Leadership and Leaders in Polybius 9783111239538, 9783111239477

Citation preview

Nikos Miltsios Leadership and Leaders in Polybius

Trends in Classics – Supplementary Volumes

Edited by Franco Montanari and Antonios Rengakos Associate Editors Stavros Frangoulidis · Fausto Montana · Lara Pagani Serena Perrone · Evina Sistakou · Christos Tsagalis Scientific Committee Alberto Bernabé · Margarethe Billerbeck Claude Calame · Kathleen Coleman · Jonas Grethlein Philip R. Hardie · Stephen J. Harrison · Stephen Hinds Richard Hunter · Giuseppe Mastromarco Gregory Nagy · Theodore D. Papanghelis Giusto Picone · Alessandro Schiesaro Tim Whitmarsh · Bernhard Zimmermann

Volume 145

Nikos Miltsios

Leadership and Leaders in Polybius

ISBN 978-3-11-123947-7 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-123953-8 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-123992-7 ISSN 1868-4785 Library of Congress Control Number: 2023935316 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Editorial Office: Alessia Ferreccio and Katerina Zianna Logo: Christopher Schneider, Laufen Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Acknowledgments I wish to thank Antonios Rengakos and Franco Montanari for accepting this book in the series Trends in Classics of Walter de Gruyter. I am indebted as well to the anonymous readers for their insightful and generous comments. Finally, I wish to express my appreciation to the Foundation for Education and European Culture (IPEP, Athens) for the financial support during the course of my research.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111239538-202

Contents Acknowledgements  V Introduction  IX  . .. .. .. .. .

Charismatic Leadership: The Case of Philip V  1 Philip V and Alexander the Great  1 Military brilliance  2 Speed  4 Perceptions  6 Youth  10 Polybius and Alexander the Great  15

 . . .. .. ..

Effective Leadership Behaviors  24 Hannibal in Italy  25 Scipio Africanus the Elder  38 Scipio’s early years  39 The siege of New Carthage  42 The Battle of the Camps  49

 . .. .. .

Ineffective Leadership  56 Ineffective leaders and followers  62 Diaeus and Critolaus  62 Agathocles of Alexandria  67 Emergence of conspiracies  74

 . . . .

Leadership and the Vicissitudes of Fortune  83 The function of fortune in the Histories  83 Leaders’ preparations  91 Historical knowledge and possibilities of prediction  94 Historical recurrence in Polybius  100

 . . .

Collective Leadership: The Romans  110 The First Punic War  111 Τίνι γένει πολιτείας  123 The exercise of Roman hegemony  133



Epilogue  151

VIII  Contents References  153 General Index  159 Index Locorum  165

Introduction Towards the middle of his account of the First Punic War, Polybius describes how the Spartan Xanthippus helps the Carthaginians to recover their selfconfidence after two successive defeats at sea and on land, and to win a major victory over the Romans and their hitherto invincible leader, M. Atilius Regulus (1.32–35). Xanthippus arrives at a critical juncture, when the Carthaginians are faced with not only the Romans who are preparing to besiege them, but also with the Numidian attacks and the problems caused by the mass of inhabitants of the countryside who have flocked to the city. Thanks to his experience, Xanthippus realizes that the Carthaginians’ failures are due to the fact that their leaders choose to fight in places where they cannot make use of their cavalry and elephants, and when he assumes command of the army himself, he routs the enemy and takes Regulus captive. Polybius, commenting on the events, observes that in this case the verse of Euripides, “one wise counsel conquers many hands” (ἓν σοφὸν βούλευμα τὰς πολλὰς χέρας νικᾷ),1 was confirmed, since one man destroyed an army thought to be invincible and extremely efficient in war (1.35.4–5). Polybius expresses his belief that a single man can affect the course of history by his behavior on other occasions, too. At 8.3.3, for example, at the opening of his description of the Roman siege of Syracuse, he repeats the observation he made concerning the Xanthippus episode, noting that the would-be conquerors did not reckon with the power of Archimedes or foresee that “in some cases the genius of one man accomplishes much more than any number of hands” (μία ψυχὴ τῆς ἁπάσης ἐστὶ πολυχειρίας ἐν ἐνίοις καιροῖς ἀνυστικωτέρα). The Romans, indeed, remain encamped around the city for eight months, unable to conquer it because all their efforts are countered by Archimedes’ defensive machines, leading Polybius to exclaim in admiration, in the same spirit as his previous comment, “Such a great and marvellous thing does the genius of one man show itself to be when properly applied to certain matters” (εἷς ἀνὴρ καὶ μία ψυχὴ δεόντως ἡρμοσμένη πρὸς ἔνια τῶν πραγμάτων μέγα τι χρῆμα φαίνεται γίνεσθαι καὶ θαυμάσιον, 8.7.7). He makes yet another similar statement on the great things that can be achieved by the right man at 9.22.6, when describing the many problems that Hannibal caused the Romans: “Such a great and wonderful product of nature is a man with a mind properly fitted by its original constitution to execute any project within human power” (οὕτως μέγα τι φύεται

 1 Antiope, TrGF 5.1 F200.3–4. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111239538-204

X  Introduction χρῆμα καὶ θαυμάσιον ἀνὴρ καὶ ψυχὴ δεόντως ἁρμοσθεῖσα κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς σύστασιν πρὸς ὅ,τι ἂν ὁρμήσῃ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων). At 39.4.1–2, moreover, commenting on the concord that arose among the Aetolians after the death of Lyciscus, Polybius notes that human nature is so powerful (τηλικαύτη τίς ἐστιν, ὡς ἔοικε, δύναμις ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσεσιν), that entire armies and nations may experience the greatest evil and the greatest good owing to the behavior of a single man (δι᾽ ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν). In the Histories many examples are to be found confirming this view. Polybius presents some of the most iconic leaders of antiquity, who achieved great deeds thanks to their abilities, and others who, on the contrary, did not live up to their role and caused irreparable damage. However, although most of Polybius’ leaders have attracted intense interest, the subject of leadership has not been treated as a key concern of the work, on a par with the presentation of the expansion of Roman rule. Polybius is primarily thought of as the historian of the rise of Rome into a great power of the time. Admittedly, the way in which the subject of the work is described in the proem of the first book can reasonably lead to such a conclusion. At 1.1.5 Polybius promises, specifically, that in his work he will explain by what means and under what system of government (πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας) almost all the nations of the world have been defeated in less than fifty-three years. This picture is further reinforced by his famous analysis in the sixth book, where the Roman success is presented as largely resulting from the flawless operation of their system of government and institutions. However, the expansion of Roman dominion was achieved following a long series of military enterprises in which the leadership skills of the participating generals played a vital part. Polybius, moreover, alongside the events of Roman history, provides a detailed account of the developments all around the Mediterranean basin that contributed to its conquest by Rome — developments set in motion by leaders whose characteristics and behaviors also form the object of systematic presentation. How strongly the Histories are permeated by an interest in leadership is also evident from the way in which Polybius envisages the audience whom he is addressing. Polybius, of course, claims in the proem that the subject of his work can leave no reader unmoved (1.1.4–5). At 9.1.2–5, however, recalling Thucydides’ famous admission that the lack of story–like elements in his work will make it less pleasurable to read (1.22.4), Polybius, too, recognizes that his exclusive focus on political and military events will only win the attention of one type of reader, those who enjoy such subjects, but will seem tedious to most (τῷ δὲ πλείονι μέρει τῶν ἀκροατῶν ἀψυχαγώγητον παρεσκευάκαμεν τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν). Moreover, Polybius clearly stresses that he is not addressing only those

Introduction  XI

who are interested in politics and war simply as enquiring readers, but also men of action, political and military leaders who may find themselves facing similar situations to those he describes, and those who aspire to such roles in future. Thus he is very often careful to underline the benefits arising from his discussions to men of action, as, for example, when explaining the distinction between the cause, the pretext, and the beginning of a war (3.7.5), or when referring to Philip V’s change for the worse (7.11.2).2 In several cases, indeed, he does not hesitate to openly urge men of action to learn from the events he narrates and adjust their behavior accordingly.3 These frequent authorial comments show that Polybius’ work contains abundant material which is not only relevant to the art of leadership but can even assist (aspiring) leaders to fulfil their obligations successfully. It is noteworthy, and typical of his especial familiarity with the theme of leadership, that in one case Polybius offers us the opportunity to observe the process by which he himself contributes as a mentor to the development of the leadership qualities and skills of a person who entrusts him with that duty. At 31.23–24 he describes the scene in which the young Scipio Aemilianus complains to Polybius that he pays more attention to his older brother Fabius, and asks him if this is because he thinks him quiet, indolent, and an unworthy successor to his illustrious forebears. Polybius reassures the young man that the only reason he engages more with his older brother is due to the latter’s seniority, and offers to help Scipio speak and act in a way worthy of his family, assur-

 2 3.7.5: τί δ᾽ ἀνδρὸς πραγματικοῦ μὴ δυναμένου συλλογίζεσθαι πῶς καὶ διὰ τί καὶ πόθεν ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἀφορμὰς εἴληφεν; (“of what use is a statesman who cannot reckon how, why, and whence each event has originated?”); 7.11.2: δοκεῖ γάρ μοι καὶ τοῖς κατὰ βραχὺ βουλομένοις τῶν πραγματικῶν ἀνδρῶν περιποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας διόρθωσιν ἐναργέστατον εἶναι τοῦτο παράδειγμα (“for this seems to me a very striking example for such men of action as wish in how small a measure to correct their standard of conduct by the study of history.”) 3 See, e.g., 9.9.10: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὐχ οὕτως τοῦ Ῥωμαίων ἢ Καρχηδονίων ἐγκωμίου χάριν εἴρηταί μοι – τούτους μὲν γὰρ ἤδη πολλάκις ἐπεσημηνάμην – τὸ δὲ πλεῖον τῶν ἡγουμένων παρ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις καὶ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα μελλόντων χειρίζειν παρ᾽ ἑκάστοις τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις (“It is not for the purpose of extolling the Romans or the Carthaginians that I have offered these remarks – I have often had occasion to bestow praise on both peoples – but rather for the sake of the leaders of both these states, and of all, no matter where, who shall be charged with the conduct of public affairs”); 11.2.11: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ τῶν ἐν πράγμασιν ἀναστρεφομένων, ἵνα μήτε προπετῶς κινδυνεύοντες σφάλλωσι τὰς τῶν πιστευσάντων ἐλπίδας μήτε φιλοζωοῦντες παρὰ τὸ δέον αἰσχρὰς καὶ ἐπονειδίστους ποιῶσι τὰς αὑτῶν περιπετείας (“what I have said here may serve to warn all who direct public affairs neither by rashly exposing themselves to cheat the hopes of those who trust in them nor by clinging to life when duty forbids it to add to their own disasters disgrace and reproach.”)

XII  Introduction ing him that he will find no better supporter (μηδένα συναγωνιστὴν καὶ συνεργὸν ἄλλον εὑρεῖν ἂν ἡμῶν ἐπιτηδειότερον, 31.24.8). At 31.25–29 there is a detailed description of the program Scipio followed in order to stand out among his peers for his prudence, generosity, and courage. Although Polybius’ role is only mentioned explicitly in the part of the program concerning the acquisition of courage (31.29.8), the fact that this section is preceded by the scene of the conversation between the two men and the emphasis on the familiarity and frequency of their communication (31.24.9–25.1) leave us in no doubt that the historian’s wise guidance was one of the chief reasons why “the fame of Scipio in Rome advanced so far and became so brilliant more quickly than it should” (ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο προέκοψε καὶ θᾶττον ἢ καθῆκεν ἐξέλαμψεν ἡ τοῦ Σκιπίωνος ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ δόξα, 31.23.2). Scipio’s achievements and virtues reflect honorably on Polybius himself, reminding readers, especially those interested in matters of leadership, that they are studying an author who knows the subject intimately, having played such a key role in the development of the abilities and the broader shaping of the character of the future conqueror of Carthage. It is commonly acknowledged that there has been a remarkable surge of interest in Polybius in recent decades. To the monumental works of Walbank (1957–1979) and Pédech (1964) has been added a series of monographs approaching Polybius’ fragmentary work from many different angles and highlighting its wealth and complexity.4 Eckstein’s Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius (1995) underlined the historian’s genuine interest in the moral dimension of the events and behaviors he records. Champion’s Cultural Politics in Polybius’s Histories (2004) discussed the strategies by means of which Polybius constructs Roman cultural identity in his work, taking the demands of his different audiences into account. McGing in Polybius’ Histories (2010) offered an up-to-date and informative introduction to the historian and the central themes of his work. Baronowski’s Polybius and Roman Imperialism (2011) explored the thorny issue of Polybius’ views on Roman expansionism. Maier’s Überall mit dem Unerwarteten rechnen (2012) demonstrated that in Polybius’ historical outlook, belief in man’s ability to learn from the past coexists with the realization that events often occur in unpredictable ways. In The Shaping of Narrative in Polybius (2013), I applied the methodological tools of narratology to the analysis of the text, in order to describe the techniques with which Polybius orchestrates his narrative and highlights the issues that concern him. Moreno Leoni’s Entre Roma y el mundo griego: Memoria, autorrepresentación y didáctica del poder en las Historias de Polibio (2017) showed how Polybius presents Roman policy  4 For a detailed overview of the relevant bibliography before 2000 see Walbank 2002, 1–27.

Introduction  XIII

through the ideological prism of Hellenism. And, even more recently, Moore’s Polybius: Experience and the Lessons of History (2020) examined the way in which Polybius approaches the relationship between the lessons one learns from personal experience and the didactic value of history. All the above studies investigated aspects of the Histories that are associated in one way or another with the theme of leadership. The presentation of Polybius’ moral views deals with the issue of the criteria applied to the assessments of the leaders. The examination of the picture of the Romans and other nations that is constructed in the work almost automatically opens the discussion of how far leaders’ behaviors are determined by their identity characteristics. Noting the role of the unforeseen in Polybius’ historical outlook raises questions about leaders’ ability to successfully handle the challenges they face. The narratological analysis focuses on the techniques Polybius uses to sketch leaders and capture the effectiveness of their behaviors. And the analysis of the relationship between the didactic value of history and personal experience is self-evidently important to how Polybius understands the ideal education of the (aspiring) leaders to whom he addresses his work. The multiple ways in which the various aspects of the Histories that have attracted the interest of Polybian scholars touch on the theme of leadership confirm the crucial role it plays in his work. It is, therefore, quite surprising that a separate study of the issue has until now been missing. The present work focuses on parts of the Histories associated with the theme of leadership. Besides the passages in which Polybius sets out his views on the matter, this study examines narrative units of the work which record leadership behaviors. The analysis of these units attempts to identify regularly recurring patterns, motifs, and themes in the descriptions of leaders, which could, precisely because of their systematic presentation, lead to useful conclusions on Polybius’ approach to leadership. Of course, given that, as we have seen, an interest in leadership permeates Polybius’ work and engages with his main thematic concerns, the investigation of the subject unavoidably brings us faceto-face with the way in which Polybius handles questions of power and control, identity and nationality, the role of fortune, narrative techniques, etc. Thus, although it focuses on descriptions of leadership behaviors, my analysis sheds light on Polybius’ broader characteristics as an author and the central themes of his work. Since this book is primarily a literary study, it is the representation of the story that attracts my interest. I analyze the way Polybius constructs his narrative in an attempt to unveil key aspects of both his approach to leadership and his literary technique. As we shall see, Polybius’ rhetorical and narrative strate-

XIV  Introduction gies play just as critical a role in shaping his representations of leadership as his views on the subject. Yet, in order to fully appreciate the complexity of Polybius’ work and the literary art that has created it, it is essential to treat it also as part of a wider network of historical narratives. In view of this, a major concern throughout the book is with the ways Polybius’ representation of leadership seems to have been influenced by literary depictions of the conquests of Alexander the Great. Polybius’ interplay with his literary context and tradition deepens our understanding of what he is trying to accomplish in the narrative and how he is interacting with the expectations of his audiences. The first two chapters deal with the way in which Polybius presents some of the most effective and charismatic leaders in his history. The first chapter focuses on Philip V, who in the opening years of his reign displays abilities and a dynamism which have reminded many critics of Alexander the Great. The discussion identifies the motifs linking the two leaders, examines to what extent these may be due to Polybius’ familiarity with the history of Alexander, and attempts to show that they are also used in the descriptions of other successful leaders in the work. The second chapter centers on Hannibal and Scipio Africanus the Elder, and argues that in both cases Polybius views their achievements as the result of their perceptiveness and advanced analytical skills. The similarities between the descriptions of the two leaders’ behavior have been noted at various times by critics, who have mainly attributed them to Polybius’ desire to compare the two men. The interpretation I propose treats these similarities as a rhetorical strategy adopted by Polybius in his effort to confer intelligibility upon the course of the military enterprises he records. The analysis takes the argument set out in the first chapter further, stressing the role that the tradition of the history of Alexander, with its emphasis on his exceptional genius, appears to have played in the shaping of this rhetoric. In the third chapter, the discussion turns to negative portraits of leaders in the Histories, discussing behaviors which Polybius describes as eminently problematic and counterproductive. The cases of Hasdrubal, the last general of Carthage, Agathocles of Alexandria, and the demagogue leaders who determined the policy of the Achaean League before the battle of the Isthmus demonstrate the devastating consequences of flawed wielding of power, while also providing the opportunity to draw some conclusions regarding the way in which Polybius approaches the relationship between leaders and followers. Interesting aspects of this relationship are also illuminated by the analysis of the conspiracies in the fourth and fifth books, where the leaders’ adequacy is associated not only with the more or less effective handling of the conspiracies but also with their actual emergence.

Introduction  XV

The fourth chapter examines the challenges posed by unpredictable factors to leaders’ efforts to realize their endeavors. The discussion analyses the function of fortune in the Histories and presents the possibilities of successful action that Polybius discerns against a background of high complexity and uncertainty. The fifth chapter, finally, focuses on the exercise of power on a collective level, investigating key aspects of the presentation of the Romans in the Histories. The analysis identifies the characteristics of Roman behavior and mentality which contributed decisively to the establishment and expansion of their dominion. It also looks at the criticism levelled against the Romans in several cases in the later books of the work, drawing comparisons with the history of Alexander the Great in an attempt to offer a new way of approaching and interpreting it.

 Charismatic Leadership: The Case of Philip V . Philip V and Alexander the Great The Histories portray many leaders who do not simply manage to fulfil their role successfully but could deservedly be called charismatic. Hannibal, Scipio Africanus the Elder, and Philip V, in the early years of his rule, are among the many examples of such brilliant, charismatic leaders. I will begin with Philip, because, as will become clear shortly, the presentation of his actions during the Social War in the fourth and fifth books allows us to identify an important literary influence on the way in which Polybius depicts leadership genius. Polybius expressly recognizes Philip’s impressive abilities at 4.77.2–3 and 10.26.7–8. At 4.77.2–3, having described the decisiveness with which Philip informed Aratus of his intention to support the Achaeans against Apelles’ attempts to cause problems (4.76), he interrupts his narrative to present the leadership characteristics with which Philip was endowed: Βασιλέα γὰρ πλείοσιν ἀφορμαῖς ἐκ φύσεως κεχορηγημένον πρὸς πραγμάτων κατάκτησιν οὐκ εὐμαρὲς εὑρεῖν; καὶ γὰρ ἀγχίνοια καὶ μνήμη καὶ χάρις ἐπῆν αὐτῷ διαφέρουσα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐπίφασις βασιλικὴ καὶ δύναμις, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πρᾶξις καὶ τόλμα πολεμική. For it would be difficult to find a prince more richly endowed by nature with the qualities requisite for the attainment of power. He possessed a quick intelligence, a retentive memory, and great personal charm, as well as the presence and authority that becomes a king, and above all ability and courage as a general.

Polybius concludes his description by raising the issue of Philip’s transformation from a charismatic king into a savage tyrant (ἐκ βασιλέως εὐφυοῦς τύραννον ἄγριον); he notes, however, that this is not easy to examine briefly, so he will discuss it on a more suitable occasion (4.77.4). In a similar vein, at 10.26.7–8 Polybius remarks that none of the former kings displayed greater merits or defects than Philip. In this case, he even adds that Philip’s good qualities were innate but his defects were acquired, comparing him to horses that become ill-tempered as they age. Both passages, then, agree that Philip was naturally endowed with such excellent qualities that he can hardly be compared to any other king. The description of Philip’s actions during the Social War fully confirms Polybius’ favorable opinion of his admirable leadership qualities. The account of his military operations is a lengthy string of successes and achievements. Philip is depicted advancing unstoppably, capturing one city after another, often without a fight since the inhabitants panic and flee at the mere news of his arrihttps://doi.org/10.1515/9783111239538-001

  Charismatic Leadership: The Case of Philip V val, and generally causing admiration and surprise in friend and foe alike. This picture of Philip naturally recalls that of his most famous predecessor on the Macedonian throne, Alexander the Great, and it is no coincidence that scholars have already identified motifs in Polybius’ narrative connected to the transmitted tradition on Alexander. McGing, for example, has noted that by emphasizing Philip’s youth and speed, Polybius wishes to compare him to Alexander, in order to highlight his transition from childhood to maturity.1 Dreyer, on the other hand, argues that the motifs of pothos and the cultivation of ambitions of world domination in Polybius’ account of the history of Philip reflect the efforts of his sources to satisfy the Macedonian king’s desire to link his politics and achievements to those of his predecessor.2 I will now go on to describe the motifs which Polybius’ presentation of Philip’s actions shares with the history of Alexander. My aim is not only to identify possible influences of the history of Alexander on Polybius, but also to reveal the various ways in which those motifs are exploited in the narrative and how they function in the Histories. As I will attempt to demonstrate, the story of Alexander’s expedition was a basic source of inspiration for Polybius in his efforts to highlight the exceptional abilities and behaviors that ensured the success of the charismatic leaders who appear in his work.

.. Military brilliance Polybius’ main priority in his portrayal of Philip is to underline his uniqueness as a leader by emphasizing the impressive abilities that made him stand out. This theme almost automatically connects Polybius’ account of Philip with the Alexander tradition. A desire to stress the leader’s superiority is, of course, a common feature of historiographical works focusing on the actions of monarchs, since it serves the political purpose of legitimizing their authority based on precisely those superhuman qualities.3 However, the narrative of Alexander’s expedition in itself self-evidently boosted the production of similar works and was instrumental in the development of their features. Besides, as regards the relationship between Polybius’ account of Philip and the history of Alexander, the image of the two men’s uniqueness can be interestingly seen to be constructed out of exactly the same narrative and thematic materials.  1 See McGing 2013, 196. 2 See Dreyer 2013, 206. 3 See Ma 2013, 11.

Philip V and Alexander the Great  

The account of Philip’s actions in the Social War in the fourth and fifth books of the Histories reflects the achievements and performance of Alexander in many respects. First of all, Polybius presents Philip as a particularly charismatic general, who combines courage and daring on the battlefield with sound judgement and insight. The string of Macedonian successes is exclusively attributed to his initiatives and his inspired guidance. The account of the siege of Alipheira, the outcome of which is sealed when Philip manages to scale the suburb of the citadel with a picked force, is a typical case in point (4.78.9). Philip’s action drives the enemy off the walls; fearing that the citadel will fall and they will be deprived of their last bastion, they rush to defend it, leaving the Macedonians free to take the city (4.78.11). Philip also displays an impressive ability to predict his opponents’ actions and take the right steps to deal with them. When some Aetolian horsemen gather on a riverbank to prevent the Macedonians from crossing or to inflict serious damage on them as they leave the water, Philip perceives their intentions (συννοήσας αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιβολήν) and orders his peltasts to cross first, shield to shield (4.64.5–6). The Aetolians are thus placed at a disadvantage, unable to break the peltasts’ closed ranks, and are forced to withdraw (4.64.7). Similarly, as he is returning from Thermus, Philip suspects (διὰ τὸ προσδοκᾶν) that the Aetolians will take advantage of the rocky pass to attack his rearguard, so he lays ambushes to repel them (5.13.2–6). The phrases “and this in fact immediately took place” (ὃ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι παρὰ πόδας, 5.13.2) and “having foreseen this” (προειδὼς τὸ μέλλον, 5.13.5) emphatically confirm that his men were saved thanks to the exceptional skills of their perceptive leader.4 Although such motifs seem very familiar or even expected in works that attempt to highlight the leadership qualities of charismatic figures, their appearance here is particularly associated with, and refers to, the history of Alexander. The connection becomes clear if we recall, for example, how often in Arrian’s Anabasis Alexander is depicted as securing victory by his courage and unrivalled strategic abilities. In all three great victories over the Persians, at Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela, the scales tip in the Macedonians’ favor thanks to Alexander’s actions. At Granicus, for instance, the enemy first begin to give way at the point where Alexander is fighting (1.16.1). At Issus, too, the battle is decided when the Persian left wing and Darius himself flee in the face of Alexander’s attack (2.10.3, 2.11.4). In this case, stressing his hero’s perceptiveness, Arrian observes, as Polybius does of Philip (5.13.2), that “it turned out just as  4 See also 4.63.9, where Philip is said to have had a premonition that 500 Aetolians would come (ὧν τὴν παρουσίαν προαισθανόμενος ὁ βασιλεύς) and prepared accordingly.

  Charismatic Leadership: The Case of Philip V Alexander had conjectured” (ξυνέβη ὅπως εἴκασεν Ἀλέξανδρος, 2.10.4). History repeats itself again at Gaugamela, where Alexander takes advantage of the break in the Persian front line to launch a sudden charge on Darius, forcing him to retreat (3.14.2–3). Alexander in the Anabasis is also, like Philip, distinguished by his ability to grasp his enemies’ plans in time and come up with the right tactics to overturn them. The incident in the Histories that I mentioned above, when Philip sent his peltasts across the river first to counter the attacks of the Aetolian cavalry (4.64.5–6), can be compared, for example, with the way in which Arrian shows Alexander saving his men from the Thracian attack on Mount Haemus. The Thracians have occupied the heights and collected their wagons with the aim of letting them loose upon the Macedonians below (1.1.6–7). Alexander orders his troops to open ranks to let the wagons pass between them, and tells those who are hemmed in to lie flat on the ground with their shields locked together to protect themselves (1.1.8–9). Once again, Arrian’s closing phrase, “and it turned out just as Alexander had conjectured and exhorted” (καὶ οὕτω ξυνέβη ὅπως παρῄνεσέ τε Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ εἴκασεν, 1.1.9), underlines the insight and perspicacity with which Alexander was able to correctly appraise the danger threatening his troops and avoid it. The solutions devised by Philip and Alexander to get their men out of a difficult situation admittedly seem self-evident, but the fact that they are explicitly attributed to the two men demonstrates that highlighting the leadership characteristics of their protagonists is a major concern of both narratives.

.. Speed One characteristic of Philip which is repeatedly noted in the account of the Social War, contributing to the shaping of the image of the charismatic general with unrivalled, almost superhuman abilities, is his astonishing speed. Philip moves between Macedonia and the Peloponnese with impressive rapidity (4.22.6: ἐκ Μακεδονίας ἔτι θάττω τὴν παρουσίαν; 4.66.3: μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ἐπάνοδον). His speed and impetuosity do not seem to be affected or impeded by even the most adverse conditions. At 5.8.1–2 the Macedonian army is said to ascend to Thermus in Aetolia “by a path not only exceedingly steep and rugged, but having high precipices on each side, so that in some places the passage was very narrow and dangerous” (ὁδὸν οὐ μόνον προσάντη καὶ τραχεῖαν διαφερόντως, ἀλλὰ καὶ κρημνοὺς ἐξ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους ἔχουσαν βαθεῖς, ὥστε καὶ λίαν ἐπισφαλῆ καὶ στενὴν τὴν πάροδον εἶναι κατ᾽ ἐνίους τόπους). However, the

Philip V and Alexander the Great  

Macedonians are able to cover the distance in a short time, marching at a great pace (ἐνεργὸν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πορείαν, 5.8.3). Philip moves so quickly that his enemies cannot follow his progress; sometimes, as at 4.69.3–9 and 5.18.6–10, they only realize that he is heading towards them once he has already entered their territory and they suddenly find themselves facing him.5 Obviously no other character in the narrative can compete with Philip in swiftness, and both his allies and his opponents are usually left behind despite their strenuous efforts to catch up with him. When, for example, Philip is preparing his Aetolian expedition, he arrives at Limnaea so suddenly (διὰ τὸ τῆς παρουσίας αἰφνίδιον) that his Epirot allies, for all their eagerness to revenge themselves on the Aetolians, are unable to gather their forces in time (καθυστέρουν, 5.6.3). Similarly, the Messenians, although honestly willing to take part in Philip’s expedition to the Peloponnese, hastily (μετὰ σπουδῆς) sending their picked troops, are too late to meet Philip at Tegea (καθυστερήσαντες τῆς εἰς τὴν Τεγέαν παρουσίας τοῦ Φιλίππου, 5.20.1–2). The Aetolian general Dorimachus also leaves Thessaly in haste (κατὰ σπουδήν) to help his compatriots when he learns that the Macedonians have invaded his country (5.17.7); he has no chance of keeping up with Philip either. As Polybius remarks, “he failed and was too late at all points” (ὑπελείπετο καὶ καθυστέρει πάντων, 5.17.7). Speed, of course, is a motif primarily associated with the history of Alexander. In Arrian’s Anabasis, the term σπουδή is used in various forms and combinations (such as σπουδῇ, κατὰ σπουδήν, σπουδῇ εἶμι, σπουδῇ ἄγω, σπουδῇ ἐλαύνω, σπουδῇ προχωρῶ, σπουδῇ πλέω) more than 20 times to indicate Alexander’s speed,6 while other synonymous expressions are also used.7 In the Anabasis, moreover, we find the same motifs Polybius employs to stress Philip’s swiftness. Alexander, like Philip, is unstoppable. Even the most inaccessible terrain cannot slow him down. He moves through the mountains of the Uxians with characteristic speed (3.17.3: ᾔει σπουδῇ ἐπὶ τὰ στενά; 3.17.4: πολλῷ τάχει ᾔει). Similarly, when he needs to use a rough and narrow road (τραχεῖαν τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ στενήν, 3.18.4) to attack Ariobarzanes’ camp, he runs along most of the route (ᾔει ὁδὸν χαλεπὴν καὶ τραχεῖαν καὶ ταύτην δρόμῳ τὸ πολὺ ἦγε, 3.18.6). Alexander’s speed takes his enemies by surprise; just like Philip’s opponents,  5 For a detailed examination of these two passages see below, pp. 7–8. 6 See, e.g., Arr. Anab. 3.7.5: ᾔει σπουδῇ; 3.8.1: ἤλαυνε σπουδῇ; 3.15.5: προὐχώρει αὖθις κατὰ σπουδήν; 3.18.10: σπουδῇ αὖθις ἦγεν; 3.19.4: ἔτι μᾶλλον ἦγε σπουδῇ; 5.24.7: σπουδῇ ἐδίωκεν; 6.4.3: σπουδῇ ἔπλει … σπουδῇ πλείονι ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν; 6.17.5: πλείονι ἢ πρόσθεν σπουδῇ κατέπλει; 6.25.3: σπουδῇ γὰρ πολλῇ ἐγίγνετο ὁ στόλος; 7.11.5: σπουδῇ ἐξέρχεται. 7 See, e.g., Arr. Anab. 2.9.1: πέμπει κατὰ τάχος; 3.17.4: πολλῷ τάχει ᾔει; 3.21.8: δρόμῳ ἡγεῖτο; 3.25.7: ὀξείας τὰς διώξεις ποιησάμενος.

  Charismatic Leadership: The Case of Philip V they are sometimes described as learning of his arrival in their region as the same time that they receive news that he has launched an expedition against them. Thus, when the Thebans learn that Alexander has crossed the pass of Thermopylae, he is already at Onchestus with all his army (1.7.6). A similar fate befalls Musicanus, a local Indian ruler, when Alexander approaches his country by sailing down the Indus. Alexander sails down the river so swiftly (καὶ γίγνεται αὐτῷ ὁ πλοῦς κατὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐς τοσόνδε ἐσπουδασμένος) that he reaches the borders of Musicanus’ country before the latter has even heard that Alexander is moving against him (6.15.6). Finally, again as in Philip’s case, Alexander’s speed, unmatched as it is by any other character, is presented as further evidence of his superiority. When Alexander sets out in pursuit of Darius after the battle of Gaugamela, his fast pace forces many of his soldiers to fall behind, while some of the horses even die (καὶ αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν σπουδῇ γιγνομένην τῶν τε στρατιωτῶν πολλοὶ κάμνοντες ὑπελείποντο καὶ ἵπποι ἀπέθνησκον, 3.20.1).

.. Perceptions Another motif linking Polybius’ portrayal of Philip with the history of Alexander is the emphasis on how his actions are perceived by others. Philip is a leader who not only acts effectively at an operational level but also has a decisive impact on his enemies’ morale. The main emotions that Philip arouses in others are fear, surprise, and admiration. Philip’s opponents in the Social War are repeatedly described as being gripped with fear when faced with his attacks, or even simply on hearing that he is coming. Thus, when he camps in the territory of Stratus, by the river Achelous, Philip pillages the whole country unopposed (ἀδεῶς), since none of the enemy dares to come out an attack him (οὐδενὸς ἐπεξιέναι τολμῶντος τῶν ὑπεναντίων, 4.63.11). Similarly, when the Dardani are informed of Philip’s imminent arrival, they are panic-stricken (καταπλαγέντες) and dismiss the army with which they planned to invade Macedonia (4.66.6). His enemies’ fear of Philip not only indicates his unrivalled military skill but also offers a crucial strategic advantage; many towns and fortifications are occupied swiftly and easily, often without a siege, precisely because their defenders abandon them through fear of him. This is the case, for example, with Ithoria and Oeniadae: despite their great natural strength and the defensive measures taken (ὀχυρότητι δὲ φυσικῇ καὶ χειροποιήτῳ διαφέρει, 4.64.9; ἀσφαλισάμενοι τείχεσι καὶ τῇ λοιπῇ κατασκευῇ, 4.65.5), when Philip approaches, their garrisons panic and flee (καταπλαγέντες οἱ φυλάττοντες ἐξέλιπον τὸν

Philip V and Alexander the Great  

τόπον, 4.64.10; καταπλαγέντες ἐξεχώρησαν, 4.66.5). The participle καταπλαγείς also occurs at other points of Polybius’ narrative, describing the reaction of Philip’s foes to his attacks and his energetic advance.8 The contrast between the unstoppable Philip, turning his sights on and striking one target after another, and his enemies, depicted as being incapable of offering the slightest resistance and simply running away in terror, strongly emphasizes how special and unparalleled the young king’s performance was in warfare. Philip’s actions are also depicted as provoking surprise and admiration. When he attempts to besiege Psophis, his opponents are completely at a loss at his unexpected movements (διηπόρουν ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσιν) due to the difficulty of the endeavor (4.71.5). Convinced that the city’s strong fortifications would deter anyone attempting to assault it, they even suspect that Philip has arranged with some of those inside the city to betray it (4.71.6). The Peloponnesians are also astonished at Philip’s victory over the Eleans on the hill of Apelaurus (τοῖς δὲ Πελοποννησίοις πᾶσι παράδοξον ἐφάνη τὸ γεγονός, 4.69.9), because they hear of his arrival in the Peloponnese at the same time as his victory (ἅμα γὰρ ἤκουον τὴν παρουσίαν καὶ τὴν νίκην τοῦ βασιλέως, 4.69.9). Polybius has earlier noted that they had all ceased to expect Philip’s appearance because winter was now advanced (πάντων ἀπηλπικότων τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ Φιλίππου, 4.67.6). He, however, moved so swiftly and secretly that “no one in the Peloponnese was aware of what had happened” (ὥστε μηδένα Πελοποννησίων ὑπονοῆσαι τὸ γεγονός, 4.67.7). The blunder of the Eleans themselves when they met Philip on the hill showcases their total ignorance of his movements. When they saw the hoplites with their bronze shields, the Eleans mistook them for Megalopolitans, because at the battle of Sellasia the Megalopolitans had carried such shields, provided by Antigonus (4.69.4–5). It was only once the Macedonians had come very close that the Eleans realized their mistake and immediately fled, casting away their weapons (4.69.6). As at the siege of Psophis, Philip takes his opponents completely by surprise, leading them to misunderstand the situation entirely. Surprise, fear and admiration are also the emotions exhibited by the Spartans on seeing Philip’s army marching past their city (ἐκπλαγεῖς ἐγένοντο καὶ

 8 4.75.5: καταπλαγέντων δὲ τῶν συμπεφευγότων τὴν ἔφοδον; 4.80.11: καταπλαγέντες τὴν περίστασιν; 4.83.3: καταπλαγέντες δ᾽ οἱ φυλάττοντες; 5.100.6: καταπλαγέντες παρέδοσαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι τὴν πόλιν. At 4.79.1 and 5.18.11 the synonymous phrases καταπλαγεῖς γεγονότες and περιδεεῖς γεγονότες are used to indicate the terror Philip’s actions provoke in the inhabitants of Triphylia and the Spartans respectively. Finally, at 4.63.2 the verb καταπλήττω is applied to Philip in the active voice: κατεπλήξατο τοὺς ἐνόντας.

  Charismatic Leadership: The Case of Philip V περίφοβοι, θαυμάζοντες τὸ συμβαῖνον, 5.18.5). Here, too, Polybius justifies the reaction of Philip’s enemies (εἰκότως ἦσαν ἐκπλαγεῖς), stressing how unexpected this was: the Spartans’ attention was on what they were hearing about Philip’s operations at Thermus, so they did not expect to face danger so soon (5.18.5–6). The historian then briefly describes Philip’s march to Sparta, highlighting what a remarkable achievement it was (5.18.8–10): ἀναχθεὶς γὰρ ἐκ μέσης Αἰτωλίας, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, καὶ διανύσας ἐν νυκτὶ τὸν Ἀμβρακικὸν κόλπον, εἰς Λευκάδα κατῆρε. δύο δὲ μείνας ἡμέρας ἐνταῦθα, τῇ τρίτῃ ποιησάμενος ὑπὸ τὴν ἑωθινὴν τὸν ἀνάπλουν, δευτεραῖος πορθήσας ἅμα τὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν παραλίαν ἐν Λεχαίῳ καθωρμίσθη. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ποιούμενος τὰς πορείας ἑβδομαῖος ἐπέβαλε τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὴν πόλιν κειμένοις παρὰ τὸ Μενελάιον λόφοις, ὥστε τοὺς πλείστους ὁρῶντας τὸ γεγονὸς μὴ πιστεύειν τοῖς συμβαίνουσιν. For putting to sea from the centre of Aetolia, as I above narrated, and traversing the Ambracian Gulf in one night, he had reached Leucas, where he spent two days, and setting sail on the morning of the third day he came to anchor next day in Lechaeum after pillaging the coast of Aetolia on his voyage. After thus marching without a break he gained upon the seventh day the hills near the Menelaïum that look down on Sparta. So that most of Spartans though they saw what had happened, could not believe their eyes.

As the concluding phrase makes clear (ὥστε τοὺς πλείστους ὁρῶντας τὸ γεγονὸς μὴ πιστεύειν τοῖς συμβαίνουσιν), Polybius is not describing Philip’s course in order to inform his readers of its details, but rather to arouse their admiration at the skills required to achieve it. This is generally the historian’s intention whenever he notes the other characters’ astonishment, admiration, and amazement at Philip’s actions. By underlining the admiration provoked by Philip’s exceptional accomplishments, Polybius is actually inviting his readers to adopt his characters’ viewpoint and realize how magnificent and out of the ordinary Philip’s achievements are. In the history of Alexander, too, his opponents are depicted as viewing him with a similar mixture of emotions ranging from surprise to admiration and fear. In Arrian’s Anabasis, the participle ἐκπλαγείς is used 10 times to describe the impact of Alexander’s actions on his enemies’ morale.9 The frequent repetition of this motif certainly underlines Alexander’s remarkable accomplishments on the battlefield; however, Arrian also shows that the astonishment he provokes in his foes is a strategic advantage in itself, often determining the outcome of

 9 See Arr. Anab. 1.1.3; 1.6.4; 2.13.5; 3.17.5; 3.25.7; 4.19.4; 4.21.6; 4.26.4; 4.30.2; 6.15.6.

Philip V and Alexander the Great  

the battle.10 A striking example is the reaction of the mercenaries fighting for the Persians at the battle of Granicus: when Alexander attacks them, they are frozen in place by surprise — “This they did rather from amazement at the unexpected result of the struggle than from any steady resolution” (ἐκπλήξει μᾶλλόν τι τοῦ παραλόγου ἢ λογισμῷ βεβαίῳ ἔμενε) — and are wiped out (1.16.2). The defenders of the Sogdian Rock are equally astonished when they see the Macedonians who have scaled it waving sheets, to let their comrades know they have succeeded (4.19.3). Their sense of security due to the inaccessibility of the location shattered, the Sogdians are so overwhelmed by the unexpected sight (ἐκπλαγέντες τῷ παραλόγῳ τῆς ὄψεως), that they surrender, believing their opponents to be more numerous than they are and fully armed. “So frightened did they become,” Arrian concludes, “at the sight of those few Macedonians” (οὕτω πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν τῶν ὀλίγων ἐκείνων Μακεδόνων φοβεροὶ ἐγένοντο, 4.19.4). Their shock is comparable to that of the Eleans on the hill of Apelaurus described above, who mistook the Macedonians with their bronze shields for Megapolitans, unable to believe that Philip was already in the Peloponnese (4.69.4–5). In some cases Alexander’s actions are so incomprehensible to his foes that even when they can see what he is doing, they cannot grasp exactly what is happening and have a skewed perception of reality. The commonest reaction of Alexander’s enemies to the surprise and fear his presence arouses is, of course, retreat. This is what the Uxians do, for instance: on seeing Alexander, they are astonished at his speed (τῷ τε τάχει Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐκπλαγέντες) and flee without giving battle (Anab. 3.17.5). Often, indeed, Alexander in Arrian, like Philip in Polybius, does not need to fight because his enemies flee on hearing of his approach. Thus, when Satibarzanes, the satrap of the Areians, is informed that Alexander is marching against him and is already near, astonished at the swiftness of his arrival (τῇ ὀξύτητι τῆς ἐφόδου ἐκπλαγείς) he retreats with only a few horsemen, since most of his men have deserted him due to their fear of Alexander (3.25.7). Similarly, the news that Alexander is approaching Maracanda makes Spitamenes, the satrap of Sogdiana, abandon his siege of the Macedonians in the citadel and flee (4.6.4). However, the most striking example of an enemy of Alexander’s panicking at his vigorous attacks

 10 This is why surprising his enemies is presented as being of primary concern to Alexander himself; see, e.g., Arr. Anab. 2.26.3: ἐκπλήξειν γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ ἔργον τῷ παραλόγῳ ἐπὶ μέγα (“for he said that the action would strike the enemy with great alarm from its being contrary to their expectation”) and 6.9.5: καταπηδήσας δὲ εἴσω τοῦ τείχους τυχὸν μὲν αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐκπλήξει τοὺς Ἰνδούς (“but if he leaped down within the fort he might perhaps by this very act strike the Indians with terror.”)

  Charismatic Leadership: The Case of Philip V and retreating is Darius himself. In Arrian’s account of the battle of Issus, the chief opponent of Alexander is among the first to abandon the fight (εὐθὺς ὡς εἶχεν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἅρματος ξὺν τοῖς πρώτοις ἔφευγε, 2.11.4). Darius is also routed in the account of the battle of Gaugamela, where he is depicted as being particularly terrified (καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ πάλαι ἤδη φοβερῷ ὄντι Δαρείῳ ἐφαίνετο, πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἐπιστρέψας ἔφευγεν, 3.14.3). In both these cases, the details of his flight are intended to highlight the strength of his fear. Darius flees the battle of Issus in his chariot, which he abandons on reaching rough ground, continuing on horseback and leaving his weapons and mantle behind (2.11.5), while after the battle of Gaugamela “he went on fleeing without taking any rest” (ἔφευγεν οὐδέν τι ἐλινύσας Δαρεῖος, 3.15.5).

.. Youth As McGing has correctly noted, the emphasis on Philip’s youth is a motif in Polybius’ narrative that automatically calls Alexander to mind.11 Polybius repeatedly stresses how young Philip was when he carried out the operations of the Social War. At 4.2.5, for example, he records Philip’s accession to the throne, underlining his youth: “he was still a boy” (ἔτι παῖς ὤν). At 4.3.2–3 Polybius notes that the Aetolians decided to fight the Achaeans because they thought they had no allies, underestimating Philip, who had succeeded Antigonus while still a child (παῖδα καταλιπὼν Φίλιππον). At 4.5.3 the Aetolian Dorimachus refers to Philip’s youth in order to persuade Scopas to join him against the Messenians, “pointing out to him that they were safe as regards Macedonia owing to the youth of its ruler” (ὑποδεικνύων μὲν τὴν ἀπὸ Μακεδόνων ἀσφάλειαν διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν τοῦ προεστῶτος). In the same vein, at 4.22.5 three of the ephors of Sparta are depicted in discussions with the Aetolians, because they are certain that Philip’s age will prevent him from handling the situation in the Peloponnese successfully. McGing is right to note that many of these observations are internally focalized through other characters’ viewpoints, with the result that Philip’s exceptional and uncommon achievements triumphantly disprove those who underestimate him.12 The reversal of the expectations of Philip’s enemies due to his youth is, to be sure, a recurrent motif in the account of the Social Wars. This becomes particularly evident at 5.29.1–3, in the description of the  11 See McGing 2013, 196: “Alexander was the ‘boy’ par excellence.” Polybius refers to Alexander’s youth at 8.10.8: καίπερ ὄντι νέῳ παντελῶς. 12 See McGing 2013, 187–189.

Philip V and Alexander the Great  

difficult position the Aetolians found themselves in, due to which they were anxious to make peace. As Polybius notes there, the Aetolians proved “contemptible and childish” (εὐκαταφρόνητοι καὶ παιδαριώδεις), “for while they had hoped to find a helpless infant in Philip, owing to his tender years and inexperience” (ὡς παιδίῳ νηπίῳ χρήσασθαι τῷ Φιλίππῳ διά τε τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν), they found a perfect man. I would argue, however, that viewing the frequent references to Philip’s youth as a narrative device ultimately intended to mislead the reader does not fully explain the ways in which this motif operates in the text. When, for example, Polybius at 4.24.1–2 voices his reservations as to whether the view expressed by Philip at the king’s council, regarding the correct response to the Spartans after the murder of Adeimantus, was indeed his own — noting that “it is scarcely probable that a boy of seventeen should be able to decide about such grave matters” (οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἑπτακαιδεκαέτη παῖδα περὶ τηλικούτων δύνασθαι πραγμάτων διευκρινεῖν) — he does not appear to be trying to give the misleading impression that Philip’s enemies who underestimated him due to his age were right to do so.13 Polybius here doubts, probably not unfairly, that Philip conceived of the view he expressed at the council on his own; instead, the historian believes that it originated with Aratus (4.24.3). It was, indeed, quite a prudent and diplomatic decision, rejecting calls to punish the Spartans on the grounds that Philip’s jurisdiction did not extend to the allies’ domestic affairs, and that the Spartans had not committed any manifest offence against the alliance, worthy of such a response (4.24.4–6). Polybius raises the question of the role played by Philip’s advisors in his policymaking again at 5.12.5–8, when Philip destroys the colonnades, statues, and votive offerings of Thermus in Aetolia; and yet again, in more detail, at 7.13–14, where he argues that the negative influence of Demetrius of Pharos changed Philip from a king into a cruel tyrant (τύραννος ἐκ βασιλέως ἀπέβη πικρός, 7.13.7) and deprived him of the friendship of his allies and the trust of the Greeks. Given the terrible consequences to leaders’ authority of choosing the wrong counsellors, selecting the right advisors is one of their most important responsibilities, and Polybius wonders why most leaders do not pay any attention to this issue (7.14.6). It is clear, however, that his emphasis on Philip’s youth also enables him to explain why

 13 For this interpretation see McGing 2013, 189: “As a direction — or, as it will prove, a misdirection — he seems to be implying that those who regarded the king as too young to rule were right.”

  Charismatic Leadership: The Case of Philip V the counsellors of the Macedonian king were able to influence his behavior to such an extent.14 The motif of Philip’s youth, therefore, is used in Polybius’ narrative in two ways. On the one hand it stresses how mistaken his enemies were in not taking him seriously and believing that they could act as they wished, while on the other it explains why he was prone to being manipulated by his advisors. The resulting picture of Philip’s abilities may seem contradictory,15 but perhaps this contradiction is not as serious and insuperable as it appears at first sight. There is no doubt that the repeated underlining of the complacency of Philip’s opponents due to his youth is an example of imminent overturning of expectations, a particularly pronounced theme in the Histories.16 I would maintain, however, that Polybius’ primary aim in this case is not to play with the readers’ expectations, leading them to believe that Philip’s enemies were right, only to set up a striking plot reversal. When Polybius observes that Philip was very young, he actually wants his readers to take this information at face value, in order to stress as strongly as possible how far the leadership skills and efficiency of the Macedonian king exceeded the limitations of his age. In other words, the constant references to this issue are yet another device deployed by Polybius to elicit admiration for Philip’s unrivalled, almost superhuman abilities. The question remains, of course, how far this picture of Philip the admirable military leader can coexist with that of the leader whose choices are shaped by his counsellors’ advice. I would argue that it is precisely Philip’s youth which allows Polybius to present both these aspects of his hero’s behavior convincingly. It is perhaps worth recalling that similar criticisms were levelled at Alexander, who, despite his unique strategic skills, was vulnerable to the influence of  14 Polybius explicitly links the extent to which Philip allowed his advisors to influence him with his youth at 5.12.5: Ἴσως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἄν τις αὐτῷ Φιλίππῳ τῶν τότε γενομένων πᾶσαν ἐπιφέροι τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν, τὸ πλεῖον δὲ τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ συμπράττουσι τῶν φίλων, ὧν ἦν Ἄρατος καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φάριος (“Possibly indeed we should not attach the whole blame to Philip for what happened, taking his extreme youth into consideration, but rather attribute it to the friends who associated and co-operated with him, among whom were Aratus and Demetrius of Pharos”) and at 7.13.3: καὶ δεῖν τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν οὐχ οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸν βασιλέα διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὡς ἐπὶ τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῷ φίλους ἀναφέρειν (“… and that we should not owing to his youth at the time lay the blame so much on the king himself as on the friends he associated with.”) 15 For this reading see McGing 2010, 117: “There is perhaps an unresolved tension here. Polybius wants to have his cake and eat it, too. When Philip makes a good decision, it must be due to Aratus; when he makes a bad one, it must be Demetrius. But this does not really fit with the rest of the literary design.” 16 For the reversal of expectations motif in Polybius see Miltsios 2009.

Philip V and Alexander the Great  

those around him. Arrian notes, for example, the corrosive influence of the flatterers who fed Alexander’s vanity, comparing him to gods and heroes and encouraging his desire to impose on his subjects the custom of prostrating themselves before him.17 It seems that both Polybius and Arrian distinguished between talent on the battlefield and maturity in the general behavior of their heroes. If youth not only does not preclude but rather indicates charisma in warfare, it may cause understandable difficulties in the handling of delicate international affairs and in leaders’ relationships with their subjects. Moreover, in Philip’s case the emphasis on the role of his counsellors is justified not only because it explains that his problematic behavior, worsening over time, was partly due to their influence, but also because of the involvement of Demetrius of Pharos in the Macedonian king’s catastrophic conflict with Rome. At 5.101.8– 10, Demetrius exploits the news of Hannibal’s successes against the Romans in Etruria to urge Philip to abandon the war against the Aetolians and turn his sights on Italy, claiming dominion not only over Greece but over the whole world. Polybius particularly stresses Demetrius’ role in cultivating Philip’s ambition to extend his rule beyond the borders of Greece. At 5.105.1 he notes that Philip had developed this impetuous desire due to Demetrius’ exhortations (τὴν ὁρμὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἤδη προκατεσκευασμένην ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ Δημητρίου παραινέσεων, 5.105.1). And at 5.108.5 he says that Demetrius fired the king’s hopes (οὕτως ἐξέκαιε τὴν ἐλπίδα) for the expedition to Italy so much, “that Philip in his sleep dreamt of nothing else than this, and was full of his new project” (ὥστε κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους τὸν Φίλιππον ταῦτ᾽ ὀνειρώττειν καὶ περὶ ταύτας εἶναι τὰς πράξεις). By these frequent remarks, Polybius attributes the decision that is to lead to end of the Macedonian dynasty to the encouragement of a person who is systematically presented as leading Philip into error. Demetrius’ promptings would obviously not have had such a serious influence on Philip had they not matched his own inclinations and desires. Indeed, thirst for fame, glory, and ever more conquests is yet another characteristic Philip and Alexander have in common. Dreyer has already noted that the attribution to Philip of ambitions to conquer the world is a direct reference to the

 17 See Arr. Anab. 4.8.3: οἷοι δὴ ἄνδρες διέφθειράν τε ἀεὶ καὶ οὔποτε παύσονται ἐπιτρίβοντες τὰ τῶν βασιλέων πράγματα (“Such men have always corrupted the character of kings and will never cease to ruin the interests of those who happen to be reigning”) and 4.9.7: οὐκ ἐνδεῆσαι δὲ οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο αὐτῷ τοὺς κολακείᾳ ἐς αὐτὸ ἐνδιδόντας (“There were not wanting those who in regard to these matters gave way to his wishes with the design of flattering him.”)

  Charismatic Leadership: The Case of Philip V history of Alexander.18 Polybius himself links Philip’s inclination not only to his youth, his abilities and his bravery, but also to the tradition of his house: “and above all who came of a house which we may say had always been inclined more than any other to covet universal dominion” (πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐξ οἰκίας ὁρμώμενον τοιαύτης, ἣ μάλιστά πως ἀεὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἐλπίδος ἐφίεται, 5.102.1). I would say, however, that the references to Philip’s ambitions of world domination are also intended to show how his addiction to fame and glory rendered him, like Alexander, unable to rein in his passion for war and conquest, heedless of the difficulties and dangers. Polybius’ observation that Philip was determined “to leave nothing unattempted or half-accomplished” (μηδὲν ἀβασάνιστον μηδ᾽ ἀπέραντον ἀπολιπεῖν, 4.75.3) is strikingly similar to Arrian’s description of Alexander’s attitude when faced with challenges: “he thought every place ought to be accessible to him and to be captured by him” (πάντα ᾤετο χρῆναι βατά τε αὑτῷ καὶ ἐξαιρετέα εἶναι, Anab. 4.21.3). And Philip’s satisfaction at 5.14.9 following his Aetolian campaign, because “he had run great risk in entering such a dangerous country, and one that no one before him had ever ventured to invade with an army” (ἐδόκει γὰρ εἰς τόπους αὑτὸν δεδωκέναι παραβόλους καὶ τοιούτους, εἰς οὓς οὐδεὶς ἐτόλμησε πρότερον στρατοπέδῳ παρεμβαλεῖν), is comparable to the pleasure Alexander is said to have gained from the thought that he has surpassed Heracles and Dionysus.19 The emphasis on the two kings’ thirst for fame and glory obviously serves a double purpose: it not only stresses a character trait that played an important part in their choices and successes, but also reinforces the image of the quasi-superman that is so assiduously cultivated for them.

 18 See Dreyer 2013, 206. 19 See Arr. Anab. 5.2.1: καὶ ταῦτα πάντα Ἀλεξάνδρῳ πρὸς θυμοῦ ἐγίγνετο ἀκούειν, καὶ ἤθελε πιστὰ εἶναι τὰ ὑπὲρ τοῦ Διονύσου τῆς πλάνης μυθευόμενα; καὶ κτίσμα εἶναι Διονύσου τὴν Νύσαν ἤθελεν, ὡς ἤδη τε ἥκειν αὐτὸς ἔνθα ἦλθε Διόνυσος, καὶ ἐπέκεινα ἐλθεῖν Διονύσου (“All this was very pleasant to Alexander to hear; for he wished that the legend about the wandering of Dionysus should be believed, as well as that Nysa owed its foundation to that deity, since he had himself reached the place where Dionysus came, and had even advanced beyond the limits of the latter’s march”); 5.26.5: ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς γε καὶ ἐπέκεινα τῆς Νύσης ἀφίγμεθα, καὶ ἡ Ἄορνος πέτρα, ἡ τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ἀνάλωτος, πρὸς ἡμῶν ἔχεται (“But we, indeed, have penetrated into regions beyond Nysa; and the rock of Aornus, which Heracles was unable to capture, is in our possession”). For the comparison with Hercules see also 4.28.4, where the legend that Heracles failed to take the rock of Aornus is said to have incited Alexander to besiege it. See also 6.24.2– 3, where Alexander chooses to take the route through the desert of Gadrosia because he wants to outdo Cyrus and Semiramis (καὶ ταῦτα Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐξαγγελλόμενα ἔριν ἐμβαλεῖν πρὸς Κῦρον καὶ Σεμίραμιν), who had crossed it with their armies, although suffering terrible losses.

Polybius and Alexander the Great  

. Polybius and Alexander the Great Some of the striking similarities between Polybius’ account of Philip’s actions during the Social War and Arrian’s portrayal of Alexander in the Anabasis were also touched upon in a previous paper of mine, in which I discussed how far they may be attributed either to the use of common sources or to Arrian’s familiarity with Polybius’ text.20 As I argued there, even if the picture of Philip presented by Polybius is due to the influence of his sources, the motifs of which it is composed are so familiar in his work, that when they are later used by Arrian in the Anabasis it seems quite reasonable to suppose that they were taken from the Histories. In the interpretation I now propose, I modify my previous view, focusing my analysis on how far the correlations I have discussed above attest not to Arrian’s reception of the Histories, but to the extent to which the history of Alexander was channeled into the Histories, affecting the way in which Polybius presents successful, charismatic leaders in general. Like every educated Greek of his time, Polybius was obviously familiar with the history of Alexander. In the surviving portion of his work Alexander is mentioned 19 times.21 Many of these references do not appear to depend on specific sources, as they are brief and generalizing, or concern famous episodes of Alexander’s career. When, for example, Polybius uses Alexander’s Asian expedition to explain to his readers the distinction between the causes, the pretexts and the beginnings of wars (3.6.4–14), or when he refers to the razing of Thebes as one of the greatest disasters ever to befall a Greek city (38.2.13–14), he is clearly referring to things that are common knowledge. The same is true of the passages where Polybius explicitly contrasts the behavior of Philip V to that of Alexander. The comparison reproduces commonplaces about Alexander, such as his harshness to the Thebans, his devoutness and his willingness to face his enemies in open battle.22 In other cases, however, Polybius draws his information on Alexander from specific texts, as at 12.17–22, where he discusses Callisthenes’ account of the battle of Issus in detail, in order to identify its weaknesses. Although Callisthenes is the only historian of Alexander mentioned in the Histories by name, this does not necessarily support Errington’s conclusion that he was Polybius’ only source on Alexander.23 At the time when the Histories were  20 Miltsios 2018. 21 References to Alexander are found in the following passages of the Histories: 1.4–5; 2.41.6, 9; 2.71.5; 3.6.4–14; 3.59.3; 4.23.9; 5.10.6–9; 5.55.9–10; 8.10.7–11; 9.28.8; 9.34.1; 12.12b.2–3; 12.17– 22; 12.23.4–5; 16.22a.5; 18.3.5; 22.18.10; 29.21; 38.2.13–14. 22 See, respectively, 4.23.8; 5.10.6–9; 18.3.4–5. 23 Errington 1976, 178.

