Leon Trotsky's Collaboration With Germany and Japan: Trotsky's Conspiracies, Volume Two [2, 1 ed.] 9780692945735

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Tro tsk y's Co nsp irac ies of the 193 0s

Vo lum e Tw o

By Gr ov er Fu rr

Ery thro s Pre ss and Media, LLC 201 7

Leo n Tro tsk y's Co llab ora tio n Wi th Ge rm any and Jap an Tro tsk y's Co nsp irac ies , Vo lum e Tw o

First Edition: 201 7

Pu bli she d by Ery thr os Pre ss and Media, 201 7 PO Box 291 994

Ke tter ing , Ohio 291 994 me dia @e ryt hro spr ess .co m

© Gro ver Fu rr 201 7 Pu bli she d and pri nte d wit h per mi ssi on of the aut hor , wh o assum es all res pon sib ilit y for the con ten t her ein .

Locally As sig ned LC-type Call Nu mb er DK254.T6 F87 2 201 7 Fur r, Gro ver C. (Gr ove r Carr) Leo n Tro tsk y's Co llab ora tio n Wi th Ge rm any and Jap an / Gro ver C. Fur r; tra nsl ati ons by Gro ver C. Fu rr

ISBN: 978 -0- 692 -94 573 -5 313 pp. Inc lud es index. 1. Tro tsk y, Leon, 187 9-1 940 . 2. Re vol uti ona rie s - Russia- Biograp hy. 3. Stalin, Joseph, 187 8-1 953 . 4. Sov iet Union - His tor y 192 5-1 953 . 5. Tri als (Co nsp irac y).

Tab le of Contents Acknow ledgem ents and Dedicat ion ........................................................................... 4 Introdu ction .......................................................................................................................... 5 Chapter 1. A Brief Overview of the Evidence ...................................................... 46 Chapter 2. Iakov A. lakovlev .................................................................................... 106 Chapter 3. Tukhac hevsky and Others ................................................................. 13 7 Chapter 4. Rakovsky, Trotsky , and the Japanes e ............................................. 186 Chapter 5. Conclusion ................................................................................................ 281 Bibliog raphy and Primary Source Docume nts ................................................. 303

Ind ex....................

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Acknowledgements and Dedication I would like to express my thanks to the dedicated staff of Harry S. Sprague Library, Montclair State University. I am especially grateful for the invaluable work of the InterLibrary Loan librarians Kevin Prendergast, Arthur Hudson, and Siobhan McCarthy. Without their hard work I simply could not obtain the many hard·to-find books and articles, in many languages, that make my research possible.

I would like to thank Montclair State University for giving me a sabbatical leave in the Fall semester of 2015 for the purpose of working on this book. My publisher, cover designer, cogent critic, and friend Mike Bessler of Erythros Press and Media, LLC, has given me encouragement, inspiration, and help whenever I needed it, often at late night hours. I could not ask for a better publisher.

Once again my colleague and friend Vladimir L'vovich Bobrov, of Moscow, Russia, has given unstintingly of his time and help to make this book a reality. I cannot do justice to the contribution he has made to this book, as to all my research and our joint research, in the field of history of the Stalin period. Professor Susana M. Sotillo, Ph.D., my camarada and compafiera, has helped me immeasurably with her patience and affectionate encouragement more than any words of mine can express. My deepest thanks to all of you.

***** This book is dedicated to Graciela Moreno - my firm supporter, my staunch friend, my inspiration.

Introduction.

5

Intro duct ion If an objecti ve researc h project on the events of those years were to be done, free of ideolog ical dogma s, then a great deal could change in our attitud e toward s those years and toward s the person alities of that epoch. And so it would be a ''bomb that would cause some problem s. ~ . 1 '

- Col. Viktor Alksnis, 2000 .

. . . it is essenti al for histori ans to defend the founda .. tion of their discipli ne: the suprem acy of evidenc e. If their texts are fictions, as in some sense they are, being literary compo sitions , the raw materia l of these fictions is verifiab le fact. Wheth er the Nazi gas ovens existed or not can be establi shed by evidenc e. Becaus e it has been so establi shed, those who deny their existence are not writing history , whatev er their narrati ve techniq ues. - Eric Hobsba wm, 1994, p. 57 . . . . we can demoli sh a myth only insofar as it rests on propos itions which can be shown to be mistak en.

- ibid. p. 60.

This chapte r and those that follow constit ute an inquiry into the eviden ce that Leon Trotsk y collabo rated with Germa n and/or Japane se officials, whethe r govern mental or military , during the 1930s.

6

Trotsky's Conspiracies

Trotsk y was charged with and convicted in absentia of such collaborat ion at the three Moscow ''Show," or public, Trials of 1936, 1937 and 1938.1 Trotsk y and his son Leon Sedov2 were absent defendan ts and central figures in all these trials. Trotsk y himsel f proclaime d the charge s false but they were widely, though not universally, credite d until 1956. On Februa ry 25th of that year Nikita Khrush chev deliver ed his famous ''Secret Speech '' to the 2Qth Congress of the Comm unist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Aside from much other matter that will not concer n us here Khrush chev hinted, withou t express ly affirmi ng, that at least some of the defendan ts in these trials were punish ed unjustl y.

In succee ding years some of the defend ants were ''rehabi litated' ' in the Soviet Union and declare d to have been innocen t. Under Khrush chev's succes sors betwee n 1965 and 1985 the wave of ''rehabilitations'' almost ceased. Subsequently, during Mikhail Gorbachev 's tenure betwee n 1985 and the end of the USSR in 1991, an even larger flood of ''rehabi litation s'' took place. Later in the present essay we will discuss the essenti ally political, rather than juridical, nature of ''rehabi litation ." By the late 1980s almost all the defend ants at all the Moscow Trials, plus the defend ants in the ''Tukhachevsky Affair'' of May-June 1937 and a great many others had been declare d to have been innocent of all charges. The chief exceptions were figures like Genrikh Jagoda and Nikolai Ezhov, two heads of the NKVD3 who were

1

These trials are often called the "Show Trials." Often too they are identified by the names of the one or two most famous defendan ts. Thus the trial of August 19-24, 1936, is often called the "Zinoviev-Kamenev Trial"; that of January 23-30, 1937, the ''Piatakov-Radek Trial"; that of March 2-13, 1938, the ''Bukharin-Rykov Trial." The formal names for these trials are as follows: August 1936: "The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre"; January 1937: "The Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyit e Centre"; March 1938: "The Case of the Anti-Soviet 'Bloc of Rights and Trotskyit es."' 2

Leon Sedov died on February 16, 1938, shortly before the Third Moscow Trial. He continued to figure prominen tly in the confessions of some of the defendan ts, as did his father. 3

People's Commiss ariat (= Ministry) of Internal Affairs, which included national security and political police functions.

Introduction.

7

certainly responsible for massive repress ions, and many of their subord inates. Trotsky and Sedov have also been ''rehabilitated," though not for the crimes they were accused of at the Moscow Trials since they were not among the defend ants and so were not formally convicted. Meanwhile there is a scholarly consen sus that the Moscow Trials were fabrications, the defend ants all innoce nt victims of frameups, and all the conspiracies inventions either of the NKVD or of Stalin himself. This consensus is a constit uent part of the model, or paradigm, of Soviet history that is domin ant within Russia itself and beyond its border s and can usefully be termed the ''anti-Stalin paradigm." However, no significant evidence that the trials were fabricated and the confessions faked has ever been published. In Trotsky's 'Amalgams' (2016) I have provid ed ample evidence that the accusations and confessions were indeed genuine.

The Soviet Archives ''Speak'' During the existence of the USSR and especially since Khrushchev's accession to power in 1953 few if any documents concerning the Moscow Trials and repress ions of the late 1930s were published in the USSR or made available in the archives to researc hers. Khrushchev and authori zed histori ans and writers made a great many asserti ons about this period of history but never gave anyone access to any evidence about it. Here is one example. At an histori ans' conference in December 1962, after many presen tations by speake rs promo ting the official Khrushchev position about questio ns of Soviet history, the convener, Presidium 4 membe r Piotr Pospelov, spoke the following words: Studen ts are asking whethe r Bukharin and the rest were spies for foreign govern ments, and what you ad-

" The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party was renamed the Presidium in 1952, and again renamed the Politburo in 1966.

8

Trotsky's Conspiracies

vise us to read. I can declare that it is sufficient to study carefully the docum ents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU to say that neither Bukharin, nor Rykov, of course, were spies or terroris ts.s Pospel ov's words create a false impres sion. In the 1938 Trial Bukharin and Rykov were not convic ted of carryin g out espion age themselves, but of being leaders in the ''bloc of Rights and Trotsky ites'' that did engage in espion age activities. Likewise both Bukharin and Rykov were convicted of recruit ing others to engage in acts of violence against others - the best transla tion here of the Russian word for ''terror," which means someth ing quite differe nt in English - but not of engagi ng in it themse lves. Theref ore the implication of Pospel ov's words is correct in the sense most readers will understand - that a ''spy'' is someo ne who himsel f spies, and a terrori st someo ne who himsel f commi ts acts of violence. But Pospelov is incorrect insofar as he wished his audien ce to unders tand that their confessions and the verdict agains t them were wrong. Furthe rmore, the questio n was about ''Bukharin and the rest'' - presum ably, all the other defend ants in the 1938 Trial, wherea s Pospel ov restric ted his answer to Bukharin and Rykov only. In the passag e that immed iately follows the quotati on above Pospel ov clearly told his audien ce that the only materia ls historians should read are the official speech es made at the 22°d Congress: ''Why is it not possible to create normal conditi ons for workin g in the Central Party archive? They do not give out materia ls concer ning the activity of the CPSU." I have already given you the answer .

Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie o merakh u/uchshenia pod9otovki nauchno-pedagogichesikh kadrov po istoricheskim naukam.18-21dekabria1962 g. M: Izdatel'st vo "Nauka", 1964, 298.

5

Introduction.

9

In effect Pospelov was saying: ''We are not going to give you access to any primary sources." That situation continued until the USSR was dissolved. Thanks to documents published since the dissolution of the USSR we can now see that some of the speeches at the 22nd Party Congress (October, 1961) also contained blatant lies about the oppositionists of the 1930s - a fact that fully explains Pospelov's refusal to let anyone see the evidence.

As one example of the degree of falsification at the 22nd Party Congress and under Khrushchev generally we cite Aleksandr Shelepin's6 quotation from a letter to Stalin by Komandarm 1st rank (= Full General, the rank just below Marshal) Iona E. lakir, accused of collaboration with Nazi Germany. In Shelepin's quotation from Iakir's letter to Stalin of June 9, 1937, the text read by Shelepin I put in boldface. The text in the original letter but omitted by Shelepin is in italics. A series of cynical resolutions by Stalin, Kaganovich, Molotov, Malenkov and Voroshilov on the letters and declarations made by those imprisoned testifies to the cruel treatment of people, of leading comrades, who found themselves under investigation. For example when it was his turn Iakir - the former commander of a military region - appealed to Stalin in a letter in which he swore his own complete innocence. Here is what he wrote: ''Dear, close comrade Stalin. I dare address you in this manner because I have said everything, given everything up, and

it seems to me that I am a noble warrior, devoted to the Party, the state and the people, as I was for many years. My whole conscious life has been passed in self-

Head of the KGB(= State Security Committee), the successor to the security and political police functions of the former NKVD.

6

10

Trotsky's Conspiracies

less, hones t work in the sight of the Party and of its leader s - then the fall into the nightmare, into the irreparable horror of betrayal. And during that short period of my life there were always within me two persons.· one who had worked much and honestly for the army, the soviets, the party, and anothe14i who thought up and was preparing vile acts hostile to the country. The investigation is completed. I have been formally accused of treason to the state, I have admitted my guilt, I have fully repented. I have unlimited faith in the justice and propriety of the decision of the court and the state. The investigation has been completed. I have been accused of treason to the state; I have admitted my guilt, I have fully repented. I have unlimited faith in the justice and appropriateness of the court and the government. I know that there can and must be only one sentence - death. I am prepared for this sentence. Nevertheless I appeal to you and to the government and beg you, beg you to believe in the possibility of my correction, to believe that I can still be of use to the state, to which I dedicate my whole being. Perhaps you will consider and decide to allow me to go somewhere in the far North or East, in Kolyma, to work and on rare occasions to learn about the magnificent Land of the Soviets, mine again. I ask you to permit me, even though rarely, to take up ''Pravda'' and to see, by the amount of the sowing, the production, the transportation, the victories of the party, of the soviets, and of the people, whom I have betrayed. I beg you and I understand that I do not have any right to do so. Now I am honest in my every word, I will die with

words of love for you, the Party, and the countr y, with an unlimi ted faith in the victory of comm unism .'''

Shelepin's remarks, here in bold face type, are from his speech to the 22nd Party Congress of the CPSU, Pravda, October 27, 1961, p. 10, cols. 3-4.XX/J S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza. 17-31 oktiabria 1961 goda. Stenograficheskii Otchet (Moscow, 1962). II, 403. The parts Shelepin omitted, here in italics, are from the original documen t My thanks to my colleague Vladimir L. Bobrov, who obtained an image of it for me. A version containing some of lakir's confession of guilt but still omitting much of the complete text is in the 7

Introduction.

11

As Shelepin read it the letter is from an honest, loyal man protesting his innocence. In reality lakir fully admitted his guilt. lakir was one of the military figures involved both in collaboration with Germany and with Trotsky. The falsification goes far beyond the speeches at the 22nd Party Congress. Archival evidence now available permits us to see that Khrushchev, then later Gorbachev, and the historians who wrote under their direction, lied consistently about the events of the Stalin years to an extent that would be scarcely imaginable if we did not have primary source evidence that proves beyond doubt the extent of their lies. A large number of documents from formerly secret Soviet archives have been published since the end of the USSR. This is a very small proportion of what we know exists. Especially as regards the oppositions of the 1930s, the Moscow Trials, the military ''purges," and the massive repressions of 1937-38, the vast majority of the documents are still top-secret, hidden away even from privileged, official researchers. Yet no system of censorship is without its failures. Many docu .. ments have been published. Even this small number enables us to see that the contours of Soviet history in the 1930s are very different from the ''official'' version.

The Question of Trotsky and Collaboration with Germany and Japan During the past decade a lot of documentary evidence has emerged from the former Soviet archives to contradict the viewpoint, canonical since at least Khrushchev's time, that the defendants in the Moscow Trials and the ''Tukhachevsky Affair'' military conspiracy were innocent victims forced to make false confessions.

"Spravka" of the Shvernik Report of 1963-4 first published in Voenno-lstoricheskii Arkhiv 1 (1993), p. 194, now normally cited from the volume Reabilitatsia. Kak Eto Bylo [''Rehabilitation. How It Happened"] vol. 2 (2003), p. 688.

12

Trotsky's Conspiracies

We hav e wri tten a num ber of works, including a num ber of chap .. ters in the pre sen t boo k and in volu me one, Trotsky's 'Amalgams,' in whi ch we poin t out tha t we now hav e stro ng evidence tha t the confessions wer e not false and Moscow Trial defe nda nts app ear to hav e bee n trut hfu l in confessing to con spir acie s aga inst the Soviet gov ernm ent. Tha t wor k has led us to the pre sen t question.

Hypothesis Leon Tro tsky and his son Leon Sedov wer e indi cted but abs ent de .. fend ants at each of the thre e Moscow Trials. If the charges aga inst and the confessions of oth er def end ants wer e basically accurate, as our rese arch has sug ges ted so far, tha t has implications for the cha rges voiced at tho se tria ls tha t Tro tsky was in league wit h fascist Germany and mil itar ist Japan. Such con side rati ons led us to form the hyp othe sis for the pre sen t study: tha t a thor oug h sea rch of pub lish ed doc ume nts from the form er Soviet and oth er arch ives wou ld turn up mor e evidence of Tro tsky 's collaboration wit h Germany and Japan in add itio n to tha t given at the thre e Moscow Trials. In the first cha pter of Trotsky's 'Amalgams' we make refe renc e to Step hen Jay Gould's essa y ''Dinosau r in a Haystack'' in ord er to outline the con cep t of scientific par adig m and its parallel usa ge in hist oric al investigation. In particular, it is scientifically and historically justified to hol d as pro ven for the time being for all practical purposes a conclusion of non exis tenc e (in this case non exis tenc e of Trotsky's guilt) of somethin g for whi ch evidence is lacking des pite con cert ed effo rt to dis .. cov er it. This was the stat e of affairs for man y hist oria ns for a long tim e wit h reg ard to Trotsky. However, once such evidence is found - assu min g the validity of tha t evidence - the conclusion of nonexiste nce (in this case of his guilt) ceases to be scientifically or historically valid, eve n thou gh man y hist oria ns illegitimately con tinu e to advocate the validity of Tro tsky 's innocence and ther efo re to igno re the evidence. We set out to see whe ther we could find still mor e evidence tha t Tro tsky had coll abo rate d wit h the Germans and Japanese. At ace r-

Introduction.

13

tain point in our research, when we had gathered a quantity of such evidence, we decided to study it and see what it amounted to. The present volume is the result. If Trotsky did not collaborate with the Germans and/or Japanese there would be no evidence of his having done so. Of course, in the case of human history and even of science there arises the possibility of fabricated or faked evidence. We have devoted a lot of attention to this problem. There exists a great deal of evidence concerning clandestine involvement on Trotsky's part with oppositional activities within the USSR during the 1930s quite aside from any collaboration with Germany and Japan. In addition to the testimony by defendants at the Moscow Trials, we also have archival evidence in the form of investigative interrogation s to confirm such activity. The present work concentrates solely on evidence of Trotsky's collaboration with German or Japanese governmenta l or military officials. The charges of German and/or Japanese collaboration were the most shocking. They have always been regarded with skepticism. For the most part we only cite and analyze direct evidence concerning Trotsky and the Germans or Japanese. This is a very narrow approach that excludes a great deal of other, corroborating evidence which tends to add credence to the direct evidence of Trotsky's guilt in collaborating with the fascists. For example, Nikolai Bukharin heard details from Karl Radek about Trotsky's negotiations and agreements with Germany and Japan. Bukharin never directly communicated with Trotsky or Sedov about this. However, there is no reason whatever to doubt that Radek did tell him about Trotsky's collaboration. By corroborating Radek's testimony on this point - Bukharin

agrees that Radek did tell him this, as Radek himself had testified, so Bukharin attests to Radek's truthfulness here - Bukharin also tends to indirectly corroborate what Radek said about Trotsky and what Radek claimed to have gotten at first hand from Trotsky himself. That is, Bukharin's testimony confirms that Radek was telling the truth in one instance, and that increases the credibility of

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Trotsky's Conspiracies

Radek's testimony on other matters, including of his contacts with Trotsky and what Trotsky communicated to him. But here we will examine only Radek's testimony, not Bukharin's. We refer the interested reader to our previous study of Bukharin (Furr and Bobrov 2007). In a few places we do cite some corroborating evidence, mainly for the sake of providing context for the direct evidence.

Objectivity and Persuasion Political prejudice still predominates in the study of Soviet history, particularly since opposition to what we call the ''anti-Stalin paradigm'' incurs risks to one's job security, possibilities of promotion, and publication opportunities, among other possible dangers. Conclusions that contradict the dominant model of Soviet history are routinely dismissed as being the result of bias or incompetence. Conclusions that cast doubt upon accusations against Stalin or whose implications tend to make him look either ''good'' or simply less ''evil'' than the predominant paradigm holds him to have been, are called ''Stalinist." Any objective study of the evidence now available is bound to be called ''Stalinist'' simply because it reaches conclusions that are politically unacceptable to those who have a strong political bias, be it anticommunist generally or Trotskyist specifically. The aim of the present study is to examine in the light of the evidence now available the allegations made in the USSR during the 1930s that Leon Trotsky collaborated with Germany and Japan against the USSR. This study is not a ''prosecutor's brief' against Trotsky. It is not an attempt to prove Trotsky ''guilty'' of conspiring with the Germans and Japanese. Nor is it an attempt to ''defend'' Trotsky against such charges.

We have tried hard to do what an investigator does in the case of a crime in which he has no parti pris but only wishes to solve the crime. This is what historians who investigate the more distant past, or the history of countries other than the Soviet Union, do all the time.

Introduction.

15

We do wish to persuade the fair-minded, objective reader that we have carried out a competent, honest investigation: namely, that we have done the following:

* collected all the evidence we could find supporting the contention that Trotsky collaborated with the Germans and Japanese; *collected all the ''negative'' evidence - any ''alibi'' Trotsky or his son and chief political aide Leon Sedov may have had. We have done this chiefly by paying serious attention to Trotsky's testimony at the Dewey Commission hearings in 1937, where he himself laid out his defense;

* studied all this evidence carefully and honestly; and * drawn our conclusions logically on the basis of that evidence. We wish to persuade the objective reader that we have reached our conclusions on the basis of evidence and its analysis and not on any other basis, such as that of political bias. We are not out to arraign or ''convict'' Trotsky. We remain ready to be convinced that Trotsky did not collaborate with Germany and Japan if, in the future, evidence comes to light-that those charges are false.

The Role of Appropriate Skepticism Throughout this essay we have tried to anticipate the objections of a skeptical critic. This is no more than any careful, objective researcher should do. In the present chapter we have a lengthy discussion of evidence. In this and the following chapters we follow each presentation of evidence with a critical examination. In the final chapter of this section titled ''Conclusion'' the reader will find a review and refutation of the objections a sharp but fair-minded critic might have. We are aware that there is a subset of readers for whom evidence is irrelevant, for whom this is not a matter of evidence but one of

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Trotsky's Conspiracies

beli ef or loyalty. We disc uss the arg ume nts nor mal ly rais ed from this qua rter in the sub sect ion title d ''Objectivity and Denial." In any hist oric al inqu iry as in any crim inal case ''be lief ' and ''loyalty'' are irre leva nt to the trut h or fals eho od of the hyp othe sis. A beli ef tha t is not rati ona lly fou nde d on evid enc e can not be disp elle d by a sou nd arg ume nt and evidence. However, tho se who can not brin g them selv es to que stio n thei r prec onc eive d idea s may nev erth eles s be pro vok ed by tho se sam e prej udic es to look espe cial ly critically at the evid enc e and to find wea kne sses in its inte rpre tati on tha t mig ht esca pe oth er read ers for who m ther e is less at stak e. This som etim es mak es obje ctio ns from suc h qua rter s wor thy of atte ntio n. We hav e trie d har d bot h to anti cipa te and to deal wit h suc h obje ctio ns in a sati sfac tory man ner .

Evidence Before pro cee ding to cite and stud y the new archival doc ume nts we nee d to disc uss the natu re of evid enc e itself. Wh erea s ''documen ts'' are mat eria l obje cts - in our case, wri ting on pap er - ''eviden ce'' is a rela tion al con cep t. We are con cern ed wit h inve stig atin g an allegation: that Tro tsky con spir ed wit h German and Jap ane se officials. We aim to gath er and stud y the evid enc e tha t sug ges ts Tro tsky acte d as alle ged and find the flaws in any put ativ e contrar y evidence. The re is no suc h thin g as ''ab solu te'' evidence. All evid enc e can be faked. Any stat eme nt - a con fess ion of guilt, a den ial of guilt, a claim one has bee n tort ure d, a claim one has not bee n coe rced in any way - may be true or false, i.e., an atte mp t to stat e the trut h as the spe ake r (or wri ter) rem emb ers it or a deli bera te lie. Docu· men ts can be forged and, in the case of Soviet history, ofte n hav e bee n. False doc ume nts hav e on occ asio n bee n inse rted into archives in ord er to be ''discovered." Or it may be alleged tha t a given doc ume nt was foun d in an arch ive whe n it was not. Pho tog rap hs can be faked. Eye witn esse s can lie, and in any case eye witn esse s are so ofte n in erro r, eve n whe n hon estl y beli evin g tha t thei r mem orie s are acc urat e, tha t suc h evid enc e is amo ng the leas t reli-

Introduc tion.

17

able kind.a In principle there is no such thing as a ''smoking gun'' a single piece of evidence that is so clearly genuin e and powerf ul that it cannot be denied. The proble ms of identifying, gathering, studying, and drawin g correct conclusions from evidence are similar in criminal investigation and in historical research. This is especially true when, as in our case, the researc h is to determ ine whethe r a kind of crime took place in the past. But there are import ant differences, and it's vital to be clear about them. In a criminal trial the accused has certain rights. The trial has to be finite in length, after which the accused is either convicted or acquitted for good. The defend ant ought to enjoy the presum ption of innocence and the benefit of any reason able doubt. The defend ant is entitled to a qualified defend er whose sole job it is to interpr et all evidence in a way so as to benefit his client. Meanwhile, the judge and even the prosec ution are suppos ed to be concer ned not only about securin g a conviction but also about justice. Once they are reason ably convinced that the defend ant is innoce nt their duty is to dismiss the charges and discharge the accused even though they might be able to sway the jury to convict. These practices, though often ''honor ed more in the breach than in the observance," are intende d to preven t an innoce nt defend ant from an unjust verdict and penalty. Historians are in quite a different situation. People long dead have no rights (or anything else) that need to be defended. Theref ore the histori an does not have to be concer ned with any presum ption of innocence, ''reasonable doubt," and so on. Unlike a legal verdict no historical conclusion is ever final. The historical inquiry need never end. It can, and will, be taken up again and again as new evidence is discovered or as new interpr etation s of old evidence are reached. This is in fact what we are doing in the presen t book. We

One famous study is Elizabeth Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979.

8

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Trotsky's Conspiracies

are investigating the question of whether Trotsky collaborated with German and Japanese officials in the light of new evidence, while at the same time reconsidering evidence that has long been available.

Objectivity Identifying, locating, gathering, and even studying and interpreting evidence are skills that can be taught to anyone. The most difficult and unfortunately all-too-rare skill in historical research is the discipline of objectivity. In order to reach true conclusions - statements that are more truthful than other possible statements about a given matter - a researcher must first question and subject to doubt any preconceived ideas she may hold about the subject under investigation. It is one's own preconceived ideas and preju . . • dices that are most likely to sway one into a subjective interpretation of the evidence. Therefore, the researcher must take special steps to make certain this does not happen. This can be done. The techniques are known, and widely practiced in the physical and social sciences. They can be adapted to historical research as well. If such techniques are not practiced the historian will inevitably be seriously swayed from an objective understanding of the evidence by her own pre-existing preferences and biases. That will all but guarantee that her conclusions are false even if she is in possession of the best evidence and all the skills necessary to analyze it. Nowhere is a devotion to objectivity more essential or less practiced than in the field of Soviet history of the Stalin period. As it is impossible to discover the truth absent a dedication to objectivity, this study strives to be objective. Its conclusions will displease, even outrage, a good many persons who are dedicated not to ob . . jectivity and the truth but to protecting the legend of Trotsky as an honorable revolutionary or to defending the Cold Waranticommunist paradigm of Soviet history. Of course we don't claim to have found all the relevant evidence there is. It is overwhelmingly likely that there is a great deal more

Introduction.

19

such evidence, since the vast majority of primary source documents dealing with the Oppositions of the 1930s are still classified in Russia and the post-Soviet states today and are inaccessible to researchers. But what we have now is a lot. In our judgment there is more than sufficient evidence to validly conclude that Trotsky did indeed collaborate with Germany and Japan more or less as defendants in the second and third Moscow Trials testified. Why Trotsky may have done so is a question worthy of consideration .

The Crisis of May-June 1937 The first document we want to present is one that illustrates both the promise and the problems of interpreting documentary evidence. June 1937 was a time of great crisis for the Soviet leadership. In April Genrikh Jagoda, Commissar (head) of the NKVD until the previous September, and Avel' Enukidze, until recently both a Central Committee member and high-ranking member of the Soviet government, had begun to confess about their important roles in plans for a coup d'etat against the government. The month of May had begun with an internal revolt against the Spanish Republican government in which anarchists and Trotskyists participated. The Soviet leadership knew this revolt had involved some kind of collaboration between pro-Trotsky forces there and both Francoist and German-Nazi intelligence.9 By the beginning of June eight military officers of the highest ranks including Mikhail Tukhachevsky, one of only five Marshals of the Red Army, had been arrested and were making confessions of conspiracy with Trotsky and Trotskyists, with the Rights led by Bukharin, Iagoda and Rykov, and - most alarming of all - with Nazi Germany and Japan.

We will examine this question in a chapter in volume three of this three-volume study of Trotsky in the '30s. 9

20

Trotsky' s Conspira cies

On June 2 Nikolai Bukharin sudden ly reverse d himself and confessed to having been one of the leaders of this same conspiracy.10 That same day Lev M. Karakhan, a leading Soviet diplom at who at one time had been closely linked to Trotsky, also confessed. 11 Marshal Tukhachevsky and the other military leaders evidently continued to make further confessions right up until June 9. At their trial on June 11 they confessed once again and were then con .. victed, sentenced, and executed. Before and during the Central Committee Plenum which took place from June 23 to 29 twenty -four of its membe rs and fourtee n candidate membe rs were expelled for conspiracy, espionage, and treason able activities. In Februa ry and March Bukharin, Rykov, and lagoda had been likewise expelled. Never before had there had been such wholesale expulsions from the Party's leading body. Unquestionably, there was much else that has never been made public. But these events, particu larly the military conspiracy, appeared to constitute the graves t threat to the security - indeed, the continu ed existence - of the Soviet Union since the darkes t days of the 1917-1 922 Civil War. Trotsk y and his son Leon Sedov had been charged in absentia at the first Moscow Trial in August 1936.12 At the second Moscow Trial of January 1937 Karl Radek had explicitly identified Leon

1o Grover Furr and Vladimir L. Bobrov, "Nikolai Bukharin 's First Statemen t of Confessio n in

the Lubianka." Cultural Logic 2007. At http://clo gic.eserv er.org/20 07 /Furr_Bo brov.pdf This article was first published in the Russian historical journal Kilo (St Petersbur g) 1 (3 6), 2005, 38-52. I have put the Russian version online at http://ms uweb.mo ntclair.ed u/-furrg/r esearch/f urrnbobr ov_bukha rin_klio0 7.pdf (Furr & Bobrov) 11

Lubianka. Stalin i Glavnoe Upravlenie Gosbezopasnosti NKVD. 1937-1938 (M.: "Materik,"

2004), No. 102, p. 225. Online at http://ist mat.info /node/31 227 and at

http://ww w.alexan deryakov lev.org/fond/issu es-doc/ 610 84 12

They were accused of "having directly prepared and personall y directed the organizat ion

in the U.S.S.R. of terroristi c acts against the leaders of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet State." Report of Court Proceedings. The Case of the Trotskyite·Zinovievite Terrorist Centre. Moscow: People's Commiss ariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1936, p. 180.

Introduction.

21

Trotsky as the leader of an import ant anti-Soviet conspiracy. He had specifically mentioned Spain as a place where Trotsky's adherent s were dangerous and called on them to turn away from Trotsky. When the ''May Days'' revolt in Barcelona broke out on May 3 Radek's warning seemed prescient. For the communists, but also for many non-communists who suppor ted the Spanish Republic, this rebellion in the rear of the Republic appear ed to be the same kind of thing the Rights, Trotskyists, and military figures were allegedly plotting for the USSR.

Trotsky's Telegram to the Soviet Leadership On the eve of the June Central Committee (CC) Plenum Trotsky

chose to send a telegram from his Mexican exile not to Stalin or the Politburo but to the Central Executive Committee, the highest organ of the Soviet government. In it he directly challenged its members to reject Stalin's leadership and turn towards himself. STALINS POLICY IS LEADING TO COMPLETE COLLAPSE INTERNAL AS WELL AS EXTERNAL STOP ONLY SALVATION IS RADICAL TURN TOWARD SOVIET DEMOCRACY BEGINNING WITH OPEN REVIEW OF THE LAST TRIALS STOP ALONG THIS ROAD I OFFER COMPLETE SUPPORT - TROTSKY13

A postscr ipt to the original publication of this telegram reads as follows: In June 1937 in Moscow, at the addres s of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) which was then formally

We have used the original English text of the telegram from a facsimile of the telegram itself in the Volkogonov Archive, Library of Congress, Washingt on DC. At this time interna· tlonal telegrams were normally sent in English; Trotsky sent it from Mexico. The comment s of Stalin and his associate s are not on the telegram itself but on the Russian translatio n provided to them along with it. The telegram was evidently first published in Novoye Vremia N2 50 (1994) C. 37. We have put this facsimile and the Russian translatio n with the remarks of Stalin and his associate s on the internet at http://ms uweb.mo ntclair.ed u/-furr/research /trotsky_telegramO 6183 7. pdf 13

22

Trotsky's Conspiracies

the highes t organ of state power in the USSR a telegram arrived from L.D. Trotsk y in Mexico: [text of telegra m]. Of course this telegra m ended up not in the CEC but in the NKVD, whenc e it was directe d to Stalin as a so-calle d ''specia l commu nicatio n." He wrote on it the followi ng remark : ''Ugly spy.14 Brazen spy of Hitler." Stalin not only signed his name under his ''sentence," but gave it to V. Molotov, K. Voroshilov, A. Mikoian, and A. Zhdano v to sign.ts The late Trotsk yist author Vadim Rogovi n paraph rased this same article in a footnot e: Trotsky 's telegra m ended up not in the CEC but in the NKVD where it was transla ted from the English (the only way the Mexica n telegra ph could accept it for sending ) and sent to Stalin as a so-call ed ''specia l commu nicatio n." Stalin read the telegra m and wrote on it a remark that bears witnes s to the fact that he had clearly lost his self-co ntrol: ''Mug of a spy. Brazen spy of Hitler!'' His signatu re beneat h these words was comple ted with the signatu res of Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoian and Zhdano v, which expres sed their agreement with Stalin's evaluation.16 ''L.B.", the anonym ous author of the article in Novoe Vremia dismissed Trotsky 's note as a fantasy on Trotsky 's part. How should we unders tand Trotsky 's propos al? Could he have possibl y suppos ed that they would accept his help? Or that in 1937 a turn toward s ''Soviet democ-

1•

Shpionskaia rozha, literally "spy-face," Rogovin (see below) translates it as "mug of a spy."

15

L.B., "Will there be no more 'Secrets of the Kremlin'?" Novoe Vremia No. 50, 1994, 37.

Vadim Rogovin.1937. Stalin's Year of Terror. Translate d by Frederick S. Choate. Oak Park MI: Mehring Books, 1998, p. 487. Chapter 50: The July Plenum of the Central Committee.

16

•

Introduction.

23

racy'' was possible? One can't call this irony; it's more like an illusion. ''L.B."'s cynicism is unfounded. As a number of scholars have shown, a ''turn towards Soviet democracy'' was indeed a point of struggle in 1937.17

Piskun vs Rogovin In his critical 1997 study of Trotsky Evgenii Piskun wrote: This strange document bears witness to the fact that the leader of the Fourth International hoped that the USSR was going to undergo immense changes in the near future and that he would return to power again. But he was wrong this time too. When the June Plenum of the CC had ended the Party leadership had not changed.ta Rogovin agreed that Trotsky must have believed he had a good chance of coming to power: Trotsky was not a person given to taking senseless or impulsive steps. Despite the fact that the motives of his appeal remain unclear even today, it is natural to assume that Trotsky possessed information which showed that the true devotion to Stalin of the majority of Party and Soviet leaders was in inverse proportion to their official exclamations of this devotion, and that Stalin's position was extremely fragile and unstable. This might have been the source of Trotsky's hopes

For the major sources and a summary of them in English see Grover Furr, Yezhov vs Stalin (2016) and "Stalin and the Struggle for Democratic Reform", Parts One and Two, Cultural Logic 2005. At http://clogic.eserver.org/2005/ 2005.html 17

Evgenil E. Piskun. Termidor v SSSR. !def L.D. Trotskogo i sovetskaia deistvitel'nost' 19201980. Riazan': Russkoe slovo, 1997, 73. te

24

Trotsky's Conspiracies

that, unde r cond ition s of the Grea t Terr or whic h was teari ng one mem ber after anot her from the Party ranks, a cons olida tion of the leadi ng figures in the coun try woul d be poss ible whic h woul d be aime d at over throw ing Stalin and his clique. (Rogovin 487) Rogovin acce pted unqu estio ning ly the ortho dox Trot skyis t position that Trot sky was not involved in cons pirac ies with the Germans. But this prese nted him with a problem: How to explain Stalin's hand writt en comm ent on Trots ky's teleg ram? Even Rogovin had to adm it that, since the note was addr essed only to his closest, most trust ed associates, it appe ared to prov e that Stalin and the rest of them did genu inely belie ve Trot sky was guilty of cons pirin g with the Germans. Moreover, Rogovin's attem pt at an expla natio n is factually incorrect. If the term ''Great Terr or'' refer s to anything, it refer s to wha t is called in Russian the Ezhovshchina or ''Ezhov's mass repre ssion ," the perio d of the illegal mass murd ers carri ed out by NKVD chief Nikolai I. Ezhov unde r the guise of comb attin g subv ersio n. Thes e did not begin until after the June 1937 Central Committee meet ing. Wha t's more, centr al aspe cts of the Ezhovshchina rema ined almo st unkn own outsi de a tiny circle of top Soviet leade rs for many years . All Rogovin could offer was the following formulation, which takes us to the hear t of our matt er: The docu ment , as well as many othe r docu ment s of the Politburo, and even the perso nal corre spon denc e of its mem bers, show that Stalin and his ''clos est comrades -in-a rms'' expr essed them selve s in a conventiona l code which was desig ned to give the impr essio n that they belie ved in the amal gams they were creat ing. Othe rwise Stalin, who hard ly belie ved in the exist ence of conta cts betw een Trot sky and Hitler, woul d not have writt en such word s in a docu ment inten ded only for his most imm ediat e circle. (Rogovin 487, note )

Introduc tion.

25

We now posses s additio nal eviden ce that Stalin did indeed believe that Trotsk y was plottin g with the Germans. Rogovin offers no eviden ce to the contrar y. In additio n we now also have eviden ce that Trotsky, as well as many others, actuall y were conspi ring with Germa ny and Japan. The eviden ce concer ning Trotsk y is the subject of this book. Trotsk y's telegra m of June 18, 193 719 will serve as an introdu ction both to the new eviden ce that has come to light since the end of the USSR and to the proble ms of and barrier s to unders tanding what it means. To our knowle dge no one has bother ed to put all this eviden ce together or to re-exam ine in light of this new eviden ce the questio n of Leon Trotsk y's ties to Japan and Germany, ties alleged by defendants at the Moscow Trials and by the Soviet govern ment. Why is this? The two very differe nt comme nts by Piskun and Rogovin sugges t an answer . Rather than being the object of careful study with an eye to questio ning previou s knowle dge, the new eviden ce is being marsha led in defens e of old historic al paradig ms. Piskun 's paradig m - that Trotsk y was probab ly prepar ing for some kind of coup against the Soviet leaders hip - has only rarely been heard for many years. Nevert heless, Piskun reads Trotsk y's telegram throug h the ''lenses'' of that paradig m, for the text of the telegram itself sugges ts nothing about any expectation of immin ent change and return to power. The most that could be said is that the text is perhap s compat ible with such an expecta tion. But we could never deduce such an expect ation from the text alone. A sober reading of Trotsky 's telegra m might be that it is eviden ce that Trotsk y was hoping for a return to power in the USSR but nothin g more.

19

The original telegram seems to be dated June 18, as that date, "18 JUN 1937,H is printed or stamped at the top of the last page. That appears to be the date the telegram was sent. «06.20 HIOHb 1937 r.» is written in small print at the top of the first page of the telegram. That may be the date it was received and translated . Stalin's note, and the signature s of Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoian, and Zhdanov appear on the translatio n of the telegram, to which the telegram itself is appended in the archive.

Trotsky's Conspiracies

26

Rogovin's interpretation is even more strained. According to Rogovin Stalin could not possibly have believed Trotsky was a German spy even though (a) Stalin wrote this on the telegram; (b) only his closest associates would see it; and (c) Stalin referred to this alleged espionage by Trotsky on other occasions. Rogovin's paradigm demands that Stalin had invented the charge that Trotsky was collaborating with the Germans (and Japanese). If that paradigm is to be preserved, then Rogovin must maintain that Stalin must be faking here too. But no objective reading of the text of Trotsky's telegram and Sta-

lin's remarks upon it would arrive at Rogovin s conclusions. Furthermore, Rogovin has no evidence to support his position that Stalin invented the charges against Trotsky. He simply assumes this to be true. 1

Piskun and Rogovin represent antithetical poles in interpreting both this document itself and the question of Trotsky's relationship, or lack thereof, with Germany and Japan. But charges of col.. laborating with the intelligence services of the major Axis powers were alleged not just against Trotsky but also against many of the defendants at the second and third public Moscow trials of January 1937 and March 1938, as well as against the military commanders tried and condemned with Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky in June 1937.20

There is a great deal of such evidence. The present chapter and those that follow concentrate on evidence concerning Trotsky specifically.

20

Elsewhere we have set forth a small part of the evidence that Oppositionists did, in fact, have some kind of clandestine political relationship, aimed at the USSR, with Germany and Japan. Grover Furr and Vladimir L. Bobrov, "Nikolai Bukharin's First Statement of Confession in the Lubianka." Cultural Logic 2007. At http://clogic.eserver.org/2007/Furr_Bobrov.pdf. This is the English translation of an article and text first published in Russian in the St Petersburg journal Klio No. 36 (March 2007).

Introduction.

27

In addition, the failure to find eviden ce that the Oppositionists did have such a relation ship would not necess arily mean that no such relatio nship existed. Indeed, in the case of a deeply clande stine conspi racy we should expect that evidence should be rare and indirect. And, of course, we do have strong evidence of such a conspiracy in the testimo ny of some of the Moscow Trials defend ants and of the ''Tukhachevsky affair'' conspi rators. The presen t study does conclude that the evidence now at our disposal strongl y suppor ts the existen ce of collaboration betwee n Trotsk y and the Germans and Japanese. This creates a peculia r proble m for us as histori ans since an article or book based upon the evidence - the presen t book - directly challenges the prevailing consen sus among anticom munist writers on the Moscow Trials and specifically on Trotsky.

What's At Stake? This prevailing consen sus is a constit uent part of the model, or paradig m, of Soviet history that is domina nt within Russia itself and beyond its border s. At the 1936 Moscow Trial Trotsk y and his son Sedov were accuse d of involve ment with the German Gestapo and of involve ment with Germans and Japanese at both the 1937 and 1938 Moscow Trials. Numer ous witnes ses at each of these trials testified that they had direct knowledge of Trotsk y's (Sedov's) collaboration. These charge s constit uted a central feature of the trials. The allegation that these charge s are false likewise constit utes a central feature of the domina nt paradig m of Soviet history during the Stalin period. Confirmation of the guilt of Nikolai Bukhar in in the crimes to which he confess ed guilt has already serious ly undermin ed what we may briefly term the ''anti-Stalin paradigm'' of Soviet history. Confirmation of Trotsk y's involve ment with the Germans and Japanese would corrob orate the evidence we already have that the charges were true to which the Moscow trials defendants confessed themselves guilty.

Trotsky's Conspiracies

28

***** On the evidence we have, Trotsky did in fact collaborate with the Germans and Japanese. This is consistent with the charges made against Trotsky and his son at the Moscow trials. It is not for us to hazard a guess as to what may be the implications of this fact for Trotskyism itself. Insofar as Trotskyism may be considered as a variety of Marxist theory, a set of political principles that are detachable from Trotsky the politician, it may have few implications. But the implications will be more far-reaching for those varieties of Trotskyism that base themselves on a cult of respect for Trotsky the man and are unable to separate him from his ideas.

What Do You Mean ''Evidence''? This statement focuses our attention on a central question: What kind of evidence would we accept? Unless objective criteria are established and then rigorously adhered to, the researcher will almost certainly ''find' what his historical preconceptions, his favored paradigm, tells him to look for. In doing so he will either ignore or misconstrue anything that does not fit his preconceived ideas. What a researcher agrees to accept as evidence, and to exclude as evidence, is too often a reflection of his historical paradigm. The problem of ''acceptable evidence'' is simply magnified in the case of a charge of secret conspiracy. 1

There are serious problems with any kind of evidence.

* Confessions in or out of court: They might be fabricated,

for any of a number of motives, including currying favor with the prosecution or state; as evidence that one has ''repented''; to shift the blame onto someone else; as a result of torture or the threat of torture, threats against one's family, and so on.

* Incrimination by associates: These are open to the same kinds of tampering as are confessions of the accused.

Introduction.

29

* Docum entary evidence: Docum ents can be forged. Any state has the technic al means to fabrica te docum ents that will convin ce anyone except, possibly, an indepe ndent scientific expert who is allowe d to use destruc tive method s of analysi s to test the chemic al compo sition of the ink, molecu lar analysi s of paper, etc., in order to determ ine whethe r the docum ent is genuin e. As this is virtual ly never permit ted in the case of archiva l docum ents deeme d to be import ant, skillful forgery is a powerf ul tool of historic al falsification. Docum entary eviden ce can also be destroy ed. Russian researc hers have told us that Khrush chev had a great many papers - perhap s amoun ting to thousa nds of pages - remove d from archive s during his leaders hip in the USSR.21 Some docum ents have also been removed from the ''closed'' Trotsk y Archive at Harvar d University.22 No archive is, or can be, comple tely secure from such manipu lation. Moreov er, how likely is it that agreem ents of espiona ge and conspiracy would have been written down in the first place? Anythi ng written down at some point would surely have been hidden securely or, more likely, destroy ed as soon as read. As long as such written eviden ce remain ed it would pose a terrible threat to any conspi rator. We can be certain of the existen ce of one such conspiracy in Soviet history - that among membe rs of the Presidi um to get rid of Lavrentii Beria - becaus e it succee ded on June 26, 1953. Yet no prior written record of that conspir acy has ever come to light, and no single, canoni cal accoun t of it exists even today. These are just examples. In genera l, there is no kind of eviden ce that cannot be forged or faked. Neithe r is there any kind of evidence that can, by itself, provid e conclus ive proof of any act.

E.g. M. lunge, R. Binner. Kak terror stal "Bol'shfm." Sekretnyi prlkaz No.004471 tekhnologiia ego ispolneniia. Moscow: AIRO-XX, 2003, 16. 21

22

We have discussed this question in Trotsky's

'Amalgams~

30

Trotsky's Conspiracies

In this essay I assu me that the large r the num ber of indiv idual item s of evide nce that are all cons isten t with a single inter preta tion, the less is the chan ce that they and that inter preta tion are the resu lt of some kind of ''orch estra tion' ' or fabri catio n acco rding to a preco nceiv ed plan. This shou ld be especially so in t.h e case of docu ment s whic h were neve r inten ded to be publ ic at all. Whe n comb ined with evide nce from docu ment s that were neve r direc tly relat ed to any prose cutio n, the likelihood of fabri catio n beco mes very smal l inde ed . This is simi lar to wha t is called ''circ umst antia l evide nce'' in the legal syste m. Whe n there is enou gh of it, circu mstant ial evide nce is the most powe rful evide nce there is.2 3 Such is the case, I woul d argu e, with Trots ky's teleg ram of June 18, 1937 . As Rogovin recog nized , the most significant thing abou t this teleg ram is what Stalin wrot e upon it. But Rogovin's own conclusion lacks any convincing ratio nale. No one who was not alrea dy conv inced that Trot sky was inno cent of colla bora tion with Germany woul d ever susp ect that Stalin did not believe the truth of wha t he wrot e to an audi ence of his close st assoc iates , rema rks neve r inten ded to go any furth er. Rogovin woul d have us belie ve that Stalin, Molotov, Mikoian and Zhda nov were ''pret endin g'' amon g them selve s that Trots ky was wo·r king with the Germ ans even whil e know ing perfe ctly well that it was they them selve s who had made this story up. No evide nce supp orts such a conclusion. If the word s on this teleg ram were the only evide nce we had that led us to susp ect the accu satio ns again st Trots ky were not fabricated - not by Stalin or to his knowledge, at least - they woul d still be highly significant. Stalin saw all investigative mate rials , inclu ding huge quan tities of evide nce that is eithe r still classified in Russia toda y or has been destr oyed . Wha t's more , we have no evidenc e that he ever talke d in ''code'' with his assoc iates . In fact, pace Trots ky, we have yet to find a singl e insta nce in whic h we can dis-

23

"Circu mstant ial eviden ce can be, and often is much more power ful than direct evidence." - Rober t Precht, a defens e attorn ey in the World Trade Center bombi ng and directo r of the Office of Public Service at the Univer sity of Michigan Law School, quoted at http:// www. pub.um ich.ed u/daily/1997 /jun/0 6-04-9 7/news /news 3.htm l.

Introduction.

31

cover evidence that Stalin lied, while there are a great many examples of Trotsky's deliberately lying in his published works and speeches.24

''Fabrication'' Of Confessions In discussions such as these, where any questioning of the dominant paradigm is viewed with distrust and even horror, it is vital that the presentation of the evidence be accompanied by refutations of the anticipated objections to this evidence coming from that same paradigm. So below we will offer a summary rebuttal to paradigmatic objections to some of the evidence we present. The details will come later. The ''canonical view'' or ''dominant paradigm'' of Soviet history is that all defendants in the Moscow Trials were innocent of the charges to which they confessed. But there is no ''canonical view'' about how the faking of those confessions might have been accomplished. The transcripts of the three Moscow Trials have been available since the 1930s. According to the dominant paradigm of Soviet history these transcripts are dishonest and the confessions of the defendants recorded in them are fabrications. But the term ''fabrication'' does not have any fixed meaning. No one has cited any evidence whatsoever that the confessions were not truthful, so no one is in a position to say anything definite. The charges against the defendants are simply declared to be ''fantastic'' or ''absurd'' and the conclusion is drawn that the defendants must have been induced to lie by some means. ''Fabrication'' is a word that is broad enough in its meaning to cover any kind of falsification. The allegation that the confessions were false, like any other assertion of fact, can and must be tested in the light of all the other

2•

We discuss many of them thoroughly in Trotsky's 'Amalgams~

32

Trotsky's Conspiracies

available evidence. This is supp osed to be done as a matt er of cour se in criminal cases. Histo rians are unde r a simil ar obligation to verify the verac ity of conf essio ns as well as of othe r evidence. We unde rtook to disch arge this respo nsibi lity in the first part of Trotsky,s 'Amalgams.' At the outs et we were prep ared to find evi . . denc e that the confessions of the defe ndan ts and/ or the othe r evidenc e again st them were false. In fact, we found that the oppo site is the case. The evide nce now available stron gly conf irms the truth of the confessions and othe r evidence we cite here.

The Issue of Torture In the pres ent book we devo te serio us atten tion to the hypo thesi s that the defe ndan ts in the Moscow Trials and othe rs who direc tly or indir ectly implicate Trot sky in colla bora tion with Germ any or Japa n may have been indu ced to make false accu satio ns by one mean s or anoth er. Most troub ling is the allegation of real or threa tene d tortu re. Specifically, we discu ss the ''tort ure'' hypo thesi s in conn ectio n with Zinoviev, Ezhov, Uritsky, and Iakovlev (see below ). We exam ine Col. Alksnis' belie f that the Tukh ache vsky trial defe ndan ts were not tortu red. We have a grea t deal of evidence that the defe ndan ts in the Moscow Trials were not tortu red or othe rwis e threa tene d into making false confessions. All inter preta tions of the Trial testim ony, like all inter preta tions of any evidence, are hypo these s. ''Tor ture' ' is one hypo thesi s. Like any hypo thesi s, evide nce is requ ired befo re it beco mes a reaso nable theo ry of expla natio n. In this case there is no such evidence. We have addu ced the appe als to the Soviet Supr eme Court by four of the defen dants at the first Moscow Trial, two of the defe ndan ts from the seco nd Moscow Trial, and all but one of those from the third Moscow Trial. All of them insis t that they are guilty. Thes e docu ment s were neve r inten ded to be made public. At the seco nd Trial of January, 1937 Karl Radek, one of the chief defen dants , direc tly addr esse d the susp icion that he had been

Introduction.

33

threate ned into testifying. Radek stated that it was not the investigators that tormen ted him, but he who tormen ted his investigators. (193 7 Trial 549) Nikolai Bukharin said that ''incriminating evidence'' (ulik1) was what induce d him to begin confessing after three months of silence. I shall now speak of myself, of the reason s for my re-

pentance. Of course, it must be admitt ed that incriminating evidence plays a very import ant part. (1938 Trial 777) Stephe n Cohen has stated that Bukharin was not torture d. Unlike many other victims of repress ion, including the Red Army comma nders, it seems that they did not use physical torture on him in prison. 2s We see no reason to repeat Cohen's reason ing here. Cohen is a world authori ty on Bukharin and continu es to insist that he was entirel y innoce nt while admitti ng that there is no evidence to support that conclusion. However, it is import ant to note that neither Cohen nor anyone else has ever found evidence that the Red Army comma nders' confessions were obtaine d throug h torture . In early 2006 a confession by Mikhail Frinovskii, second -incomma nd to Nikolai Ezhov at the NKVD, was published. 26 In it Frinovskii admitt ed that Ezhov and his co-conspirators, himsel f included, had torture d and fabricated false charges against a great

Stephen Cohen (Koen), "Bukharin na Lubianke." Svobodna ia Mysl' 21, No. 3 (2003), 5863, at 60-61.

2s

"Spetssoo bshchenie L.P. Berii l.V. Stalinu s Prilozhen iem Zaiavleniia M.P. Frinovsko go. 13 aprelia 1939 g. In Lubianka. Stalin i NKVD-NKGB-GUKR "Smersh" 1939 - mart 1946. Eds. V.N. Khaustov , V.P. Naumov, N.S. Plotnika. Moscow: "Materik," 2006. No. 33, pp. 33-50. I have put the original text online at http:/ /msuweb .montcla ir.edu/-fu rrg/resea rch/Frino vskiiru.h tml and an English translation (mine) at http://ms uweb.mo ntclair.ed u/-furrg/ research/ Frinovsk iieng.htm l. 2&

Trotsky's Conspiracies

34

many people. But Frinovskii explicitly said that this was not done in the case of the March 1938 Trial of the ''Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites," the ''Bukharin'' trial. Frinovskii also makes it clear that Zinoviev and Kamenev, the princip al defend ants at the first Moscow Trial of August 1936, were guilty. In this same confession Frinovskii also explicitly states that Bukharin et al. were guilty, and that moreov er he and Ezhov were part of this Rightist conspi racy too. Furthe rmore he states that Bukharin knew Ezhov was involved in this conspir acy and kept quiet about it at the trial, taking this secret to his death. Frinovskii wrote: The prepar ation of the trial of Rykov, Bukharin, Krestinsky, Jagoda and others. An active partici pant in investi gations generally, Ezhov kept himsel f aloof from the prepar ation of this trial. Before the trial there took place the face-to-face confro ntation s of the suspec ts, interro gations , and refining, in which Ezhov did not particip ate. He spoke for a long time with Jagoda, and that talk concer ned, in the main, assurin g Iagoda that he would not be shot. Ezhov had conver sations several times with Bukhar in and Rykov and also in order to calm them assure d them that under no circum stances would they be shot. Ezhov had one conver sation with Bulanov, and began this conver sation in the presen ce of the investi gator and myself, and finished the conver sation one on one, having asked us to leave. At that momen t Bulanov had begun talking about the poison ing of Ezhov. What the conver sation was about Ezhov did not say. When he asked us to enter again he said: ''Behave yourse lf well at the trial - I will ask that you not be shot." After the trial Ezhov always expresse d regret about Bulanov. At the time of the executions Ezhov sugges ted shootin g Bulanov first and he

Introduction.

35

himself did not enter the building where the shootings took place. Here Ezhov unquestionab ly was ruled by the necessity of covering up his own ties with the arrested leaders of the Right who were going into the public trial. In no way did Frinovskii deny torturing and fabricating false confessions against innocent people. Rather, he contrasted the way Ezhov handled the ''Bukharin'' trial defendants with the way he dealt with a great many innocent victims, whom he had tortured by his ''bone-breake rs'' so that they would sign confessions drafted by Ezhov's NKVD men. To sum up: Frinovskii confessed to widespread torture, but (a) specifically exempted the defendants in the 1938 Trial; (b) specifically stated that Bukharin and the other major defendants at the trial were, in fact, guilty; and (c) made passing reference to the principal defendant~ in the first Moscow Trial in which he claims that they too were guilty. Frinovskii's confirmation of the guilt of Bukharin and others corroborates all the other evidence we have concerning Bukharin. Before its publication in 2006 Frinovskii's confession had been fraudulently quoted by historians and by the Soviet Supreme Court itself, suitably expurgated so that it seemed to prove the innocence, not the guilt, of the 1938 Trial defendants. This was done in the same manner as Shelepin's dishonest quotation of lakir's letter, which we briefly examined above. No hypothesis is worth anything unless it is supported by evidence. With respect to the Moscow Trials and Tukhachevsk y Affair there is no evidence to support the ''torture'' hypothesis, and a great deal of evidence against it. Therefore the ''torture'' hypothesis must fall.

36

Trotsky's Conspiracies

Other Possible Hypotheses to Account for Bukharin's Confession Bukh arin' s confessions are impo rtant for us both beca use they illustr ate the issues involved in allegations of tortu re and beca use Bukharin explicitly implicates Trotsky. We'll discuss his testi mon y abou t Trots ky later in the pres ent essay. Here we are conc erne d with the ''tort ure'' question. In any trial there are a num ber of hypo these s aside from the ''torture' ' hypo thesi s that may acco unt for a false confession of guilt by a defendant:

* The defe ndan t's family is threa tened .

* The defe ndan t wish es to ''pun ish himself' to aton e for past misdeeds.

* The

''Rubashov'' expla natio n made famous in Arth ur Koestler's book Darkness At Noon - that ''the Party dema nds it," the Party is histo ry's instr ume nt and so histo ry dema nds it, and so on.

* The defe ndan t has been prom ised favored treat men t by the Pros ecuti on in retur n for falsely accusing other s. In Bukharin's case there is no evidence to supp ort any of these hypoth eses. The main reaso n defe ndan ts confess to crimes of which they are guilty is their calculation that the pros ecuti on has sufficient evidenc e to convict them of the crime(s) in question, rend ering further denial useless, inde ed coun terpr oduc tive. A defe ndan t decides to coop erate with the pros ecuti on in hope s of more lenie nt treat men t by the cour t - of ''getting the best deal he can." It now seem s beyo nd doub t that this was the reaso n for Bukh arin' s confession of guilt. At the seco nd Moscow Trial of Janu ary 1937 four defe ndan ts who appe ared to have coop erate d fully with the pros ecutio n - Radek, Sokol'nikov, Arnol'd and Stroilov - were sente nced to priso n inste ad of execution. Two of these, Grigory Sokol'nikov and Karl Radek, were amon g the principal defen dants . This was a

Introduction.

37

strong incentive to cooperate for any defendant for whom further denial seemed hopeless. Frinovskii's statement corroborates Bukharin's own testimony at trial. Bukharin himself said that ''the incriminating evidence'' was the primary factor motivating his confessions, which began with his first one on June 2, 1937. Frinovskii testified that Ezhov promised Bukharin and others that they would not be shot as long as they did not disclose Ezhov's own involvement with the conspiracy. Frinovskii does not claim that he actually heard Ezhov say this. But he does state that Ezhov did not organize any false confessions in this trial. Frinovskii himself stated that he knew that Bukharin was guilty. And indeed Bukharin did not mention at his trial that Ezhov was a co-conspirator. Frinovskii also confirms Bukharin's guilt as a conspirator known to Ezhov. This corroborates a great deal of other evidence we now possess, including some confessions of Iagoda published for the first time in 1997. Towards the end of these chapters we return to the matter of torture in a different way: to consider the allegations of torture and how they have functioned in the historiography and mythology of Trotsky's role, the Moscow Trials, and the history of the Stalin period generally.

Why Did None of Trotsky's Supporters at the Moscow Trials Defend Trotsky? None of Trotsky's longtime and devoted supporters among the Moscow Trial defendants defended Trotsky or their actions in supporting him. Not only did they plead guilty to various crimes, including working with Trotsky; most of them recanted their former longtime allegiance to him (not all: Khristian Rakovsky, for one, did not). To anticipate one objection, it may be asked: how is this to be explained other than by the fabrication of false testimony through torture or some other means?

38

Trotsky's Conspiracies

In a crimina l case we should not think it strange if co-con spirato rs ''fall out'' and denoun ce one anothe r, as the longtim e Trotsk yists did during their testimo ny at the public Moscow trials. Moreover, we should also consid er the trial from the viewpo int of the prosecution, the Stalin govern ment. What was the purpos e of having these public trials in the first place? Like any crimina l prosec ution, of course, the trial was to deter further criminal (in this case, treason ous) activity and encour age those who suspec ted such activity to report it to authori ties. But larger motive s were doubtle ss at play as well. Given the political conjun cture of the mid-19 30s it seems safe to assume that the trials were also aimed to demon strate to the world that these high-level conspir acies had been nipped in the bud, that the Soviet govern ment was still in charge, and that, therefo re, Soviet securit y was not advers ely affected. The Soviets may have feared that, if the USSR were seen to have been weakened by serious conspir acies at the top, some combin ation of enemy states would attack them. They also feared that the Wester n powers , led by France and the U.K., would not agree to ''collective securit y'' mutual defens e treatie s with the USSR agains t Nazi Germa ny becaus e of Germa n penetra tion of the Soviet leadership including, especially, the militar y leaders hip. That these fears were well founde d is sugges ted by the facts that (a) Japan did indeed attack the USSR - twice, in 1938 and a larger assault in 1939; and (b) the Allies did refuse to make any mutual defense treaties with the USSR. Rather, they continu ed to encour age Hitler to attack the USSR. The late Alvin D. Coox, the leading expert on Soviet- Japane se relatio ns during this time, conclu ded that the Japane se attack on the USSR at Lake Khasan in 1938 was directly motiva ted by the testimo ny of General Genrikh Liushkov, who defecte d to Japan in July 1938 and reporte d that the Red Army was serious ly weakenect.21

21Coox1, 92; Coox 2, 145.

Introduction.

39

If we assume that this was the purpos e of the ''Show Trials'' it stands to reason that the only defend ants who would appear in them would be those who would attack Trotsk y and say they were wrong, the USSR was right, and so on.

Why Is There No German or Japanese Evidence of Trotsky's Collaboration? ''Most conspir acy theoris ts don't unders tand this. But if there really were a C.I.A. plot, no docum ents would exist." (Shane 2009)28 Instruc tions on concre te organiz ation questio ns regarding prepar ation for underg round conditions must be given only verball y.... At the very least it should have been specified that these names and addres ses be given strictly orally... 29 In the course of this essay we will show that there is a large amoun t of mutual ly-corr oborati ve eviden ce of Trotsk y's GermanJapane se collabo ration from the Soviet side. In additio n we have import ant evidence from Germa n and Japane se source s of collaboration by membe rs of the Soviet opposition, including by some who themse lves claimed to have been workin g with Trotsky. But no direct evidence of Germa n or Japane se collabo ration with Trotsk y has been discov ered outside the former USSR. There are a numbe r of possible explan ations: *Trots ky never collabo rated with the Germans or Japanese. All the Soviet eviden ce is fabricated. If Trotsk y did collabo rate the following possibilities exist:

ze Gerald Posner, "author of an anti-cons piracy account of the Kennedy assassina tion, on efforts to obtain C.l.A. documen ts relating to the assassin." 0. Weber. "How Not to Prepare For Undergro und Condition s of Revolutio nary Work." The Communist International. July 1, 1932, 417.

29

40

Trot sky's Conspiracies

* Many of thes e arch ives wer e des troy ed dur ing the war . *No bod y has look ed for suc h evidence. At least, we are not awa re any bod y has don e so, part icul arly in the unp ubli she d pap ers of the German gen eral s allegedly involved. *Th ese arch ives too mig ht hav e bee n ''purged." *Th ere nev er was any arch ival evid enc e of this collabo rati on bec aus e con spir ator ial info rma tion of this kind is typically not wri tten dow n at all. We kno w tha t the Sov iet arch ives hav e bee n pur ged by Khrushchev, and per hap s by othe rs. Des pite our lim ited exp erie nce wor king wit h oth er archives, we kno w of two cases in whi ch arch ival mat eria ls hav e ''dis app eare d." In add itio n mos t Soviet arch ives are not ope n to rese arch ers. Given the evid enc e tha t we hav e discovered in the rela tive ly few arch ival doc ume nts tha t hav e bee n pub lish ed to date it see ms likely tha t furt her evid enc e imp lica ting Tro tsky may be con tain ed in arch ives tha t are still classified. Lat er in this essa y we brie fly disc uss the ''purging'' of the Tro tsky archive at Har vard of incr imi nati ng mat eria ls. In man y cou ntri es it is nor mal to kee p intelligence arch ives sec ret indefinitely. This is cert ainl y the case in the USA. We sug ges t it is logical to sus pec t the sam e thin g in the case of Ger man y and Japan. The re is a gre at dea l of evid enc e tha t the mil itar y com man der s led by Marshal Mikhail Tuk hac hev sky did ind eed coll abo rate wit h the German General Staff and wit h the Japanese. We hav e ind irec t confirm atio n of this from a Ger man arch ive and mor e dire ct con firm ation in one doc ume nt from the Czech Archives. We disc uss this evid enc e in mor e deta il in Trotsky's 'Amalgams.' In disc ussi ng thei r esp iona ge for Germany sev eral Soviet defendan ts said they had dea lt dire ctly with German General Kur t von Ham mer stei n-E quo rd. Rumor, at least, of this coll abo rati on eviden tly surv ived in Ham mer stei n's family. Although to our knowl-

Introduction.

