Liberalism and Democracy 9780860912699, 0860912698, 9780860919858, 0860919854

Citation preview

Liberalism and Democracy ----------------♦ ----------------

NORBERTO

BOBBIO

Translated by Martin Ryle & Kate Soper

V

VERSO London • New York

Univ. Library. UC Sar.ta Cruz 1990

F irst p u b lis h e d as Liberalismo e democrazia by F ra n c o A n g eli L ib ri, M ila n © F ra n c o A n g eli L ib ri 1988 T h is e d itio n p u b lis h e d b y V erso 1990 T h is tra n sla tio n © V erso 1990 A ll rig h ts reserv ed V e rso U K : 6 M e a r d S tre e t, L o n d o n W 1V 3 H R U S A : 29 W e st 3 5th S tre e t, N ew Y o rk , N Y 10001-2291 V erso is th e im p rin t o f N ew L eft B ooks B ritis h L ib ra r y C a ta lo g u in g in P u b lic a tio n D a ta B o b b io , N o rb e rto 7909L ib e ra lism a n d d e m o c ra c y . 1. D e m o c ra c y . L ib e ra tisi th eo ries I. T itle 321.8*01 ISB N 0-86091-269-8 IS B N 0-86091-985-4 p b k LrS L ib r a r y o f C o n g re ss C a ta lo g in g > in -P u b lic a tio n D ata B o b b io , N o rb e rto , 1 9 0 9 | L ib e ra lis m o e d e m o c ra z ia . E nglish) L ib era lism a n d d e m o c ra c y / N o rb e rto B o b b io ; tra n s la te d b y M a rtin R yle & K ate S o p er, p. cm . T ra n s la tio n of: L ib e ra lism o c d e m o c ra z ia . ISB N 0-86091-269-8. — ISB N 0-86091-985-4 (p b k .) 1. L ib e ra lism . 2. D em o cra c y . I. T itle . JC 585.B 5613 1990 3 2 6 .5 'I — d c2 0 P rin te d in G re a t B rita in by B ookcraft (B ath ) L td T ypeset in B a sk e n ille b y L c a p c r & G a rd L td . B ristol

SiS

bsioi ? -------------- H}:> Contents

CHA PTER 1

Classical and Modem Ideas of Liberty

1 CHA PTER 2

The Rights of Man

5 CHA PTER 3

The Limits o f State Power 11 CHA PTER 4

Liberty versus Power

15 CHA PTER 5

The Fruitfulness of Conflict 21 CHA PTER 6

Ancient and Modem Ideas of Democracy

25 C HA PTER 7

Democracy and Equality

31

CHA PTER 8

Liberalism’s Encounter with Democracy

37 CHA PTER 9

Individualism and Organicism

41 C H A P T E R 10

Liberals and Democrats in the Nineteenth Century

45 C H A P T E R 11

The Tyranny of the Majority

51 C H A P T E R 12

Liberalism and Utilitarianism

57 C H A P T E R 13

Representative Democracy

63 C H A P T E R 14

Liberalism and Democracy in Italy

67 C H A P T E R 15

Democracy as It Relates to Socialism

73 C H A P T E R 16

The New Liberalism

79 C H A P T E R 17

Democracy and Ungovernability

85 Notes

91

Classical and Modem Ideas of Liberty

T h e existence at the present tim e of regim es referred to as ‘liberal-dem ocratic’ or ‘dem ocratic-liberal’ suggests th at liber­ alism an d dem ocracy are interdependent. In reality, however, the relationship betw een the two is very com plex an d by no m eans one of continuity or identity. In the com m onest usage of the two term s, ‘liberalism ’ denotes a particular conception of the state, in w hich the state is conceived as having lim ited powers an d functions, an d thus as differing from both the absolute state an d from w hat is now adays called the social state; ‘dem ocracy’ denotes one of m any possible m odes of governm ent, nam ely th at in which pow er is not vested in a single individual or in the hands of a few, b u t lies with everybody, or rath er w ith the m ajority. D em ocracy is thus differentiated from autocratic forms such as m onarchy and oligarchy. A liberal state is not necessarily dem ocratic: indeed, there are historical instances of liberal states in societies w here participation in governm ent was highly restricted, an d lim ited to the wealthy classes. A dem ocratic governm ent does not necessarily issue in a liberal state: indeed, the classical liberal state now finds itself in crisis as a result of the progressive dem ocratization th at has followed on the gradual extension of 7

Liberalism and Democracy the franchise to th e point where it has becom e universal. In his com parison of m odem and ancient ideas of liberty, B enjam in C onstant (1767-1830) counterposed liberalism to dem ocracy, discussing the distinction betw een the two with som e subtlety in his celebrated address to the Royal A cadem y in Paris in 1818. T his provides a starting-point for tracing the history of the vexed an d controversial relations betw een the fundam ental dem ands th at have given rise to the contem por­ ary forms of the state in the m ost econom ically a n d socially developed nations: the dem and, on the one hand, th at pow er should be lim ited; an d on the other, that it be distributed. H e writes: The ancients aimed at a distribution of power among all the citizens of a given state, and they referred to this as freedom. For the moderns, the goal is security in their private posses­ sions. For them, liberty refers to the guarantees of these possessions afforded by their institutions.1 As a thoroughgoing liberal, C onstant held that these two aim s were m utually incom patible. W here everyone partici­ pates directly in collective decisions, the individual ends up being subordinated to the authority of the whole, and loses his liberty as a private person; an d it is private liberty which the citizen today dem ands of public power. H ence, he concludes: We today are no longer able to enjoy the liberty of the ancients, which consisted in their continual and active partici­ pation in collective power. O ur freedom, by contrast, must reside in the peaceful enjoyment of private independence.2 A lthough C onstant cites the ancients, his argum ent is directed at a figure closer in tim e: Jean -Jacq u es Rousseau. T h e a u th o r of The Social Contract, draw ing heavily on classical authors, had in fact envisaged a republic in which sovereign power, once constituted by universal voluntary agreem ent, w ould becom e infallible and ‘need give no guarantee to its 2

Classical and Modem Ideas of Liberty subjects, because it is im possible for the body to wish to h u rt all its m em b ers’.3 T o be sure, R ousseau never took the arg u m ent of the general will so far as to deny the necessity of lim iting state power: it is as misconceived as it is com m on­ place to charge him with being the founder of ‘totalitarian dem ocracy’. A lthough he m aintained that the social pact endow s the body politic with an absolute power, he also insisted th at ‘the sovereign, for its part, cannot im pose upon its subjects any fetters th at are useless to the com m unity’.4 It is true, however, that these limits are not established prior to the b irth of the state, as is the case in the doctrine of natural rights w hich provides the core of the thinking behind the liberal state. R ousseau, indeed, while he adm its that ‘each m an alienates . . . by the social contract, only such part of his powers . . . as it is im portant for the com m unity to control’, concludes nonetheless th at ‘it m ust also be granted that the Sovereign is sole ju d g e of w hat is im p o rtan t’.5

3

The Rights of Man

T h e philosophical presupposition of the liberal state, u n d er­ stood as the lim ited state and counterposed to the absolute state, is to be found in the doctrine of natural rights developed by the school of natural rights (or natural law). T his holds that m an - all persons w ithout exception - possesses by nature, and thus irrespective of his own will and still m ore so of the will of one or a few others, certain fundam ental rights, such as the right to life, liberty, security and happiness. T he state, or m ore concretely those who at a given tim e enjoy the legitim ate power to enforce obedience to their com m ands, m u st respect these rights, m ust not infringe them and m ust guarantee them against any possible transgression by others. T o attribute a right to som eone is to recognize that the individual in question has the capacity to act or not to act ju st as he pleases, an d also the power to resist, availing him self in the last instance of the use of force (his own or others’), against whoever m ay trans­ gress that right: so that potential transgressors have in tu rn a duty (or obligation) to abstain from any action which m ight interfere in any way w ith this capacity to act or not to act. ‘R ights’ and ‘duties’ are notions carrying prescriptive force, and as such they presuppose the existence of a norm o r rule of

Liberalism and Democracy conduct which in the sam e m om ent as it recognizes the capacity of the subject to act or n o t act as he pleases also requires everyone else to abstain from all acts which m ight in any way h in d er the exercise of that capacity. O n e m ight define the natural law doctrine as asserting the existence of laws not established by h u m an will, an d w hich accordingly precede the form ation of any social group: such laws can be ascertained by rational enquiry, an d from them , as from all m oral o r juridical laws, rights an d duties derive w hich, in virtue of their deri­ vation from a natural law, are n atural rights an d duties. W e have spoken of the doctrine of n atu ral law as the ‘philosophi­ cal’ presupposition of liberalism because it serves to establish th e limits of pow er on the basis of a general an d hypothetical conception of the nature of m an, w hich dispenses w ith any kind of em pirical verification a n d historical proof. In his second Treatise of Government, Locke, one of the fathers of m o d em liberalism , takes as his starting-point the state of n atu re which he describes as a state of perfect liberty and equality, governed by a law of n a tu re which ‘teaches all m an k in d who will b u t consult it, that being all equal and ind ep en dent, no one m ight do h arm to another in his life, health, liberty or possessions’.6 T h is description is the outcom e of an im aginary reconstruc­ tion of a presum ed original state of m an, and its sole purpose is to allow Locke a good reason to justify lim iting the pow er of th e state. T h e doctrine of natural rights in fact underlies the N o rth A m erican D eclaration of Independence (1776) and the D eclaration of the Rights of M an of the French Revolution (1789), in both of which we find an affirm ation of the funda­ m ental principle of the liberal state as a lim ited state: ‘T h e aim of every political association is the preservation of the natural a n d im prescriptible rights of m a n ’ (Article Tw o of the D eclar­ ation of the Rights of M an and of the Citizen, 1789). As a theory variously developed by philosophers, theolo­ gians an d jurists, the doctrine of the rights of m an can be regarded as a later rationalization of the state of affairs 6

The Rights of Man resulting from the struggle m any centuries earlier, especially in E ngland, betw een the king and other social forces. In the M agna C arta, to which King J o h n yielded his consent in 1215, we find a recognition of w hat in future centuries were to be called the ‘rights of m an ’: these are designated as ‘liberties’ (libertates, franchises, freedoms), or as recognized spheres of individual action and property in goods which are protected against the coercive pow er of the king. A lthough the charter an d its successors m ay have taken the juridical form of sovereign concessions, they were in reality the outcom e of a genuine pact betw een opposing parties. T h e pact, com m only know n as the pactum subjectionis, concerns reciprocal rights and duties in the political relationship: in the relationship, that is, betw een the duty (of the sovereign) to protect and the duty (of the subject) to obey (his so-called ‘political obligation’). T he principal object of a charter of ‘liberties’ is to define forms and limits of obedience, or, in other words, of the subject’s political obligation and the corresponding forms and limits of the sovereign’s right to com m and. T hese ancient charters, like the constitutional charters granted - octroyées - by constitutional m onarchies during the restoration period and since (which include the A lbertine constitution of 1848), adm ittedly take the juridical lorm of a unilateral concession on the part of the m onarch, even though in reality they are the result of bilateral accord. However, this is no m ore than a typical legal fiction, whose purpose is to safeguard the principle of the king’s suprem acy and to ensure the m aintenance of the m onarchical form of governm ent, despite the lim itations actually im posed on the traditional powers of the holder of suprem e power. H ere, too, of course, we have another instance of a reverse presentation of the sequence betw een the historical events and the juridical agreem ent and rational justification to which they give rise: historically, the liberal state was the outcom e of a continual and ever-growing erosion of the sovereign’s absolute power, and of the revolutionary ru p tu re which occurred in historical periods of sharper crisis (such as the seventeenth 7

Liberalism and Democracy century in E ngland an d the late eighteenth century in France); rationally, it was justified as the outcom e of an accord betw een individuals w ho are initially free a n d w ho come together to establish the bonds essential to a p erm anent and peaceful coexistence. T h e course of history led from an initial state of servitude, by way of a gradual process of liberalization, to the conquest by the subject of growing areas of liberty, b u t the doctrine proceeds in the opposite direction: only by taking as its starting-point a hypothetical initial state of liberty, and conceiving of m an as naturally free, does it arrive at the construction of a political society as a society in which sover­ eignty is lim ited. T h u s it is th at the doctrine - here the doctrine of natural rights - inverts the course of historical events, treating as origin or foundation, as prius, that which is historically the result, which occurs poslerius. T h ere is a close connection betw een the assertion of natural rights an d the theory of the social contract, or contract theory. T h e idea th at the exercise of political pow er is legitim ate only if it is founded on the consent of those who are subject to it (another of Locke’s theses), an d thus that it is based on an agreem ent among those w ho decide to subject themselves to a higher pow er and with those to w hom the exercise of pow er is entrusted, derives from the postulate that individuals possess rights not d ependent on the institution of sovereignty and that the chief function of that institution is to allow the fullest possible realization of those rights com patible with secure social life. T h e connecting link betw een the doctrine of the rights of m an an d contract theory is the individualistic concep­ tion of society they hold in com m on: a conception according to which the particular individual, with his interests and needs, which take the form of rights in virtue of the acceptance of a hypothetical law of nature, com es first and precedes the establishm ent of society. T his contrasts with the organicist conception, in all its various guises, which takes the opposite view, seeing society as prior to the individual, or the social whole as taking precedence over its parts (in the Aristotelian 8

The Rights of Man form ulation which had so enduring an influence). M odem co n tract theory is a real turning-point in the history of political th o u g h t, dom inated as it had been by the organic idea, insofar as th e contract theorists reversed the relationship betw een individual and society, and no longer saw society as a natural fact existing independently of the will of individuals, b u t as an artificial body, created by individuals in their own im age and likeness to prom ote the satisfaction of their own interests and needs an d the fullest exercise of their rights. T h e agreem ent w hich gives birth to the state is in tu rn viewed as possible, according to the theory of natural right, in virtue of the law of n a tu re w hich attributes to all individuals certain natural rights th at can be enjoyed only in the context of the free an d ordered form of coexistence secured through such a voluntary accord an accord requiring a m utual an d reciprocal renunciation of certain rights on the part of all the individuals concerned. W ith o u t this C opem ican revolution, which allowed the problem of the state to be viewed for the first tim e through the eyes of its subjects rath er th an its sovereign, the doctrine of the liberal state, which is first and foremost the doctrine of ju rid ical limits to state power, would have been im possible. W ith o u t individualism , there can be no liberalism .