  Charismatic Leadership: The Case of Philip V being written, Alexander formed an object of discussion not only in the biographies of him but also in general works of history and philosophical treatises, and, as Billows has convincingly shown, Polybius incorporates material from all three categories.24 The portrayal of Philip V using motifs which, as we have seen, refer so strongly to Alexander could be seen as further evidence of Polybius’ familiarity with written accounts of Alexander’s history, although in this case Polybius’ sources on Philip himself probably played a major part, since they deliberately attempted to depict him as a new Alexander. As has been argued repeatedly, imitatio Alexandri was a basic element of the propaganda of many descendants of the iconic general, who desired, for comprehensible reasons, to portray themselves as the worthy continuators of his magnificent deeds; and it was also, by extension, a basic tool of the writers undertaking to satisfy this royal wish in their works.25 It is worth noting that in two passages Polybius appears to capture Philip’s own desire to be associated with Alexander. At 4.23.8, when describing the meeting of the Macedonian king’s council to discuss the response to the Spartans following the murder of the pro–Macedonian ephor Adeimantus, Polybius states that some people advised Philip to make an example of them, as Alexander had done to the Thebans at the outset of his reign (χρησάμενον αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὅνπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐχρήσατο Θηβαίοις). Philip, of course, decides in this case (at Aratus’ prompting, as Polybius maintains), to handle the situation with diplomatic good sense (4.24.1–7). The fact, however, that the example of Alexander is brought up as an argument by the king’s advisors shows how important to Philip his comparison with Alexander was. This is made even clearer at 5.10.6–10, where Polybius contrasts the sacrilegious acts of the Macedonians at Thermus in Aetolia to Alexander’s care to avoid sacrilege, even when razing Thebes or during his Asian expedition. As Polybius observes of Philip at 5.10.10, “though all through his life he was at great pains to prove that he was allied in blood to Alexander and Philip, he was not in the least anxious to show himself their emulator” (ὁ δ᾽ ἵνα μὲν καὶ συγγενὴς Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Φιλίππου φαίνηται μεγάλην ἐποιεῖτο παρ᾽ ὅλον τὸν βίον σπουδήν, ἵνα δὲ ζηλωτὴς οὐδὲ τὸν ἐλάχιστον ἔσχε λόγον). Paradoxically, although this passage gives the impression of making a distinction between the two kings, it actually confirms that the association with Alexander was a key element of the image of himself that Philip wished to project. Polybius’ comment that Philip was not in the least anxious to resemble Alexander is a rhetorical hyperbole based on their  24 Billows 2000. 25 See Stewart 1993, 325–328; Billows 1995, 33–44; Dreyer 2013, 206.

Polybius and Alexander the Great  

different treatment of their enemies’ sacred places; it certainly does not mean that Philip did not seek to highlight his connection and similarities to Alexander through actions and behaviors that reminded his contemporaries of his legendary ancestor. It appears, therefore, that Polybius’ description of Philip’s impressive performance in the Social War could have been influenced both by his sources on the specific events and by his more general familiarity with the history of Alexander. Although the possibility that he draws the motifs referring to the history of Alexander from his sources on Philip seems the most likely, it is important to note that the same motifs are also used in the portrayal of other charismatic generals in the Histories. Hannibal’s actions on his march from New Carthage in Spain to Italy at the beginning of the Second Punic War, for example, are comparable in several respects to Philip’s behavior in the Social War. Like Philip, Hannibal is distinguished by his impressive military skills and his talent for warfare. Polybius repeatedly depicts him as realizing his enemies’ plans in time and foiling them by taking the appropriate action, thereby saving his soldiers. At 3.50.3–9, for example, when the Allobroges capture some key positions from which to attack the Carthaginians, Hannibal finds out about this (γνοὺς γάρ) and sends spies to reconnoiter (χάριν τοῦ κατασκέψασθαι) and report on their plans and the situation as a whole. Thus, as soon as the enemy withdraw in the night, he occupies the same positions to deprive them of their advantage. Then, when the Allobroges attack the Carthaginian pack animals, Hannibal, who is watching the scene (εἰς ἃ βλέπων) and realizes that without the pack animals no one will escape even if they survive the battle, rushes to their aid and drives off the attack (3.51.2–9). At 3.53.1–2 the Carthaginians are again saved by Hannibal’s actions when they are attacked as they are traversing a precipitous gorge; Hannibal, having foreseen this possibility (προορώμενοι τὸ μέλλον), has placed his infantry in the rear. Here Polybius highlights Hannibal’s forestalling of the danger to his army by way of a counterfactual statement; as he says at 3.53.1, “On this occasion Hannibal’s whole army would have been utterly destroyed, had he not still been a little apprehensive and foreseeing such a contingency placed the pack-train and cavalry at the head of the column and the heavy infantry in the rear” (ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ πάντας ἄρδην ἀπολέσθαι συνέβη τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν, εἰ μὴ δεδιότες ἀκμὴν ἐπὶ ποσὸν καὶ προορώμενοι τὸ μέλλον τὰ μὲν σκευοφόρα καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς εἶχον ἐν τῇ πρωτοπορείᾳ, τοὺς δ᾽ ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ τῆς οὐραγίας). The verbs used in these episodes to describe Hannibal’s actions (γιγνώσκω, βλέπω, προορῶμαι) not only render him responsible for saving the Carthaginians but also show very clearly that his actions resulted from insightful decisions made following careful observation and a rational analysis of the

  Charismatic Leadership: The Case of Philip V situation. In the same vein, Polybius’ remark at 3.43.11, that “all fell out favorably as he had purposed” (κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν αὐτῷ συντρεχόντων τῶν πραγμάτων), also underlines Hannibal’s exceptional acumen, with a similar effect to the phrases “as they actually did at once” (ὃ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι παρὰ πόδας) and “it turned out just as Alexander had conjectured” (καὶ ξυνέβη ὅπως εἴκασεν Ἀλέξανδρος), which, as we saw above, are used by Polybius (5.13.2) and Arrian (Anab. 2.10.3) of Philip and Alexander respectively. The account of Hannibal’s march also includes the motif of the fear that the leader provokes in his opponents by his vigor and achievements. Thus, at 3.51.13, by capturing the town of the Allobroges who had attacked him earlier, Hannibal struck terror into (φόβον ἐνειργάσατο) the other tribes, so that none of the people he met later dared to attack him. Similarly, at 3.60.10 by massacring all who resisted him, he struck such terror into (τοιοῦτον ἐνειργάσατο φόβον) the neighboring tribes that all began to submit to the Carthaginians willingly. In both cases, the fear that Hannibal inspires in his enemies is described using the phrase “to strike terror into,” ἐνεργάζομαι φόβον, while, as we saw above, the reaction of Philip’s enemies to his attacks is mainly expressed by the verb “to be panic-stricken,” καταπλήττομαι. This difference in terminology may indicate that Polybius did not take this motif from his sources on Philip. On the other hand, a common point in both narratives is the emphasis on the way in which their enemies’ fear proves a strategic advantage for both Hannibal and Philip. At 3.51.13, indeed, the impact of the looting of the Allobrogan town on the morale of the neighboring barbarian tribes is described as the greatest profit (τὸ δὲ συνέχον), even greater than the material goods that Hannibal gained from the operation. The strongest link, however, between Hannibal and Philip (and Alexander) is their impressive speed. Polybius explicitly refers to Hannibal’s swiftness at the start of his march on Italy, when he notes that, as soon as the Carthaginian general crossed the Ebro, he subdued a series of barbarian tribes “with unexpected rapidity” (ταχέως μὲν καὶ παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα, 3.35.3). Mainly, however, Polybius tries to stress Hannibal’s speed by focusing on his enemies, who are systematically depicted as experiencing one surprise after another as they hear of his progress. At 3.40.2, the news that Hannibal has already crossed the Ebro with an army takes the Romans by surprise, as it comes sooner than they had expected (θᾶττον ἢ προσεδόκων), prompting them to send T. Sempronius Longus to Africa and P. Cornelius Scipio to Spain. This passage is connected to 3.35.2, allowing Polybius to resume his account of the operations of the Punic War after the intervening geographical digression (3.36–39), having confirmed his observation on Hannibal’s speed from the Roman viewpoint. Similarly, at 3.41.6,

Polybius and Alexander the Great  

although Scipio learns that Hannibal is crossing the Pyrenees, he is convinced that he is still far away (πεπεισμένος δ᾽ ἔτι μακρὰν ἀπέχειν) due to the difficulty of the country and the many Celtic tribes in his way. Thus, when he is informed that the enemy has reached the Rhône, he finds it hard to believe due to the swiftness of their appearance (τὰ μὲν ἀπιστῶν διὰ τὸ τάχος τῆς παρουσίας, 3.41.8). After confirming that the Carthaginians have indeed arrived, Scipio rushes to meet them (σπεύδων συμμῖξαι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, 3.45.4), but only manages to reach the point where they crossed the Rhône three days after their departure (3.49.1). The detailed description at 3.47 of the way in which the Carthaginians get their elephants across makes their lead over Scipio even more impressive, when he is so late to arrive despite being in a hurry and not facing similar difficulties. Once again, Scipio is “in the highest degree astonished” (ἐξενίσθη μὲν ὡς ἐνδέχεται μάλιστα) at the Carthaginians’ behavior, as he was convinced that they would never march on Italy over the Alps (3.49.1–2). This motif is reprised again at 3.61.7–8, where Polybius, having completed his account of the Carthaginian march, turns his attention back to the Romans, to show the impressive speed with which Hannibal crossed from Spain to Italy through their eyes. As he observes at 3.61.8, the last news of Hannibal that had reached the Romans was that he had captured Saguntum; and now they were suddenly hearing that he was already close by and besieging Italian towns. The strikingly similar way in which Hannibal and Philip’s speed is stressed at 3.61.8 and 5.18.5–6 has been noted by McGing, who believes that Polybius is attempting to compare the two characters.26 I would argue, however, that the common elements in the accounts of the actions of the two men which I have detailed above primarily attest to the extent to which the history of Alexander has been incorporated in Polybius’ narrative, influencing the way in which he describes charismatic and effective leaders. Most of the motifs used to highlight the abilities of Hannibal and Philip are not limited to the description of their deeds but recur with great frequency, almost systematically, in the portrayals of the successful leaders of the Histories. It is worth noting, for instance, the terms which Polybius uses to underline the abilities of T. Quinctius Flamininus, when referring to the Romans’ decision to award him sole responsibility for Greek affairs (18.12.2–5): ταχὺ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διασαφηθέντων ἐγεγόνει τῷ Τίτῳ πάντα κατὰ νοῦν, ἐπὶ βραχὺ μὲν καὶ ταὐτομάτου συνεργήσαντος, τὸ δὲ πολὺ διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ προνοίας ἁπάντων κεχειρισμένων. πάνυ γὰρ ἀγχίνους, εἰ καί τις ἕτερος Ῥωμαίων, [καὶ] ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ

 26 McGing 2010, 112–113.

  Charismatic Leadership: The Case of Philip V γέγονεν: οὕτως γὰρ εὐστόχως ἐχείριζε καὶ νουνεχῶς οὐ μόνον τὰς κοινὰς ἐπιβολάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κατ᾽ ἰδίαν ἐντεύξεις, ὥσθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν μὴ καταλιπεῖν. καίτοι γε [καὶ] νέος ἦν κομιδῇ: πλείω γὰρ τῶν τριάκοντ᾽ ἐτῶν οὐκ εἶχε. This information was rapidly conveyed to Greece, and now all had fallen out as Flamininus wished, chance having contributed little to help him, but nearly all being due to his own prudent management. For this general had shown a sagacity equal to that of any Roman, having managed both public enterprises and his own private dealings with consummate skill and good sense, and this although he was yet quite young, not being over thirty.

It is impossible to find any motif in this passage which is not connected to the history of Alexander. The emphasis on Flamininus’ sagacity (προνοίας) and intellectual abilities (ἀγχίνους, νουνεχῶς) automatically reminds us of Alexander, who was famed precisely for his perspicacity in observing the situation and grasping the actions necessary to ensure victory. The phrase “and now all had fallen out as Flamininus wished” (ἐγεγόνει τῷ Τίτῳ πάντα κατὰ νοῦν) in particular is paralleled by “and it turned out just as Alexander had conjectured and exhorted” (καὶ οὕτω ξυνέβη ὅπως παρῄνεσέ τε Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ εἴκασεν), and “it turned out just as Alexander had conjectured” (καὶ ξυνέβη ὅπως εἴκασεν Ἀλέξανδρος), which we have seen Arrian using in the Anabasis (1.1.9, 2.10.3) to show how exactly Alexander’s plans and calculations were borne out. The mention of Flamininus’ youth is also a typical point of contact with the history of Alexander, intended to further highlight the leader’s charismatic nature by portraying him as possessing the attributes of a mature and experienced general from an early age.27 Even the reference to the part, albeit limited, played by fortune in the success of Flamininus’ plans touches on a question popular in

 27 Polybius often invokes his characters’ youth to praise the skill or maturity they display. He mentions, for instance, that when Scipio Africanus decided to lay siege to New Carthage, an enterprise so difficult that most considered it a desperate act, he was only 27 years old (10.6.10), and that, although he was only of that age (καὶ ταύτην ἔχων … τὴν ἡλικίαν, 10.9.1), he managed to keep his plan a secret. Similarly, Polybius praises Scipio’s humility when, after his first major victories in Spain, he asked the local inhabitants not to call him king but general, because although he was very young (κομιδῇ νέος ὤν) and successful, he did not have an inflated sense of self-worth (10.40.5–6). As McGing 2013, 186–187 aptly notes, Polybius tends to bestow this praise even when referring to characters who are not all that young. A typical example can be found at 35.4.13, where he says of Scipio Aemilianus (who was then around 33 years of age) that the Senate was surprised at his offer to participate in the Spanish expedition due to his age (διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν) and his cautiousness in general.

Polybius and Alexander the Great  

treatises discussing how far Alexander’s achievements were due to luck or to his abilities; as Billows has shown, Polybius must have been familiar with these.28 It is worth noting, moreover, that Polybius is not simply willing to use the motifs referring to Alexander in order to stress the uniqueness of the charismatic leaders who appear in his work; he also modifies them, creating similarities and contrasts that serve his purpose aesthetically or thematically. At 3.61.1– 6, for example, he exploits the motif of the enemies’ surprise at the performance of the charismatic leader to compare Hannibal and Scipio, having each admire the progress of the other. Thus, when Hannibal hears that Scipio has already crossed the Po and is near at hand, at first he is unable to believe the news, reflecting that he left Scipio at Marseilles a few days previously and that both the land and the sea route open to him were very arduous. However, as more information continues to arrive confirming Scipio’s arrival, Hannibal is amazed and surprised (ἐθαύμαζε καὶ κατεπέπληκτο) at his daring venture (3.61.4). Scipio feels much the same emotions (τὸ δὲ παραπλήσιον συνέβαινε πάσχειν καὶ τὸν Πόπλιον, 3.61.5); having thought that Hannibal would never dare to cross the Alps, and that if he attempted to do so he would be destroyed, he is amazed (κατεπέπληκτο) at his daring when he learns that Hannibal has not only survived but is already besieging towns in Italy (3.61.6). This parallel marks the end of the account of Hannibal’s march to Italy and, by making it obvious how close the two opponents have come to each other, turns readers’ attention to the subsequent military operations. At 5.110.1–5, moreover, when Polybius describes Philip as panic-stricken (ἐμπίπτει πανικόν, 5.110.1; περίφοβος γενόμενος, 5.110.4) at the idea that the Roman navy is sailing against him, and fleeing in disarray, travelling day and night, the historian is using the motifs of fear and speed to create a strong contrast with the previous narrative, where, as we have seen, it is Philip who arouses fear in others, moving swiftly not to avoid conflict but to achieve his grandiose aims. Philip, of course, fears the Romans, and this may be stressed in part to demonstrate the superiority of this foe, whom even such a charismatic general dares not face. Above all, however, this impressive reversal prepares the ground for Philip’s future transformation, when the decisiveness and vigor of his early reign abandon him.29 Polybius also seems to be  28 See Billows 2000, 297–299. 29 See, e.g., at 16.10.2–4 the way in which Polybius comments on Philip’s failure to seize the opportunity to attack Egypt after his victory in the naval battle of Lade: τί οὖν ἦν τὸ τῆς ὁρμῆς ἐπιλαβόμενον; οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φύσις τῶν πραγμάτων. ἐκ πολλοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐνίοτε πολλοὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐφίενται διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν προφαινομένων ἐλπίδων, κρατούσης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τῶν ἑκάστου λογισμῶν: ὅταν δ᾽ ἐγγίσωσι τοῖς ἔργοις, οὐδενὶ λόγῳ πάλιν ἀφίστανται τῶν προθέσεων, ἐπισκοτούμενοι καὶ παραλογιζόμενοι τοῖς λογισμοῖς διὰ τὴν ἀμηχανίαν καὶ τὴν δυ-

  Charismatic Leadership: The Case of Philip V referring to this side of Philip’s behavior shortly afterwards, at 5.110.10, when commenting on his retreat by making a counterfactual statement. If Philip had not “taken alarm so absurdly” (πτοηθεὶς ἀλόγως), he points out, he would have succeeded in achieving his aims in Illyria, as the Romans were concentrating on their preparations to face Hannibal. Earlier, too, in the account of the Social War, Polybius used a counterfactual statement to stress how quickly Philip could have ended the war if he had unexpectedly invaded Aetolia from Epirus rather than accepting the Epirots’ proposal to besiege Ambracus, thus giving the Aetolians the opportunity to take measures and organize against him (4.61.3–4). To be sure, all the motifs discussed above could have entered Polybius’ narrative via his sources on Philip, which attempted to portray him as a new Alexander. In this case, too, of course, the motifs would ultimately be traced back to the history of Alexander, but indirectly. Nevertheless, we have no reason to exclude the possibility that Polybius drew this material directly from historians or other writers on Alexander. Philip was a leader of extraordinary ability, at least in the early years of his reign, but his subsequent development may have dissuaded Polybius from treating him as an exemplum of charismatic leadership in general. On the other hand, Alexander never ceased to be considered the gold standard of strategic genius, and, as we have seen, Polybius often refers to him in a variety of contexts. I am not, of course, trying to argue that the history of Alexander was Polybius’ only source of inspiration in his portrayal of the charismatic leaders in his Histories. The motif of the leader who grasps what is required in every situation, allowing his companions to surmount the obstacles

 σχρηστίαν τῶν ἀπαντωμένων (“What was it then that arrested his impulse? Simply the nature of things. For at a distance many men at times strive after impossibilities owing to the magnitude of the hopes before their eyes, their desires getting the better of their reason: but when the hour of action approaches they abandon their projects again without any exercise of reason, their faculty of thought being confused and upset by the insuperable difficulties they encounter.”) Walbank 1967, 512 claims that this comment cannot refer to the attack on Egypt, since Polybius refers to unattainable goals, whereas he has previously stressed that it was possible for Philip to sail to Alexandria (ἐξῆν γε τελεῖν … τὸν εἰς τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν πλοῦν), and that the context is consequently unknown. I think, however, that there is no reason to disconnect this comment from the previous account. Polybius is using this episode to make a psychological observation, probably in order to explain why Philip, in spite of all his abilities and successes at the outset of his reign, was unable to achieve the consuming ambitions he had developed to extend his rule across the known world (see above, pp. 13–14). In order to achieve this aim, Philip would have had to meet and defeat the Romans, something which almost reflexively drew Polybius’ attention to the issue.

Polybius and Alexander the Great  

in their way, is already found, for example, in Xenophon’s Anabasis.30 However, the simultaneous presence of multiple motifs connected with Alexander in various sections of the Histories indicates that the history of Alexander has a particularly prominent place among the narratives that influenced the way in which Polybius presents successful leaders. In the next chapter, I will focus my reading on two of the most charismatic generals in the Histories, Hannibal and Scipio Africanus the Elder, in order to examine which of their behaviors Polybius highlights as most effective for the achievement of their aims.

 30 See, e.g., Xen. Anab. 3.4.37–49; 4.7.1–14. See also Seretaki and Tamiolaki 2018 for a discussion comparing Hannibal in Polybius and Cyrus the Great in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia.

 Effective Leadership Behaviors In the previous chapter I attempted, by examining the depiction of Philip V, to show that some of the most characteristic motifs Polybius uses to highlight the young king’s impressive qualities, such as his speed or the fear and surprise that he arouses in his enemies, may be directly or indirectly traced back to the account of the history of Alexander by authors who narrated the events of his expedition and discussed his personality. Alexander, however, was also famed for his talent in observing the situation clearly and then acting appropriately. In his Anabasis, Arrian repeatedly presents him planning his next movements based on the conclusions he draws from the information at his disposal.1 This narrative pattern is also extensively used by Polybius. Indeed, the most successful leaders in the Histories are depicted as basing their decisions on a similar chain of mental processes, involving observation and critical evaluation of the situation, and the subsequent conjecture or prediction.2 In this chapter I will focus on the presentation in the Histories of two leaders who stand out for their handling of challenges with the use of reason: Hannibal and Scipio Africanus the Elder. Many scholars have noted Polybius’ emphasis on the intellectual aspect of the two leaders’ behavior, interpreting it in many different ways. Pédech, for instance, argues that Polybius contrasts the heroes of the past, specifically the Romans and Carthaginians, who act with pragmatism and (cold) rationalism, with their contemporary Greeks, and eastern leaders more generally, who are carried away by their strong emotions and impulsiveness.3 Foulon, although noting that similar qualities are found in other heroes of the Histories, stresses that in the cases of Hannibal and Scipio they recur with particular persistence, and attributes the many common points between the two generals to Polybius’ intention to draw parallels between them.4 For Champion, the behaviors of Scipio and (to some extent) Hannibal are presented by Polybius as the result of the application of the fundamental Greek virtue of reason, logismos, as opposed to the behaviors of the barbarians and

 1 For an enlightening analysis of Polybius’ depiction of Alexander’s decision-making process see Ma 2013. 2 For Polybius, presenting this process is the primary duty of the historian, as it reveals the reasons for the outcome, successful or otherwise, of military operations. Otherwise, as he says at 11.19a.1–3, the description of battles and sieges is not beneficial but merely entertaining. 3 See Pédech 1964, 216–229. 4 According to his interpretation, Polybius includes Philopoemen in his comparison, in order to praise his friend and his country by the flattering juxtaposition. See Foulon 1993, 377–379. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111239538-002

Hannibal in Italy  

(most of) the enemies of Rome.5 Hau notes that the emphasis on leaders’ intellectual qualities is usually found in parts of the work where Polybius is criticizing other authors and is therefore explained by his desire to correct their errors, while the traditional virtues of bravery and martial ability are promoted in the narrative sections.6 Next I will analyze some characteristic episodes in which Hannibal and Scipio are depicted achieving success for their armies by means of rational thinking. As I will attempt to show, the description of their mental processes is Polybius’ primary concern and an integral part of the rhetorical strategy by which he interprets the outcome of the military operations. I will conclude this chapter by noting some further ways in which the history of Alexander appears to have left its mark on Polybius’ account.

. Hannibal in Italy In Hannibal’s battles against the Romans in Italy, it is repeatedly demonstrated how efficiently a leader performs when he makes decisions based on observation, logical assessment, and knowledge. Polybius contrasts Hannibal’s behavior to that of his enemies so explicitly and emphatically, almost schematically, that readers are in a position to anticipate the outcome of their conflict before reaching the descriptions of the battles themselves. The contrast is first thematicized in the interaction between Hannibal and the Roman consul T. Sempronius Longus before the battle of the Trebia. Sempronius is seeking a pretext (ζητῶν ἀφορμήν, 3.69.8) to fight, while Hannibal is waiting for the right moment, taking the view that it is foolish to risk an engagement without a plan and on any pretext (χωρὶς προθέσεως μηδ᾽ ἐκ πάσης ἀφορμῆς, 3.69.12–13), an attitude praised by Polybius (“as we must pronounce to be the part of a good general,” ὅπερ εἶναι φατέον ἔργον ἡγεμόνος ἀγαθοῦ, 3.69.13). The emphasis on Sempronius’ elation and joy at his victory in a brief skirmish (μετεωρισθεὶς καὶ περιχαρὴς γενόμενος, 3.70.1),7 which makes him eager to bring on a decisive battle, creates another strong counterpoint to Hannibal, who is described in all the preceding narrative as deciding and acting based on logic and a careful examination of the facts. It is interesting, moreover, that Sempronius is not only con-

 5 See Champion 2004, 149–150, 255. 6 See Hau 2016, 60. 7 On the inauspicious connotations of excessive joy and confidence in ancient Greek historiography see Lateiner 1977; Chiasson 1983; Eckstein 1995, 276; Miltsios 2009, 496–497.

  Effective Leadership Behaviors trasted with Hannibal but also with his Roman counterpart P. Cornelius Scipio, who is in no hurry to fight but seeks to gain time (3.70.4–6): τὰ γὰρ στρατόπεδα χειμασκήσαντα βελτίω τὰ παρ᾽ αὑτῶν ὑπελάμβανε γενήσεσθαι, τήν τε τῶν Κελτῶν ἀθεσίαν οὐκ ἐμμενεῖν ἐν τῇ πίστει, τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπραγούντων καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἀναγκαζομένων ἄγειν, ἀλλὰ καινοτομήσειν τι πάλιν κατ᾽ ἐκείνων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις αὐτὸς ὑγιασθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος ἀληθινὴν παρέξεσθαι χρείαν ἤλπιζε τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγμασιν. διὸ καὶ τοιούτοις χρώμενος λογισμοῖς μένειν ἠξίου τὸν Τεβέριον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων. He considered that their legions would be all the better for a winter’s drilling, and that the notoriously fickle Celts would not remain loyal to the Carthaginians if the latter were kept in forced inaction, but would throw them over in their turn. Besides he hoped himself when his wound was healed to be of some real service in their joint action. On all these grounds therefore he advised Tiberius to let matters remain where they were.

This detailed description of Scipio’s rationale leaves few doubts that his attitude in favor of delay is the most prudent and appropriate choice, since it is based on an assessment of the condition and state of the opposing armies. The wisdom of his policy is further confirmed by the fact that Hannibal is then shown interpreting the data in the same way and realizing that it is to his advantage to do battle soon, for exactly the same reasons that Scipio concludes it is preferable to wait (3.70.9–11): ὁ δ᾽ Ἀννίβας παραπλησίους ἔχων ἐπινοίας Ποπλίῳ περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων κατὰ τοὐναντίον ἔσπευδε συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, θέλων μὲν πρῶτον ἀκεραίοις ἀποχρήσασθαι ταῖς τῶν Κελτῶν ὁρμαῖς, δεύτερον ἀνασκήτοις καὶ νεοσυλλόγοις συμβαλεῖν τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατοπέδοις, τρίτον ἀδυνατοῦντος ἔτι τοῦ Ποπλίου ποιήσασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πράττειν τι καὶ μὴ προΐεσθαι διὰ κενῆς τὸν χρόνον. Hannibal’s view of the situation was very much the same as Scipio’s; so that he on the other hand was anxious to force a battle on the enemy, wishing in the first place to avail himself of the enthusiasm of the Celts while still fresh, secondly to encounter the Roman legions while still newly-levied and undrilled, thirdly to fight the battle before Scipio had recovered, but most of all to be up and doing and not let the time slip away resultlessly.

Against this carefully considered and accurate assessment of the situation, Sempronius sets a policy dictated solely by self-interest. His eagerness to fight is due to his desire to win the victory alone, since Scipio is not in a position to participate and the consuls designate will not replace Scipio and himself in time (3.70.7). Even more worryingly, Sempronius insists on his decision even though he recognizes that Scipio’s warnings are correct (ᾔδει μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ἀληθινῶς λεγόμενα καὶ δεόντως, 3.70.7). Nevertheless, his ambition and unfounded self-confidence ultimately count for more (ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς φιλοδοξίας ἐλαυνόμενος

Hannibal in Italy  

καὶ καταπιστεύων τοῖς πράγμασι παραλόγως, 3.70.7) than his awareness of the current difficulties and the advantages of postponing the battle. As Polybius observes, Sempronius was bound to fail once “he did not choose the time indicated by circumstances, but his own time” (οὐ τὸν τῶν πραγμάτων καιρὸν ἐκλεγόμενος ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴδιον, 3.70.8).8 The difference in the quality of the opposing generals is also apparent in their behavior before the battle. Hannibal is aware of Sempronius’ aggressiveness (εἰδὼς τὴν ἐσομένην ὁρμήν, 3.70.12) and makes intensive preparations. Observing (συνεωρακώς) the area, he spots a suitable site for an ambush, where he conceals his warriors (3.71.1). He also orders the Numidian horsemen to stir up the enemy early in the morning, to find them hungry and unprepared, while ensuring that his own men have breakfasted and are in good condition (3.71.10– 11). The frequent references during the battle to the health and vigor of the Carthaginian army, and the poor condition of the Romans, not only allow Polybius to explain the outcome of the battle but also confirm the effectiveness of the measures taken by Hannibal when organizing the whole enterprise.9 Indeed, the

 8 Walbank 1957, 404 attributes the negative depiction of Sempronius to the prejudices of his source: “P., however, following a pro-Scipionic tradition, makes Sempronius by contrast ambitious, full of false confidence, and jealous of both his colleague and his successors. This prejudice must be disallowed.” However, as we will see below, Polybius presents the behavior of other Roman generals in the first years of the Second Punic War in an equally problematic light, presumably in order to contrast it with Hannibal’s appropriate attitude and explain the outcome of their clashes. 9 Cf. 3.72.3–6: οὔσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας περὶ χειμερινὰς τροπὰς καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας νιφετώδους καὶ ψυχρᾶς διαφερόντως, τῶν δ᾽ ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῶν ἵππων σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπάντων ἀναρίστων ἐκπεπορευμένων, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁρμῇ καὶ προθυμίᾳ περιῆν τὸ πλῆθος; ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς τοῦ Τρεβία ποταμοῦ διαβάσεως, καὶ προσαναβεβηκότος τῷ ῥεύματι διὰ τὸν ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ γενόμενον ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὰ στρατόπεδα τόποις ὄμβρον, μόλις ἕως τῶν μασθῶν οἱ πεζοὶ βαπτιζόμενοι διέβαινον; ἐξ ὧν ἐκακοπάθει τὸ στρατόπεδον ὑπό τε τοῦ ψύχους καὶ τῆς ἐνδείας, ὡς ἂν ἤδη καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας προβαινούσης. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι κατὰ σκηνὰς βεβρωκότες καὶ πεπωκότες καὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἡτοιμακότες ἠλείφοντο καὶ καθωπλίζοντο περὶ τὰ πυρὰ πάντες (“The time of year was about the winter solstice, and the day exceedingly cold and snowy, while the men and horses nearly all left the camp without having had their morning meal. At first their enthusiasm and eagerness sustained them, but when they had to cross the Trebia, swollen as it was owing to the rain that had fallen during the night higher up the valley than where the armies were, the infantry had great difficulty in crossing, as the water was breast-high. The consequence was that the whole force suffered much from cold and also from hunger, as the day was now advancing. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, who had eaten and drunk in their tents and looked after their horses, were all anointing and arming themselves around their fires”); 3.73.2–5: τούτου δὲ συμβάντος οἱ μὲν Ῥωμαῖοι κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ἠλαττοῦντο, τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις ὑπερδέξιον γίνεσθαι συνέβαινε τὴν χρείαν, ἅτε δὴ τῶν μὲν Ῥωμαίων πεζακοντι-

  Effective Leadership Behaviors difference in the physical condition of the two armies and the surprise attack by the men in ambush prove to be the most decisive factors in the Carthaginian victory.10 Sempronius, on the other hand, does not make any plan of action but simply reacts to his opponent’s provocation in the way that the latter has predicted (3.72.1). If Polybius devotes a great deal of narrative space to Hannibal’s premeditated movements, in Sempronius’ case he limits himself to recording the general’s arrogant belief that his superior numbers and his victory in the previous skirmish meant that “the mere sight of them would decide the issue” (ὡς ἐξ ἐπιφανείας κριθησομένων τῶν ὅλων, 3.72.2). It is no coincidence that Sempronius is not mentioned at all during the battle. He only reappears after it is over, when he attempts to conceal what actually happened from the Romans, attributing his defeat to the poor weather conditions (3.75.1).11 The contrast between Hannibal and G. Flaminius before the battle of Lake Trasimene is described in similar terms (3.80–82). Once again, Hannibal’s priority is to carefully examine (πολυπραγμονῆσαι) the situation and the location, and to acquire detailed information on the opponent’s character (3.80.2). He learns from his investigations (πυνθανόμενος) that the region in front of him is rich in booty and that Flaminius is “a thorough mob-courtier and demagogue”

 στῶν κακοπαθούντων ἐξ ὄρθρου καὶ προεμένων τὰ πλεῖστα βέλη κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Νομάδας συμπλοκήν, τῶν δὲ καταλειπομένων βελῶν ἠχρειωμένων αὐτοῖς διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς νοτίδος. παραπλήσια δὲ τούτοις συνέβαινε καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς γίνεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὸ σύμπαν αὐτοῖς στρατόπεδον. περί γε μὴν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ὑπῆρχε τἀναντία τούτων; ἀκμαῖοι γὰρ παρατεταγμένοι καὶ νεαλεῖς ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ δέον εὐχρήστως καὶ προθύμως εἶχον (“and here the Romans laboured under many disadvantages, the efficiency of the Carthaginians being much superior, since the Roman javelineers had had a hard time since daybreak, and had spent most of their missiles in the skirmish with the Numidians, while those they had left had been rendered useless by the continued wet weather. The cavalry and the whole army were in much the same state, whereas just the opposite was the case with the Carthaginians, who, standing in their ranks fresh and in first-rate condition, were ready to give efficient support wherever it was required”); 3.73.6: οἱ μὲν ἱππεῖς οἱ τῶν Καρχηδονίων εὐθέως ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν κεράτοιν ἐπίεζον τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ὡς ἂν τῷ πλήθει πολὺ διαφέροντες καὶ ταῖς ἀκμαῖς αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἵππων διὰ τὴν προειρημένην ἀκεραιότητα περὶ τὴν ἔξοδον (“the Carthaginian cavalry at once pressed on both flanks of the enemy, being greatly superior in numbers and the condition of themselves and their horses, having, as I explained above, started quite fresh.”) 10 Cf. Maier 2012, 62–67 on how Polybius uses συλλογίζεσθαι to analyze his characters’ thinking processes when they manage to gain an accurate understanding of the situation at hand. 11 For the dissonance during the first stages of the Second Punic War between the events and the way in which they are interpreted and presented by the Romans in their speeches see Wiater 2010, 83–92.

Hannibal in Italy  

(ὀχλοκόπον μὲν καὶ δημαγωγὸν εἶναι τέλειον),12 but “with no talent for the practical conduct of war” (πρὸς ἀληθινῶν δὲ καὶ πολεμικῶν πραγμάτων χειρισμὸν οὐκ εὐφυῆ), and also “exceedingly self-confident” (καταπεπιστευκέναι τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασιν, 3.80.3). Based on the information at his disposal, Hannibal decides to pass the Roman camp and move on ahead. He realizes that Flaminius will not dare leave the countryside to be destroyed, but fearing the jeers of the mob (ἀγωνιῶν τὸν ἐπιτωθασμὸν τοῦ ὄχλου), and being grieved (κατηλγηκώς), will follow Hannibal everywhere unprepared (προχείρως), in order to gain the victory himself before his fellow-consul can arrive, thereby giving Hannibal many opportunities to attack him (3.80.4–5). Polybius uses Hannibal’s reading of Flaminius’ behavior to launch an extensive discussion on the importance of understanding the opponent’s character in warfare (3.81): οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἄλλως εἰπεῖν, ὡς εἴ τις οἴεται κυριώτερόν τι μέρος εἶναι στρατηγίας τοῦ γνῶναι τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ φύσιν τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡγεμόνος, ἀγνοεῖ καὶ τετύφωται. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν κατ᾽ ἄνδρα καὶ ζυγὸν ἀγωνισμάτων δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα νικᾶν συνθεωρεῖν πῶς δυνατὸν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ τί γυμνὸν ἢ ποῖον ἔξοπλον μέρος φαίνεται τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν, οὕτως χρὴ καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων προεστῶτας σκοπεῖν οὐχ ὅπου τι τοῦ σώματος γυμνόν, ἀλλὰ ποῦ τῆς ψυχῆς εὐχείρωτόν τι παραφαίνεται τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡγεμόνος … διόπερ εἴ τις δύναιτο συννοεῖν τὰ περὶ τοὺς πέλας ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τῇδέ που προσιέναι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, ᾗ μάλιστα καὶ δι᾽ ὧν εὐχείρωτος ἔσθ᾽ ὁ προεστὼς τῶν πολεμίων, τάχιστ᾽ ἂν τῶν ὅλων κατακρατοίη. καθάπερ γὰρ νεὼς ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις τὸν κυβερνήτην, τὸ ὅλον αὐτανδρὶ σκάφος ὑποχείριον γίνεται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐὰν τὸν προεστῶτα [πόλεμον] δυνάμεως χειρώσηταί τις κατὰ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ συλλογισμούς, αὐτανδρὶ γίνεται πολλάκις κρατεῖν τῶν ἀντιταττομένων. For there is no denying that he who thinks that there is anything more essential to a general than the knowledge of his opponent’s principles and character, is both ignorant and foolish. For as in combats between man and man and rank and rank, he who means to conquer must observe how best to attain his aim, and what naked or unprotected part of the enemy is visible, so he who is in command must try to see in the enemy’s general not what part of his body is exposed, but what are the weak spots that can be discovered in his mind … Therefore the leader who will soonest gain a decisive victory, is he who is able to perceive the faults of others, and to choose that manner and means of attacking the enemy which will take full advantage of the weaknesses of their commander. For just as a

 12 Cf. 2.21.8, where Flaminius is also accused of demagoguery due to his proposal of the law allowing Romans to settle in Picenum after its previous inhabitants were driven out: “Flaminius was the originator of this popular policy” (Φλαμινίου ταύτην τὴν δημαγωγίαν εἰσηγησαμένου καὶ πολιτείαν). As Polybius notes, this policy led to the corruption of the populace (ἣν δὴ καὶ Ῥωμαίοις … ἀρχηγὸν μὲν γενέσθαι τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ δήμου διαστροφῆς). For Polybius’ attitude to Flaminius see Walbank 1957, 192–193.

  Effective Leadership Behaviors ship if deprived of its pilot will fall with its whole crew into the hands of the enemy, so the general who is his opponent’s master in strategy and reasoning may often capture his whole army.

Polybius removes doubts as to how events will turn out, framing this digression with the assurance that Hannibal’s thoughts concerning Flaminius are accurate: “and all this reasoning on his part was very wise and sound” (πάντα δ᾽ ἐμφρόνως ἐλογίζετο ταῦτα καὶ πραγματικῶς, 3.81.1); “as Hannibal had correctly foreseen and reckoned … his plan had the success he expected” (ἃ δὴ καὶ τότε προϊδόμενος καὶ συλλογισάμενος Ἀννίβας οὐ διεσφάλη τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, 3.81.12). He further highlights the perspicacity and precision of Hannibal’s assessments by showing Flaminius reacting to his provocations exactly as predicted. The whole description of Flaminius’ behavior is simply a repetition of Hannibal’s predictions about his opponent’s actions at 3.80.4–5.13 Indeed, as soon as the Carthaginian general bypasses the Roman encampment and invades the country lying before him, Flaminius is “filled with fury and resentment, thinking that the enemy were treating him with contempt” (μετέωρος ἦν ὁ Φλαμίνιος καὶ θυμοῦ πλήρης, δοξάζων ἑαυτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων καταφρονεῖσθαι, 3.82.2). He is particularly indignant when he sees the smoke indicating the ravaging of the countryside, “regarding this as insufferable” (ἐσχετλίαζε, δεινὸν ἡγούμενος τὸ γινόμενον, 3.82.3). Thus, although he is advised not to follow the enemy without preparation (προχείρως, 3.82.4), but to beware of their numerous cavalry and wait for the other consul, so they can fight with all the legions together, “he not only paid no attention to the advice, but could not listen with patience to those who offered it” (οὐχ οἷον προσεῖχε τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀνείχετο τῶν ἀποφαινομένων ταῦτα, 3.82.5). The fact that Flaminius deliberately chooses to ignore the advice recommending a specific course of action reinforces the picture painted of him in the Histories as a man completely wrapped up in his personal ambitions. His sole concern is with what will be said of him back home if they learn that the country is laid waste up to Rome, while the army remains encamped in the enemy’s rear

 13 This is a narrative device meant to underline the precision with which Hannibal diagnosed his opponent’s state and mentality; it is comparable to the way in which Arrian highlights the impressive perspicacity of Alexander in the Anabasis, often depicting events as unfolding according to his calculations. Cf., e.g., Arr. Anab. 3.10.4, 3.12.1 with 3.14.6, and 5.16.3 with 5.17.1. See also the discussion in the previous chapter (p. 4) on the phrases καὶ οὕτω ξυνέβη ὅπως παρῄνεσέ τε Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ εἴκασεν (1.1.9) and καὶ ξυνέβη ὅπως εἴκασεν Ἀλέξανδρος (2.10.3).

Hannibal in Italy  

(3.82.6).14 He therefore proceeds “utterly regardless of time or place, but bent only on falling in with the enemy, as if victory were a dead certainty” (οὐ καιρόν, οὐ τόπον προορώμενος, μόνον δὲ σπεύδων συμπεσεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὡς προδήλου τῆς νίκης αὐτοῖς ὑπαρχούσης, 3.82.7). The observation that Flaminius has inspired the people with such hopes of victory (τηλικοῦτον γὰρ προενεβεβλήκει κατελπισμὸν τοῖς ὄχλοις, 3.82.8), “that the soldiery were outnumbered by the rabble that followed him for the sake of the booty,” lends the description of the Romans’ mistaken convictions a strongly ironic hue, inviting readers to continue reading in order to observe the dramatic reversal of their expectations that is to follow. The superiority of Hannibal’s approach over that of Flaminius is also evident in the two men’s behavior before the battle. Polybius gives a detailed description of Hannibal’s careful examination of the battlefield and the way he arranges his men in order to gain the strategic advantage (τόπους δ᾽ εὐφυεῖς συνεθεώρησε, 3.82.11; διελθών … κατελάβετο … κατεστρατοπέδευσε … ἐκπεριάγων … παρατείνας, ὑπέστειλε … κύκλῳ περιαγαγὼν παρεξέτεινε … προκατασκευασάμενος … περιειληφώς, 3.83.2–5). In the case of Flaminius, on the contrary, the historian does not record the slightest attempt at preparation and organization, nor any means of defending against the enemy’s stratagems. He simply notes yet again the haste with which the Roman general follows Hannibal in order to meet him in battle (εἵπετο κατόπιν, σπεύδων συνάψαι τοῖς πολεμίοις, 3.83.6; βουλόμενος ἐξάπτεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων, 3.83.7). The contrast is thus reinforced between the careful Hannibal, who bases all his actions on gathering and analyzing information, and the impulsive Flaminius, who acts emotionally, driven by his self-interest and obsessions, prefiguring the outcome of their approaching conflict. If, in the presentation of the preliminaries of the battle, the problem of ignorance recurs due to Flaminius’ absorption in his ideas and plans to ensure victory, in the description of the battle itself it assumes new and impressive dimensions, literally sealing the Romans’ fate. The battle takes place on a very foggy day (οὔσης δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ὁμιχλώδους διαφερόντως, 3.84.1). Polybius is at pains to underline the Romans’ inability not only to react to but even to realize pre-

 14 As Wiater 2010, 89 aptly notes, Flaminius seems to have been hoist with his own petard. His anxiety about Hannibal, who is advancing through the Italian countryside, looting on his way, could indeed be a slogan of a demagogic speech ultimately intended to manipulate public opinion. Flaminius, in other words, is depicted as fearing the reactions which he himself would be attempting to provoke were he in Rome.

  Effective Leadership Behaviors cisely what they are facing, due to the low visibility and the coordinated enemy attack (3.84.2): οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον, παραδόξου γενομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐπιφανείας, ἔτι δὲ δυσσυνόπτου τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα περιστάσεως ὑπαρχούσης, καὶ τῶν πολεμίων κατὰ πολλοὺς τόπους ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου καταφερομένων καὶ προσπιπτόντων, οὐχ οἷον παραβοηθεῖν ἐδύναντο πρός τι τῶν δεομένων οἱ ταξίαρχοι καὶ χιλίαρχοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ συννοῆσαι τὸ γινόμενον. The sudden appearance of the enemy took Flaminius completely by surprise, and as the condition of the atmosphere rendered it very difficult to see, and their foes were charging down on them in so many places from higher ground, the Roman Centurions and Tribunes were not only unable to take any effectual measures to set things right, but could not even understand what was happening.

Thus, while the Romans are still wondering what to do, they are being unexpectedly slaughtered (ἔτι γὰρ διαβουλευόμενοι τί δεῖ πράττειν ἀπώλλυντο παραδόξως, 3.84.5). Almost 15,000 Roman soldiers are lost in this way, unable to do anything (πράττειν οὐδὲν δυνάμενοι, 3.84.7). Part of the Roman army, consisting of around 6,000 men, manages to defeat its opponents, but these troops are not in any position to assist their comrades, “as they could see nothing of what was happening” (διὰ τὸ μηδὲν συνορᾶν τῶν γινομένων, 3.84.11); “Although,” as Polybius comments, with evident bitterness at the unnecessary waste of so many lives and opportunities, “they might have been of very material service” (3.84.11). Instead, they move forward, certain that they will meet someone, until they find themselves isolated on the heights (ἔλαθον ἐκπεσόντες, 3.84.12). When the fog clears, they realize the extent of the disaster but the enemy is in full possession of the ground and there is nothing they can do about it (ποιεῖν οὐδὲν ὄντες δυνατοί, 3.84.13). The repeated references to the low visibility due to the fog could perhaps be seen as intended to justify the Roman defeat to some extent. It is indeed in this spirit that L. Aemilius Paullus refers to the battle of Lake Trasimene, to encourage his soldiers before their imminent clash with the Carthaginians at Cannae (3.108.9): τοῖς δὲ κατὰ Τυρρηνίαν ἀγωνισαμένοις οὐχ οἷον πρότερον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ μάχῃ συνιδεῖν ἐξεγένετο τοὺς πολεμίους διὰ τὸ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα γενόμενον σύμπτωμα. those who fought in Etruria not only had not seen their enemies before, but could not even see them in the battle itself owing to the condition of the atmosphere.

Hannibal in Italy  

However, in Polybius’ description of the battle of Lake Trasimene, the emphasis on the Romans’ inability to see their opponents functions less as a mitigating factor in their defeat and more as proof of the problematic strategic behavior of Flaminius.15 His decision to advance into this area in spite of the climate conditions confirms Polybius’ observation that, in his haste to fight Hannibal and certain of victory, the Roman general was “utterly regardless of time or place” (οὐ καιρόν, οὐ τόπον προορώμενος, 3.82.7). At 3.84.4, indeed, the Roman disaster is explicitly attributed to Flaminius’ reduced critical perception: “they were quite unable to protect themselves, and, as it were, betrayed by their commander’s lack of judgement” (μὴ δυναμένους αὑτοῖς βοηθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡσανεὶ προδεδομένους ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ προεστῶτος ἀκρισίας). It would be tempting to hypothesize that the Romans might have won under different circumstances, but Polybius does not examine this possibility. The dramatic images of the Romans being slaughtered, powerless to react or even understand what is happening, vividly demonstrate the catastrophic consequences of Flaminius’ impetuous behavior for his army.16 The now familiar pattern recurs (albeit in a somewhat more complicated form) once more at 3.87.6–105, this time with Q. Fabius Maximus and M. Minucius Rufus on the Roman side. The Romans, perturbed by their successive defeats and finding themselves in serious danger, decide to deal with the situation in a more dynamic way (μειζόνως ἐπεβάλοντο βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων, 3.86.7). Instead of two consuls they appoint Fabius Dictator, a general with absolute authority, and his lieutenant Minucius Master of Horse. The difference between this episode and the preceding ones is that this time it is not just Hannibal’s behavior which is contrasted to those of his opponents, but the attitudes of the two Roman commanders are also contrasted to each other. Of course,

 15 For a similar situation in which the leaders’ failure to evaluate the situation correctly is reflected in their men’s inability to comprehend what they are faced with see the description of the firing of the Carthaginian and Numidian camps by Scipio at 14.4.8–5.2 (below, p. 52). 16 Wiater 2010, 88–90 argues that the account of Flaminius’ failure casts doubt on the value of rhetoric as the cornerstone of effective leadership, containing a criticism of the leader whose actions are not based on a rational assessment of the situation but on rhetorical principles. Although this interpretation highlights interesting and hitherto largely elusive facets of the narrative, making the relationship between rhetoric and leadership the main pillar of the historian’s thinking raises some questions. The Roman commanders are depicted as failing because they do not take the actual situation into account but are guided by their personal ambitions, leading them to act rashly and impulsively. Rhetoric certainly plays a vital part in the pursuit of their aims, but I would be hard pressed to agree that it is what Polybius considers the deciding factor shaping their behavior in this instance.

  Effective Leadership Behaviors Scipio’s objections to his co-consul Sempronius have been recorded previously, as was the criticism of Minucius by his colleagues for his rash behavior (3.70.4– 6, 82.4). However, while in those cases the differing assessments were mentioned precisely in order to emphasize how deeply the Roman consuls were invested in their own plans and priorities, functioning in rather the same manner as the wise advisors’ warnings in Herodotus and Thucydides, now the antagonism between the two Roman commanders becomes a key feature of the narrative and the reflections on the nature of leadership developed in it.17 Fabius is characterized as “a man of admirable judgement and great natural gifts” (ἄνδρα καὶ φρονήσει διαφέροντα καὶ πεφυκότα καλῶς, 3.87.6). Right from the beginning he makes it clear that he does not intend to take any risks in responding to Hannibal’s provocations, his primary concern being the safety of his soldiers (στοχάζεσθαι δὲ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῶν ὑποταττομένων, 3.89.2). Indeed, he does not allow his men to stray from the camp, but keeps them gathered together, watching for the right time and place (ἐφήδρευε τοῖς τόποις καὶ καιροῖς, 3.90.2). Neither does he engage the enemy in a decisive battle but prefers to thin their ranks in minor engagements, thereby improving his own soldiers’ morale (3.90.4). However, Fabius’ delaying tactics lead to his disparagement by his men and especially by Minucius, who slanders him at every opportunity as a weak-willed coward, in order to show how eager he himself is to throw himself into danger and fight (αὐτὸς δὲ πρόθυμος ἦν παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ διακινδυνεύειν, 3.90.6). Fabius’ behavior significantly differentiates him from Sempronius and Flaminius, who, as we have seen, acted rashly, guided by self-interest. Polybius is keen to clarify in advance that Fabius, despite all the criticism he received, would soon force everyone to admit that “it was impossible for anyone to deal with the present situation in a more sensible and prudent manner” (οὔτε νουνεχέστερον οὔτε φρονιμώτερον οὐδένα δυνατὸν ἦν χρῆσθαι τοῖς τότε περιεστῶσι καιροῖς, 3.89.3); and then goes on to justify Fabius’ rationale further, with a detailed explanation of why open battle against the Carthaginians was definitely not a good idea (3.89.5–8): τὰς μὲν γὰρ τῶν ὑπεναντίων δυνάμεις συνέβαινε γεγυμνάσθαι μὲν ἐκ τῆς πρώτης ἡλικίας συνεχῶς ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, ἡγεμόνι δὲ χρῆσθαι συντεθραμμένῳ σφίσι καὶ παιδομαθεῖ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις χρείας, νενικηκέναι δὲ πολλὰς μὲν ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ μάχας, δὶς δὲ Ῥωμαίους ἑξῆς καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ἀπεγνωκότας πάντα μίαν ἔχειν ἐλπίδα τῆς σωτηρίας τὴν ἐν τῷ νικᾶν· περὶ δὲ τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατιὰν τἀναντία τούτοις ὑπῆρχε.

 17 For the motif of the wise advisor see Bischoff 1932; Lattimore 1939; Pelling 1991.

Hannibal in Italy  

διόπερ εἰς μὲν τὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων κίνδυνον οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἦν συγκαταβαίνειν, προδήλου τῆς ἐλαττώσεως ὑπαρχούσης. For the enemy’s forces had been trained in actual warfare constantly from their earliest youth, they had a general who had been brought up together with them and was accustomed from childhood to operations in the field, they had won many battles in Spain and had twice in succession beaten the Romans and their allies, and what was most important, they had cast to the winds everything else, and their only hope of safety lay in victory. The circumstances of the Roman army were the exact opposite, and therefore Fabius was not able to meet the enemy in a general battle, as it would evidently result in a reverse.

Comparing the situation of the two opposing forces not only reveals the realism of Fabius’ approach (“facts testified to the wisdom of his conduct,” τὰ πράγματα προσεμαρτύρησε τοῖς λογισμοῖς αὐτοῦ, 3.89.4) but also shows how devastating for the Romans a different handling of the problem would be. Minucius’ desire to provoke a battle, placed after the list of Carthaginian advantages, is thus an ominous forewarning of future problems, linking him to the previous examples of Roman commanders whose self-serving focus prevented them from accurately evaluating the situation. The difference between Fabius on the one hand, and Minucius and the other Roman commanders on the other, is clearly highlighted when Hannibal invades Capua and ravages the most fertile and celebrated plains in Italy. At 3.91.10 Polybius underlines the magnitude of the challenge, comparing the region to a theatre stage (ὥσπερ εἰς θέατρον), chosen by the Carthaginians precisely because they want to make the Romans’ pusillanimity a public spectacle (ἐκθεατριεῖν δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους φυγομαχοῦντας).18 Minucius and all the Roman officers want to descend into the plain as fast as possible, to prevent the finest part of the country from being destroyed. Fabius, on the contrary, although “taken aback by the audacity of this stroke,” does not allow himself to be carried away and “continued all the more to adhere to his deliberate plan” (κατε 18 For Hannibal’s tendency to gain the reaction he wishes from his audience by showing images or presenting performances see very characteristically 3.54.2–3, where he attempts to raise the morale of his exhausted soldiers by showing them the view of Italy from the top of the Alps, and 3.62.5–11, where he organizes a single combat between two captives, offering the victor valuable prizes and the loser delivery from the misery of slavery through death, in order to show his soldiers that they are faced with a similar choice. Wiater 2010, 81–82 believes that Hannibal’s approach suggests that deeds are more important than words, and that the latter are of no value unless based on facts. However, a different question that may simultaneously arise from Polybius’ account is how far the use of such means is rendered necessary by the fact that Hannibal is addressing a barbarian audience.

  Effective Leadership Behaviors πέπληκτο μὲν τὴν ἐπιβολήν … τοσούτῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῶν κεκριμένων ἔμενεν, 3.92.3). Moreover, when Hannibal leaves the region, Fabius displays selfrestraint once more and does not seize the chance to launch a general attack, fearing to lead the army into ambush (3.94.4). Fabius remains unmoved not only by the enemy’s provocations and the apparent strategic opportunities presented, but also by the opinion of his compatriots: their reproaches following his failure to stop Hannibal, for example, are not enough to make him abandon his policy (οὐ μὴν ἀφίστατό γε τῆς προθέσεως, 3.94.8). Even when, after two victories by Minucius, public opinion in Rome turns against Fabius, attributing the previous failures to his excessive caution (τὴν τοῦ προεστῶτος εὐλάβειαν, 3.103.2), Fabius returns to the army “wholly unchanged by recent circumstances, and adhering even more firmly than before to his original determination” (οὐδὲν ἠλλοιωμένος ὑπὸ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἔτι δὲ βεβαιότερον μένων ἐπὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διαλήψεως, 3.103.6). If Fabius’ commitment to his policy is due to his assessment of the situation and both sides’ chances of victory, Minucius’ behavior is emotional and based on his concern for self-promotion. The extent to which he is fixated on his own aims is revealed by the observation that, when Fabius warned him that his eagerness to strike the enemy should not supersede his care for the safety of his troops, Minucius “instead of paying any attention to this advice,” was, even as Fabius was speaking, “entirely wrapped up in the project of risking a great battle” (ὧν οὐδὲ μικρὸν ἐν νῷ τιθέμενος … πρὸς τῷ παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ τῷ διακινδυνεύειν ὅλος καὶ πᾶς ἦν, 3.94.10). Minucius’ desire to do battle is a constant motif that recurs every time Polybius turns his attention to him.19 Minucius also  19 Cf. 3.90.6: αὐτὸς δὲ πρόθυμος ἦν παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ διακινδυνεύειν (“he himself was most eager to risk a battle”); 3.92.4: σπεύδειν ᾤοντο δεῖν καὶ συνάπτειν εἰς τὰ πεδία καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν τὴν ἐπιφανεστάτην χώραν δῃουμένην (“urged him to make all haste to reach the plain and not allow the finest part of the country to be devastated”); 3.94.10: πρὸς τῷ παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ τῷ διακινδυνεύειν ὅλος καὶ πᾶς ἦν (“he was entirely wrapped up in the project of risking a great battle”); 3.101.3: πρόχειρος ὢν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις (“being eager at all hazards to engage the enemy”); 3.103.5: διπλασίως παρωρμήθη πρὸς τὸ παραβάλλεσθαι κατατολμᾶν τῶν πολεμίων (“he grew twice as eager to run risks and take some bold action against the enemy”); 3.103.7: θεωρῶν δὲ τὸν Μάρκον ἐκπεφυσημένον καὶ πρὸς πάντ᾽ ἀντιφιλονικοῦντα καὶ καθόλου πολὺν ὄντα πρὸς τῷ διακινδυνεύειν (“observing that Minucius was unduly elated and was jealously opposing him in every way and altogether strongly disposed to risk a battle”); 3.104.1: ᾔδει τήν τε τῶν ἡγεμόνων πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλοτιμίαν καὶ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν φιλοδοξίαν τοῦ Μάρκου (“he was aware of the rivalry of the two generals and of Marcus’ impulsiveness and ambition”); 3.104.2: ἐγίνετο περὶ τὸν Μάρκον, σπουδάζων τὴν τόλμαν ἀφελέσθαι καὶ προκαταλαβεῖν αὐτοῦ τὴν ὁρμήν (“he turned his attention to Minucius, being anxious to put a stop to his venturesomeness and anticipate his offensive.”)

Hannibal in Italy  

differs from Fabius in how he responds to the mood of the crowd. It is obviously no surprise that such an ambitious military commander and politician should be influenced by his countrymen’s mood. Unlike Fabius, who, as we have seen, refused to change his policy according to the opinions of his comrades and the Romans back home, Minucius, on being informed of his own popularity (τῆς τε τοῦ πλήθους εὐνοίας) and his appointment to the rank of Dictator, “grew twice as eager to run risks and take some bold action against the enemy” (διπλασίως παρωρμήθη πρὸς τὸ παραβάλλεσθαι κατατολμᾶν τῶν πολεμίων, 3.103.5).20 As in the previous episodes, Hannibal, who evinces a strong interest in the state of affairs in the Roman camp (τὰ μὲν ἀκούων τῶν ἁλισκομένων αἰχμαλώτων, τὰ δὲ θεωρῶν ἐκ τῶν πραττομένων ᾔδει …, 3.104.1), learns of his opponent’s weakness and attempts to exploit it (3.104.2): διόπερ οὐ καθ᾽ αὑτοῦ, πρὸς αὑτοῦ δὲ νομίσας εἶναι τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους, ἐγίνετο περὶ τὸν Μάρκον, σπουδάζων τὴν τόλμαν ἀφελέσθαι καὶ προκαταλαβεῖν αὐτοῦ τὴν ὁρμήν. Considering, then, that the present circumstances of the enemy were not against him but in his favour, he turned his attention to Minucius, being anxious to put a stop to his venturesomeness and anticipate his offensive.

In this case, however, following Hannibal’s ambush of Minucius, disaster is averted at the last moment thanks to the arrival on the battlefield of Fabius and his legions, allowing the Romans to seek refuge among his army (3.105.5–6). The description of the Romans’ reaction to their unhoped-for rescue confirms what we have already been told at 3.89.3: Fabius, in spite of all the criticism, would force everyone to acknowledge that no one could handle the situation with greater sense and prudence. Thus, the soldiers who took part in the battle realized that “all was lost by the rashness of Minucius, and that all had been saved by the caution of Fabius” (διὰ μὲν τὴν τοῦ Μάρκου τόλμαν ἀπόλωλε τὰ ὅλα, διὰ δὲ τὴν εὐλάβειαν τοῦ Φαβίου σέσωσται, 3.105.8). It also became clear to those in Rome “how widely the foresight, good sense, and calm calculation of a general differ from the recklessness and bravado of a mere soldier” (τί διαφέρει στρατιωτικῆς προπετείας καὶ κενοδοξίας στρατηγικὴ πρόνοια καὶ λογισμὸς ἑστὼς καὶ νουνεχής, 3.105.9).21

 20 For Polybius’ views on the interaction between leaders and the masses see Walbank 1995; Eckstein 1995, 129–140. 21 For the distinction between the qualities of the general and the simple soldier cf. 1.84.6; 9.14.2–5.