41

edge no writt en reco rd of that colla bora tion exists, it appe ars that no one has actua lly look ed for such records.3o Nor has anyo ne ever unde rtake n to surv ey the survi ving pape rs of the Germ an gene rals alleg edly involved. We belie ve that the singl e most likely reaso n for the abse nce of such evide nce is simp ly that no one shou ld expe ct a cons pirac y like this to be docu ment ed anyw here , ever, much less in archi ves. The dema nds of secre cy and secu rity requ ire that such infor ma .. tion be exch ange d only by word of mout h. The lack of archi val or in fact of any docu ment ary evide nce of the succ essfu l cons pirac y again st Lavr entii Beria has alrea dy been cited. This cons pirac y must have invo lved at least half a doze n men. Acco unts of it by its parti cipan ts do not agre e in detai ls except in this: it was all plan ned and carri ed out throu gh oral communi catio n. Ther e is no ment ion of any writt en comm unica tion. Wha t does exist in the archi ves is the outli ne of a spee ch to be deliver ed by Malenkov at the Presi dium meet ing of June 26, 1953 . It was at this meet ing, we know , that Beria was eithe r arres ted or killed. Male nkov was certa inly a party to what ever occu rred. Yet acco rding to the outli ne of Male nkov 's spee ch Beria was to be remov ed as head of the MVD (Min istry of Inter nal Affairs, inclu ding the inter nal polic e force) and mad e Mini ster of the Petro leum lndustry.31

Alleged Lack Of Non-Soviet Evidence The Trot sky archi ves at Harv ard have been purg ed of evide nce that Trot sky supp orter s with privi leged acces s to this othe rwis eclose d archi ve foun d emb arras sing to Trots ky's repu tatio n, as we dem onstr ated in Trotsky's 'Amalgams.' The mate rials purg ed in ..

Hans Magnus Enzensberger. Hammerstein oder der Eigensinn. Eine deutsche Geschichte. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2008, pp. 234; 213-215. 30

The outline of Malenkov's speech is in Lavrentii Beriia.1953. Stenogramma iiul'skogo plenuma TsK KPSS i drugie dokumenty. Ed. V. Naumov, JU. Sigachev. Moscow: MDF, 1999, pp. 69-70.

31

42

Trotsky's Conspiracies

eluded, at the very least, furth er evidence abou t the exist ence of the ''Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites'' and Trots ky's corre spon denc e with supp orter s with in the USSR. The late Pierr e Broue, in his day the forem ost Trot skyis t histo rian in the worl d and a pers on who enjoy ed wide sprea d resp ect from antic omm unist scho lars, conc luded that this evide nce mean t little since it only dem onst rated the exist ence of a bloc in 1932 . Broue assu med that beca use the only evidence that was not successfully purg ed from the archi ve happ ened to be from 1932 that mus t have been the only time the bloc existed. That is, Broue erron eous ly assume d in his article that there was no bloc after 1932 beca use there is no evide nce in Trotsky's archive for the bloc after 1932 . This is an invalid assum ption . It ignores the fact that the archive has been purg ed. Had those who purg ed Trots ky's archi ve done an even more thoro ugh job we woul d not even have this evidence. Yet that woul d in no way imply that no evidence of the bloc ever existed. Much less woul d it imply that the bloc itself neve r existed. ''Lack of evidence'' - in this case, of the existence of the bloc after 1932 - ''is not evide nce of lack'' - that such evide nce neve r existed. If those who purg ed the Harv ard Trot sky archi ve of incri mina ting docu ment s had been more thoro ugh they woul d have also taken the certified mail recei pts of Trots ky's lette rs to oppo sitio nists in the USSR and Trots ky's and van Heije noor t's note s abou t the ''bloc of Rights and Trotskyites." Then what woul d we now have? We'd have the Gorbachev-era ''reha bilita tion' ' docu ment deny ing that there ever was such a ''bloc," and Trots ky's staun ch denia l that there ever was such a ''bloc." Plus we'd have the insis tence of the Soviet Pros ecuto r, Vyshinskii, and the confessions of a num ber of Moscow Trial defen dants , that there was indee d such a ''bloc." Getty's discovery in the Trot sky archive corro bora tes the testi· mon y of the Moscow Trial defen dants . It is evide nce that they did not lie, since in the few insta nces wher e we can get inde pend ent evidence - as here - that evide nce supp orts the trial defe ndan ts' confessions. Likewise it corro bora tes the state ment s of the Prosecuto r that is, of ''Stalin," in the redu ctive langu age of

Introduction.

43

anticom munist writers . The testimo ny of the trial defend ants and the Soviet prosec utor about the bloc and about Trotsk y's corresponde nce turns out to have been truthfu l, while Trotsk y's testimony and that of the Gorbac hev-era Soviet govern ment is false. This is not direct eviden ce of any Trotsk y collabo ration with Germany or Japan. But it is consist ent with such allegat ions, since it corrob orates the testimo ny of the same witnes ses on a related matter . Trotsk y denied collabo rating with Axis represe ntative s just as he denied existen ce of the bloc and contac t with his Soviet suppor ters. Theref ore the lack of eviden ce in Trotsk y's archive of any contac t with the Axis is not eviden ce that such eviden ce was never there. We do have a little non-So viet eviden ce of such collabo ration. In Februa ry 1937 the Japane se Ministe r of War, Genera l Hajime Sugiyama, reveale d in a meetin g that Japan was in touch with opposi tionists within the USSR who were provid ing the Japane se with militar y intelligence.32 Other examp les of non-So viet eviden ce attest to the real existen ce of the conspir acies alleged by the Stalin govern ment. There is the Arao Docum ent, still extant in 1962-6 3. We have direct testimo ny from the Germa n ambass ador to Czechoslovakia that Hitler knew that high-ra nking militar y figures in the USSR were prepar ing a coup d'etat. This docum ent, in the Czech nationa l archive s, was only discov ered in 1987. This docum ent is corrob orated by corresponde nce found in capture d Germa n archive s disclos ed in 1974 but not recogn ized until 1988 (see the section on the Mastny Benes note in Trotsky's 'Amalgams1. On June 13, 1938 Genera l of the NKVD Genrik h S. Liushk ov defected to the Japane se. At a press confere nce prepar ed by the Japane se he claimed that the alleged conspir acies in the USSR were

32

"Soviet Links Tokyo with 'Trotskyism."' New York Times March 2, 1937, p. 5. My thanks to Sven-Eric Holmstrom, who obtained and has shared with me a copy of the original article from the Japanese newspape r Miyako Simbun of February 20, 1937.

44

Trotsky' s Conspiracies

faked. But private ly Liushkov told the Japane se that Stalin was convin ced there were real conspir acies, includi ng the militar y conspiracy. He also confirm ed that the conspi rators were linked with the Tukhac hevsky group throug h Gamarnik. Liushkov confirm ed that the conspi rators wanted to join forces with the Japane se to inflict defeat upon the Soviet military, and that some of them had been conspir ing directly with the Japane se military. We discuss Liushkov's testimo ny in Trotsky's 'Amalgams' and in Chapte r 17 of

The Murder of Sergei Kirov. Even if we had no non-So viet eviden ce of collabo ration betwee n Soviet opposi tionists and Axis represe ntative s that would not mean that no such eviden ce ever existed. Much less would it mean that no such collabo ration took place, for such collabo ration might well not leave any evidenc e. However, despite frequen t allegat ions to the contrar y, we do posses s eviden ce of the anti-So viet conspiraci es that could not have been fabrica ted by the Soviets.

Soviet Evidence No researc her today, no matter how anti-Soviet, dismis ses Soviet eviden ce just becaus e it is Soviet. Evidence from Soviet archive s is routine ly regard ed as valid. For example, later in this essay we examine pretria l testimo ny of Genrikh lagoda, Ezhov's immed iate predec essor as head of the NKVD and defend ant at the 1938 Moscow Trial, and will show that it is cited unprob lematic ally as genuine by extrem ely anticom munist scholar s. It include s testimo ny about Trotsky. In collabo ration with my colleague Vladimir L. Bobrov the presen t author has publish ed and analyze d Bukhar in's first confession of June 2, 193 7. (Furr & Bobrov) This docum ent is still top-sec ret in Russia. In it Bukhar in directly implica tes Trotsky.

Lengthy Quotations Much of the following chapte rs consist s of direct quotati ons from primar y sources . We unders tand that this increas es the length of these chapter s. However, in a study such as this one we cannot do withou t these quotati ons. The primar y source s constit ute the evidentiar y basis for the analysi s and conclusions. Some quotati ons

Introduction.

45

are from sources that are not easy for most readers to obtain, such as the English versions of the Moscow Trial transcripts. Even more of them are from documents not available in English at all. Marshal Budennyi's letter to Marshal Voroshilov, which we have discussed in Trotsky's 'Amalgams,' is an archival document that had never been published in any language and whose contents are entirely new to the scholarly world.33 In the age of the Internet there is no reason why any scholar should ever cite archival or hard.. to-obtain materials without making them available to the reader. We could have put the primary source quotations onto a separate file and inserted hyperlinks when appropriate, and considered doing so. Doing so, however, would force the reader either to ignore the evidence or to move back and forth between the document and the Internet. We feared such a procedure would be distracting to a careful reader and so decided against it. We urge the reader to study carefully the quotations from the primary sources. Like any work of scholarship this book stands or falls on the evidence and its analysis. In this book all boldface emphases are by me unless otherwise noted. I have put the central documents discussed in this book online in both the Russian original and in English translation. See the URL cited at the beginning of the Bibliography.

33

See Vladimir L. Bobrov and Grover Furr,, "Marshal S.M. Budennyi's on the Tukhachevsky

Trial. Impressions of an Eye-Witness." (in Russian). Klio (St. Petersburg) No. 2 (2012), pp. 824.

C ha pt er 1. A Br ie f O ve rv ie w of th e Ev id en ce Our aim in the se cha pte rs is to cite and analyze all of the evidence tha t directly ties Tro tsk y to collaboration wit h Germany or Japan. We follow each citation of evidence wit h an analysis of tha t evidence. Because all evi den ce may be int erp ret ed in var iou s ways, no evidence is left to f'speak for itself." We hav e also str ive n to cite and stu dy contextual and cor rob ora tiv e evidence, as all analysis of evidence req uir es. Th ere is no suc h thi ng as ''absolute proof." This oug ht to go without saying. Wh at gives the complex of existing evidence its pow er is its mutually cor rob ora tiv e or reinforcing cha rac ter , the she er qua nti ty of it, and the fact tha t it comes from dif fer ent sources. Strictly spe aki ng eye -w itn ess evidence is not ''circumstantial'' in the sam e ma nne r as oth er evidence. We pay special att ent ion to the tes tim ony of tho se wh o claim the y we re told by Tro tsk y himsel f of his ties wit h Germany and Japan. This tes tim ony is mu tua lly cor rob ora tiv e too. We will examine the ext ent to which the credibility of the eye -w itn ess es can be verified by cross-checking som e of the sta tem ent s the y ma ke wit h oth er evidence at ou r disposal. In Trotsky s 'Amalgams we dev ote a gre at deal of att ent ion to the job of verifying the Moscow Trials testimony. Aside from ver bal denials the re can be no abs olu te evidence tha t Tro tsk y did no t collab ora te wit h the Germans or Japanese. Th ere for e any investigatio n mu st sea rch for evidence tha t he did collaborate. 1

1

We also trie d har d to find evidence tha t sup por ts the con tra ry hypothesis: tha t the confessions of all the se people, wh eth er at the Moscow Trials or oth erw ise , we re ''fabricated'' and false. This wo uld im pug n the evi den ce tha t Tro tsk y did collaborate, and so rep res ent ''negative'' evidence of a sor t. But we have bee n unsuc-

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

47

cessful. We feel confident in saying that, at this point at least, no such evidence has ever been discovered by anyone.

The introduction to the Report of the Dewey Conllllission, which was convened in 193 7 to examine the charges against Trotsky, itself states: If Leon Trotsky is guilty of the acts with which he is charged, no condemnatio n can be too severe. On the evidence now available, the only objective conclusion must be that Trotsky did indeed collaborate with the Germans and Japanese. If evidence to the contrary should surface in the future we must be ready to review and, if necessary, change this conclu•

SlOil.

Trotsky Lied Trotsky denied working with Germany or Japan, as charged in the 193 7 and 1938 Moscow Trial by several of the defendants. But we now know he lied to the very friendly Dewey Commission in 1937 about other matters far less serious. We have documented many of these lies in the two sections of Trotsky's 'Amalgams'. On the basis of his research in the Trotsky papers at Houghton Library, Harvard University, J. Arch Getty pointed out in 1986 that Trotsky had been in written contact with his followers in the USSR at least in 1932. Either Trotsky himself or one of his secretaries took some pains to conceal these connections. The noted French Trotskyist scholar Pierre Broue, who also studied these papers and acknowledged Trotsky's lies, explains them as an attempt to deny any plausibility to the ''Stalinist'' accusations against him at the Moscow Trials, as well as to protect any further Trotskyist supporters not yet uncovered in the USSR.1

Pierre Braue, "Trotsky et le bloc des oppositions de 193 2." Cahiers Leon Trotsky 5 Uan-Mar 1980), 29.

1

48

Trotsky's Conspiracies

Fro m Tro tsky 's poi nt of view this mad e perf ect sen se. Wh y give Stal in and his coll eag ues add itio nal amm uni tion in thei r war wit h him ? But for the hist oria n it mea ns tha t Tro tsky 's den ials , not only of the exis tenc e of the bloc, but of any cha rge, can not sim ply be take n at face valu e. As Get ty has poi nted out else whe re: The poi nt her e is tha t Tro tsky lied .... [H]e had goo d reas ons to lie. But wha t he said was not the trut h. It was not ''objective."2 We cite this not to blam e Tro tsky for lyin g (alt hou gh man y wou ld blam e him for the con spir acie s them selv es). Lying is an esse ntia l par t of any con spir acy . Tro tsky had goo d reas on to lie. But the fact tha t Tro tsky lied mea ns tha t we mus t set asid e any den ials on Tro tsky 's part . It is to be exp ecte d tha t per son s will lie whe n nec essa ry to defl ect pun ishm ent or blam e from them selv es. No one pay s muc h atte ntion to den ials of guil t on the par t of per son s sus pec ted of a crim e. In man y cou ntri es an acc use d per son has the righ t to lie in his own defe nse, thou gh of cou rse at his own peri l too. To any inve stig ator and to any hist oria n as wel l an acc use d's con fess ion of guil t may be muc h mor e sign ific ant than a clai m of inno cen ce. So Tro tsky 's clai m of inno cen ce mea ns littl e in itself. How eve r, Tro tsky nev er did confess. He lied, and ''go t awa y wit h it'' - and not mer ely inso far as the Dew ey Com mis sion mem ber s and its aud ienc e wer e con cern ed. To this day ver y few boo ks abo ut Tro tsky eve n men tion his man y pro ven lies. I hav e nev er fou nd a sing le boo k abo ut Tro tsky tha t atte mpt s to exp lore the imp lica tion s of Tro tsky 's man y dem ons trab le fals eho ods . Ver y few Tro tsky ists are eve n awa re of them . Wh at's mor e, on the evid enc e now ava ilab le we can vali dly con clud e tha t Tro tsky lied abo ut a gre at dea l mor e.

2

Getty, post to H-RUSSIA list Nov. 24, 1998 . See http: //tiny url.c om/g etty- trots ky-li ed.

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidenc e

49

It is no wonde r that Trotsk y lied in order to conceal his conspi ratorial activities. Keeping such a thing secret would have been an elemen tary sine qua non of such a conspiracy. The German and Japanese participants, if asked about this, would also have denied it. In lying, they would have felt certain that they were being loyal to their countries and to their military oaths. General Ernst Kostring, German military attache in Moscow, did deny the contac t with the conspi rators that he was charged with.3

Trotsky's Archive Falsified In volume one of this study, Trotsky's 'Amalgams,' we examine the falsification of the Trotsky archive in more detail. What follows is a brief outline for the reader s of volume two.

We know that there has been a practic e of falsifying what Trotsk y did that extended to the Trotsk y papers themselves. Getty has pointed out that the corresp ondenc e betwee n Trotsk y and Oppositionists in the USSR had been remove d from the Trotsk y Papers at Harvard at some time before they were opened to researc hers in Januar y 1980.4 Braue and Getty both note that Trotsky's secreta ry Jean van Heijenoort remind ed Trotsk y and his son Leon Sedov of his (Trotsky s) corresp ondenc e about the bloc at the time of the Dewey Commission hearings. Trotsk y chose to lie about this. Van Heijenoort knew the Trotsk y Papers better than anyone else. But he never revealed that he had person al knowledge that Trotsk y (and Sedov) had deliberately lied to the Dewey Commission. Therefore van Heijenoort lied too - an issue we investigate in Trotsky's 'Amalgams.' 1

Isaac Deutscher was also given special access to the Trotsk y Papers by Trotsky's widow so he could write his famous three-

Herman Teske, ed., Profile bedeutender Soldaten. Band/. General Ernst Kostring Der milltarlscher Mittler zwlschen dem Deutschen Reich und der Sowjetunion. 1921-1941. (Frankfurt/M.: Mittler, 1965), 3

• Getty, 34 n.18.

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Trotsky' s Conspiracies

volume biograp hy of Trotsky . But Deutsc her did not reveal the existence of the bloc of Rights and Trotsk yites or of van Heijen oort's letter. Van Heijeno ort, Deutsc her, or conceiv ably some other de .. fender of Trotsk y's legacy with rare privile ged access deliber ately falsified his archive . This makes one doubly curious as to exactly what was in those letters from Trotsk y to the Opposi tionists that have been remove d and for which Getty found only the certifie d mail receipt s. The questio n remain s: What inform ation in those letters to his followers in the USSR would have been so sensitiv e that person s loyal to Trotsk y felt it necess ary to remove them even while leaving sensitive personal materi als alone? The logical answe r is: sensiti ve po .. litical materia l. But this could not have been mere eviden ce that Trotsk y was in contac t with his followe rs in the USSR. That eviden ce still remain s in the Archive. Getty wrote: Sedov's addres s book contain ed the exile addres ses of Trotsky ists in the USSR. Trotsky Papers 15741. The Ex .. ile Corres ponden ce section of the Trotsky Papers contains copies of such letters. (Getty, Trotsky , 34 n. 16) Those of Trotsk y's followe rs who had access to the Trotsk y Papers did not feel that this materia l was politica lly sensitiv e enough to remove . So what would have been? At the top of any such list would be: materia l that confirm ed the accusa tions made against Trotsk y at the Mosco w Trials. Such eviden ce would have irrepar ably ruined Trotsk y's reputat ion while justifying, in the eyes of many, the repress ions of the late 1930s and, therefo re, Stalin. Such eviden ce would have threate ned to cut the founda tion out of Trotskyism . Trotsky 's denial that he was involve d in conspi ring with the Germans and Japane se cannot be accepte d as evidenc e, since, when accuse d of a crime, both the innoce nt and the guilty would tend to claim innoce nce.

Chapt er One. A Brief Overv iew of the Evide nce

51

The path is now clear ed for us to study the evidence that does exist.

Evidence from the Three Moscow Trials The testi mon y of the defe ndan ts at the three Moscow ''Show'' Trials is routi nely dismissed as false. The defen dants are said to have been threa tened , or tortu red, or in some othe r way indu ced to confess to absu rd crimes whic h they could not have committed. As we have exhaustively dem onst rated in the twelve chap ters that comp rise the first part of Trotsky's 'Amalgams' this is all wron g. Ther e is no evidence wort hy of the nam e that the defe ndan ts were threa tened , or tortu red, or indu ced to give false confessions by prom ises of some kind. Under Khrushchev, again unde r Gorbachev and, in fact, right up to this day the official stanc e of both Soviet and Russian regim es has been that the defe ndan ts' confessions are false. The investigative materials, all but a small fraction of which are still classified in Russia today, have been scou red by antic omm unist histo rians for any evidence that woul d discr edit the Trials and prov e the defendant s' confessions were false. But, desp ite their inten se desir e to find such evidence, none has been discovered. This failure can make us reaso nabl y conf ident that no such evidence exists. In 1992 durin g the short -live d ''glasnost''' perio d unde r Eltsin the appe als to the Soviet Supr eme Cour t of ten of the Moscow Trials defe ndan ts were publ ished in the news pape r Jzvestiia. All the defend ants in ques tion had been sente nced to death on the basis of their own confessions and the accusations of othe r defen dants . This was their last chance to retra ct their confessions and proclaim their innocence. Not one of them did so. Every one of them reco nfirm ed his own guilt. In 2013 the appeals of all but one of the defe ndan ts (Khristian Rakovsky) in the third Moscow Trial of March 1938 were published. Once again, all repe ated that they were guilty of the crim es

52

Trotsky's Conspiracies

of whi ch they had bee n convicted. We have discussed thes e appeals in mor e deta il in Trotsky's 'Amalgams.' Most people who disr ega rd the confessions of the defe nda nts at the Moscow Trials hav e nev er stud ied the tran scri pts of thes e trials. They dismiss them bec aus e they have bee n told tha t the defendan ts' confessions wer e fabricated. In Trotsky's 'Amalgams' we dem ons trat ed tha t the evidence given in tho se confessions tha t we can now check from ind epe nde nt sou rces is in fact corr obo rate d. A num ber of the def end ants at the Moscow Trials testified tha t Trotsky was collaborating wit h Germany or Japan. Some testified tha t they had bee n told of Trotsky's collaboration pers ona lly by Trotsky, pers ona lly by Tro tsky s son Leon Sedov, or in not es or lett ers from Tro tsky or Sedov. Oth er defe nda nts said tha t they had bee n told of Trotsky's collaboration at second hand. 1

In thes e cha pter s we will con cen trat e on this firs t-ha nd test imo ny of Trotsky's collaboration. At the end of the cha pter we will say som ethi ng abo ut the ind irec t or seco nd- han d evidence to note how it cor rob ora tes the first-hand evidence.

The August 1936 Trial: Valentin Ol'berg In the August 193 6 tria l of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and oth ers the only first-hand test imo ny to collaboration betw een Tro tsky and the German gov ern men t con cern s collaboration wit h German intelligence. Defendant Valentin Ol'berg claimed tha t he obta ined from the Gestapo a Hon dur an pas spo rt to get into the USSR wit h the help of his bro ther Paul, a German agent. He furt her test ifie d tha t he was given the mon ey to buy it from the German Tro tsky ite or .. ganization bec aus e Sedov had told them to pro vide it. Ol'berg claimed tha t he had bee n in dire ct con tact wit h Trotsky. We kno w tha t this latt er stat eme nt is true bec aus e lett ers from Ol'berg rem ain in the Har vard Tro tsky Archive. These lett ers are not incriminating. But this mea ns nothing, since we kno w tha t the Tro tsky Archive has bee n pur ged .

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

53

Getty discovered evidence in the Trotsky Archive that Trotsky had ''safe contacts in Berlin, Prague, and Istanbul'' (Getty 28). Insofar as German Trotskyists did exist, therefore, the contact Ol'berg alleged could have happened. The alleged contacts between Trotskyists and the Gestapo were for the joint purpose of organizing assassination attempts on Stalin and Voroshilov.s Ol'berg claimed there was systematic collaboration between the Gestapo and German Trotskyists with Trotsky's consent. From Prosecutor Vyshinskii's Opening Statement: As the investigation has established, V. Olberg arrived in the U.S.S.R. with the passport of a citizen of the Republic of Honduras obtained with the aid of the German Secret Police (Gestapo). On this point V. Olberg, during examination in the office of the State Attorney of the U.S.S.R., testified •

'' ... Sedov promised to help me to obtain a passport to return to the U.S.S.R. once more. But I succeeded in obtaining a passport with the help of my younger brother, Paul Olberg. Thanks to my connections with the German police and their agent in Prague, V. P. Tukalevsky, I, by means of a bribe, obtained the passport of a citizen of the Republic of Honduras. The money for the passport - 13,000 Czechoslovak ian kronen - I obtained from Sedov, or rather, from the Trotskyite organization on Sedov' s instructions.'' (Vol. XXI, p. 262) Re-examined on the question of his connection with the Gestapo, V. Olberg on July 31 of this year testified: ''Confirming also my testimony of May 9 of this year, I emphasize that my connection with the Ge-

5 There

is no testimony at this trial about any Trotsky contacts with the Japanese.

Trotsky's Conspiracies

54

stapo was not at all an exception, of which one could speak as of the fall of an individual Trotskyite. It was the line of the Trotskyites in conformity with the instructions of L. Trotsky given through Sedov. The connection with the Gestapo followed the line of organizing terrorism in the U.S . S.R. against the leaders of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government." (1936 Trial, 25) From the trial transcript: Then, continues Olberg, I wrote a letter to Sedov in Paris telling him about the proposal made by the agent of the Gestapo, and asked him to inform me whether L. D. Trotsky would approve of an arrangement with such an agent. After some time I received a reply sanctioning my actions, that is to say, my understandin g with Tukalevsky. Sedov wrote saying that the strictest secrecy was necessary, and that none of the other members of the Trotskyite organization was to be informed about this understandin g. (1936 Trial, 89)

Interrogation of Pavel Ol'berg Volume two of the document collection Politbiuro i Lev Trotskii (PiLT2), published in 2013, contains a single interrogation of Pavel Ol'berg. It is dated May 5, 1936. Pavel Ol'berg confirms that his brother Valentin ... lived in Prague from the summer of 1933 to the end of 1934. During this time he obtained the Honduran passport and, as I have already testified in my previ . . ous confessions, traveled to the USSR in order to organize a terrorist act against Stalin as an assignment he had received from Lev Sedov. (274) Pavel Ol'berg stated that his brother Valentin had contact ''with the German secret police (Gestapo)." He continued:

Chapter One. A Brie f Overview of the Evidence

SS

Dur ing his firs t trip to the USSR in 193 3 [Valentin] Ol'b erg was not able to mak e con tact with the Tro tsky ist org aniz atio n and get him self esta blis hed in the USSR. The n he retu rne d to Prag ue, whe re he mai n· tain ed his con tact wit h the Gestapo. Wh en he rece ived his assi gnm ent from Sed ov in 193 4 to go to the USSR to pre par e a terr oris t act aga inst Stalin he rep orte d this to the Gestapo. The n he rece ived the assi gnm ent from the Ges tapo to acc ept this [Sedov's] assi gnm ent and to stop off in Ber lin for inst ruct ions befo re his trip to the USSR ...

The Gestapo help ed him obt ain the pas spo rt. He received from Sed ov the mon ey to buy the pas spo rt, 13,000 Czech crow ns. In add itio n, befo re his trip to the USSR he also rece ived mon ey from the Gestapo. Wh at sum he rece ived from the Gestapo, I do not kno w. Val enti n Ol'b erg' s wife Bet ty Ol'b erg also kne w abo ut her hus ban d's con tact wit h the Gestapo. (27 5) In the one inte rrog atio n of Bet ty Ol'b erg now ava ilab le (PiLT2, 251 ff.) she adm its to kno win g tha t her hus ban d had bee n assi gne d by Tro tsky 's son Sed ov to mu rde r Stalin and oth er Bol she vik lead ers but doe s not men tion the Gestapo. Thi s inte rrog atio n is date d April 26, 193 6, nin e day s befo re Pavel Ol'berg's.

Conclusion: the 1936 Mo sco w Trial Ol'b erg con nec ted Tro tsky or Sed ov dire ctly wit h the Ger man Gestap o. Ol'b erg rep eate d this cha rge in his dire ct test imo ny: Vyshinsky: Con nec tion betw een the Ger man Tro tsky ites and the Ger man poli ce - was tha t syst ema tic? Ofberg: Yes, it was sys tem atic and it was don e wit h Tro tsky 's con sen t.

Vyshinsky: How do you kno w tha t it was don e wit h Tro tsky 's kno wle dge and con sen t?

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Trotsky's Conspiracies

Olberg: On e of the se lines of con nec tio n wa s ma intai ned by myself. My con nec tio n wa s est abl ish ed wit h the san cti on of Tro tsk y.

Vyshinsky: Yo ur per son al con nec tio n wit h wh om ?

Olberg: Wi th the fascist sec ret police. Vyshinsky: So it can be sai d tha t you you rse lf adm it con nec tio n wit h the Ge sta po?

Olberg: I do no t den y this . In 193 3 the re beg an org aniz ed sys tem ati c con nec tio n bet we en the Ge rm an Tro tsk yit es and the Ge rm an fas cis t pol ice . (19 36 Trial, 87-88)

Gurevich Kh ats kel Ge sel evi ch Gu rev ich wa s a Lat via n by bir th wh o had bee n a me mb er of the Co mm uni st Par ty of Ge rm any unt il 193 3 and had the n mo ved to Len ing rad . Gu rev ich 's act ivi ties and tho se of his wif e Fri da Gre be sho w ho w Tro tsk yis t act ivi ty wa s int erc onn ect ed wit h tha t of the Ge rm an Ge sta po. [Gurevich] An sw er. I mu st als o adm it the following: In Len ing rad Gre be tol d me tha t wh ile she wa s un der arres t in Lei pzi g she had bee n rec rui ted by the Ge sta po and she had agr eed to wo rk wit h the Ge sta po .... Gre be rec eiv ed the ass ign me nt of con duc tin g mil itar y esp ionag e wit hin the USSR for the Ge rm ans . (PiLT2, 288 ) Fri da Gre be kne w tha t I wa s in con tac t wit h the Tro tsky ist org ani zat ion in Ber lin and Leipzig, kne w abo ut my con tac ts wit h Lev Sed ov, and als o kne w tha t I and Mikhail By kho vsk i had an ass ign me nt fro m the Tro tsky ist org ani zat ion to pre par e and car ry ou t ins ide the Sov iet Un ion ter ror ist act s aga ins t the lea der s of the Par ty.

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

57

Yes, I have to admit that in connec tion with the confession s of my wife Frida Grebe in Leipzig, at the beginning of June one of the officials of the Gestap o interroga ted me about my Trotsk yist activity and contacts in German y. During this interro gation I admitt ed that I was a membe r of a Trotsk yist organiz ation and was connec ted in my activity with Sedov, Ol'berg , Fridma n, Bykhov ski and others, and that I had been assigne d by the organiz ation to emigra te to the USSR to prepar e terrori st acts against the leaders of the Party. I also asked them to release me from custod y so that I would be free to leave for the USSR. The Gestap o official said that my liberat ion might compro mise me in the eyes of the Soviet colony and the CPG, and so I would be transfe rred to the USSR by convoy . On June 22, 1933, I was transfe rred to the USSR ...

I have already confes sed about the person s with whom Grebe, by assignm ent of the Gestap o, was in contact . Throug h Grebe in connec tion with the assignm ents I had receive d I also transm itted for the Gestap o information about the prepar ation by the Trotsk yist organizatio n in Leningrad of a terrori st act against Zhdanov. Grebe's last meetin g that I know of with Fridric h, a Gestap o courier , was in March 1936 ... (289) Gurevi ch confess ed that he had inform ed a known Germa n spy about his Trotsk yist activiti es so that they would work togethe r.

I have to admit that Mikhai l Sukhan ov, who had been drawn into espion age for the Germa ns by Grebe in 1935, was inform ed in 1936 by me about the existence of the Trotsk yist terrori st organiz ation. I considered that the risk of doing this for me was minima l

Trotsky's Conspiracies

58

sinc e Suk han ov, as a spy , was com plet ely in our han ds and if he gav e me up to the auth orit ies it wou ld be the inev itab le end for him . Dur ing one of Suk han ov's trip s from Gat chin a to me in Len ingr ad in Jan uary 193 6 I, in Gre be's abs enc e, told him tha t I was a mem ber of a Tro tsky ist org aniz atio n and had com e to the USSR on assi gnm ent from Sedov. (29 0) Gur evic h wor ked wit h bot h the Ges tapo and the clan des tine Tro tsky ist org aniz atio n wit hin the USSR, He was also in dire ct touc h wit h Sedov. In this inte rrog atio n he doe s not exp licit ly stat e tha t Sed ov had app rov ed his coll abo rati on with the Ges tapo . But we can infe r it. Since Gur evic h's loya lty was to Tro tsky he wou ld no dou bt hav e info rme d Sedov, as wel l as his fellow Tro tsky ists , abo ut his Ges tapo coll abo rati on.

The January 1937 Trial: Piatakov, Radek, Sokol'nikov, Shestov In the Jan uary 193 7 Tria l def end ants Piat ako v, Radek, and She stov all test ifie d to hav ing bee n give n exp licit inst ruct ion s by Tro tsky him self con cern ing coll abo rati on by eith er Ger man y or Japan. We'll brie fly revi ew tha t here .

Piatakov The esp iona ge acti viti es of the Tro tsky ites on beh alf of the Ger man inte llig enc e serv ice wer e cov ered up in a number of case s by thei r con nec tion s wit h cert ain Ger man firm s. The inve stig atio n in the pre sen t case has esta blis hed tha t an agr eem ent was con clud ed betw een L. Trotsky and cert ain Ger man firm s by virt ue of whi ch thes e firm s fina nce d the Tro tsky ites from a fun d form ed by rais ing the pric e of goo ds imp orte d into the U.S.S.R. from Ger man y.

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

On this point the accuse d Pyatakov, referrin g to his conver sation with Trotsky's son, L. L. Sedov, now in emigration, testified: ... Sedov convey ed to me Trotsky's instruc tions to

try and place as many orders as possible with the firms Demag and Borsig, with whose represe ntatives Trotsky has connec tions. ''You, added Sedov, will have to pay higher prices, but this money will go for our work.'' (Vol. I, p. 227) (1937 Trial, 15-16) •••

Sedov said that only one thing was require d of me, namely, that I should place as many orders as possible with two Germa n firms, Borsig and Demag, and that he, Sedov, would arrang e to receive the necess ary sums from them, bearing in mind that I would not be particu larly exacting as to prices. If this were deciph ered it was clear that the additions to prices that would be made on the Soviet orders would pass wholly or in part into Trotsk y's hands for his counte r-revol utionar y purpos es. There the second conver sation ended. (26-27 ) ... I recall that Trotsk y said in this directive that withou t the necess ary suppor t from foreign states, a govern ment of the bloc could neither come to power nor hold power. It was therefo re a questio n of arrivin g at the necess ary prelim inary agreement with the most aggress ive foreign states, like Germany and Japan, and that he, Trotsky, on his part had already taken the necess ary steps in establishing contac ts both with the Japanese and the German govern ments. (53) ... In connec tion with the interna tional questio n Trotsk y very empha tically insiste d on the neces-

59

Trotsky's Conspiracies

60

sity of preparing diversionist cadres. He rebuked us for not engaging energetically enough in diversive, wrecking6 and terrorist activities. He told me that he had come to an absolutely definite agreement with the fascist German government and with the Japanese government that they would adopt a favourable attitude in the event of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc coming to power. But, he added, it went without saying that such a favourable attitude was not due to any particular love these governments cherished for the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. It simply proceeded from the real interests of the fascist governments and from what we had promised to do for them if we came to power. (63-64) •••

Pyatakov: Here I must first make one explanation. Trotsky again said that from this standpoint, too, from the standpoint of the negotiations he was conducting and of what he had already achieved, it was extremely important to build up an active, concrete and real force. He then told me that he had conducted rather lengthy negotiations with the Vice-Chairman of the German NationalSocialist Party - Hess. It is true I cannot say whether there is an agreement signed by him, or whether there is only an understanding, but Trotsky put it to me as though an agreement existed, one which it is true still had to be given definite shape by certain other persons, of whom I shall speak in camera. (64)

For the word "wrecking" it is best to substitute "sabotage." 'Wrecking" is a clumsy translation that makes the original sound forced. The Russian word is epeoume.11bcmeo, from Hvred'' =''harm."

6

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence •••

First, the Germa n fascists promis e to adopt a fa· vourab le attitud e toward s the Trotsky iteZinovievite bloc and to suppor t it if it comes to power, either in time of war, or before a war, should it succee d in doing so. But in return the fascists are to receive the following compe nsation : a genera l favoura ble attitud e toward s German interest and toward s the Germa n govern ment on all questio ns of interna tional policy; certain territorial conces sions would have to be made, and these territor ial conces sions have been defined - in particular, mentio n was made of territor ial conces sions in a veiled form which were called ''not resisting Ukrain ian nationa l-bourg eois forces in the event of their self-de termina tion." Vyshinsky: What does that mean?

Pyatakov: It means in a veiled form what Radek spoke about here: should the Germa ns set up their Ukrain ian govern ment, ruling the Ukrain e not throug h their Germa n Govern or-Gen eral but perhaps throug h a hetman - at any rate, should the Germa ns ''self-d etermin e'' the Ukrain e - the Trotskyist-Z inoviev ite bloc will not oppose it. Actually, this meant the beginn ing of the dismem bermen t of the Soviet Union. (64) ... Vyshinsky: And what about diversi ve acts in case of war?

Pyatakov: That was the last point ... In the event of militar y attack the destruc tive forces of the Trotsky ite organiz ations which would act within the country must be co-ord inated with the forces from withou t acting under the guidan ce of Germa n fascism. The diversi ve and sabotag e activity which

61

Trotsky's Conspiracies

62

is being conduc ted by the Trotsky ite-Zin ovievit e organiz ation within the Soviet Union must be carried out under the instruc tions of Trotsky , which are to be agreed upon with the Germa n Genera l Staff. (65)

This statem ent of Piatako v's is confirm ed in Marsha l Budenn yi's letter to Marsha l Vorosh ilov, and in Marsha l Tukhac hevsky 's confession. We have studied both docum ents in Trotsky's 'Amalgams.' 1

Radek: ... The third point that emerge d from Trotsk y s conver sation with Pyatak ov was that Germa ny demande d comple te freedom of action for the advanc e of Germa ny to the Balkan and Danube countri es. This is also a very import ant fact.

Vyshinsky (To Pyatak ov): Did you say that? Do you confirm that?

Pyatakov: Yes. Radek is relatin g it very exactly. It is all quite true. (445)

Assessing this Evidence Piatako v testifie d at length that he had person ally spoken to Trotsky and receive d letters from him concer ning the latter's agreements with both Germa ny and Japan. Likewi se Radek said that Trotsk y had discuss ed his (Trotsk y's) agreem ents with both Germany and Japan in letters to him. Getty discov ered that Trotsk y had sent letters to Radek, Sokol'n ikov, Preobr azhens ky, ''and others' ' in 1932. Shesto v said that he had receive d Trotsk y's instruc tions throug h a face-to-face talk with Sedov. Piatako v claimed Sedov had told him to order throug h Germa n firms that would ''kick back'' funds to Trotsky . Americ an engine er John Littlepa ge read this passag e in the trial transcr ipt and wrote that he found it credibl e. Littlep age claime d that in Berlin in 1931 he had learned of fraudu lent orders for useless mining equipm ent

Chapt er One. A Brief Overv iew of the Evide nce

63

being made by Russian emig res acting for Soviet companies. He said that if Piatakov had mad e such orde rs the Germ an comp anies woul d not have found it unusual, so Piatakov's story did not seem at all farfetched to him.7 The pass age belo w from Littlepage3B is also quot ed in Trotsky's 'Amalgams' Part One, Chap ter Eight. Ther e we cited it in verifying Moscow Trial testi mon y. We are citing it again here for the read er's convenience and to emph asize how Littlepage dram atically confirms Piatakov's testi mon y that Trots ky had cons pired with German firms for the purp oses of espionage and sabo tage. I was parti cular ly inter ested in that part of Piatakoff's confession which conc erne d his actions in Berli n in 1931 , when he head ed the purc hasin g commission to which I was assigned as technical adviser. It then became clear to me why the Russians roun d Piatakoff bad not been pleas ed whe n I discovered that German conc erns had subs titut ed cast- iron for light steel in specifications for mine-hoists. Piatakoff testif ied that anti-Stalin cons pirat ors, head ed by Leon Trotsky, the exiled form er Commissar of War, need ed foreign curre ncy to build up a fund for their work abro ad. Inside Russia, with so man y conspira tors occupying impo rtant positions, he said it was easy to get funds, but Soviet pape r mon ey was no good abroad. Trot sky's son, Sedoff, according to Piatakoff, there fore work ed out a sche me to get foreign curre ncy with out rous ing suspicion.

John D. Littlepage with Demar ee Bess, In Search ofSoviet Gold. New York: Harco urt, Brace & Co, 1938, pp. 102-3. According to the late Prof. John N. Hazard of Columbia University, Littlepage was an antico mmun ist but basica lly apoliti cal engine er who had no reason to lie to make the Soviet charge s "look good." As a studen t of Soviet law Hazard stayed with the Littlep age family in Moscow in the mid-1 930s. (Interv iew of Profes sor John N. Hazar d at Columbia Univer sity by Grover Furr, April 1981)

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Trotsky' s Conspiracies

64

At his trial Piatakoff testified that he met Sedoff in Berlin in 1931, by previous arrangement, in a restaurant near the Zoo. He added, ''Sedoff said that only one thing was require d of me-namely, that I should place as many orders as possible with two German firmsand that be, Sedoff, would arrange to receive the necessary sums from them, bearing in mind that I would not be particularly exacting as to prices." Questioned by the prosecutor, Piatakoff added that he was not require d to steal or divert Soviet money, but only to place as many orders as possible with the firms mentioned. He said that he made no person al contacts of any kind with these firms, but that the matter was arrang ed by others withou t any further action on his part than throwing business to them. Piatakoff testified: ''It was done very simply, particularly since I had very many opportunities and a fairly large numbe r of orders went to those firms." He added at it was easy to act withou t rousing suspicion in the case of one firm because that firm itself had a fine reputation, and it was simply a question of paying slightly higher prices than were necessary. The following testimo ny then was given at the trial: PIATAKOFF: But as regards the other firm, it was necessary to persua de and exercise pressu re in order to have purcha ses placed with this firm. PROSECUTOR: Consequently you also paid this firm excessively at the expense of the Soviet Governmen t? PIATAKOFF: Yes. Piatakoff then went on to say that Sedoff did not tell him exactly what the conditions were, what the technique was for this transfe r of money, but assure d him

Chap ter One. A Brie f Ove rview of the Evid ence

tha t if Piatakoff plac ed ord ers wit h thes e firms Se dof f wou ld receive mon ey for the special fund. This pas sag e in Pia tako ff s confession is a plau sibl e explanation, in my opin ion, of wha t was going on in Berlin in 193 1, whe n my susp icio ns wer e rou sed because the Russians wor kin g wit h Piatakoff trie d to induce me to app rov e the pur cha se of min e-ho ists which wer e not only too expensive, but wou ld hav e bee n useless in the min es for whi ch they wer e intend ed. I had fou nd it har d to believe tha t the se men wer e ord inar y graf ters , as they did not see m to be the kind inte rest ed in feat heri ng thei r own nes ts. But the y had bee n sea son ed political con spir ator s befo re the Revolution, and had take n risk s of the sam e deg ree for the sak e of thei r so-called cause. Of course, I hav e no way of kno win g whe the r the political con spir acy men tion ed in all confessions at this trial was org aniz ed as the pris one rs said it was. I nev er atte mpt ed to follow the ins and out s of political disp utes in Russia, and wou ldn 't hav e kno wn wha t anti -Go vern men t con spir ator s wer e talking abo ut if they had trie d to dra g me into thei r affairs, which non e of them eve r did. But I am abs olut ely sur e tha t som ethi ng que er was taki ng place in Berlin in 193 1 dur ing the per iod men tion ed by Piatakoff at his trial. I hav e alre ady said tha t my exp erie nce s at tha t tim e puz zled me for yea rs, and tha t I cou ldn' t wor k out any sen sibl e exp lana tion unti l I read Piat ako frs test imo ny in the Moscow new spa . . per s at the tim e of his trial. Ano ther par t of this test imo ny tha t som e Moscow jour nali sts found it har d to believe was tha t German firms wou ld give com mis sion s to Sedoff. But I hav e alread y men tion ed in an earl ier cha pter tha t Russian emigres wer e in the hab it of collecting commissions

65

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Trotsky's Conspiracies

from German firms for using their alleged influence to throw Soviet business in their direction. The manag.. ers of these German firms might consider that Sedoff was simply another Russian emigre, and would make the same kind of a deal with him that I know they had been making for years with other emigres. In such cases it was the usual procedure for German firms merely to work the promised commissions into their prices, and if the Russians accepted the prices nothing more was necessary. But in the case of these mine .. hoists the commission must have been put so high that the firm had to juggle the specifications in order to clear its profit. When they did this my attention was attracted and the deal was blocked. Piatakoff testified that he had to exert pressure to have some orders passed, and I have told how pressure was put on me. The testimony at this trial roused a great deal of scepticism abroad, and among foreign diplomats at Moscow. I talked with some Americans there who believed it was a frame-up from beginning to end. Well, I didn't attend the trial, but I did follow the evidence very closely, and it was printed verbatim in several languages. A great deal of the testimony about industrial sabotage sounded more probable to me than it did to some of the Moscow diplomats and corresponden ts. I know from my own experiences that a good deal of industrial sabotage was going on all the time in Soviet mines, and that some of it could hardly have occurred without the complicity of highly placed Communist managers. My story is valuable, so far as this trial is concerned, only as regards the incident in Berlin. I have described what that was, and how, so far as I was concerned, Piatakoff s confession cleared up what had happened.

Chapt er One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

67

In Trotsky's 'Amalgams' we discu ss Little page 's mem oir and how it conf irms the testi mon y of Piata kov and othe r defe ndan ts at the seco nd Mosc ow Trial of Janu ary 1937 conc ernin g the spec ial arrang emen ts made by Trot sky and Sedo v throu gh Piata kov with certa in Germ an firms .

Radek Radek: This was in May 1934 . In the autu mn of 1934 , at a diplo mati c recep tion, a diplo mati c repre senta tive of a Cent ral Euro pean coun try who was know n to me, sat down besid e me and start ed a conv ersat ion. He said (spea king Germ an): ''Our leade rs" (he said that more expli citly) ''kno w that Mr. Trot sky is striv ing for a rapp roch emen t with Germ any. Our lead er want s to know , what does this idea of Mr. Trots ky's signi fy? Perh aps it is the idea of an emig re who sleep s badly ? Who is behi nd these ideas ?'' It was clear that I was bein g aske d abou t the attitu de of the bloc. ... I told him that the reali st polit ician s in the U.S.S.R. unde rstan d the signi fican ce of a Germ anSovi et rapp roch emen t and are prep ared to make the nece ssary conc essio ns to achie ve this rapp roch emen t. This repre senta tive unde rstoo d that since I was spea king abou t reali st polit ician s it mean t that there were reali st polit ician s and unre alist polit ician s in the U.S.S.R.: the reali st polit ician s were the Trots kyite-Z inovi evite bloc. And he also unde rstoo d that wha t I mean t was: if the bloc come s into pow er it will make conc essio ns in orde r to bring abou t a rapp roch emen t with your gove rnme nt and the coun try whic h it repre sents . (108 -109 ) •• •

Radek: ... Seve ral mon ths later , appr oxim ately , Novem ber 1935 , at one of the regu lar diplo mati c recep tions , the milit ary repre senta tive of that coun try...

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Trotsky's Conspiracies

Th e Pr es id en t [P re sid in g officer of th e co ur t]: Do no t m en tio n hi s na m e or th e co un try . Radek: ... ap pr oa ch ed m e an d be ga n to co mp lai n ab ou t th e co m pl et e ch an ge of at m os ph er e be tw ee n th e tw o co un tri es . Af ter th e fir st fe w wo rd s he sa id th at du rin g Mr. Tr ot sk y's tim e th e re la tio ns be tw ee n th e ar m ie s of th e tw o co un tri es we re be tte r.

He w en t on to sa y th at Tr ot sk y ha d re m ai ne d tru e to hi s ol d op in io n ab ou t th e ne ed fo r So vi et- Ge rm an fri en ds hi p. Af ter sp ea ki ng in th is str ai n fo r a lit tle wh ile lo ng er he be ga n to pr es s m e ha rd as on e wh o ha d fo rm er ly pu rs ue d th e RappaloB lin e. I re pl ie d to th is by ut te rin g th e sa m e fo rm ul a wh ich I ha d ut te re d wh en I was fir st so un de d, na me ly , th at th e re al is t po lit ici an s of th e U.S.S.R. ap pr ec ia te th e sig ni fic an ce of So vi et- Ge rm an fri en ds hi p an d ar e pr ep ar ed to m ak e th e ne ce ss ar y co nc es sio ns in or de r to en su re th is fri en ds hi p. To th is he re pl ie d th at we ou gh t at la st to ge t to ge th er so m eh ow an d jo in tly di sc us s th e de tai ls, definitely, ab ou t wa ys of re ac hi ng a ra pp ro ch em en t. (4 44 ) W e ha ve pu t th e wo rd ''re ali st' ' in bo ld fa ce be ca us e th is sa m e expr es sio n wa s us ed by a Ja pa ne se ag en t in co nv er sa tio n wi th Nikolai Ustrialov. Us tri alo v re co gn ize d th at it re fe rre d to th e ''b lo c of Rights an d Tr ot sk yi tes ." W e di sc us s th is iss ue in m or e de tai l in

Trotsky's 'Amalgams'.

Radek: As re ga rd s Ja pa n, we we re to ld sh e m us t no t on ly be gi ve n Sa kh ali n oil bu t be gu ar an te ed oil in th e ev en t of a w ar wi th th e U.S.A. It wa s sta te d th at no ob sta cle s m us t be ra ise d to th e co nq ue st of Ch in a by Ja pa ne se im pe ria lis m.

8

In 192 2 Soviet Russia and Germany signed a tre aty at Rapallo tha t pro vid ed for econom ic and lat er agreed to sec ret military collaboration.

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

Vyshinsky: And as reg ard s the Danube countries? Radek: As reg ard s the Danube and Balkan countries,

Trotsky said in his lett er tha t German fascism was expan ding and we sho uld do noth ing to pre ven t this. The poi nt was, of course, to sev er any of our rela tion s wit h Czechoslovakia whi ch would have con trib uted to the defense of tha t country. (115-116) I

I

0

And, finally, afte r receiving Trotsky's directives in 1934, I sen t him the rep ly of the centre, and add ed in my own name tha t I agre ed tha t the gro und sho uld be sounded, but tha t he sho uld not bind himself, bec aus e the situ atio n might change. I suggested tha t the negotiations sho uld be con duc ted by Putna,9 who had connections wit h leading Japanese and German military circles. And Tro tsky replied: ''We shall not bin d our selves wit hou t you r knowledge, we shall mak e no de· cisions." For a who le yea r he was silent. And at the end of tha t yea r he con fron ted us wit h the accomplished fact of his agre eme nt. You will und erst and tha t it was not any virt ue on my par t tha t I rebelled aga inst this. But it is a fact for you to und erst and . (545) And, finally, whe n Pyatakov retu rne d from abro ad, he casually rem ark ed whe n speaking of the con vers atio n with Trotsky tha t Tro tsky had told him tha t cad res of people wer e being form ed who had not bee n corrup ted by the Stalin leadership. But whe n I read abo ut Olberg and ask ed oth ers whe the r they had kno wn of the existence of Olberg, and non e of them had hea rd

9

Corps Commander Vitovt Kazimirovich Putna was the Soviet military attac he to Great Britain when he was named by one or more defendants at the August 1936 Moscow Trial, whereupon he was recalled and arrested. In 1937 he confessed to conspiring with othe r military leade rs and was tried and executed in what has become known as the "Tukhachevsky Affair."

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70

about him, it became clear to me that in addition to the cadres who had passed through his school, Trotsky was organizing agents who had passed through the school of German fascism. (548)

Evaluating This Evidence: Pavliukov's Book In 2007 Russian researcher Aleksei Pavliukov published the fullest account to date of Nikolai Ezhov's career.10 This book, and Ezhov's career and conspiracies, are of great importance to any accurate understandin g of the events of the late 1930s. For our present more limited purposes it is important because Pavliukov was accorded privileged access to certain unpublished materials relating to these conspiracies from the investigative files. Among those materials were some dealing with the second Moscow Trial. Here is Pavliukov's discussion of the part of a confession by Radek dated October 20, 1936 in which Radek discusses Trotsky's relations with Germany and their significance: Radek reported that Trotsky, who had supposedly established firm contacts with German authorities, let them know that after its coming to power the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc was ready to make significant concessions in relation to Germany. This would be expressed in profitable conditions for the export of German goods to the USSR, in a reduction of prices for Soviet goods exported to Germany, in the permission of German capital to exploit the natural riches of the country, and also in several territorial concessions. (Pavliukov 236) This corresponds with what Radek testified during the January 1937 Moscow Trial. Had the pretrial investigation materials to which Pavliukov was made privy, but which were never intended

10

Aleksei Pavliukov, Ezhov. Biografia. Moscow: Zakharov, 2007.

Cha pter One. A Brie f Ove rview of the Evidence

71

to be mad e public, failed to con firm the tria l test imo ny, we wou ld have reas on to dou bt tha t test imo ny and sus pec t som e ''stagemanaging'' at the trial. But her e the opp osit e is the case, as it confirms Radek's tria l test imo ny. The exis tenc e of suc h pre tria l investigative mat eria l, alon g wit h the confessions dur ing trial, arg ues aga inst any claim tha t the Tria l was ''stage-managed." In the following pas sag e Pavliukov quo tes som e wor ds of Radek's directly:

In the eve nt of war betw een Germany and the Sov iet Union upo n which, acc ord ing to Radek's wor ds, Tro tsky laid gre at hop es, ''the Tro tsky ist com man der s could eve n use cert ain indi vidu al defe ats in batt le as pro of of the sup pos edly inco rrec t policy of the Central Committee of the AUCP(b) and in gen eral of the sen seless nes s and ruin ous natu re of the given war ... Using suc h failures and the exh aus tion of the Red Army soldiers, they mig ht eve n call upo n them to aba ndo n the fron t and turn thei r wea pon s aga inst the gov ernm ent. Tha t mig ht give the Ger man Army the pos sibi lity of occupying the aba ndo ned area s and crea te a real thre at of a cru shin g def eat of the who le front." Und er thes e con diti ons the con spir ator s, relying upo n tho se par ts of the Arm y com man ded by the Tro tsky ist com man ders , mig ht obt ain a real chance to carr y out a seiz ure of pow er in the cou ntry . (Pavliukov, 236 -7) This pas sag e is con gru ent wit h the test imo ny of som e of the military figures who asse rted tha t they wer e in coll abo rati on wit h bot h Tro tsky and the Germans. We will exa min e tha t test imo ny below. It is also bro adly con sist ent wit h wha t Piat ako v test ifie d at the Jan uary 193 7 tria l (see abo ve). Pavliukov also sum mar izes a con fess ion of Radek's in the arch ives - date d two days late r, Dec emb er 22, 193 6 - tha t con cern s Tro tsky:

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The ul tim ate completion of the sto ry wi th Trotsky's se llo ut of his fo rm er co un try oc cu rre d in Radek's con .. fession of December 22, 1936. ''As it tu rn ed out, th e su pp os ed m ee tin g be tw ee n Pyatakov an d Tr ot sk y in Norway wa s ca us ed by th e necessity to discuss a le tte r th at ha d be en received th e evening be fo re from Trotsky, in which th e la tte r se t forth his pl an s on th e questions of th e activity of th e Trotskyist-Zinovievist bloc on foreign m at te rs . 1 '

This letter, according to Radek, po in te d ou t th e desirability of th e se izu re of po we r even be fo re th e st ar t of th e im pe nd in g wa r, an d for this it wo ul d be essential to activate te rro ris t activity ag ain st th e le ad er s of th e Soviet government. For th e normalization of re lat io ns with Germany it wa s co ns id er ed ex pe di en t to agree to pe rm it Germany to take pa rt in th e exploitation of ar eas of useful or es on th e te rri to ry of th e USSR an d to gu ar an te e th e provision of foodstuffs and fats at less th an wo rld prices. As for Japan, th e le tte r su pp os ed ly sa id th at it wo ul d be ne ce ss ar y to give it access to Sakhalin oil, an d to gu ar an te e additional access to oil in th e ev en t of w ar wi th America, an d also to pe rm it it access to th e exploitation of Soviet gold-producing areas. Besides th at it followed th at th ey ou gh t no t to hi nd er th e German se izu re of th e Danubian an d Balkan co un tri es an d no t to in ter fe re with Japan's se izu re of China. If th ey did no t su cc ee d in taking po we r before th e wa r th is goal m ig ht be attainable, in Trotsky's opinion (in Rade k's exposition), as a re su lt of a military de fe at of th e USSR, for which it wa s essential to energetically pr ep ar e. Active sa bo tag e activities before an d du rin g th e w ar would, be sid es we ak en in g th e defensive potential of th e Soviet Union, de m on str at e th e real str en gt h of th e Trotskyist-Zinovievist bloc an d facilita te po stw ar negotiations with Germany, which wa s

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

73

not of small import ance, since in the event the conspirato rs came to power as a result of a crushin g de .. feat of the USSR, it would not be possibl e to manag e with the conces sions of peaceti me. In that case they would have to yield to the Germa ns obligat ions for the purcha se of Germa n goods for a long period of time, etc. In order that this scheme , attribu ted to the professional revolut ionary Trotsky , would not look altogether too clumsy, Radek supplie d it with argume nts that Trotsk y suppos edly relied upon in develo ping all these defeati st plans. Afterw ards, as a result of the strengt hening of Germa ny and Japan (althou gh at the expens e of the USSR), would begin the unavoi dable war betwee n the imperi alist powers , as it was supposedly set forth in Trotsk y's letter, it could be possible to go once again on the counter -offens ive, since the conseq uences of this war would facilitate the reappearan ce in the world of a new revolut ionary situation. This is the messag e suppos edly receive d by Radek at the end of 1935 that stimula ted Pyatak ov to set out as soon as he could to consul t with Trotsk y in person . Radek confirm ed Pyatak ov's confess ions about this meetin g and filled them out with new details that Pyatak ov had suppos edly shared with him after his return to Moscow. It turned out that Trotsk y had promised the Germa ns that during war betwee n Germa ny and the USSR the Trotsk yist comma nders at the front would act accord ing to the direct orders of the German Genera l Staff, and after the war the new govern ment would compe nsate Germa ny for part of its military expens es by paying with goods that were essential for its militar y industr ies.

Radek stated that Trotsk y was also negotia ting with Britain and France - still Pavliukov:

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Tr ots ky 's Conspiracies

At th e sa m e tim e Tr ot sk y str ov e to av oi d to o gr ea t a de pe nd en ce on Ge rm an y an d Ja pa n an d wa s su pp os ed ly ca rry in g on ne go tia tio ns wi th th e En gl ish an d Fr en ch too. As a re su lt of th e m ee tin gs th at ha d ta ke n pl ac e wi th re pr es en ta tiv es of Ge rm an y, En gl an d an d Fr an ce an ag re em en t ha d be en dr af te d th at fo re sa w th at , in th e ev en t th e Tr ot sk yi sts ca m e to po we r, England an d Fr an ce wo ul d also no t lo se by it, to wh ic h Ge rm an y gr ac io us ly ac ce de d. Th e Fr en ch we re pr om ise d a be ne vo le nt re ga rd to th ei r at te m pt s to ob ta in th e re tu rn of th ei r pr er ev ol ut io na ry de bt s to Ru ss ia an d th ei r pr et en sio ns to th e me tal lu rg ica l in du str y of th e Do nb as , an d th e En gl ish - co ns id er at io n of th ei r in te re sts in th e Ca uc as us . In hi s on e pr et ria l in te rro ga tio n pu bl ish ed in Pi l T2 So ko l'n ik ov gi ve s de tai ls ab ou t hi s ne go tia tio ns on th e bl oc 's be ha lf wi th re pre se nt at iv es of Br ita in an d Fr an ce . W e wi ll di sc us s th is in te rro ga tio n in vo lu m e th re e. Ra de k co nc lu de d: Af ter th e wa r, in ac co rd an ce wi th th e pl an s at tri bu te d to Tr ot sk y, th er e wo ul d be es tab lis he d in th e So vi et Un io n th e sa m e ki nd of so cia l . . ec on om ic sy ste m as in th e ot he r co un tri es of Eu ro pe an d, of co ur se , th e Co mi nt er n wo ul d be di sb an de d. (P av liu ko v 23 9- 24 0) Th is fully co rre sp on ds wi th so m e re ce nt ly -d ec las sif ied tex ts fro m th e fo rm er NKVD ar ch iv e in M os co w th at co nf irm an d give m or e de tai l ab ou t th es e m at te rs .

Pavliukov and the 1937 Trial Transcript Compared Th is su m m ar y of Ra de k's co nf es sio n of De ce m be r 22, 19 36 , is co nsis te nt wi th Ra de k's te sti m on y at th e Ja nu ar y 19 37 tri al. Vy sh in sk ii re ad a br ie f qu ot at io n fro m th is ve ry co nf es sio n in hi s op en in g sta te m en t at th e tri al:

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

75

For example, the accused Radek, confirming Pyatakov's testimony, testified during examination on December 22, 1936, that one of the points of the agreement reached between Trotsky and the representatives of the German National-Soci alist Party was the obligation ... ''... during Germany's war against the U.S.S.R.... to adopt a defeatist position, to intensify diversive activities, particularly in enterprises of military importance ... to act on Trotsky's instructions agreed upon with the German General Staff." (Vol. V, p. 152) (1937 Trial, 10-11) Pavliukov's summary of Radek's confession also contains some details that did not come out at the trial. For instance, according to the published trial transcript Radek did not accuse Trotsky during the Trial of planning to accommodate the powerful imperialist countries by dissolving or banishing the Comintern.

In this unpublished confession Radek stresses that ''Trotskyist military commanders' ' would be working directly with the German general staff to take advantage of defeat in war with Germany. According to the transcript Radek said nothing about this at the trial. It is, however, confirmed in Marshal Budennyi's letter to Marshal Voroshilov concerning the trial of Tukhachevsk y and other military commanders. We have studied this letter in Trotsky's 'Amalgams' and published the text in the documentary appendix to that book.

Shestov Aleksei Aleksandrovi ch Shestov was to be a major defendant in the second Moscow Trial of January 1937. Shestov was a mining engineer and former Party member who had been expelled as a Trotskyist. The following passages are from Shestov's trial testimony:

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Trotsky's Conspiracies

D ur in g m y m ee tin g w ith Se do v I as ke d hi m w ha t ou r le ad er , Tr ot sk y, th ou gh t, w ha t w er e th e sp ec ifi c ta sk s he pl ac ed be fo re us Tr ot sk yi te s. Se do v be ga n by sa yin g th at it w as no us e si tti ng and w hi st lin g fo r fa ir w ea th er ; w e m us t pr oc ee d w ith all fo rc es an d m ea ns at ou r di sp os al to an ac tiv e po lic y of di sc re di tin g St a· lin's le ad er sh ip an d St al in 's policy. Fu rth er , Se do v sa id th at hi s fa th er he ld th at th e on ly co rr ec t w ay , a di ffi cu lt on e bu t a su re on e, w as fo rc ib ly to re m ov e St al in an d th e le ad er s of th e go ve rn m en t by m ea ns of te rr or is m .. .. Se ei ng th at I w as be in g in flu en ce d by hi s w or ds , he sw itc he d th e co nv er sa tio n to a ne w su bj ec t. He as ke d me w he th er I kn ew any of th e di re ct or s of G er m an firms, D eh lm an n in pa rti cu la r. I to ld hi m th at I re m em be re d su ch a na m e, th at he w as a di re ct or of th e firm of Fr oh lic h- K lil pf el -D eh lm an n. Th is fir m w as re n· de rin g te ch ni ca l as si st an ce , un de r a co nt ra ct , in si nk in g m in es in th e Kuzbas. Se do v ad vi se d m e to ge t in to uc h w ith th at fir m an d m ak e th e ac qu ai nt an ce of H er r D eh lm an n. I as ke d hi m w hy I sh ou ld ge t in to uc h w ith him. He sa id th at th is fir m w as of he lp in se nd in g m ai l to th e So vi et Union. I th en sa id : ''Are yo u ad vi si ng m e to m ak e a de al w ith th e firm?'' He sa id : ''W ha t's te rr ib le ab ou t th at ? You m us t un de rs ta nd th at if th ey ar e do in g us a fa vo ur w hy sh ou ld no t w e do th em a fa vo ur an d fu rn is h th em w ith ce rta in in fo rm at io n. " •••

I sa id : ''You ar e si m pl y pr op os in g th at I sh ou ld be co m e a spy." He sh ru gg ed hi s sh ou ld er s an d sa id : ''I t is ab su rd to us e w or ds like th at . In a fig ht it is un re as on ab le to be as sq ue am is h as th at.. .." I m et Sm irn ov ab ou t th e m id dl e of July an d he as ke d m e bluntly:

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

77

''Well, how is your mood?'' I told him that I had no personal mood, but I did as our leader Trotsk y taught us stand at attenti on and wait for orders .... I detaine d him and asked: ''But Ivan Nikitich, Sedov ordere d me to establish connec tions with the firm of FrohlichKliipfel-Dehlmann ... that was engaged in espion age and diversive work in the Kuzbas. In that case, I said, 'I will be a spy and a diversionist."' To this he replied: ''Stop slinging big words like 'spy' and 'divers ionist' about. I I." He said: ''What do you find terrible in enlisting German diversionists for this work? ..." He insisted that there was no other way. After this conversation I consen ted to establish connection with this firm. (235-2 36) Here Shestov is very explicit that Sedov and l.N. Smirnov, who headed the clandestine Trotsk yist organization within the USSR and was one of the major defend ants at the first Moscow Trial of August 1936, wanted him to collaborate with German firms.