9

---- -----------------------------

3

------------------------------------

The Limits of State Power

T h u s far, we have been speaking in general term s of the lim ited state or the lim its to the state. It m ust now be m ade clear that such expressions cover two different aspects of the problem , which are n o t always properly distinguished: the limits (a) of the powers, an d (b) of the functions of the state. Liberal doctrine includes both these aspects, even though they can be treated separately, each to the exclusion of the other. Liberalism refers us to lim its both in the pow er an d in the functions of the state. In respect of the limits of pow er one speaks currently of the rights-based state, while the term minimal state is used in reference to the lim it on function. Even though liberalism conceives of the state as both rights-based and m inim al, one can have rights-based, non-m inim alist states (as w ith the social state today), and also m inim alist states which are not rights-based (as is the case with H obbes’s Leviathan, in the econom ic sphere: a state which is at one and the sam e tim e absolute in the fullest sense of the term , and liberal in its economics). W hile the rights-based state is counterposed to the absolute state understood in the sense of legibus solutus, the m inim al state is counterposed to the m axim al state: a n d so we say th at it is in the n am e of the liberal state th at the struggle to 11

Liberalism and Democracy defend the rights-based against the absolute state is waged, as that in defence of the m inim al against the m axim al state, even though the two em ancipatory im pulses do not always coincide in history and in practice. T h e rights-based state is generally understood as a state in which public pow er is regulated by general norm s (funda­ m ental or constitutional laws) a n d m ust be exercised within the fram ework of the laws which regulate it, while citizens have secure rights of recourse to an independent judiciary in order to establish an d prevent any abuse or excessive exercise of power. T h e rights-based state, understood in this sense, is a reflection of the old doctrine, going back to classical tim es and transm itted by way of medieval political theory, that the governm ent of law is superior to the governm ent of m en, or as the form ula has it, lex facit regem (the ‘law m akes the king’).7 Even in the period of absolutism , this doctrine survived, in that the m axim princeps legibus solutus (‘the ru ler is above the law’)8 was understood to m ean th at the sovereign, while exem pt from the positive laws th at he him self prom ulgated, rem ained subject to divine or natural laws and the funda­ m ental laws of the kingdom . W hen we discuss the rightsbased state in the context of the liberal account of the state, we m ust however add a further qualification to the traditional definition, nam ely the constitutional form ulation of natural rights, o r in other w ords the transform ation of these rights into rights protected by law an d thus into positive rights in the proper sense. In liberal doctrine, the rights-based state m eans not only th at public pow er of every kind is subject to the general laws of the country (a purely formal lim itation), but also th at the laws themselves are subject to the m aterial lim itation stem m ing from the recognition of certain funda­ m ental rights which are constitutionally, and thus as a m atter of principle, taken to be ‘inviolable’ (the epithet is found in Article T w o of the Italian constitution). From this point of view, we can distinguish the rights-based state in the strong sense from the w eak sense in which it is the non-despotic state, 72

The Limits of State Power ruled by laws rather th an by m en, and from an even weaker sense, th at of Kelsen, for w hom every state figures as a rightsbased state, once reduced to its juridical ordinances; a defi­ nition w hich deprives the notion of a rights-based state of all descriptive force. In the strong sense of the term , w hich is th at intended by liberal doctrine, the rights-based state acquires its definitive ch aracter from all those constitutional m echanism s which obstruct or h in d er the arbitrary or illegitim ate exercise of pow er an d prevent or discourage its abuse o r illegal exercise. T h e m ost im portant of these m echanism s are: (1) the sub­ o rdination of the executive to the legislative power, or to be m ore exact, of the governm ent from which executive power proceeds to th e parliam ent from w hich legislative power, and the pow er of political direction, derive in the last instance; (2) the ultim ate accountability of parliam ent, in its exercise of o rdinary legislative power, to a jurisdictional court to which is en tru sted the entire constitutional aspect of legislation; (3) the relative autonom y of local governm ent in all its forms and levels vis-à-vis central governm ent; (4) a m agistrature inde­ p en d en t of the political authority.

13

Liberty versus Power

T h e constitutional m echanism s which characterize the rightsbased state are intended to defend the individual against abuses of power. T hey are, in other words, guarantees of liberty, taking liberty in the sense of w hat is known as negative liberty - as a sphere of action w ithin which the individual is neither constrained, by whoever holds the power of coercion, to do anything he does not wish to do, nor prevented from doing w hat he does wish to do. T h ere is a sense (predom inant in the liberal tradition) in which ‘liberty’ and ‘pow er’ can be counterposed as antithetical term s, dehoting two realm s which are m utually conflicting and thus incom patible. In the relationship between two persons, as the power of the form er is enlarged (power, that is, to com pel or forbid), so the liberty, that is the negative liberty, of the latter dim inishes; and conversely, as the latter enlarges his sphere of liberty, the power of the form er dim inishes. W e m ust now add that in liberal thought individual liberty is guaranteed, not only by the constitutional m echanism s of the rights-based state, but also by the fact that the state is entrusted only with those tasks involved in m aintaining public order, dom estically and inter­ nationally. In liberal thought, the theory of the need to control 75

Liberalism and Democracy pow er and the theory of th e lim itation of the role of the state proceed pari passu. O n e m ay even claim th at the second is the sine qua non of the first, in the sense that the abuse of pow er is th at m uch m ore easily contained, the less space there is for the state to intervene. T o p u t the m atter in a nutshell, the m inim al state is m ore controllable than the m axim al state. F rom the individual’s point of view, upon which liberalism is prem ised, the state is a necessary evil: an d in being an evil, albeit a necessary one (here liberalism differs from anarchism ), it should interfere as little as possible in the sphere of action of individuals. T hom as Paine (1737-1809), defending the rights of m an on the eve of the A m erican Revolution, expresses the viewpoint very clearly: Society is produced by o u r wants, an d governm ent by o u r wickedness; the form er prom otes o u r happiness positively by uniting o u r affections, the latter negatively by restraining o u r vices. T h e one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions. T h e first is a patron, the last a punisher. Society in every state is a blessing, bu t governm ent even in its best state is b u t a necessary evil; in its worst state, an intolerable one.9

O nce liberty has been given the definition which prevails in liberal doctrine - once it has been defined as liberty from the state - then the form ation of the liberal state can be seen as coinciding w ith the gradual expansion of the sphere in which the individual is free from interference by the public powers (to use Paine’s term ), o r w ith the gradual em ancipation of society or of civil society, in the Hegelian or M arxist sense, from the state. T h e two chief spheres of this em ancipation are those, on the one h an d , of religion an d spiritual m atters generally, and on the oth er of econom ic life or m aterial concerns. W eber, in his well-known thesis on the relation betw een the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism , argued that the two processes were closely connected. It is, at all events, a fact that the history of the liberal states coincides 76

Liberty versus Power b o th w ith the dem ise of confessional states and the rise of states neutral or agnostic in their attitude to the religious beliefs of their citizens; an d w ith the dem ise of the privileges a n d bonds of feudalism a n d the em ergence of the dem and for free disposal of wealth and liberty of exchange, which m arks the b irth and developm ent of the bourgeois m ercantile society. Viewed in this perspective, the liberal state m ust be seen as distinct from any form of paternalism . From the paternalist point of view, the duty of the state is to care for its subjects after the m an n e r in which a father cares for his children, a form of solicitude justified by the supposedly perm anent m inority status of its subjects. O n e of Locke’s aim s in the Two Treatises of Civil Government was to dem onstrate that the civil power, created to guarantee the liberty and property of individuals who have formed an association for governing themselves, is distinct from paternal governance and hence, a fortiori, from patronage. It is thus against paternalism that K ant (1724-1804), for his part, m ost clearly an d effectively takes aim , w hen he observes that a governm ent founded on the principle of benevolence tow ards the people, like the governance of a father over his children, in other words, a paternalistic governm ent (imperium patemale), in which the subjects, like m inors who cannot distinguish betw een w hat is good and w hat is bad for them , are forced to adopt a passive role, and m ust look to the sovereign to determ ine the nature of their happiness, expecting nothing except w hat he chooses to bestow on them : such a governm ent is the worst possible despotism one can im agine.10

K an t’s prim ary concern is with the m oral freedom of the individual. In the field of econom ic freedom and m aterial selfinterest, A dam Sm ith’s concerns are equally clear and pronounced: in accordance with ‘the system of natural free­ d o m ’ the sovereign has no m ore than three significant respon­ sibilities, nam ely, the defence of society against external enem ies, the protection of each individual against any harm 77

Liberalism and Democracy inflicted upon him by another, and the undertaking of such public works as w ould not be carried ou t if entrusted to private profit. F or K ant, as for Sm ith, despite their very differing starting-points, the lim itation of the role of the state is grounded in the prior liberty of the individual relative to the pow er of the sovereign, a n d thus on the subordination of the latter’s duties to the rights or interests of the individual. At the close of the century of the D eclarations of Rights, the century of K ant and Sm ith, W ilhelm von H u m b o ld t (1767— 1835) perfectly sum m ed u p the liberal ideal of the state in his The Limits of State Action (1792). T h e a u th o r’s intention, already plain in the essay’s title, is further displayed in the epigraph to the first chapter, which is draw n from the elder M irabeau: T h e hard thing is to prom ulgate only such laws as are necessary, an d to rem ain ever faithful to the authentic constitutional principle of society, which dem ands of govern­ m ents that they constrain their fury to govern, this being the deadliest disease afflicting m od em regimes.

It is H u m b o ld t’s unswerving conviction that the individual, in his ineffable particularity a n d variety, m ust be the startingpoint. M a n ’s true end, he states, is to develop his faculties as fully as possible. If this end is to be attained, then the state should be guided ideally by the following principle: T h a t reason cannot desire for m an any other condition than that in w hich each individual not only enjoys the most absolute freedom of developing him self by his own energies, in his perfect individuality, bu t in which external nature itself is left unfashioned by any hum an agency, but only receives the im press given to it by each individual by him self and of his own free will according to the m easure of his w ants and instincts, and restricted only by the limits of his powers and his rights."

18

Liberty versus Power From this prem ise, H u m b o ld t draw s the conclusion that ‘any state interference in private affairs, w here there is no im m ediate reference to violence done to individual rights, should be absolutely cond em n ed ’.12 T his inversion of the traditional, organicist view of the relation between individual a n d state, is paralleled an d reinforced by a further inversion directly bearing upon it, th a t of m eans an d end: the state, according to H um boldt, is not an end in itself, b u t m erely a m eans ‘to raise the culture of the citizen to such a point that he m ay find every incentive to cooperation in the state’s designs, in the consciousness of the advantages w hich the political institutions offer his own individual interests’.13 If the state does have an ultim ate end, it is ‘security’. It is repeatedly stated in H u m b o ld t’s essay that the purpose of the state is sim ply ‘security’, defined as ‘the assurance of legal freedom ’.14

79

-----------------------------------------------------

5

---------------------------------------------------------

The Fruitfulness of Conflict

As well as presenting individual liberty as the sole end of the state an d arguing that the state is a m eans rath er than an end in itself, H u m b o ld t’s writings have another them atic m otif of great interest to any analysis of liberal thought, nam ely their praise o f ‘variety’. In a closely argued critique of the ‘providen­ tial state’, the state which m anifests an excessive solicitude for the ‘well-being’ of its citizens, H u m b o ld t (whose line of arg u m ent anticipates contem porary neo-liberal denunciations of the supposed ill effects of the welfare state) explains that w hen governm ent intervenes outside its allotted sphere of action, the m aintenance of internal an d external order, the result is to create uniform ity of behaviour in society and thus to stifle the natural variety of character and tem peram ent. G overnm ents, in despite of individuals, seek an undisturbed state of well-being: ‘bu t w hat m an does an d m ust have in view is som ething quite different - it is variety an d activity’.15 T hose w ho think otherwise m ay justly be suspected of regarding m en as autom ata. ‘H ence it arises,’ he adds (and w hat w ould H u m b o ld t’s reaction have been to the ‘steel cage’ of the m odern bureaucratic state?), ‘that in m ost states from decade to decade the n u m b e r of the public officials and the extent of 21

Liberalism and Democracy registration increase, while the liberty of the subject propor­ tionately declines’.16 A nd he concludes: ‘in the kind of policy we are supposing, then, m en are neglected for things, and creature powers for results’.17 In defending the individual against the presum ptions of the state which w ould provide for his well-being, one is therefore touching on m atters not only of m aterial interest b u t also of m orality. W e are now adays so accustom ed to an exclusively econom ic critique of the welfare state that it is h ard to recapture a sense of the strong ethical charge carried by early liberalism , an d to rem em ber th at the critique of paternalism had as its principal raison d ’être the defence of the individ­ ual’s autonom y. In this respect, there is a line of linkage betw een H u m b o ld t an d K ant, an d betw een both thinkers and C onstant. For Sm ith, too, w ho was m oreover a m oralist before he becam e an econom ist, liberty has its m oral value. Associated with its counterposing of individual variety to state-sponsored uniform ity, we discover a further original and characteristic them e of liberal thought: the insistence that conflict is fruitful. T raditional organicist views of socicty had p u t harm ony at a prem ium : concord, even if it necessitated com pulsion, was a good; the parts m ust be subordinated to the whole in a regulated an d ordered fashion, an d conflict was to be condem ned as a factor of disruption an d social disinte­ gration. In all those currents of thought w hich set them selves against organicism , we find a growing em phasis on the idea th at opposition betw een individuals an d groups (and betw een nations, too, whence the praise of w arfare as a nurse of p o p u lar virtue) is beneficent, being a necessary condition of h u m an ity ’s technical a n d m oral progress. T his progress is seen as b rought about solely through the clash of divergent opinions a n d interests, through conflicts w hich in the realm of arg u m en t further the quest for tru th ; which in econom ic com petition ten d to secure the greatest social prosperity; and whose struggles in the political dom ain result in the selection of those best fitted to govern. O n the basis of such a general 22

The Fruitfulness of Conflict conception of m ankind an d its history, it is no m ystery if individual liberty - conceived as an em ancipation from the chains in w hich for centuries individuals had been im prisoned by tradition, custom , an d authorities both religious and secular —cam e to be viewed as the essential condition allowing the realization of the ‘variety’ of individual personalities to be viewed as com patible w ith conflict, an d conflict itself as prom oting the perfection of all. In his essay on ‘T h e Idea of Universal H istory from a C osm opolitan Point of View’ (1784), K ant expresses, in as unprejudicial a fashion as possible, his conviction that antag­ onism is ‘the m eans used by n ature to further the developm ent of all h er dispositions’,18 and by ‘antagonism ’ he m eans m a n ’s tendency to satisfy his own interests in com petition with those of everyone else - a tendency w hich awakens all his energies, leads him to overcome his propensity to indolence, and encourages him to strive for em inence am ong his fellows. C om paring the antagonistic to the harm onious society from the point of view of its m oral as well as econom ic significance, K ant delivers him self of a ju d g em en t w hich m ight well be viewed as capturing the heart of liberal thinking: ‘In the absence of unsociability, all h u m an talents w ould rem ain confined to an em bryonic stage w ithin an A rcadian pastoral existence; m en, like the obedient sheep u n d e r the shepherd’s guidance, would ascribe no value whatsoever to their life’. A nd on the basis of this explosive ju d g em en t he offers the following hym n in praise of the w isdom of creation: Let thanks be given to n atu re for the stubbornness she engenders, the invidious and vainglorious spirit of em ulation, the never sated greed for w ealth - an d for pow er too! For w ithout her, all the excellent n atu ral h u m a n dispositions w ould rem ain forever d o rm an t an d deprived of developm ent.19

As a theory of the lim ited state, liberalism counterposes the rights-based state to the absolute state an d the m inim al to the

23

Liberalism and Democracy m axim al state. T h e theory of progress as m ediated by a n ta ­ gonism introduces a further opposition, betw een the free states of E u rope a n d the despotism s of the O rient. ‘D espotism ’ is a term d ating back to antiquity, and alongside its descriptive m eaning it has always had a strong polem ical connotation. As liberal thought expanded, ‘despotism ’ acquired an additional negative charge: since despotic states plunge everyone into subjugation (so that, as M achiavelli had pu t it, the entire m onarchy of the T u rk is ‘governed by one lord, the others are his servants’,20 or, as Hegel (1770—1831) said of the despotic regim es of the O rient, ‘only one m an is free’21), they also tend tow ards stagnation and inertia. T h e law of indefinite progress does n o t apply to them , b u t is valid only of civilized Europe. From this point of view, in addition to figuring as a general political category, the liberal state becom es a criterion of historical interpretation.

