​ the​totalitarian​state,​just​as​between​the​two​types​of​totalitarian​states.​ The​ state,​ the​ privileged​ community​ par​ excellence,​ tends​ to​ include​ social​life​in​its​fullness.​The​old​liberal​individualism​is​moving​away​ from​the​European​political​constitutions;​the​rights​of​man,​which​the​ French​Revolution​consecrated,​are​disrespected​today​by​many​theories​ of​law​and​of​the​state.​It​has​come​to​be​declared​that​the​world​initiates​ in​its​advance​the​episodes​of​“a​new​Middle​Age.”​And​the​conflict​is​ not​only​between​democracy​and​the​totalitarian​state,​but​also​the​discussion​between​the​Russian​and​German​regimes,​between​racism​and​ classism. ​ A​student​of​political​science​or​of​constitutional​law​of​the​past​century​who​attended​seminars​on​contemporary​politics​would​see​denied​ all​the​fundamentals​of​the​science​he​learned.​The​individual​was​conceived​then​as​the​final​end​of​civil​organization.​It​was​said:​the​state​ exists​for​the​individual,​to​sanction​the​rights​of​man.​Today​it​is​said:​ the​individual​is​only​an​element​in​the​hands​of​the​state.​The​“transmutation​of​values”​tends​to​be​completed. ​ How​not​to​see​in​the​contemporary​political​vicissitudes​one​of​the​ distinctive​ attributes​ of​ our​ time?​ .​ .​ .​ Science​ and​ industry—its​ immediate​corollary—again​organize​people​in​large​groups​around​the​ machines.​Architecture,​which​makes​use​of​new​industrial​resources,​is,​ perhaps,​among​the​liberal​arts,​the​only​one​that​stands​out,​being​able​ to​exercise​its​aesthetic​creation​in​magnificent​constructions​that​bring​ to​mind​the​days​of​Babylon​or​Memphis.​Great​masses​woven​of​iron​ that​climb​to​the​sky,​formidable​structures​whose​vertebrae​machines​ forge,​the​incomparably​more​powerful​Cyclops​of​our​industrial​and​ scientific​mythology! ​ The​world​is​transformed​into​an​accelerated​political​and​economic​ rhythm​whose​movement​marks​the​hour​we​arrived,​in​the​haste​of​our​ life,​constantly​agitated​and​complex,​and​the​anguish​of​our​heart,​suffering​with​the​perpetual​outbreak​of​war​and​the​urgent,​formidable​ social​revolution.

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2.​kant A​singular​rhythm​ guides​ the​forward​ movement​ of​philosophy,​ that​ is​ to​ say,​ of​ independent​ thought.​ The​ great​ critical​ thinker​ appears​ first,​who​proved​to​be​the​teacher​and​founder​of​a​large​and​illustrious​ philosophical​tradition;​afterward​the​brilliant​metaphysician​who​organizes​into​a​vast​synthesis​the​metaphysical​idea;​and,​finally,​the​great​ encyclopedist,​who,​in​harvesting​the​fruits​of​his​precursors,​organizes​ knowledge​and​effects​in​his​work​a​universal​definition​of​the​type​of​ a​culture. ​ Greek​philosophy​before​Socrates​was,​perhaps,​the​preferred​period​ of​ speculative​ creation.​ Parmenides,​ Heraclitus,​ Pythagoras,​ Democritus,​ Empedocles,​ and​ Anaxagoras​ created​ the​ cosmological​ ideas​ of​ thinking​humanity.​It​seems​that​in​those​remote​days,​the​Greek​genius​ contributed​to​the​coming​centuries​all​the​ideas​that​afterward​were​ discussed​and​appreciated​with​the​effort​of​the​generations. ​ Socrates​refined​the​critical​spirit​of​his​race;​he​ordered​the​systematic​dialectic​and​created​ethics​as​a​discipline​independent​of​religion.​ His​fine​and​classical​irony,​his​supreme​art​of​“midwife​of​souls,”​taught​ the​fundamentals​of​morality​independent​of​the​will​of​the​gods.​For​ this​reason,​without​hyperbole,​Aristotle​could​call​him​“the​founder​of​ moral​science,”​distinguished​title​among​all​philosophical​titles! ​ Plato​is​the​philosopher​of​the​ideational​act,​the​brilliant​metaphysician​of​the​Socratic​cycle:​“What​is​inherent​in​man​is​to​understand​the​ general,​that​is​to​say,​the​rational​unity​in​the​scattered​multiplicity​of​the​ sensible.”​But​this​is​the​memory​of​what​our​soul​beheld​in​its​journey​ in​pursuit​of​God,​when,​treating​disdainfully​what​is​improperly​called​ reality,​it​elevates​its​awareness​to​what​in​itself​is​true.​“When​man​sees​ beauty​on​the​earth​(says​the​philosopher​in​Phaedrus)​he​remembers​true​ beauty,​takes​wing,​and​burns​with​the​desire​to​fly​toward​it.” ​ Perhaps​the​title​of​the​most​profound​intelligence​of​the​evolution​of​ thought​should​be​reserved​for​Plato.​His​work​is​one​of​the​keystones​ of​Western​civilization.​Champion​of​philosophical​paganism​and​precursor​of​Christianity,​“Father​of​the​Fathers​of​the​Church.”​After​the​ great​critic​(Socrates),​the​great​metaphysical​creator​(Plato),​arises​the​ encyclopedist​Aristotle.​He​grounds​the​Platonic​ideas​in​life​and​experience.​ The​ world​ of​ Plato​ was​ divine.​ The​ Stagirite​ conserved​ for​ him​his​august​divinity​but​brought​him​nearer​to​earth.​The​idea​became​form,​and​only​through​abstraction​could​it​be​separated​from​mat-

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ter.​The​Aristotelian​encyclopedia​summed​up​the​teaching​of​Greece.​ Hereafter,​stoics,​epicureans,​and​skeptics​will​distribute​the​immortal​ inheritance,​as​the​lieutenants​of​Alexander​his​ephemeral​empire. ​ In​modern​times​the​rhythm​of​ancient​philosophy​is​repeated.​Descartes​is​the​first​modern​philosopher.​He​inverted​the​ends​of​human​ certitude.​He​made​of​the​I​the​origin​of​philosophy:​I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am.​France—said​Hegel​to​Cousin—did​enough​for​ philosophy​ in​ giving​ it​ Descartes.​ Never​ before​ had​ skepticism​ been​ vanquished.​Greek​thought​in​the​end​asserted​its​topics.​According​to​ Descartes,​ doubt​ affirms​ something​ over​ all​ dubitability.​ Even​ today,​ the​beginning​point​of​phenomenology​is​the​Cartesian​ego cogitans,​and​ Husserl​calls​his​own​system​neo-​Cartesianism. ​ After​ the​ great​ critical​ thinker,​ the​ great​ independent​ metaphysicians,​Spinoza​and​Malebranche.​They​are​the​Platonic​philosophers​of​ the​Cartesian​cycle.​The​saintly​Benedict​Spinoza,​intellectual​lover​of​ God,​is​the​pride​of​the​modern​world.​The​systematic​pantheism​of​the​ Ethics​is​still,​today,​one​of​the​limiting​points​of​speculation.​Parmenides​revived​in​the​seventeenth​century​of​the​Christian​era!​.​.​. ​ Leibniz​represents​the​recovery​of​spiritual​individuality​before​the​ vast​synthesis​of​pantheistic​and​Cartesian​rationalism.​His​work​initiates​all​the​contemporary​psychological​and​metaphysical​ideas:​evolution,​the​subconscious,​the​ideality​of​time​and​space​.​.​.​He​is​the​Aristotle,​the​encyclopedist,​of​the​Cartesian​cycle. ​ And​ when​ another​ great​ rectifier​ of​ intelligence​ appeared​ in​ the​ eighteenth​century,​his​Critique of Pure Reason​came​back​to​repeat​the​ Cartesian​position,​making​it​more​profound,​modifying​it,​strengthening​it.​In​the​evolution​of​ideas​exist,​in​our​opinion,​three​calm​and​ self-​sacrificing​founders:​Socrates,​Descartes,​and​Kant.​They​represent​ the​three​moments​of​development​of​an​immortal​idea—to​wit,​that​ the​genuine​certitude,​the​positive​seat​of​the​human​sciences,​cannot​ come​from​outside​consciousness,​but​rather​must​be​extracted​from​the​ depths​of​our​moral​being.​The​oracle​at​Delphi​said​it​already,​“Know​ thyself.”​The​words​of​the​oracle​of​Apollo​produced​in​the​course​of​the​ centuries​three​fixed​stars​of​the​mind:​the​Greek,​that​is​to​say,​Socrates;​the​French,​that​is​to​say,​Descartes;​and​the​German,​under​whose​ immediate​light​we​live,​Kant. ​ Why​is​Kant​great?​.​.​.​Because,​to​the​three​great​fundamental​questions​that​intelligence​posed​and​that​constitute​philosophy,​he​gave​an​

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original​response.​What​is​knowledge?—human​curiosity​inquired— and​Kant​answered:​“A​synthetic​a​priori​judgment.”​To​know​is​to​synthesize​the​forms​of​reason​with​the​matter​that​experience​provides.​ The​judgments​that​extend​and​perfect​knowledge​are​those​in​which​ the​ predicate​ is​ not​ yet​ implicit​ in​ the​subject.​ Nonetheless,​ they​are​ formulated​for​what​has​still​not​occurred,​with​as​much​certitude​as​ if​it​were​before​the​facts​that​were​to​come.​All​science​is​a​synthesis​ of​knowledge,​of​synthetic​a​priori​judgments.​Philosophy​also​asked,​ What​is​beauty?​And​Kant,​founder​of​aesthetics,​answered:​A​“finality​ without​an​end,”​a​necessary​and​universal​disinterestedness.​The​difference​that​exists​among​the​useful,​the​good,​and​the​beautiful​rests​on​ the​fact​that​the​useful​and​the​good​are​desired​for​the​good​they​cause,​ while​the​beautiful​is​sought​for​itself.​The​beautiful​is​disinterested;​it​ signifies​a​repose​amidst​the​eagerness​of​desire.​This​subtle​cloudscape​ that​we​could​not​reach​is​as​beautiful​as​the​slight​wave​that​rises​to​kiss​ the​beach​and​dies​at​our​feet!​The​soul​stops​wanting​and​desiring​when​ the​eye​or​the​ear​sees​to​contemplate​or​listens​to​hear. ​ Philosophy​proposes​another​inquiry​as​well,​the​most​difficult​and​ frightening​of​all:​What​is​duty?​And​Kant​teaches:​a​categorical​imperative,​that​is​to​say,​an​unconditional​but​absolute​command,​the​only​ absolute​command.​It​is​therefore​the​only​categorical​imperative.​But duty postulates liberty. Only for free beings does it have meaning. The will is autonomous in doing good, heteronymous in doing evil. As we have to be good, we are free. God is the kingdom of the moral ends that duty imposes. ​ In​his​Critique of Judgment​Kant​says​that​three​attributes​distinguish​ the​philosopher:​“to​think​for​himself,​finding​out​what​others​think,​ without​ incurring​ contradiction.”​ The​ first​ is​ characteristic​ for​ original​and​free​spirits.​Kant​was​a​free​and​original​spirit.​The​second​corresponds​ to​ the​ far-​reaching​ spirits.​ Kant​ was​ a​ distinguished​ spirit​ of​breadth.​The​third​is​the​work​of​congruent​spirits.​Few​men​have​ thought​with​greater​congruence​than​the​author​of​the​Critique of Pure Reason!​Moreover,​ the​cosmogonic​ hypothesis​ that​Laplace​conceived​ mathematically​today​carries​a​doubly​glorious​name:​Kant-​Laplace.​Is​ it​possible​to​give​greater​praise​to​a​philosopher?​.​.​.

3.​German​idealiSm Again,​the​rhythm​of​independent​philosophical​thought​is​repeated​in​ the​development​of​the​Kantian​cycle.​To​seek,​like​Socrates,​like​Des-

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cartes,​like​Kant,​in​the​knowledge​of​oneself​the​unquestionable​foundation​of​a​first​truth​leads​necessarily​to​spiritualism​or​idealism.​Socrates,​Descartes,​and​Husserl​are​spiritualists.​Kant​arrives,​resolutely,​at​ an​idealist​position.​Socrates​did​not​believe​one​could​have​firm​knowledge​of​something​in​the​world.​He​had,​on​the​other​hand,​full​faith​ in​the​knowledge​of​the​spirit.​Descartes​leaves​the​solipsism​that​cogito ergo sum​imposes,​thanks​to​the​ontological​argument:​existence​is​a​necessary​attribute​of​the​perfect​being.​Kant,​who​rejects​the​ontological​ proof,​reduces​to​the​“thing​in​itself ”​that​which​is​heterogeneous​to​the​ spirit;​but​he​insinuates​that​this​X,​this​unknown,​could​very​well​be​ found​in​one’s​own​unexplored​consciousness. ​ His​successors,​the​great​idealist​metaphysicians.​Fichte​and​Schelling,​ more​intrepid​even​than​the​great​critic​of​Königsberg​(or​less​circumspect),​address​the​“thing​in​itself,”​the​impenetrable​unknown,​by​reducing​ it​ to​ the​ position​ that​ defines​ idealism.​ Hegel,​ the​ encyclopedist,​the​Aristotle​of​the​idealist​direction​inaugurated​by​Kant,​sustains​ absolute​ idealism,​the​immanence​ of​the​universe​ in​the​idea​“everything​real​is​rational.” ​ Kant​had​declared​that​“the​mysterious​unknown​that​hides​behind​ the​sensible​phenomena​could​very​well​be​one’s​own​unknown​that​resides​in​ourselves.”​According​to​the​great​philosopher,​pure​reason​creates​space​and​time,​and​in​applying​to​the​phenomena​the​categories​of​ the​relationship,​it​unites​them​with​the​nexus​of​causation.​Reason​is​ the​legislator​of​nature.​And​from​reason​arise​the​ideas​of​cosmos​and​ God. ​ If​the​“thing​in​itself,”​if​the​unknown,​is​not​a​reality,​if​it​cannot​be​ conceived,​it​is​nothing,​or​properly​is,​like​space,​time,​the​categories,​ and​God​itself,​something​identified​with​the​subject​of​knowledge. ​ From​ this​ arises​ the​ philosophy​ of​ identity;​ first​ Fichte​ and​ then​ Schelling.​The​supreme​principle​of​Fichte​is​the​I.​To​philosophize​is​ to​be​convinced​that​pure​being​is​nothing.​The​ought-​to-​be​is​everything.​Knowledge is the creation of the I.​The​I​produces​or​“creates”​the​ truth.​“Theoretical​reason,”—says​Weber,​commenting​on​Fichte,—“is​ the​means​or​the​agent​from​which​practical​reason​is​served​in​order​ to​realize​the​ideal.”​The​apotheosis​of​morality,​of​the​ought-​to-​be,​of​ the​will​to​good,​makes​the​idealism​of​Fichte​one​of​the​most​original​ and​noble​philosophical​ideas​of​all​time.​Kant​himself​had​already​insinuated​the​superior​dignity​of​the​ought-​to-​be​over​being,​in​harmony​

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with​the​moral​consciousness​of​the​human​genus.​The​moral​idealism​of​ Fichte​burst​forth​as​a​direct​consequence​of​both​critiques​of​pure reason​ and​of​practical reason. ​ Schelling​reaches​the​apex​of​the​system​of​identity​in​his​transcendental idealism.​The​life​of​the​culture​contains​three​supreme​moments.​ Through​science​we​intuit​the​absolute;​through​art​we​see​the​absolute​ manifest​in​individuality;​in​religion​the​spirit​is​transformed​into​absolute​reality.​Nature​and​culture:​“Everything​is​one​and​the​same.”​History​is​an​epic​poem​in​accordance​with​the​spirit​of​God.​It​offers​two​ principal​parts:​one​represents​the​distancing​from​humanity,​from​its​ center​until​touching​the​extreme​limit;​the​other​represents​the​return​ to​the​primordial​center.​One​is​a​type​of​Iliad,​the​other​the​Odyssey.​In​ the​first,​the​direction​is​centrifugal;​in​the​second,​centripetal.​The​universal​point​of​view​is​expressed​in​history.​Nature​shows​the​spirit​in​ the​law:​“Everything​is​one​and​the​same.” ​ After​ the​ great​ Platonic​ philosophers​ of​ German​ Idealism​ comes​ Hegel,​that​is​to​say,​the​Aristotle​of​the​Kantian​cycle.​According​to​ the​philosopher,​everything​is​immanent​in​the​idea.​“Everything​real​ is​rational,​everything​rational​is​real.”​Nothing​is​extrinsic​to​the​idea.​ Logic,​science​of​the​idea,​is​metaphysics.​The​world​is​a​universal​dialectical​process.​Hegelianism​is​method​and​doctrine,​dialectic​and​system.​Each​one​of​the​things​is​linked,​necessarily,​to​other​things​that​ precede​and​follow​it.​Each​one​of​our​thoughts​leads​to​other​thoughts​ and​is​the​fruit​of​thoughts​that​led​to​it.​Thoughts​originate​as​things​ follow​one​another.​This​is​not​a​simple​coincidence.​The​real​and​natural​orders​are​not​distinct​orders.​The​order​is​unique,​reality​is​unique.​ Existence​and​truth​are​identical.​The​mental​process​is​the​real​process.​ The​logical​unfolding​of​the​idea​is​the​cosmic​process. ​ Each​isolated​concept​is​false;​it​represents​only​a​more​or​less​considerable​and​imperfect​part​of​the​truth;​it​demands​its​complement;​it​ converts​itself​into​its​negation.​Now​then,​for​two​negations​to​exist​is​ impossible.​Every​idea​tends​to​find,​in​its​superior​idea,​the​affirmation​ of​what​it​contains​of​genuine​and​the​negation​of​what​it​has​of​false. ​ The​ synthesis​ is,​ simultaneously,​ affirmation​ and​ negation​ of​ the​ thesis​ and​ of​ the​ antithesis.​ But​ in​ its​ turn,​ the​ synthesis—which​ is​ an​idea​like​the​very​ones​it​resolved—has​its​opposite,​its​antithesis,​ which,​together​with​it​is​resolved​into​a​superior​synthesis,​and​thus,​ successively,​from​the​pure​being​or​abstract​idea​to​the​absolute​idea​

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that​encompasses​everything.​“Becoming”​is​developed​by​triads,​and,​ supported​by​the​dialectic​method,​Hegel​can​dare​to​construct​the​universe,​because​the​“thought​of​existence”​is,​according​to​the​sublime​ phrase​of​the​philosopher,​“existence​itself​that​thinks​within​us.” ​ With​reason,​Ortega​y​Gasset​has​written: The​block​of​German​Idealism​is​one​of​the​greatest​edifices​that​has​ been​constructed​on​the​planet.​For​it​alone,​it​would​be​enough​to​ justify​and​consecrate​before​the​universe​the​existence​of​the​European​continent.​In​that​exemplary​construction,​modern​thought​ reaches​its​greatest​height.​Because,​in​truth,​all​modern​philosophy​ is​idealism.​There​are​only​two​notable​exceptions:​Spinoza,​who​ was​not​European,​and​materialism,​which​is​not​philosophy.

4.​viCiSSitudeS​of​heGelianiSm The​system​of​Hegel​originated​in​itself​a​“center”​central​to​the​teaching​of​the​master,​a​“right”​inclined​toward​misoneism,​and​a​revolutionary​“left.”​The​three​Hegelian​positions​have​influenced,​and​continue​ influencing,​the​political-​social​vicissitudes​of​the​world.​Here​is​how: ​ Hegel​himself​was​the​philosopher​of​monarchy.​In​his​opinion,​the​ state​is​the​organism​of​morality.​Through​it​the​substance​of​the​ethical​is​made,​in​general,​the​ethical​substance​itself,​conscious​of​itself,​ because​the​state​creates​the​organization​of​the​national​will.​The​state​ is​not​something​artificial,​but​rather​the politically organized person of the nation​in​a​given​country.​The​political​constitution​is​an​organic​product​ of​the​spirit​of​the​nation​and​of​its​individual​history. This​Hegelian​philosophy​was​made​(says​Sauer​in​his​Juridical and Social Philosophy,​page​49​of​the​Spanish​edition)​to​be​converted​ into​“Prussian​philosophy​of​state,”​justified​“the​reason​of​state,”​ then​practiced​as​a​national​resource​that​gave​a​fundamental​logic​ to​the​patriotic​rebirth​of​this​state,​deteriorated​and​again​restored,​ and​attributed​to​the​state​itself​a​broad​cultural​mission,​in​opposition​to​Kant,​who​only​saw​in​it​a​juridical​organization​for​the​protection​of​individuals. The​state​signifies​the​dominion​of​the​idea,​of​what​is,​in​truth,​universal​of​the​objective spirit.​The​republic​does​not​constitute​the​most​per-

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fect​form​of​government.​It​rests​on​the​confusion​of​civil​society​and​ the​state,​it​maximizes​the​importance​and​significance​of​the​individual.​ Precisely​for​having​sacrificed​the​Idea​to​the​individual,​the​family,​and​ the​ lineage,​ the​ republics​ of​ antiquity​ ended​ in​ dictatorships.​ Greek​ tyranny​and​Roman​caesarism​are​the​result​of​the​inherent​defects​in​ the​ republican​ form​ (democratic​ or​ aristocratic).​ On​ the​ other​ hand,​ monarchy​is​the​political​regime​in​which​the​national​idea​determines​ its​adequate​expression.​The​prince,​according​to​Hegel,​is​the state made man,​the​general​will​converted​to​individual​will.​Thus​the​maxim​of​ absolute​royalty​acquires​meaning:​“I​am​the​state.” ​ Against​ this​ Prussian​ state​ erected​ in​ the European state​ par​ excellence,​the​historic​materialism—Hegelianism​of​the​“left”—evokes​another,​different​political​social​idea.​Thus,​as​the​theory​of​the​teacher​ informed​the​thought​of​the​Prussian​monarchy,​the​disciples​fomented​ with​their​social​theories​the​contemporary​organization​of​Bolshevik​ Russia.​The​state—according​to​Marx—is​only​the ideological superstructure​of​those​who​command​or​rule​in​the​bourgeois​society.​The​basis​of​ all​“ideology”​is​economic,​and​all​“ideology”​denies,​nevertheless,​that​ its​ascendancy​might​be​economic.​It​is​evident,​nonetheless,​that​culture​(politics,​law,​religion,​art,​science,​etc.)​is​based​on​the​economic,​ according​to​the​Marxist​thesis.​It​is​not​that​Marx​denies​culture​itself​ (this​would​be​impossible​and​absurd);​what​he​denies​is​that​the​fundamental​ structure​ of​ social​ life​ might​ be​ of​ a​ cultural​ kind​ and​ not​ economic.​As​workers​enjoy​only​strict​remuneration​to​live​from​their​ labor,​wealth​is​accumulated​in​the​hands​of​the​capitalist.​By​virtue​of​ this,​the​state​must​be​converted​into​“the​proletarian​state”;​or​be​“the​ systematic​expropriation​of​those​who​have​inveterately​been​expropriators.”​Marx​believes​that​the​“administration”​will​replace​the​“bourgeois​state.”​The​triumphant​economy​will​end​up​being​the​apotheosis​ of​the​material,​as​the​state​of​Hegel​signaled​“the​advance​of​the idea,​that​ is​to​say,​God,​in​history”​.​.​. ​ But​ in​ the​ course​ of​ its​ development,​ Hegelian​ philosophy​ is​ not​ summed​up​only​in​pure​Marxism,​but​rather​it​forms​the​base​of​another​new,​different​social​philosophy:​anarchism.​Max​Stirner,​author​ of​the​famous​book​The Individual and His Property,​is​the​theoretician​of​ “anarchism”​as​Marx​is​of​“collectivism”​and​Hegel​of​“monarchism.” ​ The​divine​contemplates​God;​the​human,​man;​I—says​Stirner—am​ neither​divine​nor​human;​I​am​myself:​the​unique​one;​and​the​world​

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is​“my​property.”​This​is​the​absolute​thesis​of​anarchist​individualism,​ with​its​corresponding​social​formula,​“free​association​of​egoists​.​.​.” ​ In​comparison​with​the​socialist​and​collectivist​“ideologies”​Stirner​ outlines,​eloquently,​his​political​system.​The​divine​contemplates​God​ (Stirner​is​not​God).​The​human​relates​to​man​(Stirner​is​not​man).​ God​and​man,​in​his​judgment,​are​abstractions.​Stirner​is​the​unique​ one:​“der​Einzige.”​Humanity​has​been​the​plaything​ of​abstractions,​ which​Hegel​blends​into​a​constant​dialectical​rhythm.​The​social​relates​ to​society,​the​collective​to​the​community.​Stirner​is​neither​“community”​nor​“society.”​He​is​himself;​neither​divine​nor​human​nor​social​ nor​communal.​He​denies​all​these​“ideologies”!​There​can​be​nothing​ over​the​“individual​and​his​property.”​The​I​is​absolute.​Apotheosis! ​ For​Hegel,​the​absolute​is​“the​state,”​which​indicates​the​course​of​ God​in​history;​for​Marx,​the​economy​is​the​foundation​of​the​cultural​ “superstructures”;​for​Stirner,​the​I​is​the​absolute.​Here​are​the​distinct​ Hegelian​symbols​of​right​and​left!​.​.​. ​ Our​eager​curiosity​now​asks:​how​could​an​“official​philosophy”​be​ acknowledged​if,​within​a​given​philosophy​(the​Hegelian​school​itself ),​ social​ and​ political​ thought​ shows​ itself​ so​ fertile​ in​ opposing​ positions?​.​.​.