Pretrial Interrogation of Shestov We now have two pretria l interro gations of Shestov, from October 14 and October 16, 1936. (PiLT2 239-33 9; 339-34 9) In his pretria l confessions Shestov explained how Trotsk y was connec ted to German firms throug h his son Leon Sedov. Q: With which German firms did you deal? A: ''Siemens-Schuckert," ''AEG," ''Freilich-KliipfelDeilman," ''Borsig." Q: And with which firms did you have contac t in your counte rrevolu tionary espionage work?

A: Only with the firm ''Freilich-Kliipfel-Deilman." ... I categorically assert that I was in contac t only with ''Freilich-Kliipfel-Deilman'' with which I was in contact, as I have already confessed, by direct orders from Sedov and Smirnov.

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Tr ot sk y's Conspiracies

Q: ... L. Sedov an d I. Smirnov explained to yo u th e ne-

cessity of establishing co nt ac t in yo ur w or k w it h German agents. You co nt ac te d th e Deilman firm. You travelled to Essen especially for a meeting w it h them. Is th at correct? A: Right. •• •

Q: Did this m ee ti ng take place al re ad y after yo u have spoken w it h Sedov an d Smirnov?

A: Yes, I ha d al re ad y re ce iv ed Sedov's an d Smirnov's as si gn m en t to co nt ac t this firm. Q: W ha t did yo u ta lk ab ou t w it h Deilman an d Koch?

A: There w er e no talks ab ou t espionage w or k..We only ar ra ng ed m y m ee ti ng in Essen. We ag re ed on th e da y I would fly in. On th e advice of Deilman an d Koch I w as to st ay at a hotel ne xt to th e bu ild in g of th e technical office of th e firm. Q: Give a detailed ac co un t of this meeting.

A: At th e en d of June or th e beginning of July on th e da y w e ha d ag re ed I ar ri ve d in Essen an d checked in at th e hotel indicated to me by Deilman. On the second day, du ri ng th e daytime, Deilman, Koch,

and the di re ct or of th e Essen technical office (I do no t re m em be r his name) came to see me. We ha d a business meeting, ar ra ng ed th at I would in sp ec t 3-4 mines an d a factory in W up pe rt al , an d in the evening I would go to see th em in th e technical office to familiarize myself w it h th e pl an of the Shcheglovsk mine th at th e firm had developed.

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

In the evenin g I went to the office. After I had been introduc ed to the plan for the Shcheglovsk mine I began a conver sation concer ning Sedov's assignm ent.

Q: How did you pose this questio n? A: I asked them whethe r they knew Sedov and re .. ceived an affirma tive answer . I asked them whethe r there had been any instruc tions from him to discuss some questio ns with me. They answer ed in the affirmative and Deilman, smiling, stated: ''To speak plainly, we know each other, and let's get straigh t to the busines s.'' The essence of the conver sation: the firm is interes ted in econom ic inform ation, the perspe ctives and the factual plan for the develo pment of coal, chemicals, and metallu rgy in the Kuzbas. The firm has its own man, Stroilov, in Novosibirsk. He knows their men in the Kuzbas. According to the wishes of our organiz ation we can use their men to organiz e sabotag e (divers ionnykh aktov). The firm can increas e the quality and quantit y of its people as needed . To my questio n about how the firm will repay our organizat ion for the econom ic inform ation Deilman said, and Koch transla ted, that: 1. Their people will work to carry out such tasks as our organiz ation gives them. They know about the tasks of our organiz ation from Mr. Lev Sedov, who is a great friend of theirs. Their people will act in the most determ ined manne r. 2. The firm assume s the respon sibility of mainta ining the contac t of our organiz ation with our foreign bureau by the avenue s we know about. We can mainta in the same contac t in Siberia; the means of contac t throug h Stroilov and their people, when they travel on any occasio n out of the USSR and back.

79

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Here Deilman told me that any lette r addr esse d to him with the note on it ''for my boss'' woul d be infallibly pass ed on to Sedov. As a resu lt of our exch ange of views we arriv ed at the conclusion: First: when ever nece ssary lette rs from Siberia to Se . . dov woul d be addr essed to Deilman with the note ''give to my boss." Second: Stroilov woul d conc entra te all diver sioni st (sabo tage) and espio nage work in his hand s, since he woul d be work ing in the mana geme nt of Kuzbasstroi. He know s the German language well and peop le from Germany will go to him. Third: The Trot skyis t orga nizat ion will coop erate with the Germans in their diver sioni st (sabotage) work . Fourth: Ther e is no doub t that once the Trot skyis t organization has attai ned pow er it will not forge t Deilman and will give to it a new orde r for the plann ing of new mine s and for carry ing the plan out. (331 -332 ) •••

333 I aske d Deilman whet her his peop le were relia ble enou gh and whe ther they woul d give us up if they were caught. Deilman answ ered me: ''We Germ ans are the kind of peop le that will die with out sayin g a word abou t the fact that they are spies and are work ing with Trotskyists." ... I assu red Deilman that when the Trots kyist s came to pow er the inter ests of their firm will certa inly not be forgotten.

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

Q: ... You have yourself confessed that the Trotskyist organization needed money. A: I repeat that I personally did not take any money from the German firms, but I must admit that if Sedov and Smirnov had given me such an assignment I would have certainly carried it out.

Q: Did you interest yourself in the sources of money received by the Trotskyists abroad? A: Unquestionably the Trotskyist organization abroad needed money. But it was not appropriate for me to ask Sedov, Smirnov, or Piatakov where the money was obtained. I can tell the investigation about one incident that may disclose one of the sources that the Trotskyist organization abroad used to obtain money. From talks in Berlin with individual comrades: with Zubkov of Soiuzugol', Don bass; with Nedrasov of Soiuzzoloto, with an engineer from Solikamsk who was working under the command of the leadership of Glavkhim whose name I don't remember but whose face I recognize well, I found out that German firms such as ''Borsig'' and ''Demag'' for some reason enjoyed special protection by Piatakov...

Q: After the meeting in Essen did you meet with Deilman and Koch again in Germany?

334 A: No, I didn't. I have already confessed that after returning from England, besides my meeting with Sedov in Berlin and receiving letters from him for Piatakov and Muralov I had no more meetings with Deilman and the Trotskyists.

81

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Trotsky's Conspiracies

Q: W he n yo u ga ve to Pia tak ov in Mo sco w the let ter s fro m Sedov did yo u sp ea k wi th him ab ou t the ass ign me nts of De ilm an an d Koch?

A: No, I did n't. •• •

338 Q: Have yo u co nfe sse d ev ery thi ng ab ou t the us e of Ge rm an sp ec ial ist s for co un ter rev olu tio na ry wo rk?

A: No, no t ev ery thi ng . I us ed Flo ren for sen din g inf orma tio n of the Sib eri an ce nte r to Se do v an d rec eiv ing ins tru cti on s fro m him. Th is wa s in 19 32 wh en Flo ren wa s wo rki ng in Pr ok op 'ev sk .

Q: Ho w did yo u do thi s? A: Du rin g the winter, at the en d of 19 32 , knowing ab ou t Flo ren 's im pe nd ing tri p to Ge rm an y on ho lid ay , I pro po sed to Mu ral ov to us e this oc ca sio n to se nd infor ma tio n to Lev Se do v .... He ag ree d to the sen din g of a let ter to Se do v via Flo ren an d off ere d to ret ur n in a few da ys wi th the let ter .... In thi s sam e let ter Mura lov ask ed Se do v for ins tru cti on s on ou r po sit ion du rin g wa r wi th ca pit ali st co un tri es an d in pa rti cu lar wi th Ge rm an y .... 33 9

Flo ren we nt to Ge rm an y du rin g the wi nte r at the en d of 19 32 . He ca rri ed ou t my ass ign me nt an d wh en he ret ur ne d in the sp rin g of the sam e ye ar he br ou gh t a rep ly fro m Se do v to Mu ral ov . I ga ve thi s let ter to Mural ov in the sp rin g of 19 33 .

Q: Do yo u kn ow the co nte nts of thi s an sw er of Sedo v's ?

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

83

A: Muralov decode d the letter himself. He told me as follows: The center abroad is satisfied with the Siberian Trotsk yist work. The Trotsky ists abroad have had successes. Contacts with socialist groups are being es .. tablished. There has been success in breakin g off from foreign companies, especially French ones, separa te groups that are now workin g under Trotsk y's direction. We need to carry out work in the Kuzbass along the same lines as this. On the questio n of the positio n of the Trotsk yist organiz ation during the period of a war betwee n the Soviet Union and Germany, Sedov instructe d Muralov that we must unconditionally take a defeati st position.

Stroilov Mikhail Stepanovich Stroilov was a mining engine er who had been recruit ed by the Germans to do espionage work in the Kuzbass mining area. Stroilov was also a defend ant in the Januar y 1937 Moscow Trial. Stroilov was not a Trotskyist. Theref ore in his testimony at trial Stroilov did not connec t Trotsk y or Sedov directly with Germans or Germany. We do have two pretria l confessions of Stroilov's, dated October 16 and October 20, 1936. (PiLT2 349-360; 360-36 5) In them he relates how he worked with Trotsk yists and Germans. Q: Does that mean that the Trotsky ists contac ted you on their own initiative?

A: Not entirel y on their own initiative. In the ensuin g talks with the Trotsk yists I discove red that they had a parallel line of contac t directly with the Germans. Q: Tell us how the Trotsk yists establi shed contac t with you concer ning subver sive work.

A: Until my busine ss trip abroad I had only a weak understan ding of Trotskyists. From newspa pers I knew of the existence of various opposition groups and

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kn ew ab ou t Tr ots ky 's exile abroad, bu t I ha d no pa rticular int ere st in the se ma tte rs. Once I wa s ab ro ad I un de rst oo d from talks with the Germans tha t the Tr ots ky ist s we re ca rry ing ou t co un ter rev olu tio na ry wo rk in the USSR an d tha t the Germans reg ard ed thi s wo rk sy mp ath eti ca lly.

351 ... Shestov inf orm ed me tha t the Tr ots ky ist organization se t its elf the tas k of de str uc tio n in the Kuzbass in or de r to ret ard its development.

353 ... So mm ere ge r pr op os ed tha t I pu t Shebesto in contac t wi th the Tr ots ky ist Shestov, wh o would be obliged to ren de r practical ass ist an ce to the German sab ote urs on the spot. Stroilov's tes tim on y co rro bo rat es Shestov's in confirming tha t the Trotskyists wo rke d closely wi th the Germans.

Andreev Vladimir Mikhailovich An dre ev wa s a young mining en gin ee r wh o wa s rec rui ted to a fascist org an iza tio n while wo rki ng in the Kuzbass. He wa s no t a de fen da nt in an y of the Moscow Trials. We have tw o int err og ati on s of him da ted October 5 an d 21, 19 36 . (PiLT2, 368-373; 37 3-3 80 ) Andreev testified ab ou t the co nn ec tio n be tw ee n the Tr ots ky ist s an d the pro-German fascist gro up of which he wa s a me mb er. He ha d be en rec rui ted to thi s gro up by a ce rta in Pe sh ek ho no v (no first na me or pa tro ny mi c is given in this source). Pe sh ek ho no v ha d

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

85

been involved in the Shakhty conspiracy some years earlier and was an avid fascist.it Andreev testified about three members of the fascist group he was in, who turned out to be Trotskyists.

Q: What did Peshekhonov tell you about them?

A: He said that it would be harder now for us to do our work since our counterrevolutionary group had been dealt a serious blow. I asked: What blow? Peshekhonov replied that during my vacation Noskov and Shubin were no longer among the participants of our group, and Kurov had to temporarily stop any practical involvement in counterrevolutionary work since he was also under threat. I was astonished at hear-

ing these names: Noskov, Shubin, and Kurov I knew as members of the Party. I said to Peshek-

honov: ''But aren't they communists?'' Peshek· honov answered me: ''They are not communists, but Trotskyists. Communists and Trotskyists are as different from one another as day is from night." I still did not really understand Peshekhonov and asked him to explain. Then Peshekhonov told me that the Trotskyists in our organization play an especially active role. In their hostility and revenge against the Party they stop at nothing and are in contact with our organization through Stroilov and carry out together with us active work against the Party and construction in the country. Then he told me that during my vacation (I was on vacation from the beginning of June until the end of August) the Trotskyist activities of Noskov and Shubin

11

An engineer named Peshekhonov ls mentioned in the published materials of the Shakhty affair. See Shakhtinskii protsess 1928 g. Podgotovka, provedenfe, ltogi. Kn. 1. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2011, 400, 407, 408.

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ha d be en di sc ov er ed . Both ha d be en ex pe lle d from th e Pa rt y an d re m ov ed from w or k. Kurov w as al so th re at en ed an d for se lf.. pr ot ec ti on ha d to te m po ra ri ly w it hdr aw fr om ac tiv e co un te rr ev ol ut io na ry w or k. B ut Pe sh ek ho no v w ar ne d m e th at th is w as ju st a te m po ra ry in te rr up ti on ca us ed by th e Moscow Trial of th e T ro ts ky is t- Z in ov ie vi st ce nt er . Now th e T ro ts ky is ts , as Pe sh ek ho no v said, w ou ld co m e to us ev en m or e hostile an d m or e actively. T he re fo re w e ha d to ho ld to ou r co ur se of re ly in g on th em especially fo r at tr ac ti ng to our w or k.

37 9 Q: Do you ad m it th at in ca rr yi ng ou t yo ur co un te rre vo lu ti on ar y ta sk s in co nj un ct io n w it h th e fascists an d T ro ts ky is ts , in th e m et ho d of ca rr yi ng th em ou t yo u st op pe d at no th in g, in cl ud in g se nd in g w or ke rs to th ei r de at hs an d pu tt in g w ho le m in e sh af ts in da ng er of be in g bl ow n up ? A: Yes, I am co m pe ll ed to ad m it this.

Q: Was th e ex pl os io n of Se pt em be r 23, as a re su lt of w hi ch 9 m in er s w er e killed an d 15 w er e se ri ou sl y injured, th e w or k of yo ur fa sc is t- T ro ts ky is t gr ou p? A: Yes, it 's tr ue , Se pt em be r 23 w as th e w or k of ou r fa sc is t- T ro ts ky is t gr ou p.

Archival Documents and the 1937 Trial Transcript: Sokol'nikov and R ad ek Concerning Trotsky's Relations with Japan and G er m an y Sokol'nikov In th e co ur se of his in di ct m en t at th e st ar t of th e 19 37 Trial Soviet Pr os ec ut or A nd re i Vyshinskii sa id th at in pr et ri al co nf es si on s

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

87

Sokol'nikov had testifie d that a foreign diplom at had inform ed him of Trotsky's contac t with his country: The accused Sokolnikov also admitt ed that, taking advantage of his positio n as Assista nt People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, he, on L.D. Trotsky s instruc tions, carried on secret negotia tions with represe ntative s of a certain foreign state. 1

The accused Sokolnikov testified: ''At the conclusion of an official conver sation held in my office, when Mr. --- and the secreta ry of the embass y were about to leave, Mr. --- stoppe d awhile. ''At that time both interpr eters had already left my office. Taking advant age of this opport unity, Mr. --, while I escorte d him to the door, exchanged a few sentenc es with me. Mr. --- asked me: 'Are you aware that Mr. Trotsky has made certain propos als to my govern ment?' ''I replied: 'Yes, I have been informed of this.' ''Mr. --- asked: 'How do you apprais e these proposals?' ''I replied: 'I think the propos als are quite serious .' ''Then Mr. --- asked: 'Is this only your person al opinion?' ''I replied: 'No, this is also the opinion of my friends."'

(Vol. VIII, pp. 235, 236) (1937 Trial, 9) To this day not one of the many volumes of the prelim inary investigative materia ls of this, of the other two Moscow Trials, and of

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many othe r such proc eedin gs, has ever been open ed to resea rchers. But the inves tigat ive mate rials perta ining to this parti cular passa ge were publ ished in 1989 and again in 1991 in a volu me on the ''rehabilitationJ' proc ess. Its cont ent is impo rtant for our purp oses. First, beca use it show s that these many volu mes of preli mina ry inves tigat ion mate rials do exist (or did in 1989 ). Second, beca use this passage, quot ed from those preli mina ry mate rials , show clearly that the coun try in question was Japan . . . . to the file was assoc iated a copy of note s of a talk betw een G. la. Sokol'nikov, who was at that time the vice .. comm issar of Foreign Affairs, with the Japa nese amb assad or Ota of April 13, 1935 , on the ques tion of the petro leum , fishing, and anth racit e conc essio ns on Sakhalin [Island]. At the preli mina ry inves tigat ion and at the trial G. la. Sokol'nikov conf irme d the fact of this talk and state d that after the talk he supp osed ly had a shor t conv ersat ion with Ota on the subje ct of L.D. Trots ky's prop osals to the Japa nese gove rnme nt. The conte nts of the conv ersat ion, as it is refle cted in the trans cript of the inter roga tion of G. Ia. Sokol'nikov of Dece mber 12, 1936 , was as follows: Soko l'niko v: ... when Ota and the secre tary of the em-

bass y were abou t to leave, Ota stopp ed awhile. At that time both inter prete rs had alrea dy left my office. Taking adva ntage of this oppo rtuni ty Ota, whil e I esco rted him to the door, exch ange d a few sente nces with me. Question: Please repro duce your conv ersat ion with Ota word for word , as far as possible.

Answer.· Ota aske d me: ''Are you awar e that Mr. Trot. . sky has mad e certa in prop osals to my gove rnme nt?'' I replied: ''Yes, I have been infor med of this." Ota asked: ''How do you appr aise these proposals?'' I replied: ''I think the prop osals are quite serious." Then Ota

Chapter One. A Brief Overvie w of the Evidence

89

asked: ''Is this only your person al opinion ?'' I replied : ''No, this is also the opinion of my friends." On this point our conver sation ended.

Question: Did Ota return to the questio n of contac t between the bloc and the Japane se govern ment after that?

Answer: No. This conver sation with Ota took place at the very end of my negotia tions with him. Shortly after that I stoppe d workin g in the NKVD and did not meet with Ota again.12 We will discuss Sokol'n ikov's talk with Japane se ambas sador Tamek ichi Ota in the next chapter . If Sokol'n ikov had been forced to fabrica te his testimo ny here, includi ng the details of person and country , it's difficult to conceiv e of any reason he would have then been admon ished to omit these details at trial. It's precise ly these details, confine d only to his pretria l testimo ny, that strongl y suggest the statem ent was not a fabrica tion. The details in this pretria l testimo ny were never intend ed by the prosec ution to see the light of day. The text of this part of Sokol'n ikov's confess ion is strong corrob orative eviden ce that both it and his testimo ny at the Moscow trial are truthfu l.

Confirmation of Trotsky's Contact with Japanese In his ''Statem ent'' to Ezhov of Decem ber 19-20, 1936, made public in 2015, lurii Piatako v mentio ns Japane se ambass ador Ota's contact with Sokol'nikov: Also, Sokol'n ikov told me that he had a talk with the Japane se, with Ota, I think, from which it was also clear that Trotsk y was carryin g on negotia tions with

12

Reabilitatsiia. Politicheskie Protsessy 30-50-x godov. Moscow: lzdatel'stv o Politicheskoi

Literatury , 2001, pp. 228-9. Originally published in lzvestiia TsK KPSS No. 9 (1989), p. 45.

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re pr es en ta tiv es of th e Ja pa ne se go ve rn m en t. (LD 257)13

Piatakov m ad e th is re m ar k in passing, wi th ou t an y emphasis. Sokol'nikov m us t ha ve told him ab ou t th is incident. It confirms Sokol'nikov's claim th at Tr ot sk y ha d be en co ns pi rin g wi th th e Japanese. We will ex am in e ot he r evidence of Tr ot sk y's co ns pi rin g wi th th e Ja pa ne se wh en we stu dy Serov's re po rt to th e Molotov Commission.

Radek The te xt of Radek's sim ila r sta te m en t at a pr el im in ar y investigation ha s no t be en pu bl ish ed , th ou gh it is briefly su m m ar iz ed on p. 22 9 in th e Reabilitatsia volume, rig ht af te r th e qu ot at io n from Sokol'nikov we 've ju st re vi ew ed . But a ve rs io n of th at te xt wa s repr in te d in a 20 04 vo lu m e of NKVD m ate ria ls se nt to Stalin. It occu rs in a pa rt of th e dr af t of Vyshinskii's op en in g sta te m en t at th e 19 37 Tria}.14 Th ou gh ex pu rg at ed to re m ov e th e na m es of th e Germ an figures id en tif ied in th e original in te rro ga tio n (w hi ch is still se cr et) th e na m e of th e go ve rn m en t - Germany, in th is ca se - wa s left in th e draft, wh ile it wa s om itt ed in th e Trial tra ns cr ip t (1937 Trial, 7- 9) . In th e following section:

* th e

pa ss ag es th at ar e co m m on to bo th ve rs io ns of Vyshinsky's re m ar ks ar e in no rm al type. * th os e pa ss ag es th at ar e only in th e pr et ria l dr af t of Vyshinsky's re m ar ks pu bl ish ed in 2004, bu t ar e no t in th e Trial tra ns cr ip t, ar e in italics. *t he pa ss ag es th at ar e only in the Trial tra ns cr ip t ar e in bold.

13

I have pu t this doc um ent online. See the note at the hea d of the Bibliography.

1•

Lubianka 1937-1938, 11-12.

Chap ter One. A Brie f Ove rview of the Evidence

91

The mos t imp orta nt resu lt of this text ual analysis is this: the dra ft vers ion pub lish ed in 200 4 con tain s mor e specific refe ren ces to Germany and Japan, to German individuals, and to an outl ine of Tro tsky 's pur por ted agr eem ents wit h them. As testified by the acc use d Pyatakov, L. Trotsky, in his con vers atio n wit h the acc use d in Dec emb er 193 5, info rme d him tha t as a resu lt of thes e neg otia tion s he had con clud ed an agr eem ent wit h the said leader of the National-Socialist Party HESS on the following term s: ''1) to gua ran tee a gen eral ly favourable atti tud e towar ds the Ger man gov ern men t and the nec essa ry collabo rati on wit h it in the mos t imp orta nt que stio ns of an inte rnat iona l cha ract er; ''2) to agr ee to terr itor ial concessions; ''3) to per mit Ger man industrialists, in the form of concessions (or som e oth er forms), to exploit ente rpris es in the U.S.S.R. whi ch are esse ntia l as com plemen ts to German eco nom y (iron ore, man gan ese, oil, gold, tim ber, etc., wer e mea nt); ''4) to crea te in the U.S.S.R. favourable con diti ons for the activities of Ger man priv ate ente rpri ses; ''5) in time of war to develop extensive diversive activities in enterprises of the war industry and at the

front. These diversive activities are to be carried on under Trotsky's instructions, agreed upon with the German General Sta ff These prin cipl es of the agre eme nt, as Tro tsky rela ted, wer e finally elab ora ted and ado pted dur ing Tro tsky 's mee ting wit h Hitl er's dep uty, Hess.

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Likewise, sa id T ro ts k y , h e h ad w el l .. es ta b li sh ed co n n ec ti o n s w it h th e Japanese g o v er n m en t. (Vol. I, pp . 267, 2 6 8 ) T h e n at u re o f th is ag re em en t an d th e ex te n t o f th e te rri to ri al co n ce ss io n s p ro p o se d w er e co m m u n ic at ed b y L. T ro ts k y in h is le tt er to th e ac cu se d R ad ek in Dece m b er 1 9 3 5 . •

0

I

On th is p o in t th e ac cu se d Radek, d u ri n g ex am in at io n o n D ec em b er 4, 1 9 3 6 , te st if ie d : ''.. . T ro ts k y 's as se rt io n ab o u t h is co m m u n ic at io n w it h th e re p re se n ta ti v es o f th e --- g o v er n m en t w as n o t id le talk. I w as ab le to co n v in ce m y se lf o f th is fr o m co n v er sa ti o n s I h ad h ad a t d ip lo m at ic re ce p ti o n s in 1 9 3 5 -3 5 w it h th e m il it ar y at ta ch e Mr. G er m an G en er al K., th e n av al at ta ch e, if I am n o t m is ta k en , Mr. B a n d finally with th e p re ss -a tt ac h e o f th e G er m an em b as sy , Mr. B, a v er y w el l in fo rm ed re p re se n ta ti v e o f G er m an y . B o th o f th em , in a ca u ti o u s way, g av e m e to u n d er st an d th a t th e --- g o v er n m en t w as in co m m u n ic at io n w it h T ro ts k y ." A n d fu rt h er : ''I to ld Mr. K--- th a t it w as ab so lu te ly u se le ss ex p ec ti n g an y co n ce ss io n s fr o m th e p re se n t g o v er n m en t, b u t th a t th e G er m an g o v er n m en t co u ld co u n t u p o n re ce iv in g co n ce ss io n s fr o m 't h e re al is t p o li ti ci an s in th e U.S.S.R~,' i.e. fr o m th e bl oc , w h en th e la tt er ca m e to p o w er ." (Vol. V, p p . 1 1 9 , 1 2 1 ) W e sh o u ld n o te th a t ev en V y sh in sk y 's d ra ft h as b ee n ex p u rg at ed o f so m e d et ai ls . F o r ex am p le in th e su m m ar y o f S o k o l' n ik o v 's co n fe ss io n O ta 's n am e is re p la ce d b y ''O'' in th is d ra ft , w h il e in th e

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

93

Trial tran scri pt itse lf eve n this lett er is omi tted and we read ''Mr. -,,

-'

Hess's nam e is men tion ed in the Trial tran scri pt. Pre sum ably this is bec aus e Hess was an official of the Nazi Par ty, not a mem ber of the German gov ernm ent. The Soviets insi sted upo n mak ing a distinc tion betw een the policies of the Soviet government tha t wan ted good rela tion s wit h cap ital ist cou ntri es in diplomacy, trad e, etc., and the policies of the Bolshevik Party tha t pur sue d com mun ist ends. It is logical tha t they wou ld mak e a sim ilar dist inct ion in the case of Germany. By ana logy wit h Sokol'nikov's inte rrog atio n we may assu me tha t all the nam es wer e pre sen t in the still -sec ret tran scri pt of Radek,s inte rrog atio n. Explicit iden tific atio n of Ger man and Jap ane se individuals is mor e freq uen t in the dra ft of Vyshinsky,s rem arks , yet Hess's nam e doe s get into the Trial tran scri pt, tho ugh the wor d ''Japan'' is excised, as are the ran ks and initials of the Ger man officials and, in the last quo tati on, the wor d ''German'' itself. This appea rs to sho w con side rabl e unc erta inty with in the Sov iet gov ernmen t as to how muc h to reve al publicly. Per hap s they did not wan t to ''bu rn thei r brid ges '' to the gov ern men t and mil itar y of any of the We ster n cou ntri es.

Assessing This Evidence We will hav e muc h mor e disc ussi on of the test imo ny above, and of con firm ator y test imo ny, in the cha pter on Piat ako v's Sta tem ent to Ezhov in volu me thre e of this wor k. As in the case of the Sokol'nikov passage, thes e diff eren ces betwe en the vari ous vers ions of the sam e test imo ny are har d to explai n unle ss one assu mes tha t the original test imo ny was gen uine . It wou ld be abs urd to crea te mul tipl e levels of fake confessions. But real confessions tha t wer e obta ined in man y inte rrog atio ns ove r an exte nde d tim e, then edit ed dow n in sev eral vers ions of the indi ctm ent, and finally edit ed aga in in the final dra ft of the Tria l tran scri pt, wou ld leav e this kind of doc ume ntar y trail.

94

Tr ots ky 's Conspiracies

Ra de k s an d Sokol'nikov's in te rro ga tio ns we re still in ex ist en ce in 19 89 wh en th e ex ce rp ts from th em we re pu bl ish ed . W e ha ve evi .. de nc e th at th e tex ts of m an y ot he r in ter ro ga tio ns , as we ll as ot he r vital investigative m ate ria ls, still ex ist bu t ar e ke pt to p se cr et in Russian archives. Th ey pr ob ab ly ha ve a gr ea t deal m or e ev id en ce to su pp or t th e ex ist en ce of th e conspiracies, in clu di ng th os e wi th Tr ot sk y, Germany, an d Japan. Since th e ar ch iv es ha ve be en sc ou re d for an y ev id en ce th at could su pp or t th e ''re ha bi lit ati on s," an d th us th e su pp os ed in no ce nc e, of the de fe nd an ts, it se em s safe to as su m e th at th e m at er ia l th at is still se cr et te nd s to su pp or t th e de fe nd an ts' guilt. 1

Until re ce nt ly ve ry fe w su ch pr et ria l confession tra ns cr ip ts ha d be en pu bl ish ed - Bu kh ar in 's fir st confession, pl us Frinovskii's, Ez .. hov's, Iagoda's, Enukidze's, Fel'dman's, an d a few by de fe nd an ts at th e 19 36 tri als like Zinoviev an d Kamenev. Now we ha ve mo re : th e se ve ra l in ter ro ga tio n- co nf es sio ns in th e vo lu m e Politbiuro i Lev Trotskii, T. 2 (PiLT2); Pi ata ko v's St at em en t of De ce m be r 19 -2 0, 19 36 ; pl us so m e qu ot at io ns from in ve sti ga tiv e m at er ia ls in Ivan Se ro v's re po rt to th e Molotov Commission of June, 19 56 . All of th es e m at er ia ls co nf irm th e im pr es sio n th at th ey co nt ai n pr im ar y ev id en ce of ou tst an di ng im po rta nc e. We de vo te a se pa ra te ch ap te r to each of th e la st tw o in th e pr es en t volume. We will stu dy m or e of th e m ate ria ls in PiLT2 in vo lu m e th re e.

Evidence W e ha ve no ev id en ce th at th e te sti m on y in th es e co nf es sio ns wa s ex tra ct ed by th re at or force - th at is, wa s false. W hy go to th e tro ub le of ha vi ng a su sp ec t co nc oc t a de tai led confession, na m in g na me s, an d th en ta ke ou t th os e na m es for th e sa ke of a tri al? By far th e m os t likely re as on fo r om itt in g th e na m es at tri al is th at th ey we re ge nu in e in th e fir st place. Given th e ab se nc e of an y evide nc e th at th es e co nf es sio ns we re false, an d given th e logical pr ogr es sio n from m or e de tai l in th e se cr et do cu m en ts to th e le as t de tail in public ones, an y ob jec tiv e stu de nt wo ul d co nc lu de th at we sh ou ld co ns id er th es e co nf es sio ns ge nu in e un les s an d un til evide nc e to th e co nt ra ry sh ou ld be discovered.

Chapt er One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

95

But the practice amo.ng most scholars of this perio d of Soviet history is to do precisely the opposite. Any evidence that tend s to supp ort the theo ry that Trotsky or any of those accused of espionage, sabotage, conspiracy to over throw the government, or treasonable contacts with foreign governments did in fact so conspire, is routinely dismissed. The evidence itself is not evaluated. Such a proc edur e is incorrect. There is never any reaso n to ''dismiss'' - to refuse to consider - any evidence. All evidence need s to be evaluated on its own meri ts and in conjunction with the rest of the evidence available, as we have done here. The evidence is stron g that Radek testified truthfully both in his pretr ial interrogations and at the trial. That mean s eithe r that Trotsky was involved with Germany and Japan or, at the least, that Trotsky told Radek he was.

The March 1938 Trial Krestinskii In this trial Nikolai Krestinskii testified that in 1922 he began col· laborating for factional Trotskyist aims with the German General von Seeckt at Trotsky's behest. Krestinskii said that the clandestine Trotskyite organization perfo rmed some kind of espionage or intelligence services for the German General Staff in retur n for a considerable sum of mon ey to furth er their factional work within the Bolshevik Party. KRESTINSKY: I began my illegal Trotskyite activities at the end of 1921, whe n on Trotsky's suggestion I consented to the formation of an illegal Trotskyite organization and to my joining its centre, which was to be made up of Trotsky, Pyatakov, Serebryakov, Preobrazhensky and myself, Krestinskii. Trotsky made this proposal to me immediately after the Tenth Congress . . . . (1938 Trial, 262) A year later I committed a crime - I refer to the one I spoke abou t durin g the examination of the accused

96

Trotsky's Conspiracies

R o se n g o lt z - th e a g re e m e n t I c o n c lu d e d o n T ro ts k y 's in st ru c ti o n s w it h G e n e ra l Seeckt, w it h th e R e ic h sw e h r in h is p e rs o n , a b o u t fi n a n c in g th e T ro ts k y it e o rg a n iz a tion in e x c h a n g e fo r se rv ic e s o f a n e sp io n a g e n a tu re w h ic h w e u n d e rt o o k in th is c o n n e c ti o n to re n d e r th e R e ic h sw e h r.. .. (2 6 2 )

VYSHINSKY: Will y o u te ll u s h o w m u c h m o n e y y ou re ceived?

KRESTINSKY: B e g in n in g w it h 1 9 2 3 u n ti l 1 9 3 0 w e re -

c e iv e d a n n u a ll y 2 5 0 ,0 0 0 G e rm a n m a rk s in gold

.

VYSHINSKY: T h is m a k e s a p p ro x im a te ly tw o milli on

g o ld m a rk s a lt o g e th e r d u ri n g th e s e y e a rs ?

KRESTINSKY: Yes, a p p ro x im a te ly two m il li o n g o ld

m a rk s. (2 6 5 )

K re st in sk ii m a d e a p o in t o f s tr e s s in g th a t h e h a d c o n ta c te d v o n S e e c k t a s e a rl y a s th e p re v io u s y e a r, 1 9 2 1 , b u t th a t h is illegal, c ri m in a l c o n ta c ts w it h v o n S e e c k t d a te d only fr o m 1 9 2 2 .

VYSHINSKY: In a s m u c h a s you a re w in d in g u p th e s to ry o f th is p e ri o d o f y o u r c ri m in a l activities, I want

to g e t m o re p re c is e in fo rm a ti o n o n o n e q u e st io n . You s a id th a t in th e w in te r o f 1921-22 y o u e v o lv e d your c a lc u la ti o n s on th e G e rm a n R e ic h sw e h r.

KRESTINSKY: T h e p la n s to u ti li z e the G e rm a n Re ich-

s w e h r fo r c ri m in a l T ro ts k y it e p u rp o s e s a p p e a re d in th e s p ri n g o f 1 9 2 2 .

VYSHINSKY: Did y o u r Trotskyite organization m a in ta in c o n ta c t with S e e c k t e v e n b e fo re 1 9 2 1 ? KRESTINSKY: T h e re w a s a contact with him o f w hich I d o n o t w a n t to s p e a k a t a n o p e n se ss io n . It w a s a conta c t e st a b li sh e d b y a m e m b e r o f o u r o rg a n iz a ti o nw

ho a t th a t ti m e w a s n o t y e t a m e m b e r o f o u r o rg a n iz a ti o n ,

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

97

and it was not a contac t of a Trotsky ite nature. (267268) 0

0

I

VYSHINSKY: The questio n of money for Trotsk yite purpos es from the Germa n Reichs wehr - is that an official aspect or not? KRESTINSKY: This was the secret Trotsky ite aspect, a crimina l thing. VYSHINSKY: Which refers to 1921-22? KRESTINSKY: To 1922. (269) It is hard to unders tand why Krestin skii would have insiste d upon such precisi on over an insubs tantial matter - whethe r his illegal Trotsk yist activity began in 1921 or in 1922 -- unless he were telling the truth. Krestin skii also claime d that he had met person ally with Trotsk y in Meran, Itaiy1s in Octobe r 1933, where Trotsk y told him that collaborat ion with Japan was also essenti al. Krestin skii said that Trotsk y person ally inform ed him that he was continu ing to work person ally with the German s, and with the Japane se throug h Sokol'nikov. He undert ook to carry on the negotia tions with the Germans. As for the Japane se, of whom he spoke as a force with which it was also necess ary to come to terms, he said that, for the time being, it was difficult for him to establi sh direct connec tions with them, that it would be necess ary to carry on conver sations with them in Moscow, that it was necess ary in this connec -

15

The city is called "Meran" in German and Russian, and "Merano" in Italian. We use "Meran" here because this is the spelling in the English translatio n of the 1938 Trial tran-

script

98

Trotsky's Conspiracies

ti on to us e S ok ol ni ko v, w ho w as w or ki ng in th e P eo pl e' s C om m is sa ri at o f F or ei gn Affairs an d, as it ha ppe ne d, w as in ch ar ge o f ea st er n affairs. A nd in as m uc h as th is co nv er sa ti on w ou ld be he ld on ly w it h an official person, an d th e pr el im in ar y co nv er sa ti on w ou ld on ly be in th e n at u re of so un di ng s, it w ou ld b e suffici en t to co nf in e ou rs el ve s at fi rs t to ge ne ra l st at em en ts to th e ef fe ct th at if a go ve rn m en t of a bl oc of th e op po si ti on gr ou ps as su m ed po w er in th e S ov ie t Union, it w ou ld di sp la y a fa vo ur ab le at ti tu de to w ar ds th e Ja pa ne se an d ta ke in to co ns id er at io n th e w is he s of th e Ja pa ne se du ri ng th e di sc us si on an d se tt le m en t of th e co nt ro ve rs ie s ex is ti ng be tw ee n th e S ov ie t go ve rn m en t an d th e Ja pa ne se go ve rn m en t. (2 77 -2 78 ) As w e ha ve se en , S ok ol 'n ik ov di d ou tl in e hi s ta lk w it h T am ek ic hi Ota, th e Ja pa ne se am ba ss ad or , w ho in fo rm ed hi m ab ou t T ro ts ky 's co nt ac t w it h th e Ja pa ne se go ve rn m en t.

Rozengol'ts R oz en go l't s te st if ie d th at he ha d co nt ac te d vo n S ee ck t an d C hi ef of th e G er m an G en er al S ta ff H as se in 19 23 w he n or de re d b y T ro ts ky an d for T ro ts ky is t pu rp os es . M y es pi on ag e ac ti vi ti es be ga n as fa r ba ck as 1923, w he n, on TROTSKY'S in st ru ct io ns , I ha nd ed va ri ou s se cr et in fo rm at io n to th e C om m an de r- in -C hi ef o f th e R ei ch sw eh r, SEECKT, an d to th e Chief of th e G er m an G en er al Staff, HASSE. S ub se qu en tl y, di re ct co nn ec ti on s w it h m e w er e es ta bl is he d by th e --- A m ba ss ad or in th e U.S.S.R., Mr. N, to w ho m I pe ri od ic al ly ga ve in fo rm a· ti on of an es pi on ag e ch ar ac te r. A ft er Mr. N's de pa rt ur e I co nt in ue d my es pi on ag e co nn ec ti on s w it h th e ne w A m ba ss ad or , Mr. N. 16 (Vol VI, p. 13 1 re ve rs e) (9 )

16

Probably Rudolf Nadolny, German am ba ss ad or to th e Soviet Un

ion 19 33 -1 93 4.

Chap ter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

99

Kre stin skii too had con fess ed to mee ting wit h Ger man gen eral s von See ckt and Hasse. We cam e to an agr eem ent wit h Gen eral s SEECKT and HASSE to the effe ct tha t we wou ld help the Reichswe hr to crea te a num ber of esp iona ge bas es on the terr itor y of the U.S.S.R. by per mit ting the unh ind ered entr y of spie s sen t by the Rei chsw ehr, and tha t we wou ld sup ply the Rei chs weh r wit h esp iona ge mat erials, i.e., to put it plai nly, tha t we wou ld be Ger man spies. In retu rn for this the Rei chs weh r und erto ok to pay us 250 ,000 mar ks per ann um as a sub sidy for cou nter -rev olut iona ry Tro tsky ite wor k.... (1938 Trial, 9) Fro m March 192 0 to Oct obe r 192 6 Han s von See ckt was ''Chef der Hee resl eitu ng'' - liter ally , ''Ch ief of the Arm y Com man d'' - in English term inol ogy , Com man der- in-C hief . Gen eral Otto Has se was ''Chef der Tru ppe nam t'' afte r 192 2. Dur ing the per iod whe n German y was pre tend ing to adh ere to the Tre aty of Ver sail les ''Tr uppen amt '' was the cod e wor d for ''Ge nera lsta b der Rei chs weh r'' or Ger man Gen eral Staff.11 Bot h wer e stro ng pro pon ents of Ger man allia nce wit h Russia. Roz eng ol'ts insi sted tha t this is whe n his con spir ator ial wor k began - tha t is, tha t this con tact was not wor k for the USSR, whi ch had trad e and mil itar y agr eem ents wit h We ima r Ger man y at the time. VYSHINSKY: ... So you , Rosengoltz, esta blis hed con nec tion s wit h the Ger man inte llig enc e serv ice alre ady in 192 3? ROSENGOL TZ: Wit h See ckt dire ctly . VYSHINSKY: Do you dra w a line betw een the two ?

17

See https://de.wlklpedia.org/wiki/Truppenamt

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Tr ot sk y's Conspiracies

ROSENGOL TZ: I am saying it merely for th e sa ke of exactitude. VYSHINSKY: So since 19 23 you, accused Rosengoltz, began to supply espionage information to foreign states? ROSENGOLTZ: Th at is right. (2 61 ) Rozengol'ts' distinction he re is correct: contact w ith th e German General Staff is no t th e sa m e as contact with German intelligence, even though espionage for bo th would be equally illegal. Here too it is ha rd to imagine w hy Rozengol'ts would have ta ke n th e trouble to be so precise unless he w er e telling th e tru th . Liars can feign precision, bu t in this case th er e seems to be no re as on to fabricate this kind of dis tin cti on. Rozengol'ts testified to working with both Germany an d Japan on Trotsky's instructions.

In addition to in st ru ct io ns I received from TROTSKY through KRESTINSKY an d SEDOV to ca rr y on sabotage activities in th e sp he re of foreign tr ad e w ith th e object of re nd er in g di re ct assistance to Germany an d Japan, the ch ar ac te r of my sabotage activities w as also determined by instructions I received from th e Ambassa do rs in the U.S.S.R., Mr. N and Mr. N, connections w ith w ho m played an im po rt an t pa rt in this m at te r, as I had to be guided in my w or k by th ei r definite instructions. After I ha d established contact with TUKHACHEVSKY an d RYKOV, I informed th e former th ro ug h KRESTINSKY, an d th e la tte r I myself informed, of TROTSKY'S instructions re ga rd in g sabotage activities, and bo th ap pr ov ed of th e w or k I had done. As a re su lt of all this, sabotage activities in foreign

tra de pr oc ee de d mainly along th e following th re e lines: first - economic assistance to Germany an d Ja-

Chapt er One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

101

pan at the expe nse of the U.S.S.R.; seco nd - causing economic loss and damage to the U.S.S.R.; third - causing political dama ge to the U.S.S.R. (Vol. VI, p. 49) (1516) ROSENGOL TZ: I shall enum erate the main points. Sedov also conveyed directions from Trot sky abou t the organization of terro rism , stati ng that at that perio d these instr uctio ns abou t terro rism should have no direct practical bear ing on Krestinskii and myself from motives of secrecy, since special instr uctio ns were being given on this score to the terro rist organization of Ivan Nikitich Smirnov. In 1933 directions and instr uctions were received with rega rd to sabo tage in the sphe re of foreign trade . As Sedov had told me that Trotsky had an agre emen t with certa in German circles, from this stand poin t sabotage was of very essen tial impo rtanc e to Trot sky for the main tenan ce of his prest ige and the prese rvati on of the agre emen t. The principal line in sabo tage was to furth er the inter ests of Germany and Japan in the sphe re of foreign trade . (246 ) Rozengol'ts said that he met perso nally with Sedov in both 1933 and 1934 . In so far as TROTSKY had an agre emen t with Germany and Japan, of which I had been informed (both durin g the negotiations - at my meeting with Sedov in 1933 ; and of the agre emen t that had been reach ed - at my meeting with him in 1934 ), I received corre spon ding instr uctio ns from TROTSKY, and my sabo tage activities in the sphe re of foreign trade serve d the same purp ose. (Vol. VI, p. 48) (18)

Bessonov Sergei Alekseevich Bessonov, a defe ndan t at the third Moscow Trial, said that he had received a lette r from Trot sky in 1934 , and

102

Trotsky's Conspiracies

also met Trotsky in Paris in tha t year. Here Trotsky urged him to pre ssu re the Germans to come to some official agr eem ent wit h the Opposition, saying: VYSHINSKY: Wh at did you and Trotsky say abo ut you r und erg rou nd Trotskyite tasks? BESSONOV: He imposed on his followers working in the diplomatic field the task of adopting the line of sabotaging official agreements in ord er to stim ulat e the inte rest of the Germans in unofficial agr eem ents with opposition groups. ''They will come to us yet," said Trotsky, refe rrin g to Hess and Rosenberg. He said tha t we mu st not be squeamish in this mat ter, and tha t we might be ens ure d real and imp orta nt help from Hess and Rosenberg. He said we mus t not stop sho rt at consenting to big cessions of territory. (63)

Rakovsky We now have additional evidence concerning Khristian Georgievich Rakovsky's meeting wit h Japanese officials on Trotsky's behalf. We devote special stud y to this evidence in the cha pter on Ivan Serov's rep ort to the Molotov Commission. Here we will discuss Rakovsky's test imo ny at the March 193 8 Moscow Trial. Khristian Rakovsky testified tha t in September 193 4 an imp orta nt Japanese official had spo ken to him directly concerning an agreemen t with the opposition. RAKOVSKY: ... In Sep tem ber 1934 I was sen t to Tokyo at the hea d of the Soviet Red Cross Delegation to an intern atio nal conference of Red Cross Societies, which was to take place ther e in October. The day afte r I arrived in Tokyo, I was stop ped in the cor rido r of the Japanese Red Cross building by a certain pro min ent public man of Japan. I can mention his name. THE PRESIDENT: No, ther e is no need.

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

103

RAKOVSKY: Very well, I will name him at the session in camera. He invited me to tea. I made his acquaintance. He held a position which had some relation to my mission - I want to say, not my mission as one who belonged to the opposition, but my governmental mission. I accepted his amiable invitation. During the conversation this person (here I omit various compliments, commonplaces, flattering remarks) said that the interes ts of the political trend to which I belonged in the U.S.S.R. and the interes ts of a certain government fully coincided, and that he personally welcomed my arrival in Tokyo because it would give him the opportun ity to discuss certain questions concerning both sides, ... (289-2 90) Rakovsky then said that during 1935 and the first half of 1936 he had had five communications with Naida, a Japanese agent. Naida gave him to unders tand that the Japanese had relations with Trotsky. Rakovsky communicated with Trotsky about this. During the second and third meeting with the public man who headed a big public organization in Japan we established the nature of the information which I promised to supply to the agents of the Japanese intelligence service in Moscow and also the technique of transm itting this information. While still in Tokyo, I drew into this work Dr. Naida, secreta ry of the Red Cross Delegation, of whom I already knew that he was a membe r of the underg round counter-revolutionary terrori st organization. I sent Dr. Naida with my card to the public man and he arrang ed with him as to how and with whom Dr. Naida was to meet in Moscow; it was he who acted as liaison agent betwee n me and the Japanese intelligence service. In Tokyo I had yet another meeting, with a third person.... I was introduced to this third person by the second high personage. He asked me to take coffee with him - this was af· ter dinner; we sat down at a table and began to talk.

104

Trotsky's Conspiracies

I shal l not rep rod uce the who le con vers atio n, and it is not nec essa ry eith er; I shal l give it to you in sub stan ce. He star ted the con vers atio n by saying: ''We are awa re tha t you are a ver y clos e frie nd and adh ere nt of Mr. Tro tsky . I mu st ask you to wri te to him tha t a cert ain gov ern men t is diss atis fied with his arti cles on the Chines e que stio n and also wit h the beh avio ur of the Chines e Tro tsky ites . We hav e a righ t to exp ect a diff eren t line of con duc t on the par t of Mr. Tro tsky . Mr. Tro tsky oug ht to und erst and wha t is nec essa ry for the cert ain gov ernm ent. The re is no nee d to go into deta ils, but it is clea r tha t an inci den t pro vok ed in China wou ld be a des irab le pre text for inte rven ing in China." I wro te to Tro tsky abo ut all this.... (19 38 Trial, 293 -29 4)

Summary: Evidence from the Moscow Trials In the firs t sect ion of Trotsky's 'Amalgams,' volu me one of this stud y, we carr y out an exh aus tive veri fica tion of the Mo scow Tria ls test imo ny. On the bas is of tha t stud y we con clud ed tha t the defe ndan ts' test imo ny at the Mo scow Tria ls rep rese nts wha t the defe ndan ts them selv es cho se to say. Thi s test imo ny is not the resu lt of inno cen t men bein g forc ed to test ify falsely aga inst them selv es and oth ers acc ord ing to som e kind of scri pt des igne d by the inve stig ation or the pro secu tion . We refe r the inte rest ed rea der to tha t stud y.

Of the defe nda nts at the thre e pub lic Mo scow Tria ls eigh t men clai med to hav e hea rd dire ctly from eith er Tro tsky or his son Sedov abo ut con tact s betw een Tro tsky and Ger man or Jap ane se officials: Ol'berg, Piat ako v, Radek, She stov , Rakovsky, Kre stin skii , Besson ov, and Rozengol'ts. One man , Sokol'nikov, hea rd of Tro tsky 's coll abo rati on wit h Jap an from a Jap ane se dipl oma t. We not ed abo ve tha t oth er defe nda nts - Buk hari n, for exa mpl e test ifie d tha t they had hea rd abo ut this at sec ond or thir d han d and beli eve d it. Buk hari n said he had hea rd abo ut it from Radek, who m he had eve ry reas on to believe. But if Rad ek had bee n lying

Chapter One. A Brief Overview of the Evidence

105

Bukharin would not have known,, so Bukharin's testimony on this point is evidence at second hand. The Moscow Trial defendants provided very strong evidence of Trotsky's collaboration with Germany and Japan. This evidence has never been successfully impugned. But it has been declared false so many times - its falsity taken for granted without evidence - that its ''falsehood'" is constituent of the current mainstream paradigm of Soviet history.

C h a p te r 2. la k o v A. Ia k o v le v Dimitrov's Diary In 20 03 th e di ar y of Georgi Dimitrov, he ad of th e Co m in te rn af te r 19 35 an d cl os e as so ci at e of Stalin, w as published. D im itr ov m et fr eq ue nt ly w ith St al in an d ot he r Bolshevik le ad er s, an d hi s di ar y co nt ai ns m an y im po rt an t pa ss ag es an d st at em en ts by Stalin an d ot he rs . On D ec em be r 16 , 19 36 , D im itr ov m et in th e K re m lin w ith Stalin an d fo ur of hi s cl os es t as so ci at es , Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, an d O rd zh on ik id ze . D ur in g th is m ee tin g th ey re ce iv ed a re po rt ab ou t an in te rr og at io n of So ko l'n ik ov of D ec em be r 12, a few da ys be fo re . H er e is w ha t D im itr ov w ro te , w ith th e ph ra se s of sp ecial in te re st to ou r pr es en t in ve st ig at io n in bo ld fa ce :

16 D ec em be r 19 36 - W ith ''t he Five'' in th e Kremlin (Stal[in], Molot[ov], Kag[anovich], Vor[oshilov], Ordzho ni ki dz e ). Exchange of op in io ns of Ch [inese] ev en ts.. .. - On th e Fr en ch qu es tio n: .. . - Fr om th e in ve st ig at io n of Piatakov, Sokolnikov, Radek, an d ot he rs : In te rr og at io n of Sokolnikov, 12 D ec em be r 19 36 : Q ue st io n: Th us , th e in ve st ig at io n co nc lu de s th at Tr ot sk y ab ro ad an d th e ce nt er of th e bl oc w ith in th e USSR en te re d in to ne go tia tio ns w ith th e H itl er ite an d Japa .. ne se go ve rn m en ts w ith th e following ai m s:

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First, to pro vok e a war by Ger man y and Jap an aga inst the USSR; Second, to pro mot e the defe at of the USSR in tha t war and to take adv anta ge of tha t def eat to ach ieve the tran sfer of pow er in the USSR to [their] gov ern men t bloc; Third, on beh alf of the futu re bloc gov ern men t to gua ran tee terr itor ial and eco nom ic con cess ions to the Hitl erit e and Jap ane se gov ernm ents . Do you con firm this ?

Reply: Yes, I con firm it. Question: Do you adm it tha t this acti vity by the bloc is tant amo unt to out righ t trea son aga inst the mot her land ? Reply: Yes, I adm it it. (Di mit rov 42- 43)

Analysis This mee ting can be con firm ed in the sch edu le of visi tors to Stalin's office for Dec emb er 16, 1936.1 The fou r Pol itbu ro mem ber s nam ed by Dim itro v are reco rde d as ente ring Stal in's office at 190 5 hrs, fifteen min utes befo re Dim itro v ente red alon g wit h Manuilsky, who was a Sec reta ry of the Executive Com mit tee of the Com inte rn and hea d of the Sov iet dele gati on to it, whi le Dim itro v him self was General Sec reta ry of the Executive Com mit tee of the Com inte rn. Dimitrov and Manuilsky stay ed for fifty min utes . The two Comintern lead ers wer e obv ious ly ther e to disc uss Com inte rn - inte rna tion al - mat ters . Sok ol'n ikov 's test imo ny was rele van t to thei r concerns.

1

"Posetiteli kremlevskogo kabineta I.V. Stalina." lstoricheskii Arkh iv 4 (199 5), 35.

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D im itr ov he ar d th is at a m ee ti ng of po lit ic al le ad er s of th e hi gh es t level, in cl ud in g St al in himself. T he re is no in di ca ti on th at St al in he w ou ld be th e on ly pe rs on w ho m ig ht be ab le to ge t aw ay w it h su ch a th in g - ''s ta ge d' ' th is m ee ti ng fo r D im it ro v' s be ne fi t. Dim itr ov , a st au nc h su pp or te r of Stalin an d th e So vi et Union, did no t ne ed re as su ra nc e or ''s ho ri ng up." And D im it ro v w ro te th is in hi s pr iv at e di ar y, on ly re ce nt ly pu bl is he d be ca us e of th e de m is e of th e So vi et bloc. T he re fo re th is en tr y is si m il ar to th e si gn at ur es of St al in et al. on th e T ro ts ky te le gr am si x m on th s la te r. It is an ex ce ll en t ga ug e of w ha t St al in an d to p So vi et le ad er s be li ev ed at th e tim e. Th is is si gni fi ca nt be ca us e th ey ha d ac ce ss to all th e ev id en ce , in cl ud in g a hu ge am ou nt th at is still se cr et .

Was Stalin Lying? It is of te n as se rt ed by Cold W ar hi st or ia ns th at St al in w as a ''lia r'' so th at no th in g he w ro te sh ou ld be ''b el ie ve d. " T he re fo re - th is logic m ig ht go - w e sh ou ld no t ''believe," in th is ca se or in th e ca se of th e T ro ts ky te le gr am , th e co m m en ts he w ro te on st at em en ts an d co nf es si on s - ev er .

But th is re as on in g is all w ro ng . T he re is no re as on to vi ew St al in as a li ar an y m or e th an an y ot he r po lit ic al figure. In th e co ur se of ou r re se ar ch ov er th e pa st de ca de w e ha ve fo un d no ex am pl es of St alin 's ''lying," ev en co nc er ni ng th e ''Katyn m as sa cr e' ' qu es ti on , fo ra re ce nt di sc ov er y at a G er m an m as s m ur de r si te in U kr ai ne ha s sh ow n th at th e ''official ve rs io n' ' of th e ''K at yn m as sa cr e' ' ca nn ot po ss ib ly be co rr ec t. B ut in an y ca se K at yn w as a ve ry di ff er en t si tu at io n th at al le ge dl y in vo lv in g lying to fo re ig n po w er s, a co mm on pr ac ti ce am on g all go ve rn m en ts at all times.2

2

1 will pu bli sh a bo ok -le ng th stu dy of th e Katyn Massacre iss ue in 20 18 . In th e me an tim e se e Grover Furr, "The 'Official Version' of th e Katyn M as sa cre Dispro ven? Discoveries at a Ge rm an Mass M ur de r Site in Ukraine." Socialism and Democracy 27 , 2 (2 01 3) , 96 -1 29 . Online at ht tp s:/ /m su we b. mo nt cla ir. ed u/ -fu rrg /re se ar ch /fu rr_ ka ty n_ 20 13 .p df Much mo re de tai l ab ou t th e ev lde nti ary qu es tio ns of "Katyn" is on my "Katyn Fo re st W ho du nn it" page, ht tp :// tin yu rl. co m/ ka ty n- th e- tru th

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Lying is a univ ersal hum an trait. Everybody lies - but nobo dy lies all the time. Ther efore , the fact that some one lied in one case or othe r is not evide nce that they lied at anot her time . Ther e's no reason to think that Stali n was lying here to Dimi trov and Manuilsky, in his word s on Trot sky's teleg ram, or at any othe r time unles s there is specific evide nce that he was. This is, of cour se, true for anyone, not just for Stalin. Ther e is no such thing as an histo rical figure ''who can alwa ys be trust ed," to tell the truth or one ''who can neve r be trust ed.''

Finally, no single piece of evide nce by itself is to be ''believed'' or ''disbelieved'' in any case. All evide nce must be analy zed carefully, including in cont ext with othe r evidence.

S.M. Uritsky Only a tiny prop ortio n of all the inves tigat ive mate rials from the 1930 s have been made available to resea rche rs and only a small part of that has been published. Occasionally a privi leged researc her is perm itted to read and quot e from some inves tigat ive files to whic h no one else has been given access. Normally these are resea rche rs who prom ote the ''official'' Russian gove rnme nt posit ion, whic h corre spon ds to the Khrushchev-Cold WarGorb ache v-Tr otsky ist posit ions the anti· Stali n para digm that all those conv icted in the Mosc ow Trials, the Military Purges, plus many other s, were comp letel y inno cent. Such a resea rche r is Col. Nikolai S. Cherushev, auth or of a num ber of book s argu ing that no milit ary cons pirac ies ever exist ed and, by extension, no othe r anti- gove rnme nt cons pirac ies could have existed eithe r. Cher ushe v has been perm itted to see and to quot e liberally from inves tigat ive files of many milit ary men that no one else has seen - or, at least, that no one else has publ ished abou t.

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One of th es e files is th at of Komkor3 S.P. Uritsky. In Uritsky's indi ct m en t w e re ad th e following: In th e ex tre m el y exhaustive te xt of th e se nt en ce by th e Military Collegium in th e ca se of S.P. Uritsky of August 1, 1938, w e read: - on th e or de r of Gamarnik, Pyatakov, lakir, an d Tukhachevsky Uritsky tr an sm itt ed th ei r le tte rs to Sedov to be pa ss ed to Trotsky;

- w as co nn ec te d to th e Tr ot sk yi st gr ou p of Souva rin e in Paris, th ro ug h w hi ch he pa ss ed espionage m at er ia ls from Tukhachevsky for French intelligence.4

Analysis We kn ow from ot he r evidence th at th es e m en w er e involved directly w ith Trotsky. Since Gamarnik, Iakir, an d Tukhachevsky w er e also involved in military collaboration w ith Germany it is safe to as su m e th at Uritsky's co nt ac t w ith Tr ot sk y ha d so m et hi ng to do w ith at le as t Germany as well. However, given Cherushev's w or ding he re w e ca n' t be su re th at Uritsky did confess to di re ct co nt ac t w ith Trotsky. We can only be ce rta in th at th e co ur t found him guilty of doing so. In a sh or t fr ag m en t be lo w from one of Uritsky's st at em en ts to th e NKVD he sa id th at he would make a clean br ea st of everything. So it ap pe ar s th at this high-ranking military officer confessed to se nd -

3

Corps Co mm an de r, eq uiv ale nt to a two~star ge ne ral in the US military. See lur ii Beremeev, Anatomfia Armii. Cited at htt p:/ /ar my .ar mo r.k iev .ua /in de x.h tm l . 4

Cherushev, N.S.1937 god. By/ If zagovor voennykh? Moskva: Veche, 20 07 , 17 9. (Cherushev, 1937)

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ing mess ages from Gam arnik , Piatakov, lakir , and Tukh ache vsky to Trots ky via Sedov. All Cher ushe v's work s are devo ted to the pred eterm ined conclusion that no milit ary cons pirac y exist ed at all. That migh t expla in why he has the acce ss he does to inves tigat ive files to whic h no one else has been admi tted: he can be trust ed not to ques tion the ''canonical'' view poin t. Neve rthel ess Cher ushe v cites the following direc t quot ation from Uritsky's pen. On April 14, 1938 , after refer ring to their ''long -stan ding frien dship '' - a phra se not furth er explain ed - Urits ky wrot e to NKVD officer Veni amin S. Agas: I have been feeling poor ly in rece nt days, no blad der contr ol, bloo dy vomi ting, unab le to think , if poss ible let me have a day's respi te, [then ] summ on me, I will repo rt to you, and then I will write ever ythin g completely. I wish to turn myse lf into the kind of arres tee who help s the autho rities , I wish to earn the merc y of Sovi et autho rity. (Che rushe v 1937 , 178) As Cher ushe v notes , this confi rms that Urits ky was ill. But it contains no accu satio n of tortu re or mist reatm ent. In any case, far from bein g a profe ssion of inno cenc e it is, on the contr ary, an admiss ion of guilt. Perso nal cont act with Trots ky or, as here, to claim that one had such perso nal conta ct, was highly unus ual. The NKVD had no need to fabri cate such a detai l simp ly in orde r to fram e an inno cent man. On the contr ary: it woul d have made Urits ky's conf essio n stand out from most othe rs, perh aps leadi ng to an inter view with a Polit buro mem ber or Stalin himself. That woul d put thing s out of Ezhov's contr ol, beca use the arres tee migh t say that his testi mon y had been coerc ed. We know that Polit buro mem bers did inter view some arres tees. So we can't just assu me that Urits ky's conf essio n was coerc ed. It may well have been genu ine, and at this time we have no reaso n to doub t that it was. Ezhov's seco nd in comm and Mikhail Frino vskii ident ified Agas as one of Ezhov's ''bon e-bre akers ," skille d in beati ng defe ndan ts and

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in fa br ic at in g co nv in ci ng confessions. B ut th is do es no t m ea n th at al l de fe nd an ts w er e be at en into false co nf es si on s ei th er . It ou gh t to re m in d us th at no in di vi du al pi ec e of ev id en ce can by its el f be decisive, be ca us e ea ch pi ec e of ev id en ce ta ke n by its el f is su bj ec t to m ul tip le po ss ib le ex pl an at io ns or in te rp re ta tio ns . It is on ly w he n th e w ho le co m pl ex of ci rc um st an tia l ev id en ce is co ns is te nt with on e conclusion th at th at co nc lu si on be co m es highly pr ob ab le , an d for all pr ac tic al pu rp os es , un til pr ov en ot he rw is e, ca n be ta ke n to re pr es en t th e tr ut h.

la. A. lakovlev's Confession o f October 1937 Among th e do cu m en ts from fo rm er Soviet ar ch iv es th at have be en pu bl is he d si nc e th e en d of th e Soviet Union in 19 91 on e of th e m os t significant for ou r pu rp os es is th e le ng th y in te rr og at io n of la. A. Iakovlev. la ko vl ev ha d be en Pe op le 's Co m m is sa r for Agriculture du rin g th e collectivization pe ri od of th e ea rly 19 30 s. In 19 37 he w as a pr om in en t m em be r of th e Central Committee. Iakovlev also he ld a nu m be r of ot he r ve ry re sp on si bl e po st s: he ad of th e agricultu ra l se ct io n of th e C.C., an d fir st as si st an t to th e ch ai rm an of th e Pa rty Control Commission bu t in re al ity its he ad si nc e Ezhov, its formal he ad , w as sp en di ng full tim e as Co m m is sa r of th e NKVD. Since A ug us t 11, 1936, la ko vl ev ha d be en a m em be r of th e se cr e· ta ri at for th e fir st dr af t of th e pr og ra m of th e VKP (b ), th e Bolshevik Party.s lakovlev ha d be en ve ry close to Stalin. He w as on e of th os e w ho w or ke d m os t closely on th e ne w Co ns tit ut io n th at w as an no un ce d in 1936, an d th at w as su pp os ed to br in g free el ec tio ns to th e USSR. Along w ith Tal' an d Stetskii, lakovlev w as , in reality, on e of th e au th or s of th e Constitution. He ha d w or ke d closely w ith Stalin on

5

I ha ve consulted the following su mm ari es of lakovlev's life an d ca ree r: htt p:/ /w ww .kn ow by sig hti nfo /Y aY Y/ 05 21 5.a sp ; htt p:/ /w ww .hr on o.i nfo /bi og raf /ya ko vle v_ ya .ht ml ; htt ps: //r u.w iki pe dia .or g/w iki /R Ko sne a,_ RK oa _A pK aA be an q Fo r the da te of Au gu st 11 , 19 36 an d lak ov lev 's pla ce in the gro up to ref orm the Pa rty pro gra m se e lur ii N. Zhukov, lnof Stalin. Moscow: Vagrius 2003, 268.(Zhukov)

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this, one of Stalin's pet project s. (Zhuko v 308 ff.) In short, Iakovle v was one of the very highes t membe rs of the Soviet govern ment and Bolshe vik Party outside the ranks of the Politbu ro itself. Iakovle v was arreste d on Octobe r 12, 1937. On Octobe r 15-18 he confess ed that in 1923 Trotsk y had asked him to be a Trotsk yist ''sleepe r'' in the Party - to go underg round, cease all contac t with any Trotsky ists, and climb into respon sible Party positio ns. Trotsk y had already at that time posed the questio n in this contex t, that he should have his own agents in the Party leaders hip at the necess ary time who could pass inform ation to him and collabo rate in his seizure of power. (Lubia nka 1937-1938, 3886) Here are the parts of lakovle v's statem ent, dated Octobe r 15-18, 1937, that concer n his ties to Trotsk y and to Germa n intellig ence. In the first section lakovle v outline s how he was recruit ed to a secret Trotsk yist conspi racy against the Party even before Lenin had died. Questio n: Explain how you manag ed to hide your Trotsk yist anti-So viet activity for so long, since 1923? Answe r: This can be explain ed by the fact that, since 1923, followi ng TROTSKY'S person al directiv es, I retreated from open struggl e with the Party. I maneu vered and immed iately took up a conspi ratoria l position. Outwa rdly I broke with the Trotsk yists and conducted all my further anti-So viet work under the flag of duplici ty. Even in 1923 TROTSKY, foresee ing the possibl e failure of an open attack against the Party, consid ered it essenti al to make some part of his suppor ters very

6

Original text online at http://ist matinfo/ node/323 85 Also at http:/ /www.alexanderyakovlev.org/ fond/issu es-doc/ 612 0 8

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ca re fu lly co nc ea led so th at th ey , wh ile re m ai ni ng in th e Pa rty an d do in g Pa rty wo rk , co ul d be co m e fortified, tru ste d by th e Pa rty m as se s an d lea de rsh ip , an d co ul d m ov e gr ad ua lly in to th e le ad er sh ip of th e Pa rty . TROTSKY se t th is ta sk at th at tim e so as to ha ve hi s ag en ts in th e Pa rty lea de rsh ip at th e ne ce ss ar y mo me nt , so th ey co ul d ke ep hi m in fo rm ed an d co op er at e in th e se iz ur e of po we r. Su ch ta sk s we re gi ve n to m e as well. Qu es tio n: Th at is, su ch ta sk s of be tra ya l, pr ov oc ati on , an d es pi on ag e, in th e fu lfi llm en t of wh ich yo u ha d al· re ad y ha d ex pe rie nc e fro m yo ur co lla bo ra tio n wi th th e Ok hr an ka [T sa ris t se cr et po lic e in pr eRe vo lu tio na ry tim es ]. An sw er : Yes. Qu es tio n: Co nt in ue yo ur co nf es sio n. W he re an d wh en di d yo u all y yo ur se lf wi th TROTSKY? An sw er : In 19 23 SOSNOVSKY pu t m e in to uc h wi th TROTSKY. Th e m ee tin g to ok pl ac e at VORONSKY'S ap ar tm en t in th e 1s t Pa lac e of So vi ets in th e Ho tel 'N ats io na l.' In at te nd an ce we re TROTSKY, SOSNOVSKY, VORONSKYand myself. In sp ea ki ng of th e pl an fo r th e wo rk of th e Tr ot sk yi sts , TROTSKY wa s po in tin g ou t th at th e po ss ib ili ty of th e te m po ra ry - as he pu t it - vi cto ry of th e CC'ists wa s no t ex clu de d; he fu rth er sa id th at in politics, as in wa r, it is ne ce ss ar y to ta ke in to ac co un t th e po ss ib ili ty of te m po ra ry de fe at an d fo r th at re as on it wa s es se nt ial to in su re on es el f in ad va nc e on en em y te rri to ry . TROTSKY es pe cia lly po in te d ou t th at th e co nd iti on s of str ug gl e pr ov e th at th e Pa rty ap pa ra tu s ha s at ta in ed de cis iv e im po rta nc e. Pr oc ee di ng fro m th at, he se t be fo re us th e tas k: to str iv e in ou r fu tu re wo rk no t on ly to pe ne tra te th e Pa rty ap pa ra tu s, bu t to str en gt he n

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ourselves there, to move forward, to select and recruit out of the Party apparatus cadres of supporters of TROTSKY'S line. Proceeding from that, TROTSKY proposed that I outwardly cease all contact with Trotskyists; in future, always and everywhere to proclaim myself a firm supporter of the Central Committee, a merciless enemy of Trotskyi.sts, to use everything in order to increase my influence in the Party, but at the same time extremely carefully and conspiratorial ly, by second and third hand, to move forward the work of attracting very carefully selected people into the Trotskyist organization. After that meeting and directions from TROTSKY I ceased open contact with VORONSKY and SOSNOVSKY, as with compromised persons; on my part I instructed those persons connected with me and who supported Trotskyism, in the spirit of the instructions I had received from TROTSKY. (Lubianka 1937-1938, 388-389)

A few pages further in his interrogation Iakovlev outlines how he was recruited by German intelligence in 1935 in Berlin. According to lakovlev he had been recruited by a German agent named Shmuke. 7 The German agent who, according to Iakovlev, recruited him into cooperation did so on two bases. Shmuke knew from Russian emigres in Germany that lakovlev had collaborated with the Russian Tsarist Okhranka, or secret police, towards the end of 1916 in Petrograd, and used this information to blackmail lakovlev by threatening to expose it. Once in the Bolshevik Party and after the Revolution a confession of collaboration, even at a vulnerable early age, would destroy

7

Presumably "Schmucke" in German.