24

Ancient and Modem Ideas of Democracy

As a theory of the state (and also as a key to the interpretation of history), liberalism is m odem , w hereas dem ocracy as a form of governm ent is ancient. Dem ocracy figures in the fam ous typology of m odes of governm ent b equeathed to us by Greek political thought, by w hich it is defined as governm ent by the m any or by m ost or by the m ajority or by the poor (but w here the poor have obtained the u p p e r hand, this indicates that pow er belongs to the pleithos, to the masses). In short, dem oc­ racy, as its etym ology tells us, is governm ent by the people, as opposed to governm ent by one or by a few. W hatever m ay be said, an d despite the passage of centuries an d the innum erable argum ents that have taken place about the difference between the dem ocracy of the ancients an d that of the m odem s, the general descriptive significance of the term has not changed, though its evaluative load has altered with changing tim es and beliefs, and in response to the degree of support for p opular as opposed to m onarchical or oligarchical governm ent. W hat is held to have changed in the passage from ancient to m odem dem ocracy, at any rate in the view of those who find the distinction a useful one, is not the people’s entitlem ent to political pow er (where by ‘people’ is m eant the entire body of

Liberalism and Democracy citizens with w hom the right to take collective decisions ultim ately rests), b u t the ways in w hich it is exercised, which m ay be m ore o r less extensive at any given point. In the sam e period w hich saw the D eclarations of Rights, we find the au th o rs of The Federalist opposing the direct dem ocracy that prevailed in an tiquity an d in medieval city-states to the representative dem ocracy w hich is the only m ode of popular governm ent possible in a large state. H am ilton puts it as follows: It is im possible to read the history of the petty republics of G reece and Italy w ithout feeling sensations of h o rror and disgust at the distractions with w hich they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration betw een the extrem es of tyranny an d anarchy.22

A ju d g em en t w hich M adison echoes: ‘T h e friend of p o p u ­ lar governm ents never finds him self so alarm ed for their character and fate as w hen he contem plates their propensity to this dangerous vice’.23 T h e claim th at the dem ocracy of the city-state was flawed by its tendency to factionalism was in fact n o m ore than a pretext, a harking back to the longstanding a n d recurrent contem pt for the people felt by oligarchic groups: had there been representative assem blies, the division into m utually opposed groups w ould have been expressed in th e form ation of parties. T h e single reason of any w eight for favouring representative dem ocracy lay in the sheer size of the m o d em state; an early instance was the union of thirteen English colonies whose new constitution the contributors to The Federalist were discussing. R ousseau himself, passionate a d m irer of the ancients as he was, had recognized as m uch. H e had indeed defended direct dem ocracy, holding that ‘sovereignty . . . cannot be represented’ an d that for this reason, although ‘the people of E ngland regards itself as free’, it is ‘grossly m istaken; it is free only during the election of

26

Ancient and Modem Ideas of Democracy m em bers of parliam ent. As soon as they are elected, slavery overtakes it, an d it is nothing’.24 However, he was also convinced th at ‘there has never been a real dem ocracy, an d there never will b e ’, because it presupposes first a very sm all state ‘w here the people can readily be got together’; secondly, ‘a great sim plicity of m anners’; next, ‘a large m easure of equality in rank a n d fortune’; a n d lastly, ‘little or no luxury’. H ence, he was persuaded that if ‘there were a people of gods, th eir governm ent w ould be dem ocratic. So perfect a govern­ m en t is not for m en ’.25 Both the authors of The Federalist a n d the F rench C onsti­ tu en t Assem blies w ere convinced th at the only kind of dem o­ cratic governm ent suitable for a population of h u m an beings was representative dem ocracy, th at form of governm ent in w hich the people does not itself take the decisions w hich affect it b u t elects its own representatives to decide on its behalf. However, the institution of representative dem ocracy was certainly not regarded by them as a d im inution of the princi­ ple of p o p u lar governm ent. O n e proof of this m ay be found in th e constitution of the State of V irginia (1776), the first w ritten constitution of any N orth A m erican state, w hich asserts —an d the sam e form ula recurs in later constitutions - that: ‘All pow er resides w ith the people, an d in consequence derives from it; the m agistrates are the peoples’ trustees a n d servants, an d at all tim es responsible tow ards th em ’. So, too, Article T h ree of the 1789 D eclaration: ‘T h e principle of every sover­ eignty resides essentially w ithin the nation. N o body, no individual, can exercise authority w hich does not derive expressly from it’. Q u ite apart from the fact th at the direct exercise of pow er by the citizens is not incom patible w ith its direct exercise by way of elected representatives (as is d em on­ strated by th e existence of constitutions such as th at now observed in Italy, w here provision is m ad e for po p u lar refer­ enda, though these can only veto or a n n u l legislation), direct an d indirect dem ocracy can both be traced back to som e principle of p o p u lar sovereignty, even if they differ in the 27

Liberalism and Democracy m odes an d form s by w hich th at sovereignty is exercised. R epresentative dem ocracy was fostered also by the convic­ tion th at the citizens’ elected representatives w ould be better able to ju d g e the com m on interest than the citizens th em ­ selves, whose vision w ould be too narrow ly focused on their particular interests. R epresentative dem ocracy m ight even for these reasons be better suited to achieving the ends envisaged by p o p u lar sovereignty. T his w ould m ean again th at it is ultim ately m isleading to counterpose ancient an d m o d em dem ocracy, at least in the sense that the form er is a m ore perfect form in respect of these ends. M adison m aintained that the delegation of governm ental pow er to a small n u m b e r of m en of proven wisdom w ould p u t the ‘true interest’ of the country in the hands of those ‘least likely to sacrifice it to tem porary or partial considerations’.26 T his depended upon the d ep uty’s behaving, once he was elected, not as the con­ fidential agent of those electors w ho had p u t him in parlia­ m ent, b u t as a representative of the whole nation. If dem ocracy was to be representative in the proper sense of the term , the elected representative could no longer be b o u n d by the will of the electorate - a form of dependency characteristic, in fact, of the old society of rank an d caste, in which various groups, corporations an d collective bodies had used their delegates as a m eans of transm ission to the sovereign of their own particular dem ands. H ere, too, E ngland led the way. As Burke wrote: T o deliver an opinion is the right of all m en, that of constituents is a weighty and respectable opinion, w hich a representative m ight always rejoice to h e ar---- B ut authoritative instructions, mandates issued, which the m em b er is b o u n d blindly an d implicitly to obey, to vote, and to argue for, . . . these are things utterly unknow n to the laws of this la n d .27

T h e French C onstituent Assemblies, acting on the eloquently expressed opinion of Sieyes (1748-1836), m ade

28

Ancient and Modem Ideas of Democracy provision in the 1791 constitution (tit. Ill, ch. I, sect. Ill, art. 7) for a formally binding separation betw een representative and those represented: the relevant article, proscribing any bind­ ing m andate, lays it dow n th at ‘the nom inated representatives in the départements shall not be representatives of a particular département, b u t of the whole nation, an d cannot be m andated by it’.28 From then on, it becam e one of the essential principles of the functioning of the parliam entary system th at representa­ tives were forbidden to accept any binding m an d ate from those who had elected them . T his principle, indeed, was what distinguished parliam entary governm ent from the previous state of affairs in which the opposite principle of corporative representation had applied, based on binding m andates which institutionally com pelled delegates to further the interests of the corporation they represented and, should they show any disinclination to do so, deprived them of their rights as representatives. T h e disappearance of the corporative state left individuals free in their particularity an d autonom y: it was individuals as such, an d not as m em bers of any corporation, who were charged with electing the n atio n ’s representatives. T hose elected were in tu rn called upo n by the particular individuals w ho elected them to represent the nation as a whole, an d they therefore had to determ ine their course of action an d take their decisions unfettered by any m andate. If by m odem dem ocracy we m ean representative dem ocracy, an d if it is of the essence of the latter th at the representatives of the nation are not directly obliged to the particular individuals they represent nor to th eir particular interests, then m odem dem ocracy is prem ised upo n the atom ization of the nation an d its recom position at another level - the level of parlia­ m entary assem blies, w hich is at once higher an d m ore restricted. Now this process of atom ization is the sam e which underlies the liberal conception of the state, whose found­ ation, as we have argued, is to be sought in the assertion of the individual’s natu ral an d inviolable rights.

29

-

7

—

—

----------

Democracy and Equality

M o d em liberalism and ancient dem ocracy have often been regarded as antithetical. T h e dem ocrats of antiquity were ignorant of both the doctrine of n atural rights a n d the idea th a t the state h ad a duty to confine its activities to the m in im u m necessary for the com m unity’s survival; th e liberals of m o d em tim es, for their part, were from the outset extremely suspicious of all forms of p o p u lar governm ent (throughout the nineteenth century, an d later, they u pheld an d defended lim ited suffrage). M odem dem ocracy, however, is not only not incom patible w ith liberalism , b u t can in m any respects, if only to a degree, be regarded as its n atu ral extension. B ut this is tru e only if we take the term ‘dem ocracy’ in its ju rid ical-in stitu tio n al rath e r th an its ethical sense - if we take it in a m ore procedural th an substantial sense. T h ere is no question th at historically the term ‘dem ocracy’ has been interpreted, a t least in its origins, in either one of two m ain senses, depending on w hether the stress is laid m ore on the body of rules (the ‘rules of the gam e’) w hich m ust be observed if political pow er is to be effectively distributed am ong the m ajority of the citizens, o r on the ideal of equality in which dem ocratic governm ent should find its inspiration. In observ­ 37

Liberalism and Democracy ance of this distinction, it has been custom ary to differentiate betw een formal an d substantial dem ocracy, or, as it is other­ wise com m only put, betw een governm ent by the people and governm ent for the people. N eedless to say, the term ‘dem oc­ racy’ is here being used in two such differing senses that it is b o u n d to issue in useless controversy of the kind surrounding the question as to which is m ore dem ocratic, a regim e w herein formal dem ocracy is found w ithout w idespread equality or one in which w idespread equality is achieved by way of despotic governm ent. E ither sense has historical legitim ation, for in the long history of the theory of dem ocracy, procedural questions are interwoven with ideals (the two are fused only in R ousseau’s theory, whose strongly egalitarian ideal is conceived as realizable only through the form ation of the general will). However, the fact that history allows both uses sheds no light on w hat connotations they m ay com e to share. O f the two senses in question, it is the first which is linked historically with the form ation of the liberal state. W hen dem ocracy is taken in its second sense, the problem s of its relationship to liberalism are rendered very complex. T h ere is no reason to suppose any im m ediate end to the inconclusive debates which have been already been conducted around these problem s. Indeed, w hen conceived in this light the question of the relation betw een liberalism and dem ocracy resolves itself into the difficult problem of the relation between liberty and equality, which assum es th at we can offer unequiv­ ocal answers to the questions: ‘W hat kind of liberty? W hat kind of equality?’ In their broadest significance, that they acquire through the extension of the respective dem ands for rights to liberty and equality (the dem ands of the opposed doctrines of laissez-faire an d egalitarianism ) into the econom ic sphere, liberty and equality are antithetical values, in the sense that neither can be fully realized except at the expense of the other: a liberal laissez-faire society is inevitably inegalitarian, and an egalitar­ ian society is inevitably illiberal. L ibertarianism an d egalitar­ 32

Democracy and Equality ianism are rooted in profoundly divergent conceptions of m an a n d society - conceptions w hich are individualistic, conflictual an d pluralistic for the liberal; totalizing, harm onious and m onistic for the egalitarian. T h e chief goal for the liberal is the expansion of the individual personality, even if the w ealthier an d m ore talented achieve this developm ent at the expense of th at of the poorer an d less gifted. T h e chief goal for the egali­ tarian is the en hancem ent of the com m unity as a whole, even if this entails som e constriction of the sphere of individual free­ dom . T h ere is one form only of equality - equality in the right to liberty - w hich is not only com patible with liberalism b u t actually dem anded by its view of freedom . Equality in liberty m eans that each person should enjoy as m uch liberty as is com patible w ith the liberty of others, an d m ay do anything w hich does not distrain on the equal liberty of others. T his form of equality inspired, very early in the developm ent of the liberal state, two fundam ental principles that cam e to be expressed in constitutional provisions: (a) equality before the law, a n d (b) equality of rights. T h e form er is found in the French constitutions of 1791,1793 and 1795; it then appears in the 1814 C h arter (art. 1), the Belgian constitution of 1813 (art. 6), an d the A lbertine C onstitution of 1848 (art. 24). T h e Fourteenth A m endm ent to the C onstitution of the U nited States, guaranteeing ‘the equal protection of the law’ to every citizen, has sim ilar scope. T h e second principle is solem nly proclaim ed in Article O n e of the 1789 Declaration of the R ights of M an an d of the Citizen: ‘M en are b o m an d rem ain free an d equal in th eir rights’. Both principles find expression all through the history of m o d em constitutionalism , an d both are jointly expressed in clause 1 of Article T hree of the cu rren t Italian constitution: ‘All citizens enjoy equal social status and are equal before the law’. T h e principle of equality before the law can be understood in a narrow sense as a reform ulation of the principle obtaining in all courts and tribunals: ‘T h e law is equal for all’. U n d e r­ 33

Liberalism and Democracy stood in this sense, it m eans no m ore th an th at ju d g es are to apply the law im partially, an d as such is an integral com ­ ponent of the constitutional m easures and procedures of the rights-based state: from which it follows th at it is an inherent feature of the liberal state, the latter being identified, as we have argued, w ith the rights-based state. U nderstood in a w ider sense, it is a principle of the universal application of the law to all citizens, an d thus carries the im plication th at such laws as apply only to particular ranks of persons o r their situations should b e repealed or at any rate not renewed: the principle is an egalitarian one in th at it does away with previous discrim ination. T h e pream ble to th e 1791 D eclar­ ation informs us th a t the C onstituent Assem blies have w anted to abolish ‘irrevocably those institutions which are injurious to liberty and the equality of rights’, and included am ong the institutions n am ed are those m ost typically feudal. T h e concluding phrases of the Pream ble state th at ‘T h ere shall no longer be any section of the nation, n o r any individual, w ho is accorded any privilege or excluded from com m on right of all French citizens’; a n d here, through the negative form ulations of the text, we have the clearest possible illustration of the principle of equality before the law in its positive m eaning as im plying rejection of the society of rank and caste, and hence as affirming the conception of society as com prised originally of purely individual subjects (of individuals uti singuli). Equality of rights represents, for its part, a further develop­ m ent of equality, w hich extends beyond the idea of equality before the law in the sense of universal exem ption from the discrim inations of th e old society of rank. It involves the equal enjoym ent by all citizens of certain fundam ental, constitution­ ally guaranteed rights. W hereas equality before the law can be interpreted as a particular, historically determ ined form of ju rid ical equality (com prising, for instance, the right of every­ one, irrespective o f birth, to have access to the com m on judicial system or to gain entry into the m ain civil and m ilitary careers), equality of rights com prises equality in all those 34

Democracy and Equality fundam ental rights en u m erated in a given constitution, and im plies th at all such rights, and only those rights, m ay be considered fundam ental, w hich every citizen enjoys w ithout discrim ination on the basis of social class, sex, religion, race, etc. T h e repertory of fundam ental rights differs from one age to an o th er an d from one com m unity to another, a n d th u s no once-for-all list can be draw n up: we can say only th at u n d e r a particular constitution, those rights are to be called funda­ m ental w hich are attrib u ted to all citizens w ithout distinction —those, in a w ord, in respect of which all citizens are equal.