5.​liberty,​authority,​and​law What​we​are​going​to​say​does​not​constitute​a​political​theory,​much​ less​a​metaphysical​or​moral​hypothesis​that​contains​the​proclamation​ of​a​philosophical​system.​It​is​only​a​matter​of​affirming​truths​that​the​ conscience​of​the​honest​man​accepts​in​its​fullness​to​the​degree​they​ are​formulated​for​him​with​clarity.​We​could​say,​repeating​the​famous​ expression​of​Newton,​“I​make​no​hypotheses.”​We​also​do​not​make​ them​because​the​synthesis​of​the​thoughts​posed​here​have​been​expressed​by​Kant​in​his​moral​philosophy​independently​of​any​reference​ to​a​metaphysical​principle​sui​generis. ​ Two​elements​constitute​the​ends​between​which​all​civil​life​turns:​ liberty and laws. Civil life without liberty is not conceivable, from the moral point of view.​Nor​is​civil​life​conceivable​without​law.​Therefore,​all civil life implies the necessary combination of liberty and law.​They​are​both​(law​ and​liberty)​indispensable​components​of​the​axis​around​which​human​ solidarity​turns. ​ A​society​in​which​law​disappears​is​disturbed​in​its​foundations.​To​

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disrespect​the​law​is​to​destroy​the​bases​of​the​social​order;​but​to​disrespect​liberty​or​exaggerate​its​radius​of​action,​even​provoking​libertinism,​is​also​to​deny​the​social​order​in​one​of​its​indeclinable​foundations. ​ There​is​need,​therefore,​for​something​that​mediates​between​liberty​and​law,​which​on​the​one​side​looks​toward​the​enormous​ideal​ of​liberty,​and​on​the​other​refers​to​the​essential​form​of​the​law.​This​ third​element​must​realize​the​plasticity​of​the​social​order,​adapting​ itself​to​the​aspirations​of​autonomy​but​being​shaped​within​the​form​ of​law.​Being a little liberty and a little law.​This​third​element,​which​looks​ toward​liberty​and​toward​law​with​equanimity​and​elegance,​is​power,​ the​authority. ​ One​sees​clearly,​from​the​foregoing,​that​the​authority​occupies​a​ middle​ condition;​ it​ signifies​ an​ intermediate​ position,​ it​ is​ true,​ but​ essential,​ between​ liberty​ and​ the​ formula​ of​ the​ law.​ Authority​ by​ itself​makes​no​sense.​The​meaning​that​it​can​have​arises​from​its​purpose.​Power​in​itself​lacks​meaning.​The​powerful​ones,​from​the​social-​ political​point​of​view,​are​the​means​and​not​the​end;​the purpose is liberty within law.​The​authority​of​the​one​who​has​power​is​justified​by​the​ ultimate​end​I​have​just​expressed.​If​the​power​is​not​an​end​in​itself,​ it​is,​nonetheless,​as​essential,​when​it​is​ordered​by​moral​reason,​as​the​ ultimate​end​of​liberty​obtained​within​the​law.​In​this​way​are​unified​ in​one​public​intention,​which​all​human​units​approve​and​enhance,​the​ authority​(full​of​greatness​and​distinction​if​it​is​adapted​to​its​intrinsic​ purpose,​reprehensible​as​an​abomination​if​it​oversteps​its​limits​consecrated​by​its​own​purpose),​liberty,​and​law. ​ Every​transgression,​every​disturbance​of​the​order​I​have​just​described,​every​inharmonious​surmounting​of​one​of​the​elements​over​ the​others,​has​been​defined​in​pejorative​terms​by​the​moral​conscience​ of​ humanity.​ These​ three​ terms:​ barbarism,​ anarchy,​ and​ despotism,​ imply​a​negative​estimation​of​the​moral​conscience,​an​implicit​condemnation.​Anarchy,​like​despotism​and​barbarism,​is​opposed​to​the​ republic,​to​culture. ​ It​is​easy​to​become​fully​aware​that​anarchy,​as​much​as​despotism​ and​barbarism,​results​from​combining,​in​a​defective​way,​power,​liberty,​ and​ law.​ Only​ harmony,​ social​ eurythmy​ of​ these​ elements,​ engenders​the​cultured​republic.​Let​us​propose​the​definition​of​anarchy.​

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Anarchy is nothing other than the apotheosis of chaotic liberty, which denies all power and loathes the law. The anarchic state exaggerates without proportion one of the indeclinable elements of collective life: liberty;​and​by​this​exaggeration​it​engenders​chaos.​The​axis​of​the​law​is​broken​and​authority​ is​crushed:​this​is​anarchy. ​ Despotism​constitutes​the​apotheosis​of​the​power​and​law,​but​without​liberty.​Despots​abhor​liberty,​as​the​anarchists​power;​therefore,​ they​constitute​another​chaotic​state,​because​the​law​without​liberty​ only​engenders​a​power​without​authority,​without​moral​sense,​without​ social​eurythmy.​It​is​seen​clearly​how​anarchism​and​despotism​are​explained​by​the​same​reasoning​because​they​suppress​an​element​of​their​ being​indispensable​for​civil​life.​The loathing of the power is anarchy; the loathing of liberty, despotism. ​ Barbarism​suppresses​liberty​and​law;​that​is​to​say,​it​eliminates​culture.​It​is​a​matter​only​of​blind​forces​that​play​within​the​natural​order,​ realizing​ the​ thinking​ of​ Spinoza​ on​ natural​ law.​ “In​ the​ state​ of​ nature,”​said​the​philosopher,​“the​right​of​each​person​is​extended​until​it​ reaches​its​power.”​The​elimination​of​culture​is​the​suppression​of​what​ man​has​added​to​nature,​the​elimination​of​the​human,​which​puts​us​in​ the​presence​of​the​pure​natural​laws​that​govern​life​and​matter.​Man​is​ then,​as​Hobbes​expressed,​“a​wolf​to​man.” ​ Don​Francisco​de​Quevedo,​profound​Castilian​writer​who​lived​in​ times​of​public​corruption,​left​his​judgment​on​liberty​and​moral​culture​formulated​in​this​lovely​fragment​that​we​cite​in​its​entirety​so​that​ it​serves​us​simultaneously​as​epigraph​and​epilogue:​“The aspiration we all have is the liberty of all, endeavoring that our subjection be just and not violent; that reason governs us, not caprice; that we are of the one who bequeaths us, not of the one who seizes us; that we are in the care of princes not merchandise; and in the republics, companions and not slaves, members and not things, bodies and not shadow.”​Therefore,​here​is​the​noble​definition​of​the​cultured​republic,​according​to​the​noble​genius​of​Kant:​“power with liberty and law.”​All​this,​we​reiterate​in​concluding,​does​not​constitute​a​metaphysical​hypothesis​or​a​newly​arrived​theory​that​can​disappear​and​be​ annihilated​by​time​in​its​indefinite​development.​We​are​not​making​a​ hypothesis,​we​are​simply​declaring​what​the​experience​of​the​human​ species​has​been​able​to​formulate​of​true​and​eternal​in​the​sad​but​profound​instruction​of​history!

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6.​demoCraCy​aS​meanS​and​end Man is the indirect being, and the more so, the more cultivated he is. — Simmel

If,​instead​of​putting​himself​in​the​service​of​the​spirit,​the​demagogue​ tries​to​dominate​it,​with​his​very​stance​he​is​obliterated​before​reason,​ and​he​dishonors,​corrupting​it,​the​very​principle​of​liberty.​This​is​the​ great​fallacy​of​all​democracies,​that​their​endeavors​on​behalf​of​the​ liberty​of​the​people​transgress​their​own​and​essential​limits:​the confusion of the means with the end.​On​occasions​the​means​for​attainment​of​ human​ends​are​so​admirable​that​these​means​are​made​into​ends,​and​ they​are​then​devoid​of​all​possible​sense. ​ In​corroboration​of​the​foregoing,​we​propose​the​study​of​the​behavior​ to​which​man​responds​in​accord​with​the​essential​development​of​culture.​There​exists​a​radical​difference​between​the​way​an​animal​acts​and​ the​conduct​of​a​human​being.​The​animal​responds​to​instinct.​It​is​an​ active​being​that​cannot​imagine​distinctly​the​ends​of​its​action.​Man​has​ a​conduct,​that​is​to​say,​a​series​of​coherent​actions​that​responds​to​ends.​ Conduct​is​an​order​sui​generis​that​is​explained,​like​all​order,​by​the​end​ that​governs​it.​It​happens​that,​as​civilization​develops,​the​ends​of​human​ activity​diversify​in​a​marvelous​way.​A​very​clear​mirror​of​this​disconcerting​diversity,​of​the​intermediate​ends​that​cultural​development​involves,​is​the​machine.​Every​machine​is​a​tool,​but​not​every​tool​is​a​machine.​To​the​extent​that​technology​develops,​the​tools​that​directly​serve​ to​achieve​the​end​of​the​relative​action​are​replaced​by​machines,​which​ only​ indirectly​ actualize​ the​ ultimate​ end​ for​ what​ was​ intended.​ And​ modern​factories​in​the​great​industrial​centers​of​the​world​are​complex​ and​very​varied​organizations​of​exquisite​machinery​that,​most​times,​engender,​only,​an​element​for​the​production​of​social​wealth. ​ What​happens​with​the​complexity​of​industrial​technology​happens​ also​in​all​orders​of​social​activity.​Political​and​juridical​institutions,​ like​the​machinery​of​our​industries,​do​not​immediately​actualize​the end for which they were conceived, the ultimate end,​which​can​be​nothing​ different​from​achieving​the​happiness​of​the​people​with​the​attainment​of​the​highest​values​of​the​culture:​truth,​beauty,​justice,​goodness,​holiness.​Between​the​final​end​and​the​principles​of​human​action,​ a​series​of​subordinate​ends​is​established,​lofty​in​themselves,​noble​by​ their​essence,​but​that​cannot​be​converted​into​the​ultimate​ends​of​the​

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action,​and​that​therefore​induce​error​many​times​if​some​political​or​ social​theory​converts​them​into​the​ultimate​norms​of​the​activity. For​primitive​man,​says​Simmel,​the​will​achieves​what​is​intended,​ taking​possession​of​it​in​a​direct​way​or​using​only​a​scarce​number​ of​simple​means.​The​growing​multiplicity​and​complexity​the​elevation​of​life​brings​with​it​do​not​permit​this​trinity​of​the​series:​ desire, means, end;​but​rather​they​transform​the​intermediate​member​into​plurality,​in​which​the​precisely​effective​means​turn​out​ to​be​results​produced​by​other​means,​and​this​by​another​in​turn,​ until​that​incalculable​complexity​appears,​that​chain​of​practical​activity​in​which​the​man​of​mature​cultures​lives. That​stepwise​increase​of​intermediate​ends​between​the​desire​and​the​ ultimate​ end​ to​ achieve​ leads​ to​ democracy,​ which​ is​ only​ a​ political​ means​for​guaranteeing​liberty,​being​converted​by​some​theories​into​ the​ultimate​end​that​must​supplant​the​highest​values​of​human​culture.​Then​the​democratic​sophism​appears​in​all​its​splendor!​Liberty​ and​its​corresponding​political​form​(this​is​the​democratic​form)​are​ means​and​not​ultimate​ends.​Anyone​who​converts​elements​into​highest​finalities​of​human​action​is​victim​of​an​illusion! ​ Culture​without​liberty​is​inconceivable.​Only​in​an​environment​of​ liberty​can​the​work​of​a​civilization​mature.​If​the​spontaneity​of​the​ spiritual​center​of​man​is​suppressed,​his​cultural​relationships​concomitantly​dry​up,​the​lushness​of​creative​invention​shrivels,​the​very​nature​ of​the​producing​spirit​is​crippled.​But​if,​because​liberty​is​a​precious​ gift,​an​inescapable​condition​of​human​perfection,​one​tries​to​put​the​ means​above​the​end,​subordinating​culture​to​democracy​and​liberty,​ one​generates​the​monstrous​effect​of​making​Simmel’s​trinity,​desire, means, and end,​meaningless.​What​is​desired​is​liberty​and​democracy​ for​good​and​for​truth,​for​justice,​beauty,​and​holiness;​but​the​constriction​of​the​highest​values​within​a​democracy​converted​into​an​ultimate​ end​has​no​meaning​(because​it​is​not​what​is​desired).​Democracy​for​ democracy​lacks​meaning.​Liberty​for​liberty​also​lacks​meaning.​On​the​ other​hand,​the​desire​and​the​means​harmonize​in​the​final​end:​culture​ integrated​with​the​splendor​of​the​supreme​values. ​ How​to​explain​the​error​of​the​sophism​of​democracy​by​itself​and​ for​itself,​of​liberty​by​itself​and​for​itself?​How​to​understand​the​for-

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mulas​of​traditional​liberalism​that​created​the​apotheosis​of​the​highly​ celebrated​apothegm:​“Liberty,​Equality,​Fraternity,​indivisibility​of​the​ Republic,​or​death”?​After​what​was​said​before,​the​elucidation​of​the​ case​becomes​obvious.​It​is​that​a​means,​going​against​the​desire​that​ adopted​it,​has​been​converted​into​a​final​end.​It​is​that,​liberty​turning​out​to​be​so​noble,​so​noble​likewise​democracy,​our​elders,​fascinated​with​their​nobility,​placed​the​means​they​judged​suitable​for​the​ realization​of​their​destinies​above​the​genuine​final​ends.​But​this​implies​a​transgression​of​Simmel’s​trinity.​The means, unfaithful to the desire, has negated the end.​The​solution​to​the​problem​appears.​The​hand​has​ touched​the​heart​of​the​error. ​ The​ contemporary​ world​ lacks​ some​ ultimate​ end​ that​ organizes​ all​ the​ complex​ and​ diverse​ secondary​ ends​ into​ a​ luminous​ sheaf​ of​ supreme​truths​that​puts​forward​beauty​and​goodness​and​holiness!​It​ is​that​contemporary​humanity​lacks​a​religion​that​might​save​it,​a​belief​that​might​nourish​it,​a​faith​that​might​redeem​it,​a​hope,​finally,​ that​might​subordinate​all​scattered​ends​into​a​fundamental​affirmation.​ For​this​reason​our​epoch​has​been​compared​with​the​distant​days​of​ Roman​decadence.​Then also there was no universal ideal; like now, no one understood the supreme finality of the common effort.​ Paganism​no​longer​ moved​people.​The​pride​of​the​stoic,​the​indifference​of​the​skeptic,​and​ the​“pleasure​in​repose”​of​the​epicurean​suited​some​sectors​of​Roman​ opinion,​but​they​did​not​manage​to​form​the​luminous​sheaf​of​truths​ that​would​give​meaning​to​desires​and​means​to​action! ​ The​teaching​of​Saint​Paul,​apostle​of​the​Gentiles,​appeared:​“So​that​ if​someone​is​in​Christ,​he​is​a​new​creation;​the​old​things​pass,​and​here​ everything​is​made​anew.” ​ Might​ not​ the​ remedy​ for​ our​ imperfect​ democracies​ depend​ on​ their​intimate​union​with​Christian​truth?​Perhaps, within Christianity, the means, faithful to the desire, will affirm the end.

7.​the​word​of​admonition The history of humanity is progress in consciousness of liberty. — Hegel

In​our​time,​various​political​systems​have​arisen​over​against​democracy​that​would​be​called​the​clear​negation​of​the​essential​postulates​ of​every​democracy.​Consider​that​the​affirmation​of​political​liberty,​

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within​a​given​democratic​regime,​constitutes​the​reiteration​of​social​ theories​already​declining​in​the​development​of​human​history.​Nonetheless,​Hegel​conceived​the​development​of​civilization​ as​if​it​were​ the​very​apotheosis​of​liberty.​For​this​he​formulated,​in​his​famous​lectures​on​the​Philosophy of Universal History:​“The​history​of​humanity​is​ progress​in​the​consciousness​of​liberty.”​That​is​to​say,​the​essence​of​ human​development,​of​humanity​in​man,​is​constituted​by​the​consciousness​of​liberty. ​ Today,​another​great​philosopher,​of​whom​Ortega​y​Gasset​has​said​ that​his​wealth​of​ideas​is​overwhelmed​in​the​splendor​of​multiple​and​ varied​small​jewels​that​spring​from​his​mind,​realizing​the​brevity​of​ his​existence,​has​written:​“Liberty,​active​and​personal​spontaneity​of​ the​spiritual​center​of​man​(of​man​in​man),​is​the​first​and​fundamental​ condition​ that​ makes​ culture​ possible.”​ Because​ Scheler​ conceives​ culture​as​an​ontological​relationship.​To​know​is​to​be​cultured.​The​ cultured​man​participates​in​the​being​of​the​things​he​knows​or​understands.​In​the​relationship​of​the​understanding,​the​object​determines​ the​attitude​of​the​subject.​To​know​is​to​observe​what​is​investigated​ with​all​the​resources​of​the​mind,​but​without​deforming​it​with​prejudgments.​And​how​would​this​endeavor​of​understanding​be​able​to​ actualize​this​ontological​relationship​with​the​object​if​it​did​not​enjoy​ liberty​in​the​investigation?​How​to​understand,​to​know​something​scientifically,​culturally,​if,​a​priori,​the​guidelines​are​set​out​so​for​knowing​the​known?​In​what​form,​outside​an​environment​of​liberty,​could​ criticism,​which​constitutes​the​very​rhythm​of​science,​be​exercised?​.​.​. ​ Therefore,​Scheler​is​right​when​he​demands​spontaneity​of​the​spiritual​center​of​man​as​a​condition​for​the​possibility​of​culture.​We​are​ not​supporters​of​just​anyone​who​calls​himself​“free​thinker”;​but​we​ certainly​believe​in​every​truly​free​thinker. ​ Well​ then,​ culture​ is​ the​ sublime​ reason​ for​ man.​ Culture​ is​ holiness,​goodness,​beauty,​justice,​truth.​All​the​values​are​integrated​into​ the​notion​of​culture.​Human​societies​are​laboratories​of​the​ideal—​ outstanding​laboratories,​in​which​the​truth​is​revealed,​in​which​beauty​ shows​itself,​in​which​justice​is​realized​and​attainable​holiness​works​in​ each​historic​moment,​in​human​individuals! Only​by​one​road—asserts​Max​Scheler—can​democracy​today​save​ itself​from​dictatorship​and,​at​the​same​time,​save​the​goods​of​cul-

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ture​and​science:​by​limiting​itself,​putting​itself​at​the​service​of​ culture​and​the​spirit​instead​of​trying​to​dominate​them.​Otherwise,​only​one​solution​remains:​an​enlightened​despotic​dictatorship​that,​without​taking​into​account​the​feeling​of​the​masses​hostile​to​the​culture​and​of​their​status​as​adults,​dominates​them​with​ the​whip,​the​saber,​and​the​lump​of​sugar. ​ The​cited​text​implies​various​distinct​propositions​in​advance.​The​ first​teaches​the​only​road​to​salvation​of​democracy,​or​better,​salvation​ of​liberty:​limitation​of​democracy​itself,​putting​itself​at​the​service​of​ culture​and​the​spirit. ​ Because​when​it​is​a​matter​of​liberty​and​democracy,​it​is​thought,​ generally,​ that​ both​ constitute​ an​ end​ in​ themselves​ by​ themselves.​ This​specifies​the​very​grave​error​of​accepting​that​the​ultimate​end​of​ man​and​his​civilization​is​liberty​and​its​corresponding​political​form,​ democracy.​No;​liberty​is​a​means​and​not​an​end;​it​can​be​justified​only​ by​putting​itself​at​the​service​of​the​goods​of​culture​and​science.​Liberty​for​everyone,​liberty​for​all;​but​provided​that​it​be​the​means​of​ acquiring​the​truth,​of​realizing​the​good​and​justice;​because​we​are​not​ born​to​be​free,​but​rather​to​be​good.​Liberty​for​evil,​liberty​for​error,​ democracy​for​crime,​totally​lack​sense;​it​denies,​as​Scheler​would​say,​ “the​ active​ and​ personal​ spontaneity​ of​ the​ spiritual​ center​ of​ man.”​ Deny​the​man​in​the​man!​.​.​.​Liberty​and​democracy​as​conditions​of​ culture​are​not​only​irreproachable,​but​rather,​as​we​have​proved​before,​only​through​them​can​the​highest​values​of​existence​be​realized. ​ But​if—as​we​have​said​before—“instead​of​putting​himself​in​the​ service​of​the​spirit,​the​demagogue​tries​to​dominate​it,​with​his​very​ stance​ he​ is​ obliterated​ in​ the​ face​ of​ reason,​ and​ he​ dishonors,​ corrupting​it,​the​very​principle​of​liberty.”​This​is​the​great​fallacy​of​all​ democracies,​that​their​endeavors​on​behalf​of​the​liberty​of​the​people​ transgress​their​own​and​essential​limits:​the confusion of the means with the end.​On​occasion,​the​means​for​attainment​of​human​ends​are​so​admirable​that​these​means​are​made​into​ends,​and​they​are​then​devoid​ of​all​possible​sense. ​ The​same​thing​that​happens​with​liberty​happens​with​wealth.​What​ happens​with​democracy​happens​with​gold.​Liberty​is​good,​it​is​essential,​ as​ gold​ is​ good​ for​ life;​ but​ the​ rich​ person​ must​ serve​ with​ his​ wealth,​the​same​as​the​free​man​with​his​liberty,​the​superior​ends​of​

