Laws (Hackett Classics) 9781647920470, 9781647920463, 9781647920487, 9781647920753

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Plato      

Laws

   

Plato      

Laws       Translated With Introduction and Notes By    

C. D. C. Reeve           Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Indianapolis/Cambridge

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Titles of Related Interest Available from Hackett Publishing Plato, Plato on Love: Lysis, Symposium, Phaedrus, Alcibiades, with Selections from Republic and Laws. Edited, with Introduction, by C. D. C. Reeve. Plato, A Plato Reader: Eight Essential Dialogues. Edited by C. D. C. Reeve. Plato, Republic. Translated from the New Standard Greek Text, with Introduction, by C. D. C. Reeve. Plato, Aristophanes, and Xenophon, The Trials of Socrates: Six Classic Texts. Edited by C. D. C. Reeve.

                For   Ina, Ela, and Deborah   with love & gratitude

   

Contents   The page numbers in curly braces {} correspond to the print edition of this title.

  In this ebook, the Stephanus numbers are embedded in the text, enclosed in square brackets.

  Abbreviations Introduction

Laws                   Book 1 624a–625c: Setting the scene 625c–632d: The aim of Spartan and Cretan laws 632d–650b: Kinds of virtue and the legislative ways to attain them 632d–635e: Courage and pleasure 635e–650b: Temperance and drinking parties as a way to acquire it 636a–641a: Criticism of Crete and Spartan views on drinking parties 641a–643a: Can drinking parties be educational? 643a–645c: The nature and aims of education (1); divine puppets 645c–650a: Drinking parties (1); the craft of politics

Book 2 652a–653c: The nature and aims of education (2); virtue and correctly nurtured pleasures and pains 653c–656c: Dance and music in education 656c–657c: Censorship of the arts in Egypt 657c–660d: Proper and improper pleasures; the correct legislator 660d–663d: Virtue and happiness; kinds of goods; the pleasant and the just 663d–664b: Persuading the youth 664b–667b: The three choruses 667b–671a: The nature of the third chorus; correctness of representation in dance and music 671a–672d: Drinking parties (2)

672d–674c: A summing up of the uses of drunkenness; gymnastic training

Book 3 676a–c: The starting-point of constitutions and their changes toward virtue or vice 677a–679e: Cities after the flood 679e–680e: Dynasties 680e–681d: The primitive city and the starting-point of legislation 681d–682e: Troy 682e–686a: The Dorian league 686a–694a: Why the league failed; pleonexia and lack of education in virtue 693c–702a: Persian monarchy or Athenian democracy? 694a–698a: Persia 698a–702a: Athens 702a–d: The lessons of history and the construction of the constitution of Magnesia

Book 4 704a–707e: The location of Magnesia and its geography 706a–707e: Problems of being located by the sea; more lessons of history 707e–708e: The nature of its first colonists 708e–715e: The problems of legislation and the conditions, constitutional and otherwise, necessary to solve them 714b–e: Thrasymachus’ argument reprised 715a–b: A constitution must aim at the common good of the entire city 715b–d: Rulers as servants of the laws 715e–723d: The double work of legislation: persuasion and compulsion 715e–718c: Address to the new colonists 718c–723d: Legislators; two sorts of doctors; why laws must have preludes 723d–724b: Introduction to the themes of Book 5

Book 5 726a–734e: Prelude to the laws of Magnesia 726a–728d: Honor due to the soul 728d–e: Honor due to the body 728e–729a: Honor due to money and property 729a–c: Proper treatment of children 729c–e: Proper treatment of kinsmen, friends, city, and fellow citizens 729e–730a: Proper treatment of foreigners 730a–731b: Personal ethics: virtue, truth, happiness 731b–d: How to treat criminals

731d–732b: Self-love 732b–d: Avoiding extremes of feeling 732d–734e: Virtue and happiness; pleasure and pain 734e–737b: The selection of citizens; harsh and gentle purges 737b–e: Distribution of the land (1) 737e–738b: The size of the population (1); the number five thousand and forty 738b–739a: The gods and the divisions of the country 739a–e: First and second best constitutions; community of property 739e–740a: Distribution of the land (2) 740a–741a: The size of the population (2) 741a–e: Property allocations are to be inalienable 741e–744a: The possession of money 744a–745b: The four property classes 745b–e: Administrative divisions 745e–746d: Ideal models need to be modified by facts 746d–747d: The importance of mathematics and measurement 747d–e: The influences of climate

Book 6 751a–752d: Appointing the first officials 752d–754d: The election of the first Guardians of the Laws 754d–755b: Duties and tenure of the Guardians; registration of property 755b–756b: Generals, Cavalry-Commanders, Tribe-Leaders, CompanyCommanders 756b–756e: The election of the Council 756e–758a: The notion of equality 758a–d: The executive committee of the Council 758d–759d: Temple-Wardens, Priests, Priestesses 759d–e: The election of the Interpreters 759d–760a: Treasurers 760a–761d: The protection of the territory 761d–762b: Rural courts 762b–763c: The way of life of the Country-Wardens 763c–e: City-Wardens 763e–764c: Market-Wardens, attendance at the Assembly 764c–765d: Education officials 765d–766c: The Supervisor of Education in its entirety 766c–d: Death while in office 766d–767c: Judges and courts of justice: three grades of court 767c–e: Election to the supreme court 767e: Corrupt verdicts

767e–768a: Court hearing charges concerning the public interest 768a–c: Neighborhood and tribal courts 768c–e: Why the discussion of courts has to be an outline sketch 768e–771a: The role of the younger legislators in filling and correcting the sketch 771a–e: The organization of religious festivals 771e–772a: Marriage: choosing a partner (1) 772a–d: Provision for changing the laws 772d–e: The marriage law 772e–773e: Marriage: choosing a partner (2) 773e–774c: Failure to marry 774c–775a: Dowries and betrothals 775a–b: Wedding feasts 775b–e: Correct procreation (1) 775e–776b: Life of the newlyweds 776b–778b: Their property: the problem of slaves 778b–779e: Buildings and walls 779e–781d: Communal messes for women 781d–783b: Three basic human needs or appetites: food, drink, sex 783b–785b: Correct procreation (2): female officials to oversee this 785b: The marriage ages for men and women

Book 7 788a–d: Nurture and education: written and unwritten rules 788d–790c: Prenatal nurture and infant education 790c–791c: The importance of movement for infants as evidenced by Corybantic ritual 791c–793a: How far to indulge children 793a–d: The importance of unwritten customs 793d–794c: Education of three- to six-year-olds 794c–804c: Education of the over sixes, separated by sex, in the use of weapons 794c–795d: Ambidexterity 795d–796e: Gymnastic training (1) 796e–800b: Musical training; the dangers of innovation 800b–802a: Some model regulations 802a–803a: Regulation of singing and dancing 803a–804c: The correct use of leisure 804c–806d: Educational institutions 804c–d: Attendance at school; foreign teachers 804d–806d: Coeducation and its importance 806d–808d: How to live a properly leisured life

808d–809a: The role of the Supervisor of Education 809a–810b: Instructions to the Supervisor of Education 810b–812b: Literature; the Laws itself as an example 812b–813a: Music 813a–814d: Gymnastic training (2) 814d–816d: Dancing 816d–817e: Comedy and tragedy 817e–821a: Mathematical sciences 821a–822d: Astronomy 822d–824a: Hunting: written and unwritten rules again

Book 8 828a–d: Festival arrangements 828d–831b: Military training 831b–832d: Obstacles to correct military training 832d–833e: Races for men and women 833e–834a: Contests in arms 834a–d: Horse races 834d–835b: Concluding remarks 835b–837a: Problems of sexual conduct 837a–838a: Three kinds of friendship 838a–839e: Unnatural sexual relations 839e–841c: The importance of self-control 841c–842b: Two alternative laws about sexual relations 842b–842e: The food supply (1) 842e–843b: Agricultural laws 843b–844a: Treatment of neighbors 844a–d: The water supply (1) 844d–845d: The harvest 845d–e: The water supply (2) 845e–846c: Bringing home the crops 846c–847b: Laws governing craftsmen 847b–e: Imports and exports 847e–848c: The food supply (2) 848c–849a: Housing 849a–850a: Markets 850a–d: Resident aliens

Book 9 853a–857b: Capital offenses

853a–854a: Preliminary discussion 854a–856b: Temple robbery 856b–e: Subversion of the constitution 856e–857a: Treason 857a–864c: The theory of punishment 857a–b: Theft: should all thefts be punished alike? 857b–860c: The need for philosophy in legislation 860c–861d: Confusions about the voluntariness and involuntariness of injustice 861d–863a: The correct distinction and the purpose of punishment 863a–864c: A fuller account of injustice 864c–874d: Homicide law 864c–e: Persons unfit to plead 864e–866d: Involuntary homicide 866d–869e: Homicide due to anger 869e–873c: Voluntary homicide 873c–e: Suicide 873e–874a: Animals and soulless objects as killers 874a–b: Killing by person unknown 874b–d: Justifiable homicide 874d–879b: Woundings 874d–875d: The state of play and preliminaries 875d–876e: The courts’ discretion 876e–878b: Voluntary wounding 878b–879a: Woundings due to anger 879a–b: Involuntary woundings 879b–882c: Assault

Book 10 884a: Universal law concerning violence 884a–885b: Sources of impiety 885b–887a: The argument of the godless 887a–888d: Address to the young godless person 888d–890b: The background cosmology of godlessness 890b–891e: The difficulty of a legislator’s responding 891e–893a: The priority of soul (1) 893b–895b: Ten kinds of movement 895b–896a: The soul as what moves itself 896a–897b: The priority of soul (2) 897b–898e: The soul moves the heavenly bodies 898e–899d: How the soul moves these bodies

899d–900c: Address to the one who thinks the gods give no thought to human affairs 900c–903b: Demonstration of the contrary 903b–907b: The justice of the gods and the fate of the soul 907b–908a: Transition to the law concerning impiety 908a–e: Two sorts of offenders 908e–909d: The punishment for impiety 909d–910d: Private shrines

Book 11 913a–922a: Law of property 913a–b: Removal of buried treasure 913b–914e: Removal of property generally 914e–915d: The treatment of slaves, freed people 915d–918a: Sale and exchange 918a–920c: Retail trade 920c–d: Agreements 920d–921d: Dealings with craftsmen 921d–922a: Craftsmen of our salvation in war 922a–932d: Family law 922a–923c: Making a will 923c–925d: Testamentary and inheritance law 925d–926d: The harshness of the marriage law involved 926d–928d: Orphans and their care 928d–929d: Disinheritance 929d–e: Senility; death of a spouse 929e–930e: Children of mixed status 930e–932d: Respect for parents 932d–960b: Miscellaneous laws 932d–933e: Poisoning 933e–934c: Harming by theft or violence; the aim of punishment 934c–934e: Lunacy 934e–936b: Verbal abuse; comedies and lampoons 936b–c: Beggars 936c–e: Injuries to property by slaves 936e–937c: Testimony 937c–d: Perjury 937d–938c: Unscrupulous advocacy

Book 12

941a–b: Offenses by ambassadors and heralds 941b–942a: Theft of public property 942a–943d: Military service 943d–945b: Abandonment of weapons 945b–948b: The Inspectors 945e–947b: Election of the Inspectors 947b–e: Funeral of an Inspector 947e–948b: Prosecutions of Inspectors 948b–949d: Oaths 949d–e: Refusals to contribute to public expenses 949e–950d: Relations with the outside world 950d–951a: Foreign travel 951a–952d: Observers 952d–953e: Foreign visitors 953e–954a: Giving guarantees 954a–c: House searches 954c–e: Disputed claims 954e–955b: Preventing people from appearing in court or entering contests 955b: Receiving stolen goods 955b: Harboring an exile 955b–c: Making private peace or war 955c–d: Bribery 955d–e: Taxation 955e–956b: Votive offerings to the gods 956b–e: Three grades of court 956e–958a: Minor points of judicial procedure; the importance of legal studies 958a–c: Execution of verdicts 958c–960b: Funerals and mourning 960b–969d: The Nocturnal Council 960b–961a: How the city can be preserved intact 961a–963a: Membership and function of the Council 963a–964a: The unity and plurality of virtue 964a–965a: The Council’s teaching responsibilities 965a–966c: The more exact education of the Council 966c–968b: The importance of theology/astronomy 968b–969c: Recruitment of the Council and its course of studies 969c–969d: Closing remarks

  Index

 

Titles of Related Interest Available from Hackett Publishing

{xvii} Abbreviations PLATO     (OMITTED IN NOTES) Alc. Alc. 2 Ap. Chrm. Crat. Cri. Crit. Epin. Euthd. Euthphr. Grg. Hp. Ma. La. Lg. Lys. Men. Menex. Min. Phd. Phdr. Phlb. Polit. Prt. Rep. Smp. Sph. {xviii} Tht. Ti.

Alcibiades Second Alcibiades* Apology° Charmides Cratylus° Crito° Critias Epinomis Euthydemus Euthyphro° Gorgias Hippias Major Laches Laws Lysis Meno° Menexenus Minos* Phaedo Phaedrus Philebus Statesman Protagoras Republic° Symposium Sophist Theaetetus Timaeus

  Translations of these in the notes—Lg. aside—are drawn (sometimes with minor silent modifications) from J. Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis, 1997); in the case of works marked °, translations are from my Hackett editions. A * indicates that the work is pseudo-Platonic.

AESCHINES In Tim.

ARISTOTLE Ath. Cael. Econ. EE GA DA HA Met. NE Ph. Po. Pol. Rh. Sens. Top.

AESCH. Against Timarchus

AR. Constitution of Athens De Caelo Economics Eudemian Ethics° Generation of Animals° De Anima° History of Animals Metaphysics° Nicomachean Ethics° Physics° Poetics Politics° Rhetoric° Sense and Sensibilia Topics

  Translations of these in the notes are my own and, in the case of works marked °, are drawn from editions in the New Hackett Aristotle Series.   HERODOTUS Hdt.

Histories

{XIX} HESIOD Op. Th.

Works and Days Theogony

HOMER Il. Od.

HIPPOCRATES Aër.

Iliad Odyssey

HP. Airs, Waters, Places

THUCYDIDES History of the Peloponnesian War

Thuc.

XENOPHON Cyr. Hell. Lac.

XEN. Cyropaedia Hellenica The Constitution of the Lacedemonians (Spartans)

  OTHER ABBREVIATIONS Those marked ‡ are particularly recommended to the general reader.   Anderson = J. Anderson, Hunting in the Ancient World (Berkeley, 1985). Barker = A. Barker, Greek Musical Writings I: The Musician and His Art (Cambridge, 1984). Beck = F. Beck, Greek Education 450–350 B.C. (London, 1964). ‡Bobonich-1 = C. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics (Oxford, 2002). ‡Bobonich-2 = C. Bobonich, (ed.), Plato’s Laws: A Critical Guide (Cambridge, 2010). Braunlich = A. Braunlich, “‘To the Right’ in Homer and Attic Greek,” American Journal of Philology 57 (1936): 245–260. {xx} Brisson = L. Brisson, “Soul and State in Plato’s Laws,” in R. Barney, T. Brennan, and C. Brittain (eds.), Plato and the Divided Self (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 281–307. Brisson-Pradeau-1 = L. Brisson and J-F. Pradeau, Plato Les Lois, Livres I à VI (Paris, 2006). Brisson-Pradeau-2 = L. Brisson and J-F. Pradeau, Plato Les Lois, Livres VII à XII (Paris, 2006). Brumbaugh = R. Brumbaugh, Plato’s Mathematical Imagination: The Mathematical Passages in the Dialogues and Their Interpretation (Bloomington, 1954). Budé = E. des Places and A. Diès, Platon Les Lois, 4 vols. (Paris, 1951, 1956).

Burkert = W. Burkert, Greek Religion (Cambridge, MA, 1985). Burnyeat & Frede = M. Burnyeat and M. Frede, The Pseudo-Platonic Seventh Letter (Oxford, 2015). Bury-1 = R. Bury, Plato: Laws, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1926). Bury-2 = R. Bury, “Two Notes on the Laws,” Classical Review (1948): 108–109. Calhoun = G. Calhoun, Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation (Austin, 1913). Campbell = D. Campbell, Greek Lyric, 5 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1982– 1993). Carone = G. Carone, “Teleology and Evil in Laws 10,” Review of Metaphysics (1994): 275–298. Clegg = J. Clegg, “Plato’s Vision of Chaos,” Classical Quarterly (1976): 52–61. David-1 = E. David, “The Spartan Sussitia and Plato’s Laws,” American Journal of Philology 99 (1978): 486–495. David-2 = E. David, “Hunting in Spartan Consciousness and Society,” Echos du Monde Classique/Classical Views XXXVII (1993): 393–413. David-3 = E. David, “Sparta and the Politics of Nudity,” in S. Hodkinson and A. Powell (eds.), Sparta: The Body Politic (Swansea, 2010), pp. 136– 163. Derenne = E. Derenne, Les procès d’impiété intentés aux philosophes à Athènes Au Vème au IVème avant J.-C. (Liége and Paris, 1930). Dickey = E. Dickey, Greek Forms of Address (Oxford, 1996). DK = H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds.), Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed. (Berlin, 1951). DL = Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, T. Dorandi (ed.) (Cambridge, 2013). {xxi} Dodds = E. R. Dodds, Plato: Gorgias (Oxford, 1959). Dover-1 = K. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, 1974). Dover-2 = K. Dover, “The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society,” Talanta 7 (1976): 24–54. Dover-3 = K. Dover, Greek Homosexuality (Cambridge, MA, 1978).

England-1 = E. England, The Laws of Plato, vol. 1 (Manchester, 1921). England-2 = E. England, The Laws of Plato, vol. 2 (Manchester, 1921). Frede = D. Frede, “Puppets on Strings: Moral Psychology in Laws Books I and II,” in Bobonich-2, pp. 108–126. Gerber = D. Gerber, Greek Elegiac Poetry: From the Seventh to the Fifth Centuries BC (Cambridge, MA, 1999). Gould = J. Gould, “Law, Custom and Myth: Aspects of the Social Position of Women in Classical Athens,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 100 (1980): 38–59. Greene = W. Greene, Scholia Platonica (Haverford, 1938). Griffith = M. Griffith, “Cretan Harmonies and Universal Morals: Early Music and Migrations of Wisdom in Plato’s Laws,” in Peponi, pp. 15–66. Harrison = A. Harrison, The Laws of Athens. I: The Family and Property (Oxford, 1968). Irwin = T. Irwin, “Morality as Law and Morality in the Laws,” in Bobonich2, pp. 92–107. Kidd = S. Kidd, Play and Aesthetics in Ancient Greece (Cambridge, 2019). Kurke = L. Kurke, “Imagining Chorality: Wonder, Plato’s Puppets, and Moving Statues,” in Peponi, pp. 123–170. Laks-1 = A. Laks, “Legislation and Demiurgy: On the Relationship between Plato’s Republic and Laws,” Classical Antiquity 9 (1990): 209– 229. LSJ = H. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th ed., rev. by H. Jones (Oxford, 1968). MacDowell-1 = D. MacDowell, Athenian Homicide Law (Manchester, 1963). MacDowell-2 = D. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (Ithaca, 1978). MacDowell-3 = D. MacDowell, Spartan Law (Edinburgh, 1986). Mayhew = R. Mayhew, Plato: Laws 10 (Oxford, 2008). Meiggs = R. Meiggs, Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World (Oxford, 1982). Menn = S. Menn, Plato on God as Nous (Carbondale, 1995). {xxii} Meyer = S. Meyer, Plato: Laws 1 & 2 (Oxford, 2015).

‡Mohr = R. Mohr, God and Forms in Plato (Las Vegas, 2005). Morrow-1 = G. Morrow, Plato’s Law of Slavery in its Relation to Greek Law (Urbana, 1939). Morrow-2 = G. Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City: A Historical Interpretation of the Laws (Princeton, 1960). Murray = O. Murray (ed.), Sympotica: A Symposium on the Symposion (Oxford, 1990). OCD = The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1996). OCT = Leges in J. Burnet, Platonis Opera, vol. 5 (Oxford, 1907). Page = D. Page, Poetae Melici Graeci (Oxford, 1962). Pangle = T. Pangle, The Laws of Plato (New York, 1980). Parker = R. Parker, Miasma (Oxford, 1983). Pellizer = E. Pellizer, “Outlines of a Morphology of Sympotic Entertainment,” in Murray, pp. 177–184. Peponi = A.-E. Peponi (ed.), Performance and Culture in Plato’s Laws (Cambridge, 2013). Petrovic = A. Petrovic and I. Petrovic, Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, vol. 1 (Oxford, 2016). Pomeroy = S. Pomeroy, Spartan Women (Oxford, 2002). Reeve-1 = C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato’s Republic (Princeton, 1988; Indianapolis, 2006). Reeve-2 = C. Reeve, Socrates in the Apology: An Essay on Plato’s Apology of Socrates (Indianapolis, 1989). ‡Reeve-3 = C. Reeve, Blindness and Reorientation: Problems in Plato’s Republic (New York, 2013). Reeve-4 = C. Reeve, “Good and Bad in Aristotle,” in Pavlos Kontos (ed.), Evil in Aristotle (Cambridge, 2018), pp. 17–31. Ritter = C. Ritter, Platos Gesetze, Kommentar zum griecheschen Text (Leipzig, 1896). Rutherford = I. Rutherford, “Strictly Ballroom: Egyptian Mousikê and Plato’s Comparative Politics,” in Peponi, pp. 67–83. Samaras = T. Samaras, “Family and the Question of Women in the Laws,” in Bobonich-2, pp. 172–196. Saunders-1 = T. Saunders, Plato: The Laws (Harmondsworth, 1975).

Saunders-2 = T. Saunders, Notes on the Laws of Plato (London, 1972). Saunders-3 = T. Saunders, “The Socratic Paradoxes in Plato’s Laws,” Hermes 96 (1968): 421–434. {xxiii} Saunders-4 = T. Saunders, “The Alleged Double Version in the Sixth Book of Plato’s Laws,” Classical Quarterly 20 (1970): 230–236. Saunders-5 = T. Saunders, “Penology and Eschatology in Plato’s Timaeus and Laws,” Classical Quarterly 23 (1973): 232–244. ‡Saunders-6 = T. Saunders, Plato’s Penal Code: Tradition, Controversy, and Reform in Greek Penology (Oxford, 1991). Saunders-7 = T. Saunders, “Plato on Women in the Laws,” in A. Powell (ed.), The Greek World (London, 1995), pp. 591–609. Schofield-1 = M. Schofield, Saving the City: Philosopher-Kings and Other Classical Paradigms (London, 1998). Schofield-2 = M. Schofield, “Plato and Practical Politics,” in C. Rowe and M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 293–302. ‡Schofield-3 = M. Schofield, Plato: Political Philosophy (Oxford, 2006). Schofield-Griffith = M. Schofield and T. Griffith, Plato: Laws (Cambridge, 2016). Schöpsdau-1 = K. Schöpsdau, Platon: Nomoi (Gesetze). Buch I–III: Übersetzung und Kommentar (Göttingen, 1994). Schöpsdau-2 = K. Schöpsdau, Platon: Nomoi (Gesetze). Buch IV–VII: Übersetzung und Kommentar (Göttingen, 2003). Schöpsdau-3 = K. Schöpsdau, Platon: Nomoi (Gesetze). Buch VIII–XII: Übersetzung und Kommentar (Göttingen, 2011). Sedley = D. Sedley, “The Atheist Underground,” in V. Harte and M. Lane (eds.), Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 329–348. Stallbaum = G. Stallbaum, Platonis Leges et Epinomis (Leipzig, 1859– 1860). Tecuşan = M. Tecuşan, “Logos Sympotikos: Patterns of the Irrational in Philosophical Drinking: Plato outside the Symposium,” in Murray, pp. 238–260. Todd = S. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford, 1993).

Ustinova = Y. Ustinova, “Corybantism: the Nature and Role of an Ecstatic Cult in the Greek Polis,” Horos 10–12 (1992–1998): 503–520. ‡Van Riel = G. Van Riel, Plato’s God (Farnham, 2013). Vernant = J.-P. Vernant, “From the ‘Presentification’ of the Invisible to the Imitation of Appearance,” in his Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays (Princeton, 1991), pp. 151–163. West = M. L. West, Delectus ex Iambis et Elegis Graecis (Oxford, 1980).

{xxv} Introduction Most readers of the Laws, which is thought to be Plato’s last work, and was perhaps edited somewhat by other hands,1 are likely to come to it already familiar with his other dialogues, in particular the Republic, to which it offers a self-conscious and apparently rather stark contrast: the constitution (politeia) described in the first is the best constitution, the one described in the Laws is a second best, though very acceptable, one (Lg. 807b, 875c–d). One might think of the present Introduction, then, as a sort of recapitulation of the path to the Laws that such readers typically take—or, at any rate, the one that I, for my part, pretty much took. For just as Plato waited till old age to write the Laws, I, after a long apprenticeship to his earlier self, waited till relatively late in life to begin the focused study of it that culminated in— indeed took in part the form of—the annotated translation offered here. I begin, then, by introducing Plato himself, proceed by introducing some of his most pertinent works and thought, especially the Republic, and—with that as a sort of prelude—end with some thoughts on the Laws itself. First, though, some acknowledgments are in order. I have borrowed from, when I thought I could not improve upon, the translations of Luc Brisson and Jean-Francois Pradeau, R. G. Bury, Robert Mayhew (in the case of Book 10), Susan Sauvé Meyer (in the case of Books 1 and 2), Trevor Saunders, Malcolm Schofield and Tom Griffith, and Thomas Pangle. E. B. England’s edition and commentary has been a constant aid in understanding Plato’s Greek, as has Klaus Schöpsdau’s immense commentary and Saunder’s sensible and insightful Notes on Plato’s Laws, as well as other works. I have based my translation on the Budé edition of the Greek text established (in some Books) by Auguste Diès and (in others) by Édouard des Places. When I have deviated significantly from this text I have indicated so in the notes, and only in these, and in references to LSJ, have I employed untransliterated Greek. From the philosophical point of view, Christopher Bobonich’s Plato’s Utopia Recast has been an indispensable guide and incitement to thought, as have the always clearheaded writings of Malcolm Schofield. Bibliographical information on these and other

important works relevant to the Laws can be found under Abbreviations, where those works especially useful to the general reader are identified. {xxvi} Marginal page numbers in the print edition, which appear between | | in the electronic text, are known as “Stephanus” page numbers (after an earlier editor of Plato’s works) and are standardly used in scholarly citations, as in this Introduction and the notes. All works are identified by the abbreviated title assigned to them, but in the case of the Laws, it is usually omitted, as is the author in the case of Plato’s works. The Index, to turn for a moment to it, is an important aid to readers, who should consult it when they want, for example, to find out where various central topics or notions are discussed in the Laws and under what headings, as it were, they are discussed. Contents should also help in this regard, where the division of the Laws usually follows that proposed in Saunders-1. Speaking of readers, let me say something about the intended audience. I conceive of all my translations as aimed at enabling reasonably committed readers to read the work at issue for themselves, with a credible chance of really understanding it. Readers should think of this edition of the Laws, then, as one that will take them quite deeply into it, while giving them some of the tools, in the shape of notes and references to other works, that will enable them to go deeper still. It can be used in any college or university class likely to include the Laws in its purview, but it can also be used by readers approaching this great work on their own. I renew my thanks to ΔKE, the first fraternity in the United States to endow a professorial chair, and to the University of North Carolina for awarding it to me. The generous research funds, among other things, that the endowment makes available each year have allowed me to travel to conferences and to acquire books, computers, and other research materials and assistance, including, most notably, that of Sean Neagle, without which my work would have been much more difficult. As I write this, COVID-19 has been raging for more than a year, with thousands of people dying each day. Such peace of mind, emotional wellbeing, physical comfort, and security as I have been able to enjoy in the midst of this dreadful plague, I owe to my wife Ina and her sister Ela. I dedicate the book they have helped nurture to them, lovers of Plato both, vividly aware that it is inadequate repayment for all they have given me. I include in the dedication, too, my longtime editor at Hackett and beloved

friend, Deborah Wilkes, without whose support and encouragement much of the work I have done in the past thirty years would not exist. I mention last another beloved friend, Pavlos Kontos, who read the entire manuscript with great care, correcting errors both great and small, and suggesting many improvements. Mere thanks are scant repayment for his many hours of learned and devoted attention—but I offer them anyway.

{xxvii} Plato Plato was born in Athens in 429 BC and died there in 348/7. His father, Ariston, traced his descent to Codrus, who was supposedly king of Athens in the eleventh century BC; his mother, Perictione, was related to Solon, architect of the Athenian constitution (594/3). While Plato was still a boy, his father died and his mother married Pyrilampes, a friend of the great Athenian statesman Pericles. Hence Plato was familiar with Athenian politics from childhood and was expected to enter it himself. Horrified by actual political events, however, including the execution of his mentor and teacher Socrates in 399 BC, he turned instead to philosophy, thinking that only it could bring true justice to human beings and put an end to civil war and political upheaval.2 Plato’s works, which are predominantly dialogues, all seem to have survived. They are customarily divided into four chronological groups, although the precise ordering (especially within groups) is controversial: Early: Alcibiades, Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Hippias Minor, Hippias Major, Ion, Laches, Lysis, Menexenus, Theages Transitional: Euthydemus, Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras Middle: Cratylus, Phaedo, Parmenides, Theaetetus

Symposium,

Republic,

Phaedrus,

Late: Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Statesman, Philebus, Laws Besides writing these dialogues, Plato contributed to philosophy by founding the Academy, arguably the first university. This was a center of research and teaching, both in theoretical subjects and in more practical ones. Eudoxus, who gave a geometrical explanation of the revolutions of the sun, moon, and planets, brought his own students with him to join Plato

and studied and taught in the Academy; Theaetetus developed solid geometry there. But cities may also have invited members of the Academy to help them in the practical task of developing new political constitutions.3 The Academy lasted for some centuries after Plato died, ending around 80 BC. Its early leaders, including his own nephew, Speusippus, who succeeded him, all modified his teachings in various ways. Later, influenced by the early Socratic dialogues, which end in puzzlement (aporia), the {xxviii} Academy, under Arcesilaus, Carneades, and other philosophers, defended skepticism; later still, influenced by Plato’s other writings, Platonists were more dogmatic, less unsure. Platonism of one sort or another—Middle, Neo-, or something else—remained the dominant philosophy in the pagan world of late antiquity, influencing St. Augustine among others, until the emperor Justinian closed the pagan schools at Athens in 529 AD. Much of what passed for Plato’s thought until the nineteenth century, when German scholars pioneered a return to Plato’s writings themselves, was a mixture of these different “Platonisms.” Given the vast span and diversity of Plato’s writings and the fact that they are dialogues, not treatises, it is little wonder that they were read in many different ways, even by Plato’s ancient followers. In this respect nothing has changed: different schools of philosophy and textual interpretation continue to find profoundly different messages and methods in Plato. Doctrinal continuities, discontinuities, and outright contradictions of one sort or another are discovered, disputed, rediscovered, and redisputed. Neglected dialogues are taken up afresh, old favorites newly interpreted. New questions are raised, old ones resurrected and reformulated: Is Plato’s Socrates really the great ironist of philosophy or a largely nonironic figure? Is Plato a systematic philosopher with answers to give or a questioner only? Is he primarily a theorist about universals, or a moralist, or a mystic with an otherworldly view about the nature of reality and the place of the human psyche in it? Is the Republic a totalitarian work, a hymn to freedom properly conceived, or a reductio ad absurdum of the very argument it seems to be advancing? Does the dramatic structure of the dialogues undermine their apparent philosophical arguments? Should Plato’s negative remarks about the efficacy of written philosophy (Phdr. 274b–278b) lead us

to look behind his dialogues for what Plato’s student Aristotle refers to as the “so-called unwritten doctrines” (Ph. 209b14–15)? Besides this continued engagement with Plato’s writings, there is, of course, the not entirely separate engagement with the problems Plato brought to philosophy, the methods he invented to solve them, and the solutions he suggested and explored. So many and various are these, however, that they constitute not just Plato’s philosophy but a large part of philosophy itself. Part of his heritage, they are also what we inevitably bring to our reading of his works.

Socrates Socrates is the central figure in most of Plato’s works. In some dialogues he is thought to be—and probably is—based to some extent on the historical {xxix} Socrates. These are often called “Socratic” dialogues for this reason. In the transitional, middle, and late dialogues, however, he is thought to be increasingly a mouthpiece for ideas that go well beyond Plato’s Socratic heritage. Interestingly, Aristotle treats the Athenian Stranger of the Laws as if he just were Socrates, since he includes the Laws among the Socratic dialogues (Pol. 1265a11), and indeed the Stranger does question the others in something very like Socratic fashion. In the Socratic dialogues, philosophy consists almost exclusively in questioning people about the conventionally recognized moral virtues. What is piety (Euthphr.)? Or courage (La.)? Or temperance (Chrm.)? These are his characteristic questions. He seems to take for granted, moreover, that there are correct answers to them—that temperance, piety, courage, and the rest are each some definite characteristic or form (eidos, idea). He does not discuss the nature of these forms, however, or develop any explicit theory of them or our knowledge of them. He does not, for that matter, explain his interest in definitions or justify his claim that if we do not know what, for example, justice is, we cannot know whether it is virtue, whether it makes its possessor happy, or anything else of any significance about it (Rep. 354b–c). Socrates’ style of questioning is called (by us, not him) an elenchus—from the Greek verb elegchein, meaning to examine or refute. He asks what justice is. His interlocutor puts forward an account he sincerely believes to

be correct. Socrates refutes this account by showing that it conflicts with other beliefs the interlocutor sincerely holds and is unwilling to abandon. In the ideal situation, which is never actually portrayed in the Socratic dialogues, this process continues until a satisfactory account emerges, one that is not inconsistent with other sincerely held beliefs, and so can withstand elenctic scrutiny. The accounts Socrates encounters in his examinations of others prove unsatisfactory. But through these examinations—which are always at the same time self-examinations (Chrm. 166c–d, Hp. Ma. 298b–c, Prt. 348c–d) —he comes to accept some positive theses that have resisted refutation. Among these are the following three famous Socratic “paradoxes”: The conventionally distinguished virtues—justice, piety, courage, and the rest—are all identical to wisdom or knowledge, conceived of as a type of craft (technê) or expertise (Chrm. 174b–c, Euthd. 281d–e, Prt. 329b–334c, 349a–361d). This is often referred to as “the unity of the virtues” doctrine. Possession of this knowledge is necessary and sufficient for happiness (Cri. 48b, Grg. 470e). {xxx} No one ever acts contrary to what he knows or believes to be best, so that lack of self-control (weakness of will) is impossible (Prt. 352a–359a). Together these three doctrines constitute a kind of ethical intellectualism: they imply that what we need in order to be virtuous and happy is expert craft knowledge. The goal of an elenchus is not just to reach adequate definitions of the virtues or seemingly paradoxical doctrines about weakness of will and virtue, however. Its primary aim is moral reform. For Socrates believes that, by curing people of the hubris of thinking they know when they do not, leading the elenctically examined life makes them happier and more virtuous than anything else. Philosophizing is so important for human welfare, indeed, that Socrates is willing to accept execution rather than give it up (Ap. 29b–d, 30a, 36c–e, 38a, 41b–c). In the transitional dialogues, as well as in some earlier ones, Socrates, as the embodiment of true philosophy, is contrasted with the sophists. They

are, for the most part, unscrupulous, fee-taking moral relativists who think that moral values are based on convention; he is an honest, fee-eschewing moral realist who thinks that the true virtues are the same for everyone everywhere. The problem latent in this contrast is that if people in different cultures have different beliefs about the virtues, it is not clear how the elenchus, which seems to rely wholly on such beliefs, can reach knowledge of objective or non-culture-relative moral truth.

Socrates in the Republic The Republic is specifically about the virtue of justice and about whether it pays better dividends in terms of happiness than does injustice. It begins, therefore, with a characteristically Socratic search for an account of justice (331b–c), with Polemarchus providing the first candidate. Justice, he says, is giving to each what he is owed (331e). Socrates then proceeds to examine this account by testing its consistency with other beliefs Polemarchus holds and is unwilling to abandon. When it proves to be inconsistent with them, it is taken to have been refuted (335e). Socrates must be presupposing, therefore, that some of Polemarchus’ sincerely held ethical beliefs are true, since inconsistency with false beliefs is no guarantee of falsehood. The problem is that there seems to be little reason to accept this presupposition. Socrates’ next interlocutor, Thrasymachus, explains why. He argues that those who are stronger in any society—the rulers—control education and socialization through legislation and enforcement. But he thinks that the {xxxi} rulers, like everyone else, are self-interested. Hence they make laws and adopt conventions—including linguistic conventions—that are advantageous to themselves, not to their weaker subjects. It is these conventions that largely determine a subject’s conception of justice and the other virtues. By being trained to follow or obey them, therefore, a subject is unwittingly adopting an ideology—a code of values and behavior—that is to his ruler’s advantage, rather than his own. Consequently, Thrasymachus defines justice not as what socialized subjects like Socrates and Polemarchus think it is (something genuinely noble and valuable that promotes their own happiness) but as what it really is in all cities: the advantage of the stronger.

As in the case of Polemarchus, Socrates again uses the elenchus to try to refute Thrasymachus. But his attempts are not found wholly adequate, either by Thrasymachus himself or by the other interlocutors (350d–e, 357a–b, 358b–c). And we can see why: by arguing that ethical beliefs are an ideologically contaminated social product, Thrasymachus has undercut the elenchus altogether. He may get tied up in knots by Socrates, but his theory is invulnerable to elenctic refutation (as Thrasymachus points out at 349a). For elenctic refutation appeals to ideologically contaminated ideas in order to counter his theory, but his theory maintains that these have no validity. Hence Plato has Socrates abandon the elenchus in subsequent books and attempt to answer Thrasymachus (whose views are taken over by Glaucon and Adeimantus) by developing a positive defense of justice of his own. The fact that Thrasymachus’ argument is reprised in the Laws (714b– e) shows that it remains vivid, so to speak, in Plato’s mind.4

The Theory of Forms In a number of dialogues, Plato connects the relativist doctrines he attributes to the sophists with the metaphysical theory of Heraclitus, according to which the perceptible things or characteristics we see around us are in constant flux or change—always becoming, never being. In the Theaetetus, he argues that Protagoras’ claim that “man is the measure of all things” presupposes that the world is in flux; in the Cratylus, he suggests that the theory of flux may itself be the result of projecting Protagorean relativism onto the world (411b–c). Nonetheless, Plato seems to accept some version of this theory himself (see Ar. Met. 987a32–34). In Republic 5, for example, he characterizes perceptible things and characteristics as lying “in between what purely is and what in every way is not” (478a–479d; see also Ti. 52a). {xxxii} The theory of flux clearly exacerbates the problem we noticed earlier with the Socratic elenchus. If perceptible things and characteristics are always in flux, how can justice and the other virtues be stable forms? How can there be stable accounts of them to serve as correct answers to Socrates’ questions? And if there are no stable accounts, how can there be such a thing as ethical knowledge? More generally, if perceptible things and characteristics are always in flux, always becoming, how can anything be

something definite or determinate? How can one know or say what anything is? Aristotle tells us that it was reflection on these fundamental questions that led Plato to “separate” the forms from perceptible things and characteristics (Ar. Met. 987a29–b1). The allegories of the sun and line (Rep. 507a–511e), which divide reality into the intelligible part and the visible (perceptible) part, seem to embody this separation. Conceived in this way, forms seemed to Plato to offer solutions to the metaphysical and epistemological problems to which the elenchus and flux give rise. As intelligible objects set apart from the perceptible world, they are above the sway of flux, and so available as stable objects of knowledge, stable meanings or referents for words. As real, mind-independent entities, they provide the basis for the accounts of the virtues that Socratic ethics needs. Like many proposed solutions to philosophical problems, however, Plato’s raises new problems of its own. If forms really are separate from the world of flux our senses reveal to us, how can we know them? How can our words connect with them? If items in the perceptible world really are separate from forms, how can they owe whatever determinate being they have to forms? In the Meno, Phaedo, and Phaedrus, Plato answers the first of these questions by appeal to the doctrine of recollection (anamnêsis). We have knowledge of forms through prenatal, direct contact with them; we forget this knowledge when our souls become embodied at birth; then we “recollect” it in this life when our memories are appropriately jogged. He answers the second question by saying that items in the world of flux “participate” in forms by resembling them. Thus perceptible objects possess the characteristic of beauty because they resemble the form of beauty, which is itself beautiful in a special and basic way (see Phd. 100c, Smp. 210b–211e). The doctrine of recollection presupposes the immortality of the soul— something Plato argues for in Republic 10 and elsewhere (Phd. 69e–84b, Phdr. 245c–246a). It also presupposes some method of jogging our memories in a reliable way. This method is dialectic, which is a descendant of the Socratic elenchus. It is introduced in the Republic as having a special bearing on first principles—a feature it continues to possess in Aristotle (Top. 101a37–b4)—particularly on those of the mathematical sciences.

{xxxiii} The importance of these sciences in Plato’s thought is twofold. First, they provided a compelling example of a rich body of precise knowledge organized into a deductive system of axioms, definitions, and theorems—a model of what philosophy itself might be. Second, the brilliant mathematical treatment of harmony (musical beauty) developed by Pythagoras of Samos and his followers (Ar. Met. 987a29–988a17) suggested a role for mathematics within philosophy itself. It opened up the possibility of giving precise definitions in wholly mathematical terms of all characteristics, including such apparently vague and evaluative ones as beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice, good and evil, and the other things of which Socrates sought definitions (Rep. 530d–533e). Despite the benefits these sciences promised, however, Plato found a problem with them: they treat their first principles as “absolute” startingpoints, to be accepted without argument (510c–d). Yet if these startingpoints are false, the entire system collapses. It is here that dialectic comes in. Dialectic defends these definitional starting-points—it renders them “unhypothetical”—not by deriving them from something yet more primitive (which is impossible, since they are starting-points) but by defending them against all objections, by solving all the aporiai, or problems, to which they give rise (437a, 534b-c). With the objections solved, our intellectual vision is cleared and we are able then to see the forms these definitions define in something like the way we did before our souls became embodied (540a– b). In the process of their dialectical defense, the definitions themselves also undergo conceptual revamping, so that their consistency with one another— and hence their immunity to dialectical (elenctic) refutation—is revealed and assured. This enables the philosopher (to whom the craft of dialectic belongs) to knit them all together into a single unified theory of everything that exhibits “their kinship with one another and with the nature of what is” (537c). The first principle of this entire theory, Plato claims, the greatest object of knowledge (505a), is the form of the good, which seems to be an ideal of rational order or unity expressed in mathematical terms. It is the model the philosopher uses to design his ideally just and happy Kallipolis (540a–b). On a larger scale, it also provides the maker of the cosmos—the Demiurge

—with the knowledge he needs to perform his cosmic task (Ti. 28b–29d).5 For even the gods are bound by the objective truths and values embodied in the forms (Euthphr. 10a–11c).

{xxxiv} The Republic in Outline At the center of Socrates’ defense of justice stand the philosopher-kings— who unite political power and authority with philosophical knowledge of the transcendent, unchanging form of the good (the good itself)—and the ideal city they come to rule, Kallipolis (“beautiful city” or “fine city”). Because this knowledge is based, as Socrates argues, in mathematics and science, it is unmediated by conventionally controlled concepts of good and bad, just and unjust. Hence it is free from the distorting influence of power or ideology, and so immune to the challenge Thrasymachus poses to the elenchus. What the philosopher-kings do is construct a political system—including primarily a system of socialization and education—that will distribute the benefits of their specialized knowledge of the good among the citizens at large. The system they construct relies on Plato’s theory of the soul or mind (psychê), the seat of consciousness, feeling, desire, rational calculation, belief, knowledge, and wisdom. According to this theory, there are three fundamentally different kinds of desires: appetitive ones for food, drink, sex, and the money with which to acquire them; spirited ones for honor, victory, and good reputation; and rational ones for knowledge and truth (435b–445e, 580d–586e). Each of these types of desire “rules” in the soul of a different type of person, determining his values. People most value what they most desire, and so those ruled by different desires have very different conceptions of what is valuable or good, or of what would make them happy. Just which type of desire rules an individual’s soul depends on the relative strengths of his desires and on the kind of education and socialization he receives. The fundamental goal of ethical or political education is not to provide knowledge, therefore, but to socialize desires, so as to turn people around (to the degree possible) from the pursuit of what they falsely believe to be happiness to the pursuit of true happiness (518b– 519d).

The famous allegory of the cave illustrates the effects of such education (514a). Uneducated people, tethered by their unsocialized appetites, see only images of models of the good (shadows cast by puppets on the walls of the cave). Such people are not virtuous to any degree, since they act simply on their whims. When their appetites are shaped through physical training and that mix of reading and writing, dance and song that the Greeks call mousikê (musical training), they are released from these bonds and are ruled by their socialized appetites. They have at least that level of virtue required to act prudently and postpone gratification. Plato refers to them as moneylovers, because they pursue money as the best means of reliably satisfying their appetitive desires in the long term (580d–581a). They see models of the good (the puppets that cast the shadows), for stable satisfaction of appetitive desires is a sort of good. {xxxv} Further education, this time in mathematical science, leaves people who are eligible for it ruled by their spirited desires. They are honorlovers, who seek success in difficult endeavors and the honor and approval it brings. They have the true beliefs about virtue required for such success and hence that greater level of virtue Plato calls “political” virtue (430c). Finally, yet further education in dialectic (a sort of philosophical training that is a descendant of the Socratic elenchus) and practical city management results in people who are bound only by their rational desires. They are free from illusion and see not mere images of the good but the good itself. They are wisdom-lovers or philosophers, who have knowledge rather than mere true belief about virtue and so are fully virtuous. Not everyone, however, is able to benefit from all these types of education: there are some at each stage whose desires are too strong for education to break. That is why there are producers, guardians, and philosopher-kings in the ideal city. That is also why these groups can cooperate with one another in a just system, where the money-loving producers trade their products for the protection provided by the honorloving guardians and the knowledge provided by the wisdom-loving kings, rather than competing with them for the very same goods (462e–463b). Nonetheless, everyone in this ideal system is enabled to travel as far toward the sun (the good) as education can take him, given the innate strength of his desires. Thus everyone comes as close to being fully virtuous, and so to pursuing and achieving genuine happiness, as he can. It is this that makes

Plato’s city both an ethical and a prudential ideal, both maximally just and maximally happy. And because it is both, it constitutes a response to the Thrasymachean challenge raised anew by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Republic 2. For if maximal justice and maximal happiness go together, then it pays, in terms of happiness, to be just rather than unjust.