35

Liberalism’s Encounter with Democracy

N one of the principles of equality reviewed above, w hich are connected with th e rise of the liberal state, has anything to do w ith dem ocratic egalitarianism , whose scope extends to p u rsu it of the ideal of som e degree of econom ic equalization, an ideal foreign to liberal thought. T h e latter has, over time, com e to accept, in addition to ju ridical equality, equality of opportunity, which provides for parity betw een individuals in th eir point of departure, b u t not in th eir point of arrival. As concerns, then, various possible constructions th at can be p u t on the notion of equality, liberalism a n d dem ocracy have been destined to follow separate paths, an d this explains why over a long period they were, historically, counterposed. In w hat sense, then, can dem ocracy be seen as the extension an d p ro p er realization of the liberal state, thus justifying o u r use of the phrase ‘liberal-dem ocratic’ to describe a n u m b e r of present-day regim es? N ot only is liberalism com patible with dem ocracy, b u t dem ocracy can be seen as the n atural devel­ o p m en t of liberalism , providing th at we have in m in d not the ideal, egalitarian aspect of dem ocracy, b u t its character as a political form ula in which, as we have seen, it is tan tam o u n t to p o p u lar sovereignty. P opular sovereignty can only be effect­

Liberalism and Democracy ively exercised if the m ajority of citizens are granted the right to participate directly a n d indirectly in collective decision­ m aking: in other words, if there is a continuous extension of political rights to the point of universal m ale a n d female suffrage, the only restriction being th at w hich stipulates a lower age lim it (usually coinciding w ith the age of legal m ajority). Even though m any liberal writers regarded the extension of the suffrage as ill-tim ed or undesirable, an d even though during the period of the form ation of the liberal state, only those w ho ow ned property were entitled to vote, universal suffrage is not in principle inconsistent w ith either the rightsbased state o r the m inim al state. Such, then, was the in ter­ dependence betw een the two which gradually cam e to establish itself, th at although at the outset it was possible for liberal states to com e into being that were not dem ocratic (except in their declarations of principle), today non-dem ocratic liberal states w ould be inconceivable, as w ould non­ liberal dem ocratic states. T h ere are, in short, good reasons to believe th at (a) the procedures of dem ocracy are necessary to safeguard those fundam ental personal rights on w hich the liberal state is based; an d (b) those rights m u st be safeguarded if dem ocratic procedures are to operate. As concerns the first point, it should be noted th at w hat best guarantees th at rights to liberty will be protected against the tendency to lim it a n d suppress them , on the part of those w ho govern, is the capacity of the citizen to defend those rights against possible abuse. N ow the best available rem edy against all possible form s of abuse of pow er (not th a t ‘best available’ signifies perfect, o r infallible) is the direct o r indirect particip­ ation of citizens, an d of the greatest possible n u m b e r of citizens, in the form ation of the laws. From this point of view, political rights are the natu ral corollary of rights to liberty: in the term s m ade fam ous by Jellinek (1851-1911), th e iura activae civitatis (‘rights of active citizenship’) are the best safeguard of the iura libertatis et civitatis (‘rights of liberty and citizenship’), while, in a regim e not based on p o p u lar sover­ 38

Liberalism’s Encounter with Democracy eignty, th at safeguard depends solely on the natural rights of resistance to oppression. In connection w ith the second point, an d here we are concerned not w ith the necessity of dem ocracy to the survival of the liberal state b u t rath e r w ith the need for inviolable personal rights to be recognized if dem ocracy is to function well, we m ust rem ark th at voting can be regarded as a proper an d effective exercise of political pow er (that is, of the pow er to influence collective decisions) only if the vote is a free one, or, in other words, only if the individual w ho places his o r her p ap er in the ballot box enjoys liberty of opinion, a free press, rights of free assem bly an d association, an d all those liberties which are the essence of the liberal state, a n d w hich thus constitute necessary preconditions for a real rath er than fictitious participation in the process of election. Liberal ideals an d dem ocratic procedures have gradually becom e interwoven. W hile it is true th at rights to liberty have from the beginning been a necessary condition for the proper application of the rules of the dem ocratic gam e, it is equally true th at the developm ent of dem ocracy has over tim e becom e th e principal tool for the defence of rights to liberty. T oday, th e only dem ocratic states are those which were b o m out of th e liberal revolutions, an d only in dem ocratic states are the rights of m an protected: every authoritarian state in the world is at once anti-liberal an d anti-dem ocratic.

39

_ —

—

----------

9

—

----------------- ----------

Individualism and Organicism

T h is reciprocal relation betw een liberalism an d dem ocracy is possible because they share a com m on starting-point: the individual. Both are grounded in an individualistic conception of society. T h e entire history of political thought is riven by the great dichotom y betw een organicism (holism ) an d individual­ ism (atom ism ). T h o u g h there is no unilinear pattern, we can say, roughly speaking, th at organicism is ancient and classical, an d individualism is m odem (or at least th at it is in individual­ ism th at the theory of the m odern state finds its origin). T his is closer to the tru th th an is C onstant’s historical counterposing of dem ocracy (ancient) to liberalism (m odem ). For organic­ ism, the state is a body, an overall corporate structure m ade u p of parts, each of which has its own destiny, b u t which all cooperate in a relation of interdependence, to further their jo in t collective life: individuals uti singuli are not regarded as possessing any autonom y. Individualism sees the state as a collection of individuals, an d as acquiring its form only th ro u g h their actions an d the relations they establish with one another. In the first pages of the Politics, Aristotle gives us the definitive form ulation of the constitutive principles of organic­ ism: ‘T h e whole is necessarily prior to the part. If the whole 41

Liberalism and Democracy body is destroyed, there will not be a foot or a h ead ’. W e thus see th at ‘the polis exists by n ature and th at it is prior to the individual’.29 A com plete an d fully self-aware individualistic theory is not found until we com e to H obbes, who begins with the hypothesis of a state of n atu re in which there exist only individuals, separated from each other by their m utually opposed passions and interests, and obliged to com e together by com m on consent in a political society in order to avoid m u tu al destruction. T his reversal of the previous startingpoint has decisive consequences for the birth of m o d em liberal an d dem ocratic thought. As far as liberalism is concerned, a coherent organic conception in which the state is held to be a totality anterior and superior to its parts can allow no space for spheres of action in dependent of the whole; it can recognize no distinction betw een private an d public spheres, n o r can it justify the abstraction of individual interests, satisfied in relations with other individuals (through the m arket), from the public interest. D em ocracy, for its part, is based on a concep­ tion of power as issuing from below, and regards organicism ’s contrary understanding of pow er as descending frojn above as an encouragem ent to autocratic m odels of governm ent; it is difficult to im agine an organism u n d er the com m and not of the head but of its m em bers. It m ust be added that while both liberalism and dem ocracy are individualistic conceptions, the individual of the form er is not the sam e as the individual of the latter, or to be m ore exact, the individual interest which the form er sets out to protect is not the sam e as that protected by the latter. T his m ay point to an o th er reason why the com bination of dem o­ cracy and liberalism is possible b u t not essential. No individualistic conception of society leaves out of account the fact that m an is a social being, or considers the individual in isolation. Individualism is not to be confused with the kind of philosophical anarchism espoused by Stim er (1806-1856). However, liberalism and dem ocracy differ in the way they understand the relation of the individual to society. 42

Individualism and Organicism L iberalism am putates the individual from the organic body, m akes him live - at least for m uch of his life - outside the m aternal wom b, plunges him into the unknow n an d perilous w orld of the struggle for survival. Dem ocracy jo in s him together once m ore w ith others like himself, so th at society can be b uilt u p again from their union, no longer as an organic w hole b u t as an association of free individuals. Liberalism defends an d proclaim s individual liberty as against the state, in b o th the spiritual an d the econom ic sphere; dem ocracy reconciles individual an d society by m aking society the p ro d u ct of a com m on agreem ent between individuals. For liberalism , the individual is the a u th o r of every kind of action perform ed outside the confines of the state; for dem ocracy, he is th e protagonist of a different kind of state, in w hich collec­ tive decisions are m ade directly by individuals or else by way of th eir delegates an d representatives. Liberalism highlights th e individual’s capacity for self-creation, his ability to develop his own faculties an d to progress intellectually a n d m orally in conditions of m axim um freedom from all externally and coercively im posed constraints; dem ocracy holds in highest regard the individual’s capacity to overcome isolation by devising various procedures allowing the institution of nontyrranical com m on power. O f the two aspects of individuality, liberalism is concerned w ith w hat which is inward-looking, dem ocracy with th at w hich is outw ard-looking. T w o different potential individuals are in question: the individual as m icro­ cosm or totality com plete in itself, an d the individual as a particle (or atom ) w hich is indivisible, b u t w hich m ay be com bined and recom bined w ith o th er sim ilar particles in various ways, giving rise to an artificial (and thus always fissionable) unity. Both liberal individualism an d dem ocratic individualism com e into being through th e struggle against various m odes of organicism , but by a process specific to each. For liberal individualism this takes the form of a gradual corrosion of the totality, akin to the m an n e r in w hich children, on reaching the 43

Liberalism and Democracy age of m ajority, detach them selves from th e all-powerful a n d all-pervasive prim itive group a n d c o n q u er for themselves ever w ider spheres of individual action. F or dem ocratic individual­ ism on the other hand, it takes the form of an internal dissolution of the unified global com pound, o u t of w hich are form ed elem ents w hich are in dependent b oth of each other an d of the whole, an d are able thereupon to pursue a life of th eir own. T h e effect of the first process is to reduce public pow er to a m inim um ; of the second, to reconstitute it, b u t to reconstitute it as the sum of particular powers - as is plain in contract theory, w hich regards the state as founded u pon a ju rid ical institution, akin to th e contract, a n d appertaining to the sphere of private rights, in w hich particular wills com e together in the form ation of a com m on will.

44

Liberals and Democrats in the Nineteenth Century

In E urope, the history of the liberal state a n d of its develop­ m en t into the dem ocratic state can properly be said to have b eg u n in the period of the restoration of the continental m onarchies. W riting in the ten th year of th e fascist regim e (1932), Benedetto C roce (1866-1952) called this epoch (with a certain rhetorical em phasis understandable in the circum ­ stances) the age of the ‘religion of liberty’, an d claim ed to perceive in it the ‘germ inal period’ of a new civilization.30 C roce’s conception of liberty em braced liberty as understood by liberals (Croce speaks of ‘th e replacem ent of absolutism by constitutional governm ent’) as well as dem ocratic liberty (electoral reform an d a broadening of political participation), w ithout clearly distinguishing betw een them ; ‘liberation from th e dom inion of foreigners’, o r liberty as national indepen­ dence, is a further aspect. If we are looking for the ‘germ inal p erio d’, however, we m u st go further back in tim e - not indeed to the ‘G erm anic forests’ in which Hegel, following M ontesquieu, discerned the birthplace of m o d em liberty, b u t to th e E ngland of the seventeenth century, w hich saw the beginnings of the m o d em liberal state in theory an d practice, a n d which for som e centuries rem ained an ideal m odel for

Liberalism and Democracy b o th E urope a n d the U nited States of Am erica. It was the P u ritan Revolution, with its ferm ent of ideas an d religious sects an d political m ovem ents, th at opened the way for the advance of those ideas of liberty of the person, a n d of religious belief and freedom of opinion a n d of the press, which were destined to becom e the lasting heritage of liberal thought. Its bloody outcom e sealed the suprem acy of P arliam ent over the king, and led in tim e - gradually, and unevenly - to the establishm ent of the representative state as the ideal form of constitution, an ideal which still holds sway today (if only for lack of anything better to take its place); the doctrine of the separation of powers inspired M ontesquieu, and through him A m erican an d E uropean constitutionalism . If by dem ocracy we m ean, as in the present instance we do, the extension of political rights to all citizens above the age of m ajority, then the dem ocratic ideal, too, was for the first tim e loudly proclaim ed in the years of the ‘great rebellion’: it is in fact in the Levellers’ ‘A greem ent of the People’ (1648) th at we first find challenged the ruling principle which debarred all n on­ landow ners from political rights (and which was to rem ain in force for at least another two centuries), an d supplanted by a proclam ation of the dem ocratic principles according to which T h e people of E ngland . . . for the election of their representa­ tives, be m ore indifferently proportioned, an d to this end, that the Representatives of the whole nations shall consist of 300 persons___A nd in all elections . . . they shall be m en of oneand-tw enty years old or upw ards .. .31

In England, moreover, an d only in E ngland, a peaceful an d gradual process of evolution from within, unm arked by violent clashes or periods of reaction and regression, was to lead from the G lorious Revolution of 1688 to the replacem ent of con­ stitutional by parliam entary m onarchy a n d from a restricted to an enlarged dem ocracy. In France, which in m any respects led the way for the

46

Liberals and Democrats in the Nineteenth Century E uropean continent, the process of dem ocratization was a good deal m ore uneven. T h e 1848 revolution, which attem pted to im pose dem ocracy by force, quickly collapsed, a n d led to the founding of a new regim e of C aesarian stam p (N apoleon I l l ’s Second Em pire). E ngland’s m ost recent C aes­ arian regime, the dictatorship of Crom well, was already a d istant event, b u t in France only a brief tim e elapsed between the Ja co b in republic an d the N apoleonic em pire, a fact which stirred strongly liberal anti-dem ocratic sentim ents am ong the w riters of the period: these proved longlasting, and profoundly influenced the debate as to w hether the dem ocratic state was a possible or desirable developm ent of the liberal state. C onser­ vative writers, in whose views we can detect echoes of classical thinkers an d especially of Plato, alm ost unanim ously agreed th at dem ocracy an d tyranny were two sides of the sam e coin: C aesarian dictatorship was no m ore than the natural and terrible consequence of the disorders unleashed by the rep u b ­ lic of dem agogues. In the final pages of his Democracy in y4mmcaTocqueville (1805-1859) uttered his fam ous prophecy: I am trying to im agine u n d er w hat novel features despotism m ay appear in the world. In th e first place, I see an in num er­ able m ultitude of m en, alike and equal, constantly circling aro u n d in pursuit of the petty and banal pleasures with which they glut their souls___O ver this kind of m en stands an im m ense, protective pow er which is alone responsible for securing their enjoym ent and w atching over their fate.32

T h e still m ore rapid collapse of the ephem eral republic of 1848, and its replacem ent by the Second Em pire, seem ed to confirm the far-sighted investigator of A m erican dem ocracy in his forecast. T h ro u g h o u t the century both liberalization an d dem ocrati­ zation continued to evolve, som etim es in tandem and som e­ tim es separately, depending on w hether the extension of the franchise was seen as an inherently necessary elem ent of the

47

Liberalism and Democracy liberal state or as an obstacle to its developm ent which tended to the reduction rath er than th e enhancem ent of freedom . Differences of response to the issues raised by the relations betw een liberalism and dem ocracy were reflected in a schism am ong the ranks of the liberals: o n the one hand, there were the radical liberals, who were at once both liberal a n d dem o­ cratic, and on the other the conservatives, w ho were not dem ocrats and w ho ceaselessly contested every broadening of the franchise as a potential erosion of freedom . T h e dem o­ cratic ranks were sim ilarly riven by a confrontation betw een liberal and non-liberal dem ocrats: the latter were concerned m ore with the distribution than w ith the lim itations of power, m ore with instituting self-governm ent th an with the division of the central governm ent’s powers, m ore with the horizontal th an with the vertical separation of powers, and m ore with the conquest of the public sphere th an w ith the scrupulous defence of the private sphere. As the m ovem ent for the extension of political rights progressed through its m ore or less num ero us an d rapid stages tow ards the achievem ent of universal franchise, dem ocratic liberals an d liberal dem ocrats gradually becam e m ore closely identified. T h e pure dem o­ crats were to find them selves standing alongside the earliest socialist m ovem ents, even if th eir relationship often involved m u tu al com petition, as was the case in Italy with M azzini’s party. Between the pure dem ocrats a n d the conservative liberals, the distance was such as to am o u n t to m u tu al incom ­ patibility. T h e relations betw een liberalism and dem ocracy can be schem atically sum m arized in term s of three com binations: (a) liberalism an d dem ocracy are com patible, and can therefore coexist, in the sense th at a state can exist which is at once both liberal and dem ocratic: b u t this does not exclude the possibil­ ity of a liberal b u t non-dem ocratic, or a dem ocratic b u t no n ­ liberal state (the form er is envisaged by conservative liberals, the latter by radical dem ocrats); (b) liberalism an d dem ocracy are antithetical in the sense th at dem ocracy pushed to its 48

Liberals and Demoaals in the Nineteenth Century furthest lim its ends in the destruction of the liberal state (this is th e a rg u m en t of the conservative liberals), o r can only be fully realized in a social state th at has ab an d o n ed the ideal of the m in im al state (this is the argum ent of the radical dem ocrats); (c) liberalism an d dem ocracy are necessarily interlinked in the sense th a t only dem ocracy is able fully to realize the liberal ideal, a n d only in a liberal state can dem ocracy be p u t into effect. In form al term s, (a) involves a relation of possibility (liberal­ ism vel dem ocracy); (b) a relation of im possibility (liberalism aut dem ocracy); (c) a relation of necessity (liberalism et dem o­ cracy). From the m om ent th at dem ocracy as a form of governm ent is associated equally w ith both liberalism and socialism , a sim ilar fram ew ork can be em ployed to analyse the relations betw een dem ocracy an d socialism. T hese can be seen as involving possibility or possible coexistence, im possi­ bility (this is the view of liberal dem ocrats, an d also at the opposite end of the spectrum , of those w ho advocate the dictatorship of the proletariat), or necessity, as m aintained by th e doctrines an d m ovem ents of social dem ocracy, in which dem ocracy is regarded as th e only m eans by which socialism can be realized, a n d socialism is regarded as the only way in w hich th e process of dem ocratization can be fully achieved.