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existence.​Over​liberty​and​wealth​are​truth​and​the​good.​No​one​is​free​ to​be​evil!​No​one​is​rich​to​be​unhappy!​Wealth​and​liberty​have​their​ full​meaning​if​they​are​put​in​the​service​of​culture​and​the​spirit,​if​ they​are​judged​means​and​not​ends,​if​they​acknowledge​that​the​ultimate​end​of​man​must​consist​only​of​the​harmonious​synthesis​of​eternal​true​values. ​ The​unavoidable​consequence​of​lack​of​knowledge​of​the​ends​of​ liberty​and​democracy​leads​directly​to​despotism.​This​is​what​the​final​ proposition​ of​ Max​ Scheler’s​ thinking​ formulates:​ “Otherwise,​ only​ one​solution​remains:​an​enlightened​despotic​dictatorship​that,​without​taking​into​account​the​feeling​of​the​masses​hostile​to​the​culture​ and​of​their​status​as​adults,​dominates​them​with​the​whip,​the​saber,​ and​the​lump​of​sugar.” ​ Dictatorships,​ then,​ are​ not​ absolute​ goods;​ they​ are​ relative​ evils.​ When​democracies​go​too​far​in​the​organic​exercise​of​liberties,​they​ appear​as​defense​of​an​unfit​culture,​of​ridiculed​truth;​but​they​cannot​ have​another​distinct​meaning​or​another​justification,​because​tyranny​ goes​against​the​essence​of​culture,​because​liberty​is​the​first​and​fundamental​condition​that​makes​it​possible.​In​this​way,​the​diverse​ideas​ to​which​we​have​alluded​join​together​in​the​history​of​peoples;​liberty,​ democracy,​dictatorship,​civilization.​When​the​democratic​thesis​oversteps​its​essential​limits,​the​antithesis​of​the​dictatorship​is​produced;​ but​the​true​synthesis​is​affirmation​and​negation​of​both​inadequate,​incomplete​thoughts;​because​dictatorships​stifle​culture​in​the​same​way​ demagogic​movements​do;​and​above​all,​the​means​figure​unfailingly​ the​ends,​the​indeclinable​values:​truth,​justice,​beauty,​goodness,​holiness!​.​.​.​For​this​reason​we​can​repeat,​in​closing,​the​thought​of​Hegel​ that​serves​us​as​epigraph:​“The​history​of​humanity​is​progress​in​the​ consciousness​of​liberty.” ​ It​is​characteristic​of​the​great​spirits​to​move​forward​in​life,​foreseeing​the​future​action​that​in​their​minds​is​revealed​before​solidifying,​ objectively,​in​tangible​historic​movements.​Science​is​foresight;​that​is​ to​say,​anticipated​vision​that​infers​the​near​or​distant​future​from​the​ present.​To​pre-​see​signifies​seeing​before​having​seen.​Because​intelligence​views​the​object​that​will​be​formed,​understanding​through​anticipation,​reading​with​the​eyes​of​the​spirit​before​those​of​the​body,​ actualize​their​optical​function.​But​intelligence​does​not​realize​its​most​ admirable​work​through​the​spirit​of​prophecy,​or​by​inexistent​magi-

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cal​intuitions;​but​rather​it​is​elevated​to​the​universal,​to​the​eternal​ and​ incorruptible​ essence,​ and​ it​ knows,​ then,​ a​ priori​ (thanks​ to​ its​ own​ ideational​ act),​ that​ the​ future​ will​ realize​ the​ essential,​ already​ perceived​from​the​present.​This​is​not​prophecy,​certainly,​or​illusion,​ or​the​working​of​miracles.​It​is​the​ordinary​act​of​the​powerful​intelligence,​which,​in​seeing​the​universal​and​concrete​essence,​knows​it​will​ be​realized​today​and​always,​here​and​everywhere. ​ In​this​way​the​brilliant​thought​of​Max​Scheler​continued​in​confirming​that​the​symptoms​of​a​troubled​epoch​of​coercion​and​slavery​ for​ the​ human​ spirit​ were​ already​ vigorously​ begun.​ Situated​ on​ the​ threshold​of​our​age,​before​death​put​an​end,​certainly​premature,​to​ his​independent​speculation,​the​philosopher​confirmed,​in​the​midst​of​ his​distressed​perplexity,​the​tyranny​of​a​century​that​prepares​itself​on​ the​ruins​of​the​decadent​individualism​of​the​nineteenth​century. ​ And​it​is​that​the​contrasts​of​the​diverse​political-​social​dogmas​are​ only​that​with​respect​to​their​subject​matter,​but​the​form​is​identical​for​the​opposing​factions.​This​universal​form,​this​essence,​is​what​ Scheler​saw,​in​his​ideational​act,​relative​to​the​characteristics​of​our​ age.​The​figure​and​the​counterfigure,​the​positive​and​the​negative,​varied​ in​content,​but​the​essence​is​universal​and​unique.​It is a matter of both opposing factions denying liberty,​ but​ without​ liberty​ there​ cannot​ be​ thought,​science,​or​culture.​Because​liberty​and​thought​are​unified​in​ the​human​composite,​in​the​human​being.​What are the two most noble faculties of the human psyche? How is personality integrated? With which elements is it organized as a true personality? . . . Only by virtue of the narrow relationship that intervenes between the will and the thought, between liberty and the idea. Man thinks freely. This is his total personality, his free thought. Liberty without thought is not conceivable. Nor thought without liberty. ​ Animals​have​neither​liberty​nor​thought.​Man​has​thought​and​liberty;​but​he​does​not​have​them​as​differentiated​and​distant​elements,​ but​rather​forming​a​synthetic,​indestructible​unity.​For​this​reason,​all​ aggression​against​liberty​threatens​thought,​and​all​aggression​against​ thought​ is​ also​ that​ against​ liberty.​ Only​ true​ thought,​ which​ is​ free​ thought,​can​give​of​itself​true​thoughts,​that​is​to​say,​cultural​realizations​in​which​the​supreme​values​of​culture​are​integrated. ​ Let​us​consider​the​figure​and​the​counterfigure​of​diverse​content,​but​ which,​together,​realize​the​formal​essence​of​tyranny:

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Let​us​cast​a​glance—says​Max​Scheler—on​the​current​world.​Russia:​an​index liborum prohibitorum,2​imitation​of​that​of​the​medieval​Roman​Church,​in​which​are​included​the​two​Testaments,​the​ Koran,​the​Talmud,​and​all​the​philosophers​from​Thales​to​Fichte.​ No​book​in​which​the​word​“God”​figures​can​pass​the​border.​Only​ immediately​usable​sciences,​technical,​hygienic,​and​economic,​are​ admitted​in​accordance​with​the​discredited​Marxist​and​pragmatic​ theory​of​the​relationship​between​science​and​economics.​Marxism, crushed today more than ever by criticism, is ceremoniously exalted to the level of dogma of a great empire. ​ In​sum,​the​form​is​tyranny,​the​essence​is​exclusion​of​the​liberty​of​ thought.​The​subject​matter​constitutes​the​apotheosis​of​one​doctrine​ among​many,​selected​to​be​converted,​as​the​philosopher​says,​into​an​ intangible​dogma​of​consciousness. ​ Let​us​look​now​at​the​counterfigure.​In​North​America, a​movement​that​is​called​fundamentalism​because​it​claims​to​elevate​ the​Bible,​in​the​sense​of​literal​inspiration,​to​absolute​foundation​ of​knowledge​and​life.​Based​in​this​idea,​a​powerful​popular​movement​that​demands​nothing​less​than​a​legal​veto​of​the​teaching​of​ the​theory​of​origins​in​any​of​its​forms​(Lamarkism,​Darwinism,​ vitalism),​and​all​research​on​it,​within​establishments​sustained​by​ the​state. ​ In​ some​ countries,​ like​ Mexico,​ the​ opposite​ is​ sought,​ even​ now;​ throw​out​every​biological​theory​that​might​be​expressed​against​transformist​ scientific​ theories.​ But​ natural​ science​ cannot​ be​ contained​ within​the​limits​of​any​dogmatic​affirmation!​It​is​as​wrong​to​exclude​ without​appeal​as​to​concede​without​disagreement.​It​is​as​unfortunate​ to​deny​without​critical​spirit​as​to​affirm​without​the​vitality​of​liberty​ of​thought.​The​advance​of​science​passes​over​Marxism,​Lamarkism,​ and​Darwinism​because​its​eternal​form​cannot​be​constrained​in​what​ a​given​epoch,​a​stage​of​knowledge​and​culture,​grasps​as​truth.​To​prohibit​or​exalt​is​not​characteristic​of​researchers​or​of​learned​people.​ ​

2.​An​index​of​forbidden​books.​(Editor’s​note)

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The​learned​person​does​not​know​what,​finally,​the​results​of​his​research​will​be;​and​he​is​always​disposed​to​sacrifice​all​the​ideas​in​favor​ of​a​sole​observation,​of​a​sole​experiment​that​negates​them. ​ Before​the​perspective​of​essentially​common​negation​arises​the​perplexity​of​the​philosopher.​Why​will​there​be​a​century​like​ours,​enemy​ of​liberty​of​conscience?​Is​it​that,​in​truth,​culture​is​declining?​Why​ do​we​declare​ourselves​enemies​of​what​constitutes​a​fundamental​part​ of​human​moral​being?​What​malevolent​spirit​inspires​contemporary​ humanity​to​make​it​disown​free​will,​supreme​divine​gift?​How​is​it​ that​in​affirming​error​one​wishes​to​realize​the​good?​Is​it​not​a​pregnant​paradox​of​unforeseen​dramatic​consequences​to be bent on destroying what is most lofty in the human personality?​Do​the​nations​not​seem​to​ be​distancing​themselves,​each​time​more,​from​the​goods​derived​from​ respecting​liberty​and​thought​in​their​essence?​.​.​. ​ For​this​reason,​the​noble​spirit​of​Max​Scheler​declares​its​anguish​ with​these​moving​words,​which​could​be​called​the admonition of the man of genius​to​the​people​of​his​century: A genuine terror takes possession of me in the face of the growing abandonment of liberties and the loss of sensibility, gray and shapeless twilight in which, not only this or that country, but almost the entire civilized world finds itself in serious danger of collapsing, of being slowly drowned, almost without noticing.​And,​nonetheless,​liberty,​active​and​personal​spontaneity​of​the​spiritual​center​of​man—of​Man​within​man—is​the​ first​and​fundamental​condition​that​makes​culture​possible,​the​enlightenment​of​humanity! ​ The great admonisher​ has​ died;​ but​ his​ word​ of​ life​ and​ truth​ resounds​over​all​the​sophisms​converted​into​inviolable​canons​of​human​ thought,​because​the​truth​is​another​eternal​essence​that​no​revolution​ can​stop​or​destroy​with​its​attacks!

octavio Paz Octavio​ Paz​ (1914–98)​ was​ born​ in​ Mexico​ City.​ A​ poet​ and​ essayist,​Paz​is​probably​the​twentieth​century’s​most​famous​ and​universally​known​intellectual​from​the​Spanish-​speaking​ world.​ He​ received​ numerous​ awards,​ including​ the​ Nobel​ Prize​for​Literature​in​1990,​primarily​for​his​poetry​but​also​ for​his​many​essays​on​culture​and​politics.​He​founded​important​literary​magazines,​such​as​Vuelta. ​ In​ his​ writings​ Paz​ reflected​ on​ liberty,​ modernity,​ history,​ art,​ liberalism,​ revolution,​ democracy,​ and​ the​ identity​ of​Mexico​and​Latin​America.​Many​of​his​texts​dwell​on​the​ relation​between​politics​and​art.​Early​on​he​became​disillusioned​with​communism​and​thus​became​a​critic​of​communist​ regimes. ​ We​present​three​texts​by​Paz​that​examine​liberty​and​liberalism:​a​speech​given​on​the​occasion​of​receiving​the​Cervantes​ Prize​(1981),​a​speech​pronounced​on​the​occasion​of​receiving​ the​Alfonso​Reyes​Prize​(1985),​and​a​speech​given​on​the​occasion​of​receiving​the​Alexis​de​Tocqueville​Prize​(1989).

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1



The Liberal Tradition

If​I​let​only​my​feelings​speak,​these​words​would​be​a​ long,​interminable​expression​of​gratitude.​But​my​emotion​is​not​blind.​ I​know​well​that​the​symbolic​reality​of​this​act​is​more​real​than​the​ fleeting​reality​of​my​person.​I​am​barely​an​episode​in​the​history​of​ our​ literature,​ the​ transitory​ and​ accidental​ incarnation​ of​ a​ moment​ in​the​Spanish​language.​The​Cervantes​Prize,​in​selecting​this​or​that​ writer​of​our​tongue​without​consideration​of​nationality,​affirms​each​ year​the​reality​of​our​literature.​And​what​is​a​literature?​It​is​not​a​ collection​of​authors​and​books​but​rather​a​society​of​works.​Novels,​ poems,​narratives,​comedies,​and​essays​become​works​through​the​creative​complicity​of​the​readers.​The​work​is​a​work​thanks​to​the​reader.​ Instantaneous​monument,​perpetually​erected​and​perpetually​demolished,​for​it​is​subject​to​the​critique​of​time:​the​successive​generations​ of​readers.​The​work​springs​from​the​association​of​author​and​reader;​ for​ this​ reason​ literature​ is​ a​ society​ within​ society:​ a​ community​ of​ works​that​simultaneously​create​a​public​of​readers​and​are​re-​created​ through​those​readers. ​ It​is​said​that​ideologies,​classes,​economic​structures,​technologies,​ and​the​sciences,​international​by​nature,​are​the​basic​and​determinant​ realities​of​history.​The​subject​is​as​old​as​historical​reflection​itself,​and​ I​cannot​linger​over​it;​I​observe,​nonetheless,​that​equally​determinant,​ if​not​more​so,​are​the​languages,​the​beliefs,​the​myths,​and​the​customs​ and​traditions​of​each​social​group.​The​Cervantes​Prize,​justly,​reminds​ us​that​the​language​we​speak​is​a​reality​no​less​decisive​than​the​ideas​ we​profess​or​the​craft​we​practice.​To​say​language​is​to​say​civilization:​ community​of​values,​symbols,​habits,​beliefs,​visions,​questions​regarding​the​past,​the​present,​the​future.​In​speaking,​we​do​not​speak​only​ ​ Original​title:​“La​tradición​liberal.”​Source:​Octavio​Paz,​Obras completas,​vol.​3,​Fundación y disidencia​(Mexico:​fCe/Círculo​de​Lectores,​1994),​pp.​303–7. 542

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with​those​who​are​close​by:​we​speak​also​with​the​dead​and​with​those​ not​yet​born,​with​the​trees​and​the​cities,​the​rivers​and​the​ruins,​the​ animals​and​the​objects.​We​speak​with​the​animate​world​and​with​the​ inanimate,​with​the​visible​and​with​the​invisible.​We​speak​with​ourselves.​To​speak​is​to​live​together,​to​live​in​a​world​that​is​this​world​and​ its​other​worlds,​this​time​and​the​others:​a​civilization. ​ Since​I​was​very​young,​the​feeling​of​belonging​to​a​civilization​was​ very​much​alive​in​me.​I​owe​it​to​my​grandfather,​Ireneo​Paz,​lover​of​ books,​who​managed​to​assemble​a​small​library​in​which​abounded​the​ great​writers​of​our​language.​I​was​eighteen​years​old​when​I​read​the​two​ first​series​of​the​National Episodes,​in​which,​perhaps,​some​of​the​best​ pages​of​Pérez​Galdós​are​found.​It​was​an​edition​in​octavo,​with​golden​ covers,​illustrated​by​various​artists​of​the​time;​the​ten​volumes​had​been​ printed​between​1881​and​1885​in​Madrid​by​La​Guirnalda.​This​novel-​ like​and​novelistic​history​of​modern​Spain​seemed​to​me​also​mine​and​ my​country’s.​When​I​came​to​the​second​series,​the​figure​of​Salvador​ Monsalud​captivated​me​immediately.​He​was​my​hero,​my​archetype.​ My​identification​with​the​young​liberal​led​me​to​come​face​to​face​with​ his​half-​brother​and​adversary,​the​terrible​Carlos​Garrote,​Carlist​partisan.​Dualism​at​the​same​time​real​and​symbolic:​the​legitimate​son​and​ the​bastard,​the​guard​dog​of​order​and​the​vagabond,​the​man​of​the​ land​and​the​cosmopolite,​the​conservative​and​the​revolutionary.​But​ Carlos​Garrote,​as​the​reader​realizes​little​by​little,​is​not​only​the​adversary​who​embodies​the​other​Spain,​that​of​religion and privileges!1​but​ he​is​also​the​double​of​Salvador​Monsalud.​In​the​final​episode—One Rebel More and Several Friars Less,​gloomy​portrayal​of​the​two​Spains​ and​their​opposing​and​symmetrical​fanaticisms—we​are​present​at​the​ death​of​Carlos​Garrote​and​his​transformation.​He​began​as​the​enemy​ and​persecutor​of​Salvador​Monsalud​and​ends​as​his​brother​and​protector:​they​are​condemned​to​live​together.​Each​one​is​the​other​and​himself.​That​struggle,​no​longer​private​but​social,​has​been​the​substance​of​ the​history​of​our​peoples​during​the​last​two​centuries.​Thus​I​learned​ that​a​civilization​is​not​a​fixed​essence,​always​identical​with​itself:​it​is​a​ society​inhabited​by​discord​and​possessed​by​the​desire​to​restore​unity,​ a​mirror​in​which,​in​contemplating​ourselves​we​lose​ourselves,​and​in​ losing​ourselves​we​recover​ourselves. ​

1.​“Religión y privilegios!”​was​the​motto​of​the​Spanish​monarchists.​(Editor’s​note)

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​ Many​ times​ I​ have​ thought​ about​ the​ Hispano-​American​ parallels​ of​Salvador​Monsalud.​Although​some​belong​to​history​and​others​to​ the​novel,​all​of​them,​real​or​imagined,​fought​and​still​fight​against​ obstacles​that​the​hero​of​Galdós​never​dreamed.​For​example,​besides​ meeting​face​to​face​with​Carlos​Garrote,​intractable​and​untamed​partisan,​embodiment​of​a​sometimes​obtuse​and​sometimes​sublime​past,​ the​Mexican​Salvador​Monsaluds​have​had​to​combat​other​realities​and​ exorcise​other​ghosts:​Spain​and​Mexico​have​different​pasts.​In​our​history​appears​an​element​unknown​in​Spain’s:​the​world​of​the​Indian.​It​ is​the​dimension​at​the​same​time​intimate​and​unfathomable,​innermost​ and​unknown,​of​my​country.​Without​this​dimension​we​would​not​ be​what​we​are.​The​presence​of​Islam​and​Judaism​in​medieval​Spain​ could​give​some​idea​of​what​the​Indian​interlocutor​signifies​in​the​consciousness​of​Mexicans.​An​interlocutor​who​is​not​in​front​of​us​but​ rather​within.​But​there​is​a​major​difference:​Islam​and​Judaism​are,​ like​Christianity,​variants​of​monotheism;​by​contrast,​Mesoamerican​ civilization​was​born​and​grew​isolated,​with​no​connection​to​the​Old​ World.​The​same​can​be​said​of​Incan​Peru.​The​world​of​the​Indian​was,​ from​the​beginning,​the​other​world,​in​the​strongest​sense​of​the​term.​ Otherness​that,​for​us​Mexicans,​becomes​identity,​distance​that​is​closeness. ​ The​appearance​of​America​with​its​great​alien​civilizations​modified​radically​the​dialogue​of​Hispanic​civilization​with​its​own​self.​It​ introduced​an​element​of​uncertainty,​so​to​speak,​that​since​then​has​ challenged​ our​ imagination​ and​ questioned​ our​ identity.​ The​ Indian​ interlocutor​tells​us​that​man​is​an​unpredictable​creature​and​that​he​ is​a​double​being.​In​other​Hispano-​American​nations​the​agents​of​the​ dislocation​ and​ transformation​ of​ the​ dialogue​ were​ the​ nomads,​ the​ blacks,​the​geography.​Instead​of​other​history,​as​in​Peru​and​Mexico,​ the​absence​of​history.​Since​its​origin,​Spain​was​a​land​of​shifting​frontiers,​and​its​last​great​frontier​has​been​America:​through​it​and​in​it​ Spain​has​a​border​with​the​unknown.​America​or​the​immensity:​the​ lands​without​people,​the​distances​without​name,​the​coasts​that​gaze​ toward​Asia​and​Oceania,​civilizations​that​did​not​know​Christianity​ but​that​had​discovered​the​zero.​Diverse​forms​of​the​limitless. ​ The​dissimilarity​of​pasts​and​interlocutors​always​induces​two​opposing​temptations:​dispersion​and​centralization.​Our​peoples​have​suffered,​on​one​extreme,​atomization​like​that​of​Central​America​and​the​

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Antilles;​on​the​other,​rigid​centralism​like​those​of​Castile​and​Mexico.​ Dispersion​ culminates​ in​ dissipation;​ centralization,​ in​ petrification.​ Double​threat:​we​turn​into​air​or​we​turn​into​stones.​For​two​centuries​we​have​sought​the​difficult​equilibrium​between​liberty​and​authority,​centralization​and​disintegration.​The​nature​of​our​tradition​ has​not​been​very​favorable​to​these​efforts​at​reform.​The​eighteenth​ century,​the​century​of​criticism​and​the​first​which,​since​pagan​antiquity,​again​extolled​the​intellectual​virtues​of​tolerance,​did​not​have​ in​the​Hispanic​world​the​brilliance​that​the​sixteenth​and​seventeenth​ had.​An​example​of​the​persistence​of​authoritarian​attitudes​and​tendencies,​overlaid​by​liberal​opinions,​is​found​precisely​in​the​final​pages​ of​Galdós’s​novel,​which​I​have​mentioned​before.​An​important​person​ known​for​the​fervor​of​his​liberal​sentiments​maintains,​without​blinking,​that​“all​Spaniards​must​embrace​the​standard​of​liberty​and​accept​ the​progress​of​the​century​.​.​.​and​if​not​everyone​wishes​to​go​in​by​ this​road,​the​rebels​must​be​convinced​with​blows,​for​which​it​would​ be​advisable​that​free​men​be​armed,​forming​a​militia.”​This​curious​ liberal​was​a​devotee​of​Rousseau,​he​of​the​omnipotence​of​the​“general​will,”​a​democratic​mask​of​Jacobin​tyranny.​Armed​with​a​general​ theory​of​liberty,​Carlos​Garrote​enters​the​twentieth​century.​He​has​ changed​attire,​not​soul:​no​longer​does​he​intimidate​the​adversary​with​ the​rusty​syllogisms​of​the​scholastic,​but​rather​with​the​undulations​ of​the​dialectic.​New​chimeras​swallow​his​intelligence,​but​the​odor​of​ blood​continues​bewitching​him.​He​leapt​from​the​Inquisition​to​the​ Committee​of​Public​Safety​without​changing​location. ​ As​ soon​ as​ liberty​ becomes​ an​ absolute,​ it​ ceases​ to​ be​ liberty:​ its​ true​name​is​despotism.​Liberty​is​not​a​system​of​general​explanation​ of​the​universe​and​of​man.​Neither​is​it​a​philosophy:​it​is​an​act,​at​ the​same​time​irrevocable​and​instantaneous,​which​consists​in​selecting​one​possibility​from​among​others.​There​is​not,​nor​can​there​be,​ a​general​theory​of​liberty​because​it​is​the​affirmation​of​that​which,​ in​each​one​of​us,​is​singular​and​particular,​irreducible​to​any​generalization.​Better​said:​each​one​of​us​is​a​singular​and​particular​creature.​ Liberty​becomes​tyranny​as​soon​as​we​try​to​impose​it​on​others.​When​ the​Bolsheviks​dissolved​the​Russian​Constituent​Assembly​in​the​name​ of​liberty,​Rosa​Luxemburg​said​to​them:​“Liberty​of​opinion​is​always​ the​liberty​of​that​one​who​does​not​think​like​us.”​Liberty,​which​begins​as​the​affirmation​of​my​singularity,​turns​into​the​knowledge​of​the​