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Trotsky's Conspiracies

one's Pa rt y career. H id in g such a connection could be much worse because it su gg es te d th at su ch a pe rs on w as completely un tr us tw or th y an d m ig ht still be some kind of clandestine ag en t or other. A Party m em be r w as no t supposed to have an y se cr et s - ce rt ai nl y no ne of an y political relevance - from th e Party. Moreover, it m ad e on e vu ln er ab le to blackmail and so an additional se cu ri ty risk. Shmuke also kn ew from T ro ts ky ab ou t lakovlev's pa rt ic ip at io n in th e T ro ts ky is t un de rg ro un d, and revealed this to him. This se ct io n of th e do cu m en t also co ns ti tu te s st ro ng ev id en ce th at T ro ts ky collaborated with German intelligence Question: You sp ea k ab ou t GAMARNIK'S an d VAREIKIS' co nn ec ti on s with foreign intelligence services. Did yo u yo ur se lf have such connections? Answer: Yes, I ha d ties w it h German intelligence. Question: Tell us concretely, w he n did yo u establish tie s w it h German intelligence? Answer: I was re cr ui te d by German intelligence w he n I was in Germany, in Berlin, in the au tu m n of 1935, and at th at time an d until my ar re st I co ll ab or at ed w it h this intelligence and maintained contact w it h it th ro ug h a special representative in Moscow. In Berlin I w as in th e hospital ''Catholic Commune'' for tr ea tm en t. A bo ut a w ee k after m y ar ri va l in Berlin a man in a suit, w ho m I did not know, ca m e to m e in th e hospital, an d in tr od uc ed hi m se lf to m e by th e na m e SHMUKE, an d sa id th at ''he ha d instructions to have di sc us si on s w it h me on a nu m be r of qu es ti on s of inte re st to hi m an d of ur ge nc y for me." He an no un ce d th at he knew ''from m y political friends'' ab ou t m y membership in th e underground organization th at w as st ru gg li ng w it h the existing po w er s in th e USSR and th at , following or de rs of th e German government, he wished to establish businesslike relations with me. SHMUKE fu rt he r told me th at in leading go ve rn m en ta l

Chapter Two. lakovlev

sphe res in Germany there were many friends of those tendencies in the USSR that were hostile to the cur .. rent leadership, that these German sphe res supp orted those tendencies in the USSR - therefore the German government considered it possible to send SHMUKE to me for negotiations. Fearing a provocation, I naturally did not wan t to disclose myself to this unknown person and expressed my total confusion concerning wha t he had prop osed to me. However, SHMUKE stubbornly continued that it was useless for me to deny facts that both he and I knew; that the German government was not turni ng to me alone, among leaders of underground organizations in the USSR, with such a proposal. At last he said to me emphatically: ''Your chief leade r L. TROTSKY is acting in full contact and on the basis of mutual benefit with the new Germany." I still attem pted to end this conversation and made as though I want ed to stand up in orde r to say goodbye and force SHMUKE to leave. But SHMUKE did not budge from the spot and told me that I was too careful and, clearly, did not trust him; that this carefulness was a good sign in me, on the one hand, however, he had the full possibility of proving to me the ''official nature'' of his visit and had the full information of the German gove rnme nt abou t me. After that he told me that ''in Germany they had been very inter ested in me personally even when I was the People's Commissar for Agriculture, and that it was not by chance'' - said SHMUKE - ''that one of our magazines in Berlin had been graced by your photograph and biography." In fact this did take place: my photograph had appe ared in one of the fascist magazines. Then he said that in Germany live emigrants from Russia, including former members of the Russian police, who have informed the German authorities abou t certain episodes of my collaboration with the Russian police at the end of 1916 in Petrograd. Al-

117

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th ou gh th ey ha d th e full ab ili ty to co m pr om ise m e wi th th e So vi et au th or iti es at an y m om en t th ey , sa id SHMUKE, di d no t wi sh to do th at, sin ce th ey ho pe to es tab lis h wi th m e th e sa m e kind of co nt ac t as th ey ha ve wi th TROTSKY.

I un de rs to od th at I ha d fallen in to a pitfall an d th er e was no ot he r way ou t. Faced wi th th is fact, an d realizing th at th e Ge rm an s we re fully in fo rm ed ab ou t me, I de cid ed to ag re e wi th SHMUKE'S pr op os al, all th e m or e sin ce SHMUKE'S in fo rm ati on ab ou t TROTSKY'S co nn ec tio ns wi th Germany co mp let ely co rre sp on de d wi th wh at PIATAKOV ha d sa id to m e an d w ha t TROTSKY ha d wr itt en . I th en as ke d w ha t specifically he - SHMUKE - wa nt ed fro m me, an d w ha t se rv ice s I m ig ht re nd er th e Germ an go ve rn m en t, ad di ng th at by m y wo rk I wa s ma in ly in vo lv ed in ag ric ul tu ra l affairs an d ha d no re latio n to m ili tar y m at te rs of de fe ns e. SHMUKE re to rte d th at th e Ge rm an go ve rn m en t wa s no t in te re ste d on ly in defense wo rk , bu t in th e sit ua tio n within th e co un try , in th e Bo lsh ev ik pa rty , an d es pe cia lly in th e sit ua tio n wi th in th e go ve rn m en t an d th e Ce nt ra l Committe e of th e Bo lsh ev ik party; he as ke d me to in fo rm th e Ge rm an au th or iti es ab ou t th es e m at te rs fro m no w on an d, as he pu t it, he ho pe d th at wi th this in fo rm ati on I wo ul d als o he lp m y po lit ica l fri en ds wh o we re wo rk ing in full co nt ac t wi th Germany. Be sid es th at, SHMUKE str es se d to m e th at he an d his le ad er s wo ul d no t ob jec t if I would in fo rm th e Ge rm an go ve rn me nt , wi th in th os e lim its I th ou gh t po ss ib le, ab ou t th e af fa irs of th e un de rg ro un d or ga ni za tio ns to wh ich I be lo ng ed . SHMUKE sa id th at he as su m ed th is wo ul d be to ou r m ut ua l benefit. Th en I to ld SHMUKE th at I ac ce pt ed hi s pr op os al an d ag re ed th at in fu tu re , to th e be st of m y ab ili tie s an d

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stren gth, I woul d infor m the Germ an gove rnme nt on the matt ers of inter est to the Germ ans. Cons ideri ng the matt er more thoro ughl y, I decid ed that if poss ible I woul d sell my colla bora tion to the Germ ans more dearl y, first of all to obtai n from German intel ligen ce corre spon ding poss ibilit ies for foreign conn ectio ns for our orga nizat ion and, in the first place, with TROTSKY, and also to incre ase my impo rtance in the eyes of the Germ an gove rnme nt. (Lubianka 1937 -193 8, 394- 395)

Assessing lakovlev's Confession This confe ssion by lakov lev is espec ially impo rtant beca use of lakovlev 's high posit ion in the Sovi et gove rnme nt and Bols hevik Party and his close ness to Stali n. He conf irms that as early as 1923 Trotsky form ed a facti onal unde rgrou nd mov emen t with in the Party . The years 1922 and 1923 pop up frequently in the trans cript of the Marc h 1938 Mosc ow Trial as the year man y of thos e who confesse d to bein g in the Trot skyis t unde rgrou nd bega n their activities.8 lakov lev admi ts direc t ties with Germ an intel ligen ce. This conf irms alleg ation s by othe rs that Trotsky's mov emen t had such conta cts. He also conf irms German ties of Gamarnik - that is, the Milit ary cons pirat ors led by Tukh ache vsky - and Vare ikis, head of the Party in the Far East who was arres ted for ties with the Japa nese . NKVD Gene ral Genr ikh S. Liushkov, who defec ted to the Japa nese in June 1938 , nam ed both Gam arnik and Vare ikis to his Japa nese hand lers as genu ine cons pirat ors in the Far East. 9

a See 1938 Moscow Trial 6, 9 (Rozengol'ts); 45 (Bessonov, about Reich). 9

See Coox 1998 (1), 151, 152,15 7; Coox 1998 (2) 81 (Vareikis); Coox 1998 (1) 156; Coox 1998 (2) 85 (Gamarnik).

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A dr am at ic re ve la ti on is Ia ko vl ev 's claim th at he he ar d di re ct ly fr om a G er m an ag en t th at T ro ts ky w as w or ki ng w it h th e German s. He co nf ir m s th at he ha d al so he ar d th is fr om Pi at ak ov , an d th at he had also re ce iv ed th is in fo rm at io n in w ri ti ng fr om T ro ts ky himself.

Stalin's Annotations T he do cu m en t im m ed ia te ly following la ko vl ev 's in te rr og at io n in th e sa m e vo lu m e is a co py of St al in 's ha nd w ri tt en qu es ti on s on hi s co py of la ko vl ev 's in te rr og at io n:

1) Did he kn ow ab ou t Vareikis' se rv ic e w it h th e T sa ris t se cr et po lic e (okhranka)? 2) Jjis opinion ab ou t Mikhailov from V or on ez h an d hi s pa rt ic ip at io n in th e c.-r. org. [c ou nt er -r ev ol ut io na ry or ga ni za ti on - GF].

3) His co nt ac t w it h Trotsky (did he se e hi m pe rs on al ly in 19 35 or in 19 34 ).

4) How di d he w an t to us e MOPR? W ho m in MOPR di d he m ak e us e of? [MOPR = Mezhdunarodnoe Obshchestvo Pomoshchi Revoliutsioneram, In te rn a-

tio na l O rg an iz at io n for Aid to R ev ol ut io na ri es , th e Sovi et s' or ga ni za ti on to give he lp to re vo lu ti on ar ie s in fa sc is t co un tr ie s w he re co m m un is t pa rt ie s w er e illegal an d su bj ec t to se ve re re pr es si on . - GF]

5) ''T ur n' ' la ko vl ev 's wife: he is a co ns pi ra to r an d sh e m us t tell us ev er yt hi ng . Ask he r ab ou t St as ov a, Kirsanova,10 an d ot he r fr ie nd s - ac qu ai nt an ce s of he rs . (Lubi an ka 19 37 -1 93 8 396)11

10

In the following ph ot og ra ph of 19 36 Kirsanova is se co nd fro m ]eft, St as ov a th ird fro m left: ht tp :// tin yu rl. co m/ ki rsa no va -st as ov a. Biographical sk etc he s of bo th ar e inc lud ed in Zhenshchiny russkoi revoliutsii ("W om en of th e Russian Revolution," Mosco w: Politizdat, 19 82 ) alo ng wi th ma ter ial s ab ou t In es sa Ar ma nd , Lenin's wi fe Kr up sk aia , Le nin 's sis ter s, an d oth ers . Kirsanova die d in 19 4 7 as a lec tu re r in th e Ce ntr al Co mm itt ee sc ho ol (

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Stal in's han dwr itte n com men ts on this con fess ion sho w tha t he beli eve d this con fess ion of Iako vlev 's was true and sug ges ted furthe r line s of inve stig atio n foll owi ng from it. No reas ona ble read ing of the evid enc e wou ld sug ges t tha t Stal in had lako vlev fram ed and then carr ied on a cha rad e by ann otat ing the con fess ion and ask ing for Iako vlev 's wife, also a Par ty mem ber, to be bro ugh t in for que stion ing abo ut his acti viti es. The ''Stasova'' refe rred to is Elen a D. Stas ova . She was one of the earl iest Bolsheviks, hav ing join ed the Par ty in 189 8, the sam e yea r as Stalin. She had long bee n wor king in the Com inte rn. Also an Old Bol shev ik and par tici pan t in the Rev olut ion of 191 7, K.I. Kirsanova, wife of fam ous Old Bol shev ik Em elia n Iaro slav skii , wor ked wit h Stas ova and oth ers in the Com inte rn. She pub lish ed boo ks on wom en und er soci alis m. The lists of tho se who met wit h Stalin in his office from the earl y 193 0s unti l his dea th hav e bee n pub lish ed. We now kno w tha t Iakovlev met in Stal in's office wit h mem ber s of Stal in's gro ups of sup por ters in the Pol itbu ro on the evening of October 11, 1931.12 The reaf ter he disa ppe ars from the poli tica l reco rd. Acc ordi ng to one sou rce Iako vlev was arre sted the nex t day , Oct obe r 12.13 Accord ing to the hea der of the inte rrog atio n tran scri pt, date d October 15- 18, 193 7, Iako vlev had alre ady mad e som e kind of stat emen t of con fess ion on Oct obe r 14.

http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/.RpocnaecKHH,_EMeJibHH_ MHxaanoBHtt ). Stasova continued to hold another high Comintern position until the Comlntern's dissolution in 1943. She died in 1966 (http ://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/CTacoea,_EneHa_ ~MHTpHeBHa . Original text online at http://istmatinfo/node/32386~ Now also at http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/61209 11

"Posetiteli kremlevskogo kabineta I.V. Stalin," Jstoricheskii Arkhiv 4 (1995), 66-67. A facsimile of the archival document itself may be viewed online at http: //ms uweb .mon tclai r.edu /-fur rg/re searc h/ stalinvlsitors10113 7.pdf. 12

''Iakovlev (Epshtein) lakov Arkad'evlch. Biograficheskii Ukazatel." Hrono.ru. At http://www.hrono.ru/biograf/yakovlev_ya.html. The CC Plenum Decree on the removal of lakovlev and othe rs from CC membership (Lubianka 1937-1938,, No. 262) is dated Decem· her 4-8 by the editors. 13

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Stalin an d his su pp or te rs wa nt ed co nt es te d ele cti on s to th e Soviet go ve rn m en t. Th e Pa rty Fi rs t Se cr eta rie s op po se d co nt es te d elections. Iurii Zhukov ha s followed th e str ug gl e ov er th is iss ue th ro ug h th e archival evidence. This str ug gl e for co nt es te d electio ns was finally lo st du rin g th e October 19 37 Central Committee Plenum.14 We di sc us s th is str ug gl e in Yezhov vs Stalin.

Assessing lakovlev's Confession: The 1938 Moscow Trial In th e no te to Iakovlev s confession Stalin su gg es te d th at I. M. Vareikis had also be en involved wi th th e Ts ar ist se cr et police. Like Iakovlev (b or n 18 96 ) Vareikis (b or n 18 94 ) was a yo un g m an dur1

in g th e Fi rst W or ld War. He ha d be en ar re ste d on Oc to be r 10, ju st tw o days be fo re Iakovlev. Pe rh ap s it wa s Vareikis wh o na m ed lakovlev. lakovlev did na m e Vareikis in his ow n confession.

Both Vareikis and lakovlev we re na m ed as active un de rg ro un d Tr ot sk yi sts by de fe nd an ts in th e March 19 38 Moscow Trial. Defe nd an t Grin'ko tes tif ied ab ou t Iakovlev's active ro le in th e conspiracy. He ev id en tly re ga rd ed lakovlev as on e of th e le ad er s of th e ''te rro ris t'' activity an d su gg es ted Iakovlev wa s in to uc h wi th Trotsky. GRINKO: In th e ev en t of success th e or ga ni za tio n inte nd ed to se t up a bo ur ge oi s Ukrainian sta te af te r th e ty pe of th e fascist sta te. Ab ou t th is ch ar ac te r of th e or ga ni za tio n I to ld a pr om in en t m em be r of th e Right an d Tr ot sk yi te conspiracy, Yakovlev. In th e Right an d Tr ot sk yi te circles wi th wh om I ha d occasion to sp ea k, th is te nd en cy to

14

Fo r a discussion of Stalin's str ugg le in favor of con tes ted elections (as stip ula ted in the 1936 Constitution), Stalin's final defeat, and many specific ref ere nce s to the res ear ch of Iur ii Zhukov and oth ers , see Grover Furr, "Stalin and the Struggle for Democratic Reform,'' Par ts One and Two, in Cultural Logic 200 5, htt p:/ /cl ogi c.e ser ver .or g/2 005 /20 05. htm l

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tra nsf orm ou r org ani zat ion int o a fas cis t typ e of org aniz atio n und oub ted ly exi ste d. (1938 Trial, 71) By ''fascist'' - ear lie r in his tes tim ony he had cal led it ''na tio nal -

fascist'' - Gri n'k o me ant tha t the Uk rai nia n Na tio nal ist org ani zatio ns out sid e the Sov iet Union had bec om e org ani zed in a fas cis t ma nne r and we re un der eit her Ge rm an or Pol ish nat ion ali st lea ders hip . Th e fas cis t nat ure of Uk rai nia n nat ion alis m dur ing the inter wa r per iod has lon g bee n rec ogn ize d.ts GRINKO: Gra dua lly ext end ing my con nec tio ns wit h the Rig ht and Tro tsk yit e cen tre , and hav ing asc ertai ned wh o bel ong ed to it, I at the beg inn ing of 19 34 for me d an opi nio n of wh at the ''Ri ght and Tro tsk yit e cen tre '' wa s. Fro m a nu mb er of con ver sat ion s and con nec tio ns, and the tas ks I rec eiv ed fro m Rykov, Bu kha rin , Ga ma rni k, Ro sen gol tz, Yakovlev, Antipov, Ru dzu tak , Yagoda, Vareik is, and a nu mb er of oth er per son s, it bec am e cle ar to me tha t at tha t tim e the ''Right and Tro tsk yit e cen ter '' bas ed itse lf ma inl y on the mil itar y aid of agg res sor s. (76 ) o

I

e

VYSHINSKY: Tel l us abo ut the ter ror ist act ivit ies . GRINKO: At tha t per iod ter ror ist act ivi ties we re one of the ma in we apo ns in the com mo n ars ena l of stru ggl e aga ins t the Sov iet pow er. VYSHINSKY: Fro m wh om did you lea rn thi s?

ts See Alexander J. Motyl. The Turn To The Right: The Ideological Origins And Development Of Ukrainian Nationalism, 191 9-19 29. Boulder, CO / New York: Eas t Eur ope an Qua rter ly/ Columbia University Press, 198 0. The re is a larg e and rapi dly grow ing bod y of rese arch on fascist Ukrainian Nationalism. See Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe, Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist: Fascism, Genocide, and Cult. New York: Ibid em Pres s, 201 4.

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GRINKO: Fr om Rykov, Yakovlev, G am ar ni k an d Py at ak ov . • • •

VYSHINSKY: W he re di d th is te rr or is t lin k em an at e from? GRINKO: Fr om T ro ts ky . I le ar ne d th is fr om Gamarnik. (77) 0

I

•

In ca rr yi ng ou t th e sa bo ta ge m ea su re s an d sa bo ta ge in st ru ct io ns in th e financing of ag ri cu lt ur e, no lit tle assi st an ce w as re nd er ed by R ud zu ta k, w ho w as in ch ar ge of financial affairs in th e Council of Pe op le 's C om m is sa rs , an d by Yakovlev. (8 0) Grin'ko's co nf es si on co rr ob or at es th at of Iakovlev. T he re w ou ld se em to be lit tle po in t in ''c oo rd in at in g' ' co nf es si on s at th e pu bl ic March 19 38 tr ia l w it h a co nf es si on - Iakovlev's - th at w as se cr et an d ne ve r in te nd ed to be pu bl is he d at all.

Interrogations o f Nikolai I. Vavilov We ha ve fu rt he r ev id en ce co nc er ni ng la ko vl ev fr om th e in ve st ig ative m at er ia ls of Nikolai I. Vavilov, a pr om in en t So vi et bi ol og is t w ho w as ar re st ed , tr ie d an d im pr is on ed in 19 40 for his cl an de sti ne pa rt ic ip at io n in an an ti- So vi et co ns pi ra cy in th e ea rl y 19 30 s. B es t kn ow n for hi s feud w it h Trofim Lysenko an d as a ch am pi on of Mendelian genetics, Vavilov's re pu ta ti on as a sc ie nt is t w as hi gh in hi s ow n da y an d ha s in cr ea se d since. It w as lo ng as su m ed th at hi s ar re st an d co nv ic tio n w as really a sc re en fo r re pr es si ng his scientific view. B ut ac co rd in g to ar ch iv al ev id en ce re le as ed si nc e th e en d of th e USSR th is w as no t th e case. Like lakovlev, Vavilov ha s lo ng si nc e be en ''r eh ab ili ta te d. " How ever, th at do es no t m ea n th at he w as no t gu ilt y or th at hi s confes si on s ha ve be en re fu te d. In th em he im pl ic at ed Iakovlev.

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Question: You have been arres ted as an active participant of an antis ovie t orga nizat ion and as an agen t of foreign intelligence services. Do you adm it your guilt to these charg es?

Answer: I adm it myse lf guilty in that since 1930 I have been a mem ber of an antis oviet orga nizat ion of Rightists that exist ed in the syste m of the Peop le's Commissaria t of Agri cultu re of the USSR. I do not confess myself guilty of espionage.

Question: Bear in mind that you will not succ eed in keep ing your espio nage activity hidd en and that the inves tigat ion will inter roga te you abou t it, but for now confess with who m you have been conn ected in the antis ovie t work .

Answer: In antis ovie t work I have been conn ected with the following perso ns: Yakovlev, form er Peop le's Com miss ar for Agriculture, Chernov, form er Peop le's Com miss ar for Agriculture, Eikhe, form er Peop le's Com miss ar for Agriculture, Muralov, form er viceCom miss ar for Agriculture, Gaister, form er viceCom miss ar for Agriculture .... 16 Vavilov mad e a diffe renti ated confession. Accused of havin g spied for foreign intelligence services, he refus ed to adm it it. But he did admi t parti cipat ing in a Rightist anti-Soviet orga nizat ion with in the People's Com miss ariat of Agriculture throu ghou t the tenu res of five comm issar s. The fact that Vavilov conf essed to one capit al charge whil e refus ing to confess to anot her make s his confession appe ar more reliable. A likely expla natio n for such a confession is the desir e to tell the truth .

IAkov Rokitianskif et al. Sud palacha. Nikolai Vavilov v zastenkakh NKVD. Biograficheskii ocherk, dokument;y. Moscow: Academia, 1999. Transcript of the interrogation of the arrestee Nikolai Ivanovlch Vavilov of August 24 1940, 269-70. (Vavilov)

16

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Tr ots ky 's Conspiracies

The commissars he na m es as Rightist co ns pi ra to rs include lakovlev an d Eikhe. Eikhe too wa s executed for massive illegal executions an d re pr es sio ns in collaboration wi th Ezhov.

Question: You have ad m itt ed yo ur guilt in th at from 19 30 yo u have be en a pa rti ci pa nt in an an tis ov ie t organization of Rightists th at has existed in th e system of th e People's Commissariat of Agriculture of th e USSR. Tell us by wh om an d un de r wh at circumstances you

we re re cr ui te d into th e aforesaid organization.

Answer: I wa s re cr ui te d to th e anti-Soviet organization by th e fo rm er People's Commissar for Agriculture of th e USSR YAKOVLEV Yakov Arkad'evich in 1930. The process of re cr ui tm en t took place th ro ug h my receiving, directly from YAKOVLEV, an d also from him via GAISTER Aron Izrailovich - fo rm er vice-president of th e agricultural academy an d VOL'F Moisei Mikhailovich - se co nd vice-president of the agricultural academic - obvious or de rs for sabotage, which I carrie d ou t in th e agricultural academy an d in th e Institu te of Pl an t Development.11 Question: It is no t clear wh y YAKOVLEV re cr ui te d you to th e an tis ov ie t organization. W ha t was his basis for doing this? Answer: During th e process of m y carrying ou t YAKOVLEV's directives he became aw ar e of m y antisoviet se nt im en ts which, at th e beginning, w er e m os t clearly ex pr es se d in th e high evaluation th at I gave to American an d W es te rn European agricultural methods an d my emphasizing th ei r su pe rio rit y in compari-

17

Vavilov has long since bee n "rehabilitated" and thi s Institute, still in existence in Russia, is nam ed in his honor.

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son with the development of agriculture in the Soviet Union. (Transcript of interrogation of August 27-28, 1940. Vavilov, 271-2) Unquestionably it was also the fact that I carried out every assignment given me by YAKOVLEV that facilitated my being drawn into the antisoviet organization.

Question: And in what form was your conversation with YAKOVLEV concerning your participation in the antisoviet organization of Rightists? Answer: There was no direct conversation about this. I unders tood him by the obvious assignments of sabotage that I received from YAKOVLEV. Question: Why do you conclude that it was precisely YAKOVLEV who recruited you to the antisoviet organization of Rightists? Answer: I conclude that because it was precisely from this period - my carrying out YAKOVLEV's directives that my obvious work of sabotage begins in the organization of science and in that of plant culture in the sense of justifying plant culture projects. Question: You have confessed that you were recruited to the antisoviet organization of Rightists by YAKOVLEV and at the same time declare that you never had any direct conversation with YAKOVLEV about this organization. You are either confusing or simply do not wish to say that even before your introduction into the organization of Rightists you were one of the ideologues and leaders of the antisoviet organization about which you are now remaining silent. (Transcript of interrogation of August 28-29, 1940. Vavilov, 2734)

In these passages Vavilov claims that he collaborated in lakovlev's Rightist organization withou t having been specifically recruited to

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it. This confuses his interrogator, who does no t un de rs ta nd ho w Iakovlev could have been a m em be r w it ho ut ha vi ng been specifically recruited to it an d also ho w he could st at e th at he ha d been

recruited (zaverbovan) by Iakovlev an d ye t ne ve r have spoken with lakovlev ab ou t th e organization. The in te rr og at or draws the obvious conclusion from this apparently contradictory assertion by Vavilov th at th e accused m us t be hiding something. Something is missing th at if added would make se ns e of Vavilov's contradictory story. Vavilov gives fuller details in the following passage, stating th at he and Iakovlev had a mutual understanding, an d th at Iakovlev spoke to him in hints and allusions ra th er th an speaking directly of conspiracies an d organizations.

Question: You confessed earlier th at YAKOVLEV recruited you into the antisoviet organization, that, supposedly, he ne ve r ha d any direct conversations with you ab ou t this. W e demand th at you make yo ur confession more precise. Answer: I confirm th e fact th at I was re cr ui te d into the antisoviet organization of Rightists by YAKOVLEV Yakov Arkad'evich. However, YAKOVLEV ne ve r explicitly said th at I should take pa rt in an antisoviet organization, an d th er e was no special need for hi m to do so, since YAKOVLEV knew my antisoviet views, ab ou t which I confessed in previous interrogations, and could confidently rely on me to carry ou t antisoviet work. In addition I enjoyed YAKOVLEV'S pa rt ic ul ar tr us t, an d he himself told me many times: ''We know you well - we tr us t you, and for th at reason I demand you carry ou t my directives w it ho ut objection." To m y fr eq ue nt declarations ab ou t m y desire to leave m y leading administrative w or k in th e Agricultural Academy YAKOVLEV answered: ''We will no t le t you go, w e need you, we un de rs ta nd each other." (Transcript of interrogation of August 30-31, 1940. Vavilov, 278-84)

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However, in the following passage Vavilov does give specific details about the sabotage of certain agricultural undertakings he was ordered to accomplish by lakovlev.

Answer: One of the basic undertakings of sabotage carried out with my direct participation upon YAKOVLEV'S orders was the creation of a great superfluity of narrowly specialized scientific .. research institutes that were of absolutely no vital importance ... The next sabotage action of significance that was carried out with my direct participation upon YAKOVLEV'S order and whose consequences may still be felt today was the collapse of the provincial [oblast1 network of experimental pasture-farmi ng stations, the assignment of which under conditions of socialist reconstruction and the wide variation of climate conditions and soils in our country is of great importance, .. Besides that I directly participated in the development of deliberately harmful plans of plant culture during the First and Second Five-Year Plans. I carried out this sabotage work according to the direct order of the former People's Commissar for Agriculture YAKOVLEV Y.A. and the former vice-presiden ts of the agricultural academy VOL'F M.M., GAISTER A.I .... Despite this I was given a directive by YAKOVLEV, through VOL'F, of expanding the compulsory plan of area to be sown in 1937of150 million hectares, which, it was clear, did not correspond to the possibilities at that time... (Transcript of interrogation of September 5-7, 1940. Vavilov, 284-288)

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Analysis o f Vavilov's Confessions T he se co nf es si on s of Vavilov's, at le as t in so fa r as th ey im pl ic at e Iakovlev, ap p ea r co m pl et el y cr ed ib le . T he re is no re as on th at th e NKVD in ve st ig at or s w ou ld ha ve w an te d Vavilov to fa br ic at e te st im on y ag ai ns t Iakovlev, w ho by th at ti m e h ad lo ng si nc e be en execu te d. By 19 40 , w he n Vavilov w as in te rr og at ed , Ezhov an d his m en to o ha d lo ng si nc e be en ar re st ed , tr ie d, an d ex ec ut ed fo r fa br ic at in g false ca se s ag ai ns t a ve ry la rg e n u m b er of pe op le , an d B er ia w as no w in ch ar ge of th e NKVD. D ur in g B er ia 's te nu re th e ca se s ag ai ns t la rg e nu m be rs of pe op le falsely ac cu se d u n d er Ezh ov w er e re vi ew ed , an d m an y of th e vi ct im s re le as ed . Here, as vi rt ua ll y ev er yw he re in hi st or y, th er e is no su ch th in g as ''a bs ol ut e pr oo f' ' - all ev id en ce ca n be in te rp re te d in m ul ti pl e w ay s -- an d th er ef or e no ''certainty." But th e fact th at th er e ar e many pi ec es of ci rc um st an ti al ev id en ce , all of w hi ch im pl ic at e Ia kovlev, su gg es ts th at Ia ko vl ev w as n o t lying in his co nf es si on an d ne it he r w as hi s wife. F ur th er m or e, la ko vl ev 's te st im on y is br oa dl y consiste n t w it h th e co nf es si on s of many of th e Moscow T ri al s defenda nt s, of th e T uk ha ch ev sk y Affair de fe nd an ts , an d th e ev id en ce w e ha ve ci te d ab ov e. A cc or di ng to th e vo lu m e w e ha ve be en ci ti ng Vavilov's in te rr og ato rs cl ai m ed in a re p o rt th at th ey ha d ca rr ie d o u t 24 0 in te rr og ati on s of Vavilov th at oc cu pi ed 10 00 ho ur s. Vavilov hi m se lf cl ai m ed in a le tt er da te d April 25, 19 42 , to Beria, w ho w as he ad of th e NKVD at th e ti m e, th at he ha d be en su bj ec te d to 40 0 in te rr og ati on s th at to ok 17 00 ho ur s! Such ti m e- co ns um in g an d th er ef or e ex pe ns iv e in ve st ig at io ns be sp ea k a ge nu in e at te m p t to find ou t th e tr ut h. No su ch ti ta ni c ef fo rt s ar e re qu ir ed ei th er to fa br ic at e an en ti re ly false se t of co nf es si on s or to co m pe l a m id dl e- ag ed acade m ic to fa br ic at e th em himself. M or eo ve r, w h en it w as all compl et ed an d Vavilov h ad be en co nv ic te d NKVD ch ie f L av re nt ii Beria ac ce de d to Vavilov's re qu es t for clemency. T he sc ie nt is t w as in th e pr oc es s of be in g m ov ed to th e E as t ah ea d of th e G er m an m il it ar y ad va nc e w he n he di ed on Ja nu ar y 26, 19 43 .

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Confession of lakovlev's Wife In 200 4 a sho rt exc erp t from just one of the inte rrog atio ncon fess ions of Sokolovskaia, Iakovlev's wife, was pub lish ed. This cor resp ond s exa ctly to the tim e Iakovlev him self was und er inte rrogation. In his own con fess ion lako vlev said tha t he had coll abo rate d wit h Ian Gamarnik, hea d of the Political Dep artm ent of the Red Army who had com mit ted suic ide on May 30, 193 7, whe n que stio ned abo ut the Tuk hac hev sky conspiracy. lako vlev nam ed his wife as a frie nd of Gam arni k's family. She wor ked in the film stud io Mosfilm. According to a rep ort to Stalin from Ezhov of April 30, 193 8, Sokolov skai a hea ded a Tro tsky ist org aniz atio n at her wor kpl ace tha t obta ined wea pon s for a plan ned upri sing .is Stalin's rem ark s on Iakovlev's inte rrog atio n-co nfes sion , quo ted above, are date d ''no late r than Oct obe r 20, 193 7'' (Lu bian ka 193 7193 8 No. 227 , p. 396 ). Iakovlev's wife Elen a Kirillovna Sokolovskaia was arre sted on Oct obe r 12, 193 7. On Oct obe r 17 she com pos ed a ''special com mun icat ion' ' to NKVD hea d Nikolai Ezhov in whi ch she con fess ed to kno wle dge of her hus ban d's Tro tsky ist activities. lako vlev has bee n a Tro tsky ist sinc e 192 3. Alr ead y in 192 3 he was taki ng par t in the stru ggle aga inst the Par ty on Tro tsky 's side. Dur ing this per iod he was con nec ted wit h a gro up of active Tro tsky ists Voron sky , El'tsin, Pop ov N.N., Mikhailov, and too k an active par t in the frac tion al mee ting s of the gro up ... Dur ing the pas t five yea rs lako vlev has take n an acti ve role in the und erg rou nd anti -So viet org aniz atio n tha t stoo d on Tro tsky ist pos itio ns. He was in an espe cial ly con spir ator ial pos itio n, acte d wit h hyp ocri sy in ord er

Lubianka 1937 ·1938 No. 323, pp. 529- 30. Now onlin e at http: //www .alex ande ryak ovlev .org/ fond /issu es-do c/ 6134 2. ta

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to str eng the n his position in Party wo rk while trying to move tow ard s the leadership of the Party. Along with Iakovlev, Vareikis and Bauman played an active role in this und erg rou nd organization ... Iakovlev wa s in anti-Party contact with the leader of the military conspiracy, Gamarnik. Through Gamarnik he maintained contact with Piatakov, who hea ded the Trotskyist und erg rou nd ... My guilt is even gre ate r because aft er the exposure of Gamarnik, Iakir, Popov N.N., who we re connected in counterrevolutionary wo rk wit h lakovlev, Bauman,

and Vareikis, I did not have the courage to tea r myself away from this counterrevolutionary filth, go to the Party, and expose this gang of enemies of the Party and the people. (Lubianka 1937-1938, 398-9). But she was to face far more serious charges. By April 1938 at least one of her coworkers in Mosfilm had nam ed her as the leader of a clandestine Trotskyist group in tha t organization. SLIVKIN ... confessed tha t he took an active par t in counterrevolutionary Tro tsk yis t activity, and tha t one of the serious und erg rou nd organizations un der his leadership wa s established at the ''Mosfilm'' cinema studio. SLIVKIN confessed tha t the organization's main lea der wa s SOKOLOVSKAIA (wife of IAKOVLEV) and BABITSKY, the director of the studio. SLIVKIN confessed tha t the organization was connected in counterrevolutionary wo rk wit h GAMARNIK and EIDEMAN. Upon the directives of GAMARNIK and EIDEMAN the Trotskyist organization at the ''Mosfilm'' cinema studio, un der the guise of working with Osoaviakhim, organized in 1935 a shooting range of a

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military type to prepare the leaders of the units that would be in the uprising. (Lubianka 1937-1938, 529) Both Stasova and Kirsanova, both prominent Old Bolsheviks, must have been investigated. On November 11, 1937, Stalin privately told Dimitrov: We shall probably arrest Stasova, too. Turned out she's scum. Kirsanova is very closely involved with Yakovlev. She's scum." (Dimitrov 69) On November 16, 1937, Dimitrov noted ''Resolution on the dismissals of Kirsanova and Stasova." In Stasova's case this meant dismissal from her post as Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of MOPR and Chair of the Central Committee of the Soviet

MOPR. Yet neither Stasova nor Kirsanova was arrested, much less repressed. This must mean that Stalin's serious suspicions against them were not borne out by investigation. The investigation into their cases must have been an objective one, rather than a frameup or one that simply aimed to invent ''evidence'' to sustain Stalin's suspicions. And that not only suggests that the investigations of at least some prominent Bolsheviks were carried out in a proper manner. It means that, whatever his suspicions, Stalin wanted to know the truth.19 Stalin's note complains that the interrogator did not ask the right questions of Sokolovskaia: On the first page is a handwritten annotation: ''Com. Ezhov: Which Mikhailov? They didn't even ask his name and patronymic ... what fine investigators! What's important is not lakovlev's and Sokolovskaia's past activity but their sabotage and espionage work during the past year and the recent months of 1937.

19

We discuss this, with references, in a chapter in the third volume of this work.

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We als o ne ed to kn ow wh y bo th of the se sco un dre ls we re go ing ab ro ad alm os t ev ery ye ar. J. Stalin." (Lubianka 19 37 -19 38 , 39 9 n.)20 He re as in the cas e of Iak ov lev 's int err og ati on Sta lin ha s an no tat ed the int err og ati on in su ch a wa y as to rul e ou t an y su gg est ion tha t he ha d or de red it fab ric ate d or faked. He wa s att em pti ng to lea rn from the int err og ati on ho w de ep the co ns pir ac y ran . Th is is evide nc e tha t the int err og ati on wa s ge nu ine . As su ch , it is als o evide nc e tha t Iak ov lev 's int err og ati on wa s no t faked, an d the ref ore tha t Iakovlev's confession ab ou t Sh mu ke an d Tr ots ky 's co nta cts wi th the Nazis is als o tru e. W ha t co nc ern ed Sta lin wa s no t the his tor y of Iak ov lev 's dis loy alt y bu t recent ma tte rs. ''The pa st ye ar an d the rec en t mo nth s of 19 37 '' ha d se en the Tu kh ac he vs ky co ns pir ac y of top mi lit ary lea de rs spying for Germany, plu s all eg ati on s of wi de sp rea d co ns pir ato ria l activity on the sid e of Ge rm an y an d Japan. This too is co ns ist en t wi th the fact tha t Stalin ge nu ine ly be lie ve d tha t Iak ov lev rea lly did consp ire wi th Ge rm an y.

lakovlev's ''Rehabilitation'' Aside fro m the co nfe ssi on we cite he re no ne of the inv est iga tiv e or co urt ma ter ial s from Iak ov lev 's file ha ve ev er be en ma de public. We do ha ve the rep or t (zapiska, or me mo ran du m, sh or ter an d/ or les s for ma l tha n a full rep ort ) rec om me nd ing Iak ov lev be po sth umo us ly ''re ha bil ita ted '' da ted De ce mb er 27, 19 56 , an d sig ne d by Ro ma n Ru de nk o, Ge ne ral Pr oc uro r (P ros ec uto r) of the USSR.21 It de cla res lak ov lev inn oc en t bu t wi tho ut giving an y ev ide nc e wh atsoever tha t he wa s, in fact, inn oc en t. It is sim ila r to ma ny oth er su ch pu bli sh ed ''re ha bil ita tio n'' rep ort s fro m the Kh rus hc he v an d

Online at http ://ist ma t.in fo/n ode /32 388 . Also at http ://w ww .ale xan der yak ovl ev. org /fon d/is sue s-d oc/ 612 11. Sta lin' s rem ark s alo ne are in Vol. 18 of the new edi tion of Sta lin' s wo rks ; onl ine at http ://g rac hev 62. nar od. ru/s tali n/t1 8/t1 8_0 65. htm . 2o

21

RKEB2 (20 03) No. 30, pp. 215 -21 6; not e 41 on p. 808 .

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Gorbachev eras. Elsewhere we have studied a number of these obviously fraudulent ''reports." We have no evidence that lakovlev was tortured, beaten, etc. Nor would it explain why Iakovlev confessed at trial. We know he did so because, among other evidence, even Rudenko's ''zapiska'' says he did - the full transcript of his trial has not been declassified: Thus lakovlev admitted his guilt in the commission of counterrevolu tionary crimes, affirmed both during the preliminary investigation and at his trial that he, supposedly, had recruited to the counterrevolu tionary organization of Rights Vareikis, Mikhailov, Gegechkori, Tsyl'ko, Tokarev, Polovinkin, Sidel'nikov, losifov, and Odintsov, and was also supposedly in contact in the anti-Soviet activity with Postyshev, Rudzutak, Bubnov, Gamarnik, Rukhimovich, Antipov, Sulimov, Komarov, Bauman, Popov, Goloded, and others, in all more than 100 persons. However, all the testimony of these men against others was then dismissed as false on the grounds that they had previously been ''rehabilitated ," i.e., declared innocent. Since no affirmative evidence of Iakovlev's innocence was provided, this must mean that Rudenko's men could not find any, and could only find evidence of his guilt. This is one sign of the fraudulent nature of this ''rehabilitation."22 Probably another such sign is that this 1956 report, in order to support Iakovlev's ''rehabilitation ," said that lakovlev was a member of the ''Rights'' rather than of the ''Trotskyists." In 1956 Khrushchev and his men were looking with favor on the Rights but Trotskyists were still viewed with great hostility. Had Rudenko's report been truthful that Iakovlev had been a Trotskyist, they would not have been able to ''rehabilitate'' him.

22

See Grover Furr, Khrushchev Lied, Chapter 11.

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Th e me mo ran dum als o dec lar es tha t NKVD man ''Kazakevich," wh o had tak en par t in the inv est iga tio n of lak ovl ev, had sai d - eviden tly in 195 6 - tha t ''m eth ods of phy sic al pre ssu re'' we re use d aga ins t Iakovlev. His tes tim ony is not ava ilab le. Even his nam e is not cer tain . No firs t nam e and pat ron ym ic are giv en. An NKVD man nam ed KQzakevich is one of two inv est iga tor s wh o sig ned the confes sio n of lak ovl ev tha t we hav e exa min ed. ''M eth ods of phy sic al pre ssu re'' can me an alm ost any thi ng, fro m rea l tor tur e - bea tin gs, for exa mp le - to the ''th ird deg ree ," pro lon ged sle epl ess nes s, and so on. Bu t lak ovl ev con fes sed wit hin two day s of his arr est , so the re wa s no tim e for any pro lon ged pre ssur e. Mo reo ver , the fac t tha t a sus pec t wa s sub jec ted to som e kin d of ''ph ysi cal pre ssu re'' is not evi den ce of tha t sus pec t's inn oce nce . It is dou btf ul tha t Ezh ov wo uld hav e dar ed to fab ric ate a false cas e aga ins t som eon e as clo se to Sta lin as Iak ovl ev, wh o mo st rec ent ly wo rke d wit h Sta lin on the new con stit uti on. Aft er all, Ezh ov cou ld no t hav e kno wn in adv anc e tha t Sta lin wo uld no t cho ose to int ervie w Iak ovl ev him sel f, and tha t Iak ovl ev wo uld no t inf orm on Ezhov to Sta lin if he had bee n for ced to inc rim ina te himself. And, as we 've not ed abo ve, Sta lin' s com me nts on the int err oga tio ns of Iakovl ev and his wif e are no t con sis ten t wit h any the ory tha t Sta lin wa s inv olv ed wit h Ezhov, or at all, in ''fra min g'' Iak ovl ev for som e rea son .

Ch ap ter 3. Tu kh ac he vs Tu kha che vsk y and the Military Leaders Much of the evid enc e we pre sen t con cern ing Tro tsky 's coll abo ration wit h Ger man y and /or Japa n com es from the inve stig ativ e materi als con nec ted wit h the so-c alle d ''Tu kha che vsk y Affair." On Jun e 11, 193 7, Mar sha l Mikhail Tuk hac hev sky , one of only five mar sha ls of the Red Army, and sev en oth er ver y high -ran king military com man der s wer e trie d and con vict ed of coll abo rati on wit h Tro tsky , oth er opp osit ioni sts, Ger man y, and /or Jap an to brin g abo ut the ove rthr ow of the Stal in gov ernm ent, the assa ssin atio n of its lead ing mem ber s, the faci litat ion of war betw een the USSR and its maj or ene mie s Ger man y, Japan, and Pola nd, seiz ure of pow er, reve rsio n to cap itali sm, and an allia nce wit h the Axis cou ntri es.

Budennyi's Letter to Voroshilov One of the judg es at the spe cial mil itar y cou rt was Mar sha l Sem ion Bud enn yi. On Jun e 26, 193 7, Bud enn yi sen t a lett er to Com mis sar for Def ense Klim ent Vor osh ilov in whi ch he outl ined his imp ression s of the tria l and wha t it mea nt. As we stud ied it in mor e deta il in volu me one , Trotsky's 'Amalgams,' we will only con side r it brie fly here . This lett er has bee n dish one stly quo ted out of con text by sev eral Rus sian wri ters , as will be seen . For exa mpl e, amo ng the line s tha t hav e bee n quo ted is this sen tenc e: PRIMAKQVl ver y stub bor nly den ied tha t he led a terrori st gro up con sist ing of SHMIDT, KUZ'MICHEV and othe rs, aga inst com. VOROSHILOV.

Vitalii Primakov was one of the eight officers tried and executed In June 1937 in the "Tukhachevsky Affair."

1

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Trot sky's Conspiracies

Wh at has always bee n omi tted are the following pas sag es whi ch follow imm edia tely afte r the sen tenc e abo ve: He den ied this on the bas is that , he said , TROTSKY had ent rus ted him , PRIMAKOV, wit h a mo re seri ous task to org ani ze an arm ed upr isin g in Leningrad, for whi ch pur pos e he, PRIMAKOV, was obli ged to rem ain stri ctly secret from all terr oris t gro ups , to bre ak his ties with all Tro tsky ists and Rights and at the sam e tim e to win for him self auth orit y and the abs olut e trus t of the Par ty and the Arm y com man d.

PRIMAKOV did not, how eve r, den y tha t he had ind eed earl ier led a terr oris t gro up and for tha t pur pos e had reco mm end ed SHMIDT to the pos t of com man der of the mec han ized corp s. By mea ns of the omi ssio n of thes e para grap hs, a pas sag e in whi ch Prim ako v con fess ed to a som ewh at diff eren t role in the sam e con spir acy is mad e to app ear to be a claim of inno cen ce tha t imp lies Prim ako v was ''fra med .'' Thi s is the sam e tech niqu e tha t we hav e see n emp loye d by She lepi n in mis quo ting laki r's lett er to the 22nd Par ty Con gres s in 196 2, disc usse d in a pre vio us cha pter .

Ano ther pas sag e in Bud enn yi's lett er reve als tha t Tuk hac hev sky had test ifie d tha t the Ger man Luf twa ffe was pre par ed to com e to the aid of the opp osit ion upr isin g in Len ingr ad. Tuk hac hev sky rece ived an inst ruc tion from Gen eral RUMSHTET2 tha t the plan for sab otag ing the Red Arm y sho uld take into acc oun t the mos t likely dire ction s of the mai n blow s of the Ger man arm ies: one aga inst the Ukr aine - Lvov, Kiev - and the othe rs, the seiz ure of Len ingr ad by the rebe ls, som ethi ng tha t wou ld be ver y ben efic ial to Ger man y as it cou ld ren-

2

Presumably, from context, General Gerd von Rundstedt, later a Field Marshal. See http: //de. wiki pedi a.org /wik i/ Rund stedt .

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der help to the rebels with its rather signific ant air force, which ought to adverti se itself as forces coming over to the rebels from the side of the Soviet forces. We know from anothe r archiva l docum ent, Marsha l Vorosh ilov's addres s to the ''Aktiv'' (officers directly attache d) of the Commissariat of Defens e on June 9, 1937, that this inform ation stems from Putna's confession.3 It concer ns what he was told by Germa n General Erhard Milch, one of the highes t ranking comma nders of the Germa n Luftwa ffe.4 Readin g from an undate d confess ion by Putna, Vorosh ilov stated the following: [Germa n Air Force General] Milch directly states - I ask you to say this to Karakh an, also a spy since 1927 who carried out the negotia tions on behalf of these swine - Milch directly states... : ''If you can capture Lening rad, the Lening rad oblast', you can count on serious help from our side and, mainly, on help from our air force, under the guise of forces that have gone over to you from the legal govern ment. We will give you our air forces in signific ant quantit ies with our own crews. ''And," declare d Milch, ''we will be able to render you all this help in the Lening rad area becaus e this area has a border with Finland with which we, he said, have excelle nt relation s." This ties Primak ov's testimo ny about Trotsk y's role in plannin g an uprisin g in Lening rad togethe r with the project ed Germa n role in the same uprisin g. A numbe r of other defend ants, both militar y

Some years ago we obtained a partial transcrip t of this address ofVoroshilov's from a fellow researche r in Moscow. It is now published: Voennyi sovet pri Narodnom Komissare Oborony SSSR.1·4 iiunia193 7 g. Dokumenty i Materialy. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2008, pp. 367423. Voroshilov's quotation from an as yet unpublished confession by Putna concerning General Milch is on pp. 384-5 of this published edition.

3

4

See the article on Milch at http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erhard_Milch.

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and civilian, confessed to discussions w ith German generals including von R un ds te dt and Milch. In a se gm en t from an interrogation of May 21, 1937, Primakov said: .. . The bloc of Trotskyists an d Rights an d th e organization of th e common tr ai to ro us anti-Soviet military conspiracy led to th e union of all th e counterrevolutio na ry forces within th e (Workers' an d Pe as an ts ') Red Army .. . This anti-Soviet political bloc an d milita ry conspiracy, personally he ad ed by th e ba se fascist Trotsky, .. . s Budennyi also re po rte d, incidentally, th at th e military figures w er e no t planning to ac ce pt th e leadership of Trotsky or th e Rights for ve ry long.

. . . KORK confessed th at he w as aw ar e th at th e leaders of th e military-fascist co un te rr ev ol ut io na ry organization re ga rd ed th ei r ties to Trotsky an d th e Rights as a te m po ra ry situation. TUKHACHEVSKY ha d spoken to KORK to th e effect th at the Trotskyists, Rights et al. w er e only te m po ra ry fellow-travelers, an d w he n th e ar m ed coup ha d be en effected he, TUKHACHEVSKY would play th e role of Bonaparte. And on November 29, 1934, according to KORK's confession, TUKHACHEVSKY, in Kork's ap ar tm en t, ha d st at ed this unequivocally to all those present.

Colonel V ik to r Alksnis and the Transcript o f the Tukhachevsky Trial The tr an sc ri pt of th e June 11, 1937, tri al of Tukhachevsky an d th e se ve n ot he r co m m an de rs has never be en m ad e public. Its te xt is

5

lulia Kantor. Voina i Mir Mikhaila Tukhachevskogo. Moscow: Izdatel'skli Dom Ogoniok "Vremia", 20 05 , 37 4. (K an tor Voina)

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still so top-sec ret in Russia that no researc her, no matter how trusted , is allowe d to read it today. But in 1990, shortly before the end of the USSR General Viktor Alksnis, militar y leader, membe r of the Duma (Soviet Parliam ent), and grands on of one of the judges at this 1937 militar y trial, was given permis sion by the KGB (successor to the MVD - NKVD) to read the transcr ipt. Perhap s the KGB though t Alksnis would be sympa thetic to the story that the militar y men had been framed. After all his own grandfa ther, Koman darm 2nd rank (=Lieuten ant General) Iakov I. Alksnis had been arreste d in Novem ber 1937 and then tried and execute d as a conspi rator in July 1938, only month s after he had served as one of the judges in the militar y panel that judged Tukhachev sky and the rest. Instead Alksnis, intervi ewed in a Russian journa l in 2000 and again by researc her Vladimir L. Bobrov shortly afterwa rds, said that reading the trial transcr ipt had forced him to reverse his opinion. He is now convin ced that the conspi racy had in fact taken place. From the intervi ew in the journal Elemen ty in 2000: My grandf ather and Tukhac hevsky were friends. And grandf ather was on the judicial panel that judged both Tukhac hevsky and Eideman. My interes t in this case became even strong er after the well-kn own publications of [forme r] Procur or Viktorov, who wrote that Iakov Alksnis was very active at the trial, harass ed the accuse d .... But in the trial transcr ipt everyth ing was just the opposite. Grandf ather only asked two or three questio ns during the entire trial. But the strange st thing is the behavi or of the accused. Newsp aper accoun ts [of the Gorbachev-era - GF] claim that all the defend ants denied their guilt completely. But accord ing to the transcript they fully admitt ed their guilt. I realize that an admiss ion of guilt itself can be the result of torture . But in the transcr ipt it was someth ing else entirely: a huge amoun t of detail, long dialogues, accusa tions of

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on e an oth er, an d a ma ss of pre cis ion . It's sim ply impo ssi ble to sta ge -m an ag e so me thi ng lik e thi s ... . I kn ow no thi ng ab ou t the na tur e of the co ns pir ac y. Bu t of the fac t tha t the re rea lly did ex ist a co ns pir ac y wi thi n the Re d Ar my an d tha t Tu kh ac he vs ky pa rti cipa ted in it I am co mp let ely co nv inc ed tod ay . e

I

0

It ap pe ars as tho ug h ba ck the re, in the 19 30 s, the re sta nd s so me typ e of ''ca nn on '' tha t mi gh t be fir ed at us, at ou r tim es. An d the n ev ery thi ng co uld tur n ou t co mple tel y dif fer en tly . And in the me an tim e ... in the me an tim e a ce rta in co nc ep tio n of tho se ev en ts ha s be en cre ate d, an d ev ery thi ng is do ne to su sta in tha t co nc ep tio n. (Alksnis)

Bo ris Al ek see vic h Vi kto rov wa s a mi lit ary pr os ec uto r wh o ha d be en ass ign ed to res tud yin g the ca ses of mi lit ary me n co nv ict ed du rin g the 19 30 s an d of rec om me nd ing ''re ha bil ita tio ns. " His bo ok of me mo irs , Be z gr ifa ''sekretno. '' Zapiski voennogo prokurora (''S tam p of Se cre cy Re mo ve d: No tes of a Mi lita ry Pr os ec uto r'') wa s a ma jor wo rk in Mikhail Go rba ch ev 's ca mp aig n to ''re ha bil ita te' ' alm os t ev ery bo dy inv olv ed in the rep res sio ns of the 19 30 s. It wa s pu bli sh ed in an ed iti on of 20 0,0 00 copies, an en orm ou s pri nti ng for a no n-f ict ion bo ok . Vi kto rov als o pu bli sh ed an art icl e in the collec tio n Krovavy Marshal. Mikhail Tu kh ac he vsk y 18 93 -19 37 (S t Peter sb urg : KORONO-print, 19 97 ). It is in thi s art icl e tha t Vi kto rov cla im ed tha t Ge ne ral Ian Alksnis ''es pe cia lly '' ask ed the ac cu sed qu est ion s (16). Vi kto rov 's ac co un ts are ce rta inl y fra ud ule nt. Fo r ex am ple , he cla im s tha t the tra ns cri pt of the Tu kh ac he vs ky tri al ''co ns ist ed of on ly a few pa ge s in all." (14 ) Col. Alksnis de scr ibe s a ve ry len gth y tra ns cri pt. Ma ny oth er su ch pa ssa ge s in Vi kto rov 's wr iti ng s co nfir m tha t it is dis ho ne st. On Au gu st 13 , 20 00 Vl ad im ir L. Bo bro v int erv iew ed Col. Al ksn is ab ou t his rea din g of the Tu kh ac he vs ky tri al tra ns cri pt an d wh at

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abou t it forced him to chan ge his mind and conc lude that the military cons pirac y really had existed. Here are some exce rpts from this inter view : Alksnis: ... I turne d the pages of the trans cript and had more ques tions than answ ers. I came away with the impr essio n that, obviously, there had reall y been a cons pirac y.... But this is wha t struc k me: in the transcrip t there are parts whic h attes t to the since rity of wha t the defe ndan ts said (no matt er who claims that the trial was an orga nized show, that they work ed on the defe ndan ts especially so that they woul d give the nece ssary confessions.) Imagine this. Let's say, Tukhachevsky is telling abou t a meet ing with the German milit ary attac he in a dach a near Moscow ... and at that mom ent Prim akov inter rupts him and says ''Mikhail Nikolaevich, you are mistaken . This meet ing did not take place in your office at the dacha, but was on the veranda." I think that it woul d have been impo ssibl e to ''direct'' thing s such that Tukh ache vsky said preci sely that and that Prim akov woul d then make a corre ction like that. Bobrov: Very well. But was there anyth ing there that mad e you think that the trial had been scrip ted and direc ted anyw ay? Alksnis: No, it woul d have been impo ssibl e to scrip t and direc t a trial such as is in the trans cript . Bobrov: That is, you wish to state that, havin g read the trans cript , you did not find in it any trace s of any kind of staging? Alksnis: Yes, yes. On top of that all of them confessed, and when they all admi tted guilt in their last word s, stati ng that they had been parti cipan ts in the cons piracy and know ing that after that exec ution awai ted

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th em , it is ju st im po ss ib le to im ag in e th at th ey fo rc ed th em all to m ak e su ch ad m is si on s an d de cl ar at io ns . • • •

Bobrov: W ha t w as th e m ai n po in t of ac cu sa tio n of th e ''c on sp ira to rs ''? Alksnis: Ev er yt hi ng w as th er e: es pi on ag e, pr ep ar at io n fo r a m ili ta ry coup, sa bo ta ge [w re ck in g] .. .. Bobrov: An d w ha t do es ''e sp io na ge '' m ea n? You w er e ta lk in g ab ou t th e m ee tin g at th e da ch a .. .. Alksnis: Yes, yes, w ith th e German m ili ta ry at ta ch e. Th ey w er e ta lk in g ab ou t ar ra ng in g co or di na tio n w ith th e G er m an m ili ta ry , co nt ac ts w er e go in g on w ith th em .. .. Bobrov: One la st qu es tio n. In yo ur in te rv ie w w ith ''E le m en ty '' yo u ta lk ed ab ou t so m e ki nd of ''c an no n' ' th at m ig ht sh oo t at ou r ow n tim es fr om ba ck in th e 30 s. W ha t di d yo u ha ve in m in d? Alksnis: If an ob je ct iv e re se ar ch pr oj ec t on th e ev en ts of th os e ye ar s w er e to be done, fr ee of id eo lo gi ca l do gm as , th en a gr ea t de al co ul d ch an ge in ou r at tit ud e to w ar ds th os e ye ar s an d to w ar ds th e pe rs on al iti es of th at ep oc h. A nd so it w ou ld be a ''b om b' ' th at w ou ld ca us e so m e pr ob le m s.. .. (Bobrov)6

Assessing This Evidence It is no t su rp ri si ng th at th e tr an sc ri pt of th e Tu kh ac he vs ky tri al is to p ..se cr et on ce again. As fa r as w e can de te rm in e no one ha s be en

6

Vladimir L. Bobrov, "R ass ch lfr ov ka au dio zap isi be sed y s de pu tat om V.I. Al ksnisom." 13 av gu sta 20 00 g. Go sdu ma RF. 4 pp . My tha nk s to Vladimir Bo bro v for pro vid ing me wi th thi s tra nsc rip t.