49

---------------------------------- 11 —

—

—

—

The Tyranny of the Majority

T h e two wings of E uropean liberalism , the one m ore conser­ vative, the other m ore radical, are well represented respect­ ively by Alexis de Tocqueville an d by J o h n Stuart Mill (1807-1873), the two m ajor liberal writers of the last century. T h ey were contem poraries (Tocqueville was b o m two years earlier th an M ill) w ho both knew an d adm ired each other. M ill wrote a long review of the first volum e of Democracy in America for the London Review, the organ of the English radi­ cals.33 In his work on representative dem ocracy, which ap p eared after Tocqueville’s death (1861), M ill rem inded his readers of his friend’s ‘great w ork’.34 Tocqueville, for his part, w rote to M ill w hen he received the latter’s essay on liberty (he him self was already dying at the time), that ‘I feel certain of y o u r continual aw areness th at w here it is a case of exploring th e terrain of liberty we have no choice b u t to proceed h an d in h a n d ’.35 For all their differing traditions, cultures an d tem ­ peram ents, the works of these two authors well illustrate the com m unality of them es betw een the two chief traditions of E uropean liberalism , the English an d the French. Tocqueville h ad devoted years of study an d reflection to the dem ocracy of a new and forward-looking society, an d M ill, less insular than 51

Liberalism and Democracy m any of his com patriots, was fam iliar w ith French thought, a n d first of all with th at of C om te (1798-1857). Tocqueville was a liberal before he was a dem ocrat. H e was firmly convinced th at life in society m ust be based on and anim ated by liberty, above all religious and m oral liberty (with econom ic liberty he was less concerned). H e had realized, however, that the revolution had given birth to a century in headlong an d unstoppable pursuit of dem ocracy. N othing could halt this process. In the introduction to the first part of his work (1835), he asked: Does anyone im agine that dem ocracy, which has destroyed the feudal system and vanquished kings, will fall back before the m iddle classes and the rich? Will it stop now, w hen it has grown so strong and its adversaries so weak?36

H is book, he explained, had been w ritten u n d e r the im pulse of a kind of religious awe provoked by the spectacle of the ‘irresistible revolution’, w hich overleaped all barriers and forged ahead even in the m idst of the ruins th at it had produced. S ubsequent to his travels in Am erica, where he had sought to u n d erstan d the n ature of the conditions of dem o­ cratic society in a world very different from Europe, and where he had beheld ‘dem ocracy in its very im age’, he rem ained obsessed throughout the rest of his life with the question: ‘C an liberty survive, and how can it survive, in a dem ocratic society?’ F or Tocqueville, ‘dem ocracy’, u n d e r one of its aspects, m eans a form of governm ent in which all participate in public affairs, an d here it is the contrary of aristocracy; u n d er an o th er aspect, it denotes a society inspired by the ideal of equality, a society which will eventually com e to overwhelm traditional social structures based on im m utable hierarchies. For Tocqueville, as indeed for his friend Mill, dem ocracy as a form of governm ent brings in its train the danger of the tyranny of the m ajority: dem ocracy as progressive realization of the

52

The Tyranny o f the Majority egalitarian ideal is attended by the danger of levelling, which issues at length in despotism . T hese are two alternative forms o f tyranny, a n d both of them , different though they are from o ne another, are the negation of liberty. T h e fact th at T ocqueville now here in his work distinguishes properly betw een these two m eanings of dem ocracy m ay lead readers to arrive at divergent or even contradictory ju d g em en ts as to his attitude to dem ocracy. W here dem ocracy is regarded not as a range of institutions whose touchstone is the institutionalized particip­ ation of the people in political power, b u t rath er as an exaltation of the value of equality in a social as well as a politi­ cal sense, or as the equalization of conditions w ithout regard for liberty, Tocqueville shows him self to be a consistent liberal an d not a dem ocrat. H e never hesitates for a m om ent in favouring individual liberty over social equality, w hereas dem ocratic peoples, he is convinced, even if they do have a n atu ral inclination tow ards liberty, feel for equality a passion w hich is ‘ardent, insatiable, eternal, an d invincible’. A lthough ‘they w ant equality in freedom ’, if they cannot have that, ‘they still w ant equality in slavery’.37 T hey will p u t u p with poverty, b u t they will not endure aristocracy. C h ap ter Seven of the first part of Democracy in America is devoted to a discussion of the tyranny of the m ajority. T h e principle that the m ajority should prevail is an egalitarian principle in that it advocates the prevalence of the force of n u m b ers over th at of a single individual; it rests upon the arg u m ent that ‘there is m ore enlightenm ent a n d wisdom in a num ero us assem bly th an in a single m an, a n d the n u m b er of legislators is m ore im p o rtan t th an how they are chosen. It is the theory of equality applied to brains’.38 W hen the m ajority is all-powerful, num erous ill effects ensue, am ong them the instability of the legislative body, the often arbitrary exercise of pow er by officials, conform ity of opinion, an d a dearth of m en w orthy of respect in the political d om ain. T o a liberal of Tocqueville’s stam p, pow er - w hether it is the pow er of the m onarch or of the people - is always an 53

Liberalism and Democracy ill. T h e overriding political problem has to do not so m uch w ith w ho holds pow er as w ith the m a n n e r of its control and lim itation. G overnm ent is to be adjudged good or bad not according to w hether it is in the hands of the m any o r the few, b u t by how m uch or how little it is allowed to do. O m nipotence in itself seems a b ad an d dangerous th in g ___So there is no pow er on earth in itself so w orthy of respect or vested with such a sacred right th at I w ould wish to let it act w ithout control an d dom inate w ithout obstacles. So w hen I see th e right and capacity to do all given to any authority whatsoever, w hether it be called people o r king, dem ocracy or aristocracy, an d w hether the scene of action is a m onarchy o r a republic, I say: the germ of tyranny is there, an d I will go look for o th e r laws u n d er w hich to live.39

Tocqueville felt keenly that in the last instance the liberal ideal, w hich values above all personal independence in m orals an d sentim ent, cannot be reconciled with the egalitarian ideal, w hich looks forward to a society whose m em bers shall be as far as possible alike in their aspirations, tastes, needs and conditions of life. H e never had m uch faith th at liberty could survive in a dem ocratic society, even if he was never able to resign him self to the idea that his contem poraries, and their future descendants, w ould be no m ore th an contented slaves. In the m em orable final pages of the second part of his ‘great w ork’ (published in 1840), he anticipates the m om ent w hen dem ocracy will turn into its opposite, since it carries w ithin itself th e seeds of a new despotism in the form of a centralized an d om nipresent governm ent. M editating on the classical notion o f dem ocracy which C onstant so m istrusted, an d on R o usseau’s idea of the general will, he writes O u r contem poraries . . . conceive a governm ent which is unitary, protective, and all-powerful, b u t elected by the people. C entralization is com bined with the sovereignty of the people. T h a t gives them a chance to relax. T hey console

54

The Tyranny of the Majority themselves for being u n d er schoolm asters by thinking that they have chosen them them selves---- U n d e r this system the citizens q u it their state of dependence ju s t long enough to choose their m asters and then fall back into it.40

D em ocracy, understood as the direct or indirect particip­ ation in political pow er of the people as a whole, is by no m eans a sufficient rem edy in itself against society’s decline into an ever less free condition: ‘O n e should never expect’, he exclaim s towards the end of his discussion, ‘a liberal, ener­ getic, an d wise governm ent to originate in the votes of a people of servants’.41 If there is a rem edy - an d Tocqueville never ceased to believe that there was, a n d indeed never ceased to suggest w hat it m ight be - it is to be sought first of all in the classical prescriptions of liberal tradition, a n d above all in the defence of certain individual liberties, such as freedom of the press an d of association, a n d in general of all those individual rights which dem ocratic states ten d to disregard in the nam e of the collective interest; secondly, it is to be found in observ­ ance of those norm s which at least guarantee equality before the law; and finally, in decentralization. F or the sam e reasons that he was a liberal before he was a dem ocrat, Tocqueville was never draw n to socialism; on the contrary, he frequently expressed his profound aversion to it. O n e can be sim ultaneously both liberal and dem ocrat or both dem ocrat and socialist; to be sim ultaneously both liberal and socialist is rather harder. W hen it cam e to the underlying confrontation betw een dem ocracy and the lofty ideal of liberty, Tocqueville was not a dem ocrat, b u t he becam e a d efender of dem ocracy w here it was a case of countering socialism, which he saw as the m anifestation of the collective state aim ed at the creation of a society of beavers rath er th an of m en. O n 12 Septem ber 1848, he m ade a speech in the C onstituent Assembly on the right to work, in the course of which he recalled and praised A m erican dem ocracy: it was com pletely im m une, he declared, from the danger of socialist

55

Liberalism and Democracy infection. D em ocracy an d socialism, he w ent on, are by no m eans akin: ‘they are not different, b u t opposed’. T hey have ju s t one w ord in com m on: equality. ‘B ut m ark the difference’, he concludes, ‘dem ocracy w ants equality in the degree of liberty enjoyed by all, socialism in th e degree of interference a n d slavery’.42

56

-------------------------------------

1 2 ----------------- --------------------

Liberalism and Utilitarianism

M ill, unlike Tocqueville, was both a liberal an d a dem ocrat. H e regarded dem ocracy, an d especially representative govern­ m en t (w hich he also called ‘po p u lar’ governm ent), as the natu ral developm ent an d consequence of liberal principles. H e recognized, to be sure, th e ills to w hich dem ocratic governm ent was subject. B ut in seeking to rem edy those ills, he displayed greater faith in the future, looking forw ard to gradual a n d inevitable progress. In his later writings, he even ad o p ted th e view th at liberalism and socialism are not incom ­ patible. H is two chief works of political theory (Mill was prim arily a philosopher and econom ist) were On Liberty (1859) an d Representative Government (1863). W hile Tocqueville w as a historian a n d political writer, M ill was additionally a political theorist, a n d was endow ed far m ore th an his French ad m irer with the talents an d tem peram ent of the reform er. M ill’s great teacher in m atters of theory was Je re m y B entham (1748-1832), whose utilitarian philosophy provided M ill w ith a new foundation for liberal argum ent unlike any found in previous writers. So it was th at M ill originated, or rath e r lent his significant authority, to w hat was subsequently to establish itself as by far the m ost im portant cu rren t of

57

Liberalism and Democracy liberalism . Earlier doctrines h a d based th e arg u m en t that governm ents had a duty to restrict the exercise of public pow er on the existence of the individual’s natural, a n d therefore inviolable, rights. B entham , in his essay on ‘A narchical Fal­ lacies’ of 1795, had launched a violent attack on the French D eclarations of Rights, pillorying them w ith disdainful irony for their philosophical feebleness, logical incoherence, verbal equivocation an d u tter lack of practical effect. T h e declaration proclaim ing th at all m en are b o m free he dism issed as absurd an d u tter foolishness, claim ing th at there was no such thing as natu ral rights, or rights prior to the institution of governm ent, or rights opposed to or in contradiction with those of law.43 In place of the long-established n atu ral rights tradition, B entham set u p the ‘principle of utility’, according to which the only criterion that should inspire a good legislator was th at the greatest happiness of the greatest n u m b er should be prom oted by the laws. T his m eant th at any such lim its as m ight be placed on the pow er of those w ho govern had nothing to do with fantasies a b o u t natural rights, which do not exist an d cannot possibly be proved to exist, b u t follow from the objective consideration that m en seek pleasure an d avoid pain, a n d th at the best society is therefore the society which succeeds in obtaining the greatest happiness for the greatest n u m b er of its m em bers. In the Anglo-Saxon intellectual tradition, which has undou b ted ly m ade the m ost enduring an d coherent contribution to th e developm ent of liberalism , utilitarianism an d liberalism w ere to proceed in parallel from the tim e of B entham onw ards, with utilitarianism becom ing the m ajor theoretical ally of th e liberal state. In m oving from the doctrine of natural rights to utilitarianism , liberal thought underw ent a fundam ental crisis, whose effects are still trace­ able in the recently renew ed debate aro u n d the issue of h u m an rights. M ill is an explicit an d convinced utilitarian:

58

Liberalism and Utilitarianism T h e creed w hich accepts as the foundation of m orals, Utility, o r the G reatest H appiness Principle, holds th at actions are right in proportion as they tend to prom ote happiness, w rong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.44

H e interpreted B entham ’s ‘happiness’ as equivalent to pleasure or the absence of pain, an d his ‘u nhappiness’ as pain o r th e loss of pleasure. As a m oral doctrine, however, an d a d octrine which criticizes and rejects any form of fundam ental m oral obligation unless it refers back to the question of pain a n d pleasure, utilitarianism , M ill argued, is concerned not w ith utility as it applies to the isolated individual in his relation to the utility of other such individuals, b u t w ith social utility; not with ‘the agent’s own happiness, b u t th at of all co n cerned’, a m atter to be assessed with the im partiality of a ‘disinterested and benevolent spectator’.45 M ill accordingly rejects the tem ptation to fall back on the doctrine of natural rights as foundation an d vindication of the notion th at state pow er m ust be lim ited (and in this his position is consistent w ith B entham ’s critique of natu ral rights). H e m akes this p o in t expressly in his introduction to On Liberty, where he sets o u t the principles which inspire his doctrines: It is proper to state th at I forgo any advantage which could be derived to m y argum ent from the idea of abstract right, as a thing dependent on utility. I regard utility as the ultim ate appeal on all ethical questions; b u t it m ust be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the p erm anent interests of m an as a progressive being.46

Mill follows liberal tradition in concerning him self with negative liberty, liberty understood as the condition of a subject (w hether an individual o r a group acting as a single whole) not hindered by any external force from doing w hat it desires and not u n d e r any com pulsion to do w hat it does not desire. M ill is thus seeking to form ulate a principle on which

59

Liberalism and Democracy he can base a n d establish, on the one h an d , the lim its w ithin w hich public pow er can legitim ately restrict the liberty of individuals; on the oth er h an d , an d as a corollary, the lim its w ithin which individuals o r groups can act w ithout the interference of state power. In o th er words, he is seeking to draw the boundary betw een private an d public spheres in such a way as to guarantee individual enjoym ent of a liberty u n m arre d by the incursion of state power, a n d to ensure th at the m argins of this liberty will be as w ide as is consistent w ith m aking the necessary allowance for m ediation betw een indi­ vidual a n d collective interests. T h e principle he proposes is as follows: T h a t the sole end for w hich m ankind are w arranted, individu­ ally or collectively, in interfering w ith the liberty of action of any of their num ber, is self-protection. T h a t the only purpose for w hich pow er can be rightfully exercised over any m em b er of a civilized com m unity, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.47

From which it follows in tu rn th at ‘If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him , by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation’.48 In enunciating this principle, M ill aim s to lim it the state’s right to restrict the sphere of individual liberty - the sphere w here the individual is free to choose betw een alternatives; an d to lim it its rights to induce citizens to act o r refrain from acting, o th er th an in accordance w ith their own wishes, to the realm of external actions (in K a n t’s sense). T h e state, in other words, can legitim ately interfere only in the case of those actions in which the individual’s pursuit of his own interests m ay infringe upon the interests of a n o th er individual. It follows that the individual is protected from any incursion of public pow er so long as his actions affect nobody b u t him selffor instance, in his private thoughts an d feelings, his liberty of

60

Liberalism and Utilitarianism th o u g h t an d opinion, his freedom to follow his own tastes and projects, his freedom to associate w ith oth er individuals. If we agree to call ‘paternalistic’ all those political doctrines which regard the state as entitled to interfere in individuals’ private affairs on the grounds th at every individual, even an adult, requires protection against his own inclinations an d im pulses, th en here in Mill, as in Locke a n d K ant, liberalism once again shows itself to be the anti-patem alistic doctrine par excellence; for its starting-point is the ethical prem ise forcefully expressed in th e M illian dictum th at each individual ‘is the p roper g u ardian of his own health, w hether bodily, or m ental an d spiritual’.49 T his is not to deny th at elem ents of paternalism are to be found in M ill (as they are in Locke an d K ant, com e to that). W e have here in m in d the fact th at M ill, in expressing the opinion ju s t cited, restricts its application to the m em bers of a ‘civilized com m unity’: the principle of liberty, in oth er words, holds good only for individuals whose faculties are fully developed. It does not hold good for m inors, w ho are still u n d e r paternal protection, or for backw ard societies, which can be considered as being in a condition of collective m inor­ ity. M ill m akes his opinion on the latter point qu ite clear: ‘D espotism is a legitim ate m ode of governm ent in dealing with b arbarians, provided the end be th eir im provem ent, an d the m eans justified by actually effecting th at e n d ’.50 Leaving aside th e qualifying clause (though w ho is to be the ju d g e of the end pursued or of the appropriateness of the m eans to th at end?), M ill here echoes faithfully the traditional justification for despotic regimes, which Aristotle, centuries earlier, had th o u g h t the right form of governm ent for those w ho w ere by n a tu re slaves.