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other​and​the​others:​their​liberty​is​the​condition​of​mine.​On​his​island​ Robinson​is​not​really​free;​although​he​does​not​experience​the​will​of​ another,​and​no​one​constrains​him,​his​liberty​unfolds​in​the​void.​The​ liberty​of​the​solitary​one​is​like​the​solitude​of​the​despot,​populated​ with​ specters.​ To​ be​ realized,​ liberty​ must​ embody​ and​ come​ face​ to​ face​with​another​consciousness​and​another​will:​the​other​is,​simultaneously,​the​limit​and​source​of​my​liberty.​In​one​of​its​extremes,​liberty​is​singularity​and​exception;​in​the​other,​it​is​plurality​and​living​ together.​For​all​of​this,​although​liberty​and​democracy​are​not​equivalent​ends,​they​are​complementary:​without​liberty,​democracy​is​despotism;​without​democracy,​liberty​is​a​chimera. ​ The​union​of​liberty​and​democracy​has​been​the​great​achievement​ of​modern​societies.​Precarious​achievement,​fragile​and​disfigured​by​ many​injustices​and​horrors;​also​an​extraordinary​achievement​and​one​ that​has​something​of​the​accidental​or​miraculous:​other​civilizations​ did​not​know​democracy,​and​in​ours​only​some​peoples,​and​during​ limited​periods,​have​enjoyed​free​institutions.​Even​now,​in​the​vast​ spaces​of​the​American​continent,​many​nations​of​our​language​suffer​ under​iniquitous​powers.​Liberty​is​as​precious​as​water​and,​like​it,​if​ we​do​not​protect​it,​it​spills,​escapes​us,​and​disappears.​I​have​alluded​ to​the​relative​poverty​of​our​eighteenth​century,​origin​of​the​political​ philosophy​of​the​modern​age.​Nonetheless,​in​our​past—the​Spanish​ and​the​Hispano-​American—exist​habits,​customs,​and​institutions​that​ are​springs​of​liberty,​sometimes​buried​but​still​living.​In​order​for​liberty​truly​to​take​root​in​our​lands,​we​would​have​to​reconcile​these​old​ traditions​with​modern​political​thought.​Except​for​some​timid​and​ isolated​attempts,​we​have​done​nothing.​I​lament​it:​it​is​not​a​task​of​ historical​piety,​but​rather​of​political​imagination. ​ The​word​“liberal”​appears​early​in​our​literature.​Not​as​an​idea​or​a​ philosophy,​but​rather​as​a​mood​and​disposition​of​mind;​more​than​an​ ideology,​it​was​a​virtue.​In​saying​this,​I​turn​my​eyes​toward​Cervantes,​ our​writer​who​embodies​most​completely​the​different​meanings​of​the​ word​“liberal.”​With​him​the​modern​novel​is​born,​the​literary​genre​ of​a​society​that,​since​its​birth,​has​identified​itself​and​its​history​with​ criticism.​ The​ Comedy​ of​ Dante​ is​ the​ reflection​ of​ a​ world​ ruled​ by​ analogy,​that​is​to​say,​by​the​correspondence​between​this​world​and​the​ other​world;​the​Quixote​is​a​work​animated​by​the​opposite​principle,​ irony,​ which​ is​ the​ rupture​ of​ the​ correspondence​ and​ which​ under-

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scores​with​a​smile​the​crevice​between​the​real​and​the​ideal.​With​Cervantes​begins​the​criticism​of​the​absolutes:​liberty​begins.​And​it​begins​ with​a​smile,​not​of​pleasure​but​rather​of​wisdom.​Man​is​a​precarious​ being,​ complex,​ double​ or​ triple,​ inhabited​ by​ ghosts,​ spurred​ on​ by​ instincts,​eaten​away​by​desire:​a​wondrous​and​lamentable​sight.​Each​ man​is​a​singular​being​and​each​man​is​like​all​the​others.​Each​man​is​ unique​and​each​man​is​many​men​he​does​not​know:​the​I​is​plural.​Cervantes​is​smiling:​to​learn​to​be​free​is​to​learn​to​smile.

2 ​

Literature and the State (excerpt)

[​.​.​.​] The​Republic​of​Letters​is​a​nation​with​an​ill-​defined​ territory​and​shifting​frontiers.​A​constitution​rules​it​whose​laws,​fanciful​and​contradictory,​are​revoked​daily​in​order​to​proclaim​others​even​ more​chimerical.​An​invisible​king,​without​face​and​without​name,​governs​it;​better​said,​it​is​a​king​who​continually​changes​his​face​and​his​ name:​they​call​him​“taste”​but​he​also​has​other​names,​almost​all​ugly​ and​terminating​in​“ism.”​The​citizens​of​the​Republic​of​Letters​belong​ to​all​the​sexes,​those​recognized​and​those​not​recognized;​the​colors​of​ their​skin,​of​their​ideas,​and​of​their​philosophies​are​those​of​the​chromatic​scale;​each​one​of​them​claims​to​speak​in​a​language​of​his​creation,​which,​nonetheless,​he​insists​on​proclaiming​universal​and​comprehensible​to​everyone.​In​that​country​there​are​many​hermits,​many​ magicians,​and​not​a​few​ecstatics.​In​the​last​years​the​Republic​has​been​ devastated​by​two​epidemics:​the​frenetic​epidemic​of​doctrinaires​and​ the​lethal​epidemic​of​scholastics;​against​both​there​is​only​one​known​ remedy:​the​smile.​These​learned​ones​are​imaginative​and​contemplative;​also,​through​astral​misfortune,​quarrelsome​and​nitpicky.​When​ they​are​not​occupied​with​some​of​their​interminable​civil​wars,​they​ have​a​passion​for​more​subtle​phenomena​and​for​scarcely​perceptible​ realities:​the​weight​of​a​particle​of​light​on​the​wing​of​a​butterfly,​the​ color​of​the​shade​of​the​rings​of​their​planet,​Saturn.​An​extraordinary​ property​of​the​natives​of​this​nation:​their​illustrious​dead​converse​and​ live​side​by​side​with​the​living. ​ The​Republic​of​Letters​dwells​in​the​territory​of​the​Republic​of​ Mexico.​ At​ times​ it​ is​ larger​ than​ the​ country​ that​ contains​ it,​ other​ times​it​is​reduced​to​the​point​of​being​turned​into​a​small,​urban​ant​ Original​title:​“La​literatura​y​el​estado.”​Source:​Octavio​Paz,​Obras completas,​vol.​8,​ El peregrino en su patria​(Mexico:​fCe/Círculo​de​Lectores,​1994),​pp.​553–58. 548

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hill.​The​relations​between​the​Republic​of​Mexico​and​the​Republic​of​ Letters​are​strained.​At​times​scant​cordiality​turns​into​open​hostility.​ It​is​natural,​for​Mexican​literature​is​bounded​on​the​east​by​indifference,​on​the​west​by​ignorance,​on​the​north​by​another​dialect,​and​on​ the​south​by​an​abyss.​Various​stratagems​have​been​devised​to​break​the​ circle.​One​of​them​is​called​literary​prizes.​Like​everything​that​exists​ in​that​fanciful​Republic,​literary​prizes​have​provoked​great​and​fierce​ disputes.​I​will​try​to​handle​this​subject​with​some​impartiality. ​ Opinions​on​literary​prizes​are​opposed.​Some​consider​them​useful​ and​beneficial.​They​are​the​just​recognition​of​merits​that​are​not​only​ artistic​but​also​moral;​to​write​is​a​task​that​demands​something​more​ than​dedication​and​perseverance:​the​entire​life​of​the​writer.​Moreover,​ prizes​educate​the​people;​so​they​are​thus​at​the​same​time​pedagogical​ enterprises​and​acts​of​justice.​Others​see​the​prizes​as​competitions​between​peacocks,​sordid​fights​for​fame​and​material​gain,​irrefutable​and​ repeated​proofs​of​the​injustice,​the​stupidity,​or​the​incompetence​of​ the​academies​and​literary​guilds.​What​is​worse:​the​prizes​domesticate​ the​independent​writer,​cut​the​wings​of​the​inspired,​castrate​the​rebel.​ Who​is​right?​All​of​them​and​none​of​them.​The​prizes​are​good​and​ they​are​bad:​it​depends​on​who​awards​them,​who​receives​them,​and​ how​they​are​bestowed.​In​an​ideal​society​there​would​not​be​prizes,​ but​there​would​also​not​be​punishments:​both​would​be​unnecessary.​ Wisdom,​goodness,​and​artistic​genius​would​not​be​isolated​virtues​but​ rather​ widespread​ and​ natural.​ Each​ one​ of​ us​ would​ be​ an​ incarnation​of​rectitude,​poetry,​and​science;​every​living​creature​would​be​a​ masterwork.​But​in​that​society​of​perfect​men​and​women,​constitutions​and​institutions,​governments​and​courts,​the​arts​and​even​literature​would​be​superfluous.​We​write​because​we​lack​something​or​we​ have​too​much​of​something,​because​of​deficiency​or​because​of​excess;​ that​is​to​say,​because​of​an​imbalance.​We​read​for​the​same​reason.​ What​we​call​civilization​is​the​expression​of​the​congenital​imbalance​ among​men.​I​add​that​this​imbalance​is​creative.​Therefore,​as​long​as​ there​are​men​and​societies​there​will​be​authors,​readers,​critics,​and​ crowns​of​laurel​or​thorns.​Prizes​are​neither​good​nor​bad:​they​are​necessary. ​ Some​prizes​(for​example,​the​Alfonso​Reyes​Prize)​exemplify​the​ relations​between​the​state​and​literature.​In​the​long​history​of​these​ relations​appear,​from​the​dawn​of​human​society,​two​extreme​situa-

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tions,​to​which​also​correspond​two​opposing​sites:​the​cell​of​the​prisoner​and​the​antechamber​of​the​prince,​the​island​of​the​exiled​and​the​ drawing​room​of​the​courtier.​Two​types:​the​rebel​and​the​protégé.​The​ prize​introduces​a​third​term,​for​it​is​realized​in​a​place​of​encounter​ in​which,​although​fleetingly,​the​government​and​the​writer​intersect.​ The​prize​is​conducive​to​conversation,​I​mean,​to​the​dialogue​between​ power​ and​ literature.​ This​ dialogue​ can​ deal​ with​ different​ subjects,​ many​contradictory,​but​it​rests​on​an​implicit​agreement:​coexistence.1​ It​is​a​relatively​new​term​in​our​vocabulary​(it​does​not​appear,​for​example,​in​the​Diccionario de Autoridades,​1726–39),​which​presupposes,​ indirectly,​a​more​civilized​idea​of​human​relations.​In​effect,​to​coexist​ is​for​everyone​to​live​with​one​another,​and​it​demands,​simultaneously,​ independence​and​solidarity.​Coexistence​compels​us​to​reflect​on​the​ limits​of​our​liberty​and​the​extent​of​our​rights​and​obligations.​Those​ limits​have​many​names,​but​there​is​one​that​embraces​all:​the​other,​the​ others.​In​a​moment​of​that​dialogue​between​the​one​and​the​other,​certain​questions​arise:​what​can​the​state​do​in​the​presence​of​literature,​ and​what​can​literature​do​in​the​presence​of​the​state? ​ These​questions​have​had​many​and​very​different​responses.​It​would​ be​presumptuous​to​try​to​set​them​out,​or​even​to​summarize​them.​It​ is​not​presumptuous​to​set​out,​marginally,​a​few​brief​reflections.​The​ powers​of​the​state​over​literature​are​immense​but​not​unlimited.​I​will​ mention​some​possible​and​impossible:​the​state​cannot​create​a​literature,​but​it​certainly​can​suppress​it;​the​state​cannot​be​a​literary​critic,​ but​certainly​censor​and​inquisitor;​the​state​can​and​should​establish​ colleges​where​grammar​and​the​art​of​reading​and​writing​are​taught,​ but​ it​cannot​ legislate​ matters​ of​ grammar​or​dictate​ laws​ of​ aesthetics;​the​state​can​support​writers,​but​not​too​much​and​without​asking​ anything​in​return​from​them;​the​state​can​and​must​teach​Mexicans​ to​read,​but​it​must​not​compel​them​to​read​or​not​read​these​or​those​ books​.​.​.​The​list​can​go​on:​it​would​be​redundant.​It​is​enough​to​repeat​that​the​state​can​neither​create​nor​invent​a​literature,​but​it​can​ certainly​denaturalize​it​and,​as​has​occurred​in​other​countries​and​in​ ​ 1.​The​original​Spanish​word​is​convivencia.​English​has​no​exact​equivalent​for​convivencia,​which​means​more​than​just​living​side​by​side​(in​Spanish​this​is​coexistencia);​ convivencia​refers​also​to​the​ability​to​live​peacefully​and​in​an​agreeable​manner​with​ others.​(Translators’​note)

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different​times,​strangle​it.​On​the​other​hand,​the​state​can​create​the​ social​conditions​for​the​free​development​of​literature.​The​two​words​ are​ complementary:​ “development”​ means​ the​ promotion​ of​ the​ material,​intellectual,​and​legal​conditions​that​permit​the​production,​publication,​and​circulation​of​the​works;​in​its​turn,​development​needs,​to​ be​truly​realized,​the​freedom​to​write​and​publish. ​ In​the​presence​of​the​state,​the​powers​of​literature​are​also​immense​ and​limited.​The​writer​must​choose​between​literature​and​power:​he​ cannot​govern​and​write​at​the​same​time;​neither​can​the​writer​be​an​ official,​social​redeemer,​founder​of​hospitals​or​houses​of​refuge​for​ the​vulnerable,​apostle​of​repented​sinners,​hierophant​for​the​worship​ of​the​cult​of​Jupiter​Amon,​or​leader​of​a​band:​the​writer​must​choose​ between​ collective​ action,​ be​ it​ philanthropic​ or​ messianic,​ and​ solitary​writing.​Naturally,​it​is​good​that​the​writer,​at​some​moment​in​his​ life,​has​known​action​and​the​various​occupations​of​men:​captain​of​ cavalry,​usher,​conspirator,​ice​cream​vendor,​industrialist,​electrician,​ diplomat,​statesman​like​Milton,​or​highwayman​like​Villon.​But​then,​ in​the​moment​of​his​truth,​the​writer​can​be​only​a​writer.​Although​it​ is​not​obligatory​that​he​have​them,​the​writer​can​indeed​have​moral​and​ political​opinions:​what​he​cannot​do​is​exchange​literature​for​action,​ or​propaganda,​without​ceasing​to​be​a​writer.​I​am​not​proposing​the​ abolition​of​criticism;​I​ask​that​it​not​be​turned​into​an​admonishment​ and​that​it​truly​be​literature.​The​criticism​of​customs​and​ideas,​passions​and​beliefs,​institutions​and​the​state,​has​been​and​is​one​of​the​ dominions​of​modern​literature.​Many​and​great​literary​works​are​creations​that​are​criticism:​Cervantes,​Dostoyevsky,​Flaubert,​Proust,​and​ so​many​others.​Also,​sometimes​critical​thought​turns​into​artistic​creation,​poem:​Nietzsche​and​Valéry​as​the​nearest​examples.​Finally,​what​ the​writer​in​the​presence​of​the​state​can​do​is,​above​all​and​before​all,​ write.​I​emphasize:​write​the​best​that​he​can. To​write​well​means​to​tell​his​truth.​The​word​of​the​writer​is​not​the​ collective​word:​it​is​an​individual​word,​unique,​singular.​If​the​writer​ says​his​truth,​his​readers​will​find​that​this​truth​belongs​also​to​them.​In​ the​individual​word​of​the​writer​is​heard,​in​its​most​intense​moments,​ the​word​of​the​world.​This​has​been​said​many​times.​Among​those​who​ have​said​it​is​one​who​did​so​in​such​a​way​that​calling​it​perfect​is​not​ an​exaggeration:​Han​Yu,​a​Chinese​poet​who​lived​in​the​eighth​cen-

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tury.​He​was​a​public​man​and​a​private​poet.​His​words​seem​as​though​ written​today​and​for​us.​Nothing​better​than​to​conclude​with​them: Everything​resounds​as​soon​as​the​equilibrium​of​things​is​broken.​ The​trees​and​the​grass​are​silent;​the​wind​stirs​them​and​they​resound.​The​water​is​quiet:​the​air​moves​it​and​it​resounds;​the​waves​ roar:​something​subdues​them;​the​cascade​rushes​headlong:​it​lacks​ ground;​the​lake​seethes:​something​heats​it.​Metals​and​rocks​are​ mute,​but​if​something​strikes​them,​they​resound.​Thus,​man.​If​ he​speaks,​it​is​that​he​cannot​hold​himself​back;​if​he​is​moved,​he​ sings;​if​he​suffers,​he​laments.​Everything​that​comes​out​of​his​ mouth​in​the​form​of​a​sound​is​owing​to​a​breach​of​his​equilibrium​.​.​.​The​most​perfect​of​the​human​sounds​is​the​word;​literature,​in​its​turn,​is​the​most​perfect​form​of​the​word.​And​so,​when​ equilibrium​is​broken,​the​heavens​choose​between​men​and​those​ who​are​more​sensible,​and​it​makes​them​resound.

3 ​

Poetry, Myth, Revolution La Révolution comfirme, par le sacrifice, la superstition. —​Charles​Baudelaire

It​ is​ very​ difficult​ to​ express​ in​ few​ and​ clear​ words​ what​I​feel:​emotion,​gratitude,​surprise.​Above​all:​I​have​been​touched​ that​you,​Mr.​President,​have​had​the​goodness​to​deliver​the​Alexis​de​ Tocqueville​ Prize​ personally​ to​ me.​ I​ will​ never​ forget​ your​ gesture.​ Your​generous​words​heighten​my​emotion:​I​see​in​them​that​sign​of​ friendship,​precious​among​all,​that​sometimes​a​writer​addresses​to​another​of​a​different​tongue,​although​those​tongues​might​be​as​close​as​ Spanish​and​French.​My​gratitude​for​this​is​double:​to​the​man​of​state​ and​the​writer​of​French,​a​language​whose​literature​has​been​my​second​spiritual​land. ​ My​gratitude​to​the​jury​of​the​Alexis​de​Tocqueville​Foundation​is​ mixed​ with​ a​ slight​ and​ very​ agreeable​ sensation​ of​ unreality.​ When​ Mr.​Alain​Peyrefitte​had​the​kindness​to​announce​the​decision​of​the​ jury​to​me,​my​first​reaction,​I​confess,​was​of​astonishment​and​even​ incredulity:​why​me,​a​poet?​Very​quickly​I​suspected​the​reason:​at​one​ time​or​another,​moved​as​much​by​the​accidents​of​my​life​as​by​the​ changes​and​upheavals​of​the​world​and​of​my​country,​I​have​participated​in​public​life,​and​I​have​written​some​books​on​the​history​and​ politics​of​our​time.​Over​and​above​the​doubtful​merits​of​my​writings,​ I​imagine​that​the​Foundation​has​wanted​to​reward​in​me,​writer​from​a​ continent​frequently​torn​between​the​forced​immobility​of​despotisms​ and​the​convulsions​of​sectarians,​a​faithfulness.​In​effect,​I​have​always​ tried​to​be​faithful​to​that​attitude​that​the​work​and​person​of​Alexis​ ​ Original​title:​“Poesía,​mito,​revolución.”​Source:​Octavio​Paz,​Poesía, mito, revolución. Precedido por los discursos de François Mitterrand, Alain Peyrefitte, y Pierre Godefroy​ (Mexico:​Vuelta,​1989),​pp.​47–69. 553

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de​Tocqueville​exemplifies​and​that​can​be​summarized​thus:​my​liberty​ begins​with​the​recognition​of​the​liberty​of​others.​In​the​dawn​of​the​ modern​age,​before​a​spectacle​that​has​since​been​repeated​many​times:​ the​tyrant​disguised​as​liberator,​Chateaubriand​wrote​these​prophetic​ words: La​Révolution​m’aurait​entrâiné​.​.​.​mais​je​vis​la​première​tête​ portée​au​bout​d’une​pique​et​je​reculai.​Jamais​le​meurtre​ne​sera​à​ mes​yeux​un​argument​de​libert​je​ne​connais​rien​de​plus​servile,​ de​plus​lâche,​de​plus​borne​qu’un​terroiste.​N’ai​je​pas​rencontré​ toute​cette​race​de​Brutus​au​service​de​César​et​de​sa​police?1 Since​ my​ adolescence​ I​ have​ written​ poems,​ and​ I​ have​ not​ stopped​ writing​them.​I​wanted​to​be​a​poet​and​nothing​more.​In​my​books​of​ prose​I​intended​to​serve​poetry,​justify​and​defend​it,​explain​it​before​ others​and​before​myself.​Soon​I​discovered​that​the​defense​of​poetry,​ undervalued​in​our​century,​was​inseparable​from​the​defense​of​liberty.​From​this​my​passionate​interest​in​the​political​and​social​matters​ that​have​shaken​our​time.​After​the​Second​World​War​I​became​acquainted​with​André​Breton​and​his​friends.​I​do​not​share​today​many​ of​their​philosophical​and​aesthetic​ideas,​but​I​keep​intact​and​alive​my​ admiration.​In​his​writings​as​much​as​in​his​life,​liberty​and​poetry​appear​with​the​same​fiery​face,​simultaneously​seductive​and​turbulent.​ Nor​did​he,​like​Chateaubriand​at​the​other​extreme,​ever​confuse​the​ tyrant​with​the​liberator.​Liberty​is​not​a​philosophy,​nor​even​is​it​an​ idea:​it​is​a​movement​of​the​conscience​that​brings​us,​in​certain​moments,​to​pronounce​two​monosyllables:​Yes​or​No.​In​its​instantaneous​ brevity,​like​the​light​of​the​lightning​flash,​the​contradictory​character​ of​human​nature​reveals​itself. ​ Throughout​the​course​of​history​and​in​the​most​diverse​circumstances,​ poets​ have​ participated​ in​ political​ life.​ I​ do​ not​ refer​ to​ the​ concept​of​poetry​as​an​art​in​the​service​of​a​state,​a​church,​or​an​ideology.​We​already​know​that​that​concept,​as​old​as​the​political​and​ideo​ 1.​“The​revolution​had​pulled​me​along​.​.​.​but​I​saw​the​first​head​on​the​end​of​a​ pike,​and​I​drew​back.​I​will​never​see​in​murder​an​argument​for​liberty;​I​know​nothing​more​servile,​more​cowardly,​more​narrow​of​mind​than​a​terrorist.​Have​I​not​met​ that​entire​race​of​Brutus​in​the​service​of​Caesar​and​his​police?”​(Editor’s​note)