Private Life and Private Property in the Republic Now, one remarkable fact about the Republic, focally discussed in Book 5, is that it abandons traditional family structure and traditional sex-based gender roles.6 There the question is introduced this way: Should women reduce the amount of work required of the males by sharing their duties, or should they “stay indoors and look after the house” (451d)? It is argued by Socrates’ imagined critic, as it has been throughout the ages, that a difference in sex roles does indeed entail a difference in social ones. Socrates {xxxvi} is not convinced by this, however, pointing out that it is not clear that one’s role in reproduction has anything to do with one’s aptitude for a type of work or occupation (454d–e). Hence, in Kallipolis, women will not be confined to the house but trained in the craft for which their natural aptitude is highest, regardless of whether that results in female guardians (female soldiers and police officers) and female philosopher rulers. These provisions are certainly enlightened, even by our own standards, but because they form a part of the discussion of guardian women, it may seem that they are intended to apply only to female guardians, not to female producers. Stray remarks that have clear application to the latter, however, suggest that this may not be the case. The principle of specialization, for example, which requires each to specialize in the craft he is best at, is said to apply to “every child, woman, free person, craftsman, ruler, and subject” (433d1–5). The implication is that female producers will be trained in the occupation for which they are naturally best suited. Since Socrates implies that there are women with a natural aptitude for carpentry (454d), explicitly mentions female physicians, and claims that natural aptitudes for each occupation are to be found in both sexes (455d–e), it seems that female producers are intended to be apprenticed in an appropriate occupation in precisely the same way as the males.

For all that, Plato is not a feminist. He shows no interest in liberating women as such and implies that they are generally inferior to men (455c–d). Moreover, his casual remarks reveal a streak of unregenerate sexism and misogyny (431b–c, 469d, 557c, 563b).7 But these are relatively small matters and do not affect the general point that in Kallipolis men and women with the same natural assets will receive the same education and have access to the same careers. Still, Plato is regrettably vague about the producers, whether male or female, and has left us somewhat in the dark on the important question of who will do the housework and rear the children if both parents are employed full-time outside the household. In the case of the guardians, he is more forthcoming, although what he describes may not appeal to us. If the guardians and producers were in competition for the same social goods, producers would fare very badly, since the guardians are armed and trained for warfare in a way that the producers are not (419a). Hence the guardians are segregated from the producers and denied both private property and private family life (the objects of the producers’ ruling appetitive desires), on the grounds that “if they acquire private land, houses, and money themselves, they will be {xxxvii} household managers and farmers, instead of guardians—hostile masters of the other citizens instead of their allies” (417a–b). The result is all the things that are likely to estrange us most from the Republic: sex by lottery as part of a state-sponsored eugenics program, state-run “rearing pens” for guardian offspring (451c–461e), and the totalitarian domination of the private sphere by the public. Part of what has led Plato in this unattractive direction is his profound suspicion of the appetites and the politically destructive potential of greed and self-interest. This suspicion, as we’ll see, carries over to the Laws as well. Removing the things that foster these elements in our psychology therefore becomes appealing. Even so, it is difficult not to see the cure as at least as bad as—if not worse than—the disease.

The Laws in Outline We may profitably think of a constitution (politeia) with its attendant laws as a sort of device that takes certain products of nature—human beings—as input and turns them, via the associated systems of education and

socialization, backed by the laws and their enforcement, into socialized subjects: citizens. But who are these human beings? In the Republic, they are the barely socialized children under the age of ten that Socrates, in the role of legislator, takes as the input for his ideal constitution (540e–541b). Their parents, already too contaminated by their socialization elsewhere, are simply sent away. The philosopher-kings require a clean slate (501a). With just this much on the table, however, we have already two problematic things to consider. One is obvious, namely, that no actual legislator is ever going to find himself with input like that for his constitution. The other, less obvious one concerns Socrates himself and his socialization. Within the Kallipolis, the legislators—the philosopher-kings —are products of the ideal constitution and as a result have form-based scientific knowledge of virtues and the good. But Socrates is not like that; he has not been socialized in the Kallipolis. So how can he be sure that the beliefs he draws on in designing its constitution are not subject to the very sort of ideological contamination that Thrasymachus challenges him with? In the Laws solutions to both these problems are proposed. First, the three Strangers—Athenian, Cretan, and Spartan—are temperate and wise old men (685a, e, 768e–769a) who have all been brought up and lived their long lives in constitutions widely recognized as the best ones (685b).8 {xxxviii} Second, the input to Magnesia (as the second best city) are colonists from all over Crete and the Peloponnese (708a), each with their own customs and laws, which makes them more ready as a group to accept new ones than they would be if they already shared all the old ones, ingrained by habit, to begin with (708c–d). By the same token, it goes a long way to insure that none of their previous ideologies will be able to dominate the new ones that they will acquire in Magnesia under supposedly correct, happiness-promoting laws. The fact that the Strangers’ constitutions are themselves different implies that the beliefs formed in them are also not contaminated by, at any rate, the same ideology (634d); the fact that their constitutions are recognized as the best, not only by those within them but by those outside, implies that the recognition cannot itself be plausibly considered as entirely an ideological product. Moreover, the discussion of these constitutions by their three representatives amounts to a critical examination, elenctic in spirit (633a), of the Cretan and Spartan, as informants on their constitutions, by the

Athenian, as an informant on his. Hence nothing in these is accepted unless it has passed rational reflective scrutiny from their respective viewpoints. Again, this does much to undercut a Thrasymachus-style critique of the constitution and laws that result. The first focus of this examination is the proper aims of a constitution and how to achieve them, which is itself based on a critical examination of human psychology, happiness, and the inculcation of virtue through education and socialization (625c–674d). The second focus, based in turn on the results of the first, is on empirical political and constitutional history (676a–715e) and attempts to discover what sorts of constitutions have in fact been most successful in achieving those aims and what sorts of factors have caused them to fail (693a–c). The importance of argument and empirical evidence working in tandem is emphasized: Then we’ll now put this thesis on a firmer footing. For by touching on the facts we did, we have arrived, it seems, at the same account, so that we won’t be investigating in the abstract but on the basis of something that really and truly happened. (683e–684a) The thesis referred to is that constitutions are overthrown by the rulers themselves when they fail to educate in virtue the children who will succeed them in power (694c–702a). This critical discussion of psychology, education, virtue, and constitutional history constitutes a sort of prelude to the laws, helping us to understand the rationale of the individual laws in the way that other {xxxix} such preludes, provided to the citizens of Magnesia (715e), are explicitly intended to (719c–723d). This allows us to see a sort of unity in this extended and complex discussion, which can otherwise be easy to miss. “Anyone who goes through laws in the way we are doing now,” the Athenian says, “is educating the citizens, not just making laws” (857e). Much of that education takes place in the preludes, including this long one. Let’s go back now to the colonists who will be formed by the new constitution and laws into the citizens of Magnesia. Although they differ in the socialization they have already received in other Greek cities, they nonetheless share in the same human nature—the same psychology. Not only that, but they also share in those social institutions, such as marriage and some sort of private property, that are common to almost all actual

human communities. These, as we just saw, the Kallipolis—because it was starting with largely unsocialized subjects—was pretty much able to do away with. But with the Magnesian colonists, it is a different story. Indeed, it is the tight grip that such social institutions exert on them that makes the constitution of Magnesia no more (though no less) than second best after that of the Kallipolis (739a–e). It is worth noticing, though, that other deeply rooted sexual practices that are also part of the societies in which the colonists were reared are not treated so hospitably. Thus sexual intercourse between people of the same sex is entirely excluded, on the grounds that it is contrary to nature and due to lack of self-control regarding sexual pleasure (636b–e). The thought, presumably, continuous with that of the Republic, is that while heterosexual sex is “natural,” the ways societies deal with it, including heterosexual marriage and the family, are not themselves equally natural. Otherwise, as is obvious, the Kallipolis would be going against nature in not incorporating these things. Nonetheless, the attitude there to sexual relations between males is not quite as explicitly hostile as it is in Magnesia (Rep. 403b–c), while a reader who comes to these works fresh from the Symposium and Phaedrus, in which paiderasteia or boy-love (discussed at 836c2n) seems to be positively embraced, is bound to be—to put it mildly—somewhat surprised.9 Turning now to the psychology of the Magnesian colonists, we find the same triadic structure of appetite, spirit (especially in the form of anger), and rational calculation as in the Republic (644d–645a).10 There is the same emphasis on pleasure as the thing we wish to get most of, pain as the thing {xl} we wish to get least of, and virtue—as involving courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom—as what we must acquire with the aid of the laws if we are to achieve these aims (732e–734e). Happiness, then, remains what the good legislator seeks for the citizens of the city (628d, 713e, 781b) and that we seek for ourselves as agents. What we do not find are people ruled by appetitive, spirited, or rational desires, or a corresponding division of the city into producers, guardians, and philosopher-kings. And this is so for a simple reason: the preservation of the traditional family, and of private property for all citizens, makes it impossible. After all, guardians need, first, to have naturally weak appetites and then to get years of education and training and be denied private

families and property, if they are to seek happiness primarily in the form of honor—as spirit’s distinctive aim—in the way definitive of a soul ruled by spirit. And the same goes—with reason replacing spirit, and the pleasure of knowing the truth replacing honor—for philosopher-kings. Also carried over from the Republic, as we noticed in passing, is what I referred to as the profound suspicion of the appetites, and of the lack of self-control their greedy nature produces in the soul (644d–645c), and the faction greed produces in political communities (728e–729a). It is this suspicion—which the woes of capitalist consumer societies can make one somewhat sympathetic to11—that leads Plato to provide all the citizens with enough inalienable property, inheritable by only one person (ideally an oldest son),12 to support them, part as farmable land and part as an urban dwelling, and strictly constrains commercial activities and the accumulation of wealth (744d–747e). Much of the actual work on these farms, as in the urban households, is in the hands of foreign slaves (806d),13 compulsory meals are provided in communal and communally funded messes (806d– 807a, 955e), and education of (noninfant) children is provided by paid foreigners (804c–d, 813e). Hence adult citizens are largely free— circumstances such as wars and the like permitting—to live a (very regulated) life devoted to the cultivation of virtue (804d–808d), in which choral music and dancing at festivals as well as preparation for and participation in military and political offices, some of which are quite onerous and time consuming, play central roles. {xli} Pretty much all of this applies equally well to female citizens,14 who receive to the greatest extent possible the same education and share in the same life as the males (805c–d), including the communal messes (806e) and military training (794c–d, 813e–814b, 833c–d), and enjoy the same artistic freedom (829e). In addition, they serve as Priestesses (741c) and TempleWardens (759b) and have important supervisory roles in marriages and reproduction (784a–c) and the communal messes (806e). The ages at which they may enter and must leave office, however, are specified as forty and fifty, while for a man they are thirty and sixty (785b). As a result, women are de facto excluded from various higher offices and are never explicitly mentioned with regard to them, those just listed aside. For example, the Supervisor of Education—who serves with his predecessors as members of the Nocturnal Council (951d–e)—must be a “father of legitimate children”

(765d), a Guardian of the Laws must be at least fifty when he enters office (754e), which is the age a woman must leave it, assistants to the Council members must be “between the ages {xlii} of thirty and forty” (951e), which again excludes women, and, while Priests are mentioned as members (951d), Priestesses are not. A woman who has married between the prescribed ages of sixteen and twenty (785b), therefore, almost certainly spends the next twenty to twentyfour years as a wife and mother, participating in public life at festivals and the like but ineligible for office until, at forty, her childbearing years are pretty much over. She is always ineligible to own property (740b–741a) and always under the control of a male guardian, with limited control even over her choice of husband (740c, 774e, 924c–925c). As is no doubt obvious, these regulations of a woman’s life pull somewhat against those intended to make her life more like that of a man.15 Faced with a choice between Kallipolis and Magnesia, a woman might be hard pressed to determine which is better (or worse). From the psychological point of view, returning to it, the citizen body that results—or is intended to result—is moderate in its appetites and competes for public honors in musical and athletic contests and, when necessary in the wars for which the latter, together with regulated hunting (822d–824a), is in part intended to prepare it. No doubt all of these, as well as their education—up to a certain level—in the mathematical sciences and astronomy (817e–822d), also satisfy the rational desires of most of them. But for those younger people (males, as we saw) between the ages of thirty and forty (951e) who are chosen to be assistants to the members of the Nocturnal Council, a “more exact” education in these subjects is provided, which culminates in a unified intellectual vision of the one “form (idea)” that is common to the many virtues (965b–c), thus providing the craft of politics with its essentially unified target (963a–968b). (Little or nothing, however, is said about such forms or about whether or not they are separate from perceptible things and characteristics. There is no equivalent in the Laws of Books 6 and 7 of the Republic, no mention of the form of the good —though virtue is, of course, a very important sort of good.) Since the older members of the Council are analogized to the city’s understanding (nous) and these younger ones to its perceptual organs, charged with keeping watch all around the city and reporting back their findings to the Council

(964e–965a), the latter are clearly analogous to the Republic’s guardians and the former to its philosopher-kings. The Nocturnal Council, for its part, consists of the Priests who have received public honors, the ten Guardians of the Laws who are oldest at the time as well as the Supervisor of Education in its entirety and his predecessors in office (which is referred to as the most important in the city at 765e), each with his young assistant (951d–952a). Two aspects of its function, beyond that of educating the assistants, merit special notice: one is receiving the reports from returned observers from foreign lands that might enable it to improve Magnesia’s laws, education, or system of nurture (952b–d); the other is learning from its own operations, and the subjects already prescribed, about what new subjects its members must learn (968c– e). Both of these two functions of the Council serve to underline the enormous importance assigned to experience in the Laws, to facts as well as words, which we have already noticed in regard to constitutional history and the consequent intellectual openness to (carefully regulated) innovation (656c–664c).16 Thus in the case of the laws of Magnesia themselves, while we do hear about how important it is for them to be unchangeable (891a), we also hear about how important experience and empirical testing are to their being properly counted as such and about all the details that the legislator must leave up to those who have experience of his laws in actual practice (772c–d, 779c–d, 956e–957b). To some extent this emphasis on experience and empirical tests simply reflects the fact that the Republic proceeds from the top-down perspective of ideal theory (in which the philosopher-kings are conceived of as already possessing secure, form-based knowledge of virtues and the good, {xliii} of designing the constitution of Kallipolis from there, while treating the subsequent legislative details as minor matters [423d–427c]), whereas the Laws replaces that perspective with the bottom-up one we have been exploring, which starts with (apparent) facts about human psychology and constitutional history and proceeds from there, always aware of the potential need for revision. In this regard, it seems to take the less safe of the paths described in the Phaedo:

To know the plain truth about such matters is either impossible or extremely difficult in this present life, but to fail to examine what is said about them in every possible way, or to give up before one has investigated them exhaustively from every angle, shows utter softness in a man. You see, where these matters are concerned, it seems to me that one must certainly achieve one of two things: either learn or discover how they stand; or, if that is impossible, then at least adopt the best of the things people say, and the one that stands up best to examination, and, carried on it as on a sort of raft, face the dangers of life’s voyage—provided one cannot travel more safely and with less risk on the more secure vessel of some divine saying. (Phd. 85c–d) Absent divine sayings, indeed, or those of philosopher-kings, who are “gods or . . . children of gods” (Lg. 739d), the less safe raft of evidence and examination seems like the only option. In the Laws, the Athenian says of it that “there is not a more perspicuous method of inquiry for any human being than this” (965c). Nonetheless, gods do play a very significant role in the Laws. Book 10 is devoted to arguments for their existence and for the priority of soul in cosmological explanation, and this topic and its crucial importance for legislators and members of the Nocturnal Council to know about is returned to in the Laws’ very last pages: No mortal person can ever become steadfastly god-fearing unless he has grasped these two things we’re now discussing: that soul is the oldest of all the things that have partaken of generation, is immortal, and rules all bodies, and in addition to these—something that has been said many times—that there is an understanding (nous) present in the stars which is the leader of all the beings. And he must also grasp the studies preliminary to these, and must see the connection between what concerns music and these studies, and must apply this harmoniously to the practices and customs that pertain to our characters. And {xliv} he must be able to give an account of as many of these as have an account. Anyone who cannot acquire all this, in addition to the virtues in the popular sense, would pretty much never become an adequate ruler of a whole city, but only an assistant to other rulers. (967d–968a)

But as this passage intimates, the gods in question are not anthropomorphic gods, of the sort that traditional Greek religion conceived Zeus and the other Olympian deities to be, but rather the sun, moon, stars, and other celestial objects conceived of as living things possessed of understanding and soul, these latter being the true gods, not the bodies they animate (899b). The many occasions for the worship of these gods, then, whether at public festivals of private shrines, legally mandated in Magnesia, are not so much occasions for intercessory prayer as for something more like the celebration of the rational order of things, splendidly illustrated in the regular movements of the heavens, visible to the eye, and captured by the “wondrous rational calculations” of astronomy (967b). That we live in a rationally ordered universe is, to put it this way, something to be grateful for, since it makes it possible for our reason to figure out how we might best live in harmony with the rational order of our larger world. For the understanding present in the heavenly bodies, and which is “a god to gods” (897b), exists in us as well, to which all the other divine goods (wisdom and the other four virtues) look to as their leader and on which all the more human ones (health, beauty, strength) depend (631b–d). Guardedly, and in the language of the Republic, we might say that for all the differences there are between that work and the Laws, it is still mathematical science, amalgamated with practical city management and aided by those discussions in the Nocturnal Council meetings that are the analogs of dialectic (if not the thing itself), that offers us the only route out of the cave of false and exploitative ideology into the clear light of the sun. In a post-truth, post-fact society, where ideology is king and science denigrated, there simply is no—in any case, no peaceful—way out.     1. Those of Philip of Opus, on whom and on the extent of whose editorship, see Morrow, pp. 515–518. 2. Or so—but not too implausibly—goes the story in the Seventh Letter 324b–326b, attributed to Plato, but not by him. See Burnyeat & Frede. 3. For a sober and somewhat skeptical evaluation of the evidence on this, see Schofield-2. 4. That it is, in fact, reprised is defended in Reeve-3, pp. 53–78. 5. It is unclear whether we are to take this story of cosmic origins literally or figuratively. See, e.g., Mohr.

6. For discussion of the issues and problems, see Reeve-1, pp. 176–197. 7. In the Laws, women are “secretive and cunning.” Because of their weakness, “female human nature is inferior as regards virtue to that of males” (781a–b), while children’s nurses have “womanish and slavish characters” (790a). 8. Aristotle judges them to be “quite justly held in high repute” (Pol. 1273b25–26). 9. See Reeve-3, pp. 110–134. 10. See Index s.vv. “Appetite(s)”—with “Have too large a share”; “Spirit”—with “Victory, love(r) of (philonikia)”; and “Rational calculation, argument (logismos, logizesthai), ”— with “Wisdom, wise (sophia, sophos),” “Wisdom, wise (phronêsis),” and “Understanding (nous).” 11. See Reeve-4, pp. 22–27. 12. This “goes against the universal Greek practice of dividing one’s land among all of one’s sons . . . [and] must have struck Plato’s contemporaries as more outlandish even than gender equality” (Samaras, p. 181). 13. On the harsh treatment of these slaves in the Laws, see Morrow-1. On slaves in the Republic, see Reeve-1, pp. 216–217. 14. A generally reliable discussion of the scattered passages in which women, or things relevant to their status, are discussed can be found in Saunders-7. 15. “The final verdict on the question of the position of women in the Laws can only be that there are two aspects to it and that they are probably irreconcilable” (Samaras, p. 196). 16. See Index s.vv. “Experience, lack of,” “Test,” “Word(s).”

         

{1} Laws                                                      

{2} BOOK 1 ATHENIAN: Is it a god or some human being, Strangers,1 who receives the |624a| credit for the composition of your laws? CLEINIAS: A god, Stranger—most decidedly, a god. Among us it is Zeus, whereas among the Spartans, where our friend here comes from, I think they say it is Apollo.2 Isn’t that so? |624a5| MEGILLUS: Yes. ATHENIAN: Don’t you say, agreeing with Homer,3 that Minos used to go to stay with his father4 |624b| every nine years, and that he established laws for your cities5 in accord with the oracles he received? CLEINIAS: That is indeed said among us. And of course his brother, Rhadamanthus, too—you’ve heard the name, no doubt—was |624b5| most just. We Cretans at least would say |625a| that he received this praise due to the correct way he settled lawsuits in those days. ATHENIAN: A fine reputation certainly, most fitting for a son of Zeus.6 And since you, and our friend here, were brought up in law-based habits of so distinguished a character, |625a5| I expect you would not find it {3} disagreeable now to describe political constitutions7 and laws, talking and listening as we walk. By all reports, the path from Cnossos |625b| to the cave of Zeus is certainly long enough, as we hear, and—the weather being stifling just now—there are no doubt resting places along the path and shady places under tall trees. And it is fitting for people of our age to rest often in these places, |625b5| and encourage ourselves with conversation. That way we will pass along the entire path easily. CLEINIAS: And as you go on, Stranger, there are indeed wonderfully tall and fine cypresses in the sacred groves, and meadows in |625c| which we might spend some time resting. ATHENIAN: An excellent suggestion! CLEINIAS: It certainly is. When we see them, we will think so all the more. But let’s go on, and may good luck be with us. |625c5|

ATHENIAN: May it indeed. Now tell me this. Why has the law prescribed communal messes8 for you, physical training, and the sorts of weapons you have? CLEINIAS: I think, Stranger, that it’s easy for anyone to understand our ways. For the nature of the countryside all over Crete, |625c10| you see, is not flat, like that of the Thessalians. That’s why, |625d| then, they in particular make use of horses more, whereas we make use of runners. For our uneven ground is more suited to the practice of foot racing. In a place like this, it is necessary to have light weapons, and not be weighed down |625d5| when we run. So, the lightness of bows and arrows seems to be fitting for this. All this readies us for war, and the legislator, as it appears to me, prescribed everything with a view to this. |625e| For it looks as though he organized even the communal messes because he saw that everyone, when on a military campaign, is compelled by the matter at hand to eat together during this time in order to be on their guard. It seems to me, then, that he charged |625e5| the majority of people {4} with ignorance for failing to understand that for all of us throughout life there always exists a continuous state of war against all other cities. If, then, in times of war we must eat our meals together in order to be on guard, with orderly relays of men and officers to act as our guards, |626a| we must also do this in peacetime. For what the majority of people call peace exists only in name, whereas in fact every city is by nature always in a state of undeclared war against every other. And you will pretty much discover, if you look at it this way, |626a5| that the Cretan legislator prescribed all our institutions,9 public and private, with a view to war, and looking just to this, in this way handed down laws to safeguard, on the understanding that nothing else whatsoever |626b| is really beneficial, whether possessions or ways of living, unless one prevails in war, since all the goods of the vanquished go to the victors. ATHENIAN: At all events, you seem to me, Stranger, to have had a fine “physical” training when it comes to |626b5| penetrating Cretan institutions. But tell me in a yet more perspicuous way about one thing. For the criterion10 you seem to me to have given for being a well-governed city is that it must be arranged and managed in such a way as |626c| to vanquish other cities in war. Isn’t that so?

CLEINIAS: Yes, indeed. And I think that it seems that way to our friend here too. MEGILLUS: What other answer, my divine fellow,11 could a Spartan possibly give? |626c5| ATHENIAN: Well then, if this criterion is correct for cities in relation to cities, is the one for village in relation to village different? CLEINIAS: Not at all. ATHENIAN: Instead, it’s the same one? CLEINIAS: Yes. |626c10| {5} ATHENIAN: What about for household in relation to household within a village, and for one man in relation to another man? Is it still the same? CLEINIAS: The same. ATHENIAN: For a man in relation to himself, though, must we think of it as enemy in relation |626d| to enemy? Is that how we are still to speak of it? CLEINIAS: Stranger from Athens—for I wouldn’t want to address you as merely “from Attica,” when you seem to me to be worthy of being called after the goddess Athena!12 By correctly following the argument13 up to its starting-point |626d5| you have made it more perspicuous,14 so that you will easily discover that we were correct in saying just now that everyone is an enemy of everyone else in public life, and in private life each is enemy to himself. ATHENIAN: What do you mean, my admirable friend?15 |626e| CLEINIAS: In the latter case, Stranger, “victory over oneself” is the first and best of all victories, and “being defeated by oneself” is the most shameful and also the worst of all defeats. For these expressions indicate that there is a war in each of ourselves against ourselves. |626e5| {6} ATHENIAN: Well then, let’s turn the argument back in the reverse direction. For, since each one of us is either self-controlled or self-defeated, should we also say that in a household, village, and city, |627a| the same thing occurs? Or should we not say this? CLEINIAS: You mean is one controlled by itself, the other defeated? ATHENIAN: Yes.

Indeed, you are right to ask. For this sort of thing certainly does exist, |627a5| not least in cities. You see, where the better people are victorious over the inferior majority, the city would correctly be said to be “in control of itself,” and would very justly be praised for such a victory. But the opposite holds where the opposite happens. |627a10| CLEINIAS:

ATHENIAN: Well, let’s leave aside whether it is ever possible for the inferior to gain control over |627b| the superior (for that’s a longer argument), but what I now understand you to be saying is this: sometimes citizens who are unjust and large in number combine to enslave by force a just minority, who are their kinsmen and born of the same city, and, when |627b5| they gain control, the city would correctly be said to be “self-defeated and bad,” and when they are defeated, “self-controlled and good.” CLEINIAS: What you are saying now, Stranger, is indeed very strange;16 nonetheless, |627c| it is most necessary to agree to it. ATHENIAN: Hold on a minute, and let’s investigate this again. There could, I take it, be many brothers born to one man and one woman, and it wouldn’t be at all wonderful if the majority turned out to be unjust |627c5| and the minority just. CLEINIAS: No, it wouldn’t. ATHENIAN: And it wouldn’t be fitting for me or for you both to hunt after whether the whole household or family should itself be called “selfdefeated,” when the wicked are victorious, and “self-controlled,” |627c10| when they are defeated. For we are not now investigating the popular phrase for the sake of refinement or lack of refinement of expression, |627d| but rather what exactly the nature of correctness and error is where laws are concerned. CLEINIAS: What you say is very true, Stranger. |627d5| MEGILLUS: What you’ve said so far also seems fine to me, certainly. {7} ATHENIAN: Then let’s also look at this point. Those brothers we just mentioned, could there also be a judge for them? CLEINIAS: Yes, certainly. |627d10| ATHENIAN: Which would be a better judge, then, the one who destroyed the bad ones among them and commanded the better ones to rule themselves,

|627e| or the one who made the good ones rule and let the inferior ones live but made them willing to be ruled? But I suppose, with a view to virtue,17 there is a third judge we should mention, if there could be one of this sort, who is capable of taking in hand this family at odds with itself and, without |627e5| destroying anyone, reconciling them |628a| by establishing laws for them for the rest of time, so as to safeguard them from each other and make them friends. CLEINIAS: This last sort of judge and legislator would be better by far. ATHENIAN: And yet it would be with a view to the opposite of war that he would be enacting laws for them. |628a5| CLEINIAS: Well, that’s true. ATHENIAN: What about the person who puts together a city? Would he arrange its way of life more with a view to external war or |628a10| to that internal war that occurs from time to time in a city, and is then |628b| called “faction,” and which everyone would wish never to occur in his own city, and were it to occur, would wish to be free of it as quickly as possible? CLEINIAS: It is clear that he will look toward the latter. |628b5| ATHENIAN: And which of these would someone prefer, for peace to come about from faction when one side is destroyed and the other victorious, or friendship as well as peace to come about due to reconciliation, were it necessary for the city to pay attention to external enemies? |628c| CLEINIAS: Everyone would prefer the latter to the former for his own city. ATHENIAN: And the legislator likewise? {8} CLEINIAS: Of course. |628c5| ATHENIAN: And isn’t it for the sake of what is best that every legislator will establish institutions? CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: The best, however, is neither war nor faction—the need for these is to be deprecated—but rather peace and |628c10| goodwill toward each other; and, in particular, so it would seem, victory of a city over itself is not one of the best things but one of the necessary ones. |628d| It’s like someone thinking that a sick body, after getting a medicinal purgation, was then doing best, without ever paying attention to the case of a body that had no

need at all for such treatment. In the same way, with regard to the happiness18 of a city or an individual, no one who thought this way |628d5| would ever become a politician in the correct sense19 if he looked solely and primarily to external wars, or become a legislator in the exact sense if he didn’t legislate about matters of war for the sake of peace rather than matters of peace for the sake of those of war. |628e| CLEINIAS: The argument appears somehow sound, Stranger; but I would be amazed if our institutions, and those of the Spartans besides, were not produced in all seriousness for the sake of the latter. |628e5| ATHENIAN: That may well be so. But we should not fight hard on this point, |629a| but rather inquire gently about the present matters, since we as well as they take them most seriously. So follow the argument along with me. Let’s take Tyrtaeus—who though by birth an Athenian, became a Spartan citizen —as a guide, the most serious of people about these matters. What he said was: I would not memorialize a man nor set him down in words,20 {9} no, not even if he were the richest of men, or if |629b| he possessed many good things (and then he mentions pretty much all of them), unless he were always best in war. I suppose you’ve heard these poems. Our friend here, I imagine, is steeped in them.

MEGILLUS: Yes, indeed. |629b5| CLEINIAS: They’ve also come to us, imported from Sparta. ATHENIAN: Well then, let’s question this poet together more or less like this: “Tyrtaeus, most divine poet, you seem to us to be wise and good, in that you have praised excessively |c| those who are outstanding in war. It so happens that on this point, I myself, and our friend here, and Cleinias, who’s from Cnossos, are strongly in agreement with you, as it seems to us. But we wish to know perspicuously whether we are talking about the same men. |629b5| Tell us, then, do you think, as we do, that there are clearly two forms of war? Or what?” I think that even a poet far inferior to Tyrtaeus would tell the truth and say that there are two, one of which |629d| we call “faction,” which is the harshest of all wars, as we were saying just now.21 The other, I believe, we would all assume, is the kind waged against external enemies and foreigners, which is far milder than the other. CLEINIAS: Certainly.

ATHENIAN: Well then, which sort of men in which sort of war were you praising when you extravagantly praised some in this way and blamed others? For it seems to be the one we wage against external enemies. In any case, you say in your poems that you cannot abide at all those who |629e| do not dare to look on bloody slaughter and, standing close, reach out to strike the foe.22

Then after this we’d say, “It seems, Tyrtaeus, that you most praise those who distinguish themselves in war against |629e5| a foreign and external enemy.” He would say “yes,” I suppose, and agree. CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: Whereas we, on the other hand, say that while these men are still good, there are others who are far better: those who show themselves to be best |630a| in the greatest war. And we too have a {10} poet as our witness— Theognis, a citizen of Megara in Sicily, who says: A trustworthy man in gold and silver his weight is worth, Kyrnus, in harsh divisive faction.23 |630a5|

This man then, we say, is altogether better in the harshest war than the other, to pretty much the same extent as justice, temperance,24 and wisdom (phronêsis)25 combined with courage in one thing |630b| is better than courage itself alone. For no one would ever be trustworthy and sound in times of faction unless he had all of virtue. There are any number of mercenaries who are willing to take a firm stand and fight to the death in the sort of war Tyrtaeus talks about, |630b5| the majority of whom—with very few exceptions—are rash, unjust, wantonly aggressive,26 and pretty much entirely lacking in wisdom. Well, where then has this argument of ours now ended up, and what does it mean to make evident when it says these things? It is clear that |630c| more than anything else it is this, that the legislator in Crete, who comes from Zeus, as well as any legislator of the least worth, will never establish laws looking to anything other than the greatest virtue. And this, Theognis says, is trustworthiness in times of danger, which |630c5| one might call complete justice. By contrast, the virtue that Tyrtaeus {11} especially praises, although it is a fine27 one, and opportunely embellished by the poet,

nonetheless, if one were to speak correctly, certainly comes fourth in number and power. |630d| CLEINIAS: We are relegating our legislator, Stranger, to a low rank among legislators. ATHENIAN: Not him, my very good man, but we ourselves, when we think that both in Sparta and here in Crete |630d5| Lycurgus28 and Minos established all their institutions with a view most of all to war. CLEINIAS: But what should we have been saying? ATHENIAN: What is true, I think, and the just thing to say when speaking on behalf of a divine man,29 is that he looked not to some part of virtue, |630e| and it the least one, but to all of virtue, and that he sought forms of laws for them, but not the forms that people nowadays propose when they seek laws. Nowadays, you see, each seeks to add on whatever kind he needs: one adds |630e5| laws concerned with inheritances and heiresses, another with assault, and others with countless other such things. But we say that the way to search for laws, for those who search well, is the way we now have begun to do it. |631a| You see, I altogether admire your attempt to interpret the laws. For it is correct to start from virtue, saying that it was for its sake that the legislator established the laws. But when you said that he legislated by referring everything to a part of virtue, and it the least one, it was plain to me that you were no longer correct, and all this last part of what I’ve now been saying is {12} due to that. Well, how then would I have wished to hear you speak in expounding things? Do you wish me to tell you? |631b| CLEINIAS: I do, indeed. ATHENIAN: “Stranger,” you should have said, “it is not for nothing that the laws of the Cretans are held in especially high repute among all the Greeks. For they are correct laws and make those who use them happy, since they provide them with every good. Now goods are twofold, |631b5| some human, others divine. The former, though, depend on the divine ones, and if a city receives the greater ones, it also acquires the lesser ones, whereas if it doesn’t, it lacks both. |631c| The leader among the lesser goods is health, second beauty, third strength for running and all other bodily movements, and fourth is wealth that is not blind30 but keen-sighted, provided it follows wisdom (phronêsis). |631c5| Wisdom, in turn, is first and leader among the

divine goods; second is a temperate state of the soul involving understanding (nous);31 third, from those two being combined with courage would come justice; and fourth would be courage. All these latter goods are by nature ranked above the former ones, |631d| and the legislator must rank them that way too.32 “Next, the citizens must be told that the other commands are given to them with a view to these things, with the human ones among them looking to the divine, and the divine ones looking to their leader, understanding (nous).33 |631d5| Concerning their joining together in marriage with each other, and the later begetting and raising of children, male or female, while they are young |631e| and also as they mature until they reach old age, he must take care to apportion honor and dishonor correctly. In all their associations he must have scrutinized carefully and observed their pains, pleasures, and appetites, and the intensity of all their passions.34 |632a| And he must blame and praise correctly by means of the laws themselves. In their feelings of anger, too, and of fear, in all the perturbances that arise in souls due to bad luck, and the relief from such things that comes with good luck, and in the feelings produced by diseases, |632a5| wars, poverty, and their opposites that befall people—for {13} all of these situations, he must teach and define what is fine and what is not in each person’s disposition. “Next, it is necessary for the legislator |632b| to safeguard the various ways in which the citizens acquire and spend money, and keep a keen eye on the associations35 they all form with each other, and the dissolutions of these, both voluntary and involuntary, |632b5| noting which sorts are just and which lacking in justice and injustice. And to those citizens who are obedient to the laws he must assign honors, and impose specified penalties on those who disobey. When he comes to putting the final touches on the entire constitution, he must see to |632c| the dead, what way each sort is to be buried and what honors should be assigned to them.36 “Looking back over all this, the one who establishes the laws will appoint guardians for all of them, some who will do so through wisdom (phronêsis), others through true belief,37 |632c5| so that understanding (nous) will bind them all together and show that they follow temperance and justice, not wealth or love of honor.”

That is the way, Strangers, I would have liked you to speak, and still wish it now, |632d| explaining how all this is present in the laws attributed to Zeus and the Pythian Apollo,38 which Minos and Lycurgus established, and how they possess a sort of order that is obvious to anyone with experience where laws are concerned, whether due to craft knowledge |632d5| or some sorts of habituation,39 though not at all evident to the rest of us. CLEINIAS: How then, Stranger, should we speak if we are to follow these injunctions? ATHENIAN: It seems to me that we should go through things again from the start, starting just as we did, by first discussing the practices that cultivate courage, |632e| and then, if you like, we’ll go through another {14} form of virtue, and then another. And we’ll try to use the way we go through the first as a model for the others, and discussing them in this way make our path encouraging. Then, after dealing with virtue |632e5| as a whole, we will show, god willing,40 that all the things we discussed just now look to this. CLEINIAS: A fine proposal! And let you first try to examine our |633a| admirer of Zeus here. ATHENIAN: I’ll try, but I’ll also try to test you and myself as well.41 For the argument is a communal effort. Tell me this, then: your communal messes, we say, and physical training were devised by the legislator with a view to war? |633a5| MEGILLUS: Yes. ATHENIAN: And the practices in third place or fourth? For we will presumably also have to enumerate virtue’s other parts, or whatever we should call them, so long as it’s clear what one means. MEGILLUS: Well, in third place, I and any other Spartan would say, |633b| he devised the hunt.42 ATHENIAN: Let’s try and state a fourth and a fifth, if we can. MEGILLUS: Well, I could certainly try to state a fourth, |633b5| endurance of pain, which occurs in many ways among us, such as in the boxing matches we have with each other, and in certain sorts of “raids,”43 which each time involve many blows. Then there is our so-called secret service,44 which is amazingly full of the hardship that promotes endurance, such as going

without shoes |633c| and sleeping without bedding in winter,45 doing without attendants and fending for themselves, ranging night and day over the whole countryside. And, further, our “naked games,”46 where we undergo terrible feats of endurance as we contend {15} in the full heat of the summer. |633c5| And there are very many other examples—so many that you’d pretty much never stop if you tried to go through each of them. ATHENIAN: Well said, Spartan Stranger. But look here, what do we suppose courage is? Is it simply a battle against fears and pains alone, or also against longings, |633d| pleasures, and certain sycophantic flatteries that can melt like wax the spirit even of those who think themselves dignified.47 MEGILLUS: That’s what I think; it is against all these things. ATHENIAN: Well, if we recall our earlier arguments, |633d5| our friend here said that a certain sort of city is a self-defeater, and a man too. Isn’t that so, Stranger from Cnossos? CLEINIAS: Yes, certainly. ATHENIAN: Now, then, is it just the person who is defeated by pains that we are saying is bad, |633e| or also the one who is defeated by pleasures? CLEINIAS: More, it seems to me, the one who is defeated by pleasures. For I suppose we all mean the one who is controlled by pleasures when we speak of being self-defeated in the blameworthy sense, rather than the one controlled |633e5| by pains. ATHENIAN: But surely Zeus and the Pythian lawgiver48 did not legislate for |634a| a crippled courage, able to resist only on the left, but unable to do so on the pleasant and flattering right, but one able to do so on both? CLEINIAS: On both, I think. |634a5| ATHENIAN: In that case, let’s go back and say what the practices are in both your cities that enable someone to taste pleasures rather than avoiding them, just as they enabled him not to avoid pains, but leading him into their midst, where he is compelled and persuaded by honors to control them. Where in your laws is this very thing |634b| prescribed concerning pleasures? Tell me what this practice of yours is that makes the same person equally courageous in the face of pains and pleasures, so that they are victorious

over the ones they should be victorious over and are never defeated by the enemies that are nearest |634b5| and most harsh. {16} MEGILLUS: Well, Stranger, although I was able to mention many laws established against pains, I no doubt couldn’t with equal ease provide large and striking examples |634c| where pleasures are concerned, but perhaps I could provide small ones. CLEINIAS: Nor could I myself with similar clarity produce something like this in the case of Cretan laws. ATHENIAN: That, excellent Strangers, is not at all surprising. But |634c5| if one of us, wishing to see what is at once true and also best, were to find something to criticize in the laws properly belonging to each of the others, we should accept this criticism from each other not harshly, but gently. CLEINIAS: Quite right, Athenian Stranger. That one must accept. ATHENIAN: Not to do so at our age, Cleinias, would hardly be fitting. |634d| CLEINIAS: Indeed, it wouldn’t. ATHENIAN: Whether or not someone could correctly criticize the Spartan or the Cretan constitution is for another account. |634d5| But presumably I’m in a better position than either of you to voice what many people say. For even if the rest of your laws are indeed established in a sensible way, to me one of the finest is the law forbidding any young person from inquiring into what is fine in them and what not fine, and requiring everyone to say in concord,49 with one voice and one mouth, |634e| that all the laws are established in a fine way, since they are established by gods and also requiring that if one of them says otherwise, they should absolutely refuse to listen. On the other hand, if some old person thinks twice about something in your laws, he must make such arguments to an official, or someone his own age, |634e5| with no young person present. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely correct, Stranger. You must be a prophet! You may be a long way from the thought of the person who established these laws, but it seems to me |635a| that you have fairly hit on his thinking now, and stated it with perfect truth. ATHENIAN: Well, there are no young people here now, and so, on account of our old age, doesn’t the legislator leave us free to converse about these

matters alone among ourselves without giving offense? |635a5| {17} CLEINIAS: That’s right, and don’t hold back anything at all in criticizing our laws. You see, there is no dishonor in recognizing that something is not fine; in fact, a remedy may come from it, if one takes the criticism not with indignation but with goodwill. |635b| ATHENIAN: Splendid. Nevertheless, I’m not really going to state a criticism of your laws—not anyway until after a thorough investigation, I can do so securely—but more an expression of perplexity. You see, you are the only people we know of, from among all the Greeks and barbarians, whose legislator has prescribed keeping away and not tasting |635b5| the greatest pleasures and amusements. On the other hand, with pains and fears, which we were just discussing,50 he held that if from an early age a person flees before these on every occasion, when he does come up against unavoidable hardships, |635c| fears, and pains, he will flee before those with training in such things and be enslaved by them. In my view, then, the same legislator should have thought the same thing about pleasures. He should have said to himself, “If our citizens grow up from their youth without experiencing the |635c5| greatest pleasures, and aren’t practiced in endurance in the face of pleasures and are never being compelled to do anything shameful, their sweetness of spirit51 in the face of pleasures will lead them to suffer the same thing as those who are defeated by fears, |635d| only they will be enslaved in another and more shameful way, namely, to those who are capable of endurance in the face of pleasures, and are masters of the things that have to do with pleasure—utterly bad people, some of them.52 Their soul will be in part slave and in part free, and they will be unworthy |635d5| of being called unconditionally courageous and free.” Consider, then, whether anything of what has now been said seems to you two to fit the case.53 CLEINIAS: It does seem so to us, at least on first hearing. |635e| But where such weighty matters are concerned, to be immediately and easily persuaded might well suggest youth and lack of sense. ATHENIAN: Well, Cleinias, and you too Spartan Stranger, suppose we turn to the next topic we proposed to discuss. After courage, |635e5| as you know, we are to talk about temperance. What will we find in your {18} constitutions

that makes them superior on this head to those of any randomly governed people, like the ones we just discovered concerned with war? |636a| MEGILLUS: That’s scarcely an easy question. But it seems that our communal messes and gymnasia have been well devised to promote both. ATHENIAN: What really seems hard, Strangers, is for what concerns constitutions to be as unidirectional in fact as it is in words.54 |636a5| You see, it’s the same with bodies, where it’s almost impossible to prescribe a single practice for a single body that would not evidently be harmful to our bodies in some respects and beneficial to them in others. So it is too with your physical training and |636b| communal messes, though they now benefit your cities in many other ways, in the event of factions they are harmful (as, for example, the young people of Miletus, Boeotia, and Thurii have shown55). And, in particular, it seems that this institution, where the practice is of long standing, has corrupted the sexual |636b5| pleasures that are in accord with nature not only for human beings but also for beasts. And your cities might primarily be accused of this, along with other cities that especially fasten upon physical training. |636c| And whether one should consider such things as topics for jokes or to be taken seriously, one must keep in mind that pleasure concerning these is assigned in accord with nature, it seems, when it is due to what is female and what is male by nature having sexual intercourse for procreation, whereas the sexual intercourse of males |636c5| with males or females with females is contrary to nature,56 and a shameless act that is primarily due to lack of self-control regarding pleasure. Certainly, we all blame the Cretans for coming up with the story of Ganymede.57 Since they were convinced that their laws came from Zeus, |636d| they saddled Zeus with this story in order to be followers of the god even when enjoying this pleasure. To the story, then, we may say goodbye. But where people who are investigating laws are concerned, almost their entire |636d5| investigation has {19} to do with pleasures and pains,58 both in cities and in individual characters. You see, these two springs flow freely by nature, and whoever draws from the one he should, when he should, and as much as he should, lives happily,59 and likewise, a city, an individual, and every living creature,60 |636e| whereas the one who does so without knowledge and outside the opportune times would live in the opposite way.