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perm itted to read it since Alksnis. But we do have the Budennyi letter. It is by far the most direc t evidence of the testi mon y given at the trial that we have. Alksnis' two acco unts conf irm the accu racy of Budennyi's acco unt of the trial. For example, Alksnis confirms that the defe ndan ts confessed to all the charg es and in some detail, some thing that Bude nnyi 's lette r also state s. It woul d be hard to over estim ate the significance of Budennyi's testimony. Ther e is no evidence to sugg est or reaso n to believe that eigh t battl e-ha rden ed milit ary men could have been forced to falsely confess at trial to such deva statin g charges, in such detail, and in the man ner in whic h they did. Nor is there any evidence that they were forced to falsely confess in the first place, even before the trial. Like the trial trans cript itself, the lette r rema ins top-s ecret . We located it in a little -kno wn and disor ganiz ed archi ve and have published it, along with an intro duct ory article in a Russia histo ry journal.7 For Budennyi as for Col. Alksnis there is no ques tion at all of the guilt of the gene rals, all of who m confessed it and gave details. This is also the case with the publ ished com men tary by General Belov, anot her of the judges. Belov's lette r to Voroshilov was publ ished in 1996 , presu mabl y beca use he make s very few substant ive rema rks abou t the specific charges. But Belov was also convinced of the gene rals' guilt. We do not exam ine it here beca use Belov says noth ing specifically abou t Trots ky and the Germans or Japanese.8

Significance of the Tukhachevsky Trial Evidence The Budennyi lette r to Voroshilov and Col. Alksnis' acco unt of his read ing the trans cript of the ''Tukhachevsky Affair'' trial toge ther

7

8

Bobrov and Furr, "Mars hal S.M. Buden nyi ..."

Belov, "Done senie koman duiush chego voiska ml Beloru sskogo voenn ogo okruga I.P. Bel ova K.E. Voroshllovu ... Smolensk, 14 iiulia 1937 g. Sovers henno sekret no Tol'ko lichno." In Antonella Christiani and Vera M. Mikhaileva, eds., Repressii v Krasnoi Armif {30-e gody). Napoli, 1996, 192·198.

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co ns tit ut e on e of th e m os t im po rt an t discoveries in th e historiogra ph y of th e Soviet Union. Thanks to th em w e no w kn ow as certainly as w e will ev er kn ow ~hat th e military de fe nd an ts in th is tri al w er e, in fact, guilty of w ha t th ey co nf es se d to. This in its el f completely dismantles th e ''anti-Stal.in paradigm," th e canonical in te rp re ta tio n of Soviet history. Fo r example, it m ea ns th at th e te st im on y at th e Th ird Moscow ''show'' trial, th e March 19 38 ''Bukharin .. Rykov'' trial, w as tru th fu l in so fa r as it confirms th e te st im on y given by Tukhachevsky an d th e ot he r m ili ta ry men. It also confirms te st im on y ab ou t Tr ot sk y' s German an d Japanese collaboration th at w as given by th os e de fe nd an ts at th e Second Moscow Trial of Ja nu ar y 19 37 , th e ''Piatakov-Radek'' trial, since th at is also co nf irm ed by th e Tukhachevsky trial testimony. If we ha d no co rr ob or at iv e evidence at all to th is effect th e te st imony of th e military figures would still be ve ry strong. And w e do have much ot he r evidence. All of it is co ns is te nt w ith w ha t we no w kn ow of th e Tukhachevsky trial testimony. Fo r ou r pr es en t purpo se s this is th e st ro ng es t possible evidence th at Tr ot sk y w as inde ed co ns pi rin g w ith th e Nazi go ve rn m en t an d German military.

Dreitser The NKVD in ve st ig at or s of th e 19 30 s re fe rr ed to th e interlocking conspiracy cases as th e ''klubok,'' or ''tangle." This m et ap ho r re fe rr ed to th e fact th at th e va rio us se pa ra te co ns pi ra ci es w er e inte rt w in ed w ith ea ch other, at le as t on th e le ad er sh ip level. It also se rv es to ill us tra te ho w th e NKVD ''unraveled'' them. Once one mino r conspiracy w as discovered it le d by pe rs is te nt investigation to ot he rs . Efim D re its er ha d be en chief of Tr ot sk y' s bo dy gu ar d du rin g th e 1920s. He w as a de fe nd an t at th e first Moscow Trial of 19 36 an d claimed to be in pe rs on al co nt ac t w ith Trotsky. D re its er na m ed Pu tn a at th e 19 36 Trial as a Tr ot sk yi st co ns pi ra to r w ho also ha d di re ct links to Trotsky.

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At the end of the evenin g session of August 21, the accused Dreitze r, replyin g to questio ns put to him by Comra de Vyshin sky concer ning certain details of the counte r-revol utionar y activiti es of the Trotsky iteZinovievite centre, declare s that one of the active participan ts in the terrori stic work of the Trotsk yites was Putna, an old and active Trotsky ite. Accord ing to Dreitzer, Putna at one time ostensi bly left the Trotsk yites in pursua nce of the line of double -dealin g, but actuall y continu ed until quite recentl y to carry on strictly secret work for the Trotsky ite centre. In particu lar, Dreitzer testifie s that Putna had direct contac t with Trotsky, met I. N. Smirno v, and in 1932 commu nicated to Smirnov, throug h Dreitze r, Trotsk y's verbal instruc tions to organiz e terrori st groups . The accuse d Smirnov tries to deny the fact that Putna partici pated in the terrori stic activity of the Trotsky ites. Howev er, in reply to questio ns put to them by Comra de Vyshinsky, the accuse d Pickel, Reingold and Bakaye v corrob orate Dreitze r's testimo ny. (1936 Trial, 116) This was eviden tly just one of a numbe r of bits of eviden ce that led to Putna's arrest, just as Kamen ev's naming Radek, Sokol'nikov, Bukhar in and others provid ed ''thread s'' that led to the Second and Third Mosco w Trials. Dreitse r's investi gation file confirm s his confession s at trial and his close ties to Putna and lakir, anothe r of the later Tukhac hevsky trial defend ants. A close membe r of Dreitse r's family and his only survivi ng relative has confirm ed that her greatuncle Efim was indeed close to high-ra nking Red Army men. Putna was well-kn own as a Trotsk yist and was named by defend ants in all three Mosco w Trials, tried and execut ed as one of the eight military leaders in the Tukhac hevsky Affair.9

Personal communi cation from Svetlana M. Chervonnaya, daughter of Dreitser's niece. Ms. Chervonnaya, an American ist and skilled researche r on Cold-War history and Dreltser's only surviving relative, has been permitted to study Dreitser's investigative file.

9

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Trotsky's Conspiracies

Dmitry Shmidt, a military commander who wa s also ar re ste d and questioned in 19 36 , testified to Pu tn a's close an d conspiratorial connection wi th Trotsky. In 19 27 wh en I joined the Trotskyists I le ar ne d from DREITSER, OKHOTNIKOVand PUTNA th at PUTNA was one of the members of the military ce nt er of the Trotskyist organization an d was carrying ou t importa nt organizational wo rk in the Red Army. He was re .. sponsible for th at wo rk to Trotsky personally. In 19 27 or 19 28 PUTNA was assigned by th e Revolutionary Military Council to be military attache to Japan. At th at time I ha d a meeting with PUTNA before his departure. He told me Trotsky used to come to his ap ar tm en t to give him a whole series of instructions and tasks in connection with his going abroad.10 So the NKVD had ot he r evidence, pe rh ap s a lot of it, about Putna's activities. Concerning Shmidt's testimony specifically, it's difficult to imagine wh at foreign instructions, ot he r th an conspiratorial ones, Trotsky might have be en giving Pu tn a in 19 27 , since Trotsky had long since (January 19 25 ) resigned from his military posts.

Kantor's Four Articles

11

In 2005 Iulia Kantor, a journalist and a gr ad ua te stu de nt in history, published a se rie s of articles an d a book i2 on Marshal Tuk.. hachevsky. Kantor does not investigate wh et he r Tukhachevsky

"N.6. Z protokolu dopity D.A Shmidta vid 31 ser pn ia1 93 6 r.," in Sergiy Kokin, Oleksandr Pshennikov, ''Bez stroku davnosti,'J Z Arkhiviv VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB No. 1-2 (4/5 ), 1997 (In Ukrainian). 10

11

Kantor's four articles we re published in lstoriia Gosudarstva i Prava (2006). This legal journal is very har d to obtain outside of Russia. I have reformatted and republished the tex t of all four articles at htt p:/ / msuweb.montclair.edu/- fur rg /res ear ch/ kan tor_4articles_igp06. pd f (Kantor 2 006) 12

Kantor, Julia. Voina i mi r Mikhaila Tukhachevsko90. Moscow: lzdatel'skii Dom Ogoniok "Vremia," 2005.

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was guilty or not but, like Cherushev, takes it for grante d that Tukhachev sky was the innoce nt victim of a frame- up by Stalin. It's probab ly no coincidence, therefo re, that like Cherus hev Kantor was granted access to some docum entary materia ls which others have not been permit ted to see including, in Kantor 's case, some of the Tukhac hevsky investi gative materia ls. Additionally she claims that she was given permis sion by Tukhac hevsky 's family to see his investigative file - someth ing that, until the 75-yea r period of declassification had expired, was strictly limited in Russia to next-ofkin and normal ly forbidd en to all others, researc hers included. Kantor used these materi als in her doctora l dissert ation as well as her books and some articles. Anyone who studies only the texts of the primar y source s that Kantor quotes withou t regard to her tendentiou s comme ntary will see that these source s strongl y suppor t Tukhac hevsky 's guilt. Some of these quotati ons involve Tukhachevsky's allegations concer ning Trotsky. No comple te interro gations of Vitovt Putna have been published. Only excerp ts from them have been publish ed. We will briefly examine them below. But accord ing to what we have of Tukhachevsky's testimo ny Putna was in direct contac t with Trotsk y and passed on to Tukhac hevsky the inform ation that he, Trotsky, had direct contac ts with the German govern ment and General Staff. This is consist ent with what we've seen of Radek's testimo ny both before and during the Januar y 1937 trial. Tukhachevsky claimed to have been in direct contac t by letter with Sedov throug h Putna. I inform the investi gation that in 1935 Putna brough t me a note from Sedov in which it said that Trotsk y consid ers it very desirab le that I establi sh closer ties with the Trotsk yist comma nder cadres. Throug h Putna I orally answer ed with my agreem ent, and burned the note from Sedov. (Kanto r 2006, 5; Kantor Voina, 378)

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Tu kh ac he vs ky als o sai d tha t in 19 32 he rec eiv ed a ''di rec tiv e'' fro m Tr ots ky to for m a co ns pir ato ria l mi lit ary org an iza tio n, so me thi ng he ha d be en pr ep ari ng to do in an y cas e. Lo ng be for e the cre ati on of the an tis ov iet mi lita ryTr ots ky ist plo t I gro up ed aro un d my sel f, ov er the co urs e of a nu mb er of ye ars , me n wh o we re ho sti le to So vie t au tho rit y, dis sat isf ied wi th the ir po sit ion s as co mm an de rs, an d co ns pir ed wi th the m ag ain st the lea de rsh ip of the Pa rty an d go ve rnm en t. Th ere for e, wh en in 19 32 I rec eiv ed a dir ec tiv e fro m Tr ots ky ab ou t the cre ati on of an an tis ov iet org an iza tio n in the arm y I alr ea dy vir tua lly ha d de vo ted ca dre s rea dy on wh om I co uld rel y in thi s wo rk. (K an tor 20 06 , 5; Kantor Voina, 37 8-9 ) Ac co rdi ng to Tu kh ac he vs ky Pu tna ha d dir ec t co nta ct wi th Tr ots ky co nc ern ing the lat ter 's tie s to the Ge rm an go ve rnm en t an d Ge ne ral Sta ff an d pa sse d on ne ws of thi s ora lly to Tu kh ac he vs ky. Pu tna tol d me ora lly tha t Tr ots ky ha d se t up dir ec t co nta ct wi th the Ge rm an fas cis t go ve rn me nt an d Genera l Staff. (K an tor 20 06 , 5; Ka nto r, Voina, 37 8-9 ) Tu kh ac he vs ky sai d tha t Vl ad im ir Ro mm ha d tol d him tha t Tr ots ky wa s rel yin g on Hi tle r's he lp in his str ug gle ag ain st So vie t po we r. We kn ow fro m Ro mm 's tes tim on y at the 19 37 Tr ial tha t Ro mm cla im ed to ha ve be en in dir ec t co nta ct wi th Tr ots ky . Ro mm tol d me tha t Tr ots ky is ex pe cti ng Hi tle r to co me to po we r an d tha t he is co un tin g on Hi tle r's aid in Tr ots ky 's ba ttl e ag ain st So vie t au tho rit y. (K an tor 20 06 , 7; Ka nto r, Voina, 38 1) Tu kh ac he vs ky rei ter ate d tha t he ha d ind ee d ha d co nta ct wi th Tr ots ky , an d als o tha t he him sel f ha d co lla bo rat ed wi th Ge rm an int ell ige nc e, tho ug h in the fol low ing pa ssa ge he do es no t ex pli cit ly say tha t Tr ots ky ha d tol d him of his ow n Ge rm an or Jap an ese conne cti on s.

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The trans cript of the inter roga tion of the accu sed Tukhachevsky of June 9, 1937 :

I fully confirm my confessions given durin g the prelimin ary investigation concerning my leadi ng participatio n in the military-Trotskyist plot, my ties to the Germans, and my past parti cipat ion in anti-Soviet groupings. I adm it my guilt in that I trans mitte d to German intelligence secre t infor mati on and facts concern ing the defen se of the USSR. I also confirm my ties with Trot sky and Dombal'. (Kantor 2006, 15; Kantor, Voina, 406- 7)

Assessing the Evidence: Kantor Kantor recei ved the perm issio n of the Tukhachevsky family and the Russian gove rnme nt to gain access to some of the investigative mate rials for her long biog raph y of Tukhachevsky. Though she does not admi t as much, it seem s that she was not perm itted to read everything. Specifically it appe ars that she was not allow ed to read the trans cript of the trial of Tukh ache vsky and the rest.13 If she had read it and yet completely omit ted its cont ents from her articles and book Kantor woul d be guilty not just of bein g guid ed by her own preco nceiv ed ideas, but of gross deception. She is guilty of deceiving her read ers in any case, since she neve r tells us what she was perm itted to see and wha t was kept from her. Kantor takes the official position that the Marshal and all the othe r military figures were inno cent victims of a frame-up. Ther efore she woul d surel y have cited any evidence that this was so. But she is unable to cite any. This is very significant, since it stron gly suggests that no such evidence exists in the mate rials to which she was perm itted access. Since the whol e thru st of Kantor's work is to try to dem onst rate the innocence of Tukh ache vsky (and, by extension, of all of his codefendants), it appe ars that she had no such

13

The trial transc ript might not be in the investigative file.

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evidence be for e he r. Kantor also ign ore s so me of the evidence tha t the y we re guilty - notably, so me alr ea dy we ll- kn ow n to res ea rch ers be ca us e it is in the Shvernik Report, wh ich ha s be en pu bli sh ed (see below). The pa ssa ge s Kantor qu ote s str on gly su pp or t all the oth er evidence we have cited. We have only qu ote d the pa ssa ge s from Kantor 's wo rk tha t directly inculpate Tr ots ky wi th Germany. The reliability of the ir tes tim on y co nc ern ing Tr ots ky 's collaboration wi th the Germans is pre dic ate d up on the tru thf uln ess of the res t of the ir tes tim on y - tha t is, up on the ir guilt. Kantor is co mm itt ed to ass ert ing the innocence of all the se me n rat he r tha n to investigating wh eth er the y we re guilty or not. But the evidence sh e quotes, as op po sed to he r ten de nti ou s co mm en tar y on it, gives str on g evidence of the ir guilt. This is also str on g evidence tha t the y told the tru th ab ou t the ir collaboration wi th Tr ots ky an d his wi th Germany.

Tukhachevsky's Confessions In 19 94 the texts of two of Tukhachevsky's confessions we re published in Russia. In the m Tukhachevsky rep ea ts tha t Romm tol d him Tr ots ky wa s relying on Hitler. As we sa w above Romm confessed to having be en a co uri er be tw ee n Tr ots ky an d co ns pir ato rs within the USSR.14 ... Romm also pa sse d on tha t it wa s Tr ots ky 's ho pe tha t Hitler wo uld come to po we r an d wo uld su pp or t him, Trotsky, in his struggle ag ain st Soviet po we r. (Main, 159; Mo lod aia Gv ard iia (he nc efo rth MG) 9 (1994), 13 3) (Evidently the sa me pa ssa ge as above.)

14

These confessions of Tuk hac hev sky 's have bee n tran slat ed and pub lish ed in Steven J. Main, "The Arr est and 'Te stim ony ' of Marshal of the Soviet Union M.N. Tuk hac hev sky (MayJune 1937)," journal ofSlavic Military Studies 10, No. 1 (March 199 7), 151 -19 5. All the pas~ sag es dea ling wit h Tro tsk y we re pub lish ed in Molodaia Gvardiia issu es 9 and 10 of 1994. We have use d Main's English tex t for the con ven ien ce of rea der s and ma de sile nt correction s in a few pla ces wh ere we dis agr eed wit h Main's tran slat ion , whi ch we hav e com par ed wit h the originals.

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Tukh ache vsky repe ats that he had told Kork (ano ther of the eigh t defen dants ) that he had had cont act with Trot sky and the Rights. I told Kork that I had links both with Trot sky and the Rightists and taske d him to recru it new mem bers in the Moscow milit ary distr ict.... (Main, 160; MG 9, 134) According to Tukh ache vsky Putn a, anot her of the eight defe ndan ts and, as we have alrea dy seen , a long -stan ding supp orter of Trotsky's, admi tted to him in 1933 that he was in touc h with Trot sky as well as with I.N. Smirnov, the leade rs of the cland estin e Trots kyist unde rgrou nd with in the USSR. Putn a later recei ved an appo intmen t as milit ary attac he (in 1934, as attac he to Grea t Britain) and so was assig ned to be the cont act pers on betw een Trots ky and the othe r cons pirat ors. Upon Putn a's and Gorbachev's retur n from the Far East - I believe this was in 1933 - I spok e with each of them sepa ratel y. Putn a quickly admi tted that he was alrea dy in cont act with Trot sky and with Smirnov. I sugg ested to him to join the rank s of the militaryTrots kyite conspiracy, tellin g him that I had direc t links with Trots ky. Putn a imm ediat ely agre ed [to join]. Later, following his appo intm ent as milit ary attac he, he was taske d to main tain the link betw een Trot sky and the cent er of the anti- Sovi et milit ary-T rotsk yite cons pirac y. (Main 160; MG 9, 134) Tukh ache vsky said that in 1933 or 1934 Romm had instr uctio ns from Trot sky that the ''German fascists'' woul d help the Trots kyists, and so the milit ary cons pirat ors shou ld help both the Germ an and the Japa nese General Staffs in sabo tage, diver sions , and assas sinat ions again st mem bers of the Sovi et gove rnme nt. Tukhach evsk y said he pass ed ''Tro tsky' s instr uctio ns'' to the cons piratoria l leade rship , implying that he hims elf acce pted them . Roun d abou t this time, 1933 /193 4, Romm visit ed me in Moscow and told me that he had to pass on Trot-

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sky's new instructions. Trotsky pointed out that it was no longer feasible to restrict our activities to simply recruiting and organizing cadres, that it was necessary to adopt a more active program, that German Fascism would render the Trotskyists assistance in their struggle with Stalin's leadership and that therefore the military conspiracy must supply the German General Staff with intelligence data, as well as working hand in glove with the Japanese General Staff, carrying out disruptive activities in the army, prepare diversions and terrorist acts against members of the government. These instructions of Trotsky I communicate d to the center of our conspiracy. (Main, 160-161; MG 9, 134) In another part of this published confession Tukhachevsk y asserts that he got other instructions from Trotsky via Piatakov, rather than through Romm, Putna, or directly to himself. During the winter of 1935/1936, Pyatakov told me that Trotsky had now asked us to ensure the [future] defeat of the USSR in war, even if this meant giving the Ukraine to the Germans and the Primor'ye to the Japanese. In order to prepare the USSR's defeat, all forces, both within the USSR and outside the USSR would have to be made ready; in particular, Pyatakov stated that Trotsky would carry out a decisive struggle to plant his people in the Comintern. Pyatakov stated that such conditions would mean the restoration of capitalism in the country. As we received Trotsky's instructions on unleashing a campaign of sabotage activity, espionage, diversionary and terrorist activity, the center of the conspiracy, which included not only me, but also Feld'man, Eideman, Kamenev,1s Primakov, Uborevich, lakir and those

15

This means Army Commander, 1st rank (=General) Sergei Sergeevich Kamenev.

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closely associated with it, Gamarnik and Kork, issued various instructions to the members of the conspiracy, based on Trotsky's directives. (Main, 163; MG 10, 257) Tukhachevsk y claims that he also received direct written instructions via Putna from Sedov, who was passing on Trotsky's instructions. Putna assured him that Trotsky had established direct ties to the German government and General Staff. In the autumn of 1935, Putna came to my office and handed over a note from Sedov, in Trotsky's name, insisting that I more energetically attract Trotskyite cadres to the military conspiracy and more actively use them. I told Putna to say that this would be done. In addition, Putna told me that Trotsky had established direct links with Hitler's government and the General Staff, and that the center of the anti-Soviet military Trotskyite conspiracy should task itself to prepare defeats on those fronts where the German Army would operate. During the winter of 1935/1936, as I have already mentioned, I had a talk with Pyatakov, during which the latter passed on another directive from Trotsky [to the effect] to ensure the unconditional defeat of the USSR in war with Hitler and Japan, as well as the break-up of the Ukraine and the Primor'ye from the USSR. These instructions meant that it was necessary to establish ties with the Germans in order to define where they intended to deploy their armies and where necessary to prepare the defeats of the Soviet armies. (Main, 166; MG 10, 261) This passage in Tukhachevsky 's published confession confirms what Budennyi reported to Voroshilov in his letter of June 26, 1937. Evidently Tukhachevsk y restated this at the trial and inserted a comment that von Rundstedt must have known this information through Trotsky.

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At the end of January 1936, I had to travel to London to attend the funeral of the British King. During the funeral procession, first by foot and then on the train, General Rundstedt - the head of the German govern .. ment's military delegation - spoke to me. It was obvi .. ous that the German General Staff had already been informed by Trotsky. Rundstedt openly told me that the German General Staff was aware that I stood at the head of a military conspiracy in the Red Army and that he, Rundstedt, had been instructed to begin talks about matters of mutual interest. (Main, 166; MG 10, 261) A few pages later Tukhachevsk y puts Trotsky's and Rundstedt's instructions together. Taking into account Trotsky's directive to prepare for defeat on that front where the Germans would attack, as well as General Rundstedt's instruction to prepare for defeat on the Ukrainian front, I proposed to lakir to make the German task easier by diversionarysabotage tactics leading to the fall of the Letichev fortified region, the commandant of which was a member of the conspiracy, Sablin. (Main, 185; MG 10, 264)

Assessing the Evidence: Tukhachevsky's Confessions Only a few of Tukhachevsk y's confessions have been made public. We are fortunate to have any of them at all. They were published in the early 1990s when the promise of 9lasnost (''openness'') was still in the air. In 2006 one confession of Nikolai Ezhov's was published. Ezhov confirmed the existence of several groups of military conspirators including that around Tukhachevsky . Ezhov also named some, at least, of the German military figures with whom 1

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they and he himself were jointly in touch.16 To that extent Ezhov's and Tukhachevsky's confessions mutually confirm each other. Frinovskii strongly confirmed the guilt of the Rightists, including Bukharin, some of whom, like Grin'ko, claimed direct conspiratorial contact with Trotsky. Others, like Bukharin, claimed indirect knowledge of Trotsky's dealings with the Germans through Radek.

Other Documents of the ''Tukhachevsky Affair'': The ''Shvernik Report'' During the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961 Nikita Khrushchev and his supporters in the Soviet leadership leveled an even stronger attack against Stalin than Khrushchev's 1956 ''Secret Speech'' had been. After the Congress Stalin's body was removed from Lenin's tomb and a new wave of materials attacking Stalin and those closely associated with him was published. This antiStalin campaign - for so it may be called - ended shortly after Khrushchev was removed from office at the Central Committee meeting of October 1964 by Leonid Brezhnev and others. In early 1962 the Presidium (formerly the Politburo, in effect Khrushchev himself) authorized a blue-ribbon commission to investigate the trials and executions of the 1930s and especially the so-called Tukhachevsky Affair.17 This commission seems to have had total access to all the investigative and other materials concerning the repressions of the 1930s. Its purpose seems to have been to find further information for attacks on Stalin and his supporters, and justificatory materials for further ''rehabilitations." In fact, it provided little if any exculpatory evidence but quite a bit of further evidence that the accused were guilty.

English translation at https://msuwe b.montclair.edu/-furrg/research/ezhov04 263 9eng.html Russian original online at http://msuweb.montclair.edu/-furrg/research/ezhovru.html; also now at http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues·doc/58654 .

t6

There had been an earlier commission, called the ''Molotov Commission." We discuss it later in the present chapter. t1

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The report was issued in two parts. The Zapiska (memo randum ) devote d mainly to the Military Purges and Tukhac hevsky Affair was issued in 1963. A further part, the Spravka (= information,, report), is dated 1964. Neithe r seems to have been used by Khrushchev or given to Soviet writers to promo te Khrush chev's ''line." The Shvern ik Report s were both publish ed after the end of the USSR in Voennyi Arkhiv y Rossii, a journal dated 1993 that never had anothe r issue. Since that time the Report s have been published several more times and are readily available. It's fair to say that these reports constit ute the largest single publish ed collection of excerp ts and quotati ons from investi gative materia ls of the 1930s repress ions. We cite here all the passag es from the Shvern ik Commission reports that bear directly on the specific topic of this book: Trotsky 's purpor ted collabo ration with Germany and Japan. There are a great many other passag es, both in these reports and elsewh ere in the available investi gative materia ls, that bear on Trotsk y's involvem ent in the genera l opposi tion conspir acies, for exampl e to assassi nate Stalin and others. Since these allegat ions are not the subject of our presen t study we will not consid er them here. From the ''Zapiska:''ts On March 25,, 1936,, Iagoda inform ed Stalin that Trotsky was giving directiv es throug h agents of the Gestapo to Trotsk yists inside the USSR about carryin g out terrori st activity, and that even in prisons Trotsky ists were trying to create militan t terrori st groups and that the leader of the Trotsky ists in the USSR was l.N. Smirnov. (Zapiska, 557)

This long report has not previousl y been translated . We take it from RKEB 2 541-670. It is available for download at http://per petrator2 004.naro d.ru/docu ments/Gr eat_Terror/Shvernik_Report.rar. The Spravka alone is also available online at the Russian language Wikisource resource in nine parts at http://tin yurl.com /spravka. It is in RKEB 2 671-788. 18

Chapter Three. Tukachevsky and Others • • •

The senten ce of the court states that Tukhac hevsky and the other defend ants, ''being leaders of an antiSoviet military-fascist organization, have violate d their militar y duty (oath), have betray ed their country, have establi shed ties with militar y circles in Germany and with enemy of the people L. Trotsk y and according to their directives have prepar ed the defeat of the Red Army in the event of an attack on the USSR by foreign aggress ors, specifically, of fascist Germany, and with the goal of destroy ing the defensive capability of the USSR have engaged in espion age and sabotage in the units of the Red Army and in enterpr ises of military significance, and also have been prepar ing terrori st acts against the leaders of the AUCP(b) and the Soviet government." (605) In the indictm ent it is asserte d that in April-May 1937 the organs of the NKVD discove red and liquida ted in the city of Moscow a military-Trotskyist conspiracy, in the ''center '' of leaders hip of which were Gamarnik, Tukhachevsky, Iakir, Uborevich, Kork, Eideman and Fel'dman. The military-Trotskyist organization, of which all those accuse d in this case were membe rs, was formed in 1932-1 933 upon the direct instruc tions of the German genera l staff and of Trotsky. It was connected with the Trotsk yist center and the BukharinRykov group of Rightists, was involved in sabotage, diversions, terror, and was prepar ing the overth row of the govern ment and the seizure of power with the aim of restori ng capitalism in the USSR. (688) lakir's addres s at the court trial in connection with the plots of the organizers, set the line for the other defendan ts also to expose the machin ations of Trotsk y and of the fascist govern ments agains t the USSR, and in additio n empha sized the role of Tukhachevsky in the conspi racy in every way. (690)

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Tukhachevsky was also forced to confirm ... in court: ''When in 1932 Romm brought me Trotsky's proposal to gather the Trotskyist cadres, I agreed to do this. Therefore I consider the beginning of the organization of our military conspiracy to have been 1932." (695) Putna testified about Tukhachevsky's ties with Sedov and Trotsky. Specifically, he declared during the investigation that, finding himself in London in September 1935 and learning that he was being summoned to Moscow, he reported about this to Sedov, Trotsky's son, in Paris. From Sedov he received by special delivery a package in which were a note from Sedov to Putna and a ''letter of recommendation, written and signed personally by Trotsky'' for Tukhachevsky. Putna carried out Sedov's task and during the first days of October 1935 supposedly handed Tukhachevsky Trotsky's letter. Tukhachevsky familiarized himself with the letter and asked Putna to ''transmit orally that Trotsky could count on him.'' ''Already in 1928 I [Tukhachevsky] was brought into the Rightist organization by Enukidze. In 1934 I personally made contact with Bukharin. I established espionage ties with the Germans in 1925, when I used to travel to Germany for study and maneuvers .... On my trip to London in 1936 Putna arranged for me a meeting with Sedov... I was connected in this conspiracy with Fel'dman, S.S. Kamenev, Iakir, Eideman, Enukidze, Bukharin, Karakhan, Pyatakov, l.N. Smirnov, Iagoda, Osepian and a number of others:· (681-2) ... the investigation obtained their [Tukhachevsky's and Putna's] ''admissions'' of a personal meeting with Sedov, supposedly arranged for Tukhachevsky by Putna in 1936 in a cafe in Paris. Meanwhile detailed information about Tukhachevsky's stay in Paris from February 10 to 16, 1936, came from Ventsov, Soviet military attache to France, and from the organs of the

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NKVD, but this information contained nothing about his meeting with Sedov. In the course of the present verification Afanas'ev, a former worker of the Foreign Section of the NKVD, member of the CPSU since 1923, expatiated upon this matter: ''Between 1932 and 1938 I was continuously in illegal work abroad. I headed the illegal resident bureau in Paris which mainly worked on the activities of Trotsky's son Sedov and his circle .... We were up to date on the most secret conspiratorial activity of Trotsky and Sedov. Therefore when you pose me the question of whether meetings between Sedov and Tukhachevsky, Putna, and other military figures of the Soviet Union could have taken place, I can assert that that could not be true ... the agent reports and documentary materials we obtained in the process of our work on Trotsky, Sedov, Kleman and in part on the ROYS in Paris do not confirm either directly or indirectly the accusations that were brought against the military figures of the Red Army in connection with the case of Tukhachevsky, Kork, Gamarnik, Putna, and others.'' (695-696) The language of the Shvernik Report makes it clear that its authors proceeded on the preconceived assumption that no such conspiracy existed. It was designed to provide ''evidence'' - likely-looking materials - for citation in further ''rehabilitation s." Soviet historians and researchers, as we have seen, were not to be permitted access to the archives themselves. In the case of Tukhachevsk y's alleged meeting with Sedov in the Paris cafe in 1936 the Report cites Ventsov, Soviet military attache to France, who reported nothing about it. Ventsov-Krants had been very close to Trotsky. According to an archival document cited by Cherushev he had helped Trotsky write the book How the Revolu-

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tion Armed ltself.19 The report also cites an undated ''former worker of the Foreign division of the NKVD'' named Afanas'ev - no first name or patronymic are given - who claimed that Soviet intelligence in France were closely following information about Sedov and Trotsky and knew nothing about any such meeting or any of the activities mentioned in the Tukhachevsky case. It's worth making several points here. First, the fact that Ventsov and Afanas'ev were told nothing about such a meeting cannot prove that such a meeting never took place. It only means that they claim they did not know of it. Afanas'ev's claim that Soviet intelligence knew about ''the most secret conspiratorial activities of Trotsky and Sedov," and so knew that Sedov could not have met with Tukhachevsky, is empty for another reason. At or shortly after the time of the alleged meeting - late January or early February 1936 - Soviet intelligence man Mark Zborowski became Leon Sedov's closest confidant. We have Zborowski's reports back to Moscow. But Zborowski himself was not privy to all of Sedov's secrets, and did not accompany him everywhere. Zborowski's handwritten notes and reports are in the archives and have been published, while we do not even know Afanas'ev's name. So the claim that Soviet intelligence knew about all Trotsky's and Sedov's ''most secret conspiratorial activities'' cannot be true.

Rudenko's Letter to Molotov On April 13, 1956, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU passed a decree establishing a commission to be chaired by V.M. Molotov to study the materials of the ''public trials."20 The commission proved unsatisfactory to all concerned. It was sharply divided between the three men who had been closest to Stalin and the majority, who were Khrushchev's people. On December 10, 1956, it issued a compromise report exonerating Tukhachevsky

t9

N.S. Cherushev.1937 god. Elita Krasnoi Armii na golgofe. Moscow: VecheJ 2003, p. 208.

Reabilitatsiia. Kak Eto Bylo. T. 2, No. 4, p. 70. Tukhachevsky was included even though his trial had not been public.

20

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and the militar y men but refusin g to consid er rehabil itating any of the defend ants in the public trials.21 Since we know that Moloto v continu ed to be firmly convin ced of Tukhac hevsky 's guilt we can assume this was, indeed , a compro mise. In 1957 Molotov, Malenk ov and Kagano vich were dismis sed from the Presidi um for having attemp ted to remove Khrush chev from office. The Moloto v Commi ssion did study a lot of materia ls, but only some of their docum ents have been made public. We will quote below from a report dated June 10, 1956, to that commi ssion from Rudenk o, the Genera l Prosec utor of the USSR. Rudenk o was a staunc h suppor ter of Khrush chev. It was his office that would have to issue recomm endatio ns to the Soviet Suprem e Court to get conviction s reverse d, the legal aspect of ''rehabi litation .'' Rudenk o's report has not been publish ed, althoug h at some point it was obtaine d by Krasnaia Zvezda (''Red Star''), which is the military daily newsp aper in Russia today as it was during Soviet times. Still not publish ed, a copy of it was obtaine d from that source in 2002 by my Moscow colleag ue Vladim ir L. Bobrov , and we reproduce portion s of it here. Once again, we reprod uce only quotati ons that deal with the questio n of Trotsk y and Germa ny/Japan, ignoring other aspects of this import ant docum ent. Only on May 15, almost ten months after his arrest, after confess ions about the militar y conspi racy had been obtaine d from Medve dev, were confess ions also obtaine d from Putna about his counte rrevolu tionary ties with Tukhac hevsky . At this interro gation Putna

confes sed that in Septem ber 1935 he receiv ed Trotsk y's directi ve concer ning the attract ion to the Trotsk y.i st organi zation of high-r anking mili· tary men. Trotsk y also declar ed that he was aware that Tukha chevsk y and S.S. Kamen ev were alread y

21

RKEB 2, 204-207: available online at

http://perpetra tor2004. narod.ru / documen ts/kirov/Molotov_ Commission_Memo.doc

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carrying out counterrevo lutionary work in the army, and that it was essential to contact them. With this Trotsky handed him a note for Tukhachevsky, in which he proposed that he [Tukhachevsky] unite with the Trotskyist center for mutual counterrevo lutionary activity. In October 1935 he [Putna] handed this note to Tuk· hachevsky, who accepted this proposal of Trot· sky's, In January 1936 he informed Trotsky of the existence of a Trotskyist military organization and its center consisting of Primakov, Putna, and Dreitser, about the connections of this organization and about recruitment. t I I

At his interrogation of June 2, 193 7, Putna had already confessed that in the spring of 1931 he had established espionage ties with the German G[eneral] S[taff] and at various times gave the Germans, through their generals Nedavmeister22 (?), Adam, and Bokkel'berg, information about the military staff of the Red army, its organizationa l structure and location of its forces, about armaments and the system of military readiness. It is not apparent from these interrogation s precisely what information Putna transmitted. Putna declared moreover that in 1936 at the time of his and Tukhachevsky's trip together to England Tukhachevsky compared the relationship of forces and proved to him that the defeat of the USSR in a war

This is probably German General Oskar von Niedermayer, who worked for the Reichswehr (German military) in an intelligence capacity in Moscow in the early 1930s, having formally resigned from the military. He was a General again during World War II, was captured after the War by the Soviets, tried and sentenced to 25 years in prison, and died shortly thereafter in 1948. 22

•

Chapter Three. Tukachevsky and Others

with Germany was inevitable. And that he, Putna, agreed with Tukhachevsky and said to him that for the swiftest defeat of Soviet forces it was essential to act together on the side of the Trotskyist organization. However Putna did not confess how Tukhachevsky reacted to this.

Fel'dman also confessed that from Tukhachevsky's words he [Fel'dman] was aware that he [Tukhachevsky] had an agreement with Pyatakov concerning a disruption in the supply of artillery, and also maintained a connection with Trotsky, from whom he was receiving directives concerning counterrevolutionary activity. From his [Tukhachevsky's] own words Fel'dman learned that Egorov, commander of the VTSIK School was preparing a ''palace coup," but Tukhachevsky said that Egorov was an indecisive person and unsuitable for this purpose. In addition this School was being moved out of the Kremlin and therefore a more realistic plan for the seizure of power - as Tukhachevsky averred - was defeat of the Red army in the future war, and an armed uprising. ... But at this point Tukhachevsky declared that Putna and Primakov did not trust him politically very much, that during their trips to Moscow Primakov gave the military center information but avoided conversations with Tukhachevsky on this topic. That Primakov and Putna had private ties through their Trotskyist centers and were maintaining contact with Trotsky. Tukhachevsky declared that he personally did not share Trotskyist views and further admitted that in 1936 he had received a note from Sedov in which the latter in Trotsky's name proposed [that Tukhachevsky] proceed to join with the Trotskyist cadres in the Red army in order to prepare the seizure of power.

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... At the beginning of the interrogation Tukhachevsky confessed that he had not met in person with either Trotsky or Sedov after their exile from the Soviet Union. But at the end of the interrogation he declared that in 1932, when he was at the maneuvers of the

German army, he had established a personal con· nection with Trotsky and had reached an agreement about carrying on Trotskyist work in the Red Army. ... On that same day, May 27, 1937, Tukhachevsky signed the transcript of an interrogation in which he admitted to his leading role in the military conspiracy, but these confessions differ significantly from those he had given earlier. In these confessions Tukhachevsky said nothing about

personal ties with Trotsky and affirmed that he maintained ties with Trotsky through Romm and Primakov. That it was through them that he received Trotsky's directive that it was essential to go over to terrorist methods of work, about which Tukhachevsky had not confessed earlier. Iona Iakir, another of the Tukhachevsky defendants: In 1933 Tukhachevsky, who knew about my waverings on questions of the Party's policy in the village, and about my ties to former Trotskyists, after first feeling me out, informed me that he was connected

with Trotsky, according to whose directive he was organizing a military conspiracy and proposed that I take part in it. I gave Tukhachevsky my agreement, after which he said to me that he was at the head of the conspiracy, that there was a military center whose staff he proposed that I join. I agreed to become part of the staff of the center. In this conversation Tukhachevsky informed me that Uborevich, with whom he had recently had a conversation on this subject, was also in the center of the military conspiracy.

Tukhachevsky spoke about a directive of Trotsky's

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that he had recently received and in which the following tasks were placed before the center of the military conspiracy: 1. The organization of a coup in Moscow, in the Ukraine, and in a number of other places in the Soviet Union with the aim of seizing power. 2. In the event that the coup d'etat was unsuccessful, to organize the defeat of the Red army in a war with the Polish-German bloc and to organize the theater of military operations and the armies accordingly.

3. To organize sabotage in the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] in both material-technical and military preparations.

4. Independently of Trotsky's direct ties with the German General Staff and the fascist government, it was important for the military center to organize these ties independently.

Analysis of Rudenko's Letter Rudenko summarized details from some interrogations of Putna, Tukhachevsky, and lakir that have not been made public. These passages tie Trotsky to collaboration with Germany in several ways:

* Putna, the leading Trotskyist among the military men, claimed he had been in touch with Trotsky; was involved in a Trotskyist military organization; and was conspiring with the German General Staff.

* Tukhachevsky confirmed that Primakov and Putna were in touch with Trotsky, as he himself was, and that he and the Trotskyist cadres were working together.

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* According to lakir, Tukhachevsk y had said that the military conspiracy was being organized in coordination with Trotsky and ''according to his directive."

* Iakir confirmed that the

military conspirators were to work for the defeat of the Red Army in a war with Germany and Poland.

* Iakir said that Trotsky had direct ties with the German General Staff. The richness and consistency of this material suggests that there is yet more evidence in the investigation materials of the Tukhachevsky group of Trotsky's contacts with Germany.

Voroshilov's Talk at the Commissariat of Defense From the same source we have obtained a copy of the transcript (stenogramma) of a talk by Commissar of Defense Voroshilov to the top military personnel (aktiv) of the Commissaria t (=Ministry) of Defense on June 9, 1937.23 Voroshilov read out quotations from interrogation s and court documents of the Tukhachevsk y Affair. Some of those quotations are not given in the transcript, or are given only partially. We will use what we have, and will only cite those quotations that deal directly with Trotsky and his alleged ties to either Germany or Japan or that confirm the information in Rudenko's report.

TRANSCRIPT OF THE ACTIV OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF DEFENSE USSR June 9, 1937 Both PUTNA and all the rest of them tell about how they linked their work with the principal scoundrel

We have already cited a short passage from this document above in connection with the question of General Milch. 23

Chapter Three. Tukachevsky and Others

and main gunman of counterrevolution in our country who was driven out of this country - Trotsky. Here is what PUTNA says: ''-When I found out (he was saying this to the investigator) that I was being recalled to Moscow in the last days of September 1935 I reported about this to Sedov." (reads PUTNA's confessions)

They [the investigators] asked him this question: ''Was Trotsky's letter handed to Tukhachevsky, when and under what circumstances?'' Answer: ''Trotsky's letter was handed to Tukhachevsky." (reads) What Tukhachevsky says about this. They asked him this question: ''When did you establish contact with Trotsky and what directives did you receive from him?'' Answer: ''I established contact with Trotsky through Romm in 1932." The latter brought him a note in 1935 too. Obviously this was not the first note. ''In 1932 ..." (reads) Further he relates what Romm

said to him. ''Everything that he reported I approved, then I met with him in 1933 and 1934. When in fact the anti-Soviet work in the army had already been developed by me there took place my second meeting with Romm in Moscow ..." (reads) That's what Tukhachevsky says about his contacts with Trotsky and about those tasks which the latter set before him. Here you see it's not just a question of Trotsky's assigning tasks on his own account, but Trotsky at the same time has instructions also from the German General Staff. I have information that it is not only the

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Ger man Gen eral Staf f tha t has infl uen ce on Tro tsky , but tha t the latt er was con nec ted to the Jap ane se General Staf f as well, or in any case wit h its inte llig enc e org ans . Prim ako v ans wer s the que stio n wha t task s wer e set befo re him and wha t he did: ''Tr otsk y's bas ic dire ctiv es ... wer e kno wn to me too from the wor ds of Dre itse r and Put na; they cam e dow n to this, tha t Tro tsky was dem and ing to rees tablish a mil itar y org aniz atio n, to stre ngt hen it in the arm y as well, mak ing use of the sha rpe nin g of the class stru ggle ... up to 193 3.'' •••

Put na abo ut his spying: ''A few day s late r'' (rea ds) ... The n whi le con vers atio ns wen t on: ''ab out the des irabil ity of cha ngin g the syst em, the lead ersh ip in the USSR ....'' (rea ds) Tha t mea ns tha t pre par ator y con vers atio ns wer e going on, and then furt her: ''Sh leik her exp ress ed his une quiv oca l read ines s ... .'' (rea ds) He bro ugh t this to Tro tsky 's atte ntio n thro ugh this gen tlem an Sed ov and Sed ov rep orts tha t Tro tsky pro pos es: (reads)24 The test imo ny her e gen eral ly acc ord s wit h wha t we hav e see n prev ious ly, no dou bt bec aus e Vor osh ilov dre w his info rma tion from the sam e inte rrog atio ns. The ''Sh leik her' ' nam ed her e is no dou bt General Kur t von Schleicher, Cha nce llor of Ger man y from June 193 2 to Jan uar y 193 3 and prev ious ly Min iste r of Defense.

Voenn{y Sovet pri Narodnom Komissare Oborony SSSR 1-4 liunia 1937 g. Dokumenty i Materia/y. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2008 , 372- 373; 384. (Voennyi Sovet).

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Colonel L.A. Shnitman Furthe r eviden ce about contact s betwee n the militar y conspir ators and Trotsk y keeps coming to light, even in source s that try to impugn its validity. In a 2009 book we read the following: In Septem ber 1937 Ezhov sent Stalin a special communica tion contain ing an assessm ent of the activiti es of Colonel L.A. Shnitm an, militar y attache to Czechoslovakia. There was compro mising materia l stating that he was aide to Koman darm 2nd rank A.I. Kork, militar y attache to Germany. In Januar y 1937 a group of Soviet pilots who had served in Spain had been detained in France, and Shnitm an was also blamed for this. During his interro gation he had also told the investiga tors about his ''meetin gs'' upon Tukhac hevsky 's instruc tions in Paris with Sedov, Trotsk y's son, concerning the transm ission of secret inform ation to foreign intellig ence services.2s That Khaust ov and Samue l'son include this materi al at all is apparentl y part of their attemp t to illustra te the unrelia bility of such reports . The scare quotes around the word ''meetin gs'' are an example of the dishon est ''argum ent by scare quotes." Instead of citing eviden ce for their implied suspici on that Shnitm an had not met with Sedov, Khaust ov and Samue l'son put scare quotes around the word. This is a commo n tactic of propon ents of the anti-St alin paradig m when they have no eviden ce to suppor t their precon ceived ideas but rather are forced to conten d with contrar y evidence. An objecti ve histori an would cite eviden ce and, if there were no such evidenc e, conclu de that the meetin gs might well have taken place. Since such an admiss ion would contrad ict the

2s Vladimir Khaustov and Lennart Samuel'son. Stalin, NKVD, l Repressii 1936·193 8 BB· "ls-

toriia Stalinizma'' series. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009 226. (Khaustov·Samuel'son)

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anti-Stalin paradigm, Khaustov and Samuel'son use this sub terfuge. We hav e discussed ''arg ume nt by sca re quo tes elsewhere.26 1 '

Evaluating This Evidence As wit h a gre at man y oth er stat eme nts in this boo k the auth ors give no citation, not even an archival source, for this information. Wh at are we to mak e of this? Both auth ors are extremely anti com mun ist and ver y hostile to Stalin. They reje ct out of han d any possibility tha t any of the Opposition conspiracies actually existed. The ir boo k contains man y falsifications, significant omissions, and out righ t lies, all in an anti com mun ist direction. Moreover, Khaustov is associated wit h the ''Memorial'' organization. He is one of a few privileged resea rch ers who have access to man y archival documents. Ano ther ''Memorial'' society sou rce rep orts tha t Shnitman was convicted of ''espionage [and] par tici pati on in a military conspiracy in the Red Army."21 This is wha t we would expect if Shnitman did confess as Khaustov and Sam uel' son affirm. Yet ano ther sou rce confirms tha t Shnitman was aide to the military attache to German y in 192 6-1 929 and again in 193 4-3 5, was military atta che to Finland in 192 9-3 0 and military atta che to Czechoslovakia 193 61938.28

The date of Ezhov's mem ora ndu m to Stalin as given by Khaustov and Samuel'son, Sep tem ber 1937, is curious. The re's goo d eviden ce from oth er sou rces tha t Shn itm an was arre sted on Jan uary 14, 1938, and tha t his trial and execution too k place on August 28,

26

Furr. Kirov Chap ter 4, 87-92.

''Kommunarka. 1938 . Avgu st" At http: //ww w.m emo. ru/m emor y/com mun arka /Cha ptlO .htm ; ''Spiski zher W http: //list s.me mo.r u/d3 7/f245 .htm #n43 . Thes e are both HMemorial Society" sourc es.

21

2e

http: //baz a.vg d.ru/ 1/38 052/ .

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1938.29 One wou ld exp ect tha t an inte rrog atio n in whi ch Shn itm an mad e suc h self -inc rim inat ing disc losu res wou ld alm ost cert ainl y hav e take n plac e betw een thes e two date s rath er than prio r to Ezhov' s Sep tem ber 193 7 com mun icat ion to Stalin. Sur ely no one who had con fess ed to suc h crim es wou ld hav e bee n left at larg e for anoth er fou r mon ths. Tha t ded ucti on in turn sug ges ts tha t Khaustov and Sam uel'son saw not just Ezhov's not e to Stalin but at leas t par t of Shn itm an's investigative file and are not bein g trut hfu l abo ut the con tent of Ezhov's note.

The ''foreign inte llig enc e service'' for whi ch Sedov and , thro ugh Shn itm an, Tuk hac hev sky wer e spy ing is not nam ed. But it mus t hav e bee n Germany. Tuk hac hev sky had ties wit h the Ger man General Staff abo ut whi ch he con fess ed at length, as we hav e seen , whi le Shn itm an had had som e con nec tion to Ger man y but not to any oth er of the gre at Eur ope an pow ers.

In a boo k of mor e than 400 pag es the auth ors dev ote only this single par agr aph to Shn itm an's case. Ind eed , ther e is no par ticu lar reas on they sho uld hav e inse rted this par agr aph at all oth er than to imp ugn inte rnal com mun icat ions amo ng the Soviet lead ers. But the imp lica tion nev erth eles s is tha t the re may be still mor e - per hap s muc h mor e - evid enc e of con tact betw een Tro tsky or Sedov and Ger man y or Japa n, to say not hin g of Tro tsky 's con tact s wit h Soviet opp osit ioni sts.

Oth er Evidence from the Soviet Archives of Trotsky's Collaboration To this poi nt we hav e con fine d our atte ntio n to doc ume nts from the form er Soviet arch ives con tain ing evid enc e of ''fir st-h and '' contact betw een Tro tsky and Ger man y or Japan. The per son s who se acc oun ts we hav e exa min ed claim tha t they kne w of Tro tsky 's con-

O.F. Suvenirov. Tra9ediia RKKA 1937 ·1938. Insti tut Voennoi lstor ii Ministerstva Oborony Rossiiskoi Fede ratsii . Moscow: "Terra," 1998 , 441, No. 262.

29

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tact with Germ any or Japan eithe r from Trot sky hims elf or from German or Japa nese diplomats. Although the dividing line betw een first· and seco nd-h and evidence is a clear one, the evid entia ry value of seco nd-h and evidence is not nece ssari ly less. For example we now have Nikolai Bukharin 's first confession of June 2, 1937 , a docu ment still top-s ecret in Russia toda y that turne d up in an archive that was sent Wes t some time in the mid- 1990 s. We have exam ined this confession in detail in anot her study to which we refer the inter ested reade r. 30 It is significant beca use Bukharin confirms wha t we have alrea dy learn ed from Radek's testimony, since Bukh arin' s knowledge of Trotsky's colla bora tion with Germany came only throu gh Radek. Radek had impl icate d Bukharin in pretr ial state men ts and then again at the publ ic Janu ary 1937 Moscow trial. Bukharin had denied over and over again what Rade k said, but on June 2, 1937 he reve rsed hims elf and confessed. Why did Bukh arin decide to confess? It appe ars that one reaso n may have been that Bukharin had learn ed of Tukhachevsky's arrest, and figured ''the jig was up."31 In his final state men t at the March 1938 Moscow Trial Bukharin said that ''of course, the incrim inati ng evid ence [ulik1]'' playe d a deter mini ng role. That must mean evidence recently obta ined and show n to him, which wou ld prob ably include the evidence of the milit ary cons pirat ors.

If Bukharin's testi mon y cont radic ted Radek's we woul d be forced to conclude that, on the evidence, one or both were wrong. Since

Grove r Furr and Vladim ir L. Bobrov, "Nikolai Bukha rin's First Statem ent of Confession in the Lubianka." Cultural Logic 2007, at http:// clogic .eserv er.org /2007 /Furr_ Bobro v.pdf This article was first publis hed in the Russia n histori cal journa l Klio 1 (36), 2005, 38-52. I have put the Russia n versio n online at http:/ /rnsuw e b.mon tclalr.e d u/-fur rg/res earch /furrn bo brov_bukharin_kllo07. pdf 30

See Grove r Furr and Vladim ir Bobrov, ''Nikolai Bukha rin's First Statem ent of Confes sion in the Lubianka." Cultural Logic 2007, 17 and nn. 32 and 33. Biblio graphi c inform ation of the Russia n origina l of this article is given there.

31

Chap ter Thre e. Tuka chev sky and Othe rs

175

Buk hari n's stat eme nt con firm s Rad ek's , thei r stat eme nts mut uall y cor rob ora te, or stre ngt hen eac h othe r.

lagoda's Confessions The re exis ts a goo d dea l mor e suc h ''sec ond -han d evid enc e'' of Tro tsky 's coll abo rati on wit h the Ger man s and Jap ane se in rece ntly pub lish ed Sov iet arch ival doc ume nts. Gen rikh S. Iago da was Com mis sar of the NKVD (= Min iste r of Intern al Affairs), whi ch incl ude d the poli tica l poli ce, from 193 4 till he was dism isse d in Sep tem ber 193 6. He was arre sted in earl y Mar ch 193 7. Sub seq uen tly he was one of the lead ing defe nda nts in the thir d Mo sco w tria l of Mar ch 193 8. In 199 7 a num ber of mat eria ls from Gen rikh Iago da's inve stig ativ e file wer e pub lish ed in a ver y sma ll edit ion of 200 cop ies in the pro vinc ial city of Kaz an' by som e rese arch ers emp loye d by the FSB, suc ces sor to the KGB. Sinc e tha t tim e som e of the doc ume nts pub lish ed in this coll ecti on hav e bee n pub lish ed else whe re, eviden tly from cop ies held in diff eren t arch ives . In thes e inte rrog ation tran scri pts Jago da mak es star tlin g con fess ions . The se con fession s incl ude deta ils of his coll abo rati on wit h Ger man inte lligence.32 Avel' Enu kidz e was a high -ran king Par ty official and mem ber of the Sov iet gov ern men t who had bee n arre sted earl ier. Onl y two inte rrog atio ns of Enu kidz e's hav e bee n pub lish ed: one in the 199 7 coll ecti on of Iago da mat eria ls, ano ther in the sec ond of the ''Lubiank a .. Stal in'' volu mes in 200 4. In neit her doe s Enu kidz e spe ak muc h abo ut Tro tsky . In the volu me of mat eria ls dev oted to Iago da, how eve r, we find the foll owi ng rem ark abo ut Enu kidz e, Tro tsky , and the Ger man s. We hav e bald ed pas sag es of spe cial inte rest to our inve stig atio n.

Genrlkh Jagoda. Narkom vnutrennikh del SSSR, General'niy komtsar gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti. Sbornik dokumentov. Kazan', 1997 . (Genrikh lagoda) 32

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In the first place, in 1935 the prospe cts of a war by a strengt hened Germa ny agains t the Soviet Union were growin g with each day. In that connec tion it was necessary to move ahead swiftly and make an agreem ent with them. Enukid ze told me that Trotsk y abroad had established full contac t with Germa n govern menta l circles, and that Enukid ze himsel f also had a line of contact with the German s. (Genrik h Iagoda, 193)

Jagoda also testifie d about Lev Karakh an's ties to Trotsk y and the German s. But I am aware that in the orient ation to and conspirac ies with Germa n govern menta l circles both the Trotsk yists and Zinovi evists, on the one side, and the Rights , on the other side, had their own separa te lines [of contac t]. Questio n: How did they differ and where do you know this from? Answe r: Karakh an spoke to me about this in one of our talks with him in 1935. The essenc e of these two lines in orienta tion to and contac t with the Germa ns consist s in the following: the Trotsk yist-Zi noviev ist part of our center was carryin g out negoti ations with Germa n govern menta l circles throug h Trotsk y, who was in emigra tion, isolate d from the Soviet Union, ignora nt of the internal proces ses of the countr y and ready to give away everyth ing just in order to overth row Soviet power and return to Russia as soon as possibl e. We, the Rights, had a differe nt attitud e. We were not suppo rters of a new partiti on of Russia , as Trotsk y was doing ....

Chapt er Three . Tukac hevsk y and Other s

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Kara khan 's conn ectio n with the Germans had exist ed for a long time. And the cent er of the Rights used this line of contact, alrea dy estab lishe d, as a real line, and offered to Karakhan to ente r into official nego tiatio ns with the German gove rnme ntal circles. I have alrea dy conf essed that Karakhan was in Berlin after this and met there with Nadolny and Hess (or Goebbels) and, as he said to me, had alrea dy in 1936 achie ved signifi .. cant concessions from the Germans. Question: Wha t concessions? Answer: Conc essio ns of the serv ile cond ition s on the basi s of whic h the agre eme nt with Trot sky had been achi eved . (Genrikh Iagoda, 194- 195) Karakhan appa rentl y claimed to have had his own ties to the Ger.. mans throu gh Nadolny (pres umab ly Rudolf Nadolny, German dipIomat)33 and eithe r Hess or Goebbels. Others of the Rights testified at the March 1938 Trial that Karakhan and Iagoda were very critical of Trot sky's dealings with the Germans, believing that Trot sky was cut off from the realities of life in the USSR and was yielding far too much to the Germans just in hope s of retur ning to powe r.

Assessing the Evidence: lagoda's Confessions Scholars with ''impeccable'' antic omm unist cred entia ls have cited these docu ment s unproblematically. For example, Marc Jansen and Nikita Petro v cite this work as a prim ary source, with out claiming that the inter roga tions in it were , or even migh t have been, faked, obta ined by compulsion, etc.34 One of the docu ment s has also been publ ished in a semiofficial collection of docu ment s from the

33

See https:/ /en.wi kipedi a.org/w iki/Ru dolf_N adolny The Germa n Wikip edia page article is much fuller. 34

E.g. Jansen & Petrov 220 n.23, 224 n. 110, 226 n. 9, 228 n.40. Petrov is a senior resear cher

with the highly antico mmun ist organi zation "Memorial"; Jansen is a major antico mmun ist resear cher of the Soviet 1930s .

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Soviet archives, a fact that further attests to their genuine nature.35 We may therefore conclude that the documents really do come from the Iagoda investigative file and are generally conceded to be genuine. These documents merit a detailed analysis in and of themselves. Their contents intersect with and confirm many other materials now available such as confession statements by other individuals arrested in connection with the investigations concerning espionage and conspiracy, and the transcript of the Third Moscow trial. At the end of each of Iagoda's confessions printed in this 1997 volume is a disclaimer, variously worded. At the end of interrogation two, lagoda's first confession, which took place on April 26, 193 7, pp.109-137, we read: Information about the conspirator-e mployees of the NKVD is falsified. Other aforemention ed statements by Jagoda are not credible. For more information about the repression of Chekists in the middle 1930s see Palchinsky A.A. ''Represii v organakh NKVD v seredine 30-kh godov," in Political

persecution in Russia." Historical and contemporary. St.Petersburg : 1997, pp. 284-294. At the end of the second confession of May 4, 1937, (pp.137-143) : Information about the conspirator-e mployees of the NKVD is falsified. At the end of the third (May 13, 1937, pp. 144-167): All information in the transcript concerning acts of terror and conspiracies are falsified.

The documents published as Nos. 40 and 41 in Genrikh Jagoda, 108-136, were also published as document No. 59, pp. 135-145 in the official collection Lubianka. Stalin i glavnoe upravleniegosbezopasnosti NKVD 1937-1938 (Moscow: "Materlk,H 2004).

35

Chapter Three. Tukachevsky and Others

179

V.M. Primakov and the other military men were fully rehabilitated in 1937. Izvestiia TsK KPSS No. 4 (1989), 42-73. A.I. Rykov, N.I. Bukharin and others were rehabilitated in 1988. Izvestiia TsK KPSS No. 5 (1989), 6992. B.I. Nicolaevsky (1887-1966), in 1903-1906 a Bolshevik, then a Menshevik, political emigre. Nicolaevsky refuted the reports that he received any packets from Rykov. Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik No. 5 (1938), 12. For more detail on P.P. Ol'berg and Shemelev see V.Z. Rogovin, 1937. Moscow, 1996. At the end of the fourth (May 19, 1937, pp. 167-184):

All information about conspiracies and acts of terror is falsified. The case of the murder of S.M. Kirov remains open to this day. A.E. Enukidze and the other persons named in the transcript were rehabilitated in the 1960s-1980s. The fifth (May 26, 1937, pp.185-199):

All information in the transcript concerning conspiracy and accusations of ''espionage'' is falsified. L.M. Karakhan and the other persons named in the transcript have been rehabilitated. At the end of a two-page statement by Iagoda to Ezhov concerning NKVD worker Mironov (June 4, 1937, pp. 200-202): The information in the document is not credible. At the end of the interrogation of December 28, 1937 (pp. 202218): The information is not credible. Professor L.G. Levin and other doctors were later rehabilitated because there is no evidence of any crime in their activities.

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The end of the ''face-to-face conf ronta tion' ' (ochnaia stavka) betwee n Iago da and Dr. Levin of Janu ary 4, 1938 , pp. 218- 223: The infor mati on cited in the trans cript is not credible. The end of the conf ronta tion betw een Iago da and Dr. Kriuchkov of Janu ary 5, 1938 , pp. 223- 227: The answ ers are not credi ble. P.P. Kriu chko v was later reha bilita ted beca use there is no evide nce of any crim e in his activities. The end of the conf ronta tion betw een lago da and Profe ssor D.D. Pletn ev of Janu ary 5, 1938 , pp. 227- 230: The answ ers are not credi ble. Prof esso r D.D. Pletn ev was later reha bilita ted beca use there is no evide nce of any crim e in his activities. The end of the conf ronta tion betw een Dr. Levin, also of Janu ary 5, 1938 , pp. 231- 233: The ''con fessi ons'' of L.G. Levin and P.P. Kriuchkov were later refut ed as not credi ble. At the end of the inter roga tion of lago da held on Janu ary 10, 1938 , pp. 235- 239: lagod a's answ ers are not credi ble. Ther e are simi lar rema rks at the end of the inter roga tion - confession of Artu zov of June 15, 1937 (pp. 487- 499) . We will cons ider Artu zov's conf essio n below. The infor mati on given by Artu zov is not credible. Late r it was all refut ed in his rehab ilitat ion. The same kind of comm ents are mad e at the end of othe r inter rogatio n - conf essio ns whic h we do not cons ider here, such as those of Avel' Enuk idze and of NKVD men Bulanov, Prokof'ev, Radzivilovskii, and Trili sser.

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Assessing These Documents: ''Rehabilitations'' The com men ts cite d abo ve are of cou rse not a crit ical analysis, or ind eed any kind of analysis, of the confessions of Iagoda's tha t the volume repr odu ces. In fact, the boo k has no analysis of the assertion s mad e in the inte rrog atio n-co nfes sion s at all. Som e of the com men ts allu de to ''reh abil itati ons ." Most suc h ''rehab ilita tion s'' hav e not bee n mad e public, so we can 't eva luat e them . How eve r, we kno w a goo d dea l abo ut a num ber of ''reh abil itati ons '' of wel l-kn own figures - eno ugh to kno w tha t they are political, not hist oric ally acc urat e, doc ume nts. Specifically, we hav e a good dea l of the mat eria l on Bukharin's ''rehab ilita tion ." We kno w tha t it doe s not pro ve him inn oce nt in the slig htes t. On the con trar y, in thei r dec ree ''reh abil itati ng'' Buk hari n the Plen um of the Sov iet Sup rem e Cou rt falsified a key doc ume nt Frin ovs kii's con fess ion of April 11, 193 9, which was not pub lic in Feb rua ry 198 8 whe n Buk hari n's case cam e bef ore it, but has bee n pub lish ed since. Far from pro ving Buk hari n inno cen t, Frin ovs kii's con fess ion in fact sho ws him to hav e bee n guilty. Ear lier in the pre sen t volu me we poi nted out tha t the ''reh abil itat ion' ' doc ume nt of Zinoviev and his cod efen dan ts con tain s evid enc e of Zinoviev's guil t rath er tha n his inno cen ce.

So ''reh abil itati ons '' are not pro of tha t the indi vidu als ''rehabilitate d'' wer e inno cen t, eve n tho ugh they are pre sen ted as tho ugh they wer e. Rat her, they are official claims tha t the indi vidu als ''rehab ilita ted' ' will be considered to be innocent, and in futu re will be dec lare d to hav e bee n ''victims'' of ''Stalin's crimes." ''Rehabilitations'' are political acts, not exercises in the reco nsid erat ion of evidence. Marc Junge, a Ger man rese arch er on the repress ion s of the 193 0s and a dete rmi ned pro pon ent of the ''antiStalin'' para digm , put it this way: In Obe rein stim mun g zu von Gou doe ver kan n abs chli eBe nd fest ges tellt wur den , daB Reh abil itier ung in der Sow jetu nion ein poli tisc h-ad min istr ativ er

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Willkiirakt blieb, der vor allem von der politischen Zweckmagigkeit der MaBnahmen bestimmt wurde, nicht aber von der strafrechtlichen Korrektheit. 36

In agreement with von Goudoever it may be definitively established that rehabilitation in the Soviet Union remained an act of political-administrative caprice that was determined above all by political usefulness, not by juridical correctness. It appears that the ''disclaimers'' quoted above and attached to the end of every confession-statement in this volume are the same kind of thing. They indirectly inform the reader something like this: ''We, the editors of this volume, claim that the contents of these confession-statements are not true. We assert that they are 'not trustworthy' or 'falsified' but we cannot prove it and, in fact, have no evidence to that effect. If you want evidence, refer to the 'rehabilitations' of the individuals in question - to which, in fact, you cannot gain access." The editors of the Iagoda volume are employees of the FSB, the successor to the KGB - that is, the Russian intelligence and security service. Not to state that these confessions are ''false'' or at least ''not trustworthy'' would be for them to take a position contradictory to what some important Russian (and Soviet) state institutions have taken in the past. It's not the job of the state security service to call some other state institution a liar. Whatever else it may mean this formula allows them to avoid doing so. We can deduce something more from these brief phrases. We may assume that if there were any other kind of evidence that the state-

ments made in the confessions and interrogations were false, that evidence would be cited. Since no such evidence is cited, in effect these notes constitute a kind of admission that the contents of the confessions cannot be shown to be false.