  Effective Leadership Behaviors In his account of Hannibal’s Italian campaign, then, Polybius pays particular attention to the behavior and characteristics affecting leaders’ effectiveness. In all the episodes I have analyzed, Hannibal is depicted as being superior to his opponents and routing them thanks to his penetrating assessment of the situation and their intentions, and his ability to plan his movements based on the conclusions he draws. Sempronius, Flaminius and Minucius, on the contrary, act on impulse, driven by their emotions and self-interest. Their haste to fight Hannibal arises from their desire to claim the victory in order to further their own aims, making them acutely aware of the impact of their actions on public opinion. They are too wrapped up in their ideas and desires to evaluate the situation correctly, with the result that they expose their men to grave danger. Interestingly, although in the Histories it is usually the Romans who are shown to possess the fundamental Greek virtue of reasoning power,22 in the battles during the early stages of the Second Punic War Hannibal invariably exercises his reason, while his Roman opponents display behaviors generally associated with barbarians. This divergence from the common pattern may invite us to rethink our understanding of Polybius’ emphasis on the characters’ decision– making process, by regarding it not only as product of his reflections on cultural identity but also as part of the rhetorical strategy he employs to construct meaningful battle narratives. The following section, which examines how Polybius explains the process by which Scipio Africanus the Elder effectively accomplishes his objectives, will provide further support for my argument.

. Scipio Africanus the Elder Before narrating the deeds of Scipio in Spain, Polybius makes some preliminary remarks on his character and strategic abilities. The special position he reserves for Scipio is obviously due to the crucial role he is to play in the next part of the Histories. Scipio is the general who will defeat Hannibal and end the Second Punic War, eliminating the threat to Rome for good. Polybius’ intervention, however, is also due to his desire to correct certain falsehoods concerning the Roman general and the way in which he won his victories. All other authors, remarks Polybius, depict Scipio as a general “who always owed the most part of his success to the unexpected and to mere chance” (τὸ πλεῖον αἰεὶ παραλόγως καὶ ταὐτομάτῳ κατορθοῦντα τὰς ἐπιβολάς, 10.2.5), because they believe that leaders of this kind are “more divine and more worthy of admiration than those  22 See Champion 2004, 100–143, 255–259.

Scipio Africanus the Elder  

who always act by calculation” (θειοτέρους εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστοτέρους τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἐν ἑκάστοις πραττόντων, 10.2.6).23 Polybius, however, argues that, on the contrary, those “with sound judgement and mental ability” (τῶν εὐλογίστων καὶ φρένας ἐχόντων ἀνδρῶν) are more praiseworthy, and it is they who should be considered most beloved by the gods (10.2.7). For the historian, Scipio is a characteristic example of such a leader. If, in some cases, he invoked dreams and omens, he did so to raise the morale of his men by giving them the impression that he was guided by divine inspiration, knowing his audience’s fondness for such arguments (10.2.8–12). In fact, however, every one of his actions was dictated by his “calculation and foresight” (μετὰ λογισμοῦ καὶ προνοίας, 10.2.13), which is why “all his enterprises fell out as he had reckoned” (πάντα κατὰ λόγον ἐξέβαινε τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων αὐτῷ, 10.2.13).24

.. Scipio’s early years From his description of Scipio’s very first public acts, Polybius highlights the abilities which later allowed him to shine as a general. The episode in which the seventeen-year-old Scipio charges the enemy to rescue his wounded father, inciting his terrified companions to follow suit, obviously demonstrates his courage but also his ability to inspire others by example (10.3). Polybius says that, having gained a reputation for bravery by this act, Scipio rarely (σπανίως, 10.3.7) threw himself into battle personally;25 he goes on to observe that such  23 Polybius is referring here to the commonly held belief that Scipio’s exceptional successes and achievements were due to divine favor. On the content and development of the legends surrounding Scipio see Haywood 1933, 9–29; Scullard 1970, 18–23. 24 For the last phrase cf. 3.43.11: κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν αὐτῷ συντρεχόντων τῶν πραγμάτων (on Hannibal), 5.13.2: ὃ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι παρὰ πόδας (on Philip V), and 18.12.5: ἐγεγόνει τῷ Τίτῳ πάντα κατὰ νοῦν (on Flamininus), where Polybius wishes to highlight the perspicacity of these characters by stressing that things fell out exactly as they had planned. The use of this pattern in the case of Philip is significant, as Pédech 1964, 223–229 argues that in Polybius there is a strong contrast between the rational Romans and the impulsive Greeks, who are driven by their emotions and passions, as illustrated by the behaviors of Scipio and Philip. Pédech bases this conclusion exclusively on Philip’s later development rather than his deeds in the early years of his reign. I would argue, however, that Polybius’ criterion for attributing this characteristic to his heroes is not their nationality but the extent of their success. Given that, as I analyzed in the previous chapter (p. 4), this pattern occurs with particular emphasis in Arrian’s Anabasis, its use in Polybius may be yet another indication that his depiction of successful leaders was influenced by the history of Alexander. 25 For the correction of the manuscript’s πάντως to σπανίως see Walbank 1967, 199.

  Effective Leadership Behaviors behavior is “characteristic not of a commander who relies on luck, but on one gifted with intelligence” (ὅπερ ἴδιόν ἐστιν οὐ τῇ τύχῃ πιστεύοντος, ἀλλὰ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἡγεμόνος, 10.3.7). This comment has led to a discussion on how far Polybius sacrifices the traditional virtue of bravery on the altar of cold pragmatism.26 The historian’s approach, however, does not mean that he places the intellectual abilities of a general above his courage, but that he wishes to underline Scipio’s prudence, which allowed him to rein in his vanity and impulsiveness, putting the interests of the army first. Without underrating the virtue of bravery in the least, Polybius clearly believes that a successful leader should combine it with maturity and discretion.27 This issue is discussed in detail in relation to the misfortune of the Roman consul M. Claudius Marcellus, who lost his life in an ambush when he left the camp with a small force to reconnoiter (10.32–33). Polybius comments that Marcellus behaved “not so much like a general as like a simpleton” (ἀκακώτερον ἢ στρατηγικώτερον, 10.32.7). The care the leader must take for his own safety does not indicate a lack of courage but an awareness of his importance to his troops. If he survives, he will have the opportunity to undo the damage even in case of defeat. If, however, the leader is killed, the army, like a ship that has lost its pilot, will not benefit even from victory (10.33.4–6).28 Scipio proved his bravery very early on when he rescued his father; consequently, he did not avoid battle out of cowardice but because he was prudent enough to know that, as a leader, there was no need for him to

 26 Eckstein 1995, 29 with nn. 4 and 5, followed by Hau 2016, 59, observes that Pédech 1964, 219 refers to the approval of Scipio’s avoidance of fighting in this case to support his argument that Polybius favored rational pragmatism over traditional moral values. Pédech 1964, 219, however, does not include 10.3.7 in the passages he discusses to show that Scipio was guided by cold logic, nor does he argue that Polybius rejects traditional moral values; rather, he holds that the historian depicts a new kind of man, who combines Roman virtues with Greek values (229). 27 At 15.35.6 Polybius says that Scipio was asked “whom he thought the greatest statesmen combining courage and wisdom” (τίνας ὑπολαμβάνει πραγματικωτάτους ἄνδρας γεγονέναι καὶ σὺν νῷ τολμηροτάτους). This phrase seems to describe the ideal model of the successful leader in the Histories. For the union of intelligence and bravery in the person of a leader see also 8.34.10, recounting the Tarentines’ impression of Hannibal: “nothing could get the better of his cleverness and courage” (οὐδὲν ἂν περιγένοιτο τῆς ἀγχινοίας τῆς ἐκείνου καὶ τόλμης). The importance Polybius places on courage is also evident in his observation on the education of Scipio Aemilianus at 31.29.1: “It remained for him to gain a reputation for courage, nearly the most essential virtue in all states and especially so in Rome” (Λοιποῦ δ᾽ ὄντος τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν μέρους καὶ κυριωτάτου σχεδὸν ἐν πάσῃ μὲν πολιτείᾳ μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ). 28 For the simile cf. 3.81.11; 6.44.3–8; 11.19.3.

Scipio Africanus the Elder  

take unnecessary risks, and to realize when circumstances required his personal participation in the fighting. The way in which Scipio managed to secure his election to the aedileship reveals interesting facets of his excellent judgement (10.4–5). The young Roman had to use his critical thinking skills to overcome specific obstacles in order to accomplish his aim. Although he wanted to stand for office, he did not dare to announce his intention at first because his brother was also interested in the same position, and he, moreover, wished to secure his mother’s agreement. Scipio soon came up with a solution. Judging from the disposition of the people (λογιζόμενος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πλήθους φορᾶς, 10.4.3), he realized that his brother had little chance of success, while his own popularity was high. When he finally spoke to his mother, Scipio did not reveal his intention, but told her that he had dreamt that he and his brother had both been elected to the aedileship, and that on their return home from the forum she had met them at the door and kissed them (10.4.6). Scipio displayed an impressive ability to assess the situation and predict other people’s reactions correctly. His mother, who, concerned for his brother’s success, was visiting all the temples and sacrificing to the gods on his behalf (10.4.4.), immediately gave her consent, and when Scipio appeared in the forum in his toga the crowd received him with such enthusiasm that they elected him aedile and his brother too, for his sake (10.4.8–5.3). The dream of Scipio came true, both concerning his election and in the moving meeting of the mother and her children. Indeed, when Scipio’s mother heard that her sons had been elected, she ran joyfully to the door to meet and kiss them (10.5.4). Thus, those who had heard of Scipio’s dream believed that he conversed with the gods not only in his sleep but even awake (10.5.5). Scipio, of course, as Polybius explicitly observes, had never had a dream (ὧν οὐδὲν ἦν ἐνύπνιον, 10.5.6). Rather, he cleverly managed to assess the mood of the people and his mother correctly and adapted his actions accordingly (συνελογίσατο … πρός τε τὸν τοῦ δήμου καὶ τὸν τῆς μητρὸς καιρὸν ἁρμοσάμενος εὐστόχως), thereby not only achieving his aim but also giving the impression that he was guided by divine inspiration (10.5.6–8). The account of Scipio’s election to the aedileship is an excellent introduction to his strategic genius, demonstrating many of the skills which were to prove useful in his many future military campaigns against the enemies of Rome. It also offers a most enlightening example of how Scipio exploited other people’s superstitiousness to obtain the desired reaction. Highlighting this theme was a key priority for Polybius, precisely because the belief that Scipio’s achievements were due to divine guidance obscured the impressive abilities that actually produced them. “Those who are incapable of taking an accurate

  Effective Leadership Behaviors view of operations, causes, and dispositions, either from lack of natural ability or from inexperience and indolence, attribute to the gods and to fortune the causes of what is accomplished by shrewdness (δι᾽ ἀγχίνοιαν) and with calculation and foresight (ἐκ λογισμοῦ προνοίας),” warns Polybius at 10.5.8. His own insightful analysis of events prevents his readers from making the same mistake. The account of the siege of New Carthage that follows clearly shows that the tactic Scipio used to manipulate his superstitious mother was equally effective when applied to the entire Roman army under his command.

.. The siege of New Carthage The siege of New Carthage is the first military operation where Scipio is shown using his impressive skills against his enemies on the battlefield. His strategy when preparing the campaign is in many ways reminiscent of the way in which he was elected aedile. As then, he attempts to assess the situation as accurately as possible. His careful enquiries (ἱστορῶν … πυνθανόμενος ἐπιμελῶς, 10.7.1) lead him to conclude that his father’s defeat was due to the treachery of the Celtiberians and the division of the Roman army, and that the situation is now reversed. Specifically, he learns that the Carthaginian leaders are on bad terms with each other and have lost the support of their allies due to their insulting treatment of them, while the Romans still have loyal allies in Spain (10.6.3–5, 7.1–3). His careful examination of the situation fills Scipio with such confidence in the outcome of the expedition, that he attempts an operation like the siege of New Carthage, which in the light of the previous Roman failures seems impossible and unthinkable to friend and foe alike (10.6.10–11). However, Scipio has good reason to believe that he will succeed “relying not on chance but on inference from the facts” (οὐ τῇ τύχῃ πιστεύων, ἀλλὰ τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, 10.7.3). Indeed, like his plan to be elected aedile, this too was based on extremely accurate calculations (ὧν οὐδὲν ἦν χωρὶς ἐκλογισμῶν τῶν ἀκριβεστάτων, 10.6.12). Polybius provides a detailed analysis of the mental process by which Scipio decided to lay siege to New Carthage. The stages were gathering information on the enemy and the city, processing that information, considering all the parameters, and then selecting the most appropriate strategy.29 Thus Scipio inquired about the situation and positions of the enemy (πάντας ἀνακινῶν καὶ παρ᾽ ἑκάστου πυνθανόμενος τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους, ηὕρισκε …, 10.7.4), the strategic importance of New Carthage, its wealth, its population, the number of soldiers  29 Cf. Maier 2012, 63.

Scipio Africanus the Elder  

defending it, and its topography (πυνθανόμενος, 10.8.1; ἐξητάκει τὰ κατὰ μέρος ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς … τῶν εἰδότων, 10.8.1; ἀκούων, 10.8.2). He was particularly interested in the lagoon on the north side of the city, which, as he learned from local fishermen (διὰ δέ τινων ἁλιέων τῶν ἐνειργασμένων τοῖς τόποις ἐξητάκει), was shallow and mostly fordable, and its waters receded in the afternoon (10.8.7).30 Based on the information he gathered, Scipio judged (νομίζων, 10.7.6) that it would be too dangerous to meet the Carthaginians in open battle, and decided to lay siege to the city. He calculated (ἐξ ὧν συλλογισάμενος, 10.7.8) that if he managed to achieve his aim, he would not only deal his enemies a serious blow but also make great progress himself, while if he failed he would use his navy to rescue his troops (10.8.8–9).31 Polybius is in a position to describe the rationale behind Scipio’s decision to attempt the siege because he has at his disposal the testimonies of those directly involved. On the one hand, as he explains in the introduction to his presentation of Scipio’s character (10.3.2), he spoke with C. Laelius, the commander of the Roman fleet and the only person in whom the Roman general had confided his intention to besiege New Carthage (10.9.1). On the other hand, Polybius gained access to the letter from Scipio himself to Philip V, in which he set out his calculations concerning his operations in Spain, and the siege of New Carthage in particular (10.9.3). Polybius wonders how it is possible that the authors writing about these events attribute the outcome of the siege to the gods and to chance, when Scipio’s own testimony and that of his closest colleague clearly state how much effort and skill were required to achieve it (10.9.2–3). Scipio’s leadership behavior during the preparation of the operation is also exemplary. Although he has decided to lay siege to the city, Scipio keeps his  30 Polybius stresses that the waters receded every day in the afternoon (καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἐπὶ δείλην ὀψίαν), as this is particularly useful in demonstrating Scipio’s ability to conceive of and organize his plan of attack from the lagoon. Appian (Hisp. 21), on the contrary, does not mention that the phenomenon was repeated at the same time. In his version of events, Scipio decides to attack at low tide, which does not highlight his perspicacity as much as in Polybius. For the difficulties of interpretation of Polybius’ version and possible solutions see Walbank 1967, 192– 194; Scullard 1970, 53–59. 31 Polybius frequently depicts his characters considering the advantages to be gained before undertaking a dangerous enterprise. In this way, he not only explains why they are exposing themselves to danger but also shows that their decision is the result of mature thought and strategy rather than impulsiveness and vainglory. This is a motif also found in similar contexts in Arrian’s Anabasis (see, e.g., 2.17; 2.26.3; 4.18.4). Given, moreover, that one of the most characteristic examples in the Histories is Philip’s reasoning prior to the battle of Psophis (4.71.1–2), I would argue that Polybius may owe it, at least partly, to the treatment of the history of Alexander.

  Effective Leadership Behaviors plan secret from everyone except Laelius until what he judges the opportune moment (10.9.1). For Polybius, silence is an essential strategic virtue. In his digression on the desirable qualities of generals (9.12–20), he states that they should not announce their plans from joy or fear, or from familiarity and affection, to anyone except those without whom the plans cannot be carried out, and even then only when their help is absolutely necessary (9.13.2–3). He also stresses that it is not enough for their tongues to be silent but also their minds, since many people who managed to keep their mouths shut betrayed their intentions by their faces or actions (9.13.5). Scipio’s tactics at the battle of New Carthage are the epitome of Polybius’ advice on the need to keep strategic aims secret. Scipio’s handling of the affair takes everyone by surprise (10.6.11). Even Laelius is only informed when Scipio himself decides to disclose his plan (μέχρι πάλι αὐτὸς ἔκρινε φανερὸν ποιεῖν, 10.9.1), and, most importantly, Laelius is not chosen due to his association with the general but because of the part he is to play in the enterprise. Having assumed command of the navy, he is to approach New Carthage by sea, so that the ships will be ready to evacuate the army if the plan fails (10.8.9).32 Scipio’s real leadership qualities are also apparent from his ability to inspire and manipulate his men. In his speech to his troops, Scipio is able to encourage them using the same arguments that convinced him to attempt the siege (οἷς ἐτύγχανε πεπεικὼς αὑτόν, 10.11.5). Thus, after explaining that the plan is feasible, he stresses what a loss it will be to the enemy and what an advantage to themselves if they succeed (10.11.6).33 He also promises golden crowns to the first to scale the walls, as well as other rewards for outstanding acts of bravery (10.11.6). And, in order to rid them of any remaining doubts, Scipio tells his men that Neptune appeared to him in his sleep, and not only suggested the plan to him but also promised to assist the Romans so conspicuously that the whole army would see his intervention (10.11.7). The metaphysical argument strongly recalls the way in which Scipio persuaded his mother to let him stand for the aedileship by telling her of a similar dream (10.4.6). Here, too, Scipio’s tactic proves irresistible. By combining in his speech accurate calculations, the promise of golden crowns and, above all, the assurance that they will have divine  32 The navy must have played an active part in the siege, as indicated by the episode Livy describes (26.48) about the argument among the Romans as to whether a soldier or a sailor was the first to scale the walls of New Carthage. Polybius does not describe the activities of the fleet, presumably because he does not wish to detract from his emphasis on Scipio’s leadership abilities by shifting his focus to events not directly linked to the general’s behavior. See Scullard 1970, 59–60. 33 Cf. 10.8.8–9.

Scipio Africanus the Elder  

providence on their side (ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις θεοῦ προνοίᾳ), Scipio, as Polybius tells us, “created great enthusiasm and ardour among the lads” (10.11.8). The description of the siege provides further examples of Scipio’s exceptional leadership skills. The first clash between the Romans and the besieged turns into a test of the efficacy of their leaders’ plans, revealing Scipio’s strategic superiority over Mago, the commander of the city. Both men invest a great deal in their troops’ first conflict. By sending the strongest of his citizens against his opponents, Mago is utterly convinced that he will terrify the enemy and foil their plans (πεπεισμένος ὅτι καταπλήξεται τοὺς ὑπεναντίους καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀφελεῖται τὴν ἐπιβολὴν αὐτῶν, 10.12.4).34 Scipio, on the other hand, calculates that if he manages to kill the strongest citizens, he will crush the enemy’s morale and no one will dare venture out of the gate (10.12.7). The battle hangs in the balance for a while, as both leaders have chosen the best warriors. However, because Scipio has posted his men near the camp, the Romans are able to send constant reinforcements, eventually defeating and routing the Carthaginians (10.12.6–8).35 The Carthaginian defeat throws the citizens into such panic that the defenders of the walls flee (ὁ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὄχλος οὕτως ἐπτοήθη πᾶς ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν φεύγειν, 10.12.10), and the Romans nearly enter the city along with the fugitives (παρ᾽ ὀλίγον μὲν οὖν ἦλθον οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τοῦ συνεισπεσεῖν τότε μετὰ τῶν φευγόντων, 10.12.11). Scipio himself fights in the battle, but as safely as possible (ἐποίει δὲ τοῦτο κατὰ δύναμιν ἀσφαλῶς, 10.13.1).36 Protected on the side of the wall by three soldiers who cover him with their shields, he is able to reach places from which he can see what is going on (ἅμα μὲν γὰρ ἑώρα τὸ γινόμενον) and meet any need that arises (10.13.4–5). He is also visible to all his men, who are encouraged by his presence during the battle (ἅμα δ᾽ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρώμενος ἐνειργάζετο προθυμίαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις, 10.13.4). Nowhere, however, are Scipio’s strategic skills more impressively highlighted than in the scene of the Roman attack through the lagoon as the tide ebbs (10.14.7–15). The crowning event of the siege, for which Polybius’ readers have been prepared since the beginning of the episode, provides a strong piece of evidence in support of the argument that Scipio’s achievements were due to his abilities rather than divine intervention or luck. Polybius has already told us, when outlining the reasons why Scipio decided to engage in the siege, that the

 34 For the use of the participle πεπεισμένος in Polybius see Miltsios 2009, 497. 35 For the motif of the leader who secures victory by his timely interventions see above, pp. 3–4. 36 This detail is omitted by Livy, but it matches Polybius’ observation that Scipio was careful not to expose himself to unnecessary risks (10.3.7).

  Effective Leadership Behaviors general had learned that the lagoon was shallow and its waters fell in the afternoon (10.8.7). He has also noted Scipio’s assurance to his soldiers that they will have Neptune on their side, as the god promised him when he appeared to him in his sleep (10.11.7). He has not explained, however, how these two elements are connected or precisely what the Roman general had in mind when speaking to his men about Neptune. Only now does it become clear that Scipio intends to exploit the receding of the waters to launch an attack from the lagoon, attributing the natural phenomenon to the miraculous intervention of Neptune. For Polybius’ readers, who have just read about Scipio’s exploitation of his mother’s superstitiousness, this tactic is, to be sure, a familiar one. In this case, too, his stratagem is successful. Seeing the water drop, the Romans believe that the phenomenon is caused by the providence of some god (μετά τινος θεοῦ προνοίας) and continue to fight fiercely, recalling Scipio’s promise about Neptune coming to their aid (10.14.11–12). The recurrence of the phrase μετά τινος θεοῦ προνοίας, which Scipio used in his speech before the enterprise (θεοῦ προνοίᾳ, 10.11.8), reveals the strong impact of his words on his soldiers.37 Scipio was indeed, as Polybius remarks, particularly distinguished for his talent for inspiring his audience and leading them in the direction he wishes (εἰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο τι, πρὸς τὸ θάρσος ἐμβαλεῖν καὶ συμπαθεῖς ποιῆσαι τοὺς παρακαλουμένους, 10.14.10–11). The strikingly methodical way in which Scipio is depicted as organizing and coordinating the whole operation is strongly contrasted to the disorganized knee-jerk reactions of his opponents. When describing the siege, Polybius does not focus exclusively on the Romans but often gives the Carthaginian point of view of the events. This choice might be explained by supposing that he is passing on information from a Carthaginian source;38 however, it seems more likely to be an attempt to throw Scipio’s abilities and leadership qualities into sharper relief. As we will see in the following section, at the famous battle of the Camps Polybius again contrasts Scipio’s keen intelligence with the dullness and passivity of his opponents. After their first failed attack on the Romans, who nearly manage to capture the city on the spot, the Carthaginians seem incapable of taking the initiative or planning any course of action. They are largely passive observers of the Roman

 37 For a similar effect see below, p. 51. 38 Given that Mago fell into the hands of the Romans (10.15.7), he could conceivably have provided Laelius or Fabius Pictor with information on the Carthaginian experience of the siege. However, it is hard to believe that the commander of the city’s defenders would give such a scathing picture of their efforts to repel the Romans.

Scipio Africanus the Elder  

actions. Polybius, indeed, focuses on the Carthaginians solely in order to record their shifting emotions as the siege unfolds.39 Thus, after their defeat in their first clash with the Romans, they feel intense fear (οὕτως ἐπτοήθη) and abandon the walls (10.13.10). Then, seeing that their enemies are having trouble scaling the high walls, they take heart (μᾶλλον ἐπερρώσθησαν, 10.13.7). When Scipio orders the temporary withdrawal of his men, the Carthaginians are overjoyed at the thought that they have repelled the danger (περιχαρεῖς ἦσαν ὡς ἀποτετριμμένοι τὸν κίνδυνον, 10.14.1). But they very soon discover their mistake when the battle resumes and the number of their dead rises, and are dispirited once more (καὶ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀπολωλότων εἰς ἀθυμίαν ἄγοντος, 10.14.6). They are, moreover, so engrossed in their emotions that they are unaware of their enemies’ movements. When the Romans attack from the lagoon, they find the walls empty, because the Carthaginians never thought it possible that anyone would attempt an attack from that direction (οὐδέποτε δ᾽ ἂν ἐλπισάντων ἐγγίσαι τῷ τείχει τοὺς πολεμίους κατὰ τὸν τῆς λίμνης τόπον, 10.14.14). The defenders remain unaware of what is happening even at the moment of the attack, because “there was such disorderly shouting and such crowding and confusion that they could neither hear nor see to any effect” (ὑπὸ τῆς ἀτάκτου κραυγῆς καὶ τῆς συμμίκτου πολυοχλίας οὐ δυναμένων οὔτ᾽ ἀκούειν οὔτε συνορᾶν τῶν δεόντων οὐδέν, 10.14.15). The account of the siege of New Carthage confirms Polybius’ opinion of Scipio as a shrewd leader, focused on his target (ἀγχίνους … καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὸ προτεθὲν ἐντεταμένος, 10.3.1), who relied not on luck but on intelligence (οὐ τῇ τύχῃ πιστεύοντος, ἀλλὰ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἡγεμόνος, 10.3.7). The episode clearly demonstrates that his success was due to his exceptional abilities, which allowed him to conceive of, organize and implement his ambitious plan with exemplary precision and effectiveness. Polybius also vividly depicts how the reputation of divine inspiration and aid came to be attached to Scipio; as he explains, it was a ploy used by Scipio to encourage his comrades. Polybius’ interpretation is considered excessively cynical by some scholars. Scullard argues, for example, that Polybius depicts Scipio more or less as a fraud who has no qualms about exploiting people’s religious feeling to achieve his aims,40 while he particularly insists on the fact that nowhere is it stated explicitly that

 39 Cf. Eckstein 1995, 181. 40 Scullard 1970, 23: “If accepted, such a cynical interpretation of Scipio’s actions would turn him into something very like a charlatan.”

  Effective Leadership Behaviors Scipio lied to his men about his dream of Neptune.41 Polybius, has, however, said that Scipio did not actually have the dream that he recounted to his mother to persuade her to support his election to the aedileship (ὧν οὐδὲν ἦν ἐνύπνιον, 10.5.6), and that he wanted to give others the impression (ἐνεργαζόμενος αἰεὶ δόξαν τοῖς πολλοῖς) that he acted under a sort of divine inspiration, in order to make them face danger more bravely (10.2.12). This latter observation, indeed, seems to have a programmatic function, as it is found in the introductory chapter before the episodes recounting the deeds of Scipio. Scipio may have truly believed that he enjoyed the favor of Neptune, as he told his men, although Polybius’ description seems to lead us to the opposite conclusion, or at least does not pay too much attention to the matter. Before we rush to condemn his interpretation as overly rationalist, cynical, or even Machiavellian, it is important to recall his statement that he drew the relevant information from Scipio’s own letter and the testimony of Laelius (10.9.3). Polybius would certainly have been unpleasantly surprised to learn that his portrait of Scipio had been called little better than a caricature and his hero a charlatan. Nor could he have imagined that his interpretation would provide an excuse for allegations of cold rationalism and cynicism, given that his attitude towards Scipio’s tactic is obviously positive and laudatory. Polybius’ interpretation in this case matches his more general approach to the subject of religion, as it is expressed, for instance, at 6.56.6–15, where he explains that the Romans have given religion such a fundamental place in public and private life in order to restrain the citizens from lawlessness through fear; and at 16.12.9, where he notes that the description of miraculous phenomena in historical works may be acceptable when it is intended to preserve the piety of the multitude. The strong emphasis on Scipio’s mental processes does, of course, form part of the polemic against those who attributed his success to his relationship with the gods, demonstrating that his deeds were instead the result of careful research and planning. At the same time, however, it is intended to reveal the genius of one of the most iconic generals in Roman history, the man who is later to defeat Hannibal. The picture of Scipio painted by Polybius in the two episodes described above is confirmed elsewhere in the Histories. In the following section, I will examine the battle of the Camps, in which Scipio is depicted overcoming the enemy’s considerable numerical advantage thanks to the same abilities which set him apart from the very outset of his public career.

 41 Scullard 1970, 24. De Sanctis 1916, 452 and 1936, 192–193 also suggests that Scipio’s faith in the aid and guidance of the gods was sincere.

Scipio Africanus the Elder  

.. The Battle of the Camps The so-called battle of the Camps, which took place during the Second Punic War, following the arrival of the Romans in Africa (203 BC), holds a particularly prominent position among the military operations of Scipio Africanus. Concluding his account of the battle, Polybius says: “of all the brilliant exploits performed by Scipio this seems to me the most splendid and most adventurous” (κάλλιστον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο τοὔργον καὶ παραβολώτατον τῶν ἐκείνῳ πεπραγμένων, 14.5.15). This praising of a success which was largely due to deceit and treachery did not escape Walbank, who noted the contrast with the derogatory views on victories won by dishonest means expressed by Polybius elsewhere (13.3).42 However, in this episode Polybius is less interested in examining the honesty or otherwise of the enterprise than in underlining the impressive abilities required for Scipio to accomplish it.43 Both during the organization and preparation of the plan and during its execution, Scipio enlists many of the strategic virtues and skills that are generally associated in the Polybian narrative with effective leadership behavior. From the very beginning of the episode, Scipio is presented as a leader who is completely familiar with the details of his opponents’ situation. He knows, for instance, that Syphax’s passion for Hasdrubal’s sister is the main reason for the alliance between the Numidians and the Carthaginians. Calculating that this passion may have waned, and being aware of the Numidians’ innate fickleness and unreliability, Scipio tries to get Syphax on his side, breaking his alliance with the Carthaginians (14.1.4). Scipio is interested in any piece of information on his enemies that he might be able to use to his advantage, and when two of his envoys tell him that the Numidian camps are roughly constructed, he conceives the idea of setting them alight, adapting his previous plan (14.1.8). Polybius gives a detailed description of the measures the Roman general takes to increase his plan’s chances of success and prevent it from being leaked. Scipio is particularly careful in his preparations and leaves nothing to chance. In order to acquire the most reliable information on the organization of the enemy camps, he includes among his spies some men with experience of military  42 Walbank 1967, 417, 430. 43 Cf. Eckstein 1995, 87, who stresses that it is not the deception that attracts Polybius’ admiration but the successful execution of such a difficult nocturnal operation. Of course, the fact that Polybius does not insist on the matter of honesty may indicate that he is deliberately trying to turn our attention elsewhere. In any case, though, he does not attempt to exonerate Scipio of the accusation of deceit entirely, as opposed to the versions of Livy (30.4.7–8) and Appian (Pun. 17–23), for example, where the peace treaty is torpedoed by his opponents.

  Effective Leadership Behaviors operations, disguised as slaves (14.1.13). He then compares their reports and verifies them with the help of the Numidian Massanissa, who is familiar with the area (14.3.7). Scipio also makes considerable efforts to conceal his true intentions, in accordance with Polybius’ views at 9.13.2–3,44 about leaders keeping their enterprises secret to prevent them being undermined. While Scipio is busy organizing the operation, he tries to give both his enemies and his own soldiers the misleading impression that he is preparing to besiege Utica (14.2.2, 3.4). He only reveals his plan to his most able and trustworthy commanders (τῶν δὲ χιλιάρχων τοὺς ἐπιτηδειοτάτους καὶ πιστοτάτους, 14.3.5), and even then only at the moment he is about to put it into action. Polybius uses various phrases to emphasize the acute mental processes with which Scipio attempts to weigh the situation, taking all the data and possible outcomes into account (ὢν δὲ περὶ πολλὰ τῇ διανοίᾳ, 14.1.5; τῷ δὲ Σκιπίωνι πάντα διηρεύνητο πρὸς τὴν προειρημένην ἐπιβολήν, 14.2.1; συνέκρινε καὶ διηρεύνα τὰ λεγόμενα, 14.3.7). These repeated references draw our attention away from the less heroic aspects of the operation and present Scipio’s success as resulting from his efforts and his exemplary leadership abilities, thanks to which he has been able to organize and implement such a difficult and dangerous task. Even during the conflict itself, Scipio acts according to a predetermined plan (ἦν δ᾽ αὐτῷ συλλελογισμένον, 14.4.4), without allowing himself to be carried away in the excitement of the moment. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that when the Roman general addresses his men, he asks them to act in exactly the same way, based on logic and intelligence. The difficulties of the nocturnal operation, he explains, mean that they must compensate for the deficiencies of their sight in the darkness with intellectual ability and daring (καθ᾽ ὅσον ἐμποδίζει καὶ κωλύει τὰ τῆς ὁράσεως τὸ σκότος, κατὰ τοσοῦτον δεῖ συνεκπληροῦν τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ τῇ τόλμῃ τὰς νυκτερινὰς ἐπιβολάς, 14.4.3).45 The careful organization, the sound preparation, and the precise implementation of Scipio’s plan are further highlighted by contrast with the disorganized and reckless behavior of his opponents. Syphax accepts at face value Scipio’s statement that he agrees that the Carthaginians should withdraw from Italy and  44 See above, p. 44. 45 Scipio’s advice recalls the defeat of the Romans at Lake Trasimene, where the thick fog prevents them from seeing what they are facing and they are slaughtered, helpless to react (3.84). Here, of course, the situation is reversed. Scipio exhorts the Romans to overcome the challenge of restricted visibility and use their mind and daring, while it is their opponents who are slain before they realize what is happening (14.4.8–10). It is interesting that in both cases the limited visibility seems to hinder those who are mentally incapable of observing and processing the situation.

Scipio Africanus the Elder  

the Romans from Africa, and does not make the slightest effort to discover his true intentions or verify the sincerity of his claims. Syphax is so wrapped up in his plan that his critical faculties are significantly weakened. It is characteristic that in his case, the use of internal focalization, rather than recording his thoughts and calculations, depicts the emotions he experiences according to how he thinks the peace negotiations are progressing. Thus even the faint hint that Scipio gives him, that his preferred solution is not impossible, relieves him and makes him even keener to work towards it (κουφισθέντα πολλαπλασίως ἐπιρρωσθῆναι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιπλοκήν, 14.1.11). Then, he is overjoyed at the Carthaginians’ acceptance of his proposal (περιχαρὴς ὤν, 14.2.10).46 Very soon, however, his happiness turns to despondency (ἔφερε μὲν δυσχερῶς, 14.3.1), when his hopes are proven premature by Scipio’s procrastination (διὰ τὸ προκατηλπικέναι, 14.3.1). Again, Syphax seems incapable of grasping the true situation. Paradoxically, the only time that the narrative presents Syphax using reason to deduce a conclusion, it only serves to confirm the extent to which he is manipulated and controlled by Scipio. At 14.2.7 Syphax is persuaded that Scipio is honestly interested in the peace treaty by the fact that the latter’s envoys insist that they will not leave until he answers them (μὴ πρότερον ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι πρὶν ἢ λαβεῖν παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις), and because Scipio seems anxious to ensure the Carthaginians’ consent. Immediately prior to this, however, and while Scipio’s determination to carry out his original plan has already been stressed (14.2.4), it is noted that the Roman general told the envoys to ask Syphax whether, supposing that he accepted the peace terms, the Carthaginians would do the same, or whether they would ask to confer further (14.2.5). Scipio also told the envoys not to return before receiving an answer to this question (μὴ πρότερον ὡς αὑτὸν ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἢ λαβεῖν ἀπόκρισιν ὑπὲρ τούτων, 14.2.6). The repetition of Scipio’s detailed instructions to the envoys in the form of Syphax’s reasoning, which ultimately determines his stance, is a clever narrative device Polybius employs to highlight the tremendous difference in the two opponents’ behavior and abilities. Even when thinking rationally, in other words, Syphax is simply repeating the ideas that Scipio has planted in his mind.47

 46 For the use of the adjective περιχαρής in Polybius and ancient Greek historiography in general see above, n. 7. As readers gradually become more familiar with the conventions of a text, they are in a position to decipher the significance of certain motifs for the development of the plot. Thus the mere appearance of this adjective at this point might alert us to the imminent reversal of Syphax’s mood. On “foreshadowing by convention” see de Jong 2007, 8. 47 Cf. Miltsios 2013, 108.

  Effective Leadership Behaviors The Carthaginian general Hasdrubal is no more perceptive and intelligent than Syphax. When the two men meet to discuss how to handle the situation, they make decisions that betray their total ignorance. Their ideas and plans are very far removed from what is about to happen (πλεῖστον ἀπέχοντες ταῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς τοῦ μέλλοντος, 14.3.2). As Polybius emphatically remarks, “they never had the least thought of taking any precaution for their security or of the likelihood of any disaster” (περὶ φυλακῆς μὲν γὰρ ἢ τοῦ πείσεσθαί τι δεινὸν οὐδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν εἶχον πρόληψιν, 14.3.3). Admittedly, their negligence is largely due to the dishonest and deceptive behavior of Scipio, who has cunningly managed to conceal his intentions up to this point; nonetheless, this is not the aspect that Polybius chooses to stress. If Scipio’s success is due to his shrewdness and his powers of observation, his opponents have nothing similar to display. Their eagerness to provoke a battle with the Romans on level ground is not the result of careful consideration of the situation, but is based purely on their desires and impulsiveness (πολλή τις ἦν αὐτῶν ὁρμὴ καὶ προθυμία, 14.3.3). Remarkably, Scipio’s opponents are not in a position to understand exactly what is happening even when they are actually faced with the fire and the Romans. The description of the firing of the camps is structured around the motif of the defenders’ ignorance. On seeing the fire, none of the Numidians, not even Syphax himself, suspects that it was deliberately set (οὐδεὶς ἁπλῶς συνυπώπτευσε τὸ γινόμενον, 14.4.8), but all are under the impression that it is accidental (ὡς αὐτομάτως ἐμπεπρησμένου τοῦ χάρακος, ταύτην ἔσχον τὴν διάληψιν, 14.4.8). Thus unsuspectingly (ἀνυπονοήτως, 14.4.9), some aroused from sleep and others drunk, they trample each other as they try to flee the camp, while many are burnt alive. Those who do manage to escape the fire fall among the enemy and are killed “without knowing what was happening to them or what they were doing” (οὔθ᾽ ὃ πάσχουσιν οὔθ᾽ ὃ ποιοῦσι γινώσκοντες διεφθείροντο, 14.4.10). Similarly, the Carthaginians, seeing what is happening in the Numidian camp, think that it has caught fire by accident (ὑπολαβόντες αὐτομάτως ἀνῆφθαι τὸν τῶν Νομάδων χάρακα, 14.5.1), and some rush to help, while the rest gather in front of their camp, astonished at what is taking place (ἐκπλαγεῖς ὄντες ἐπὶ τοῖς γινομένοις, 14.5.2). It is only when Scipio attacks the Carthaginian camp, setting fire to it as well, that Hasdrubal and his men realize what is going on. By now, however, it is too late; there is nothing they can do but try to save themselves, albeit without any hope of success (διὰ τὴν ταραχὴν καὶ σύγχυσιν ἀνέλπιστον εἶναι τὴν σωτηρίαν, 14.5.5–6).

Scipio Africanus the Elder  

The horrifying scenes that Polybius describes unfolding in the two camps attest the success of the enterprise. There is no need to seek the historian’s possible sources in order to justify his approving attitude towards Scipio.48 The interruption of the negotiations before the attack undoubtedly provided Scipio with a convenient excuse for his decision to set his plan in motion. However, the narrative does not examine the honesty or otherwise of his behavior. The defeat of the Carthaginians and their allies was due not only to Scipio’s shrewdness and effective actions, but also to their own inability to realize the danger and prepare accordingly. Scipio, on the other hand, displayed an impressive strategic ability in the organization and execution of his plan, and is praised precisely for the skills that ensured his victory in a military operation dependent on a number of unknown variables and, therefore, exceedingly dangerous. The preceding analysis has revealed important similarities in the description of the leadership behavior of Hannibal and Scipio. These similarities, together with several others noted on several occasions, have essentially been attributed to Polybius’ intention to link the two iconic leaders of Rome and Carthage.49 However, as has also been made clear, there are interesting correspondences not only between the deeds of Scipio and Hannibal but also between the various episodes recording the same character’s actions. The account of the battle of the Camps, for example, with its emphasis on Scipio’s perspicacity and powers of observation, and his opponents’ inability to understand precisely what they are facing, is heavily reminiscent not only of the battle of Lake Trasimene but also of the siege of New Carthage. The multitude of similarities could be seen as merely a symptom of Polybius’ tendency to indulge in repetition and mannerism. It would be more useful, however, to attempt to diagnose their function in the general economy of his narrative. The episodes discussed above show that interpretations which explain Polybius’ practice based on the identifying cultural characteristics of the participants do not suffice to demonstrate how his strategy works. In the opening stages of the Second Punic War in Italy, Hannibal systematically and successfully applies the fundamental Greek virtue of rational thinking, whereas his Roman opponents behave in ways traditionally associated with barbarians. If we had to identify a pattern which may account for Polybius’ tendency to analyze the mental processes behind his characters’ decisions, this would be directly connected to his constant attempt

 48 Scala 1898, 37 n. 2 pointed out that the laudatory remarks may reflect the enthusiasm of Massanissa, who took part in the operation and probably informed Polybius of the events when they met (9.25.4). 49 See above, p. 24 with n. 4.

  Effective Leadership Behaviors to elucidate the way in which they achieve their aims and secure victory. Polybius, that is to say, tends to expand on the reasoning of those characters who are going to succeed and emerge victorious precisely in order to illustrate what has brought about the outcomes of their actions. Apparently, in Scipio’s case the frequent references to his mental processes are also justified by Polybius’ wish to criticize the accounts of his fellow-historians who attributed the Roman general’s achievements to divine inspiration rather than his own abilities. However, as we have seen, Polybius also systematically records Hannibal’s reasoning in his depiction of the Carthaginian general’s military operations, although the same justification does not apply. At the beginning of this chapter, I noted that the detailed description of the decision-making process is a narrative pattern that recurs with striking frequency in Arrian’s Anabasis. It would be tempting to interpret its strong presence in Polybius as further evidence of the influence of the history of Alexander. This practice is certainly a familiar one in historical narratives intended to highlight the leadership characteristics of specific figures, but its implementation in the Anabasis, where Alexander’s predictions are so strikingly borne out by events, gives the impression that the accounts of the Macedonian king’s deeds must have played an important part in its further development and expansion. Polybius’ presentation of the actions of Hannibal and Scipio also contains motifs associated — albeit not as prominently as in the case of Philip V — with Alexander, such as their great speed and the surprise provoked by their initiatives.50 Moreover, some of the scenes described during the siege of New Carthage also recall famous moments of Alexander’s expedition. The key dropping of the water level in the lagoon, in particular, is reminiscent of the ebb-tide that allowed Alexander to cross the rocky coast of Pamphylia (Arr. Anab. 1.26.1–2), while Scipio’s self-restraint when offered a beautiful maiden (10.19.3–7) is already paralleled in antiquity to Alexander’s attitude towards the wife of Darius, whom he treated with respect in spite of her matchless beauty and his own youth (Arr. Anab. 4.19.6).51  50 For Hannibal see, e.g., 3.13.6: ἐνεργοῖς ἅμα καὶ καταπληκτικαῖς προσβολαῖς ταχέως ἐκράτησε τῆς πόλεως; 3.14.1: ἐξ ἐφόδου ποιησάμενος προσβολάς; 3.35.6: ταχέως μὲν καὶ παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα; 3.40.2: θᾶττον ἢ προσεδόκων; 3.41.8: διὰ τὸ τάχος τῆς παρουσίας; 3.66.5: ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν, σπεύδων; 3.78.5: τὴν ταχίστην ἀναζευγνύειν; 3.91.10: καταπλήξεσθαι μὲν τῷ παραλόγῳ πάντας; 9.4.7: αἰφνιδίως ἐπιφανείη; 9.6.2: ἅτε τοῦ πράγματος αἰφνιδίου μὲν ὄντος καὶ τελέως ἀνελπίστου. For Scipio see, e.g., 10.5.2: διὰ τὸ παράδοξον; 10.5.4: ἄφνω προσπεσόντος; 10.6.8: πολιορκεῖν ἐξ ἐφόδου; 10.8.5: παραδόξου γενομένης ἐπιφανείας; 10.9.6: ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν μετὰ σπουδῆς; 11.21.3: διὰ τὸ παράδοξον τῆς ἐπιφανείας τῆς ἄφνω τῶν ἱππέων. 51 See Front. Strat. 2.11.5–6; Gellius 7.8; Ammianus 24.4.27.

Scipio Africanus the Elder  

Undoubtedly, as in the case of Philip V, the correspondences with Alexander are not necessarily due to Polybius adding deliberate references to the history of the Macedonian general, but may have arisen from the similarity of the circumstances and Scipio’s own wish to project this image of himself.52 Nevertheless, it would be odd to argue that the numerous motifs in the depiction of Scipio which have reminded modern critics and ancient authors of Alexander would have gone unnoticed by Polybius or been treated as coincidental. Regardless of the route by which they ended up in Polybius’ narrative, the points of (real or imagined) contact with Alexander attest to the depth of the influence exercised by his history on depictions of leaders in antiquity. In the accounts of military operations discussed in the preceding pages, Polybius also focuses on the behavior of the successful leaders’ opponents. In contrast to the victors, the defeated leaders neither observe nor understand the situations they are faced with, or, even if they do, they have only a limited understanding of the realities on the ground, prove incapable of acting rationally, and are ultimately carried away by their obsessions. In the case of leaders who fail, instead of the detailed presentation of their decision-making processes, we are generally given a description of their emotional reactions. Remarkably, if the observation and rational assessment of the available information simply provide some chance of success in military enterprises, emotionalism and impulsiveness seem to predict failure with almost mathematical precision. In the next chapter, I will go on to examine other leadership behaviors which Polybius rejects as unproductive or absolutely detrimental to the interests of leaders and led alike.

 52 At 10.38.2–3 Scipio himself is shown stating that he has treated the captive Spanish women better than a parent. For the various correlations between Scipio and Alexander see Green 1989, 201–202; Spencer 2002, 168–169.

 Ineffective Leadership At 3.81.4–9, prompted by Hannibal’s ability to identify and exploit Gaius Flaminius’ weaknesses before the Battle of Lake Trasimene, Polybius embarks on a detailed discussion of the behaviors and characteristics of leaders which do not augur well for their operations but pose risks both to themselves and to those under their command: πολλοὶ μὲν διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν καὶ τὴν σύμπασαν ἀργίαν οὐ μόνον τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἰδίους καταπροΐενται βίους ἄρδην, πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν οἶνον ἐπιθυμίαν οὐδ᾽ ὑπνῶσαι δύνανται χωρὶς ἀλλοιώσεως καὶ μέθης, ἔνιοι δὲ διὰ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ὁρμὰς καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἔκπληξιν οὐ μόνον πόλεις καὶ βίους ἀναστάτους πεποιήκασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ζῆν αὑτῶν ἀφῄρηνται μετ᾽ αἰσχύνης. καὶ μὴν δειλία καὶ βλακεία κατ᾽ ἰδίαν μὲν αὐτοῖς ὄνειδος ἐπιφέρει τοῖς ἔχουσι, περὶ δὲ τὸν τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμόνα γενομένη κοινόν ἐστι καὶ μέγιστον συμπτωμάτων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀπράκτους ποιεῖ τοὺς ὑποταττομένους, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ κινδύνους ἐπιφέρει τοὺς μεγίστους τοῖς πεπιστευκόσι. προπέτειά γε μὴν καὶ θρασύτης καὶ θυμὸς ἄλογος, ἔτι δὲ κενοδοξία καὶ τῦφος εὐχείρωτα μὲν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, ἐπισφαλέστατα δὲ τοῖς φίλοις. πρὸς γὰρ πᾶσαν ἐπιβουλήν, ἐνέδραν, ἀπάτην ἕτοιμος ὅ γε τοιοῦτος. For there are many men who, owing to indolence and general inactivity, bring to utter ruin not only the welfare of the state but their private fortunes as well; while there are many others so fond of wine that they cannot even go to sleep without fuddling themselves with drink; and some, owing to their abandonment to venery and the consequent derangement of their minds, have not only ruined their countries and their fortunes but brought their lives to a shameful end. But cowardice and stupidity are vices which, disgraceful as they are in private to those who have them, are when found in a general the greatest of public calamities. For not only do they render his army inefficient but often expose those who confide in him to the greatest perils. Rashness on the other hand on his part and undue boldness and blind anger, as well as vaingloriousness and conceit, are easy to be taken advantage of by his enemy and are most dangerous to his friends; for such a general is the easy victim of all manner of plots, ambushes, and cheatery.

It should be noted that in this discussion, Polybius refers not only to the lack of basic military virtues in leaders (who instead display δειλία καὶ βλακεία, “cowardice and stupidity”), but also to morally reprehensible qualities and conditions, such as indolence, inactivity, dependence on drink and the pleasures of the flesh, undue boldness, anger, vaingloriousness, and conceit. The list confirms the interpretations of Polybius scholars who have attempted to show how large a part morality plays in his historical thought.1 Admittedly, given that these moral defects are mentioned because they often undermine the success of  1 See especially Eckstein 1995; Hau 2016, 23–72. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111239538-003

Ineffective leaders and followers  

military operations, one might argue that they are seen here from a pragmatical point of view. The emphasis on practical utility, however, arises from the subject of the passage, which analyses ways in which a leader can identify and exploit his opponent’s weaknesses in order to turn them against him; it does not indicate that Polybius sets pragmatism above morality. Indolence, dependence on drink and the pleasures of the flesh, anger, and vaingloriousness betray a lack of self-control. Polybius would not, of course, expect someone who cannot master himself to control others and be a successful and effective ruler. However, this does not mean that he does not condemn these characteristics just as much when they are found in a private individual; it is merely that, as the historian notes explicitly in connection with cowardice, they are magnified in a leader due to the large number of people they affect and endanger. In the Histories, ineffectiveness in the exercise of leadership generally coexists with, and is often due to, moral weaknesses; that is why unsuccessful leaders are usually also judged by moral criteria. Indeed, in many cases, such as the depiction of Nabis the tyrant of Sparta, or the Bithynian king Prusias, moral designations constitute the lion’s share of Polybius’ analysis. Nabis is called the protector and king of a gang of “murderers, rippers, highwaymen and burglars” (οὗτοι δ᾽ ἦσαν ἀνδροφόνοι καὶ παρασχίσται, λωποδύται, τοιχωρύχοι, 13.6.4). Having banished the rich and noble from Sparta, he gathered around him those who could not remain in their own countries due to their behavior, so that with such accomplices “his rule would long be memorable for its wickedness” (πολυχρόνιον ἔχειν τὴν ἐπ᾽ ἀσεβείᾳ φήμην, 13.6.5). Polybius relates various criminal acts, including the imaginative ways in which Nabis murdered his enemies (13.6.8–7.11), and how Sparta became the base of operations for the robbers and murderers he had scattered throughout the Peloponnese (13.8.2). Similarly, the description of Prusias focuses on aspects of his character which determined and shaped his behavior. Prusias was effeminate in body and mind, and incontinent in his sexual appetites (36.15.2–4). Moreover, he had no sense of beauty, “but lived by day and night the barbarous life of a Sardanapallus” (Σαρδαναπάλλου δὲ βάρβαρον βίον ἔζη καὶ μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτωρ, 36.15.6). Obviously such a man, although “possessed of fair reasoning power” (ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ βελτίων ὑπάρχων), could not but be a coward, unsuited to military affairs (πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας ἀγεννής) and hardships (36.15.1–2). The emphasis on the close link between a ruler’s moral integrity and how he lives up to his role does not mean that the Histories do not contain leaders who are distinguished for their bravery and effectiveness on the battlefield but present problematic behavior off it; or the reverse, leaders whose skill in governing the state and carrying out their duties are not matched by their military perfor-

  Ineffective Leadership mance. Tlepolemus, for example, having spent his whole life in the army, was skilled in handling the conduct of war (χειρίζειν πολεμικὰς πράξεις δυνατὸς ἦν) and courageous (ἀνδρώδης), but completely unfit (ἀφυέστατος) for handling complex matters of state requiring care and vigilance, or economic affairs (16.21.1–4). Moreover, he was particularly open to flattery, and wasted public money by giving it to those who praised him; these constant eulogies made him ever vainer and more conceited (16.21.8–12). Aratus, on the contrary, although an exceptional and well-rounded leader in most respects (τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τέλειος ἀνὴρ εἰς τὸν πραγματικὸν τρόπον, 4.8.1), became dull and timid on the battlefield, unable to personally face danger (4.8.5). Polybius, of course, explicitly acknowledges at 4.8.7 that human nature is multidimensional, so that the same person may express differing abilities even in similar pursuits. However, this observation is in large part intended to justify the seemingly contradictory judgments of the same characters in his work,2 and certainly does not call into question the basic idea of a connection between a leader’s moral state and his capability in the performance of his duties. One of the most notable examples of a failed leader whose ineffectiveness is correlated with his moral deficiencies is Hasdrubal, the last Carthaginian general. Polybius notes his vaingloriousness and arrogance from the very beginning of the narrative, as well as his ignorance of government and military matters (κενόδοξος ἦν ἀλαζὼν καὶ πολὺ κεχωρισμένος τῆς πραγματικῆς καὶ στρατηγικῆς δυνάμεως, 38.7.1). In an effort to provide evidence for his characterizations, Polybius gives a detailed description of Hasdrubal’s behavior during the negotiations for the surrender of Carthage. Despite being at a serious disadvantage, Hasdrubal appears before Golosses, who is acting as an intermediary with the Romans, in full armor and magnificent attire; he even demands that the Numidian king should come to him to talk, “while it ought to have been the reverse” (καθῆκον γίνεσθαι τοὐναντίον, 38.7.3). His discourteous and pretentious attitude is further accompanied by obviously feigned bombast. When Golosses explains to Hasdrubal that his situation does not permit him to make demands, Hasdrubal replies that the Carthaginians place their hopes in their allies (ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔξωθεν συμμάχοις ἀκμὴν καλὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχειν) and especially the gods (μάλιστα δὲ πεποιθέναι τῇ τῶν θεῶν συμμαχίᾳ καὶ ταῖς ἐν ἐκείνοις ἐλπίσιν),

 2 See 4.8.12: ταῦτα μὲν εἰρήσθω μοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ διαπιστεῖν τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἐάν που περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐναντίας ἀποφάσεις ποιώμεθα περὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων (“I say this in order that my readers may not refuse to trust my judgement, because in some cases I make contrary pronouncements regarding the conduct of the same men even when engaged in pursuits of a like nature.”)

Ineffective leaders and followers  

who will not ignore the injustice done to the Carthaginians but give them many opportunities of salvation (38.7.8–10). He further stresses that the Carthaginians are determined to all be slaughtered rather than allow their city to be destroyed (38.7.11). Hasdrubal’s rhetoric is remarkably reminiscent of one of the most famous and dramatic episodes in ancient Greek historiography, the Melian Dialogue in the fifth book of Thucydides. The Melians, facing the threat of destruction by the Athenians, had also declared their decision to resist, citing their faith in the gods, who would not neglect to give them justice, and the aid of their Spartan allies.3 In his second meeting with Golosses, Hasdrubal again resorts to blustering references to famous moments in ancient Greek history. When informed of Scipio Aemilianus’ proposals, he retorts that “the day will never come on which Hasdrubal will look at the same time on the sun and on his city being consumed by fire” (οὐδέποτε ταύτην ἔσεσθαι τὴν ἡμέραν ἔφασκεν ἐν ᾗ συμβήσεται τὸν ἥλιον Ἀσδρούβαν βλέπειν ἅμα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα πυρπολουμένην, 38.8.8). This declaration recalls the Athenians’ categorical answer to Mardonius when he sent King Alexander I of Macedon to win them over in exchange for significant rewards. They replied that as long as the sun continued its course they would not enter any alliance with Xerxes (Hdt. 8.143.2). Hasdrubal moreover adds that “the most noble funeral for right-minded men is to perish in their native city and amid her flames” (καλὸν γὰρ ἐντάφιον εἶναι τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσι τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τὸ ταύτης πῦρ, 38.8.9), alluding to the well-known saying “tyranny is a fair winding-sheet” (καλόν ἐστιν ἐντάφιον ἡ τυραννίς), which is said to have persuaded Dionysius I not to abandon Syracuse when it was besieged by the Carthaginians but to stay and fight, ultimately victoriously.4 Hasdrubal is thus presented as addressing Golosses with sayings used in the past by people finding themselves in danger and at a disadvantage, stating their determination to resist their enemies. However, despite the seriousness of the situation, at his second meeting with Golosses Hasdrubal continues to behave affectedly, with blatant ostentation. He appears again in magnificent attire, in his full armor and purple robe, with slow and stately walk, “leaving,” as Polybius observes, “the tyrants of tragedy much to seek” (τοὺς ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδί-

 3 Thuc. 5.105: ὅμως δὲ πιστεύομεν τῇ μὲν τύχῃ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ μὴ ἐλασσώσεσθαι, ὅτι ὅσιοι πρὸς οὐ δικαίους ἱστάμεθα, τῆς δὲ δυνάμεως τῷ ἐλλείποντι τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἡμῖν ξυμμαχίαν προσέσεσθαι (“But we trust that the gods my grant as fortune as good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that what we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the Lacedaemonians”, trans. R. Crawley). 4 For the saying see Walbank 1979, 697.

  Ineffective Leadership αις τυράννους πολύ τι προσοφείλειν, 38.8.7). Once again, the image of Hasdrubal does not match his difficult position. Polybius even goes on to describe the physical features of the Carthaginian general, which make the whole spectacle even more bizarre (38.8.7): ἦν μὲν οὖν καὶ φύσει σάρκινος, τότε δὲ καὶ κοιλίαν εἰλήφει καὶ τῷ χρώματι παρὰ φύσιν ἐπικεκαυμένος ἦν, ὥστε δοκεῖν ἐν πανηγύρει που διαιτᾶσθαι παραπλησίως τοῖς σιτευτοῖς βουσίν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τηλικούτων καὶ τοιούτων κακῶν προστατεῖν, ὧν οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐφίκοιτο τῷ λόγῳ διεξιὼν οὐδείς. He was by nature corpulent, and he had now become pot-bellied and was unnaturally red in the face, so that it looked as if he were living like a fatted ox in the plenty of a festival, instead of being at the head of a people suffering from such extreme misery that it would be difficult to set it down in words.