MEGILLUS: In a way, that’s right, Stranger; in any case, we’re perplexed about what exactly to say against |636e5| it. Nonetheless, it still seems to me that the legislator in Sparta directed us to avoid pleasures. As for the laws in Cnossos, our friend here, if he wishes, will come to their rescue. But those in Sparta concerning pleasures seem to me to be the finest ones established for people. |637a| For the circumstances in which people most fall victim to pleasures, acts of wanton aggression, and utter foolishness, our law has banished from the entire country—that is, neither in the countryside nor in any city under Spartan supervision will you see |637a5| drinking parties,61 and all that goes along with them, with their power to move people to every sort of pleasure. Nor is there anyone among all the citizens who, on encountering a drunken reveler, would not immediately inflict on him the severest punishment, and |637b| not even having the festival of Dionysus62 as an excuse would save him. Once I saw wagonloads of such revelers in your country, and in Tarentum,63 among our own colonists, I once saw the entire city drunk at the Dionysiac festival. Among us, there is nothing of this sort. |637b5| ATHENIAN: But all such things are praiseworthy, Spartan Stranger, where there is endurance, but where without restraint, they are pretty stupid. Indeed, perhaps someone from our side might take you up on it |637c| and defend himself by pointing to the lack of restraint of the women in your country.64 But whether in Tarentum, or among my people, or among yours, there is one reply that seems to acquit all such things of the charge of being bad rather than correct. For everyone replies |637c5| {20} to a foreigner who is surprised at seeing what he is not used to seeing among his own people by saying, “Don’t be surprised, Stranger. This is the custom65 among us. No doubt among your people there is a different one concerning these same things.” However, our present discussion, my dear friends, is not about what other people do, |637d| but rather about the vice and virtue of the legislators themselves. But let’s say a bit more about the whole subject of drunkenness, which is a practice of no small importance, and not one for a run-of-the-mill legislator to determine. I’m not talking about drinking or not drinking wine in general, |637d5| but about drunkenness itself, and about whether it should be made use of in the way the Scythians and Persians do, as well as the Carthaginians, Celts, Iberians, and Thracians (all of them

warlike races), |637e| or in the way you do. For while you people, as you say, wholly abstain from it, the Scythians and Thracians, women as well as men, employ wine that is entirely unmixed,66 and pour it on their clothes, thinking it a fine and happy practice to engage in. |637e5| The Persians too make excessive use of it, along with other indulgences that you reject, but do so in a more orderly way than the others. MEGILLUS: But, my good friend, we put all these people to flight |638a| when we take up arms! ATHENIAN: Don’t say such things, my very good man! There have been, and will be, many cases of flight and pursuit that are quite inexplicable. Hence victory or defeat in battle is not always a self-evident criterion67 for us to invoke, but rather a disputable68 one, |638a5| where the admirability or not of practices is concerned. Larger cities, you see, defeat smaller ones in battle, the Syracusans |638b| enslaved the Locrians69 (the very people who seem to be governed by the best laws in that region), the Athenians the people of Cos,70 and we could find {21} countless other such cases. No, with regard to each practice we discuss, let’s now leave aside talk of victories and defeats, and try to persuade ourselves by means of discussion |638b5| that one sort of practice is fine, while another sort is not. But first listen to me while I tell you something about how one should look for what is good and not good in these. MEGILLUS: What do you mean? |638c| ATHENIAN: It seems to me that all who take up a practice for discussion, and set out to criticize or praise it as soon as it is mentioned, do not at all proceed in the correct way. No, they do the same thing as a person who, on hearing someone praise cheese71 as good, immediately |638c5| criticizes it, without finding out its preparation (in what way, by whom, with what accompaniments, and in what condition) and consumption (what the condition is of the person consuming it). This is precisely, it seems to me, what we’re now doing in our discussions. Having heard |638d| only this much about drunkenness, you see, some of us criticize it immediately, while others praise it—both very pointlessly. And making use of witnesses and commenders, we give our praise to one or the other side, and we think that what we say has the controlling vote in the one case because of the |638d5|

number supplied, and in the other because we see that those who make no use of drunkenness are victorious in battle (though again even that is disputed by us). If this, then, is the way we propose to discuss all other institutions, |638e| it would not be in accord with my understanding (nous) of things. In another way, however, which appears to me to be the requisite one, I am willing to speak about this very one, about drunkenness, trying, if I can, to make clear the right method of investigation where all such things are concerned. For countless numbers of peoples would dispute |638e5| the position of your two cities on these matters and fight against it in argument. MEGILLUS: Well, if there is some correct method of investigating such things, we must not shrink from hearing it. |639a| ATHENIAN: We should investigate, then, in the following way. Suppose one person praises goat-keeping, and the animal itself as a fine possession, while another, who had seen goats untended by a goatherd causing damage by grazing in cultivated fields, were to disparage it, and were to find fault in the same way |639a5| with any creature he had ever seen without a ruler or with bad rulers. Would we regard the criticism of someone like this— whatever it is he might criticize—to be sound? {22} MEGILLUS: How could we? ATHENIAN: Do we regard someone as a good ruler of ships if he possesses only the knowledge72 of the craft of navigation, regardless of whether he is subject to seasickness or |639b| not? What would we say about that? MEGILLUS: He’s not good at all, if he possesses the craft73 but also the affliction you mentioned. ATHENIAN: What about a ruler of armies? If he has the knowledge |639b5| of the craft of war, is he sufficiently prepared to rule, even if he is a coward in the face of dangers and seasick from the drunkenness of fear? MEGILLUS: How could he be? ATHENIAN: And what if he does not possess the craft and is a coward too? MEGILLUS: Then you’re speaking of someone who is altogether good-fornothing—not a ruler for men at all, but for the most womanish of women! ATHENIAN: Now what about someone praising or blaming any community you like of which |639c| there is naturally a ruler, and which is beneficial

when along with its ruler, without his ever having seen it correctly forming a community along with its ruler, but always having seen it associating without a ruler or along with a bad ruler? Do we think observers of these sorts, of |639c5| these sorts of communities, will ever have any blame or praise that is any good? MEGILLUS: How could they, when they’ve never seen or participated in a correctly run community of any of these sorts? |639d| ATHENIAN: Hold that thought for a moment. Would we include drinking companions and drinking parties among the many sorts of communities? MEGILLUS: Yes, absolutely. {23} ATHENIAN: Well, has anyone ever seen one of these that was correctly run?74 |639d5| For you two it’s easy to answer that you never have, since the practice is neither native nor an institution in your countries. I, on the other hand, have encountered many of them in many places, and what’s more I’ve examined (one might almost say) all of them, and I’ve pretty much never seen or heard of a single one that was correctly run in its entirety, |639e| and if a few small parts of some were in some degree so, the vast majority (so to speak) were utter failures. CLEINIAS: What do you mean by that, Stranger? Could you put it yet more perspicuously? You see, we lack experience of these sorts of things, as you’ve pointed out, and |639e5| if we happened upon one, we, no doubt, wouldn’t know right away what was being correctly run and not |640a| correctly run in them. ATHENIAN: Likely so, but you can still try to learn from what I’m going to say. For you do understand this much, don’t you, that in every single joint venture or communal activity, the correct thing in all cases is for there to be a leader? |640a5| CLEINIAS: Yes, of course. ATHENIAN: And we were saying just now that a leader for warriors must be courageous. CLEINIAS: Of course. |640a10| ATHENIAN: And the courageous person is less perturbed by fears than cowardly ones are.

CLEINIAS: That’s

true too. |640b| ATHENIAN: And if there’d been some contrivance for appointing a completely fearless and unperturbed commander to an army, wouldn’t we have made every effort to use it? CLEINIAS: Yes, absolutely. |640b5| ATHENIAN: At the moment, though, we are speaking not of a ruler of an army in companies of men who are enemies fighting enemies in war, but a ruler of friends who in peacetime are forming a community with friends in a spirit of goodwill. CLEINIAS: Correct. ATHENIAN: And such an association, if indeed it is to involve |640c| drunkenness, will not be without perturbance, will it? {24} CLEINIAS: How could it be? I think it’d be entirely the opposite. ATHENIAN: In the first place, then, won’t these people also need a leader? CLEINIAS: Of course! More so than in any other sort of activity. |640c5| ATHENIAN: Mustn’t the sort of ruler they are provided with, though, be unperturbed, if possible? CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: And also, it would seem, someone who must himself be wise about associations. For he is both the guardian of their existing friendship and the one who takes care of its increase by means of |640d| their association at that time. CLEINIAS: Very true. ATHENIAN: Mustn’t we, then, appoint a sober and wise (sophos) ruler over our drinkers,75 and not the opposite? For if drunks have a drunk, |640d5| young, unwise leader who does not end up causing some great evil, it would be declared a stroke of good luck. CLEINIAS: Absolutely. ATHENIAN: Now if someone were to criticize these associations, even in cities where they take place in as correct a way as possible, |640d10| posing a challenge to the practice itself, he might perhaps be correct in his criticism. |640e| But if someone were to heap abuse on the practice because he sees it

done all wrong, he makes it clear that he is ignorant, first, of the fact that it is taking place in an incorrect way, and, second, of the fact that any practice will appear good-for-nothing when done in this way, that is, without a sober master and ruler. |640e5| Or don’t you think that a drunken captain,76 or indeed any ruler of anything, will ruin everything, whether ship, chariot, |641a| army, or whatever might be governed by him? CLEINIAS: What you have said is all very true, Stranger. But tell us this next. Even if the way it takes place is correct, |641a5| what possible good effect could this institution related to drinking have on us? Take for example the thing we said just now, if an army had correct leadership, victory in war (which is no small good) would go to those who followed it, and similarly with the other examples. But from a correctly led |641b| drinking party what great good would come about for private individuals or for the city? {25} ATHENIAN: What about this? When one child or one chorus for a play is led in a way that is fitting, what great good would we say comes about for the city? If we were asked the question in this way, wouldn’t we reply that from a single case |641b5| the benefit for the city would be small? But if you are asking what great benefit a city derives from the education in general of those who are educated, it is not difficult to respond that if they are well educated, they become good men, and having become such, they also do the other things admirably, and furthermore |641c| are even victorious when they fight their enemies. Education, you see, brings forth victory, though victory sometimes brings forth a lack of education. For many become people more wantonly aggressive due to victories in war, and have become filled with countless other evils due to their wanton aggression. Education is never |641c5| “Cadmean,” 77 whereas victories have often been of this sort for people, and will be again. CLEINIAS: You seem to us, my friend, to be saying that spending time drinking wine together makes a great contribution to education, |641d| provided it is done correctly! ATHENIAN: And if I am? CLEINIAS: Well, would you be in a position, then, to state that what’s now being claimed is true? |641d5|

ATHENIAN: As for the truth, Stranger, to affirm confidently that these things hold, when so many dispute it, would be a task for a god. But if I am to state how things appear to me, I won’t begrudge you that, seeing that we have now embarked on a discussion of laws and constitutions.78 {26} CLEINIAS: That’s precisely what we are trying to understand: what seems to you |641d10| to be the case where these disputed matters are concerned! |641e| ATHENIAN: Yes, that’s the way it must be done, with you trying the best you can to understand the argument and me trying the best I can to make it clear somehow or other. First, though, hear me out on the following point. Every Greek assumes that our city loves words |641e5| and long-talking, but as for Sparta and Crete, the former is short-spoken and the latter more longthinking than long-spoken. I’m anxious, then, not to give you the impression that I’m long-talking about a small matter, |642a| when I go on at great length elaborating about drunkenness, which is a small affair. But a correct regulation of it in accord with nature would be impossible without rendering an at once perspicuous and satisfactory account in words of correctness in musical training,79 or to render an account of musical training |642a5| without rendering one of education as a whole—and that would involve a great number of words. Consider, then, what we should do. Should we leave aside these topics for the present, and turn to a different argument having to do with laws? |642b| MEGILLUS: Perhaps you are not aware, Athenian Stranger, that my family happens to hold the position of agent80 for your city. Now, as perhaps is the case with all children who hear that |642b5| they are the agents for a certain city, each of us who is an agent is imbued right from youth with a feeling of goodwill toward it, as if it were a second fatherland after his own city. And that is exactly what has sprung up in me now. For whenever the Spartans were blaming or praising the Athenians for something, I would hear the mere children saying, |642c| “Your city, Megillus, has not acted nobly toward us,” or “has acted nobly toward us.” Listening to this, then, and always fighting on your behalf against those who blamed your city, I came to have a thorough feeling of goodwill toward it—indeed, now even |642c5| your accent is dear to me! And I believe that the thing said by many, that those Athenians who are good are extraordinarily good, is very true.81 For they

alone are good not by compulsion but by their own nature, by a divine dispensation, truly and without pretense. |642d| As far as I’m concerned, then, you should take courage and talk as long as you like. {27} CLEINIAS: That goes for me too, Stranger, and after you’ve listened to what I have to say and accepted it, you’ll take courage and talk as long as you wish. For presumably you’ve heard of Epimenides,82 a divine man, who was born here in Crete, |642d5| and is in fact related to my family. Ten years before the Persian war, in accord with the god’s oracle, he visited your city and offered some sacrifices that had been ordained by the god. The Athenians were alarmed at the time about the Persian expedition, but he told them that the Persians would not come for another ten years, |642e| and that when they did come, they’d depart having accomplished nothing of what they hoped for, and having suffered more evils than they’d inflicted. At that time, then, my ancestors formed ties of guest-friendship83 with you, and since then I and my people have had goodwill toward yours. |643a| ATHENIAN: So it seems that you, for your part, are ready to listen. And I, for mine, am ready too, as far as wishing goes, but as for being able, that’s far from easy, but I must try, nonetheless. First, then, for the purposes of the argument, let’s define what education is, and what power84 it has. |643a5| For that’s the way we say that the argument we have now undertaken must proceed, until the god85 is reached. CLEINIAS: Certainly, let’s do that, if indeed it pleases you. ATHENIAN: Well, as I tell you what one should assert education |643b| to be, you look to see whether what’s said pleases you! CLEINIAS: Tell us then. {28} ATHENIAN: I will. I say that whatever a man is going to be good at, he must right from childhood practice that very thing, |643b5| both by playing games86 and by being serious, with each of the things that are appropriate to the given occupation. For example, the one who is going to be a good farmer or a good builder of some sort must, in the one case, play at building one of those toy houses, in the other, at working the soil, |643c| and the one nurturing each of them must supply him with miniature tools that are replicas of the true ones. And that, in particular, they must learn ahead of time whatever subjects it is necessary to have learned ahead of time—for

example, measurement for a carpenter, riding a horse, |643c5| or some other things of this sort, for a soldier—by doing them while they play. And an attempt must be made to direct, by means of games, the pleasures and appetites of the children toward the things they must do when they are perfectly grown. In that case, the main thing for education, we say, is a correct nurturing, one that as far as possible will lead the soul of the child at play toward a passionate love |643d| for what, as concerns the virtue87 of his occupation, he is to be perfect at when he becomes a man. Take a look, then, as I said, and see whether what has been said so far pleases you. CLEINIAS: How could it not? |643d5| ATHENIAN: In that case, let’s not leave undefined either what we say education is. You see, as things stand, we blame or praise the nurturing of individual people, saying that this one among us is educated and that one uneducated, even though the latter people are sometimes thoroughly “educated” in retail trade, ship-owning, |643e| or some other such thing. Our present argument, though, would not regard these things to be education, so it seems, but the education that directs someone toward virtue from childhood, producing in him an appetite and passion to become a perfect citizen, |643e5| one who knows88 how to rule and be ruled with justice. It is this nurturing alone, it appears to me, |644a| that our argument would wish to isolate and call by the name of “education.” On the other hand, one aiming at money, some sort of strength, or some other sort of “wisdom (sophia)” that is without understanding (nous) and justice, it calls {29} “vulgar,” “illiberal,”89 and “altogether unworthy of being called ‘education.’” |644a5| But let’s not get in a dispute with each other over a name. Instead, let’s stick with the argument now being agreed to by us, that those who are correctly educated become good, pretty much, and that education is nowhere to be dishonored, since it is the first of the finest things accruing to the best men. |644b| If it ever goes astray, and it is possible to rectify it, then everyone must always, throughout life, do so to the extent that he can. CLEINIAS: That’s right, and we agree to what you say. |644b5| ATHENIAN: And indeed, we agreed just now that the good are those who are able to rule themselves, and the bad those who are not.90

CLEINIAS: Absolutely correct. ATHENIAN: Let’s take this point up again and make it yet more perspicuous what exactly we mean by it, and allow me, please, to show you by means of an image, |644c| if I can, how the case stands. CLEINIAS: Go right ahead. ATHENIAN: Do we not assume, then, that each of us is one thing? CLEINIAS: Yes. |644c5| ATHENIAN: But having within itself two opposed and foolish advisors, which we call pleasure and pain? CLEINIAS: That’s right. ATHENIAN: But in addition to these two, there are beliefs about the future, whose common name is “expectation,” and whose special names are “fear” for the expectation of pain, |644c10| and “confidence” for the expectation of the opposite. And dealing with all of these is |644d| rational calculation as to which of them is better and which worse—and when it becomes the common doctrine of a city it is named “law.” {30} CLEINIAS: I’m having difficulty following you; but say what comes next as if I did follow. |644d5| MEGILLUS: That goes for me too. I have the same feeling. ATHENIAN: Then let’s think about these things in the following way. Consider each of us, living beings that we are, to be a divine puppet, whether put together as the gods’ plaything or for a serious purpose.91 For this is something we do not know. But we do know this, that these feelings in us |644e| are like strings or cords drawing us, but pulling in opposite directions, toward opposite actions, in the very region where virtue and vice lie distinguished. Now the argument says that there is one of these pulls that each of us must always follow, never letting go |644e5| of that one, and pulling with it against the other strings. This one is the golden and sacred leadership of rational calculation, |645a| also called the city’s common law. The others are hard and iron, but this one is soft inasmuch as it is golden, whereas the others resemble other various kinds of materials. One must always, then, assist the finest leadership, that of law,92 since rational calculation, |645a5| though fine, is gentle rather than forceful, so its leadership

needs assistants93 if our golden element is to be victorious over the other elements. {31} And in this way the myth about virtue, about us being puppets, |645b| would be saved, and what was understood by being “self-controlled” and “self-defeated” would be, in a way, more evident, and that when it comes to a city and an individual, an individual must grasp within himself the true account concerning these pulls and live by following it, |645b5| while a city, having received this account from a god or from this person who knows these things, must establish it as a law for its comportment toward both itself and other cities. In this way vice and virtue would also be more perspicuously articulated for us, and with this being more manifest to the mind’s eye, |645c| education and the other practices will perhaps be more clearly seen too, and, in particular, that of spending time drinking together, which might seem a trivial matter—on which a many worded discussion would be out of place—may perhaps appear |645c5| not unworthy of lengthy treatment. CLEINIAS: Well said! And so let’s finish whatever in our present way of spending time is worth the effort! ATHENIAN: Tell me, then, if we get this puppet drunk, |645d| what effect will be produced in it? CLEINIAS: What are you looking for in asking this? ATHENIAN: Nothing in particular yet, but just what generally happens when one is combined with the other. But I’ll try to state yet more perspicuously |645d5| what it is I wish. What I’m asking is the following: doesn’t drinking wine make our pleasures, pains, angers, and passions more intense? CLEINIAS: Very much so. {32} ATHENIAN: What about our perceptions, memories, beliefs, and |645e| wise thoughts? Does it likewise make them more intense? Or don’t they altogether abandon anyone who becomes sated with drink? CLEINIAS: Yes, they altogether abandon him. ATHENIAN: So doesn’t his soul return to the same state |645e5| as when he was a young child? CLEINIAS: It certainly does.

ATHENIAN: Wouldn’t he then be least in control of himself? CLEINIAS: Least indeed. |646a| ATHENIAN: And a person of this sort, we say, is the worst? CLEINIAS: Very much so. ATHENIAN: Then it is not, it seems, only the old man who becomes a child for a second time, but also the one who is drunk. |646a5| CLEINIAS: Very well put, Stranger! ATHENIAN: Is there any argument, then, that could even begin to persuade us that we should taste the sweets of this sort of practice rather than making every possible effort to avoid it? CLEINIAS: There seems to be. Anyway, you say there is and were ready just now |646a10| to state it. ATHENIAN: You remember correctly. And I’m ready now as well, |646b| since the two of you have declared your eager willingness to listen. CLEINIAS: How could we not listen—if for no other reason than your amazing and strange suggestion that a person should voluntarily throw himself into a state of utter degradation! |646b5| ATHENIAN: Of the soul you mean, do you? CLEINIAS: Yes. ATHENIAN: Well, comrade, what about the body and its bad state— emaciation, ugliness, or debility? Would we be amazed if someone |646b10| voluntarily got into a state of this sort? |646c| CLEINIAS: Yes, of course we would. ATHENIAN: Well, what about people who go of their own accord to a dispensary to drink some drug? Do we think them ignorant of the fact that shortly thereafter, and for many days, their body will be in a state that, if |646c5| it were permanent, they would refuse to go on living? And don’t we know that those who go in for strenuous physical training become weak immediately afterward? CLEINIAS: Yes, we know all that. ATHENIAN: And that it’s for the sake of the subsequent benefit that they voluntarily |646c10| go in for these things?

CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely right. |646d| ATHENIAN: Then shouldn’t we think about other practices in the same way? CLEINIAS: Yes, certainly. ATHENIAN: And so this is how passing the time drinking together |646d5| must be thought of, if indeed it is correctly thought to be included among these practices. {33} CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: So if it’s evident that it has some benefit that is not inferior to the one having to do with the body, it will be victorious over bodily exercise, anyway at the start, because the latter involves pains, whereas the former does not. |646d10| CLEINIAS: What you say is correct, but I would be amazed if we were able |646e| to discover something of this sort in it. ATHENIAN: That’s the very thing, it would seem, that we must now attempt to show. And so tell me this: are we able to apprehend two forms of fear that are pretty much opposites? |646e5| CLEINIAS: Which ones do you mean? ATHENIAN: These: on the one hand, we surely fear evils, when we expect them to come about. CLEINIAS: Yes. ATHENIAN: On the other hand, we often fear for our reputation, believing that people will think |646e10| badly of us if we do or say something that isn’t fine. This is the fear that we call “shame,” and I think everyone does. |647a| CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: These, then, are the two fears I meant. And of these, the latter, while it opposes pains and other fears, also opposes |647a5| the most numerous and greatest pleasures. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely correct. ATHENIAN: Won’t a legislator, then, and anyone indeed who is of the least benefit, show his respect by awarding the greatest honor to this fear, calling it “shame,” and calling the confidence that is opposed to it “shamelessness,”

and consider it |647a10| as the greatest evil for everyone both in private and in public life? |647b| CLEINIAS: That’s correct. ATHENIAN: And doesn’t this fear save us from many great evils, and in particular, isn’t nothing more effective, all things considered, in producing victory and salvation in war? For there are two things |647b5| that produce victory—confidence in the face of the enemy and, in the face of one’s friends, fear of shame (and shame is an evil). CLEINIAS: That’s right. {34} ATHENIAN: So each of us must become fearless, and afraid, for the reasons we have distinguished in each case. |647c| CLEINIAS: Absolutely. ATHENIAN: And when we wish to make a particular person fearless in the face of many sorts of things, we accomplish this by leading him, with the help of the law, into fear. |647c5| CLEINIAS: It is evident that we do.94 ATHENIAN: What about when we try, with the help of justice, to make him afraid? Mustn’t we throw him up against shamelessness, and, by training him to fight against it, make him victorious over his own pleasures? It is by fighting against, and |647c10| defeating, the cowardice within him that a person must become perfect in courage, |647d| since without experience and training in these sorts of struggles surely no one would bring even half of himself toward virtue. Will anyone, then, become perfect in temperance if he has not fought victoriously—with the help of reason, deed,95 and craft, both in playing games and in serious pursuits—against |647d5| the many pleasures and appetites that urge him to act shamelessly and unjustly, but has never experienced any such things? CLEINIAS: That hardly seems reasonable. ATHENIAN: Well then, has any god given a drug for fear |647e| to human beings, such that the more someone is willing to drink of it, the more unlucky he supposes himself to be with each drink, and being afraid of everything that’s happening or will happen to him, he—even if he’s the most courageous man—finally ends up in a state of total dread, |648a| but

once he has slept it off and is free of the effects of the drink, he becomes himself again each time? CLEINIAS: And where among people, Stranger, would you say we find a drink of this sort? |648a5| ATHENIAN: Nowhere! But if there were such a drink somewhere, could a legislator have made use of it at all with an eye to courage? For example, the sort of thing we might find ourselves asking him about is the following: “Well, legislator, whether you are legislating for the Cretans or for anyone else, wouldn’t you first like to be able to get hold of a test |648b| for courage and cowardice in your citizens?” {35} CLEINIAS: It is clear that any legislator would say yes. ATHENIAN: “One you could use with safety and without great danger, or one that involved their opposites?” CLEINIAS: All would also agree on the safe option. |648b5| ATHENIAN: “And would you use it to lead your citizens into these fears and test them while they were experiencing these, so that by encouraging, admonishing, and honoring them, |648c| but dishonoring anyone who failed to obey you and be in every respect the sort of person you prescribed, you would compel them to become fearless? Whoever did well and courageously in this training would escape penalty, but those who did badly would be penalized. Or would you refuse to use the drink at all, even if you had no other objection to it?” |648c5| CLEINIAS: But how, Stranger, could he fail to use it? ATHENIAN: In any case, my friend, this training would be amazingly easy in comparison to the present ones, whether for individuals, small groups, or as many as one might ever wish. And if a single person training by himself in isolation, |648d| ashamed at being seen before he was in what he regarded as good condition, were to train himself against his fears in this way, providing himself with only a drink instead of countless other things, he would be acting correctly. As would someone who, trusting in his excellent preparation, whether due to nature or practice, |648d5| did not hesitate to strip and train with fellow drinkers, showing his power to outdo and control the inevitable difference produced by the drink, so that, |648e| because of his virtue, he would not once go wrong in a big way or be changed for the

worse due to impropriety—although he would leave off before the last drink, fearing the defeat that all people suffer at the hands of drink. |648e5| CLEINIAS: Yes. For that person too would be temperate and act this way.96 ATHENIAN: Then let’s go back to our legislator and say this: “Well, |649a| legislator, I dare say that such a drug for fear has neither been given to humans by a god nor have they managed to devise one for themselves (for to our feast I invite no sorcerers!).97 But what are we to say about fearlessness and confidence that is too great, ill timed, and toward things one must not do—is there a drink for it?” |649a5| {36} CLEINIAS: “There is,” he’ll no doubt say, and he will name wine. ATHENIAN: But isn’t it the very opposite of the one we were just discussing? When a person drinks doesn’t it first make him immediately more cheerful than he was before, and the more he tastes it, |649b| the more he is filled with great expectations of good things and with belief in his own ability? And, supposing himself to be wise, doesn’t someone like that end up being filled with every sort of freedom of speech, of freedom generally, and of every sort of fearlessness, so that he does not hesitate to say, or likewise even to do, anything? |649b5| Everyone, I think, would agree to that. CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: Let’s recall, then, the two things that we said98 must be cultivated in our souls: first, that we must be as confident as possible, while the second, its opposite, is that we should be as fearful as possible. |649c| CLEINIAS: We think you said that the latter had to do with shame. ATHENIAN: You remember correctly. Seeing, then, that it is in the presence of fears that we must practice being courageous and fearless, we must look to see whether the opposite condition would have to be cultivated in the opposite circumstances. |649c5| CLEINIAS: So it seems. ATHENIAN: It’s those conditions, then, in which we are naturally inclined to be especially confident and rash that are the ones, it seems, in which we must practice becoming as little filled as possible with shamelessness and rashness, but rather afraid on each occasion of daring to say, |649d| undergo, or do anything shameful at all.

CLEINIAS: So it seems. ATHENIAN: Well, aren’t all these conditions in which we are affected in this way: anger, passion, wanton aggression, ignorance, greed, cowardice, and also |649d5| wealth, beauty, strength, and everything that by making us drunk with pleasure drives us out of our wits? And, of these, is any as inexpensive and as harmless, first for testing and then for practicing, than the playful test to be found in wine? What pleasure that we possess can we say is more suitable than this, provided |649e| it is produced with some care? Let’s look at it this way. Take a person whose soul is difficult {37} and savage, from which countless injustices come about. Would it be more dangerous to test him by entering into business transactions with him, and run the risks involved in those, or by keeping company with him at a festival of Dionysus? |650a| Or take a soul overcome by sexual passion. Is it safer to test it by entrusting it with our daughters, sons, and wives, risking those who are dearest to us, in order to observe the soul’s character? And one could give endless such examples |650a5| of the superiority of observing with the help of play, which is otherwise without harmful consequences. And in fact, where this feature of it is concerned, we think that neither Cretans nor any other people |650b| would dispute that it is a suitable way of testing each other, superior to other tests in inexpensiveness, safety, and speed. CLEINIAS: Yes, that’s certainly true. |650b5| ATHENIAN: So wouldn’t this—the knowledge of the natures and states of souls—be one of the things that are most useful to that craft that takes care of these matters? And this we say, I think, is the craft of politics,99 don’t we? CLEINIAS: Of course. |650b10|     1. Xenoi: Xenos is sometimes appropriately translated as “stranger,” sometimes as “foreigner,” depending on the context. See LSJ s.v. ξένος. 2. God of music, medicine, prophecy, and other things, on whom, see Burkert, pp. 143– 149. 3. Od. 19.178–179, also 11.568–571. 4. Minos was king of Crete; his father was Zeus. He is mentioned again at 706a8.

5. Polesin: A canonical Greek polis (translated as “city,” but “city-state” or “state” are often used by translators) was a unique political organization. Unlike a modern city, it enjoyed the political sovereignty characteristic of a modern state: it could possess its own army and navy, enter into alliances, make war and peace, and so on. Unlike a typical modern state, however, it was culturally and religiously homogenous and quite small in scale. The territory of a typical polis included a single (usually) walled urban center (astu), with a citadel (akropolis) and a marketplace (agora), which, as the political and administrative center, is itself often referred to as a polis, as for that matter is the citizen body itself (e.g., 755c5). But a polis also included the surrounding agricultural land, and the citizens lived both there and in the town proper. Astu too is also usually translated as “city” but occasionally, when context requires it, as “town.” 6. Chief among the Greek gods, on whom, see Burkert, pp. 125–131. 7. Politeias: The U.S. Constitution is the highest law of the land and is embodied in a document. A politeia is something like that but is not simply a set of laws, written or otherwise. Instead, it is the community of people whose laws those are. (The English word “constitution” has a parallel sense, as in “He has a strong constitution.”) Aristotle gives a number of characterizations of a politeia that show this clearly: a politeia is “a sort of life (bios) of a city” (Pol. 1295a40–b1); “a certain ordering of those who inhabit the city” (1274b38) or of its various offices, “above all of the office that controls everything” (1278b8–10). 8. Sussitia: See 780a–781d, 783b–c, Rep. 416e, and on the difference between the Spartan and Cretan organization of these, Ar. Pol. 1271a26–37, 1272a1–27. 9. Nomima: This term is variously translated as “laws,” when, as often, it is clearly being used as equivalent in meaning to nomoi (e.g., 688a6, 793a10, 834a7, 914b2, 918a5) or as “customs,” “rites,” or, as here and elsewhere (following Meyer, p. 82), “institutions.” 10. Horos: The root meaning derives from a stone marking the boundary or limit of a territory or piece of land in a visible way. Hence the doctor’s horos is the thing “by reference to which he discerns what is healthy for a body from what isn’t” (Ar. EE 1249a21–22). 11. Theie: A favorite Spartan term of praise. See Ar. NE 1145a29. 12. Attica is the region in which Athens is situated. Athena is the virgin goddess of the arts and technical expertise of every kind and patron goddess of Athens. 13. Ho logos: In ordinary Greek, logos can refer among other things (1) to a word or organized string of words constituting a discussion, conversation, speech, text, explanation, argument, definition, principle, reason, or piece of reasoning; or (2) to what such words or their utterances mean, express, or denote, such as the ratio between quantities; or (3) to the capacity that enables someone to argue, give reasons, and so on. I treat the three Strangers as trying to develop a logos—in the sense of an explanatory argument—about laws and constitutions (see 695e5–6) but otherwise use “account,” “reason,” or “word,” as context requires. 14. Saphesteron: The demand for sapheneia (“perspicuity”) is persistent throughout Lg. 15. Thaumasie: “The address thaumasie is primarily Platonic. The lexical meaning of thaumasios is ‘wonderful’, ‘admirable’, or ‘extraordinary’; . . . [but] there is generally no

distinction in usage between thaumasie and phile [‘my friend’] and agathe [‘my good friend’], and thus it was probably the sense of ‘admirable’ rather than ‘extraordinary’ which underlay the use of this term as an address. In a few passages, however, thaumasie is used when the speaker expresses surprise at the addressee (e.g., Phdr. 230c); in these cases it seems to regain the sense of the lexical meaning ‘extraordinary’” (Dickey, p. 141). Its use at 854b1 is of the latter sort. The same is true of daimonie (“my marvelous friend”), which is used at 705d3, 965c5. See Dickey, p. 142. 16. Because when superior numbers conquer inferior ones, the city is superior, and vice versa. 17. Aretên: Anything that has a function, activity, task, or work (ergon) has a correlative aretê. See Rep. 353a–354a. Thus it is possible to speak of the aretê of thieves, scandalmongers, and other bad things that are good at doing what they do (Ar. Met. 1021b12–23), as well as of the aretê of nonliving tools and instruments. For this reason aretê, though usually translated in the traditional way as “virtue,” is sometimes translated as “excellence.” 18. Eudaimonian: Eudaimonia (“happiness” is the traditional translation) is the same as doing well (eu prattein, eupraxia)—notice arista prattein (“doing best”) at 628d3—or living well: “surely anyone who lives well (eu zôn) is blessed and happy, and anyone who does not is the opposite” (Rep. 354a1–2). While cities as well as individuals can be eudaimôn, since both can do well or flourish, the flourishing of the former involves that of the latter, even if the two are not quite equivalent. See Irwin, pp. 94–95, Morrison, Schofield-3, pp. 94–95, and, for my own view, Reeve-3, pp. 196–198. And although eudaimonia is not simply a feeling or an affective state, it does involve taking pleasure in life, which is an affective response. 19. I.e., one skilled in the craft of politics. See 650b9n, 963a–969d. 20. Tyrtaeus Fr. 12.1 West = Gerber, p. 59. Tyrtaeus was a 7th-cent. BC elegiac poet from Sparta. 21. At 628b. 22. Tyrtaeus Fr. 12.11–12 West = Gerber, p. 59. 23. Theognidae 77–78 West = Gerber, p. 185. Theognis was a mid-6th-cent. BC poet, whose poems were included in a large body of poetry attributed to him but also included the work of others. 24. Sôphrosunê: “Temperance is surely a sort of order (kosmos), the control of certain sorts of pleasures and appetites. People indicate as much when they use the term ‘self-control’— though I do not know in what way. This and other similar things are like tracks that temperance has left. Isn’t that so?” (Rep. 430e4–7). 25. Phronêsis: In Aristotle, phronêsis is in particular practical wisdom or prudence, while sophia is theoretical wisdom. In Lg.—indeed in Plato generally—the two are not distinguished (see 677c6, 689d7), although sophia is often used ironically or to refer to pretended wisdom (644a4, 679c5, 732a6, 863c5). In the translation both are rendered as “wisdom,” with the Greek terms appended in parentheses when needed for clarity. 26. Hubristai: “Wanton aggression (hubris) consists in doing or saying things that involve shame for the one who suffers them, not in order that something or other [beneficial] may come about for the agent himself, or because something [bad] has happened to him, but in order to take pleasure in it. For those who are doing the same thing back are not

committing wanton aggression but revenging themselves. The cause of pleasure to those who commit wanton aggression, though, is that they think that they become more superior themselves by doing evil [to others]” (Ar. Rh. 1378b23–29). 27. Kalê: The adjective kalos is often a term of vague or general commendation, with different connotations in different contexts: “kalon is homonymous” or ambiguous, as Aristotle puts it (Top. 106a21–22). Similarly, the adverb kalôs often means something like “well,” or “correct,” or “right.” Even in the general sense, however, kalos has a distinctive evaluative coloration suggestive of “order (taxis), proportion (summetria), and determinateness (hôrismenon)” (Ar. Met. 1078a36–b1), making a term with aesthetic connotation, such as “beauty,” a good equivalent in many cases. At the same time, it seems wrong to associate kalon with beauty in general, since Aristotle can comfortably claim that to be kalon a thing has to be on a certain scale: “small people are elegant and wellproportioned but not kaloi” (NE 1123b7–8); “what is kalon consists in magnitude and order (taxis)” (Po. 1450b36–37). It is this requirement that makes “nobility” in its more aesthetic sense a closer equivalent than “beauty” in many cases. It also has the advantage of capturing the moral or ethical flavor of kalos, in which it is canonically contrasted with aischros, meaning “shameful” or “morally ugly.” See Dover-1, pp. 69–73. “Fine” is the preferred equivalent in the translation, although “beautiful” is occasionally used. 28. The (perhaps legendary) architect of the Spartan constitution. 29. Reading θείου ἀνδρός with Bury-1 for Budé εὐηθείας. 30. Plutus, the god of wealth, was often represented as being blind. See Rep. 554b. 31. Nous: Always translated as “understanding” with the Greek term added in parentheses for clarity is here, and in general in Lg., pretty much identical to wisdom (phronêsis). On Plato’s views on the soul, see Reeve-3, pp. 78–109. 32. For an explanation of why he must, see 661a4–d5. 33. See 897b2. 34. Erôtôn: Erôs includes, but is not restricted to, sexual passion. See, e.g., 643d1. 35. Such as secret societies and political clubs. See Rep. 365d. 36. See 958c–960b. 37. See Men. 97e–98a, Rep. 601e–602a. 38. The Apollo whose temple is in Delphi and whose oracular Priestess is the Pythia. See Ap. 20e–21a, Rep. 427b. 39. In a parallel distinction, an experienced-based knack (tribê, empeiria) is distinguished from a craft (technê), because a knack “has no account (ouk echei logon) . . . and so does not possess the cause of each thing,” and nothing can be a craft if it “does not have an account” (Grg. 465a). Notice aneu logou at 857c8 and cf. 938a3–4. In Aristotle, those who “rely on experience” are described as knowing “the fact that but not the reason why, while those with the craft know the reason why, that is, the explanation” (Met. 981a28–30). The most common object of the verb epistasthai (epistêmê is the associated noun) in Plato is technê. See 760c4, 813e7. 40. See also 688e2, 739e5, 752a8, 778b7, 934c5. 41. See Chrm. 166c–d, Grg. 506a. 42. See David-2.

43. A practice in which young Spartans tried to “steal” as many cheeses as possible, while others tried to catch and whip them. See Xen. Lac. 2.9.1–3. 44. An organization of young Spartans aimed at keeping the helots (the Spartan slave class) in subjection by a reign of terror and arbitrary violence. See Plutarch, Lycurgus 28.2–3, and cf. 763b7. 45. See 942d. 46. Gumnopaidiais: See 813b5n, Rep. 452, Thuc. 1.6.4, David-3. 47. See 635b–d, 643c–d, La. 191d–e, Rep. 442b–c, and on spirit, 863b3n. 48. I.e., Apollo. See 632d. 49. Sumphonein: The notion of sumphônia is employed throughout the laws, both in its literal musical sense and as a metaphor reminding us of the importance of musical training as a source of other sorts of social and political agreement: sumphonein also means “to make an agreement or bargain.” See LSJ s.v. συμφωνέω. 50. At 633b–d. 51. Glukothumia comes from glukus (“sweet”) and thumos (“spirit”), like our “sweet tempered,” and is the opposite of karteria (“endurance”). LSJ s.v. γλυκυθυμία suggests “readiness to indulge” as its meaning here. 52. See 633e. 53. Kata tropon: Used again at 638c4, 641b4, 681b4, 687a4, 766d4, 809a3, 847e3, 931a7. 54. Unidirectional (anamphisbêtêtôs): Literally: “not to go in two directions.” The usual meaning, given in LSJ (s.v. ἀναμφισβητήτως) is “undisputed,” “indisputable.” In fact (ergô[o]) . . . in words (logo[i]). See Rep. 473a–b. 55. On Thurii, see Ar. Pol. 1307a27–b19; on Miletus, Plutarch, Lysander 8. 56. See 835b–842a, 874c, Rep. 403a–c, Phdr. 250e–251a. On Greek attitudes to homosexuality generally, see Dover-3 (lesbianism is discussed at pp. 179–184). 57. A beautiful boy abducted by Zeus to be his boyfriend and cupbearer. See Homer, Il. 20.231–235. 58. Cf. Ar. NE 1105a10–13. 59. See 628d, 631b. 60. What this includes is not entirely clear. See Ti. 30c–31a. 61. On the Greek institution of the drinking party or symposion (a famous example of which is described in Smp.), see Ar. Pol. 1336b20–23, 1338a21–30 and the papers in Murray, especially Pellizer. 62. The god of wine, intoxication, madness, drama, and so on. 63. Modern-day Taranto, a coastal city in Apulia in southern Italy. The ancient city was founded by Sparta in 708 BC. 64. See 806c, Ar. Pol. 1269b12–1270a15, and Pomeroy. 65. Nomos, also “law.” 66. That is, unmixed with water, the opposite of the way the Greeks usually drank it. See 773c–d. 67. See 626b7n. 68. See 636a5n.

69. Locris was a Greek settlement in southern Italy. It was defeated in 352 BC by Dionysius II, tyrant of Syracuse. See Ar. Pol. 1307a38–40. The date, five years before Plato’s death, is thought to provide a terminus post quem for the composition of the Laws. 70. An island in the Dodecanese chain of islands, located in the southeastern Aegean, off the Anatolian coast of present-day Turkey. It was enslaved by Athens in 364 BC after an attempt to leave the Athenian Confederacy. See Ar. Pol. 1304b25–27. The laws of Cos were proverbially excellent. 71. Reading τυροὺς with Saunders-2 for Budé πυροὺς (“wheat”). 72. Epistêmên: Epistêmê is sometimes identified with noêsis, a power that is exclusively “concerned with being” (Rep. 533e3–534a3) and the intelligible realm of Forms (511b2– c2) and is exercised by understanding (nous), but elsewhere it seems to have broader application. See 760c4, 813e7, 901b5 (combined with aisthêsis), Rep. 428c–429a, 601e– 602a. 73. See 632d5n. 74. For Plato’s views on correctly run symposia, see Tecuşan. 75. See Ar. Pol. 1274b11–12. 76. See Rep. 488a–489a. 77. Cadmus, the founder of Thebes, killed a dragon and planted its teeth in the ground (see 663e5–9). From these armed men grew up. But they killed each other. Cadmean victories are typically like our Pyrrhic victories. However, in education there are no cases like that, since true education always improves one’s character. See 643e–644a, Saunders-2, p. 4. 78. Cf. “To know the plain truth about such matters is either impossible or extremely difficult in this present life, but to fail to examine what is said about them in every possible way, or to give up before one has investigated them exhaustively from every angle, shows utter softness in a man. You see, where these matters are concerned, it seems to me that one must certainly achieve one of two things: either learn or discover how they stand; or, if that is impossible, then at least adopt the best of the things people say, and the one that stands up best to examination, and, carried on it as on a sort of raft, face the dangers of life’s voyage—provided one cannot travel more safely and with less risk on the more secure vessel of some divine saying” (Phd. 85c1–d4). Also Rep. 450d9–451a4. 79. Mousikê: Includes poetry, stories, and dance, as well as music proper. See 655c–657b, 667b–670e. 80. Proxenos: A proxenos, like a consul or ambassador, was the representative of city X to city Y, and was a citizen of Y, not of X. 81. The implication being that those who are bad are very bad. See Saunders-2, p. 5. 82. Epimenides of Cnossos was a legendary 7th-cent. BC wonder-worker and prophet from Crete. See Morrow-2, pp. 19–20. His supposed visit to Athens was in the time of Solon, in the late 7th or early 6th cent. (Plutarch, Solon 12.7–12). Cleinias dates it almost 100 years later, in c. 500 BC. On “divine man,” see 626c4n. 83. Exenôthêsan: Xenikê philia was a ritualized kind of pseudokinship between (typically) men of equal social status but belonging to different social units (such as Athens and Crete), involving a variety of kinds of mutual support, including exchange of valuable resources (gifts, troops) and services (a home away from home). The relationship, like true kinship, was perpetual, descending from fathers to sons, so that, for example, a xenos was

expected to show protective concern for the son of his xenos, including acting as his substitute father if his real father died. 84. Dunamis: For a definition, see Rep. 475c–d. 85. Probably Zeus, to whose cave the three Strangers are traveling. See 625b1–2, 968b9– 10, Meyer, p. 160. But many scholars think it is Dionysus. See 642a1–6, and, e.g., BrissonPradeau-1, p. 345 n100, which cites 647b–650b, and Schöpsdau-1, p. 224, which cites 672b, 773d, 775b. 86. Paizonta: Paidia, which is an important notion in Lg., is illuminatingly discussed, along with the equally important contrasting notion of seriousness (spoudê), in Kidd. 87. See 627e4n. 88. Epistamenon: Participle corresponding to epistêmê. 89. Banauson: An exact English equivalent for banausos is now difficult to find, but the idea is captured in the contrast Herodotus draws in the following passage: “The Thracians, Scythians, Persians, Lydians, and pretty much all the barbarians think that those of their fellow citizens who learn crafts—and their descendants too—are inferior in esteem, and regard as well-born those who keep themselves clear of any form of manual work, and above all those who are free to engage in warfare. All the Greeks have learned this, especially the Spartans” (2.167). Aneleutheron: Or “unfree.” See 701a4n. 90. See 627e. 91. See 658b–d, 803c2–804c1, where puppets are again discussed. Puppet imagery, however, without explicit mention of puppets, also occurs at 653c7–654a7 and 803c4–5. See Kurke, pp. 128–146 (a particularly rich and perceptive discussion), and Bobonich-1, pp. 258–292. 92. Good laws are presented (719e8–720a3, 722b5–c2, 858d6–9) as needing to mix force (bia) or threat of sanctions with persuasion or prudential considerations. See Bobonich-1, pp. 97–106. But force and compulsion are not the same: “against necessity [or compulsion (anagkên)], it is said, even a god cannot use force (biazesthai)” (741a4–5; also 818b2–3). In some cases, indeed, the compulsive element is altogether missing, since the laws “advise (sumbouleutikos), but [do] not compel (ouk anagkastikos)” (930b5). 93. Hupêretôn: The immediate thought is that because rational calculation is “gentle rather than forceful,” we should always assist the finest leadership (agôgê) of law, which, since it mixes force with persuasion, suggests that force and persuasion are the helpers (a view defended in Laks-1). Cf. “Paternal instructions do not have such strength or the element of compulsion and neither, then, do the instructions of any individual man in general (unless he is a king or something like that). The law, however, does have the power to compel” (Ar. NE 1180a18–21). Somewhat consistent with this view of the assistants is one that identifies them with (1) a proper training of children to control pleasure and pain (Schöpsdau-1, p. 232), or (2) “a lifetime of choral habituation and training, under the guidance of the gods at festivals that transport us, at least temporarily, back to the ease and bliss of the golden race” (Kurke, p. 132). For both of these are the result of good laws. 94. See 634a6–b1. 95. Logos (“reason”): See 645a5. Ergon (“deed”): practical training on behalf of trainer and/or trained. See England-1, p. 264, Schöpsdau-1, p. 246. 96. Reading σωφρονοῖ γὰρ with England-1. 97. Goêtas: See 909b.