36

Bucharins Rehabilitierung. Historisches Gediichtnis in der Sowjetunion 1953-1991. Berlin:

BasisDruck Vig, 1999, 266. This is discussed in more detail in Furr and Bobrov, 5 ff.

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183

One could object that here too ''lack of evidence is not evidence of the lack'' of contradictory evidence, but this would be to ignore the fact that when concerted efforts to find evidence, made by those highly motivated to find such evidence, turns out to be unsuccessful, there is important information content in this failure. It is one thing if those motivated not to find such evidence fail to find any, but quite different when highly motivated searchers fail. In reality, we know from the published volumes of rehabilitation documents that during Gorbachevs time very thorough searches of the archives were carried out with a view to finding evidence that the condemned Opposition defendants of the 1930s were falsely convicted. In the case of lagoda, the Moscow Trials defendants, and the ''Tukhachevsk y Affair'' we can conclude with relative confidence that no such evidence was found. Even some Cold-War scholars who reject the validity of the Moscow Trials on principle accept these Jagoda documents at face value and have cited them as genuine without negative comment on the veracity of their contents. Evidence is not to be simply ''believed'' or ''disbelieved'' - much less rejected or disregarded - but rather must be considered in the context of all the other evidence. Even to say that Iagoda's confession may be false is also to say that it may not be false. That is, absent any information that they were false, there is no more basis for ''disbelieving'' than for ''believing'' them. In fact, not even the anticommuni st scholars have rejected them as invalid. If lagoda's confessions were the only evidence we had of oppositionists conspiring with Germany or Japan, we would still have no grounds to discard them. On the contrary: testimony that such an illegal contact existed, while not conclusive, is far more compelling than any claims to the contrary. This is a principle of investigation so self-evident it is seldom discussed. In the case of a person accused of a crime one may expect denial in any case: by an innocent person, because he is innocent; by a guilty person because he wishes to escape the consequences of his crime. Therefore confessions of guilt are of greater interest than professions of innocence - unless there is evidence that such confessions were extracted by

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force, and no such evidence, in the pres ent case, has been produced. But Iagoda's confessions are far from the only evidence we have that the oppo sitio n was cons pirin g with Germ any and/ or Japan. They cons titute just one grou p of docu ment s with in a large body of evidence that sugg ests such conspiracy. As with any confession of guilt, the exist ence of this testi mon y is prima facie evide nce that the conf essio ns are true. They are conf irme d by lagod a's appe al for clem ency publ ished in lzvestiia in 1992 , whic h read s as follows: My guilt befo re my coun try is great . It is impossible to rede em it to any exten t. It is hard to die. Before the whol e peop le and Party I stand on my knee s and beg you to have merc y on me and let me live.37 Every one of the ten pers ons who se conf essio ns were repro duce d along with Iago da's insis ted upon his own guilt in his appeal. Bukharin wrot e that his guilt was so grea t he ''sho uld be shot ten time s over." As we have alrea dy note d Dr. Nata n Lur'e repe ated his guilt: I reall y did prep are the assas sinat ion of Voroshilov upon instr uctio n from Fran z Weitz, a Gestapo repre senta tive. I wish ed to acco mpli sh these disgu sting murd ers beca use I had been poiso ned by the poiso n of Trot skyis m durin g my long stay in Germany. The appe als of man y othe r Moscow Trials defe ndan ts have now been publ ished including those of all but one (Rakovsky) the defend ants at the Thir d Moscow Trial of March 1938 . All the defen dants , with out exception, reaffirm their guilt. We have exam ined them in Chap ter Nine of Trotsky's 'Amalgams.'

37

tfRasskaz o desiati rasstrellannykh".

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No singl e piece of evide nce is univo cal, poin ting towa rds a singl e conc lusio n only. One migh t perh aps imagine an exam ple of an innoce nt pers on who neve rthel ess was pers uade d to confe ss again and again in pretr ial inter roga tions ; to do so again at trial; to protest his inno cenc e of certa in capit al crim es in vehe men t term s whil e at the same time conf irmin g his guilt of othe r capit al crim es; and then conf essin g his guilt again in his appe al. But we have to draw our histo rical conc lusio ns not on imag inati on but evide nce. Ther e is no evide nce to refut e Iago da's confe ssion s, whil e they conf irm and are cons isten t with a grea t deal of evide nce we do have .

Cha pter 4. Rakovsky, Trot sky, and the apan ese In Januar y 1937 the second Moscow Trial, the ''Radek-Piatakov Trial," was under way. In an essay dated Januar y 25, 1937, and titled simply ''Rakovsky'' Trotsk y wrote the following: In the presen t trial, the defend ant Drobnis is playing the part of chief agent for the GPU in laying the basis for new indictments. Among others, Drobnis named Rakovsky as an accomplice in the alleged terrori st conspiracy. Rakovsky's fate is profou ndly tragic. He and I were bound by ties of friends hip for more than thirty years. Of all the defend ants in both trials he stood the closest to me. After being sent to Siberian exile in 1928, Rakovsky held out longer and more firmly than all the others in spite of illness and age (he is now sixty). He even made an attemp t to escape, was captur ed and wound ed; in the end, he capitul ated - in 1934, six years later than the rest. At the trial of the sixteen it was ''establ ished'' that I first issued instruc tions for terrori sm in 1932. But it was altoget her impossible to unders tand why I would have issued such instruc tions to capitul ators, who had been waging war agains t me, rather than to Rakovsky, who at that time remain ed true to the banner of the Opposition. The very fact that Rakovsky was not named as a membe r of either the main center, or the ''parallel'' center, or the ''reserv e'' center was in itself the most convincing proof to though tful people that none of these centers ever existed. The GPU has now decide d to correct its original error. Drobnis has named Rakovsky. The old fighter, broken by life, goes inescap ably to meet his fate. (WLT 1936-3 7 142)

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One mon th later , on Febr uary 27, 1937 , Trot sky retur ned to Rakovsky: A few mon ths after his capit ulati on, Rako vsky was

sent to Japa n as a repre senta tive of the USSR to the interna tiona l conf erenc e of the Red Cros s (whi ch took place at the begin ning of 1935 , I belie ve, altho ugh it is very easy to find the exac t date from the news pape rs of the perio d). It is clear that whil e Rako vsky was sent to Japan , mem bers of his family were held in Mosc ow as hosta ges. Neve rthel ess, send ing Rako vsky abro ad so soon after his capit ulati on prod uced some surp rise at the time. The ''frie nds'' of the USSR in Engl and - inspire d, of cour se, by the GPU - used Rako vsky 's trip to prov e the since rity of his repe ntan ce. Now we can hypoth esize with some certa inty that the only reaso n Rako vsky was sent abro ad was to bette r catch him in the toils of the amal gam in prep arati on. It is quite

certa in that in the next trial , with Rako vsky par· ticip ating as the accu sed, ther e will be char ges of cons pirat orial deal ings betw een Rako vsky and the Japa nese diplo mats and mili tary (und er orde rs from Trot sky, of cour se). (ibid. 213) Seve n week s after that, durin g the ''Dew ey Com miss ion'' heari ngs on Apri l 15, 1937 , Trot sky again retur ned to the subje ct of Rako vsky 's arres t: I can say now wha t it is abou t. It is the prep arati on for a new trial. I don' t know the conc rete circu msta nces . I know only that Bukh arin was sent abro ad in 1936 , the begin ning of 1936 , for the facto ries. He was their agen t. He was in Prag ue, a touri st. Now, I ask myse lf if it was not with the purp ose of prep aring with him a new comb inati on. He gave a lectu re in Prag ue, total ly in the official spiri t. But it is poss ible they sent him in orde r to have the poss ibilit y to affirm that abro ad he ente red into comm unica tions with Trots kyite s and Germ an agen ts. I don' t know , but it is quite poss ible.

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Th e sa m e wi th Rakovsky. Im me di ate ly , he wa s se nt to Japan. I wa s a bi t as to ni sh ed . W ha t wa s th e m ea ni ng of it? It wa s at th e en d of 19 34 , an d th e Br iti sh fri en ds of th e So vi et Union - th e fri en ds of th e So vi et Union ar e ev er yw he re - th ey ar e di re ct ed by th e ag en ts of th e GPU, wi th ou t th ei r knowing; th e ge nu in e di re cti on is ev er yw he re in th e ha nd s of th e GPU. Th e fri en ds in Lo nd on de cla re d: ''You see, th e re pe nt an ce of Rakovsky is to tal ly sin ce re . Th e Go ve rn m en t se nt hi m fam e th w, co os M in d ne ai m re ily fam s hi t Bu ab ro ad ." at th n io in op e th of s wa I e tim at th At . ky vs ko Ra ily of he wa s se nt fo r de m on str at iv e pu rp os es in or de r to ce an nt pe re s hi e, fre s wa he at th rld wo e ol wh e th sh ow wa s sin ce re . Now, I as k m ys el f if it di d no t ha ve a se co nd pu rp os e, to fr am e hi m af te rw ar ds - th at he w as co nn ec te d w ith th e Ja pa ne se m ili ta ry ch ie fs in th e Go ve rn m en t, an d so fo rth . (CLT 33 8- 9, 9t h session, April 15, 19 37 ) In e. ag ss pa st fir e th in g in ly s wa y sk ot Tr at th w no We ca n se e y sk ot Tr at th ed er ov sc di e ou Br re er Pi er ch ar se re st yi sk ot 19 80 Tr sdi y sk ot Tr v. ne me Ka d an v vie no Zi th wi oc bl a in wa s in de ed r fo em th d ise sp de he at th s im cla s ou er cif vo nd gu ise d th is fa ct be hi d an n ali St to n io sit po op of t en nm do an ab or n'' io lat th ei r ''c ap itu or s," ter en ''c e Th . ile ex s hi ce sin em th th wi do to g in th no ha d ha d le ad er sh ip collectives fo r th e bloc, ex ist ed as well. t an nd fe de a k, de Ra t ou ab s im cla r ge on str en ev e ad Tr ot sk y ha d m d an t no d ha he at th ed im cla y sk ot Tr . ial Tr w co os M nd co in th e se a s wa r tte la e th e us ca be k de Ra th wi do to ng hi yt an wo ul d no t ha ve in k de Ra lts su in d ge an ch ex en ev d ha k de Ra d an He ." ''c ap itu lat or ot Tr d ke ac att he ich wh in rs pe pa ws ne et vi So in ed ish bl pu ar tic les y sk ot Tr at th ow kn w no we t Ye . les tic ar n ow s hi in y sk ot sky, an d Tr s on ati lam oc pr e th , ain ag ce On k. de Ra th wi t ac nt co in ed wa s in de itu ap ''c e th th wi t ac nt co no d ha d ha he at th s of di sd ain an d claim d ha n tio ra bo lla co r ei th h ic wh nd hi be n ee cr es ok sm a lat or '' we re co nt in ue d.

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In the second quotation written a month later Trotsky made a ''prediction'': It is quite certain that in the next trial, with Rakovsky participating as the accused, there will be charges of conspiratoria l dealings between Rakovsky and the Japanese diplomats and military (under orders from Trotsky, of course). Rakovsky was one of the defendants in the third Moscow trial of March 2-15, 1938. As we shall see, Rakovsky did indeed claim exactly what Trotsky ''predicted'' - that he had been approached by ''Japanese military chiefs in the government'' ''under orders from Trotsky," transmitted indirectly through the Soviet ambassador to Japan Konstantin Konstantinov ich IUrenev 1 , who Rakovsky claimed had been a Trotskyist since the 1920s.

Whose ''Amalgam''? In his essays about the Kirov murder Trotsky ''predicted'' that his name would soon appear in Soviet accounts of the investigation, and explained this prediction as follows:

IUrenev, K.K. Ambassador to Japan January 29, 1933, to June 16, 1937; to Germany June 16, 1937 to October 11, 1937.Arrested September 23, 1937. Executed August 1, 1938. "Rehabilitated'' December 22, 1956. Biographical information on IUrenev can be found at https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/lOpeHeB,_KoHCTaHTHH_KoHCTaHTHHOBH'i http://www.hrono .ru/biograf/bio_y u/jurenev_kk.php , http://www.sakha rovcenter.ru/asfcd/martirol og/?t=page&id= 15 808 1

IUrenev was arrested the day after his "face-to-face confrontation"' with Rakovsky, who had named him in one of his confession statements. lt appears that the NKVD did not know about IUrenev's involvement prior to Rakovsky's naming him. This fact troubles Georgii Cherniavskii, coauthor of the recent (2014) biography of Rakovsky. We shall discuss this work below. In contrast to Rakovsky, who got a prison sentence, IUrenev was sentenced to death and executed. This difference in treatment may well reflect that fact that Rakovsky confessed to things, and named people, about which the NKVD did not previously know. We discuss these issues later in the present essay.

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There is only one way to forestall en route the amalgams that are in preparation: Expose the scheme in advance. (Emphasis in original.)2 Trotsky knew his name would soon appear because he and his Russian followers were in a political bloc with Zinoviev, Kamenev, and their followers. Therefore it was predictable that the Leningrad Zinovievites, arrested in December 1934 for the murder of Sergei Kirov, would name Trotsky, since they had already named their own leaders. So Trotsky's tactic was indeed to ''expose the scheme in advance', - except that the ''scheme'' in question was not Stalin's but his own. Trotsky claimed that he was being ''framed'' for complicity in the Kirov murder. In reality he was not being ''framed." The Trotsky. . ists, who were in a political bloc with the Zinovievites and Rightists, were thereby at least accessories to Kirov's murder whether or not they knew in advance that their partners in the bloc, the Zinovievites, were planning the assassination. By anticipating the charge against him Trotsky hoped to convince his readers that the charges were obvious lies - so obvious that they were ''predict-I. able." 3 We have some evidence that Trotsky, through his supporters in the bloc, approved of the plan to murder Kirov. According to Genrikh Jagoda, Avel' Enukidze told him that the Rights (of which he and lagoda were members) reluctantly ''sanctioned'' the murder of Kirov by the Zinovievists at the insistence of ''the TrotskyistZinovievist part of the center [of the conspiracy]." If that is so, then Trotsky knew about the plan for the murder. (Genrikh Iagoda 180; 193)

The Russian edition, which must be the original, reads: "pa3o6Jia'IHTh saMbICeJI sapaHee." See Biulleten' Oppozitsii No. 41, Section 12, at http://web.mitedu/fjk/www/FI/BO/B041.shtml

2

See the sections "Expose the scheme in advance" in Chapters 13, 14, and 15 of Trotsky's #Amalgams."

3

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However, none of the defe ndan ts in the Kirov assas sinat ion trial or in the first Moscow trial of Augu st 1936 , the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, claim ed that the Trots kyist s eithe r had prior know ledge of or playe d any role in the murd er. If these defe ndan ts' testi mon y was genuine, and if Trots kyist s reall y had prior know ledge or playe d a role, the defe ndan ts woul d have had no reaso n to conceal this fact. If their testi mon y had been ''fabr icate d'' by the prose cutio n, there was no reaso n for the NKVD, Vyshinsky, or for that matt er Stalin, to refra in from putti ng into the mou ths of the 1936 trial defendant s a story that Trot sky and/ or his followers were at least accesso ries, if not outri ght accomplices, to Kirov's murd er. But no such accu satio ns occu rred. That leave s this parti cular issue in doub t. False capit ulati ons - false decla ratio ns of loyalty to the Party in the futur e - were comm on amon g mem bers of the Sovi et oppo sition . In 1990 leadi ng Trot skyis t scho lar Pierr e Brau e asser ted that ''eve rybo dy'' knew this. Lev Sedov called the Smir nov grou p eithe r the ''form er capit ulato rs'' or the ''Tro tskiit e capit ulato rs." Everybody had know n, from 1929 on, that peop le in the Smir nov grou p had not reall y capit ulate d but were tryin g to fool the appa ratus , and were capa ble of organiz ing them selve s as an Oppo sition with in the party : the fact was so univ ersal ly know n that Andr es Nin, the Span iard depo rted from the Sovi et Union in Augu st 1930 , expla ined it open ly to his Germ an comrade s of Die permanente Revolution who print ed his decla ratio n with out appa rent problem.4

Broue, Pierre. "Party Opposition to Stalin (1930- 1932) and the First Moscow Trial." In John W. Strong, ed. Essays on Revolutionary Culture and Stalinism. Columbus, OH: Slavica Publis hers, 1990, pp. 98-111 , at p. 104. Broue had a lapse of memory here. In a later and more detailed article Broue says that Nin's article was published in "l'organe de l'Opposition de gauche allemande, Der Kommunist, du debut novembre 1930.H (Broue, "Ivan Nikitlch Smirnov. Une conscience comm uniste (1881- 1936). " CahLT 60 (1997) 44. 4

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Therefore the fact that Rakovsky had openly ''capitulated'' is no reason to believe that this ''capitulation' ' was genuine. Rakovsky was probably telling the truth when he testified that he had remained a loyal Trotskyist all along, that his ''capitulation'' was dishonest. •

... in February 1934, I sent a telegram to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., saying that I had completely disarmed myself both ideologically and organizationally and asked to be reinstated in the Party. This telegram was insincere, I was lying.s We can be reasonably confident that this part of Rakovsky's testi ~ mony at the third Moscow trial was truthful: that he had lied when he claimed that he had capitulated and that he had ''completely disarmed'' himself. But we would like to know more. Were Rakovsky's dramatic confessions of having been a Japanese spy on Trotsky's behalf true or not? Whose false story or ''amalgam'' is in play here? Did ''Stalin'' - really the Soviet prosecution invent the story of Rakovsky's connivance with the Japanese, including Trotsky's own conspiring with them, and then force Rakovsky to mouth lies? Or was it Trotsky who was lying when he claimed that this story was an ''amalgam," another of ''Stalin's'' fabrications? The evidentiary issues that face us when we address this question are the subject of the present chapter.

Moscow Trial Testimony In anticommuni st and Trotskyist writing Moscow Trial testimony is routinely dismissed out of hand as worthless for evidentiary purposes. When a reason is given, it is normally that the testimony

Report ofCourt Proceedings in the Case ofthe Anti-Soviet ''Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites'' Heard Before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. Moscow, March 2-13,

5

1938. Verbatim Report. Moscow: People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R, 1938. (1938 Trial), 288.

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either was, or might have been, invente d by the prosec ution and the defend ants were forced to repeat it. The claim that the testimo ny ''might have been'' fabrica ted and therefo re untruth ful is an interes ting one. It logically leaves open the possibi lity that it ''might not'' have been fabricated. And that sugges ts that the testimo ny ought to be evalua ted in some way to determ ine whethe r it had been fabrica ted or not. However, in practic e this is not done. The testimo ny is disrega rded on the naive basis that if it ''might'' be fabrica ted then it is useless as historical evidence. This reason ing is invalid. All testimo ny given by person s under arrest, or even by person s detaine d by police, anywh ere, is in some sense given ''under threat'' or ''under compulsion," since normal ly the person s giving this testimo ny would not be giving it if they had not been under police detenti on, which is itself a threat - of further detenti on or worse. Even testimo ny that is appare ntly voluntarily and freely given - say, by a person whom the police were not seeking and who had no reason to think the police might seek him or her in future - might have been fabrica ted by the witnes s him/he rself for some reason, or simply misrem embere d. Even the probab ility that eviden ce will be far from reliable does not normal ly disqualify its use in court. For example, many studies have confirm ed that eyewit ness testimo ny is notorio usly unreliable under any circum stances , even when offered comple tely voluntarily. But no court would simply disrega rd it. Testim ony given by person s under arrest, by person s detaine d by police, and by person s not detaine d but merely questio ned by police, by person s who volunt eer their testimo ny (for example, by walkin g into a police station and offering to make a statem ent), eyewit ness testimo ny - all these forms of testimo ny are normal ly subject ed to various tests in an attemp t to assess their validity. This means that it is incorre ct to simply reject the testimo ny, either pre-tria l or at trial, of defend ants in the Moscow trials. Rather, we need to subjec t this testimo ny to verification or invalidation.

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The most obvious method is that of indepe ndent verification. We can study the testimo ny carefully to see whethe r we have independen t evidence, either from within the USSR or from beyond its border s that can corrob orate or disprov e it. I have not found any scholarship that undert akes indepe ndent verification - proof or disproo f - of Moscow trial testimony. This fact can't be explain ed by any lack of indepe ndent corrob orating evidence .... there is a lot of it. In previou s essays, and in other chapte rs in this book, we have cited a good deal of such evidence. Examples include the following:

* For decade s Trotsky, Khrushchev-era, Gorbachev-era, Wester n academ ic scholar ship, and Trotsk yist writers , dismis sed the allegation made at the Moscow trials that a ''bloc of Rights and Trotskyites'' existed. The bloc was declare d to be part of a ''Stalinist'' frame-up. But in 1980 evidence found by Trotsk yist scholar Pierre Broue in the Trotsk y archive at Harvar d proved that this bloc did indeed exist and that it had been formed in 1932, the same year that testimo ny at several of the Moscow trials claimed. * A numbe r of the statem ents made in their testimo ny by Moscow

trial defend ants about Trotsk y and which Trotsk y vehem ently denied can also now be verified. For example, in anothe r chapte r of this book we discuss how we can now verify Karl Radek's claim that he received a letter from Trotsk y in late Februa ry or early March of 1932 by means of evidence from the Harvar d Trotsk y archive.

* NKVD

General Genrikh Samoilovich Liushkov, who defected to the Japane se in July 1938, private ly told his Japanese militar y handlers that Aleksei Rykov, one of the chief defend ants at the recent (March 1938) Moscow trial, really had been conspi ring with military men agains t the Soviet regime.

*

Liushkov also private ly told the Japane se about militar y conspiraci es that really existed, and named a numbe r of Party leaders who had been implicated in these conspiracies. Some of these

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Party figur e and milit ary men had been nam ed by Mosc ow trials defen dants .6 * In Febr uary 1937 an official of the Germ an Fore ign Mini stry told a Czech diplo mat that Hitle r was expe cting a milit ary seizu re of pow er in the USSR whic h woul d resu lt in a milit ary dicta torsh ip favo rable to relat ions with Germ any. This conf irms testi mon y at the 1938 Mosc ow trial testim ony, as well as the testi mon y by accuse d Sovi et gene rals whic h they made unde r arres t in May and June 1937 and at their close d trial of June 11, 1937 , that they had been secre tly in leagu e with the Germ an milit ary. * Jules Hum bert- Droz , a close assoc iate of Bukh arin' s, reve aled in mem oirs publ ished in Swit zerla nd in 1971 that in 1928 Bukh arin had told him that he and his supp orter s were plan ning to assas sinate Stalin.7

We can also chec k some asser tions made at the Mosc ow trials again st infor mati on from with in the Sovi et Unio n in cases wher e it is highl y unlik ely that the conf irma tion is the resu lt of fabri catio n. Exam ples inclu de the following:

* Test imon y by defe ndan ts befo re and at the trial of the eigh t military comm ande rs accu sed of co-co nspir acy with some of the defend ants at the Mosc ow trials and of colla bora tion with Germ any conf irms Trots ky's colla bora tion with Germ any as well. This testimo ny was mad e to a secre t cour t and it rema ins secre t in Russ ia today . We know abou t it only beca use it was sent out of Russ ia be-

See Grover Furr, The Murder ofSergei Kirov. History, Scholarship and the Anti-Stalin Paradigm. Kettering, OH: Erythr6s Press and Media, LLC, 2013, Chapter 17. 6

See the discussion of and excerpt from Humbert-Droz's memoir in Grover Furr and Vladimir L. Bobrov. "Stephen Cohen's Biography of Bukharin: A Study in the Falsehood of Khrushchev-Era 'Revelations'." Cultural Logic 2010. At http://clogic.eserver.org/2010 /Furr. pdf

1

Trotsky's Conspiracies

196

fore his deat h by General Dmitrii Volkogonov, who had carte blanche acce ss to secre t Soviet archives.a Ther e is no evide nce of any scen ario acco rding to whic h even this top-s ecre t testi mon y was fabri cated so as to confirm accu satio ns at the Moscow trials . Moreover, the guilt of these milit ary comman ders is conf irme d in a gene ral way by Liushkov's priva te state men ts to his Japa nese hand lers, whe re the Soviet NKVD general asse rted that real cons pirac ies amon g Soviet milit ary leade rs did exist.

*

Grigory Zinoviev, unde r arres t and inter roga tion in July 1936 , admi tted conti nuin g oppo sitio n to the Stalin regim e but refus ed to adm it to any crim inal activity until finally conf ronte d by one of his supp orter s in a conf essio n that rema ins secre t to this day but whic h Ame rican scho lar J. Arch Getty was perm itted to read. Thre e days later [July 26, 1936 ] Zinoviev was conf ronte d by one of his followers, [N.A.] Karev, who direc tly accu sed him. Zinoviev aske d that the inter roga tion be stop ped becaus e he want ed to make a state men t that, in the even t, amo unte d to a full conf essio n of orga nizin g assas sinat ion and terro r. (Getty, Yezhov, 191) The conf essio n ment ione d by Getty came just two days befo re Zinovi ev' s conf essio n of July 28, 1936 , still secre t in Russia but available in the Volkogonov Pape rs. We have obta ined a copy of this confession.9

See Furr and Bobrov, "Marshal S.M. Budiennyi on the Tukha chevsk y Trial. Impres sions of an Eye..Witness." (in Russian). Klio (St Peters burg) No. 2 (2012) , pp. 8-24. At https:/ /msuw eb.mo ntclair .edu/- furrg/ resear ch/bud ennyi_ klio12 .pdf

8

9

See Furr, The Murder ofSergei Kirov, 228·23 5.

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* Zinoviev used the phrase ''I am no longer an enemy'' in a letter he sent before trial from prison, asking for leniency, and again in his appeal of his death sentence.10

* A numbe r of high .. profile defend ants such as Nikolai Bukharin and Genrikh Jagoda vigorously rejecte d some of the charge s made against them by Soviet prosec utor Vyshinskii at trial. Most of Bukharin's testimo ny is devote d to rejectin g accusations against him. At the same time Bukharin admitt ed to other serious crimes with .. out any attemp t to deny them.11 Jagoda refused repeate dly to admit to being an accomplice to the murde r of Sergei Kirov while admitti ng to being what in AngloAmerican jurispr udence is called an accesso ry to it. lagoda insisted that he knew someth ing was going to happen and took no steps to stop it, but was not inform ed in advanc e exactly what kind of attempt would be made to murde r Kirov, when, or by whom. When the eventu al assassin, Leonid Nikolaev, was detaine d near Kirov's home with a pistol and notes indicating he was shadow ing Kirov, lagoda 's men followed his instruc tions and release d Nikolaev. When inform ed of this Iagoda approved.12 This kind of vigorous, prolonged, empha tic rejection of one of the Prosec utor's central charges is incons istent with any hypoth esis that Bukhar in and lagoda confessed out of fear of torture , to spare their families, or becaus e they had been promis ed leniency for a false confession. *We now have appeal s of death senten ces from many of the defendan ts at all three Moscow trials. In every one of them the de ..

10

See "O Tak Nazyvaem om 'Antisove tskom Ob"edine nnom Trotskists ko-Zinov 'evskom TsentreN. Izvestiia TsK KPSS 8 (1989), p. 89 col. 2 (same text in RKEB 184); "Rasskaz o desiati rasstrelia nnykh" ("A Story of Ten Who Were Shot"), lzvestiia Septembe r 2, 1992, p. 3 col.

1. 11

For a detailed discussio n of this point see Furr and Bobrov, "Stephen Cohen's Biograph y of Bukharin."

12

See the full discussio n of this point in Furr, Murder ofSergei Kirov, Chapter 15.

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fendants insist that they are guilty. Some of these appeals were published under Gorbachev, who was in the middle of an intense campaign to blame Stalin and the Stalin-era Soviet leadership of frame-ups in all the trials. Many others were published in 2013 under the auspices of the intensely anti-Stalin ''Memorial Society." If any of the defendants had appealed for clemency on grounds other than guilt and repentance - for example, on grounds that they had pied guilty in return for some promise or other (not to be executed, to spare their families, etc.) - Gorbachev and the ''Memo! rial Society'' would certainly have published them.13 * On June 20, 1937, Stalin was handed a telegram that Trotsky had

sent from Mexico to the Executive Committee of the Supreme Soviet concerning his willingness to return to the USSR under certain circumstances. On it Stalin wrote that Trotsky was a ''spy of Hitler'' and handed the telegram on to two of his associates, who concurred. This is evidence that Stalin believed Trotsky was guilty of conspiring with Germany. It is not compatible with a theory that Stalin, through the NKVD, had compelled any of those who, like the military commanders, had testified to this, to testify falsely. We have examined this document in an earlier chapter.

* A confession

date April 11, 1939, by Mikhail Frinovskii, former assistant commissar of the NKVD under Nikolai Ezhov, has been quoted as genuine many times by Soviet and Russian officials. When the full text of Frinovskii's confession was published in 2006 it turned out that sections of the confession that had always previously been omitted confirm the guilt of a number of the major de .. fendants at the Moscow trials. Later in the present chapter we will return to Frinovskii's confession and its implications.14

13

See the sources cited in n. 11 above.

Frinovskii's confession statement is available in English translation at https://msuweb.m ontclair.edu/-furr g/research/Frinov skiieng.html; in the original Rus.. 14

slan at https://msuweb.montclair.edu/-furrg/research/Frinovskiiru.html (choose Charac.. ter Encoding Cyrillic - Windows)

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It would appear virtual ly imposs ible that all this mutual ly corrobora tory circum stantia l eviden ce and more like it was carefully scripte d and coordi nated by ''Stalin'' - really the NKVD and prosecution - in advance, and all the defend ants, while innoce nt of any crimes, were forced to rehear se it until their ''perfor mances '' were virtual ly seamle ss and convincing and that this massively coordinated forgery left no traces. A far more likely hypoth esis, albeit one that sharply contrad ictions the mainst ream anti-Stalin paradigm, is that the defend ants really were guilty of at least those crimes to which they pleade d guilty though not necess arily to eve· rything the prosec ution accuse d them of. In light of all this confirm ation of statem ents made by Moscow trials defend ants, the only hypoth esis concer ning the statem ents of both the defend ants and the prosec ution at the Moscow trials that is suppor ted by eviden ce is that these statem ent are genuin emeanin g that they origina ted from the person s who made them and from the events they describ ed. At the same time, the prosecu tion's charge s too are statem ents the prosec ution believe d to be truthfu l. The confessions and other asserti ons made by the defend ants either are statem ents that they believe d were truthfu l or are falsehoods that the defend ants chose to make, but are not fabrications by the prosec ution. We do know that the defend ants someti mes chose to make statem ents that were false in order to mislead the prosec ution and the state. Here are some examples: *At the Januar y 1937 trial Karl Radek claime d that he knew Marshal Tukhac hevsky to be comple tely loyal to the USSR. This was not true, and Nikolai Bukharin, who collabo rated with Radek, knew that it was not true. Radek probab ly also knew about Tukhachev sky's partici pation in the Right-Trotskyist conspir acy but

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concea led it, no doubt in the hope that the militar y conspi racy would be successfu1.1s *At the August 1936 Moscow trial Zinovie v and Kamen ev failed to identif y Genrik h lagoda, chief (Peopl e's Commi ssar) of the NKVD, as a membe r of the networ k of conspir acies. In 1937, in pretria l testimo ny that was never intende d to be made public, Iagoda confessed that he had told Zinoviev and Kamen ev that they would not be execut ed and then made certain that they were indeed execut ed so as to preven t them from ''saying too much'' - admitti ng his own partici pation in the conspiracy.16

* Likewise, Frinovskii's statem ent makes it clear that Zinoviev and Kamen ev knew at least about Iagoda 's involve ment in the Zinovievite -Right- Trotsky ist conspi racy and did not reveal this during the tria1.11

* The

statem ent of Mikhail Frinov skii reveals that Ezhov had induced Genrik h Jagoda to confess to attemp ting to poison Ezhov with mercur y but that this confess ion was false. The fiction that he himsel f had been one of the targets of the networ k of conspir acies was useful to Ezhov in disguis ing the fact that he himsel f was a party to these conspir acies. Iagoda agreed to make this false confession in hopes that Ezhov would preven t his executi on.is

* Nikolai Bukhar in repeate dly said that he had confess ed to everything. Yet we know that he did not. He never confess ed that he had been plottin g to murde r Stalin as early as 1928. We know this is true thanks to Humbe rt-Droz 's memoi rs.

See Report ofCourt Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre. Heard Before the Military Collegium ofthe Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, January 23-30, 1937....Verbatim Report. Moscow: People's Commiss ariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R, 1937.

1s

(1937 Trial), p. 146. This passage is not present in the shorter Russian language transcrip t. t6

Genrikh Jagoda, 198-199.

11

Frinovskii, 40.

1e Frinovski i, 48.

Chapter Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japanese

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* Bukhar in and other defend ants at the March 1938 trial never revealed that Nikolai Ezhov, then chief (People 's Commi ssar) of the NKVD, was also a part of the opposi tion conspir acy. Mikhail Frinovskii reveale d this in his confess ion statem ent of April 11, 1939.19 We will discuss this statem ent in more detail below. Ezhov too made extensi ve confess ions about his conspir acy, some of which have been published.20 Thus there is a great deal of corrob orative eviden ce both from within the USSR and from beyond Soviet influen ce that confirm s the essenti al reliability as evidenc e of the defend ants' confess ions at the Moscow trials. We refer the interes ted reader to Part One of the first volume of this study, Trotsky 's 'Amalg ams,' which is an exhaus tive verifica tion of many of the accusa tions to which Moscow Trials defend ants confess ed. Theref ore it is more reason able to procee d on the assump tion that even confess ion statem ents that we cannot at presen t verify inde· penden tly represe nt what the defend ants chose to say rather than lies concocted by the prosecution - even if we hold such statem ents aside for future confirm ation.

Another Method of Verification We have review ed the results of verifyi ng the statem ents of Moscow trials defend ants by checkin g them agains t indepe ndent evidence from both outside and within the USSR. This is the more obvious and traditio nal method of verifyi ng eviden ce and the most reliable one. With the release of much docum entatio n from former Soviet archives we now have anothe r way to check the Moscow trials tes-

19

Frinovskii, 4 7.. 4s.

See Furr, "The Moscow Trials and the 'Great Terror' of 1937-193 8: What the Evidence Shows," at https://m suweb.m ontclair.e du/-furrg /research /trials_ez hovshchi na_updat e0710.ht ml and the links to the confessions at the end of that article. 20

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timony. We can study the attempts made during Khrushchev's and Gorbachev's time to prove that the trials were frame-ups and the defendants innocent of the charges against them. We will devote the rest of this essay to reviewing these attempts, with special attention to Rakovsky.

Khrushchev For reasons that he never disclosed Khrushchev organized a serious and long-term campaign to disparage Stalin. This effort was first announced in Khrushchev's infamous ''Secret Speech'' to the 2Qth Party Congress on February 25, 1956. One aspect of this campaign was to attempt to prove that the defendants at the Moscow trials, along with many other defendants at non-public trials, were innocent, framed by Stalin and his subordinates. Evidence from former Soviet archives now reveals that Khrushchev's attempt to frame Stalin preceded the ''Secret Speech'' and continued until Khrushchev was removed from power in 1964. Such attempts then stopped until 1987, when they resumed under Mikhail Gorbachev. Judging from the considerable documentation now available Gorbachev's associates appear to have studied and mined what Khrushchev's associates had done and also to have done some research on their own. The reports composed by Khrushchev's and Gorbachev's associates are important in that they represent an attempt to prove that the Moscow trials were frame-ups and the defendants forced to make false confessions. As far as we can tell these reports were all fraudulent. Neither Khrushchev's nor Gorbachev's associates were able to find any evidence that any of the Moscow trials defendants were ''framed," forced to falsely confess to the charges against them. 21

lagoda's false confession to an attempt to poison Ezhov is a special case, though not one in which he was coerced to lie by the prosecution. For one thing, there's no evidence that Jagoda was forced to confess to this. Furthermore, it seems he did so at Ezhov's suggestion, in the hope that this would save him (lagoda) from execution, but Ezhov double-crossed 21

Chapt er Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japanese

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The repo rt that bega n this long trail of falsehoods, Khru shch ev's ''Secret Speech," was also entir ely a fabrication. All of the char ges that Khru shch ev made in it again st both Stalin and Beria have been prov en to be false.22

Serov's Report of July 7, 1956 Wes tern antic omm unist scho lars and Trots kyist s routi nely dismiss the defe ndan ts' testi mon y at the Moscow trials. But Soviet anti-Stalinists neve r did this. On the contr ary, unde r Khru shch ev and later unde r Gorbachev, Soviet leade rs orga nized majo r researc h efforts to attem pt to prov e that the trials were fram e-up s and the defe ndan ts inno cent. Thes e were subs tanti al unde rtakings, for the Soviet leade rship had ever ythin g at their disposal: all the inves tigat ion mate rials on all defen dants . Team s of resea rche rs were empl oyed to comb the archives, collect, and study the mate rials and draft the repo rts. Most of the mate rials the Soviet inves tigato rs revie wed are still top secre t in Russia today, unavailable to resea rche rs. The post- Sovi et Russian gove rnme nt takes the same posit ion that the Gorbachev gove rnme nt took that all the trial test.imonies were fabri catio ns and all of the defe ndan ts inno cent. Cons eque ntly there is no reaso n to doub t that any evide nce that can be used to supp ort this preco nceiv ed notio n has been made public. This effor t bega n with Khrushchev. On April 13, 1956 , not long after the ''Sec ret Speech'' Khru shch ev appo inted a special commission to be chair ed by Viacheslav M. Molotov. Although he had

him. Second, this fabrica tion was of course known to EzhovJs men at the time and was disclosed by Frinov skii in April 1939. It is not a discov ery by Khrus hchev or Gorba chev and does not change our conclusion that the defend ants testifie d as they chose - wheth er or not their testim ony was the truth as they unders tood it

Furr, Khrushchev Lied: The Evidence That Every "Revelation" ofStalin's (and Beria's) Crimes in Nikita Khrushchev's Infamous "Secret Speech" to the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 25, 1956, is Provably False. Kettering, OH:

22

Erythr6s Press & Media LLC, 2011.

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vot ed in fav or of Kh rus hch ev' s ''Se cre t Spe ech '' Mo loto v wa s kno wn to be a Sta lin sup por ter . Th e Co mm iss ion 's me mb ers hip t bu ch ovi gan Ka and v, hilo ros Vo v, loto Mo '' ists alin ''St the ed lud inc the ma jor ity we re Kh rus hch ev sup por ter s: Suslov, Fur tse va, Shv ern ik, Aristov, Pospelov, and Rudenko.23 Th e com mis sio n wa s cha rge d to ''st udy the ma ter ial s of the pub lic tria ls in the cas e of Bu kha rin , Rykov, Zinoviev, Tu kha che vsk y, and oth ers ." A nu mb er of the rep ort s of thi s com mis sio n we re pub lish ed in 200 3.

Serov's Reports Th e July 7, 195 6, rep ort of Iva n A. Ser ov, hea d of the KGB, wa s pub lish ed in 2013. Th is rep ort rem ain s the mo st com pre hen siv e attem pt kno wn to pro ve tha t the def end ant s in the Ma rch 19 38 Mos .. cow tria l we re inn oce nt. We wil l rev iew thi s rep ort her e in som e det ail. In 201 0 Ma tth ew Len oe rev eal ed tha t Ser ov had lied to the Molotov Co mm iss ion in ano the r rep ort . Len oe con clu ded tha t Ser ov did so at Kh rus hch ev' s req ues t, in ord er to sup po rt Kh rus hch ev' s con ten tio n tha t Kirov had no t bee n mu rde red by a cla nde stin e gro up of Zin ovi evi tes bu t eit her at Sta lin 's ow n ord ers or by a ''lo ne gun -

man." He re is my dis cus sio n in The Murder of Sergei Kirov of Len oe' s accou nt of Ser ov' s falsification (all hol din g and italics in my ori gin al): Ear ly in his boo k Len oe exp lain s how Kh rus hche v 's me n set out to ''in cri min ate Stalin '' (7) - in pla in lan gua ge, to fra me him .

23

RKEB 2, 70.

Chapter Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japanese

The 1960-1 961 investi gation run by the Party Control Committee (KPK) was aimed explicitly at inculpa ting Stalin in the Kirov murder . (8)24 •

••

To unders tand the positio ns that Serov and the USSR prosec utor's office took in their memor anda, it is necessary to see precise ly what was at stake in the deliberation s of the Molotov commission. The commission was charge d with investigating the show trials of the later 1930s and determ ining whethe r the charge s were valid. The Kirov murde r and the trials of the ''Leningrad Center'' and ''Moscow Center '' that immediately followed were just the startin g point of the inquiry, but everyth ing that followed depend ed on these events. If the official charge s in the first two trials that forme r Zinoviev suppo rters/ 592 /had conspired to murde r Kirov - were entirel y bogus, then the indictm ents in all of the succee ding show trials collaps ed. The latter indictm ents were built on the earlier ones, albeit in a confused and illogical way. But if there was some truth to the charge that Zi· noviev ites conspi red to kill Kirov, then that preserved the possib ility of arguin g that the later charge s were also valid, at least in part. Theref ore Serov and Ruden ko (or their subord inates who author ed the memor anda) chose to make a clearcut argum ent that Nikola ev had had no relatio nship at all with the ex-Zinoviev suppor ters convic ted in the trial of the ''Leningrad Center." It appear s that Serov or his boss had though t throug h this strateg y, to deny any connec tion at all betwee n Nikolaev and the Zinovievites, even before the ''Secret

24

Furr, Kirov 16 6.

205

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nce ed oy str de B KG e th 56 19 , 27 y ar nu Ja On .'' ch Spee tra l re co rd s on th e case file ''Svoiak," th e all-union su rv eil lan ce op er at io n ag ai ns t th e Zinovievites. It se em s likely th at ''Svoiak'' co nt ai ne d m or e evidence th an Serov wa nt ed Molotov to see, ei th er of co un ter or d/ an s ite ev vi no Zi er rm fo g on am lk ta ry na tio lu re vo of Nikolaev 's co nn ec tio ns wi th th e ac cu se d in th e ''Leningrad Center." Se ro v co nc ea led ot he r evidence of co nn ec tio ns be tw ee n Nikolaev an d th e ex-Zinovievites m fro ts rp ce ex e Th . ky ats Sh d an , ov ton An , ov yn Kotol Nikolaev 's di ar ies th at he re le as ed to th e Molotov to es nc re fe re no d ne ai nt co 56 19 ril Ap in n io iss m co m th es e men. Bu t we kn ow from la te r re le as es of da ta th at Nikolaev did m en tio n all th re e in his diaries. (Leno e 591-2.) I ha ve pu t in pl ai n bo ld fa ce ab ov e th e pa ss ag e in wh ich Lenoe ou tli ne s th e im po rta nc e of th e Kirov case os M e th of st re e th nd ta rs de un to g in nt wa ne yo an fo r co w ''s ho w trials." Obviously, Kh ru sh ch ev an d his m en , es iv ch ar e th in le ab ail av ce en id ev e th by at th re ali ze d th es e tri al s an d th e co ns pi ra cie s de tai led at th em did no t ap pe ar to have be en faked. It wa s th ey th em se lv es wh o wo ul d ha ve to fake: falsify, wi th ho ld an d de str oy evidence, in or de r to bu ild a case th at th es e conspirae th e ac ldf bo lic ita in t pu ve ha I . ce pla ke ta t no cies did isif fal e th of e m so es iz ar m m su e no Le e er wh es ag pa ss ca tio ns th at Serov, Kh ru sh ch ev 's man, ac co m pl ish ed in or de r to try to convince th e Molotov Commission th at Nikolaev wa s no t lin ke d to th e cla nd es tin e Zinovi ev ite co ns pi ra to rs. (1 64 -5 ) t re ec ''S 's ev ch sh ru Kh at th ct fa e th of, nt ra no ig is Lenoe ignores, or v, ro Se at th er ov sc di d di e no Le t Bu . ied sif fal y el tir en s Speech'' wa g yin sif fal t ou ab t se , rs de or 's ev ch sh ru Kh on g tin ac y dl te un do ub in ce en id ev g in oy str de by se ca r de ur m v ro Ki e th of th e re op en in g e, or m t's ha W ." ch ee Sp t re ec ''S 's ev ch sh ru Kh re fo be , 56 19 Ja nu ar y r de ur m v ro Ki e th of on ati fic lsi fa e th , ks ar m re as Lenoe as tu te ly

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was done in the service of falsifying the reviews of the later Moscow trials, all of which were linked to the Kirov murder . Since Serov lied to the Molotov Commission about the Kirov murder in the service of trying to fraudulently argue that the defendants in the Moscow trials were innocent, we might suspec t that Serov also lied about the March 1938 Moscow trial. In this chapte r we will show that this is the case.

Serov's July 7, 1956, Report We will not cite every bit of evidence that Serov's report of July 7, 1956, is fraudulent. Instead, we'll give details on a few import ant instances of Serov's falsification. Then we will procee d to study in detail Serov's attemp t to prove that Rakovsky was innocent. To make it easier for readers to follow our critique we'll go throug h Serov's report page by page rather than by groupi ng Serov's falsifications in categories. All transla tions from Serov's report are by the presen t author. As can be seen from the materia ls of the case, before the arrests of BUKHARIN N. I., RYKOV A.I., KRESTINSKII N.N. and others, the organs of the NKVD and of the USSR Prosec utor's Office did not posses s any verified facts on organized activities of these individuals and on the existence of a so-called ''Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites." (83 3) This is false. By Februa ry 27, 1937, the day Bukharin was arreste d during the February-March 1937 Central Committee Plenum there was a great deal of evidence agains t him. There had been at least two face-to-face confrontations with accusers - Piatakov and Astrov.25 A great many others had accused Bukharin - he received 20

25

With Astrov: "' ... Ni razu ne govorllos ' otnosiltel 'no terrora.' Stenogra mma ochnoi stavki N.l. Bukharin a s V.N. Astrovym v Politburo TsK VKP(b) 13 ianvaria 1937 g.H Istochnik No. 2, 2001, 89-110. With Piatakov: ''Stenogra mma ochnykh stavokv TsK VKP(b). Dekabr' 1936 goda. No. 3. Stenogra mma ochnoi stavki mezhdu Piatakovy m i Bukharin ym v Ts.K VKP(b) ot 7 dekabria 1936 goda." Voprosy Istorii 4 (2003), 3·12.

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such on one day alone, Febr uary 16, 1937 , as he said hims elf at the Plenum: On Febr uary 16 at 6:30 in the evening I received 20 diffe rent confessions ... 26 In this repo rt Serov claims no fewe r than 17 times that pers ons convicted and exec uted who had incul pated trial defe ndan ts in their confessions had alrea dy been ''rehabilitated." Khrushchev refer red to rehab ilitat ions in the ''Secret Speech.'' Few of these rehabil itatio n repo rts have been publ ished . The pres ent auth or studied the reha bilita tion repo rts that had been publ ished as of 2006 in Chap ter 11 of Khrushchev Lied. All of them are disho nest ''whi tewa sh'' jobs. Not a single one of them prov es the innocence of anybody. In Chap ter 2 of our Russian-language book 1937. Pravosudie Stalina (201 0) my colleague Vladimir L. Bobr ov and I publ ished an analysis of the 1988 Rehabilitation repo rt on Bukharin and the othe r defe ndan ts in the March 1938 Moscow trial, toge ther with the evide nce that this ''rehabilitation'' by the Soviet Supr eme Court is inde ed delib erate ly fraudulent. We will refer to it here whe n we cons ider Mikhail Frinovskii's confession of April 11, 1939, which also figures in Serov's repo rt. None of the rehab ilitat ion repo rts yet publ ished dispr oves the guilt of the pers on ''rehabilitated." Khrushchev and, later, Gorbachev had access to all the investigation and trial materials. The fact that their resea rche rs could not cite any evidence to exculpate any of the defe ndan ts at any of the Moscow trials mean s that they could not find any such evidence. Therefore, they were forced to lie.

On page 836 of Serov's repo rt we read:

26

Voprosy lstorli, 2-3 (1992), 30. This is Bukharin's openin g statem ent at the February-

March 1937 C.C. Plenum. Bukharin enume rates a large amoun t of the testim ony agains t him at that point

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All the accuse d convic ted in the presen t case pleade d guilty to the charge s agains t them. This is an examp le of ''wease l words' ' an equivo cal statem ent intende d to give a differe nt impres sion than what the words literally mean. Bukhar in did plead guilty of ''the charge s against him'' (1938 Trial, 36). But the charge s in the Indictm ent were not brough t specifically against any individ ual. Instead they were brough t against the bloc of Rights and Trotsk yites as a group (343 S). The accuse d, includi ng Bukhar in, pleade d guilty on the understandin g that they were all guilty of all of the acts of the bloc whethe r they knew about all of them or not. Howev er, during the trial Bukhar in spent a great deal of time denyin g certain other specific accusa tions that the Prosec utor tried to convic t him of.21 Serov claime d that an ''agent' ' was kept in defend ant S.A. Bessonov's cell where he heard Besson ov denoun ce the trial as a frame- up (838): On May 6, 1939 /Agen t ''Blagin'' /,who was confine d with BESSONOV in Solovki prison, reporte d that BESSONOV respon ded about the trial of ''anti-S oviet bloc of Rights and Trotsky ites'' as follows: ''The whole trial is a comple te inventi on of the NKVD. In reality none of the accuse d commi tted any crimes ..." (arch. case numbe r 101492 , Vol. 1 l.d. 27) •••

On April 29, 1939 / agent ''Grachev'' /wrote about the same subject : ''Descr ibing the trial as a ''farce," pris-

27

For much more detail on this question see Furr and Bobrov. "Stephen Cohen's Biography of Bukharin: A Study in the Falsehood of Khrushchev-Era 'Revelations'." Cultural Logic 2010. At http://clo gic.eserv er.org/20 10/Furr.p df

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on er BESSO NOV sa id th at ev er yt hi ng th at th e ac cu se d sa id at th e tri al wa s co er ce d te sti m on y an d in fa ct no ne of th em ha d pl ot te d an yt hi ng ag ai ns t So vi et po we r." (ibid, vol. 1, l.d. 22 ) ng hi yt er ev t ou ab ow kn ov on ss Be d ul co w Ho . This ha s to be a lie r fo ilt gu ed pt ce ac in ar kh Bu ? ne do d ha ts an nd fe de r he ot th at all th e at th ed im cla t bu d te pa ci rti pa he h ic wh in c blo e th of es iti th e ac tiv ve ha t no d ul co ov on ss Be d. di oc bl e th ng hi yt er ev he di d no t kn ow lyly ate er lib de s wa he is, th y sa d di ov on ss Be if So r. kn ow n eit he sly ou ul ed cr he or g in ly s wa v ro Se er th ei it, y sa ing; if he di d no t ts en ag ed eg all by ld to s wa he ng hi et m so ed at pe re d be lie ve d an th tru n ee tw be p ga e th e er wh r te at m No v." he rac ''G d an ' ''Blagin' . re he ew m so d rre cu oc ve ha to d ha it d, rre cu oc od ho lse fa an d dif o tw tly en id ev s'' nt ge ''a y wh to as on ati an Se ro v gi ve s no ex pl pt ke g in be re we r he ot an e on of ys da w fe a in th fe re nt ag en ts wi . ce en nt se s hi g in rv se s wa he ile wh al, tri e th r te af in Be ss on ov 's cell he en wh g in ly ly ab str on m de s wa v ro Se at th on r te W e wi ll se e la m ad e a sim ila r cla im ab ou t Ra ko vs ky .

Serov m ad e th e following cla im (8 40 -8 41 ): in al tri e th at ng ki ea sp s, es tn wi n io ut ec os pr r he ot An th e ca se of th e an ti- So vi et bloc, fo rm er m em be r of th e ac . B.D OV MK KA s SR '' eft ''L e th of ee itt mm Co l ra nt Ce co rd in g to th e te sti m on y of th e ar re ste d BRIUKid sa ll, ce e m sa e th in m hi th wi er th ge to ld he V, NO HA to hi m:

''All th re e of th e re ce nt tri al s ar e th e sa m e kind of sw in dl e as th e pr ev io us on es . Th er e is no t a dr op of tru th in th em . Ne ith er ZINOVIEV no r BUKry na io ut ol ev r-r te un co y an in ed lv vo in s wa N RI HA co ns pi ra to ria l wo rk . Es pi on ag e, di ve rsi on , sa bo tag e, te rro ris m , ki lli ng - th is is all a co m pl ete sh am , fa br ica ted by th e NKVD. Co nf es sio ns we re ex tra ct ed fro m th e ac cu se d by to rtu re , bl ac km ail , beatings, threats, th re at s ag ai ns t th ei r families, th e

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211

arrests of their wives etc. by means of physical and mental pressure. At the same time they used bribery, appeasing the defendants, promises not to execute them, etc..." (arch. case number 967389, separate packet). This is false. Thanks to Pierre Broue's research in the Harvard Trotsky archive in 1980 we know that both Zinoviev and Bukharin were indeed involved in ''counter-revolutionary conspiratorial work'' the bloc of Zinovievists, Trotskyists, Rightists, and other oppositionists that was formed in 1932. From Jules HumbertDroz's memoirs we know that Bukharin and some of his followers were plotting to murder Stalin as early as 1928. What's more, Kamkov could not possibly know whether Zinoviev or Bukharin had been involved in a conspiracy or not, because no one ever claimed that Kamkov was a part of it, so he could not have known about it. Kamkov's only connection to the 1938 Moscow trial was that he had had some conspiratorial talks with Bukharin in 1918, twenty years earlier. So if Kamkov really said this, he was lying. Most likely, though, this another of Serov's fabrications.

Serov: While BUKHARIN was in custody the prisoner ZARITSKII N.D. had been in the same cell and when questioned on July 3, 1956, testified: ''I spent 4-5 months with BUKHARIN before he was executed ...

During the investigation, and especially during the trial, BUKHARIN expressed indignation at the injustice of the accusations against him .... He also told me that he had good personal relations with STALIN, that in a number of instances STALIN had given him and his family assistance in domestic matters, and therefore he never could even think of murdering him. (841)

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If Bukh arin said this to Zarit skii he was lying. We know he was involv ed in a cons pirac y to kill Stali n by 1928 at the lates t, as he told Hum bert- Droz . But given Sero v's othe r prov en lies (for more , see below ) we have no reaso n to acce pt this Zarit skii quot e as genu ine. Sero v claim s seve ral time s that a defe ndan t's guilt is not ''con firme d'' beca use the defe ndan t did not confess. For exam ple, abou t Kara khan : Acco rding to RYKOV'S testi mon y KARAKHAN, allegedly a mem ber of an orga nizat ion of Rights, held talks on TOMSKII's instr uctio ns with repre senta tives of fascist Germany, to who m he mad e it clear that in the even t the bloc of Rights and Trots kyite s came to pow er certa in conc essio ns wou ld be made in favo r of the capit alist coun tries . Thes e conf essio ns of RYKOV'S too have not been confirme d since KARAKHAN, brou ght to trial in 1937 , refuse d to conf ess to any of the charg es. (842 ) Sero v is the one lying here. A conf essio n of Kara khan 's has been publ ished . 28 More over, just as conf essio n of guilt is not firm proo f of guilt, so a fortiori failure to conf ess guilt woul d, if genu ine, not be evide nce of innoc ence . Norm ally we expe ct that both the inno cent and the guilt y will usua lly claim inno cenc e. It migh t be the case that Kara khan refus ed to conf irm his confe ssions at his trial. If so, this woul d be good evide nce that he was not ''pres sured '' in the vario us ways Sero v claim ed that othe rs were press ured . It woul d not be evide nce of innoc ence , but an attem pt to force the pros ecuti on to prov e its case with othe r evide nce.

2s Lubianka

1937-38 No. 102; online at http:// istmat info/n ode/3 1227

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Serov is almost certainly lying again, as he does in the case of Piatakov (see below). Ovsiannikov names bot h Karakhan and Krestinskii in his confession.29 Concerning Dr. D.D. Pletnev, one of the defendants at the March 193 8 Moscow trial who was sen tenc ed to prison rath er than to execution, Serov stat es the following: PLETNEV, who during the investigation and at trial admitted his guilt in the organization of killing A.M. GOR'KII and V.V. KUIBYSHEV on the instruction of IAGO DA, afte r the conviction on June 11, 193 9 addre ssed the following stat eme nt to Comrade V.M. Molotov: ''I was sen tenc ed in the Bukharin case. During the

investigation I adm itte d the accusations against me, and at trial I did not renounce them. I was slandered ...." (84 6) This is false. At trial Pletnev pleaded guilty but did indeed renounce his guilty plea and claimed tha t he had not take n par t in any of the murders. But und er questioning by Vyshinskii Pletnev conceded tha t he had failed to inform the authorities once Iagoda had bee n removed from office even though he had a yea r to do so. VYSHINSKY: Why did you not refuse to be implicated in this criminal plan ? PLETNEV: There wer e thre ats on the par t of Yagoda directed against me.

VYSHINSKY: Wh y did you attach such serious Importance to Yagoda's threats? PLETNEV: After all, he was People's Commissar of Jn . . tern al Affairs.

29

Lubianka 1937 -38 No. 228; online at http; //istm at.in fo/no de/3 2387

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VYSHINSKY: Well, and when he was Peop le's Commissar no longer, what restr aine d you then from comi ng to the appr opria te bodi es and perfo rmin g your duty as a citizen? PLETNEV: I considered the ques tion finished, dead. VYSHINSKY: Dead are your victims, but the question is still alive. PLETNEV: Now I see that it is alive. I

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I

KOMMODOV: Would your anti-Soviet senti ment s be sufficient in themselves to prom pt you to commit a crime in connection with your work, if there had not been Yagoda's instructions? PLETNEV: Under no circumstances. (193 8 Trial, 594, 596) In its sente nce the cour t acce pted his claim that he had agre ed to help in the malt reatm ent of Gorky beca use he had been threa tene d by Jagoda, chief (Peo ple's Com miss ar) of the NKVD. The cour t

agre ed that Pletnev had not taken part in any killing but had been a part of the conspiracy and had not informed on it when he had had the chance to do so. PLETNEV, Dmitry Dmitrievich, as not having directly taken an active part in the causing of death of Comrade s V. V. Kuibyshev and A. M. Gorky, although he was an accessory ... (193 8 Trial, 799).

According to Serov, Pletnev claimed that he had always been loyal to the USSR: All my life since October of 1917 I have been loyal to the Soviet regime and unde r the leadership of the

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party have given all my stren gth and know ledge to my home land. (846 ) Sero v is lying again. At the trial Pletn ev conf essed that he had been a mem ber of the Cade t Party (K-D - Cons tituti onal Dem ocrat ic Party ), an inten sely antic omm unist party . This has been conf irme d by V.D. Topo lians kii, who has publ ished a serie s of artic les to ''rehabil itate '' Pletn ev's reputation.30 Pletn ev's appe al for a more lenie nt sente nce has now been publishe d. Rath er than claim inno cenc e, in it he admi ts his guilt once again. I

I have conf essed my full guilt of the accu satio n again st me. My depo rtme nt durin g the inves tigat ion and at the trial are testi mon y to this. I ask the Pres idium of the Supr eme Sovi et to mitig ate the sente nce impo sed upon me. (Pro tsess Bukh arina 2013, 749- 50) Sero v wrot e: Ques tione d as a witn ess form er NKVD man LERNER, who was invol ved in the inves tigat ion of this case, said the following in an inter roga tion in July 1956: ''I did not lead the inves tigat ion of the IAGO DA case to its conc lusio n, the last 6-8 mon ths I was doin g othe r thing s and had no relat ionsh ip with the inves tigat ion of the case. (856 ) This is a lie, eithe r by Lern er or Serov. Lern er signe d the inter roga tion of Jago da dated Dece mber 28, 1937 , and the two face-to-face

30

"Firm democ ratic convic tions charac teristic of the Russian intellig entsia of the end of the 19th and beginn ing of the 20th centuries, and an inexhaustible drive to serve their countr y broug ht ... D.D. Pletne v to the ... Constitutional-Democratic Party." - "Doctor D.D. Pletnev." In Represstrovannaia nauka. Spb.: 'Natika" 1991, p. 307.

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con fro nta tio ns bet we en Jagoda and Kriuchkov and bet we en Jagoda and Pletnev, bot h dat ed Jan uar y 5, 1938, less tha n two mo nth s bef ore the trial began.31 So if Lerner, in fact, ma de the r rne Le t tha e car t no did ov Ser her eit and g, lyin s wa he , ent tem sta was lying, or he him sel f wa s lying. Eit her way, Molotov wo ula nev er know. It is eas y to imagine tha t for me r NKVD ma n Le rne r wa nte d to place him sel f as far away from the investigation as possible. We discuss thi s ma tte r later. sup had r rne Le e for ere Th 6. 195 7, y Jul ed dat is ort rep s ov' Ser pos edl y - ma de this sta tem ent only a few days earlier. If so, he st mu r rne Le so, If . ort rep s ov' Ser for sly res exp it de ma ly bab pro have bee n per sua ded to lie so his tes tim ony wo uld be helpful to Serov's att em pt to ''prove'' all the tria l def end ant s we re innocent. evi al nti sta cum cir d goo is r rne Le to d ute rib att lie le vab pro s Thi den ce tha t the oth er NKVD me n and ''agents'' quo ted by Serov we re also lying. At the end of his rep ort Serov claimed to the Commission tha t the pub lish ed tra nsc rip t of the 19 38 Moscow had bee n falsified. During the int err oga tio n of IAGO DA at the tria l the que stio n of his guilt in the mu rde r of KUIBYSHEV wa s no t at all explained, as can be see n from the tra nsc rip t. However, the tra nsc rip t wa s filled out as follows: ''VYSHINSKll. Do you ple ad guilty in the organization of the mu rde r of KUIBYSHEV? JAGODA. I do." (857) In fact, Jagoda had confessed to this in pre tria l int err oga tio ns.

Genrikh Jagoda. Narkom vnutrennikhdel SSSR, General'niy komlssar gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti. Sbornik dokumentov. Kazan', 199 7, 218, 227, 230. 3t

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IAGODA: Yes, I have hidd en thing s. But now there 's no poin t in my hidin g anyth ing. I adm it that in addi tion to Max, V.R. Menzhinskii, V.V. Kuibyshev, and A.M. Gor'kii were also killed in the same man ner by my orde r. I ask that you reco rd that, if I am the only pers on to blam e in Menz hinsk ii's death , the death s of V.V. Kuib yshe v and A.M. Gor'kii were orga nized on the direct comm and of the unifi ed cent er of the RightTrot skyis t orga nizat ion, whic h (orde r) was given persona lly to me by A.S. Enuk idze, a mem ber of this center. (Gen rikh Jagoda, 210) In a good exam ple of ''bias by omis sion' ' Sero v hid this fact from the Molotov Commission.

Serov's Report and Frinovskii's Confession Statement of April 11, 1939 Mikhail Frinovskii, Ezhov's seco nd-in -com mand in the NKVD until remo ved in late 1938 , mad e an impo rtant conf essio n state men t on April 11, 1939 . It is not an inter roga tion but a lette r to Lavr entii Beria, the head (Peo ple's Com miss ar) for Inter nal Affairs who had repla ced Ezhov in Nove mber 1938 . In Augu st 1938 Beria had been appo inted Ezhov's seco nd-in -com mand . This was a signa l that the Polit buro knew some thing was wron g at the NKVD and no long er trust ed Ezhov. The diffe rence betw een lette rs of conf essio n and inter roga tions is an inter estin g one. Lette rs such as Frino vskii 's appe ar to have been a susp ect's attem pt to ''get out in front of' the inves tigat ion. The idea was evide ntly to volu nteer infor mati on that the pros ecution did not know , thus demo nstra ting one's since rity. Confessions drag ged out of a susp ect throu gh inter roga tions or face-to-face conf ronta tions with othe r accu sers mere ly dem onst rated that the susp ect in ques tion had not yet ''disa rmed '' and woul d only confe ss to crim es when furth er denia l was usele ss.