Polybius ridicules Hasdrubal precisely in order to highlight his incapacity to handle the critical situation in which his country finds itself. The reaction Polybius hopes to arouse in this passage is similar to that of Scipio, who laughs when Golosses informs him of Hasdrubal’s conviction that the favor of the gods and fortune can save the Carthaginians (γελάσας ὁ Πόπλιος, 38.8.1). Scipio’s laughter does not reveal, as Walbank argues, a Roman aristocrat’s indifference to the fate of the common soldiery.5 In the famous and much discussed scene of the burning of Carthage, Scipio is depicted as a particularly thoughtful man who, in his moment of victory, does not hesitate to weep openly for his enemies, thinking of the common fate of men (λέγεται μὲν δακρῦσαι καὶ φανερὸς γενέσθαι κλαίων ὑπὲρ πολεμίων, 38.22.1). At 38.8.1, Scipio is laughing at the hypocrisy of Hasdrubal, who, after his disgraceful treatment of his Roman captives, dares to pretend that he can hope for salvation from the gods. The description of Hasdrubal’s affected behavior and his physical appearance strikes an unexpectedly comic note given the seriousness of the situation, inviting readers to view his heroic bombast with suspicion and ultimately not to take it seriously. At 38.8.10, Polybius explicitly notes the striking discrepancy between Hasdrubal’s heroic words (τὸ μεγαλόψυχον τῶν λόγων) and his ignoble, cowardly way of handling the situation (τὴν ἀγεννίαν καταπλήττεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀνανδρίαν). It is, however, interesting that the examples put forward to explain the historian’s negative comment are not connected to Hasdrubal’s prowess on the battlefield but rather to his behavior towards his fellow-citizens. Hasdrubal, says Polybius, gave luxurious feasts while many people starved to death, “and

 5 See Walbank 1979, 697.

Ineffective leaders and followers  

by his good cheer exposed the general distress” (38.8.11–12). He also retained his grip on power in Carthage, which was facing so much suffering, by terrorizing the citizens with mockery, insults and murder-methods which a tyrant would hardly apply in even a prosperous city (38.8.13). Polybius is clearly trying to show that Hasdrubal’s declarations of defending his city to the death were utterly hypocritical. By his overly affected and theatrical attitude, Hasdrubal was trying to hide not only his inability to act effectively on the battlefield, but also his true feelings towards the Carthaginians. His behavior in his meetings with Golosses did not spring, as he would have liked people to believe, from a desire to save the city and its people, but from his desperation to ensure his own survival. In the surviving text we cannot follow Hasdrubal’s actions as general during the siege of Carthage; however, his behavior after his enemies’ victory fully confirms Polybius’ characterization of him. Hasdrubal appears before Scipio as a suppliant, falling to his knees and begging for his life (38.20.1–2). The contrast between this humiliating gesture and his previous proud and uncompromising attitude is obviously very striking, and Polybius highlights it yet further by presenting it from the viewpoint of different characters, each approaching (and experiencing) it in their own way. Scipio uses the opportunity to teach his men a lesson about the importance of being aware of reversals of fortune, so that one should not behave presumptuously (38.20.1–2). The Roman deserters remind Hasdrubal that he swore not to abandon them, jeering at and abusing him as an oath-breaker and a coward (38.20.5–6). In the most dramatic scene of the episode, Hasdrubal’s wife approaches him with their children and accuses him that without saying a word to her he tried to secure his own safety, and that he “shamelessly” (ἀναισχύντως) abandoned the city and the citizens in order to go over to the enemy in secret (38.20.7–9). She also recalls Hasdrubal’s heroic words that the day would never come when he would look on the light of the sun and Carthage in flames (38.20.10). The text is irreparably damaged at 38.20.11, where Hasdrubal’s wife, as we can deduce from Appian’s account of the same events (Lib. 131–132), probably denounces Hasdrubal again before killing their children and throwing herself into the flames with their lifeless bodies, carrying out in practice what her husband only promised in words.6

 6 Appian records her reproach to her husband as follows (Lib. 131): ὦ μιαρὲ καὶ ἄπιστε καὶ μαλακώτατε ἀνδρῶν, ἐμὲ μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἐμοὺς παῖδας τόδε τὸ πῦρ θάψει; σὺ δὲ τίνα κοσμήσεις θρίαμβον, ὁ τῆς μεγάλης Καρχηδόνος ἡγεμών; τίνα δ᾽ οὐ δώσεις δίκην τῷδε, ᾧ παρακαθέζῃ; (“Wretch, traitor, most effeminate of men, this fire will entomb me and my children. Will you,

  Ineffective Leadership The case of Hasdrubal underlines not only how directly a leader’s ability to exercise his duties is linked to his moral character, but also how extensive is the impact of his actions and omissions. A leader’s behavior, unlike that of a private citizen, affects and determines the fates of a large number of people, and often entire nations. A crucial aspect of Polybius’ treatment of leadership, and one which has not been sufficiently highlighted in the scholarship, is the interaction between leaders and the led.7 In the following section I will focus my analysis on specific examples of leaders whose influence on the behavior of their followers sheds light on interesting aspects of this relationship.

. Ineffective leaders and followers .. Diaeus and Critolaus The decisive influence of leaders on the behavior of their followers becomes particularly obvious in the account of the Achaean War (38.9–18). The text is not intact, but the surviving fragments provide a reasonably informative picture of the way in which Polybius believed the relations between Achaeans and Romans degraded to such a point that the outcome was what he describes as one of the greatest disasters in the history of Greece (38.1–3). The narrative is clearly intended to demonstrate that the war was largely the result of the miscalculations and mistakes of the corrupt Achaean leadership. Polybius portrays the individuals who shaped the policies of the Achaean League in the most negative manner: it was as though they were “a deliberate selection from each city of the worst men,” he notes at 38.10.8. In the space of a few pages, he presents numerous occasions on which the demagogic leaders of the League Diaeus and Critolaus took bribes, slandered and tortured their opponents, and made decisions based not on the common good but on their own interests.8 Moreover, he particularly stresses their inability to think logically and interpret the situation correctly (παρέπαιον τοῖς λογισμοῖς, 38.10.9). The Achaean leaders believed that  the leader of great Carthage, decorate a Roman triumph? Ah, what punishment will you not receive from him at whose feet you are now sitting”, trans. H. White). 7 See, e.g., Hau 2016, 61: “On the positive side, Hannibal is repeatedly praised for taking good care of his soldiers with the result that they remain unfailingly loyal to him even under extreme circumstances, but otherwise the relationship between the commander and his men is not one that receives a lot of attention, a fact which distinguishes Polybius significantly from the other soldier-historian of this study, Xenophon.” 8 See, e.g., 38.10.9; 38.13.3–4; 38.17.2; 38.17.8–10; 38.18.2–6.

Ineffective leaders and followers  

the Romans would avoid war because they were already fighting on two fronts in Africa and Spain, and mistook their forbearance for weakness due to the pressure they were under (38.10.10). At 38.12.11, the historian also notes that Critolaus declared that certain kings and cities would follow him, although it is not specified whether he truly believed that to be the case or whether he was just seeking to convince his audience. As the narrative repeatedly emphasizes, the choices of the Achaean leaders were not guided by reason and revealed their ignorance, inexperience and insanity.9 To be sure, Polybius still holds the populace responsible for letting themselves be carried away by these leaders. When the Roman envoys to Aegium attempt to restrain the Achaeans, refraining from severe censure of their prior behavior, the historian remarks that some citizens accepted the envoys’ advice, were ashamed of the actions of their fellow-countrymen, and were also well aware of the fate of those who opposed Rome (38.10.4–6). Polybius calls this group of citizens τὸ σωφρονοῦν μέρος, “the wiser people,” differentiating them from the great majority of the Achaeans (τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, 38.10.7), who remained silent and inactive, and also from the destructive demagogues Diaeus and Critolaus, who were not only immoral but also misconceived the situation (38.10.9). A little further on, Polybius refers to the Achaeans who adopted Diaeus and Critolaus’ views as “the mob,” “the mass,” “the multitude” (οἱ ὄχλοι, τὰ πλήθη, οἱ πολλοί).10 Although Gruen argues that the above terms simply designate the majority of participants in the assemblies, and that any negative connotations are due to the stance those people adopted towards Rome rather than their social background,11 it is worth noting that at 38.12.5 Polybius describes the Achaeans who opposed the Roman envoys in Corinth as “a pack of artisans and common men”

 9 See, e.g., 38.10.12–13: ἦγον ἐπὶ τὴν πάλαι προκειμένην αὐτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τὸ ταλαίπωρον ἔθνος. Καὶ τοῦτ᾽ εἰκότως συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι δι᾽ ἀπειρίαν καὶ κακίαν τῶν κρατούντων (“they by their future conduct, led on the unhappy nation to adopt the mistaken policy they had set their hearts on. What else could be expected when those in power were so ignorant and illdisposed?”); 38.11.6: κατεγνωκότες ἄγνοιαν καὶ μανίαν τοῦ Κριτολάου (“pronouncing Critolaus to have acted in a wrong-headed way and like a madman”); 38.13.8: οὐδενὶ λόγῳ τοῦτο πράττων, ἀλλὰ πάντων ἀσεβεστάτοις καὶ παρανομωτάτοις ἐπιβαλλόμενος (“not listening to reason, but forming projects which outraged the laws of god and man”); 38.18.8: καθαπερανεὶ τύχη τις ἀντερεῖσαι πανοῦργος καὶ τεχνικὴ πρὸς τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ μανίαν τῶν ἡγουμένων (“some sort of resourceful and ingenious fortune counteracted the folly and insanity of the leading statesmen.”) 10 See, e.g., 38.11.9; 38.12.2; 38.12.4; 38.12.10; 38.13.6; 38.17.2. 11 Gruen 1976, 67.

  Ineffective Leadership (πλῆθος ἐργαστηριακῶν καὶ βαναύσων ἀνθρώπων). The terms ὄχλοι, πλήθη, πολλοί are also used to refer to the Achaeans on the eve of the Achaean War, as is usually the case in the Histories, to indicate collective behaviors associated with greed, irrational anger and an absence of reason and insight.12 This is not to deny, however, that Polybius considers the corrupt Achaean politicians who shaped public opinion in their cities primarily responsible for the deterioration of relations between the Achaean League and Rome. Even at 38.3.13, where, as has been argued, the sufferings of the Achaeans are described as resulting from a mutual destructive interaction between the politicians’ choices and the negative trends of society,13 Polybius holds the leaders responsible for the ignorance and misleading of the citizens.14 At the same time of course, he makes sure that readers do not overlook the characteristic ease with which these leaders were able to exploit social pathologies in order to turn the majority in the desired direction. When, then, Polybius states at 38.16.9 that the Achaeans suffered calamity “owing to the folly of their leaders and their own errors” (διὰ τὴν τῶν προεστώτων ἀβουλίαν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἄγνοιαν), he does not hold the leaders and the citizens equally responsible. The citizens are censured for their inability to realize that they have been deceived by their leaders and to depart from the tragic course on which they have been set. Polybius is particularly keen to underline the decisive influence of the Achaean politicians on shaping their followers’ behavior. At 38.11.9 he says that Critolaus twisted the words of the Roman envoys, “by which means he inspired the populace with hostility and hatred” (δυσμένειαν καὶ μῖσος ἐνειργάζετο τοῖς ὄχλοις). Similarly, at 38.12.10 his rhetoric “continued to excite and irritate the mob” (ἐκίνει καὶ παρώξυνε τοὺς ὄχλους). Polybius uses the same phrase when describing Critolaus persuading the Achaeans to vote for war (παροξύνας τοὺς ὄχλους, 38.13.6). The historian explains, moreover, that Critolaus’ impressive appeal was due not only to his skills or his familiarity with the desires and psychology of the people, but also to a demagogic policy intended to manipulate the citizenry by serving their interests. Specifically, Critolaus ordered that debts should not be paid and debtors should not be imprisoned for the duration of the war (38.11.10). These decisions made the Achaeans his willing tools, ready to  12 For the way in which Polybius presents the characteristics and behavior of the mob see Eckstein 1995, 129–140. 13 Cf. Welwei 1966, 293–95; Eckstein 1995, 135–136. 14 38.3.13: ἐγὼ γὰρ ἠγνοηκέναι πολ καὶ παραπεπαικέναι , ἡμαρτ γεγονότας τῆς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀγνοίας (“For I should rather say that the people in general acted mistakenly and failed in their duty, but that the actual authors of the mistakes were the real offenders.”)

Ineffective leaders and followers  

believe and do everything he told them, and also unwilling to take thought for the future (περὶ μὲν τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀδυνατοῦν προνοεῖσθαι), being led astray by present joys and ease (38.11.11). The self-serving policies of the Achaean leaders combined with the arousal of the basest instincts of the mob to create an atmosphere of tension and unrest in the cities of the League, which is described by Polybius in the blackest colors. At 38.12.1 he refers to the “foolish excitement and commotion” (ἀκρισίαν καὶ ταραχήν) in the Peloponnese. Shortly afterwards, at 38.12.7, he expands on this statement by comparing the Corinthian assembly to a theatre audience “ready to share his fervour and run mad” (θεάτρου συνενθουσιῶντος καὶ παρεστηκότος ταῖς διανοίαις). The frenzy into which the Achaeans had been whipped up by their leaders is equally vividly described at 38.16.1–2: ἡ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀεὶ προσπιπτόντων κατάπληξις ἀφῃρεῖτο τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων ἐπίστασιν καὶ διάληψιν, δι᾽ ἧς ἔμελλον προνοεῖσθαι ότι πάντες εἰς πρόδηλον ὄλεθρον ἄγονται μετὰ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν. λοιπόν, οἷον ὑπὸ χειμάρρου τινὸς λάβρου προωθούμενοι καὶ φερόμενοι μετὰ βίας, ἐπηκολούθουν τῇ τοῦ προεστῶτος ἀγνοίᾳ καὶ παρακοπῇ. the dismay created by the particular events of every day rendered people incapable of that general and careful reflection, which would have made them foresee that they all with their wives and children were clearly on the road to ruin. So, as if carried away and swept down by the force of a fierce torrent, they resigned themselves to the demented and perverse guidance of their leader.

As at 38.11.11, Polybius again stresses the multitude’s inability to look ahead. In fact, contrary to what one might think at first glance, there is no contradiction between the historian’s remarks here and at 38.15.9, where he says that the Achaeans wept “as if foreseeing the future” (ὡσανεὶ προορώμενοι τὸ μέλλον). The use of ὡσανεί confirms that the participle προορώμενοι is not used here to denote foresight but rather a lack of it. The Achaeans’ despair could, of course, mean that they foresaw their defeat; that this is not the case, however, is clear from the passage quoted above, in which they are not even capable of grasping the obvious (πρόδηλον). The image of the multitude swept away by the ignorance and insanity of their leaders, as if by a raging torrent, illustrates not only the power of manipulation and the Achaeans’ inability to withstand it, but also how the situation gets completely out of hand as a result. Indeed, at 38.18.7 Polybius comments that all were gripped by such folly and lack of judgement as it would not be easy to find even among barbarians (τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς ἀνοίας καὶ τῆς ἀκρισίας συμβαινούσης περὶ πάντας οἵαν οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐν βαρβάροις εὕροι τις ῥᾳδίως).

  Ineffective Leadership Polybius’ criticism of the leaders of the Achaean League, therefore, refers not only to their corruption but also, and primarily, to their inability to evaluate the situation correctly and to plot a course serving the common good. This false impression of the facts, described, as we have seen, by the word ἄγνοια and other similar terms and phrases (e.g. παρέπαιον τοῖς λογισμοῖς, οὐδενὶ λόγῳ τοῦτο πράττων, μανία, ἀβουλία, παρακοπή), was the key to the breakdown of relationships between the Achaean League and Rome, and to the ensuing war. The Achaean leaders’ responsibility for this state of affairs is further highlighted by the leniency which Rome repeatedly shows to the members of the League. Polybius explains the Roman attitude towards the League in detail at 38.9.6–8, stating that the Romans did not intend to dissolve the League but only to frighten the Achaeans into ceasing their presumptuousness. The Romans acknowledged the Achaeans, believing them to be the most trustworthy of the Greeks, and wanted to restrain their undue arrogance but not go to war with them. The same conclusion may be drawn from the other episodes describing the Roman envoys’ meetings with the Achaeans in Aegium and Corinth (38.10.4–5, 38.12.2– 3). In both cases, the legates, who visit following the ill-treatment of their colleagues, do not make an issue of the unpleasant events and the Achaeans’ reprehensible behavior, but attempt to help them understand their error in a friendly way and halt the destructive course of action on which they have embarked.15 This emphasis on the mildness of the Roman attitude gives the impression that compromise was possible and that conflict could perhaps have been avoided. However, the furious reaction of the crowd to the proposals of Metellus’ envoys in Corinth shows that any chance of handling the situation in a reasona-

 15 Cf. 38.10.4–5: καὶ προφερομένων πολλοὺς καὶ φιλανθρώπους λόγους, καὶ τὸ περὶ τοὺς πρεσβευτὰς ἔγκλημα παραπεμπόντων καὶ σχεδὸν οὐδὲν προσδεόμενον δικαιολογίας, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ἐκδεχομένων τὸ γεγονὸς αὐτῶν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, καθόλου δὲ παρακαλούντων μὴ πορρωτέρω προβῆναι τῆς ἁμαρτίας μήτε τῆς εἰς αὑτοὺς μήτε τῆς εἰς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους (“their language was most courteous; they scarcely alluded to the charge of ill-treating the legates or demanded any justification of the conduct of the Achaeans, but taking a most favourable view of what had occurred than the Achaeans themselves, begged them not to give any further offence either to the Romans or to the Lacedaemonians”) and 38.12.2–3: διετίθεντο πολλοὺς οὗτοι καὶ φιλανθρώπους λόγους παραπλησίους τοῖς περὶ τὸν Σέξτον, πᾶσαν ἐνδεικνύμενοι φιλοτιμίαν χάριν τοῦ μὴ προβῆναι τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς εἰς ὁλοσχεστέραν ἀπέχθειαν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους (“[they] addressed them at length in the same conciliatory terms as Sextus and his colleagues had done, employing every effort to prevent the Achaeans from proceeding to acts of declared hostility towards Rome.”)

Ineffective leaders and followers  

ble manner had effectively disappeared.16 Although Gruen questions to what extent the Achaeans’ expulsion of the Roman envoys from the meeting truly expresses anti–Roman sentiment, citing Critolaus’ declaration that “he wished to be friends with Rome, but he was not at all minded to make himself subject to despots” (βούλεσθαι μὲν Ῥωμαίων φίλος ὑπάρχειν, δεσπότας δ᾽ οὐκ ἂν εὐδοκῆσαι κτησάμενος, 38.12.8),17 this and similar slogans, which seem to have been popular with the multitude,18 criticized precisely this Roman intention to limit Achaean autonomy.19 Polybius apparently did not expect the mob to show rationality and foresight — these virtues are usually absent from descriptions of the behavior of the multitude in the Histories, while it is leaders who are called upon to display them in order to restrain the destructive tendencies of οἱ πολλοί. However, on this occasion the Achaean leaders’ errors in judgement swept the multitude away on a course inevitably leading to catastrophe. The horrific scenes that take place during the war in many Achaean cities, whose inhabitants are described as being “visited by an unparalleled attack of mental disturbance” (πάντα δ᾽ ἦν πλήρη παρηλλαγμένης φαρμακείας, 38.16.7) and throwing themselves down wells and off cliffs, reveal the criminal results of the Achaean leaders’ policies, rather than Polybius’ inability to propose a rational explanation of events.20

.. Agathocles of Alexandria The theme of the leader’s responsibility for shaping the behavior of the multitude, and the uncontrolled reactions that may arise from his inability to exercise his duties properly, is also strongly emphasized in the account of the fall of  16 See 38.12.4: ὧν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ διακούοντες οὐδαμῶς ἀνείχοντο, χλευάζοντες δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις μετὰ θορύβου καὶ κραυγῆς ἐξέβαλον (“The people, on listening to them, showed no disposition to comply, but jeered at the legates, hooted and hustled them out of the meeting.”) 17 See Gruen 1976, 64. 18 See 38.12.10: … ἐκίνει καὶ παρώξυνε τοὺς ὄχλους (“… he continued to excite and irritate the mob.”) 19 Cf. also 38.12.9: καθόλου δὲ παρῄνει, λέγων ὡς, ἐὰν μὲν ἄνδρες ὦσιν, οὐκ ἀπορήσουσι συμμάχων, ἐὰν ἀνδρόγυνοι, κυρίων (“The general tenour of his advice was that if they behaved like men they would be in no want of allies, but if they behaved no better than women they would have plenty of lords and masters.”) 20 For this criticism see Gruen 1976, 47: “The analysis is tortured and unconvincing. In fact, not a rational explanation at all … Polybius’ virulent diatribes against the politicians cannot conceal the fact that he lacks a plausible solution. And as he much as admits it: the whole country was afflicted with an evil spell.”

  Ineffective Leadership Agathocles of Alexandria (15.25–33). Polybius’ picture of the guardian of the young Ptolemy V is that of an ambitious, ruthless, and corrupt man attempting to take power by devious and unlawful means. Agathocles pays the army two months’ wages in order to calm the anger and reactions against him (15.25.11), sends any distinguished and capable officials away from Alexandria (15.25.15), and places men of his choice in key positions (15.25.18). His machinations do not betray leadership skills but rather a desperate attempt to make up for their lack, along with deceit. When he eventually manages to secure his position by these means, Agathocles uses his power to continue his unlawful activities unscrupulously and unhindered (15.25.21–24): καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν φίλων χώρας ἀνεπλήρωσε, παρεισαγαγὼν ἐκ τῆς διακονίας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ὑπηρεσίας τοὺς εἰκαιοτάτους καὶ θρασυτάτους· αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς ἐν μέθῃ διέτριβε καὶ ταῖς τῇ μέθῃ παρεπομέναις ἀκρασίαις, οὐ φειδόμενος οὔτ᾽ ἀκμαζούσης γυναικὸς οὔτε νύμφης οὔτε παρθένου, καὶ πάντα ταῦτ᾽ ἔπραττε μετὰ τῆς ἐπαχθεστάτης φαντασίας. ὅθεν πολλῆς μὲν καὶ παντοδαπῆς γινομένης δυσαρεστήσεως, οὐδεμιᾶς δὲ θεραπείας οὐδὲ βοηθείας προσαγομένης, τὸ δ᾽ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ προσεπαγομένης ὕβρεως, ὑπερηφανίας, ῥᾳθυμίας, ἀνεθυμιᾶτο πάλιν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ προϋπάρχον μῖσος καὶ πάντες ἀνενεοῦντο τὰ προγεγενημένα περὶ τὴν βασιλείαν ἀτυχήματα διὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τούτους. He filled up the vacant places of the royal “friends” by appointing from the body servants and other attendants those most remarkable for their effrontery and recklessness. He himself spent the greater part of the day and night in drinking and the debauchery which commonly accompanies it, sparing neither women in the flower of their age nor brides nor virgins, and all this he did with the most odious ostentation. So that as strong dislike against him was aroused on all sides, as no attempt was made to conciliate or help those aggrieved, but on the contrary there was a constant repetition of outrage, arrogance, and neglect, the former hatred of the populace for him began to fume again, and all recalled the calamities that these men had brought on the kingdom.

Agathocles is presented as forming and following a plan only when attempting to neutralize his opponents, such as Tlepolemus (15.25.34–36). In other respects, his leadership appears to focus on his wish to satisfy his unlawful appetites and desires. Agathocles’ lack of ability is exemplified by the way in which, in the critical hours before the rising of the people and the army, the mere news of Tlepolemus’ arrival is enough to make him abandon all thought of action and rational handling of the situation, instead taking refuge in drink (οὕτως ἐξέστη τῶν φρενῶν ὡστ᾽ ἀφέμενος τοῦ πράττειν τι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν προσπεπτωκότων ἀπῆλθε κατὰ τὸν εἰθισμένον καιρὸν εἰς τὸν πότον, 15.29.7). The combination of arrogance, vanity, indifference and intellectual sluggishness that marks Agathocles as a leader destroys his credibility, making him hated by both the troops and the people of Alexandria.

Ineffective leaders and followers  

Agathocles made up for his major lack of leadership skills by his theatrical tendencies. This characteristic is obvious early on, from the pomp of the ceremony in which Agathocles and Sosibius assume power (15.25.3–10). The two men erected a dais in the largest colonnade of the palace. From there they informed the gathered officers of the deaths of Ptolemy and Arsinoe, placed the royal crown on the young heir’s head, and read out a fake will appointing them his guardians (15.25.3–5). They also displayed two silver urns said to contain the bones of the king and queen, although the second was actually full of spices (15.25.6–7). Agathocles also resorts to theatricality in his attempt to persuade the Macedonians to stand with him against his enemy Tlepolemus. He opens his speech by pretending that he cannot speak due to the abundant tears running from his eyes (ὑπεκρίνετο τὸν οὐ δυνάμενον εἰπεῖν ἃ βούλεται διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐπιφερομένων δακρύων, 15.26.2). Wiping them away repeatedly on his cloak, he eventually stops his lamenting and, holding the child in his arms, asks the Macedonians to fight for the child’s safety (15.26.3–4). Agathocles’ men even display their hostility to Tlepolemus by humiliating his mother-in-law Danae in public, taking her from the temple of Demeter and dragging her through the city before imprisoning her (15.27.1–2). Theatricality is also evident in the scene where Agathocles and his sister Agathocleia beg the Macedonians for their lives. They put their hands through the lattice-work of the door and Agathocleia displays her breasts, with which she claims to have suckled the king, while they both beg for their lives to be spared, using any argument that might conceivably help (15.31.13). Agathocles and his party use this theatrical behavior to control the thoughts and emotions of their audiences, in order to gain the desired reactions. It is indicative of their incapability and the great hatred they arouse in the people, however, that these “performances” are not only unconvincing and ineffective, but often have the opposite result to that intended or end in their ridicule. Thus the appearance of the supposed urn of Arsinoe reminded the crowd of her sufferings, so that “the town was full of groans, tears, and ceaseless lamentation” (ὥστε πλήρη γενέσθαι τὴν πόλιν στεναγμοῦ, δακρύων, οἰμωγῆς ἀκαταπαύστου, 15.25.9). This, however, as Polybius notes, was due not so much to their love of their dead queen as to their hatred of Agathocles (οὐχ οὕτω τῆς πρὸς Ἀρσινόην εὐνοίας τεκμήρια, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα μίσους, 15.25.10). The Macedonians, too, on seeing Agathocles begging them with tears in his eyes to fight Tlepolemus for the young king’s sake, not only felt no pity for Agathocles (οὐχ οἷον ἠλέουν αὐτόν), but paid no attention to his words, sneered at him (μυχθίζοντες) and jeered at him until “he did not know himself how he got away from the meeting” (15.26.8). Similarly, the public humiliation of Danae

  Ineffective Leadership provoked such outrage among the populace (ἐφ᾽ οἷς τὸ πλῆθος ἀγανακτοῦν) that they no longer hesitated to openly reveal their hatred of those in power (15.27.3). Lastly, the dramatic entreaties of Agathocles and his sister to the Macedonians to spare their lives, although temporarily effective, ultimately proved useless (οὐδὲν ἤνυον, 15.32.1), as the pair handed over the king and were subsequently arrested and executed (15.32.11–33.10). In each case Polybius does not deny that theatricality can function in the political arena as an effective, if undignified, means of persuasion, but he shows that trust in the leaders had been so eroded by their corruption and incapability that any attempt to influence or deceive their audiences was immediately revealed or backfired.21 Appropriately for characters who made systematic use of theatrical behaviors to achieve their aims, the death of Agathocles and his friends and relatives takes place in a stadium before a large crowd, who are not just spectators but active participants in the action.22 The execution scene is vividly described in strongly dramatic terms. The bloodshed begins when a parasite of the rulers, Philo, enters the stadium drunk and threatens the crowd that if Agathocles comes out they will regret it (15.33.2–3). They immediately tear off his cloak, stab him with spears, and drag him, still convulsing in his death throes (ἔτι σπαίροντα), into the middle of the stadium. Once the mob has tasted blood (γεύσασθαι τὰ πλήθη φόνου), they eagerly wait for the others to appear (15.33.5). Agathocles came next, and some people managed to suddenly stab him with their spears, acting, as Polybius says, as his friends rather than his enemies, since they saved him from suffering the fate he deserved (τῆς ἁρμοζούσης καταστροφῆς, 15.33.6). However, the satisfaction of which Agathocles’ swift death deprived the murderous instincts of the raging crowd was provided by his family. Agathocleia and her sisters were led naked to the stadium, together with Oenanthe, who was on horseback (15.33.7–8). When Agathocles’ relatives were delivered into the hands of the mob, people began to bite them, stab them, dig out their eyes, and tear those who fell limb from limb until they had mutilated them all (οἱ μὲν ἔδακνον, οἱ δ᾽ ἐκέντουν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐξέκοπτον· ἀεὶ δὲ τοῦ πεσόντος τὰ μέλη διέσπων, ἕως ὅτου κατελώβησαν πάντας αὐτούς, 15.33.9).

 21 Cf. also 15.25.34–36, where Agathocles tries to turn the crowd against Tlepolemus (ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐποίει βουλόμενος τὰ πλήθη παροξύνειν κατὰ τοῦ Τληπολέμου) by falsely accusing him of hostile intentions towards the king, and invites Antiochus to assume power, but with the opposite result (συνέβαινε δὲ τοὐναντίον). 22 Cf. Wiater 2017, 209.

Ineffective leaders and followers  

It is no surprise that this scene is considered one of the most striking occasions on which Polybius, contrary to his categorical condemnations of “tragic historiography,” appears to submit to its charms and utilize its techniques.23 The details of the victims’ torture and its results lend a vivid imagery to the scene, giving readers the impression that the events are taking place before their eyes, while simultaneously evoking a multitude of emotions ranging from horror and revulsion at the brutality of the revenge to satisfaction at the fitting punishment of the victims’ crimes.24 However, as Wiater has argued, here Polybius, unlike his fellow historians whom he criticizes for confusing the methods of history and tragedy, does not simply invite his readers’ emotional participation but incorporates their feelings into the rational evaluation of events.25 Specifically, his observation that “terrible is the cruelty of the Egyptians when their anger is aroused” (δεινὴ γάρ τις ἡ περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ὠμότης γίνεται τῶν κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἀνθρώπων, 15.33.10) causes a certain detachment, encouraging his readers to stay at a safe distance that will allow them to evaluate both the events described and their own emotional reactions to them. Polybius’ readers are thus called upon, Wiater argues, to think about their cultural and social identity, and to contrast the behavior of the Egyptian masses with that which they themselves should display as members of the civilized elite to which they belong. Wiater undoubtedly identifies a critical difference between Polybius’ treatment of events and corresponding descriptions by his fellow-historians which are exclusively intended to attract readers through emotional arousal and sensationalism. His interpretation, though, takes it for granted that Polybius’ attitude to the Egyptians is completely negative and disparaging. However, although Polybius notes critically that the Egyptians express their anger with particular brutality, this does not mean that he considers the rage of the crowd against Agathocles and his kindred unjustified. Wiater links the Egyptians’ savagery in this case with the generally negative picture of the multitude painted in the Histories, due to their tendency to irrational and unbridled behavior, and argues that a basic idea in this episode is the danger posed by the mob when it is not controlled by its leaders.26 The preceding narrative, however, showed that the citizens of Alexandria had many reasons to be unhappy with their leadership, and that Agathocles and his circle are not censured by Polybius for their inability to restrain the base instincts of their subjects, but because

 23 See, e.g., Verdin 1990, 453; Huss 2001, 485 n. 97; Schepens 2005, 163 n. 60. 24 Cf. Wiater 2017, 210. 25 Wiater 2017, 212. 26 See Wiater 2017, 211.

  Ineffective Leadership their corrupt policies and inability to exercise their duties damaged their relationship with the populace irreparably, arousing the latter’s righteous indignation. For Polybius the mob is indeed more generally associated with irrational and extreme behavior, and with negative characteristics such as greed and anger. The subject is even touched upon in the theoretical discussion of forms of government in the sixth book. As Eckstein has observed, at 6.4.10 democracy is presented as containing the seeds of its own mutation into ochlocracy (ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτου πάλιν ὕβρεως καὶ παρανομίας ἀποπληροῦται σὺν χρόνοις ὀχλοκρατία), while at 6.57.7–9 it is called responsible for the degradation of the mixed constitution.27 However, 6.4.10 is merely a summary of the process detailed at 6.9.5–9. There it is noted that democracy is transformed into ochlocracy when the rich, in their efforts to win high office by virtue of their wealth rather than their ability, corrupt the citizens (δελεάζοντες καὶ λυμαινόμενοι τὰ πλήθη κατὰ πάντα τρόπον) by bribing them (δωροδόκους καὶ δωροφάγους κατασκευάσωσι τοὺς πολλούς) and making them used to living off other people’s gifts (συνειθισμένον γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος ἐσθίειν τὰ ἀλλότρια καὶ τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχειν τοῦ ζῆν ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πέλας). Likewise, at 6.57.7–9 it is stated that the citizens are stirred to fury and disobedience, resulting in mob rule; again, though, this is due to the behavior of those who either offer them less than they have become accustomed to, or flatter them in order to be voted into office. These passages show that the mood of the populace is largely shaped by the choices of those who stand out among them as leaders. Polybius recognizes, of course, that the multitude is particularly prone to problematic and uncontrolled reactions, like anyone who lacks the correct upbringing and education.28 However, by overemphasizing the negative tendencies of the multitude, one risks paying too little attention to the critical role played by leaders in the emergence, escalation or limitation of these tendencies. Polybius vividly depicts the susceptibility of the populace to external influences in two passages in which he likens them to the sea, whose waves change and adapt according to the strength of the wind. This image is first used in the speech addressed by Scipio Africanus to his mutinous soldiers (11.29.9–11): ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ διότι πᾶς ὄχλος εὐπαραλόγιστος ὑπάρχει καὶ πρὸς πᾶν εὐάγωγος. ὅθεν αἰεὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάθος συμβαίνει περί τε τοὺς ὄχλους καὶ τὴν θάλατταν. καθάπερ γὰρ κἀκείνης ἡ μὲν ἰδία φύσις ἐστὶν ἀβλαβὴς τοῖς χρωμένοις καὶ στάσιμος, ὅταν δ᾽ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμπέσῃ τὰ πνεύματα βίᾳ, τοιαύτη φαίνεται τοῖς χρωμένοις οἷοί τινες ἂν ὦσιν οἱ κυκλοῦντες αὐτὴν  27 Eckstein 1995, 131. 28 See Eckstein 1995, 136–138.

Ineffective leaders and followers  

ἄνεμοι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀεὶ καὶ φαίνεται καὶ γίνεται πρὸς τοὺς χρωμένους οἵους ἂν ἔχῃ προστάτας καὶ συμβούλους. and that is that all multitudes are easily misled and easily impelled to every excess, so that a multitude is ever liable to the same vicissitudes as the sea. For as the sea is by its own nature harmless to those who voyage on it and quiet, but when winds fall violently upon it seems to those who have dealings with it to be of the same character as the winds that happen to stir it, so a multitude ever appears to be and actually is to those who deal with it of the same character as the leaders and counsellors it happens to have.

On the second occasion, the simile is used by Leon the Athenian before the Senate, when he attempt to allay the Roman anger at the Aetolians by attributing their choices to the influence of certain people (21.31.9–11): εἶναι γὰρ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις περὶ τὰ πλήθη παραπλήσιον τῷ γινομένῳ περὶ τὴν θάλατταν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνην κατὰ μὲν τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν ἀεὶ ποτ᾽ εἶναι γαληνὴν καὶ καθεστηκυῖαν καὶ συλλήβδην τοιαύτην ὥστε μηδέποτ᾽ ἂν ἐνοχλῆσαι μηδένα τῶν προσπελαζόντων αὐτῇ καὶ χρωμένων· ἐπειδὰν δ᾽ ἐμπεσόντες εἰς αὐτὴν ἄνεμοι βίαιοι ταράξωσι καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἀναγκάσωσι κινεῖσθαι, τότε μηθὲν ἔτι δεινότερον εἶναι μηδὲ φοβερώτερον θαλάττης. For what happened in states to the people was very much the same as what befalls the sea. The sea by its proper nature was always calm and at rest, and in general of such a character that it would never give trouble to any of those who approach it and make use of it; but when violent winds fall upon it and stir it up, compelling it to move contrary to its own nature, nothing was more terrible and appalling than the sea.

Although in the above passages the simile is used by characters, its almost word–for–word repetition and the fact that it appears in speeches that succeed in achieving their aims permit us to suppose that it reflects Polybius’ own views.29 Eckstein notes that there is a significant difference between comparing the multitude to a calm sea and its description at 6.56.11, where it is stated that “every multitude is fickle, full of lawless desires, unreasoned passion, and violent anger” (πᾶν πλῆθος ἐστιν ἐλαφρὸν καὶ πλῆρες ἐπιθυμιῶν παρανόμων, ὀργῆς ἀλόγου, θυμοῦ βιαίου),30 but the gaps may not be as unbridgeable as they first appear. Both cases should be examined based on the context and the rhetorical purpose they serve. Just as comparing the multitude to a calm sea affected by the winds permits the orators to cast the blame for the mistakes made on specific people, so too does highlighting the innate negative tendencies of the

 29 Cf. Eckstein 1995, 130 with n. 42. 30 Eckstein 1995, 137.

  Ineffective Leadership mob form part of Polybius’ efforts to explain why the Romans acted more wisely than the Greeks by preserving the important role of religion in both public and private life, because “the multitude must be held in by invisible terrors and suchlike pageantry” (τοῖς ἀδήλοις φόβοις καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τραγωδίᾳ τὰ πλήθη συνέχειν, 6.56.11). Even if, therefore, 6.56.11 does indeed express, as Eckstein argues, Polybius’ general views on the characteristics and operation of the multitude, this does not mean that it is the whole picture.31 Examining the contexts of these passages reveals, moreover, another point they have in common, and one perhaps more significant than their differences. In both cases, the behavior of the multitude is shown to be ultimately determined by external influences. It appears, therefore, that Polybius believes that leaders are principally responsible for the behavior of their followers, treating the interaction between the two groups as similar to that between teachers and their pupils.32

. Emergence of conspiracies As we saw in the case of Agathocles, ineffectiveness in the exercise of leadership not only has repercussions on the prosperity of states and citizens, but also often turns against the leaders themselves, threatening their position or even their life. For Polybius, leaders’ qualities are reflected almost automatically in their subjects’ attitude towards them. A characteristic example is that of Philip V, who at the beginning of his career, thanks to his brilliant natural gifts (διὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως λαμπρόν, 7.11.3) and his beneficent policy (διὰ τὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως εὐεργετικόν, 7.11.8), enjoyed such love and universal acceptance that he became, so to speak, the common lover of all the Greeks (κοινός τις οἷον ἐρώμενος ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων, 7.11.8). Subsequently, however, he adopted a completely

 31 See Eckstein 1995, 137. 32 See also 9.23.6–8, where it is explicitly stated that the leaders in power in Athens and Sparta shaped the citizens’ attitudes: Ἀθηναίων γοῦν εὕροι τις ἂν ὀλίγα μὲν τὰ πικρά, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ σεμνὰ τῆς πολιτείας Ἀριστείδου καὶ Περικλέους προεστώτων, Κλέωνος δὲ καὶ Χάρητος τἀναντία; Λακεδαιμονίων δ᾽ ἡγουμένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὅσα μὲν διὰ Κλεομβρότου τοῦ βασιλέως πράττοιτο, πάντα συμμαχικὴν εἶχε τὴν αἵρεσιν, ὅσα δὲ δι᾽ Ἀγησιλάου, τοὐναντίον; ὥστε καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων ἔθη ταῖς τῶν προεστώτων διαφοραῖς συμμεταπίπτειν (“At Athens at least we find that during the government of Aristides and Pericles the state was the author of few cruel actions, but of many kind and praiseworthy ones, while under Cleon and Chares it was quite the reverse; and again when the Lacedaemonians were supreme in Greece, all that King Cleombrotus did was done in the spirit of friendly alliance, but it was the reverse with Agesilaus; so that the character of cities also changes with that of those who govern them.”)

Emergence of conspiracies  

different mode of behavior, with the result that the people’s attitude towards him changed accordingly (7.11.10–11): καὶ τοῦτο συνέβαινε κατὰ λόγον· τραπεὶς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντικειμένην προαίρεσιν τῇ πρόσθεν, καὶ ταύτῃ προστιθεὶς ἀεὶ τἀκόλουθον, ἔμελλε καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων διαλήψεις περὶ αὑτοῦ τρέψειν εἰς τἀναντία καὶ ταῖς τῶν πραγμάτων συντελείαις ἐγκυρήσειν ἐναντίαις ἢ πρότερον. For as he totally changed his principles, it was inevitable that he should totally reverse also other men’s opinion of him, and that he should meet with totally different results in his undertakings.

Philip’s example shows that people’s attitudes towards the same person are dependent on, and can consequently change according to, his behavior. Polybius often mentions in his portraits of leaders how they were treated by the people. He mentions that Hiero, for instance, managed to maintain his grip on power in Sicily for 54 years without being plotted against, avoiding the envy that accompanies those in positions of authority (7.8.4). Indeed, he often attempted to give up his throne but was prevented from doing so by the citizens (7.8.5). Massanissa, termed the best and most fortunate king of Polybius’ own time (ἀνὴρ ἦν τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς βασιλέων ἄριστος καὶ μακαριώτατος, 36.16.1), also spent his whole life undisturbed by plots (36.16.6).33 Prusias, on the other hand, was so disliked that his subjects missed no opportunity to revenge themselves on him (36.15.7). It is interesting that in the case of Prusias no mention is made of his actual behavior to his subjects; their strong dissatisfaction with him seems to be due solely to his inadequacy and unsuitability for kingship (36.15.1– 6). It seems, therefore, that Polybius uses conspiracies as a barometer of leaders’ success and connects their emergence not only with the citizens’ reaction to their unfair or cruel treatment, but also with the leaders’ more general conduct and ability in exercising leadership. I will now focus my reading on accounts of conspiracies in the Histories, in order to analyze the ways in which the behavior of the leaders faced with those conspiracies is presented as being reflected in the emergence, progress, and outcome of the machinations against them.

 33 Polybius attributes Massanissa’s freedom from plots and conspiracies to the concord among his sons (διὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τούτων εὔνοιαν, 36.16.6). However, his greatest achievement (τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ θειότατον τούτου, 36.16.7) is said to be his transformation of the barren land of Numidia into a fertile plain (36.16.8). The concord among Massanissa’s sons appears to be due to their father’s equal treatment of them (ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὑιῶν ἐν διαστάσει μυριοπλέθρους ἀγροὺς κατασκευάσας παμφόρους, 36.16.8).

  Ineffective Leadership When Polybius, at 5.30.8, interrupts his account of the actions of Philip V during the Social War, he reminds his readers that, following the design of the work, he must now turn to the events taking place at that time in Asia, namely the war between Antiochus III and Ptolemy IV over Coele-Syria. However, following his favorite tactic, before taking up the thread of that war he goes further back into the past, beginning his narrative at the moment when each of the two kings took power. His treatment is particularly selective, as he does not intend to provide a full record of the events faced by Antiochus and Ptolemy; instead he focuses on the conspiracies that emerged in their kingdoms during that period. Thus, given that the preceding account of the Social War also describes conspiratorial acts — the plots against Philip by Apelles and his co-conspirators — a large part of the fifth book is devoted to the scheming of courtiers and officials of the Hellenistic kingdoms against or unbeknownst to their kings. These episodes have been the object of literary research, mainly with regard to their depiction of courtiers.34 Polybius, inspired by the behavior, actions and mentality of these courtiers, has created some of the most negatively drawn characters in his work, surrendered to their passions and instincts. They are depicted as so envious, ruthless, and treacherous that, as I have argued elsewhere, the narratives build suspense regarding not only whether the plots will be successful but also whether and how the orchestrators will eventually pay for their crimes.35 Although the courtiers’ characteristics almost automatically draw the reader’s attention to their role, I will attempt to show that the descriptions of their scheming can also contribute to the investigation of Polybius’ views on leadership. Leaders’ skills and performance are directly linked both to the emergence of conspiracies, insofar as they provide fertile soil for plots to grow in, and, above all, to their handling, effective or otherwise. Despite their similarities, these episodes also present significant differences, precisely in the ways in which the three leaders manage the crises that befall their kingdoms owing to the machinations of their ambitious courtiers. Apelles, Sosibius and Hermeias, the main courtiers seeking to shape events in the Antigonid, Ptolemaic, and Seleucid kingdoms respectively, share common behaviors and reactions. All three are extremely ambitious, love power, and are envious of and plot against anyone they believe might hinder their plans. Apelles, for example, targets Aratus when he realizes that Philip holds Aratus in higher regard than himself (4.76.9, 5.1.9, 5.2.8, 5.16.10). Sosibius decides to get rid of Cleomenes due to his influence over the Peloponnesian and  34 See, e.g., Herman 1997; Strootman 2011. 35 See Miltsios 2021, 291–300.

Emergence of conspiracies  

Cretan mercenaries (5.36.3–8), while Hermeias is hostile to Epigenes “as he saw he was capable both as a speaker and as a man of action and enjoyed great popularity with the soldiery” (διὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν δυνάμενον καὶ μεγάλης ἀποδοχῆς ἀξιούμενον παρὰ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν, 5.41.4). In their efforts to rid themselves of their opponents, the courtiers falsely accuse them of undermining the interests of the kings, with trumped–up accusations and incriminating evidence such as forged letters (4.84.7–9, 5.38.4–6, 5.50.11– 14). In fact, of course, they are projecting their own intentions on their antagonists, since they themselves do not hesitate to make damaging proposals and act against their kings in order to further their personal ambitions (5.2.8, 5.42.5– 6, 5.55.4–5).36 Although the courtiers seem to steal the show with their unlawful and blatantly unjust behavior, Polybius also evinces a strong interest in the character and qualities of the kings who are faced with these challenges. All are very young and have only recently ascended to the throne; however, that is where

 36 Polybius is very hostile and ironical when describing the role of the courtiers. At 5.26.13, for example, he observes of Apelles’ marginalization by Philip: βραχεῖς γὰρ δὴ πάνυ καιροὶ πάντας μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὡς ἐπίπαν ὑψοῦσι καὶ πάλιν ταπεινοῦσι, μάλιστα δὲ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς βασιλείαις. ὄντως γάρ εἰσιν οὗτοι παραπλήσιοι ταῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀβακίων ψήφοις: ἐκεῖναί τε γὰρ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ψηφίζοντος βούλησιν ἄρτι χαλκοῦν καὶ παραυτίκα τάλαντον ἰσχύουσιν, οἵ τε περὶ τὰς αὐλὰς κατὰ τὸ τοῦ βασιλέως νεῦμα μακάριοι καὶ παρὰ πόδας ἐλεεινοὶ γίνονται (“So brief a space of time suffices to exalt and abase men all over the world and especially those in the courts of kings, for those are in truth exactly like counters on a reckoning-board. For these at the will of the reckoner are now worth a copper and now worth a talent, and courtiers at the nod of the king are at one moment universally envied and at the next universally pitied.”) At 5.41.3, too, before narrating the doings of Hermeias, Polybius introduces him to his readers by painting his mentality in the darkest colors: τυχὼν δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἐξουσίας πᾶσι μὲν ἐφθόνει τοῖς ἐν ὑπεροχαῖς οὖσι τῶν περὶ τὴν αὐλήν, φύσει δ᾽ ὠμὸς ὢν τῶν μὲν τὰς ἀγνοίας ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐκδεχόμενος ἐκόλαζε, τοῖς δὲ χειροποιήτους καὶ ψευδεῖς ἐπιφέρων αἰτίας ἀπαραίτητος ἦν καὶ πικρὸς δικαστής (“Having attained this position of authority he was jealous of all the holders of prominent posts at court, and as he was naturally of a savage disposition, he inflicted punishment on some for errors which he magnified into crimes, and trumping up false charges against others, showed himself a cruel and relentless judge.”) Sosibius is not subjected to such a fierce attack, presumably because his initiatives filled the power vacuum created by Ptolemy’s inexcusable neglect. However, the deviousness with which he plots Cleomenes’ demise leaves no doubt as to his character. The historian’s strongly condemnatory attitude to the courtiers is also apparent in his satisfaction when narrating the deaths of Apelles and Hermeias. See 5.28.8: οὗτοι μὲν οὖν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης τυχόντες καταστροφῆς ἐξέλιπον τὸν βίον (“thus did these men meet with the end they deserved”); 5.56.13: Ἑρμείας μὲν οὖν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ μετήλλαξε τὸν βίον, οὐδεμίαν ὑποσχὼν τιμωρίαν ἀξίαν τῶν αὑτῷ πεπραγμένων (“So perished Hermeias, meeting with a punishment by no means adequate to his crimes.”)

  Ineffective Leadership the similarities stop. The way in which their characteristics and mentality are described indicates leaders of different abilities, priorities, and calibers. Philip is repeatedly praised for his virtues. At 4.77.1–3 Polybius states that he was held in high esteem by all the Peloponnesians for his military prowess and daring, and that it would be difficult to find another king more richly endowed by nature with the qualities necessary to gain power and to rule. The historian makes specific mention of Philip’s quick intelligence, good memory, and charm (ἀγχίνοια, καὶ μνήμη καὶ χάρις ἐπῆν αὐτῷ διαφέρουσα), his kingly bearing and authority (ἐπίφασις βασιλικὴ καὶ δύναμις), and, above all, his ability and courage in military matters (τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πρᾶξις καὶ τόλμα πολεμική). In the same vein, at 4.82.1, he comments that Philip won universal admiration in his campaign in the Peloponnese due to his conduct and achievements beyond his years. Polybius returns to Philip’s impressive martial prowess at 5.18.7: ὁ γὰρ Φίλιππος τολμηρότερον καὶ πρακτικώτερον ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν χρώμενος ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς εἰς ἀπορίαν καὶ δυσχρηστίαν ἅπαντας ἦγε τοὺς πολεμίους. for Philip had shown a daring and energy beyond his years in his enterprises, and reduced all his enemies to a state of bewilderment and helplessness.

Ptolemy, on the contrary, is roundly criticized by the historian. Polybius opens his account of Ptolemy’s reign with an unpromising sketch of his behavior and mentality. Ptolemy, he notes, interpreted the current situation overoptimistically and his rule was primarily concerned with pomp (καταπιστεύσας διὰ ταῦτα τοῖς παροῦσι καιροῖς, πανηγυρικώτερον διῆγε τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχήν, 5.34.3). He was careless and unapproachable (ἀνεπίστατον μὲν καὶ δυσέντευκτον αὑτὸν παρασκευάζων) with those responsible for the domestic affairs of Egypt, and negligent and indifferent (ὁλίγωρον δὲ καὶ ῥᾴθυμον ὑποδεικνύων) towards those handling its foreign affairs (5.34.3). Unlike his predecessors, whose impressive foreign policy achievements had secured their rule over Egypt, he paid no attention to matters either inside the kingdom or outside it, indulging instead in illicit love affairs and drunkenness (5.34.6–10). Further references to Ptolemy’s problematic behavior follow at 5.36.6 and 5.40.1, in both cases from the point of view of other characters: the powerful courtier Sosibius, who exploits the power vacuum to rule himself (θεωρῶν τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως ῥᾳθυμίαν), and the Aetolian governor Theodotus, who despises the king for his debauchery and goes over to Antiochus (καταφρονήσας τοῦ βασιλέως διὰ τὴν ἀσέλγειαν τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς ὅλης αἱρέσεως). Interestingly, Polybius explicitly links Ptolemy’s neglect of his kingly duties with the emergence of conspiracies

Emergence of conspiracies  

against his person and his throne (εἰκότως ἐν πάνυ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅμα καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιβούλους εὗρε καὶ πλείους, 5.34.10–11). Antiochus appears to occupy an intermediate position between the capable Philip, who is extremely efficient in achieving his aims, and the negligent and incompetent Ptolemy. Polybius does not analyze Antiochus’ morals in depth, but stresses his youth, which is the reason why, like Philip, he is not taken seriously (οἳ καταφρονήσαντες μὲν αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν, 5.41.1). Unlike Philip, however, who confounds his enemies’ expectations, astonishing them with his achievements, Antiochus behaves and reacts in a manner appropriate to his age. He may not fade into the background like Ptolemy, who lets his courtiers handle the affairs of his kingdom as they wish, and he is always present both at councils and on the field, but he is lead astray by Hermeias’ machinations and is unwilling to stand up to him even when he does not agree with him. Moreover, he is depicted as being discouraged and alarmed at the first sign of trouble (λαβὼν ἐπτοημένον τὸν βασιλέα καὶ δεδιότα τὸ γεγονὸς κίνημα, 5.50.2). His whole behavior confirms that because of his young age, as Polybius notes, he was under Hermeias’ control (διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὑποχείριον ἔχων τὸν νεανίσκον, 5.45.7) and “was not his own master” (οὐκ ἦν αὑτοῦ κύριος, 5.50.5). The qualitative differences in the mentality, behavior, and skills of the three kings directly affect the progress and outcome of their courtiers’ conspiracies. Philip handles the schemes of his officials with the same decisiveness that he displays in his military operations. His maturity is already evident in his stance when Apelles accuses Aratus of having engineered the failure of the talks with the Eleans, because he managed to persuade their general Amphidamus not to accept his proposals (4.84). Philip asks Apelles to repeat his accusation in front of Aratus, so that Philip can hear what he has to say, and stresses that he will not neglect the matter but investigate it (φήσαντος οὐκ ὀλιγωρήσειν ἀλλ᾽ ἐξετάσειν, 4.86.1). Indeed, when he meets Amphidamus himself and finds that the accusation is baseless, he draws his own conclusions from the affair and begins to value Aratus’ opinion more highly and trust Apelles less (4.86.8). At 5.1.8–9 Philip is clearly aware that it is much more in his interests to collaborate with Aratus than with Apelles, and chooses his allies definitively. From that point forward, Polybius presents Apelles and the other conspirators as systematically attempting to cause Philip problems, only to ultimately see their efforts backfire.37 Philip does not give them any opportunity to undermine his operations significantly.  37 Cf. 5.14.12: τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτοῖς κατὰ τοὐναντίον προχωρούντων (“the tide of events having set against them”); 5.16.9: ἡ μὲν οὖν Ἀπελλοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν Λεόντιον πρᾶξις ἐν

  Ineffective Leadership The siege of Palus, of course, eventually fails due to the secret agreement between Apelles’ co-conspirator Leontius and his men. This failure, however, allows Philip to realize Leontius’ treachery and change his behavior accordingly. Philip displays an impressive ability to learn from his experiences, managing to foil all of Leontius’ subsequent attempts to hinder his progress (5.5.10, 5.7.3). Philip’s correct choices are undoubtedly largely due to Aratus’ sage guidance; however, alongside Philip’s wise decision to trust Aratus and follow his advice, Polybius also records the dynamic reaction of the Macedonian king to the conspirators’ provocations. When for example, Leontius enters Philip’s tent with his peltasts to demand why Megaleas has been imprisoned, Philip is not alarmed and strongly defends his decision (5.16.1–4). He is also able, through his personal intervention, to calm down the commotion caused among his soldiers by the conspirators (5.25). Philip’s leadership qualities are further highlighted by the methodical way in which he organized his counterattack. Although he had long been vexed by Apelles’ behavior, he was patient and did not reveal his intentions to anyone (ἐκαρτέρει καὶ πᾶσιν ἄδηλος ἦν ἐπὶ τί φέρεται καὶ ἐπὶ ποίας ὑπάρχει γνώμης, 5.26.6). He did, however, make sure to exclude him from important councils in order to reduce his status and influence, and ordered his death when the opportunity arose (5.26.15–16, 5.28.8). Apelles’ conspiracy failed not only because he made an enemy of Aratus, as noted at 4.87.10 (ὃ δὴ καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐπετέλεσε μὴ παρασκευάσας ἀνταγωνιστὴν Ἄρατον αὑτῷ), but also due to the strong leadership of Philip, who kept strict control over the Macedonian court. Ptolemy’s negligence, on the other hand, allowed Sosibius to make all major decisions and wield power from behind the scenes. When the Spartan Cleomenes asked permission to return to Greece in an attempt to regain power, Ptolemy was completely indifferent to his situation (5.35.6): ὁ μὲν οὖν βασιλεύς, οὔτ᾽ ἐφιστάνων [ἐν] οὐδενὶ τῶν τοιούτων οὔτε προνοούμενος τοῦ μέλλοντος διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας, εὐήθως καὶ ἀλόγως ἀεὶ παρήκουε τοῦ Κλεομένους.

 τούτοις ἦν, παλίντροπον λαμβάνουσα τὴν προκοπὴν ταῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν ἐλπίσιν (“such was the issue so far of the plot between Apelles and Leontius, which had progressed in a manner quite contrary to their expectation”); 5.26.2: διὰ τὸ μηδὲν σφίσι προχωρεῖν τῶν ἐπινοουμένων (“owing to all his plans having failed”); 5.26.14: ὁρῶν παρὰ δόξαν ἐκβαίνουσαν αὑτοῖς τὴν ἐπικουρίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν Ἀπελλῆν (“seeing that the result of Apelles' intervention had not been at all what he expected.”)

Emergence of conspiracies  

The king, however, who for the reasons I stated above neither concerned himself at all with such questions, nor took any thought for the future, continued in his thoughtlessness and folly to turn a deaf ear to Cleomenes.

Following this disparaging comment on Ptolemy, Polybius focuses on Sosibius, presenting the reasons why the courtier, who essentially had the upper hand in everything (οὗτος γὰρ μάλιστα τότε προεστάτει τῶν πραγμάτων, 5.35.7), thought it necessary to refuse Cleomenes the right to return home, instead keeping him in Alexandria in order to eliminate him. The detailed record of Sosibius’ reasoning not only explains the motivations behind his decision; it also shows indisputably that he was the mastermind in shaping the kingdom’s policy. It is not surprising, therefore, that Ptolemy is easily misled by Sosibius’ fake letter incriminating Cleomenes (5.38.1–7). Sosibius’ occupation of the narrative space that should rightly belong to the king is an apt literary reflection of the way in which Ptolemy has been marginalized by his ambitious courtier. In the same spirit, the decision to place Cleomenes in custody is not presented as being made by the king, but as resulting from the pressure put on him by Sosibius (παρώξυνε τὸν βασιλέα … γενομένου δὲ τούτου, 5.38.6). The case of Theodotus, the governor of Coele-Syria, which ensures the smooth shifting of the narrative from the kingdom of the Ptolemies to that of the Seleucids, highlights not only Ptolemy’s indifference to politics but also the negative impact on the kingdom’s interests when that power vacuum is filled by the courtiers (5.40.1–3). Antiochus, unlike Ptolemy, does not neglect the running of his kingdom, but his efforts to overcome the difficulties he faces come up against Hermeias’ ambitions. Antiochus, however, also differs from Philip, since, instead of controlling his ambitious courtier, he allows himself to be manipulated by him. In the consecutive councils on Molon’s revolt, Hermeias imposes his views by using slander and fabricated evidence, dissuading the king from handling the crisis himself and turning him against Ptolemy (5.42, 5.45.6–7). Even after Hermeias’ plan proves misleading and damaging in practice, it is abandoned not by Antiochus but by majority decision (δόξαντος δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς, 5.50.6). Antiochus, moreover, gives in against his will (δυσχερῶς μὲν ἤκουσε) to Hermeias’ demand that he remove Epigenes from the campaign (5.50.4–5). That demand, of course, is pure blackmail-only if it is met will Hermeias pay the mutinous troops their wages (5.50.1–3). The picture that emerges, in any case, is one in which Hermeias manages, in one way or the other, to lead Antiochus in the direction he wishes. It is no surprise, therefore, that Antiochus is so easily taken in by the fake letter Hermeias produces to implicate Epigenes (5.50.11–14). Interestingly, Antiochus is not shown acting independently of Hermeias (ἃ δὲ κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώμην χειρίζων) until after the successful quelling of the mu-

  Ineffective Leadership tiny, when he greatly reduces the fine imposed by Hermeias on the inhabitants of Seleucia (5.54.11). It would seem that his recent success has given the young king the confidence to handle the matter as he sees fit. So when, soon afterwards, his physician Apollophanes advises him to be wary of Hermeias if he is to avoid his brother’s fate, Antiochus seizes the opportunity to plan the courtier’s demise with the assistance of his friends (5.56.2–6). The presentation of the earlier history of the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms focuses on matters already raised in the account of the first years of the reign of Philip V. The three narrative units obviously share similarities in their depiction of the courtiers’ mentality and behavior, but it is precisely these similarities which throw their differences into high relief. The structure of the work itself, placing them one after the other, invites a comparative reading of the three units. All three detail the machinations by which the courtiers attempt to eliminate their enemies and increase their influence, even at the expense of their own kings. The outcome of their plots, however, appears to be directly dependent on the dynamism and leadership skills of the kings who face them. Philip, by handling court affairs with the same firm hand and efficiency that he displays in military operations, defeats the attempts to undermine him by Apelles and his friends, turning them against the conspirators. Ptolemy, on the contrary, is completely indifferent to the exercise of his duties and leaves the way open for Sosibius to steer the kingdom as he sees fit. In his case, Polybius explicitly links his negligence to the emergence of conspiracies in his kingdom. It is no coincidence that Ptolemy is the only one of the three rulers who shows no interest in controlling his courtier and does not get rid of him. Lastly, Antiochus, although always present at the war councils and keen to handle matters, appears to lack Philip’s strategic genius, which allows the latter to act in a way beyond his years. Thus, at the outset of his reign, Antiochus constantly succumbs to Hermeias’ manipulations. Over time, however, as his experience and self-confidence grow, he separates himself from, works against, and ultimately succeeds in ridding himself of his powerful courtier. His development provides the clearest demonstration that in Polybius’ narrative, rulers’ leadership skills are accurately measured by how far they successfully handle the challenges they face due to the scheming of their close collaborators.