67

-------------------—

13

—

-------------------------

Representative Democracy

M ill, like Tocqueville, fears the tyranny of the m ajority an d regards it as one of th e evils against which society m u st protect itself. However, this does not lead him to reject dem ocratic governm ent. In his w ork on representative dem ocracy, w ritten shortly after On Liberty, he asks him self th e tim e-honoured question, W hat is the best form of governm ent? a n d concludes th a t it is, in fact, representative dem ocracy, w hich constitutes, a t any rate in those nations that have advanced to a certain level of civilization, the natural developm ent of any state seeking to guarantee the m axim um freedom for its citizens: ‘the participation of all in these benefits is the ideally perfect conception of free governm ent’. A nd he supports the claim with the following observation: In proportion as any, no matter who, are excluded from it, the interests of the excluded are left without the guarantee accorded to the rest, and they themselves have less scope and encouragement than they might otherwise have to that exertion of their energies for the good of themselves and of the community.51

63

Liberalism and Democracy H ere we find the clearest possible expression of the link between liberalism and dem ocracy or, m ore precisely, between a particular conception of the state, a n d those modes and forms of the exercise of power that are best fitted to realize this conception in actuality. T his view that the perfectly free governm ent is that in which all participate, to the benefit of all, led M ill to becom e an advocate of the extension of the franchise. H ere he followed Bentham ite radicalism , which had pressed for the English electoral reform of 1832. O ne rem edy against the tyranny of the m ajority lies in extending participation at elections beyond the leisured classes (always a m inority of the population and naturally showing a tendency to be exclusively concerned with their own interests), so allowing the m ajority to include the popular classes provided that they are tax-payers on however small a scale. Voting has great educational value: political discussion encourages the m anual labourer, despite the repeti­ tive character of his work and the narrow horizons of the factory, to arrive at some understanding of the relation between distant events and his own personal interests and to establish relations with citizens unlike those with w hom he is in daily intercourse at work. H e thus becom es a conscious m em ber of a great com m unity: ‘T h ere ought to be no pariahs in a full-grown and civilized nation; no persons disqualified, except through their own default’.52 Universal suffrage nonetheless rem ains ideal, an ultim ate objective, an d M ill’s own proposals fall considerably short of it: M ill excludes from the vote not only bankrupts and fraudulent debtors, b u t also the illiterate (though he looks forward to universal education, which, he says, m ust precede universal suffrage) an d those in receipt of parish relief, for he holds th at those who m ake no contribution at all by way of taxes can have no right to decide how everyone is to contribute to public expenditure. O n the other hand, Mill supports the enfranchisem ent of w om en (whereas in continental Europe the vote was generally extended to illiterate m en earlier than

64

Representative Democracy to wom en), basing his position on the argum ent th at all h u m an beings have an interest in being well governed and th at each person thus has an equal need of the vote in order to ensure his or h er rightful share of the benefits accruing to each m em b er of the com m unity. T his leads him to tu rn on its head the usual anti-fem inist argum ent: if there is any difference of claim , says M ill, ‘w om en require it m ore than m en, since, being physically weaker, they are m ore dependent on law and society for protection’.53 M ill’s second rem edy against the tyranny of the m ajority is reform of the electoral system. H e advocates a change from the m ajority vote system - w hereby each constituency is allowed to elect no m ore than one representative, the successful candidate being the one to receive the m ost votes (w hether in one or m ore rounds) an d the rest being elim inated —in favour of a proportional system (M ill’s m odel was that proposed by T h o m as H are, 1806-1891); such a system ensures th at m inor­ ities will be adequately represented, each in proportion to the votes it receives, an d m ay be based either on a single nationw ide constituency, o r on constituencies large enough to allow the election of several representatives. O utlining the advantages and m erits of the schem e, M ill em phasizes th at the m ajority will be held in check by the presence of a diehard m inority, who will h in d er any abuse of pow er w hich m ight otherwise be open to it, and w ho will thus prevent dem ocracy from degenerating. H e takes this opportunity to pen one of the m ost forceful eulogies of antagonism to be found in liberal thought, in a passage offering w hat is surely a quintessential expression of the liberal ethic: No com m unity has ever long continued progressive, b u t while a conflict was going on betw een the strongest pow er in the com m unity and some rival power; betw een the spiritual and tem poral authorities; the m ilitary or territorial an d the industrious classes; the king and the people; the orthodox and the religious reform ers.54

65

Liberalism and Democracy W herever conflict is stifled o r sm oothed away, stagnation invariably sets in, followed by the decline a n d decay of the state or of an entire civilization. A lthough Mill fully accepts the dem ocratic principle, an d although he praises representative dem ocracy as the best form of governm ent, his thought still falls far short of em bracing the ideal of perfect dem ocracy. As if to m odify the innovatory effects of a w ider franchise, he proposed the institution of plural votes (a proposal th at was not taken up): although it is only ju s t th at everyone should have the vote, it does not follow from this, he argues, th at each elector is entitled to ju s t one vote. T h e best educated, M ill proposes (and not those who are wealthiest), should have m ore than one vote, adding the proviso that those who apply for them an d succeed in passing an exam ination should also be entitled to extra votes. M o d em constitutions however affirm, not w ithout reason, th at the right to vote should be an ‘eq u al’ right (as stated in Article Forty-eight of the present Italian constitution).

66

Liberalism and Democracy in Italy

Even though its liberalism retained strongly paternalistic elem ents and rested on an incom plete and inegalitarian model of dem ocracy, M ill’s work represented a fruitful encounter betw een liberal and dem ocratic thought. N onetheless, liberals and dem ocrats continued, as they do to this day, to organize themselves into different political m ovem ents an d factions. At times, these will be directly opposed, as is the case w hen the liberals, for their part, direct their polem ic at the growing incursions of the state, which they rightly interpret as a consequence of dem ocratization; or the dem ocrats for their part challenge the continuation of political oligarchies and m arked econom ic inequalities, which they rightly claim are a consequence of the slow pace at w hich dem ocratization is proceeding and of the obstacles p u t in its p ath by those blessed by w e a lth . T h e o p p o s itio n b e tw e e n lib e ra lis m a n d d e m o c ra c y in

this area can also be considered from a n o th e r point of view: there is a close connection betw een the developm ent of liberal doctrine and the econom ic critique of autocratic societies, whereas the developm ent of dem ocratic doctrine tends rather to be associated with a political or institutional critique. At all events, liberalism an d dem ocracy designated m utually antag­ onistic doctrines an d m ovem ents th ro u g h o u t the last century.

Liberalism and Democracy Liberals supported the moves tow ards establishing or claim ing rights an d liberties which were associated w ith the period of th e restoration, an d were suspicious of the dem ocrats’ nostal­ gia for the age of revolution. D em ocrats, holding th at the restoration had b rought to a p rem atu re halt the process of p o p u lar em ancipation initiated in the French revolution, dism issed the liberals as the party of m oderation. U ntil the advent of the socialist parties, parliam entarians were divided betw een the party of conservatism a n d the party of progress, these two opposing form ations corresponding m ore or less to th e opposition betw een liberals a n d dem ocrats. T h e dialectic o f politics is best understood as alternating betw een these cam ps, even though in E ngland, hom elan d of parliam entarianism and tw o-party governm ent, they referred to themselves respectively as conservatives an d liberals (the nam es were retained despite changes over tim e in their program m es). T h e disposing factors in the gradual confluence of the liberal and dem ocratic traditions were, in the first instance, the form ation o f th e socialist parties, a n d even m ore im portantly, in the present century, the establishm ent of regim es th at were n eith er liberal nor dem ocratic - th e fascist regim es a n d the regim e th at cam e to pow er as a result of the R ussian O ctober Revolution. T h e original differences betw een liberalism and dem ocracy dw indled into historical a n d political irrelevance in th e face of the new phenom enon of tw entieth-century totalitar­ ianism . Italian political thought in the second half of the nineteenth century (which follows the broad lines of E uropean, an d in particu lar French, political thought) reveals a very clear opposition betw een liberal and dem ocratic schools of thought. T h is was highlighted through th e presence on the Italian scene of M azzini (1805-1872), active as a w riter and political agitator, and known beyond his native land as one of the m ost typical exponents of the new dem ocratic ideas which were pu ttin g all E urope in a ferm ent as the old autocracies were challenged.

68

Liberalism and Democracy in Italy In the course of his account o f M azzini’s literary work, Francesco De Sanctis (1817-1883) outlined an d em phasized the distinction between liberal a n d dem ocratic doctrines. T hese, he argued, were the two currents th at anim ated the public m ind of Italy in the nineteenth century; an d although concerned above all with their literary aspect, he stressed their sim ilarity in bringing together political, m oral an d religious objectives, with the result that, unlike the purely literary groups, they affected Italian society as a whole an d not m erely the narrow circle of the literary intelligentsia. De Sanctis, m oreover, in the course of his discussion on M azzini, ap p lau ded his role in the furtherance of national education through the stim ulus he gave to the form ation of a left-wing youth m ovem ent dedicated to re-directing the country along new lines and to prom oting ‘a new attitude tow ards the p o p u lar classes, a new concept of w hat is national - different from that which the right has traditionally upheld, because broader, less elitist and less a u th o ritarian ’.55 H e took the view that the liberal school had ab an d o n ed the goal of ultim ate liberty proclaim ed by the philosopher-revolutionaries of the seventeenth century, and had settled for liberty in a purely ‘procedural’ sense, as the m ethod o r m eans of a m erely formal liberty, which anyone was entitled to avail them selves of in pursuit of their own private ends. T h e liberal school, he observed, was a sort of com m on ground open to m en pursuing the m ost divergent ends. H ere we find clerics anxious to preserve the freedom of the C hurch, conservatives seeking the liberty of the u p p er classes, dem o­ crats seeking the liberty of the lower, the friends of progress in search of a way forward w ithout disturbing n a tu re ’s m odest pace of change.56

T h e dem ocratic school, by contrast, argued De Sanctis, was inspired by the ideal of a new society ‘based on distributive justice, and on equality of rights - which m eans, in the m ost

69

Liberalism and Democracy advanced countries, equality in reality also’. For the dem o­ crats, liberty was not a procedure b u t som ething ‘substan­ tial’.57 E xpanding on this point, he wrote: W here inequality prevails, liberty m ay be proclaim ed in laws and statutes, b u t it does not really exist. T h ere is no liberty for the peasant who depends on the landow ner, the supplicant w ho asks a favour of the boss, o r the serf condem ned to ceaseless toil in the fields.58

Ideas such as these, concluded D e Sanctis, could only lead to th e res publica, which is ‘not the governm ent of this or that person, nor arbitrary power, n o r the dom inion of certain classes: it is the governm ent of all’.59 A state for w hich liberty is no m ore th an a m eans can be neutral, indifferent, atheistic. T h e state which belongs to all, the res publica, can be none of these things; on the contrary, it m u st aim at educating the nation, especially in the afterm ath of a rapid an d forced process of unification. Still in the Italian context, a nice instance of this persistent opposition, as it appeared du rin g the R isorgim ento, is presented by the contrasting figures of Cavour (1810-1868) a n d M azzini. From his youthful reading of B entham , together w ith C onstant, Cavour retained principles to which he rem ained faithful thereafter. From B entham he took the idea th at the theory of natural rights lacked any foundation, and he was also strongly convinced of the excellence of utilitarianism , so m uch so that he was happy to regard him self as a ‘hardened B entham ite’.60 In I sistemi e la democrazia. Pensieri (1850), one of the fullest expressions of his doctrine, M azzini argued that B entham an d his utilitarian doctrines should be regarded as the prim e source of the m aterialism th at held sway in dem o­ cratic an d socialist thought from Saint-Sim on (1760-1825) through to the com m unists (am ong w hom , however, he m entions by nam e neither M arx (1818-1883) n o r Engels (1820-1895)); B entham , he says, is the ‘principal figure of this

70

Liberalism and Democracy in Italy school and the architect of its principles’,61 an d his disciples include all those who ‘w orship utility’. In the place of the doctrine of utility, M azzini puts forward the notion of duty an d sacrifice in the nam e of the sacred cause of hum anity: N o, it is not by way of interest an d pleasure th at dem ocracy finds m eans to improve the life of society; theoretical consider­ ations of utility are not going to m ake the w ealthy in all their ease feel the w retchedness of the poor and the urgent necessity of som e rem edy.62

C avour was an ad m irer of Tocqueville a n d shared his anxiety a b o u t hu m an ity ’s inexorable progress tow ards dem o­ cracy. It was Tocqueville who, as foreign m inister of the French republic from J u n e 1849 onw ards, sealed the fate of the R o m an republic. M azzini addressed a vehem ent letter of protest to him and his fellow m inister, Falloux (1811-1886), accusing the two of being the ‘latest recruits to th at school which began by spreading atheistical doctrines a b o u t art and has ended u p pursuing pow er for pow er’s sake’.63 Cavour, advocate of the golden m ean, sought an interm ediate position, the only one conform ing to reason, betw een reaction and revolution. M azzini rem ained intransigent in his com m itm ent to th e national revolution, an d associated him self unequivo­ cally with one of the two extrem es rejected by the liberal advocates of flexibility, C avour was a student of econom ics an d ad m irer of the great econom ists from Sm ith to Ricardo (1772-1823); he was a convinced and a d am an t believer in laissez-faire and the free trade theory, to which M azzini rem ained steadfastly opposed. M azzini proclaim ed the edu­ cational role and responsibility of the state, in opposition to the liberal view of it as a necessary evil whose functions should accordingly be restricted to the policing of society. N othing could be m ore foreign to the opinions of a thoroughgoing liberal like C avour than M azzini’s assault upon the idea that the state should be ‘bereft of any powers to initiate, and

77

Liberalism and Democracy function in a purely restraining capacity’: the result, says M azzini, is that in place of society, we have a m ass of separate individuals, shackled and rendered passive, b u t all pursuing th eir own particular ends and all free to choose th eir own m an n er of life w hether or not it is advantageous to the com m on cause. In politics as in economics, the great form ula of this school of thought is laissez faire, laissez passer,64

Cavour, with his gradualist faith in the progressive a d ap ­ tation of institutions to the changing needs of society, can have had little stom ach for the abstract revolutionarism of M azzini, for w hom the simple, sane criterion of utility was supplanted by the im perative of sacrifice, and who transform ed the stress on individual rights associated w ith the E nlightenm ent into a strict code of duty. R om eo states th at ‘Cavour, faithful to his B entham ite origins, held the view th at econom ic progress, far from conflicting with spiritual an d m oral progress, in fact runs parallel to it.’65 M azzini, loyal to his anti-B entham ite origins, argues, by contrast, th at spiritual progress is the condition of m aterial progress: doctrines of happiness an d well-being draw n from the utilitarian school m ake for an egoistic cult of m aterialism . ‘W hat is needed, therefore, is a higher educative principle . . . the principle of d u ty .’66

72

Democracy as It Relates to Socialism

A lthough liberal and dem ocratic ideals have gradually fused in the course of their troubled history, the opposition betw een liberalism and dem ocracy rem ains as strong as ever, and m ay even in recent years be said to have grown m ore acute in certain respects. It is an opposition kept alive an d intensified by a fact that supervened during the second half of the last century: the entry into the political arena of the w orkers’ m ovem ent, which increasingly drew its inspiration from socialist doctrines. T h ese latter were antithetical to those of liberalism , although the dem ocratic m ethod was not rejected - not, at any rate, by a large part of the m ovem ent, which included the English L ab o u r Party, the G erm an Social D em ocrats, and the reform ­ ist wing generally. As we have seen, liberalism an d dem ocracy have never been radically antithetical, even though it proved difficult a n d contentious to graft dem ocratic ideals on to the original stock of liberal aspirations, a n d even though where liberalism a n d dem ocracy have com e together the process has been slow, painful an d uneven. Socialism, on the oth er hand, clearly appeared as opposed to liberalism from the beginning - a n d not m erely in its M arxist or marxisant guise. T h e bone of