98. See 647b. 99. See Grg. 464b–c, Ar. NE 1102a5–7.

{38} BOOK 2 ATHENIAN: The next thing that must be investigated about |652a| these matters, it seems, is whether insight into our natures is the only good to be found in the correct use of wine in drinking parties, or whether there is not some additional great benefit, worthy of much serious consideration. What do we say? The argument seems to wish |652a5| to indicate that there is, but to see in which part and in what way it does, we must pay attention while listening, if we are not to be tripped up by it somewhere. |652b| CLEINIAS: Go on. ATHENIAN: I want to recall, then, what we said correct education is for us.1 You |653a| see, my guess, in fact, is that salvation is to be found for it in this practice, when it is conducted properly. CLEINIAS: That’s a large claim! ATHENIAN: Well, what I mean is that children’s first childish |653a5| perception is that of pleasure and pain, and it is in relation to these that virtue and vice first develop in our souls. As for wisdom and true belief that is stable,2 it is a lucky person in whom it develops even in old age. At all events, someone who does possess these goods and all that they involve is a perfect human being. Education, then, I say, is the |653b| virtue that first develops in children. If pleasure, love, pain, and hatred develop correctly in our souls when we are not yet able to grasp the reason,3 and when we do grasp the reason, they are in concord with the reason,4 because they have been correctly habituated5 in the appropriate |653b5| habits, this concord is virtue in its entirety. But the part of virtue {39} that consists in having correctly nurtured pleasures and pains, so as to hate what one should hate from start to finish, |653c| and love what one should love, if you separate this off in your argument and call it “education,” you would, in my view, be calling it by the correct name. CLEINIAS: And in fact, Stranger, your previous remarks about education6 seem correct to us, |653c5| as does what you have said just now. ATHENIAN: Fine. Now this condition that consists in correctly brought up pleasures and pains, which is what education is, tends to slacken7 in people,

and to become ruined to a great extent in the course of life. But the gods, taking pity on the naturally toiling race of humans, |653d| have not only prescribed periods of rest from their toils in the form of festivals in honor of the gods,8 but have given them the Muses, their leader Apollo, and Dionysus as fellow celebrants, in order that they be rectified9 again, as well as the sorts of nurture10 that are produced in festivals with the help of the gods. |653d5| But whether the things the argument is now singing to us are in accord with nature or not, we must look to see. And what it says is that every young person is practically incapable of keeping quiet, whether in body or in voice, but is always seeking to move or utter a sound, sometimes leaping |653e| and jumping, as if dancing with joy and joining in a game, other times uttering sounds of every sort. And whereas the other animals do not have a perception of the order and disorder in movement (the ones that we call “rhythm” and “harmony”), we, by contrast, |653e5| have been given the gods we just mentioned as fellow dancers, and |654a| they have given us a perception of rhythm and harmony that involves pleasure, and that is how11 they set us in movement and lead us in choruses, linking us one with another by means of songs and dances, and giving this the name “chorus” from the name for the delight (chara) that is natural to it.12 {40} First, |654a5| then, do we accept this? Are we to establish our initial education as being through the Muses and Apollo, or what? CLEINIAS: Through the Muses and Apollo. ATHENIAN: For us, then, the uneducated person will be one untrained in choral singing and dancing, while the educated person, it must be posited, will be one with sufficient choral training. |654b| CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: Now choral performance as a whole consists of dancing and singing. CLEINIAS: Necessarily. |654b5| ATHENIAN: Therefore, the well-educated person will be able to sing and dance well. CLEINIAS: It seems so.

ATHENIAN: Let’s see, then, what the thing is exactly that has just been said. CLEINIAS: What thing? ATHENIAN: “He sings well,” we say, “and he dances well.” Should we add, “provided he sings fine songs and dances fine dances”? |654c| Or shouldn’t we? CLEINIAS: We should add it. ATHENIAN: What if the things he thinks to be fine are fine, and the ugly ones ugly, and shows by his use of them that he does?13 Will he be better |654c5| educated for us in choral dance and music than a person who on each occasion is able by using his body and voice to subserve what is thought14 to be fine in a satisfactory way, but who neither takes pleasure in the fine ones nor hates15 the ones that are not fine? Or is it rather the one who, even if he is not entirely able to get it right by using his body and voice, or to grasp in his thought, does get it right by |654d| {41} pleasure and pain— welcoming whatever is fine and feeling disgust16 at whatever is not fine?17 CLEINIAS: You’re speaking of a great difference as regards education, Stranger. ATHENIAN: Then, if we three know what is fine in song and dance, |654d5| we will also know who is correctly educated and who is uneducated. But if we do not know this, we will never be able to know whether there is any safeguard for education, or where it is to be found.18 Isn’t that so? |654e| CLEINIAS: It is. ATHENIAN: In that case, we must next, like hounds hunting by scent, track down fine gesture, melody, song, and dance. For if these escape us and get away, |654e5| our argument concerning later education, whether Greek or barbarian, would be pointless. CLEINIAS: Yes. ATHENIAN: Well then, what should we say the fine gesture or melody is exactly? Look, imagine a courageous soul involved in great hardships, and a cowardly soul in an equal number of the same ones, |655a| will their gestures and utterances be alike? CLEINIAS: How could they, when not even their coloring19 is?

ATHENIAN: That’s fine, comrade. But music, you see, has both gestures and melodies present in it, because music involves rhythm and harmony, |655a5| so that it is correct to speak of “having good rhythm” and “having good harmony,” but not, when it comes to melody and gesture, to say that they are of a good color the way chorus masters do. As for the gesture or melody of the cowardly or courageous person, on the other hand, it is correct to call those of courageous people “fine,” |655b| and those {42} of cowardly ones “ugly.” And in order for us to avoid a very lengthy discussion of all these cases, let’s simply say that all the gestures and melodies connected with virtue of soul or of body, whether this is the virtue itself or its image,20 are fine ones, while all those connected with vice |655b5| are the opposite. CLEINIAS: That’s a good suggestion. Let our response for now be that this is how things stand. ATHENIAN: Here’s a further point. Do we all take pleasure in every choral work to the same degree? Or is this far from being the case? |655c| CLEINIAS: Very far indeed. ATHENIAN: What, then, do we say is making us err? Is it that the same things are not fine for all of us? Or is it that they are the same, but don’t seem to be the same? For I suppose no one would say, surely, that |655c5| the choral performances characteristic of vice are ever more fine than those characteristic of virtue, or that he himself takes pleasure in the gestures characteristic of wickedness, whereas others take pleasure in the opposite Muse. Yet the majority of people do say that correctness in music consists in its power to produce pleasure in people’s souls. |655d| Although this is neither a tolerable nor a pious thing to express, it is more likely the following view that is the cause of our error. CLEINIAS: What view is that? ATHENIAN: Since choral performances are imitations of modes |655d5| of character exhibited in various sorts of actions and varieties of luck, performers rely both on their characters and on imitations in each case. When the words, songs, or any other part of the choral performance are on the side of their mode of character, either in accord with nature or habit or both, |655e| they will necessarily take pleasure in them, praise them, and call them fine. But when they are contrary to nature, mode, or a certain

character, they are incapable of taking pleasure in them or praising them, and will call them ugly. When their nature is correct, |655e5| but their habits are the opposite, or their habits are correct but their nature the opposite, their expressions of praise will be opposed to their pleasures, and they will in each case call such choral performances pleasant, |656a| but wicked. In the presence of others they think wise, they are ashamed to move their bodies in such ways, and ashamed to sing the songs, as if they were seriously affirming their fineness, although they do take pleasure in doing so when they are by themselves. |656a5| {43} CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely correct. ATHENIAN: Now, does any harm come to a person who takes pleasure in the gestures or melodies characteristic of wickedness, or any benefit to those who welcome the opposite pleasures? CLEINIAS: It’s likely, anyway. |656a10| ATHENIAN: Is it likely or in fact necessary? Isn’t it precisely the same as |656b| when someone associates with wicked characters of evil people and doesn’t hate them, but instead welcomes them with joy, blaming them as if participating in a game and dreaming his own21 depravity. In that situation, surely, it is necessary that the person who is taking pleasure in this becomes like the sorts of people he takes pleasure in, even if |656b5| he is ashamed to praise them. And yet what greater good or evil could we say happens to us than this of absolute necessity coming about? CLEINIAS: I believe there is none. ATHENIAN: Where, then, there are laws that are well established, either |656c| now or in the future, concerning the education and play having to do with the Muses, do we think that poets will be allowed to put in their poem whatever rhythm, melody, or words delight the poet22 himself, and teach this both to the children of those who live under good laws |656c5| and to young men in choruses, regardless of the effect it may happen to have as regards virtue and depravity? CLEINIAS: That would certainly make no sense. How could it? ATHENIAN: But as things stand, at least, they are allowed to do this in almost every |656d| city—except in Egypt.23

CLEINIAS: In Egypt? What do you say has been legislated on this matter there? ATHENIAN: It’s an amazing thing to hear about. A long time ago, it seems, |656d5| this argument that we are now stating was known to them, that the young people in cities must habitually practice fine gestures and melodies. They drew up lists of these, prescribing what they are and {44} what they are to be like, displaying these in their temples, and allowed no painters, or anyone else |656e| who represents gestures, to make innovations or invent anything beyond what is traditional.24 Even today it is not allowed in these crafts, or in music generally. If you look there, you will find that things written or molded ten thousand years ago—not |656e5| practically ten thousand, but really ten thousand—are in no way finer or uglier than those produced today, since they are produced by the same |657a| craft.25 CLEINIAS: What you describe is amazing indeed. ATHENIAN: In fact it surpasses everything in the legislative and political sphere. Still, you could find other things there that are inferior. But this one concerning music |657a5| is true and worth noticing, namely, that it was possible to legislate with stable confidence about the sorts of melodies that have a natural correctness.26 This, though, would be a task for a god, or some divine man27—just as they claim in Egypt that the melodies that have been preserved for this long time are the compositions of Isis.28 |657b| So, as I was saying, if someone could grasp in some way the correctness in these things, he must have the confidence to bring it to law and draw up a list that prescribes them. For the seeking of pleasure and pain29 constantly seeks to employ new music, but has pretty much no great power |657b5| to corrupt choral performance established as sacred by {45} calling it “old-fashioned.” In Egypt, anyway, it seems to have had no power to corrupt it at all, quite the opposite. CLEINIAS: So it appears, from what you |657c| are saying now. ATHENIAN: Do we have the confidence to say, then, that the correct way to employ music and play in choral performance is something like this: when we think we are doing well, we are taking pleasure in it and, conversely, when we are taking pleasure in it, |657c5| we think we are doing well. Is that not so?

CLEINIAS: It certainly is. |657c10| ATHENIAN: And, of course, when we are in a state like that, taking pleasure in something, we are incapable of keeping quiet. CLEINIAS: That’s right. ATHENIAN: Aren’t, then, the young among us eager to dance in a chorus themselves, |657d| while we elders think it fitting to spend our time observing them, taking pleasure in their play and festive activity, since our own nimbleness is wanting now? And missing it, in fact clinging fondly to it, we establish contests, don’t we, |657d5| for those who are most capable of rousing us, by means of memory, to youthfulness? CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true. ATHENIAN: Do we think, then, that the argument commonly stated about festival performers nowadays is altogether foolish, when they say that |657e| the one who must be thought most skilled and judged the victor is the one who makes us enjoy ourselves the most and gives us the most pleasure? For since we give ourselves over to play on these sorts of occasions, the person who gives the most pleasure to the greatest number of people should be |657e5| honored most and, as I said just now, carry off the victory prizes. Isn’t this the correct thing to say, and wouldn’t things be done correctly if |658a| they were done in this way? CLEINIAS: Maybe so. ATHENIAN: But, my blessedly happy friend, let us not judge this matter too quickly. Instead, let’s divide it into parts and investigate it in something like the following |658a5| way. Suppose someone one day were simply to establish a contest, restricting it neither to gymnastics, music, nor horsemanship. Instead, after gathering everyone in the city together, he established victory prizes and declared that anyone who wished could compete in a contest concerning pleasure alone. Whoever pleased the spectators the most, with no |658b| restrictions on the way of doing it, would {46} be victorious, simply by being best at accomplishing this very thing, that is, being judged the most pleasing of the contestants. What exactly do you think would result from this declaration? |658b5| CLEINIAS: What do you mean?

ATHENIAN: Well, it’s likely, I imagine, that one person would perform, like Homer, as a rhapsode,30 while another would play the lyre, another stage tragedies, and another again, comedies. And it wouldn’t even be surprising if someone thought that putting on a puppet show31 would most of all gain him victory. |658c| With performers such as these coming forward and countless others as well, can we say which one would rightly be the winner? CLEINIAS: That’s a strange question to ask. For how could anyone answer you, implying that he knew it, before he had heard and been an earwitness himself |658c5| of each of the contestants? ATHENIAN: What then? Do you wish me to give the two of you the strange reply to this strange question? CLEINIAS: Why not? ATHENIAN: In that case, if the very small children are the judges, they’ll judge in favor of the one showing the puppets, won’t they? CLEINIAS: Of course. |658d| ATHENIAN: And if it’s the older children, it’ll be the producer of the comedies, whereas tragedy will be the choice of the educated women, adolescent boys, and pretty much the majority of the crowd.32 CLEINIAS: Yes, probably so. |658d5| ATHENIAN: But the rhapsode, who recited the Iliad or the Odyssey well, or something from Hesiod,33 would probably please us old male listeners most, and we would declare him to be very much the winner. Who, then, would have been the rightful winner? That’s the next question, isn’t it? {47} CLEINIAS: Yes. |658d10| ATHENIAN: It’s clear that for you and I, at least, it is necessary to declare that |658e| the ones judged so by men of our age are the rightful winners. For our habituation34 seems to be by far the best of the sorts produced today in any cities, or anywhere. CLEINIAS: Of course. |658e5| ATHENIAN: I too agree, then, with the majority to this extent at least, that music is to be judged by pleasure, but not, certainly, by the pleasures of random people. Instead, pretty much the finest Muse is the one who pleases

the best people and the sufficiently educated ones, and especially the one who pleases that one person who excels in virtue and education. |659a| And that is why we say that the judges of these things need virtue: it is because they must partake of the various sorts of wisdom, and especially of courage. For the true judge must not learn to judge from the spectators, driven out of his wits by |659a5| the clamor of the masses35 and by his own lack of education. Nor, again, when knowing the truth must he, through lack of courage and cowardice, lie and deliver a careless judgment from the very same lips that summoned the gods as witnesses to his oath when he was about to judge.36 For |659b| it is not as a student but as a teacher of the spectators that the judge rightly sits in judgment, and he will oppose himself to those spectators who display their pleasure in a way that is neither fitting nor correct. In fact that’s the way it used to be under the ancient law of the Greeks, and not37 as in |659b5| Sicilian and Italian law today,38 where it is entrusted to the majority of the spectators and the winner is decided by show of hands. This has not only corrupted the poets themselves, who compose their works with an eye to the base pleasures of the judges, so that |659c| the spectators are educating them; it has corrupted the pleasures of the spectators too. For they are supposed to get better pleasure by continually {48} listening to characters better than their own, but in fact, by their own doing, entirely the opposite happens to them. What is it, then, that the things now again |659c5| brought to a conclusion in the argument wish to indicate to us? Consider whether it is this. CLEINIAS: What? ATHENIAN: It seems to me to be the third or fourth time that the argument has come around again to the same conclusion, that education is |659d| the drawing and leading of children toward the reason said to be “correct” by the law39 and also believed to be really correct on the basis of experience by those who are most decent and oldest. The soul of a child must not, then, become habituated to feel pleasure or pain that opposes |659d5| the law, and those who have been persuaded to accept it, but rather must follow the law, being pleased and pained by the same things as the elderly are. For the sake of this, then, the things we call songs—which are really |659e| incantations for souls—have now come about, which have this concord we mentioned as

their serious aim. But because the souls of the young cannot bear seriousness, they are called “games” and “songs” and are taken part in as such. It’s like when people |659e5| are sick and their bodies weak. Those taking care of them try to give them the wholesome nourishment in the form of pleasant-tasting foods and drinks, |660a| and bad things in the form of bad-tasting ones, in order that they welcome the one and are correctly habituated to hate the other. The correct legislator, then, will persuade the poets to do the same thing with the help of their fine and praiseworthy phrases, and if he fails to persuade them, he will compel them |660a5| to compose poetry correctly, reproducing the gestures of temperate, courageous, and entirely good men with the help of rhythms, and their melodies with the help of harmonies. CLEINIAS: By Zeus, Stranger, is that how it seems to you poets compose in |660b| other cities today? As far as I can see, except among us and among the Spartans, I know of no place where things are done in the way you describe. Instead, innovations are always being produced in dances and in all the rest of music, |660b5| and the changes are subject not to laws but to irregular pleasures,40 which far from remaining the same and in accord with the same things, as explained in your Egyptian example,41 are never the same. |660c| {49} ATHENIAN: Excellent, Cleinias! If I seemed to you to be describing how things are produced nowadays, I wouldn’t be surprised if it were through my not expressing in a perspicuous way what I was thinking that— to my cost—I did so. What I was describing was what I wish to happen with regard to music, but in such a way, perhaps, |660c5| as to make you think that the former was what I meant. You see, to reproach errors that are incurable or far advanced is never pleasant, though it is sometimes necessary. Since, though, these things also seem so |660d| to you, tell me this: are you saying that this is how things are done among your people and among those of our friend here, in contrast to the rest of the Greeks? CLEINIAS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: What if it were also done in this way among the others? |660d5| Would we say that things were being done in a better way than they are being done at present?

CLEINIAS: It would make a world of difference if things were done as they are among his people and among us, and, what’s more, as you said just now they should be done. |660d10| ATHENIAN: Well,

let’s make sure, then, that we agree about the matters we are now discussing. Among your people is anything said about education and music other than this? |660e| You compel your poets to say that the good man, since he is temperate and just, is happy and blessed, regardless of whether he is tall and strong or short and weak, and whether or not he is wealthy, whereas the unjust man, even if he is richer than Cinyras and Midas, |660e5| is wretched and lives miserably.42 “I would not memorialize a man,” your poet says, if indeed he speaks correctly, “nor set him down in words,” if it is not with justice that he does, or acquires, all those so-called fine things—not even if such a man, though unjust, were “reaching out to strike the foe,” while “standing close,” |661a| or were to dare “to look on bloody slaughter,” “outrun the north wind of Trace,”43 or ever to come into any of the so-called goods.44 {50} You see, the things said to be good by the mass of people are not correctly said to be such.45 For it is said that |661a5| being healthy is best, beauty second, wealth third. And countless other things are said to be good: keen sight and hearing, and all that one has when his perceptual capacities are keen; |661b| further, doing whatever one wants by exercising tyranny; and then, as the crown of all blessed happiness, on acquiring all these goods, becoming immortal as quickly as possible. But you and I, I take it, say this: that for just |661b5| and pious men, all these things are the best possessions, but for unjust men, they are all the worst, starting with health. In fact, seeing, hearing, perceiving, |661c| even being alive in general, are the greatest evil for the person who is immortal for the whole of time, and who possesses all the so-called goods but not justice and all of virtue, although they are less evil for such a person if he lives for the shortest time possible. The very things I’m saying, |661c5| I imagine, are what you persuade and compel your poets to say, and, further, that they furnish rhythms and harmonies that go along with these, and in this way educate your youth. Isn’t that so? See what you think. For I for my part say, to put it perspicuously, that the so-called bad things |661d| are good for the unjust, but

bad for the just ones, while the good ones are really good for those who are good, but bad for those who are bad. To return to my question, then, are we in concord, you and I, or not? |661d5| CLEINIAS: On some points, it appears to me that we are in a way, but not at all on others. ATHENIAN: Well, then, suppose a person possesses health, wealth, and permanent tyranny—I’ll even add, if you like, that he has superlative strength and courage along with immortality and none at all |661e| of the socalled bad things, but has within him only injustice and wanton aggression. Perhaps what I’m not convincing you of in a perspicuous way is that the one who lives like that is not happy but wretched. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true, you aren’t. |661e5| {51} ATHENIAN: Good. Then what must we say next? Doesn’t it seem to you that a person who is courageous46 and of course strong, beautiful, and rich, and who his whole life does whatever he wants, |662a| if indeed he were unjust and wantonly aggressive, would of necessity live shamefully? This much perhaps you would agree to, that he would live shamefully? CLEINIAS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: And also badly? |662a5| CLEINIAS: No, we would no longer agree to that to the same extent. ATHENIAN: What about, that he would live both unpleasantly and in a way that was of no advantage to him? CLEINIAS: How could we possibly agree to that either? ATHENIAN: How indeed? Only, it seems, if a god were to give us a sort of |662b| concord pretty much on the order of our present discord with each other. You see, to me these things appear so necessary, my dear Cleinias, that not even “Crete is an island,” is as perspicuously the case. And if I were a legislator I would try to compel the poets, |662b5| and all those in the city, to speak in this way. And I would establish virtually the greatest penalty for anyone in the country who said that there are certain people who while wicked live pleasantly, or that while |662c| some things are beneficial and profitable, others are more just. I would persuade my citizens to say

things contrary to what it seems Cretans and Spartans are saying these days, and no doubt the rest of mankind as well. |662c5| Come now, my excellent friends, in the name of Zeus and Apollo, suppose we asked these very gods, who were your legislators, “Is the most just life the most pleasant, |662d| or are there two lives, one of them the most pleasant, the other the most just?” If they said that there are two, we would presumably ask them next, if indeed we were to correctly question them again, “Must we say that those living the most just life are the happiest, |662d5| or those living the most pleasant one?” If they said it was those living the most pleasant one, their answer would be a strange one.47 But I would not wish to attribute something like that to the gods, but rather to fathers and legislators. And so let the questions I asked before |662e| have been asked to a father and legislator and let him be the one to have said that the person living the most pleasant life is the most blessedly happy. Then I would next say: “Father, didn’t you wish me to {52} live the happiest life? And yet you never ceased exhorting me to live in |662e5| the most just way!” A legislator or father who took that position would appear strange, I think, and at a loss as to how to speak in concord with himself. On the other hand, if he declared that the life that is most just is happiest, anyone |662e10| hearing this, I think, would surely inquire as to what exactly the good and fine thing is, superior to pleasure, that the law is praising in the life that is most just. For what good |663a| could there be for the just person that is separate from pleasure? Is fame and praise good and fine in the eyes of men and gods, but unpleasant, and infamy the opposite? “Not at all, my dear legislator,” we would say. Yet |663a5| surely neither doing an injustice to anyone nor being done an injustice by anyone, though unpleasant, is good or fine, while the opposite, though pleasant, is shameful and bad?48 CLEINIAS: How could it be? ATHENIAN: Well, then, the argument that does not separate the pleasant and the just, |663b| or the good and the fine, is persuasive (if nothing else) relative to being willing to live a just and pious life. So, for a legislator, the most shameful and the most diametrically opposed of arguments is the one that would deny that these things are so. For nobody would voluntarily be persuaded49 to do anything that was not followed by more pleasure than

pain. |663b5| Objects seen from a distance, however, cause blurry vision in almost everyone, especially in children, but the legislator will make our belief into the opposite of this,50 by removing the obscurity. And because just things and unjust ones are like illusionist paintings, he will persuade us somehow or other, by habits, praises, or |663c| arguments.51 The unjust ones, for their part, appear to be the opposite of what they appear to be to the just person, whereas from the point of view of the unjust and evil person, they look pleasant, and the just ones most unpleasant. But from that of the just person all of them look in every respect the opposite in both cases. |663c5| CLEINIAS: Apparently so. {53} ATHENIAN: Which of them, though, has the more controlling vote52 when it comes to the truth of the judgment? The worse soul or the better one? CLEINIAS: That of the better one, I take it, necessarily. |663d| ATHENIAN: So, it’s necessary for the unjust life to be not only more shameful and more depraved, but also in truth more unpleasant than the just and pious life. CLEINIAS: It looks that way, friends, at least according to the present argument. |663d5| ATHENIAN: But even if things were not the way the present argument has taken them to be, could any legislator who was even of the slightest help— if indeed he dared to lie to the youth in the interests of the good—ever tell a lie more profitable than this, or one with a greater power to make everyone do everything just, |663e| not by force but voluntarily? CLEINIAS: Truth is a fine thing, Stranger, and a stable one. But it is not easy, it seems, to persuade people of it. ATHENIAN: Well, wasn’t it easy to persuade people of the Sidonian’s story,53 |663e5| unpersuasive though it is, and of countless other stories. CLEINIAS: Such as? ATHENIAN: About how once upon a time teeth were sown in the ground, from which armed warriors grew. And indeed this is a great model for the legislator of how it is possible to persuade the souls of the young of whatever he undertakes to persuade them of. So |664a| he must do nothing

else besides look to discover what would produce the {54} greatest good for the city, were he to convince them of it, and he must try to discover every contrivance of whatever sort that will in some way insure that the whole of such a community54 always speaks about these things with one and the same voice as far as possible |664a5| throughout its life, whether in songs, in stories, or in arguments. But if anyone believes differently on any point, no one will begrudge you the chance to dispute the argument. CLEINIAS: It doesn’t appear to me that either of us is capable of |664b| ever disputing these points. ATHENIAN: Then I will take it upon myself to state the next point. For I say that all choruses, which are three in number, must sing their incantations to the souls of children, which are still young and tender, |664b5| saying all the fine things we’ve gone through, and yet other ones that we could go through. And let the main point be this: in asserting that the gods say that the most pleasant life and the best life55 are the same, we will be saying what is most true, and also what will be more likely to persuade those whom we must |664c| persuade than if we spoke in some other way. CLEINIAS: We have to agree. ATHENIAN: In the first place, then, it would be most correct for the Muses’ chorus of children to come onstage first, singing out such doctrines in public, |664c5| with full professionalism, before the whole city. Second will come the chorus of those up to thirty years old, calling upon Paean Apollo56 as witness for the truth of what they are saying, and praying that he grace the youth with persuasion. And then there will be yet a third chorus |664d| that must sing, that of the men between the ages of thirty and sixty. It remains for those who come after these in age57 (since they can no longer bear the burden of singing) to be storytellers, who leave us oracular reports about the same characters.58 {55} CLEINIAS: What did you mean, Stranger, by these third choruses? |664d5| You see, we don’t follow in an entirely perspicuous way what you wished to say about them. ATHENIAN: And yet these were pretty much what most of the preceding arguments were for the sake of!

CLEINIAS: We didn’t see that at all. Try to explain it in a yet more perspicuous way. |664e| ATHENIAN: At the start of our arguments,59 if you recall, we said that the nature of all young creatures is fiery, and unable to stay quiet, whether in body or in voice, |664e5| but always uttering sounds and jumping about in a disorderly way. A perception of order in both of these, we said, is possessed by none of the other animals; human nature alone possesses it. We said that the name for order in movement is “rhythm”; order in voice, which is a mixing of high pitch |665a| and low pitch, is called by the name “harmony”; and the combination of the two is called a “chorus.” The gods took pity on us, we said, and gave us Apollo and the Muses to join and lead our choruses, and then we spoke of a third, |665a5| if you recall—Dionysus.60 CLEINIAS: How could we not remember! ATHENIAN: Well, now that the chorus of Apollo and that of the Muses have been spoken about, it is necessary to call the third and remaining chorus, |665b| “Dionysus’ chorus.” CLEINIAS: How so? Explain. For a Dionysian chorus of elders sounds very strange, on first hearing. Are those over thirty, fifty, even up to |665b5| sixty really going to dance a chorus in his honor? ATHENIAN: What you say is very true. In fact, an argument is needed, I imagine, of the way in which this could reasonably come about. CLEINIAS: It certainly is! ATHENIAN: Are we agreed, then, on the preceding points? |665b10| CLEINIAS: Which ones? |665c| ATHENIAN: That every man and child, free person and slave, female and male, indeed the whole city, must never stop singing to the whole city, it to itself, those incantations we’ve described, always with some {56} alteration or other, and |665c5| providing continual variety, so that the singers will have an insatiable desire for singing and the pleasure in it.61 CLEINIAS: How could one not agree that things must be done in this way? ATHENIAN: Where, then, will this best element in the city—the one whose age |665d| and also whose wisdom make it the most persuasive element in the city62—be singing the finest songs, if it is to accomplish the greatest goods?

Or will we be so senseless as to leave aside those who would have the greatest control of the finest and most beneficial songs? |665d5| CLEINIAS: No, it is impossible to leave them aside, given what is being said now, certainly. ATHENIAN: So, what would be fitting for this element? See if it’s this. CLEINIAS: What? ATHENIAN: Everyone, as he gets older is filled with a dread of singing, and he enjoys doing it less and |665e| is more embarrassed if compelled to do it, and the older and more temperate he has become, the more he feels so. Isn’t that right? CLEINIAS: It is. ATHENIAN: Wouldn’t he, then, feel even more embarrassed to sing in the theater, |665e5| standing up before all sorts of people? And if men of this sort were compelled to be lean and sing on an empty stomach, like the choruses that train their voices for contests, they would, I imagine, do so entirely without pleasure, embarrassed to be singing, and without a spark of enthusiasm. |665e10| CLEINIAS: What you say is certainly most compelling! |666a| ATHENIAN: How, then, will we encourage them to be enthusiastic about singing? Won’t we legislate, first of all, that children up to the age of eighteen are not to drink wine at all? We will explain that one must not pour fuel onto the fire, |666a5| which is in their body and soul, until they proceed to take up their burdensome occupations, but beware of the excitable state of the young.63 Next, that up to the age of thirty they are to drink wine in moderation, but that the young men must stay {57} away entirely from drunkenness and heavy wine-drinking. |666b| As a man approaches forty, however, in the communal messes after dinner, while invoking the other gods, he is to call on Dionysus in particular, inviting him to this ritual festivity and time of play for the elders, which he gave as a helper to humans |666b5| as a drug for the crabbiness of old age, so that we grow young again and forget our ill temper64 as the harder character of our soul becomes softer, like |666c| iron that has been put in the fire, and in this way becomes easier to mold.

First, then, in this condition won’t each of them be more enthusiastic and less embarrassed to sing—not in front of large gatherings, but in front of moderate-sized ones, and not in front of strangers but in front of |666c5| familiar people—those songs that we’ve often said are incantations?65 CLEINIAS: Very much so. ATHENIAN: As a means, then, of inducing them to take part in our singing, this way of doing so would not be entirely unseemly. |666d| CLEINIAS: Not at all. ATHENIAN: But what sort of sound66 or music67 will issue from these men? Isn’t it clear that it must be something fitting for them? CLEINIAS: Of course. |666d5| ATHENIAN: What sort, then, would be fitting for divine men? Would it be that of choruses? CLEINIAS: Anyway, we Cretans, Stranger, and the Spartans as well, wouldn’t be able to sing any songs other than the ones we learned when we were accustomed to sing in choruses. |666d10| ATHENIAN: I expect so. For you have not achieved the finest sort of song. You see, the constitutions you have are for an army camp, but |666e| not for those who reside in cities.68 You keep your youth collected together in flocks, like colts grazing in a herd. And none of you takes hold of his own colt and drags him all wild and furious away from his fellow grazers, and brings in a private groom |666e5| who educates him by grooming {58} and making him gentle, and gives him all the elements of child-rearing that would be fitting not only for becoming a good soldier, but for becoming able to manage a city and town. |667a| Someone who, as we said at the start, is even more of a warrior than those warriors of Tyrtaeus, one who always and everywhere honors the possession of courage as the fourth part of virtue, and not the first one, both for individuals and for the entire city. |667a5| CLEINIAS: I don’t know how, Stranger, but in some way or other you are again belittling our legislators! ATHENIAN: No, my good friend, but if indeed I am, it’s not what I’ve a mind to be doing. But let’s proceed to where the argument carries us, if you are willing. You see, if we have a sort of music that is finer than those of the

choruses and public theaters, we must try to assign it to those |667b| who we said were embarrassed by the latter, but looking to take part in this one, which is the finest. CLEINIAS: Of course we must. ATHENIAN: Well then, where anything is accompanied by some enjoyment, |667b5| mustn’t it be the case either, first, that this very enjoyment, and it only, is the greatest thing about it, or else a certain correctness, or, third, a benefit? I mean, for example, that food, drink, and nourishment in general are accompanied by enjoyment, which we would call “pleasure.” But as for correctness and benefit, the very thing among the ones offered to us |667c| that we say is healthy, this is the one among these that is most correct.69 CLEINIAS: It certainly is. ATHENIAN: And enjoyment—pleasure—accompanies learning too, |667c5| but its correctness and benefit, what is good and what is fine, derive from its truth. CLEINIAS: That’s right. ATHENIAN: What about the image-making crafts, which produce likenesses? Isn’t it the case that when they succeed, the accompanying pleasure |667d| taken in them, if any is taken, would most rightly be called “enjoyment”? CLEINIAS: Yes. {59} ATHENIAN: But the correctness of such things, I take it, would generally speaking be achieved by accuracy70 |667d5| in quantity and quality, not by pleasure. CLEINIAS: That’s right. ATHENIAN: Wouldn’t, then, the only thing correctly judged by pleasure be what isn’t produced to provide benefit, truth, or likeness |667d10| (or, of course, harm), but is produced |667e| only for the sake of what accompanies these things, namely, enjoyment, but, when it is followed by none of them, the best name for it is “pleasure”? CLEINIAS: You mean harmless pleasure only?71 ATHENIAN: Yes. And when it produces neither harm not benefit worth seriously talking about, I call this same pleasure “play.”

CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely right. ATHENIAN: Well then, on the basis of our present discussion wouldn’t we say that it least belongs |667e10| to pleasure and untrue belief to judge any imitation, and especially any exactness. For it is not, in general, due to belief |668a| or to someone’s lack of enjoyment that what is accurate is accurate or what is proportional is proportional. Instead, it is due to its truth most of all, and least of all due to anything else whatever. CLEINIAS: Absolutely. |668a5| ATHENIAN: Now don’t we say that all music is imagistic and imitative. CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: So when someone says that music is to be judged by pleasure, we mustn’t at all accept this argument.72 We must least of all seek out this music as something serious, if indeed some were to exist somewhere, but rather the sort |668b| that bears the likeness it does by being an imitation of what is fine. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true. ATHENIAN: So those who seek out the {60} finest song and music must seek out, it seems, not the sort that is pleasant but the sort that is |668b5| correct. For correctness of imitation, as we said,73 consists in reproducing in quantity and quality the thing being imitated. CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: And where music is concerned everyone would agree to this, that all of its compositions are a matter of imitation |668b10| and representation. Surely all |668c| poets, audiences, and actors would agree to this, wouldn’t they? CLEINIAS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: So, in the case of each composition, it seems, one must know just what it is, if one is not going to make errors about it. |668c5| For without knowing its being74—just what is wished and just what it is really an image of—one will hardly discern what is correctness or indeed error in carrying out the wish.75 CLEINIAS: Hardly, to be sure.

ATHENIAN: And the one who does not know what is correct, would he ever |668d| be able to discern what is well or badly carried out? I see I’m not speaking in an entirely perspicuous way. Perhaps this way of stating the point would be more perspicuous. CLEINIAS: What way? ATHENIAN: There are, I imagine, countless representations that are directed to our sight. |668d5| CLEINIAS: Yes. ATHENIAN: What if in these representations, then, someone did not know just what each of the bodies being imitated is? Would he ever know what is correctly rendered in them? I mean the following: he must know the dimensions76 of each body |668d10| and the positions of each one of the parts, if it has parts, how many they are, how they are {61} positioned in relation to each other, |668e| and whether they have received a fitting arrangement, and also their colors and shapes, or whether all these things are rendered confusedly. Do you think that anyone could ever know these things if he is entirely ignorant of just what the creature being imitated is? |668e5| CLEINIAS: How could he? ATHENIAN: What if he knew that the thing being painted or sculpted is a human being, and that it has received from the craft all of its parts, colors, and shapes? |669a| Doesn’t it necessarily follow that someone who knows these things thereby also knows whether the work is fine, or whether it falls short of being fine in some way? CLEINIAS: If that were so, Stranger, virtually all of us would recognize which representations77 were fine ones! ATHENIAN: You’re absolutely correct. So where each image is concerned, whether in painting or in music or any other craft, mustn’t the person who is going to be a wise judge have these three things: first, he must know what it is of, next, how correctly represented, and then, |669b| third, how well the given image is rendered in phrases, melodies, and rhythms? CLEINIAS: So it would seem at least. ATHENIAN: Well then, we mustn’t fail to mention a difficulty where music is concerned. |669b5| For since it gets harped upon much more than the other

sorts of images, it requires the most careful treatment of all the sorts of images. You see, if someone makes an error here not only would he suffer the greatest harm by showing favor to evil characters, but it is very difficult for him to perceive it. This is because |669c| the poets are inferior poets to the Muses. For the Muses would never make the error of composing phrases for men and then giving them the color78 or melody for women, or of attaching the melody and gestures of the free |669c5| to the rhythms of the slavish and unfree, or, again, of giving as an accompaniment to the rhythms and gestures of a free person a melody or speech that conflicts with the rhythms. Further, they would never mix together the voices of beasts, human beings, instruments, and every sort of sound, |669d| when purporting to imitate some one thing. {62} Human poets, on the other hand, eagerly intertwining and jumbling such things together in an irrational way, would furnish a source of ridicule for people Orpheus79 says are “at the age when pleasure is in full bloom.” For |669d5| they see that all these are confounded together, and, furthermore, that the poets tear things asunder, when they separate rhythm and gesture from melody and set bare speech in meter, or separate melody and rhythm from words when they use a bare lyre |669e| or flute.80 This makes it very difficult to know what is meant by the rhythm and harmony that is without speech, or which of the worthy objects of imitation it is like. But it is necessary to understand that it is the height of boorishness |669e5| to be so intensely in love with speed, perfect execution, and bestial voices that one uses flutes and lyres except to accompany dance and song. The bare use |670a| of either of them is unmusical jugglery.81 So much for the account of that. After all, our investigation is not into what our already-thirty-year-olds and over-fifty-year-olds should not do in their use of the Muses, |670a5| but rather what they should do. Well, on the basis of the things that have been said, the argument seems to me to already indicate this much, that those fifty-year-olds for whom singing is fitting82 must have had a better education than the one in choral music.83 |670b| For it is necessary for them to have keen perception and knowledge of rhythms and harmonies. How else could they know the correctness of melodies, or whether the Dorian mode84 is fitting or not fitting for a given one, or

whether the rhythm that a poet |670b5| has attached to a melody is correct or not? CLEINIAS: Clearly there is no way. ATHENIAN: It’s ridiculous, in fact, for a mighty mob to think they are competent to know what is and isn’t a good harmony or a good rhythm {63} just because they have been drilled in singing to the flute and marching in rhythm. |670b10| They do not realize that they do these things without knowing a single one of them. |670c| Yet the fact remains that every melody is correct when it has the fitting elements, erroneous when it doesn’t have the fitting ones. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely necessary. ATHENIAN: What if someone does not even know just what a melody contains? |670c5| Will he ever know, the very thing we said, that the melody is correct in any respect whatsoever? CLEINIAS: How could he contrive to do so? ATHENIAN: It seems, then, that we are now once again discovering that it is pretty much necessary for these singers of ours, whom we now encourage and in a way compel to sing voluntarily, to have been educated at least up to the point at which |670d| each is able to follow closely the feet of the rhythms and the notes of the melodies, in order that by seeing distinctly the harmonies and rhythms, they will be able to select the ones that are fitting, that is, |670d5| fitting for people of their age and condition to sing, and sing in this way. And in singing them they will themselves enjoy the harmless pleasures of the moment, and lead the younger singers to have fitting affection for good characters. |670e| If they are educated to this point, the education they have in hand would be more exact85 than the education the majority bring to bear, or even that of the poets themselves. For there is no necessity for a poet to know the third thing,86 namely, whether |670e5| the imitation is a fine one or not a fine one—though harmony and rhythm, it is pretty much necessary for him to know. Our singers, by contrast, must know all three, {64} in order to select what is finest, as well as what is second,87 or their enchantment will never be competent to lead the youth toward virtue. |671a|

Well, at the start of things88 the argument wished to show that we were right in our advocacy of the chorus of Dionysus, and it has done its best. Let us look to see, then, whether it has succeeded. A gathering of this sort will of necessity |671a5| always become more and more perturbed, I take it, as more drinking goes on. In fact, we assumed it to be necessary at the start89 in the gatherings that take place90 nowadays. |671b| CLEINIAS: It is necessary. ATHENIAN: Everyone feels more lighthearted, rejoices, filled with freedom of speech, and deaf to his neighbors, and thinks himself competent to rule both himself and |671b5| the others. CLEINIAS: Indeed. ATHENIAN: Didn’t we say91 that, when these things occur, the souls of the drinkers, like a piece of iron in the fire, become heated, softer, and more youthful, so that they are more easily led |671b10| by someone who is able and knows how to educate and mold them, |671c| as was the case when they were young? And didn’t we say that the one who molds them is the same as before, the good legislator,92 who must have laws for drinking parties? When our drinker becomes cheerful, confident, unduly shameless, |671c5| and unwilling to maintain the order of taking turns at being silent, speaking, drinking, or music, these are the laws that make him willing to do the opposite of these things, and when this non-fine confidence comes onstage, didn’t we say that, along with justice, they send in as its opponent the finest fear, |671d| a divine fear that we named93 “reverence” and “shame”? CLEINIAS: We did. ATHENIAN: And as guardians of the laws and |671d5| co-workers, there will be unperturbed and sober commanders94 for those who are not sober. To {65} fight against drunkenness without these commanders is more dangerous than to fight against enemies without unperturbed officers. And the person who is incapable of willingly obeying these and the Dionysiac leaders, who are the over-sixty-year-olds, |671e| bears an equal or even greater shame than the one who disobeys the officers of Ares.95 CLEINIAS: That’s right.

ATHENIAN: When the drinking is of this sort, then, and the play of this sort, |671e5| wouldn’t these sorts of drinking companions be benefited, wouldn’t they part company as better friends than previously, and not like nowadays as enemies, because they organize the entire gathering |672a| in accord with the laws and follow them, each time those who are not drunk leading those who are drunk? CLEINIAS: That’s right, anyway if the gathering really is of the sort that you’re now describing. ATHENIAN: Let us not, then, simply condemn the gift of Dionysus |672a5| as a bad thing and not worthy of being admitted into the city.96 And indeed one might go on to say still more on the subject. But the greatest good the gift gives is something one is reluctant to mention in front of the majority of people, since people take it badly and think badly of it, when one does mention it. |672b| CLEINIAS: What sort of thing do you mean? ATHENIAN: There is a sort of underground account or oracular report97 somehow going around about how this god had the judgment of his soul carried off by his stepmother Hera,98 which is why, in revenge, he inflicts Bacchic frenzy and all that mad |672b5| dancing on us. And it was for this reason that he gave us the gift of wine. For my part, I leave it to those who think it safe to say such things about the gods. But this much I do know, that the level of understanding (nous) it is fitting for any living creature to have when it is fully grown, |672c| this is never the level it has when it is born. During the time in which it does not yet possess the level of wisdom appropriate to it, every creature raves like a mad thing and roars in a disorderly way, and as soon as it stands up by itself, it leaps, again in a disorderly way. Let us remember |672c5| {66} that we said99 that these are the starting-points of musical and gymnastic training.100 CLEINIAS: We remember. How could we not? ATHENIAN: Didn’t we also say that this starting-point gave us humans the perception of rhythm and harmony, |672d| and that, among the gods, Apollo, the Muses, and Dionysus are responsible for it. CLEINIAS: Certainly.

ATHENIAN: And as for wine in particular, things are like this, it seems. The others’ account is |672d5| that wine was given to human beings out of revenge in order to drive us mad. But the one we are stating now is the opposite. It says that wine is a drug for facilitating the soul’s acquisition of reverence and the body’s acquisition of health and strength. CLEINIAS: You have recapitulated the account perfectly, Stranger. |672d10| And now let us take it that half of the discussion of choral performance is completed. |672e| As for the other half, we’ll proceed with it, if the way forward still seems as it did,101 or leave it aside. CLEINIAS: What parts do you mean, and how are you distinguishing them? ATHENIAN: Choral performance as a whole was for us in some degree the whole of education,102 |672e5| and one part of it—the part concerning the voice—is rhythms and harmonies. CLEINIAS: Yes. ATHENIAN: The other part, the bodily movement, had rhythm in common with the movement of the voice but a gesture special to it, while to the former, the movement of the voice, melody is special. |673a| ATHENIAN:

CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true. ATHENIAN: Now the movements of the voice that reach the soul,103 since they are an education in virtue, we—for better or worse—named “music.”104 |673a5| {67} CLEINIAS: And correctly so. ATHENIAN: As for the movements of the body, which we called “dance” when of those at play,105 if these sorts of movements lead to the virtue of the body, we should call guidance to this condition of the body that is within the province of craft “gymnastic training.” |673a10| CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely correct. ATHENIAN: As for music, which is pretty much the half |673b| of the discussion about chorus that, as we said just now, has been completed, let that also be the verdict now. As for the other half, are we to discuss it, and if so, how and in what way must we do it?