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Frinovskii's lette r has been repe atedl y and disho nestl y quot ed in vario us Soviet docu ment s in attem pts to prov e that the Moscow trials defe ndan ts were inno cent but forced to falsely confess. In this lette r, the full text of whic h was not publ ished until 2006, Frinovskii actually testifies to the guilt, not the innocence, of the Moscow trial defen dants . Serov carefully omit s those parts of Frinovskii's state men t and edits the rest to make it appe ar as thou gh the oppo site was the case. Clearly the Molotov Commission did not have the actua l text of Frinovskii's confession. A glance at it woul d have refut ed Serov's, and there fore Khrushchev's, whol e case. In the following secti on we will quot e the passages from Frinovskii's confession that Serov quotes, and then the passa ges Serov omits in which Frinovskii reveals that the defe ndan ts were in fact guilty. Serov wrot e: The investigation of the case of the so-called ''AntiSoviet bloc of Rights and Trots kyite s'' and its considerati on at trial, cond ucted betw een 1937 and early 1938 , was char acter ized by mass ive repre ssion of so .. viet citizens, by the most serio us violations of socialist legality, by seve re beati ngs of priso ners and by various and provocative techn ique s by mean s of whic h the inves tigat ing auth oriti es exto rted confessions from the priso ners and the cour ts hand ed down clearly unjustified sentences. (849 ) Frinovskii did say this abou t Ezhov's pract ices in general. But he specifically exce pted the March 1938 Trial. Moreover, he reve aled that Ezhov hims elf was a part of the conspiracy, along with the 1938 Trial defendants. Here is one part that Serov omit ted: The prep arati on of the trial of Rykov, Bukharin, Krestinskii, Yagoda and othe rs

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An activ e part icipa nt in inve stiga tions gene rally , Ezhov kept hims elf aloo f from the prep arati on of this trial . Before the trial there took place the face-toface conf ronta tions of the susp ects, inter roga tions , and refining, in whic h Ezhov did not parti cipat e. He spok e for a long time with Yagoda, and that talk concerne d, in the main , of his assu ring Yagoda that he woul d not be shot. Ezhov had conv ersat ions seve ral time s with Bukh arin and Rykov and also in orde r to calm them assu red them that unde r no circu msta nces woul d they be shot. Ezhov had one conv ersat ion with Bulanov, and bega n this conv ersat ion in the prese nce of the inves tigat or and myself, and finished the conv ersat ion one on one, havin g aske d us to leave.

I 48 I At that mom ent Bulanov had begu n talki ng abou t the poiso ning of Ezhov. Wha t the conv ersat ion was abou t Ezhov did not say. Whe n he aske d us to ente r again he said: ''Behave your self well at the trial - I will ask that you not be shot." After the trial Ezhov always expres sed regre t abou t Bulanov. At the time of the executio ns Ezhov sugg ested shoo ting Bulanov first and he hims elf did not ente r the build ing wher e the shoo tings took place. Here Ezhov unqu estio nabl y was ruled by the nece ssity of cove ring up his own ties with the arres ted leade rs of the Right who were goin g into the publ ic trial. Frinovskii also conf irme d the guilt of Zinoviev and Kamenev and of the Rightists, including Iagoda:

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Dur ing this con vers atio n I con fide d in Evdokimov and told him tha t I had fallen in wit h the Rights in my wor k. In the sam e year, 193 3, Yagoda, afte r I had clas hed wit h him on an 6fficial que stio n, beg an onc e aga in to brin g me clos er to him wit h the help of Bulanov. Bulanov wou ld ofte n call me to his dac ha in the guis e of going fishing and play ing billiards. During one of thes e trip s to Bulanov's on a free day at his dac ha Yagoda arri ved , who afte r din ner and drin ks had a con vers ation wit h me in a sep arat e roo m. Yagoda beg an the con vers atio n by say ing I was not cor rect in opp osin g him and tha t here , obviously, the han d of Evdokimov was in play, and then he said to

me: ''Keep this in min d: I kno w tha t you rem ain a Rightist, tha t you are lead ing wor k, tha t I also know, and wou ld it not be bet ter for you to come to term s wit h the situ atio n tha t exis ts wit h us in the central app arat us, to get off you r high hor se and obe y me." And then , con tinu ing the con vers atio n, Yagoda ask ed me: ''How are thin gs in the GUPVO, you hav e a lot of assi stan ts ther e, wou ldn 't it be bet ter to get rid of som ebo dy? Wh at do you thin k - who wou ld it be bes t to keep, Kruchinkin or Lepin?''

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37 I

Wit hou t wai ting for my ans wer Yagoda said tha t Kruchinkin was a reli able man. I und erst ood tha t Kruchinkin was con nec ted wit h him in som e criminal activity.

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At tha t sam e time, 193 4, I had sev eral mee ting s wit h Evdokimov whe n he cam e to Moscow. At thes e mee tings he grad uall y disc lose d to me his prac tica l wor k and spo ke abo ut the wor k of the cen ter of the Rights

Chapter Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japanese

and arou nd the USSR. In parti cular he told me that he had a num ber of peop le insid e the appa ratus of the GPU, and nam ed Rud', Dagin, Raev, Kursky, Dem ent'e v, Gorbach, and other s. He said that he was begin ning to have conta cts in the natio nal oblas ts: in Dagestan, thou gh Mam edbe kov, in Chec hnya - Gors heev or Gorshenin, and then said that the only pers on he had troub le with was Kalmykov, who had his own line of work , and Evdokimov coul dn't cut him off in any way, but he char acter ized Kalmykov as a man whol ly ''ours'', a Rightist, but evide ntly one who had his own line of work . I aske d him what was bein g done gene rally in the USSR? Evdokimov said that large -scal e work was going on, a whol e num ber of peop le who had impo rtant posit ions in a num ber of othe r oblas ts of the USSR, had cross ed over to the Rights. And here he state d: ''You see how we must now cond uct the strug gle with the Cent ral Committee: at one time we foug ht again st the mov emen t of upris ings, and now we ourse lves must seek out the threa ds, ties to this mov emen t and, in orde r to orga nize it, we mus t go down to its base . This is very comp licate d and dang erou s work but with out the base - the secre tarie s of the regio nal comm ittee s, the chair men of the regio nal exec utive comm ittee s (RIKs) or men who have conta cts with the coun trysi de - we will not be able to lead the movemen t of upris ings, and that is one of the fund amen tal tasks that pres ents itself to us."

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In 1935 Evdo kimo v bega n to ask me whet her Yagoda's hand were in the assas sinat ion of Kirov and whet her I had any facts abou t this? At the same time he indic ated that if Yagoda had parti cipat ed in this affair it was a bad move, not from the view poin t of sympath y abou t the loss of Kirov, but from the view poin t

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of complicating the position and of the repressions which began soon after Kirov's murder.

I 40 I At the time of the trial of Zinoviev, Kamenev and others, when the testimony about Bukharin was published in the press, Evdokimov was in Moscow. He became very upset and in a conversation with me, said: ''The devil only knows how he will be able to extract himself from this whole affair. I just don't understand Yagoda at all, what he is doing, why he is broadening the circle of persons for repression, or maybe the nerves of these people are weak - they will give out. But it could have been possible to direct the course of the investigation in such a manner as to leave oneself safe in any case." Serov claimed that many trial defendants were ''specially prepared'' and sometimes told Ezhov that their confessions were false: Those prisoners who were being made ready for the trial and for face-to-face confrontation s to be carried out with participation by leaders of the Party and government were especially carefully prepared by the investigating authorities. Here everything was done strictly according to a developed plan and the prisoners repeatedly rehearsed ''their'' confessions. As you know, some of the persons involved in the case of the Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites before their criminal prosecution were given face-to-face confrontations where prisoners previously arrested accused them of committing serious crimes against the state. From the confessions, given after his arrest, of the former Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR FRINOVSKII it may be seen that specially in-

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structe d prisone rs were brough t forth at these faceto-face confron tations .

FRINOVSKII confess ed about this: At first the investi gator, then the chief of the department, prepar ed the prisone rs in a special way. The prepar ation consist ed in the reading of the confessions that the prison er had given against the person with whom the face-to-face confro ntation was about to be conduc ted. They explain ed how the face-to-face confro ntation would be conduc ted, what unexpe cted questio ns might be presen ted to the prison er and how he should answer . In essenc e what happen ed was an agreem ent and a rehears al for the upcom ing face-to-face confron tation. After that EZHOV would call the prison er to himself, or pretend ing that he had by chance droppe d in to the investi gator's room where the prison er was sitting he would speak to him about the upcom ing confro ntation and would ask whethe r he felt himsel f strong, would he confirm his confessions, and by the way, would mentio n that membe rs of the govern ment would be presen t at the face-to-face confron tation. Usually EZHOV was nervou s before such face-to-face confro ntation s even after he had had a talk with the prisone r. There were cases when the prison er

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856 I

would state, during the conver sation with EZHOV, that his confess ions were not true, that he had been falsely accused. (arch. case numbe r 975181 , Vol. 2, l.d. 37-38) As we saw above, Frinovskii explicitly stated that Ezhov did not do this in the case of the 1938 Moscow Trial.

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Serov also omi tted wha t Frinovskii said imm edia tely befo re this passage: one of man y ack now ledg eme nts by Frinovskii tha t a conspir acy did in fact exist, and tha t he, Frinovskii, was a par ty to them : In carr ying out the inve stig atio n of the case of Yagoda and the Chekist con spir ator s, and also in thos e of oth er arre sted pers ons , especially the Rights, the system of ''correction'' of the tran scri pts set up by Ezhov pur sue d the goal of pre serv ing the cad res of con spir ators and pre ven ting any pos sibi lity of the failure of our part icip atio n in the anti-Soviet conspiracy. I can cite doz ens and hun dre ds of exa mpl es whe n the def end ants und er arre st did not give up the per son s who wer e tied to them in anti-Soviet work. The mos t glaring exa mpl es wer e the con spir ator s Yagoda, Bulanov, Zakovsky, Kruchinkin and othe rs, who kne w abo ut my part icip atio n in the con spir acy and did not confess abo ut it. (4 7) Serov cou ld not reve al thes e mat ters to the Molotov Commission. Serov's and Khrushchev's aim was to claim tha t ther e had bee n no con spir acie s and all the def end ants had bee n innocent. Frinovskii's stat eme nt pro ves the opp osit e.

More of Serov's Omissions from Frinovskii's Confession Thr oug hou t his rep ort Serov sou ght to und erm ine the validity of the con fess ions of Moscow tria ls def end ants and of oth er defendan ts - in fact, of all confessions obt aine d by the NKVD. In so doin g Serov mad e hea vy use of Frinovskii's confession stat eme nt of April 11, 193 9, whi ch had also bee n obt aine d by the NKVD. However, Serov failed to cite the following dra mat ic pas sag e from Frinovskii's confession:

Chapter Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japanese

I mov e now to the prac tica l hos tile wor k whi ch was led by Ezhov, myself, and oth er con spir ator s in the NKVD. Inve stig ativ e wor k The inve stig ativ e app arat us in all dep artm ents of the NKVD was divi ded into ''inv esti gato r-bo neb reak ers, " ''bo neb reak ers, " and ''ord inar y'' inve stig ator s. Wh at did thes e gro ups rep rese nt and who wer e they ? ''Inv esti gato r-bo neb reak ers' ' wer e cho sen basi call y from amo ng the con spir ator s or per son s who wer e com pro mis ed. The y had uns upe rvis ed reco urse to bea ting arre sted per son s and in a ver y sho rt tim e obtain ed ''confessions'' and kne w how to wri te up tran scri pts in a gram mat ical and eleg ant fashion.

In this cate gor y belong: Nikolayev, Agas, Ushakov, Listeng urt, Evgen'ev, Zhu pak hin, Minaev, Davydov, Al'tman, Geiman, Litvin, Leplevsky, Karelin, Kerzon, Iam nits ky, and othe rs. Since the qua ntit y of tho se und er arre st who confessed due to suc h met hod s gre w daily and the re was a gre at nee d for investigators who kne w how to compos e inte rrog atio ns, the so-c alle d ''inv esti gato rbon ebre ake rs'' beg an, eac h on his own, to crea te gro ups of sim ple ''bo neb reak ers. " The gro up of ''bone brea kers '' con sist ed of tech nica l wor ker s. The se men did not kno w the evid enc e concern ing the susp ect, but wer e sen t to the Lefortovo [pri son in Moscow], sum mon ed the accu sed, and set to bea ting him. The bea ting s con tinu ed up to the momen t tha t the acc use d agr eed to give a confession. The rem aini ng gro up of inve stig ator s too k care of interr oga tion s of tho se acc use d of less seri ous crim es

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an d we re lef t to the ms elv es, wi tho ut lea de rsh ip from an yo ne . Th e fur the r pro ce ss of inv est iga tio n wa s as follows: the inv est iga tor co nd uc ted the int err og ati on an d inste ad of a tra ns cri pt pu t tog eth er no tes . After sev era l su ch int er-

I 46 I rog ati on s a dr aft tra ns cri pt wa s pu t tog eth er by the inv est iga tor . Th e dra ft we nt for ''co rre cti on '' to the ch ief of the ap pro pri ate de pa rtm en t, an d fro m him, still un sig ne d, for ''re vie w' ' to for me r Pe op le' s Commi ssa r Ezhov an d in rar e ca ses to myself. Ezhov loo ke d thr ou gh the tra ns cri pt, ma de ch an ge s an d ad dit ion s . In mo st ca ses tho se un de r arr es t did no t ag ree wi th the ed iti ng of the tra ns cri pt an d sta ted tha t the y ha d no t sai d tha t du rin g the inv est iga tio n an d ref us ed to sig n it. Th en the inv est iga tor s wo uld rem ind the arr es ted pa rty ab ou t the ''b on eb rea ke rs, " an d the pe rso n un de r inv est iga tio n wo uld sig n the tra ns cri pt. Ezhov pro du ce d the ''co rre cti on '' an d ''ed itin g'' of tra ns cri pts , in mo st cases, ne ve r ha vin g se en wi th his ow n ey es the pe rso n un de r arr es t an d if he did see him, the n on ly du rin g a mo me nta ry ins pe cti on of the cells or inv est iga tiv e roo ms . W ith su ch me tho ds the inv est iga tio ns su pp lie d the na me s.

In my op ini on I wo uld sp ea k the tru th if I de cla red , in ge ne ral , th at ve ry oft en the co nfe ssi on s we re giv en by the inv est iga tor s, an d no t by tho se un de r inv est iga tion. Did the lea de rsh ip of the Pe op le' s Co mm iss ari at, tha t is I an d Ezhov, kn ow ab ou t thi s? W e kn ew .

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How did we react ? Hone stly spea king - not at all, and Ezhov even enco urag ed it. No one both ered to find out to whic h of the accu sed physical pres sure was applied. And sinc e the majo rity of the pers ons who were

emp loyin g thes e meth ods were them selv es enemies of the peop le and cons pirat ors, then clearly false accu satio ns took place, we took false accu satio ns and arres ted and shot inno cent peop le who had been sland ered by enem ies of the peop le from amon g those unde r arres t and by enem ies of the peop le amon g the inves tigat ors. Real inves tigat ion was wipe d out. It is obvi ous why Sero v omit ted the passa ges quot ed earli er wher e Frinovskii mad e it clear that the Moscow trials defe ndan ts were guilty. But why did Serov omit this passa ge? At first glance this omis sion is hard to unde rstan d since the passa ge abov e make s a stron g claim that many NKVD conf essio ns were coerced, many defend ants inno cent. A poss ible expla natio n is that it focused atten tion not on the Moscow trials defe ndan ts but on the crim inal beha vior of Ezhov and his men. Emp hasis on them migh t lead to cons idera tion of what had happ ened to them - their arres ts, inter roga tions , trials, punishm ent, etc. This was done by Lavrentii Beria, who repla ced Ezhov as head of the NKVD in Nove mber 1938 . Khru shch ev hate d and demo nized Beria even more than he did Stalin. Unde r Beria a grea t many sente nces hand ed down unde r Ezhov were reve rsed. Hund reds of thou sand s of wron gfull y-co nvict ed peop le were relea sed from camp s (the GULAG) and priso ns. Hundred s of Ezhov's NKVD men, who had done the dirty work of framing hund reds of thou sand s of inno cent Sovi et citizens, were arreste d, inves tigat ed, inter roga ted, tried , and convicted. Many were sente nced to death , including both Ezhov and Frinovskii. Many othe rs were impr isone d. Perh aps anyth ing that serio usly involved Beria was a tabo o subje ct amon g all these people, Khru shch evite s and non- Khru shch evite s alike. Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov had been

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parti es to the illegal arres t and murd er of Beria, who had been a mem ber of the Presidium (nam e of the Politburo after October 1952 ) and a gove rnme nt minister. This treat men t of Beria in fact amo unte d to a kind of coup d'etat. It was a cardinal event; noth ing like this had ever happ ened befo re in Soviet history. And the charges again st Beria were faked, trum ped- up after the fact, as even Khrushchev later admitted. In the conspiracy to oust and then to kill Beria the ''Stalinists'' in the Presidium were just as guilty as Khrushchev and his supp orter s were. Or perh aps Serov simply did not wan t his Report to be ''top-heavy'' with quot ation s from Frinovskii. That migh t stim ulate the ''Stalinists'' on the Molotov Commission to requ est a copy of Frinovskii's confession state ment . Then they wou ld have seen that Frinovskii actually testified to the real existence of the various conspiracies. And Serov could not perm it that because it would have made it clear that his repo rt was dishonest. It would have exposed Khrushchev's scheme to rewr ite, by mean s of lies and omissions, all Soviet histo ry of the Stalin period.

Evaluating and Using NKVD Confessions A common practice today, even by histo rians who should know bette r, is to rejec t all Stalin-era Soviet political confessions. Serov could not do this, of course. All his counter-evidence again st the Moscow Trials was also comp osed of confession materials:

* Reports

by jailhouse snitc hes are at least as ques tiona ble evi-

dence as confessions given to NKVD investigators. Serov relied very heavily on them in this Repo rt As we shall see, it appe ars that all of those cited as ''evidence'' by Serov were fabrications.

* Claims of innocence by convicted priso ners like Bessonov, Kamkov, and Pletnev, even if genuine, are highly questionable. Wha t does a convicted priso ner have to lose by claiming innocence and compulsion? Especially when he knows that Ezhov has been oust ed and charged with framing and executing a grea t many innoce nt people? Serov's repo rt relies heavily on such claims as well. We have also shown on othe r grou nds that these claims are faked.

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* The state men ts by form er NKVD men quot ed by Serov are eithe r prov en lies or, at the very least, highly suspect. At least some of these men, like Lern er and Aronson, were ques tione d specifically for Serov's repo rt. They had ever y reaso n to fear terri ble retri bution from Khrushchev and Serov if they did not do what was want ed of them. Form er NKVD colonel Boris V. Rodos had been arres ted by Khrushchev in 1953, inter roga ted at length abou t his role in the repre ssion s of the 1930 s, and shot on April 20, 1956 , less than two mon ths befo re Serov ques tione d NKVD man Aronson. Othe r cowork ers of Beria's were also arres ted, charged with crimes, and eithe r were shot (e.g. Solomon Mil'shtein) or had comm itted sui .. cide in priso n befo re they could be shot (e.g. Lavrentii F. Tsanava). Eight of Beria's chief assis tants had been executed in December 1953 after a secre t trial and on wha t appe ar to be phon y charges. But Rodos, Mil'shtein, Tsanava, and othe rs suffered their fates in 1955 or 1956, not long befo re Serov's repo rt. All the materials in their cases are still top-s ecret in Russia today. Pavel A. Sudoplatov, by 1953 a Lieutenant-General in the MVD (successor to the NKVD), was arres ted in August 1953. By his own testi mon y he was aske d by Roman Rudenko, Chief Pros ecuto r and a Khrushchev man, to make state men ts implicating Beria (eith er arres ted or killed on June 26, 1953 ) in crimes that Sudoplatov either knew noth ing abou t or knew were fictitious. When Sudoplatov refus ed he was arres ted on the capital crime of treas on. Sudopla tov succeeded in faking insanity, was sente nced to 15 year s in prison, serve d his full sente nce, and was relea sed on time in 1968. In his memoirs Sudoplatov state s that he saw General Ivan I. Maslennikov, who had also work ed unde r Beria in the arme d forces of the NKVD. Sudoplatov hear d that Rudenko had deman ded that Maslennikov supp ort the false story that Beria had plan ned to surro und Moscow with MVD troop s and stage a coup

Trotsky's Conspiracies

23 0

de ov ik nn le as M d an y, it al re in d'etat. ''Such a pl an ne ve r ex is te d 32 ." ed st re ar be an th e id ic su it m m co to ci de d it w as b et te r n, ei ht 's il M to ed en pp ha ad h at h F or m er NKVD m en kn ew w l al e, or m t's ha W . rs he ot y an m d an T sa na va , Rodos, S ud op la to v, Se om fr es m co en m D V K N er th is p u rp o rt ed m at er ia l fr om fo rm ov ot ol M e th to g in ly ly te ra be li de as rov. W e kn ow th at S er ov w e th ng li ea nc co , ce en id ev nt ie en C om m is si on b y de st ro yi ng in co nv on si es nf co i's ki vs no ri F e, pl am ex or ex is te nc e of o th er ev id en ce (f y on im st te er th o et y ng ti re rp te in is m st at em en t) , an d de li be ra te ly nco s hi d te ac tr re d ha da go la at th g in m ai cl fo r ex am pl e by falsely fe ss io n at tria}.33 D V K N er rm fo e th , em th on ti es qu id d A ss um in g th at S er ov re al ly at th as w it r ve te ha w m hi ll te to on as re y m en w ou ld ha ve ha d ev er K hr us hc he v w an te d to he ar .

Evaluating NKVD Confessions D V K N at th on si es pr im e th ve gi to d te S er ov w ou ld n o t ha ve w an ed ac pl re d ha ho w , ia er B d le vi re e co nf es si on s ob ta in ed un de r th , ns io at ic if ls fa 's ov zh E g in at ig st ve in as w E zh ov in la te 1 9 3 8 an d . ov zh E r o da go Ja er d n u ed in ta w er e m or e re li ab le th an th os e ob eat st i's ki vs no ri F g in us s hi of n io at ic T ha t w as , ho w ev er , th e im pl m en t. e os th , se ca is th in s on si es nf co of t If on e is go in g to re je ct on e se ob e os th ct je re t o n hy w en th ov zh E ob ta in ed u n d er Jagoda an d iFr g in ct je re n ea m ld ou w at th ta in ed u n d er B er ia as w el l? And .. r to r o ed en at re th ve ha en m 's ia er B t no vs ki i's . A ft er all, could n o zE er d n u ed in ta ob s on si es nf co e tu re d F ri no vs ki i to claim th at th ls ia tr w co os M e th g in lv vo in e os th r ho v w er e la rg el y false ex ce pt fo , ed ud cl in i ki vs no ri F , en m s hi d an ov zh de fe nd an ts ? Plus th at E

nse Es " ll. fa wn Do s Hi d an ria Be t ns ai Ag ot Pl he "T : 32 Su do pl ato v, Spetsoperatsii, Ch ap te r 12 . 33 243 , 6) 99 (1 l' em Kr i ka ed zv Ra ok bo s hi in is n tially th e sa m e ve rs io 33

See Fu rr, Sergei Kirov, Ch ap te r 15.

Chapt er Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japan ese

231

were all crim inals who had now been found out and neut raliz ed by the cleve r Beria? As we have just noted , this same logic could apply to the ''jailhouse snitch'' state ment s, claims of inno cenc e by defen dant s alrea dy convicted, and even to the state men ts of the form er NKVD men whic h were , after all, also obta ined by Sero v's KGB, the succ esso r to the NKVD. If all conf essio ns are to be disco unte d as poten tially faked then the only rema ining categ ory of evide nce is mate rial evidence, wher e any exists. But a mom ent's thou ght revea ls that mate rial evide nce too can be faked. In fact it may be easie r to forge false lette rs, maps, pass ports , to plan t false weap ons, etc., than to force lifelong revo lutio narie s to falsely incri mina te them selve s and other s. Unscrup ulou s inves tigat ors who will stoop to anyt hing -- to tortu re, malt reatm ent, threa ts again st family and frien ds - woul d not scruple at forgery, plan ting false mate rial evidence, and the kind of decepti ons that we know Sero v pract iced. But such a chain of reaso ning leads to an absu rd conclusion: all evidence, anyw here , shou ld be disre gard ed since it migh t have been faked! Nothing rema ins, so histo rical resea rch is impo ssibl e. Of cour se histo rians in othe r fields do not reaso n like this. But this kind of ''logic'' is comm on in the field of Soviet histo ry of the Stalin perio d. Wha t othe r histo rians comm only do, but histo rians of the Moscow trials and the oppo sitio n cons pirac ies in the USSR durin g the 1930 s seldo m do, is to follow some elem entar y rules for deali ng with evide nce that help to assu re an objective asse ssme nt of that evidence. Such rules inclu de the following: *No evide nce shou ld ever be rejec ted a priori. It is always invalid to say that some evide nce shou ld be disre gard ed beca use it ''might'' have been faked. Specific reaso ns are requ ired for rejecting any evidence. We need ''evid ence that evide nce has been faked'' befo re it can be rejec ted. This inclu des Stali n-era Soviet confessions.

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Trotsky's Conspiracies

To put this anot her way: the state men t ''X migh t have been forced to confess falsely'' is a hypo thesi s. All hypo these s requ ire evidence to susta in them. That evidence mus t then be evaluated. That is wha t we are doin g in the pres ent essay. Serov claimed - i.e. state d the hypo thesi s - that the confessions of Rakovsky and others were untru e, obta ined by threa ts of some kind. In the pres ent essay we show that Serov's evide nce to supp ort his hypo thesi s was itself faked by Serov. A hypo thesi s that is not supp orted by evidence does not have to be dispr oven - it ''falls of its own weight." If there is no evidence that supp orts the hypo thesi s that ''X was forced to confess'' then that hypo thesi s must be discarded. We must acce pt the confession as valid unle ss and until evidence that tend s to dispr ove it shou ld come to light. Then we must stud y that evidence and if nece ssary amen d or discard our original conclusion. This is the meth od we have empl oyed in this essay by study ing Serov's repo rt.

* Even when we do have evidence that a confession or othe r evidenc e is faked, it can often still prov ide impo rtant evidence for some othe r hypothesis. Serov's July 7, 1956 , repo rt is a good example. We can prov e it is full of delib erate ly false state ment s. Yet impo rtant conclusions can be draw n from it. Serov's repo rt does not do wha t Serov want ed it to do: it does not prov ide reliable evidence to supp ort the hypo thesi s that Rakovsky and the othe r Moscow trials defe ndan ts were framed. But it does prov ide addit ional evidence for a diffe rent hypo thesi s: that Khrushchev and Serov were them selve s tryin g to frame Ezhov and Stalin. (They also tried to frame Beria).

* All evidence should be verified to the exten t possible by comparis on with othe r evidence. The likelihood that num erou s pieces of evidence from diffe rent sour ces will all have been faked in some coor dina ted way, yet with out leaving any trace of that faking process, beco mes so remo te that it can be disregarded. Ther efore confessions and state men ts made by priso ners unde r NKVD investigation and othe r Stalin-era docu ment s must be stud-

Chapter Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japanese

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ied in the same way as all other evidence. We have a great deal of evidence from different source s that corrob orates the guilt of many of the Moscow trials defendants. At the same time, we have no credible evidence that tends to prove they were framed. Serov and Khrushchev's aides, and later Gorbachev and his aides, tried to prove this. But we can now prove that it is they who were fabricat. . ing false evidence.

* In the case of Stalin-era researc h we must guard against unexamined assumptions. This is what I have called ''the anti-Stalin paradigm." We should not assume that Stalin deliberately framed innocent people, or lied, or fabricated evidence. Like any hypothesis, this has to be suppor ted with evidence. In practice, I have yet to find a single instanc e where Stalin did any of these things. By contras t, even a commi tted Trotsk yist like Pierre Braue has

found many examples of Trotsk y's deliber ate lying. Yet I have never yet encoun tered an example of any scholar rejecting something Trotsk y said on the ground s that ''he might be lying since we know he lied in other instances." The fact that a person - say, Trotsky - provably lied in some instanc es does not mean that he lied, or ''proba bly lied," in other instanc es or that everything he said or wrote can be disregarded. This illogical logic is only applied to Stalin himsel f and to Stalin-era materia ls like NKVD interrogations, statem ents by prisone rs, and Moscow Trial transcr ipts. To lie is a human trait. Anyone, at any time, may be either lying or telling the truth (at least what the person believes is the truth). In particular, the fact that a person is under investigation, under arrest, in prison, etc., does not mean that they are lying. Nor does it necessarily mean that they are ''more likely'' to be lying. Likewise, people who are not under any kind of compulsion at all also might be either lying or telling the truth. There is no formula such as, for example, ''People who are under arrest are X% more likely to lie than people who are at liberty." A statem ent by someo ne who is at liberty and free from threat cannot be assumed to be true. Likewise a statem ent by someo ne under arrest cannot be assumed to be false. There is no justifica-

23 4

Trotsky's Conspiracies

sri p y b rs e tt le s, n o ti a g o rr te in D V K N g n ti n u o c is d ly p m si r fo ti o n r fo n so a re l a n o ti ra o n d n a , c. et , ts p ri sc n a tr s al ri T w o sc o M , rs e n o r fo s si a b ly n o e h T e. ls fa e b to '' y el k th in k in g th e m ''m o re (o r le ss ) li , rs e n so ri p y b rs e tt le s, n o ti a g o rr te in D V K N g n ti n u o c is d ly e n ti u ro eev t a th f e li e b d e rt o p p su n u n a is M o sc o w T ri al s tr a n sc ri p ts , etc., t u B . st e n o h is d s a w , ra e n li ta S e th in st a le t a , id d D V K N e th g in ry th iev e v a h st u m h ic h w t a th g in th is is c ir c u la r re a so n in g - a ss u m l al m o fr e c n e id v e ll A . n io st e u q e th g in g g e b r o it rt o p p su to e c den d e iz n ti ru sc e b st u m , ty er b li t a r p e rs o n s, w h e th e r u n d e r a rr e st o w it h a p p ro p ri a te sk e p ti c is m . . g in ly s a w y k ts ro T re e h w s e c n a st in y n a m d n u fo e u ro B e rr P ie 's y k ts ro T f o y d u st e th r fo s n o ti a c li p im s u o ri se e v a h es li se e h T re v o r e h it e re a es li n e v ro p 's y k w o rk s o f th e 1930s. Yet T ro ts to rd a h is it st a tr n o c y B . n o ti n e tt a ry o rs u c ly n o en iv g r o d e k o lo o n d n A . d o ri e p e m sa is th g n ri u d d find e x a m p le s w h e re S ta li n li e ts n a d n fe e d s al ri T w o sc o M t a th e c n e id v e y n a d n u fo t e y s a h one tle d n a s n o ti a g o rr te in se o th in r o l w e re fo rc e d to lie e it h e r a t tr ia . m e th m o fr e v a h e w t a th rs te se u a c e b ly n o d e z si a h p m e e b to s d e e n It s. u io v b o e b ld u o sh is th ll A e th f o ry to is h t ie v o S f o t c je b su so few re se a rc h e rs a p p ro a c h th e e th d n a n li ta S s rd a g re s A . y it iv ct je b o e k li g in th y n a h it w s 0 3 19 e th t a th r o st e n o h is d s a w e h t a th m ai cl y n a st o lm a ls a ri T w o sc o M is , e c n a st b su in g in ck la w o h r e tt a e v id e n c e w a s fa b ri ca te d , n o m a c c e p te d .

y k s v o k a R '' te a it il b a h e R '' Serov's Attempt to to d re e v o c is d t e y t p m e tt a d e in a S e ro v 's re p o rt is th e m o st su st e g a ss a p h c a e e in m a x e l il w e W t. n e c o n in s a w y sk v o ak R t a th e p ro v th a t d e a ls w it h Rakovsky. . im h st in a g a s n o ti sa u c c a y n a m R ak o v sk y w a s a rr e st e d a ft e r m u n le P e th to rt o p re 'S V O H Z E r e In February 1937, aft IN R A H K U B ), (b U S P C e th f o e te it m m o f th e C en tr al C o a n d RYKOV w e re a rr e st e d .

Chapter Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japanese

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Somewhat earl ier RAKOVSKY Kh. G. had been arre sted on a criminal charge. In a special communication to J.V. STALIN, asking for his con sen t to arre st RAKOVSKY, the NKVD of the USSR poi nted out tha t he had bee n exposed as one of the active participants of the Trotsky-Zinoviev terr orist organization by the test imo ny of PIATAKOV, KASPAROVA, NIKOLAEV, TER-VAGANIAN and others, as well as by material from und erco ver agents.34 In fact, ther e wer e no materials in the possession of the NKVD from agents concerning criminal activities by RAKOVSKY, while the confessions of the abovenam ed per son s wer e vague and uncertain in thei r reliability. (834) Even if true - Serov, of course, can not simply be believed -- the fact tha t no NKVD agents had evidence against Rakovsky is not evidence tha t he was innocent. Nor does Serov explain wha t was ''vague and doubtful'' abo ut the confessions. Thus, TER-VAGANIAN, citing SMIRNOV I.N., confessed tha t in 193 2 RAKOVSKY ''wrote a new counterrevolution ary document." But the re wer e no confessions by SMIRNOV along thes e lines. Serov does not claim tha t Smirnov denied it, only tha t he did not mention it himself. If true - this comes from Serov so we can nev er be sur e -- this only means tha t no one asked Smirnov abo ut Rakovsky's document. For if Smirnov had been asked abo ut this doc ume nt and had denied it, Serov would have said so. The pris one r NIKOLAEV gave vague confessions tha t RAKOVSKY belonged to a rese rve ''especially sec ret center'' consisting of PIATAKOV, SOKOL' NIKOVand

34

Lubianka1937·1938, Doc. No.1 1.

Trotsky's Conspiracies

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RAD EK, abo ut wh ich he sup pos edl y lea rne d fro m DREITSER. Ho we ver , non e of the ind ivi dua ls nam ed by NIKOLAEV sta ted thi s in the ir tes tim ony . It app ear s tha t Ser ov is pre var ica tin g her e, pla yin g wit h wo rds . Pia tak ov tes tifi ed ma ny tim es abo ut a ''re ser ve cen ter '' of the bloc, wh ich wa s the n cha nge d int o a ''pa ral lel cen ter. " Nik ola ev use d the wo rds ''es pec iall y sec ret cen ter '' to ref er to the sam e gro up. Pia tak ov, Sokol'nikov, and Ra dek we re def end ant s at the sec ond Mo sco w Tri al of Jan uar y 193 7. It wo uld be logical for the m to kee p qui et abo ut any me mb ers of the ir lea din g gro up wh o had no t yet bee n arr est ed. Th eir pre tria l inv est iga tiv e ma ter ial s are all still top -se cre t in Ru ssia tod ay. No ne of the se me n wa s com ple tely ho nes t in the ir con fes sio ns. We e aus bec y tsk Tro m fro ter let a ed eiv rec had v iko ol'n Sok t tha w kno the ret urn rec eip t rem ain s in the Tro tsk y Pap ers at Ho ugh ton Libra ry, Ha rva rd University. Bu t at tria l Sok ol'n iko v den ied rec eiv ing any let ter s from Tro tsk y. Th e pro sec uti on did no t cha llen ge him on thi s poi nt. Ev ide ntl y it did no t kno w abo ut this . Also, Karl Ra dek con cea led Tu kha che vsk y's rol e in the opp osi tio n con spi rac ies . KASPAROVA con fes sed tha t RAKOVSKY hyp ocr itic ally ann oun ced his dep art ure fro m the opp osi tio n, bu t in rea lity did no t bre ak wit h it and in 193 3, out lin ing his ant i-S ovi et vie ws , inf orm ed her in his let ter s abo ut the cre ati on on a ter ror ist bas is of the Tro tsk yit eZinovievite bloc. We can be sur e tha t thi s is tru e. As we hav e see n, Pie rre Bro ue believ ed tha t all ''ca pit ula tor s'' we re lyin g and thi s acc ord s wit h the y wh er nd wo to has e On ay. tod e hav we ce den evi ive ens ext re mo Ser ov inc lud ed the se rem ark s in his rep ort . He doe s no t att em pt to ref ute the m. Ser ov con tin ued : To RAKOVSKY's cas e wa s als o att ach ed an exc erp t fro m the tes tim ony of PIATAKOV in wh ich it is sta ted tha t ''RAKOVSKY has his ow n lin e of con tac t wit h

Chapter Four.

Rakovsky~ Trotsky,

and the Japanese

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TROTSKY." In reality PIATAKOV did not give any such testimony. Serov is lying. In the ''Document No. 11'' which we quoted above there is such an exce rpt from Piatakov's testimony. The passage in question reads as follows: Concerning RAKOVSKY TROTSKY said that it was essential to talk with him and give him a push in his work along the lines of the Trotskyist organization. From this I deduced that RAKOVSKY had some personal line of contact with TROTSKY.35 If this is the same docu men t Serov quoted from, then he was using ''weasel words." Piatakov did not state for a fact that ''Rakovsky had his own line of contact with Trotsky'' - he ''deduced'' it. Most of Piatakov's pretr ial testimony remains unavailable to researchers. However, we now have one of Piatakov's pretrial statemen ts in which he summarizes his conversation with Trotsky during his, Piatakov's, clandestine flight to Norway in December 1935 . In this state men t he makes the following references to Rakovsky: I should add that among the specific perso ns who se

names were tossed out by Trotsky during this conver. . satio n were mentioned: RADEK, SOKOL'NIKOV, SEREBRAKOV, MURALOV, BELOBORODOV, RAKOVSKY, Budu MDIVANI, V.M. SMIRNOV, SAPRONOV, BUKHARIN, RYKOV, TOMSKI!, UGLANOV, PREOBRAZHENSKll, PUTNA, PRIMAKOV, KRESTINSKII. Concerning these persons were had the following conversations .... Abou t RAKOVSKY and PREOBRAZ-

Special communication of N.I. Ezhov to J.V. Stalin Concerning Kh. G. Rakovsky with appendix of excerp ts from confessions concer ning his case. Jan. 25 1937 No. 55464. Lubianka 1937-1938, No. 11, p. 58.

3s

Trotsky's Conspiracies

23 8

HENSKII he sa id th at it w as es se nt ia l to ha ve a ta lk 6 3 w ith th em an d sp ur th em on in th ei r work.

de ve ha d ul co ov ak at Pi w ho r ea cl es ak m t en m cu Even th is on e do " y. sk ot Tr ith w t ac nt co of e lin n ow is ''h d du ce d th at Rakovsky ha . gh ou en y el tiv ac ng ki or w t no as w ky vs ko Ra Tr ot sk y kn ew th at t en m cu do e th in id sa ng vi ha as ed ot qu This is exactly w ha t he is .. ck la g in th ly on e Th e. ov ab , 11 . No t en um oc D Se ro v qu ot es an d in 's ky vs ko Ra t ou ab n io ct du de 's ov ak at Pi is t en in g in th is st at em ow n lin e of contact." 11

ssu ith w ok lo e w at th es ir qu re e on is th as en ov pr A lie as clearly .. s di to r de or in t no , te ro w v ro Se at th se el ng hi yt picion up on ev er a ith w y el os cl e or m e at ig st ve in to er th ra t bu , nd m is s ou t of ha it As rt. po re s v' ro Se of y ud st r ou ue in nt co cr iti ca l eye. So w e will . . i ev le ab lu va e m so to us ad le ill w ns io at fic lsi fa ha pp en s, Serov's de nc e ab ou t Rakovsky an d Trotsky.

Rakovsky in Serov's Report La te r in Serov's re po rt w e read: d de ea pl se ca t en es pr e th in d te ic nv co d All th e ac cu se rive e th , er ev ow H . em th t ns ai ag s ge ar ch e guilty to th e es th rt, pa t os m e th r fo at th ed al ve re s es oc pr n io at fic d di d an n io ls pu m co r de un e ad m en be d ha co nf es si on s no t reflect th e tr ut h.

ac s hi d se es nf co ho w , G. . Kb KY VS KO RA e, pl am Fo r ex ysk ot Tr d an ts gh Ri of c lo ''B e th in n tio pa ci tiv e pa rti sh iti Br d an se ne pa Ja ith w n tio ra bo lla co s hi d ite s'' an ly ed at pe re al tri e th r te af s, ce vi er /s 7 83 in te lli ge nc e/ e th ng ri du at th ed m ai cl d an e nc ce no in s hi pr ot es te d n ow kn s on si es nf co ve gi to ed rc fo as w he in ve st ig at io n er th ge to ld he as w ho /w i'' nr ''A nt ge /A . to be false

36

Piatakov, Sta tem en t to Ezhov De ce mb er 19-20, 1936.

Chapter Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japanese

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with RAKOVSKY in the Orel prison, reporte d on March 17, 1940 that RAKOVSKY: ''compl etely denies his guilt and consid ers everything that took place at the trial and in the investi gation was nothin g but a farce. Someti mes he casuall y asserte d that he gave all his testimo ny under pressu re ''(arch. case numbe r 300956 , v. 9, l.d.181 [=archi val 'delo' numbe r, volume numbe r, page numbe r]) Anothe r, / agent ''Dima'' /,who was also with RAKOVSKY in the same cell, reporte d on April 2, 1941 that in conver sations with him RAKOVSKY had categorical ly denied any involve ment in the Bloc of Rights and Trotsky ites, said that his interro gation protoco ls had been falsified and then declare d ''I was indigna nt when ARONSON (invest igator) wrote the protoco l that stated that we wanted to restore capital ism. Listen - I said - that is illitera te. He threw the crumpl ed protocol in my face. Generally, when I did not write the way they wanted me to, they always did that...." (ibid, l.d. 322) Questio ned on July 3, 1956 former employ ee of the NKVD ARONSON Ia.A. confirm ed that the investi gation against RAKOVSKY was indeed conduc ted in an atmosph ere of serious violatio n of the norms of socialis t legality. After the trial RAKOVSKY, citing his advanc ed age and illness, repeate dly made applica tions in which he petitioned for clemen cy. Howev er, RAKOVSKY's reques ts remain ed unsatis fied. (836-7 ) Even if it were true that Rakovs ky retract ed his confess ion to his cellmat es, who just happen ed to be ''agents ," that would not be good eviden ce that he was innoce nt. It is commo n for convic ted prisone rs to claim that they were innoce nt.

240

Trotsky's Conspiracies

Th at sai d, the re are so me po int s of int ere st he re: his er aft g lon l cel y's vsk ko Ra in ing do ts'' en ''ag re we t ha *W co nv ict ion ? We'll ret ur n to thi s qu est ion below.

* Rakovsky tes tif ied at tri al th at he wa s legally a pa rti cip an t t no s wa he h ug ho alt s, ite ky ots Tr d an ts gh Ri of c blo the in aw are of all of activities: I co nfe sse d to all my cri me s. W ha t wo uld it ma tte r for the su bs tan ce of the ca se if I sh ou ld att em pt to est ab lis h he re be for e yo u the fac t tha t I lea rne d ma ny of the cri me s, an d of the mo st ap pa lli ng cri me s of the ''bloc of Rights an d Trotskyites," he re in Court, an d tha t it wa s he re tha t I fir st me t so me of the pa rti cip an ts? It is of no im po rt wh ate ve r. I am co nn ec ted wi th the ''bloc of Rights and Tr ots ky ite s," of co urs e wi thi n the lim its de fined by the Cr im ina l Code, by tha t complicity, bo th political an d juridical, wh ich follows from the fact tha t I be lon ge d to thi s bloc. (19 38 Trial, 75 8) Skilled co ns pir ato rs do no t inf orm all me mb ers of the co ns pir ato mco ey Th . ers mb me er oth of s itie tiv ac the all t ou ab k or ria l ne tw y vsk ko Ra t tha al tur na s wa It . on ati orm inf ir the ize tal en pa rtm all , ing do s wa c blo the ng thi ery ev t ou ab d tol en be ve wo uld no t ha im an r," rro ''te of tic tac the th wi d ree ag dis he ce sin so re the mo po rta nt asp ec t of the blo c's activities. st mu n so on Ar n ma VD NK r me for r, rne Le n ma VD NK r me for e * Lik ys da r fou , ort rep 's rov Se for lly ica cif spe d ate og err int en ha ve be Ar is It ). 56 19 7, y Jul vs 3 ly (Ju ted da s wa elf its t or rep the e be for t ub do no s wa t tha on ati og err int s thi g rin du y on tim on so n's tes ion lat vio s iou ser of ere ph os atm an ''in d an ' re' ssu pre er nd giv en ''u of the no rm s of so cia lis t legality." This rai ses the qu est ion of the ca se file tha t Se rov rep ea ted ly cites: rov Se 9. e lum vo or 7 e lum vo r he eit ,'' 56 09 30 . No file l ''Archiva cit es thi s file nu mb er nin e tim es, alw ay s wh en ''ag en t Dima," orinf ed os pp su se the All d. ote qu are s'' ate llm ''ce or ''ag en t Finn,"

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man ts are them selve s quot ing alleg ed state men ts of Rako vsky 's to them in 1940 or 1941 in Orlo v priso n. Georgii Cher niavs kii is a Russ ian Trot skyis t resea rche r who has publ ished many book s and artic les on Trot sky and Trot sky. . relat ed subje cts from a fierc ely parti san pro-T rotsk y and anti- Stali n stand point .37 Cher niavs kii was perm itted to read Rako vsky 's file from Orlo v priso n, wher e Rako vsky was confi ned. It cont ains letters from his wife, from one of whic h, dated Marc h 26, 1940 , he quot es some lines. Cher niavs kii read Rako vsky 's appe als to Kalinin, Beria, and Stali n askin g that his case be revie wed. Cher niavs kii says that there are a num ber of these. All of these appe als were made on grou nds of healt h. All were denie d. Sero v conf irms this: After the trial RAKOVSKY, citin g his adva nced age and illness, repe atedl y mad e appli catio ns in whic h he peti· tione d for clem ency . How ever, RAKOVSKY's requ ests rema ined unsa tisfie d. (837 ) If Rako vsky had claim ed he was inno cent those docu ment s woul d also be in his file. But none is. Evidently, there fore, Rako vsky neve r claim ed he was inno cent, only that he was elder ly and unwell.

''Solitary Confinement'' In Janu ary 1941 Rako vsky aske d Beria for trans fer from Orlo v priso n to a camp . The reaso ns he gave for his requ est were : ''lack of fresh air, light, unsa tisfa ctory food, and solit ary conf inem ent 'odin ochn oe zakli uche nie." ' (Che rniav skii, 540) Acco rding to Rako vsky 's priso n file he had no cellm ates! No wonder none of the ''agen t'' or ''cell mate '' repo rts that Sero v quotes are in Rako vsky 's priso n file. Much othe r mate rial is: scrap s of ciga-

37

Georgii Cherni avskii, Mikhail Stanch ev, Maria Tortik a (Loban ova), Zhiznennyi put' Khristiana Rakovskogo 1873-1941. Evropeizm I Bol'shevism: Neokonchennaia Duel'. Moscow: Tsentropoli graf, 2014.

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rette pape r on which Rakovsky wrot e what were evidently commen ts abou t politics, now unre adab le (Cherniavskii, 541) . Once more, Serov was lying.3s Serov claims that Rakovsky mad e the following threat: In this regard, on May 17, 1941 RAKOVSKY said to / agen t ''Fin n''/: ''I have decided to change my tactics. So far I have only asked for pardon, but have not written about my own case. Now I will write a state men t calling for review of my case, with a description of all the 'secrets of the Madrid court' Soviet investigation. At least let the people through whose hands all state men ts pass know how dutye [either ''inflated," i.e. exaggerated, or ''phony''] cases and trials are concocted out of personal political revenge. Even though I may soon die, even if I am a corpse, reme mbe r ... sometimes even corpses will begin to speak." (arch. case num ber 3009 56, v. 9, l.d. 239- 240) This is the one state men t abou t Rakovsky in prison that has been previously published: in the journal Izvestiia TsK KPSS 1, 1989, p. 119. This journal was begun unde r Gorbachev and was the venue for many ''revelations'' and rehabilitations concerning the Stalin years. But there it is attrib uted not to ''agent Finn'' but to Aronson: 39 According to Serov, 40." 239''Delo [case file] Aronson, vol. 9, pp. it is with the other ''agent'' materials in ''archival file (arkh. delo) 300956," pp. 239-40. We do not know anything abou t this file. Serov never names the file from which he is quoting Aronson's state men ts of 1956 . Were

Rakovsky must have had occasional contac t with other prison ers and with the prison staff. A tiuremnaia kharakteristicka or note by prison author ities about Rakovsky's behav ior from 1941 states: "The prisoner shows himse lf to be an embitt ered and irrecon cilable enemy of Soviet author ity. He system aticall y spread s counte rrevol utiona ry slande r." (540)

38

Also in Reabilitatsiia. Politicheskie Protsessy 30·50·x godov. (M. Izd. Polit Litera tury, 1991), p. 240.

39

Chapter Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japanese

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all the ''age nt materials'' plus Aronson's testi mon y put into the same file? Perh aps Gorbachev's men did not really do any resea rch of their own and just copied from Serov's repo rt and, what 's more, copied inaccurately. They had little incentive to copy correctly from these top-s ecret docu ment s that no one else could see - if, indeed, this file exists at all. Or are both sour ces corre ct and it was Aronson who was quoting ''agent Finn'' and, if so, no doub t ''agent Dima'' and Rakovsky's ''cellmates'' too? That would make the ''agent'' and ''cellmate'' accoun ts third -han d (Rakovsky to ''age nt/ce llma te'' - to Aronson - to Serov's resea rche rs). In this scenario NKVD man Aronson was the pers on who ''debriefed'' Rakovsky's ''agents/cellmates." But as we now know Rakovsky had no eel/mates: he was in solitary confinement. Cherniavskii repro duce s this ''Aronson-Finn'' passage from Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1989. Evidently Cherniavskii was unaw are of Serov's July 7, 1956 , repo rt which had been publ ished the year befo re his own book. It also suggests that Cherniavskii did not see case file 3009 56 or ''Delo Aronson." But Cherniavskii was given access to Rakovsky's investigative file and the file on Rakovsky from Orlov prison. And this file woul d have prov ided him with all the testimon y from ''age nt Dima," ''age nt Finn," and prob ably from Aronson himself. Had Cherniavskii aske d for this file and been refus ed he woul d surel y have said as much in his book. Therefore, we can conclude that Rakovsky's investigation and Orlov priso n files do not contain these ''agent'' and ''cellmate'' repo rts. That mean s that, if they exist at all, they were prod uced for Serov in 1956. Given Serov's prov en dishonesty, plus the fact that Rakovsky was in solitary confinement, we cann ot acce pt these supp osed repo rts of Rakovsky's state men ts in priso n as genuine. They are most likely yet more falsifications by Serov and his associates. Molotov would not have know n this. Serov continues:

244

Trotsky's Conspiracies

RAKOVSKY's testimony ab ou t his alleged criminal activity is also refuted by the fact tha t the men he named in interrogations as his accomplices, GVAKHARIA, BABAYAN and SABANIN have now be en rehabilitated an d the ir cases closed. BOGOMOLOV, whom RAKOVSKY named as a me mb er of a counterrevolutionary organization, pleaded no t guilty at his trial. (83 7) n, ow sh ly ted ea rep ve ha we as e tru are ts en tem sta se the if en Ev Bo e. nc ide ev t no are s ion tat ili ab reh d ste tru be ot Serov ca nn or t en oc inn s wa he an me t no uld wo ss nfe co to e lur fai s ' lov mo go tha t Rakovsky's testimony was false. Serov claimed tha t Aronson testified ab ou t thr ea ts against Rakovsky: It should be noted tha t pri so ne rs we re pr od de d into self-incrimination and sla nd er against others not only by direct physical violence bu t also by mental violence. Threats of repression against relatives, thr ea ts of beatings, cries of pr iso ne rs being be ate n the investigators used all the se in or de r to obtain ''confessions." Former investigator ARONSON testified ab ou t this: ''I personally did no t use physical force against

RAKOVSKY, obviously, because he did no t confess to me ab ou t espionage (RAKOVSKY ''confessed'' himself gu ilty of espionage to oth er investigators). I ad mi t tha t I mi gh t have applied oth er means of pr es su re measures of a mental nature: thr ea ts against him personally, thr ea ts to arr es t me mb ers of his family. I seem to remember, in particular, tha t RAKOVSKY wa s informed about the arr es t of his wife and tha t he r fate de pe nd ed upon his confessions. Such was the system of interrogation of prisoners, introduced as mandator y methods by the leadership of the NKVD of tha t time."

Chapt er Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japan ese

245

As is evid ent from the repo rt of agen t ''Dima'' RAKOVSKY himself, in his cell at the Orlov priso n, spok e abou t the situa tion of the inves tigat ion of his case as follows: ''...when almo st from the first day they make it clear that you have to lie abou t your self and other s, smea r your own nam e and hono r, then you are over come with rage and indig natio n. You begin to fight, to resis t, but then when they tell you, as ARONSON told me: 'Old man, do not hold out, confess,' when they tell you that they will annih ilate your family, that they will shoo t you, you give up. Whe n I was told that my wife had been put into the Lefo rtovo , I scre ame d and grab bed my head that mea nt she wou ld die. Fear for your family, the cons cious ness that you are send ing them to their death s, fear and the desir e to live, comp lete hope lessn ess, and then the

part y 'auto mati c,' the habi t of obey ing the part y these thing s make you lie and do the devil know s what . All this is a lie, there is not a drop of truth in any of these cases." (arch . case num ber 3009 56, v. 9, l.d. 321) This Aron son state men t has to be a fabri catio n. Cher niavs kii inter view ed at least two relat ives of Rako vsky 's conc ernin g this perio d. Neith er said anyt hing abou t an arres t of Rako vsky 's wife who, as we have alrea dy seen , mail ed lette rs and mon ey to Rako vsky in Orlov priso n. Cher niavs kii reco unts the arres t of a niece of Rako vsky 's who was a Bulg arian and had been stayi ng with him. She was arres ted shor tly after Rako vsky whil e tryin g to retur n hom e and rema ined unde r arres t for some mon ths - Cher niavs kii does not say how long, but sugg ests that she was relea sed in late 193 7. The fact that this even t was reme mbe red and reco rded in Rakovsky's family make s it all but certa in that an arres t of Rako vsky 's wife woul d also have been reme mbe red - if it had occu rred. More over, it had been many year s - if ever - since Rakovsky, a long time oppo sitio nist, had ''auto matic ally,' ' i.e. reflexively, obey ed

Trotsky's Conspiracies

246

b fa a is '' c ti a m to u a y rt a p e h ''t t u o ''t h e P ar ty ." So th e st a te m e n t a b e h if r a fe to n so a re d a h n so n ro A t a th e v o b a d te o n e W . o to n o ti ri c a n e m is h d n a v e h c sh ru h K s e n li e d id n o t m a k e a c o n fe ss io n a lo n g th w a n te d . S e ro v c o n ti n u e d : : id sa so al ] y sk v o ak [R e h r, e h F u rt eL e th to ] n so ri [p i rk ty u B e th ''I w a s ta k e n fr o m a. k an y b u L e th to o v o rt o ef L e th m fo rt o v o , a n d fr o in , o v o rt o ef L In t. o sh e b to d E v e ry n ig h t I e x p e c te e th r a e h ld u o c u o y re e h w n so th is h o rr ib le p ri f o g in n a o m e th , re u rt to r e d n u le p o sc re a m s o f p e e th d n a n o ti u c e x e f o s e m ti g n w o m e n , sh o ts d u ri ly n e d d su y e th s, e in g n e ft ra c ir a f c o n st a n t n o is e o to d te n a w y e th t a th d e z li a re I c u t m y fi n g er n ai ls p a I t. h ig n t a d e n o m m su s a w to rt u re m e. S o o n I e p ty r e th o n a d n a , S A G A , V E p e a re d b e fo re NIKOLA s a w I , in d e lk a w I n e h W . g n ri th a t d o e s th e to rt u u o y d n A . u o y , es 'Y ' ? y sp a e, to ld th a t I w a s a sp y . 'M la re I ' s. ie it v ti ac r u o y t u o b a y o u rs e lf will te ll u s to y a w ly n o e th t a th , d n e e th iz e d th a t th is w a s s u o ri se st o m e th g n ti it m d a h g sa lv a ti o n w a s th ro u t n e w g in th ry e v E ... c ti c le ia d e c h a rg e s. T h is is th lf se y m I . sh ti ri B e th d n a se e n a in to it - th e Ja p ." ch u m so id sa I , d se fu n co e m a c e b so m e ti m e s

(ibid, l.d. 3 22) e m sa e th g in y sa s a d te o u q is v o n o ss e B is th r e ft a ly te ia d e m Im

thing. to d e c n te n se , v o ik n l' o k o S t u o b a T h e n w e a re to ld th e fo ll o w in g . al ri T w o sc o M 7 3 9 1 ry a u n Ja e th t a p ri so n ra th e r th a n e x e c u ti o n w o n k e w B G K e th f o s e iv h rc a F ro m m a te ri a ls in th e m o fr w o sc o M to t h g u ro b s a w V th a t SOKOL'NIKO e th t a ss e n it w a s a d se u e b to 7 3 9 p ri so n in th e fall o f 1 t u b , rs e th o d n a V O K Y R , IN R A H K U u p c o m in g tr ia l o f B

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bec aus e of his refu sal to test ify at tria l he was sen t back. (85 3) App aren tly Ser ov did not realize tha t stat eme nts like thes e contrad ict the who le ten or of his rep ort. If Rakovsky or any one else mad e false confessions in the inve stig atio n and at tria l bec aus e of thre ats aga inst thei r families, why wou ld they con trad ict thei r testim ony just bec aus e they had bee n convicted and wer e in pris on? The re wou ld be no less dan ger to thei r families afte r tria l than before. How then could oth ers refu se to plea d guilty, as Ser ov said they did? How could Sokol'nikov hav e refu sed to testify? How could Buk hari n hav e spe nt half of his leng thy test imo ny, plus all of his closing stat eme nt, stau nch ly den ying the Pro sec uto r's mos t seri ous acc usa tion s? Evidently they wer e not afraid of tort ure , thre ats to family, etc., whe n they did so.

There is not now, nor has there eve r been, any evidence tha t any of the Moscow trials defendants wer e tortured. On the con trar y: ther e is goo d evidence tha t they wer e not. Zinoviev stat ed in a pre tria l lett er tha t he was bein g wel l treated.40 Even Steven Cohen, a wor ld auth orit y on Buk hari n and stau nch ly anti-Stalin, con clud ed in 200 3 tha t Buk hari n was not tortured.41 In 195 6 Ana stas Mikoian told American wri ter Louis Fisc her tha t ''Bu kha rin and the oth er Moscow tria l defe nda nts wer e not torture d." 42 Mikoian had no reas on to lie abo ut this. He clai med to beli eve tha t they wer e inno cen t, was a stau nch Khr ush che v man, and sup por ted Khrushchev's atte mp t to ''reh abil itat e'' them as ''victims of Stalin."

•0

R·PP184; originally published in lzvestiia TsK KPSS 8 (1989), 89-90.

Koen, Stiven (Cohen), "Bukharin na Lubianke.H Svobodnaia Mys/' 22 (3), 2003, 58-63, at pp. 60 .. 61. 41

~2

Louis Fischer. Russia Revisited. A New Look at Russia and Her Satellites. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 195 7, p. 70.

248

Trotsky's Conspiracies

We have the tex ts of the app eal s of all the def end ant s who received dea th sentences, plus tha t of Dr. Pletnev. In eve ry case the def end ant s rei ter ate d the ir guilt. Bukharin wr ote two such appeals. He sta ted tha t he ''de ser ved to be sho t ten times over."43 How likely is it tha t the me n who we re sen ten ced to dea th rei ter ate d the ir guilt, often in the str ong est possible terms, and yet we re innocent? Not ''to pro tec t the ir families'' - Jagoda and, especially, Bukharin spe nt a lot of the ir tes tim ony vigorously denying som e of Pro sec uto r Vyshinskii's accusations aga ins t them. If the re we re s, eal app se the in n bee e hav uld wo it nce oce inn im cla to e tim a r eve which we re nev er sup pos ed to be ma de public. Moreover, if one sur mi ses tha t the y continued to ins ist upo n the ir own guilt ''in order to sav e the ir families," the n wh y wo uld the thr ee wh o did no t received dea th sen ten ces - Bessonov, Rakovsky, and Pletnev - no t also con tin ue to ins ist upo n the ir ow n guilt for the sam e rea son ? One mo re poi nt in the lur id acc oun t above mu st be a falsification: ''Every nig ht I expected to be shot." Th ere would have bee n no reat hou wit t sho be ght mi he t tha '' ted pec ''ex e hav to sky kov Ra for son an investigation and trial. In all the cases we know abo ut and tha t Rakovsky wo uld have kno wn about, arr est ed per son s we re impri son ed dur ing investigation according to the Soviet (and, incidentally, the European) practice and the n given a trial. Serov, however, had every rea son to dep ict all aspects of the investigation and trial of the 193 8 Moscow trial def end ant s as out rageously im pro per . We have pro ven tha t he lied in ma ny oth er insta nce s in this rep ort . This alleged sta tem ent by Rakovsky app ear s to be ano the r of Serov's fabrications. According to Cherniavskii, Rakovsky wa s given a copy of the indic tm ent aga ins t him on April 9, 193 7,

Bukharin's app eals wer e first published in Izvestiia Sep tem ber 2, 1993, p. 2.1 have put a tran slat ion on line at http s://ms uwe b.m ontc lair. edu /-fu rrg/ rese arch /buk hari nap pea ls.h tml

4l

Chapt er Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japan ese

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... in which it is asse rted that against Rakovsky ''there is sufficient evidence that he is a mem ber in a counterrevolutionary Trotskyist organization." (499) Ther eafte r Rakovsky was inter roga ted num erou s times. This means that a normal judicial proc edur e was being followed. We'll look at Cherniavskii's account of them below. More alleged testimony from Rakovsky's ''cellmates'': The ''processing'' of priso ners in the case of the RightTrotskyite cente r did not stop day or night. This was handled during the interrogations by the investigators and in the cells by specially placed people. Concerning one of these people RAKOVSKY, after his conviction, told his fellow inmates: In Lefortovo they put Lieberman into my cell ... They let me write my confessions in my cell. When I pres ente d them, if they did not like them, they / 853 /wou ld tear them up and throw them in my face. When I consulted with Lieberman my confessions always satisfied the investigators. He serve d as the trans fer authority, he dictated to me wha t they wanted and throu gh him I asked their advice •••

In the end, I did not care, because I lied. And he could not hurt me, on the contrary, he facilitated my work. (arch. case num ber 300956, v. 9, l.d. 324) (852-3) Here Serov does not even both er to name the purp orted ''fellow inmates'' of Rakovsky's who supposedly hear d Rakovsky say this. Serov recounts some othe r stories about Rakovsky that do not spea k directly to the question of guilt or innocence. The story below is evidently an attem pt to account for Krestinskii's decision, betw een the first and second days of the March 1938 trial, to change his plea from innocent to guilty.

Trotsky's Conspiracies

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Concerning the circumstances su rro un din g KRESTINSKll'S confessions at the trial, for me r employee of the NKVD ARONSON has testified: ''I, like many oth er NKVD men, att en de d the trial. At

the first session KRESTINSKII ret rac ted the confessions he had given earlier an d pleaded no t guilty. Th is sta tem en t caused confusion on the pa rt of VYSHINSKll, who was in charge of the trial.