 Leadership and the Vicissitudes of Fortune . The function of fortune in the Histories A major challenge that every leader is called upon to face in his efforts to realize his endeavors arises due to the effect of unpredictable, random factors. In the Histories we find 129 references to fortune, in such a wide variety of contexts that one sometimes has the impression that there is a deep and unresolved contradiction in the way in which Polybius understands and uses the concept of fortune.1 Indeed, alongside numerous narrative interventions arguing that the causes of the events described should not be attributed to fortune but be sought in the sphere of human action, there are also the famous images in which the main theme of the work, the rise and expansion of Roman rule, is presented as the result of the will and actions of fortune.2 Two much discussed passages which depict the (seemingly) different approaches to fortune in the Histories in a characteristic way are 1.4.1 and 36.17.2– 4. In the first, from the preamble of the prokataskeue, the “symploke” or weaving together of events, the process by which events throughout the known world interact with each other, with the overarching aim of fostering the establishment and expansion of Roman rule, is presented as the inspiration and creation of fortune (1.4.1): τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἡμετέρας πραγματείας ἴδιον καὶ τὸ θαυμάσιον τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς καιρῶν τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὅτι, καθάπερ ἡ τύχη σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ τῆς οἰκουμένης πράγματα πρὸς ἓν ἔκλινε μέρος καὶ πάντα νεύειν ἠνάγκασε πρὸς ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν σκοπόν, οὕτως καὶ διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑπὸ μίαν σύνοψιν ἀγαγεῖν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τὸν χειρισμὸν τῆς τύχης, ᾧ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων συντέλειαν. For what gives my work its peculiar quality, and what is most remarkable in the present age, is this. Fortune has guided almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and has forced them to incline towards one and the same end; a historian should likewise bring before his readers under one synoptical view the operations by which she has accomplished her general purpose.

The second passage argues that authors should only fall back on fortune and the concept of the supernatural more generally as a last resort to explain the

 1 See, e.g., Walbank 1972, 58–65. 2 The bibliography on the function of fortune in Polybius is extensive: see, e.g., Roveri 1956; Pédech 1964, 331–354; Walbank, 1972, 58–65; Ferrary 1988, 265–276; Hau 2011. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111239538-004

  Leadership and the Vicissitudes of Fortune events they describe, in other words only when the root causes of those events cannot be identified in human behavior (36.17.2–4): ὧν μὲν νὴ Δί᾽ ἀδύνατον ἢ δυσχερὲς τὰς αἰτίας καταλαβεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα, περὶ τούτων ἴσως ἄν τις ἀπορῶν ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν τὴν ἀναφορὰν ποιοῖτο καὶ τὴν τύχην, οἷον ὄμβρων καὶ νιφετῶν ἐξαισίων ἐπιφορὰ συνεχής, ἢ τἀναντία πάλιν αὐχμῶν καὶ πάγων καὶ διὰ ταῦτα φθορὰ καρπῶν, ὁμοίως λοιμικαὶ διαθέσεις συνεχεῖς, ἄλλα παραπλήσια τούτοις, ὧν οὐκ εὐμαρὲς τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν … ὧν δὲ δυνατόν ἐστι τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν, ἐξ ἧς καὶ δι᾽ ἣν ἐγένετο τὸ συμβαῖνον, οὐχί μοι δοκεῖ τῶν τοιούτων δεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ θεῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀναφοράν. Now indeed as regards things the causes of which it is impossible or difficult for a mere man to understand, we may perhaps be justified in getting out of the difficulty by setting them down to the action of a god or of chance, I mean such things as exceptionally heavy and continuous rain or snow, or on the other hand the destruction of crops by severe drought or frost, or a persistent outbreak of plague or other similar things of which it is not easy to detect the cause … But as for matters the efficient and final cause of which it is possible to discover we should not, I think, put them down to divine action.

Indeed, Polybius appears to restrict the field of application of metaphysical interpretations exclusively to extreme climate and meteorological phenomena. Hau observes that the passage appears too late in the work to be considered a programmatic statement. Given, moreover, that the Macedonians’ decision to stand with Andriscus against the Romans is then described in metaphysical terms as “divinely inflicted madness” (δαιμονοβλάβειαν, 36.17.15), Hau sees in this another argument that the above passage is not attempting to set out a methodological framework for the analysis of causality, but is instead a narrative device intended to highlight the incomprehensibility of that decision.3 Before referring to the Macedonian revolt, however, Polybius discusses an example extensively in order to clarify his position. Specifically, he refers to the serious demographic problem faced by Greece in his own time, providing a series of arguments showing that neither its causes nor its solutions should be sought in the metaphysical sphere, but that both are due to human choices and priorities (36.17.5–11). The detailed discussion betrays the historian’s genuine methodological interest rather than a simple desire to disparage the Macedonian reaction by comparing it to unexplained atmospheric phenomena. Moreover, how far the view proposed in the passage under consideration is simply a narrative device serving a specific aim or, on the contrary, expresses the more general

 3 Hau 2011, 188: “The passage is not meant to function as a programme for his analyses of causality in the rest of the Histories (if it was, he would presumably have placed it much earlier in the work), but to shine a torch on Macedonian irrationality.”

The function of fortune in the Histories  

stance adopted by Polybius towards the methodology of causality, is not determined by the position of the passage in the work but by the extent to which it matches his other stated opinions on the subject. The attitude that authors should not resort to supernatural interpretations before they have exhausted every possibility of identifying the causes of the phenomena in human behavior is generally promoted by Polybius as the most appropriate approach to the issue of causality in historiography. We have only to think of those cases where the historian rejects the supernatural interpretations previously proposed for the events he describes, arguing that their causes actually have a rational explanation. At 2.38.4–9, for example, he says that it would be wrong and naive to attribute the success of the Achaean League to chance (τύχην μὲν λέγειν οὐδαμῶς ἂν εἴη πρέπον· φαῦλον γάρ), because the true cause lies in the exceptional political principles by means of which it attracted its members. At 3.47.8, he casts doubt on the role of the supernatural in Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps, as such a daring and prudent general would not need the aid of gods and heroes to show him the way. In the same vein, at 10.2.5–13 Polybius argues that Scipio Africanus did not owe his success “to the unexpected and to mere chance” (ἐπιτυχῆ τινα καὶ τὸ πλεῖον αἰεὶ παραλόγως καὶ ταὐτομάτῳ κατορθοῦντα τὰς ἐπιβολάς), but because he consistently acted with calculation and foresight (ἕκαστα μετὰ λογισμοῦ καὶ προνοίας ἔπραττε). On the other hand, 1.4.1 is also not an isolated case; it is associated with 8.2.3–4, where the concept of fortune appears again as a supernatural entity that pulls the strings of History, raising Rome to the status of world superpower: πῶς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψιλῶς αὐτὰς καθ᾽ αὑτὰς ἀναγνόντα τὰς Σικελικὰς ἢ τὰς Ἰβηρικὰς πράξεις, γνῶναι καὶ μαθεῖν ἢ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν γεγονότων ἢ τὸ συνέχον, τίνι τρόπῳ καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας τὸ παραδοξότατον καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἔργον ἡ τύχη συνετέλεσε; τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστι τὸ πάντα τὰ γνωριζόμενα μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀγαγεῖν, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ εὑρίσκεται γεγονός. For how by the bare reading of events in Sicily or in Spain can we hope to learn and understand either the magnitude of the occurrences or the thing of greatest moment, what means and what form of government Fortune has employed to accomplish the most surprising feat she has performed in our times, that is, to bring all the known parts of the world under one rule and dominion, a thing absolutely without precedent?

In contrast to Polybius’ repeated warnings about the ease with which many of his fellow-historians resort to interpretations based on supernatural principles, fortune in this passage is depicted as orchestrating the unique process of global unification under Roman rule. The contradiction is heightened further by the fact that 1.4.1 and 8.2.3–4 appear to depart from a categorical statement in

  Leadership and the Vicissitudes of Fortune which Polybius does not reject the interpretive value of the supernatural element in historiography generally, but is specifically challenging the view that the great success of Rome was due to fortune (1.63.9): ἐξ ὧν δῆλον τὸ προτεθὲν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡς οὐ τύχῃ Ῥωμαῖοι, καθάπερ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐδ᾽ αὐτομάτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν εἰκότως ἐν τοιούτοις καὶ τηλικούτοις πράγμασιν ἐνασκήσαντες οὐ μόνον ἐπεβάλοντο τῇ τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμονίᾳ καὶ δυναστείᾳ τολμηρῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθίκοντο τῆς προθέσεως. This confirms the assertion I ventured to make at the outset that the progress of the Romans was not due to chance and was not involuntary, as some among the Greeks choose to think, but that by schooling themselves in such vast and perilous enterprises it was perfectly natural that they not only gained the courage to aim at universal dominion, but executed their purpose.

The issue comes to the forefront once again in a more specific context at 18.28.4–5, where it is announced that the account of Philip’s defeat at Cynoscephalae will be followed by a comparison of the Macedonian phalanx and the Roman legion, so that the readers “may not, like foolish men, talk simply of chance and felicitate the victors without giving any reason for it” (ἵνα μὴ τύχην λέγοντες μόνον μακαρίζωμεν τοὺς κρατοῦντας ἀλόγως, καθάπερ οἱ μάταιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων), but may know “the true causes” (τὰς ἀληθεῖς αἰτίας) why the Romans prevail on the battlefield.4 These contradictions have attracted scholarly attention, and much ink has been spilt in the effort to explain them.5 It has been aptly pointed out, for instance, that the statements rejecting supernatural interpretations are mainly found in polemical parts of the work. In the case of Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps that we saw above, Polybius’ critical comments are aimed at other historians who magnified the difficulty of the venture so much that they were forced to call upon the supernatural element in order to explain its successful outcome (3.47.6–9). Similarly, his discussion at 10.2.5–13 on the true causes of Scipio’s success is also prompted by narratives of his fellow-historians that painted a different picture; this becomes especially apparent at 10.9.2–3, where Polybius wonders why historians insist on attributing the fall of New Carthage to the gods and fortune (εἰς δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὴν τύχην ἀναφέρουσι τὸ γεγονὸς κα-

 4 Cf. 6.51–52, where the superiority of the Romans over the Carthaginians is demonstrated via a presentation of their political systems and their specific ways of organizing and carrying out military enterprises. 5 See, e.g., Roveri 1956; Walbank 1957, 21–25; Pédech 1964, 331–354; Ferrary 1988, 265–276; Hau 2011.

The function of fortune in the Histories  

τόρθωμα), when Scipio himself revealed his plans and calculations regarding the enterprise in his letter to Philip. Many scholars have also noted that the concept of fortune as a supernatural force that intervenes in and shapes history is also found in strongly rhetorical passages.6 One such case is 1.4.1, since in the proem this rhetorical flourish serves to highlight the importance and originality of the work. The image of the unification of the world by fortune arouses reader interest in the events about to be related by praising their uniqueness. The same image recurs at 8.2.3–4, where Polybius supports his decision to write a universal history with the argument that this is the only historiographical genre suitable for providing a satisfactory depiction of the interweaving of events. Given that the phenomenon of symploke is generally stressed by Polybius as a distinctive feature of the period he is concerned with, its linking with fortune, which appears to be an established tactic of the historian, lends drama and grandeur to the contents of his history. At 15.9.3–5, where fortune is depicted as turning the clash between Hannibal and Scipio Africanus at Zama into a contest with the mastery of the whole world as a prize (οὐδὲ μὴν ἆθλα μείζω τὴν τύχην ἐκτεθεικυῖαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις τῶν τότε προκειμένων), the rhetorical overture is justified by the fact that the narrative has reached a critical point.7 This is the battle that will determine not only the outcome of the war but also the future ruler of the world. There is also a strong rhetorical flavor to those passages where fortune imposes a just punishment on characters for their crimes, for example 4.81.5 and 15.20.4–8; the same goes for 4.2.4, where the simultaneous accession of young kings to thrones of the Hellenistic world is metaphorically described as a complete rebuilding of the world by fortune (διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν τύχην ὡσανεὶ κεκαινοποιηκέναι πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην). This distinction between passages in which other authors are criticized for their tendency to attribute to fortune events whose causes have a rational explanation, and passages obviously intended to arouse readers’ interest by means of a rhetorical flourish, largely resolves the apparent contradiction which has been observed at various times in the way in which fortune is depicted in the Histories.8 It must be stressed, however, that both the rejection of other au-

 6 See Shorey 1921; Mioni 1949, 140–147; Roveri 1956; Hau 2011. 7 See Hau 2011, 191 for further rhetorical elements in this passage. 8 For a different attempt to overcome the contradictions in the use of fortune in the Histories see Brouwer 2011, who approaches the issue from the point of view of Stoicism. For the similarities between Stoicism and the concept of fortune in Polybius see also Darbo–Peschanski 2007, 302–308.

  Leadership and the Vicissitudes of Fortune thors’ supernatural interpretations, and the rhetorical or metaphorical use of fortune, are directly linked to their specific contexts and the narrative purposes they serve, and should not give the misleading impression that Polybius ignores the effect on people’s lives of factors beyond their control. The warning that the successful outcome of enterprises is not guaranteed even when all the necessary measures are taken often recurs in his analytical comments. At 8.36.8 he notes, for example, that Achaeus was captured although he had not omitted to take any measure to ensure his safety, instead “foreseeing and providing against every contingency as far as it was possible for human intelligence to do so” (ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων προνοηθείς, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἀνθρωπίνῃ γνώμῃ δυνατὸν ἦν). Similarly, at 15.16.1 it is stated that Hannibal, who at the battle of Zama did all he could to win (οὕτως ἐνδεχομένως Ἀννίβας ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἡρμόσατο παρ᾽ αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν ὥσθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν μὴ καταλιπεῖν), was nevertheless defeated.9 Thus nobody is safe from sudden reversals of fortune, not even the most able generals or those who have generally been lucky, like Philopoemen, who was finally struck by ill-fortune (τῆς τύχης μέντοι γ᾽ ἥττων), although he was thought in all his previous life to have been favored by fortune (23.12.3). At 2.7.1–3 it is noted that such ills, which are not the fault of those who suffer them but are due to fortune and those who inflict them, are met with understanding (τῆς τύχης δὲ καὶ τῶν πραξάντων ἐστίν ἔγκλημα … τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τύχης πταίουσιν ἔλεος ἕπεται). Moreover, the observation that it is important to take the mutability of fortune into account, is a frequent moral following descriptions of great successes or failures.10

 9 It is worth noting, though, that at 15.16.6 Hannibal’s defeat at Zama is not attributed solely to ill-fortune but also — and perhaps primarily — to his opponent’s ability: ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὅτε καὶ ταὐτόματον ἀντέπραξε ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε πάλιν κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν ἄλλου κρείττονος ἀντέτυχεν; ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε γεγονέναι περὶ ἐκεῖνον φήσειεν ἄν τις (“For there are times when Fortune counteracts the plans of valiant men, and again at times, as the proverb says, ‘A brave man meets another braver yet,’ as we may say happened in the case of Hannibal.”) 10 Cf., for example, the way in which Polybius comments on the defeat of M. Atilius Regulus after his successive victories and the attitude of Scipio Aemilianus during the firing of Carthage at 1.35.1–2 and 38.21.2–3 respectively. 1.35.1–2: ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ πολλά τις ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐπισημαινόμενος εὕροι πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίου συντελεσθέντα. καὶ γὰρ τὸ διαπιστεῖν τῇ τύχῃ, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὰς εὐπραγίας, ἐναργέστατον ἐφάνη πᾶσιν τότε διὰ τῶν Μάρκου συμπτωμάτων (“In these events there will be found by one who notes them aright much to contribute to the better conduct of human life. For the precept to distrust Fortune, and especially when we are enjoying success, was most clearly enforced on all by Regulus’s misfortunes”); 38.21.2–3: τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις κατορθώμασι καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν συμφοραῖς ἔννοιαν λαμβάνειν τῶν οἰκείων πραγμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας περιστάσεως καὶ καθόλου πρόχειρον ἔχειν ἐν

The function of fortune in the Histories  

It is of course unclear whether the frequent references to the influence of fortune refer to the will of a supernatural force or to concurrences of events and coincidences that are not subject to human control and rational analysis. Often, however, one has the feeling that the “double determination” familiar from Homer and Herodotus — the joint operation of the human and the supernatural factor — is also at work in the Histories.11 A typical case, for example, is that of Scipio Aemilianus, who was able to develop the virtues of generosity and courage due not only to his natural inclination but also to the right circumstances.12 The same even seems to apply, despite Polybius’ attempt to prove that his brilliant achievements were due to his abilities, to Scipio Africanus, of whom it is said at 10.40.6 that “fortune had favored him” (καὶ τῆς τύχης αὐτῷ συνεκδραμούσης). In relation to the central theme of the work, the rise of Rome, the concept of double determination evidently means that fortune favored the Romans’ plans, orchestrating developments throughout the world in such a way as to serve the expansion of their rule, precisely because they prevailed over their  ταῖς ἐπιτυχίαις τὴν τῆς τύχης ἐπισφάλειαν ἀνδρός ἐστι μεγάλου καὶ τελείου καὶ συλλήβδην ἀξίου μνήμης (“For at the moment of our greatest triumph and of disaster to our enemies to reflect on our own situation and on the possible reversal of circumstances, and generally to bear in mind at the season of success the mutability of Fortune, is like a great and perfect man, a man in short worthy to be remembered.”) 11 Hau 2011 also refers to double determination in Polybius, but she bases her interpretation on the comparison between 1.1.5 (πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν οὐχ ὅλοις πεντήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαίων) and 6.2.3 (πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν οὐδ᾽ ὅλοις πεντήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἔπεσεν) on the one hand, and 8.2.3–4 (τίνι τρόπῳ καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας τὸ παραδοξότατον καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἔργον ἡ τύχη συνετέλεσε; τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστι τὸ πάντα τὰ γνωριζόμενα μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀγαγεῖν) on the other, where, as she notes, unlike the other two passages, the subject of the sentence is not Rome itself but tychê (192). At 1.1.5 and 6.2.3, however, the subject is the nations of the whole world (ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην; πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην). Nor, indeed, would it be accurate to argue that Rome is the intended subject of the sentences, because, if τίνι γένει πολιτείας refers to the Roman polity, πῶς includes all the military and diplomatic operations that led to the known world falling under Roman dominion; even those which Rome did not participate in but which due to the interweaving of events contributed to its becoming the ruler of the world. By avoiding making Rome the subject of the above sentences, Polybius turns readers’ attention to the uniqueness of the phenomenon (the phrase ὃ πρότερον οὐχ εὑρίσκεται γεγονός appears verbatim in all three passages), while leaving the field open for the addition of fortune to the overall picture. 12 See 31.25.10: πολλὰ δ᾽ αὐτῷ καὶ ταὐτόματον συνήργησε πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ταύτην (“but chance too helped him much in carrying out this resolve”); 31.29.2: καλὸν μὲν οὖν τι πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολὴν αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ τῆς τύχης ἐγένετο συνέργημα (“Chance, however, assisted him also in this determination.”)

  Leadership and the Vicissitudes of Fortune enemies thanks to their abilities and proved the most suitable candidates to assume the role of world leader at that particular moment in time.13 In his monograph on Polybius, Maier argues that the characters of the Histories are exposed to a complex reality, in which uncertainty predominates, the possibility of prediction is severely limited, and events usually unfold differently than expected.14 Paradoxically, however, Maier disconnects the view of history that he identifies in the work from Polybius’ belief in the role of fortune.15 One of his key arguments is that the passages attributing events to fortune do not reflect the views of Polybius but rather those of his characters. Maier notes, for instance — to mention only two of the examples he discusses — that although at 1.59.4 it is stated that the Romans withdrew from the sea “yielding to the blows of fortune” (εἴξαντες τοῖς ἐκ τῆς τύχης συμπτώμασι), in the account of the event the wrecking of their fleets is attributed to the commanders’ lack of judgement and experience (ἧς τὴν αἰτίαν οὐχ οὕτως εἰς τὴν τύχην ὡς εἰς τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἐπανοιστέον, 1.37.3; διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, 1.39.3). Similarly, at 1.35.2 we are given the impression that the defeat of Μ. Atilius Regulus in Africa was due to fortune (τὸ διαπιστεῖν τῇ τύχῃ … ἐναργέστατον ἐφάνη πᾶσι τότε διὰ τῶν Μάρκου συμπτωμάτων), whereas in the preceding narrative it is rationally explained by Xanthippus’ presence in the opposing camp and the erroneous actions of Regulus himself.16 Firstly, it is worth noting that both examples are taken from passages in which Polybius offers an appraisal of the narrated events. Although Maier does recognize this with regard to 1.59.4, since, as he observes, “the gaze into the

 13 Cf. von Fritz 1954, 393. The concept of double determination is certainly quite widespread in ancient Greek literature, not just historiography, but it is worth pointing out its special importance in the case of Alexander. As we see, for example, from the treatment of the question in Plutarch’s two speeches On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander, how far the deeds of the iconic Macedonian general were due to the favor of fortune or his own abilities was a subject of intense discussion. Plutarch examines the same issue with reference to the Romans in On the Fortune of the Romans, where, contrary to his texts on Alexander, he does not reject the positive contribution of fortune in their rise to grandeur — a choice of topic which shows, if anything, how closely the paths of these great conquerors were linked in the ancient imagination. 14 Maier 2012. 15 See, e.g., Maier 2012, 246: “Die von mir durchgeführte Deutung einer radikalen Tyche– Dekonstruktion will somit einen Beitrag zum Verständnis jener schwierigen Problematik leisten, die bei der Lektüre jeden Leser in ihren Bann zieht, jedoch im Hinblick auf Polybios’ Geschichtsverständnis eine weitaus geringere Rolle einnimmt, als ihr vielfaches Auftauchen im Text vermuten lassen könnte.” 16 Maier 2012, 229–230.

Leaders’ preparations  

Roman soul” ends at 1.59.3, to be followed by Polybius’ recapitulation of the Romans’ naval misadventures from his own point of view, he nevertheless claims that the reference to fortune reproduces the Romans’ own perception, interpreting this as a deliberate game with constant shifts in focalization.17 If we now examine the two passages which supposedly contradict 1.59.4, we will see that at 1.37.3, the phrase οὐχ οὕτως … ὡς is primarily intended to define a factor that led to the sinking of the Roman fleet, rather than to eliminate fortune from the equation. The fact that Polybius is in a position to identify the recklessness of the Roman commanders, who, despite the captains’ warnings, insisted on following a dangerous course, as a determining factor in the disaster, apparently does not prevent him from then describing the destruction of the fleet in a storm as a blow of fortune. At 1.39.3 the Romans’ ignorance is responsible for their running aground on a shoal (προσπεσόντες εἴς τινα βραχέα διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν), and not for the sinking of the fleet, which occurs later on, in the open sea (1.39.6). Finally, concerning 1.35.2, the reference to fortune (τὸ διαπιστεῖν τῇ τύχῃ) is not intended to shift the blame for Regulus’ defeat to the supernatural sphere, but is justified by the sudden reversal of his situation, since, after his inflexible and arrogant behavior towards his opponents, he found himself in the position of the defeated, begging for mercy (1.35.3). Thus in this case, too, there is no contradiction with the previous narrative that would lead us to understand this comment as being made by the characters rather than the author himself.

. Leaders’ preparations In an environment where the best-laid plans of men so often prove futile and deceptive, carrying out military enterprises requires particular circumspection (πολλὴν μὲν ἐπισκέψεως χρείαν ἔχειν τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τὰς πολεμικὰς ἐπιβολάς, 9.12.1). Success is possible if one puts one’s plan into action with prudence (ἐὰν σὺν νῷ τις πράττῃ τὸ προτεθέν, 9.12.1). Polybius also notes that even when military operations are implemented at the right time, more fail than are successful (9.12.3), and that the failures are primarily due to the ignorance or negligence of the leaders (παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἡγουμένων ἀγνοίας ἢ ῥᾳθυμίας ἐπιτελεῖται τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, 9.12.4). Polybius’ answer to this problem is that many mistakes could be avoided if leaders had the necessary knowledge and abilities to bring their endeavors to fruition.18 Thus, in an extensive digression  17 Maier 2012, 229 with n. 89. 18 Cf. Maier 2012, 281–282.

  Leadership and the Vicissitudes of Fortune (9.12.6–26), he explains in detail what type of knowledge is most useful in military enterprises and how it may be acquired, referring to certain historical episodes which would have taken a completely different turn had their protagonists possessed that knowledge. Before beginning his presentation, Polybius stresses that the success of military operations lies in the details and requires careful planning and skillful manipulation. The time and place of the actions must be fixed, secrecy must be kept, specific signals must be used, and the means, confederates, and plan of action ensured (9.12.8). And although a single detail may lead to failure, “correctness in every detail is barely enough for success” (πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατορθοῦν μόλις ἱκανὰ πάντα, 9.12.10). The emphasis on the difficulties inherent in military operations is intended to justify the multitude of qualifications that Polybius is about to demand from aspiring generals. His protest at the conclusion of the digression also serves the same end — even artists, he says, display greater diligence and zeal than those who aspire to the exalted rank of strategos (9.20.9). Commanding an army, for the Megalopolitan historian, is an art; and like every art, it has its own rules and requires training and effort to be exercised successfully. A general must have experience of day and night marches and know the distances to be travelled by land and sea (9.13.6). He should also be able to calculate time by observing the sky (9.13.7). It is very important that he should be familiar with the location of the enterprise, as this is often the determining factor in its outcome, making the seemingly impossible possible and vice versa (9.13.8). He must also choose those concerned in the affair carefully and pay attention to signals and counter signals (9.13.9). And even once the general has arranged all the practical matters down to the smallest detail, he must keep his plans secret; he should not reveal them, carried away by his emotions, but only announce them to those without whom they cannot be carried out, and even then no earlier than the moment he requires their services (9.13.2–3). He must, moreover, be careful not to betray himself not only by his words but also by his facial expressions and actions (9.13.5). Polybius states that the general acquires some of these necessary skills through practice (ἐκ τριβῆς), others through personal inquiry (ἐξ ἱστορίας), and yet others through experience by means of methodical study (κατ᾽ ἐμπειρίαν μεθοδικήν, 9.14.1).19 In the last case, Polybius explains at 9.14.5, he is referring  19 Cf. 11.8.1–3, where it is stated that anyone can train in the art of strategy via: (a) the study of historical works (πρώτου μὲν διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκ τούτων κατασκευῆς); (b) methodical teaching by specialists (ἑτέρου δὲ τοῦ μεθοδικοῦ καὶ τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἐμπείρων ἀνδρῶν

Leaders’ preparations  

to a knowledge of astronomy and geometry. Polybius does not expect aspiring generals to become experts in these sciences, but to understand all that will assist them in their work (cf. 9.20.1, 9.20.6). Thus, based on their knowledge of the summer and winter solstices, the equinoxes and the zodiac cycle, for example, they will be able to determine when to start their operations and calculate the distances to be travelled (9.15.1–11). Similarly, understanding the concepts of proportion and equation of shapes will allow them to calculate the length of scaling ladders and modify the shape and space of their camps (9.19.5–20.3). Polybius even gives some historical examples to show that, had their protagonists possessed a knowledge of astronomy and geography, the outcome of their efforts would have been completely different. Specifically, he refers to the failures of Aratus, Cleomenes, and Philip V to conquer Cynaetha, Megalopolis, and Melitaea respectively, as well as Nicias’ decision to delay the Athenian army’s withdrawal from Syracuse due to his superstitiousness. Cleomenes and Philip did not set out at the right time, with the result that the former arrived after dawn had already broken, while the latter arrived too early, before the city’s inhabitants had gone to sleep (9.18.2–3, 9.18.6–7). Moreover, Philip went to Melitaea with ladders that were too short to reach the top of the walls (9.18.5). Nicias, for his part, could have saved the Athenian army but missed the chance to do so because he took the eclipse of the moon to be an evil omen (9.19.1). Aratus’ failure is particularly interesting. He had agreed with his accomplices in Cynaetha to attack when they sent one of their men to a predetermined point outside the city, to let him know that they had eliminated the gate guards (9.17.1–4). By coincidence, however, the owner of a flock of sheep happened to emerge from the city at the same time and stand at the same place, searching for his shepherd (9.17.6). As soon as Aratus saw him, he thought that this was the signal and made a rush for the city, with the result that his attempt failed, as nothing had been prepared (9.17.7–8). Aratus’ failure could apparently be attributed to a purely chance event, such as the appearance of the wrong person in the agreed place at the same time. However, Polybius narrates this episode in order to emphasize that Aratus himself was to blame for the error because he had only arranged a single signal, being “still young and ignorant of the accuracy secured by double signals and counter signals” (νέον ἀκμὴν ὄντα καὶ τῆς

 παραδόσεως); and (c) familiarity with and personal experience of the subject matter (τρίτου δὲ τοῦ διὰ τῆς ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἕξεως καὶ τριβῆς). Although Walbank 1967, 280 believes that by point (b) Polybius appears to mean personal tutoring rather than the study of specialized treatises, I would argue that the juxtaposition with 9.14.1 indicates that he must be referring to both. For a useful discussion of the two passages see recently Moore 2020, 23–28.

  Leadership and the Vicissitudes of Fortune τῶν διπλῶν συνθημάτων καὶ παρασυνθημάτων ἄπειρον, 9.17.9). Aratus’ mistake shows that knowledge and experience can help generals to avoid unpleasant happenings due to the forces of chance, so as to carry out their duties more effectively. Polybius does not deny that the execution of military enterprises depends on a plethora of unknowns, with the result that it most often ends in failure (9.16.2–3): ἱκανὰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ παρὰ δόξαν γινόμενα μὴ δυνάμενα τυγχάνειν προνοίας ἀκριβοῦς εἰς τὸ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρασκευάζειν καὶ πολλάκις, οἷον ὄμβρων καὶ ποταμῶν ἐπιφοραὶ καὶ πάγων ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ χιόνες, ἔτι δ᾽ ὁ καπνώδης καὶ συννεφὴς ἀὴρ καὶ τἄλλα τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις. For those accidents which take us by surprise and cannot be accurately foreseen are quite sufficiently numerous to expose us to great and frequent difficulties, I mean sudden rains and floods, exceeding great frosts and snowfalls, a foggy and clouded state of the atmosphere and the like.

However, the existence of all these unforeseeable hindrances does not absolve generals of responsibility for the results of their efforts; on the contrary, it makes it all the more necessary that they should attend to the things which they can control. As Polybius remarks at 9.16.5, “if we pay no attention even to such things as can be foreseen, we are sure to fail in most enterprises by our own fault” (εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ ὧν δυνατόν ἐστι προϊδέσθαι, καὶ τούτων ὀλιγωρήσομεν, πῶς οὐκ εἰκότως ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἀποτευξόμεθα δι᾽ αὑτούς;). Knowledge and experience, combined with an interest in and attention to every detail, may not guarantee success, but they do significantly increase the chances of achieving it, allowing generals to predict some potential errors and prepare themselves accordingly in order to avoid them.

. Historical knowledge and possibilities of prediction The Histories record many cases of successful prediction of future developments and coming difficulties. The verb προορῶμαι occurs in the relevant passages over 40 times, often with μέλλον as its object, while other verbs with a similar meaning are also used, such as ὀττεύομαι, προλέγω, and προνοοῦμαι.20 The  20 See, e.g., 1.10.9: ὃ προορώμενοι; 1.11.15: ὀττευσάμενός τι; 1.27.2: διὰ τὸ προορᾶσθαι τὸ μέλλον; 1.54.6: προορώμενοι τὸ μέλλον καὶ προλέγοντες τὸ συμβησόμενον; 2.47.4: προορώμενος Ἄρατος τὸ μέλλον; 3.112.7: προορωμένων δὲ καὶ προλαμβανόντων τὰ συμβησόμενα ταῖς

Historical knowledge and possibilities of prediction  

predictions in the Histories often involve issues of strategy, and therefore presuppose knowledge, experience, observational skills and sound judgement. At 1.54.6 it is pointed out that the captains of the Carthaginian ships saved the fleet thanks to their familiarity with the area and their experience, which allowed them to foresee the coming storm and escape in time (διά τε τὴν τῶν τόπων καὶ τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἐμπειρίαν προορώμενοι τὸ μέλλον καὶ προλέγοντες τὸ συμβησόμενον). The link, of course, between experience and prediction is not always expressly stated; it is usually implied by the context, as, for example, at 5.92.7–8, where Aratus, planning for the future (προνοούμενος τοῦ μέλλοντος), decrees that Messenia, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Argos should be guarded. The observation immediately following, that these cities border Laconia and so are the first to suffer Spartan attacks, explains why Aratus provided for their safety (5.92.9). On the contrary, at 27.16.5, where it is described how the Roman consul A. Hostilius was saved from the ambush set for him by those wishing to deliver him to Perseus, when his host suspected what was about to happen and helped him escape by night, the way in which this was predicted is not explained — instead, we are told that his host Nestor mysteriously divined the future (δαιμονίως πως ὁ Νέστωρ τὸ μέλλον ὀττευσάμενος). Nestor may, likely enough, have acted on information he had received, but Polybius does not examine this possibility and attributes Hostilius’ escape to fortune (εἰ μὴ τύχη τις ἐβράβευσε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖ διαφυγεῖν). This passage, however, appears to be an exception. The type of prediction referred to by Polybius is that based on knowledge, experience, information processing, or common sense at the very least. And in general, attributing a correct prediction to a character, regardless of how the prediction is arrived at, is a positive indication of success and overcoming difficulties. Perhaps the most famous passage in which Polybius associates knowledge with the possibility of prediction is not found in accounts of military operations but in a theoretical discussion in the sixth book on the famous anacyclosis or “recycling” of forms of government.21 Having analyzed the way in which the transition from one constitutional form to another takes place, Polybius observes that the sequence is adhered to so precisely and systematically, that once

 ἐννοίαις; 5.92.7: προνοούμενος τοῦ μέλλοντος; 7.17.5: προορώμενοι καὶ δεδιότες τὸ συμβησόμενον; 21.11.4: προείδετο τὸ μέλλον ἐνδεχομένως; 27.4.7: προορᾶσθαι καὶ φυλάττεσθαι; 28.6.4: προορώμενος τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ἐσομένης ἐξουσίας περὶ τοὺς κρατήσαντας; 30.2.1: ὀττευσάμενος ὁ βασιλεὺς τὸ μέλλον. 21 On Polybius’ presentation of the theory of anacyclosis see Walbank 1972, 137–142; Trompf 1979, 4–59; Alonso–Núñez 1986; Podes 1991; Hahm 1995.

  Leadership and the Vicissitudes of Fortune one understands it, one is in a position to discern which system will follow (6.9.10–11): ταῦτά τις σαφῶς ἐπεγνωκὼς χρόνοις μὲν ἴσως διαμαρτήσεται λέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος περὶ πολιτείας, τὸ δὲ ποῦ τῆς αὐξήσεως ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἢ τῆς φθορᾶς ἢ ποῦ μεταστήσεται σπανίως ἂν διασφάλλοιτο, χωρὶς ὀργῆς ἢ φθόνου ποιούμενος τὴν ἀπόφασιν. Anyone who clearly perceives this may indeed in speaking of the future of any state be wrong in his estimate of the time the process will take, but if his judgement is not tainted by animosity or jealousy, he will very seldom be mistaken as to the stage of growth or decline it has reached, and as to the form into which it will change.

The factor that permits the prediction of the next stage in this process is evidently knowing the sequence of the constitutions (ταῦτά τις σαφῶς ἐπεγνωκώς). Taking his cue from this idea, Momigliano commented of Polybius that “when he came to historical narrative, he forgot cycles.”22 Momigliano’s ingenious observation, however, should not give the impression that Polybius’ optimistic view of the predictive power of history is limited to the sixth book and this specific context. Knowledge in Polybius is generally linked to the possibility of predicting future situations, even when it does not concern a systematically repeated model of sequential phenomena such as the anacyclosis of political constitutions. The idea that through knowledge one can express valid hypotheses about the future and prepare more effectively for what one may face is fundamental to the way in which Polybius conceives of his role as a historian and the value of history. Polybius repeatedly stresses that the study of history can be a useful guide to the future. As early as the opening of the first book, he states that “men have no more ready corrective of conduct than knowledge of the past” (μηδεμίαν ἑτοιμοτέραν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διόρθωσιν τῆς τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων ἐπιστήμης). He adds that there is no need for him to expand on this, since all his fellow-historians start from, and end at, the observation that a knowledge of history “is the soundest education and training for a life of active politics” (ἀληθινωτάτην μὲν εἶναι παιδείαν καὶ γυμνασίαν πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις), and that recalling the calamities of others helps us to bear the vicissitudes we will face ourselves (1.1.1–2). In fact, of course, despite his resounding refusal to expand on this subject, Polybius will return to it in his account of the sudden

 22 Momigliano 1977a, 167; cf. Momigliano 1977b, 189: “But the main consideration is that outside the constitutional chapters, in the rest of his history, Polybius operates as if he did not hold any cyclical view of history.”

Historical knowledge and possibilities of prediction  

reversal of fortune suffered by Μ. Atilius Regulus, who, from a successful and merciless conqueror, ended up begging his Carthaginian enemies for his life (1.35.6–10): ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ἐπεμνήσθην χάριν τῆς τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι διορθώσεως. δυεῖν γὰρ ὄντων τρόπων πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον μεταθέσεως, τοῦ τε διὰ τῶν ἰδίων συμπτωμάτων καὶ τοῦ διὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἐναργέστερον μὲν εἶναι συμβαίνει τὸν διὰ τῶν οἰκείων περιπετειῶν, ἀβλαβέστερον δὲ τὸν διὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. διὸ τὸν μὲν οὐδέποθ᾽ ἑκουσίως αἱρετέον, ἐπεὶ μετὰ μεγάλων πόνων καὶ κινδύνων ποιεῖ τὴν διόρθωσιν, τὸν δ᾽ ἀεὶ θηρευτέον, ἐπεὶ χωρὶς βλάβης ἔστιν συνιδεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιον. ἐξ ὧν συνιδόντι καλλίστην παιδείαν ἡγητέον πρὸς ἀληθινὸν βίον τὴν ἐκ τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας περιγινομένην ἐμπειρίαν· μόνη γὰρ αὕτη χωρὶς βλάβης ἐπὶ παντὸς καιροῦ καὶ περιστάσεως κριτὰς ἀληθινοὺς ἀποτελεῖ τοῦ βελτίονος. This I mention for the sake of the improvement of the readers of this history. For there are two ways by which all men can reform themselves, the one through their own mischances, the other through those of others, and of these the former is the more impressive, but the latter less hurtful. Therefore we should never choose the first method if we can help it, as it corrects by means of great pain and peril, but ever pursue the other, since by it we can discern what is best without suffering hurt. Reflecting on this we should regard as the best discipline for actual life the experience that accrues from serious history; for this alone makes us, without inflicting any harm on us, the most competent judges of what is best at every time and in every circumstance.

For Polybius, the educational value of historical exempla is comparable to that of personal experience. As from their mistakes and failures, so too from history, readers can draw useful lessons for the future — and, what is more, from the safety of their study, without being subjected to pain and peril. Juxtaposing Polybius’ belief in the possibility of self-improvement through history with his emphasis on the necessity of personal experience for historians, Sacks identifies a logical contradiction. Whereas Polybius denies historians the possibility of creating a useful work, when this is not the fruit of their personal research and familiarity with the matters they discuss but is based exclusively on the reading of other historical texts, he also says that readers can be improved through the experiences of others.23 In his recent monograph, Moore raises this question and concludes that a knowledge of history is presented as operating not simply as a substitute for personal experience but as a necessary complement to it, although he warns that Polybius’ views on the matter are

 23 Sacks 1981, 191–192. For the importance Polybius places on the political and military experience of the historian see 12.27–28a.

  Leadership and the Vicissitudes of Fortune often contradictory and not fully clarified.24 It is worth noting, however, that at 1.35.6–10, too, Polybius does not overlook the fact that personal experiences leave livelier and stronger impressions that historical exempla (ἐναργέστερον μὲν εἶναι συμβαίνει).25 A lack of experientiality, however, not only does not undermine the educational function of history but is ultimately counterbalanced by the safety and ease of drawing knowledge and lessons from texts. Polybius does not correlate the prospect of benefiting from the study of history only with the author’s skill and the quality of his work, but also with the intelligence and maturity of the reader.26 At 15.21.7–8 he expresses his indignation at the fact that humans often prove lower than the animals as regards their readiness to learn from others’ mistakes. Animals, he says, not only if they themselves have been trapped by baits and nets but even when they see another animal in danger, are wary and unlikely to be caught in the same trap. Men, however, even when they have seen whole cities destroyed by demagogues, on hearing promises of easy gains at others’ expense will approach the snare without a second thought, even though they know than no one has ever been saved in this way.27 Polybius’ remark indicates that the discussion of historical exem-

 24 See, e.g., Moore 2020, 2: “Although Polybius has much to say on this topic, his explicit comments fail to answer this question fully and at times even further confuse the issue through apparent contradictions”; 33: “… the historian’s views on the practical value of history for future statesmen are not made clear by his frequent discussions of the subject.” 25 Moore 2020, 18–20 identifies a further contradiction between this comment and Polybius’ claim at 1.1.2 that recalling the calamities of others is the plainest way of learning (ἐναργεστάτην … διδάσκαλον) to bear the vicissitudes of fortune bravely. However, Polybius’ intervention at this point, prompted by the reversal suffered by M. Atilius Regulus, in fact complements his argument in the proem on the educational value of history, presenting a case in which the study of history familiarizes readers with the vicissitudes of fortune without them having to suffer any unpleasantness themselves. There is no need to invoke the particular rhetorical aims of the proem in order to justify the use of the superlative ἐναργεστάτην. If some comparison is hinted at, this is between history and other objects of study (οὕτως ἐκπαθὴς πρός τι τῶν ἄλλων θεαμάτων ἢ μαθημάτων, 1.1.6). There would only be a substantial contradiction if Polybius were to claim somewhere that the study of history teaches more plainly and effectively than personal experience; he does not, however, do so. 26 Polybius links the benefit to be gained from the study of history primarily with the genres of pragmatike historia and universal history. Cf. 1.2.8; 1.4.10–11; 1.35.9–10. 27 For people’s reluctance to benefit from the teachings of history see also 5.75.2–6, where Polybius states that “indeed it seems to me that man, who is supposed to be the most cunning of all animals, is in fact the most easily duped” (πάντων τῶν ζῴων εὐπαραλογιστότατον ὑπάρχειν ἄνθρωπος, δοκοῦν εἶναι πανουργότατον), and that people tend to spare no pains and expense to safeguard themselves from possible dangers, while neglecting the study of history,

Historical knowledge and possibilities of prediction  

pla cannot prove educational and beneficial of itself, even when the account is a vivid and immediate one. The historian’s experience is important if he is to compose a work that will depict events accurately and identify their true causes without transmitting errors, but the benefit gained by the reader also depends on the reader’s own intentions and abilities. Polybius’ view is close to that expressed by L. Aemilius Paullus, when, referring to Perseus’ reversal of fortune, he asks the Roman senators to display moderation in the time of success (29.20.4): τοῦτο γὰρ διαφέρειν ἔφη τοὺς ἀνοήτους τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων, διότι συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις ἀτυχίαις παιδεύεσθαι, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς τῶν πέλας. “The difference,” he said, “between foolish and wise men lies in this, that the former are schooled by their own misfortunes and the latter by those of others.”

Aemilius Paullus’ observation could serve Polybius as an advertising slogan for his work. Contrary to aspiring historians, who are repeatedly exhorted in the Histories not to avoid toil and suffering in writing their work, the ease with which one can learn from history is not seen as laziness but as an advantage that readers are called upon to exploit, in order to improve their behavior and safely prepare for the problems they may face in future. As Polybius expressly states at 12.25b.3, cultivating the ability to predict future situations forms an important part of the defense against various difficulties and challenges provided by absorbing the lessons of history: ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐπὶ τοὺς οἰκείους μεταφερομένων καιροὺς ἀφορμαὶ γίνονται καὶ προλήψεις εἰς τὸ προϊδέσθαι τὸ μέλλον, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν εὐλαβηθῆναι, ποτὲ δὲ μιμούμενον τὰ προγεγονότα θαρραλεώτερον ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς ἐπιφερομένοις. For it is the mental transference of similar circumstances to our own times that gives us the means of forming presentiments of what is about to happen, and enables us at certain times to take precautions and at others by reproducing former conditions to face with more confidence the difficulties that menace us.

At 6.3.1–2 Polybius appears equally convinced that it is possible to make correct predictions about future outcomes: “it is an easy matter … to pronounce as to their future” (ῥᾳδίαν εἶναι συμβαίνει … καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀπόφασιν); “it is not hard to foretell the future by inference from the past” (τό τε προειπεῖν

 which is extremely useful at critical moments and allows them to gain a wide range of experiences in comfort.

  Leadership and the Vicissitudes of Fortune ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος στοχαζόμενον ἐκ τῶν ἤδη γεγονότων εὐμαρές). These optimistic statements are, of course, made with reference to the future development of Greek states, although it should be noted that the possibility of prognosis is not linked in this case with the theory of anacyclosis, which has not yet been presented in the work. Moreover, this idea is also an argument made by certain characters in the Histories in their orations. At 9.30.8, for example, the Aetolian envoy Chlaeneas, attempting to persuade the Spartans to join the Aetolians in their war against Philip, highlights precisely the ease with which one can use the past to predict the future: “It is indeed very easy to conjecture what will happen from the past” (λίαν δ᾽ εὐμαρῶς ἔστι συλλογίσασθαι τὸ μέλλον ἐκ τῶν ἤδη γεγονότων). Similarly, at 18.23.5, T. Quinctius Flamininus tries to boost his soldiers’ morale before the battle of Cynoscephalae by explaining that, based on their previous experiences with the Macedonians, they should expect to be victors again: “What need for you to dread a recurrence of former danger, when you should rather on the contrary derive confidence from memory of the past!” (τί δὲ προορᾶσθαι τῶν προγεγονότων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τἀναντία δι᾽ ἐκεῖνα καὶ νῦν θαρρεῖν;). In a somewhat paradoxical way, another case in point is 11.6.6, where the Rhodian Thrasycrates, although warning the Aetolians that “much of the future escapes human foresight” (πολλὰ διαφεύγει τῶν μελλόντων τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην πρόνοιαν), is actually encouraging them to turn their attention to what they can predict, drawing conclusions about the future from what is happening now: “it should be your duty now at last, when these occurrences have opened your eyes to facts, to take better counsel for the future” (νῦν γε δέον ἂν εἴη, διὰ τούτων τῶν πραγμάτων συνεωρακότας τὸ συμβαῖνον, βέλτιον βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος).

. Historical recurrence in Polybius In the passages mentioned above, it is hinted that the study of history cultivates the ability to predict the future through familiarization with patterns and behaviors that may be repeated in later periods. This repetition does not necessarily presuppose a systematically cyclical view of history, but rather rests on the admission that the human condition is governed by certain fixed qualities which are likely to produce similar results in different eras. A characteristic passage describing this conviction is 1.37.7–10, where Polybius asserts that the Romans’ impetuosity and dynamism was the main reason for the sinking of their fleet south of Sicily. As he explains, this mentality usually ensures victory in military enterprises carried out on land. When faced with the sea, however, it often leads to accidents and losses: “It was so on this occasion and on many

Historical recurrence in Polybius  

others, and it will always continue to be so, until they correct this fault of daring and violence which makes them think they can sail and travel where they will at no matter what season” (ὃ καὶ τότε καὶ πλεονάκις αὐτοῖς ἤδη συνέβη καὶ συμβήσεται πάσχειν, ἕως ἄν ποτε διορθώσωνται τὴν τοιαύτην τόλμαν καὶ βίαν, καθ᾽ ἣν οἴονται δεῖν αὑτοῖς πάντα καιρὸν εἶναι πλωτὸν καὶ πορευτόν, 1.37.10). Polybius’ phrasing recalls Thucydides’ famous proclamation that his work will become “a possession for all time” (κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί) for future generations of readers who wish to gain a clear picture of all that occurred “as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it” (καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, Thuc. 1.22.4); and, perhaps even more directly, his observation that the calamities suffered by the Greek cities due to the civil conflicts “always will occur, as long as the nature of mankind remains the same” (καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, 3.82.2).28 The correlation of these passages has already been noted by Rood, who differentiated between the generality of Thucydides’ statements and the specific practical usefulness of Polybius’ advice, arguing that this difference is indicative of the two historians’ different approach overall.29 I would say, however, that the similarity of the passages is even more striking and revealing than their differences. Both historians appear to share the view that since human behavior does not change, the recurrence of historical phenomena is to be expected. The Histories contain some characteristic examples which seem to confirm this view, and in which, contrary to Momigliano’s criticism that after the anacyclosis of constitutions, cycles are forgotten in Polybius’ narrative,30 there may be found some kind of repetition in the occurrence of historical events. One such case is 22.18.10, where Alexander’s expedition in Asia is compared to Perseus’ war against the Romans. More specifically, Polybius says that, just as the Asian expedition was planned by Philip but carried out by his son Alexander, so too the war against the Romans was decided and prepared by Philip V but carried out by his son Perseus. Undoubtedly, Polybius’ aim here is to explain the difference between the cause, the pretext for, and the start of a war, rather than to draw attention to the repetitiveness of history. Nevertheless, this element is in fact stressed by the highlighting of the striking similarities on which Polybius bases his argument.

 28 The translations of Thucydides are by R. Crawley. 29 See Rood 2012, 63–64. 30 See above, n. 22.

  Leadership and the Vicissitudes of Fortune In the sixth book, moreover, circularity is not seen only in the sequence according to which each form of government changes and gives way to the next, but also in human behavior, which is presented as causing the change at each stage in the process. In Polybius’ account, the descendants of those who establish each form of government forget the causes that rendered its establishment necessary and adopt behaviors leading to its degeneration and collapse. So the descendants of those who establish kingship, for example, believing that they should stand out from their subjects, indulge in luxury and unlawful pleasures, changing the form of government into a tyranny and leading the citizens to desire its overthrow (6.7.6–8). Similarly, the descendants of those who establish an aristocracy, having been brought up in an atmosphere of power and ease, take their privileges for granted and by their arbitrary behavior convert the aristocracy into an oligarchy and prepare the ground for its dissolution (6.8.4–6). Finally, in the same way, the descendants of the founders of a democracy, not having experienced any other form of government, are unable to understand its value and, in order to promote their own interests, do not hesitate to turn it into an ochlocracy by corrupting the people and accustoming them to acts of violence and lawlessness (6.9.5–9). Polybius’ description demonstrates in the clearest way that human nature has certain fixed qualities, and that, as a result, similar behaviors are likely to arise under similar conditions. Another case of recurrence in Polybius is found in the narrative of the events of the Second Punic War. Studying the early stages of the war in the third book and its late stages in the fourteenth and fifteenth books, one can observe striking similarities and correlations. The situation in Africa, where the theatre of operations shifts at the end of the war, is in many respects similar to that in Italy at its start, with the difference that the roles of the main protagonists are reversed. Now it is the Carthaginians who find themselves in the difficult position of fighting not to conquer their enemies’ country but to preserve the territorial integrity of their own and save themselves, facing a particularly active and effective opponent. The exceptional leadership, the organizational skills, and the dynamism of Scipio Africanus match the image of a young and equally, if not more, charismatic Hannibal.31 And, conversely, the mistakes, failures, and omissions that prevent Syphax and Hasdrubal from averting the firing of their camps may be paralleled with the problematic behaviors of Hannibal’s enemies in Italy, which led the Roman armies to successive defeats.32 The Carthaginians  31 See 15.16.6: ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε πάλιν κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν ἄλλου κρείττονος ἀντέτυχεν (“and again at times, as the proverb says, ‘A brave man meets another braver yet’.”) 32 See above, § 2.1 and § 2.2.3.

Historical recurrence in Polybius  

are also reminiscent of the Romans in their emotional reactions when informed of the failures of their armies. The scenes of surprise, agitation, and anxiety that unfold in Rome after the defeats, for example, at the Trebia (ἐξενίζοντο μὲν τῷ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν, 3.68.9) and Lake Trasimene (τηλικαύτην συνέβη γενέσθαι διατροπήν … οὐ μετρίως οὐδὲ κατὰ σχῆμα τὴν περιπέτειαν ἔφερον, 3.85.8–9), or before the battle of Cannae (ἐκπλαγεῖς ἦσαν καὶ κατάφοβοι τὸ μέλλον, 3.107.15; ὀρθὴ καὶ περίφοβος ἦν ἡ πόλις, δεδιότων μὲν τῶν πολλῶν τὸ μέλλον, 3.112.7), are repeated in Carthage following the battle of the Camps (βαρέως ἔφερον τὸ γεγονός … τελέως ἐκπλαγεῖς ἦσαν καὶ περίφοβοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς, 14.6.7–8) and the battle of the Great Plains (ἔτι μείζω τότε συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν ταραχήν, 14.9.6). At 14.6.7–8, indeed, the parallels are even more conspicuous, as the emphasis on the dashing of the Carthaginians’ expectations — when, hoping to besiege their enemies in Utica, they ended up ceding to them control of the countryside and found themselves and their homeland in peril (τὸν περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη προσδοκᾶν κίνδυνον, τελέως ἐκπλαγεῖς ἦσαν καὶ περίφοβοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς) — seems to recall the corresponding frustrations of the Romans’ calculations when, thinking they would be fighting in Spain, they found themselves fighting close to Rome and throughout Italy (3.15.13, 3.16.6); and again later, after their defeat at Cannae, when they lost all hope of claiming dominion over Italy, fearing for their lives and the territorial integrity of their country (ἐν μεγάλοις δὲ φόβοις καὶ κινδύνοις ἦσαν περί τε σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους, 3.118.5). The correspondences between the beginning and the end of the Second Punic War could potentially be attributed to Polybius’ own tendency to repetition rather than to his intention of stressing the cyclic character of the events and their interconnection. However, this interpretation would be grossly unfair to Polybius’ authorial skills in this case, since his desire to draw attention to the parallels between the historical circumstances is unmistakable. A first sense of this is already provided in 11.24a.2–3, when, after the successful completion of his Spanish expedition, Scipio Africanus announces his intention to fight the Carthaginians because, as he says, “up to now the Carthaginians had been making war on the Romans, but now chance had given the Romans the opportunity of making war on the Carthaginians” (τὸν μὲν γὰρ πρὸ τούτου χρόνον Καρχηδονίους Ῥωμαίοις πεπολεμηκέναι, νυνὶ δὲ τὴν τύχην παραδεδωκέναι καιρὸν εἰς τὸ Ῥωμαίους Καρχηδονίοις ἐξενεγκεῖν πόλεμον). Scipio’s declaration seems to be referring to the reversal of the roles of aspiring conquerors and defenders that will occur in the final phase of the war. However, the most emphatic linking of the beginning and end of the war is found in Hannibal’s words to Scipio before the battle of Zama (15.6.4–7.9). Hannibal opens by noting the similarity between

  Leadership and the Vicissitudes of Fortune the situation the Carthaginians find themselves in now with that previously faced by the Romans (15.6.6: περὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους οὓς μὲν κεκινδυνευκέναι, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀκμὴν ἔτι καὶ νῦν κινδυνεύειν, “your native soil was once in imminent danger and our own still is”), before reminding his interlocutor that the general who now comes to negotiate for the salvation of his country is the same man who managed to conquer almost the whole of Italy and seemed to hold the fate of the Romans in his hands (15.7.3–4): εἰμὶ τοιγαροῦν Ἀννίβας ἐκεῖνος, ὃς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Κάνναις μάχην σχεδὸν ἁπάσης Ἰταλίας ἐγκρατὴς γενόμενος μετά τινα χρόνον ἧκον πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν Ῥώμην, καὶ στρατοπεδεύσας ἐν τετταράκοντα σταδίοις ἐβουλευόμην ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους πῶς ἐστί μοι χρηστέον, ὃς νῦν ἐν Λιβύῃ πάρειμι πρὸς σὲ Ῥωμαῖον ὄντα περὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων σωτηρίας κοινολογησόμενος. I, then, am that Hannibal who after the battle of Cannae became master of almost the whole of Italy, who not long afterwards advanced even up to Rome, and encamping at forty stades from the walls deliberated with myself how I should treat you and your native soil. And now here am I in Africa on the point of negotiating with you, a Roman, for the safety of myself and my country.

This introduction may seem unnecessary, but it is justified by, and heightens, the drama of the scene while also stressing the mutability of fortune, which has brought Hannibal, the would-be conqueror of Rome and the whole of Italy, to such a difficult pass.33 The similarity of the situations, of course, makes the reversal even more impressive. Hannibal, however, is concerned that Scipio may not be in a position to heed his warnings, because he is still young and all his enterprises until now have fallen out as he planned (καὶ διὰ τὸ νέον εἶναι κομιδῇ καὶ διὰ τὸ πάντα σοι κατὰ λόγον κεχωρηκέναι), and has not yet experienced the vicissitudes of fortune (15.7.1). This statement also refers back to the start of the war, where Hannibal himself was described by Polybius in similar terms (ἅτε νέος μὲν ὤν … ἐπιτυχὴς δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, 3.15.6).34 Moreover, as

 33 Grethlein 2013, 255 aptly notes that Hannibal’s warnings about the instability of human happiness are strongly reminiscent of Polybius’ beliefs on the role of fortune in history, giving his speech a meta-historical backdrop. 34 Cf. Eckstein 1995, 145: “Hannibal’s perception of Scipio echoes here what Polybius himself had said of the young and self-confident Hannibal in 3.15.” Moore 2020, 90 observes that Scipio was no longer that young and that this characterization is (wrongly) attributed to him by Hannibal rather than the author. I would suggest, however, that the emphasis on Scipio’s youth primarily serves Polybius’ wish to compare him to Hannibal (of New Carthage), in order to highlight the similarities both between the two men and between the beginning and the end of

Historical recurrence in Polybius  

the Carthaginian general tells his comrades shortly afterwards to boost their morale before the battle, many of the Romans they are about to fight are the descendants of those whom they repeatedly routed in Italy, and their commander is the son of the Roman general whom they defeated at the Trebia (15.11.8–11). The sense of cyclic recurrence appears to be echoed even in the presence of the direct descendants of the protagonists of the first phase of the war. Moore has recently argued that Polybius’ depiction of the meeting between Hannibal and Scipio is intended to contrast the two men and the different ways in which they were led to success.35 In Moore’s view, the critical difference between the two men lies in the fact that Hannibal learns and improves only from his personal experiences, whereas Scipio complements the experience he gains from participating in military enterprises with the lessons he learns from the study of history. The passage on which Moore essentially bases his interpretation is 10.7.1, where it is stated that Scipio realized, from the information he gathered through his research in Rome (ἱστορῶν ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ καὶ πυνθανόμενος), that his father’s failure was due to the betrayal of the Celtiberians and the division of the Roman army. This argument is, however, problematic for several reasons. Firstly, Polybius does not appear to connect this element with the military genius of Scipio, but mentions it in order to explain why, unlike the other Romans, he had not lost his courage (οὐδ᾽ ἥττητο τῇ ψυχῇ, 10.7.2). Scipio, to be sure, is depicted later on as deliberately attempting to avoid his father’s fate (10.7.7); however, by attributing his success to his recognition of his predecessors’ failures,36 one risks overlooking the fact that Scipio is portrayed as achieving his aims by demonstrating precisely the same skills by which Hannibal, too, secures victory.37 Moreover, the argument that Hannibal exclusively exploits his personal experiences is also debatable. At 3.34.2–3, for example, it is stated that before crossing the Alps, Hannibal had made sure to gather reliable information

 the war. For Polybius’ tendency to over-emphasize the youth of charismatic generals see McGing 2013, 186–187. 35 Moore 2020, 88: “Polybius composed this scene not simply in order to enhance his characterization of Hannibal but more importantly to contrast directly the two most prominent figures of this war and the distinct paths they have taken to achieve their success.” 36 See Moore 2020, 83: “In Polybius’ judgement, it is precisely Africanus’ understanding of the mistakes of others in the past that underlies his remarkable success in restoring the Roman prominence in Spain at this time.” 37 See above, § 2.1 and § 2.2.