CLEINIAS: My very good friend, you’re talking to Cretans and Spartans! |673b5| If we’ve gone through music, but omitted gymnastic training, how do you think either of us is going to answer this question of yours? ATHENIAN: I’d certainly say that your question pretty much answers it in a perspicuous way! And I understand your present question |673c| to be not only an answer but a command to complete the discussion of gymnastic training. CLEINIAS: You have understood me very well. Do just that. ATHENIAN: It must be done, then. Indeed, it’s not very difficult to talk |673c5| to you about what you both know. For you have more experience in this craft than in the other one. CLEINIAS: That’s pretty much true. ATHENIAN: Well, to repeat, the starting-point of this sort of play is that all animals are by nature accustomed to jump about, and the human kind, as |673d| we said,106 by getting a perception of rhythm, created and gave birth to dance. When melody recalled and awakened rhythm, the communion of these with each other gave birth to choral performance and play. |673d5| CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true. ATHENIAN: And the one part, we say, we have already gone through, while the other we will try to go through next. CLEINIAS: Absolutely. {68} ATHENIAN: But let’s first put the finishing touches to our discussion |673d10| of the use of drunkenness—that is, if you agree. |673e| CLEINIAS: What sort and which ones do you mean? ATHENIAN: If a city treats the practice that has now been discussed as a serious matter, and uses it along with laws and order as a means to the practice of temperance, and, in accord with the same argument, will in the same way not avoid |673e5| the other pleasures, but will contrive to have them for the sake of controlling them, then in this way it must make use of all these things. But if it treats the practice as a sort of play, allowing anyone who wishes to drink whenever and with whoever he wishes, combining it with any other practices whatsoever, |674a| then mine is one vote that would not be cast for the use of strong drink at any time by this city or this man.

Indeed, I would go even beyond the Cretan and Spartan usage and cast it for the Carthaginian law requiring that no one ever taste this drink while on campaign,107 |674a5| but for all this time drink water at their gatherings. Even in the city, it requires that no slave, male or female, should ever taste it, nor any of the officials during their year in office; nor should ship captains or jurors |674b| taste any wine at all when on active duty, nor anyone who is about to give advice at an important council meeting, nor anyone at all during the day (except on account of bodily training or disease), nor even at night when anyone, a man or a woman, |674b5| is intending to beget children.108 And there are many other circumstances one could mention in which those who possess understanding (nous) and correct law109 think that one must not drink wine. The result, according to this argument, is that no city would need many vineyards, |674c| and that while the other agricultural products and all dietary matters would be regulated,110 those having to do with wine would turn out to be pretty much the most properly measured and restricted to the smallest quantity. Let this, Strangers, if you agree, put the finishing touch to our argument about wine. |674c5| CLEINIAS: Good. We agree.

    1. See 643d–644b. 2. The two are being identified: “True doxai are also a fine thing, as long as they stay with one . . . but they are not willing to stay with one for long. Instead, they run away from the human soul. So they are not worth very much until someone ties them down by rationally calculating the cause (aitias logismio[i]). . . . When they have been tied down they first of all become instances of knowledge (epistêmê), then stable (monimoi)” (Men. 97e7–98a7). Notice “when we are not yet able to grasp the account” at 653b3–4. 3. Ton logon: Cf. Rep. 401d–402a. Logos could equally well be the account that states the reason but not the faculty of reason. See Meyer, p. 209. 4. Sumphônêsôsi tô[i] logô[i]: Cf. homophônei tô[i] logô[i] (Ar. NE 1102b25–29). 5. Reading τῷ λόγῳ ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι with Schöpsdau-1, pp. 256–257. 6. At 643a–650b. 7. Chalatai: A metaphor derived in all likelihood from the strings of puppets (644d7– 645c6). See Kurke, pp. 130–132. 8. For a succinct and authoritative discussion of these, see Burkert, pp. 99–109. 9. Epanarthôntai: The verb has strong ethical overtones. See Frede, pp. 121–122. 10. Trophas: Also “nourishment” or “food,” which is presumably the trophê referred to: “The natural and straightforward aim of festival is feasting—eating and drinking” (Burkert, p. 107). See 738c–e. 11. Reading ᾗ δὴ with England-1, p. 277 for Budé ἤδη. 12. See 816a–b. 13. Houtôs autois chrêtai: Namely, by taking pleasure in the fine ones and hating (being pained by) the not fine ones. See 657c3–6. 14. Dianoêthen: A passive participle, but the thoughts are probably best thought of as (a) correct, and (b) shared by the person in question, since this makes best sense of the Stranger’s contrasts. 15. Misê[i]: The hatred is the result of finding something painful. Notice lupê[i] (“pain”) at 854d2. 16. Duscherainôn: The verb duscherainein means, among other things, “to be unable to endure or put up with” but also “to feel dislike, disgust, or annoyance.” See LSJ s.v. δυσχεραίνω. In general, in Rep. and Lg., as here, it refers to a strong emotional reaction or feeling, making something like “disgust” or “repugnance” seem to capture its meaning best. 17. The first person has correct thoughts, choral actions, and pleasures and pains; the second has (most probably) correct thoughts, correct choral actions, but not correct pleasures and pains; the third has not entirely correct thoughts or correct choral actions but does have correct pleasures and pains. For discussion, see Meyer, pp. 220–222. 18. See Rep. 424d–e. 19. Chrômata: As we speak of the chromatic scale. Cleinias is attempting a clever pun. 20. See 667c–669c. 21. Reading αὑτοῦ with England-1, p. 284 and Schöpdau-1, p. 275 for Budé αὐτοῦ (“dreaming of its depravity”).

22. Poiêtên: Not just a poet in our sense of the term but a maker (also poiêtês) of art generally, whether music, dance, drama, literature, painting, or architecture. 23. See 799a–e. 24. Although variety within the prescribed patterns may be required to keep the singers and their audience interested and engaged. See 665c5–7. Cf. “You and I are not poets at present, Adeimantus. But we are founding a city. And it is appropriate for the founders to know the patterns on which the poets must base their accounts, and from which they must not deviate. But they should not themselves make up any poems” (Rep. 378e7–379a4). The philosopher-kings know the patterns the poets must follow. But these patterns, as the discussion makes clear, are neither poems nor detailed blueprints for them. 25. Cf. Hdt. 2.79, and on Egyptian astronomy, Epin. 987a. For discussion, see Griffith, Rutherford, and Morrow-2, pp. 355–358. 26. The difficulties in the transmitted text of this sentence are discussed in England-1, pp. 286–287, Saunders-2, p. 9, Schöpsdau-1, pp. 278–279, and Meyer, pp. 239–240. My translation follows Brisson-Pradeau-1. 27. Reading θείου τινὸς ἀνδρὸς with OCT and England-1. 28. Egyptian goddess of magic, wisdom, and other things, usually mentioned together with her husband Osiris. Hathor is the goddess usually associated with music. It is unclear why Plato associates it with Isis instead. See Schöpsdau-1, p. 279. But “Isis and Hathor were often linked” (Rutherford, p. 80 n9) and “Isis is the leader of the Muses at Hermoupolis” (ibid., p. 82 n23). 29. I.e., the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. 30. A person who gave dramatic recitations of epic poems. 31. See 644d7n. 32. Cf. Min. 321a: “Tragedy is that form of poetry which most delights the populace and which most seduces the soul.” 33. Greek poet (c. 700 BC) from Boeotia. His works, like those of Homer, played a substantial role in Greek education. 34. Ethos: Literally, “habit,” but here equivalent in meaning to what produces it: “training” or “habituation.” See England-1, pp. 291–292. 35. Tous pollous: Hoi polloi (literally, “the many”) are ordinary, relatively poor people, who typically made up the majority of a city’s inhabitants. Often contrasted in Greek political thought with “the few,” who were typically rich and often aristocratic. 36. As in legal trials (Ap. 35c), judges at Athenian festivals took an oath to give their verdicts fairly. See Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae 1160 and, for other references, Schöpsdau1, pp. 284. 37. Reading with OCT. For an alternative proposal, see England-1, p. 293. 38. Otherwise unknown and perhaps more a custom than a piece of legislation. 39. Itself supposed correct, see 645b4–8. 40. See 840e4. 41. See 656d–657b. 42. Midas was a legendary king of Phrygia (now central Turkey). As the result of a foolish wish, everything he touched turned to gold, so that he became temporarily very rich but died of starvation. Cinyras, a legendary king of Cyprus, was allegedly three times richer

than Midas. On the connection between virtue and happiness, see 662d–663d, 734c–e, 742e–743e, Bobonich-1, pp. 210–215. 43. The Stranger again quoted Tyrtaeus. See 629a7, e2–3. 44. On the translation of this difficult sentence, see Meyer, pp. 255–256. 45. The so-called goods are human goods, while justice and all of virtue are divine ones. See 631b6–631d2. The dependence of the former on the latter is here explained as follows: without virtue the so-called good things are positively bad ones, although when possessed along with virtue, they are good. The text mentions (661d1), but does not discuss, so-called bad things, which are presumably lacks or opposites of the so-called good ones (e.g., being ill or ugly), or commit itself to how these affect the virtuous as opposed to the vicious person, for whom they are good. They might, for all that is said, be bad or neither good nor bad. For discussion of alternative views, see Bobonich-1, pp. 68, 123–127, Meyer, pp. 256–257. 46. I.e., the “courage” that does not involve wisdom and so may really be rashness. See 630a6–b8, Meyer, p. 260. 47. Because it would apparently deny happiness to the virtuous. 48. See 829a1–2. 49. On being persuaded voluntarily as opposed to involuntarily, see Rep. 412e–413d. 50. Distant things appear blurry to perception. If we believe in accord with perception, our beliefs will likely be false. The legislator will make our beliefs (not our perceptions) nonblurry and so will correct for the distortions of distance. See Rep. 602c1–603a7. 51. Eskiagraphêmena: Literally, shadow paintings—paintings in black-and-white in which shading creates an illusion of volume. See Rep. 365c4, 523b6, 583b5, 586b8, 602d2. On points of translation, I follow Meyer, pp. 272–273. 52. Kuriôteran: Control (kurios) is often a matter of legal or rational authority and the associated power (causal or executive in nature) to compel. Thus laws can have control in the country that legislates them (866c4) but lack control when someone usurps their control (700a4, 715d3); political institutions can have control (758d3), as can officials (759e5) and nonofficials in whom it is legally vested (774e6, 883e3). But control is not always or in essence a legal or social matter. An element in an animal’s nature can have it (765e4) as can a socialized version of such an element (797a8) as can a cultural institution (797a8). The associated notion of kratos, found in such notions as enkrateia (typically “selfcontrol”) and akrateia (“lack of self-control”) although usually more a sort of nonsocial or natural causal power, can also be applied to laws as pretty much a synonym of kurios (839a4). It is translated as “control” or “authority” as context demands. 53. The myth of Cadmus. See 641c6n. 54. I.e., a city. 55. In the sense of the most virtuous one. 56. Apollo the healer. 57. These over-sixty-year-olds are the ones referred to as “the Dionysiac leaders” (671e1), who are assisted by senior singing members of the Dionysiac chorus, referred to as “guardians of the laws and co-workers” (671d5–6), who remain sober, while the others drink. We might compare the division of the guardians into “complete guardians” and “auxiliaries” at Rep. 412b–414b.

58. I.e., the virtuous ones and vicious ones whose lives are (respectively) most and least pleasant. 59. See 653c–654a. 60. See 653d4. 61. See 656d8–e3n. 62. 658e1–4 suggests that these will be, in particular, the older members of the chorus. See Meyer, p. 285. 63. See 664e4–5, 643b–d, 653c–654a. 64. Dusthumias: Also “despondency,” “despair.” 65. See 659e2, 664b4, 665c4; also 670e8. 66. Phônê: “Its surface meaning in the context is ‘sung note’, but it can of course also mean ‘played note’ and ‘spoken word’” (Saunders-2, p. 10). 67. Mousan: See 967e2, Phd. 61a2–3, Ti. 88c5, Morrow-2, pp. 313–315. 68. Astesi (dative plural of astu): See 642b2n. 69. In the case of food and drink, health is the benefit that determines correctness, so that it is most correct to eat and drink the healthy options. 70. Isotês: Or “proportion” or “equality.” 71. See Rep. 357b7. 72. Cf. 658e6–659a1. 73. At 667d5–7. 74. Ousia: Abstract noun derived from a participle of the verb einai (“to be”). The being of, e.g., beauty (to kalon) is just what beauty is, and so answers the question Ti esti to kalon? (“What is beauty?”). See 895b4. 75. Tên orthotêta tês boulêseôs ê kai hamartian autou: Literally, “the correctness or indeed error of the wish.” But see England-1, pp. 322–323, Meyer, p. 302, Schöpsdau-1, p. 323. 76. Tous arithmous: Or “proportions.” Literally, “the numbers.” A sort of quantity. See 667d5–7. 77. Zô[i]ôn: Unlike zô[i]on at 668e5, which means “creature” or “animal,” it here, as often elsewhere, means “picture” or “representation.” See Saunders-2, pp. 10–11. 78. See 655a3–8n. 79. A legendary singer from Thrace. His music is supposed to have charmed animals, trees, and rocks. His fame in Greek myth rests on the poems in which the doctrines of Orphic religion are set forth. These are discussed in Burkert, pp. 296–304. 80. Aulêsei: “Flute” is the traditional translation. But the aulos was in fact a reed instrument, like an oboe. It was thought to be especially good at conveying emotion. See Rep. 399a–e. 81. Thaumatourgia: Cf. Rep. 602d4. 82. See 664d3. 83. Cf. 812b9–10. 84. This mode is q, q, d, t, q, q, d—where d = ditone (the interval of a major third); q = quartertone; s = semitone; t = tone. It can be represented as two tetrachords, each of the form q, q, d, together with a tone that disjoins them. See Barker, pp. 163–168. Cf. Rep. 399a–e. 85. Akribesteran: See 965b1.

86. The three levels of education just mentioned are the following: (1) Being “drilled in singing to the flute and marching in rhythm” (670b9–11), which is what Cleinias refers to as “the ones we learned when we were accustomed to sing in choruses (666d8–10)” and the Athenian refers to as “choral music” (670a7). (2) The education that results in the singers having “keen perception and knowledge of rhythms and harmonies” (670b2–3), which is more or less what the poets know (670e5–7). (3) The education that results in the singers knowing the harmonies and rhythms that are fitting and will “lead the younger singers to have fitting affection for good characters” (670e1–2). This involves knowing how such characters are correctly imitated in rhythms and harmonies, and this is what knowing whether “the imitation is a fine one or not a fine one” (670e5–6) amounts to: “those who seek out the finest song and music must seek out, it seems, not the sort that is pleasant but the sort that is correct. For correctness of imitation . . . consists in reproducing in quantity and quality the thing being imitated” (668b4–7). 87. I.e., second in fineness; or, perhaps, (2) (previous note). See Meyer, p. 323, for discussion. 88. See 667a–b. 89. See 640c. 90. Reading γιγνομένων with Meyer for Budé λεγομένων. 91. See 666b–c. 92. See 639c–d. 93. See 647a–d, 649c–d. 94. See 640b2–4. 95. God of war. 96. See 637a–b. 97. Phêmê: See 771d1n. 98. The wife of Zeus. 99. See 653d5–654a3. 100. Gumnastikês: Gumnastikê included dance and training in warfare, as well as what we call physical training. This is the first occurrence of the term in the Laws. 101. I.e., that the argument should be followed where it leads. See, e.g., 667a9–10. 102. See 652b–654a. 103. See Rep. 401d. 104. See 642a. 105. As opposed to those engaging in them for a more serious purpose. See Meyer, p. 334. 106. See 653d–654a, 664e–665a. 107. Ar. Econ. 1344a33–34 attests to the existence of this part of the law. The status of the remainder is more problematic. See Saunders-2, pp. 11–12. 108. See 775b–e. 109. See 714a1–2, 957c. 110. See 842b–848c.

{69} BOOK 3 ATHENIAN: Let these things, then, be settled in this way. Of constitutions,1 though, what |676a| should we say the starting-point is? Wouldn’t one see it in the easiest and best way from the following vantage point? CLEINIAS: Which one? ATHENIAN: The very one from which to view the progress of cities |676a5| as on each occasion they change toward virtue, or equally toward vice. CLEINIAS: Which one are you talking about? ATHENIAN: That of an unlimitedly long time, I take it, and the changes occurring in it. |676b| CLEINIAS: What do you mean? ATHENIAN: Come on, do you think you could ever grasp how long it is that cities have existed or that human beings have had some form of government? |676b5| CLEINIAS: Not at all easily, that’s for sure. ATHENIAN: But you do know that it would be an inconceivably immense period of time? CLEINIAS: I do know that, certainly. ATHENIAN: Well, isn’t it true that countless numbers of cities have come to be during this time, while, in correspondingly vast numbers, |676b10| no fewer have been destroyed. And hasn’t each of them many times been governed |676c| by every sort of constitution? And sometimes haven’t small ones become bigger, big ones smaller, better ones worse, and worse ones better? CLEINIAS: Necessarily. |676c5| ATHENIAN: Then let’s try to grasp, if we can, the cause of that change. For this might perhaps show us the first origin of constitutions and their first change. CLEINIAS: You put it well, and we should proceed in good spirits, with you making known what you think about these things while we follow along. |676c10|

{70} ATHENIAN: Well, do you believe that the ancient accounts have any truth in them? |677a| CLEINIAS: Which ones? ATHENIAN: That human beings have been destroyed many times by floods, plagues, and many other things, in which only a small part |677a5| of the human race was left alive.2 CLEINIAS: Yes, of course, that sort of thing is entirely persuasive to everyone. ATHENIAN: Come on, let’s consider just one of the many disasters, the one caused by the flood.3 CLEINIAS: What in particular are we to consider about it? |677a10| ATHENIAN: That those who at that time escaped destruction would pretty much all have been mountain |677b| shepherds, little sparks of the human race preserved, I imagine, on the peaks. CLEINIAS: Clearly so. ATHENIAN: Yes, and I suppose that such people necessarily |677b5| lack experience in the other crafts, and in particular in the contrivances that people in cities use against each other out of a desire to have too large a share,4 or a love of victory, and all the other sorts of evildoing they think up against each other. CLEINIAS: Yes, probably so. ATHENIAN: May we assume, then, that the cities established in the plains and near |677c| the sea were utterly destroyed at that time? CLEINIAS: We may. ATHENIAN: Won’t we say that all their tools were also destroyed, and if any |677c5| serious discovery had been made in a craft, whether the craft of politics or some other sort of wisdom (sophia), all these things would have disappeared at the same time? For otherwise, my very good friend, if these things had survived in the order they are in today, how could anything new have ever been discovered? |677c10| {71} CLEINIAS: You mean that for countless thousands of years these things escaped the notice |677d| of the people then, and have only come into

existence within the last one or two thousand years, some due to Daedalus, others to Orpheus, and others to Palamedes, the ones having to do with music to Marsyas and Olympos, those with the lyre to Amphion,5 and many others to other people—only |677d5| yesterday, so to speak, or the day before? ATHENIAN: It’s very nice of you, Cleinias, to leave out your friend, who really was around only yesterday. CLEINIAS: Do you mean Epimenides?6 ATHENIAN: Yes, him. He, my friend, far surpassed |677e| all your other candidates in inventiveness. What Hesiod prophesized in words long ago, he brought to completion in fact7—or so you Cretans say. CLEINIAS: We certainly do say that. |677e5| ATHENIAN: So what should we say the state of human affairs was like after the disaster? Wasn’t there a vast and frightening desolation, but a very large quantity of bounteous land? And though other animals had disappeared, didn’t the cattle, and perhaps some small stock of goats that happened to survive, also few in number, |677e10| insure at the start the life of those grazing them? |678a| CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: But as for city, constitution, and legislation, which are the things our present argument concerns, do we think that there was, so to speak, any memory at all? |678a5| CLEINIAS: No, none at all. ATHENIAN: So from those people, in those circumstances, did all the things we have today originate—cities, constitutions, crafts, laws, and though a lot of vice, a lot of virtue too? {72} CLEINIAS: What do you mean? |678a10| ATHENIAN: Are we really to think, my admirable friend, that people back then, with no experience |678b| of the many fine things that go along with city life, ever became perfectly virtuous or perfectly vicious? CLEINIAS: Good question. We understand what you mean. |678b5| ATHENIAN: Wasn’t it only as time went on, and our race increased in number, that everything progressed to the state that everything is in today?

CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely correct. ATHENIAN: Not all at once, anyway, but little by little, in all likelihood, and over |678b10| a very long period of time. CLEINIAS: Yes, that is very likely. |678c| ATHENIAN: For the fear of descending from the mountains into the plains, I imagine, was still fresh in everyone’s memory. CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: Weren’t they pleased, then, whenever they saw each other, because there were so few of them |678c5| around during that time, and, as for traveling, their means of getting to each other by land or sea would pretty much (so to speak) all have been destroyed along with the crafts? So, I don’t suppose that they were very capable of mixing together with each other. You see, iron, copper, and all the metals had disappeared under the mud, |678d| so that, since they were at a total loss as to how to extract these, there was very little felling of trees for lumber, since if some tool had survived somewhere up in the mountains, it was quickly worn down and disappeared, and there weren’t any others to appear, until once again |678d5| the craft concerned with metals returned to human beings. CLEINIAS: How could there be? ATHENIAN: And how many generations later do you suppose this happened? CLEINIAS: It’s clear that it must have been very many. |678e| ATHENIAN: Doesn’t it follow that the crafts that need iron, bronze, or anything of these sorts would have disappeared for this period of time or an even longer one? CLEINIAS: Of course. |678e5| {73} ATHENIAN: For several reasons, then, faction and war ceased to exist during that time. CLEINIAS: How so? ATHENIAN: In the first place, because, due to the desolation, they were pleased with each other and treated each other in a kindly fashion. Second, nourishment was not something they fought over. |678e10| For except perhaps for some people at the start, there was no shortage of food from grazing

animals, |679a| which is what the majority of people lived on at that time. For example, there was for them no lack of milk or meat; besides, by hunting they provided themselves with nourishment that was neither poor in quality nor small in quantity. Then too they were well supplied with clothing, bedding, housing, and utensils for cooking on the fire or for use without fire, |679a5| since the molding or weaving crafts do not require iron at all. A god gave these crafts to human beings to provide them with all these things, in order that, |679b| whenever the human race found itself in this sort of perplexity, it might still be able to grow and increase. Because of all this, then, they weren’t exceedingly poor, or compelled by poverty to quarrel with each other. But neither, on the other hand, could they ever become rich, since they were without gold |679b5| or silver, which was the situation they were in then. Now the community in which neither wealth nor poverty ever resides is pretty much the one in which the most well-bred8 characters would be produced. For neither wanton aggression nor injustice, nor again fits of jealousy and envy, spring up there. |679c| They were good people, then, due to these things, and also because of what is called “naivete.”9 For whenever they heard things being called “fine” or “shameful,” in their naivete they regarded what was said as absolutely true and were convinced of it. You see, no one knew to suspect a lie, as people, due to their “wisdom (sophia),” do nowadays. Instead, |679c5| they believed the things said about gods and humans to be true, and lived their lives accordingly. That is precisely why they were in every respect as we have just described them. CLEINIAS: To me at least, and to Megillus too, it does seem that this is how things were. |679d| {74} ATHENIAN: And mustn’t we also say that the many generations that spent their lives in this way were inevitably more unskilled in the other crafts and more ignorant of them than those who lived before the flood or those who live now? And weren’t they especially ignorant of the crafts of war, |679d5| as practiced today on land or on sea, or in a city in relation to itself, where they are called “lawsuits” and “factions,” and whatever other contrivances of word or deed have been devised in order to |679e| do evil and injustice to each other? And weren’t they—due to the cause we have

already gone through—more naive, more courageous, and also more temperate and in every way more just? CLEINIAS: That’s correct. |679e5| Let’s recall that the things we’ve been saying, and all those that are still to follow, have been said for a purpose, namely, in order that we would understand what need the people of that time had for laws, and who their legislator was. |680a| ATHENIAN:

CLEINIAS: Yes, good. ATHENIAN: But isn’t it the case that they didn’t need legislators, and that as yet such a thing wasn’t likely to arise in those times? For writing didn’t yet exist among those born in that part |680a5| of the cycle,10 and they lived following habits and so-called ancestral laws.11 CLEINIAS: Likely so. ATHENIAN: But this is already in a way a sort of constitution. CLEINIAS: What sort? ATHENIAN: It seems to me that everyone calls the constitution existing at that time |680b| a “dynasty,”12 which even today still exists in many places, both among Greeks and among barbarians. It is what Homer is talking about, I imagine, when he describes the household of the Cyclopes, saying: They have no assemblies or laws but live In high mountain caves, ruling their own Children and wives and ignoring each other.13 |680c|

{75} CLEINIAS: That poet of yours seems to have been an accomplished one. We’ve gone through other things of his that were very elegant, though not that much of it. You see, Cretans don’t go in very much for foreign poetry. |680c5| MEGILLUS: But we Spartans do go in for it, and Homer seems to us to be the master of such poets, even though in each instance the way of life he describes is not Spartan but rather a sort of Ionian one. In the present case, however, |680d| he seems to be a good witness to your account, since, through his stories, he ascribes their primitiveness to their savagery. ATHENIAN: Yes, he is indeed a witness, so let’s take him as testifying that constitutions of this sort do sometimes arise. |680d5|

CLEINIAS: Fine,

let’s. ATHENIAN: Don’t they arise among those people who, due to the difficulty caused by disasters, live scattered in a single household or family? In these households, doesn’t the oldest rule due to a rule derived from father and mother, whom the others follow, like birds |680e| forming a single flock, under patriarchal rule and a kingship that is the most just of all forms of kingship? CLEINIAS: It certainly is. |680e5| ATHENIAN: After that, larger numbers come together to form greater communities, making cities.14 And the first to turn to farming were those who lived in the foothills, building dry stone walls around them |681a| as a defense against wild beasts, producing one large communal household. CLEINIAS: Yes, it’s certainly likely that it happened this way. ATHENIAN: Well then, isn’t this likely too? |681a5| CLEINIAS: What? ATHENIAN: As these households grow larger from the initial smaller ones, each of the smaller brings with it, family by family, its own oldest as ruler and, because of living separately from the others, its own special customs— customs |681b| relating to themselves and to the gods, which vary with their various parents and those bringing them up, more moderate if they are more moderate, more manly if they are more {76} manly. And each group, as fits the case, having impressed their own preferences on their children |681b5| and their children’s children, reaches the larger community we say, having their own special laws. CLEINIAS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: And to each group, I take it, its own laws are necessarily pleasing, |681c| while those of others are less so. CLEINIAS: Exactly. ATHENIAN: It seems, then, that we have stumbled unawares on the startingpoint of legislation. CLEINIAS: We certainly have. ATHENIAN: After this, at any rate, it is necessary for those who have come together to choose from among themselves certain men as representatives

who will look over the customs of all the families and, displaying openly the ones they find most pleasing for the common use, |681c10| to present them for the approval of the leaders and chiefs of the people—the kings, as it were. |681d| These representatives will be called “legislators,” and, while they have established the others as rulers, producing a sort of aristocracy or a sort of kingship from the dynasties, during this change of constitution they will manage things. |681d5| CLEINIAS: Yes, step-by-step, it would occur in this way. ATHENIAN: Let’s say, then, that yet a third form of constitution emerges, in which all kinds and conditions of political systems, and also of cities,15 fall into line. CLEINIAS: Which one is that? |681e| ATHENIAN: The one that comes after the second, as Homer too indicated, when he said that the third emerged in this way. For he says somewhere, “He founded Dardania,” . . . Sacred Ilion Was not yet a city on the plain. The people then |681e5| All live on the slopes of spring-dotted Ida.16

{77} You see, when he says these things, and the previous ones he said about the Cyclopes, |682a| he is speaking somehow under the guidance of a god and, what’s more, in accord with the nature of things. For the race of poets is divine, and so is inspired when it sings,17 and on each occasion, with the aid of certain Graces and Muses, hits upon the way in which things really happen.18 |682a5| CLEINIAS: They do indeed. ATHENIAN: Let’s proceed still further, then, with this story that has now come into our heads, since it may explain something to our purpose. Isn’t that what we should do? CLEINIAS: Certainly. |682b| ATHENIAN: So, Troy was established, we say, when people left the heights for the wide and beautiful plain, and settled on a low ridge with several rivers that flowed down from Ida. CLEINIAS: So they say, yes. |682b5|

ATHENIAN: Don’t you think that this happened many ages after the flood? CLEINIAS: Yes, of course, many. ATHENIAN: It seems, anyway, that there was at that time a vast forgetfulness of the disaster we just now discussed, since they established their city within reach of a lot of rivers |682c| flowing down from the heights, putting their trust in some hills that were not very high. CLEINIAS: It is entirely clear, then, that they were far removed in time from this sort of disaster. |682c5| ATHENIAN: And already by that time, I imagine, many other cities had been established, since human beings were increasing in numbers. CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: And these, I imagine, made war against Troy, and by sea probably, since by then everyone was fearlessly making use of |682c10| the sea. |682d| CLEINIAS: Evidently. ATHENIAN: And after being there about ten years, the Achaeans sacked Troy. {78} CLEINIAS: Indeed, they did. |682d5| ATHENIAN: And during this period of ten years when Troy was being besieged, many evils befell each of the besiegers at home, having to do with the factions of the younger generation, who did not give the soldiers returning to their cities and their households a good or just reception, |682d10| with the result that deaths, slaughters, and exiles came about |682e| wholesale instead. The ones who were driven out came back, however, having changed their name from Achaeans to Dorians, because Dorieus had collected the exiles together at that time.19 And, surely, it is you Spartans who tell the story and describe thoroughly |682e5| all that happened after that. MEGILLUS: Of course. ATHENIAN: At the start of our discussion of laws, you see, we digressed and fell into a discussion of music and the sorts of drunkenness,20 and now, as if under the guidance of a god, we have returned to the same topic, and the |682e10| argument is giving us, as it were, a handle on it, since it has returned to the actual founding of Sparta, which you said |683a| was correctly founded, and of Crete, as their laws are brothers.21 Well, we’ve now certainly gained

this much by the wanderings of the argument, that by going through certain constitutions and settlements, we have observed the first, second, and third city being founded one after the other, as we suppose, |683a5| over vast periods of time. And now this fourth sort of city—or nation,22 if you like— is before us, which was being founded then and now has been founded.23 If, on the basis of all of this, we are able to get some understanding |683b| of what has and has not been founded correctly, of which sorts of laws are responsible for preserving the things that are preserved and which sorts for destroying the things that are destroyed, and what sorts of changes would make a city happy, then, Megillus and Cleinias, we must discuss these things again, as it {79} were, from the start. |683b5| Unless, that is, we have some objection to bring against the accounts that have been stated. MEGILLUS: Well, Stranger, if some god were to promise us that if we do make a second attempt to investigate legislation, |683c| we will hear accounts that are neither shorter nor worse than the ones stated just now, I for one would be willing to extend our journey, and this present day would seem short to me. And yet we are pretty much at the day when the god turns from summer toward winter.24 |683c5| ATHENIAN: So, the things I referred to must, it seems, be investigated. MEGILLUS: They certainly must. ATHENIAN: Then let’s, in thought, go back to the time when Sparta, Argos, Messene, and their territories were effectively in the hands, Megillus, of your ancestor. |683d| Their next decision, so at least the story relates, was to divide the army into three parts and found three cities, Argos, Messene, and Sparta. MEGILLUS: It certainly was. |683d5| ATHENIAN: Temenos became king of Sparta, Chresphontes of Messene, and Procles and Eurysthenes kings of Sparta. MEGILLUS: They certainly did. ATHENIAN: And everyone swore to them at that time that they would come to their aid |683d10| if anyone tried to destroy their kingships. |683e| MEGILLUS: Of course.

ATHENIAN: But, in the name of Zeus, is a kingship overthrown, or has any rule of any sort ever been overthrown, by anyone other than the rulers themselves? Or, though just a little while ago now, when we touched |683e5| on this topic in our arguments, we posited this,25 have we now forgotten? MEGILLUS: How could we? ATHENIAN: Then we’ll now put this thesis on a firmer footing. For by touching on the facts we did, we have arrived, it seems, |683e10| at the same account, so that we won’t be investigating in the abstract but on the basis of something that really and truly happened. |684a| {80} What happened was this: the three hereditary kingships and the three cities that were under the rule of the kingships all swore oaths to each other, in keeping with the laws they had established, in common for those ruling and those being ruled. The kings swore not to impose their rule more forcibly as time went on and their line continued, |684a5| while those they ruled swore that if the rulers kept their oath, they would neither overthrow the kingship themselves at any time nor allow others to try to do so. The kings swore that they would come to the aid of kings and peoples |684b| if these were treated unjustly, the peoples that they would come to the aid of peoples and kings if these were so treated. Isn’t that how it was? MEGILLUS: Yes, that’s how it was. ATHENIAN: Now whether it was the kings or someone else |684b5| who did the legislating for the constitutions of the three cities that were being legislated for, the greatest provision was surely this . . . MEGILLUS: What? ATHENIAN: That there were two cities always ready to come to the aid against one, if it disobeyed the laws that had been established. |684b10| MEGILLUS: Clearly. ATHENIAN: Yet surely the masses command their |684c| legislators to establish the sorts of laws that the peoples and the majorities will accept voluntarily. It’s just as if someone were to command gymnastic trainers or doctors to treat and cure with pleasure the bodies they are treating!26 |684c5| MEGILLUS: Yes, it’s absolutely like that.

ATHENIAN: Whereas we must often be satisfied if it is without too much pain that someone can make bodies strong and healthy. MEGILLUS: Of course. |684c10| ATHENIAN: At that time, too, people had a further advantage that made |684d| establishing laws to no small degree easier. MEGILLUS: What was that? ATHENIAN: Their legislators, when they were establishing a certain equality of property among those people, were not subject to the greatest complaints |684d5| raised in many other cities when laws are being {81} established, when someone seeks to change ownership of land and dissolve debts, because he sees that a satisfactory degree of equality will never be achieved on any other terms. If a legislator attempts to change something of these sorts, you see, everyone opposes him, saying “Don’t change what mustn’t be changed,”27 and curses him |684e| for proposing the redistribution of land and cancelation of debts, with the result that any man legislating is brought to a state of perplexity. For the Dorians, then, as things stood, this went well and without animosity, because they could divide up the land without controversy and there were no large and long-standing debts. |684e5| MEGILLUS: That’s true. ATHENIAN: Then why exactly, my very good friends, did the settlement and the legislation turn out so badly for them?28 MEGILLUS: What do you mean? What complaint are you raising against them? |685a| ATHENIAN: The fact that of the three settlements that came about, two quickly ruined their constitution and laws, while only one remained as it was—your city. MEGILLUS: That’s not an easy question you’re asking. |685a5| ATHENIAN: Nonetheless, this is what we must now investigate and examine, as we play our temperate old man’s game29 concerning laws, and proceed on our path free from discomfort, as we said we would when we began our journey.30 |685b| MEGILLUS: Of course, it must be done as you say.

ATHENIAN: And what finer investigation concerning laws could we produce than into those that have regulated these cities? Would it be possible to investigate the establishment of cities more famous or greater than these?31 |685b5| MEGILLUS: No, it would not be easy to find alternatives to these. ATHENIAN: Well then, it’s pretty much clear that the people at that time planned this arrangement of theirs to provide sufficient aid not {82} only for the Peloponnese but also for all the Greeks, in the event that |685c| any of the barbarians were to do them an injustice, as happened when those who at the time lived around Troy put their trust in the power of the Assyrian Empire under Ninos, and rashly stirred up the war against Troy.32 You see, no small part of the glory of that empire |685c5| still survived, and just as we today fear the Great King,33 so they at that time dreaded the united organization of the Assyrians. For the fact that Troy had been captured for the second time34 was a strong ground for complaint against the Greeks, since Troy |685d| was a part of the Assyrian empire. In the face of all these things, the arrangement whereby the one army was divided at that time among three cities under their brother-kings, the sons of Heracles, seemed an excellent invention and arrangement, |685d5| an arrangement superior to that of the expedition against Troy. For, first, the sons of Heracles were considered to be better rulers than the descendants of Pelops35 and, second, their army was considered to be superior in virtue to the one that went against Troy. |685e| After all, the former (the Dorians) were victorious, while the others (the Achaeans) were defeated by them.36 At all events, don’t we suppose that the people at that time arranged things in this way with this plan in mind? MEGILLUS: We certainly do. |685e5| ATHENIAN: And isn’t it also likely that they supposed that these arrangements would be stable and last a long time, seeing that |686a| they had shared many hardships and dangers, had been regulated by a single family (the kings being brothers), and furthermore had consulted many prophets, including the Delphic Apollo? |686a5| MEGILLUS: It certainly is likely.

ATHENIAN: But then, it seems, these great expectations quickly vanished, except, as we said just now,37 for the small part around your location, and even it |686b| has never, even to this day, ceased making war against the other two parts. Otherwise, if the original plan had been realized, {83} and a single consonance had resulted, it would have possessed an irresistible power in war. MEGILLUS: It certainly would. |686b5| So how and in what way did it come to naught? It’s worth investigating, isn’t it, just what stroke of luck destroyed such, and so great, an organization? MEGILLUS: If one neglects these laws and constitutions, one would seek in vain to observe others that preserve fine and great |686c| things, or else do the opposite and destroy them utterly. ATHENIAN: It seems, then, that we have somehow been lucky enough to embark on an investigation sufficient for these purposes. |686c5| ATHENIAN:

MEGILLUS: We certainly have been. ATHENIAN: But, my admirable friend, can it be that we—all human beings and ourselves too in the present case—have fallen unawares into the error of always supposing, when we see some fine thing, that it would produce amazing results, if only one knew the way to make some fine use of it?38 And at this moment, |686d| perhaps we are not thinking about this very issue correctly, or in accord with nature—as, indeed, may always be the case when anyone thinks of anything in this way. MEGILLUS: What do you mean? What are we to think you’re especially |686d5| referring to when you make this claim? ATHENIAN: My good friend, it was myself that I was laughing at. You see, I looked at this military organization we’re talking about, and it seemed to me to be a very fine and amazing possession that had fallen into the hands of the Greeks—or would have been, if, I said, someone had made fine use of it at the time. MEGILLUS: Well, wasn’t everything you said, and we approved, well said and said with understanding (nous)? |686e|

ATHENIAN: Perhaps. In any case, I do think that everyone who sees something great, with a lot of power and strength, immediately feels that if indeed the possessor of it knew how to make use of a thing of such quality |686e5| and magnitude, he would accomplish many amazing things and be thereby happy.39 {84} MEGILLUS: Well, isn’t that correct too? Or do you disagree? |687a| ATHENIAN: You must investigate, then, what one looks to in each case when one bestows the praise “what you say is correct,” but first in the case we’re talking about at present: if those who were organizing things at that time had known how, as fits the case, to put the army in order, how exactly would they have made the best they could of the situation? |687a5| Wouldn’t they have kept the army steadfastly together and preserved it always, so that they themselves would be free and would rule anyone else they wanted, and in general, so that among all human beings, both Greeks and barbarians, they themselves and their descendants |687b| would be able to do whatever they wanted? This is what people would praise them for, isn’t it? MEGILLUS: It certainly is. ATHENIAN: And when—having seen great wealth, exceptional honors |687b5| paid to a family, or anything of this sort—someone speaks of these things in this way, isn’t he looking to this when he says it, that by means of it one would gain all, or most of what one wants, and whatever is most worth having? MEGILLUS: Yes, it seems so. |687b10| ATHENIAN: Well, then, do all human beings have one want in common, |687c| namely, the one revealed by the present argument?40 MEGILLUS: Which is that? ATHENIAN: To have things come about in accord with the prescription given by one’s |687c5| own soul—preferably all of them, but failing that, human affairs, at least. MEGILLUS: Of course. ATHENIAN: Well, if indeed all of us always wish this sort of thing, when we were children and also when we’re old men, wouldn’t we also necessarily |687c10| pray for this throughout life?

MEGILLUS: How could we not? ATHENIAN: Further, I suppose that we join with our friends too in praying for the |687d| very things that they would pray for, for themselves. MEGILLUS: Of course. {85} ATHENIAN: And a son is a friend to a father, though one is a child and the other a man. MEGILLUS: How could he not be? |687d5| ATHENIAN: And yet many of the things a son prays will happen to him, his father would pray to the gods never to allow to happen in accord with his son’s prayers. MEGILLUS: You mean when the child who prays lacks sense and is still young? ATHENIAN: And also when the father—either because he is old or perhaps very hotheaded, |687d10| knows nothing of what is fine and what is just, |687e| and whose feelings are akin to those of Theseus toward Hippolytus,41 who came to such an unlucky end—prays too eagerly, do you think that his son, who does know, will ever join in his father’s prayers? MEGILLUS: I understand what you mean. For you mean, I think, |687e5| that one must not pray or hurry to have everything follow one’s own wish, but that one’s wish follow nothing other than one’s own wisdom.42 And this is what both a city and each one of us must pray for and strive after, namely, that we acquire understanding (nous). ATHENIAN: Yes, and in particular, I’m not only reminded that a political legislator, at any rate, must always |688a| look to this when he is establishing the prescriptions of the laws, but I also remind you of what was said at the start of the discussion. You two said, if you remember, that a good legislator should establish all the institutions for the sake of war.43 |688a5| But I said that this was to tell him to establish the laws with a view to one virtue out of the four, whereas what must be done is to look to the whole of virtue, and most of all |688b| and first of all to the leader of all virtue, which would be wisdom (phronêsis), understanding (nous), and belief,44 along with the passion and appetite that follow these. Well, the argument has arrived again at the same point, and the fact is that I, the speaker, now say again just what I said then.