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logical​powers,​invariably​has​yielded​the​same​results:​states​collapse,​ churches​break​up​or​turn​to​stone,​ideologies​disappear—but​poetry​ remains.​No:​I​allude​to​the​free​participation​of​the​poet​in​the​affairs​ of​the​city.​Even​in​societies​that​did​not​know​political​liberty,​like​ancient​China,​poets​who​contributed​to​the​course​of​public​affairs​were​ not​rare.​Many​among​them​did​not​hesitate​to​censure​the​abuses​of​the​ Son​of​Heaven,​and​not​a​few​suffered​imprisonment,​exile,​and​other​ punishments​for​their​opinions.​In​the​West​this​tradition​has​been​very​ much​ alive,​ and​ I​ hardly​ need​ to​ evoke​ the​ Greek​ and​ Roman​ poets.​ Two​ of​ the​ greatest​ poets​ of​ our​ tradition,​ the​ Florentine​ Dante​ and​ the​Englishman​Milton,​were​also​notable​political​thinkers.​We​owe​to​ the​first​the​treatise​On Monarchy​and​to​the​second​daring​defenses​on​ behalf​of​the​emancipation​of​consciences,​such​as​his​famous​defense​ of​the​right​to​divorce​or​his​criticism​of​the​censure​decreed​by​Parliament,​which​he​had​the​courage​to​make​before​Parliament​itself. ​ These​historical​precedents​should​not​conceal​from​us​that​there​is​ a​major​difference​between​these​attitudes​and​the​situation​of​modern​ poets.​The​Chinese​poets​censured​the​throne​but​belonged​to​the​imperial​bureaucracy;​almost​all​were​high​officials,​and​censure​formed​ part​of​the​Confucian​moral​and​intellectual​tradition.​Dante​and​Milton​ found​themselves​involved​in​controversies​in​which​politics​was​indistinguishable​from​religion.​For​both,​the​foundation​of​their​opinions​ was​in​theology.​They​fought​in​this​world​with​their​eyes​fixed​on​the​ next​and​with​motives​that​came​from​that​other​world.​In​the​last​circle​ of​Hell,​at​the​side​of​Judas​Iscariot,​the​archtraitor,​Dante​put​two​enemies​of​the​empire:​Brutus​and​Cassius.​For​Dante​the​reality​of​this​ world​was​an​imitation​of​the​more​real​reality​of​the​other​world;​for​ this​reason,​political​offenses​were​judged​in​the​divine​tribunal.​In​the​ Greek​cities​and​in​the​Roman​Republic​the​influence​of​religion​was​ less;​the​questions​that​divided​citizens​were​clearly​political​and​were​ not​tinged​by​theology.​Nonetheless,​the​similarity​with​Greco-​Roman​ antiquity​is​deceptive;​a​central​element​is​lacking​in​it,​and​that​is​the​ distinctive​mark,​the​sign​of​the​birth​of​the​modern​age:​the​idea​of​ Revolution.​It​is​an​idea​that​could​arise​only​in​our​time,​for​it​is​heir​ to​Greece​and​Christianity,​that​is​to​say,​to​philosophy​and​the​yearning​for​redemption.​In​no​other​historical​period​has​the​idea​of​Revolution​ had​ that​ power​ of​ magnetic​ attraction.​ Other​ civilizations​ and​ societies​experienced​immense​changes—tumults,​dynastic​falls,​frat-

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ricidal​wars—but​only​their​great​religious​mutations​can​be​compared​ with​our​fascination​before​Revolution.​It​is​an​idea​that,​during​more​ than​two​centuries,​has​hypnotized​many​consciences​and​various​generations.​ It​ has​ been​ the​ North​ Star​ that​ has​ guided​ our​ wanderings​ and​the​secret​sun​that​has​illuminated​and​warmed​the​vigils​of​many​ solitary​persons.​In​it​have​been​fused​the​certainties​of​reason​and​the​ hopes​of​religious​movements. ​ From​ the​ moment​ in​ which​ it​ appeared​ on​ the​ historical​ horizon,​ Revolution​was​twofold:​reason​made​act​and​providential​act,​rational​ determination​and​miraculous​action,​history​and​myth.​Child​of​reason​ in​its​most​rigorous​and​lucid​form:​criticism,​in​the​image​of​revolution,​is​at​the​same​time​creator​and​destroyer;​better​said:​in​destroying,​ it​creates.​Revolution​is​that​moment​in​which​criticism​is​transformed​ into​utopia​and​utopia​becomes​incarnate​in​some​men​and​in​an​action.​ The​descent​of​reason​to​earth​was​a​true​epiphany,​and​as​such​was​lived​ through​its​protagonists​and,​later,​through​its​interpreters.​Lived​and​ not​thought.​For​almost​everybody,​the​Revolution​was​a​consequence​ of​certain​rational​postulates​and​of​the​general​evolution​of​society;​almost​no​one​realized​that​they​were​present​at​a​resurrection.​Certainly​ the​novelty​of​the​Revolution​appears​absolute;​it​breaks​with​the​past​ and​institutes​a​rational​regime,​just​and​radically​different​from​the​old.​ Nonetheless,​this​absolute​novelty​was​seen​and​lived​as​a​return​to​the​ beginning​of​the​beginning.​The​Revolution​is​a​return​to​the​time​of​ origin,​before​injustice,​before​that​moment​in​which,​Rousseau​says,​ in​designating​the​boundaries​of​a​piece​of​land,​a​man​said:​this is mine.​ That​day​inequality​began​and,​with​it,​discord​and​oppression:​history.​ In​sum,​the​Revolution​is​an​eminently​historical​act​and,​nonetheless,​ is​an​act​negating​history:​the​new​time​that​it​installs​is​a​restoration​of​ the​original​time.​Child​of​history​and​reason,​the​Revolution​is​the​child​ of​linear,​consecutive,​and​unrepeatable​time;​child​of​myth,​the​Revolution​is​a​moment​of​cyclical​time,​like​the​gyre​of​the​stars​and​the​cycle​ of​the​seasons.​The​nature​of​the​Revolution​is​dual,​but​we​cannot​think​ of​it​without​separating​its​two​elements​and​rejecting​the​mythical​as​ a​foreign​body​.​.​.​and​we​cannot​live​it​without​connecting​them.​We​ think​of​it​as​a​phenomenon​that​responds​to​the​predictions​of​reason;​ we​live​it​as​a​mystery.​In​this​enigma​dwells​the​secret​of​its​fascination. ​ The​modern​age​broke​the​old​link​that​bound​poetry​to​myth​but​ only​in​order​to​bind​it,​immediately​afterward,​to​the​idea​of​Revo-

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lution.​ This​ idea​ proclaimed​ the​ end​ of​ the​ myths—and​ thus​ it​ was​ converted​into​the​central​myth​of​modernity.​The​history​of​modern​ poetry,​from​romanticism​to​our​days,​has​been​nothing​but​the​history​ of​ its​ connections​ with​ that​ myth,​ clear​ and​ coherent​ as​ a​ geometric​ proof,​turbulent​as​the​revelations​of​the​ancient​chaos.​Connections​inflamed​and​extreme,​from​the​seduction​to​the​horror,​from​the​devotion​to​the​anathema,​from​the​idolatry​to​the​abjuration—the​entire​ gamut​of​the​two​great​passions:​love​and​religion.​The​enthusiasm​of​ Hölderlin​ before​ the​ young​ Bonaparte​ and​ the​ disillusion​ he​ feels​ in​ seeing​him​become​the​emperor​Napoleon,​the​Girondist​sympathies​of​ Wordsworth​and​the​abhorrence​that​Robespierre​inspires​in​him,​are​ just​two​examples​of​the​vacillations​of​the​German​and​English​Romantics​in​the​face​of​the​French​Revolution.​Those​violent​oscillations​are​ repeated​throughout​the​nineteenth​century​in​the​face​of​each​revolutionary​movement​and​culminate​in​the​twentieth​with​the​immense​ and​successive​waves​of​contradictory​sentiments—again​from​fanaticism​to​repulsion—that​the​prolonged​influence​of​the​Bolshevik​Revolution​stirred​up​in​the​world. ​ The​movements​of​adherence​that​all​revolutions​provoke​can​be​explained​in​the​first​place​by​the​necessity​that​we​men​feel​to​remedy​and​ put​an​end​to​our​unhappy​condition.​There​are​times​in​which​that​need​ for​redemption​becomes​more​intense​and​urgent​because​of​the​disappearance​of​traditional​beliefs.​The​old​divinities,​riddled​with​superstition,​vilified​by​fanaticism,​and​eaten​away​by​criticism,​disintegrate.​ Amidst​the​rubble​springs​up​the​tribe​of​the​specters:​they​appear​first​ as​radiant​ideas​but​soon​are​deified​and​turned​into​frightening​idols.​ Although​there​are​other​explanations​for​the​revolutionary​phenomenon—economic,​ psychological,​ political—all​ of​ them,​ without​ being​ false,​essentially​depend​on​this​basic​fact.​A​faith​that​arises​from​the​ vacuum​that​the​old​beliefs​have​left​and​that​is​nourished,​jointly,​by​the​ consciousness​of​our​misery​and​the​geometries​of​reason,​is​coriaceous​ and​resistant;​it​closes​its​eyes​with​obstinacy​equally​to​the​incoherencies​of​its​doctrine​and​to​the​atrocities​of​its​leaders.​In​this,​revolutionary​faith​is​like​religious​faith:​neither​the​slaughters​of​September​1792​ nor​the​butchery​of​Saint​Bartholomew​nor​the​concentration​camps​of​ Stalin​made​the​convictions​of​the​faithful​waver.​Nonetheless,​there​ is​a​difference:​revolutionary​beliefs​are​subject​to​the​proof​of​time,​ while​religious​beliefs​are​registered​in​another​world,​untouched​by​

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time​and​its​changes.​Revolutions​are​historical​phenomena,​that​is​to​ say,​temporal.​The​criticism​of​time​is​irrefutable​because​it​is​the​criticism​of​reality:​showing​without​demonstrating.​And​what​shows​is​that​ the​Revolution​begins​as​a​promise,​dissipates​in​frenzied​agitations,​and​ congeals​in​bloody​dictatorships​ that​are​the​negation​ of​the​impulse​ that​caused​it​to​arise.​In​all​revolutionary​movements,​the​sacred​time​ of​myth​is​inexorably​transformed​into​the​profane​time​of​history. ​ Hope​ is​ reborn​ after​ each​ failure.​ The​ enthusiasm​ of​ Shelley​ refutes​the​disenchantment​of​Coleridge,​and​Heine​writes​Of Germany​ in​order​to​respond​to​Madame​de​Staël​and​heap​ridicule​on​the​poets​ of​the​previous​generation,​who​had​initially​shown​sympathies​for​the​ French​Revolution​but​who​ended​by​being​its​enemies.​The​circle​of​adhesion–negation–adhesion​is​repeated​during​more​than​two​centuries,​ first​in​Europe​and​afterwards​in​the​entire​world.​The​poetic​word​has​ been​simultaneously​prophecy,​anathema,​and​elegy​of​modern​revolutions.​Although​the​differences​and​contrasts​between​the​two​great​ revolutionary​prototypes​(the​French​Revolution​of​1789​and​the​Russian​Revolution​of​1917)​are​greater​and​more​profound​than​the​similarities,​the​feelings​they​provoked​obeyed​the​same​emotional​rhythm​ of​attraction​and​repulsion.​Despite​the​fact​that​the​religious​function​ of​modern​revolutions​has​invariably​been​broken​by​the​eminently​historical​nature​of​those​movements,​the​result​has​been​the​rebirth,​in​the​ following​generation,​of​similar​aspirations​and​chimeras.​Or​the​adoption​of​personal​mythologies.​Here​appears​another​of​the​differences​ between​modern​poetry​and​that​of​yesterday:​ for​Dante,​the​Sacred​ Scriptures,​ axis​ of​ the​ universal​ analogy,​ were​ the​ key​ to​ his​ poem;​ Blake,​ by​ contrast,​ created​ a​ mythology​ with​ remnants​ of​ gnosticism​ and​ the​ hermetic​ tradition.​ Many​ poets​ arrived​ at​ the​ same​ solution,​ and​I​have​hardly​to​bring​to​mind​the​beliefs​of​Nerval​or​of​Hugo​and,​ already​in​the​twentieth​century,​the​theosophy​of​Yeats​or​the​occultism​ of​Breton.​The​reason​for​this​apparent​paradox​lies​in​the​following:​ the​public​religion​of​modernity​has​been​the​Revolution,​and​poetry​ its​private​religion. ​ The​criticism​of​revolutions​has​been​made​by​those​nostalgic​for​the​ old​order​and​by​the​liberals​(in​the​broad​sense​of​the​term​liberal:​more​ than​a​doctrine,​a​philosophical​and​political​disposition).​Contrary​to​ reactionary​criticism,​liberal​criticism​has​been​effective:​it​dismantled​

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the​ideological​constructions​of​the​revolutions,​it​pulled​away​the​religious​mask​from​them,​and​it​showed​them​in​their​historical,​profane​ nakedness.​ Liberalism​ did​ not​ intend​ to​ replace​ those​ constructions​ with​ others;​ the​ very​ nature​ of​ this​ intellectual​ tradition,​ essentially​ critical,​has​prohibited​it​from​proposing,​like​the​other​great​political​ philosophies,​a​metahistory.​Earlier,​this​had​been​the​domain​of​religions;​liberalism​offered​nothing​in​exchange​and​confined​religion​to​ the​private​sphere.​It​established​liberty​on​the​only​base​that​can​sustain​ it:​the​autonomy​of​the​conscience​and​the​acknowledgment​of​the​autonomy​of​other​persons’​consciences.​It​was​admirable​and​also​terrible:​ it​locked​us​into​a​solipsism,​broke​the​bridge​that​joined​the​I​and​the​ you​and​both​to​the​third​person:​the​other,​the​others.​Between​liberty​ and​fraternity​there​is​no​contradiction,​but​rather​distance—a​distance​ that​liberalism​has​not​been​able​to​erase.​What​would​be​the​foundation​for​fraternity?​Inspired​by​the​ancients,​Robespierre​and​Saint-​Just​ wanted​to​establish​the​solidarity​of​the​citizens​in​virtue.​Except,​what​ can​be​the​foundation​for​virtue?​The​Jacobins,​as​later​their​descendants,​the​Bolsheviks,​did​not​ask​themselves​this​question.​Better​said:​ their​response​was​virtue​by​decree,​the​Terror.​But​the​Terror​can​engender​only​two​irreconcilable​fraternities:​that​of​the​executioners​and​ that​of​the​victims. ​ Democratic​liberalism​is​a​civilized​way​of​living​together.​For​me​ it​is​the​best​among​all​those​that​political​philosophy​has​conceived.​ Nonetheless,​it​leaves​without​answer​half​the​questions​that​we​men​ask​ ourselves:​fraternity,​the​question​of​the​origin​and​purpose,​the​question​of​the​meaning​and​value​of​existence.​The​modern​age​has​exalted​ individualism​and​has​been,​thus,​the​period​of​the​dispersion​of​consciences.​Poets​have​been​particularly​sensitive​to​this​vacuum.​Around​ 1851​Baudelaire​writes​in​a​notebook: Le​monde​va​finir.​.​.​.​Je​ne​dis​pas​que​le​monde​sera​réduit​au​ desordre​bouffon​des​républiques​du​Sud​Amérique​ou​que​peut-​ être​nous​retournerons​à​l’état​sauvage.​.​.​.​Non,​la​mécanique​ nous’aura​tellement​américanisés,​le​progrès​aura​si​bien​atrophié​en​ nous​toute​la​partie​spirituelle,​que​rien​parmi​les​rêveries​sanguinaires​des​utopistes​ne​pourra​être​comparé​à​ses​resultats​positifs​ .​.​.​mais​ce​n’est​pas​par​des​institutions​politiques​que​se​manifes-

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tera​la​ruine​universelle​(ou​le​progrès​universel,​car​peu​m’importe​ le​nom).​Se​sera​par​l’avilissement​des​coeurs.2 ​ Ninety​years​later,​as​if​continuing​the​reflections​of​Baudelaire,​in​ one​of​his​Four Quartets,​Eliot​sees​our​world,​which​we​consider​moved​ by​progress,​as​the​interminable​fall​from​the​vacant​into​the​vacant: O​dark​dark​dark.​They​all​go​into​the​dark, The​vacant​interstellar​spaces,​the​vacant​into​the​vacant, The​captains,​merchants,​bankers,​eminent​men​of​letters, The​generous​patrons​of​art,​the​statesmen​and​the​rulers, Distinguished​civil​servants,​chairmen​of​many​committees, Industrial​lords​and​petty​contractors,​all​go​into​the​dark, And​dark​the​Sun​and​Moon,​and​the​Allmanach​[sic]​of​Gotha And​the​Stock​Exchange​Gazette,​the​Directory​of​Directors, And​cold​the​sense​and​lost​the​motive​of​action. And​we​all​go​with​them,​into​the​silent​funeral, Nobody’s​funeral,​for​there​is​no​one​to​bury.3 ​ I​could​add​other​testimonies,​but​it​seems​to​me​that​the​two​I​have​ cited​ are​ sufficient​ to​ illustrate​ the​ state​ of​ spirit​ of​ the​ poets​ in​ the​ face​of​the​disasters​of​modernity.​The​reflections​of​Baudelaire​and​the​ verses​of​Eliot​are​a​gloomy​counterpoint​to​the​enthusiastic​hymns​of​ Whitman​and​Victor​Hugo.​Both​are​examples​of​the​schisms;​better​ said,​of​the​rent​in​modern​poetry.​That​rent​is​the​mark​that​distinguishes​it​from​the​poetry​of​other​times​and​civilizations.​Suspended​ between​the​hands​of​time,​between​myth​and​history,​modern​poetry​ consecrates​a​distinct​and​much​older​fraternity​than​that​of​the​reli​ 2.​The​world​is​going​to​end.​.​.​.​I​am​not​saying​it​will​be​reduced​to​the​buffoonish​ disorder​of​the​South​American​republics,​or​that​perhaps​we​will​be​returned​to​the​ state​of​savagery.​.​.​.​No,​the​mechanism​will​have​Americanized​us​so​much,​progress​ will​have​atrophied​our​spiritual​faculties​so​completely,​that​nothing​among​the​bloody​ dreams​of​the​utopians​will​be​comparable​to​their​excellent​results​.​.​.​but​it​is​not​ through​political​institutions​that​universal​ruin​will​be​manifest​(or​universal​progress,​ because​ the​ name​ is​ not​ important​ to​ me).​ This​ will​ be​ through​ the​ degradation​ of​ hearts.​(Editor’s​note) ​ 3.​This​passage​is​in​English​in​the​original.​(Editor’s​note)

poetry,​myth,​revolution : 561

gions​and​philosophies,​a​fraternity​born​of​the​same​feeling​of​solitude​ the​primitive​had​in​the​middle​of​an​alien​and​hostile​nature.​The​difference​is​that​now​we​live​that​solitude​not​only​facing​the​cosmos​but​ also​before​our​neighbors.​Nonetheless,​we​all​know,​each​one​in​his​ room,​that​we​are​not​really​alone:​fraternity​over​the​vacant. ​ After​a​long​period​of​political​deadlock,​always​on​the​brink​of​the​ precipice,​always​in​the​presence​of​the​specter​of​a​new​total​war​and​ the​threat​of​the​annihilation​of​humankind,​we​have​been​witnesses,​ during​the​last​twenty​years,​to​a​series​of​changes,​portents​of​a​new​era,​ which,​perhaps,​is​dawning.​First,​the​sunset​of​the​revolutionary​myth​ in​the​very​place​of​its​birth,​Western​Europe,​today​recovered​from​the​ war,​prosperous​and,​in​each​one​of​the​countries​of​the​Community,​the​ liberal​democratic​regime​secured.​Following​this,​the​return​to​democracy​in​Latin​America,​although​still​wavering​between​the​specters​of​ populist​demagoguery​and​militarism—its​two​endemic​diseases—the​ iron​shackle​of​debt​around​its​neck.​Finally,​the​changes​in​the​Soviet​ Union,​in​China,​and​other​totalitarian​regimes.​Whatever​might​be​the​ scope​of​those​reforms,​it​is​clear​that​they​signify​the​end​of​the​myth​ of​authoritarian​socialism.​These​changes​are​a​self-​criticism​and​equivalent​to​a​confession.​For​this​reason​I​have​spoken​of​the​end​of​an​era:​ we​are​present​at​the​twilight​of​the​idea​of​Revolution​in​its​last​unfortunate​incarnation,​the​Bolshevik​version.​It​is​an​idea​that​survives​only​ in​some​regions​on​the​periphery​and​among​insane​sects​like​that​of​the​ Peruvian​terrorists.​We​do​not​know​what​the​future​holds​for​us:​virulent​nationalisms,​ecological​catastrophes,​rebirth​of​buried​mythologies,​new​fanaticisms,​but​also​discoveries​and​creations:​history​and​its​ entourage​of​horrors​and​wonders.​Nor​do​we​know​if​the​peoples​of​the​ Soviet​Union​will​become​acquainted​with​new​forms​of​oppression​or​ an​original​and​Slavic​version​of​democracy.​In​any​case,​the​revolutionary​myth​is​dying.​Will​it​come​back​to​life?​I​do​not​believe​so.​A​Holy​ Alliance​is​not​killing​it:​it​is​dying​a​natural​death. ​ Joyce​ said​ that​ history​ is​ a​ nightmare.​ He​ was​ wrong:​ nightmares​ disappear​ with​ the​ light​ of​ dawn​ whereas​ history​ will​ conclude​ only​ toward​the​end​of​our​species.​We​are​men​through​it​and​in​it;​if​it​ ceases​to​exist,​we​will​cease​to​be​men.​But​the​end​of​the​revolutionary​myth​perhaps​will​permit​us​to​think​anew​about​the​principles​that​ have​established​ our​society​and​about​their​deficiencies​ and​lacunas.​ Relieved,​finally,​of​the​struggle​against​totalitarian​superstition,​we​can​

562 : oCtavio​paz

now​reflect​more​freely​on​our​tradition.​Thus,​the​subject​of​the​virtue​ of​citizens​reappears.​It​is​a​subject​that​comes​from​Classical​Antiquity;​ it​preoccupied​Machiavelli​as​well​as​Montesquieu,​and​today​it​has​a​ painful​actuality​in​many​countries,​among​them​the​Anglo-​American​ democracy​based​on​the​Puritan​ethic.​Kant​taught​us​that​morality​cannot​be​based​on​history:​it​flows​without​ceasing,​and​we​do​not​even​ know​if​some​law​or​plan​rules​its​unpredictable​passing.​We​know​also​ that​the​metahistoric​constructions—be​they​religious​or​metaphysical,​ conservative​or​revolutionary—strangle​liberty​and​end​by​corrupting​ fraternity.​The​thought​of​the​era​that​is​beginning—if​an​era​is​really​ beginning—will​have​to​find​the​point​of​convergence​between​liberty​ and​fraternity.​We​must​rethink​our​tradition,​renew​it,​and​seek​the​ reconciliation​of​the​two​great​political​traditions​of​modernity,​liberalism​and​socialism.​I​venture​to​say,​paraphrasing​Ortega​y​Gasset,​that​ this​is​“the​subject​of​our​time.”​It​seems​to​me​that​our​days​are​auspicious​for​an​endeavor​of​this​significance;​in​some​contemporaneous​ works—for​example​in​that​of​Cornelio​Castoriadis—I​already​note​the​ beginning​of​a​response. ​ What​can​be​the​contribution​of​poetry​to​the​reconstitution​of​a​new​ political​thought?​No​new​ideas​but​rather​something​more​precious​ and​fragile:​memory.​Each​generation​of​poets​rediscovers​the​terrible​ antiquity​and​the​no-​less-​terrible​youth​of​the​passions.​In​the​schools​ and​faculties​where​the​so-​called​political​sciences​are​taught,​the​reading​of​Esquilo​and​Shakespeare​should​be​obligatory.​Poets​nourished​ the​thought​of​Hobbes​and​Locke,​of​Marx​and​Tocqueville.​Through​ the​mouth​of​the​poet​speaks—I​emphasize:​speaks,​not​writes—the​other​ voice.​It​is​the​voice​of​the​tragic​poet​and​that​of​the​buffoon,​that​of​the​ melancholy​solitary​person​and​that​of​the​fiesta,​it​is​the​guffaw​and​the​ sigh,​that​of​the​embrace​of​lovers​and​that​of​Hamlet​before​the​skull,​ the​voice​of​silence​and​that​of​tumult,​insane​wisdom​and​wise​insanity,​ whisper​of​confidence​in​the​bedroom​and​surge​of​the​multitude​in​the​ plaza.​To​hear​that​voice​is​to​hear​time​itself,​the​time​that​passes​and​ that,​nevertheless,​returns​transformed​in​a​few​crystalline​syllables.