  Leadership and the Vicissitudes of Fortune (σαφῶς ἐξητάκει) on the region and its inhabitants.38 Moore takes account of this passage, but asserts that Hannibal’s research concerned the circumstances at that moment, whereas Scipio’s concerned the past.39 Polybius, however, underlines that Hannibal was primarily informed (καὶ τὸ μέγιστον) of the locals’ enmity to the Romans due to the previous war (3.34.3). The interest in the reasons for this resentment of the Romans is no less a historical “exercise” than the investigation of the causes of the Roman army’s defeat in Spain. The idea that Scipio familiarized himself with the vicissitudes of fortune through the study of history is a reasonable hypothesis, but it is not enough to support the conclusion that Polybius uses it to justify the superiority (if any) of the Roman general over his opponent and to contrast the two men and their methods.40 One could provide many more examples showing that the cycles in the Histories are not forgotten after the theory of the anacyclosis of forms of government. The most obvious would probably be the several narrative patterns that recur in the work, such as the importance of knowing one’s enemy and of collecting and comparing all available information for the effective organization and implementation of military enterprises,41 the consequences of impulsiveness and overconfidence on the performance of generals on the battlefield,42 the tendency for towns to fall due to the defenders’ misplaced trust in their fortifications,43 the dangers that lie in wait when dealing with courtiers, mercenaries, or barbarians, and so on.44 Again, although the frequency of such patterns in the Histories could be interpreted as being due to the author’s notorious repetitive-

 38 Cf. 3.61.3, where the verb ἱστορῶ is also used of Hannibal, as it is of Scipio at 10.7.1: τὴν πορείαν ἱστορῶν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ Τυρρηνικοῦ πελάγους διὰ τῆς Ἰταλίας μέχρι πρὸς τὰς Ἄλπεις ὡς πολλὴ καὶ δυσδίοδος ὑπάρχει στρατοπέδοις (“and learning further by inquiry that the road through Italy from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Alps was likewise very long and not suited for the march of troops.”) 39 See Moore 2020, 89. 40 Cf. Stocks 2014, 21, who also stresses that the scene of the two generals’ encounter before the battle of Zama encourages their comparison: “Whilst Scipio acknowledges the fickleness of fortune, Tyche (15.8.3), his rejection of a peace (15.8.4–14) appears to set him on a path reminiscent of Hannibal.” 41 See, e.g., 3.81; 3.104.1–5; 10.7–9; 10.11.5–15.11; 14.1–5. 42 See, e.g., 3.69.7–74.11; 3.82–84; 3.90.6; 3.103.5–8; 3.104.6–105.9. 43 See, e.g., 3.18.3; 4.71; 7.15; 10.8.4–5. 44 See, e.g., 1.7.1–5; 1.43; 1.65–88; 2.7; 3.52–53; 3.78.2; 3.98.2–4; 4.84–87; 5.2.8–4.13; 5.41–42; 5.49–50; 5.78; 21.39.

Historical recurrence in Polybius  

ness, I would argue that it is, primarily, yet a further strong indication of Polybius’ belief in the recurrence of historical phenomena.45 Their familiarity with behaviors and phenomena that may be repeated is supposed to enable Polybius’ readers, like the successful leaders in his work, to predict and prevent possible problems and setbacks, and generally to implement their plans effectively. Of course, as we have seen, at 9.12.8–10 it is explicitly noted that the conduct of military operations is affected by such a multitude of factors that, even when everything has been meticulously prepared, success is still not guaranteed (πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατορθοῦν μόλις ἱκανὰ πάντα). Polybius at 9.4.6–7.6 recounts Hannibal’s failed attempt to attack Rome itself, precisely in order to show how easily a plan can go wrong due to factors that cannot always be controlled or predicted.46 Hannibal decided to head towards Rome when he realized that he could not raise Ap. Claudius Pulcher’s siege of Capua by battle. He thought that, if he appeared suddenly at Rome, he might have the chance to win a significant advantage against the city; and even if he did not succeed in taking Rome, he would force Claudius either to leave Capua to defend his city or to divide his army (9.4.6–8). Having informed the besieged of his intentions, so they would not be discouraged by his departure, he quickly reached Rome by a series of rapid marches (χρησάμενος δὲ ταῖς πορείαις … ἐνεργοῖς καὶ συνεχέσι), while the attention of his opponents was still on events at Capua (9.5). The scenes of tumult and affright that unfold in Rome when the news of Hannibal’s arrival reaches the city show that he managed to take his enemies by surprise as he had planned, placing them in a difficult position (9.6.1–4). However, the soldiers of a freshly sworn-in legion happened to be in the city that day, together with those of a second legion who had come to enroll. Thus the Romans were saved, Polybius observes, “by an unexpected stroke of luck” (παράδοξόν τι καὶ τυχικὸν σύμπτωμα), since a large number of men happened to be gathered in the city at the right moment (9.6.5–7). When he saw these men drawn up in their ranks, Hannibal abandoned the idea of attacking Rome and began to withdraw with the aim of returning to Capua (9.6.8–7.7). Hannibal’s misfortune gives Polybius the opportunity to refer to a similar event from Greek history. When Epaminondas realized that the Spartans had gathered all their army and allies in Mantinea to face the Thebans, he conceived the plan to attack Sparta itself (9.8.2–5). Just as he was occupying the city, however, the Spartans appeared, because a deserter had reached Mantinea in the  45 Trompf 1979, 60–115 discusses in detail ways in which Polybius reproduces models of recurrence in his narrative. 46 Cf. Maier 2012, 283–284.

  Leadership and the Vicissitudes of Fortune night and revealed the plan to Agesilaus (9.8.6). Epaminondas then set out for Mantinea on a rapid night march (χρησάμενος ἐνεργῷ τῇ νυκτοπορείᾳ), expecting to find it empty of defenders, as indeed it was (9.8.7–9). At the same time, though, “as if by design” (ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες) as Polybius remarks, the Athenians chanced to arrive at Mantinea to aid the Spartans, foiling Epaminondas’ second plan, too (9.8.10–11). Once again, through the juxtaposition of the similar experiences of Hannibal and Epaminondas, Polybius turns our attention to a case in which history seems to repeat itself. This time, however, he does so in order to familiarize his readers not with a situation in which they may one day find themselves, but, on the contrary, with the limitations on the human ability to predict and plan ahead. At 9.9.9–10 he states that he has not provided these parallels to praise the Romans and the Carthaginians, but to encourage the leaders of both nations and all those who are to assume leadership roles in the future not to hesitate to undertake designs which, though seemingly hazardous and reckless, are safe and well planned, and which will therefore, regardless of their outcome, leave an indelible mark on people’s memories.47 The observation that rational and well-thought-out action (ἐὰν μόνον σὺν νῷ γένηται τὰ πραττόμενα, 9.9.10) will be remembered even if unsuccessful is particularly revealing in light of the interpretations portraying Polybius as a hard–nosed pragmatist, and indicates at the same time the correct way to react to the vicissitudes of fortune. This reminder of the existence of unpredictable factors not only does not dispute the value of experience and knowledge; it actually underlines it more emphatically, urging readers to immerse themselves in the study of history in order to avoid, as far as possible, the difficulties that arise from the influence of those factors.48 By drawing upon their knowledge, their experience, and their intelligence, (as-

 47 Although the text is poorly preserved at this point, the general sense is reasonably clear. For the various attempts to fill in the lacunae see Walbank 1967, 132–133, who believes that Polybius probably recommends the undertaking of ventures that are not hazardous, rather than simply those that give the impression of being hazardous without actually being so, since the enterprises of Epaminondas and Hannibal neither were nor appeared to be particularly risky. I would argue, however, that it is preferable to preserve the emphasis on the impression of danger left by the ventures in question. Epaminondas and Hannibal attempted to attack their enemies’ capitals, enterprises which could justifiably be termed risky, even though they ultimately proved to be less hazardous than they seemed at first sight, as we see from the fact that when they did not manage to carry out their aims, the two leaders returned without exposing their men to serious danger. 48 See Maier 2012, 285–303 for a detailed discussion of the ways in which military commanders may benefit from historical contingency.

Historical recurrence in Polybius  

piring) leaders will significantly increase their chances of handling the situations they will be faced with. And should they fail to do so, at least they will know that they did all that was humanly possible to avert that failure, while in some cases they will have the opportunity to limit or even offset their losses.

 Collective Leadership: The Romans A monograph focusing on leaders and leadership in Polybius could hardly omit a discussion of the presentation of the Romans in the work. The Histories may be, as is often pointed out, a valuable handbook for aspiring leaders, but the work primarily promises to show how the Romans managed to subjugate almost the whole of the known world in a period of just 53 years. This unique achievement was the result not only of the individual efforts of Roman generals, who secured the victory for their troops by their impressive performance on the battlefield, but also of Roman struggles on a collective level. In this last chapter I will examine the characteristics of the Romans’ collective behavior which contributed to the expansion of their dominion and their emergence as a new world power. My discussion will focus on three sections of the Histories which Polybius himself distinguishes as being extremely important for familiarizing his readers with Roman behaviors: the account of the First Punic War in the first book, the presentation of the Roman constitution in the sixth, and the narrative covering the events after the Battle of Pydna and the collapse of the Macedonian kingdom in the last 10 books. As I will attempt to show, the account of the First Punic War highlights Roman abilities and elements of their mentality which were to play a decisive role in the achievement of their ambitions to establish and extend their rule. The sketching of the positive picture of the Romans is completed in the sixth book, in which the distinctive attributes of their behavior and mindset which contributed decisively to their impressive ascent are displayed alongside the organization and operation of their constitution. In the 10 final books, the presentation of the Romans assumes different characteristics, as the focus of interest is no longer the abilities by which they gained their hegemony so much as the way in which they exercised it. In these books Polybius expresses some openly critical views of Rome and its utilitarian foreign policy priorities. This shift has long been noted by Polybian scholars, who have variously attempted to attribute it to the historian’s personal experiences, his desire to satisfy the anti-Roman sentiments of part of his audience, and his changing worldview.1 In the reading I propose, comparison with the tradition of the history of Alexander will provide a different interpretive framework within which to view the critical distance that Polybius often maintains from the Romans in the later books of his work.

 1 For bibliographical references see below, p. 137. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111239538-005

The First Punic War  

. The First Punic War In the narrative of the First Punic War, the antagonism between Romans and Carthaginians is mainly presented on the level of collective action. This does not mean that references to the activities of individual leaders on both sides are absent from this section. The Roman victory at the Battle of Aegusa, for example, the military operation that signaled the end of the war, is very characteristically presented as the result of the exemplary leadership of the naval commander.2 Polybius places the Roman general G. Lutatius Catulus center stage, employing, as is his usual practice, a series of verbs and participles referring to the general’s mental processes and strategic calculations: προορώμενος, μνημονεύων (1.59.11), συνείς, συλλογισάμενος (1.60.4), διηπόρει (1.60.6), συλλογιζόμενος (1.60.7), ἔκρινε (1.60.9). It is also indicative of Polybius’ intention to attribute the Roman victory to Lutatius’ effective command that, contrary to other similar cases — for example in the narratives of the naval battles of Cape Ecnomus (1.27–28) and Drepana (1.50–51) — the adversaries’ confrontation is described in terms of strategic planning rather than military conflict. Lutatius’ success is foreshadowed from the description of his very first actions on assuming command, when Polybius says that “he did not allow the time to pass uselessly and idly” (οὐκ ἀχρεῖον οὐδ᾽ ἀργὸν εἴα γίνεσθαι τὸν χρόνον, 1.59.12) and that he exercised his crews daily, quickly getting them into perfect condition (ἀθλητὰς ἀπετέλεσε, 1.59.12) for the approaching battle. Even when the camera briefly moves away from the Roman general, focusing instead on the Carthaginian plans and calculations (1.60.1–3), it is again Lutatius’ acuity that is highlighted, as he is in a position to divine his enemies’ intentions (συλλογισάμενος τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν, 1.60.4) and react appropriately. Lutatius’ indisputable leadership abilities are thrown into sharp relief when he is faced with the dilemma of whether or not to give battle immediately. It is not an easy decision, as the weather conditions favor the Carthaginians, making Lutatius hesitate about what to do (διηπόρει τί δεῖ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι, 1.60.6). Polybius gives a detailed description of the process by which the Roman general ultimately decides to fight in spite of this serious disadvantage (1.60.7–8): συλλογιζόμενος δ’ ὡς ἐὰν μὲν παραβάλληται χειμῶνος ὄντος, πρὸς Ἄννωνα ποιήσεται τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰς τὰς ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις καὶ πρὸς ἔτι γέμοντα τὰ σκάφη, ἐὰν δὲ τηρῶν εὐδίαν καὶ καταμέλλων ἐάσῃ διᾶραι καὶ συμμῖξαι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις τοὺς πολεμίους, πρός  2 The narrative unit of the First Punic War also includes the story of the Spartan Xanthippus (1.32–35), allowing Polybius to express his belief that a single capable person can defeat entire armies by his wise choices and change the course of history (1.35.4–5).

  Collective Leadership: The Romans τε τὰς ναῦς εὐκινήτους καὶ κεκουφισμένας ἀγωνιεῖται πρός τε τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πεζοῦ στρατευμάτων, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πρὸς τὴν Ἀμίλκου τόλμαν, ἧς οὐδὲν ἦν τότε φοβερώτερον; διόπερ ἔκρινε μὴ παρεῖναι τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρόν. He reflected that if he risked an attack now that the weather was stormy, he would be fighting against Hanno and the naval forces alone and also against heavily laden ships, whereas if he waited for calm weather and by his delay allowed the enemy to cross and join the army, he would have to face ships now lightened and manageable as well as the pick of the land forces and above all the bravery of Hamilcar which was what they dreaded most at that time. He therefore decided not to let the present opportunity slip.

This train of thought shows that Lutatius handled the critical situation he found himself in wisely and calmly, and that his decision to overlook the poor weather conditions threatening his fleet and engage in battle was very well thought out.3 Polybius does not take the trouble to describe the course of the naval battle, simply mentioning the advantages and disadvantages of the two opponents, and leaving the outcome of their conflict to be inferred on that basis. He specifically notes, at 1.61.3–4, that the Roman ships were in better condition than those of the Carthaginians, and that their crews were of very different quality, thereby confirming the calculations of Lutatius, whom he has just shown taking precisely those elements into account. The contrast between the completely untrained (τελέως ἦν ἀνάσκητα) and inexperienced (πρωτόπειρα πάσης κακοπαθείας καὶ δεινοῦ) Carthaginian crews and the well-trained Romans (τά τε πληρώματα συγκεκροτημένα … ἐκ τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων εἶχον) further recalls the intensive training Lutatius subjected his men to before the battle (1.59.12), again highlighting the Roman general’s decisive contribution to his side’s victory.4

 3 Moreover, Lutatius is presented as accurately grasping the Carthaginian intentions as they are set out at 1.61.3, and adapting his strategy accordingly. For Walbank 1957, 125, Polybius’ source for the Carthaginian plans was Philinus. It seems, however, that here too the author applies the familiar pattern in which the character who is ultimately victorious manages to diagnose the situation and his opponent’s intentions, and preempt the latter’s movements. For this pattern see § 2.1. 4 Walbank 1957, 125 notes that the reference to the insufficient training and preparation (τελέως ἦν ἀνάσκητα) of the Carthaginian crews may come from Philinus, who would have used this as an excuse for the Carthaginian defeat. I would argue, however, that this interpretation does not match the whole spirit of the passage, where the intention is clearly to attribute the Roman victory to Lutatius’ effective leadership and perspicacity, rather than to make excuses for the Carthaginians. Also, the narratorial observation immediately afterwards, that the Carthaginians neglected their navy because they did not believe that the Romans would challenge their maritime supremacy ever again (1.61.5), does not appear intended to vindicate the Car-

The First Punic War  

The case of Lutatius, however, although narratively handled in the same way as effective leadership behaviors in the rest of the Histories, is an exception in Book 1. The presentation of the actions of the Roman and Carthaginian military commanders of the First Punic War cannot be compared, in extent or degree of detail, with the analysis of the actions of the charismatic leaders appearing in the main part of the work, such as Hannibal, Philip V or Scipio Africanus the Elder. One reason for this, besides the conciseness of the prokataskeue, is obviously the introductory and preparatory nature of the first book, whose aim is precisely to familiarize Greek readers with the attributes of its main protagonists, the Romans, and their greatest rivals, the Carthaginians, rather than focusing on the behavior of individual representatives of each side.5 Given that readers of the Histories are introduced to the Romans and Carthaginians in the context of a long war, it is only to be expected that in Polybius’ account they come into contact with ideas and motifs betraying the historian’s keen interest in behaviors that may provide the opponents with a higher chance of prevailing or, on the contrary, risk leading them to defeat on the battlefield. The two sides are introduced to the readers mainly in the narrative sections of the work, through the description of their actions and reactions to the critical situations they are faced with during the war. In some cases, however, Polybius chooses to interrupt the narrative and draw our attention to specific characteristics which he considers impressive or important to the issue at hand. At 1.17.11, for example, he states that the excellence of the Roman institutions (ἡ τῶν ἐθισμῶν διαφορά) and their scrupulous observance have saved the Romans many times in the past, as was the case during the siege of Agrigentum, when they averted a shattering defeat. The fear of the death penalty for any Roman who  thaginians so much as to praise the Romans, who managed to overturn their opponents’ calculations by their admirable performance. Even if Polybius did take his information from Philinus, he adapted it to his narrative in order to make it serve the picture he wanted to paint. 5 As Polybius states at 1.3.7–8: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν ἦν συνήθη καὶ γνώριμα τὰ πολιτεύματα τὰ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητήσαντα, ἴσως οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμᾶς ἔδει περὶ τῶν πρὸ τοῦ γράφειν ἀπὸ ποίας προθέσεως ἢ δυνάμεως ὁρμηθέντες ἐνεχείρησαν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ τηλικούτοις ἔργοις. ἐπεὶ δ’ οὔτε τοῦ Ῥωμαίων οὔτε τοῦ Καρχηδονίων πολιτεύματος πρόχειρός ἐστι τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡ προγεγενημένη δύναμις οὐδ’ αἱ πράξεις αὐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον ὑπελάβομεν εἶναι συντάξασθαι ταύτην καὶ τὴν ἑξῆς βύβλον πρὸ τῆς ἱστορίας (“Now were we Greeks well acquainted with the two states which disputed the empire of the world, it would not perhaps have been necessary for me to deal at all with their previous history, or to narrate what purpose guided them, and on what sources of strength they relied, in entering upon such a vast undertaking. But as neither the former power nor the earlier history of Rome and Carthage is familiar to most of us Greeks, I thought it necessary to prefix this Book and the next to the actual history.”)

  Collective Leadership: The Romans abandoned his post made the soldiers defending the camp fiercely resist the attack of the numerically superior Carthaginians and rout them (1.17.11–13).6 The most striking case, however, is definitely found at 1.37.7–10, where Polybius uses the disastrous sinking of the Roman fleet at Camarina to stress an essential element of the Roman mentality, one which was to prove decisive in their development into a world power: καθόλου δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς πάντα χρώμενοι τῇ βίᾳ καὶ τὸ προτεθὲν οἰόμενοι δεῖν κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐπιτελεῖν καὶ μηδὲν ἀδύνατον εἶναι σφίσι τῶν ἅπαξ δοξάντων, ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν κατορθοῦσι διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁρμήν, ἐν τισὶ δὲ προφανῶς σφάλλονται, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν τοῖς κατὰ θάλατταν. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς γῆς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὰ τούτων ἔργα ποιούμενοι τὰς ἐπιβολὰς τὰ μὲν πολλὰ κατορθοῦσι διὰ τὸ πρὸς παραπλησίους δυνάμεις χρῆσθαι τῇ βίᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ σπανίως ἀποτυγχάνουσι· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θάλατταν καὶ πρὸς τὸ περιέχον ὅταν παραβάλλωνται καὶ βιαιομαχῶσι, μεγάλοις ἐλαττώμασι περιπίπτουσιν. ὃ καὶ τότε καὶ πλεονάκις αὐτοῖς ἤδη συνέβη καὶ συμβήσεται πάσχειν, ἕως ἄν ποτε διορθώσωνται τὴν τοιαύτην τόλμαν καὶ βίαν, καθ' ἣν οἴονται δεῖν αὑτοῖς πάντα καιρὸν εἶναι πλωτὸν καὶ πορευτόν. The Romans, to speak generally, rely on force in all their enterprises, and think it is incumbent on them to carry out their projects in spite of all, and that nothing is impossible when they have once decided on it. They owe their success in many cases to this spirit, but sometimes they conspicuously fail by reason of it and especially at sea. For on land they are attacking men and the works of man and are usually successful, as there they are employing force against forces of the same nature, although even here they have in some rare instances failed. But when they come to encounter the sea and the atmosphere and choose to fight them by force they meet with signal defeats. It was so on this occasion and on many others, and it will always continue to be so, until they correct this fault of daring and violence which makes them think they can sail and travel where they will at no matter what season.

Despite all the dangers to which it sometime exposes them, particularly in naval operations, the dynamic and reckless character of the Romans is in fact an essential component of their success, keeping them in a constant state of alertness and allowing them to put every plan they conceive of into action. Their conviction that nothing they attempt is impossible operates as a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy, endowing them with a vigor that renders them almost invincible (σπανίως ἀποτυγχάνουσι).7 The presentation of the Roman actions in the first  6 For details of the severity of the punishments imposed on Roman soldiers who failed in their duty see 6.37–38. 7 Scholars usually dwell on the judgmental character of the analysis, overlooking the positive presentation of Roman determination and dynamism. Cf., e.g., Walbank 1957, 97; Champion 2004, 187. See, however, Rood 2012, 63–64 for the points of contact between this passage and the Corinthians’ description of the Athenians in Thucydides (1.70).

The First Punic War  

book of the Histories offers abundant examples confirming the above description. I would like to begin, however, by noting how self-evident Polybius considered the influence of the combatants’ mentality and mindset on the course and outcome of their struggles and endeavors. High morale is a basic factor of success in military enterprises, whereas defeatism severely undermines their effective implementation. Victors and vanquished, moreover, often enter cycles of consecutive successes or failures, in which the results of their efforts confirm their view of their own abilities, driving them to undertake and execute new ventures with the same pugnacity and daring, or trapping them in inactivity and fear. This idea recurs with striking frequency in the account of the First Punic War. After conquering Agrigentum, the Romans, in their joy and elation (περιχαρεῖς γενόμενοι καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις ἐπαρθέντες), no longer content themselves with saving the Mamertines and with what they have gained, but plan to drive the Carthaginians out of Sicily completely (1.20.1–2).8 Later, when they mark their first victory at sea, they become twice as strong in their drive for war (διπλασίως ἐπερρώσθησαν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, 1.24.1). Their naval actions almost automatically arouse a desire to claim Sardinia, too (Ῥωμαῖοι γὰρ ἅμα τῆς θαλάττης ἥψαντο καὶ τῶν κατὰ Σαρδόνα πραγμάτων εὐθέως ἀντείχοντο, “The Romans, I should explain, from the moment they concerned themselves with the sea, began to entertain designs on Sardinia,” 1.24.7). This behavior is so understandable and widespread that even the characters are shown as expecting their enemies to display it. After the naval battle of Ecnomus, for instance, the Carthaginians are convinced that the Romans, elated by their recent success, will target Carthage itself (πεπεισμένοι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἐκ τοῦ γεγονότος προτερήματος ἐπαρθέντας εὐθέως ποιήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπίπλουν ἐπ᾽  8 Heuss 1949, 487–488, noting the similarity of this passage to 2.31.8, where the Romans, following their victory at Telamon, hope to drive the Celts out of the plain of the Po entirely, rejects Polybius’ account as an attempt to interpret Roman imperialism on the basis of a psychological observation. Cf. Walbank 1957, 72–73, who also expresses doubts on the importance Polybius places on the capture of Agrigentum. More recent scholarship, however, tends to defend Polybius’ version. The analysis of the Roman way of thought seems convincing, while the siege of Agrigentum was a lengthy and laborious process, whose successful outcome justified the elation mentioned by Polybius; see Harris 1979, 111; Davidson 1991, 22 n. 53. It is also worth noting that the taking of the city is not as directly linked in Polybius to the development of Roman imperialist objectives as Walbank argues. At 1.20.6–7 it is noted that even when the Romans held Agrigentum, the outcome of the war could not be decided in the following years, because many coastal cities of Sicily sided with the Carthaginians due to their maritime supremacy, and Italy was often attacked while Libya remained unharmed. This situation led the Romans to decide to build a fleet for the first time (1.20.9).

  Collective Leadership: The Romans αὐτὴν τὴν Καρχηδόνα, 1.29.4). And, conversely, the Romans are terrified by the descriptions of the damage caused to their army by the elephants in Libya, with the result that they dare not face the Carthaginians in open battle again for two whole years (1.39.11–12).9 The importance placed by the characters on preserving a good frame of mind in order to fight effectively is particularly evident in two cases, in which the Romans and the Carthaginians are depicted as gaining pleasure not so much from the successful outcome of their ventures, but rather from how that success has affected the morale of both their own soldiers and the enemy. When the Romans learn of the victory gained by L. Caecilius Metellus over Hasdrubal near Panormus, they rejoice, says Polybius, “not so much because of the enemy being weakened by the loss of their elephants as because of the confidence which the capture of these gave to their own troops” (περιχαρεῖς ἦσαν οὐχ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῷ τοὺς πολεμίους ἠλαττῶσθαι τῶν θηρίων ἐστηρημένους, ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ τοὺς ἰδίους τεθαρρηκέναι τῶν ἐλεφάντων κεκρατηκότας, 1.41.1). Similarly, the besieged Carthaginians in Lilybaeum, on being reinforced by their countrymen, are filled with joy not so much because of the aid they have received as because the Romans did not dare to prevent its arrival (οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ πόλει πάντες οὐχ οὕτως ἦσαν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς βοηθείας παρουσίᾳ περιχαρεῖς, καίπερ μεγάλην ἐλπίδα καὶ χεῖρα προσειληφότες, ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ τετολμηκέναι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους κωλῦσαι τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν Καρχηδονίων, 1.44.7). In both cases, the use of the same syntax (οὐχ οὕτως … ὡς), while foregrounding the obvious cause of the two opponents’ satisfaction, draws our attention to the fact that the emotional impact of the ventures described was more important to them than their successful outcome. For the readers, of course, who have already been informed of how drastically the presence of the elephants and the siege of Lilybaeum affected the spirits of the Romans and the Carthaginians respectively (1.39.12: οὕτως ἦσαν κατάφοβοι τοὺς ἐλέφαντας, “they were so afraid of the elephants”; 1.42.11: ἦν ἰσχυρὰ διατροπὴ καὶ κατάπληξις παρὰ τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις, “The besieged were in a state of utter confusion and panic”), this reaction is completely justified. Polybius, moreover, allows the beneficial influence of both parties’ morale boost to shine through in his presentation of their next movements in continuing the fight: the Romans decided to send a new expeditionary force to Sicily (1.41.2–3),10 while

 9 Cf. Davidson 1991, 21–23 for discussion and further examples. 10 Polybius’ emphasis on the boosting of Roman morale by their victory at Panormus is also noted by Walbank 1957, 103: “The change in policy has already been recorded (39.15): the important thing here is the change in spirit.”

The First Punic War  

the Carthaginians launched a ferocious attack on the besiegers which nearly set all their preparations at naught (1.45.6–14). Thus, being very familiar with the importance of the combatants’ emotional state to the outcome of their enterprises, Polybius often includes relevant references in his narrative, for example when describing the Romans’ anxiety when faced with certain difficulties, precisely in order to then show how rapidly they regain their courage.11 It appears, too, that the Roman ability to overcome adversity is not only connected, as we will see in the next section, with the composition and the smooth functioning of their constitution, but also with their temperament. In the account of the First Punic War the Romans are, indeed, distinguished by the daring and impetuosity with which they carry out their enterprises, a mood which does not abandon them after each defeat but rather intensifies. Paradoxically, the primary area in which they display their mental fortitude is also that in which their impetuosity often leads them to make mistakes: naval activities. Polybius observes that one could discern their bravery and daring simply from their decision to build ships and face the Carthaginians at sea (ἐξ ὧν καὶ μάλιστα συνίδοι τις ἂν τὸ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ παράβολον τῆς Ῥωμαίων αἱρέσεως), as they not only lacked the means to do so but also had to compete with rivals who traditionally ruled the seas (1.20.11).12 Indeed, even when they had to transport an army to Messene, the Romans were obliged to borrow ships from their allies (1.20.13–14). It was then that they were attacked by the Carthaginians and managed to capture a Carthaginian ship, which they then used as a model in building their fleet (1.20.15). “If this had not occurred,” Polybius notes, “they would have been entirely prevented from carrying out their design by lack of practical knowledge” (1.20.16).13 The transformation of a coincidence into the catalyst for the establishment of the Roman navy might be thought to reinforce the view that Polybius treats the expansion of Roman rule as the result of fortune.14 The narrator’s comment on the capture of the Carthaginian ship, more specifically, seems to indicate — at least at first sight — an approach to the rhetoric on the crucial role of fortune in the expansion of Roman rule. In fact, however, one only has to read the next  11 See, e.g., 1.36.5; 1.38.5; 1.39.14. 12 For Roman naval activity during this period see Thiel 1954; see also, more recently, Steinby 2007, who attempts to question Polybius’ view, generally accepted by scholars, that the Romans began to take a systematic interest in the sea from the First Punic War onwards. Steinby is criticized by Dart 2009. 13 For a discussion of the historicity of the episode see Walbank 1957, 75–76. 14 For an analysis of the passages in which Polybius discusses the part played by fortune in the rise of Rome to a world power see § 4.1.

  Collective Leadership: The Romans part of the narrative to realize that this impression is false. When recounting the Romans’ efforts to become active at sea, Polybius does not present them as benefiting from favorable circumstances; on the contrary, he underlines the daring, persistence and determination they show when faced with the most unfavorable adversities. Polybius was certainly an author familiar enough with both the contingent nature of history and the Roman mentality to realize that even if they had not captured that particular Carthaginian ship, they would have found a way to accomplish their aim. His observation is therefore probably intended to underscore the Romans’ inexperience in seamanship, rendering their decision to engage in this field even more impressive, rather than to make a statement about the role of fortune in their rise to becoming a world superpower.15 I would maintain that precisely this highlighting of the characteristics of the Roman mentality is the main reason why Polybius places so much importance on the presentation of Roman naval activity, as he expressly states at 1.20.8, where he says that a powerful motive for his detailed treatment of the First Punic War was the fact that he would be able to develop this subject (διὸ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος οὐχ ἥκιστά με παρώρμησε ποιήσασθαι μνήμην ἐπὶ πλεῖον τοῦ προειρημένου πολέμου). The Romans’ interest in the sea tries their strength and determination, as their fleets are wrecked in storms no fewer than three times between 255 and 249. Polybius particularly stresses how catastrophic these shipwrecks were for the Romans. He notes that when their fleet was sunk near Cape Pachynus on its return from Libya, only 80 of the 364 ships survived: “History tells of no greater catastrophe at sea taking place at one time” (ταύτης δὲ μείζω περιπέτειαν ἐν ἑνὶ καιρῷ κατὰ θάλατταν οὐδ᾽ ἱστορῆσθαι συμβέβηκεν, 1.37.3). In the second case, as they sailed from Parormus to Italy, the Romans again encountered such a terrible storm (πάλιν περιέπεσον χειμῶνι τηλικούτῳ τὸ μέγεθος, 1.39.6) that they lost over 150 ships; while the third great disaster,

 15 For two other cases in the account of the First Punic War, describing the influence of fortune on the development and outcome of military operations, this time to the Romans’ detriment, cf. 1.43.1–6 and 1.48.2–9. In the first case, the Roman agreement with the leaders of the mercenaries on the Carthaginian side for the surrender of Lilybaeum fails because the Achaean Alexon learns of the treachery in good time and denounces it to the Carthaginian general. Consequently, although they come very close to losing the city (παρὰ μικρὸν ἦλθον ἀπολέσαι τὰ πράγματα, 1.43.7), the Carthaginians escape the danger thanks to a coincidence. Then, at 1.48.2–9, the besieged in Lilybaeum are again favored by fortune, when they use the windstorm blowing against the Roman siegeworks to attack and destroy them. These examples confirm Polybius’ warning at 9.17.10 about military operations requiring careful organization and preparation, since their outcome depends on the details (οὕτως αἱ πολεμικαὶ πράξεις ἐν μικρῷ ἔχουσι τῆς ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερα ῥοπῆς τῶν ἐκβαινόντων).

The First Punic War  

off Camarina, destroyed their fleet so completely that nothing useful remained (ὥστε μηδὲ τῶν ναυαγίων μηδὲν γενέσθαι χρήσιμον, 1.54.8). This emphasis on the magnitude of the disasters is not meant to impress, but rather to stress yet further the determination with which the Romans manage to recover each time and continue their struggle for dominion. Polybius does not deny that their successive failures caused them disappointment and despondency. As he says at 1.38.5, when they were informed of the details of the first wrecking by the survivors, they took it heavily to heart (βαρέως μὲν ἤνεγκαν τὸ γεγονός). At the same time, however, he underlines their determination not to give in for any reason (οὐ βουλόμενοι δὲ καθάπαξ εἴκειν), rebuilding their fleet in three months, which as he comments, is hard to believe (ὅπερ οὐδὲ πιστεῦσαι ῥᾴδιον, 1.38.6). Indeed, the striking thing about the behavior of the Romans, which allows them to overcome adversity, is precisely the fact that they do not become mired in negative emotions but make the right decisions to handle the crisis in each case. This behavior characterizes the Romans at the level of both collective and individual action. The reaction of L. Junius Pullus after the wrecking of the fleet at Camarina is a very enlightening example. When he returns to camp, although emotionally affected (περιπαθὴς ὤν, 1.55.5), he immediately begins to plan how to change tactics and do what needs to be done, in an effort to overcome the disaster (ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸ καινοτομῆσαί τι καὶ πρᾶξαι τῶν δεόντων, σπουδάζων ἀναμαχέσασθαι τὴν γεγενημένην περιπέτειαν, 1.55.5). Junius’ behavior accurately reflects the Roman way of thinking and acting. The Romans are repeatedly depicted as reacting to failure with determination and persistence, redoubling their efforts. When, for example, they learn of the defeat of their army in Libya or the successful counterattack of the besieged in Lilybaeum, their foremost concern is to make good the damage (1.36.5: εὐθέως ἐγένοντο πρὸς τὸ καταρτίζειν; 1.49.1: σπουδῇ κατέγραφον ναύτας). In these cases Polybius does not even mention the emotional impact of these events on the Romans, only the corrective action they take to shift the situation in their favor. At 1.52.4 he particularly stresses the fact that “they left undone nothing that was in their power” (οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπον τῶν ἐνδεχομένων) in spite of what had happened (καίπερ τοιούτων συμβεβηκότων). In a similar sense, at 1.55.3–4 Polybius describes the Romans persisting with their plan to besiege Lilybaeum (τῆς γε μὴν προθέσεως οὐκ ἀφίσταντο τῆς κατὰ τὴν πολιορκίαν), even though they express their indignation (ἐσχετλίαζον) at their recent failures. The Romans’ composure and their unwavering commitment to their aims allow them not only to function under pressure and make the most appropriate decisions in times of crisis, but also to demonstrate flexibility in revising those

  Collective Leadership: The Romans decisions when it is clear that they do not serve their purpose. The readiness with which they adapt their strategy following the second sinking of their fleet is typical. Although they are initially forced to halt their naval endeavors, as soon as they realize that their efforts on land are also doomed to failure due to the fear and despondency of their troops (θεωροῦντες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὴν ἐν τοῖς πεζικοῖς στρατοπέδοις πτοίαν καὶ δυσελπιστίαν, 1.39.15), they do not hesitate to change their minds and turn their hopes to the sea once again by building new ships (1.39.14–15). Nowhere, however, is the Roman efficiency in facing difficulties more evident than when they decide to build a fleet for the third time, in order to cut off the resupplying of the Carthaginian troops at Eryx. Polybius calls this effort a desperate fight (ἦν δὲ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τὸ πλεῖον ψυχομαχία, 1.59.6), as there was no money in the public treasury and the endeavor relied solely on the patriotism and generosity of the Romans. Wealthy citizens, depending on their means, undertook to cover the cost of a ship individually or in groups, on condition that they would be repaid if things turned out positively (1.59.7). Thus, thanks to their ingenuity and persistence, the Romans soon managed to build 200 quinqueremes, with which they went on to win the war, decisively defeating the Carthaginians in the naval battle of Aegusa (1.59.8–61).16 The Carthaginians, too, as is noted at many points in the narrative, fight with similar zeal and enthusiasm.17 Although temporarily overcome with despondency (δυσθυμία, 1.31.3) following their defeat in the Battle of Cape Ecno-

 16 Beck 2013, 137–138 refers to the tradition preserved by Dio Cassius, that the Romans decided to become active again at sea because they were encouraged by the successful raids on Africa by individual pirates (Zon. 8.16), to show that Polybius suppresses this information in an attempt to prove the moral superiority of the Romans. It is worth noting, however, that Polybius praises the Roman strength of spirit not for their decision to return to sea after their previous failures, but for managing to implement that decision despite the lack of public funds. 17 Cf., e.g., 1.23.3: συνιδόντες δ᾽ οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ χαρᾶς καὶ σπουδῆς ἀνήγοντο ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν καὶ τριάκοντα (“The Carthaginians on sighting him put to sea with a hundred and thirty sail, quite overjoyed and eager”); 1.32.7: … ὥστε μετὰ κραυγῆς ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ σπεύδειν ὡς τάχιστα συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις (“… the soldiery expressed their approval by cheers and were eager to engage the enemy”); 1.33.5: … ἐξαγαγεῖν σφᾶς ᾤοντο δεῖν τὴν ταχίστην. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ τήν τε τῶν ὄχλων ὁρμὴν καὶ προθυμίαν θεωροῦντες (“… clearly indicated their opinion that he should lead them forward at once. The generals when they saw the enthusiasm and keenness of the soldiers”); 1.38.1: … ὥρμησαν προθυμότερον ἐπί τε τὰς ναυτικὰς καὶ πεζικὰς παρασκευάς (“… were encouraged to make more extensive military and naval preparations”); 1.49.11: ἑτοίμως δ᾽ αὐτῶν παρορμηθέντων πρὸς τὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ βοώντων ἄγειν καὶ μὴ μέλλειν (“Their spirit for the fight was readily aroused, and on their calling on him to lead them on and not delay”); 1.58.3: … ἀπίστως δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀντέχειν (“… the Carthaginians, though it is scarcely credible, maintained their position.”)

The First Punic War  

mus and the string of Roman victories in Africa, and considering capitulation, as soon as they realize that the demands of M. Atilius Regulus are excessive, they regain their vigor and handle the situation with manly courage (ἀνδρωδῶς ἔστη καὶ γενναίως, 1.31.8).18 Although they do not seriously believe that they can be saved, they decide to suffer anything and exploit any means and opportunity “rather than submit to anything ignoble or unworthy of their past” (ἐφ᾽ ᾧ μηδὲν ἀγεννὲς μηδ᾽ ἀνάξιον τῶν πρὸ τοῦ πράξεων ὑπομεῖναι, 1.31.8). The fact that the Carthaginians are the equals of the Romans in obstinacy and fighting spirit is perfectly highlighted by the comparison of the two rivals to roosters dueling to the death (1.58.7–8): τὰ δὲ πολιτεύματ᾽ ἦν ἀμφοτέρων παραπλήσια τοῖς ψυχομαχοῦσι τῶν εὐγενῶν ὀρνίθων. ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ πολλάκις ἀπολωλεκότες τὰς πτέρυγας διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν, αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ μένοντες ἐκβάλλουσι τὰς πληγάς, ἕως ἂν αὐτομάτως ποτὲ περιπεσόντες αὑτοῖς καιρίως ἀλλήλων διαδράξωνται, κἄπειτα τούτου γενομένου συμβῇ τὸν ἕτερον αὐτῶν προπεσεῖν. We may compare the spirit displayed by both states to that of game cocks engaged in a death-struggle. For we often see that when these birds have lost the use of their wings from exhaustion, their courage remains as high as ever and they continue to strike blow upon blow, until closing involuntarily they get a deadly hold of each other, and as soon as this happens one or the other of the two will soon fall dead.

It is characteristic that even after their defeat in the naval battle of Aegusa, the last great battle of the war, the Carthaginians do not lose their impetuosity and their desire for success and glory, even though they have run out of options and do not know how to continue (οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, προσπεσούσης αὐτοῖς ἀπροσδοκήτως τῆς ἥττης, ταῖς μὲν ὁρμαῖς καὶ ταῖς φιλοτιμίαις ἀκμὴν ἕτοιμοι πολεμεῖν ἦσαν, τοῖς δὲ λογισμοῖς ἐξηπόρουν, 1.62.1).19 This is why the decision to capitu-

 18 It should be noted, however, that the discouragement and despondency of the Carthaginians are not only due to the developments of the war, but mainly to the constant raids by the Numidians, who caused greater damage to the countryside than the Romans did (πλείω δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων εἰργάζετο κακὰ τὴν χώραν, 1.32.2), forcing the inhabitants to seek refuge in the city. In other words, the poor Carthaginian morale is caused by the accumulation of many difficulties striking them together. On the other hand, of course, their decision not to submit to Regulus’ demands and continue the struggle, when they are facing war on so many fronts, highlights their persistence and warlike spirit yet further. 19 Walbank 1957, 126 believes that the praising of the Carthaginians’ courage and determination reflects the influence of the pro–Carthaginian historian Philinus. As I have attempted to show elsewhere, however (Miltsios 2013, 39–47), Polybius’ main aim in the account of the First Punic War is to create parallels between Romans and Carthaginians. Cf. Eckstein 1995, 63, who also stresses that Polybius was toο skillful a writer to reproduce his sources’ prejudices uncriti-

  Collective Leadership: The Romans late and cease hostilities is not presented as arising from their loss of morale or despair, but rather as a personal decision by Hamilcar Barca after careful consideration of the facts. Polybius strongly praises Hamilcar for this initiative, stressing that he acted like a good and prudent leader (καὶ λίαν ἐποίησεν ἔργον ἡγεμόνος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φρονίμου, 1.62.4), who, having tried everything and realizing that there was no reasonable way of reversing the situation, yielded with wisdom and realism to circumstance (πάνυ νουνεχῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς εἴξας τοῖς παροῦσιν, 1.62.5). For a ruler, Polybius concludes, discerning when defeat is imminent is as important as being able to discern opportunities for victory (τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ νομιστέον ἡγεμόνος εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι βλέπειν τόν τε τοῦ νικᾶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ λείπεσθαι καιρόν, 1.62.6).20 In conclusion, the presentation of the First Punic War, above and beyond familiarizing readers with the former history of the two great opponents, primarily serves to highlight fundamental characteristics of their mentality and behavior which are to play a decisive part in their subsequent attempts to defeat each other and extend their dominion. The narrative of the Roman adventures at sea, in particular, proves very useful in revealing the daring, determination, ingenuity and mental fortitude which prevent them from succumbing to adversity and allow them to become yet more stubborn and persist until they bring their endeavors to fruition. It is not surprising, of course, that similar characteristics, though not as heavily emphasized, are also attributed to the Carthaginians. One would hardly expect the great opponents of the Romans, the enemies who will often put them in a difficult position in the next part of the work, threatening their homeland in the Second Punic War and rightfully claiming for themselves τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν, to be treated otherwise. The Romans and the Carthaginians, moreover, are depicted as being linked not only by their mentality and mental fortitude, but also by their type of political constitution, which also contributes decisively to their development and prosperity, and to the furtherance of their ambitious aims. The following section will examine what Polybius has to say on this subject in the sixth book of the Histories.

 cally. For Polybius as a critic of other authors see Walbank 1962; Lehmann 1974; Meister 1975; Boncqeut 1982–83; Schepens 1990; Vercruysse 1990; Schepens and Bollansée 2005. 20 As Eckstein 1995, 175 notes: “In this passage, then, Hamilcar personifies the Polybian ideal of the self-controlled aristocratic leader.”

Τίνι γένει πολιτείας  

. Τίνι γένει πολιτείας The next essential step after the prokataskeue in familiarizing the readers of the Histories with the Romans is the presentation of the Roman constitution in Book 6. Polybius states that the discussion of this subject holds a crucial position in his work both in the preface of Book 1, when he wonders what reader would not be interested in learning how and with what kind of politeia (πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας) all the nations of the world were subjected to Roman rule in less than 53 years (1.1.5), and in the preface to Book 6, where he reminds us of his programmatic statement and repeats it, calling the description of this process the best and most beneficial part of his work (κάλλιστον ἔφαμεν, ἅμα δ᾽ ὠφελιμώτατον, 6.2.3).21 As this observation shows, Polybius believes that the Roman constitution was vital to the establishment of the Roman hegemony, and just as important as the military enterprises and the diplomatic missions included in the πῶς of the phrase πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας.22 At 6.2.9–10 he characteristically declares: “Now the chief cause of success or the reverse in all matters is the form of a state’s constitution; for springing from this, as from a fountain– head, all designs and plans of action not only originate, but reach their consummation.” In analyses of the sixth book, the term πολιτεία is generally translated as “constitution.” Indeed, in many places Polybius clearly uses it to refer to the various systems of government, for instance at 6.3.5 (τρία γένη λέγειν πολιτειῶν) and 6.9.10 (αὕτη πολιτειῶν ἀνακύκλωσις). However, he also uses the term πολίτευμα in the same sense.23 Moreover, besides the form and particular characteristics of the Roman mixed constitution (6.11–18), the sixth book presents the organization of the Roman army (6.19–42) and institutions of the Roman state, such as the public funeral given to the illustrious dead (6.53–54.3),  21 The presentation of the Roman constitution in the sixth book is announced in advance at the end of the account of the First Punic War, at 1.64.2–4, where it is said to be a very important matter which should be treated attentively both by Polybius himself as the author and by his readers. The constitution is also mentioned in the introduction to the main part of the work, at 3.2.6: “the peculiar qualities of the Constitution (ἡ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἰδιότης) conduced very largely not only to their subjection of the Italians and Sicilians, and subsequently of the Spaniards and Celts, but finally to their victory over Carthage and their conceiving the project of universal empire”; and yet again at the end of the third book, at 3.118.9, after the description of the Roman defeat at Cannae, with the same emphasis on its contribution to the spread of Roman rule across Italy and the whole world. 22 Cf. Walbank (1998) 2002, 277–278; Erskine 2013, 232. 23 See, e.g., 3.118.9: τῇ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἰδιότητι; 6.18.3: τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ πολιτεύματος; 6.18.4: τὴν ἰδιότητα τοῦ πολιτεύματος.

  Collective Leadership: The Romans customs and legislation on monetary profit (6.56.1–5), and the central role of religion in private and public life (6.56.6–15). The range of themes touched upon by Polybius when describing the politeia of the Romans has led Erskine to express reasonable doubts on how far the usual English translation of the term as “constitution” satisfactorily renders the sense in which it is used in the text. As he argues, this translation is too limiting and narrow, since Polybius treats various aspects of the public life of the Roman citizen alongside the structure and operation of the Roman political constitution.24 This broader interpretation of the term matches the way in which it was understood by other ancient Greek authors, such as Aristotle, who defines politeia as “a way of life of the city” (βίος τίς ἐστι πόλεως, Pol. 1295a40);25 it is also supported by Polybian passages such as 6.44 and 6.47.1–5, where it is also used in a wider sense. At 6.44, specifically, it signifies not the form of government but the group of citizens who constituted Athens and participated in its public affairs (περὶ τῆς Ἀθηναίων πολιτείας, 6.44.1; τῇ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ, 6.44.8). More interesting, however, is 6.47.1–5, where the broad sense of the term is confirmed by the preceding adjective ὅλην. There Polybius, criticizing certain authors who praised the Cretan constitution, argues that citizens’ mentality and behavior are largely shaped by the form and quality of their politeia as a whole: “Thus when we notice that men are covetous in their private lives and that their public actions are unjust, we are plainly justified in saying that their laws, their particular customs, and the state as a whole (τὴν ὅλην πολιτείαν, 6.47.4) are bad.” It seems, therefore, that when Polybius announces that he will explain in his work τίνι γένει πολιτείας all the nations of the world were subjected to Roman rule in less than 53 years, by the term πολιτεία he means not only the Roman political constitution but also the institutions and the particular features that made up the public life of the Roman citizen. Obviously, the mixed constitution in and of itself contributed decisively to the achievement of the ambitious Roman designs.26 Polybius claims that the best constitution is that which combines the virtues and the particular characteristics of all the others (ἀρίστην μὲν ἡγητέον πολιτείαν τὴν ἐκ πάντων τῶν προειρημένων ἰδιωμάτων συνεστῶσαν, 6.3.7), since it prevents, to a point, their degenerative tendencies, ensuring

 24 Erskine 2013, 233–234. 25 Cf. Isoc. 7.14: ἔστι γὰρ ψυχὴ πόλεως οὐδὲν ἔτερον ἢ πολιτεία (“for the soul of the city is none other than its politeia.”) 26 For the concept of the mixed constitution in ancient Greek political thought see von Fritz 1954; Nippel 1980; Millar 2002, 23–36; Hahm 2009; Seager 2013.

Τίνι γένει πολιτείας  

greater stability and balance (6.10).27 The Roman constitution in particular united in the duties of the consuls, the Senate and the people elements of all three main forms of government so harmoniously, that “it was impossible even for a native to pronounce with certainty whether the whole system was aristocratic, democratic, or monarchical” (6.11.11). The result of this mixture was the creation of a perfect constitution (ὥστε μὴ οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι ταύτης εὑρεῖν ἀμείνω πολιτείας σύστασιν, 6.18.1), which served the Romans both in war and in peacetime. Thus, when they had to make war, everything necessary was accomplished thanks to the collaboration of the three parts, “as all were zealously competing in devising means of meeting the need of the hour” (6.18.2–3). When they were not threatened by any enemy, the mixed constitution served a balancing and stabilizing purpose, preventing any one part from increasing its power over the others too much (6.18.5–8). Of course, the mixed constitution was neither the invention nor the exclusive privilege of the Romans. Having described in detail his theory of anacyclosis, the way in which forms of government decline and succeed one another (6.5–9), Polybius says that Lycurgus considered establishing a mixed constitution in Sparta, uniting (the best) elements of all the others, in order to delay this process and achieve longer duration and stability (6.10).28 The Carthaginian constitution was also mixed, combining, like the Spartan and Roman systems, features of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy (6.51.1–2). Since, however, both Sparta and Carthage had mixed constitutions, the question arises why it was the Romans who managed to extend their dominion over the whole of the Mediterranean, to an extent unrivaled by any other nation. Polybius treats this question by focusing, firstly, on the structural and functional characteristics of these three mixed constitutions and the differences he perceives among them. As he notes, the constitution of Lycurgus proved particularly effective in helping the Spartans to preserve their freedom and the territorial integrity of their country. Unlike the Roman constitution, however, it did not create the right economic foundations for them to achieve their expansionist ambitions (6.48.5–6, 6.50). The Carthaginian constitution, on the other hand, was less effective than the Roman one because it was older at the time of the Hannibalic War and already in decline: “consequently the multitude at Carthage had already acquired the chief voice in deliberations; while at Rome the senate still retained this; and hence, as in one case the masses deliberated and in the other the most eminent men, the Roman decisions on public affairs were  27 See, however, n. 29 below. 28 For a bibliography on Polybius’ presentation of the theory of anacyclosis see above, p. 95 n. 21.

  Collective Leadership: The Romans superior, so that although they met with complete disaster, they were finally by the wisdom of their counsels victorious over the Carthaginians in the war” (6.51.6–8).29 Taking his cue from this comparison of the Roman and Carthaginian constitutions, Polybius then turns his attention to the two opponents’ other features, in order to highlight further differences that might explain the outcome of their conflict. First of all, he brings back to the fore the distinction between land and sea power (6.52.1–3), recalling what he has said in Book 1 regarding the determination and dynamism shown by the Romans in familiarizing themselves with maritime matters and defeating their enemies on what was traditionally their own ground. He also observes that the Carthaginians largely rely on mercenaries, while the Romans rely on their own forces; this benefits them in military operations generally and naval battles in particular, where they make up for their lack of experience by their bravery (6.52.8–9).30 It is interesting, however, that Polybius does not consider the Romans’ courage simply an innate characteristic (διαφέρουσι μὲν οὖν καὶ φύσει πάντες Ἰταλιῶται … ταῖς ψυχικαῖς τόλμαις), but also the result of a conscious decision by the state to cultivate this attitude in the young (6.52.10–11): Μεγάλην δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθισμῶν πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ποιοῦνται τῶν νέων παρόρμησιν. ἓν δὲ ῥηθὲν ἱκανὸν ἔσται σημεῖον τῆς τοῦ πολιτεύματος σπουδῆς, ἣν ποιεῖται περὶ τὸ τοιούτους ἀποτελεῖν ἄνδρας ὥστε πᾶν ὑπομένειν χάριν τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐν τῇ πατρίδι τῆς ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῇ φήμης. By their institutions also they do much to foster a spirit of bravery in the young men. A single instance will suffice to indicate the pains taken by the state to turn out men who will be ready to endure everything in order to gain a reputation in their country for valour.

 29 The passage indicates that not even mixed constitutions are completely proof against the degenerative tendencies described by the theory of anacyclosis. On the contrary, as is argued at 6.57, they, too, tend towards ochlocracy. Champion 2004, 96–99 believes that this statement clearly contradicts Polybius’ observation that mixed constitutions were instituted precisely in order to halt the degenerative tendencies of simple constitutions (6.10.6–11), attributing this discrepancy to the historian’s wish to satisfy the different audiences he is addressing. However, the two views are not incompatible. Polybius never claims that the balance and stability ensured by mixed constitutions will last forever. Mixed constitutions delay the natural decay of simple ones, but they, too, are inevitably subject to the biological pattern of growth, peaking and collapse. Cf. 6.4.11–13, 6.9.12–14 and 6.51.5, where Polybius uses this pattern with reference to the Roman mixed constitution. 30 For Polybius’ views on mercenaries and the problems they create see Eckstein 1995, 125–129.

Τίνι γένει πολιτείας  

The example Polybius provides is the public funeral ceremony for the illustrious dead in Rome (6.53–54).31 In his detailed description, the deceased is presented to the assembled crowd upright, to be clearly visible (ἑστὼς ἐναργής), and rarely reclining (6.53.1). The enumeration of his achievements brings the events before the eyes (λαμβάνοντας ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν τὰ γεγονότα) of all the people, not only those who played a part in them, so that “the loss seems to be not confined to the mourners, but a public one affecting the whole people” (6.53.3). After the burial, a wax mask of the deceased, reproducing his features with remarkable fidelity, is placed in the most conspicuous place in the house (6.53.4–5). When a distinguished member of the family dies, these masks of his relatives are taken to the funeral ceremony, together with the emblems of authority of their rank and office, and worn by people of similar stature and carriage (6.53.6–8). “There could not easily be a more ennobling spectacle for a young man who aspires to fame and virtue,” says Polybius, “for who would not be inspired by the sight of the images of men renowned for their excellence, all together and as if alive and breathing?” (6.53.10). Furthermore, since the person who makes the funeral oration praising the deceased goes on to speak of the others whose images are present, the reputation of brave men who performed great deeds is constantly renewed and their glory remains immortal (ἀθανατίζεται, 6.54.2). Encouraging citizens of military age to fight without hesitating to sacrifice their lives was also, of course, the common topos and aim of Athenian funeral orations, as we know from Thucydides’ supreme example.32 However, the impact on the spirits of young Romans of this spectacle of the procession of images of the illustrious dead combined with the narration of their deeds is surprising in its intensity, exceeding the emotional charge of the moment. As Polybius observes, in the history of Rome one can find many examples of those who engaged in single combat to decide the outcome of a battle, those who died for the common good, or even those in office who put their own sons to death “contrary to every law or custom (παρὰ πᾶν ἔθος ἢ νόμον), setting a higher value on the interest of their country than on the ties of nature that bound them to their nearest and dearest” (6.54.4–6). In confirmation of his words, Polybius gives the example of Horatius Cocles, who, fighting at the far end of the bridge across the Tiber, saw a mass of enemies charging upon him and commanded his companions behind him to retire and cut the bridge (6.55.1). In Polybius’ version, Horatius leapt into the river in full armor and was drowned (6.55.3), whereas all the

 31 For a detailed discussion of the ceremony see Flower 1996, 91–158. 32 See, e.g., Thuc. 2.43.

  Collective Leadership: The Romans other sources say that he managed to reach the opposite bank and survived.33 It would appear that Polybius invented or adopted an ending that better served his aim of highlighting the Romans’ readiness to sacrifice themselves for their country and the common good. But although at the conclusion of this passage he notes again that this attitude is cultivated in the Romans by their institutions (διὰ τῶν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐθισμῶν ἐγγεννᾶται τοῖς νέοις ὁρμὴ καὶ φιλοτιμία, 6.55.4), it is hard to entirely avoid the feeling that the extreme expressions of courage and self-sacrifice he mentions were the result not only of the encouragement of the organized state, but also of the idiosyncracies of the Roman mentality and mindset. Especially the cases of Roman officials who, as he notes at 6.54.5, put their own sons to death, indicate that this adherence to duty may exceed any institutional imperative and political necessity (παρὰ πᾶν ἔθος ἢ νόμον).34 A similar picture of the Romans is painted by the presentation of the Roman military system at 6.19–42. This thorough discussion in a book intended to describe the particular characteristics of the Roman politeia is sometimes viewed with perplexity; however, it is perfectly justified because it reinforces the conclusions arising from the development of the main theme.35 The detailed description of the procedures by which the Romans recruit their legions, organize their units, assign the various duties, and set up camp, has been accurately argued to reflect the emphasis on order and discipline that characterizes the Roman politeia more generally.36 Indeed, Polybius is often careful to explain the functional purpose behind the Roman practices he describes, not only in order to inform his readers who are ignorant of them, but also to show that every detail was well thought out.37  33 Liv. 2.10; Plut. Publ. 16; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.23–5, De vir. ill. 11.1. 34 Polybius does not provide specific examples, but he may be thinking of cases like those of L. Junius Brutus, who had his two sons executed for plotting to overthrow the constitution (Liv. 2.5), A. Postumius Tubertus, who condemned his son to death for desertion (Liv. 4.29), and T. Manlius Torquatus, who ordered his son beheaded for fighting a duel in defiance of his orders (Liv. 8.7). Erskine 2013, 244 argues that the phrase παρὰ πᾶν ἔθος ἢ νόμον implies criticism, being reminiscent of the adjective παράνομος, which is generally applied to barbarian behaviors in the Histories. 35 The discussion of this part of the work has mainly focused on identifying Polybius’ possible sources: cf. Brunt 1971, 625–628; Rawson (1971) 1991; de Ligt 2007, 115–116. For Champion 2004, 92–94, the description of the Roman military system underlines the superlative degree to which their every tactic is dictated by logic. 36 See McGing 2010, 183–184: “It is difficult not to see the order, the calm, the discipline, the clear structures, and the logic of the army as a metaphor for the Roman state as a whole.” Cf. Erskine 2013, 238–240. 37 See, e.g., 6.24.7; 6.31.11–14; 6.40.9.