Take it playfully, if {86} you wish, |688b5| or as seriously intended, but I say that to make use of prayer, without having acquired understanding, is a risky business—and the opposite of what is wished for comes to pass. If you wish to take me seriously, |688c| do! You see, I certainly expect that you will both now find, if you follow the argument we advanced a little while ago, that the cause of the destruction of the kingships,45 and of the plan as a whole, was not cowardice, or that the rulers and those fitted to be ruled |688c5| did not know things having to do with war; instead, the destruction was due to the rest of vice, and especially to ignorance of the greatest things46 in human affairs. That this is how things happened back then, how they happen now, if they happen somewhere, and in |688d| the future will happen no differently, is what, if you wish, by proceeding step-by-step in accord with the argument, I’ll try to the best of my ability to think out and make clear to you, since we are friends. CLEINIAS: Well, to praise you in words, Stranger, would be quite invidious, |688d5| but we’ll praise you effusively in deed, since we’ll zealously follow what you say closely. And it is in these that a free person makes most evident what he finds praiseworthy and what he does not. MEGILLUS: Excellent, Cleinias. Let’s do as you say. |688e| CLEINIAS: And so we will, god willing. Go right ahead. ATHENIAN: We now say, as we procced along the path of the argument, that the greatest sort of ignorance is what destroyed that power back then, and that it is natural for it also to do the same today. So, |688e5| if this is the case, the legislator must indeed try to produce as much wisdom as possible in cities and to remove the ignorance as far as he can. CLEINIAS: Clearly. ATHENIAN: What, then, would one rightly say the greatest sort of ignorance47 is? |689a| See if you both agree with what I say. I propose that it is something of this sort . . . CLEINIAS: What sort? ATHENIAN: The sort involved when someone doesn’t love but instead hates what he believes to be fine or good, |689a5| or loves and welcomes what he believes to be wicked and unjust. This discord between pleasure and {87}

pain and the belief that is in accord with reason48 is what I say is the ultimate and greatest ignorance, because it belongs to the major part of the soul. For the part that feels pain and pleasure is for the soul just what the people and the |689b| majority are for the city. So, when the soul opposes pieces of knowledge, beliefs, or reason, which are by nature fitted for rule, I call this “ignorance”—it’s the same thing in a city, when the majority do not obey the rulers and the laws, and in particular, in an individual man, whenever |689b5| the fine reasons that are present in the soul produce no good effect, but rather entirely the opposite. All these are the sorts of ignorance that I, for my part, would set down as the most false note,49 both in the city and in each one of the |689c| citizens, and not—if you understand what I mean, Strangers—those of the craftsmen.50 CLEINIAS: We do understand, my friend, and we agree with what you’re saying. |689c5| In that case, this must be laid down as something determined and affirmed, that those among the citizens who are ignorant in the way we mentioned must not be allowed to have anything to do with rule, and must be blamed for their ignorance, even if they are entirely skilled in rational calculation, and have been thoroughly trained in all the refinements whose natural effect is to make the soul quick. |689d| It is those whose state is the opposite of these that must be called “wise (sophos),” even if, as in the saying, “they know neither how to read nor how to swim,”51 and the ruling offices must be given to them, as being wise (emphrôn). For without concord, my friends, how could wisdom (phronêsis) of even |689d5| the smallest form come about? It’s impossible. And the finest and greatest of the concords would most justly be called “wisdom (sophia),” and the one who partakes of it lives in accord with reason, whereas the one who is wanting in it evidently destroys his household and is in no way a savior of his city, but entirely the opposite, since he is ignorant of the relevant things. So, |689e| as we said just now, let these things be laid down as things we have affirmed on this topic. CLEINIAS: Yes, let them be laid down. {88} ATHENIAN: But it is necessary, I take it, for there to be rulers and ruled in cities. ATHENIAN:

CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: Good. But what are the titles to rule and be ruled, |690a| whether in large or small cities or households likewise, and how many of them are there? Wouldn’t one be that of father or mother, and in general, wouldn’t it be correct for parents everywhere to have title to rule their descendants? |690a5| CLEINIAS: Absolutely. ATHENIAN: And following this, for the well-bred people to rule the not wellbred ones. And, third, following these, the older people must rule and the younger ones must be ruled. CLEINIAS: Of course. |690a10| ATHENIAN: Moreover, fourth, slaves must be ruled and despots52 must |690b| rule. CLEINIAS: How could it be otherwise? ATHENIAN: And the fifth, I imagine, is that the stronger must rule and the weaker be ruled.53 |690b5| CLEINIAS: That’s

a most compelling sort of rule you’ve mentioned! ATHENIAN: Yes, and one most widespread, certainly, among all animals, and in accord with nature, as Pindar of Thebes once remarked.54 But the greatest title, it seems, would be the sixth, the one bidding the ones who lack knowledge to follow and the wise to lead |690b10| and rule. And yet this, my most wise Pindar, I at least would |690c| say was scarcely contrary to nature, but in accord with nature, namely, the natural and unforced rule of law over voluntary subjects. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely correct. {89} ATHENIAN: And saying that the seventh sort of rule is “dear to the gods” and “lucky,” |690c5| we persuade someone to draw lots,55 and say that what is most just is for the one who draws a winning lot to rule and for the one who draws a losing one to be ruled. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true. ATHENIAN: “Do you see then, dear legislator,” we might say, |690d| playing with one of those who too readily approaches the task of establishing laws,

“how many titles to rule there are, and how they are naturally opposed to each other? For now we’ve discovered a sort of source for factions, which you must provide medical treatment for. First, though, investigate with us |690d5| how the kings of Argos and Messene erred in these titles, and so destroyed themselves and the power of the Greeks, which at that time was so amazing. Wasn’t it because they were ignorant of what Hesiod had most correctly |690e| said, that ‘the half is often greater than the whole’?56 He thought that when it is harmful to get the whole, and the half constitutes proper measure,57 then proper measure is more (that is, better) than what is not proper measure (that is, worse).” |690e5| CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely correct. ATHENIAN: Do we suppose that on each occasion this error first arises and causes destruction among the kings, or among the people?58 CLEINIAS: It is probably, as most cases suggest, a disease of kings, |691a| whose self-indulgent living makes them arrogant. ATHENIAN: Isn’t it clear, then, that it was this that had hold of the kings at that time, namely, the desire to have a larger share59 than the established laws allowed, and in what they praised in word and oath, they were not in concord with themselves. Instead, the discord, |691a5| which we have said is the greatest sort of ignorance (though seeming to be {90} wisdom [sophia]), because of striking a false note60 and showing a sharp want of musical education, destroyed everything. CLEINIAS: Yes, probably so. ATHENIAN: Well then, what should the legislator have established at that time |691b| to guard against the birth of this affliction? God knows, it takes no wisdom at all to know the answer at this point, nor is it difficult to state it— although if it had been possible to foresee it back then, the one foreseeing it would have been wiser than we are, wouldn’t he? |691b5| CLEINIAS: What do you mean? ATHENIAN: If you look at what happened to your people, Megillus, it is now possible to know the answer and, knowing it, to say what should have happened back then. MEGILLUS: Speak in a yet more perspicuous way, please. |691b10|

ATHENIAN: Well then, the most perspicuous way to put it would be as follows . . . MEGILLUS: How? ATHENIAN: If someone goes against proper measure and gives what is too big to what is too small, |691c| whether sails to ships, nourishment to bodies, or ruling offices to souls, he will, I take it, overturn everything, and, bursting forth exuberantly,61 some things run to disease, others to the injustice born of wanton aggression. So, what in the world are we saying? Isn’t it something like this: There is no |691c5| mortal soul, my dear friends, whose nature is ever able to bear the greatest sort of rule over human beings when it is young and not accountable to anyone, with the result that its thought becomes filled with the greatest disease, |691d| which is ignorance, and it incurs the hatred of its closest friends, and this, once it happens, quickly destroys it, and does away with all its power. It is characteristic of great legislators to guard against this by knowing what constitutes proper measure. So, that this did occur back then, |691d5| is the most properly measured guess to make now. But in point of fact it seems as if there was . . . MEGILLUS: What? {91} ATHENIAN:  .  .  . some god taking care of you, who, foreseeing the future, engendered twin kings for you from a single line,62 trimming its sails more toward what constitutes proper measure. And after this, |691e| as a further step, some human nature, having been mixed with a sort of divine power, seeing that your ruling office was still feverish, mixed the temperate power of old age with the self-willed strength of the royal line, |692a| and on the greatest matters gave the twenty-eight elders a vote equal to the power of the kings. Your “third savior,”63 seeing that your ruling office was still swollen with wanton aggression and spiritedness, put a sort of bridle on it with the power of the ephors—a power which came close |692a5| to being selected by lot.64 And so, according to this account, your kingship, having become a mixture of what was needed, and achieving proper measure, saved itself and became a savior for the others. If it had been left to Temenos, Cresophontes, and the |692b| legislators of that time, whoever the people doing the legislating actually were, even Aristodemus’65 part would

never have been saved. You see, they were not sufficiently experienced in legislation. For otherwise they would scarcely have ever thought that they could keep proper measure in a young soul by means of oaths, once it got hold of a ruling office that could potentially |692b5| become a tyranny. Now, though, the god has shown what was needed, and what is needed still, to produce a ruling office that is as stable as possible. For us to know these things now, |692c| as I said earlier,66 takes no wisdom at all, since to see them from the model isn’t difficult. But if someone had foreseen these things back then, and had produced ruling offices that observed proper measure, and had made one out of three, he would have saved all the fine plans back then, and |692c5| there would never have been the Persian expedition against Greece67 or any other expedition either, because of our being despised as of insignificant worth. CLEINIAS: That’s true. ATHENIAN: In any case, Cleinias, the way the Greeks repulsed them was shameful. |692d| When I say, “shameful,” I don’t mean to deny that the {92} people back then were victorious and won fine victories on land and sea. No, when I say something was shameful back then, what I mean is this, that of these cities, which were three in number, only one defended Greece, |692d5| whereas the other two were so badly corrupted that one of them68 even hindered Sparta from aiding in the defense by fighting against it with all its might, while the other, the city of Argos, which held first place at that time (that is, when the division was made), although called upon to ward off |692e| the barbarian, neither heeded the request nor contributed to the defense. There are many things one could tell about what happened back then in that war, on the basis of which one could make accusations against Greece that are not at all honorable. Indeed, even if one were to say that Greece defended itself, one would not be speaking correctly. On the contrary, if |692e5| the joint determination of the Athenians and the Spartans hadn’t warded off the imminent slavery, the Greek races would by now |693a| be pretty much all mixed in with each other, and barbarians mixed in with Greeks, and Greeks with barbarians, like the peoples now ruled tyrannically by the Persians, who, having been dispersed and then jumbled together, live miserably in scattered communities.

These are the things, Cleinias and |693a5| Megillus, for which we can censure the so-called politicians and legislators of old, as well as those of today, in order that we may investigate their causes and discover what should have been done differently. |693b| And so in the present case we said the following, that they should not have made great and unmixed ruling offices part of their legislation, but thought of something like this: that a city must be free,69 wise, and a friend to itself, and that the legislator should legislate with a view to these things. |693b5| (By the way, we mustn’t be surprised if on several occasions before now we have established aims that we’ve said the legislator must look to when he makes his laws, but that the aims do not appear to us to be the same |693c| on each occasion. Instead, one must rationally calculate as follows: when we said he must legislate with a view to temperance, or to wisdom, or to friendship, these aims are not distinct, but the same,70 and we mustn’t be discombobulated if many other expressions of this sort crop up.) |693c5| CLEINIAS: We’ll try to do so as we go back over the arguments. But for now, tell us what you wished to say about the friendship, wisdom, and freedom that the legislator must aim at. |693d| {93} ATHENIAN: Well then, listen. There are, as it were, two motherconstitutions, from which it would be correct for someone to say that all the others are born, and to call one monarchy would be correct, and the other democracy, and to say that the Persian race has reached the peak of the former, |693d5| that of my people, of the latter. And practically all the others, as I said,71 are variations of these. A constitution must—and it is an essential thing—participate in both of them if indeed there is to be freedom and friendship together with wisdom. This is what our argument wishes to |693e| prescribe for us, when it says that no city will ever be correctly governed if it is without a share in these. CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: One of the two was pleased more than it should be |693e5| with monarchy alone, and the other with freedom, and so neither possessed the proper measures of these, whereas your constitutions, the Spartan and the Cretan, did so more. The Athenians and Persians of old also did so in a way, but now do so less. But let’s go through the causes of this, shall we? |694a|

CLEINIAS: By all means—if, that is, we are going to proceed with what we proposed. ATHENIAN: Let’s listen to it then. The Persians under Cyrus,72 since they possessed the proper measure of slavery, and freedom to a higher degree, first became free themselves and then became despotic masters of many others. |694a5| For the rulers gave a share of their freedom to the ruled and drew them toward equality, and as a result the soldiers were more friendly toward the generals and displayed more eagerness in the face of dangers. |694b| And further, if someone among them was wise and capable of giving advice, the king wasn’t envious, but granted him freedom of speech, and honored those capable of giving advice about any matter, so that a person was willing to share his capacity for wisdom in public. And so everything |694b5| advanced for them back then, due to freedom, friendship, and a shared understanding (nous). CLEINIAS: Yes, things probably did happen somewhat as you describe. {94} ATHENIAN: How exactly, then, was this destroyed under Cambyses, and |694c| practically saved again under Darius?73 Do you wish us to think it out by use of a sort of prophecy? CLEINIAS: In any case, this would help us pursue the investigation we’ve begun. |694c5| ATHENIAN: I “prophesize,”74 then, that Cyrus, though in other respects a good general and a friend to his city, had no grasp at all of correct education, and never paid attention to household management. CLEINIAS: Why would we say something like that? ATHENIAN: It seems that from youth on he spent his life in the army, and |694d| handed over his children to his women to nurture. And they brought them up as if they were happy, straight from childhood, blessed from the moment they were born, and in need of nothing. And, on the supposition they were fully happy, allowed no one to oppose them |694d5| in anything, and compelled everyone to praise whatever the children said or did, and in this way brought them up to be the sort of people they were. CLEINIAS: A fine nurturing, by the sound of it!

ATHENIAN: A womanish one, given by women of the royal family who had newly |694e| become rich, and were nurturing the children in the absence of the men who, due to wars and other dangers, did not have the leisure for it. CLEINIAS: Yes, that makes sense. ATHENIAN: Their father, for his part, kept acquiring flocks and herds, as well as bands of men and many other sorts of creatures, on their behalf, but he was ignorant of the fact that the ones he was going to give these things to |695a| were not being educated in the father’s craft, which was Persian and— for the Persians are shepherds, offspring of a harsh land—a hard one, sufficient to produce very strong shepherds, capable of camping out and keeping awake on watch, and ready to be soldiers |695a5| if being a soldier was needed. In any case, he failed to see that women and eunuchs had given his sons the education of a Mede,75 one that had {95} been ruined by their so-called happiness, and that, as a result, they had turned out to be as one would expect, after having being brought up |695b| in a licentious way. When, then, his children, having been fed to bursting with self-indulgence and licentiousness, took over from Cyrus after his death, first, one killed the other, because he could not bear the idea of an equal. After that, the one who remained, maddened by drunkenness and lack of education, |695b5| lost his rule to the Medes and the one they called “the Eunuch,”76 who despised the foolishness of Cambyses. CLEINIAS: That’s what is said to have happened, anyway, and it probably did happen more or less this way. |695c| ATHENIAN: Yes, and it is said too, I believe, that rule passed back into the hands of the Persians due to Darius and the Seven.77 CLEINIAS: Of course. |695c5| ATHENIAN: Let’s look at it by following along with the argument. You see, Darius was not the son of a king, and was not brought up with an indulgent education. Having set out to rule, and having seized the empire with the aid of six others, he divided it into seven parts (faint and shadowy traces of the division still remain to this day). He thought it fitting to manage things by establishing laws that |695c10| introduced a sort of general equality. He bound by law |695d| the tribute promised to the Persians by Cyrus, bringing about friendship and communality among all the Persians, and winning over the

Persian people with money and gifts. So his army had goodwill toward him and won him new territory, no less than that bequeathed by |695d5| Cyrus. After Darius came Xerxes, who was once again brought up and educated with a royal and indulgent education. (“Darius,” it is presumably most just to say, “you did not learn from the mistake of Cyrus and brought up Xerxes in the same habits |695e| as Cyrus did Cambyses!”) And Xerxes, inasmuch as he was an offspring of the same sorts of education, ended up suffering a similar fate to Cambyses. And since then, hardly a single truly “great” king has arisen among the Persians, except in name.78 But the cause |695e5| of this, according to my argument, is not luck, but rather the evil life lived, for the most part, by the children of exceedingly rich and tyrannical people. |696a| For no child, man, or old man ever became outstanding in virtue from such a nurturing. And these, {96} we say, are matters that the legislator must investigate and that we must do so now in our present argument. Yet it is just, Spartans, to concede this at least to your city, |696a5| you make no distinctions between poverty and wealth, private individual and king, when you distribute honors and nurturing—with the exception of those determined at the start by the divine oracle of a certain god.79 |696b| For certainly with regard to a city, at least, there should be no exceptional honors conferred on someone simply because he is exceedingly rich, any more than if he is an exceedingly fast runner, beautiful, or strong, if he lacks a certain virtue—nor if he has a virtue, but temperance is absent.80 |696b5| MEGILLUS: What do you mean, Stranger? ATHENIAN: Courage, I take it, is one part of virtue? MEGILLUS: Of course. ATHENIAN: Then, you be the judge yourself, now that you’ve heard the argument: Would you welcome someone as a member of your household or as a neighbor who, though very |696b10| courageous, was not temperate but rather intemperate? MEGILLUS: God forbid! |696c| ATHENIAN: What about a craftsman, wise in his own field, but unjust? MEGILLUS: Not at all.

ATHENIAN: But surely justice does not spring up separately from temperance. MEGILLUS: How could it? ATHENIAN: Nor does the one we’ve just put forward as wise,81 the one who has pleasures and pains that are consonant with and follow the correct reasons. |696c10| MEGILLUS: No, he certainly doesn’t. ATHENIAN: Further, then, let’s also investigate this with regard to which honors in cities are correctly and not correctly conferred on each occasion. |696d| {97} MEGILLUS: What? ATHENIAN: If temperance existed alone in some soul without all the rest of virtue,82 would it be right to honor it or to dishonor it? MEGILLUS: I don’t know how to respond. |696d5| And yet you’ve given a properly measured response anyway. For if you’d given either of the answers I suggested, you would, it seems to me, have spoken out of tune. MEGILLUS: My reply turned out all right, then! ATHENIAN: So far, so good. The fact is that what is an appendage to the things that merit honor or dishonor isn’t worthy of words, but worthy of wordless silence. |696e| ATHENIAN:

MEGILLUS: You appear to me to be speaking of temperance. ATHENIAN: Yes. As for the rest, the most correct way to assign honors would be to honor most the thing that, when combined with this appendage, gives us the greatest benefit, |696e5| and second most, the second greatest. And, likewise, if the rest were honored in succession in accord with this ratio, each would be honored correctly. MEGILLUS: That’s right. |697a| ATHENIAN: Well then, won’t we assert again83 that this assignment is a task for the legislator? MEGILLUS: Certainly.

ATHENIAN: Do you wish us to leave it to him to assign everything for each deed |697a5| in detail, while we, having something of an appetite for laws ourselves, try to make a threefold division, distinguishing separately the greatest things, and the ones that come second and third? MEGILLUS: By all means. ATHENIAN: We say, then, that in all likelihood a city that is going to |697a10| be preserved and become happy, to the extent that human powers allow, must —and |697b| it is a necessary thing—assign honors and dishonors in the correct way. And the correct way is to consider the things that lie in the soul as the most honorable and the first ones, provided temperance is present in it; second, the fine and good things that have to do with {98} the body; and, third, |697b5| the so-called goods having to do with property and money.84 If some legislator or city departs from these by advancing money to a position of honor, or by placing one of the lower-ranked goods in a more honorable position, |697c| he would do a thing that is neither pious nor befitting a politician.85 Shall we let these be the things said by us, or what? MEGILLUS: Certainly, let them be said as things perspicuous. ATHENIAN: Our investigation of the Persian constitution |697c5| made us speak about these matters at length. And we discovered that year by year they got worse, and we say the cause is that by going too far in depriving the people of freedom, and by bringing in more despotism than is fitting, they destroyed the friendship and sense of community in the city. And once this is ruined, |697d| the policy of the rulers is no longer devised for the sake of the ruled and the people, but rather for the sake of their own rule. And if they suppose that even a little more will be theirs, when the occasion arises, they lay waste cities, lay waste friendly nations and destroy them with fire, and as a result |697d5| hate and are hated with a hostile and pitiless hatred. When they come to need their peoples to fight for them, they find no sense of community among them, and no willingness or eagerness to face danger and fight. Although they are despotic masters of countless thousands of subjects, |697e| they possess none that is of any use in war, so they have to hire men, as if they had no men of their own, and think that they can somehow save themselves by relying on mercenaries and foreign people. And in addition to these things they are compelled to be so ignorant as to

declare by their deeds that |698a| the things said to be “honorable” and “fine” according to the city are in each and every case mere trash in comparison to gold and silver. MEGILLUS: Absolutely. ATHENIAN: About matters having to do with the Persians, then, let our conclusion be this: |698a5| that as things stand they are not correctly managed because of an excess of slavery and despotism. MEGILLUS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: Next, we must go through matters having to do with the constitution of Attica in the same way, showing how complete freedom |698a10| {99} from all rule is to no small degree worse than a properly measured degree |698b| of rule by others. You see, at the time of the Persian attack on Greece,86 and equally against practically all the settlements in Europe, there was an ancient constitution,87 with ruling offices based on four property classes.88 In it too was a sort of despotic mistress, |698b5| shame,89 due to whom we were willing to live as slaves to the laws that existed then. In addition, too, the emerging magnitude of the expeditionary force, both on land and on sea threw us into a helpless state of fear, which made us even more enslaved to the rulers and the laws. |698c| And due to all these things together a very strong feeling of friendship toward each other arose. For roughly ten years before the battle of Salamis, Datis arrived leading a Persian expeditionary force, sent by Darius expressly against the Athenians and Eretrians, |698c5| with orders to lead them back as slaves, threatening him with death if he failed to do so.90 In a short time, indeed, Datis with his countless thousands completely overpowered the Eretrians, |698d| and then sent frightening word to our city that not one of the Eretrians had escaped him, since the soldiers of Datis had actually joined hands to form a dragnet and swept Eretria clean. This word, whether true |698d5| or otherwise, terrified the other Greeks, and in particular the Athenians. They sent embassies everywhere for aid, but no one was willing to come except the Spartans. |698e| But they, due to the war they were {100} waging at the time against Messene, and maybe prevented by something else (for we don’t

know what was said), arrived one day too late for the battle that took place at Marathon.91 After this, reports came in constantly of vast preparations and numerous threats on the part of the Persian king. As time went by, it was reported that Darius had died and that his impetuous young son92 had inherited the rule, and was in no way disposed to abandon the effort. The Athenians supposed that all these preparations were directed against |699a| them, because of what had happened at Marathon. When they heard of the canal being dug at Athos, the Hellespont being bridged, and how many ships there were, they believed that there was no salvation for them either on land or sea. For |699a5| they believed that no one would come to their aid, remembering how even on the previous occasion, when Eretria had been destroyed, no one had come to their aid or dared to be allied with them. Hence they expected the same thing to happen this time, on land anyway, and |699b| on the sea too they could see no way for their salvation, with more than a thousand ships coming against them. The one hope of salvation they thought of, though slender and desperate, was the only one there was. They looked at what had happened previously and realized that victory in a battle on that occasion too had appeared to emerge |699b5| from a situation that was desperate. Borne up by this hope, they found their refuge to lie in themselves alone and in the gods.93 All these things, then, produced in them a feeling of friendship toward each other. |699c| One was the fear that they faced at that moment, the other the fear that sprang from the laws they had of old, which they possessed due to their enslavement to those early laws, and which we have often in the foregoing accounts called “shame,”94 and said that those who are going to be good must be enslaved to it, |699c5| whereas the coward is free and without fear of it. But if this cause of fear had not taken hold then, they would never have banded together to defend themselves, never have defended their temples, their tombs, their fatherland, not to mention their relatives and friends, as they did when they came to {101} their aid then. Instead, dealt with piecemeal, |699d| we’d have been scattered and distributed, each one of us, to one place or another.95

MEGILLUS: Yes, what you say is absolutely correct, Stranger, and spoken in a manner befitting yourself and your fatherland. ATHENIAN: It is befitting, Megillus. For it is just to tell you about what happened at |699d5| that time, you who share the natural character of your forefathers. But now you and Cleinias must consider whether what we’re speaking about has anything to do with legislation. You see, I’m not going through it for the sake of telling stories. Look: |699e| in a certain way the same calamity happened to us as happened to the Persians, though they led the people into total slavery, whereas we led the majority in the opposite direction, toward total freedom. So our earlier arguments |699e5| are in a way apt for showing us how to proceed and what to say. MEGILLUS: Well said! But do try to explain yet more perspicuously |700a| what you are saying now. ATHENIAN: All right. Under our ancient laws, my friends, the people were not in control of anything, but were in a way voluntary slaves of the laws. |700a5| MEGILLUS: What laws are you talking about? ATHENIAN: First, the ones concerning music back then, in order that we may go through, from its starting-point, the excessive increase in the freedom of life.96 In those days, our music was divided in accord with its forms and schemes.97 One form of song consisted of prayers |700b| to the gods, these were called “hymns.” Opposite to this was another form of song, which one might well have called “laments.” Paeans98 were another. And another, which was about the birth of Dionysus, I think, was called a “dithyramb.”99 And they gave the name “nomes”100 |700b5| {102} to another kind of song— which was said to be suited to accompaniment on the lyre. Once these, and certain others, had been put in place, to use one form of melody in a song of another kind was not allowed. And as for the controlling element that knew about these matters, |700c| used its knowledge to judge them, and penalized anyone who disobeyed, it was not, as is the case today, the catcalls and unmusical shouts of the majority, nor the applause that assigns praise. On the contrary, those with an education made it a rule, where they were concerned, to listen |700c5| in silence to the end,

while the children, their attendants, and the general mob were kept in order by the threat of the official’s rod. The majority of the citizens, then, were willing to be ruled in an orderly way in these matters, |700d| and did not have the audacity to pass judgment by their noise. But later, as time passed, the poets—who, though by nature creative people, were ignorant about the justice and law of the Muse— became rulers of an unmusical lawlessness. In a sort of Bacchic frenzy, |700d5| and more in the grip of pleasure than they should have been, they mingled together laments with hymns, paeans with dithyrambs, even imitating on the flute songs suited to accompaniment on the lyre, and bringing everything together with everything. Due to their ignorance, they involuntarily told lies about music, implying that |700e| in music there is no place whatsoever for correctness, and that it was most correct to judge it by the pleasure it gives to the one who enjoys it, regardless of whether he is better or worse. By composing works of this sort, and adding words of the same sort, they inspired in the mass of people a lawless attitude toward |700e5| music, and the audacity to suppose that they were competent to pass judgment. Hence audiences have become noisy instead of quiet, on the supposition that they are experts |701a| on what is fine in music and what is not. And in place of an aristocracy in music, a sort of wicked “theatocracy” arose. For even if a sort of democracy had indeed emerged in a music of liberally educated men101 alone, what happened wouldn’t have been altogether terrible. But as it was, the belief that everyone is wise in {103} every sort of wisdom (sophia) started for us in music, |701a5| as did lawlessness, and freedom followed along with them. For people became fearless, on the supposition that they were knowers, and the lack of fear engendered shamelessness. For being so rash as not to fear the opinion of a better person is practically the same as |701b| wicked shamelessness, and is due to a too presumptuous freedom. MEGILLUS: What you say is absolutely true. ATHENIAN: Next in succession to this freedom would come the one consisting in not being willing |701b5| to be enslaved to the rulers; following it, escape from the slavery and admonition of fathers, mothers, and those

who are older; next to last, seeking not to obey the laws; and right at the very end is when they pay no heed to oaths, promises, |701c| and the gods in general, but exhibit and imitate the ancient Titanic102 nature we’re told about, and, returning again to that old condition, they spend miserable eons without any respite from evils. What, again, is the purpose of our having said these things? |701c5| Well, it appears to me at least that one must pull up the argument short every now and then, just like a horse, and not, as if it had no bridle in its mouth, allow oneself to be forcibly carried along by the argument, and so—in accord with the proverb—fall from the ass. Instead, one must raise again the question |701d| just asked—“What is the point of our having said these things?” MEGILLUS: Excellent. ATHENIAN: Well, the purpose is what he said earlier. MEGILLUS: Which was what? |701d5| ATHENIAN: We said103 that the legislator must aim at three things when making his laws: that the city for which he legislates be free, that it be a friend to itself, and that it have understanding (nous). These were the aims, weren’t they? MEGILLUS: Certainly. |701d10| ATHENIAN: It was for this purpose that we chose from among the constitutions the most despotic and the freest ones,104 and are now investigating |701e| {104} which of these is correctly governed. When we took a sort of properly measured example of each of them, for the Persians in the case of despotic rule, for the Athenians in the case of free rule, we saw that then well-being105 was produced to an exceptional degree |701e5| in these. But when either was carried to its extreme—the one lot toward slavery, the other toward its opposite—it was not to the advantage of either one. MEGILLUS: That’s absolutely true. |702a| ATHENIAN: It was also for this purpose that we looked at the settlement of the Dorian encampment, at Dardanus’ settlement in the foothills by the sea, the first survivors of the disaster, and further our arguments concerning

music and drunkenness that were produced before these, and the things that came even before that.106 All these things have been discussed for the purpose of seeing just how a city might best be managed, and how a private individual might best spend his own life. |702b| But as to whether we have produced anything useful for that purpose, is there possibly some test, Megillus and Cleinias, that we could state for ourselves? CLEINIAS: I, it seems to me, Stranger, do perceive one. It seems that |702b5| some stroke of luck has produced for us the subjects of all the arguments we’ve gone through. For I, for my part, have pretty much come to the point of needing them, and so you, as well as Megillus here, have come along at an opportune time. For I won’t hide from you what is going on with me at the moment, |702c| but will treat this as a sort of omen. You see, the greater part of Crete is attempting to found a colony and has assigned supervision of the project to the people of Cnossos. And the city of Cnossos has assigned it to myself and nine other people. |702c5| It instructed us to establish the same laws as the ones here, if any of these satisfy us, but if some from elsewhere do, we should take no account of their being foreign, provided they appear to be better. So let’s now do ourselves—both me and you—a favor. By making a selection from the things that have been said, let’s construct a city in |702d| speech,107 as if we were founding it from the start. And so, it will be an {105} investigation of what we are inquiring into, while at the same time I may perhaps make use of our construction for the future city. |702d5| That’s certainly good news,108 Cleinias. And unless Megillus has some objection, you may take it that I for my part will do all in my power to fall in with your understanding (nous) of things. CLEINIAS: Well said. MEGILLUS: Yes, I too am at your service. |702d10| ATHENIAN:

CLEINIAS: Very good of you to say so! Then let’s try, in words first of all, |702e| to found the city.     1. See 625a6n.

2. Cf., e.g., Ar. Cael. 270b19–20, Mete. 339b27–29, Met. 1074b10–14, Pol. 1329b25–30. 3. Probably the flood associated with Deucalion, the son of Prometheus. See Ti. 22a–e, Crit. 109c–111d. 4. Pleonexias: See 906c. 5. Daedalus: Legendary sculptor of great skill. His statues were so lifelike that they moved around by themselves just like living things (see Euthphr. 11b–c, Hp. Ma. 282a, Ion 533a– b, Men. 97d). Orpheus: See 669d5n. Palamedes: Greek hero of the Trojan War credited with the invention of numbers, writing, and law (see Ap. 41b, Phdr. 261b, Rep. 522d). Marsyas: A mythical satyr, part human, part animal. He was flayed alive by Apollo for challenging him to a flute contest and losing; Olympos was his student (Smp. 215a–c). Amphion: Legendary musician, mentioned at Grg. 485e, 506b. 6. See 642d5n. 7. What Epimenides invented was a mixture of mallow and asphodel that took away people’s hunger and thirst. See Hesiod, Op. 40–41, 658d7n. 8. Gennaiotata: “An animal is well-bred (eugenes) if it comes from good stock, it is true to its stock (gennaios) in not being a degeneration from its own nature” (Ar. HA 488b18–20). 9. Euêtheian: Euêtheia is the opposite of kakoêtheia, which means “cynicism.” The literal meaning of the terms is “with well-disposed character” and “with badly disposed character.” See Rep. 336c1–2. 10. Periodou: A periodos is here the interval between one flood or disaster and another. 11. Since writing hadn’t been invented, these were unwritten and so needed no legislator. See 793b–793e. 12. Dunasteian: A dunasteia (often translated as “autocracy”) is a hereditary oligarchy in which not the law but the officials rule. See Ar. Pol. 1292b5–10. It is mentioned at Rep. 544d1. 13. Homer, Od. 9.112–115. 14. Poleis: In the loose rather than strict sense of the term. See 624b2n, Brisson-Pradeau-1, p. 364 n22. 15. Poleôn: Again, in the loose sense, roughly equivalent to the extended household in which the oldest rules. 16. Homer, Il. 20.216–218. “He” is Dardanus, son of Zeus (see 702a3); Ida is Mount Ida. 17. See Ion 533c–534e, and on the Muses, Phdr. 259c–e. 18. On the translation of this paragraph, see Saunders-2, pp. 13–14. 19. The idea that the Dorians were renamed Achaeans seems to be original with Plato. Cf. Thuc. 1.12.1–4. 20. See 636e. 21. See 628e, 632d. 22. Ethnos: An ethnos occupied a larger territory than a city and had a larger population and a less tight political order. It need not have had a single town or urban center and may have consisted of many scattered villages. 23. The four are (1) single families under dynastic rule, (2) collections of families under aristocratic or kingly rule, (3) cities settled in the plains with various constitutions, and (4) a league of such cities. 24. I.e., the summer solstice, when the day is longest. The god is the sun, Helios.

25. The reference is unclear, but perhaps 626d–627c (or 682d–e) is meant. Cf. Rep. 545d. 26. See Grg. 521d–522a, Pol. 292c–d. 27. Mê kinein ta akinêta: See 736d1, 843a1, 912b9, Tht. 181a8. 28. See 688c. 29. See 769a1. 30. See 625b. 31. See Cri. 52e–53a. 32. “Ninos” is the Greek name for the founder of the Assyrian empire, whose capital, Nineveh, is named for him. 33. The king of Persia, emblematic of absolute rule. 34. According to Homer, Il. 5.638–642, Heracles conquered Troy a generation before the Trojan War. 35. Agamemnon and Menelaus. 36. See 682d–e. 37. See 685a. 38. See Euthd. 289a–b. 39. See 662d4. 40. Omitting ὡς αὐτός φησιν ὁ λόγος (“as the argument itself suggests”) with BrissonPradeau-1. See England-1, p. 372. 41. In Euripides, Hippolytus, Theseus’ wife, Phaedra, falsely accused her stepson Hippolytus of trying to seduce her. The revengeful prayer of Theseus for his son’s destruction was answered before he could discover the truth. 42. See 630a–b, 631c. On the textual difficulties in the final clause, see England-1, p. 373, Saunders-2, p. 14. 43. See 626b–c. 44. See 653a7–8n. 45. Reading βασιλειῶν with England-1 for Budé βασιλέων (“kings”). See 684a2. 46. Ta megista: See Ap. 29d–30b. 47. Amathian: Amathia here and at 689a8, anoia at 689b3. 48. See 644e–645c. 49. Plêmelestatas: See 691a7. 50. Where it is what Aristotle calls “craft incompetence (atechnia)” (NE 1140a21). 51. See Grg. 511c. 52. Despotas: Despoteia is the rule of masters over slaves. 53. See 714b–715a. 54. Pindar (5th cent. BC) lyric poet. The poem referred to is no longer extant, but the relevant lines are summarized at 715a1–2 and quoted at Grg. 484b: Law, the king of all, Of mortals and the immortal gods, Brings on and renders just what has most force. See Dodds, pp. 271–272 for discussion. 55. See 756e, 759b, contrast Rep. 557a. On points of translation, see Saunders-2, pp. 14– 15. 56. Hesiod (c. 700 BC) was one of the oldest known Greek poets. His works, like those of Homer, played a substantial role in Greek education. Plato quotes Op. 40. See Rep. 466b–c.

57. To metrion: The notion of proper measure, relating as it does to mathematics and music, is systematically important in Lg. and has for that reason been for the most part rendered consistently. Other meanings include “moderate,” “reasonable,” “tolerable,” “fitting.” See LSJ s.v. μέτριος. 58. See Rep. 545c–d. 59. Pleonektein: See 906c. 60. Plêmmeleian: As at 689b7. 61. Exubrizonta: The verb exubrizein, which primarily means “break out into wanton aggression,” here has the more general meaning in which it applies to bodies that break out from overfeeding and plants that burst out in overluxuriant growth. See LSJ s.v. ἐξυβρίζω. Notice hubreôs (“wanton aggression”) in the next line. 62. Namely, Eurysthenes and Procles. See 683d7–8. 63. The first toast at a banquet was to the Olympian Zeus, the third to Zeus the Savior. See Rep. 583b. 64. The dual kingship, elders, and ephors are discussed in Ar. Pol. 1270b6–1271a26. 65. Father of Procles and Eurysthenes, being thought of as the first Spartan king. 66. At 691b. 67. In 490 BC and 480 BC. Described in Hdt. Books 5–9. 68. I.e., Messene. See 968d–e. 69. First time mentioned as a legislative aim. See Rep. 590e–591a. 70. Since the aim is virtue entire. See 630a–631d. 71. A reference, apparently, to 683e–684b. 72. Cyrus the Great was the first ruler of the Persian empire (559–529 BC). See Menex. 239d–e and Xen. Cyr. 7–8. 73. Cambyses was king of Persia (530–522 BC). See Herod. 3.1–38, 61–66. Darius was his successor (521–486 BC). 74. Manteuomai: “What happened in the past, which is scientifically knowable ‘even to prophets,’ as Epimenides the Cretan said (for he used to ‘prophesize’ not about the future but about things that happened in the past that were unclear)” (Ar. Rh. 1418a23–26). 75. I.e., one suited to a life of indulgence. 76. The false Smerdis, Gomates. See Herod. 3.61–66. 77. See Herod. 3.68–89. 78. See 685c6n. 79. I.e., Apollo. See 624a4–5. 80. See 661e6–662a3. 81. See 689c–e. 82. See 710a5–b2. 83. See 631e. 84. See Grg. 477b. 85. I.e., in the correct sense of the term. See 628d6. 86. Also described in Menex. 239d–241e. 87. The constitution is that of Solon (c. 640–560 BC), described in Ar. Ath. 5–12. 88. “Solon at any rate seems to have given the people only the very minimum power necessary—that of electing and inspecting officials (since if they do not even control these,

the people would be slave and enemy of the constitution). But he drew all the officials from among the notable and rich, namely, from the pentakosiomedimnoi, the zeugitai, and the third, the so-called hippeis, whereas the fourth, the thetes, had a share in no office” (Ar. Pol. 1274a15–21). The pentakosiomedimnoi were those whose property produced at least five hundred measures (medimnoi) of corn, olive oil, or wine. The zeugitai were those whose property produced three hundred measures of these things, and so they were able to maintain a team of oxen (zeugos). The hippeis were those whose property produced two hundred measures, and so they could keep a horse and fight as cavalrymen (hippeis). Since these divisions were based solely on wealth or property, not on lineage, they allowed the sort of upward mobility that the earlier lineage system effectively excluded. 89. Aidôs: See 646e–647c, 699c. 90. The Athenians defeated the Persians in a sea battle near the island of Salamis, off the coast of Attica (480 BC); Datis’ expedition arrived in 490 BC. See Herod. 6.94–120. Plato’s account is broadly similar, though differing in some details. Eretria in Euboea had assisted the Ionians (on the Mediterranean coast of Asia Minor) in their earlier revolt against Darius. See Herod. 5.28–38. 91. This famous battle took place in northeast Attica in the summer of 490 BC. In it the Athenians and Plateans defeated the Persians. See Herod. 6.106–113, Morrow-2, pp. 71– 73. 92. Xerxes (486–465 BC). 93. Perhaps a reference to Apollo, whose oracle at Delphi the Athenians sent to for advice. See Herod. 7.140–142. 94. Most recently at 698b6. 95. See 693a. 96. See Rep. 424b–d. 97. Schêmata: As we speak of rhyme schemes. In dance, schêmata are gestures. See 654e. 98. Paiôn (“healer”) is a title of Apollo, and a paean is often a prayer to Apollo for healing or deliverance, but it may also be a victory song, when deliverance has come, and may be offered to other gods, such as Artemis. See Barker, p. 19. 99. Dithurambos: A hymn to the god Dionysus (Bacchus), which shared in the frenzy that characterized his worship (see 700a5). On its effects, see Ar. Pol. 1342a1–11. 100. Nomous: Solo competition pieces, grouped into four kinds: songs accompanied by the singer on a lyre, instrumental solos for the lyre, songs accompanied by the flute, and instrumental solos for the flute. See Barker, pp. 249–255. Nomos also means “law” and so lends itself to puns of the sort found at, e.g., 775b4, 799e10. 101. Eleutherôn: A free (eleutheros) person is, in the first instance, someone who is not a slave. In this sense the farmer citizens of a democracy are free men. But a farmer must work in order to get the necessities of life—he is not a man of leisure. So there is another sense in which he is not free. But even a man of leisure may not be free of prejudice or have general good judgment, if he has not been liberally (eleutherôs) educated. Here this further sense of freedom seems to be the relevant one. 102. The Titans were overthrown by the Olympian gods and condemned to eternal punishment in Tartarus for their castration of Ouranos. See Hesiod, Th. 617–626, 716–735. 103. See 693b4–5. 104. See 693d–e.

105. Eupragia: Literally, “doing or acting well.” See 628d5n. 106. On the Dorian confederation, see 682e; on the settlements in the foothills (Troy), see 681e–682c; on the first survivors of the disaster, see 677a; on music, see 653a; and on drunkenness, see 637d, 645d, 652a. 107. See Rep. 472e–473b, 548c–d. 108. Ou polemon ge epaggelleis: Literally, “You’re certainly not declaring war.” A proverbial expression for good news. See scholiast on Phdr. 242b6 (Greene, p. 78).

{106} BOOK 4 ATHENIAN: Come on, then, what are we to understand that the city |704a| is going to be? I don’t mean what it is called now, or what name is going to be given to it, because that will presumably depend on some detail of its settlement, or its location, or its name might derive from some river or spring, or one of the local gods |704a5| that consents to give its renowned name to the new city. What I wish to ask about it is |704b| rather this: will it be by the sea or inland? CLEINIAS: The city we’re discussing at the moment is about eighty stades1 from the sea. ATHENIAN: What about harbors? Does it have any on its seaside, or is it entirely without harbors? CLEINIAS: It has good harbors on that side, Stranger, the best possible. |704b10| ATHENIAN: You don’t say!2 But what about the territory around it? |704c| Does it grow everything or is it deficient in some things? CLEINIAS: It’s deficient in pretty much nothing. ATHENIAN: Will there be any neighboring city nearby? CLEINIAS: None whatever. That’s why it is being founded. You see, an ancient |704c5| migration from the place has left the territory deserted for an inconceivably long time. ATHENIAN: What about plains, mountains, and forests? What share of each does it have? CLEINIAS: It’s alike in nature to Crete as a whole. |704d| ATHENIAN: Rugged, would you say, rather than flat? CLEINIAS: Exactly. ATHENIAN: It wouldn’t be a hopeless case, then, for the acquisition of virtue. For if it was right by the sea, with good harbors, |704d5| not growing {107} everything but deficient in many things, with such a nature, it would have needed some great savior, and some divine legislators to prevent it from coming to have many various and base habits. As things stand, though, there is encouragement in those eighty stades. But it is certainly nearer to

the sea than it should be—all the more so because you say it has good harbors. All the same, |705a| that’s something we must make the best of. For, though a territory’s proximity to the sea is pleasant enough for the purposes of daily life, in reality the sea is a “briny and bitter neighbor.”3 It fills the city with merchandizing and the moneymaking that comes with retail trade,4 and so breeds shifty and untrustworthy habits |705a5| in souls, and this makes the city untrustworthy and unfriendly to itself, and likewise to the rest of humanity. There’s encouragement in this regard, though, in the fact that the territory grows everything, while, because it is rugged, it clearly would not both grow much |705b| and grow everything at the same time. For, if it did, it would allow large exports, which would fill it with silver and gold currency in return. And, taking one thing with another, there is no greater evil, so to speak, when it comes to a city’s acquiring well-bred and just habits—as |705b5| we said in our earlier discussions, if you remember.5 CLEINIAS: Yes, we do remember, and we agree that what we said then was correct, and still is now. ATHENIAN: What about timber for shipbuilding,6 how well off is the territory in our location |705c| for that? CLEINIAS: There’s no fir worth mentioning, no pine, and not much cypress. And you won’t find much Aleppo pine or plane either, which are the trees it is necessary for shipbuilders |705c5| always to use for the interior parts of ships. ATHENIAN: This too may be no bad thing as regards the nature of the land. CLEINIAS: How so? {108} ATHENIAN: When the imitations are wicked, it’s a good thing |705c10| that a city cannot easily imitate its enemies. |705d| CLEINIAS: Which of the aforementioned things had you in mind in saying what you just said? ATHENIAN: You keep an eye on me, my marvelous friend!7 But look back what was said at the start, about the laws of Crete looking to one thing, and in particular at you two saying that |705d5| this was warfare, whereas I took you up on that point, saying that it was fine that such existing institutions

looked somehow to virtue, but that I could not at all assent to them when they looked only to a part of virtue, and not pretty much the whole of it. Now you two in turn must keep an eye on me as you follow the present legislation, |705e| in case I legislate something that doesn’t aim at virtue, or aims only at a part of virtue. For I propose that the only correctly established law is one that, just like an archer, always aims at this,8 namely, the thing that alone is uninterruptedly |706a| always accompanied by some fine result, and ignores all the rest, be it wealth or anything else of this sort, if it lacks what was just mentioned.9 Now the bad imitation of enemies I mentioned is the sort that occurs when someone lives by the sea and is troubled by enemies, as, for example—I say this not wishing to stir up bad memories—Minos once imposed a harsh tribute on the inhabitants of Attica.10 You see, he exercised great power |706b| at sea, whereas the Athenians did not yet possess the warships that they do today, nor a territory so well stocked with shipbuilding timber that they could easily supply themselves with naval power. So they were not able, through “naval imitation,” |706b5| to become sailors themselves right away and defend themselves against their enemies back then. For it would have been advantageous to have lost seven young people over and over again, rather than, from being hoplites11 {109} capable of standing their ground, becoming |706c| sailors, accustomed to leaping ashore constantly and then running back quickly onto their ships, believing that they are doing nothing shameful in not having the courage to stand and die when the enemy attacks. On the contrary, specious excuses are readily made for them |706c5| when they throw away their weapons and flee, in what are certainly “no shameful,” as they say, “flights.”12 These are the expressions of approval13 one is likely to get from hoplites skilled in seafaring, which merit not infinite and frequent praise, but the opposite. For people must never be habituated into wicked habits, |706d| least of all the best part of the citizenry. This at least could also, I take it, be gathered from Homer, that such practices are not fine ones. For his Odysseus reproached Agamemnon when |706d5| the Achaeans are being pressed hard in battle by the Trojans, and he orders them to drag the ships down to sea. Odysseus gets angry, and says: . . . [You must have lost your mind,]

Ordering us to launch ships while the battle is raging. |706e| The Trojans, who are winning as it is, Will have all their prayers answered, and our army Will be utterly crushed. Draw the ships To the sea, and the Greeks will be looking Over their shoulders and give up the fight. Your plan will ruin us, Lord Agamemnon.14 |707a|

So Homer also knew that it’s a bad idea to have triremes at sea in support of hoplites who are fighting a battle. Even lions could be habituated to flee from deer by furnishing them with these sorts of habits! What is more, cities whose power is due to their navies |707a5| do not award honors to the finest of their fighters once they are saved, since this is due to the craft of the captain, boatswain, rower, and, in fact, to a multifarious lot who are not at all excellent, |707b| so that one wouldn’t be capable of awarding honors to each individual correctly. And yet how could a constitution possibly be correct if it lacked this capacity?15 CLEINIAS: It’s {110} pretty much impossible. Nonetheless, Stranger, it was the |707b5| naval battle of the Greeks against the barbarians at Salamis that we Cretans, at least, say saved Greece. ATHENIAN: Yes, the majority of people, both Greek and barbarian, do indeed say these things. But what we say, my friend, myself and Megillus here, |707c| is that it was the land battles at Marathon and Plataea16—the former started the salvation of the Greeks, and the latter completed it. And these battles, we say, made the Greeks better, whereas those other battles (for to your Salamis |707c5| I would add the sea battle at Artemisium17) made them no better—if one may speak that way about battles that did help to secure our safety at the time. But be that as it may, what we are looking to at present, |707d| as we investigate the nature of the territory and the organization of the laws, is the virtue of the constitution, because we do not consider that the most valuable thing for human beings is survival and mere existence, as the majority of people do, but to become as good as possible and to remain so for as long a time as they may exist. This too was said, |707d5| I think, in our earlier discussions.18 CLEINIAS: Of course, it was.