Liberalism and Democracy contention was econom ic liberty, which presupposes an unyielding com m itm ent to private property. D espite th e m any different definitions which have been given of socialism over th e last century, there is one criterion w hich consistently, distinctively and definitely m arks it off from other doctrines: nam ely, the critique of private property as the principal source of ‘inequalities am ong m en ’ (to use the w ords of R ousseau’s celebrated Discourse), and the view th at the total o r partial elim ination of private property was the goal of the society of the future. M ost socialist writers, an d m ost of the m ovem ents they have inspired, have identified liberalism (rightly or w rongly - though certainly rightly in purely historical term s) with a com m itm ent to defend econom ic freedom a n d thus individual property as its sole guarantee, this being regarded as a form of freedom essential to the flourishing of any other forms. T h e socialist m ovem ent inherited from bourgeois theories of history a class-based conception of history, accord­ ing to w hich classes are the leading historical subjects and historical developm ent comes about through the transition from th e rule of one class to that of another. In this concep­ tion, liberalism , understood as the view th at econom ic liberty is the foundation of all other liberties and th at no m an can be truly free in its absence, cam e in the end to be regarded by socialist writers (and not only by M arx, though it was M arx’s influence that predom inated in the form ation of the continen­ tal socialist parties, especially in G erm any and Italy) as n othing m ore than the ideology of the bourgeois class - the ideology, in other words, of the opposing party with w hich the socialists would have to do battle until they w ere finally elim inated. W hile the relation betw een liberalism an d socialism was one of clear antithesis (w hether the criterion was socialism ’s project for the future society or its status as the ideology of a class destined, in the course of historical progress, to take the place of the bourgeoisie), the relation betw een socialism and dem ocracy was com plem entary, like that which h ad hitherto

74

Democracy as It Relates to Socialism held betw een dem ocracy an d liberalism . T h o u g h reckoned incom patible with liberalism , socialism gradually cam e to be th o u g h t of as congruent with dem ocracy. T w o argum ents w ere advanced in support of this conception of their com pat­ ible, even com plem entary status. In the first place, it was claim ed th at as dem ocratization proceeded so it w ould inevi­ tably lead to, o r at any rate foster, the advent of a socialist society, based on the transform ation of the institution of private property and on the collectivization of at least the principal m eans of production. Secondly, it was argued that only by way of the advent of socialism could participation in political life be strengthened a n d enlarged, an d dem ocracy fully realized. A m ong the prom ises held ou t by such a dem ocracy, moreover, was that of an equal (or at any rate m ore equal) distribution not only of political b u t of econom ic power, and this was som ething th a t a m erely liberal dem oc­ racy could never have offered. T h ese two theses were the basis of the claim that dem ocracy an d socialism were indissolubly linked: the m ain strands of the socialist m ovem ent saw this link as a necessary condition for the creation of a socialist society, while dem ocratic m ovem ents saw it as a condition of the developm ent of dem ocracy itself. T h is is not to suggest that the relationship betw een dem oc­ racy an d socialism was always peaceful. Indeed, it m irrored th at betw een liberalism and dem ocracy in being, aro u n d certain issues, quite frequently a n d openly contestatory. D em ocracy and socialism, it was clear, reinforced one an o th er in a circular relation; from w hich point on this circle should one attem pt to initiate change? T o begin by w idening the scope of dem ocracy im plied the acceptance of a gradual and uncertain process of developm ent. W as it possible, desirable an d legitim ate to take the opposite approach - to set out art once on the path of socialist transform ation of society, by way of a qualitative, revolutionary break which w ould involve at least a tem porary suspension of th e m ethods of dem ocracy? T h u s it was that from the second half of the last century

75

Liberalism and Democracy onw ards, the conflict betw een liberalism a n d dem ocracy wa& overlaid by a new opposition betw een the defenders of liberal dem ocracy, on the one hand, w ho often form ed com m on cause against socialism (which they regarded as the negation of both liberalism and dem ocracy) and, on the oth er h an d , the socialists, both dem ocratic an d non-dem ocratic. T hese in tu rn were divided not over their attitude to liberalism , which they agreed in opposing, b u t by their ju d g em en t of the validity and efficacy of dem ocracy, at least in the im m ediate afterm ath of the conquest of power. However, such d o u b ts a b o u t the appropriateness of dem ocratic m ethods during the so-called transition period never in any way negated the fundam ental dem ocratic inspiration of the socialist parties, based as this was on a conviction th at dem ocracy would best be advanced in a socialist society an d that the latter would prove in the long ru n m ore dem ocratic than a liberal society which has sprung up and been n u rtu red along w ith the birth and grow th of capitalism . Surveying the vast literature of the past century, we can identify at least three argum ents advanced in support of this view that socialist dem ocracy is preferable to liberal dem oc­ racy: (a) Liberal dem ocracy - or, in m ore polem ical term s, capitalist dem ocracy an d (with regard to the historical subject which b rought it into being) bourgeois dem ocracy - cam e into cxistencc as representative dem ocracy, with elected represen­ tatives unfettered by any m andate; while socialist or, in class term s, proletarian dem ocracy is to be a direct dem ocracy, in the double sense either of a dem ocracy of all the people w ithout representatives or else of a dem ocracy based, not on representatives, b u t on m andated delegates subject to recall, (b) Bourgeois dem ocracy has allowed people to participate in political power, both central and local, through the extension of the suffrage to the point w here all m en an d w om en enjoy the vote; b u t only socialist dem ocracy will allow them to participate also in decisions on econom ic m atters, which in capitalist society are taken autocratically. In this sense, social­

76

Democracy as It Relates to Socialism ist dem ocracy represents not ju st a m ore active participation, b u t a quantitative extension of participation through the opening up of new spaces for the exercise of th at popular sovereignty which constitutes the essence of dem ocracy, (c) Finally, and above all, liberal dem ocracy offers the right to participate directly or indirectly in political decisions, b u t this is not paralleled by any increased equality in th e distribution of econom ic power, with the result that the right to vote often am o u n ts to nothing m ore than a m irage. Socialist dem ocracy, by contrast, holds a m ore equal distribution of econom ic pow er to be one of the prim e aim s of the changes which it aim s to institute in the econom ic regim e, an d th u s transform s the formal power to participate into a real a n d substantial power, at the sam e tim e bringing dem ocracy itself to its ideal fulfilment, a greater equality am ong m en. T h e fact that the dem ocratic ideal has been em braced by bo th the liberal m ovem ent and by the antithetical socialist m ovem ent, with the result that both liberal-dem ocratic and social-dem ocratic governm ents have com e into being (though as yet no socialist-dem ocratic governm ent; we have yet to see a regim e which is both dem ocratic and socialist), m ight incline one to conclude that for the last two centuries dem ocracy has figured as a kind of com m on d enom inator am ong all the regim es that have developed in the econom ically a n d politi­ cally advanced countries. However, we should not autom ati­ cally assum e that the concept of dem ocracy has rem ained unaltered in the passage from liberal to social dem ocracy. In the liberalism -dem ocracy couple, dem ocracy m eans above all universal suffrage, and thus a m eans w hereby particular individuals can freely express their will. In the socialism dem ocracy coupling, it signifies above all the egalitarian ideal, which can only be achieved by the property reform s proposed by socialism. In the form er case dem ocracy is a consequence, in the latter it is a presupposition. As a consequence, it is the political liberty which follows from and com pletes the series of m ore particular liberties; as a presupposition, it rem ains to be

77

Liberalism and Democracy com pleted, and can only be com pleted u n d e r the changed conditions which socialism aspires to create through the transform ation of capitalist society. T h e am biguous nature of the concept of dem ocracy is very m anifest in the so-called ‘social dem ocracy’, w hich has been the architect of the ‘welfare state’.’ Social dem ocracy claim s to represent an advance on liberal dem ocracy in that its declar­ ation of rights em braces social rights as well as rights to liberty; w ith respect to socialist dem ocracy, on the o th er hand, it claim s only to be a first phase. T h e am biguity has been reflected in the double-edged nature of the critique which it has elicited, with intransigent liberals on the right claim ing th at it dim inishes the liberty of the individual, w hile on the left, im patient socialists condem n it as a com prom ise between old a n d new which, far from favouring the realization of socialism, hinders or renders it altogether inoperable.

Bobbio uses the Italian term stato dei servizi (literally ‘service state’), explaining that he prefers it to the other terms in use in Italy: stalo benessere (‘welfare state’) and stato assistenziale (‘assistance state’), which he claims err respectively by overstating or understating the blessings of such a state. [Trans. J

78

16

The New Liberalism

Let us now return to o u r them e: the relationship betw een liberalism and dem ocracy. T here is no d oubt th at the em erg­ ence an d spread of socialist doctrines and m ovem ents, and the accom panying explicit alliance between the latter and dem o­ cratic parties, reopened the longstanding conflict between liberalism and dem ocracy - and at the very m om ent, too, w hen the progress of the m ost advanced countries towards universal suffrage was prom ising a final historic reconciliation betw een the two. If — as the social dem ocratic parties claim ed in the program m e of the Second International - th e process of progressive dem ocratization was b o u n d inevitably to lead to socialism, then could it be supported by liberals? It was precisely in reaction to this supposed advance of socialism, w ith its general program m e of econom ic planning an d collec­ tivization of the m eans of production, that liberal argum ent has com e to focus ever m ore narrow ly on the defence of the m arket econom y a n d of freedom of enterprise (together with the connected right to private property), a n d has becom e identified with the econom ic position known in Italian politics as liberismo. As always happens, and despite th e fact that liberalism and socialism are m utually opposed ideologies both

79

Liberalism and Democracy in th eir origins and in their program m atic outlines, attem pts have been m ade to overcom e their antithesis by w ay of m ediation or synthesis: these have ranged from the wellknow n Liberalism (1911) of H obhouse (1864-1929) to th e Socialismo Liberale (1930) of C arlo Roselli (1899-1937), a n d the liberal socialism, which also attracted its advocates in Italy (b u t was a form ula unknow n elsewhere), and which inspired the sm all anti-Fascist Partito d ’Azione during its brief period of activity (1942-1947). However, the antithesis has persisted, a n d indeed becom e even m ore rigid and sharply defined in the course of the last two decades. T here are two very obvious historical reasons for this. In the first place, the flagrantly illiberal n atu re of those regim es which have attem pted, for the first tim e, to transform society along socialist lines; in the second, the em ergence of illiberal elem ents in the policies of those governm ents which have gone furthest in im plem enting th e welfare state. Liberal socialism (or liberal-socialism ) has h ith erto rem ained either an abstract doctrinal idea, as te m p t­ ing in theory as it is h ard to translate into institutional practice, or else a form ula (by no m eans the only one) of use in designating those forms of governm ent w herein the state ap p aratu s is deployed in the protection of social as well as liberal rights. If, then, a m arriage betw een liberalism and socialism has h itherto been a vain, if w orthy aspiration, there is no denying th e very real n ature of the increasing identification of liberal­ ism with the defence of th e free m arket. T h ere can be no p ro p er understanding of one of the m ost im portant aspects of th e current political struggles of w estern E urope a n d the U n ited States if one fails to take note of this reality. In Italy, the n atu re of the issues was m ade particularly clear in the d eb ate betw een Croce and E inaudi (1874—1961), which took place during the last years of the fascist regim e, and centred on the relationship betw een ethical-political liberalism and econ­ om ic liberalism . E inaudi, as a liberal econom ist, m aintained th a t there was an indissoluble connection betw een the ethi­ 80

The New Liberalism cal-political doctrine and econom ic liberalism (or the defence of the free m arket), and that w ithout the latter, the form er could not survive. Croce, though in certain respects m ore of a conservative than E inaudi, opposed this view an d argued that liberty was a m oral ideal and as such could be realized in a range of econom ic dispensations, provided these were directed to the m oral im provem ent of the individual; an d he cited with approval H obhouse’s ‘fine eulogy and apologia’ for liberal socialism .67 If we consider the current m eaning of the term liberalism , especially in the usage of the various so-called neo-liberal currents of thought, then we m ust conclude th at the econo­ mist, E inaudi, has been proved right. N eo-liberalism today refers prim arily to a widely supported econom ic doctrine, while political liberalism is regarded as no m ore than a m eans (and not even always a necessary m eans) to its realization; or else it represents an uncom prom ising com m itm ent to an econom ic liberty of which political freedom is viewed as no m ore th an a corollary. T h e A ustrian econom ist, Friedrich von Hayek, one of the key influences behind the present moves to dism antle the welfare state, has been as insistent as anyone on the indissolubility of the connection betw een econom ic liberty an d liberty tout court. H e has in consequence stressed the im portance of cleariy distinguishing betw een liberalism , whose starting-point is in econom ic theory; and dem ocracy, which is a political theory. For Hayek, individual liberty, of which the first condition is econom ic freedom , possesses intrinsic value, whereas dem ocracy’s value is only instru­ m ental. H e grants that liberalism and dem ocracy m ay have stood side by side, and even been confused w ith one another, in the old struggles against absolutism , b u t the tim e for such confusion is past now th at it has been brought hom e to us (not least th rough the illiberalism to which the process of dem ocra­ tization is potentially - and indeed actually - subject) th at the two doctrines are responses to different problem s. L iberalism is concerned w ith the problem of governm ental functioning,

81

Liberalism and Democracy an d in particular with lim iting th e powers of governm ent, while dem ocracy is concerned w ith the problem of who is to govern an d by w hat procedures: Liberalism requires that all power, and this m ust include the pow er of the m ajority, m ust be circum scribed. D em ocracy, by contrast, tends to the view that th e opinion of the m ajority constitutes the sole lim it to the powers of the governm ent. T h e difference between the two principles is clearly ap p aren t w hen we recall that the opposite of dem ocracy is authoritarianism , an d the opposite of liberty, totalitarianism .68

O f course, the term ‘liberalism ’, like every other term of political discourse, has had various m eanings which have enjoyed m ore or less wide currency. N onetheless H ayek’s views, expressed in a considerable n u m b er of works which m ay well be regarded as the epitom e of contem porary liberal thinking, are an authoritative confirm ation of the original kernel of classical liberalism as a theory of the limits of state power, prem ised upon the individual as possessor, prior to the em ergence of political power, of certain interests an d rights, including the right to private property. T hese lim its apply to whoever holds political power, extending even to the case of p o p u lar pow er or in other words of dem ocratic governm ent, w here all citizens have the right to participate, even if only indirectly, in the m aking of im portant decisions, and w hich is subject to the rule of the m ajority. It is im possible to d em ar­ cate once and for all the b o u n d ary betw een the powers of the state an d the rights of the individual: nonetheless, liberal doctrine in all its traditional expressions, and especially in the Anglo-Saxon w orld, has characteristically and repeatedly taken the view that those states are m ost liberal which wield the least power, a n d in which, as a corollary, the sphere of negative liberty is widest. Liberalism differs from auth o ritar­ ianism (which is nonetheless regarded as preferable to totalit­ arianism ) in its valuation of the two antithetical term s, power

82

The New Liberalism a n d liberty, and of their respective consequences. F or liberal­ ism , th e positive sign is attached to the term ‘liberty’, and those societies are accordingly deem ed best w here liberty is at its w idest an d pow er at its m ost restricted. L iberalism is today often defined as the doctrine of the ‘m in im al state’. W hereas the anarchist regards the state as an absolute evil, w hich m ust therefore be done away with, the liberal regards it as evil b u t also as necessary, a n d hence as indispensable, although it should never be extended beyond the absolute m inim um . T h e great attention paid to this notion of th e ‘m inim al state’ explains why there has been such a w ealth of discussion centred on R obert Nozick’s book, Anar­ chy, State and Utopia, which appeared in 1974.69 Nozick directs his attack at two targets: at the m axim al state advocated by those w ho believe in ‘the ju s t state’ (whose tasks w ould include the redistribution of wealth); a n d also at anarchist proposals th at th e state should be com pletely elim inated. T h o u g h he deploys som e fresh argum ents, Nozick offers a restatem ent an d a defence of the classic liberal thesis th at the state is an organization enjoying the exclusive right to the use of force an d en trusted with the single, lim ited task of protecting the individual rights of each m em b er of the group. His startingpoint is Locke’s theory of the state of n ature an d of natural rights, even though he rejects contract theory with its view of the state as arising from a voluntary agreem ent, preferring the convenient (and perhaps m istaken) notion th at it is the creation of an ‘invisible h a n d ’. T h e state, he argues, is a free association into which those who live in a given territory enter for the sake of protection, and its task is to defend the rights of each individual against interference on the part of any other, an d accordingly to prevent the developm ent of any form of private protection, or in other words, to stop individuals m eting o u t their own private justice. W hen he tu rn s to the question of which individual rights the state should protect, Nozick bases his theory on a n u m b er of general principles of private right, which lay down th at individuals have a right to 83

Liberalism and Democracy possess w hat they have justly acquired (the principle of justice in acquisition), including w hatever they have ju stly acquired from a previous ow ner (the principle of justice in transfer). If the state takes on any tasks beyond these, it acts unjustly in th a t it interferes u n duly in the lives an d liberties of individuals. T h e m inim al state, Nozick concludes, m ay be m inim al, b u t it is th e only state properly speaking th at we can conceive of: anything m ore extended in scope is im m oral. Nozick’s theory raises m ore problem s th an it solves. It depends entirely on o u r acceptance of the juridical doctrine concerning acquired and derived entitlem ent to property, which Nozick altogether fails to discuss. For all that, it is an excellent illustration of the lengths to w hich the authentic liberal tradition can go in its defence of the m inim al state as against the welfare conception which envisages social justice as falling w ithin the purview of the state. A nd as such, it inevi­ tably has an account to settle w ith the tradition of dem ocratic thought; n o t so m uch in respect of egalitarian dem ocracy (for as we have said all along this is difficult to reconcile w ith the spirit of liberalism ), b u t rather in regard to the very forms of dem ocracy. For wherever those forms have been p u t into effect - even in countries such as the U nited States, w here no socialist party has em erged - the result has been a degree of state intervention incom patible with the ideal of m inim al governm ent.