Index Abasolo,​438 absolutism​preceding​liberal​revolutions​ in​Latin​America,​xvi–xvii absolutist​principles,​“old”​liberals​versus​ “new”​liberals​on,​397–401,​431–35 Academia​de​Nobles​Artes,​280 Adams,​John,​x,​xiv,​474 African​Americans​in​U.S.,​universal​suffrage​and,​477,​479 Alamán,​Lucas:​Altamirano​on,​317–18;​ biographical​information,​150;​Bustamante​administration,​as​part​of,​ 150,​153n2;​free​trade​and,​324;​as​key​ writer,​xxix;​on​restriction​of​vote​to​ property​holders,​xv,​169–74.​See also​ Bustamante​administration​(1829– 1832),​Alamán’s​critical​examination​of alcabalas​(internal​duties​and​customs),​ 322–23,​362 Alexander​VI​(pope),​donation​of,​9 Alexandria,​Museum​of,​520 Alexis​de​Tocqueville​Prize,​541,​553–54 Alfonso​Reyes​Prize,​541,​549 Allende,​438 Almovogates,​320 Altamirano,​Ignacio​Manuel:​amnesty​ after​civil​war,​speech​against,​299–306;​ biographical​information,​298;​independence,​speech​on​anniversary​of,​ 314–20;​as​key​author,​xxix;​on​martyrs​ of​Tacubaya,​303,​307–13;​as​“old”​liberal,​xxiv Álvarez,​General,​265,​302–3 ambition,​problem​of,​32–39,​203–4 amendment​of​constitution,​Otero’s​proposals​for,​233–34 America.​See​Latin​America,​liberal​re-

publican​tradition​in;​United​States;​ specific Latin American countries American​Indians.​See​indigenous​peoples​ of​Mexico amnesty​proposal​following​Three​Years’​ War,​299–306 amparo,​writ​of,​410 Anaxagoras,​522 Appleby,​Joyce,​xiv,​xxi Argentina,​483 Arista,​Mariano,​272n4,​459 Aristides,​53 Aristophanes,​319 Aristotle​and​Aristotelianism,​xvii,​30,​ 520,​522–23,​525,​526 armed​forces.​See​military Arriaga,​Ponciano,​33,​395,​476 Arteaga,​Eduardo​F.,​415 association/assembly,​right​of,​216,​279 El​Ateneo​de​la​Juventud,​518 Attila​the​Hun,​319 Augustine​of​Hippo,​288 Ayutla,​Plan/Revolution​of​(1854),​252,​ 263,​264,​266,​267,​272,​291,​296,​302–3,​ 322,​459,​483 Bagehot,​Walter,​493 balance​of​powers,​xxv–xxvi,​487–93 Balmes,​Jaime,​338 Barquera,​Juan​Wenceslao,​xxvn51 Barreda,​Gabino,​511 Barthélémy,​Joseph,​484n2,​488–89 Bases​Orgánicas​(1843),​233 Bassols,​Narciso,​507,​513 Baudelaire,​Charles,​553,​559–60 Bayard,​Pierre​Terrail,​seigneur​de​(Chevalier​de​Bayard),​305 563

564 : index Bayle,​Pierre,​76 Belisarius​(Flavius​Belisarius),​318 Bello,​Dionisio,​309 Benítez,​Justo,​406–7 Bentham,​Jeremy,​xixn34,​45,​74–76,​ 86–87,​98,​433 Berencer,​Justice Criminelle,​59n3 Bergson,​Henri,​518,​520 bicameral​system,​issues​relating​to,​ 171–78,​498 Bignon,​Louis​Pierre​Edouard,​baron,​94 Bitterness​Street,​341 black​people​in​U.S.,​universal​suffrage​ and,​477,​479 Blake,​William,​558 Blancarte,​José​María,​272n4 Bolivia,​xv Bonaparte,​Napoleon,​38,​52,​557 Bravo,​Nicolás,​14,​154n3,​438 Brazil,​483 Breton,​André,​554,​558 Brissot​de​Warville,​Jacques​Pierre,​x Britain:​citizen​meetings​or​councils​in​ public​houses​of,​126;​conservatism​ in,​402;​Constitution​of,​212,​222,​229,​ 394,​492;​education​in,​335;​emergency​ powers​in,​164;​parliamentary​system​ of​government​in,​487,​494,​497;​Tories​ and​Whigs​in,​97;​universal​suffrage​ in,​477,​478–80;​U.S.​government​and​ Constitution​originating​in​experience​ of,​156;​vagrancy​in,​346 Brito,​Rodolfo,​506 Bruni,​Leonardo,​xvii Brutus​(Caesar’s​assassin),​96,​303,​554 Bryce,​474 Buenabad,​Ángel,​311,​312 Buenrostro,​Felipe,​299 Burke,​Edmund,​85–86,​151,​152n1,​155,​ 157n6,​171 business​and​commerce,​government​support​for,​369

Bustamante​administration​(1829–1832),​ Alamán’s​critical​examination​of,​151– 78;​bicameral​system,​issues​relating​to,​ 171–78;​circumstances​and​objectives​ of,​153–55;​means​available​to​carry​out​ objectives​of,​153,​155–56,​162–69;​property​owners,​proposal​to​restrict​voting​ rights​to,​169–74;​U.S.​Constitution​and​ government​compared,​156–63,​165–67 Bustamante,​Anastasio,​14,​67n1,​139,​ 150–54,​159n7,​168,​321 Bustamante,​Carlos​María,​185 Caamaño,​301,​303 Calderón​de​la​Barca,​Pedro,​329,​446 Caligula​(Roman​emperor),​96 Calleja,​Félix​María,​438 Callejo,​General,​308 Calles,​Plutarco​Elías,​512n3 Calpulalpan,​republican​victory​at,​300,​ 301,​303,​307 Cardoso,​Mr.,​235 Carlos​I​(king​of​Spain),​117 Carlos​III​(king​of​Spain),​346 Carlos​IV​(king​of​Spain),​xvi–xvii Carlos​V​(Holy​Roman​Emperor),​103,​ 117,​316 Caro,​Elme-​Marie,​398,​421–23,​432–33 Carrel,​Dr.,​520 Cartagena,​Alonso​de,​xvii Casa​Mata,​Plan​of​(1823),​140–41,​142,​157 Casanova,​301,​304 Caso,​Antonio:​on​ancient​and​early​ modern​philosophy,​520–23;​biographical​information,​518;​on​democracy,​ 532–37;​on​fundamentalist​religion,​ 439;​on​German​idealism,​524–27;​on​ Hegel​and​Hegelianism,​523,​525,​526– 29,​534,​535;​on​Kant,​522–25,​527,​529,​ 531;​as​key​writer,​xxix;​liberty​and​law,​ on​relationship​between,​529–31;​on​ Scheler,​520,​535–40;​science​and​phi-

index : 565 losophy,​on​modern​advancements​in,​ 519–21;​university​politics​and,​506,​518 Cassius,​303,​555 Castelar,​Emilio,​382–84,​402 Castillo,​Severo​del,​302–3 Castoriadis,​Cornelio,​562 Catholic​Church.​See​Roman​Catholic​ Church Cato,​319 Central​American​Union/Provincias​ Unidas​de​Centro​América,​134n1,​472 Cervantes,​Miguel​de,​546–47,​551 Cervantes​Prize,​541,​542 Chacón,​301,​303 Charles​(kings​of​Spain).​See entries at​ Carlos Chateaubriand,​François-​René​de,​554 Chavarría,​General,​312 Chile,​403,​483 Cicero,​124,​221n8,​346 Cinna,​305 citizens,​civil​liberties​of.​See​civil​liberties​of​the​citizen citizenship,​amendment​of​Constitution​ of​1824​to​encompass​rights​of,​214–18 civil​authority:​ambition​and,​32–39;​civil​ liberties​of​the​citizen,​importance​of​ government​protection​of,​42–49;​laws​ of​exception​violating​limits​on,​52–53;​ limitations​on,​17–22,​41 civil​legislation​and​litigation,​Zavala​on,​ 129–31 civil​liberties​of​the​citizen,​40–49;​defined,​40;​despots,​expunged​by,​41–42,​ 45–49;​importance​of​government​protection​of,​42–49;​laws​of​exception​ eroding​(see​exception,​laws​of );​social​ contract​and,​40–41 civil​register,​Laws​of​Reform​establishing,​353,​360 civil​war​in​Mexico.​See​revolution​and​ civil​war​in​Mexico

Civil War​(Lucan),​169n12 Civil​War,​U.S.,​393,​394,​414 classes,​representation​by,​139 classical​democracy,​distinguished​from​ modern,​84 Coleridge,​Samuel​Taylor,​558 collectivism.​See​socialism/communism College​of​Agriculture,​280 Colmeiro,​347 Colocolo,​105 Colombia,​xiv,​472 colonial​period​in​Mexico,​Zavala​on,​ 102–12,​115–16 Columbus,​Christopher,​102,​288,​349 commerce.​See​economics communism.​See​socialism/communism Comonfort,​Ignacio,​262,​265,​303,​309,​ 318,​353,​452,​459,​483 Comte,​Auguste,​398 Condorcet,​Marie-​Jean-​Antoine-​Nicolas​ Caritat,​marquis​de,​x Confucian​tradition​in​China,​555 Congress.​See​legislative​branch Congress​of​University​Students,​502 Congressional Government​(Wilson,​1885),​ 488,​493n5 conquest​and​colonial​period​in​Mexico,​ 102–12,​316 conquest,​right​of,​10 conservatives​versus​liberals:​on​ambition​ of​public​men,​203–4;​on​changeableness​of​persons​and​systems​in​power,​ 204–5;​civil​war​in​mid-​nineteenth​ century​Mexico​and,​xxvi–xxvii;​on​ education,​280–84;​on​equality​as​principle,​193–94;​federal​representative​ system’s​appropriateness​for​Mexico,​ 191–96;​on​motives​for​Mexican​independence,​184–86,​197–99;​on​popular​ sovereignty,​192–93;​press​polemic​regarding,​181–82;​progressive​movement​​ and,​279–84;​on​religious​tolerance​

566 : index conservatives​versus​liberals​(continued) and​religious​freedom,​282–83,​285–90;​ unity​of​power,​concern​over​lack​ of,​186–90,​199–201;​on​veto​powers,​ 264–65;​work,​article​5​of​Constitution​ on​freedom​of,​391–405.​See also​“old”​ liberals​versus​“new”​liberals Considerations concerning the Greatness and Decline of the Romans​(Montesquieu),​ 50 Constant,​Benjamin,​xix–xx,​xxiii,​3,​18 La Constitución y la dictadura​(Rabasa,​ 1912):​on​adolescent​or​simplistic​conception​of​elections,​468–71;​on​classification​of​governmental​systems,​ 486–87;​composition​of,​467;​constitutions,​effects​of​persistent​action​ of,​491–93;​on​evolution​of​succession​ practices,​481–85;​legislative​branch,​ critique​of,​493–98;​on​parliamentary​ systems​of​government,​487,​492,​494;​ on​party​politics​and​elections,​471–76;​ on​presidential​or​American​system​of​ government​with​balance​of​powers,​ 487–93;​on​universal​suffrage,​476–81 constitutions​and​constitutionalism:​ amendment​of,​Otero’s​proposals​for,​ 233–34;​Bases​Orgánicas​(1843),​233;​ British​Constitution,​212,​222,​229,​ 394,​492;​Bustamante​administration​ and​U.S.​government​and​Constitution​compared,​156–63,​165–67;​criminals​and​Constitutional​rights,​Vigil​ on,​454–57;​factions​in​liberal​society​ not​about,​88–89;​French​Constituent​Assembly,​Constitution​of,​157,​ 175;​French​Constitution​of​1815,​212;​ French​Constitution​of​1848,​xxvi;​ French​Constitution​of​1875,​492;​ Gómez​Farías​on​need​to​convene​new​ constituent​congress​(1823),​138–49;​ homeland​obligations,​article​31​re-

garding,​411–12;​Latin​America,​liberal​ republican​tradition​in,​xiv–xv;​Mexican​Constitution​of​1824,​206,​209–14,​ 234–41,​266,​272,​289,​292,​458;​Mexican​ Constitution​of​1857,​xxvi–xxviii,​262,​ 269–73,​285,​291–97,​326–28,​330,​332,​ 356,​385–87,​388,​409,​459,​476,​491–92;​ Mexican​Constitution​of​1917,​xxviii,​ 517;​Mexico,​first​efforts​to​construct​ constitutional​system​in,​xxv–xxvi,​ 156–60,​172–78;​Otero’s​vote​on​constituent​congress​(1847),​207–41;​persistent​actions​of​constitutions,​effects​ of,​491–93;​rights​of​citizenship,​establishing,​214–18;​secondary​laws​conflicting​with​principles​of,​50–52;​ Seven​Laws​(1836),​210n3,​247,​269;​ slavery,​Mexican​abolition​of,​329–93,​ 411;​U.S.​Constitution,​17–18,​114,​156,​ 158,​212,​215,​491,​492;​work,​freedom​ of,​interpretation​of​article​5​of​Constitution​regarding,​391–93,​394–95,​ 404–5,​410–14,​419,​421.​See also​Laws​ of​Reform;​“old”​liberals​versus​“new”​ liberals;​Spanish​Constitution Contemporáneos,​501 Córdova,​Treaties​of​(1821),​145 corporations​and​corporate​rights,​xxii,​ xxvi,​114,​167,​169,​376,​464 El Correo de México,​298 Cortés,​Hernando,​103,​117–18 Cortes​of​1814,​143–45 Cos,​José​María​de,​185n2 Cosío​Villegas,​Daniel,​xxi,​xxii Costa​Rica,​134n1,​483 Council​of​the​government,​162–63 Cousin,​Victor,​523 criminal​justice​in​Mexico:​Constitutional​guarantees​and​criminality,​Vigil​ on,​454–57;​Laws​on​Reform​regarding,​360;​vagrancy​as​crime,​344–52;​ Zavala​on​state​of,​127–29

index : 567 Critique of Judgment​(Kant),​524 Critique of Pure Reason​(Kant),​523 Cromwell,​Oliver,​447 crucifixion​of​Jesus,​53 Cualpopoca,​316 Cuesta,​Jorge:​biographical​information,​ 501;​as​key​writer,​xxix;​on​new​clerical​ politics,​511–13;​on​political​dogmatism​ following​Revolution​of​1917–1920,​ 514–17;​on​university​politics,​502–8,​ 509–11,​513 Cumplido,​Ignacio,​182 Curso de política constitucional​(Constant),​ xx customs​and​laws,​relationship​between,​ 285–90 Dante,​318,​349,​546,​555,​558 Danton,​Georges,​44,​52,​309 Daunou,​Pierre​Claude​François,​28 day​laborers,​landless.​See​landless​ laborers Daza​Argüelles,​311,​312 de​Pradt,​Mr.,​142 Degollado,​Santos,​304,​308–9,​330,​438 democracy:​philosophy​of,​532–37;​union​ of​liberty​and,​546 Democracy in America​(Tocqueville),​221 Democritus,​522 Descartes,​René,​523,​524–25 despotism:​ambition,​destruction​of​liberty​via,​32–39;​civil​liberties​of​citizens,​expunging,​41–42,​45–49;​defined,​ 19,​52;​indigenous​peoples​and​ecclesiastical​authorities,​relationship​between,​108;​Latin​America,​association​ of​dictatorship​with,​ix;​as​law​without​ liberty,​531;​secondary​laws​violating​ constitutive​principles,​via,​50–52,​55 Diario de los debates. Sexto Congreso Constitucional​(1872),​326,​333,​344 Díaz​Cerna,​347

Díaz​Covarrubias,​Juan,​310,​311 Díaz,​Isidro,​301,​304,​313 Díaz,​Porfirio,​xxiv,​xxviii,​xxix,​321,​381,​ 395,​407,​442n1,​467,​483 Diccionario de Autoridades​(1726–39),​550 doctrinaire​constitutionalists​(“old”​liberals).​See​“old”​liberals​versus​“new”​ liberals Dolores,​cry​of​(1810),​184–85n1–2,​198,​ 199,​315,​436–39 Don Quixote​(Cervantes),​546 Don Simplicio,​242 Dostoyevsky,​Fyodor,​551 Durango,​College​of,​281 Duval,​Dr.,​310 Echávarri,​José​Antonio​de,​14,​138–39,​ 140n5 Eco Nacional,​279–82,​284,​285,​288–90 economics:​business​and​commerce,​government​support​for,​369;​free​trade,​ 112,​279,​323–25,​362,​xxixn56;​internal​duties​and​customs,​Prieto’s​proposal​to​abolish,​322–23,​362;​laissez faire,​adopted​as​political​philosophy,​ 280–84;​laws​of,​in​capitalist​and​communist​systems,​505;​Laws​of​Reform,​ on​national​finances,​361–65;​Ministry​ of​Economic​Development,​establishment​of,​280–81;​resources​and​population​necessary​to​sustain​independence,​15–16 Ecuador,​xiv education​in​Mexico:​boards​of,​339–40;​ freedom​of​instruction,​333–35,​337,​ 359;​history​of,​121–26;​Laws​of​Reform​ on,​359;​new​clerical​politics​and,​511– 13;​oral​lessons,​adequacy​of,​338–39;​ politics​and​philosophy​of​university,​ 502–8,​509–11,​513,​518;​progressive​​ movement​and,​280–84;​romantic​nonconformity​of​student​spirit,​510–11;​

568 : index education​in​Mexico​(continued) system​of​public​education,​335–43;​ vagrancy,​as​antidote​to,​351 Edward​VI​(king​of​England),​346 Einstein,​Albert,​519,​520 El​Salvador,​134n1 elections:​adolescent​or​simplistic​conception​of,​468–71;​citizen​involvement​ and​interest,​importance​of,​274–78;​ evolution​of​succession​practices​and,​ 481–85;​governmental​need​for​stability​versus,​470–71;​Latin​America,​ electoral​practice​in,​xv;​party​politics​ and,​471–76;​property​owners,​proposals​to​restrict​vote​to,​xv,​96–97,​ 169–74;​property​owners,​rejection​of​ restriction​of​elected​office​to,​221–22;​ reform​of​electoral​system,​proposals​regarding,​226–30.​See also​universal​ suffrage Eliot,​T.​S.,​560 emergency​powers:​Bustamante​administration’s​lack​of,​164–65;​in​Constitution​of​1857,​xxvi.​See also​exception,​ laws​of Empedocles,​522 encomiendas​and​encomenderos,​104,​107,​316 England.​See​Britain Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México, desde 1808 hasta 1830​(Zavala,​ 1831):​on​civil​legislation​and​litigation,​ 129–31;​on​colonial​period,​102–12,​ 115–16;​composition​of,​100;​conclusion​ to,​115–33;​on​criminal​justice,​127–29;​ on​education,​121–26;​on​honor,​131–32;​ on​indigenous​peoples​(see​indigenous​ peoples​of​Mexico);​introduction​to,​ 102–14;​post-​revolutionary​society,​ issues​in,​112–14;​on​property​distribution​and​landless​laborers,​104,​108–12;​ on​Roman​Catholic​church,​105–8,​114,​ 116–21

equality​as​principle,​conservatives​versus​ liberals​on,​193–94 Escalante,​Fernando,​xxii El Espectador Sevillano,​3,​77n6,​81n7 Espinosa​de​los​Monteros,​Mr.,​235 Esteva,​Sr.,​163 Ethics​(Spinoza),​523 La evolución política del pueblo mexicano​ (Sierra),​381 exception,​laws​of,​50–59;​Bustamante​ administration’s​lack​of​emergency​ powers,​164–65;​Constitution​of​1857,​ emergency​powers​in,​xxvi;​illegal​nature​of,​55–57;​limits​on​civil​authority,​ violating,​52–53;​no​justification​for,​ 53–55;​as​outside​the​law,​130;​public​ security​threatened​by,​57–59;​secondary​laws​contradicting​principles​of​ constitutive​law,​50–52 executive​branch:​checks​and​balances​ versus​strict​separation​of​powers,​ xxv–xxvi;​Otero’s​proposed​reforms​to​ Constitution​of​1824​regarding,​224–26;​ presidential​or​American​system​of​ government​with​balance​of​powers,​ 487–93;​U.S.​powers,​160–61 expression,​freedom​of,​23–31 factions,​88–99;​foundational​and​constitutional​issues,​importance​of​general​ agreement​regarding,​88–89;​inevitability​in​liberal​institutions,​88;​majority​opinion​versus,​92–94;​negative​ and​destructive,​90–99;​proper​subjects​ of​dispute,​89–90;​property​owners​ abstaining​from,​96–97 federalism,​xii,​137,​168,​206,​209–10 Federalist Papers,​xxv,​xxviin54 Fedro,​60 Felipe​II​(king​of​Spain),​117 Fernando​and​Isabel​(Catholic​monarchs​ of​Spain),​117

index : 569 Fernando​(Ferdinand)​VII​(king​of​ Spain),​9,​141n6,​143,​184n1,​185n2,​198 Ferrier,​M.,​245 Fichte,​Johann​Gottlieb,​525–26,​539 Filangieri,​413 Filisola,​Vicente,​14,​135 financial​issues.​See​economics Flaubert,​Gustave,​551 Fontana,​Biancamaria,​xviiin29 foreign​relations,​Laws​of​Reform​on,​ 360–61 Fox,​Charles​James,​220 France:​chambers​of​representatives​in,​ 494–95,​498;​conservatism​in,​394,​ 402;​Constituent​Assembly,​Constitution​of,​157,​175;​Constitution​of​ 1815,​212;​Constitution​of​1848,​xxvi;​ Constitution​of​1875,​492;​education​ in,​338;​martial​law​in,​164;​Mexico,​ intervention​in,​xxvi–xxvii,​242,​262,​ 321;​Revolution​of​1848,​319;​Saint​ Bartholomew’s​day​massacre​in,​557;​ Spain,​invasion​of,​184,​198;​strict​separation​of​powers​in,​xxv,​175;​system​of​ government​in,​488;​universal​suffrage​ in,​477,​478.​See also​French​Revolution​ of​1789 Francis​of​Assisi,​349 Franklin,​Benjamin,​319 free​trade,​112,​279,​323–25,​362,​xxixn56 freedom.​See​liberty​and​liberalism​in​ Mexico,​and​specific liberties French​Revolution​of​1789:​clergy​and,​ 318;​customs​and​laws,​relationship​between,​287;​denial​of​natural​rights​in​ pre-​revolutionary​French​society​and,​ 409;​Mexican​theories​of​liberty​and,​ xvii–xix,​xxv;​Mora’s​use​of,​18–19,​34,​ 44,​49,​52,​66,​95;​“old”​liberals​versus​ “new”​liberals​and,​394,​409,​432–33,​ 435;​poets’​responses​to,​557,​558,​559;​ Reflections on the French Revolution​