Τίνι γένει πολιτείας  

Obviously, in a context of military discipline, where everything was carefully designed to work together like the cogs in a well-oiled machine, any attempt at autonomy and deviation from the rules was to be condemned, as we see from the systematic checks and punishments (6.35–38). However, alongside the efficiency of the Roman system, what is also stressed via Polybius’ presentation is the Romans’ ability to fit into and function within such a strictly organized framework.38 At the end of the section, moreover, the comparison of the Roman and Greek methods of making camp reveals another fundamental characteristic of their behavior and mentality. In order to preserve the usual way of making camp, the Romans do not hesitate to submit to the labor of entrenching (6.42.5). Thus each soldier knows in advance in which part of the camp he is to set his tent, just as he knows his own house when he enters his city (6.41.11–12). The Greeks, on the contrary, seek naturally fortified places, to avoid the labor of entrenching (ἐκκλίνοντες τὴν περὶ τὰς ταφρείας ταλαιπωρίαν), and therefore adapt the shape of the camp to the place chosen (6.42.2–4). The analysis of the characteristics of the Romans’ politeia which contributed to the establishment and expansion of their rule is completed at 6.56 with the presentation of their views on monetary profit and the role of religion in private and public life. The Roman constitution is better than the Carthaginian, Polybius argues, even in how it handles issues of bribery and illicit enrichment. Contrary to the Carthaginians, who see nothing profitable as disgraceful and gain office through open bribery, the Romans condemn illicit enrichment and punish bribery to gain office with death. (6.56.2–4). The comparison of Romans and Carthaginians typically forms part of the broader discussion of the reasons explaining the outcome of their conflict, starting at 6.51 with the comparison of their constitutions. Essentially, however, as we see from the subsequent observations on Roman religious beliefs, Polybius’ chief aim is, again, to highlight the uniqueness of the protagonists of his history.39 Polybius argues that superstition plays a crucial part in the preservation of the rule of law in Rome, operating as a cohesive social bond (συνέχειν τὰ Ῥωμαίων πράγματα, 6.56.7). The fear  38 Cf. Erskine 2013, 242, who argues that a basic motif in the presentation of the Roman military system is the subordination of the individual to the collective interest; this is exemplified in the way that the soldiers themselves undertake the punishment of their comrades who endanger their lives by sleeping or leaving their post while on watch (6.37.1–6). 39 Cf. 18.34.7–8, where the Roman attitude to bribery is contrasted to that of the Greeks. Bribery was so widespread in Greece, that when, after the battle of Cynoscephalae, T. Quinctius Flamininus appeared willing to discuss the terms of the truce in a friendly spirit, the Greeks, who were unfamiliar with Roman morals and institutions, judged from their own experience and attributed his change of mood to his having received money from Philip V.

  Collective Leadership: The Romans of divine punishment assists in the prevention of transgressions by the common people. “It is a course which perhaps would not have been necessary had it been possible to form a state composed of wise men,” he says at 6.56.10–11, “but as every multitude is fickle, full of lawless desires, unreasoned passion, and violent anger, the multitude must be held in by invisible terrors and suchlike pageantry.”40 To highlight how religious sentiment has a real effect on Roman behavior, Polybius uses an impressively honest (and timely) example (6.56.13–15): τοιγαροῦν χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων οἱ τὰ κοινὰ χειρίζοντες παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἐὰν ταλάντου μόνον πιστευθῶσιν, ἀντιγραφεῖς ἔχοντες δέκα καὶ σφραγῖδας τοσαύτας καὶ μάρτυρας διπλασίους οὐ δύνανται τηρεῖν τὴν πίστιν; παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις κατά τε τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ πρεσβείας πολύ τι πλῆθος χρημάτων χειρίζοντες δι᾽ αὐτῆς τῆς κατὰ τὸν ὅρκον πίστεως τηροῦσι τὸ καθῆκον. καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις σπάνιόν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν ἀπεχόμενον ἄνδρα τῶν δημοσίων καὶ καθαρεύοντα περὶ ταῦτα· παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις σπάνιόν ἐστι τὸ λαβεῖν τινα πεφωραμένον ἐπὶ τοιαύτῃ πράξει. The consequence is that among the Greeks, apart from other things, members of the government, if they are entrusted with no more than a talent, though they have ten copyists and as many seals and twice as many witnesses, cannot keep their faith; whereas among the Romans those who as magistrates and legates are dealing with large sums of money maintain correct conduct just because they have pledged their faith by oath. Whereas elsewhere it is a rare thing to find a man who keeps his hands off public money, and whose record is clean in this respect, among the Romans one rarely comes across a man who has been detected in such conduct.

Polybius mentions the various measures taken by the Greeks to prevent the embezzlement of public money precisely in order to underline the difference made by simple oath-taking in the case of the Romans. However, the emphasis on the Romans’ self-restraint, which differentiates them not only from the Greeks but also from all others (παρὰ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις), creates the sense that, alongside the attributes of the Roman constitution, Polybius here is also shed-

 40 For an illuminating discussion of this passage see Erskine 2000, 176–181, who explains how Polybius applies to the Romans a fundamentally negative term such as δεισιδαιμονία, associated with barbarian behaviors, attributing to it expedience and depth. Cf. also 16.12.9–10, where Polybius condescendingly accepts the tendency of some of his fellow-historians to include miraculous phenomena in their works (δοτέον ἐστὶ συγγνώμην ἐνίοις τῶν συγγραφέων τερατευομένοις καὶ λογοποιοῦσι περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα), as long as it helps to preserve the people’s piety and is not excessive. For Polybius’ attitude to religion generally see van Hooff 1977.

Τίνι γένει πολιτείας  

ding light on their temperament.41 And, conversely, the references to the many copyists, seals, and witnesses which ultimately cannot prevent the Greeks from embezzling, also seem to indicate traits of their mentality that could, of course, potentially be controlled within a strictly organized institutional framework. Polybus closes Book 6 with an episode which took place immediately after the Battle of Cannae, confirming all that he has said about the Roman constitution in the preceding pages. He thus picks up the thread of his narrative of the Second Punic War where he left off, and also shows in deed as well as in word, “as if exhibiting a single specimen of a good artist’s work” (ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ τεχνίτου δεῖγμα τῶν ἔργων ἕν τι προενεγκάμενοι), as he notes in an apt simile, the power of the Roman constitution at its peak during that period (6.58.1). When, after his victory, Hannibal captured the 8,000 men of the Roman camp garrison, he agreed that 10 representatives should be sent to Rome to request a ransom for their release. The representatives attempted to persuade the Senate to allow each of them to pay a sum of money to return to their families, since they had not been guilty of cowardice but were following orders to stay and guard the camp. The Romans, however, although they had suffered consecutive defeats and were left without allies, and although they expected to fight for their country itself, rejected this plea. They believed it was more important to show their soldiers that they had no hope of safety if defeated, than to ensure the captives’ service in the coming struggle or assuage the feelings of their relatives (6.58.2– 10). The Romans thus frustrated Hannibal’s calculations and hopes (τοὺς μὲν Ἀννίβου λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐν τούτοις ἐλπίδας ἀπέδειξαν κενάς); instead of rejoicing in his victory, he was disheartened and astonished at his enemies’ steadfastness and strength of spirit (6.58.11–13). The narrative of the Second Punic War thus resumes with a reversal; not, of course in the attitude of the Romans, which was to be expected following the preceding discussion, but in Hannibal’s reaction. Whereas in the descriptions of the conflicts between Hannibal and the Romans up until this point, Hannibal was consistently distinguished by his ability to predict his enemies’ moves and surprise them, here the tables are turned. This is an impressive reversal, one which operates not only as a foreshadowing of the outcome of the war, but also as a literary illustration of Polybius’ belief in the decisive role played by the Roman constitution in the Romans’ recovery after the defeat at Cannae, and in their ultimate victory (3.118.8–9). Hannibal’s first defeat (συντριβῆναι, 6.58.13)  41 As Walbank 1957, 743 observes, Roman officials in charge of public money would hardly fall under the heading of a mob requiring to be tamed via religious superstition; their moral integrity could not have been solely due to the fear of divine punishment.

  Collective Leadership: The Romans is not due to the actions of an individual Roman opponent but to the power and the effective operation of the Roman constitution. Consequently, although Book 6 is often rather narrowly thought to refer to the form and function of the Roman mixed constitution, it includes within the term politeia material on the mentality and behavior of the Romans that essentially completes the relevant analysis in Book 1. Even if one only took these two books of the Histories into account, one would actually form a pretty good idea of the characteristics and attributes which allowed the Romans to implement their ambitious plans. In the preceding discussion, I have attempted to highlight the ambiguous nature of many of Polybius’ accounts, which give the impression of referring to characteristics both of the Roman constitution and of the Roman mentality. Polybius, of course, as we saw in the case of the Cretan constitution, believes that a people’s temperament is shaped by the quality of their constitution (6.47.1–6). Specifically regarding the Roman constitution, however, he makes an important observation on how the Romans acquired it. They did not institute the mixed constitution, like the Spartans, based on the inspired conception of a single legislator (διὰ λόγου), but through struggles and troubles (διὰ δὲ πολλῶν ἀγώνων καὶ πραγμάτων) which forced them to choose the best each time (6.10.14).42 This difference indicates that the Roman mentality was interwoven with the qualities of the constitution, precisely because they effectively arose in tandem, and not simply because the Romans were familiarized with its basic principles from an early age. In this regard, the various similarities which have been observed between the Roman constitution and the Roman military system, and interpreted as the political structure being reflected in the  42 This observation has justifiably been compared with the view of Cato the Elder on the Roman constitution, as set out by Cicero in the De re publica (2.2). He states that the Roman constitution is superior because it was not established by one man or during the course of a single generation, since there has never been a man of such genius that nothing could escape him, nor could the combined efforts of everyone living during the same period be able to foresee everything without the aid of practical implementation and the test of time. Although the similarities between the two passages are striking, some scholars believe that they differ because Cato is attempting to stress the superiority of the Roman constitution, whereas Polybius highlights the role of logic (διὰ λόγου) in the establishment of the Spartan constitution, and does not present the gradual and practical application of the Roman one as an advantage. For the relevant discussion cf. La Roche 1857, 25; Ollier 1943, 151; Walbank 1957, 662–663; Nicolet 1974, 249. I would maintain that in this instance the phrase διὰ λόγου, being associated with διὰ δὲ πολλῶν ἀγώνων καὶ πραγμάτων, does not refer to the well-known contrast between the reasoned behavior of the Greeks and the unreasoning actions of barbarians, but rather to the famous distinction between λόγος and πράγμα or ἔργα, ultimately favoring, of course, the example of the Roman constitution.

The exercise of Roman hegemony  

military organization,43 appear instead to be due to the fact that the two institutions are harmonious aspects of the same Roman soul, taught to overcome adversity by reverent devotion to order and duty, perfectly coordinated collaboration, and the subordination of private interest to the common good.

. The exercise of Roman hegemony If Polybius’ primary aim is to explain in his work the process and the abilities by which the Romans spread their dominion to the ends of the known world, another major objective is to present the way in which they went on to handle the power they acquired (τήν τε τῶν κρατούντων αἵρεσιν, ποία τις ἦν μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ πῶς προεστάτει τῶν ὅλων), as well as the opinions that their subjects formed of them (3.4.6). This intention led Polybius to expand his narrative beyond the Battle of Pydna and the fall of the Macedonian dynasty in 168, and to add a further 10 books to his work, covering events up to 146. From the events described in these last books it will become apparent, as he notes at 3.4.7, how far the Roman hegemony is accepted by its contemporaries or not, and whether it deserves the praise or the blame of future generations.44 This conclusion will certainly be valuable to aspiring leaders, who form a substantial part of the Histories’ readership, and who are called upon not only to fulfil their ambitions but also to use them for the common good.45 As the historian observes at 3.4.9– 11, “all men do all they do for the resulting pleasure, good, or utility” (χάριν τῶν ἐπιγινομένων τοῖς ἔργοις ἡδέων ἢ καλῶν ἢ συμφερόντων). The importance Polybius places on this issue is evident from his statement that the usefulness of

 43 For this approach see Erskine 2013, 243. 44 Walbank 1972, 182–183 and (1977) 1985 argues that, since the last books do not actually allow one to draw safe conclusions on the qualities of Roman rule and its assessment by its subjects, the main reason Polybius included them was because he had collected the material during his stay in Rome and had participated in many of the enterprises referred to. This argument, apart from overlooking the fragmentary state of the surviving text, is unfair to Polybius and the last part of his work. As I attempt to show below, the emphasis there shifts to aspects of Roman leadership which are no longer only associated with ability on the battlefield but also cover the exercise of foreign policy. It is worth noting that Walbank 2002, 21 partly reconsidered his position. For Polybius’ decision to continue his narrative after the fall of the Macedonian dynasty see also Foulon 2003, 40–44; Grethlein 2013, 234–240; Wiater 2016. 45 Cf. Grethlein 2013, 237: “As Polybius has it, men fight not for the sake of fighting, but in order to rule; it therefore makes good sense to limit the account not to the period of fighting, but also to deal with the ensuing time of rule.” For Polybius’ readership see Walbank 1972, 3–6; Mohm 1977, 121–229; Champion 2004, 96–98; Maier 2012, 277–280.

  Collective Leadership: The Romans his work for the present and the future will mainly lie in this point (τὸ γὰρ ὠφέλιμον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἱστορίας πρός τε τὸ παρὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἐν τούτῳ πλεῖστον κείσεται τῷ μέρει, 3.4.8), and also in his feeling that when he started to treat the subject, it was as though he were beginning a new work (προήχθην οἷον ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενος ἄλλην γράφειν, 3.4.13).46 One often has the same sense of approaching a new work when reading the later books of the Histories, mainly due to the picture they provide of the Romans. While the descriptions of the military enterprises by means of which the Romans established and extended their power stress their virtues and the positive characteristics which contributed to the success of their ambitions, many descriptions of the Romans in the later books emphasize their pragmatic policies and self-serving motives. Thus, at 31.10.6 Polybius observes that the Senate agreed to cede Cyprus along with Cyrene to Ptolemy VIII Physcon, operating in their own interests (συγκατέθετο τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ νεωτέρου παρακαλουμένοις ἐπὶ τῷ σφετέρῳ συμφέροντι). Having in mind the size of the Egyptian kingdom, they feared that it might fall into the hands of a more able and ambitious ruler, and so preferred to divide it (31.10.8). At 31.10.7, indeed, the historian explains that this type of policy was now a standard Roman tactic: πολὺ γὰρ ἤδη τοῦτο τὸ γένος ἐστὶ τῶν διαβουλίων παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις, ἐν οἷς διὰ τῆς τῶν πέλας ἀγνοίας αὔξουσι καὶ κατασκευάζονται τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρχὴν πραγματικῶς, ἅμα χαριζόμενοι καὶ δοκοῦντες εὐεργετεῖν τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας. For many decisions of the Romans are now of this kind: availing themselves of the mistakes of others they effectively increase and build up their own power, at the same time doing a favour and appearing to confer a benefit on the offenders.

According to Walbank, the use of the adverb πραγματικῶς in the above passage indicates that Polybius was not necessarily criticizing this behavior.47 It is difficult, however, to accept that Polybius describes this widespread, as he notes, Roman tactic of exploiting others’ mistakes to their own benefit, without giving it a negative moral hue.48 This comment, in any case, appears in a group of episodes in which the decisions the Romans make to further their interests (τοῖς  46 This last phrase has been thought to indicate that Polybius intended to cover the events of this period in a separate work. For this interpretation cf. Walbank 1972, 183; Grethlein 2013, 239. However Wiater 2016, 249–250 is right to note that οἷον clearly shows that Polybius is referring here to a new beginning in a metaphorical sense, attempting to stress that in the final part of his work he is approaching the phenomenon of Roman hegemony from a different angle. 47 Walbank 1974, 12. 48 Cf. Eckstein 1995, 104 with n. 70; Champion 2004, 161 n. 51.

The exercise of Roman hegemony  

σφετέροις πράγμασι) are explicitly termed unjust. In this spirit, at 31.11.11 Polybius mentions that the Senate refused to allow Demetrius to return to Syria, preferring to keep his son Antiochus IV in power, not because Demetrius was not right, but because it was in their own interests to do so (οὐ διὰ τὸ μὴ λέγειν τὰ δίκαια τὸν Δημήτριον … ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασιν). As the historian has explained above, the Senate was suspicious of Demetrius, who was in the prime of life, and judged that the youth and weakness of the child who had succeeded his father would further Rome’s interests more (μᾶλλον δὲ κρίνασα συμφέρειν τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι, 31.2.7). Similarly, at 31.21.6 Polybius notes that during the conflict between the Carthaginians and Massanissa, the Romans always took the latter’s part, not because he was right, but because they were convinced that this stance served their own interests (οὐ τοῖς δικαίοις, ἀλλὰ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι τοὺς κρίνοντας συμφέρειν σφίσι τὴν τοιαύτην γνώμην). The idea that the Senate made decisions based on expediency may not have surprised Polybius or many of his readers, or been a reproof to a state attempting to establish and extend its rule.49 However, as we have noted in the cases cited above, Polybius does not simply stress the Senate’s concern with promoting Roman interests, but also states that those interests were set above the notion of justice and led to its violation.50 The emphasis on the amorality exhibited by the Romans here forms a striking counterpoint to the repeated references to their wish to give the impression that they support justice, revealing, as at 31.10.7, the hypocrisy of their policy.51 Of course, this is not the first time that Polybius has accused the Romans of committing an act of injustice. At 3.15.10, for example, he called their decision to take Sardinia from the Carthaginians and impose taxes on them after the end of the Libyan War unjust (ἀδίκως παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ἔλαβον, 1.88.8–12).52 However, the way in which the Romans are presented in the final part of the work, when they self-servingly attempt to secure the dominions they have acquired, is markedly different from their quasi-heroic

 49 For this position see Walbank (1965) 1985, 167–168, 171–172; 1972, 165, 171–173; 1974, 11–13; 1981/2. 50 Cf. in detail Eckstein 1995, 100–109, who argues against the view that Polybius cynically accepts the pragmatism of Roman foreign policy. 51 For the Romans’ wish to give their decisions a veneer of legality see 1.7.12–13; 1.10.3–4; 32.13.9; 36.2. 52 Cf. also 3.28.2: ἀλλ᾽ ὁμολογουμένως τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἠναγκασμένους παρὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια διὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐκχωρῆσαι μὲν Σαρδόνος, ἐξενεγκεῖν δὲ τὸ προειρημένον πλῆθος τῶν χρημάτων (“In this case everyone would agree that the Carthaginians, contrary to all justice, and merely because the occasion permitted it, were forced to evacuate Sardinia and pay the additional sum I mentioned.”)

  Collective Leadership: The Romans image in the first books, an effect which is obviously due to a shift in theme and emphasis. The fragmentary condition of the Histories prevents us from knowing for certain how far the theme of amorality in Roman foreign policy was developed in the later books. The fact, however, that the same book contains so many references to cases where the Romans place self-interest above justice indicates that highlighting this subject must have been one of the main aims of the Polybian narrative in the final part of the work. Moreover, this theme matches Polybius’ observations on the wider moral decay of the Romans during that period.53 As he says at 31.25.3–5, the virtue of wisdom had become rare among the younger generation of Roman aristocrats, since most of them tended towards viciousness (διὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὁρμὴν τῶν πλείστων). They had relationships with boys and prostitutes, and spent their time in musical entertainments, banquets, and expensive luxuries. They were so unrestrained that some paid a talent for a boy and 300 drachmas for a jar of salt fish. This state of affairs, the historian notes at 31.25.5a, aroused the indignation of Cato, who once said in a public speech “that it was the surest sign of deterioration in the republic when pretty boys fetch more than fields, and jars of caviar more than ploughmen.” Polybius affirms that these phenomena of decline and degeneration reached their peak at that time due to the fall of the Macedonian kingdom. Having defeated that enemy, too, the Romans believed that their universal dominion was undisputed (ἀδήριτον αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν περὶ τῶν ὅλων ἐξουσίαν), while, as the riches of Macedonia were brought to Rome, they engaged in a great display of material prosperity, both in private and in public (31.25.6–7).54 The negative image of the Romans projected by the two themes of the amorality of their foreign policy and the moral degeneration in their private and  53 For the link between the moral decline at Rome and the pragmatism of its foreign policy see already Petzold 1969, 59–64. This argument is disputed by Walbank 1972, 172–173 and 1974, 23–24, who counters that the self-serving decisions of an imperial power are unconnected with the moral degeneration of its people. Although Walbank’s argument seems reasonable at first sight, it is important to note that this analysis is contained in a book where the amorality of Roman foreign policy is particularly pronounced; moreover, Polybius himself associates the moral degradation of the Romans with the establishment of their hegemony. I agree more with Eckstein 1995, 264, who also treats these two phenomena as signs of the ongoing corruption of the Romans described in the last books of the Histories. 54 Cf. also 6.57.4–9, where, discussing the natural evolution of constitutions, including mixed ones, on a theoretical level, Polybius observes that they reach their most critical point when the citizens, no longer threatened by any enemy, rest on the laurels of their supremacy and uncontested sovereignty (ὑπεροχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀδήριτον) and are interested only in office, pleasure, and profit.

The exercise of Roman hegemony  

public life is central to the attempt to define Polybius’ stance towards the new Mediterranean superpower. Walbank, who discerns a certain evolution or shift in the way the Romans are presented in the Histories, connects the emphasis on the negative marks of their behavior with major milestones in the author’s life.55 At the time when the exercise of Roman policy was described in a critical way, Polybius was in Rome, where he was taken with other Greek captives and remained for 16 years, as the Romans refused to agree to Greek requests for their repatriation. These critical observations have also been viewed as an indication of Polybius’ genuine interest in ethics, as he does not hesitate to castigate the Romans for their unlawful actions,56 or attributed to his desire to respond to the anti–Roman sentiments of a section of the readership to whom his work was addressed.57 I will now attempt an interpretive approach to the negative portrayal of the Romans which is not based on the details of Polybius’ life or his intentions with regard to his various audiences, but rather on his familiarity with central themes and ideas of the literary tradition to which he belongs. As I hope I have made clear in the discussion in the previous chapters, the history of Alexander the Great must have played a decisive part in shaping the techniques and methods by which Polybius describes the effective behaviors of successful leaders in his work. The tradition of the history of Alexander, as I will argue, as regards the way in which it often handles the darker and more problematic aspects of the Macedonian king’s behavior, also presents interesting affinities to the criticism of the Romans in the later books of the Histories. Of course, the elements of the history of Alexander on which I will focus evoke and reproduce in their turn common themes and motifs of ancient Greek historiography, which I will also highlight. I would like to begin with a point I have already discussed with reference to the possible influence of the history of Alexander on Polybius. As I have argued, detailed presentation of the characters’ mental processes through internal focalization is the primary method Polybius uses to interpret the causes of events, and although it must be as old as Homer or Herodotus, it would have received a significant boost from the historians of Alexander, who thereby wished to stress the amazing perspicacity of the Macedonian general. This method, which is systematically applied by Polybius in order to interpret the behaviors of the

 55 See Walbank (1965) 1985, 162–167; 1972, 168–170; see, however, also Shimron 1979/80 for criticism of this view. 56 See Eckstein 1995, 103–109. 57 See Champion 2004, 158–169 and passim.

  Collective Leadership: The Romans individual leaders and the characters he presents, is also used on a collective level in the case of the Romans. Instead of the extremely detailed accounts of the thoughts, feelings, and motives of the great leaders who dominate and set the tone in the main part of the work, in the later books we find similar analyses being applied increasingly frequently to the Romans. It is worth noting, for example, the similarity between the presentation of the reasoning of the Roman senators (οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ) when they decide to continue the war in Spain at 35.3, with the accumulation of terms referring to sensory and mental processes (διακούσαντες, 35.3.1; θεωροῦντες, 35.3.2; νομίσαντες, 35.3.4; διαπιστήσαντες, 35.3.6; νομίζοντες, 35.3.8; ὑπέλαβον, 35.3.9), and passages such as 3.17.4–8 (προορώμενος, 3.17.4; ὑπέλαβε, ἐπέπειστο, 3.17.5; ὑπελάμβανεν, 3.17.7; τοιούτοις δὲ χρώμενος διαλογισμοῖς, 3.17.8), setting out the train of thought leading to Hannibal’s decision to besiege Saguntum. The subject of these descriptions is often ἡ σύγκλητος, which is thus presented as an acting person, whose plans, calculations, and emotional reactions are depicted in the narrative. The Senate is shown, for example, making its decisions after evaluating the information it gathers (ἡ σύγκλητος πυνθανομένη … νομίζουσα … κατέστησε πρεσβευτάς, 29.2.1–2), and feeling anger, distress (ἡ σύγκλητος ὀργισθεῖσα καὶ βαρέως φέρουσα τὸ γεγονός, 33.7.3), or even indignation (ἡ σύγκλητος ἠγανάκτησεν, 38.9.3). The great frequency of references to the exercise of Roman foreign policy is partly due to the fact that much of the text of Books 20–39 comes from the section on embassies contained in the famous collection of excerpts from ancient historians commissioned by the Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus in the tenth century CE.58 It is also, however, justified by Polybius’ aim of offering an assessment of the Roman hegemony and its consequences for its subjects in the final part of the work (3.4.6–7). In other words, the picture might have not been too different even if we had more material from the last books at our disposal. It is a mark of the importance placed on the collective behavior of the Romans, that typical characteristics of the accounts focusing on individual leaders are adopted in the descriptions of the Senate’s activities. There is a particularly striking similarity, for instance, between 31.1.6–8, where the Senate appoints official representatives to observe (ἐποπτεύσοντας) the situation in Greece and investigate (πολυπραγμονήσοντας) the activities of Antiochus IV and Eumenes II, and 14.1.13, where Scipio Africanus sends his men into the

 58 See Marincola 2001, 117; Walbank 2005, 2; McGing 2013, 211. For a useful discussion on the fragments of Polybius generally see Thompson 1985.

The exercise of Roman hegemony  

enemy camps to explore and spy out the approaches and entrances (χάριν τοῦ … ἐξερευνῆσαι καὶ κατοπτεῦσαι). While, however, the main objective of the analyses of the thought processes of individual leaders is to highlight their insight and their ability to grasp the situation, in the descriptions of the Senate the emphasis is on revealing the pragmatical dimension of its choices and actions. At 32.3.11–13, for example, the Senate is said to have let the murderers of Gn. Octavius go unpunished, believing (ὑπολαβοῦσα) that otherwise it would give the impression that the murder had been avenged. It preferred to keep the case open, in order to be able to use the accusation whenever it wished. In the same vein, at 32.13 the Senate is presented as deciding to declare war on the Dalmatians not out of indignation (ἠγανάκτει μέν, 32.13.4) at their insubordination and rudeness to its envoys, as it pretended (32.13.9), but for purely pragmatical reasons.59 The Senate believed this would be a good opportunity (ὑπέλαβε τὸν καιρὸν ἐπιτήδειον) for the Romans to set foot in Illyria and strike terror into the Illyrians, forcing them to obey their commands, and also a way of arousing the people, who were becoming soft due to the long peace.60 Purely pragmatical motives are also discernible behind the Senate’s decision to agree to the request of Cotys, king of the Odrysae, to have his son returned to him at 30.17. Believing (νομίσαντες, 30.17.2) that they had achieved their aim, as the war against Perseus had fallen out according to their calculations, and that consequently they no longer had any reason to prolong their difference with Cotys, the Romans released his son, in order to demonstrate their magnanimity and also attach Cotys to them by this

 59 Although mistreatment of their envoys is also described elsewhere as triggering Roman disapproval and attack (see, e.g., 2.8.12–13; 33.9.1–8), it is noteworthy that only here is it stated that this accusation was a pretext. 60 Walbank 1979, 535 observes that although the Romans had not started another war in the East after Perseus’ defeat, they did engage in various military enterprises, and therefore the accusation of softness due to a long period of peace is not entirely true. Polybius’ comment is thought to be exaggerated, reflecting his lack of interest in events in the West. See also Gelzer 1964, 174–175. I would argue, however, that the attribution of these motivations to the Romans indicates how Polybius himself comprehended, and wished to convey, the pragmatic dimension of their decision. Indeed, the historian here touches upon two issues that completely match his views and the picture he paints of the Romans in his work generally. The Romans’ demand that their orders should be carried out is a major feature of their foreign policy as portrayed in the Histories. See, e.g., 3.4.2–3, 16.27.2–3, 16.34.3–4, 18.47.1–2, 23.2.6, 23.8.2, 30.30.2–3, 33.12.8, 36.9.6 with Derow 1979, 4–6. Similarly, the negative impact of protracted idleness on the morals and fighting spirit of a people is a widespread ancient Greek concept which Polybius embraces and expresses in the final books of his work with reference to the Romans. See 31.25.3–7; 35.4.3–7.

  Collective Leadership: The Romans favor. The Senate’s self-serving rationale is highlighted yet further when compared to the opposite decision it makes, again based exclusively on its own interests, when it refuses to allow Demetrius to return to Syria, although he had right on his side (31.2.7, 31.11.11). Another indication of the way in which Polybius outlines the exercise of Roman hegemony which could be associated with themes and motifs from the history of Alexander can be found in the descriptions of embassies, so frequent in the last books of his Histories. The numerous embassies sent to Alexander, described by Arrian in the Anabasis, function, as a rule, as a confirmation of his power and dominance. The envoys come to render honors, to declare their subjection or to beg the indulgence of the glorious conqueror, who is in a position to grant or reject their requests depending on his interests and how much magnanimity or severity he is willing to show. The connection between sending embassies and rendering honors to him or recognizing his supremacy is so apparent to Alexander himself that he often prepares to attack on the pretext that he has not received embassies from those he is targeting (6.15.5, 6.16.2, 7.19.6). Arrian presents the flocking of envoys to the royal court as a sign of power and dominance in an interesting passage listing the numerous official envoys sent to Alexander by the Ethiopians, the Carthaginians, the Scythians of Europe, the Celts, and various nations of Italy and Spain, to congratulate him and ask him to resolve the differences between them (7.15.4–6). As Arrian notes at 7.15.5, “Then indeed it was especially evident both to himself and to those about him that he was lord of all the land and sea” (τότε μάλιστα αὐτόν τε αὑτῷ Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τοῖς ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν φανῆναι γῆς τε ἁπάσης καὶ θαλάσσης κύριον).61 Arrian also observes that certain authors assert that Alexander received embassies even from the Romans, and that judging from what he learned of their constitution, among other things (καὶ περὶ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἅμα διαπυνθανόμενον), he predicted their future power (7.15.5) — a point reminiscent of the famous phrase from Polybius’ preface καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας (1.1.5) on the part played by the Roman constitution in the establishment of the Roman hegemony. Arrian reports this piece of information with reservations, as it is not mentioned in his main sources and, in his view, does not match the situation, the attitude, and

 61 Tarn 1948, 24–25 holds that this phrase does not belong to Alexander’s era but refers to the rule of Rome, being used here to highlight the glory of both by displaying Alexander in the position held in future by Rome. Bosworth 1988, 85 n. 103, on the contrary, believes it is not improbable that the influx of embassies from all these distant nations drew the Macedonians’ admiration and provoked the comment that Alexander has become the ruler of land and sea.

The exercise of Roman hegemony  

the needs of the Romans at that time (7.15.6).62 Regardless of its historical accuracy, however, the dissemination of this information is a revealing attestation of both the well-known connection between Alexander and the Romans and the importance of sending envoys as a polite gesture to powerful leaders, who determined the fates not only of their subjects but also of the other powers wishing to play a role in the same geographical region. This picture of numerous embassies coming to the dominant power in order to describe their affairs, submit their requests, account for their actions, and generally secure or regain its favor also emerges in the later books of the Histories in connection with Rome. I would argue, therefore, that the frequent descriptions of embassies in this part of the work reflect not only the interests and preferences of the Byzantine compilers, as is often pointed out, but also Polybius’ own desire to highlight in this way, too, the key role assumed by the new superpower in the Mediterranean region. Indeed, at 30.19.15 Polybius appears to be trying to convey precisely this impression when describing the atmosphere at Rome when embassies arrived after the successful conclusion of the war against Perseus: “For there was no city or prince or king who had not at this time sent a mission to congratulate them” (οὐ γὰρ ἦν οὔτε πόλις οὔτε δυνάστης οὔτε βασιλεὺς ὃς οὐκ ἀπεστάλκει πρεσβείαν κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν τὴν συγχαρησομένην ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσιν). His observation may well be compared to the connection we saw in Arrian between the sending of embassies to Alexander and the recognition of his power and dominion. As in the case of Alexander, the multitude of embassies sent to the Romans at the end of the war against Perseus is mentioned as a confirmation of their status as the undisputed ruling power in the Mediterranean following their victory over the Macedonian king.63 Moreover, the  62 The only surviving testimony comes from Pliny, who notes that Cleitarchus briefly mentions the sending of a Roman embassy to Alexander (Nat. Hist. 3.57 = FGrHist 137 F 31). However, the historicity of the episode as recounted by Arrian is generally disputed. For a discussion of the issue and an overview of the various arguments see Seibert 1972, 172–173; Weippert 1972, 1–10. Several scholars do not exclude the possibility that an embassy was indeed sent to Alexander from Rome; see, e.g., Sordi 1965, 445–452; Schachermeyr 1970, 218–223; Bosworth 1988, 83–93. 63 It is interesting that when Polybius at 6.50.3–4, comparing the Spartan and the Roman constitutions, describes the state of a hegemonic power with authoritarian and expansionist intentions, one of its main characteristics he notes is that it attracts everyone’s attention: εἰ δέ τις μειζόνων ἐφίεται, κἀκείνου κάλλιον καὶ σεμνότερον εἶναι νομίζει τὸ πολλῶν μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι, πολλῶν δ᾽ ἐπικρατεῖν καὶ δεσπόζειν, πάντας δ᾽ εἰς αὐτὸν ἀποβλέπειν καὶ νεύειν πρὸς αὐτόν, τῇδέ πῃ συγχωρητέον τὸ μὲν Λακωνικὸν ἐνδεὲς εἶναι πολίτευμα, τὸ δὲ Ῥωμαίων διαφέρειν καὶ δυναμικωτέραν ἔχειν τὴν σύστασιν (“But if anyone is ambitious of greater things, and esteems it finer and more glorious than that to be the leader of many men and to rule and lord it over

  Collective Leadership: The Romans Romans themselves, again like Alexander, seem to regard the embassies to their country as a self-evident consequence of their power and an opportunity to intervene in others’ affairs. Polybius already raises this issue at 23.17.4, when commenting on the Roman stance concerning the conflict between the Achaeans and the Messenians in 183: ἐξ οὗ καταφανεῖς ἅπασιν ἐγενήθησαν ὅτι τοσοῦτον ἀπέχουσιν τοῦ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐκτὸς πραγμάτων ἀποτρίβεσθαι καὶ παρορᾶν, ὡς τοὐναντίον καὶ δυσχεραίνουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ πάντων τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς γίνεσθαι καὶ πάντα πράττεσθαι μετὰ τῆς αὑτῶν γνώμης. This made it patent to every one that so far from shirking and neglecting less important items of foreign affairs, they were on the contrary displeased if all matters were not submitted to them and if all was not done in accordance with their decision.

The impression of Roman superiority created by the frequent references to official embassies from other nations is confirmed and further reinforced by the reactions of the characters who have diplomatic contacts with the Romans. A favorable Roman attitude is generally a cause for optimism and courage for those who believe they have their support. Attalus, for example, elated by the warm welcome given to him at Rome, “began to entertain extravagant hopes” (μετέωρος ἐγενήθη ταῖς ἐλπίσιν, 30.1.4). Similarly, Ariarathes, judging from the replies his envoys received from the Romans, believed his rule to be safe, since he had won their favor (καθῖκται τῆς Ῥωμαίων εὐνοίας, 31.7.1). On the contrary, the negative attitude of the superpower arouses intense fear and despair. When the Rhodian envoys Astymedes and Philophron met the Romans and became aware of their suspicion and hostility (τὴν ὑφόρασιν καὶ τὴν ἀλλοτριότητα τῶν ἀνθρώπων), “they fell into a state of utter despondency and helplessness” (εἰς ἀθυμίαν ὁλοσχερῆ καὶ δυσχρηστίαν ἐνέπιπτον, 30.4.3). And when they were faced with the threat of war, “entirely losing their senses (παντάπασιν ἔξω τοῦ φρονεῖν γενόμενοι) owing to the danger in which their country stood, they were in such a state of distress that they put on mourning and in seeking the aid of their friends no longer begged for it or asked for it, but implored them in tears not to resort to extreme measures against Rhodes” (30.4.5). The repercussions of the Roman refusal to allow the repatriation of the Greeks who had been taken to Rome on suspicion of anti-Roman activities is also described in an especially

 many and have the eyes of all the world turned to him, it must be admitted that from this point of view the Laconian constitution is defective, while that of Rome is superior and better framed for the attainment of power.”)

The exercise of Roman hegemony  

dramatic fashion (30.32.10–11). The declaration of the decision caused “utter despondency and helplessness” (ἐγένετό τις ὁλοσχερὴς ἀθυμία καὶ παράλυσις τῆς ψυχῆς) not only in the political prisoners themselves but also in all the Greeks in Rome, who experienced it as a common mourning (ὡσανεὶ κοινόν τι πένθος). And when the news came to Greece, “the spirits of the people were crushed (τὰ μὲν πλήθη συνετρίβη ταῖς διανοίαις) and something like despair everywhere prevailed (καί τις οἷον ἀπελπισμὸς ὑπέδραμεν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους).” The criticism of Alexander largely focused on the corrupting influence of power and success on his character.64 His string of victories increased Alexander’s insatiable need for honors and recognition, leading him to adopt behaviors foreign to Macedonian tradition, such as imposing the custom of proskynesis of himself.65 This situation was worsened by the flatterers who praised his decisions and fueled his megalomania.66 The Alexander tradition also records the difficulties his behavior caused in his relationship with the Macedonians, and the efforts of some of his friends to counsel and restrain him. The most famous and tragic episode is the killing of Clitus, when he reacted strongly to Alexander’s achievements being compared to those of Castor, Polydeuces, and Heracles (Arr. Anab. 4.8.4–5). Another noteworthy example is Arrian’s depiction of the council at the Hyphasis, where Coenus attempts to persuade Alexander not to continue the expedition into India but allow the Macedonians to return home. Alexander’s ambitious vision for the global expansion of the Macedonian empire, until it borders only the Ocean in every direction (5.26.1–2), is countered by Coenus’ stressing of the need for wisdom in times of success (καλὸν δέ, ὦ βασιλεῦ, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο, καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ εὐτυχεῖν σωφροσύνη, 5.27.9). Coenus also warns that, although with Alexander at the head of such an army no enemy can frighten them, men cannot predict and avoid that which comes from the gods (τὰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἀδόκητά τε καὶ ταύτῃ καὶ ἀφύλακτα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστί, 5.27.9). It is striking that all the above elements used by Arrian to highlight the problematic points of Alexander’s behavior are also encountered in the description of the Romans in the later books of Polybius’ Histories. As regards the corruption of Roman morals and behavior by the acquisition of power, we have  64 See, e.g., Arr. Anab. 4.7.4–5, 4.8–9, 5.26.2, 7.1.4 with Stadter 1980, 103–114 and Liotsakis 2019, 14–80 and passim. For Roman authors’ criticism of Alexander see Fears 1974; Wirth 1976; Baynham 1998, 11. 65 See Arr. Anab. 4.10–12 with Bosworth 1988, 113–123. For a detailed bibliography on the practice of proskynesis see Sisti and Zambrini 2004, 400–401. 66 See Arr. Anab. 4.8.3–4; 4.9.8–9; 7.29.1; Plut. Alex. 23.7; Q.C. 8.5.6–8. On the role of flatterers in Alexander’s court see Völcker–Janssen 1993, 81–84; Baynham 1998, 136–137.

  Collective Leadership: The Romans seen earlier how graphically the younger generation’s indulgence in expensive luxuries and display is depicted (31.25.3–5). Polybius also notes that as long as the Romans remained true to their mores and institutions, they could not have imagined that they would accept bribes to offer a service, but this changed when they began to engage in overseas wars (18.35.1–2). The dismal image he portrays of the young Romans of his time is further reinforced by the description of their reluctance to enlist in the war against the Celtiberians in Spain. The information reaching Rome on the operations of the previous year caused a fear “such as their elders said they never remembered before” (35.4.3). Even the posts of military tribunes remained unfilled, while the young men who were called up resorted to disgraceful excuses to avoid enrolment (35.4.4–6).67 The subject of flatterers, who gradually replace the honest friends of the superpower (κολάκων μὲν εὐπορεῖν, φίλων δὲ σπανίζειν ἀληθινῶν, 24.10.5), also appears in this part of the work, along with warnings to the new conquerors about the mutability of fortune, their human vulnerability, and the consequent need to display moderation in times of success. At 29.20.1–3 L. Aemilius Paullus addresses such a warning to his officers: using the captive Perseus standing before them as an example, he tells them “never to boast unduly of achievements and never be overbearing and merciless in their conduct to anyone, in fact never place any reliance on present prosperity; it is chiefly at those moments when we ourselves or our country are most successful that we should reflect on the opposite extremity of fortune; for only thus, and then with difficulty, shall we prove moderate in the season of prosperity.”68 The same theme, but with more pointed emphasis, is raised at 21.14.4–6 by Antiochus’ envoy Heracleides, when he is summoned to an audience at the council of Scipio Afri 67 This last point may at first sight appear to be a significant divergence from Alexander’s need for ever more conquests; it is worth noting, however, that Polybius stresses that the Senate was eager for war (ὅσῳ δὲ φιλοτιμότερον ἡ σύγκλητος διέκειτο πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, 35.4.1) but that the young Romans simply did not wish to go along with it. 68 It has been noted that Polybius’ source for Aemilius’ speech may have been Scipio Aemilianus himself, who was present and who makes a similar declaration after the fall of Carthage when Hasdrubal appears before him as a suppliant (38.20.1–3); see Pédech 1964, 352; Walbank 1979, 392. In any case, the emphasis on the mutability of human prosperity, occasioned by the humiliation of once-powerful characters in front of their enemies, is a favorite subject of Polybius. Cf. also the narratorial comment following the capture of Achaeus by Antiochus at 8.21.11. It is interesting that the reminder of human vulnerability at both 8.21.11 (πᾶν δὲ προσδοκᾶν ἀνθρώπους ὄντας) and 38.20.3 (δεῖ μηδέποτε λέγειν μηδὲ πράττειν μηδὲν ὑπερήφανον ἄνθρωπον ὄντα) also appears in Aemilius’ speech as reported by Diodorus (καὶ διὰ μνήμης ἔχειν ἑαυτὸν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα, 30.23.1), showing, as Walbank 1979, 392 notes, that it was also present in Polybius’ text but was omitted by the compiler.

The exercise of Roman hegemony  

canus. After enumerating Antiochus’ concessions, Heracleides exhorts the Romans “first to remember that they were but men (ἀνθρώπους ὑπάρχοντας) and not to test fortune too severely, and next to impose some limit on the extent of their empire (μήτε τὸ μέγεθος τῆς αὑτῶν ἐξουσίας ἀόριστον ποιεῖν), confining it if possible to Europe (μάλιστα μὲν τοῖς τῆς Εὐρώπης ὅροις), for even so it was vast and unexampled, no people in the past having attained to this. But if they must at all hazards grasp for themselves some portions of Asia in addition, let them definitely state which.” Heracleides’ observation is particularly interesting and may be paralleled more directly to Coenus’ intervention at the Hyphasis council which we saw above; in both cases, the reminder of the crucial role of fortune in the outcome of human affairs is linked to the critical issue of the expansion and delimitation of the rule of ambitious conquerors. I do not mean by the above to suggest that Polybius drew the negative aspects he notes in the Romans’ behavior exclusively from sources on Alexander. Many parallels could certainly be drawn between many of the topics I have discussed and various works. The speeches of Alexander and Coenus at the Hyphasis, for example, seem to echo the famous council in Herodotus where Xerxes announces his decision to campaign against Greece to the Persian nobles (7.8–11). Xerxes expounds to his audience an ambitious plan for the establishment of a global empire which will border on no other country save the sky of Zeus (7.8c.1–2).69 Although in Xerxes’ vision it is the sky rather than the Ocean that forms the boundary of his empire, just like Alexander, his desire to unify human and cosmic geographical demarcation through his conquests (cf. Hdt. 7.8c.1: γῆν τὴν Περσίδα ἀποδέξομεν τῷ Διὸς αἰθέρι ὁμουρέουσαν; Arr. Anab. 5.26.2: καὶ ὅροι τῆς ταύτῃ ἀρχῆς οὕσπερ καὶ τῆς γῆς ὅρους ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησε) reflects his arrogant conviction that his power negates his human limitations, sets him apart from common mortals, and unites him with the gods.70 Artabanus’ reply to Xerxes, like that of Coenus to Alexander, stresses the excessiveness of his design and warns of the dangers of megalomania (7.10e.1):

 69 On the council of Xerxes in Herodotus see Solmsen 1982; Baragwanath 2008, 243–249. 70 The establishment of a world empire bordered on all sides by the Ocean is an idea connected to Roman expansionism. On the Ocean as the limit of the empire see, e.g., Plut. Pomp. 38.2– 3; Liv. 36.17.15; Virg. Aen. 7.100–101; Ovid Met. 15.829–831. The appearance of this idea in the Anabasis is therefore thought to reproduce topoi of Latin literature (see Bosworth 1988, 131– 132). However, as the striking similarity between Alexander’s and Xerxes’ declaration shows, Arrian may also have drawn his inspiration here from the Greek historiographical tradition. For a detailed analysis of the similarities between the council at the Hyphasis and the Persian council in Herodotus see Miltsios 2022.

  Collective Leadership: The Romans Ὁρᾷς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα ζῷα ὡς κεραυνοῖ ὁ θεὸς οὐδὲ ἐᾷ φαντάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ οὐδὲ μιν κνίζει· ὁρᾷς δὲ ὡς ἐς οἰκήματα τὰ μέγιστα αἰεὶ καὶ δένδρεα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποσκήπτει τὰ βέλεα. Φιλέει γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα πάντα κολούειν. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ στρατὸς πολλὸς ὑπὸ ὀλίγου διαφθείρεται κατὰ τοιόνδε· ἐπεάν σφι ὁ θεὸς φθονήσας φόβον ἐμβάλῃ ἢ βροντήν, δι᾽ ὧν ἐφθάρησαν ἀναξίως ἑωυτῶν. Οὐ γὰρ ἐᾷ φρονέειν μέγα ὁ θεὸς ἄλλον ἢ ἑωυτόν. You see how the god smites with his thunderbolt creatures of greatness and does not suffer them to display their pride, while little ones do not move him to anger; and you see how it is always on the tallest buildings and trees that his bolts fall; for the god loves to bring low all things of surpassing greatness. Thus a large army is destroyed by a smaller, when the jealous god sends panic or the thunderbolt among them, and they perish unworthily; for the god suffers pride in none but himself (trans. A.D. Godley).

The reference to the possibility of a large army being defeated due to unknown factors links Artabanus’ warning both to Coenus’ observation that, despite all the abilities of Alexander and the Macedonians, humans cannot predict and take precautions against the will of the gods (Arr. Anab. 5.27.9), and to the more general observations in Polybius on the mutability of fortune and the human vulnerability of the Romans.71 Similarly, Polybius did not need to refer to Alexander and the Macedonians for inspiration and models when linking power and prosperity on the one hand to corruption and moral decay on the other; these ideas were deeply rooted in ancient Greek thought, as is evident from the emphasis with which they appeared as issues in the historical works of Herodotus and Thucydides. Kings and tyrants in Herodotus, such as Cambyses, Xerxes, and Periander, to mention only a few typical examples among barbarians and Greeks, repeatedly commit illegal and immoral acts to satisfy their desires.72 On a collective level, too, the Athenians, particularly after Mycale, express behaviors which remind many modern readers of Herodotus of the aggressive role they are to play soon afterwards.73 Concerning the effects of material prosperity on conquerors’ morals and fighting spirit, it is sufficient to recall Cyrus’ warning to the Persians, in the final paragraph of Herodotus, that if they hold fertile lands, they must be prepared to no  71 For this idea in Polybius cf. also the speech of the Aravacae in the Senate at 35.2.14: τὰ τῆς τύχης ἄδηλα πολλάκις ὑπεδείκνυον καὶ τὰς προγεγενημένας μάχας ἀμφιδηρίτους ποιοῦντες ἐν πάσαις ἔμφασιν ἀπέλειπον ὡς ἐπικυδεστέρων αὐτῶν γεγονότων (“they more than once hinted at the uncertainty of Fortune, and by making out that the engagements that had taken place were hotly contested left the impression that in all of them they thought they themselves had fought more brilliantly than the Romans.”) 72 For the portrayal of leaders in Herodotus see Immerwahr 1966, 167–169, 176–183; Gammie 1986; Lateiner 1989, 170–185; Gray 1996. 73 See, e.g., Moles 1996, 259–284; Dewald 1997, 62–82.

The exercise of Roman hegemony  

longer be rulers but subjects (9.122.3). In Thucydides, too, episodes such as the Melian Dialogue or Euphemus’ speech comparing the Athenian hegemony to a tyrant who makes every decision based solely on his own best interests (ἀνδρὶ δὲ τυράννῳ ἢ πόλει ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ οὐδὲν ἄλογον ὅτι ξυμφέρον οὐδ᾽ οἰκεῖον ὅτι μὴ πιστόν, 6.85.1) form strongly ironic counterpoints to the idealized picture of Athens painted in Pericles’ Funeral Oration, suggesting that the reason for the atrocities described is not just the violence of war but also the moral decay of the city due to power and the constant struggle to preserve it.74 Thus, when Polybius touches on these problematic points in the exercise of Roman hegemony in the last books of his work, he is building on a tradition shaped in some of the most popular historical narratives of Greek antiquity, which he must have absorbed almost with his mother’s milk. On the other hand, however, it would be unfair to overlook the part played by Alexander and the Macedonians in the corroboration and furtherance of this tradition, and in its reception by Polybius and his contemporaries. Alexander’s Asian expedition was one of the most gripping tales of the Hellenistic world, and the uniqueness of his abilities and achievements almost automatically drew comparisons with the new invincible conquerors. Besides, although the rise and fall of the Athenian hegemony and the Persian empire was the history Polybius had been taught and studied through the texts of earlier historians and oral accounts, the collapse of the Macedonian kingdom was the fall of the great power which he had the opportunity to observe at first hand in his own time. Polybius states that he was an eyewitness to this event (ἅτε γεγονὼς αὐτόπτης τῆς πράξεως, 29.21.8), when he reports that, almost 150 years before the fall of the Macedonian dynasty, the Peripatetic philosopher Demetrius of Phalerum in his treatise On Fortune (Περὶ Τύχης) had foretold that, just as the Macedonians, whose name was formerly almost unknown, won the enviable lands and wealth of the Persians, so would their own situation change again at some point in the future (29.21.3–6). Polybius praises Demetrius’ view, commenting that his words were spoken “as if by the mouth of some god” (ὡσανεὶ θείῳ τινὶ στόματι, 29.21.7). The reporting of Demetrius’ prophetic words seems to function as an indirect and cautious reminder that something similar may befall the new wielders of world power.75  74 See in detail Connor 1984, 148–157, 180–184. 75 Cf. the famous scene at 38.21–22, when, at the sight of Carthage in flames, Scipio Aemilianus, thinking of the fall of all the previous great dynasties, wept and admitted to Polybius, who was standing by his side, that he was afraid that his own country would share the same fate. On the scene see Eckstein 1995, 232 and Grethlein 2013, 261–262, who also take Scipio’s words to be a melancholy prediction of the fate of Rome. See, however, also the reservations of Wiater 2016, 257–265, who observes that neither of the passages allows us to draw “reliable

  Collective Leadership: The Romans However, it is especially significant for the purpose of the present study that Polybius uses an observation on the Macedonians and Alexander to underline the common fate of great powers. The portrayal of the Romans in dark hues, traditionally associated in Greek historiography and thought with the exercise of authority by ruling powers, does not mean that the answer provided in the final part of the Histories to the question of the usefulness of the Roman hegemony and how far it was accepted by its contemporaries is a negative one. Once again, the limitations imposed by the fragmentary state of the work leave room for multiple interpretations but not certainty. I suspect, however, that this question would be difficult to answer even if we had the text in its entirety. For Polybius and his contemporaries, the Roman hegemony was the complex reality they were experiencing, not a historical event which they could judge with the comfort, the safety, or the composure afforded by temporal distance. How controversial this issue was, and why 10 whole books had to be devoted to its discussion, may be perceived from the way in which Polybius describes the impact on Greece of the Roman decision to raze Carthage to the ground. Some people, he says, held that the Romans acted wisely and pragmatically (φρονίμως καὶ πραγματικῶς, 36.9.3) for their hegemony, by eliminating a constant threat to themselves, and an enemy who had often disputed their world supremacy and could do so even now if given the opportunity (36.9.4). Others believed that the Romans deviated from the traditional principles by which they had gained their hegemony, when they had fought not to exterminate their enemies but only until they could force them to obey their orders; and that they had now been carried away by a lust for domination like that of the Athenians and the Spartans (εἰς τὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐκτρέπεσθαι φιλαρχίαν), and risked sharing the same end (36.9.5). Although this comparison, which may be taken to mean either that the Romans would ultimately lose their sway or

 conclusions about the future of the Roman Empire, positive or negative,” and that Demetrius’ prediction is contradictory in that it combines the concept of the unforeseeable reversals of fortune with the possibility of foretelling the future of the Macedonian dynasty based on the pattern of the succession of empires (259). I would argue, however, that the two passages simply hint at a possible future development and are therefore not intended to suggest any conclusions; in this case Polybius is using the concept of fortune to highlight not so much the limitations on the possibility of predicting the future as the unexpectedness of the defeat of the all-powerful Persians by the hitherto unknown Macedonians. The coexistence of the ideas of the mutability of fortune and the succession of empires is no more contradictory in the text of Demetrius reproduced by Polybius than it is in fact. Polybius clearly believed in both equally.

The exercise of Roman hegemony  

that they would become tyrants,76 is to the Athenians and the Spartans rather than Alexander, it is particularly interesting in that it shows that the Roman hegemony was interpreted by Polybius’ contemporaries based on their historical perception of the behaviors and characteristics of the great powers of the familiar past. Others, again, did not dwell so much on the decision to destroy Carthage as on the way in which the Romans negotiated with their opponents. They stressed that although the Romans generally condemned all acts of deceit and fraud in war, in this case they did not hesitate to resort to dishonest practices, acting more like a monarch than in accordance with their political principles (36.9.9– 11). Lastly, there were also those who disagreed with this view of the situation and placed the blame on the Carthaginians. Once the Carthaginians, they argued, had entrusted themselves to the hands of the Romans, they gave them the right to treat them in any way they chose and to take steps to impose their decisions (36.9.13). Consequently, it was not the Romans who broke the agreements but the Carthaginians, by disobeying their orders and forcing them to resort to violence (36.9.16–17). Since Polybius records these views without commenting on them or hinting at his own position, scholarly attempts to interpret his stance have reached opposite conclusions. According to Petzold, Polybius embraces the anti-Roman criticism, given that elsewhere he counsels the powerful not to treat their subjects too harshly, and to preserve their rule by the same principles and methods by which they achieved it.77 Walbank, on the other hand, noting the historian’s personal participation in the siege of Carthage, and structural features of the text, such as the fact that the pro-Roman arguments frame the discussion and take up more space than the anti-Roman ones, has argued that Polybius cannot agree with those who criticize Roman policy.78 I would say that Polybius’ familiarity with Scipio Aemilianus and his participation in the enterprise probably made him careful and restrained about expressing anti-Roman views rather than eager to approve of the Roman decision.79 In any case, however, Polybius’ choice not to express an opinion on this matter, besides his personal sympathies and obligations, also indicates that in the final part of the work he is de-

 76 See Walbank 1979, 665–666. 77 Petzold 1969, 62–63. 78 Walbank 1974, 13–18 and (1977) 1985, 338–340; contra Musti 1978, 55–57. 79 Cf. Rich 1999, 26.

  Collective Leadership: The Romans scribing a political situation that was still being assessed and did not offer itself to unambiguous answers.80 To summarize, Polybius’ approach to the presentation of the collective behavior of the Romans differs significantly from the way in which he describes the abilities and characteristics of individual leaders in his work. Whereas, when recording individual effective leadership behaviors, the emphasis is on the leaders’ mental abilities and the perspicacity with which they grasp and decipher the situations they face, in the presentation of the Romans, as we saw in the analysis of the account of the First Punic War, the focus of attention shifts to highlighting their temperament and moral superiority. In Book 6 references to the mental processes of the Romans are replaced by detailed descriptions of their constitution and military system, which essentially set out the framework within which they think and act. Again, though, as we have seen, the organization and operation of the Roman constitution seem to have been shaped alongside and completely interwoven with their ethos and mentality. If, however, in the narrative of the process by which they subjected almost the whole of the known world, the Romans are distinguished by their impressive abilities and their uniqueness, in the description of how they went on to exercise their power they present the usual moral failings connected in ancient Greek historiography with the corruptive influence of power and material prosperity. In the last 10 books of the Histories Polybius makes some openly critical observations on the pragmatic motives of Roman foreign policy and on the Romans’ moral decay. In my proposed analysis, I have compared the picture of the Romans in this part of the work with the history of Alexander the Great, arguing that most of the elements of that picture are common to the narratives of ancient Greek historians presenting the behaviors of successful conquerors. For Polybius and his contemporaries, of course, the exercise of Roman hegemony was an open, ongoing process. Consequently, as is so frequently the case in his descriptions of aspiring individual leaders, the noting of these worrying phenomena appears to be yet another warning to the supreme leaders of his time and history of what might befall them and how to avoid it.

 80 Cf. Ferrary 1988, 327–334.

 Epilogue The issue of leadership is a key one for Polybius. Although the main theme of the Histories is the rise of Roman dominion in the Mediterranean basin, it would be very difficult to find any section of the work that is not concerned with the exercise of leadership on both a personal and a collective level. If Rome’s conquest of the Hellenistic kingdoms and Greece dramatically limited the field of practical application of the lessons to be drawn from the examples of successful and unsuccessful leadership in the Histories for Polybius’ Greek readership, his Roman readers could draw valuable conclusions on their own leadership behavior and their interaction with their subjects. Besides, Polybius was a historian with far too well-developed a sense of the complexity of historical circumstances and the role of contingency to believe that the situation that had emerged in his time would remain unchanged. In the narrative interventions at the end of many episodes, indeed, there is a clear idea of the diachronic value of the events described to readers of the Histories who may one day have to assume positions of responsibility and face the challenges involved in exercising leadership. For Polybius, however, the theme of leadership is the field in which he not only establishes the educational value of this work but also contends with his predecessors, claiming his place in the literary tradition of ancient Greek historiography. Emphasis on leadership behaviors was a central theme of the genre from its beginnings, boosted yet further by the works of Xenophon and the various attempts of the authors of the Hellenistic period who recorded the impressive achievements of Alexander the Great. The descriptions of Alexander’s unsurpassed military skill and genius greatly influenced and shaped the way in which Polybius presents successful leadership behaviors in his own work. Interestingly, though, even the more problematic points of Alexander’s behavior, linked to the corruptive influence of power on the character of the leader, also appear to be echoed in the Histories, for example in the picture of the Romans sketched in the last ten books. Undoubtedly, the various themes, motifs, and patterns seemingly associated with the history of Alexander can be traced back in their turn to a complex amalgam of ancient Greek ideas and beliefs on leadership, which was further enriched to serve the thematic needs of the authors who described the deeds of the Macedonian general, before being channeled into Polybius’ Histories, leaving its mark upon them. Polybius drew these ideas and themes from the literary tradition to which he belonged, but he elaborated them systematically and adapted them to the particular requirements of his own narrative presenting the global expansion of https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111239538-006

  Epilogue Roman dominion. Thus, although one can discern the origins of many of the themes, motifs, and patterns used to describe leadership behaviors in the Histories, they are well organized and fully incorporated into their new textual universe, allowing readers who become familiar with their use to recognize their function and purpose. If the systematic exploitation of these elements sometimes gives the impression of serving, for the most part, rhetorical and narrative aims, this is because in the Histories, as in ancient Greek literature generally, the form of the work is inextricably linked to its contents. The deeper one delves into Polybius’ technique, then, the closer one approaches to his historical vision and his assessments of the characters and events described. The strict structure of the Polybian narrative operates as a literary depiction of the Roman politeia, in which the emphasis on organization, control, and discipline is dictated by specific ideological principles and aims. In contrast to Roman dominion, however, which would sooner or later decline, Polybius’ narrative, like the lessons on leadership to be drawn from it, will remain open to readers in every age to endow it with meaning according to the questions and challenges of their own generation.