ATHENIAN: Then let’s investigate this alone, whether we are still proceeding along the same path, which is the best one when it comes to founding cities and legislating for them. |707d10| CLEINIAS: Yes, by far the best one. ATHENIAN: Next, then, tell me this: What people |707e| will be your colonists? Will it be volunteers from all over Crete, as you’d expect if a mob of people, too great for the land’s food supply, has grown up in each of its cities? For I don’t suppose you’re collecting together every Greek who even wishes to come. Although |707e5| I see that some people from Argos and Aegina and from elsewhere in Greece have settled in your territory. But tell us now where |708a| you say the present encampment of citizens will come from. CLEINIAS: It seems that they’ll come from all over Crete; as for the other Greeks, it appears to me that fellow colonists from the Peloponnese will be admitted to citizenship. For in fact it’s true what you were {111} saying just now about people from Argos: |708a5| they include the most notable of the groups in Crete at the moment, the Gortynian, which is in fact a settlement from the Gortyn in the Peloponnese. ATHENIAN: The settlement wouldn’t be as easy |708b| for the cities involved, then, as when it occurs in the way bee swarms do, with one nationality coming from a single territory doing the settling, a friend coming from the land of friends, due to the pressures of land shortage, or compelled by other such conditions. And sometimes a part of a city |708b5| may be compelled by factional violence to migrate to some other place. It has even been known for a whole city to go into exile, utterly conquered in a war too great for it. In all these circumstances, |708c| to found a city and legislate for it is in one way comparatively easy, but in another more difficult. Having a single group, with the same language and the same laws, makes for a certain friendliness, because of sharing the same sacred rituals and everything of that sort. On the other hand, they do not readily accept |708c5| laws and constitutions different from their own, and sometimes, even when it is the wickedness of their laws that has factionalized them, because of habit, they still demand to employ the same customs that also ruined them in the past, and they become difficult for the one founding the city and legislating for it

to deal with and hard to persuade. |708d| By contrast, a multifarious lot that has flowed together into the same group would probably be more willing to obey new laws, whereas for it to “puff and pull” (as the saying goes) like a team of horses, man by man, in the same direction,19 requires much time and is very difficult. |708d5| Yes, it really is the case that legislation and founding cities is the most perfect of all tests of manly virtue. CLEINIAS: It probably is. But tell us more perspicuously what you have in mind in saying this. ATHENIAN: My good friend, if I return to investigating legislators, I’ll probably |708e| also have to say something bad about them. Still, if we say something opportune, it shouldn’t cause trouble. And yet, why exactly should I feel disgust at it? For, let me tell you, the same thing probably applies to practically all human affairs. |708e5| CLEINIAS: What are you talking about? ATHENIAN: I was going to say that no human being ever legislates anything, |709a| but that strokes of luck and accidents of every sort, happening {112} in every sort of way, legislate everything for us. For either some war violently overthrows constitutions and changes laws, or |709a5| it’s the distress of harsh poverty. Diseases, too, necessitate innovation in many cases, when epidemics befall us, and prolonged bad weather,20 often lasting many years. Foreseeing all these things, then, one might be eager to say precisely what I said just now, that no mortal ever legislates anything, but that practically |709b| all human affairs are matters of luck. And, it is possible to say these things also about the crafts of sailing, captaincy, medicine, and generalship, and to seem to be speaking correctly. But in fact one also again seems to be speaking equally correctly in speaking about these same things in this other way. |709b5| CLEINIAS: What way? ATHENIAN: That a god—and together with a god, luck and opportunity—is captain of all human affairs. One must concede, though, that these are accompanied by a third, gentler, thing—craft. For when, |709c| in the midst of a storm, it comes to co-operating or not with the opportune moment, I for my part would reckon the craft of captaincy a great advantage. Isn’t that so? CLEINIAS: It is.

ATHENIAN: So, the same argument would hold |709c5| in the same way for other cases, and this particular thing must be granted in the case of legislation. Along with the other things that must by way of luck coincide in a territory, if a city is ever going to be settled happily there, a legislator who holds fast to the truth must always come to the aid of it. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true. |709c10| ATHENIAN: So wouldn’t the one who, in each of the cases mentioned, possesses |709d| the craft also surely be able to pray in the correct way for the thing which, if it were by luck available to him, would need only the craft in addition? CLEINIAS: He certainly would. ATHENIAN: And if all the others mentioned just now were asked |709d5| to state their prayer, they could state it. Isn’t that so? CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: And so a legislator, I take it, could do the same. {113} CLEINIAS: I certainly think he could. ATHENIAN: “Come on, then, Legislator,” let’s say to him, “what |709d10| city should we give you and in what condition, so that, when you received it, |709e| you’d manage it satisfactorily from then on?” What’s the correct thing to say after that? Have we to speak on behalf of the legislator, or what? CLEINIAS: Yes. ATHENIAN: He will say this: “Give me a city under a tyranny, and let the tyrant be young, with a good memory, quick to learn, courageous, and by nature high-minded.”21 And the thing that we said earlier22 must accompany all the parts of virtue must now accompany the soul under tyranny, if |710a| its other qualities are going to be of any benefit. CLEINIAS: Temperance, it seems to me, Megillus, is what the Stranger is saying must be the accompaniment. Isn’t that so? ATHENIAN: Yes, Cleinias, at least in the popular sense,23 not the sort one |710a5| would speak of in a dignified way, by compelling temperance to be wisdom, but rather the sort that blooms innately from the outset in children and beasts, and due to which some lack self-control in the face of pleasures, while others have self-control. We said then24 that in isolation from the

other good things we were talking about it was not |710b| worth mentioning. You understand, I imagine, what I mean. CLEINIAS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: So let our tyrant possess this nature in addition to those other natural qualities, if the city is going to have, |710b5| in the quickest and best way possible, the constitution whose possession will make it happiest. For a quicker and better way of composing a constitution there neither is nor could ever be. CLEINIAS: In what way, and by what reason, Stranger, could someone persuade himself that in saying |710c| this he is speaking the truth? {114} ATHENIAN: Surely, it’s easy enough, Cleinias, to understand this at least, that it’s in accord with nature for it to be this way. CLEINIAS: What are you saying? If a tyrant were to arise, you mean, who is young, temperate, |710c5| quick to learn, with a good memory, courageous, and high-minded? ATHENIAN: And lucky, in addition—not with respect to other things, but in this, that in his lifetime there should arise a legislator worthy of praise, and that some stroke of luck should bring the two of them together.25 For if this should happen, pretty much all the things |710d| have been done by the god, the ones that he does when he wishes some city to do exceedingly well. Second best is where two such rulers arise. Then comes the third best, with three rulers. And so on, the difficulty increasing in proportion the more there are, and vice versa. |710d5| CLEINIAS: You mean, apparently, that the best city emerges from a tyranny, with an eminent legislator and a moderate tyrant, and that a city would be most easily and most quickly changed into the former from one of the latter sort. Second, would be from an oligarchy—wouldn’t it? And |710e| third, from a democracy. ATHENIAN: No, not at all. In the first place would be a change from tyranny; second, from a kingly constitution; and, third, from some sort of democracy.26 The fourth, oligarchy, would be able to admit of |710e5| the emergence of the best city with the greatest difficulty, because it has the greatest number of powerful individuals.27 No, the change occurs, we say, when there by nature arises a true legislator who comes to share a sort of

strength with the most powerful people in the city. If this were to happen when the latter are the smallest in number, but the strongest, |711a| as happens in the case of tyranny, there and then the change is likely to occur quickly and easily. CLEINIAS: How so? We don’t understand. ATHENIAN: And yet it has been said by us not once, I think, but many |711a5| times. But maybe you have never seen a city under a tyranny. {115} CLEINIAS: No, nor am I, personally, eager for the sight of one. ATHENIAN: And yet you’d see in it what we mentioned just now. |711b| CLEINIAS: What’s that? ATHENIAN: That when a tyrant wishes to change the habits of a city, he need not exert himself, nor does it take a vast amount of time. But what he does need to do is first proceed |711b5| himself in the direction that he wishes to urge the citizens, whether toward the practices of virtue, or toward the opposite, first sketching out everything in outline by his own actions, praising and honoring some things, while |711c| assigning blame to others, and dishonoring anyone who disobeys in any particular activity. CLEINIAS: And why are we to think that the other citizens will quickly follow someone who has adopted this sort of combination of persuasion and force? |711c5| Let no one persuade us, my friends, that there will ever be a quicker or easier way for a city to change its laws than through the leadership of its powerful individuals.28 Not now, nor at any time in the future. And indeed for us this is not impossible or even difficult to bring about. But |711d| what is difficult to bring about, and rarely occurs in the course of history, though when it does it brings innumerable—indeed, all— good things to the city in which it appears, is the following . . . CLEINIAS: What sort of occurrence are you talking about? |711d5| ATHENIAN:

ATHENIAN: Whenever a divine passion for temperate and just practices appears in some powerful individuals, whether they hold power based on monarchy, on outstanding superiority of wealth or birth, or because someone at the time happened to duplicate the nature of Nestor,29 |711e| who, they say, was outstanding among human beings for the strength of his

speech, but still more for his temperance. That, they say, was in the time of Troy. There has been nothing like that in our day. But if there ever has been, or will be, such a person, or is one now among us, |711e5| then he himself would live a blessedly happy life, and blessedly happy are those who are able to hear together the words coming from his temperate mouth. And the same argument applies to every sort of power: whenever the greatest power coincides in a human being with {116} wisdom and temperance, |712a| that is when the origin of the best constitution, with laws to match, is born.30 It will never come about in any other way. Consider this as being just like a story uttered in oracular fashion, showing that, in one way, it is difficult for a city with good laws to come |712a5| about, but in another way, if indeed what we described were to occur, it is the quickest and easiest thing of all, by far. CLEINIAS: How so? ATHENIAN: Let us old men, just like children, try to adapt |712b| our story to this city of yours, and mold the laws in words.31 CLEINIAS: Yes, let’s go on and not delay further. ATHENIAN: Then let’s invoke a god to aid us in constructing our city. Let him hear us, and having heard, graciously and with goodwill come to us, and |712b5| join us in setting the city and the laws in order. CLEINIAS: May he come indeed. ATHENIAN: But exactly what sort of constitution do we have in mind (nous) to assign to our city? |712c| CLEINIAS: In what sense do you wish your question to be taken? Tell us yet more perspicuously. Do you mean what sort of democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, or kingship? For surely you couldn’t mean tyranny—anyway, we wouldn’t think so.32 |712c5| ATHENIAN: Come then, which of you two is more willing to answer first, telling us which of these his own home constitution is? MEGILLUS: Since I’m older, wouldn’t it be more just for me to speak first? |712c10| CLEINIAS: Probably so. |712d|

{117} MEGILLUS: In fact, Stranger, when I reflect on the Spartan constitution, I can’t tell you which of these it should be called. It seems to me to be like a tyranny (for the board of ephors in it is a remarkably tyrannical feature in it). |712d5| Yet sometimes it, of all cities, appears to me to be most like a city under democratic rule. On the other hand, not to say that it is an aristocracy would be totally absurd. And then of course there is monarchy in it with a king |712e| for life, which is said by all mankind indeed, even by ourselves, to be the most ancient of all monarchies. But now that I’m questioned33 all of a sudden in this way, I am really unable, as I said, to say definitely which of these constitutions it is. CLEINIAS: And I, Megillus, appear to be in the same condition as you. For I’m altogether at a loss and unable to say confidently which of these the constitution in Cnossos is. ATHENIAN: That is because, my very good friends, you really do take part in constitutions worthy of the name. The other things we just named aren’t constitutions, but city managements, |712e10| where one part of the city is being despotically ruled and serving like slaves, |713a| each being called after the despotically ruling power. But if indeed it is a power of this sort that is to furnish a city with its name, one should use the name of the god who truly rules as despot over those who possess understanding (nous). |713a5| CLEINIAS: What god is that? ATHENIAN: Well then, mustn’t we make a little further use of a story, if indeed we’re going to somehow hit the right note and make clear the answer to what you’re asking now? CLEINIAS: Is that the way we have to proceed?34 ATHENIAN: It certainly is. |713a10| For indeed long before the foundation of the cities we described earlier,35 |713b| there is said to have arisen under Cronus a sort of rule and settlement that was very happy,36 of which the best managed city among those nowadays is an imitation. {118} CLEINIAS: Then it seems absolutely imperative that we should hear about it. |713b5| ATHENIAN: So it appears to me at least. That’s why I brought it up in the middle of our discussion.

CLEINIAS: You were very right to do so. And going on to complete the story, if indeed it is fitting, would be quite right too. |713c| ATHENIAN: Let it be done as you say. Well then, the oracular report we’ve received about the blessedly happy way of life of those who lived in that time tells that it included a spontaneously generated abundance of all things. And the cause of this is said to have been something like this: Cronus knew—as we’ve gone through in detail37—that |713c5| human nature is not at all competent to manage human affairs as an autocratic ruler of everything, without becoming full of wanton aggression and injustice. So, reflecting on this, he then set kings and rulers over our cities who were not human beings but daimons,38 a |713d| more divine and better race. He did as we do now with sheep and other domesticated herd animals: we don’t make oxen rulers of oxen or goats rulers of goats; on the contrary, we exercise despotic rule over them ourselves, because our race is better than theirs. In like manner, then, |713d5| the god too, as a lover of mankind, set the better race of daimons over us, who, with much convenience to themselves and much to us, took care of us, and furnished peace, shame, |713e| good government, and justice in abundance, making the races of mankind free of faction and happy. The account has some truth for us even today. It says that insofar as cities have not a god but rather some mortal as ruler, there can be no respite either from evils |713e5| or from hardships,39 and it thinks that we should imitate by means of every contrivance40 the way of life that is {119} said to have existed under Cronus, and, by obeying in private and public whatever element of immortality is present within us, manage both our households and cities, |714a| giving the name (eponomazontas) “law” (nomos) to the regulation (dianomê) deriving from the understanding (nous).41 But if there is one human being, or a sort of oligarchy, or even a democracy, having a soul that grasps at appetites and pleasures, and wishes to be filled with these, and retains nothing,42 but is in the grip of an endless and insatiable evil plague—if |714a5| someone like that is going to rule a city, or rule some private individual, trampling the laws underfoot, there is, as we said just now, no contrivance for its salvation.

This is the account we must investigate, Cleinias, to see whether we are going to be persuaded by it, or what we are to do. |714b| CLEINIAS: It is necessary, surely, to be persuaded. ATHENIAN: Well, but do you understand that some people say there are as many forms of law as there are of constitutions? (The forms of constitution we just went through are the ones commonly mentioned.) Don’t think that this present dispute |714b5| concerns something trivial. It in fact concerns the greatest thing. For we are again faced with the dispute about what justice and injustice must look to.43 These people are claiming that the laws must not look to war or virtue as a whole, but |714c| must look to the advantage of the established constitution, whatever it is, so that it will rule forever and never be overthrown, and that the criterion of what is just by nature is best stated this way. CLEINIAS: How? |714c5| ATHENIAN: That it is the advantage of the stronger.44 CLEINIAS: Speak in a yet more perspicuous way. ATHENIAN: It runs as follows: the laws in a city, they say, are always established by the stronger. Isn’t that so? {120} CLEINIAS: What you say is true. |714c10| ATHENIAN: So do you think, they ask, that when a democracy is victorious, or some |714d| other constitution, or even a tyrant, that it will voluntarily establish laws looking primarily to anything other than what is advantageous for the maintenance of its own rule? CLEINIAS: Certainly not. ATHENIAN: And won’t the one who established them call the things he established “just,” punishing anyone who transgresses against them as being unjust? CLEINIAS: Probably so, in any case. ATHENIAN: So these things would always, in this way, and in this constitution45 be what is just. |714d10| CLEINIAS: In any case, it’s what this argument asserts. ATHENIAN: Yes, you see it concerns one of those “titles to rule.” |714e|

CLEINIAS: What titles? ATHENIAN: The ones we investigated earlier, to see who should rule over whom.46 It came to light that parents should rule over offspring, older over younger, and the well-bred over the not well-bred. And there were several others, if |714e5| we recall, some presenting an obstacle to others. And in particular the claim before was one of these. We said, I think, quoting Pindar, that in accord with nature it is just for what has most force to lead, as he puts it.47 |715a| CLEINIAS: Yes, that is what was said then. ATHENIAN: Consider, then, to which side one must hand over our city. You see, this sort of thing has already occurred countless times in some cities. |715a5| CLEINIAS: What sort of thing? ATHENIAN: Where offices get fought over, and those who are victorious take over the city’s affairs so completely that they give no share of rule at all to the defeated ones, either themselves or their descendants, {121} and they live keeping watch on each other, |715a10| in case someone from the defeated side coming into office and, remembering |715b| the old evils, might ever raise an insurrection. These, I presume, we would now say are not constitutions, nor are any laws correct that are not established for the sake of the common good of the entire city; where they are for the sake of some, we say that these consist of “partisans”48 not citizens, |715b5| and that when they declare these laws to be the just ones, they are uttering empty words. We have said these things to make the point that in your city we will not assign offices on the basis of someone’s wealth, or any other possession of this sort, whether it is strength, stature, or |715c| birth. No, the person who is most obedient to the established laws and wins this sort of victory in the city, he is the one, we say, who must also be assigned the service of the gods, the greatest service to the one who comes first,49 the second greatest to the second in mastery, and the ones |715c5| that come successively after these must be assigned in this same ratio. Those who are usually said to be “rulers,” however, I have now called “servants of the laws,” not for the sake of an innovation50 in names, but because I believe |715d| that it is on this more than anything else that the

salvation of a city, and the opposite, depend. But the city in which the law is ruled over and without control is a city for which I see destruction near at hand. But where the law is a despotic ruler over the rulers, and the rulers are slaves of the law, there I distinctly see safety |715d5| and all the good things that gods have given to cities. CLEINIAS: Yes, by Zeus, Stranger. You have the keen-sightedness of old age! ATHENIAN: In fact, every young person sees things of this sort most indistinctly when he looks at them himself, whereas when he is old he sees them with great keen-sightedness. |715e| CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true. ATHENIAN: Well, what’s our next step? Shouldn’t we assume that our colonists have arrived and are present, and that the rest of the argument must be carried sequentially to its conclusion before them? |715e5| CLEINIAS: Yes, why not? {122} ATHENIAN: In that case, let’s say to them, “Gentlemen, just as the ancient account tells us, ‘the god, who holds in his hands the beginning, the end, and the middle of all the beings,’51 completes his circuit in a straight way,52 in accord with nature. |716a| With him Lady Justice always follows, taking vengeance on those who abandon the divine law. The one who is destined to be happy follows Lady Justice meekly and moderately. But anyone who is puffed up with arrogance, or who feels exalted by wealth |716a5| or honors, or bodily shapeliness when he is young and ignorant, and whose soul is so enflamed with wanton aggression that he thinks he needs neither ruler nor any leader, but even thinks himself capable of leading others—he is left behind, deserted by the god.53 Once left behind, though, he takes up with yet |716b| others like himself, he kicks over the traces and throws everything into confusion. And to many people he seems to be somebody, but before too long he pays a well-deserved penalty to Lady Justice, and causes utter ruin to himself, his household, and his city. Looking at these things, then, |716b5| ordained in this way, what must the wise person do and think, and what not?” CLEINIAS: Well, this is clear at least, that every man must think about how he will become one of the followers of the god.

“So what sort of action is dear to and follows the god?54 There is only one sort, |716c| and one ancient saying expressing it, namely, that ‘like is dear to like,’55 when in proper measure, whereas those without proper measure are dear neither to each other nor to what is in proper measure. Now for us the god would be the measure of all things in the highest degree, much more so, I imagine, than any ‘man,’ as some people say.56 |716c5| It is necessary, then, for the person who is to become dear to such a being to do everything in his power to become like him. And, according to this argument, the one among us who is temperate |716d| is dear to the god, since he is like him, while the one who is intemperate is {123} unlike him and at variance with him, as also is the unjust person—and the same argument applies to the other cases. “Let us observe, then, that following on from these things is a principle of this sort, which I think is the finest and truest of all principles, |716d5| namely, that for the good person to sacrifice and commune with the gods, through prayers, votive offerings, and every sort of service to the gods, is always finest, best, and most effective in furthering a happy life, and in addition is especially fitting, whereas for the bad person |716e| the opposites of these things naturally hold. For the bad person is impure of soul, whereas his opposite is pure, and it is never right for either a good man or a god to receive gifts from a polluted one.57 |717a| So all the great effort of the impious having to do with the gods is pointless, though for the pious it is most opportune. ATHENIAN:

“This, then, is the target we must aim at. But as to the ‘arrows’ for it, and (as it were) the ‘bow’ suitable to shoot the arrows, what names would it be most correct to give to these? |717a5| First, we say, if—after the honors paid to the Olympian gods and the patron gods of the city—we assign as honors to the gods of the underworld the even-numbered ones, the second place, and the left side, while assigning to the former gods the superior odd ones and the ones that contrast with the ones mentioned just now, |717b| we would hit the target of reverence most correctly.58 After these gods, the wise man, at least, would worship the {124} daimons,59 and after these the heroes.60 These would be followed by the rites celebrated in accord with law at private shrines of ancestral gods.61 |717b5|

“After these are the honors paid to living parents, to whom it is right for the debtor to repay his first and greatest debts, the most long-standing of all his obligations, regarding all his acquisitions and possessions as belonging to those who begot him and brought him up, |717c| and putting them at their service to the greatest extent possible—first, with his property, second, with the goods of his body, and third with those of his soul.62 In this way he will pay back the old loans, of care and pains suffered, that they made him as a child, |717c5| repaying his old folks in their old age, when they need it desperately. “Throughout all his life he must have, and always have had, an especially respectful tongue, because the penalty for light or idle words is very heavy, since the supervision |717d| of everything of this sort has been assigned to Nemesis,63 the messenger of Lady Justice. Hence the son must yield to his parents when they are angry and give vent to their anger, whether they do so in words or deeds, understanding that it makes perfect sense for a father to be especially |717d5| angry if he believes he is being treated unjustly by his own son. “When parents die, the most temperate funeral is the most beautiful, one not going beyond the customary level of dignity, nor yet falling short of those with which his forefathers laid their parents to rest, and likewise the annual |717e| ceremonies in honor of those who are already dead and buried. He should always pay special honor to them by never failing to provide a perpetual memorial to them, spending |718a| on the dead a proper measure of the wealth that luck bestows.64 “If we do these things and live in accord with these principles, each of us will on each occasion reap what we deserve from the gods and such beings as are mightier than ourselves, and will spend |718a5| most of life in good hopes.65 {125} “As for obligations to offspring, relatives, friends, and fellow citizens, as well as whatever services to foreigners are performed for the sake of the gods, and of dealings with all these groups, by fulfilling which, in accord with law, a person must brighten and adorn his life, the exposition of these is a matter for the laws themselves. |718b| Sometimes the law will do so by persuasion, and sometimes (when people’s characters do not yield to

persuasion) by force and just punishment, and, if the gods collectively wish it, it succeeds in making our city blessed and happy. “And then there are things that a legislator, who thinks as I do, should— indeed must—mention, |718b5| but which are not suited to being expressed in the form of a law. Where these are concerned, it seems to me that the legislator should present an example for himself and those he is legislating for. And, having explained all the rest to the best of his ability, after |718c| that he should begin to establish the laws.” CLEINIAS: In what form, then, should these sorts of things be mostly established?66 ATHENIAN: It’s not at all easy to encompass them by speaking of a single pattern, as it were. But to see if we are able to determine something about them, let’s understand them in the following way . . . |718c5| CLEINIAS: Which is? ATHENIAN: I would wish people to be as persuadable as possible as regards virtue. And it’s clear that the legislator will try to bring this about in all his legislation. |718c10| CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: Well then, it seemed to me that what was just said, |718d| provided it took hold of a soul that was not entirely savage, might prove of some help in making the hearer listen in a gentler way and with more goodwill. So even if it has no great effect, but only makes the listener, as I say, |718d5| have a little more goodwill and be quicker at learning, the legislator must be entirely content. For there is no great horde or abundance of people eager to become as good as possible and as quickly as possible. The majority of people, indeed, only show that Hesiod was wise |718e| when he said that the road to vice is smooth and, being very short, can be traveled without sweat, whereas “in front of virtue,” he says, {126} The immortal gods have put what will make us sweat, |718e5| Long and steep is the path to it, And rough at first. But when you get to the summit, |719a| The going is easy, though it was hard before.67

CLEINIAS: Yes, what he says does seem to be correct.

ATHENIAN: It certainly does. But the effect produced on me by the preceding argument68 is what I wish to put before you now. |719a5| CLEINIAS: Put it before us, then. ATHENIAN: Let’s address the legislator, then, saying this: “Tell us, Legislator, if indeed you knew what we should do and say, |719b| isn’t it clear that you would also state it?” CLEINIAS: He’d have to. ATHENIAN: “But a little while ago did we not hear you saying that a legislator should not allow the poets |719b5| to put whatever they like in their poems.69 For they would not be likely to know what harm they will inflict on the city by saying things contrary to the laws.” CLEINIAS: That’s true. ATHENIAN: If we were to say the following to him on behalf of the poets, would what we say be reasonable? |719b10| CLEINIAS: What? ATHENIAN: This: “There is an old story, Legislator, which we |719c| ourselves are always telling and which everyone else seems to agree to, that once a poet is seated on the three-footed stool of the Muses,70 he is not then in his own mind,71 but is like some fountain that allows free passage to the flow of water, and since his craft is imitative, |719c5| when he puts characters who are opposed to one another in his poems, he is often compelled to {127} contradict himself, and does not know if either of the things he says is true. But it is not possible for the legislator to do this in the law, saying two things concerning one thing. |719d| Instead, he must always pronounce one statement concerning one thing. Consider, for example, one of the things you were talking about just now.72 A funeral, you see, can be either excessive, deficient, or properly measured. You chose one of these, the properly measured one, and this you prescribed |719d5| and praised unconditionally. But if I had some especially wealthy woman in my poem and she were to order me to bury her, I73 would praise the excessive funeral. On the other hand, if some miserly |719e| poor man did so, he’d praise the shabby one, and if someone possessed a moderate amount of property, and were moderate himself, he’d praise the same funeral as you. You, though,

must not merely speak of a thing as ‘properly measured,’ as you did just now. Instead, you must state what constitutes proper measure and how much it is. Otherwise, |719e5| you must not think that an account of that sort is yet to become a law.” CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true. ATHENIAN: So, should the one in charge of our laws not declare anything of this sort at the start of the laws, but declare right away what must and must not be done, add the threat of a penalty, |719e10| and then turn to another law, without adding to his enactments |720a| a single word of encouragement or persuasion? It’s just like with doctors: one is accustomed to treat us in this way on each occasion, another in that. Let’s remind ourselves of each of the two ways, in order that we may plead with our legislator in the way that children do when they plead with a doctor |720a5| to treat them in the gentlest way possible. What, then, are we saying? There are doctors, we’d probably say, and doctor’s assistants, though we also, I take it, call the latter “doctors.” CLEINIAS: We certainly do. |720b| ATHENIAN: And whether they are free people or slaves they acquire their craft by following their masters’ instructions, by observation, and guided by experience, not guided by nature, as the free ones do, who have themselves learned it in this way and teach it in this way to their |720b5| disciples. Would you describe these as two kinds of what are called “doctors”? CLEINIAS: Of course. {128} ATHENIAN: You also understand that, as slaves and free people are among the sick in cities, the slaves |720c| are pretty much treated by slaves, who either go on rounds or remain in their surgeries. Not one of these slave doctors either gives or is in receipt of any sort of account of the particular disease of a particular slave, but prescribes for him, |720c5| with the selfconfidence of a tyrant, what from experience he believes best, as if he had exact knowledge, then dashes off to some other sick slave,74 and in this way relieves his master from caring for the sick. The free doctor, on the other hand, for the |720d| most part treats and keeps an eye on the diseases of free people. He investigates these from their starting-point and guided by nature, in consultation with the patient himself and his friends, at once learning

something himself from those who are sick, while also, to the extent |720d5| possible, teaching the invalid himself. He doesn’t prescribe anything until he has somehow persuaded him. Only then, after securing the patient’s continued gentle acquiescence by means of persuasion, does he attempt to complete the task of restoring him to health.75 Is it in this way or |720e| in the other way that a doctor gives better treatment, or a gymnastic trainer better training? Should he exercise his one capacity in two ways, or in only one, that is, the worse of the two and the one that makes the patient more hostile? CLEINIAS: I suppose, Stranger, that the double version would be far superior. |720e5| ATHENIAN: So do you wish us to observe this double version and also the simple one as applied to actual legislations? CLEINIAS: How could I not wish it? {129} ATHENIAN: Come, tell me then, in the name of the gods, what would be the first law that the legislator would establish? Won’t he be guided by nature and with his prescriptions |720e10| regulate what has to do with the first starting-point of childbirth in cities? |721a| CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: And isn’t the starting-point of childbirth in all cities the sexual intercourse and partnership in which marriages consist?76 CLEINIAS: How could it be otherwise? |721a5| ATHENIAN: So, if the marriage laws were the first to be established, it looks as though in every city they would be well established as regards correctness. CLEINIAS: Absolutely. ATHENIAN: Well then, let’s state the simple version first, which, I imagine, would run something like this: |721a10| A man is to marry between the ages of |721b| thirty and thirty-five. If he doesn’t, the penalty is to be a fine and dishonor, the fine being so-and-so much, the dishonor being of such-and-such a sort.

Let something like that be the simple version where marriage is concerned. Let the double version be this: |721b5|

A man is to marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, bearing in mind that this is the way in which humankind shares by nature in a sort of immortality, a thing for every sort of which everyone has a natural appetite.77 For a desire to become famous and not lie in a nameless grave is an appetite |721c| of this sort. Humankind, then, is naturally attached to the entirety of time, in that it forever accompanies {130} it and will accompany it.78 And it is immortal in this way: by leaving behind |721c5| the children of children, while itself always remaining one and the same, it partakes of immortality through reproduction. For someone to deprive himself of this voluntarily is never pious, and one who does not care for children and a wife does voluntarily deprive himself of it.

One who obeys the law |721d| should be free of any penalty. But one who disobeys, one who by the age of thirty-five does not marry, is to pay annually a fine of such-and-such an amount (lest he believe that the bachelor life brings him profit and self-indulgent ease), and be excluded from the honors |721d5| that are paid from time to time by the younger people in the city to their elders. When one has heard and compared this law to the other, it is possible to make up your mind in any given case whether laws should be at the very least double in length by combining persuasion |721e| with deterrence, or, by using deterrence alone, be simple and shorter in length. MEGILLUS: Well, the Laconic79 way, Stranger, is always to prefer the shorter. But if someone were to tell me to be a judge of these two written laws80 I would wish to have established in writing in a city, I would choose the longer. What is more, in the case of every law, if it followed this model, |722a| in which each of the two alternatives is offered, I would make this same choice. Nevertheless, I suppose the laws we are now making must also be satisfying to Cleinias here. After all, it is his city that now has it in mind to make use of such laws. |722a5| CLEINIAS: Yes, Megillus, and what you say is correct. ATHENIAN: In fact, though, to hinge the argument on the length or brevity of written laws is extremely naive! For what must be honored, I think, are the best ones, not the shortest ones or the long ones. And in the case of the laws stated just now, the second is not just twice superior to the other |722b| with respect to usefulness,81 but, as was said just now,82 the comparison with the two kinds of doctors is an absolutely correct one. Yet for all that, it seems

that none of the legislators has ever had in mind that, |722b5| while it is open to them to make use of two {131} factors in legislating (insofar as the mob’s nonacquaintance with education allows), persuasion and force, they make use only of the latter. For they have not mixed compulsion in with persuasion |722c| in their legislation, but use unmixed force alone. But I, my blessedly happy friends, see yet a third thing that must be found in laws, but which nowadays is not found anywhere. CLEINIAS: What thing do you mean? |722c5| ATHENIAN: Something that has emerged, with the aid of some god, from the very things we have been discussing. You see, since we started to discuss laws, dawn has become practically high noon, and here we are in this very fine resting place. All this time we have been discussing nothing except laws, and yet it seems to me that we have just now started to state laws, |722d| and that all the things we said before were preludes to laws. Why do I mention this? What I wish to say is this: all speeches, and whatever things involve the voice, are preceded by preludes,83 which are pretty much a sort of warm-up, and which provide a sort of craft-like preparation, within the province of the relevant craft, that is useful |722d5| for the coming performance. I think, in fact, that of the songs sung to the lyre, the so-called nomoi,84 indeed all music, are preceded by preludes that are composed with amazing seriousness. But in the case of what are really and truly nomoi, |722e| the laws that we say are political, no one has ever either given voice to a prelude, or composed one and published it, as if it is natural for there not to be one. It seems to me, though, that the way we have been passing the time indicates that it is natural; and the |722e5| laws stated in double fashion seemed to me just now not to be double in a somehow simple way, but rather to be two things—a law and a prelude to the law. What was called a “tyrannical prescription,” and likened to the prescriptions of the doctors we said were unfree,85 |723a| seemed to be unmixed law,86 whereas what was stated before it, and was said to be a persuasive element by our friend here,87 while it really did seem to be a persuasive element, in fact has the power that a prelude has {132} in a speech. You see, it became evident to me that this whole speech, which the speaker utters in order to persuade, |723a5| is spoken for the sake of this, namely, in order that the one who receives the law stated by the legislator receives his prescription—the law

—with goodwill, and because of having goodwill, learns it more quickly. That is why, then, according to my argument at least, this would correctly |723b| be called the “prelude,” not the “text” of the law. Having said this, what should I wish to say next? This: the legislator must make it the case that neither the laws as a whole nor each particular statute will be bereft of preludes. In virtue of this they will surpass |723b5| their simple versions by as much as the double version stated just now surpassed its simple version.88 CLEINIAS: As far as I’m concerned, I’d direct the one with knowledge of these things to legislate in no other way. ATHENIAN: Well, you seem right to me, Cleinias, in saying at least |723c| this much, that all laws have preludes, and that in starting every piece of legislation, one must preface the text as a whole with the prelude that naturally belongs to it. For what is going to be said after this is of no small importance, and it makes no small difference whether |723c5| it is remembered perspicuously or not perspicuously. Yet if we were to prescribe that what one might call “major laws” and “minor ones” are uniformly to have preludes, we would not be speaking correctly. For this should not be done even in the case of every song or every speech—even |723d| though for all of them there is a prelude that naturally belongs, it must not be used in all of them. No, what to do must in each case be left up to the rhetorician, the songwriter, or the legislator. CLEINIAS: What you say seems absolutely true to me. But let’s not, |723d5| Stranger, spend any more time delaying. Let’s return to the argument and start, if it’s agreeable to you, with the things you said earlier, when you were not speaking by way of a prelude.89 Let’s go back and reexamine things, saying like checkers players, “second time lucky,”90 |723e| understanding them as a prelude, not some random bit of the text, like just now. Let’s take it as agreed that the start of them is by way of being a prelude. Moreover, as regards the worship of the gods and the services due to ancestors, what was said just now is sufficient.91 |723e5| Let’s try to say {133} what comes next, until the entire prelude seems to you to be sufficient. Then, after this, go on with stating the laws themselves.

ATHENIAN: So then, the prelude we composed concerning the gods, |724a| those who come after the gods, and ancestors, living and dead, we are now saying is sufficient. And you are now directing me, it appears, to bring to light, as it were, whatever it still remains to say. |724a5| CLEINIAS: Exactly. ATHENIAN: Well, after these topics, it is surely both fitting and most for the common advantage of speaker and listeners to think over how serious, or how relaxed, they need to be |724b| where their souls, bodies, and property are concerned, in order for them—as far as possible—to gain an education. These, then, are for us undoubtedly the very topics that must be spoken about and listened to next. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely correct. |724b5|     1. About ten miles. A stade is roughly two hundred yards. 2. See 706a–707c. Even though the navy saved the Athenians from the Persians at Salamis, the navy was too democratic, and perhaps too implicated in Athenian expansionism, for Plato’s tastes. That is why the neophyte guardians in the Republic are not to imitate “those who row in triremes, or their time-keepers, or anything else connected with ships” (396a– b). 3. Apparently, a partial quotation from the early Spartan lyric poet Alcman. See Fr. 108 Page. 4. Emporias . . . kapêleias: “Those who wait in the marketplace, and provide this service of buying and selling, are called retailers (kapêlous), aren’t they, whereas those who travel between cities are merchants (emporous)?” (Rep. 371d5–7). See also Sph. 223d–e. 5. Apparently a reference to 695e–696b or perhaps 679b–c. 6. See Meiggs, Ch. 5. 7. Daimonie: See 626e1n. 8. I.e., virtue. 9. I.e., that is not accompanied by virtue. See 870b6–c1, 660d–661d, 696b–c. On the translation of this much emended sentence, see England-1, p. 419, Saunders-2, pp. 14–15. 10. As a punishment for killing his son Androgeos, Minos forced the Athenians to send a tribute of seven young men and seven girls each year as victims for the Minotaur, a Cretan monster. See Phd. 58a–b, Min. 321a. 11. Hoplitôn: A hoplite was a heavily armed infantryman who carried a round shield (hoplon), a spear, and a sword. Since he had to provide these at his own expense, only moderately rich people could afford to be hoplites. Poorer people rowed in the navy or served as light-armored troops (one reason the navy was more democratic). Richer citizens,

who could afford a horse, fought in the cavalry. Citizen hoplites were the principal fighting force in Greece until mercenaries replaced them late in the fourth century. 12. See Tyrtaeus Fr. 12.17 West = Gerber, p. 59. 13. On the importance of such expressions, see 730e, 732b, 738b, Rep. 336a, and Saunders-2, p. 15. 14. Homer, Il. 14.96–102 (with some minor departures from our text). I’ve added the first line in brackets for sense. 15. See 697b, 757a–b. 16. The battle of Plataea, an Athenian ally in southern Boeotia, took place in 479 BC; on Marathon, see 698e4n. 17. On these four battles, see Menex. 240e–241c. Artemisium was a promontory in northeast Euboea, where the Greeks held back the Persian fleet. See Herod. 8.1–96. 18. See 661a–d, 687a–688d. 19. Eis tauton: See Saunders-2, p. 16. 20. Which is a cause of disease. See Smp. 188b. 21. Megaloprepês: Cf. 691c–d, Rep. 487a, and 577e, and see Brisson-Pradeau-1, pp. 382– 383 n26. For Aristotle, a high-minded or magnificent person is someone who “is able to get a theoretical grasp on what is appropriate and spend great sums in a suitable way” (NE 1122a34–35). But, more generally, “to trust a friend with money, instead of leaving it with a banker was megaloprepês, the act of a proud man who wanted to be seen to rate friendship above security” (Dover-1, p. 194). 22. See 696a–c. 23. See 968a2, Phd. 82a–d. 24. See 696d–e. 25. Cf. Rep. 473c–e. 26. Because “formal power in a state must not be confused with effective power. Effective power in a democracy is likely to be in fewer hands than in an oligarchy” (Saunders-1, pp. 167n13). Cf. “[Athens was] in name a democracy, but in fact on the way to becoming rule by the first citizen [Pericles]” (Thuc. 2.65.9–10). 27. Dunastai: See 680b2n. 28. Dunasteuontôn: See 710e7n. 29. The wise counselor of the Achaeans at Troy. See Homer, Il. 1.247–284. 30. See Men. 99e–100a: “If we have inquired and spoken correctly throughout this entire discussion, virtue is not acquired by nature or by teaching, but comes to be present by divine dispensation, without understanding, in those in whom it does come to be present— provided, of course, there is not some political man who is able to make someone else a politician. If there were, he could pretty much be said to be among the living what Homer said Tiresias was among the dead. Among those in Hades, he said, ‘He alone is wise, the others flit around as shadows.’ [Od. 10.495] In the same way here, such a man would be like a truly real thing in comparison to shadows as regards virtue.” Cf. Rep. 473c–e, 499b– d. 31. See 746a7–8, 671c1–4. 32. See 713c–d. 33. Reading ἀνερωτηθείς with Saunders-2 for Budé ἂν ἐρωτηθείς.

34. Reading Οὐκοῦν . . . δρᾶν; with most editors for Budé Οὐκοῦν . . . δρᾶν. (“That is the way we have to proceed.”) The mss. assign the question to the Athenian, and Πάνυ μὲν οὖν (“It certainly is”) to Cleinias. 35. See 677a–686c. 36. See Polit. 269a–274e, Hesiod, Op. 109–120. Cronus was king of the Titans, who ruled the cosmos during the Golden Age, after castrating and deposing his father Uranus. 37. See 691c–d. 38. Daimonas: Daimons are either gods or children of gods and mortals (Ap. 27d–e). They serve as intermediaries between gods and human beings (Smp. 202e). Socrates’ famous daimonion is the voice or sign of a daimon, and so of either a god (Apollo, in this case) or his offspring (Ap. 26b–28a, 31c–d). But at Ti. 90a2–b1 a person’s daimon is identified with a part of his soul: “Concerning the kind of soul found in us that has the most control, we must think the following: God has given it to each of us as a daimon, the thing we say has its home in the topmost part of our body, and raises us up away from the earth toward what is akin to us in the heavens, as though we were a heavenly plant, not an earthly one, as we rightly put it. For it is from the heavens, the place from which our soul was first born, that the divine suspends our head, that is, our root, and so keeps our whole body upright.” See Reeve-3, pp. 14–17. 39. See Rep. 473c–d, 501e. 40. See 664a4. 41. Cf. “The law .  .  . [is] reason that derives from a sort of practical wisdom and understanding” (Ar. NE 1180a21–22). The Stranger’s wordplay suggests that the derivation is almost etymologically encoded in the language itself. Etymologies of this (usually imaginary) sort are explored in the Cratylus. See also 957c5–7. 42. Stegousan ouden: “That part of the souls of fools (anoêtoi) where their appetites are located is their intemperate part, one not tightly closed (steganon), a leaking jar, as it were. . . . For because of their untrustworthiness and forgetfulness they are unable to retain (stegein) anything” (Grg. 493a–c). 43. See 631b–632d, 663c, 690b–c. 44. A reprise of Thrasymachus’ famous claim. See Rep. 338b–339a, Reeve-3, pp. 53–78. 45. Tautê[i]: Feminine pronoun referring to the politeia (feminine) in which the relevant laws are established but generalizing to all constitutions, since (according to the argument) the same sort of power structure exists in them. 46. See 690a–d. 47. See 690a8n. 48. Stasiôteias: A punning allusion to stasis (“faction”). 49. See 762e4–5. 50. Kainotomias: See 950a1. 51. Probably a paraphrase of a hymn to Zeus, quoted by the scholiast (Greene, p. 317), and in Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mundo 401a28–401b3. 52. I.e., in a just way. 53. Plato seems to have Alcibiades in mind here. See Alc. 104a–c, 105b–c, Smp. 215d– 216d, Rep. 494c–d. Alcibiades’ extraordinary career is described in Thuc. 6–8. 54. See Phdr. 246a–257a.

55. See Lys. 214a, Grg. 510b, Homer, Od. 17.218. 56. See Protagoras B1 DK: “A man is the measure of all things.” Also, Crat. 385e–386a, Tht. 152a. 57. Miarou: The adjective miaros refers to “a condition that has some, and usually all, of the following characteristics: it makes the person affected ritually impure and thus unfit to enter a temple: it is contagious: it is dangerous, and this danger is not of familiar secular origin” (Parker, pp. 3–4). On the role of pollution in the moral, religious, and legal lives of the Greeks, see Burkert, pp. 75–84, and on this sentence of the Laws, Petrovic, pp. 65–66. 58. A reference, it seems, to the Pythagorean division of starting-points or first principles in to two columns of contraries, which Aristotle (Met. 986a22–27) lists as follows: limited odd one right male resting straight light good square

unlimited even plurality left female moving curved darkness bad rectangular

The left column, as in our text, lists the good starting-points, the right the bad or evil ones. See Ar. Met. 1093b12–13. 59. See 713d2n. 60. On hero cults, see Burkert, pp. 203–208. 61. Cf. 909d–910d. 62. Ta tou sômatos . . . ta tês psuchês: Literally, “the things of the body . . . the things of the soul.” See 697b2–6. 63. A personification of retribution for wrongdoing, a “bane (pêma) to mortals and gods” (Hesiod, Th. 223). 64. Legislation regarding funerals is returned to at 945c–948d, 959c–960a. 65. See Ap. 41c8–d2: “You too, gentlemen of the jury, should be of good hope in the face of death, and bear in mind this single truth: nothing bad can happen to a good man, whether in life or in death, nor are the gods unconcerned about his troubles.” 66. With England-1, p. 457, and other editors, I attribute this question to Cleinias; Budé and others assign it to the Athenian. 67. Hesiod, Op. 287–292. A favorite passage of Plato’s, also cited at Prt. 340d, Rep. 364c– d, Phdr. 272c. 68. The reference is vague but seems to reach back to Books 1 and 2. 69. See 656c. 70. The Priestess at Delphi delivered the oracles of Apollo while seated on a three-footed stool. 71. “All the good epic poets compose all those fine poems not out of craft-knowledge but through being inspired and possessed. . . . For a poet is an airy thing, winged and holy, and

he is not able to make poetry until he becomes inspired and goes out of his mind and his understanding is no longer in him” (Ion 533e5–b6). Also Ap. 22b8–c3, Reeve-3, pp. 11–13. 72. See 717d–718a. 73. I.e., the poet speaking in her character. 74. Cf. Ar. Met. 981a24–b6: “We regard knowledge and comprehension as characteristic of craft rather than of experience, and take it that craftsmen are wiser than experienced people, on the supposition that in every case wisdom follows along rather with knowledge than with experience. This is because craftsmen know the cause, whereas experienced people do not. For experienced people know the that but do not know the why, whereas craftsmen know the why, that is, the cause. . . . The supposition being that . . . craftsmen are wiser not in terms of being practically efficient, but in terms of having the account themselves and knowing the causes.” 75. Cf. 857c–e, Grg. 462a–465d, 500d–501c on genuine crafts vs. experience-based knacks, and on a legal parallel to persuading a patient, Cri. 51e4–52a3: “We Laws say that whoever does not obey commits a threefold injustice: he disobeys us as his parents; he disobeys us as those who brought him up; and, after having agreed to obey us, he neither obeys nor persuades us, if we’re doing something that isn’t right. Yet we offer him a choice and do not harshly command him to do what he’s told. On the contrary, we offer two alternatives: he must either persuade us or do what we say.” 76. See 631d–e. 77. See 773e–774a, Smp. 207d–208e, Reeve-3, pp. 113–121; also, Ar. GA 731b24–732a1: “For since some beings are eternal and divine, while others admit of both being and not being, and since the nobly beautiful and the divine is always in accord with its own nature a cause of the better in things that admit of it, while the non-eternal does admit of being and of partaking in the worse and the better, and since the soul is better than the body, and the animate than the inanimate because of the soul, and being than not being, and living than not living—due to these causes there is generation of animals. For since it is impossible for the nature of this sort of genus to be eternal, what comes into being is eternal in the [only] way that is possible for it. Now in number it is not possible (for the substance of the beings is in the particular one), but if indeed it were so, it would be eternal, in form, however, it is possible. That is why there is always a genus—of human beings, of animals, and of plants.” 78. See Ti. 37c–d. 79. I.e., Spartan. See 641e. 80. Grammatôn: On the importance of written laws, see 793d–e, 823a, 858e–859b, 922a. 81. Eis aretên tês chreias: Cf. aretên sôterias at 969c3. 82. See 720b–e. 83. Ar. Rh. 3.14 is devoted to a discussion of these. 84. I.e., nomes. See 700b5n. 85. See 720c–d. 86. See 722c2. 87. Hupo toude: Most naturally understood to mean the one of the other two who had not spoken last, viz. Megillus. But he does not describe the prelude as persuasive in so many

words, although he does express a preference for laws that involve a persuasive element at 721e–722a. See England-1, p. 468, Brisson-Pradeau-1, p. 391 n109. 88. See 721a–d. 89. I.e., at 720e–722a, when written laws are first formulated. 90. See 739a1n, 903d5. 91. At 716c–718a.