(Burke),​151,​155;​Zavala​on​colonial​ Mexico​and,​111 Frías​y​Soto,​Citizen,​340–43 Fritot,​413–14 Fuente,​C.​Juan​Antonio​de​la,​377 fundamentalist​religion,​439 Galileo,​30,​288 Gamboa,​Mr.,​323 García​de​la​Cadena,​Mr.,​330–32 García​Torres,​Vicente,​181,​391n1 Garza,​Juan​José​de​la,​308 Gayón,​347 general​power,​Otero​on​limits​of,​230–33 German​idealism,​524–27 Germany,​335,​343,​486–87 Ghibellines,​117 Girondists,​44,​557 Gladstone,​William​Ewart,​491 El Globo,​382 El Gobierno Constitucional, á la Nación​ (Juárez,​1859),​355 Godoy,​Manuel​de,​xvii Gómez​Farías,​Valentín:​biographical​information,​137;​education​and,​337;​as​ key​writer,​xxix;​Mora​in​administration​of,​3;​new​constituent​congress,​ 1823​argument​in​favor​of​convening,​ 138–49;​Prieto​and,​321;​revolt​overthrowing,​438n2;​Vigil​on​independence​of​Mexico​and,​438;​Zavala​in​ administration​of,​100 Gómez​Pedraza,​Manuel,​154n4,​164,​438 González​Ortega,​General,​303,​407 Gorostiza,​José,​501 The Government of Poland​(Rousseau),​ 217n5 Gracii,​77 Great​Britain.​See​Britain Greek​democracy,​distinguished​from​ modern,​84 Guadalupe,​Order​of,​270

570 : index Guadalupe,​Virgin​of,​198 Guatemala,​xv,​101,​134–36,​253 Guatimocine,​105 Guernica,​Tree​of,​328 Guerra,​François-​Xavier,​xvin21,​xxi–xxii Guerrero,​Vicente,​14,​67n1,​100,​150,​ 153–54n2–4,​438 Guillaumen,​338 Guizot,​François,​229 Gutiérrez,​303,​317 Guzmán,​Léon,​309,​395 Hale,​Charles​A.,​xi–xii,​xx–xxv,​xxviii Han​Yu,​551–52 happiness,​general​human​desire​for,​71 Harrington,​James,​xvii,​111 Hartmann,​Karl,​427 Hegel,​Georg​Wilhelm​Friedrich,​and​ Hegelianism,​523,​525,​526–29,​534,​535 Henríquez​Ureña,​Pedro,​518 Henry​IV​(king​of​France),​300,​303 Heraclitus,​522 Herrera,​José​Joaquín​de,​14,​206 Hidalgo,​Miguel,​of​Dolores,​184n1,​ 185n2,​198,​199,​436–39 Hippocrates,​339 Historia de Méjico​(Alamán,​1849–52),​150 Historia del Congreso Extraordinario Constituyente (1856–1857)​(Zarco,​1857),​251,​ 262,​291 Historia del Segundo Congreso Constitucional de la República Mexicana​(Buenrostro,​1875),​299 Historia moderna de México​(Villegas,​ 1955),​xxi Historia parlamentaria del Cuarto Congreso Constitucional​(Tovar,​1874),​325 historical​constitutionalists​(“new”​liberals).​See​“old”​liberals​versus​“new”​ liberals Hitler,​Adolf,​517

Hobbes,​Thomas,​427,​531,​562 Hölderlin,​Friedrich,​557 Homer,​105,​349 Honduras,​134n1 honor,​principles​of,​131–32 Horace,​152,​175–76 Huerta,​Victoriano,​467 Hugo,​Victor,​405,​558,​560 Humboldt,​Alexander​von,​ix,​xn3 Hume,​David,​90–91 Husserl,​Edmund,​520,​523,​525 Huxley,​Aldous,​501 Iguala,​Plan​of​(1822),​14,​140,​145,​188,​ 190,​198 immigration,​Laws​of​Reform​on​Mexican​encouragement​of,​367–68 Inclán,​Ignacio,​159 independence​of​Guatemala,​Zavala’s​vote​ on,​134–36 independence​of​judges,​xxiv,​60–67 independence​of​Mexico:​federal​representative​system,​appropriateness​of,​ 191–96;​legitimate​possession​of​land​ occupied,​8–12;​motives​for​independence​movement,​184–86,​197–99;​ “old”​liberal​meditation​on​anniversary​ of,​436–39;​population​and​resources​ necessary​to​sustain,​15–16;​from​principles​of​Spanish​Constitution,​5–8;​ speech​of​Altamirano​on​anniversary​ of​(1861),​314–20;​sufficient​enlightenment​of​peoples​claiming,​13–15;​unity​ of​power​and,​186–90,​199–201 independence​of​Texas​from​Mexico,​ 100–101 indigenous​peoples​of​Mexico:​during​ conquest​and​colonial​period,​104–8;​ ecclesiastical​authority​and,​105–8,​117– 18;​education​of,​122–23,​281;​landless​ state​of,​109–12;​lands​set​aside​for,​331;​

index : 571 languages​of,​254–55;​in​Mexican​consciousness,​544;​territorial​division​and,​ 251–55;​universal​suffrage​and,​477–78 The Individual and His Property​(Stirner),​ 528 individual​security,​laws​attacking.​See​ exception,​laws​of infrastructure,​Laws​of​Reform​on,​ 366–67 Inquisition,​106–7,​283,​545 Instituto​de​Ciencias​of​Oaxaca,​281 Instituto​de​Guadalajara,​281 Instituto​Literario​of​Toluca,​281 internal​duties​and​customs​(alcabalas),​ 322–23,​362 international​relations,​Laws​of​Reform​ on,​360–61 Isabel​and​Fernando​(Catholic​monarchs​ of​Spain),​117 Iturbide,​Agustín​de:​ambition,​Mora​on​ dangers​of,​38;​constituent​congress​ under,​139n3,​157n5;​on​education,​337;​ Gómez​Farías​and,​137,​142,​143,​144;​ independence​of​Mexico​proclaimed​ by,​14,​199,​438;​public​opinion​and​the​ general​will,​Mora​on,​77n3;​rebellion​ and​accession​to​power​of,​140–41n4–6;​ Treaties​of​Córdova​signed​by,​145n8;​ Zavala​and,​100 Jackson,​Andrew,​160,​474 Jacobinism,​xxiv,​xxviii–xix,​249,​469,​ 480,​545,​559 Jalisco,​Revolution​of​(1852),​272 Jane,​Cecil,​xii Jansenists,​119 Jefferson,​Thomas,​ix–xi,​473–74,​492 Jerome​(saint),​349 Jesuits​(casuists),​118–21,​281 Jesus,​crucifixion​of,​53 Jicotencale,​105

Jiménez​de​Cisneros,​Francisco,​316 Jovellanos,​Gaspar​Melchor​de,​xvi Joyce,​James,​561 Juárez,​Benito:​administration​of,​242,​ 258n2,​262,​321,​353–54;​Constitution​ of​1857​and,​xxvii–xxviii;​Instituto​ de​Ciencias​of​Oaxaca,​as​director​of,​ 281;​Law​of​Reform,​proclamation​of​ (1859),​353–54,​355;​Mateos​and,​309;​ “new”​liberals​on​Mexican​republic​ under,​395;​overthrow​of,​483,​497;​in​ Ramirez’s​“Letter​to​Fidel”​(1965),​259,​ 260;​religious​freedom,​declaration​of​ (1860),​372–77;​veto​power​and,​265;​ Vigil​on​independence​of​Mexico​and,​ 438 judicial​branch:​checks​and​balances​versus​strict​separation​of​powers,​xxv– xxvi;​civil​legislation​and​litigation,​ Zavala​on,​129–31;​criminal​justice​in​ Mexico,​Zavala​on​state​of,​127–29;​extraordinary​powers​made​independent​ of,​51;​independence​of​judges,​xxiv,​ 60–67;​laws​of​exception​altering​tribunals​and​forms​of​trial,​53–54;​Laws​ of​Reform​regarding,​358–59 juicio de amparo,​xxvi,​206 Julius​Caesar​(Gaius​Julius​Caesar),​96,​ 300,​303,​447,​554 Juridical and Social Philosophy​(Sauer),​528 Justice Criminelle​(Berencer),​59n3 Justinian​I​(Byzantine​emperor),​318n1,​ 339 Kant,​Immanuel,​522–25,​527,​529,​531,​562 Koskiusco,​Tadeusz,​319 Kossuth,​Lajos,​315,​319 La​Harpe,​Jean-​François​de,​124–25 La​Llave,​General,​308 Laboulaye,​Edouard​de,​xxiii–xivn49

572 : index Lafayette,​Gilbert​de​Motier,​marquis​ de,​xi Lafragua,​José​María,​xxix laissez faire,​adopted​as​political​philosophy,​280–84 landless​laborers:​in​colonial​Mexico,​104,​ 108–12;​Ramírez​on​slavery​of,​255–57 languages​of​indigenous​peoples​of​ Mexico,​254–55 Lanjuinais,​Jean​Denis,​comte,​89 Laplace,​Pierre-​Simon,​524 Latin​America,​liberal​republican​tradition​in,​ix–xx;​constitutions,​liberal​ basis​of,​xiv–xv;​dictatorship,​association​of​Latin​America​with,​ix;​historical​background​and​context​of​Spanish​ American​revolutions,​xv–xx;​independence​from​Spain,​adoption​of​liberal​ republican​form​of​government​after,​ ix;​scholarly​neglect​of,​xi–xiv;​U.S.​ founding​fathers’​skepticism​regarding,​ix–xi law​and​liberty,​relationship​between,​ 529–31 Laws​of​Reform,​353–54;​business​and​ commerce,​government​support​for,​ 369;​civil​register,​establishment​of,​ 353,​360;​constitutional​precepts,​Prieto’s​proposal​to​elevate​to​status​of,​ 326–32;​on​crime​and​internal​security,​ 360;​economic​measures​in,​361–65;​ on​education,​359;​on​foreign​relations,​360–61;​on​free​movement,​360;​ on​freedom​of​the​press,​360;​immigration,​encouragement​of,​367–68;​on​ infrastructure,​366–67;​judicial​branch,​ pertaining​to,​358–59;​on​military,​ 363–64,​366;​on​pensions,​363–64;​proclamation​of​(1859),​355–71;​reasons​for​ promulgating,​356–57,​369–71;​religious​ liberty,​establishment​of,​353,​358;​ Roman​Catholic​Church,​loss​of​privi-

leges​of,​331,​353,​357–58;​separation​ of​church​and​state,​353,​357;​statistics,​ gathering​and​dissemination​of,​369;​ territorial​property,​subdivision​of,​ 368–69;​Three​Years’​War​(1858–1861)​ and,​353–57,​369–70;​Vigil​on,​434,​440,​ 458–61 Laws​of​the​Indies,​104–5,​424 Lazcano,​General,​309 legislative​branch:​checks​and​balances​ versus​strict​separation​of​powers,​ xxv–xxvi;​civil​legislation​and​litigation,​129–31;​criminal​justice​in​Mexico​ and,​127–29;​critiqued​by​Rabasa,​ 493–98;​laws​of​exception​passed​by​ (see​exception,​laws​of );​Otero’s​proposed​reforms​to​Constitution​of​1824​ regarding,​219–24;​powers​under​first​ Mexican​Constitution,​167–68;​presidential​or​American​system​of​government​with​balance​of​powers,​487–93;​ public​opinion,​obligation​of​representatives​to​submit​to,​80–87;​in​U.S.,​ 165–67;​veto​power​and,​xxvii,​167,​175,​ 263–68 Leibniz,​Gottfried,​523 Lemus,​Mr.,​328 León,​330 Lerdo​de​Tejada,​Miguel,​319,​327,​354,​ 371,​483,​495 lèse-​nation,​43 “Letter​to​Fidel”​(Ramirez,​1965),​259,​ 260 “liberal”​and​“liberalism,”​Spanish​origins​of​terms,​xvii La Libertad:​“old”​liberals​and​“new”​liberals,​polemic​between,​xxiv,​381,​408;​ Sierra’s​publications​in,​382–84,​385,​ 388,​391,​401,​402;​Vigil​referencing,​ 416–22,​426–34,​444–47,​449,​451,​452 liberty​and​liberalism​in​Mexico,​ix–xxix;​ colonial​period,​102–12;​Hale’s​analysis​

index : 573 of,​xi–xii,​xx–xxv,​xxviii;​as​ideological​ issue,​xx–xxii,​xxviii–xxix;​key​writers​ on,​xxix​(see also specific authors by name);​law​and​liberty,​relationship​between,​529–31;​literature​and,​542–47;​ from​Mexican​War​of​Independence​ (1810–1821)​to​Mexican​Revolution​ (1910–1929),​xxii–xxviii;​in​postrevolutionary​period​(1929–2000),​xxviii– xxix;​traditional​political​structures,​ interaction​with,​xii–xiv,​xx,​xxiin46.​ See also​conservatives​versus​liberals;​ constitutions​and​constitutionalism;​ Latin​America,​liberal​republican​tradition​in;​“old”​liberals​versus​“new”​ liberals;​revolution​and​civil​war​in​ Mexico;​specific liberties Liceo,​281 Lista,​Alberto,​3 literacy​requirements​for​universal​suffrage,​476–77 literary​prizes,​541,​542,​549 literature:​liberal​tradition​and,​542–47;​ “The​National​Representation”​(poem;​ Ramirez,​1845),​243–50;​poets,​poetry,​ and​revolution,​553–62;​the​state​and,​ 548–52 Livy,​105,​124 Lloyd,​James,​x Locke,​John,​82,​131,​562 Lombardo​Toledano,​Vicente,​502,​510,​ 518 López​de​la​Plata,​Mr.,​135,​136 López,​Marcial​Antonio,​xxn36 López,​Narciso,​319 loyalty​oath​to​Spain,​11–12 Lucan,​169n12 Luxemburg,​Rosa,​545 Lycurgus,​286 Mach,​Ernst,​519 Machiavelli,​Niccólo,​427,​562

Madison,​James,​xxviin54 Magiscatzine,​105 Magyars,​319 Malebranche,​Nicolas,​121,​523 Marat,​Jean-​Paul,​34 Marín,​General,​308 Marión Delorme​(Victor​Hugo,​1831),​405 Marius,​305 Márquez,​Leonardo,​301,​308,​310,​312,​313 Martinez​Marina,​Francisco​Xavier,​83,​ 145–48 Marx,​Karl,​528–29,​562 Mateos,​Manuel,​309,​311 Maximilian​(emperor​of​Mexico),​xxvi– xxvii,​261,​308n1,​313 McKinley,​William,​489 Mejía,​General,​308,​310,​313 Merquior,​J.​G.,​xviin28 Mexican-​American​war​(1846–1848),​150,​ 181,​263 Mexican​Constitutions.​See under​constitutions​and​constitutionalism Mexico,​liberty​and​liberalism​in.​See​liberty​and​liberalism​in​Mexico military:​conscription/levy,​393,​410–11;​ France,​martial​law​in,​164;​honor,​ principles​of,​131–32;​Laws​of​Reform​ on,​363–64,​366;​National​Guard,​209,​ 216,​366;​pensions,​363–64;​permanent​ troops,​Zavala​on​problem​of,​113;​in​ U.S.,​393,​394,​414 Mill,​John​Stuart,​338,​398 Miltiades,​53 Milton,​John,​555 Ministry​of​Economic​Development,​ 280–81 Miramón,​Miguel,​303,​308,​310,​312 Miranda,​Francisco,​x Moctezuma,​9–10,​106,​245,​316 El Monitor Republicano:​Altamirano’s​ speech​on​anniversary​of​independence​in,​314;​polemic​between​El Siglo

574 : index El Monitor Republicano​(continued) XIX, El Universal,​and,​181–82,​183,​191,​ 197,​202;​Sierra​referencing,​391,​393,​ 397,​400,​401,​403,​404;​Vigil’s​publications​in,​408,​409,​415,​421,​426,​428,​ 431,​436,​440,​444,​449,​454,​458,​462 Montaño,​301,​303 Montesquieu,​Charles​Louis​de​Secondat,​ baron​de,​xivn13,​xixn34,​xxiii,​40,​42,​ 50,​93,​132,​214n4,​223n9,​245,​562 Montezuma.​See​Moctezuma Mora,​José​María​Luis:​Alamán​compared,​150;​ambition,​on​destruction​of​ liberty​via,​32–39;​biographical​information,​3–4;​Constant,​influence​of,​ xx;​education​and,​337;​on​freedom​of​ thought,​speech,​and​writing,​23–31;​on​ independence​of​judicial​power,​60–67;​ as​key​writer,​xxix;​on​limitations​of​ civil​authority,​17–22,​41;​religion​and​ public​morality,​cited​by​Vigil​on,​462– 65;​on​restriction​of​vote​to​property​ holders,​xv;​on​weakness​of​executive​ under​strict​separation​of​powers,​xxv.​ See also​civil​liberties​of​the​citizen;​ exception,​laws​of;​factions;​independence​of​Mexico;​public​opinion​and​ general​will Morales,​Juan​Bautista,​182 morality​and​religion,​relationship​between,​118–21,​462–66 Morelos,​438 Morse,​Richard,​xii–xiii,​xxii Moses,​286 movement,​freedom​of,​360 Mussolini,​Benito,​507,​517 Muzquiz,​Mr.,​138,​149 Napoleon​Bonaparte,​38,​52,​557 Napoleon​III​(French​emperor),​xxvi– xxvii National​College​of​San​Gregorio,​281

National Episodes​(Pérez​Galdós,​1881– 1885),​543–44,​545 National​Guard,​209,​216,​366 “The​National​Representation”​(poem;​ Ramirez,​1845),​243–50 Native​Americans.​See​indigenous​ peoples​of​Mexico Negrete,​Pedro​Celestino,​14,​138–39 El​Negromante.​See​Ramírez,​Ignacio Nerval,​Gérard​de,​558 new​clerical​politics,​Cuesta​on,​511–13 New​Granada,​xiv,​xv “new”​liberals.​See​“old”​liberals​versus​ “new”​liberals Newton,​Isaac,​529 Nicaragua,​134n1,​136 Nietzsche,​Friedrich,​520,​551 oath​of​loyalty​to​Spain,​11–12 oaths,​374 Obregón​González,​Citizen,​351,​352 El Observador de la República Mexicana,​3,​ 17,​23,​32,​40,​50,​60,​68,​88 obvenciones,​107 Ocampo,​Melchor,​301,​304,​305,​309,​330,​ 354,​371,​438 Oceana​(Harrington),​111 O’Donojú,​Juan​de,​145n8 O’Horan,​311,​313 “old”​liberals​versus​“new”​liberals,​ xxiii–xxiv,​381;​absolutist​principles,​ Sierra​on,​397–401;​absolutist​principles,​Vigil​on,​431–35;​conservatism​ of​“new”​liberals,​Sierra​on,​388–90,​ 402–5;​conservatism​of​“new”​liberals,​ Vigil​on,​440–43,​449;​Constitution​ of​1857,​opinion​of​“new”​liberals​on,​ 385–87,​388;​criminal​justice​and​Constitutional​guarantees,​Vigil​on,​454– 57;​French​Revolution​of​1789​and,​ 394,​409,​432–33,​435;​idealism​of​“old”​ liberals,​Vigil​on,​415–20;​impracti-

index : 575 cal​nature​of​“old”​liberal​laws,​Sierra​ on,​393–97;​independence​of​Mexico,​ Vigil​on,​436–39;​individual​rights​for​ all,​Vigil​on​“new”​liberals​as​rejecting,​421–25;​Laws​of​Reform,​Vigil​ on,​xxiii–xxiv,​381;​La Libertad,​Sierra​ on​program​of,​382–84;​natural​rights​ guaranteed​by​Constitution,​Vigil​on,​ 409–10;​presidential​elections​of​1880​ and,​406–7;​principles​of​“new”​liberals,​Sierra​on,​397–401;​principles​of​ “new”​liberals,​Vigil​on,​449–53;​revolutionaries​and​reactionaries,​Sierra​ on,​388,​401–2;​revolutionaries​and​reactionaries,​Vigil​on,​416–20,​427–29;​ scientific​method​of​“new”​liberals,​ Sierra​on,​402–3;​scientific​method​of​ “new”​liberals,​Vigil​on,​445–46,​448,​ 449,​451;​social​order,​Sierra​on​aims​ of​“new”​liberals​to​conserve,​402;​ social​order,​Vigil​on​aims​of​“new”​ liberals​to​conserve,​449–53;​strong​ government,​Sierra’s​“new”​liberal​ support​for,​403–7;​strong​government,​Vigil’s​“old”​liberal​questioning​ of,​444–48,​451;​tyranny,​Vigil’s​rejection​of​“new”​liberalism​as,​426–30;​ work,​article​5​of​Constitution​on​ freedom​of,​391–93,​394–95,​404–5,​ 410–14,​419,​421 Olmedo,​Father,​316 On Liberty​(Mill),​398 On Monarchy​(Dante),​555 Onofre​(saint),​349 opinion,​freedom​of,​23–31 Order​of​Guadalupe,​270 Ortega​y​Gasset,​527,​535,​562 Ortíz​Rubio,​Pascual,​512n3 Osollo,​303 Otero,​Mariano:​on​amendment​of​constitution,​233–34;​biographical​information,​206;​constituent​congress,​

vote​on​(1847),​207–41;​Constitution​ of​1824,​proposal​to​restore​with​reforms,​206,​209–14,​234–41;​on​electoral​ system,​226–30;​on​executive​branch,​ 224–26;​formal​plan​for​constitutional​ reform,​236–41;​as​key​writer,​xxix;​on​ legislative​branch,​219–24;​on​limits​to​ general​power​and​state​power,​230–33;​ on​rights​of​citizenship,​214–18;​El Siglo XIX​and,​182,​206 Owen,​Gilberto,​501 Pacheco,​Citizen,​335 Padilla,​316 Pagden,​Anthony,​xv–xvi Paley,​William,​82,​87,​131 Panama,​xiv Paraguay,​10 Paredes,​General,​269 parliamentary​systems​of​government,​ 487,​492,​494 Parmenides,​522,​523 Pascal,​Blaise,​121 Paz,​Irenio,​543 Paz,​Octavio:​biographical​information,​ 541;​as​key​writer,​xxix;​on​literature​ and​the​liberal​tradition,​542–47;​on​literature​and​the​state,​548–52;​on​poets,​ poetry,​and​revolution,​553–62 Peña​y​Ramírez,​476 penance,​doctrine​of,​119–20 pensions,​Laws​of​Reform​on,​363–64 Pérez​Galdós,​Benito,​543–44,​545 Pericles,​320 Perry,​Laurens​Ballard,​xxii La persona humana y el estado totalitario​ (Caso,​1941),​518,​519 Peru,​110,​483,​544,​561 petition,​right​of,​216 Petofi,​Sándor,​319 Peyrefitte,​Alain,​553 Phaedrus​(Plato),​522