I ass I ''During the bre ak we investigators discussed wh at ha d happened an d talked ab ou t how to ge t ou t of this situation. NIKOLAEV (he was in charge of RAKOVSKY's case) the n said tha t he would try to re· solve the incident. When the accused we re taken from the co ur t the y took KRESTINSKII tog eth er with RAKOVSKY. The next da y KRESTINSKII pleaded gu ilty an d confirmed all the confessions tha t he had given previously. I thi nk , an d the investigators said the same thing at the time, tha t KRESTINSKII had no t be en beaten, bu t RAKOVSKY ha d pe rsu ad ed him. Th ey sa id tha t RAKOVSKY, who in general had gr ea t influence on KRESTINSKII, told him something like this: 'You ought to ad mi t guilt, all the defendants are pleading guilty, and the co ur t will co ns ide r an yo ne wh o does no t admit guilt as an un rep en tan t enemy and will unquestionably sh oo t him, while in ret ur n for the admission of guilt they will pre ser ve your life. The family of him wh o co nfe sse d guilt will no t suffer, bu t in case of rejection of guilt the family will also be repressed.' This so affected KRESTINSKII tha t to the end of the trial he did no t try any mo re to reject the confessions he had given during the investigation." Also characteristic in thi s reg ard is the behavior at

trial of the public pr os ec uto r VYSHINSKll. When the co ur t su mm on ed KRESTINSKII for qu est ion ing VY-

Cha pter Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japanese

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SHINSKII did not per mi t his immediate interrogation and first asked a num ber of questions precisely to RAKOVSKY. KRESTINSKII was int err oga ted only after RAKOVSKY had iiv en him an examQle he fully adm itte d his guilt and named KRESTINSKII as his accomplice. (8545. Underlined emphasis in the original.) Even if this we re tru e - and even Serov only claims tha t it wa s Aronson' s speculation - the fact tha t Rakovsky convinced Krestinskii to reaffirm his initial confessions and ''set an example'' does no t say anything abo ut Krestinskii's or Rakovsky's guilt or innocence. Another alleged sta tem ent by Rakovsky is given wit h no specific source and to no discernable purpose: During the trial the investigators nev er left me, encouraged me, talked abo ut the impression tha t this revolting farce was making on me. (Arch. case nu mb er 300956, v. 7, l.d. 325) (856)

The final passage in Serov's report concerning Rakovsky is the following: After his conviction RAKOVSKY told his cellmates: ''I coordinated the main points of my speech at the trial, my las t wo rds with the investigators ... During this las t period they we re all at my service, right up to the olives [sic]." (arch. case nu mb er 300956, v. 7, l.d. 325) This sto ry of RAKOVSKY's is fully confirmed in archival documents of the NKVD. Moreover, the y sho w tha t this situation occurred no t only in relation to RAKOVSKY bu t also in relation to oth er defendants in the pre sen t case. So, in archival files on RAKOVSKY and GRIN'KO we have found typ ew ritt en outlines of the ir future confessions at trial. By comparing the se outlines wit h the confessions tha t RAKOVSKY and GRIN'KO gave at trial

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it wa s rev eal ed tha t the y are ide nti cal bot h str uct urally and in the ir me ani ng, and tha t som e phr ase s in the m are rep eat ed alm ost wo rd for wo rd in the tria l tra nsc rip t. Moreover, in the se arc hiv al ma ter ial s we hav e als o dis cov ere d dra fts of the ''la st wo rds '' of the acc use d RAKOVSKY, RYKOV and GRIN'KO, and in the ma ter ial s on RAKOVSKY eve n two ver sio ns of ''his'' las t wo rds at the tria l hav e tur ned up. (85 7) We kno w the firs t par agr aph is a lie bec aus e we kno w tha t t no do e, tru if n eve , ims cla er oth e Th . tes lma cel no had sky kov Ra spe ak to gui lt or inn oce nce . Ev en if gen uin e thi s par agr aph can g nin ope the s hap per s, ent tem sta ger lon 's sky kov Ra to er ref y onl and clo sin g sta tem ent s. No pro sec uti on any wh ere wo uld go to any ser iou s trial, let alo ne a pub lic trial, wit hou t a fairly pre cis e ide a of wh at the def end ant s ii nsk shi Vy ged llen cha sky kov Ra l tria the ing dur , ver we Ho . say l wil on sev era l poi nts . Much of his tes tim ony wa s in the form of sho rt que stio n and ans we r pas sag es. Th ese cou ld no t hav e bee n wr itte n dow n for pra ctic e in adv anc e.

Serov and the Bloc Th rou gho ut his rep ort Ser ov app ear s to claim tha t the blo c of Rights and Tro tsk yit es itse lf wa s a Stalin-NKVD inv ent ion and nev er rea lly existed. nor ma lly put s the wo rds ''an ti-S ovi et blo c of Rights and is he t tha nal sig a tly den evi is is Th . tes quo re sca in es'' yit tsk Tro att est ing to the non exi ste nce of the bloc.

* Ser ov

* He ref ers sev era l tim es to ''a so- cal led 'Bloc of Rights and Tro t-

sky ites .''' (833; 836 ; 849 ) He quo tes sev era l def end ant s as sup pos edl y sta tin g tha t the wh ole tria l wa s ''a com ple te inv ent ion of the NKVD'' (Be sso nov 838 ; Kamkov, 840 -1)

*

Chapt er Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japanese

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Serov's most unam bigu ous claim that no bloc exist ed is found at the very end of the Report: ... the accu satio n again st them that in the following year s they creat ed a bloc of Rights and Trots kyite s and cond ucted orga nized anti-Soviet activities, is falsi .. fied and in this rega rd they are subje ct to rehab ilitation. (858 ) After the 22nd Party Congress of Octo ber 1961 durin g whic h Khru shch ev and his men attac ked Stalin even more ferociously than he had done at the 2Qth Party Congress in 1956 there was a more exten sive attem pt to clear the 1938 Moscow trial defen dants . The ''Shvernik Commission'' issue d two repo rts, the ''Zapiska'' or ''mem oran dum '' and the ''Spravka'' or ''inquiry." In the long er ''Zapiska'' writt en in 1962 or early 1963 and available to Gorbach ev's aides but not publ ished until the mid- 1990 s Khru sh .. chev's aides concluded: No ''Anti-Soviet Right-Trotskyist Bloc'' in reali ty ever existed, and those who were convicted in this case were not reall y guilty of coun terre volu tiona ry activ.. I"ty.44

Gorbachev's men adop ted the same conclusion. This is inter estin g beca use Gorbachev's men mad e this state men t after Pierr e Brou e's disco very that a bloc of Rights and Trots kyite s, inclu ding Zinovievites and othe r oppo sition ists, had inde ed existed. In 1986 American scho lar J. Arch Getty publ ished an artic le in the journ al Sovie t Studi es in whic h he discusses, amon g othe r things, Brou e's disco very of the bloc. Getty's artic le was publ ished in Russian trans latio n in one of the last issue s of the Soviet Com mun ist Party journ al Problems in the histo ry of the CPSU. In a spec ial afterw ord Boris Starkov, an official CPSU histo rian, tried to explain

44

Reabilitatsiia. Kak Eto Bylo. Fevral' 1956 - nachalo 80-kh godov. T. 2. Moskva: ''Materik",

2003. (RKEB 2), p. 630.

25 4

Trotsky's Conspiracies

rce it or F y. er ov sc di ng si as rr ba em aw ay th e significance of th is en be d ha s de ai 's ev ch ba or G d an s v' he hc us tainly pr ov ed th at Khr is ex in l il st e er w U PS C e th d an R lying - an d th is while th e USS tence. 45 t ie ov S in ce en id ev of t n u o am se en m im T he re was, an d remains, an cu do of y er ov sc di 's ue ro B d. te is ex ar ch iv es th at this bloc really en m cu do t ie ov S is th ed fi ri ve ov ed S n m en ts by T ro ts ky an d his so tation. So Serov w as lying he re too.

Cherniavskii's discoveries e th at th ce en id ev nd fi to s pt m te at The Khrushchev an d Gorbachev ed er ff su ve ha nt ce no in e er w l ia tr w co os M de fe nd an ts in th e 19 38 . ns ea m is th at h w g in er id ns co h to ta l defeat. It is w o rt of s nt ou am st va g in ud cl in , ng hi yt T he Soviets ha d access to ever y. da to s er ch ar se re to e bl la ai av un is do cu m en ta ry evidence th at y if ls fa to d ge li ob e er w so d an ce en id ev y T he y found no exculpator th e re su lt s of th ei r studies. de n io at ig st ve in al ic or st hi to ch An objective, m at er ia li st ap pr oa nfe de he T e. bl si is rm pe on si lu nc co m an ds th at w e dr aw th e only , es os rp pu t n se re p r u o r fo , ly al ic if da nt s in th e Moscow tr ia ls - spec . . to ts in po ce en id ev e th ll A . ty il gu e th e 1 9 3 8 Moscow tr ia l - w er om ng ro st h it w e os th by s rt fo ef l ta w ar d s th ei r guilt. M on um en d an m m co r ei th at s ce ur so re e th l ti ve s to pr ov e th e op po si te an d al h it w m le ob pr no ve ha l il w ts en ud st ha ve failed. Truly objective h it w e os th e ar it ct je re ill w ho w le op pe th is conclusion. The on ly po w er fu l preconceived ideas. t ns ai ag d ha n io ut ec os pr e th at th We do n o t kn ow all th e ev id en ce us R t ie ov -S st po d an , ra -e ev ch ba or G Rakovsky. Khrushchev-era, n io at rm fo in is th e as le re to e iv nt si an le ad er s ha d an d ha ve no ince ti an d an t is un m m co ti an r ei th to s be ca us e of th e th re at it po se

il or Ist y os pr Vo ." la na sio at rn te In JV e ni va no Os i: ni na lzg v •s Dzh. Arch Getti (Getty), "T ro tsk ii KPSS 5 (1991), 72-83.

Chapter Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky and the Japanese 1

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Stalin historic al paradig m. Howev er, we now have more eviden ce about Rakovsky than we did a few years ago. The curtain of secrecy surrou nding this eviden ce was lifted just a crack for Georgii Cherniavskii and his coauth ors who in 2014 publish ed a biograp hy of Rakovsky. Cherniavskii was permit ted to read Rakovsky's NKVD file as well as his file from Orlov prison. He disclos ed some of what he read in his recent biograp hy of Rakovsky. But Cherniavskii chose not to act with the objectivity of an ethical scholar. He was already convinced that Rakovsky had been innoce nt. Rakovsky's interro gations do not suppor t this conclusion, so Cherniavskii did not reproduc e any of them. All Cherniavskii gives us are a few quotati ons from these confessions and letters. Nevert heless, some of these quotati ons are of consid erable interes t. Though he was arreste d on January 27, 1937, Rakovsky only began to confess on June 1, 1937, when he wrote a statem ent addres sed to Ezhov. In it he wrote: After four months of obstina te silence at the investi gation I have conclu ded that the only correct thing to do is a fundam ental change of my positio n. In beginn ing to give full and sincere confess ions I wish to declare that I remain ed a Trotsk yist until the presen t and have been connec ted with the Trotsk yist underg round. I promis e to be sincere and truthfu l to the end and consider that my confess ions about the counte rrevolu tionary work of the Trotsk yist underg round will help the Party and the state appara tus to root out the Trotskyist underg round. (500-5 01) The first interro gation transcr ipt in Rakovsky's file is dated June 8, 1937. Cherniavskii writes: ''Having admitte d'' in it his adhere nce to ''count errevolutiona ry Trotsky ism'' Rakovsky at the same time dis-

256

Trotsky's Conspiracies

vti ac st ri o rr te of on ti sa cu ac y an om fr so ci at es hi m se lf ity. ty vi ti ac st ri o rr te in e ev li be t o n d di ly al I pe rs on e os th g on al rk o w y an t u o d ie rr ca t o n ve ha an d lines. ty vi ti ac st ri o rr te of e ar aw un as w Rakovsky do es n o t claim th at he r o in e ev li be t o n d di he at th ly on d, by th e T ro ts ky is t un de rg ro un t. is ex d di ty vi ti ac ch su at th ow kn e W . ty pa rt ic ip at e in su ch activi as st ri o rr te e th d re ha ''s he at th d te it m On June 29 Rakovsky ad so al e H ." on ti za ni ga or t is ky ts ro T d un su m pt io ns of th e un de rg ro ve ha d an s on si es nf co y m in ng hi yt er sa id ''I have re co un te d ev no th in g else to say." ' ns io ss fe on 'c y th ng le te ro w y sk ov D ur in g th e ne xt tw o m on th s ''Rak rk o w y] ar on ti lu vo re er nt ou [c r cd u n d er th e title 'My un de rg ro un t en m cu do is th In . 34 19 d an 8 2 9 1 n du ri ng m y exile''' be tw ee es do i ki vs ia rn he C t u b s on rs pe y an Rakovsky ci te d th e na m es of m n o t m en ti on an y of th em . la tu pi ca e th d an ile ex 's ky ts ro T r He claimed th at af te e m ca be he ts is on ti si po op er th o ti on of a n u m b er of d te uc nd co , on ti si po op e th f o an ci ti re th e pr im ar y th eo a la rg e am ou nt of analytical w o rk .... nge e th at th on si lu nc co e th at d ve ri ar he B ut finally be as w at th is is cr a to d le ad h ty ar P e er al line of th P E -N re ''p e th to rn tu re a at th e, ph coming a ca ta st ro ar m f o n io ct je re a , is at th e bl da oi av pe ri od '' w as un sea m y ar in rd ao tr ex to rn tu re a d an s ip k et re la ti on sh e ac pl n ke ta d ha up co a at th d de lu nc co ur es . Rakovsky in th e co un tr y, th at e th in e ac pl n ke ta d ha n io at m or sf an tr e a co m pl et l ca gi lo eo id e th in d an ip sh or at ct di n ia ar pr ol et ng ni ai m re le hi w , at th ; lf se it ty ar P e th st ru ct ur e of er th o d an nd la e th as r fa so in , se ba s it at t is so ci al d ne ai m re on ti uc od pr of ns ea m d an im pl em en ts

Chapter Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Jap ane se

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soc iali zed , the pro let ari an dic tato rsh ip had bee n tra nsf orm ed int o a stra tifi ed soc iety . Th e bur eau crac y [sluzhebnoe soslovie] had rep lac ed the pro letar iat and the wo rki ng ma sse s . •••

In the doc um ent now un der con sid era tio n Ra kov sky nam es two mo re im por tan t pol itic al wo rks of tha t perio d [viz of his exile]: ''Back to the soc iali st con stit u tion , bac k to the Par ty pro gra m'' , and ''M em oir of a Bolshevik-Leninist.'' In his ''co nfe ssi ons '' Ra kov sky rec oun ted his wo rk on his me mo irs: I col lec ted an eno rm ous am oun t of his tor ica l ma ter ials bot h on the his tor y of the rev olu tio nar y mo vem ent in Ru ssia and the We ste rn wo rke rs' mo vem ent , of wh ich I wa s a me mb er, and on the nat ion al reb irth of the Ba lka n cou ntr ies , and beg an to gra dua lly wr ite my me mo irs, in wh ich bot h the per son s and the events of the his tor y of the rev olut ion ary wo rki ng cla ss mo vem ent of a nu mb er of cou ntr ies , inc lud ing Russia, we re to be dep icte d.

Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japanese Be twe en June and Au gus t 193 7 Ra kov sky 's tes tim ony evi den tly con cer ned onl y his act ivi ties up to 193 7. Bu t on Sep tem ber 4, 193 7, Ra kov sky 's sta tem ent s beg an to cha nge dra ma tica lly . On tha t day Ra kov sky wr ote the following: At a tim e wh en the Sov iet hom ela nd cou ld be facing int ern ati ona l com pli cat ion s of eve ry kin d I con sid er it doubly my dut y, bot h as a for me r me mb er of the com mu nis t par ty and as a citi zen of a soc iali st fat her lan d to rel ate hon est ly, fully and wh oll y eve ryt hin g tha t I did. (Ch ern iav ski i 503 )

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Trotsky's Conspiracies

on ed w llo fo s on si es nf co s y' sk ov ak R i A cc or di ng to C he rn ia vs ki . 12 d an , 10 9, er ob ct O d an , 17 d an 16 , 14 Se pt em be r 8, 9, 10, lli te in se ne pa Ja to d te ui cr re en be d ha he at R ak ov sk y co nf es se d th ed R se ne pa Ja e th of an rm ai ch a, aw ug ge nc e by Pr in ce Iy es at o T ok ng di an St e th of an m ir ha C d an 8 3 19 d Cross be tw ee n 19 28 an . 38 19 to 34 19 om fr t en sc re C ed R d an C om m is si on of th e Red Cross t af dr e th in is it ut B l. ia tr at ed on ti en m t T ok ug aw a' s na m e w as no 13 20 e th in d he is bl pu is ch hi w ks ar m re g in of V ys hi ns ki i's op en l, ia tr w co os M 38 19 ch ar M e th of pt ri ed it io n of th e or ig in al tr an sc of s al pe ap e th d an rt po re s v' ro Se ns ai nt co at th e sa m e ed it io n th 0) (3 h. at de to d ce en nt se e er w ho w ts th os e de fe nd an be ld he as w n io at nt ro nf co ce fa o-t ce fa a On Se pt em be r 22, 19 37 , ass ba am et vi So er rm fo v, ne re IU n ti an st on tw ee n R ak ov sk y an d K . 37 19 , 23 r be em pt Se l ti un ed st re ar do r to Japan. IU re ne v w as no t aig st ve in et vi So e th at th ts es gg su s te T he ne ar co in ci de nc e of da nco t is ky ts ro T e th in t en em lv vo in s v' ne re IU of ti on di d no t kn ow cre t no d di at th id sa v ne re IU it. d se lo sp ir ac y un ti l Rakovsky di sc d ha he , ts es gg su g in w llo fo e th as , tly og ni ze Rakovsky; ev id en es ot qu i ki vs ia rn he C . on is pr in pt m gr ow n ha gg ar d an d un ke R ak ov sk y' s re pl y: ch su is en m gi re on is pr he T e. m e iz gn co re t no d You di to e on w lo al t no es do d an e at er od m is et di e th as ga ne ss ne ill y m ed ct fe af is Th t. gh ei w s e' on m ai nt ai n iiv pr n ai rt ce e m ve gi to n ga be ey th r te la t bu tively, nco ve ha I hy w t no is at th ut B t. en hm is le ge s in no ur to y ar ss ce ne as w it at th od to rs de fe ss ed ... At la st I un to r de or in a] bi se it' ch la ob az [r f el ys m k as m un ce an ch e th ty ar P e th ve gi to d an ky ts un m as k T ro e ar ho w e os th t ns ai ag th bo ar re s it en th ng to st re r· te ex t ns ai ag d an n io at or st re al rn te st ri vi ng for in na l ag gr es si on . (5 04 ) y sk ov ak R n io at og rr te in e on ng ri du A cc or di ng to Cherniavskii, ht ig fl et cr se 's ov ak at Pi t ou ab m hi ld to d ha st at ed th at Karl R ad ek a In ) 05 (5 . ky ts ro T h it w ng ti ee m d an to Oslo at th e en d of 19 35 , 36 19 0, -2 19 r be em ec D d te da v ho Ez to st at em en t he m ad e

Cha pter Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japanese

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Piat ako v stat ed tha t dur ing his sec ret visi t to Tro tsky in Nor way in 193 5 Tro tsky had told him to get in tou ch wit h Rakovsky by all mea ns and tell him to wor k mor e actively. Piat ako v said tha t he inte nde d to mee t wit h Rakovsky and tran smi t Tro tsky 's inst ruction s, but was not able to do so . 46 Rakovsky also stat ed tha t afte r he had bee n recr uite d by Prin ce Tok uga wa his recr uitm ent was con firm ed by Jap ane se Min iste r of For eign Affairs Koki Hir ota (Fo reig n Min iste r Sep tem ber 193 3 April 193 6) and then by Jap ane se Prim e Min iste r Keisuke Oka da (Pri me Min iste r July 193 4 to March 193 6). (50 6) The se nam es are also men tion ed in the not e of Gor bac hev 's Pol itbu ro Com mis sion inve stig atin g the mu rde r of Kirov, in thei r resp ons e to Iako vlev date d Jun e 14, 1990.47 Con vinc ed bef ore han d tha t Rakovsky and, for tha t mat ter, all defend ants at all the Moscow tria ls wer e inno cen t, Che rnia vsk ii conside rs it abs urd tha t thes e high -ran king Jap ane se figu res wou ld hav e met wit h Rakovsky bec aus e suc h peo ple do not mee t wit h ''spies." (50 6) Her e Che rnia vsk ii is gra spin g at a stra w, for Rakovsky was no ord inar y ''spy." He was an age nt who had onc e bee n a sign ific ant figu re in the Bol shev ik Par ty and who was clos er to Tro tsky than any one else.

Rakovsky's Recruitment by the Japanese Che rnia vsk ii's acc oun t sug ges ts tha t Rak ovs ky vol unt eere d thes e nam es and the stat eme nt tha t he had agre ed to wor k for Jap ane se inte llig enc e to the exte nt of bein g Tro tsky 's rep rese ntat ive. No one else kne w abo ut thes e activities. If Rakovsky had not vol unt eere d thes e con fess ions and nam es they wou ld not hav e figu red in the cha rges aga inst him or at the tria l at all.

See Lubianka 1937 -193 8, Docu ment No. 11, pp. 56-60; also at http: //ww w.ale xand eryak ovlev .org/ fond /issu es-do c/609 82

•6

47

RKEB 3, p. 487; also at http: //ww w.ale xand eryak ovlev .org/ fond /issu es-do c/681 80

Trotsky's Conspiracies

260

e th on y lt na pe h at de e th ed ar sp as At se nt en ci ng Rakovsky w of on ti za ni ga or e th in t ar p ct re di a n ke ta gr ou nd s of ''n ot ha vi ng 0) 80 , al ri T 8 93 (1 ." es ti vi ti ac g in te rr or is t, diversive, an d w re ck se ne pa Ja d an sh ti ri B r fo e ag on pi es of d Rakovsky w as n o t co nv ic te in t o n e, bl m ea pr e th in ly on ed on ti en m as w intelligence. E sp io na ge th e se nt en ce itself.

he us r fo ly te na tu or nf U s. on si es nf co s Cherniavskii re ad Rakovsky' y nl ai rt ce ld ou w i ki vs ia rn he C ut B . em th ch os e n o t to re pr od uc e ed nt ve in d ha s or at ig st ve in D V K N e ha ve to ld us of an y sign th at th d an y sp se ne pa Ja a e m co be d ha y sk th e ac cu sa ti on th at Rakov e th of g in th no ys sa i ki vs ia rn he C it. fo rc ed Rakovsky to co nf es s to so rt . e th ed nt ve in lf se m hi y sk ov ak R at th In fact Cherniavskii th in ks ri ok lo l ia tr e th e ak m to er rd o ch ar ge of Ja pa ne se es pi on ag e in d di VD K N e th i, ki vs ia rn he C to 9 in rd diculous. This means th a t acco

at th t u b n pa ja r fo e ag on pi es not force Rakovsky to confess to n. ow s hi on n io at rm fo in is th d re ee nt lu vo y Rakovsk

e s e n a p a J e th h it w n o ti ra o b a ll o Trotsky's C ysp s y' sk ov ak R m ir nf co d di ho w However, th er e w as on e pe rs on e on st ju , 37 19 , 27 y ar ru eb F n O . lf in g fo r Ja pa n - T ro ts ky himse d se es nf co y sk ov ak R re fo be s th on m on th af te r Rakovsky's ar re st , m do ld ou w y sk ov ak R at th '' ed ct di re ''p to sp yi ng for Japan, T ro ts ky pr ec is el y th at . : te ro w ky ts ro T , 37 19 , 27 y ar ru eb F We re ca ll th at on y sk ov ak R h it w l, ia tr xt ne e th in at It is q u it e ce rt ai n th of s ge ar ch be l il w e er th d, se cu ac e th pa rt ic ip at in g as e th d an y sk ov ak R n ee tw be gs in al de al co ns pi ra to ri rs de or er nd (u y ar it il m d an s at m lo ip d e Ja p an es from Trotsky, of co ur se ). : te ro w ky ts ro T , 37 19 , 15 il pr A on And ag ai n e, os rp pu nd co se a ve ha t o n d di it if f el Now, I as k m ys h it w d te ec nn co as w he at th ds ar to fr am e hi m af te rw

Cha pter Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japanese

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the Jap ane se mil itar y chiefs in the Government, and so forth. Tro tsky ''pre dict ed'' tha t Rakovsky wou ld confess, not to con tact wit h age nts of Jap ane se intelligence, but to dire ct con tact wit h per son s of the high est rank , wit h ''dip lom ats' ' and ''Jap ane se mil itar y chiefs in the Government." And sure eno ugh , Rakovsky said he had met wit h Koki Hir ota and Keisuke Okada. Hir ota was Jap ane se min iste r of foreign affairs. Oka da was Prim e Min iste r of Japa n and also an adm iral in the Imper ial Jap ane se navy. The se men perf ectl y fit Tro tsky 's des crip tion of ''Jap ane se dipl oma ts and military," ''Jap ane se mil itar y chiefs in the Government."

A few def end ants in the firs t two Moscow tria ls had also con fess ed to esp iona ge for fore ign pow ers. But not one of them said tha t he had bee n in con tact wit h any per son s of high rank . Only ''Gestapo'' age nts, Ger man pro fess ors, per son s who m no one had hea rd of, had bee n men tion ed. Tro tsky did not wri te ''Rakovsky may be cha rge d wit h coll abo ration wit h the Jap ane se (un der ord ers from Tro tsky , of cou rse) ." He did not wri te ''Perhaps this tim e a def end ant will be forc ed to admit to con tact wit h high -ran king per son s (un der ord ers ...)." Tro tsky said tha t ''It is quite certain that ... between Rakovsky and the Japanese diplomats and military." Six wee ks late r Tro tsky was eve n mor e prec ise: ''with the Japanese military chiefs in the Government." How cou ld Tro tsky hav e bee n bot h so precise abo ut who m Rakovsky wou ld adm it to mee ting with , and at the sam e tim e so completely accurate? The re is only one hyp othe sis tha t offers an ans wer to this que stio n and tha t is con sist ent wit h Tro tsky 's stat ed prac tice to ''exp ose the sch eme in adv anc e'': Trotsky knew that

Rakovsky had done these things. Mo reov er, we also kno w how Tro tsky kne w wha t Rakovsky wou ld testify: Rakovsky him self had info rme d him. In his tria l test imo ny Rakovsky stat ed:

Tr ots kys Conspiracies

26 2

I w ro te to Tr ot sk y ab ou t al l th is ab ou t m y negotia tio ns in Tokyo, ab ou t m y co nv er sa tio ns wi th Yuis th t ou ab , se ur co of d, an s, ng eti me y m t ou ab v, re ne la st pr op os iti on . (1 93 8 Trial, 29 4) et vi So e th in th wi m fro y sk ot Tr ite wr to e ag an m ky vs ko Ra Ho w di d ky vs ko Ra ts an nd fe de o tw of y on m sti te e th to g in rd Union? Ac co e W . elf ms hi to ial ec sp s wa at th y sk ot Tr g tin ac nt co of y ha d a wa of n ali St to r tte le v's ho Ez to g in rd co ac at, th ha ve al re ad y se en Ja nu ar y 27, 19 37 , Pi ata ko v tes tif ied : Co nc er ni ng RAKOVSKY TROTSKY sa id th at it wa s es s hi in sh pu a m hi ve gi d an m hi th wi lk ta to ial se nt w or k alo ng th e lin es of th e Tr ot sk yi st or ga ni za tio n. rpe e m so d ha KY VS KO RA at th d ce du de I is th Fr om so na l lin e of co nt ac t wi th TROTSKY. (L ub ian ka 19 37 19 38 , Doc. No. 11 ) ste s hi in is th id sa y all re d ha v ko ata Pi ed ni de v We re ca ll th at Se ro n ali St to d rte po re v ho Ez rt po re e m sa e th in , re mo t's tim on y. W ha is: th of ew kn o als n') ku (O ill' M l ve Pa st, yi sk ot Tr r he ot an th at Ac co rd in g to co nf es sio ns of PIATAKOV an d MILL' (O ku n') he ha d an in de pe nd en t lin e of co nt ac t wi th TROTSKY (a nd ha s ef fe cte d th is co nt ac t th ro ug h

ROSMER).48 ed irm nf co n') ku (O ill' M at th ct fa e th t ou ab t en Se ro v re m ai ne d sil rly ea e th In y." sk ot Tr th wi t ac nt co of e lin t en nd pe de ''in Ra ko vs ky 's t ia ar et cr Se l na io at rn te In e th th wi ed rk wo d ha 19 30 s Mill' (Okun') to y iv pr en be ve ha d ul co so d an ris Pa in t en em ov m of Tr ot sk y's th is in fo rm ati on .

G. ii IUr by ted edi ogo tsk Tro hiv Ark ies ser the of 5 e um vol in te no a to g din cor 48 Ac and e igr em iet Sov a , un' Ok el Pav of nym udo pse a s wa l' Mil i, ski iav ern Fel 'sh tin ski i and Ch of er mb nu a are ere Th 2. 193 in SR US the to ed urn ret He is. Par in adh ere nt of Tro tsk y's let ter s fro m Tro tsk y to Okun' in the Tro tsk y Archive. See htt p:/ /ww w.l ib. ru/ TR OC KI J/Ar hiv_Tro tsk ogo _tS .tx t and not e 504 .

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Given all the evidence we now have, the bes t explanation bot h for Rakovsky's confession tha t he agr eed to wo rk for Japanese intel}i .. gence, and for Trotsky's uncannily specific and acc ura te ''predic.. tion'' tha t Rakovsky wo uld adm it this, is tha t it wa s tru e. Tro tsk y kne w abo ut the se contacts from the Japanese, or from Rakovsky himself, or from bot h

The Alternative Hypothesis A ten et of good his tor iog rap hy is to ''re spe ct and welcome div er.. gen t poi nts of view.'' 49 Though few ant ico mm uni st his tor ian s do so, and Cherniavskii cer tain ly does not, it is an essential practice for any one int ere ste d in discovering the tru th. Th at me ans we are obligated to con sid er oth er possible hyp oth ese s tha t mi ght accou nt for the evidence we have outlined here. In the pre sen t case, the only alte rna tiv e hyp oth esi s we can thi nk of would be tha t the NKVD rea d Trotsky's rem ark s of Feb rua ry 27 and April 15, 1937, and, ins pir ed by them, coerced Rakovsky to make a false confession tha t he had done exactly wh at Trotsky had sai d - tha t he had bee n rec rui ted by ''Japanese diplomats and military," ''Japanese military chiefs in the Government." We nee d to examine thi s hyp oth esi s to det erm ine wh eth er the re is any evidence to sus tain it. In add itio n to Rakovsky's tes tim ony at the March 193 8 Moscow tria l the re are two ind epe nde nt sou rce s for the sto ry of Rakovsky's rec rui tm ent . The first is a let ter from a Gorbachev-era Politburo commission to Aleksandr Iakovlev, one of Gorbachev's closest advisers and the leading ideological anti-Stalinist in his circle. Iakovlev had ask ed tha t res ear che rs be tas ked to gat her evidence to sup po rt his hypothesis tha t Stalin had bee n res pon sib le for having Sergei Kirov mu rde red on December 1, 1934. The res ear ch tea m had rep ort ed tha t the re wa s no evidence to sup po rt this hypothe-

Am eric an Hist oric al Association. Statement on Standards ofProfessional Conduct Was hingt on, DC, 201 1, 6. 49

264

Trotsky's Conspiracies

mco hy gt len a th wi d te ac re ev vl ko Ia is th To ff.) 2 20 3, B sis. (RKE ff.) 5 32 3, B KE (R . ain ag ok lo to em th d ke as he m un ica tio n in which er ov of se on sp re led tai de ry ve d an er ng lo en ev an s wa The re su lt 04 20 its in s ge pa ed ac -sp ly se clo 48 es pi cu oc at th 23,000 wo rd s m de s er ch ar se re ro bu lit Po e th it In ff.) 9 45 3, B KE (R n. tio publica no y pl sim is e er th at th ss bo g in nk -ra gh hi r ei th on str at e in detail to ev id en ce to tie Stalin to Kirov's m ur de r. w co os M e th to d te la re ce en id ev e th all g in in am ex of se In th e co ur , 38 19 9, ch ar M e th on up d he uc to rs be em m n io iss m m co e tri als th nfe de e th of in rta ce re He al. tri w co os M ird th e th of n io closed se ss d te ui cr re d ha o wh es tri un co n ig re fo of ns ize cit e th ied tif en da nt s id ntra al tri e th in d ne tio en m is n io ss se is Th e. th em for espionag 13 20 e th in ed uc od pr re it is r No it. in ed rd co re t no is sc rip t bu t al. tri 38 19 e th of t ip cr ns tra ed ct rre co un e th of on ed iti as n, io ss se is th t ou ab id sa n io iss m m co ro bu lit Po e th at wh He re is re ga rd s Rakovsky's te sti m on y at it: of um gi lle co y tar ili M e th of n io ss se t ur co d se clo e At th th e Su pr em e co ur t of th e USSR th at to ok place on March 9, 19 38 , sta te pr os ec ut or Vyshinsky qu es tio ne d tgh Ri iet ov -S nti ''A ed all -c so e th of ts an cip rti pa th e Tr ot sk yi st Bloc'' ab ou t th ei r es pi on ag e wo rk for foreign sta tes . Rozengol'ts sta te d th at he ha d be en re cr ui te d by Gernco d an rg bu len hu Sc d an n se rk Di s or ad ss ba am m an firmed his tie s to German intelligence. Rakovsky confessed th at wh en he wa s in Tokyo he ha d be en recr ui ted for es pi on ag e wo rk for Japan by th e Chairman pa Ja e th s, os Cr d Re e th of on ati leg de se ne pa of th e Ja Af n ig re Fo of er ist in M e th by , wa ga ku To ce in pr se ne fairs Hiroto, an d also by th e Prime-Minister of Japan is th at d se es nf co ky vs ko Ra n tio di ad In a. ad Ok l ira ad m se ss io n ab ou t his tie s wi th English intelligence to em e'' fic Of n eig or ''F by d te ui cr re en be d ha he wh ich ployees Lo ck ha rt an d Ar m str on g wi th th e kn ow led ge

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of the Per man ent Sec reta ry of the Eng lish Min istry of For eign Affairs ''Sir Wil liam Tyrrell."So Afte r this Vys hins ky que stio ned Buk hari n con cern ing his atte mp t to ove rthr ow Sov iet pow er in 191 8 wit h Loc kha rt's help , whi ch the latt er [Bu kha rin] cate gor icall y den ied. s1 The Pol itbu ro com mis sion had all the Sov iet arch ives at its dispos al. The re is no indi cati on tha t Rak ovs ky was forc ed to nam e thes e nam es or tha t they wer e eve n sug ges ted to him dur ing the inve stig atio n. As we hav e alre ady seen , Che rnia vsk ii con clud ed tha t Rak ovs ky had vol unt eere d this info rma tion of his own acco rd. Che rnia vsk ii is dete rmi ned to defend his prec onc eive d idea s tha t Rak ovs ky was inno cen t. Since he has no evid enc e at all to sup por t this noti on, he is forc ed to ''ch ann el'' Rakovsky! Che rnia vsk ii trie s to exp lain Rak ovs ky's con fess ions to esp iona ge for Jap an and the per son s Rak ovs ky nam ed as par t of a sup pos ed ''pla n'' to mak e stat eme nts so ''absurd''s2 tha t he him self and oth er sup pos edly ''inn oce nt vict ims ' wou ld be ''reh abil itat ed'' at som e futu re time : 1

His mai n aim was to faci litat e the futu re reha bili tati on of inn oce nt vict ims and , natu rall y, his own reha bili ta .. ti on in the firs t place. (5 0 5) Che rnia vsk ii sug ges ts an alte rnat ive exp lana tion for Rak ovs ky's con fess ions :

so "Lockhart" must mean Robe rt Bruc e Lockhart, the famo us Briti sh intell igenc e agen t. Sir William Tyrre ll was Perm anen t Unde r-Sec retar y of State for Fore ign Affairs betw een 1925 and 1928. The Russ ian text read s THpe - "Tireh," no doub t a steno grap her's error. 51

RKEB 3, 487. It appe ars that the Polit buro Com missi on simp ly repro duce d the summ ary

of the Closed Sessi on from the publ ished versi on of the Russ ian-l angu age trial trans cript of 1938. Evidently they did not both er to obtai n the origi nal trans cript of the Closed Session. Or perh aps this summ ary is the only recor d rema ining . s2 Scare quot es arou nd the word s "plan" and "absu rd" repre sent Cher niavs kii's subje ctive

comm ents, not any demo nstra ble inten t of Rakovsky's.

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ry sto hi by d ate in sc fa s wa o wh on rs pe ed at uc ed An an d kn ew it well, Rakovsky m us t ha ve re m em be re d er lib de en wh hs oc ep us rio va m fro s de iso ep di ffe re nt ate ly false confessions du rin g in ve sti ga tio ns an d tri als ha d be en given especially in or de r to un de rm in e th e wh ol e accusation. (505-6) s'' de iso ep t en er iff ''d ch su of e pl am ex e on t as le at d fin St ra in in g to in 91 19 in ed ish bl pu c Ar of an Jo t ou ab ok bo a es cit ii sk Cherniav ve ha y ma s or ut ec os pr 's an Jo of e on at th ts es gg wh ich th e au th or su ve ha d ul wo ky vs ko Ra at th ely lik un ly gh hi is It y. wa is ac te d in th d ul co ii sk av ni er Ch at th r ea cl o als is It n. tio no be en aw ar e of th is no t th in k of an y ot he r examples. lit Po v's he ac rb Go . file n tio ga sti ve in 's ky vs ko Ra ad re ii Cherniavsk o wh s, ue ag lle co s hi d an v ro Se . ng hi yt er ev ad re n io iss m m bu ro co ed m fra s wa ky vs ko Ra at th ow sh to rd ha ed tri ss, ce also ha d to ta l ac o wh s'' nt ge ''a nt ve in to ed rc fo s wa v ro Se . so do to le ab un e bu t w er at th ow kn we ii sk av ni er Ch to ks an Th .'' tes ma ell ''c 's we re Rakovsky at th ed at str on m de ve ha e W s. ate llm ce y an ve ha t no d Rakovsky di ll. we as l ia er at m r he ot of al de t ea gr a y sif fal to d ha v Se ro y's sk ot Tr ad re VD NK e th at th is es th po hy e tiv na er alt e th in To su sta ed rc fo en th d an , 37 19 , 15 ril Ap d an 27 ry ua br Fe of s'' ''p re di cti on y sk ot Tr t ha w to g in m or nf co ns sio es nf co se fal e ak m to ky Rakovs . so d di VD NK e th at th ce en id ev ed ne d ul wo e ha d ''predicted,'' on But all th e evidence we no w ha ve is from:

* Serov's re po rt of July 7, 1956, *t he Go rb ac he v- er a Po lit bu ro commission, *t he Go rb ac he v- er a Rehabilitation re po rt of th e Soviet Supr em e Court,

* Rakovsky's ow n investigation file as de sc rib ed by Cherniavskii,

38 19 h arc M e th of rt pa ic bl pu e th in ts en m te sta 's ky vs * Rako trial,

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* and the text of the secre t session of March 9, 1938.

All this evidence is consistent only with the hypothesis that Rakovsky volunteered his testimony. There is no indication here that Rakovsky was compelled in any way to confess his ties to the Japanese. Rakovsky's word s give the appe aran ce of a pers on striving to be truthful. At one point he rejects an accusation by Vyshinsky: VYSHINSKY: I wan t to put the question bluntly: I have a grave suspicion that your signature on the lette r which Armstrong pres ente d to you, a lette r addr essed to the German intelligence service, was not forged but was actually signed by you, because you were then already an agent of the German intelligence service. Is this right or wrong? RAKOVSKY: Absolutely wrong. (1938 Trial, 302-303) Rakovsky also state d outri ght that he mad e his confession voluntarily and why he did so. RAKOVSKY: I mus t say that I have pleaded guilty to this from the mom ent when I decided to give complete, exhaustive and frank testimony. For eigh t mon ths I deni ed ever ythin g and refu sed to testify. VYSHINSKY: Following the instructions and tactics of the Trotskyites? RAKOVSKY: I will tell you wha t prom pted me ... VYSHINSKY: I have no objection if you will deal briefly with this, with out long historical digressions. No objections, on my part. RAKOVSKY: Very briefly. As I said, it was only in the eigh th mon th that I bega n to mak e a clea n brea st of my main activ ities .

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VYSHINSKY: Criminal activities. be t Bu . se ur co of , es iti tiv ac al in im cr y M RAKOVSKY: as w d: in m y m in e os ar ly nt ue eq fr t gh ou th e th fo re th is im at th ny de ill w y od ob N g? in ny de in t gh ri g I do in rde un le op pe es ak m l, ra ne ge in e ud lit so pr is on m en t, ill w d an r, be em m re I ut B . es lu va of n io at lu va re ta ke a ch hi w s ce an st um rc ci e th e, liv I as ng lo as et rg fo r ve ne e th of e on g in ur D . ce en id ev ve gi to e m d finally im pe lle e th in , nt ar le I , er m m su e th in as w is th , ns io ex am in at t ns ai ag n gu be d ha on si es gr ag se ne pa Ja at th e, ac pl st fir China, ag ai ns t th e Ch in es e pe op le , I le ar nt of Gere th t ns ai ag on si es gr ag d se ui sg di un 's ly Ita d an s m an y' Sp an is h pe op le .... sfa e th l al ch hi w ns io at ar ep pr h ris ve fe e th of nt ar I le t ha W . ar w ld or w a h as le un to g in ak m e er w ci st st at es in s se do l al sm in y da y er ev s rb so ab lly ua us er ad a re a d ha is Th . se do g bi a in ce on at ed iv ce re I s, te le gr am Of e. m re fo be se ro st pa y m l Al e. m on ct fe ef ng st un ni be ill w d an ht ug na to d ce du re be ay m st co ur se th is pa r ne in an as t bu , ns tio ac l fu ce ra sg di y m by ed at ob lit er t ns ai ag ng hi yt an do n ca dy bo no d an g in th no e, iv ot m d an s, ie lit bi si on sp re y m e, m re fo be se ro st pa it. All m y is, th to y rt pa a as w f el ys m I at th e m to r ea cl e m ca be it th at I w as re sp on si bl e, th at I m ys el f ha d he lp ed th e at th ew kn I . es iti tiv ac e bl na so ea tr y m ith w rs so ag gr es t ou ab ns io us ill ng ri ou rb ha as w I at th e, on I w as no t al oPe er rm fo t, en m rn ve go e th of s ad he er rm Fo . th em is m m Co 's le op Pe nt ta is ss A er rm fo , rs sa is pl e's Co m m in d le ng ta en e m co be d ha s or ad ss ba m A er sa rs , fo rm t sa I f, el ys m er ov e dg ju a e m ca be I en th nd A . eb th is w e on no ch hi w t ur co a is is Th f. el ys m er ov t in ju dg m en er ov t en m dg ju in t sa I . ed as bi g in be ith w ch oa will re pr t en em ov m ur bo la e th to f el ys m n ve gi d ha I f. el ys m d he ac re d ha I ? to t go I d ha re he w d an h, ut yo fr om m y ac y m ith w k or w st le vi e th ed at lit ci fa I n he w e a st ag aar ep pr ' rs so es gr ag t is sc fa e th ed at lit ci fa d ha I , ns tio

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tions to destroy culture, civilization, all the achievements of democracy, all the achievements of the working class. That is what induced me to speak, that is what overcame my obstinacy, my false shame born of vanity, fear for my own fate, which was not worthy of a man who had once taken part in the revolutionary movement. My rancour, which all of us harboured, some to a greater and some to a lesser extent, rancour against the leadership, rancour against particular individuals, had played a great part. Rancour and ambition fell from me. I considered that from now on my duty was to help in this struggle against the aggressor, that I would go and expose myself fully and entirely, and I told the investigator that on the following day I would begin to give complete, exhaustive testimony. I must say that the testimony which I gave here is absolutely complete, sincere and exhaustive. Here Rakovsky states that ''it was only in the eighth month that I began to make a clean breast of my main activities." This corresponds exactly with what Cherniavskii found in reading Rakovsky's investigation file. Rakovsky had already made some admissions about much earlier activity. But Cherniavskii states: Only after almost seven and a half months from the time of his arrest did the prisoner again agree to make his confessions. (503)

Cherniavskii also outlines the reasons Rakovsky gave for finally revealing his Trotskyist activities on September 4, 1937. On September 4 [193 7] ... Rakovsky again wrote a statement to Ezhov, again permeated by ''ambiva-

lence'' and internal contradictoriness, calculated so that his confessions could easily be considered false: ''At a time when the Soviet homeland may face all

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kin ds of in ter na tio na l co mp lic ati on s, I co ns id er it to be do ub ly m y du ty bo th as a fo rm er me mb er of th e Co mm un ist Pa rty an d as a cit ize n of th e socialist fatherl~nd to re lat e fra nk ly, fully, an d comple tel y ev ery thi ng th at I ha ve done." (503) er mb pte Se of on ssi nfe co al tri pre 's ky vs ko Ra m fro n tio ota qu Th is 4, 19 37 , rec ord ed by Ch ern iav ski i, is in co mp let e ac co rd wi th the fol low ing pa ssa ge fro m Ra ko vsk y's tri al tra ns cri pt:

I co ns ide red th at fro m no w on my du ty wa s to he lp in thi s str ug gle ag ain st th e ag gr es so r, th at I wo ul d go an d ex po se my se lf fully an d en tir ely , an d I to ld th e inv es tig ato r th at on th e following da y I wo ul d be gin to give co mp let e, ex ha us tiv e tes tim on y. (19 38 Trial, 31 4) Co nv inc ed fro m the ou tse t tha t Ra ko vsk y an d all oth er de fen da nts erCh , ary ntr co the to e nc ide ev all of t ran ole int d an t en oc inn re we at th r, ve ate wh e nc ide ev y an ut tho wi s, im cla f sel nia vs kii him og rec be to s on ssi nfe co his d nte wa d an '' en rok ''b s wa y Ra ko vsk niz ed as false by so me fut ure rea de r. ch su for r ve ate wh e nc ide ev no s ha i ski iav ern Ch re he ew els as re He ob of k lac er utt n ow his te tra ns mo de to ly on ve ser cla im s, wh ich t no s wa y vsk ko Ra t tha ar cle it ke ma es do i ski iav ern Ch t Bu . ity tiv jec forced to confess by any maltreatment by the NKVD or by being exposed by other prisoners' testimony.

Hypotheses and Evidence e nc ide ev the for t un co ac to ses the po hy o tw ted iga est W e ha ve inv is sis the po hy st fir e Th . ese an Jap the th wi ed pir ns co ky ots Tr t tha for ts un co ac sis the po hy is Th e. pir ns co so d ee ind did th at Tr ots ky on s'' ion ict red ''p e cis pre ry ve 's ky ots Tr : ve ha we e nc ide ev the all Fe bru ary 27 an d Ap ril 15 , 19 37 tha t Ra ko vsk y wo uld be ac cu sed ats lom dip ese an Jap th wi lf ha be 's ky ots Tr his on of co ns pir ing on ssi nfe co y's vsk ko Ra d an t; en rnm ve go the in n me ary lit mi an d th at he did ind ee d so co ns pir e.

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The alter nativ e hypo thesi s is that the NKVD read Trots ky's ''predictions'' and, inspi red by them , coerc ed Rakovsky to make confessions that conf orme d to Trots ky's state ment s. All the evide nce in our poss essio n refut es this hypo thesi s.

*

In his state men ts Rakovsky nam ed three prom inen t Japa nese figures, inclu ding two in the gove rnme nt. But these name s were not used durin g the trial. We only learn ed of them in 2004 . So it is unlikely that the NKVD prov ided them .

* Because

it is so clear that Rakovsky mad e his conf essio n state men ts by himself, rathe r than prom pted by anyo ne else, Cherniavs kii was force d to supp ose that they are ''absu rd'' and so do not need to be taken serio usly. In reali ty there is noth ing objectivel y ''absu rd'' abou t Rakovsky's confessions. This is Cherniavskii's stanc e when ever he is faced with evide nce that contr adicts his preco nceiv ed idea that Rakovsky was inno cent. It is the logical fallacy know n as the ''argu ment from incredulity."53

But it is also clear that Cherniavskii belie ves Rakovsky volu nteer ed these state ment s, chos e wha t to say and who m to name . This mean s that, in February and April 1937~ Trotsky could only have know n abou t Rakovsky's cont act with 'Japanese diplomats and military,'' 'Japanese milit ary chiefs in the Government,'' from Rakovsky himself.

* Sero v and Khru shch ev's aides, and then Gorbachev s aides, were 1

unab le to find any evide nce that Rakovsky was force d to confess. Sero v cons truct ed some fabri catio ns abou t Rakovsky, since he had to pres ent a repo rt to Molotov and othe rs who were unsy mpatheti c to Khru shch ev's idea that all the defe ndan ts in all the Moscow trials were inno cent. Writ ing to Alek sand r Iakovlev, a perso n who want ed very badl y to prov e that Stalin had fram ed every body , Gorb ache v's aides were unab le to cite any evide nce that Rakovsky

See, for example, https: / /en. wikipe dia.or g/wiki /Argum en t_from_ignorance#Argument_from_increduli ty.2FL ack_of_imagination

s3

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of y an te ci to er th bo en ev t no d di s de ai 's ev ch ba or G w as innocent. '' es at lm el ''c ed os pp su 's ky vs ko Ra by ts en th e pu rp or te d st at em e es th at th k in th to on as re r he rt fu is f el its in is cited by Serov. Th st at em en ts ar e phony. yer ev to ss ce ac e et pl m co d ha s de ai 's ev ch ba or G d Both Serov an ill st is at th l ia er at m h uc m g in ud cl in , es iv ch ar et th in g in th e Sovi · ar t re ec -s ill st e os th in g in th no at th e m su as n ca e to p se cr et . W chives suggests th at Rakovsky w as framed. tta ili ab eh ''r ith w ed sk ta as w rt ou C e em pr Su * Gorbachev's Soviet g in ud cl in , al tri w co os M d ir th e th of ts an nd fe de ng ni ing'' th e re m ai lu nc co its se ba to ch hi w on ce en id ev y an Rakovsky. B ut it lacked Re its In d. te ic nv co lly fu ng ro w en be d ha ts an nd fe si on th at th e de , ia ss Ru in et cr se pto ll sti , 88 19 4, ry ua br habilitation re po rt of Fe on si es nf co s ii' sk ov in Fr d te ci tly es on sh di t ur Co e th e Soviet Su pr em As . 06 20 til un et cr se d ne ai m re ch hi w , 39 19 , 11 il pr st at em en t of A of ilt gu e th s m fir af t en em at st on si es nf co s ii' sk w e ha ve seen, Frinov iFr as l el w as s al tri w co os M d ir th d an st fir e th th e de fe nd an ts at novskii's an d Ezhov's ow n guilt. ed rc fo VD NK e th at th is es th po hy e th t or pp No evidence exists to su .. ot Tr irm nf co to r de or in s on si es nf co s hi e Rakovsky to st ru ct ur nco e th On . 37 19 , 15 il pr A d an 27 ry ua br sky's ''predictions'' of Fe d se es nf co ky vs ko Ra at th ts es gg su ve ha e w ce tra ry , all th e eviden . ce ur so y an om fr g in pt om pr t ou ith w ily ar nt volu pa Ja e th at th m hi ld to l ia fic of se ne pa Ja e on w ho After re co un tin g ith w d an gs in rit w s y' sk ot Tr ith w d fie is at ss ne se go ve rn m en t w as di : id sa ky vs ko Ra s st yi sk ot Tr e es in Ch e th of es iti th e activ I w ro te to Tr ot sk y ab ou t all th is ab ou t m y negotia, ev en ur Y ith w ns tio sa er nv co y m t ou ab o, ky tions in To st la is th t ou ab , se ur co of d, an , gs tin ee m y m t ou ab proposition. (1 93 8 Moscow Trial, 294) ht ig m ky vs ko Ra t ha w g in ow kn s y' sk ot Tr r fo Th at w ou ld ac co un t testify, an d so for Tr ot sk y' s ''prediction."

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Trotsky Conspired with the Japanese The only hyp othe sis tha t can successfully acc oun t for the evid enc e now available is tha t Tro tsky did ind eed coll abo rate wit h the Japanes e. Tro tsky aim ed to mak e the cha rge app ear so abs urd and yet so obvious tha t he could ''pre dict '' it in advance. But we kno w tha t Tro tsky freq uen tly did this befo re in hop es of blun ting the stin g of a cha rge tha t he kne w mig ht soo n be mad e aga inst him bec aus e it was true . In Trotsky's 'Amalgams' we exa min ed the ''na me of Trotsky'' issu e in the Kirov mu rde r case, the ''res tora tion of capitalism," and the ''arm ed inte rven tion '' charges. We also esta blis hed tha t Tro tsky lied a gre at deal. Tro tsky had to lie, of course. Lying is esse ntia l in any conspiracy. But this fact mea ns tha t we can nev er acc ept Tro tsky's stat eme nts, including his denials, as trut hfu l. We hav e also see n how Tro tsky use d the stra tage m of ''exposing the sch eme in advance'' man y times. We hav e disc ove red tha t he did this as a way to war d off, in advance, acc usa tion s tha t he cou ld be reas ona bly cert ain wou ld be forthcoming.s4 Tro tsky cou ld not pre ven t the Soviet pro sec utio n - ''Stalin'' - from unc ove ring and exp osin g his, Trotsky's, con spir ator ial activities. But he could claim tha t thes e acc usa tion s wer e so crud e, so tran spa ren t, tha t he could eve n ''predict'' them in advance. In the pre sen t case Tro tsky ove rste ppe d. He wou ld hav e don e muc h bet ter to mak e a mor e gen eral ''pre dict ion' ' - say, tha t Rakovsky wou ld confess to som e kind of clan des tine con tact wit h som e Jap ane se figures. Inst ead , Tro tsky stat ed exactly wha t Rakovsky wou ld confess. This was a ''prediction'' so prec ise tha t the only way Tro tsky could hav e mad e it is if he kne w wha t Rakovsky wou ld say - tha t is, if Rakovsky's confession was true .

s4 See Furr, Trotsky's 'Amalgams,' Chapters 13 throu gh 15, sections titled ' Expose the sche me in advance." 1

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s ay w al t no d di ky vs ko Ra at th n er nc co s se es pr Cherniavskii ex m ho w d an d te ic nv co en be y ad re al d ha na m e only pe rs on s w ho . er rth fu y an rm ha t no ly ab um es pr d ul co s on si th er ef or e, his confes Bo V. D. d an v ne re IU K. K. s at om pl di e th ns tio en m He specifically as w v ne re IU ith w n io at nt ro nf co ce -fa -to ce fa gomolov. Rakovsky's is Th ) 07 (5 8. er ob ct O on ov ol m go Bo ith w , 37 19 , on Se pt em be r 22 Bo d an v ne re IU at th es at st ii sk av ni er Ch s. st re ar r ei w as be fo re th ed m na ky vs ko Ra e tim e th by ed st re ar en be gomolov ha d al re ad y r be em pt Se on ed st re ar as w v ne re IU . se ca e th t no is th em , bu t th is 23, 19 37 , Bogomolov on O ct ob er 13, 1937.ss nco y el fre ng vi ha r fo it ed cr n ve gi as w ky vs It ap pe ar s th at Rako n. ow kn en be ve ha t no e is rw he ot ld ou w at th gs fessed so m e th in n. pa Ja r fo e ag on pi es of on si es nf co 's ky vs ko Ra as w One example se ho w t ou ab s on rs pe e m so d ie tif en id ve ha to s em Rakovsky also se . ow kn t no d di VD NK e th cy ra pi ns co et vi So tian e th pa rti ci pa tio n in t an nd fe de er th no A . on is pr in s ar ye 20 Rakovsky w as se nt en ce d to on ce en nt se r ea -y 25 a n ve gi as w v, ne et Pl in th e sa m e trial, Dr. D.D. e m so r de ur m to cy ra pi ns co e th of n ow kn d ha he th e gr ou nd s th at to ed ut rib nt co t no d ha he gh ou th al d, an of his famous pa tie nt s cy ra pi ns co e th on ed rm fo in ily ar nt lu vo t no d ha th ei r de at hs , he e th d ha he d an e fic of m fro ed ov m re en be d ha da go ev en w he n la .. r fe in t an rt po im n ve gi d ha ky vs ko Ra , st ra nt co chance to do so. By m at io n voluntarily.

n tio ta ili ab eh R t n le u d u ra F 's ky vs ko a R e em pr Su et vi So e th of ee cr de a by ed at lit bi Rakovsky w as re ha is ee cr de n io at lit bi ha re e th of xt te e Th . 88 19 4, ry Court on Fe br ua ii itr m D al er en G 5 9 19 in ut B y. da to ia ss Ru in still se cr et to ia ss Ru of t ou e iv ch ar s hi of t en m ip sh e th ed iz or Volkogonov au th e th 00 20 In . ss re ng Co of y ar br Li e th in up d de en py th e West. A co l sa ru pe l fu re ca A s. er ch ar se re to en op e m ca Volkogonov Archive be

ss Yurenev: The Sakharov Center: htt p://www.sakharovof ist "L ty, cie So l ria mo Me : lov mo go Bo 8 80 15 id= e& ag =p /?t log iro art d/m center.ru/asfc l #n tm 8.h 45 4/f u/d o.r em .m sts /li p:/ htt ": on ssi pre Re cal liti Po Victims of

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of this poorly- indexe d archive turned up a copy of the rehabil itation decree. We can be sure it is the right docum ent becaus e a reproduc tion of the header of the first and footer of the last page of the original was reprod uced in the 1991 book Reabilitatsiia. Poli· ticheskie protsessy 30-50-kh godov, pp. 240-24 1. This rehabil itation report is falsified. On page 7 we find the following statem ent: According to the testimo ny of former NKVD worker Aronson, questio ned in 1956, the convic ted prison er Kh.G. Rakovs ky while in prison in May of 1941 also told him about the falsification of the materia ls of the crimina l case and about his wrongf ul conviction. We have already consid ered this alleged statem ent by ''Aronson," also attribu ted by Serov to an ''agent Finn." It is hearsa y at best and most likely a fabrica tion solicite d by Serov for his July 7, 1956, report. In any case, the mere claim of a defend ant that the evidence against him was falsified and that he is innoce nt, carries no weight as eviden ce unless it is firmly corrob orated by other independen t testimo ny or physica l evidence. Page 6 of the rehabil itation report summa rizes parts of Frinovskii 's confess ion statem ent of April 11, 1939, as follows: Forme r Assista nt People 's Comm issar for Interna l Affairs of the USSR Frinovskii in his statem ent of April 11, 1939, admitt ed that worker s of the NKVD USSR ''prepa red'' the prisone rs for the interro gations at face-to-face confron tations , alertin g them to possibl e questio ns and answer s to them. Ezhov frequen tly talked with those to be interro gated. If the prison er recante d his confess ions he gave the investi gator the order to ''restor e'' the prisone r, that is to obtain from him his previou s false confessions. Accord ing to Frinovskii 's confess ions Ezhov often spoke with N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov, P.P. Bulanov and other defend ants

276

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and trie d to con vin ce eac h of the m tha t the cou rt wo uld spa re the ir lives if the y adm itte d the ir guilt. Th e reh abi lita tio n rep ort con cea ls Fri nov ski i's specific sta tem ent , in his con fes sio n sta tem ent , tha t Ezhov too k a han ds- off sta nce tow ard s the 193 8 Moscow trial.

An act ive par tic ipa nt in inv est iga tio ns generally, Ezhov kep t him sel f alo of fro m the pre par ati on of thi s tria l ... It als o falsifies thr oug h om iss ion by con cea lin g Fri nov ski i's explanat ion of wh at Ezhov tol d the def end ant s: not tha t the ir lives wo uld be spa red if the y con fes sed , bu t if the y did no t me nti on Ezhov ' s par tic ipa tio n in the con spi rac y. He re Ezhov unq ues tio nab ly wa s rul ed by the nec ess ity of cov eri ng up his ow n ties wit h the arr est ed lea der s of the Right wh o we re goi ng int o the pub lic tria l. It als o om its all the par ts of Fri nov ski i's sta tem ent in wh ich he ma kes it cle ar Zinoviev, Kamenev, and the def end ant s in the Ma rch 193 8 Moscow tria l rea lly we re con spi rat ors ; tha t he and Ezhov we re inv olv ed in thi s con spi rac y; and mu ch mo re. Th e ''re hab ilit atio n'' rep ort con tain s thi s pas sag e: Fo rm er wo rke rs of the NKVD of the USSR Frinovskii, Agranov, Nikolaev, Dmitriev, Tse rpe nto , Ushakov, Chistov, Passov, Kogan, Gerzon, Glebov, Lulov and oth ers , wh o too k a dir ect rol e in the inv est iga tio n of thi s cri min al case, we re lat er con vic ted for illegal arres ts, falsification of evi den ce, and oth er ver y ser iou s vio lati ons of law. We kno w tha t ma ny of the se me n had in fact bee n inv olv ed in the inv est iga tio n of the def end ant s in the Ma rch 193 8 tria\.56 Th e mo st

lakov S. Agranov was expelled from the Part y in July 193 7 and arre sted on July 20, 1937, alm ost seve n mon ths before the trial. The edit ors of Genrikh Jagoda, who had access to

56

Chap ter Four. Rakovsky, Trotsky, and the Japa nese

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significant falsification her e is by omission. Most of thes e men wer e Ezhov's accomplices in the massive fram e-up s of inn oce nt pers ons . After Ezhov's rem ova l they wer e investigated, arre sted , tried, and sho t und er Beria. Of the oth ers who can be identified and abo ut who m we hav e found reliable data, Nikolaev-Zhurid was arre sted October 25, 193 8, trie d and convicted Feb rua ry 4, 193 9; D.M. Dmitriev was arre sted June 28, 193 8, trie d and convicted March 7, 193 9; Z.I. Passov was arre sted October 22, 193 8, trie d and convicted Feb rua ry 14, 194 0. All thes e men wer e trie d and convicted, dur ing Beria's investigation of Ezhov's crimes. It was Stalin and his close asso ciat es who app oin ted Beria to repl ace Ezhov and then to inve stig ate and pro sec ute the crim es of Ezhov and his men. The re is no evidence tha t the March 193 8 Moscow tria l involving Rakovsky and oth ers had any thin g to do wit h the convictions of thes e men. Frinovskii's stat eme nt makes it clea r tha t the 193 8 Moscow tria l defe nda nts of who m he speaks, Bukharin, lagoda, Rykov, and Bulanov, wer e guil ty and also con cea led Ezhov's particip atio n in the conspiracy. Rakovsky was reha bili tate d as a par t of the gro up of defe nda nts in the March 193 8 tria l who had not bee n reha bili tate d previously.s1

former NKVD files now in possession of the FSB (successor to the NKVD, MVD-MGB, KGB) revealed in 1997 that Agranov was convicted of involvement in lagoda's conspiracy and in a conspiracy with the Socialist Revolutionaries. He admitted guilt in lette rs to Stalin and Ezhov. A partial trans cript of an interrogation of former NKVD man Trilisser in January 1939 records that Trilisser named Agranov as one of lagoda's co-conspirators.(Genrikh lagoda, 39-40; 531). s7 Those rehabilitated on February 4, 1988 , those previously rehabilitated, and the one

person, Jagoda, who was not rehabilitated, are listed in the trans cript of the Politburo Commission of February 5, 1988 :

IlpHHHTO K cBe~eHHIO coo6nteHHe npe,l\ce.ztaTeng BepxoBHoro Cy,qa CCCP o TOM, qTo IlneHyM BepxoeHoro CyAa caoHM nocTaHOBJieHHeM 4 cpeapaJIH 1988 r. OTMeHHJI npHroeop BoeHHOH KonnerHH e OTHoweHHH ocy~eHHbIX H.H. ByxapHHa, A.H. PbIKOBa, A.11. Po3eHronb~a, M.A. tfepHoea, 11.n. EynaHoea, JI.r. JleBHHa, H.H. KasaKoea, BA MaKcHMOBa,l(eKoBcKoro, n.n. KproqKoBa H x.r. PaKOBCKOfO H AeJIO npeKp3THJI 3a OTC}'TCTBHeM B HX ,l\eHCTBH.HX COCTaBa npecTynJieHHH.

27 8

Trotsky's Conspiracies

am ex ve ha e w ch hi w '' on ns ro ''A om fr t en em at st e O th er th an th is ns co ce en id ev no ns ai nt co rt po re n io at in ed ab ov e th e Rehabilit te nt w ith Rakovsky's innocence.

Conclusion lco d di y sk ot Tr on Le at th is r te ap ch is th Th e m ai n conclusion of ac at th is es th po hy ly on e th is is Th . se ne pa Ja e th la bo ra te w ith of e tic ac pr a d ha y sk ot Tr . ve ha w no e w co un ts for th e evidence e ad m be ly ab ob pr ld ou w ed is rm su he at th s ge an tic ip at in g ch ar ho w s on rs pe e us ca be d an ue tr e er w ey ag ai ns t hi m be ca us e th ay w r he ot no is e er Th ed st re ar en be d ha es iti kn ew ab ou t hi s activ ky vs ko Ra at th e nc va ad in ng lo '' ed ct di re ''p ve ha Tr ot sk y could d an y sk ot Tr n ee tw be g tin ia ed m as w he at th al tri w ou ld claim at Ja pa ne se m ili ta ry m en in th e go ve rn m en t.. m hi ky vs ko Ra at th s irm nf co He e. fil 's ky vs ko Cherniavskii re ad Ra t ha w to ed re ag d ha he at th n io at rm se lf vo lu nt ee re d th e in fo pa Ja r fo s ge sa es m ng yi rr ca to n pa Ja r fo am ou nt ed to es pi on ag e ith w t en em re ag r io pr e m so d ha ho w y sk ot Tr ne se intelligence to t no d di VD NK e th at th in rta ce be n ca e w ns ea m th e Japanese. This , en th d an , 37 19 , 27 ry ua br Fe of ' n' io ct di re ''p s le ar n ab ou t Tr ot sk y' opi es to s es nf co d an it irm nf co to ky vs ko Ra e rc in sp ir ed by it, fo nage fo r Japan. en ev t no d di ky vs ko Ra t ns ai ag t ic rd ve t's ur co e th W ha t's m or e, e at ic br fa '' lin ta ''S VD NK e th ld ou w hy W e. m en tio n th is espionag pa Ja e th to ry sa is em s y' sk ot Tr en be d ha ky vs ko Ra a ch ar ge th at , es ur fig al ic lit po se ne pa Ja t an rt po im of nese, su pp ly th e na m es , es m na e es th e m na to d an ge ar ch is th to s es nf co force Rakovsky to

0 Th1 oC 1H no1 JIH 6ht M Ba TH MO me TeM no H eny 11. me MY 3TO no CP CC M PaHee BepxoBHblM CyAo . C.A , OB aH HB . B.H , HH CK ieH 3eJ A H. , KO Hb fpH >. r.