84

----------------------------- ------------

17

—

------------------ —

Democracy and Ungovernability

T h e relation betw een liberalism an d dem ocracy has always been difficult: nec cum te nec sine te. Now th at liberalism seem s once again to com e dow n to a defence of the m inim al state (which is not to deny its consistency in this w ith the best liberal tradition), the relation is m ore vexed th an ever. O f late, polem ical discussion has revolved principally aro u n d the them e of ungovernability.70 W hile in the early stages of the d ebate the m ain target, as we have seen, was the tyranny of the m ajority, w hich led liberals to defend at all costs the liberty of the individual against the invasions of the public sphere even w here m ajority rule prevailed, now adays the target is the inability of dem ocratic governm ents to find suitable m eans of controlling conflict in com plex societies - a target which reverses the signs, for it highlights the deficiency rath er than the excess of power. T h ere are three m ain lines of argum ent p u t forward in support of the thesis that dem ocratic regim es are inherently ungovernable: (a) D em ocratic regimes, in contrast to autocratic ones, characteristically experience a growing disproportion betw een 85

Liberalism and Democracy the d em ands em anating from civil society an d the capacity of the system to respond (in the term inology of systems theory this is know n as ‘overload’). T his supposed characteristic of dem ocracies has two causes, opposite in n atu re b u t each tending to produce the sam e result. First of all, dem ocratic governm ent inherits from the liberal state a range of institu­ tions, w hich are in fact (as we have noted) presuppositions of the effective functioning of pop u lar power; these include freedom of assem bly an d association, the freedom of interest groups, trad e unions an d parties to organize, a n d the w idest possible extension of political rights. By m eans of these institutions, individuals an d groups are able to p u t their d em ands to the public powers knowing th at the latter m ust see to their urgent satisfaction or else risk a loss of support. Pressure on such a scale is com pletely unknow n in autocratic regim es, w here the governm ent controls the press, protest dem onstrations are banned, trade unions are either disallowed or tolerated only as appendages of the political establishm ent, an d the only political parties are those which either constitute the governm ent o r are a direct outgrow th of it. In the second place, in a dem ocratic system with its procedures for collective decision-m aking and for responding to dem ands com ing from civil society, decisions m ay be slow in being reached an d on occasion indefinitely deferred on account of the netw ork of interlocking powers of veto. In autocracies, by contrast, pow er is concentrated in a few hands or even in the single person of a charism atic leader whose w ord is law; there is no place for institutions such as parliam ents in which various opinions are debated an d decisions taken only after lengthy discussion (and even then parliam entary decisions m ay be subject in tu rn to the control of a jurisdictional body such as the constitutional court or to the views of the people them selves as expressed in a referendum ). Autocracies are able to take swift, perem ptory an d definitive decisions. T h e contrast here can be sum m ed up by saying th at in a dem ocracy it is easy to p u t d em an d s b u t m uch h a rd e r to extract a response, w hereas in an autocracy, it

86

Democracy and Ungovernability is difficult to m ake dem ands b u t responses to them are m ore readily agreed. (b) D em ocratic regim es are m ore prone to social conflict th an are autocratic regimes. Given that one task of whoever governs is to resolve social conflicts in such a way that individuals and groups representing different interests can live together peaceably, it is clear that the sharper the level of conflict, the h ard er it becom es to m anage it. A pluralistic society of the kind which exists and flourishes in a dem ocratic political system is beset by a m ultitude of contrary interests; class conflict is m ultiplied by a host of petty corporate squab­ bles; it becom es im possible to satisfy one interest w ithout h arm in g another, an d this leads to an endless chain of aggravation. W e know that the interests of particular parties ought to be subordinated to collective interests, b u t w hat precisely does this impressive form ula m ean? As a rule, the various com ponent elem ents of a dem ocratic governm ent - a governm ent in which the different parties m ust answ er to their electors for the choices th at they m ake - recognizes only one com m on interest, which is that they ought to satisfy those interests (partial interests, on m any occasions) for whose satisfaction the greatest degree of consensus is forthcom ing. (c) In dem ocratic regimes, pow er is m ore evenly distributed th an in autocratic regimes; the former, unlike the latter, are characterized by w hat is now adays referred to as ‘diffusion’ of power. O n e m ark of a dem ocratic society is th at it has several centres of pow er (hence the appropriateness of the term ‘polyarchy’ in its application to dem ocracies). T h e diffusion of pow er increases the m ore the governm ent of society is regu­ lated at every level by procedures that allow for participation a n d dissent, since these m ultiply the sites at which collective decisions are taken. Pow er in a dem ocratic society is not only diffuse, b u t also fragm ented an d difficult to reintegrate. T his fragm entation of pow er has evident negative consequences w hen it com es to the question of govem ability; fragm entation leads to a com petition betw een different centres of pow er and

87

Liberalism and Democracy in the long run creates conflict betw een the very subjects supposedly responsible for resolving them . T h e conflict is as it were raised to a higher power. A certain degree of social conflict is part of norm al functioning, b u t a conflict of powers is pathological an d so aggravates social conflict that it too ends by becom ing pathological. T o deplore the ungovernability of dem ocratic regim es is to be draw n tow ards authoritarian solutions. T hese have a double thrust: in the first place, executive power can be strengthened, an d this represents a tendency to prom ote presidential or sem i-presidential types of system over parlia­ m entary governm ents of the classical kind; in the second place, the sphere of standard dem ocratic decision-m aking in accordance with the principle of m ajority rule can be ever m ore narrow ly circum scribed. If dem ocracies do indeed find them selves suffering from ‘overload’, then there are in fact basically only two rem edies available. E ither one can im prove the functioning of the organs of decision (the objective of moves to increase the pow er of governm ent vis-à-vis parlia­ m ent), or one can drastically reduce their pow er (the objective of proposals for lim iting the pow er of the majority). Every actual dem ocracy, unlike the R ousseauean ideal, cam e into being as a lim ited dem ocracy, in the sense already explained; m ajority decisions were from the beginning denied any purchase on all questions affecting rights to liberty, which were regarded, precisely, as ‘inviolable’. A m ong the proposals p u t forward by one group of neo-liberal writers has been the idea th at constitutional lim its should also be set on the econom ic and fiscal powers of parliam ent, with a view to preventing it from responding politically to social dem ands involving a level of public expenditure in excess of the resources of the country. O nce again, the conflict betw een liberalism and dem ocracy resolves itself into a situation w herein liberal doctrine, while accepting dem ocracy as a m eth o d or set of ‘rules of the gam e’, w ants at the sam e tim e to determ ine, w hen it sees a need, the limits w ithin which these

88

Democracy and Ungovernability rules have application. It was dem ocracy w hich benefited m ost from the clash betw een liberal an d dem ocratic currents, w hen this m ade its first appearance during the last century: political discrim in­ ations were thereafter gradually b u t inexorably abolished and universal suffrage established. T oday, dem ocratic reaction to neo-liberalism centres on the dem and th at participation in collective decisions should be extended to m atters an d areas outside the political sphere. T h e aim is to win new o p p o rtu n it­ ies a n d openings for po p u lar participation, a n d thus to prepare the ground for the passage from w hat M acpherson, in his typology of the various stages of dem ocratization, calls the phase of ‘equilibrium dem ocracy’, to th at of participatory dem ocracy.71 T o consider this constant dialectical interplay betw een liberalism and dem ocracy in the perspective of general politi­ cal theory is to realize th at underlying the conflict betw een the liberals, with th eir d em an d th at the state should govern as little as possible, an d the dem ocrats, with their d em an d that the governm ent of the state should rest as far as possible in the h an d s of the citizens (a conflict which is being continually transferred to higher levels w ithout attaining any definitive resolution), is a clash betw een two different u nderstandings of liberty. T hese are usually term ed negative liberty an d positive liberty. O pposing ju d g em en ts are m ade upon them , d ep en d ­ ing on historical circum stances, b u t depending above all on the social position of the ju d g e; those w ho are well placed usually favour the form er, those lower in the social scale usually opt for the latter. Since every hitherto existing society has contained m em bers of both these categories, this w hole­ som e dispute is not of a kind to be resolved once an d for all, an d insofar as it has from tim e to tim e issued in agreem ent, this has been in the n a tu re of a com prom ise. U nfortunately, not all regim es have the benefit of this conflict, w hich is denied outlet w here the first kind of liberty is usurped by unlim ited power; or where the place of the second kind is usu rp ed by a 89

Liberalism and Democracy pow er w ithout public accountability. Faced w ith either of these alternatives, these hostile twins, liberalism a n d dem oc­ racy, of necessity becom e allies.

90

Notes

1. B. Constant, De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes (1818), in Collection complète des ouvrages, Béchct Libraire, Paris 1820, vol. 4, part 7, p. 253. 2. Ibid. 3. J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, vol. 1, p. 7, trans. and introd. G.D.H. Cole, London 1973, p. 176. 4. Ibid., p. 186. 5. Ibid. 6. J. Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government (1690), Dent, London 1970, p. 119. 7. H. Bracton, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. G.E. Woodbine, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1968, vol. 2, p. 33. 8. Ulpiano, Dig., vol. 1, part 3, p. 31. 9. T. Paine, Common Sense ( 1776), Penguin, Harmondsworth 1976, p. 65. 10. I. Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis (1793). 11. W. von Humboldt, The Limits of State Action (1792), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1969, pp. 20-21.

97

Liberalism and Democracy 12. Ibid., p. 22. 13. Ibid., p. 65. 14. Ibid., p. 83. 15. Ibid., p. 24. 16. Ibid., p. 34. 17. Ibid., p. 35. 18. I. Kant, Idee ZM einer allgemeinen Geschichte in welXbiirgerlicher Absuht (1784). 19. Ibid. 20. N. Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. W.K. Marriott, Dent, London 1958, p. 22. 21. G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History^ trans. J . Sibree, Dover, London 1956. 22. A. Hamilton, J. Madison, J. Jay, The Federalist Papers (1788), Mentor, London 1961, p. 71. 23. Ibid., p. 77. 24. J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 240. 25. Ibid., pp. 217-18. 26. Hamilton, Madison & Jay, The Federalist Papers, p. 82. 27. E. Burke, ‘Speech at the Conclusion of the Poll on his being Declared Duly Elected’ (1774), The Works, John C. Nimmo, London 1899, vol. 2, p. 96. 28. For a commentary on the theme, see P. Violante, Lo spazio della rappresentanza. I Francia 1788-1789\ Palermo 1981. 29. Aristotle, Politics 1253a, trans. E. Barker, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1948, pp. 7-8. 30. B. Croce, Storia d yEuropa nel secolo decimonono, Laterza, Bari 1932, p. 21. 31. See A.S.P. YVoodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty, Being the Army Debates (1647-49) from the Clarke Manuscripts, Dent, London 1986 pp. 356-7.

92

Notes 32. A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1833-1840), trans. G. Lawrence, Fontana, London 1968, voi. 2, p. 898. 33. J.S. Mill, ‘Tocqueville on Democracy in America’, London Review, June-Jan u ary 1835-36, pp. 85-129. 34. J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government, Dent, London 1962, p. 277. 35. Cited in the Italian collection of Tocqueville’s writing, D. Cofrancesco, ed. Guida, Naples 1971, p. 13. 36. Tocqueville, Democracy in America,, vol. 1, p. 8. 37. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 650. 38. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 305. 39. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 311. 40. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 899-900. 41. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 901. 42. Tocqueville, Discours sur la révolution sociale {1848). 43. J . Bentham, ‘Anarchical Fallacies’ in The Works, J. Bowring, ed., William Tait, Edinburgh, vol. 2, p. 500. 44. J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government, p. 6. 45. Ibid., p. 16. 46. Ibid., p. 74. 47. Ibid., pp. 72-3. 48. Ibid., p. 74. 49. Ibid., p. 75. 50. Ibid., p. 73. 51. Ibid., p. 211. 52. Ibid., p. 279. 53. Ibid., p. 290. 54. Ibid., p. 268. 55. F. De Sanctis, Letteratura e vita nazionale, Einaudi, Turin 1950, p. 7.

93

Liberalism and Democracy 56. F. De Sanctis, Mazzini e la scuola democratica, Einaudi, Turin 1951, p. 6. 57.

Ibid., p. 13.

58.

Ibid., p. 14.

59.

Ibid., pp. 13-14.

60. The phrase is that used by R. Romeo in his Cavour e il suo tempo. I, 1810-1842, Laterza, Bari 1969, p. 288. 61. G. Mazzini, I sistemi e la democrazia. Pensieri, in Mazzini, G. Galasso, ed., Il Mulino, Bologna 1961, pp. 101-2. 62.

Ibid., p. 110.

63. G. Mazzini, ‘Lettera ai signori Tocqueville e Falloux ministri di Francia’, in G. Mazzini, Scritti Politici, T. Grandi and A. Comba, eds., Utet, Turin 1972, p. 647. 64.

G. Mazzini, 1 sistemi e la democrazia, p. 96.

65.

R. Romeo, Cavour e il suo tempo, p. 288.

66. G. Mazzini, ‘Dei doveri dell ’uomo’, in Scritti politici, p. 847. 67. The exchange between Croce and Einaudi is to be found in the volume, Liberismo e liberalismo, P. Solari, ed., Ricciardi, Naples 1957. The praise for Hobhouse is to be found in the first of these writings: ‘La concezione liberale come concezione della vita’ (1927), p. 14. 68. F. von Hayek, ‘Liberalismo’ in Enciclopedia del Novecento, Istituto dell ’Enciclopedia italiana, Rome 1978, voi. 3, p. 990. 69. For an assessment of this debate together with bibliographical details, see F. Comanducci, ‘La meta-utopia di Nozick’ in Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, vol. 12, 1982, pp. 507-23. 70. The debate on the ungovernability of democratic regimes arose initially in response to the writings collected together in M. Crozier, S.P. Huntingdon, J. Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Govemabxlity of Democracy, New York 1975. 71. C.B. Macpherson, The Life and Time of Liberal Democracy, Oxford Univer­ sity Press, Oxford 1977. According to the author, there are four stages in the development of democracy: protective democracy, development democracy, equilibrium democracy, and lastly (and as yet unrealized) participatory democracy.

94