576 : index philosophy:​ancient​and​early​modern,​ 520–23;​of​democracy,​532–37;​German​idealism,​524–27;​Hegel​and​Hegelianism,​523,​525,​526–29,​534,​535;​ Kant,​522–25,​527,​529,​531,​562;​modern​ advancements​in​science​and,​519–20;​ Scheler,​520,​535–40;​university,​politics​and​philosophy​of,​502–8,​509–11,​ 513,​518 Philosophy of Universal History​(Hegel),​ 535 Phocian,​53 physiocrats,​349 Piña,​Ismael,​301 Pitt,​William,​220 Pizarro,​Francisco,​484 Planck,​Max,​519 Plan​of​Ayutla/Revolution​of​Ayutla​ (1854),​252,​263,​264,​266,​267,​272,​291,​ 296,​302–3,​322,​459,​483 Plan​of​Casa​Mata​(1823),​140–41,​142,​157 Plan​of​Iguala​(1822),​14,​140,​145,​188,​ 190,​198 Plan​of​Tacubaya/Revolution​of​Tacubaya​ (1858),​xxvi,​483 Plan​of​Tuxtepec/Revolution​of​Tuxtepec​ (1876),​442,​483 Plato​and​Platonism,​346,​511,​512,​520,​ 522,​526 Plutarch,​124 Pocock,​J.​G.​A.,​xix poets,​poetry,​and​revolution,​553–62 Polybius,​396–97 popular​sovereignty,​conservative​ polemic​regarding,​192–93 population​and​resources​necessary​to​ sustain​independence,​15–16 Portes​Gil,​Emilio,​505 Portugal,​Dr.,​310 positivism,​xxiv,​381,​398,​408,​422n1,​432,​ 467,​511,​518

preemption​of​state​law,​230–33 presidency.​See​executive​branch,​and​specific presidents by name press:​conservative​versus​liberal​(see​conservatives​versus​liberals);​elections​ and,​277–78;​freedom​of,​23–31,​78–80,​ 98,​273,​360.​See also specific newspapers and journals Prieto,​Guillermo:​biographical​information,​321;​El Correo de México​and,​298;​ on​education,​333–43;​on​free​trade,​ 324–25;​on​freedom​to​work/not​work​ and​vagrancy​as​crime,​344–52;​on​internal​duties​and​customs,​322–23;​as​ key​writer,​xxix;​on​Laws​of​Reform​ (to​Constitution​of​1857),​326–32;​ Mateos​and,​309;​Ramirez​and,​242,​ 258,​298 Principles of Constitutional Law​(Bagehot),​ 493n5 progress​and​progressive​movement,​ 279–84 property​and​property​ownership:​ Church​property,​nationalization​of,​ 357–58,​364–65;​civil​legislation​regarding,​129;​colonial​Mexico,​property​ distribution​and​landless​laborers​in,​ 104,​108–12;​factions,​abstaining​from,​ 96–97;​indigenous​peoples​of​Mexico,​ lands​set​aside​for,​331;​proposals​to​ restrict​vote​to​property​holders,​xv,​ 96–97,​169–74;​restriction​of​elected​ office​to,​Otero’s​rejection​of,​221–22;​ slavery​of​day​laborers,​Ramírez​on,​ 255–57;​tax​on​transfers​of​property,​ abolition​of,​362;​territorial​division,​ Ramirez​on,​251–55;​territorial​property,​subdivision​of,​368–69 Proust,​Marcel,​551 Provincias​Unidas​de​Centro​América/ Central​American​Union,​134n1,​472

index : 577 public​morality​and​religion,​relationship​ between,​118–21,​462–66 public​opinion​and​general​will,​68–87;​ defined,​69–70;​factions​versus,​92–94;​ fixed​signs​of​formation​of,​determining,​74–80;​laws​of​exception​not​justified​by,​53–54;​liberty​as​most​essential​ character​of,​78;​obligation​to​submit​ to,​80–87;​Plan​of​Casa​Mata,​support​for,​140–41;​popular​voice​versus,​ 80–81;​significance​of​concept​to​any​ government,​68–69;​verification​of​uniformity,​problem​of,​70–74 Pythagoras,​522 Quevedo,​Francisco​de,​531 Quisteil,​110 Rabasa,​Emilio:​biographical​information,​467;​on​Constitution​of​1857,​ xxvii–xxviii;​as​key​writer,​xxix;​as​ latter-​day​scientific​constitutionalist,​ xxivn50;​as​“new”​liberal,​467.​See also Constitución y la dictadura Rafael​y​Vilá,​Rafael​de,​181 Ramírez,​Ignacio​(El​Negromante):​biographical​information,​242;​El Correo de México​and,​298;​as​key​writer,​xxix;​ “Letter​to​Fidel”​(1865)​on​representative​government,​258–61;​“The​National​Representation”​(poem,​1845),​ 243–50;​new​clerical​politics​and,​511;​ Prieto​and,​242,​258,​298;​on​slavery​ of​day​laborers,​255–57;​on​territorial​ division,​251–55 Ramos​Tritemio,​Pedro,​30 Ravaillac,​François,​303 La raza cósmica​(Vasconcelos,​1925),​ 511n2 Reflections on the French Revolution​ (Burke),​151,​155

Reform​War​or​Three​Years’​War​(1858– 1861),​xxvi–xxvii,​262,​269,​299n1,​307,​ 327,​353–57,​369–70,​459–60,​517 religion​and​public​morality,​relationship​ between,​118–21,​462–66 religion,​fundamentalist,​439 religious​tolerance​and​religious​freedom:​Constant’s​valorization,​Mexican​suppression​of,​xxn36;​customs​and​ laws,​relationship​between,​285–90;​ declaration​of​1860,​372–77;​Laws​of​ Reform​decreeing,​353,​358;​Mexican​ independence,​Altamirano’s​speech​on​ anniversary​of​(1861),​318;​progressive​ movement​and,​282–83;​Saint​Bartholomew’s​day​massacre,​557;​separation​of​church​and​state​in​Mexico,​353,​ 357.​See also​Roman​Catholic​Church representative​government:​appropriateness​for​Mexico,​conservative​doubts​ regarding,​191–96;​classes,​representation​by,​139;​classical​democracy,​distinguished​from,​84;​Gómez​Farías​ on​need​to​convene​new​constituent​ congress​(1823),​138–49;​“The​National​ Representation”​(poem;​Ramirez,​ 1845),​243–50;​Otero’s​proposed​reforms​to​Constitution​of​1824​regarding,​219–24;​public​opinion,​obligation​ of​representatives​to​submit​to,​80–87;​ Ramírez’s​“Letter​to​Fidel”​(1865)​on,​ 258–61;​town​and​municipal​councils,​ votes​granted​to,​139–40,​141–42;​unity​ of​power,​conservative​versus​liberal​ polemic​regarding,​186–90,​199–201.​See also​elections;​legislative​branch;​universal​suffrage La República,​307 El Republicano,​207 resources​and​population​necessary​to​ sustain​independence,​15–16

578 : index revolution​and​civil​war​in​Mexico,​ 207–10,​258–61;​absolutism​preceding,​xvi–xvii;​Ayutla,​Plan/Revolution​ of​(1854),​252,​263,​264,​266,​267,​272,​ 291,​296,​302–3,​322,​459,​483;​Dolores,​ cry​of​(1810),​184–85n1–2,​198,​199,​315,​ 436–39;​evolution​of​succession​process​ and,​483–84;​historical​background​and​ context​of​Spanish​American​revolutions,​xv–xx;​Jalisco,​Revolution​of​ (1852),​272;​Noria,​Revolution​of​the,​ 483;​North,​Revolution​of​the,​483;​ “old”​liberals​versus​“new”​liberals​on​ revolutionaries​and​reactionaries,​388,​ 401–2,​416–20,​427–29;​poets,​poetry,​ and​revolution,​Paz​on,​553–62;​political​dogmatism​following​Revolution​ of​1917–1920,​514–17;​Reform​War​or​ Three​Years’​War​(1858–1861),​xxvi– xxvii,​262,​269,​299n1,​307,​327,​353–57,​ 369–70,​459–60,​517;​Tacubaya,​Plan/ Revolution​of​(1858),​xxvi,​483;​Tuxtepec,​Plan/Revolution​of​(1876),​442,​ 483.​See also Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México revolution​in​France:​1789​(see​French​ Revolution​of​1789);​1848,​319 Revolutionary​War,​U.S.,​xviii,​15,​134,​414 Revue des deux mondes,​421–22 Reyes,​Alfonso,​518,​541,​549 Reyes​Heroles,​Jesús,​xxn39,​xxi,​xxv rights​of​citizenship,​amendment​of​Constitution​of​1824​to​encompass,​214–18 Rio​de​la​Plata,​xv Ripalda,​Jeronimo,​281,​350 Riva​Palacio,​General,​312 Robespierre,​Maximilien​de,​34,​44,​52,​ 66,​557,​559 Le Rôle du pouvoir exécutif dans les républiques modernes​(Barthélémy,​1906),​ 484n2,​488–89 Rollin,​Charles,​123

Roman​Catholic​Church:​civil​register,​Laws​of​Reform​establishing,​353,​ 360;​corruption​in,​283–84;​democratic​ opinion​and,​440;​education​in​Mexico​ and,​121,​122,​124;​independence​of​ Mexico,​Altamirano’s​speech​on​anniversary​of​(1861),​314–15,​316,​317–19;​ indigenous​peoples​in​colonial​period​ and,​105–8,​117–18;​influence​on​Mexican​society,​Zavala​on,​116–21;​Inquisition,​106–7,​283,​545;​monastic​houses,​ suppression​of,​357,​399–400;​nationalization​of​church​property,​357–58,​ 364–65,​460–61;​new​clerical​politics,​ Cuesta​on,​511–13;​possession​of​land,​ proclamation​of​Gospel​not​legitimate​ entitlement​to,​10;​public​morality​and​ religion,​relationship​between,​118–21,​ 462–66;​reform​policies​against​privileges​of,​xxvi,​xxvii,​3,​114,​318–19,​331,​ 353,​357–58;​Santa​Anna​backed​by,​ 459;​Tacubaya,​martyrs​of,​312,​313;​U.S.​ founding​fathers’​skepticism​regarding​ liberal​republican​tradition​in​Latin​ America​and,​ix–xi.​See also​religious​ tolerance​and​religious​freedom Roman​democracy,​84,​217,​221 romanticism:​French​Revolution​and,​557;​ student​spirit,​romantic​nonconformity​of,​510–11 Romero,​Matías,​259 Roosevelt,​Theodore,​489 Rousseau,​Jean-​Jacques,​xviii–xix,​18,​74,​ 217n5,​228n12,​397,​398,​422,​432,​545,​ 556 Ruiz​de​Alarcón,​Juan,​281 Ruiz,​Manuel,​309,​354,​371 Russia/Soviet​Union,​487,​528,​539,​545,​ 558,​561 Safford,​Frank,​xiin9,​xiv,​xv,​xvin19,​xix Saint​Bartholomew’s​day​massacre,​557

index : 579 Saint-​Just,​Louis​Antoine​de,​557 San​Juan​de​Letrán,​literary​academy​of,​ 281 San​Martin,​martyrs​of,​317 Sánchez,​Atilano,​337 Sánchez,​Dr.,​310,​311 sans culottes,​52,​95 Santa​Anna,​Antonio​López​de:​Bustamante​government,​overthrow​of,​150,​ 153n2;​clerical​support​for,​318;​dictatorship​of,​269–70,​272,​424,​458,​ 459;​Gómez​Farías​and,​137;​overthrow​ of,​252n2,​302,​483;​Plan​of​Casa​Mata​ (1823)​issued​by,​157n5;​press​under,​ 181–82;​rebellion​of​(1822),​140n5;​veto​ power​and,​263 Santo​Domingo​(Haiti),​slave​revolt​in,​ xviii Sauer,​Juridical and Social Philosophy,​528 Savigny,​Frederic​Charles​de,​xxiiin49 Scheler,​Max,​520,​535–40 Schelling,​Friedrich​Wilhelm​Joseph,​ 525,​526 School​of​Medicine​of​Puebla,​281 Schopenhauer,​Arthur,​427 science​and​philosophy,​Caso​on​modern​ advancements​in,​519–20 scientific​constitutionalists​(“new”​liberals).​See​“old”​liberals​versus​“new”​ liberals Scottish​party,​154n3–4 Sebastian​(saint),​349 Segur,​123 Semanario Político y Literario de México,​5 separation​of​church​and​state​in​Mexico,​ 353,​357 separation​of​powers,​xxv–xxvi,​175,​489 Seven​Laws​(1836),​210n3,​247,​269 Shelley,​Percy​Byssche,​558 Sherman,​William​Tecumseh,​393 Sierra,​Justo:​biographical​information,​ 381;​on​conservatives​versus​liberals,​

381;​on​Constitution​of​1857,​385–87,​ 388;​as​key​writer,​xxix;​La Libertad,​on​ program​of,​382–84;​as​“new”​liberal,​ xxiv,​381;​positivism​of,​381,​518;​on​ presidential​elections​of​1880,​406–7;​ Vigil,​polemic​with​(see​“old”​liberals​ versus​“new”​liberals) El Siglo XIX:​Otero​and,​182,​206;​polemic​ between​El Universal, El Monitor Republicano,​and,​181–84,​187,​188,​190–97,​ 202;​Prieto​and,​321,​323;​Vigil’s​articles​ for,​408;​Zarco​and,​182,​262,​269,​274,​ 279,​285 Simmel,​532,​533 Sismondi,​Jean​Charles​Léonard,​102,​117,​ 119,​221n7,​228–29 slavery,​Mexican​abolition​of,​329–93,​411 slavery​of​day​laborers,​Ramírez​on,​ 255–57 Smith,​Adam,​349 Sobieski,​John​III​(king​of​Poland​and​ grand​duke​of​Lithuania),​319 social​contract:​civil​liberties​and,​40–41;​ origins​of,​19–21 The Social Contract​(Rousseau),​228n12,​ 397,​398,​422,​432 socialism/communism:​Hegelianism​ and,​528–29;​human​person,​challenges​ posed​by​doctrine​to,​518;​rise​of,​501;​ romantic​nonconformity​of​student​ spirit​and,​510–11;​Scheler​on,​539;​university,​politics​and​philosophy​of,​ 502–8,​509–11,​513,​518 Socrates,​53,​520,​522–25 Solon,​245 South​America.​See​Latin​America,​liberal​republican​tradition​in;​Latin​ America,​liberal​republican​tradition​ in,​and​specific Latin American countries Southey,​Robert,​xvii–xviiin28 Soviet​Union/Russia,​487,​528,​539,​545,​ 558,​561

580 : index Spain,​oath​of​loyalty​to,​11–12 Spanish​America.​See​Latin​America,​liberal​republican​tradition​in,​and​specific Latin American countries Spanish​conquest​and​colonial​period​in​ Mexico,​102–12,​316 Spanish​Constitution:​arguments​for​ Mexican​independence​based​on,​5–8;​ corporations​and​corporate​rights​ under,​168–69;​Council​of​the​government,​appointment​of,​162;​Mexican​ adaptation​of,​114,​157–58;​in​Plan​of​ Iguala,​141n6 Spanish​Cortes​of​1814,​143–45 Spanish​origins​of​terms​“liberal”​and​ “liberalism,”​xvii Spartacus,​319 Spedalieri,​Nicola,​26 speech,​freedom​of,​23–31 “Speech​to​the​Electors​of​Bristol”​ (Burke,​1774),​85–86,​171n14 Spinoza,​Benedict,​523,​527 The Spirit of the Laws​(Montesquieu),​40,​ 214n4,​223n9 Staël,​Madame​de,​425,​558 Stalin,​Josef,​517,​557 the​state:​Laws​of​Reform​on​separation​ of​church​and,​353,​357;​literature​and,​ 548–52 states:​central​government,​Laws​of​Reform​relationship​with,​359–60;​federalism,​xii,​137,​168,​206,​209–10;​income​ of,​363;​limits​on​power​of,​Otero​on,​ 230–33;​presidential​or​American​system​of​government​with​balance​of​ powers​and,​490–91;​territorial​division,​Ramirez​on,​251–55 statistics,​gathering​and​dissemination​ of,​369 Stirner,​Max,​528–29 Stoics,​349

Suárez,​Francisco,​xvi Switzerland,​487 Tacitus,​23,​88,​124 Tacubaya,​martyrs​of​(1859),​303,​307–13 Tacubaya,​Plan/Revolution​of​(1858),​ xxvi,​483 Taft,​William​Howard,​489 Tagle,​Mr.,​139 Tantalus,​313 Tavera,​312 taxation:​internal​duties​and​customs​ (alcabalas),​322–23,​362;​Laws​of​Reform​on,​361–63;​resources​and​population​necessary​to​sustain​independence,​15–16 Terán,​Mr.,​135 territorial​division,​Ramirez​on,​251–55 territorial​property,​subdivision​of,​ 368–69 Texan​independence​from​Mexico,​100– 101 Thales,​539 thought,​freedom​of,​23–31 Three​Years’​War​or​Reform​War​(1858– 1861),​xxvi–xxvii,​262,​269,​299n1,​307,​ 327,​353–57,​369–70,​459–60,​517 Tocqueville,​Alexis​de,​xxiii,​206,​221,​244,​ 541,​552–54,​562 Tolstoy,​Leo,​520 Tovar,​Pantaleón,​325 Treaties​of​Córdova​(1821),​145 Tree​of​Guernica,​328 Trejo,​301 Tupac-​Amaro,​110 Tuxtepec,​Plan/Revolution​of​(1876),​ 442,​483 Tyrtaeus​of​Sparta,​258 United​Kingdom.​See​Britain United​States:​African​Americans​in,​477,​

index : 581 479;​bicameral​system​in,​175;​Bustamante​administration​and​U.S.​government​and​Constitution​compared,​ 156–63,​165–67;​checks​and​balances​in​ government​of,​xxv;​citizen​meetings​ or​councils​in​public​houses​of,​126;​ Civil​War​and​military​organization​ in,​393,​394,​414;​Congress​of,​493–95;​ conservatism​in,​402;​Constitution​of,​ 17–18,​114,​156,​158,​212,​215,​491,​492;​ education​in,​335,​336,​342;​founding​ fathers’​skepticism​regarding​liberal​ republican​tradition​in​Latin​America,​ ix–xi;​individual​rights​in,​394;​ Mexican-​American​war​(1846–1848),​ 150,​181,​263;​Mexico,​as​model​for,​114,​ 142,​156;​military​conscription​in,​393;​ political​parties,​early​history​of,​473– 75;​population​of​Mexico​compared​to,​ 15;​presidential​system​of​government​ in,​487,​488–91;​religious​freedom​in,​ 289–90;​Revolutionary​War,​xviii,​15,​ 134,​414;​universal​suffrage​in,​477,​479;​ vagrancy​in,​351;​veto​power​in,​266;​ Zavala​in,​100–101 unity​of​power,​conservative​versus​liberal​ polemic​regarding,​186–90,​199–201 El Universal:​Cuesta’s​publications​in,​502,​ 509,​514;​polemic​between​El Siglo XIX, El Monitor Republicano,​and,​181–84,​ 191,​193,​194,​196–98,​202,​203;​Zarco​on​ progressivism​and,​281 universal​suffrage:​Constitution​of​1824,​ Otero’s​proposed​amendments​to,​ 214–16;​disruptive​elements,​producing,​477–78;​indigenous​peoples​and,​ 477–78;​indirect​elections​versus,​275;​ in​Latin​America,​xv;​literacy​requirements,​476–77;​property​owners,​ proposals​to​restrict​vote​to,​xv,​ 96–97,​169–74;​public​opinion,​prob-

lem​of​lack​of​general​uniformity​in,​ 74;​Rabasa​on​reasons​for​qualifying,​ 476–81 universities.​See​education​in​Mexico utilitarianism,​75,​348–49,​399,​433–34 vagrancy,​as​crime,​344–52 Valens​(Valente;​Roman​emperor),​87 Valentinian​(Valentiano;​Roman​emperor),​87 Valéry,​Paul,​551 Valle,​Leandro,​304,​309 Vasconcelos,​José,​511–13,​518 Velasco,​Gustavo​R.,​xxixn56 Véliz,​Claudio,​xvii–xviiin28 Venezuela,​xiv,​xv Victoria,​Guadalupe,​154n3,​163n8,​164n9 Vigil,​José​María:​biographical​information,​408;​on​criminal​justice​and​ Constitutional​rights,​454–57;​on​independence​of​Mexico,​436–39;​as​key​ author,​xxix;​on​Laws​of​Reform,​434,​ 440,​458–61;​as​“old”​liberal,​xxiv,​381;​ on​religion​and​public​morality,​462– 66;​Sierra,​polemic​with​(see​“old”​liberals​versus​“new”​liberals) Villaurrutia,​Xavier,​501 Villemain,​Abel-​François,​221 Virgil,​105 Virgin​of​Guadalupe,​198 Vivanco,​marquis​of,​138–39 votes​and​voting.​See​elections;​universal​ suffrage Vuelta,​541 Warren,​Richard,​xv Washington,​George,​473 Weber,​Max,​525 Whitman,​Walt,​560 Wilson,​Woodrow,​488,​493 Wordsworth,​William,​557

582 : index work,​freedom​of:​article​5​of​Constitution​regarding,​interpretation​of,​ 391–93,​394–95,​404–5,​410–14,​419,​ 421;​vagrancy​as​crime​and,​344–52 writing,​freedom​of,​23–31 Xenophon,​346 Yeats,​William​Butler,​558 Yorkist​party,​100,​154n3–4,​159n7 Zamora,​330 Zaragoza,​438 El Zarco​(Altamirano),​298 Zarco,​Francisco:​biographical​information,​262;​on​Constitution​of​1857,​

269–73,​291–97;​on​elections,​274–78;​ Historia del Congreso Extraordinario Constituyente, 1856–1857​(1857),​251,​ 262,​291;​as​key​writer,​xxix;​laissez faire,​as​political​philosophy​of,​280– 84;​on​progress,​279–84;​on​religious​ tolerance​and​religious​freedom,​282– 83,​285–90;​El Siglo XIX​and,​182,​262;​ on​veto​power,​263–68 Zavala,​Lorenzo​de:​biographical​information,​100–101;​Guatemala,​vote​on​ independence​of,​134–36;​as​key​writer,​ xxix.​See also Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México Zuloaga,​Félix,​353 Zumárraga,​Juan​de,​254,​316

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