References Alonso-Núñez, J.M. “The anacyclosis in Polybius,” Eranos 84, 17–22. Baragwanath, E. 2008. Motivation and Narrative in Herodotus, Oxford. Baronowski, D.W. 2011. Polybius and Roman Imperialism, London. Baynham, E. 1998. Alexander the Great: The Unique History of Quintus Curtius, Ann Arbor. Beck, H. 2013. “Polybius’ Roman prokataskeuē,” in: B. Gibson/T. Harrison (eds.), 125–42. Billows, R.A. 1995. Kings and Colonists. Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism, Leiden. Billows, R.A. 2000. “Polybius and Alexander Historiography,” in: A.B. Bosworth/E.J. Baynham (eds.), Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction, Oxford, 286–306. Bischoff, H. 1932. Der Warner bei Herodot, Leipzig. Boncquet, J. 1982–83. “Polybius on the Critical Evaluation of Historians,” AncSoc 13–14, 277– 91. Bosworth, A.B. 1988. From Arrian to Alexander: Studies in Historical Interpretation, Oxford. Brouwer, R. 2011. “Polybius and Stoic Tyche,” GRBS 51, 111–32. Brunt, P.A. 1971. Italian Manpower, Oxford. Champion, C. 2004. Cultural Politics in Polybius’s Histories, Berkeley. Chiasson, C.C. 1983. “An Ominous Word in Herodotus,” Hermes 110, 115–16. Connor, W.R. 1984. Thucydides, Princeton. Darbo-Peschanski, C. 2007. L’historia: Commencements grecs, Paris. Dart, C.J. 2009. “Review of Steinby, The Roman Republican Navy: From the Sixth Century to 167 BC,” BMCR 2009.04.31. Davidson, J. 1991. “The Gaze in Polybius’ Histories,” JRS 81, 10–24. Derow, P. 1979. “Polybius, Rome, and the East,” JRS 69, 1–15. Dewald, C. 1997. “Pickled Heroes, Wanton Kings and Gnomic Founding Fathers: Reading the End of Herodotus’ Histories,” in: D.H. Roberts/F.M. Dunn/D. Fowler (eds.), Classical Closure: Reading the End in Greek and Latin Literature, Princeton, 62–82. Dreyer, B. 2013. “Frank Walbank’s Philippos Tragoidoumenos: Polybius’ Account of Philip’s Last Years,” in: B. Gibson/T. Harrison (eds.), 201–11. Eckstein, A.M. 1995. Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius, Berkeley. Errington, R.M. 1976. “Alexander in the Hellenistic World,” in: E. Badian (ed.), Alexandre le Grand (Entretiens Hardt 22), Vandoeuvres–Geneva, 137–79. Erskine, A. 2000. “Polybios and Barbarian Rome,” MedAnt 3, 165–82. Erskine, A. 2013. “How to Rule the World: Polybius Book 6 Reconsidered,” in: B. Gibson/T. Harrison (eds.), 231–45. Fears, J.R. 1974. “The Stoic View of Alexander the Great,” Philologus 118, 113–30. Ferrary, J. 1988. Philhellénisme et impérialisme: Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique, de la seconde guerre de Macédoine à la guerre contre Mithridate, Rome. Flower, H. 1996. Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture, Oxford.

 Greek authors and their works are abbreviated mostly as in LSJ9 and journals as in L’Année Philologique. The text of Polybius is cited from the edition of Th. Büttner–Wobst 1888–1905, 5 vols., Leipzig. Translations of Polybius are by W.R. Paton and those of Arrian by E.J. Chinnock. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111239538-007

  References Foulon, E. 1993. “Philopoemen, Hannibal, Scipion: Trois vies parallèles chez Polybe,” REG 106, 333–79. Foulon, E. 2003. “Entre ἀρχή et τέλος: les Histoires de Polybe,” in: G. Lachenaud/D. Longrée (eds.), Grecs et Romains aux prises avec l’histoire. Réprésentations, récits et idéologie. Colloque de Nantes et Angers I, Rennes, 31–50. von Fritz, K. 1954. The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity: A Critical Analysis of Polybius’ Political Ideas, New York. Gabba, E. (ed.) 1974. Polybe (Entretiens Hardt 20), Vandoeuvres–Geneva. Gammie, J.G. 1986. “Herodotus on Kings and Tyrants: Objective Historiography or Conventional Portraiture,” JNES 45, 171–95. Gelzer, M. 1964. Kleine Schriften, vol. 3, Wiesbaden. Gibson, B. and T. Harrison (eds.) 2013. Polybius and his World: Essays in Memory of Frank Walbank, Oxford. Gray, V.J. 1996. “Herodotus and Images of Tyranny: The Tyrants of Corinth,” AJP 117, 361–89. Green, P. 1989. “Caesar and Alexander: Aemulatio, imitatio, comparatio,” in: P. Green, Classical Bearings. Interpreting Ancient History, London, 193–209. Grethlein, J. 2013. Experience and Teleology in Ancient Historiography, Cambridge. Gruen, E.S. 1976. “The Origins of the Achaean War,” JHS 96, 46–69. Hahm, D.E. 1995. “Polybius’ Applied Political Theory,” in: A. Laks/M. Schofield (eds.), Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum, Cambridge, 7–47. Hahm, D.E. 2009. “The Mixed Constitution in Greek Thought,” in: R.K. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought, Oxford and Malden, MA, 178–98. Harris, W.V. 1979. War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327–70 BC, Oxford. Hau, L. 2011. “Tychê in Polybios: Narrative Answers to a Philosophical Question,” Histos 5, 183–207. Hau, L. 2016. Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus, Edinburgh. Haywood, R.M. 1933. Studies on Scipio Africanus, Baltimore. Herman, G. 1997. “The Court Society of the Hellenistic Age,” in: P. Cartledge/P. Garnsey/E. Gruen (eds.), Hellenistic Constructs: Essays in Culture, History, and Historiography, Berkeley, 199–224. Heuss, A. 1949. “Der erste punische Krieg und das Problem des römischen Imperialismus,” HZ 169, 457–513. van Hooff, A.J.L. 1977. “Polybius’ Reason and Religion: The Relation between Polybius’ Casual Thinking and His Attitude towards Religion in the Studies of History,” Klio 59, 101–28. Huss, W. 2001. Ägypten in hellenistischer Zeit 323–30 v. Chr., Munich. Immerwahr, H. 1966. Form and Thought in Herodotus, Cleveland. de Jong, I.J.F. 2007. “Introduction. Narratological Theory on Time,” in: I.J.F. de Jong/ R. Nünlist (eds.), Time in Ancient Greek Narrative (Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative 2), Leiden, 1–14. La–Roche, P. 1857. Charakteristik des Polybios, Leipzig. Lateiner, D. 1977. “No Laughing Matter: A Literary Tactic in Herodotus,” TAPA 107, 173–82. Lateiner, D. 1989. The Historical Method of Herodotus, Toronto. Lattimore, R. 1939. “The Wise Advisor in Herodotus,” CP 34, 24–35. Lehmann, G. A. 1974. “Polybios und die zeitgenössische griechische Geschichtsschreibung,” in: E. Gabba (ed.), 145–205. de Ligt, L. 2007. “Roman Manpower and Recruitment during the Middle Republic,” in: P. Erdkamp (ed.), A Companion to the Roman Army, Oxford, 114–31.

References  

Liotsakis, V. 2019. Alexander the Great in Arrian’s Anabasis. A Literary Portrait, Berlin. Ma, J. 2013. “Alexander’s Decision–Making as Historical Problem,” in: C. Brélaz/S. Fachard (eds.), Pratiques militaires et art de la guerre dans le monde grec antique: études offertes à Pierre Ducrey à l’occasion de son 75ème anniversaire (Revue des Études Militaires Anciennes 6), Paris, 113–25. Maier, F. 2012. “Überall mit dem Unerwarteten rechnen”: Die Kontingenz historischer Prozesse bei Polybios, Munich. McGing, B.C. 2010. Polybius’ Histories, Oxford. McGing, B.C. 2013. “Youthfulness in Polybius: The Case of Philip V of Macedon,” in: B. Gibson/ T. Harrison (eds.), 181–99. Meister, K. 1975. Historische Kritik bei Polybios, Wiesbaden. Millar, F. 2002. The Roman Republic in Political Thought, Hanover. Miltsios, N. 2009. “The Perils of Expectations: Perceptions, Suspense and Surprise in Polybius’ Histories,” in: J. Grethlein/A. Rengakos (eds.), Narratology and Interpretation, Berlin, 481–506. Miltsios, N. 2013. The Shaping of Narrative in Polybius, Berlin. Miltsios, N. 2018. “Polybius and Arrian: The Cases of Philip V and Alexander the Great,” in: N. Miltsios/M. Tamiolaki (eds.), Polybius and his Legacy, Berlin, 325–40. Miltsios, N. 2021. “Suspense in Conspiracy Narratives: Polybius and Appian,” in: I. Konstantakos/V. Liotsakis (eds.), Suspense in Ancient Greek Literature, Berlin, 285–302. Miltsios, N. 2022. “Αρριανός και Ηρόδοτος: Το συμβούλιο στον Ύφαση και το Συμβούλιο του Ξέρξη,” in: Α. Μαρκαντωνάτος/Β. Λιοτσάκης (eds.), Ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός. Festschrift in memory of F. I. Kakrides, Athens, 177–95. Mioni, E. 1949. Polibio, Padua. Mohm, S. 1977. Untersuchungen zu den historiographischen Anschauungen des Polybios, Saarbrücken. Moles, J. 1996. “Herodotus Warns the Athenians,” PLLS 9, 259–84. Momigliano, A. 1977. Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography, Oxford. Momigliano, A. 1977a. “Tradition and the Classical Historian,” in: Momigliano 1977, 161–78. Momigliano, A. 1977b. “Time in Ancient Historiography,” in: Momigliano 1977, 179–204. Moreno Leoni, A. 2017. Entre Roma y el mundo griego: Memoria, autorrepresentación y didáctica del poder en las Historias de Polibio, Cordova. Moore, D.W. 2020. Polybius: Experience and the Lessons of History, Leiden. Musti, D. 1978. Polibio e l’imperialismo romano, Naples. Nicolet, C. 1974. “Polybe et les institutions romaines,” in: E. Gabba (ed.), 209–65. Nippel, W. 1980. Mischverfassungstheorie und Verfassungsrealität in Antike und früer Neuzeit, Stuttgart. Ollier, F. 1943. Le mirage spartiate: étude sur l’idéalisation de Sparte dans l’antiquité grecque, vol. 2: Du début de l’école cynique jusqu’ à la fin de la cité, Paris. Pédech, P. 1964. La Méthode historique de Polybe, Paris. Pelling, C.B.R. 1991. “Thucydides’ Archidamus and Herodotus’ Artabanus,” in: M.A. Flower/ M. Toher (eds.), Georgica: Greek Studies in Honor of George Cawkwell, London, 120–42. Petzold, K.E. 1969. Studien zur Methode des Polybios und zu ihrer historischen Auswertung, Munich. Podes, S. 1991. “Polybios’ Anakyklosis–Lehre, diskrete Zustandssysteme und das Problem der Mischverfassung,” Klio 73, 382–90.

  References Rawson, E. 1971. “The Literary Sources for the Pre–Marian Roman Army,” PBSR 39, 13–31 (reprinted in E. Rawson 1991, Roman Culture and Society. Collected Papers, Oxford, 34– 57). Rich, J.W. 1999. “Polybius’ Ethics: Review of Eckstein, Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius,” CR 49.1, 25–26. Rood, T. 2012. “Polybius, Thucydides, and the First Punic War,” in: C. Smith/L.M. Yarrow (eds.), Imperialism, Cultural Politics, and Polybius, Oxford, 50–67. Roveri, A. 1956. “Tyche in Polibio,” Convivium 24, 275–93. Sacks, K.S. 1981. Polybius on the Writing of History, Berkeley. de Sanctis, G. 1916. Storia dei Romani 3.1, Turin. de Sanctis, G. 1936. “Review of Haywood, Studies on Scipio Africanus,” RFIC 14, 189–203. von Scala, R. 1898. Die Staatsverträge des Altertums, Leipzig. Schachermeyr, F. 1970. Alexander in Babylon und die Reichsordnung nach seinem Tode, Vienna. Schepens, G. 1990. “Polemic and Methodology in Polybius’ Book XII,” in: H. Verdin/G. Schepens/ E. de Keyser (eds.), 39–61. Schepens, G. 2005. “Polybius on Phularchus’ ‘tragic’ historiography,” in: G. Schepens/J. Bollansée (eds.), 141–64. Schepens, G. and J. Bollansée (eds.) 2005. The Shadow of Polybius: Intertextuality as a Research Tool in Greek Historiography. Proceedings of the International Colloquium, Leuven, 21–22 September 2001 (Studia Hellenistica 42), Leuven. Scullard, H.H. 1970. Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician, Ithaca, NY. Seager, R. 2013. “Polybius’ Distortions of the Roman ‘Constitution’: A Simpl(istic) Explanation,” in: B. Gibson/T. Harrison (eds.), 247–54. Seibert, J. 1972. Alexander der Grosse, Darmstadt. Seretaki, M. and M. Tamiolaki 2018. “Polybius and Xenophon: Hannibal and Cyrus the Great as Model Leaders”, in: N. Miltsios/M. Tamiolaki (eds.), Polybius and his Legacy, Berlin, 227– 41. Shimron, B. 1979/80. “Polybius and Rome: A New Examination of the Evidence,” SCI 5, 94–117. Shorey, P. 1921. “Τύχη in Polybius,” CP 16, 280–3. Sisti, F. and A. Zambrini, 2004. Arriano: Anabasi di Alessandro, vol. 2, Milan. Solmsen, F. 1982. “Two Crucial Decisions in Herodotus,” in: id., Kleine Schriften III, Hildesheim, 78–109. Sordi, M. 1965. “Alessandro e i Romani,” RIL 99, 445–452. Spencer, D. 2002. The Roman Alexander: Reading a Cultural Myth, Exeter. Stadter, P.A. 1980. Arrian of Nicomedia, Chapel Hill, NC. Steinby, C. 2007. The Roman Republican Navy: From the Sixth Century to 167 BC, Helsinki. Stewart, A. 1993. Faces of Power. Alexander’s Image and Hellenistic Politics, Berkeley. Stocks, C. 2014. The Roman Hannibal: Remembering the Enemy in Silius Italicus’ Punica, Liverpool. Strootman, R. 2011. “Hellenistic Court Society: The Seleucid Imperial Court under Antiochus the Great, 223–187 BCE,” in: J. Duindam/ T. Artan/ M. Kunt (eds.), Royal Courts in Dynastic States and Empires, Leiden, 63–89. Tarn, W.W. 1948. Alexander the Great, vols. 1–2, Cambridge. Thiel, J.H. 1954. A History of Roman Sea–Power before the Second Punic War, Amsterdam.

References  

Thompson, W.E. 1985. “Fragments of the Preserved Historians–Especially Polybius,” in: M.H. Jameson (ed.), The Greek Historians: Literature and History. Papers Presented to A.E. Raubitschek, Saratoga, CA, 119–39. Trompf, G.W. 1979. The Idea of Historical Recurrence in Western Thought: From Antiquity to the Reformation, Berkeley. Vercruysse, M. 1990. “A la recherche du mensonge et de la verité: la function des passages méthodologiques chez Polybe,” in: H. Verdin/G. Schepens/E. de Keyser (eds.), 17–38. Verdin, H. 1990. “Polybius over het Agathoclesdrama,” in: M. Geerard (ed.), Opes Atticae: Miscellanea philologica et historica Raymondo Bogaert et Hermanno Van Looy oblata (Sacris Erudiri 31), The Hague, 443–54. Verdin, H., G. Schepens, and E. de Keyser (eds.) 1990. Purposes of History: Studies in Greek Historiography from the Fourth to the Second Centuries BC, Leuven. Völker-Janssen, W. 1993. Kunst und Gesellschaft an den Höfen Alexanders d. Gr. und seiner Nachfolger, Munich. Walbank, F.W. 1957, 1967, 1979. A Historical Commentary on Polybius, vol. 1, Books I–VI; vol. 2, Books VII–XVIII; vol. 3, Books XIX–XL, Oxford. Walbank, F.W. 1962. “Polemic in Polybius,” JRS 52, 1–12. Walbank, F.W. 1965. “Political Morality and the Friends of Scipio,” JRS 55, 1–16 (reprinted in Walbank 1985, 157–80). Walbank, F.W. 1972. Polybius, Berkeley. Walbank, F.W. 1974. “Polybius between Greece and Rome,” in: E. Gabba (ed.), 1–31 (reprinted in Walbank 2002, 280–97). Walbank, F.W. 1977. “Polybius’ Last Ten Books,” in: Historiographia Antiqua: Commentationes Lovanienses in honorem W. Peremans septuagenarii editae, Leuven, 139–62 (reprinted in Walbank 2002, 325–43). Walbank, F.W. 1985. Selected Papers: Studies in Greek and Roman History and Historiography, Cambridge. Walbank, F.W. 1995. “Polybius’ Perception of the One and the Many,” in: I. Malkin/Z.W. Rubinsohn (eds.), Leaders and Masses in the Roman World: Studies in Honor of Zvi Yavetz, Leiden, 201–22 (reprinted in Walbank 2002, 212–30). Walbank, F.W. 1998. “A Greek Looks at Rome: Polybius VI Revisited,” SCI 17, 45–59 (reprinted in Walbank 2002, 277–92). Walbank, F.W. 2002. Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections, Cambridge. Walbank, F.W. 2005. “The Two-Way Shadow: Polybius among the Fragments,” in: G. Schepens/ J. Bollansée (eds.), 1–18. Weippert, O. 1972. Alexander–imitatio und römische Politik in republikanischer Zeit, Augsburg. Welwei, K.-H. 1966. “Demokratie und Masse bei Polybios,” Historia 15, 282–301. Wiater, N. 2010. “Speeches and Historical Narrative in Polybius’ Histories: Approaching Speeches in Polybius,” in: D. Pausch (ed.), Stimmen der Geschichte: Funktionen von Reden in der antiken Historiographie, Berlin, 67–107. Wiater, N. 2016. “Shifting Endings, Ambiguity and Deferred Closure in Polybius’ Histories,” in: A. Lianeri (ed.), Knowing Future Time In and Through Greek Historiography, Berlin/Boston, 243–66. Wiater, N. 2017. “The Aesthetics of Truth: Narrative and Historical Hermeneutics in Polybius’ Histories,” in: I. Ruffell/L. Hau (eds.), Truth and History in the Ancient World: Pluralising the Past, London, 202–25.

  References Wirth, G. 1976. “Alexander und Rom,” in: E. Badian (ed.), Alexandre le Grand: Image et réalité (Entretiens Hardt 22), Vandoeuvres–Geneva, 181–221.

General Index Achaean League XIV, 62, 64–66, 85 Achaean War 62, 64 Achaeans 1, 10, 62–67, 142 Achaeus 88, 144 n. 68 Achelous, River 6 Adeimantus 11, 16 Aegium 63, 66 Aegusa, battle of 111, 120–121 Aemilius Paullus, L. (cos. 219, 216) 32 Aemilius Paullus, L. (cos. 182, 168) 99, 144 Aetolia 4, 8, 11, 16, 22 Aetolians X, 3, 5, 10–11, 13, 22, 73, 100 Africa 49, 51, 63, 90, 102, 104, 120 n. 16, 121 Agathocleia 69–70 Agathocles of Alexandria XIV, 67–71, 74 Agesilaus 74 n. 32, 108 Agrigentum 113, 115 Alexander I 59 Alexander the Great XIV–XV, 2, 12, 15–17, 19, 21–23, 25, 39 n. 24, 43 n. 31, 54–55, 90 n. 13, 101, 110, 137, 140–143, 144 n. 67, 145–151 – imitatio Alexandri 16 – impact on adversaries 8–10 – military brilliance 3–4, 18, 20, 24, 30 n. 13 – proskynesis 143 – speed 5–6, 9, 18 – vanity 13–14, 143, 145 Alexandria 22 n. 29, 68, 71, 81 Alexon 118 n. 15 Alipheira 3 Allobroges 17–18 Alps 19, 21, 35 n. 18, 85–86, 105, 106 n. 38 Ambracian Gulf 8 Ambracus 22 Ammianus Marcellinus 54 n. 51 Amphidamus 79 anacyclosis 95–96, 100–101, 106, 125, 126 n. 29 Andriscus 84 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111239538-008

Antigonus III Doson 7, 10 Antiochus III the Great 70 n. 21, 76, 78– 79, 81–82, 144–145 Antiochus IV Epiphanes 135, 138 Aornus Rock 14 n. 19 Apelaurus 7, 9 Apelles 1, 76, 77 n. 36, 79–80, 82 Apollophanes 82 Appian 43 n. 30, 49 n. 43, 61 Aratus of Sicyon 1, 11, 16, 58, 76, 79–80, 93, 95 Aravacae 146 n. 71 Archimedes IX Argos 95 Ariarathes V 142 Ariobarzanes 5 Aristides 74 n. 32 Aristotle 124 Arrian 8–10, 13–15, 20, 24, 30 n. 13, 140–141, 143, 145 n. 70 – Anabasis 3–5, 8–9, 15, 20, 24, 30 n. 13, 39 n. 24, 43 n. 31, 54, 140, 145 n. 70 Arsinoe 69 Artabanus 145–146 Asia 76, 101, 145 Astymedes 142 Athenians 59, 108, 114 n. 7, 146, 148–149 Athens 74 n. 32, 124, 147 Atilius Regulus, M. IX, 88 n. 10, 90–91, 97, 98 n. 25, 121 Attalus II 142 barbarian(s) 18, 24, 35 n. 18, 38, 53, 65, 106, 128 n. 34, 130 n. 40, 132 n. 42, 146 Caecilius Metellus, L. 116 Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, Q. 66 Callisthenes 15 Camarina 114, 119 Cambyses 146 Cannae, battle of 32, 103–104, 123 n. 21, 131 Capua 35, 107

  General Index Carthage 53, 58, 60–61, 88 n. 10, 103, 113 n. 5, 115, 123 n. 21, 125, 144 n. 68, 147 n. 75, 148–149 Carthaginians IX, XI n. 3, 17–19, 24, 26, 27–28 n. 9, 32, 34–35, 43, 45–47, 49– 53, 58–61, 86 n. 4, 102–104, 108, 111– 117, 118 n. 15, 120–122, 126, 135, 140, 149 Castor 143 Cato the Elder 132 n. 42, 136 Celtiberians 42, 105, 144 Celts 26, 115 n. 8, 123 n. 21, 140 Chares 74 n. 32 Chlaeneas 100 Cicero 132 n. 42 Claudius Marcellus, M. 40 Claudius Pulcher, Ap. 107 Cleitarchus 141 n. 62 Cleombrotus 74 n. 32 Cleomenes III 76, 77 n. 36, 80–81, 93 Cleon 74 n. 32 Clitus 143 Coele-Syria 76, 81 Coenus 143, 145–146 Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus 138 constitution – Carthaginian 125–126, 129 – Cretan 124, 132 – mixed 72, 124–125, 126 n. 29, 132, 136 n. 54 – Roman 110, 117, 123–126, 129–132, 140, 141–142 n. 63, 150 – Spartan 125, 132 n. 42, 141–142 n. 63 Corinth 66 Corinthians 114 n. 7 Cornelius Scipio, P. 18–19, 21, 26, 33 Cornelius Scipio Africanus, P. XIV, 1, 20 n. 27, 23–25, 33 n. 15, 38, 54–55, 72, 85–87, 89, 103–106, 113, 138, 144 – leadership qualities 39–54, 102 Cornelius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus, P. XI–XII, 20 n. 27, 40 n. 27, 59–61, 88 n. 10, 89, 144 n. 68, 147 n. 75, 149 Cotys, king of the Odrysae 139 courtiers 76–77, 81–82, 106 Critolaus 62–64, 67 Cynaetha 93

Cynoscephalae, battle of 86, 100, 129 n. 39 Cyprus 134 Cyrene 134 Cyrus the Great 14 n. 19, 23 n. 30, 146 Dalmatians 139 Danae 69 Dardani 6 Darius III 3–4, 6, 10, 54 Demetrius I Soter 135, 140 Demetrius of Phalerum 147, 148 n. 75 Demetrius of Pharos 11, 13 Diaeus 62–63 Dio Cassius 120 n. 16 Diodorus 144 n. 68 Dionysius I 59 Dionysus 14 Dorimachus 5, 10 double determination 89, 90 n. 13 Drepana, battle of 111 Ebro, River 18 Ecnomus, Cape, battle of 111, 115, 120 Egypt 21 n. 29, 78 Egyptians 71 Eleans 7, 9, 79 Epaminondas 107–108 Epigenes 77, 81 Epirus 22 Eryx, Mt. 120 Ethiopians 140 Etruria 13, 32 Eumenes II 138 Euphemus 147 Euripides IX Europe 145 European Scythians 140 Fabius Maximus, Q. 33–37 Fabius Pictor, Q. 46 n. 38 Flaminius, G. 28–31, 32–34, 38, 56 focalization 51, 91 fortune XV, 20, 83, 85–91, 98 n. 25, 104, 106 n. 40, 108, 117–118, 144–146, 148 n. 75 Frontinus 54 n. 51

General Index  

Gadrosia 14 n. 19 Gaugamela, battle of 3–4, 6, 10 Gellius, A. 54 n. 51 Golosses 58–61 Granicus, battle of 3, 9 Great Plains, battle of 103 Greece 13, 20, 39 n. 24, 62, 74 n. 32, 80, 84, 129 n. 39, 138, 143, 145, 148, 151 Greeks 24, 66, 74, 86, 113 n. 5, 129–131, 132 n. 42, 142–143, 146 Haemus, Mt. 4 Hamilcar Barca 112, 122 Hannibal IX, XIV, 1, 13, 21–24, 33–36, 38, 48, 53–54, 85–88, 103–108, 113, 131, 138 – impact on adversaries 18, 21, 54 – leadership qualities 35 n. 18, 62 n. 7, 102 – military brilliance 17–19, 25–31, 37–38, 39 n. 24, 40 n. 27, 54, 56 – speed 18–19, 54 Hanno 112 Hasdrubal, Carthaginian commander in First Punic War 116 Hasdrubal, Carthaginian commander in Third Punic War XIV, 58–62, 144 n. 68 Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo 49, 52, 102 Heracleides 144–145 Heracles 14, 143 Hermeias 76–77, 79, 81–82 Herodotus 34, 89, 137, 145–146 Hiero II 75 Homer 89, 137 Horatius Cocles 127 Hostilius, A. 95 Hyphasis, River 143, 145 Illyria 22, 139 Illyrians 139 Indus, River 6 Issus, battle of 3, 10, 15 Italians 123 n. 21 Italy 13, 17–19, 21, 25, 35, 50, 102–105, 106 n. 38, 118, 123 n. 21, 140 Ithoria 6

Julius Caesar, Sex. 66 n. 15 Junius Brutus, L. 128 n. 34 Junius Pullus, L. 119 Laconia 95 Lade, naval battle of 21 n. 29 Laelius, C. 43–44, 46 n. 38, 48 Lechaeum 8 Leon 73 Leontius 79 n. 37, 80 Leucas 8 Libya 115 n. 8, 116, 118–119 Libyan War 135 Lilybaeum 116, 118 n. 15, 119 Limnaea 5 Livy 44 n. 32, 45 n. 36, 49 n. 43 Lutatius Catulus, G. 111–113 Lyciscus X Lycurgus 125 Macedonia 4, 6, 10, 136 Macedonian dynasty 13, 133, 147, 148 n. 75 Macedonian empire/kingdom 110, 136, 143, 147 Macedonians 3–5, 9, 69–70, 84, 100, 140 n. 61, 143, 146–148 Mago 45, 46 n. 38 Mamertines 115 Manlius Torquatus, T. 128 n. 34 Mantinea 107–108 Maracanda 9 Mardonius 59 Marseilles 21 Massanissa 50, 53 n. 48, 75, 135 Megaleas 80 Megalopolis 93, 95 Megalopolitans 7, 9 Melians 59 Melitaea 93 Menelaïum 8 mercenaries 9, 77, 106, 118 n. 15, 126 Messene 117 Messenia 95 Messenians 5, 10, 142 Minucius Rufus, M. 33–38 Molon 81

  General Index Musicanus 6 Mycale, battle of 146 Nabis 57 narrative patterns XIII, 106, 151–152 Nestor 95 New Carthage 17, 20 n. 27, 42–44, 47, 53–54, 86, 104 n. 34 Nicias 93 Numidia 75 n. 33 Numidians 28 n. 9, 49, 52, 121 n. 18 Nysa 14 n. 19 Ocean 143, 145 Octavius, Gn. 139 Oenanthe 70 Oeniadae 6 Onchestus 6 Pachynus, Cape 118 Palus, siege of 80 Pamphylia 54 Panormus 116, 118 Peloponnese 4–5, 7, 9, 10, 57, 65, 78 Peloponnesians 7, 78 Periander 146 Pericles 74 n. 32, 147 Perseus 95, 99, 101, 139, 141, 144 Persian empire 145, 147 Persians 3, 9, 146–147, 148 n. 75 Philinus 112 nn. 3–4, 113 n. 4, 121 n. 19 Philip II 101 Philip V 43, 54–55, 76, 77 n. 36, 82, 86– 87, 93, 100, 113, 129 n. 39 – against Rome 21, 22 n. 29, 101 – and Alexander the Great 2–3, 10, 14– 17, 22 – bad advisors 11–12 – deterioration XI, 1, 11, 21 n. 29, 22, 75 – expansionist designs 13–14, 21 – impact on adversaries 6–9, 18, 21 – leadership qualities 1, 12, 19, 74, 78– 82 – military brilliance 1–4, 18, 24, 39 n. 24, 78 – speed 4–5, 9, 18–19 – youth 10–13

Philo 70 Philophron 142 Philopoemen 24 n. 4, 88 Picenum 29 n. 12 Pliny the Elder 141 n. 62 Plutarch 90 n. 13 Po, River 21 – plain of 115 n. 8 politeia 123–124, 128–129, 132, 152 Polydeuces 143 Postumius Tubertus, A. 128 n. 34 pragmatike historia 98 n. 26 prokataskeue 83, 113, 123 Prusias II 57, 75 Psophis 7, 43 n. 31 Ptolemies 81 Ptolemy IV Philopator 69, 76, 77 n. 36, 78–82 Ptolemy V Epiphanes 68 Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II (Physcon) 134 Punic War, First IX, 110–111, 113, 117–118, 121 n. 19, 122, 123 n. 21, 150 Punic War, Second 17–18, 27 n. 8, 28 n. 11, 38, 49, 53, 102–103, 122, 131 Pydna, battle of 110, 133 Pyrenees 19 Quinctius Flamininus, T. 19–20, 39 n. 24, 100, 129 n. 39 reversal of expectations motif 10, 12 Rhodes 142 Rhône, River 19 Roman empire 123 n. 21, 145, 148 n. 75 Roman military system 128–129, 132, 150 Romans IX, XI n. 3, XV, 13, 18–19, 22, 24– 25, 27–28, 31–33, 35, 37–38, 39 n. 24, 42, 44–49, 50 n. 45, 51–52, 62–63, 66, 74, 84, 86, 89–91, 100–101, 103–108, 110–146, 148–151 Rome 13, 30, 36–38, 41–42, 53, 63–64, 66–67, 103–105, 107, 113 n. 5, 125, 127, 129, 131, 133 n. 44, 135–137, 140 n. 61, 141 n. 62, 142–144, 147 n. 75 – world expansion X, 85–86, 89, 117 n. 14, 123, 141, 151 Saguntum 19, 138

General Index  

Sardinia 115, 135 Satibarzanes 9 Scopas 10 Seleucia 82 Seleucids 81 Sellasia, battle of 7 Semiramis 14 n. 19 Sempronius Longus, T. 18, 25–28, 34, 38 Senate, Roman 20 n. 27, 73, 125, 131, 134–135, 138–140, 144 n. 67, 146 n. 71 Sicilians 123 n. 21 Sicily 75, 85, 100, 115–116 Social War 1, 3–4, 6, 10, 15, 17, 22, 76 Sogdian Rock 9 Sogdians 9 Sosibius 69, 76, 77 n. 36, 78, 80–82 Spain 17–19, 20 n. 27, 35, 38, 42–43, 63, 85, 103, 105 n. 36, 106, 138, 140, 144 Spaniards 123 n. 21 Sparta 8, 10, 57, 74 n. 32, 107 Spartans 7–8, 11, 16, 100, 107–108, 125, 132, 148–149 Spitamenes 9 Stoicism 87 n. 8 Stratus 6 symploke 83, 87 Syphax 49–52, 102 Syracuse IX, 59, 93 Syria 135, 140 Tarentines 40 n. 27 Tegea 5, 95 Telamon 115 n. 8 Thebans 6, 15–16, 107

Thebes 15–16 Theodotus 78, 81 Thermopylae 6 Thermus 3–4, 8, 11, 16 Thessaly 5 Thracians 4 Thrasycrates 100 Thucydides X, 34, 59, 101, 114 n. 7, 127, 146–147 – Funeral Oration 147 – Melian Dialogue 59, 147 Tiber, River 127 Tlepolemus 58, 68–69, 70 n. 21 tragic historiography 71 Trasimene, Lake, battle of 28, 32–33, 50 n. 45, 53, 56, 103 Trebia, battle of 25, 27 n. 9, 103, 105 Tyrrhenian Sea 106 n. 38 universal history 87, 98 n. 26 Utica 50, 103 Uxians 5, 9 Xanthippus IX, 90, 111 n. 2 Xenophon 23, 62 n. 7, 151 – Anabasis 23 – Cyropaedia 23 n. 30 Xerxes 59, 145–146 wise advisor motif 34 Zama, battle of 87–88, 103, 106 n. 40 Zeus 145

Index Locorum Ammianus 24.4.27 Appian Hisp. 21 Lib. 131 Pun. 17–23

54 n. 51

43 n. 30 61 n. 6 49 n. 43

Aristotle Pol. 1295a40

124

Arrian Anabasis 1.1.3 1.1.6–7 1.1.8–9 1.1.9 1.6.4 1.7.6 1.16.1 1.16.2 1.26.1–2 2.9.1 2.10.3 2.10.4 2.11.4 2.11.5 2.13.5 2.17 2.26.3 3.7.5 3.8.1 3.10.4 3.12.1 3.14.2–3 3.14.3 3.14.6 3.15.5 3.17.3 3.17.4

8 n. 9 4 4 4, 20, 30 n. 13 8 n. 9 6 3 9 54 5 n. 7 3, 18, 20, 30 n. 13 4 3, 10 10 8 n. 9 43 n. 31 9 n. 10, 43 n. 31 5 n. 6 5 n. 6 30 n. 13 30 n. 13 4 10 30 n. 13 5 n. 6, 10 5 5

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111239538-009

3.17.5 3.18.4 3.18.6 3.18.10 3.19.4 3.20.1 3.21.8 3.25.7 4.6.4 4.7.4–5 4.8–9 4.8.3 4.8.3–4 4.8.4–5 4.9.7 4.9.8–9 4.10–12 4.18.4 4.19.3 4.19.4 4.19.6 4.21.3 4.21.6 4.26.4 4.28.4 4.30.2 5.2.1 5.16.3 5.17.1 5.24.7 5.26.1–2 5.26.2 5.26.5 5.27.9 6.4.3 6.9.5 6.15.6 6.17.5 6.24.2–3 6.25.3 7.1.4 7.11.5 7.29.1

8 n. 9, 9 5 5 5 n. 6 5 n. 6 6 5 n. 7 5 n. 7, 8 n. 9, 9 9 143 n. 64 143 n. 64 13 n. 17 143 n. 66 143 13 n. 17 143 n. 66 143 n. 65 43 n. 31 9 8 n. 9, 9 54 14 8 n. 9 8 n. 9 14 n. 19 8 n. 9 14 n. 19 30 n. 13 30 n. 13 5 n. 6 143 143 n. 64, 145 14 n. 19 143, 146 5 n. 6 9 n. 10 6, 8 n. 9 5 n. 6 14 n. 19 5 n. 6 143 n. 64 5 n. 6 143 n. 66

  Index Locorum Cicero De re pub. 2.2

132 n. 42

Curtius Rufus 8.5.6–8

143 n. 66

Dionysius of Halicarnassus Ant. Rom. 5.23–5 128 n. 33 De vir. ill. 11.1 128 n. 33 Euripides Antiope F200.3–4 TrGF 5.1

IX

Frontinus Strat. 2.11.5–6

54 n. 51

Gellius 7.8

54 n. 51

Herodotus 7.8–11 7.8c.1 7.8c.1–2 7.10e.1 8.143.2 9.122.3

145 145 145 145 59 147

Isocrates 7.14

124 n. 25

Livy 2.5 2.10 4.29 8.7 26.48 30.4.7–8 36.17.15

128 n. 34 128 n. 33 128 n. 34 128 n. 34 44 n. 32 49 n. 43 145 n. 70

Ovid Met. 15.829–831

145 n. 70

Pliny the Elder Nat. Hist. 3.57 Plutarch Alex. 23.7 Pomp. 38.2–3 Publ. 16 Polybius 1.1.1–2 1.1.2 1.1.4–5 1.1.5 1.1.6 1.2.8 1.3.7–8 1.4–5 1.4.1 1.4.10–11 1.7.1–5 1.7.12–13 1.10.3–4 1.10.9 1.11.15 1.14.1 1.17.11 1.17.11–13 1.20.1–2 1.20.6–7 1.20.8 1.20.9 1.20.11 1.20.13–14 1.20.15 1.20.16 1.23.3 1.24.1 1.24.7 1.27–28 1.27.2 1.29.4 1.31.3

141 n. 62

143 n. 66 145 n. 70 128 n. 33

96 98 n. 25 X X, 89 n. 11, 123, 140 98 n. 25 98 n. 26 113 n. 5 15 n. 21 83, 85, 87 98 n. 26 106 n. 44 135 n. 51 135 n. 51 94 n. 20 94 n. 20 116 113 114 115 115 n. 8 118 115 n. 8 117 117 117 117 120 n. 17 115 115 111 94 n. 20 116 120

Index Locorum  

1.31.8 1.32.2 1.32.7 1.33.5 1.35.1–2 1.35.2 1.35.3 1.35.4–5 1.35.6–10 1.35.9–10 1.36.5 1.37.3 1.37.7–10 1.37.10 1.38.1 1.38.5 1.38.6 1.39.3 1.39.6 1.39.11–12 1.39.12 1.39.14 1.39.14–15 1.39.15 1.41.2–3 1.42.11 1.43 1.43.1–6 1.43.7 1.44.7 1.45.6–14 1.48.2–9 1.49.1 1.49.11 1.50–51 1.52.4 1.54.6 1.54.8 1.55.3–4 1.55.5 1.58.3 1.58.7–8 1.59.3 1.59.4 1.59.6 1.59.7 1.59.8–61

121 121 n. 18 120 n. 17 120 n. 17 88 n. 10 90–91 91 IX, 111 n. 2 97–98 98 n. 26 117 n. 11, 119 90–91, 118 100, 114 101 120 n. 17 117 n. 11, 119 119 90–91 91, 118 116 116 117 n. 11 120 120 116 116 106 n. 44 118 n. 15 118 n. 15 116 117 118 n. 15 119 120 n. 17 111 119 94 n. 20, 95 119 119 119 120 n. 17 121 91 90–91 120 120 120

1.59.11 1.59.12 1.60.1–3 1.60.4 1.60.6 1.60.7 1.60.7–8 1.60.9 1.61.3 1.61.3–4 1.61.5 1.62.1 1.62.4 1.62.5 1.62.6 1.63.9 1.64.2–4 1.84.6 1.88.8–12 2.7 2.7.1–3 2.8.12–13 2.21.8 2.31.8 2.38.4–9 2.41.6 2.41.9 2.47.4 2.71.5 3.2.6 3.4.2–3 3.4.6 3.4.6–7 3.4.7 3.4.8 3.4.9–11 3.4.13 3.6.4–14 3.7.5 3.13.6 3.14.1 3.15.6 3.15.10 3.15.13 3.16.6 3.17.4 3.17.4–8

111 111–112 111 111 111 111 111 111 112 n. 3 112 112 n. 4 121 122 122 122 86 123 n. 21 37 n. 21 135 106 n. 44 88 139 n. 59 29 n. 12 115 n. 8 85 15 n. 21 15 n. 21 94 n. 20 15 n. 21 123 n. 21 139 n. 60 133 138 133 134 133 134 15 XI n. 2 54 n. 50 54 n. 50 104 135 103 103 138 138

  Index Locorum 3.17.5 3.17.7 3.17.8 3.18.3 3.28.2 3.34.2–3 3.52–53 3.35.2 3.35.3 3.35.6 3.40.2 3.41.6 3.41.8 3.43.3 3.43.11 3.45.4 3.47 3.47.6–9 3.47.8 3.49.1 3.49.1–2 3.50.3–9 3.51.2–9 3.51.13 3.53.1 3.53.1–2 3.54.2–3 3.59.3 3.60.10 3.61.1–6 3.61.3 3.61.4 3.61.5 3.61.6 3.61.7–8 3.61.8 3.62.5–11 3.66.5 3.68.9 3.69.7–74.11 3.69.8 3.69.12–13 3.69.13 3.70.1 3.70.4–6 3.70.7 3.70.8

138 138 138 106 n. 43 135 n. 52 105 106 n. 44 18 18 54 n. 50 18, 54 n. 50 18–19 19, 54 n. 50 106 18, 39 n. 24 19 19 86 85 19 19 17 17 18 17 17 35 n. 18 15 n. 21 18 21 106 n. 38 21 21 21 19 19 35 n. 18 54 n. 50 103 106 n. 42 25 25 25 25 26, 34 26–27 27

3.70.9–11 3.70.12 3.71.1 3.71.10–11 3.72.1 3.72.2 3.72.3–6 3.73.2–5 3.73.6 3.75.1 3.78.2 3.78.5 3.80.2 3.80.3 3.80.4–5 3.81 3.81.1 3.81.4–9 3.81.11 3.81.12 3.82–84 3.82.2 3.82.3 3.82.4 3.82.5 3.82.6 3.82.7 3.82.8 3.82.11 3.83.2–5 3.83.6 3.83.7 3.84 3.84.1 3.84.2 3.84.4 3.84.5 3.84.7 3.84.11 3.84.12 3.84.13 3.85.8–9 3.86.7 3.87.6 3.89.2 3.89.3 3.89.4

26 27 27 27 28 28 27 n. 9 27 n. 9 28 n. 9 28 106 n. 44 54 n. 50 28 29 29–30 29, 106 n. 41 30 56 40 n. 28 30 106 n. 42 30 30 30, 34 30 31 31, 33 31 31 31 31 31 50 n. 45 31 32 33 32 32 32 32 32 103 33 34 34 34, 37 35

Index Locorum  

3.89.5–8 3.90.2 3.90.4 3.90.6 3.91.10 3.92.3 3.92.4 3.94.4 3.94.8 3.94.10 3.98.2–4 3.101.3 3.103.2 3.103.5 3.103.5–8 3.103.6 3.103.7 3.104.1 3.104.1–5 3.104.2 3.104.6–105.9 3.105.5–6 3.105.8 3.105.9 3.107.15 3.108.9 3.112.7 3.118.5 3.118.8–8 3.118.9 4.2.4 4.2.5 4.3.2–3 4.5.3 4.8.1 4.8.5 4.8.7 4.8.12 4.22.5 4.22.6 4.23.8 4.23.9 4.24.1–2 4.24.1–7 4.24.3 4.24.4–6

34–35 34 34 34, 36 n. 19, 106 n. 42 35, 54 n. 50 36 36 n. 19 36 36 36 106 n. 44 36 n. 19 36 36 n. 19, 37 106 n. 42 36 36 n. 19 36 n. 19, 37 106 n. 41 36 n. 19, 37 106 n. 42 37 37 37 103 32 94 n. 20, 103 103 131 123 nn. 21, 23 87 10 10 10 58 58 58 58 n. 2 10 4 15 n. 22, 16 15 n. 21 11 16 11 11

4.61.3–4 4.63.2 4.63.9 4.63.11 4.64.5–6 4.64.7 4.64.9 4.64.10 4.65.5 4.66.3 4.66.5 4.66.6 4.67.6 4.67.7 4.69.4–5 4.69.6 4.69.9 4.71 4.71.1–2 4.71.5 4.71.6 4.75.3 4.75.5 4.76.9 4.77.1–3 4.77.2–3 4.77.4 4.78.9 4.78.11 4.79.1 4.80.11 4.81.5 4.82.1 4.83.3 4.84 4.84–87 4.84.7–9 4.86.1 4.86.8 4.87.10 5.1.8–9 5.1.9 5.2.8 5.2.8–4.13 5.5.10 5.6.3 5.7.3

22 7 n. 8 3 n. 4 6 3–4 3 6 7 6 4 7 6 7 7 7, 9 7 7 106 n. 43 43 n. 31 7 7 14 7 n. 8 76 78 1 1 3 3 7 n. 8 7 n. 8 87 78 7 n. 8 79 106 n. 44 77 79 79 80 79 76 76–77 106 n. 44 80 5 80

  Index Locorum 5.8.1–2 5.8.3 5.10.6–9 5.10.6–10 5.10.10 5.12.5 5.13.2 5.13.5 5.14.9 5.14.12 5.16.1–4 5.16.9 5.16.10 5.17.7 5.18.5 5.18.5–6 5.18.7 5.18.8–10 5.18.11 5.20.1–2 5.25 5.26.2 5.26.6 5.26.13 5.26.14 5.26.15–16 5.28.8 5.29.1–3 5.30.8 5.34.3 5.34.6–10 5.34.10–11 5.35.6 5.35.7 5.36.3–8 5.36.6 5.38.1–7 5.38.4–6 5.38.6 5.40.1 5.40.1–3 5.41–42 5.41.1 5.41.3 5.41.4 5.42 5.42.5–6

4 5 15 nn. 21–22 16 16 12 n. 14 3, 18, 39 n. 24 3 14 79 n. 37 80 79 n. 37 76 5 8 8, 19 78 8 7 n. 8 5 80 80 n. 37 80 77 n. 36 80 n. 37 80 77 n. 36, 80 10–11 76 78 78 79 80 81 77 78 81 77 81 78 81 106 n. 44 79 77 n. 36 77 81 77

5.45.6–7 5.45.7 5.49–50 5.50.1–3 5.50.2 5.50.4–5 5.50.5 5.50.6 5.50.11–14 5.54.11 5.55.4–5 5.55.9–10 5.56.2–6 5.56.13 5.75.2–6 5.78 5.92.7 5.92.7–8 5.92.9 5.100.6 5.101.8–10 5.102.1 5.105.1 5.108.5 5.110.1 5.110.1–5 5.110.4 5.110.10 6.2.3 6.2.9–10 6.3.1–2 6.3.5 6.3.7 6.4.10 6.4.11–13 6.5–9 6.7.6–8 6.8.4–6 6.9.5–9 6.9.10 6.9.10–11 6.9.12–14 6.10 6.10.6–11 6.10.14 6.11.11 6.15.5

81 79 106 n. 44 81 79 81 79 81 77, 81 81 77 15 n. 21 82 77 n. 36 98 n. 27 106 n. 44 95 n. 20 95 95 7 n. 8 13 14 13 13 21 21 21 22 89 n. 11, 123 123 99 123 124 72 126 n. 29 125 102 102 72, 102 123 96 126 n. 29 125 126 n. 29 132 125 140

Index Locorum  

6.16.2 6.18.1 6.18.2–3 6.18.3 6.18.4 6.18.5–8 6.19–42 6.24.7 6.31.11–14 6.35–38 6.37.1–6 6.40.9 6.41.11–12 6.42.2–4 6.42.5 6.44 6.44.1 6.44.3–8 6.44.8 6.47.1–5 6.47.1–6 6.47.4 6.48.5–6 6.50 6.50.3–4 6.51 6.51–52 6.51.1–2 6.51.5 6.51.6–8 6.52.1–3 6.52.8–9 6.52.10–11 6.53–54 6.53–54.3 6.53.1 6.53.3 6.53.4–5 6.53.6–8 6.53.10 6.54.2 6.54.4–6 6.54.5 6.55.1 6.55.3 6.55.4 6.56

140 125 125 123 n. 23 123 n. 23 125 123, 128 128 n. 37 128 n. 37 129 129 n. 38 128 n. 37 129 129 129 124 124 40 n. 28 124 124 132 124 125 125 141 n. 63 129 86 n. 4 125 126 n. 29 126 126 126 126 127 123 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 128 127 127 128 129

6.56.1–5 6.56.2–4 6.56.6–15 6.56.7 6.56.10–11 6.56.11 6.56.13–15 6.57 6.57.4–9 6.57.7–9 6.58.1 6.58.2–10 6.58.11–13 6.58.13 7.8.4 7.8.5 7.11.2 7.11.3 7.11.8 7.11.10–11 7.13.3 7.13.7 7.14.6 7.15 7.15.4–6 7.15.5 7.15.6 7.19.6 8.2.3–4 8.2.7 8.3.3 8.10.7–8 8.21.11 8.34.10 8.36.8 9.1.2–5 9.4.6–7.6 9.4.6–8 9.4.7 9.5 9.6.1–4 9.6.2 9.6.5–7 9.6.8–7.7 9.8.2–5 9.8.6 9.8.7–9

124 129 48, 124 129 130 73–74 130 126 n. 29 136 n. 54 72 131 131 131 131 75 75 XI n. 2 74 74 75 12 n. 14 11 11 106 n. 43 140 95 n. 20, 140 141 140 85, 87, 89 n. 11 IX IX 15 n. 21 144 n. 68 40 n. 27 88 X 107 107 54 n. 50 107 107 54 n. 50 107 107 107 108 108

  Index Locorum 9.8.10–11 9.9.9–10 9.9.10 9.12.1 9.12.3 9.12.4 9.12.8 9.12.8–10 9.12.10 9.13.2–3 9.13.5 9.13.6 9.13.7 9.13.8 9.13.9 9.14.1 9.14.2–5 9.14.5 9.15.1–11 9.16.2–3 9.16.5 9.17.1–4 9.17.6 9.17.7–8 9.17.9 9.17.10 9.18.2–3 9.18.5 9.18.6–7 9.19.1 9.19.5–20.3 9.20.1 9.20.6 9.20.9 9.22.6 9.23.6–8 9.28.8 9.30.8 9.34.1 9.52.4 10.2.5 10.2.5–13 10.2.6 10.2.7 10.2.8–12 10.2.12 10.2.13

108 108 XI n. 3, 108 91 91 91 92 107 92 44, 50, 92 44, 92 92 92 92 92 92, 93 n. 19 37 n. 21 92 93 94 94 93 93 93 94 118 n. 15 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 92 IX 74 n. 32 15 n. 21 100 15 n. 21 53 n. 48 38 85–86 39 39 39 48 39

10.3 10.3.1 10.3.2 10.3.7 10.4–5 10.4.3 10.4.4 10.4.6 10.4.8–5.3 10.5.2 10.5.4 10.5.5 10.5.6 10.5.6–8 10.5.8 10.6.3–5 10.6.8 10.6.10 10.6.10–11 10.6.11 10.6.12 10.7.1 10.7.1–3 10.7.2 10.7.3 10.7.4 10.7.6 10.7.7 10.7.8 10.7.9 10.8.1 10.8.2 10.8.4–5 10.8.5 10.8.7 10.8.8–9 10.8.9 10.9.1 10.9.2–3 10.9.3 10.9.6 10.11.5 10.11.5–15.11 10.11.6 10.11.7 10.11.8

39 47 43 39–40, 45 n. 36, 47 41 41 41 41, 44 41 54 n. 50 41, 54 n. 50 41 41, 48 41 42 42 54 n. 50 20 n. 27 42 44 42 42, 105, 106 n. 38 42 105 42 42 43 105 43 106 n. 41 43 43 106 n. 43 54 n. 50 43, 46 43, 44 n. 33 44 20 n. 27, 43–44 43, 86 43, 48 54 n. 50 44 106 n. 41 44 44, 46 45–46

Index Locorum  

10.12.4 10.12.6–8 10.12.7 10.12.10 10.12.11 10.13.1 10.13.4 10.13.4–5 10.13.7 10.13.10 10.14.1 10.14.6 10.14.10–11 10.14.11–12 10.14.14 10.14.15 10.15.7 10.19.3–7 10.26.7–8 10.32.7 10.33.4–6 10.38.2–3 10.40.5–6 10.40.6 11.2.11 11.6.6 11.8.1–3 11.19.3 11.21.3 11.24a.2–3 11.29.9–11 12.12b.2–3 12.17–22 12.23.4–5 12.25b.3 12.27–28a 13.3 13.6.4 13.6.5 13.6.8–7.11 13.8.2 14.1.4 14.1.5 14.1.8 14.1.11 14.1.13 14.2.1

45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 47 47 47 47 46 46 47 47 46 n. 38 54 1 40 40 55 n. 52 20 n. 27 89 XI n. 3 100 92 n. 19 40 n. 28 54 n. 50 103 72–73 15 n. 21 15 15 n. 21 99 97 n. 23 49 57 57 57 57 49 50, 106 n. 41 49 51 50, 138 50

14.2.2 14.2.4 14.2.5 14.2.6 14.2.7 14.2.10 14.3.1 14.3.2 14.3.3 14.3.4 14.3.5 14.3.7 14.4.3 14.4.4 14.4.8 14.4.8–10 14.4.9 14.4.10 14.5.1 14.5.2 14.5.5–6 14.5.15 14.6.7–8 14.9.6 15.6.4–7.9 15.6.6 15.7.1 15.7.3–4 15.9.3–5 15.11.8–11 15.16.1 15.16.6 15.20.4–8 15.21.7–8 15.25.3–5 15.25.3–10 15.25.6–7 15.25.9 15.25.10 15.25.11 15.25.15 15.25.18 15.25.21–24 15.25.34–36 15.26.2 15.26.3–4 15.26.8

50 51 51 51 51 51 51 52 52 50 50 50 50 50 52 50 n. 45 52 52 52 52 52 49 103 103 103 104 104 104 87 105 88 88 n. 9, 102 n. 31 87 98 69 69 69 69 69 68 68 68 68 68, 70 n. 21 69 69 69

  Index Locorum 15.27.1–2 15.27.3 15.29.7 15.31.13 15.32.1 15.32.11–33.10 15.33.2–3 15.33.5 15.33.6 15.33.7–8 15.33.9 15.33.10 15.35.6 16.10.2–4 16.12.9 16.12.9–10 16.21.2–4 16.21.8–12 16.22a.5 16.27.2–3 16.34.3–4 18.3.4–5 18.3.5 18.12.2–5 18.12.5 18.23.5 18.28.4–5 18.34.7–8 18.35.1–2 18.47.1–2 21.11.4 21.14.4–6 21.31.9–11 21.39 22.18.10 23.2.6 23.8.2 23.12.3 23.17.4 24.10.5 27.4.7 27.16.5 28.6.4 29.2.1–2 29.20.1–3 29.20.4 29.21

69 70 68 69 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 71 40 n. 27 21 n. 29 48 130 n. 40 58 58 15 n. 21 139 n. 60 139 n. 60 15 n. 22 15 n. 21 19–20 39 n. 24 100 86 129 n. 39 144 139 n. 60 95 n. 20 144 73 106 n. 44 15 n. 21, 101 139 n. 60 139 n. 60 88 142 144 95 n. 20 95 95 n. 20 138 144 99 15 n. 21

29.21.3–6 29.21.7 29.21.8 30.1.4 30.2.1 30.4.3 30.4.5 30.17 30.17.2 30.19.15 30.23.1 30.30.2–3 30.32.10–11 31.1.6–8 31.2.7 31.7.1 31.10.6 31.10.7 31.10.8 31.11.11 31.21.6 31.23.2 31.24.8 31.24.9–25.1 31.25.3–5 31.25.3–7 31.25.5a 31.25.6–7 31.25.10 31.29.1 31.29.2 31.29.8 32.3.11–13 32.13 32.13.4 32.13.9 33.7.3 33.9.1–8 33.12.8 35.2.14 35.3 35.3.1 35.3.2 35.3.4 35.3.6 35.3.8 35.3.9

147 147 147 142 95 n. 20 142 142 139 139 141 144 n. 68 139 n. 60 143 138 135, 140 142 134 134–135 134 135, 140 135 XII XII XII 136, 144 139 n. 60 136 136 89 n. 12 40 n. 27 89 n. 12 XII 139 139 139 135 n. 51, 139 138 139 n. 59 139 n. 60 146 n. 71 138 138 138 138 138 138 138

Index Locorum  

35.4.1 35.4.3 35.4.3–7 35.4.4–6 35.4.13 36.2 36.9.3 36.9.4 36.9.5 36.9.6 36.9.9–11 36.9.13 36.9.16–17 36.15.1–2 36.15.1–6 36.15.2–4 36.15.6 36.15.7 36.16.1 36.16.6 36.16.7 36.16.8 36.17.2–4 36.17.5–11 36.17.15 38.1–3 38.2.13–14 38.3.13 38.7.1 38.7.3 38.7.8–10 38.7.11 38.8.1 38.8.7 38.8.8 38.8.9 38.8.10 38.8.11–12 38.8.13 38.9.3 38.9.6–8 38.10.4–5 38.10.4–6 38.10.7 38.10.8 38.10.9 38.10.10

144 n. 67 144 139 n. 60 144 20 n. 27 135 n. 51 148 148 148 139 n. 60 149 149 149 57 75 57 57 57 75 75 75 n. 33 75 n. 33 83–84 84 84 62 15 64 58 58 59 59 60 60 59 59 60 61 61 138 66 66 63 63 62 62–63 63

38.10.12–13 38.11.6 38.11.9 38.11.10 38.11.11 38.12.1 38.12.2 38.12.2–3 38.12.4 38.12.5 38.12.7 38.12.8 38.12.9 38.12.10 38.12.11 38.13.3–4 38.13.6 38.13.8 38.15.9 38.16.1–2 38.16.7 38.16.9 38.17.2 38.17.8–10 38.18.2–6 38.18.7 38.18.8 38.20.1–2 38.20.1–3 38.20.3 38.20.5–6 38.20.7–9 38.20.10 38.20.11 38.21–22 38.21.2–3 38.22.1 39.4.1–2

63 n. 9 63 n. 9 63 n. 10, 64 64 65 65 63 n. 10 66 63 n. 10, 67 n. 16 63 65 67 67 n. 19 63 n. 10, 64, 67 n. 18 63 62 n. 8 63 n. 10, 64 63 n. 9 65 65 67 64 62 n. 8, 63 n. 10 62 n. 8 62 n. 8 65 63 n. 9 61 144 n. 68 144 n. 68 61 61 61 61 147 n. 75 88 n. 10 60 X

Thucydides 1.22.4 1.70 2.43 3.82.2 5.105 6.85.1

X, 101 114 n. 7 127 n. 32 101 59 n. 3 147

  Index Locorum

Vergil Aen. 7.100–101

145 n. 70

Xenophon Anabasis 3.4.37–49 4.7.1–14

23 n. 30 23 n. 30