{134} BOOK 5 ATHENIAN: “Listen, then, all who have heard what was said just now about the gods |726a| and our dearly beloved ancestors.1 “Of all of a person’s own belongings, you see, the most divine after the gods is his soul, since it is most his own.2 And everything that belongs to a person invariably falls into two classes. One lot, stronger and better, does the mastering, while the other lot, weaker and worse, are slaves. And so, he must always prefer his master |726a5| possessions to his slave ones. So, when I say that in second place after the gods, who are our masters, and the beings that follow them,3 |727a| one must honor one’s soul, my prescription is correct. But practically none of us confers honor correctly, though we believe we do. For honor is, I take it, a divine good, and no evil thing can confer honor. The person who thinks that he is honoring his soul with words, gifts, or by indulging it in certain ways, yet |727a5| fails to change it from worse to better, believes he is honoring it, but in fact this is not what he is doing at all. “For example, every boy, as soon as he becomes a man, regards himself as capable of judging everything, thinks he is honoring his soul by praising it, and eagerly |727b| tells it to do whatever it wishes. But what is now being said is that by doing these things he harms rather than honors it, whereas we say that it must be honored second after the gods. “When a person regards himself on each occasion as not responsible for his own errors or for the |727b5| most and the greatest evils, but other people, and always exempts himself from blame, he believes, of course, that he is honoring his own soul, but is far from doing so. In fact, he is harming it. “When he indulges |727c| in pleasures contrary to the legislator’s speech and praise, then he does not honor it at all, but dishonors it by filling it with evils and regrets. And when, to take the opposite case, he fails to stand up resiliently to the hardships, fears, sufferings, and pains that are praised, |727c5| but instead gives into them, then he does not honor it by giving in. In fact, by doing all such things he causes it dishonor.

“When he considers life under any circumstances to be a good thing, he does not honor his soul, but dishonors it |727d| then too, since he gives in {135} to the view of his soul that all things in Hades are bad, rather than resisting it, teaching it by refutation4 that it does not know whether things are not the opposite, and that the things that are by nature the greatest of all goods for us are to be found among the gods there.5 |727d5| “When someone honors beauty more than virtue, this is nothing other than a literal and total dishonoring of the soul. For this argument states that the body is more honorable than the soul, but does so falsely, since nothing earth-born is more honorable than the Olympians, |727e| and the person who believes otherwise about the soul does not know how wonderous a possession this is that he is neglecting. “And when someone has a passion for acquiring money in a way that is not fine, or feels no disgust at the acquisition, he does not by these gifts then honor |728a| his soul, but misses the mark altogether, since he is selling what makes it honorable and fine for a small quantity of gold. Yet all the gold on earth or under the earth is not worth as much as virtue. “To sum up: as regards the things the legislator |728a5| enumerates and prescribes as shameful and bad, and the opposite, good and fine, anyone who is unwilling to use every contrivance to avoid the first and practice the latter as far as he is able—any human being like that—does not know that in all these matters he is treating his soul, which is a most divine thing, in a most dishonorable |728b| and most disgraceful way. You see, practically no one rationally calculates the greatest so-called judgment (dikê) on evildoing. And the greatest one is to become like evil men, and in becoming like them, to avoid good men |728b5| and good conversations, and to cut oneself off from them, while sticking like glue to the others, seeking companionship with them. And when one becomes naturally adapted to such people, it is necessary for one to do and suffer what such |728c| people do and say to each other.6 Now this suffering is certainly not a “judgment,” since what is just (to dikaion)—that is, what is a real judgment (hê dikê)—is a fine thing (rather, it is retribution, suffering that follows upon injustice); both the one who meets with {136} this and the one who avoids it are

wretched, the one because he is not cured, the other because he is destroyed in order that many others |728c5| may be saved.7 “On the other hand, honor for us, broadly speaking, consists in following what is better, and in the case of what is worse but capable of being better, to accomplish this goal as best we can. Now for a human being there is no possession more naturally adapted than a soul for avoiding evil, tracking down and catching what is best of all, |728d| and, having caught it, for living together communally with it for the rest of his life.8 That is why it was assigned the second rank of honor.9 “The third rank—as everyone would certainly acknowledge—is that of the honor that by nature belongs to the body. Here again it is necessary to examine these honors to see which are genuine and which are |728d5| spurious, and this is a task for a legislator. And he, as it appears to me, will declare these to be the following and of the following sorts: The body that is to be honored is not the beautiful, strong, swift, large, or even healthy one, although many would believe so; and |728e| nor, of course, is it of the sort opposite to these. Instead, the ones that achieve a mean in all these states are the most temperate and most steadfast by far. For the one set of extremes makes souls conceited and rash, while the other makes them humble and unfree.10 “Similarly, |728e5| for the possession of money and property: they are to be honored on the same scale. For excesses of each of these produce enmities and factions both in cities and |729a| in private life, while deficiencies for the most part produce slavery.11 And no one is to love money for the sake of his children, in order to leave them as wealthy as possible, since {137} this is better neither for them nor for the city. For the young, property that does not attract flatterers, but is not lacking in the necessities, |729a5| is most “musical” and best, since it is in concord and harmony with us and makes our lives free of pain in all circumstances. But what children must be left a lot of is shame, not gold. |729b| Now we think that by chastising the young when they behave shamelessly we will leave this to them. However, this is not what results from the young being exhorted as they are nowadays, when a young person is exhorted not to behave shamelessly12 to anyone. Instead, the wise |729b5| legislator would rather exhort the old not to behave shamelessly to the

young, and above all take care not to allow any young person ever to see or to hear them doing or saying anything shameful, since when the old are shameless, |729c| there the young are of necessity lacking any sense of shame. For the best education for young people, and also for ourselves, consists not in admonition, but by visibly doing oneself throughout life the very things that one would admonish in words another to do. “If a person honors and reveres his kinsmen |729c5| and all those who share in the worship of the family gods and have the same blood in their veins, he can reasonably expect the gods of childbirth13 to show goodwill toward his own begetting of children. And when it comes to friends and comrades, he will find them showing more goodwill in day-to-day dealings, if he thinks more highly |729d| than they do of the value and importance of their services to him, and considers his own favors to friends and companions of less value than they do themselves. With regard to the city and its citizens, surely, the best person by far is the one who, rather than victories in the Olympic |729d5| Games or in any contests in war or peace, would choose to have a victorious reputation for service to his own city’s laws, as being the one who throughout his life served the laws more nobly than any other human being. |729e| “As regards foreigners, on the other hand, a person must consider contracts made with them as especially sacred. For practically all offenses committed among foreigners or against foreigners14 are more referable to an avenging god than those against citizens. For the foreigner, being bereft of comrades |729e5| and kinsmen, is more piteous to human beings and gods, so the one more capable of avenging him is more eager to come to his aid. And preeminently capable of doing so is {138} the daimon15 or god of foreigners concerned in each case, |730a| who follows Zeus the God of Foreigners. Anyone with even a little forethought, then, will take great care to journey through his life to the end without committing any offense involving foreigners. And the most serious of the offenses against foreigners or fellow countrymen |730a5| is in every instance that involving suppliants. For the god the suppliant invoked when he obtained his agreement becomes a special guardian of the one who suffers by it, so that he will never suffer without vengeance being taken for what he has suffered.”

Well then, we have pretty much gone through matters having to do with a person’s dealings with parents, |730b| with himself and his own possessions, as well as with the city, friends, kinsmen, foreigners, and fellow countrymen. The next thing to go through following this is the sort of person he should be himself if he is to spend his life in the finest way. These matters that must be gone through next are not matters of law, but rather of praise and blame educating |730b5| each person to become more obedient to the laws that are going to be produced and show more goodwill toward them. “Truth absolutely heads the list of all good things for gods, |730c| and of all of them for human beings.16 It is of it that the one who is to become happy must partake right from the start, in order that he may live his life for as long as possible as a truthful person. For he is trustworthy. The untrustworthy person, on the other hand, is one fond of a voluntary lie, while the one fond of an involuntary one is lacking in understanding.17 Neither |730c5| condition is enviable. For the one who is untrustworthy or ignorant is entirely friendless. As time goes by he is known for what he is, and in harsh old age, toward the end of life, has prepared a state of utter loneliness for himself, so that whether his comrades and children are living or not, his life becomes pretty much |730d| like that of one bereft of them. “A person who commits no injustice is also certainly to be honored, but the one who does not allow unjust people to commit injustice deserves more than twice as much honor. For the former counts as one, whereas he counts as many different ones, by reporting the injustice of the others to the authorities.18 But the one |730d5| who also does what {139} he can to help the authorities in inflicting punishment is the one who must be declared the great and perfect man in the city, and victorious in virtue. “This same praise, then, must also be awarded to temperance and |730e| wisdom, and also to any other good qualities to be acquired that are capable not only of being possessed by the person himself but also of his imparting them to others. And while the one who does the imparting must be honored most highly, the one who is willing but unable to impart them must be second. As for the one who is envious |730e5| and unwilling to share through friendship any good qualities with anyone, though he is to be criticized,

what he possesses must, nonetheless, not be |731a| dishonored because of its possessor—instead, every possible effort must be made to acquire it. “Let all of us be lovers of victory when it comes to virtue, but not enviously so. For someone of this sort makes a city great, since, while competing himself, he does not hinder others with false accusations. The envious person, by contrast, |731a5| who thinks he can only come out on top by falsely accusing others, both lessens his own efforts to attain true virtue and discourages his competitors by criticizing them unjustly. Because of these things he does his part to make the whole city untrained in the competition for virtue, |731b| and to diminish its good reputation. “Every man must be spirited,19 but also as gentle as possible. For it is not possible to escape from the injustices done by others, when they are both hard to deal with and difficult or even entirely impossible to cure, in any other way |731b5| than by fighting and defending oneself victoriously, and by never leaving them unpunished, and no soul is able to do this without wellbred spiritedness. But, on the other hand, when people commit injustices that can be cured, |731c| the first thing to know is that no unjust person is unjust voluntarily.20 For no one anywhere would ever voluntarily possess any of the greatest evils, least of all in the most honorable parts of himself. But the soul, we are saying,21 is in truth the most honorable thing for everyone. |731c5| No one, then, would ever take the greatest evil into his soul and live throughout life in possession of it. On the contrary, the unjust person is piteous in every way, just as much as the one who possesses bad things, |731d| and it is permissible to {140} show pity to such a person when his illness is curable, and to restrain one’s spirit and be gentle with him, instead of storming away like an angry woman. But in dealing with a thoroughly and incorrigibly out-of-tune and evil person one must give one’s anger free rein. That is why we say that it is fitting |731d5| for a good person to be both spirited and gentle, as the occasion demands. “The greatest of all evils for most human beings, though, is something innate in their souls, for which everyone excuses himself, and so devises no means to escape. This is what people refer to when they say |731e| that every human being is by nature a self-lover and that it is correct for him to be so.22 But the truth is that for each person excessive self-love is in each case the

cause due to which all his faults arise. For the lover is blind |731e5| where the thing he loves is concerned, with the result that he is a bad judge of what is just, what is good, and what is fine, because he thinks that he must always honor what is his own more than what is true. |732a| You see, it is not himself or what is his own that a man who is going to be great must love, but what is just, either when doing it happens to be on his own part or even more when on someone else’s. And from this same fault arises everyone’s belief that ignorance on his own part |732a5| is wisdom (sophia), which is why, though we know practically nothing, we think we know everything.23 And when we refuse to turn over to others what we don’t know how to do, we necessarily commit errors |732b| in doing them ourselves. That is why every human being must avoid excessive self-love, and always follow the one who is better than himself, allowing no shame to stand in his way.24 “Other precepts that are often expressed are shallower than these, |732b5| but no less useful than these. A person must repeat them to himself as a way of recollecting them. For where there is a constant outflow, there must also be the opposite inflow, and recollection is the inflow of wisdom that has departed.25 So then: excessive laughter and tears {141} must be avoided,26 |732c| and every man must transmit this message to every other; in general, each person should try to conceal all excessive joy or excessive pain and behave with decorum, both if his daimon27 makes him to do well, and if due to luck his daimon—facing as it were a steep upward climb—makes |732c5| him to do the opposite in certain cases,28 hoping that, to good men at least, the god will always, by his gifts, make any hardships that may befall them less than they would otherwise have been, and their present ones |732d| change for the better; where good things are concerned, they must hope that, with the aid of good luck, they, contrariwise, will be made greater. It is with these hopes, then, and all these sorts of recollections, that each person should live, without any relaxation of effort, |732d5| but, whether in playing games or in serious activities, constantly recollecting them in a perspicuous way both for another person and for himself.” Where the practices that must be followed are concerned, and what sort of person each must himself be, we have pretty much now |732e| spoken about the ones that are the province of the gods, whereas about those in the human

province we have not yet said anything, but we must. For we are discussing human beings, not gods. “Pleasures, pains, and appetites are by nature especially human; and, of necessity, every mortal creature is simply (as it were) |732e5| hung up and suspended from these in the most serious ways.29 The finest life must be praised, then, not only because, viewed from the outside, it is superior with respect to good reputation, but also because, if someone is willing |733a| to taste it and not become a fugitive from it in his youth, it will also prove superior in the thing we all seek, which is to be more pleased and less pained throughout our whole life. That this will be perspicuous, provided one tastes it in the correct way, will be readily and abundantly apparent in a moment. |733a5| But what is ‘the correct way’? This is what, by taking guidance from the argument, must now be investigated. Comparing life with life, the more pleasant with the more painful, we must look to see whether one is in accord with nature linked with us, and the other contrary to nature.30 {142} “Pleasure we wish to be ours; pain we neither choose nor wish for; the absence of both |733b| we do not wish for in place of pleasure, but in exchange for pain, we do wish for it; less pain with more pleasure, we wish for, but less pleasure with more pain, we do not wish for; when the two are equal in one state to what they are in another, we have no perspicuous idea which to wish for. |733b5| All these considerations of number and size, of intensities and equalities (and whatever are the opposites of these sorts of things) either do, or do not, make a difference to wishing when it comes to making a choice of each of them. This being of |733c| necessity the order of things, the life in which pleasures and pains that are numerous, great, and intense are present, though the pleasures predominate, we wish for, but the one in which the opposites do, we do not wish for; contrariwise, the life in which pleasures and pains are few, small, and slight, though the pains predominate, |733c5| we do not wish for, but the one in which the opposites do, we do wish for. Further, we must understand the equibalanced life31 in the same way as before: the equibalanced life in which what we like predominates, we wish for, but the one in which what we hate does, we do not wish for. |733d| It must be understood that the lives open to us are all naturally linked with these considerations, and understood what sorts we by

nature wish for. If we say that we wish for something besides these, it is through ignorance and lack of experience of what lives are really available that we say this. “What, then, and how many, are these lives among which one must choose between the wanted and voluntary and the unwanted and involuntary, by looking to a law prescribed for himself, and choosing what is at once liked, pleasant, |733e| best, and finest, and so living as blessedly happy a life as is humanly possible? Let’s say that the temperate life is one, the wise is one, the courageous is one, and let’s class the healthy life as one. And opposed to these four are |733e5| four others: the unwise, the cowardly, the intemperate, and the diseased. Now the person who knows the temperate life will describe it as mild in all respects, with gentle pains, gentle pleasures, soft appetites, |734a| and passions that are not mad, but the intemperate life as sharp in all respects, with intense pains, intense pleasures, and given over to severe and frantic appetites, and passions that are as mad as possible. In the temperate life, |734a5| he will say, the pleasures predominate over the burdens, whereas in the intemperate one the pains are greater, more numerous, and more frequent than the pleasures. The necessary result of this is that the one life is {143} in accord with nature more pleasant for us, the other more painful; |734b| and it is no longer an option, at least for the person who wishes to live pleasantly, to allow himself to live intemperately. On the contrary, it is already clear (if what we are now saying is correct) that every intemperate person is of necessity involuntarily so. For it is either because of ignorance, lack of self-control, or both that the mob of humanity |734b5| in general live lives lacking in temperance. The diseased and healthy lives must be understood in the same way: both have pleasures and pains, but in health the pleasures predominate over the pains, whereas in diseases pains predominate over pleasures. “What we wish for in choosing |734c| between lives, though, is for what is painful not to predominate, and it is the life where it is predominated over that we have judged to be more pleasant. If, then, we compare the temperate life with the intemperate, the wise with the foolish, and the courageous with the cowardly, we would say that in the first ones both pleasures and pains are fewer, smaller, |734c5| and rarer, and that in the case of pleasures, they predominate over the second, though in the case of pain, the second ones

predominate over these; the courageous one defeats the cowardly one, and the wise one defeats the foolish one. So lives compared with lives, the temperate, |734d| courageous, wise, and healthy ones are more pleasant than the cowardly, foolish, intemperate, and diseased ones. “To sum up: we would say that the life that involves virtue, whether of body or of soul, is more pleasant than the life that involves depravity, |734d5| and in the other respects as well—beauty, correctness, virtue, and reputation —is incomparably superior, so that it makes the person who has it live more happily in every respect |734e| and overall than the opposite one does.” Let the statement of the arguments that make up the prelude to the laws32 end there. And after the prelude it is necessary, I take it, for a “law”33 to follow, or (more accurately), an outline sketch of a constitution’s laws. |734e5| Now, just as in the case of a piece of webbing, or any other piece of weaving, the woof and the warp cannot be made of the same materials, and it is necessary for the warp to be different in its kind of excellence34 (for it must be strong and be made stable by its twistings, while the other must be softer |735a| and furnished with a sort of “decent {144} justness”35), so in the case of those who are to be the ruling officials in cities, it is necessary in each case to distinguish in some such reasonable way as this between them and the others, who have gone through the test of a small education only.36 For a constitution, you must know, has two fundamental parts: |735a5| one is the appointment of individuals to the various offices, the other the laws assigned to the offices. But before all that, we must have in mind the following points. In dealing with a herd of any sort, a shepherd, cattleman, or breeder of horses (or |735b| anything else of this sort) will never attempt to take care of it until he has first employed the purge37 appropriate to his particular animal community. Picking out the healthy and the unhealthy, the well-bred and the not wellbred, he will send the latter ones away |735b5| to other herds, and direct his care to the former ones, having in mind that his labor would be pointless and never-ending if it concerned a body and a soul that nature and a wicked nurturing has ruined, and which in addition |735c| destroys the stock with healthy and undefiled characters and bodies, unless some thorough purge is made of the existing herd. In the case of the other animals this is a less

serious matter and deserves mention in the argument solely as an example, |735c5| but in the case of human beings it is a matter of the greatest seriousness for the legislator to discover and declare what is fitting for each group as regards purging and all other activities. To begin with, where a city’s purges are concerned, this is how one might proceed. |735d| Among the many sorts of purges, some are gentler and some harsher. If the same person is both a tyrant and a legislator,38 he would be able to employ the purges that are harshest and best. But if a legislator without tyrannical power, who is establishing a new constitution |735d5| and laws, can employ even the gentlest purges, he would gladly do even something of this sort. Now, the best one is painful, like all {145} such medicines. It uses judgment along with retribution39 to punish people, |735e| crowning the retribution with death or exile (for this is how it is customary to get rid of the greatest offenders, the ones who are incurable40 and the greatest harm to cities). The gentler of our purges, by contrast, is something like this. |735e5| When, because of a shortage of food, the have-nots show themselves ready to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the haves, these are regarded as a disease growing in the city, |736a| and by means of a removal that is given the euphemistic name of “colonization,” are sent off with a show of the most goodwill possible. Somehow or other this must be done by every legislator at the start,41 but for us now the case is yet more unusual. |736a5| For there is no need at the moment for us to devise a colonization or other sort of purgative selection. No, it’s like having waters from many sources, some from springs, some from mountain torrents, flowing together into a single lake, and its being necessary |736b| for us, by paying attention to it, to make sure that the water flowing in is as purged of impurities as possible, partly by draining some of it off, partly by diverting some into other channels.42 Now, hard work and risk, it seems, exist in every political arrangement. But since |736b5| at present things are being done in word and not in deed, let’s assume that our selection has been completed and the purge of it carried out in accord with our understanding (nous). For the evil people who attempt to become citizens of our present city |736c| we’ll have thoroughly tested by every means of persuasion over a sufficient length of time and prevented from entering it, but the good ones should be embraced with all possible graciousness and goodwill.

And let this stroke of good luck not escape our notice, that |736c5| just as we said43 that the colony of the sons of Heracles was lucky in avoiding terrible and dangerous strife concerning land, the cancelation of debts, and the redistribution of property, so it is with ours. For when a city of ancient holdings is compelled to legislate about this, it can neither leave things unchanged nor is it able to change them |736d| in any way. The {146} only thing left (so to speak) is prayer, and a small change taking hold over a long period of time producing a small change of course, in the following way: among the reformers there is a never-ending supply of men44 who themselves possess plentiful land, and among the possessors, |736d5| some also with a large number of debtors who are willing, because of a sense of decency,45 to share these things in some way with those debtors who are in need, partly by canceling debts and partly by redistributions, in this way attaching themselves to what is properly measured, |736e| and believing that poverty consists not in making one’s property less but in making one’s greed greater. For this46 is the greatest starting-point of a city’s salvation, and on this, as on a stable foundation, one can later |736e5| build whatever political order is fitting for this sort of settlement. But if this is rotten, subsequent political activity would never be easy in any |737a| city. This issue, as we said,47 we are avoiding. Nonetheless, it is more correct to explain how, even if we had not escaped it, we might have made an escape from it. Let it be said now, then, that it is through a justice-involving non-love-ofmoney. There is no other way of escape, |737a5| broad or narrow, besides this contrivance. So let this be laid down now as a sort of prop for our city. For somehow or other properties must be arranged so as to give people no grounds for dispute with each other, |737b| because those with even the least bit of understanding (nous) will not voluntarily proceed with the rest of the system, while they have ancient complaints against each other. But for people, as with us now, where a god has given us a new city to found, and |737b5| there are as yet no sorts of enmities against each other, for them to cause enmities to arise among themselves due to the distribution of land and houses would be an act of inhuman ignorance and utter vice combined. What, then, would be the correct mode of distribution? First, |737c| the total number of people must be prescribed—how many they must be. After that,

there must be agreement on the distribution of citizens, and the number and size of the divisions into which they must be divided. Among these divisions, the land and the houses |737c5| must be distributed as equally as possible. As for the total number of people, there is no correct way of saying what would be sufficient other than by looking to the land and the neighboring cities. The land must be large enough {147} to support a certain number48 |737d| of temperate people, and must be no larger than that. This number must be large enough to enable them to defend themselves against unjust treatment by their neighbors, and not entirely without the resources that would enable them to aid their neighbors if they are treated unjustly. But these are matters |737d5| we will determine in deed as well as in words once we have seen the territory and the neighbors. But now, for the sake of giving an outline sketch, let the argument proceed to legislation, in order that it may be completed. For the sake of a convenient number, let there be five thousand |737e| and forty landowners and defenders of the distribution, and let the land and the houses be likewise divided into the same number of divisions, with the man and his allotment forming one distributive unit. First let the entire number be divided by two, next, |737e5| let the same number be divided by three (for it is natural for this number to be divisible also by four, five, and so on continuously, up to ten).49 Every man who is legislating, then, must understand at least this much about numbers, namely, what |738a| number and what sort of number would be most useful for all cities. So, let’s pick the one that has within itself the most divisors and the most that are consecutive. Of course, the entire number admits of every division for every purpose. But our five thousand and forty—for the purposes of war |738a5| and all those of peace, relating to contracts, partnerships, taxes, and distributions—admits of no more than sixty minus one divisors (including one to ten consecutively).50 |738b| These things, then, must be securely understood even while at leisure, by those the law assigns to understand them. For they are no other way than the way I’ve said, and a city’s founder must be told of them, for the following reasons. Whether it’s a question of producing a new city from the start, or |738b5| repairing an old city that has gone to ruin, when it’s a matter concerning the gods and the temples that must be established by each city,

and which gods or daimons they should be named {148} for, no one with any understanding (nous) will try to alter whatever advice comes from Delphi, Dodona, or Ammon,51 |738c| or ancient sayings that have been found persuasive, in whatever form these persuaded people, whether stemming from visions or from inspiration said to be from gods. By this advice they established sacrifices with their miscellaneous rites either from their very own country or from Etruria, Cyprus, |738c5| or wherever, and guided by such sayings they established oracles, statues, altars, temples, and consecrated precincts to each of these. A legislator must not alter any of these in the least. He must assign to each section |738d| a god, daimon, or at least a hero of some sort, and in the distribution of the land he must assign choice precincts and all that is fitting for them to these first, so that when, at the appointed times, assemblies of each of the divisions take place, |738d5| they may have an ample supply to meet their particular needs, and the citizens may deal kindly with each other during the sacrifices, make friends with each other, and become known to each other. Now there is no greater good for a city than |738e| that the citizens be well known to each other. For where their characters are dark to each other rather than well lit, no one ever gets the honor he correctly deserves, or the office, or judgment52 that is correctly fitting. So every man in every city must above everything |738e5| eagerly strive never to appear dishonest to anyone, but always straightforward and true, and to avoid being deceived by such a person himself. The next move in establishing the laws, because it is unusual, like abandoning the “sacred line” in a game of checkers,53 |739a| may well cause surprise at first hearing. Nonetheless, to anyone making use of rational calculation and experience it is evident that a city is likely to be established in a way that is second to the best. Perhaps someone might not accept this |739a5| because he is unaccustomed to a legislator who is not a tyrant. But the most correct thing is to state what the best constitution is, and the second and third best, and, having stated it, to give the choice among them to the person in control of doing the establishing in each case. |739b| Let’s also act in accord with this principle now. Let’s {149} state what constitution is first as regards virtue, what second, and what third. Then let’s on this occasion give the choice to Cleinias, and to anyone else at any time who might be

willing in proceeding to a choice of such things, |739b5| to help himself to a share of whatever, in keeping with his own character, is dear to him in his own fatherland. First, then, comes that city and constitution—and its laws are best—where the ancient saying most holds throughout the entire |739c| city, that the things of friends really are common.54 Whether this exists anywhere now, or will ever exist, so that women are common, and children are common, and every sort of property is common—whether by means of every contrivance what is called “private” |739c5| has been entirely removed from every corner of life —whether, as far as possible, a way has been devised to make even the things that are by nature private somehow common, in the way eyes, ears, and hands seem to see, hear, and do things in common—whether, again, everyone is at one in what they praise and blame, |739d| and most of all pleased and pained at the same things—that is, if as far as possible the laws are the sort that make the city most of all a unity, no one will ever find a better or more correct criterion of superior virtue for laws. |739d5| A city of this sort—either gods, I take it, or children of gods (in numbers greater than one) manage55 it—where lives are spent in this way, is one where the inhabitants reside pleasantly. That is why one must not look elsewhere for a model indeed |739e| of a constitution, but hold on to this one and as far as possible seek the one that is most like it. The one we’ve been trying to found today, if it came to be, would be in a way very near attaining immortality56 and would be second in unity.57 The third (god willing) |739e5| we’ll go through after this. For the moment, though, what are we to say about this second-best city, and how it would come to be such? First of all, they must distribute lands and houses, and not |740a| farm in common, since something like that would be too much for the birth, nurturing, and education that have now been selected. And let the distribution be made with something like this thought in mind: that the {150} person who obtains this allotment is to regard it as still the common property of the entire city, and because the land belongs to his fatherland, he must take more care of his land |740a5| than a mother does of her children, inasmuch as it, being a goddess, is mistress over those who are mortal. He must also have the same thoughts about the local gods and daimons.

In order that these things remain in this state forever, |740b| the following things must be kept in mind as well: the number of households, as now distributed by us, must always remain the same, and must never become either more or less. And the surest way of bringing this about in any city would be as follows: the |740b5| allotment-holder must always leave behind only one of his sons, whichever one is most dear to him, as heir to his household and as his successor in taking care of gods, whether of family or of city, both those who are living and those who may be already dead by that time.58 |740c| As for the rest of his children, in cases where there are more than one, the females must be given in marriage, in accord with the law that will be prescribed,59 and the males distributed as sons to those citizens who lack male issue. This must be done as much as possible in accord with personal preferences, but |740c5| if personal preferences are lacking in some cases, or where a family is too large either in females or in males, or where, on the other hand, it is too small, because of the onset of sterility—in all these cases, |740d| an office, which we will establish as the greatest and most honored, must investigate how the excesses and deficiencies are to be dealt with, and must provide a contrivance to insure that, as far as possible, there will always be only the five thousand and forty households. There are many contrivances. |740d5| For there are in fact ways of limiting births in families where too many children are being born and, on the other hand, various ways of encouraging and incentivizing a greater number of births. Honors and dishonors, and older people’s admonishments, though words of admonishment addressing the young, |740e| are capable of producing what we’re talking about. And what is more, as a final step, if we are entirely at a loss concerning the equalization of the five thousand and forty households, if we face an excessive outpouring of citizens, due to the friendly feelings among those who live together in households, |740e5| and are at a loss, there is, I take it, the age-old contrivance we’ve often mentioned,60 which is to send out colonists, as friends coming from friends, from among those who seem suitable. {151} Conversely, if the opposite occurs, and a wave bearing a flood of diseases attacks, or destructive wars, and through bereavements the number of citizens becomes much smaller than the number prescribed, |741a| then, though they must not voluntarily import

citizens educated in a bastardized education—well, against necessity, it is said,61 even a god cannot use force. Let us imagine, then, that the argument we are now stating |741a5| is speaking and giving the following advice: “You, my very good friends, never cease to follow nature in honoring likeness, equality, sameness, and agreement, whether with respect to number or any capacity for fine and good actions. And in particular, |741b| first, guard throughout your entire life the number mentioned just now. Next, dishonor not the upper limit and the size of the property first distributed to you, which is a proper measure, by buying and selling it to each other, since neither the lot distributed, which is divine,62 |741b5| nor the legislator will be on your side.” For the present, then, for the one who disobeys, the law prescribes as follows: Fair warning has been given that anyone who wishes must either accept these distributions, or not accept them, on the understanding that, first, the |741c| land is sacred to all the gods, and next, that prayers are to be made by the Priests and Priestesses at the first, second, and third sacrifices. So, anyone who buys or sells his house-plot or plot of land is to suffer the penalties appropriate |741c5| to these things. Written records,63 inscribed on tablets of cypress wood, they are to deposit in the temples, as a memorial for times to come. Moreover, as guardian of these matters, to see that they come about, they are to appoint the official64 who seems to have the sharpest eyesight, |741d| in order that whatever transgressions occur on a given occasion may not escape their notice, and they may punish anyone who at once disobeys the law and the god. How much good what is now being prescribed does for all the cities it persuades, |741d5| when the accompanying system is added to it, is something that, in accord with the ancient proverb, no evil person can ever understand, but rather one experienced and decent due to his habits. For in such a system excessive moneymaking is not present, |741e| and it follows that in it there is no need, nor is it allowed, to make money from any of the unfree65 sorts of moneymaking, inasmuch as so-called {152} blameworthy vulgarity66 perverts a free character, nor in general for anyone to expect |741e5| to collect money from any such source.

In addition to this, accompanying all these things is a further law: No private individual is allowed to possess any gold or silver, |742a| but only currency for the pretty much necessary day-to-day exchange with craftsmen, and all other indispensable people of these sorts, whether slaves or foreigners, to whom wages must be paid for their hired services.67 For these purposes, we say that they must possess currency |742a5| that has value among themselves but is not legal tender among other people. As for the currency that is common to Greece, for the purposes of military expeditions or visits out of the country to other peoples (embassies, for example, or any other necessary missions that the city needs to send out) |742b| —for the sake of these things, it is necessary for the city always to possess Greek currency. But if it is ever necessary for any private individual to go out of the country, if the officials allow it, he is to go, but if he returns with any foreign currency, |742b5| he is to deposit it with the city and take the equivalent in local currency in exchange. But if anyone is found keeping it for himself, it is to become city property, and anyone who knew of it, but failed to report it, is to be subject to a curse and a reproach along with the one who has imported it, and to a fine, in addition, not less than the foreign currency that was brought in. |742c| Also, a person marrying or giving in marriage is neither to give nor to receive any dowry whatsoever, nor is anyone to deposit money with someone he doesn’t trust, nor lend money at interest, because the borrower is allowed to make no repayment at all |742c5| either of principal or of interest. That these are the best practices for a city to have may be judged by anyone who investigates the matter correctly by always referring back to the starting-point and the |742d| wish. Now the wish of a legislator who possesses understanding (nous), we say, is not at all the wish that the majority of people would say a good legislator must have. For, they’d say, he must wish that the city, for which he is legislating well, be as great as possible and as wealthy as possible, possessing |742d5| gold and silver, and ruling over as many people as possible, both on land and on sea; and they would add that, if he is to legislate correctly, he must wish the city to be the best possible and the happiest possible. But of these things, some are possible |742e| to bring about, others not possible. The ones that are possible, the person setting the city in order

{153} would certainly wish for, whereas those that are not possible he would neither have a pointless wish for nor attempt. You see, it is pretty much a necessity that people become happy and good simultaneously. So, this |742e5| is something he would wish for. But for them to become very rich and happy is impossible—certainly for the ones that the majority of people declare to be rich. They mean those few people whose possessions are worth the most money—ones that even an evil person could possess. If this is so, however, I for one |743a| would never agree with them that a rich person could become truly happy, if he is not also good. But for someone really to be exceedingly good and exceedingly wealthy is impossible.68 “Why is that?” someone might ask. “Because,” we would reply, “acquisition by just and unjust means |743a5| is more than twice that by just means alone, whereas the expenditures of those who are unwilling to spend either in a fine way or in a shameful one are half that of those who are fine and are willing to spend also on fine things.69 So those who acquire twice as much |743b| and spend twice as little will always be wealthier than the person who does the opposite. Now one of these is good, while the other, though not bad when he’s a miser, is utterly bad otherwise, and, as we said just now, is never good. For while the person |743b5| who takes both justly and unjustly and spends neither justly nor unjustly is rich, when he’s also a miser, and the utterly bad one, since he’s generally a spendthrift, is very poor, the other person, who spends on fine things and acquires by just means only, |743c| will not easily become either exceedingly rich or very poor. So our argument is correct: the utterly rich are not good, and if they are not good, they are not happy either.”70 Now the objective71 our laws looked to was that the citizens be as |743c5| happy as possible and friends with each other as far as possible.72 However, citizens don’t ever become friends where they have many lawsuits {154} among themselves, and many injustices, but rather where these are as |743d| minor and as infrequent as possible.73 We say, then, that there must be neither gold nor silver in our city, nor much moneymaking from vulgar pursuits, nor shameful interest and fattening of the principal sums.74 No, just the things that farming gives and yields, and only as much of these as would not compel a person to neglect, through making money, |743d5| the things that money is naturally for the sake of. These things are soul and

body, which without gymnastic training and the other sorts of education would never become worthy of mention. That is why, |743e| indeed, we have said more than once75 that the pursuit of money must be honored last. You see, there are really three things in all that every human being is serious about, and the serious and correct concern for money is the third and last of them, the concern for the body |743e5| is in the middle, and the concern for the soul is first. And in particular, in the case of the constitution we are now describing, if it assigns honors in this way, it has framed laws correctly. But if it becomes evident that one of the laws subsequently framed makes health more honorable than temperance in the city, |744a| or wealth more than health and being temperate, it reveals that it is not correctly established. This, then, is what the legislator must repeatedly ask himself: “What do I wish to achieve?” and “Am I achieving it, or am I off target?” In this way, |744a5| he might perhaps finish the task of legislating himself and not leave it to others. But there is not a single other way in which he ever could. So the person who has acquired an allotment must keep it, we say, on the terms stated.76 It would indeed have been a fine thing if each person entered |744b| the colony having an equal amount of everything else as well. But since that is impossible, and one will arrive with more money, another with less, it is necessary, for many purposes, and for the sake of equality of opportunity, that there must be unequal property assessments, in order that |744b5| offices, revenues, and distributions, be assigned in accord with the assessed valuation in each case—in accord not merely {155} with the virtue of his ancestors and himself, or his bodily strength and good looks, but in accord also with the use77 made of wealth or with poverty. In this way, receiving honors and offices |744c| as equally as possible, due to “proportional inequality”78 they would avoid disagreements. For these reasons, four classes must be created, based on property size, called “first,” “second,” “third,” and “fourth” assessment classes, or by whatever other names they are being called, |744c5| whether people remain in the same class or, through a change from poverty to wealth or from wealth to poverty, they change in each case to the assessment class that is fitting for them. |744d|

In view of these considerations, the shape of law that I for one would establish as following next would be this. For I suppose that if a city is to avoid the greatest disease of all, as we say, which would be more correctly termed “splitting apart” than “faction,” |744d5| then neither harsh poverty nor wealth must exist among the citizens, since both conditions breed this double-named disease. Now is the time, then, for the legislator to state a criterion for both conditions. The criterion for poverty, then, is to be the value of the allotment—which must be maintained, and which no official must ever, in the case of anyone, |744e| allow to become less, nor must any of the others who are eager to be honored for virtue. And having established this as the measure, the legislator is to allow ownership of twice this amount, or three times, or up to four times.79 But if anyone acquires more than this, |744e5| whether by finding it, being given it, by moneymaking, or by acquiring what is over and above the proper measure by some other stroke of luck of this sort, |745a| then, provided he assigns it to the city and the gods the city belongs to, he would be in good repute and free from penalty. If, however, he disobeys this law, anyone who wishes may inform against him for half the surplus, while the offending party is to pay an equal amount from his own property, |745a5| and give the other half to the gods. Everyone’s entire property, apart from the allotment, is to be written down as a public record and be in the keeping of officials appointed by the law, in order that all matters of property may be easy to resolve and perfectly |745b| perspicuous. After this, the first task for the legislator is to establish the city as nearly as possible in the middle of the territory, choosing a spot that {156} also possesses all the other pre-existing features that are useful for a city, which are not at all difficult |745b5| to understand and state. Next, he must divide off twelve parts. First, he must set apart a sanctuary for Hestia,80 Zeus, and Athena, to be called the “acropolis,”81 and surrounded by a circular wall. From this as center he must divide both the city itself and the entire territory |745c| into twelve parts. The twelve parts must be made equal, in the sense that the ones where the land is good must be smaller, the ones where it is worse, larger. He must mark off five thousand and forty allotments, and each of these he must divide again into two pieces, and then form one lot by joining two pieces together, |745c5| one closer in, one farther out—the piece

closest to the city with the piece closest to the borders to form one allotment, the second-closest to the city to the second-closest to the borders, and the others |745d| all in the same way. For these two-part divisions he must employ the contrivance just mentioned in connection with the poor quality or excellence of the land, making them equal again by means of the largeness or smallness of the allocations. He must deal out the men too into twelve parts, |745d5| arranging for the twelve parts to be as equal as possible with respect to the rest of their property,82 having produced a register of all of them. Moreover, after this, they must assign twelve allotments to the twelve gods, and name each for, and dedicate it to, the god to whom it has been allotted, and name it a “tribe.” |745e| And they must also divide the twelve parts of the city in the very same way as they divided the rest of the territory, and each man must be allotted two houses, one near the center and the other near the border. |745e5| And in this way its foundation will be completed. But we must by all means bear the following sort of thing in mind, namely, that all the things we’ve just described may never meet with such opportune circumstances as would allow all of them to come about exactly in accord with every detail of our argument83—men who will not feel disgust at this sort |746a| of community, but will tolerate prescribed and properly measured limits on property throughout their entire life, the mode of having children that we’ve ordained for each, being deprived of gold and of the other things that the legislator must clearly prescribe, based on what has been said just now, |746a5| or, further, the sort of territory and city he’s described, with houses at the center and {157} all around. It’s pretty much as if he were telling dreams, or molding, as it were, a city and its citizens from wax.84 In certain respects, of course, it wasn’t bad to say things in that way, but the legislator must |746b| revise it with an eye to the following considerations. So the legislator again speaks to us, saying this: “You must not think, my friends, that in these discussions I have overlooked the fact that what has just been said is in a way true. But in the case of each thing |746b5| that is to exist in the future, I think the most just way to proceed is this: the one presenting the model one must try to realize is to omit nothing of what is

finest and most true; but if one of these things turns out to be impossible to bring about, this one he |746c| is to omit and not implement, but contrive to implement instead whichever of the remaining things comes closest to this, and is by nature most closely akin to what is fitting. One must allow the legislator to put a finish to the model he wishes to realize, then, only when this |746c5| is done, join with him in investigating which of his proposals is advantageous and which part of the legislation he has described is too arduous. For a craftsman of even the most insignificant thing, if he’s going to be anyone worth mentioning, must, I imagine, make it in every way consistent with itself.” |746d| Now then, after the doctrine of the division of the city into twelve parts, one must be eager to see in what clear way the twelve parts, which have within them a very large number of subdivisions, |746d5| and the ones that come next to these and are generated from them, until we get down to five thousand and forty—from which will come clans, demes, and villages,85 as well as military companies and training units, {158} and furthermore the units of currency, dry and liquid measures, |746e| and weights—to see, I say, how all these must be prescribed by law so as to be commensurable and in concord with each other. In addition, he must not be afraid, fearing that he might seem to be speaking in too much detail, to prescribe that of the equipment they possess, |746e5| none must be without proper measure. He must recognize as a general principle that the divisions and variations of numbers are useful for everything—whether |747a| it’s the variations present in the numbers themselves or the variations present in plane and solid figures, in sounds, and in movements (whether straight upward or downward or circular).86 For the legislator must look to |747a5| all these and prescribe that all the citizens do all in their power not to abandon this system. For with an eye to household management, to a constitution, and to all the |747b| crafts, no single branch of education has so great a power as the one about numbers. Its greatest feature, though, is that it awakens the person who is by nature drowsy and bad at learning,87 and causes him to be quick at learning, retentive of memory, and ready witted,88 advancing beyond his own nature |747b5| due to a divine craft. All these branches of education would be fine and fitting, provided that there are other laws and practices to remove illiberality and love of money

from the souls of those who are to acquire them sufficiently and benefit by them. |747c| Otherwise, you would have unwittingly produced what is called unscrupulousness89 rather than wisdom (sophia), just as can now be seen to have been produced in the case of the Egyptians, Phoenicians,90 and many other races, due to the illiberality of the {159} rest of their practices |747c5| and of their attitudes to possessions—whether it might have been some bad legislator who contrived these for them, or because hard luck befell them, or even some other influence of this sort that is natural. |747d| For we also must not overlook the fact, Megillus and Cleinias, that some places are superior to others for the breeding of better (or worse) human beings, and one must not legislate contrary to these facts. Due to all sorts of winds, I take it, or different exposures to the sun, some places are unfavorable, others favorable, or due to the sorts of water, or even due to the very nourishment that comes from the soil yielding better (or worse) results not only for people’s bodies, but it being no less capable |747e| of producing all such results for their souls as well.91 But of all these places, the territories that would be the most superior would be those in which a sort of divine wind breathes and where the allotments are in the possession of daimons,92 who receive with favor (or the opposite) those who from time to time come to settle there. These facts the legislator, anyway one who possesses understanding (nous), |747e5| would investigate—to the extent that a human being can investigate things of this sort—and try to establish his laws accordingly. That, then, is what you must do as well, Cleinias: you must turn to these matters first, when you are going to settle the territory. CLEINIAS: That’s entirely well said, Athenian Stranger, and I |747e10| must do what you say.     1. At 716c–718a. 2. See Alc. 128a–132b. 3. I.e., daimons and heroes. See 717b3n. 4. Elegchôn: As in the famous Socratic elenchus, on which see 892b5, Reeve-2, pp. 33–53. 5. See Ap. 29a4–b2: “You see, fearing death, gentlemen, is nothing other than thinking one’s wise when one isn’t, since it’s thinking one knows what one doesn’t know. After all,

no one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all goods for people, but they fear it as if they knew for certain that it’s the worst thing of all. Yet surely this is the most blameworthy ignorance of thinking one knows what one doesn’t know.” See also Ap. 40b– 41c, Reeve-2, pp. 148–150, 179–183. 6. Cf. 854c, which makes the injustice itself the “punishment.” 7. To become assimilated to unjust men is necessarily to do and suffer what people like that (people who are incorrigibly unjust) do and say, namely, X. X is not a real or just judgment (dikê), which is something fine, but simply retribution (timôria). The “this” (the feminine pronoun hês) cannot be X (the feminine noun timôria). Why? Because avoiding X does not cure anybody of anything, nor does meeting with X serve in any straightforward way as a means to saving others. Instead, hês must refer back to real punishment (the feminine noun dikê). The idea then is the familiar one in Platonic penology that for someone to meet with just punishment is to meet what will cure him of vice, or—if he is incorrigibly unjust (854e, 957e), like those who have become “naturally adapted (prospepukota)” to really unjust people—put him to death to save others from following his example (see Prt. 324a– c, Grg. 479b–d, 525a–c). For a different proposal on how to interpret the passage, see Saunders-2, pp. 18–21. 8. See 696b–c. 9. See 726a. 10. See 701a4n. 11. See Rep. 373d. 12. Aischunestai: Literally, “be ashamed” but with a meaning better captured by the negation, “not behave shamelessly,” or (more positively) “show respect by not behaving in that way.” 13. See 784a4n. 14. Ta tôn xenôn kai eis tous xenous: Translating with Saunders-2, pp. 21–22. 15. See 713d2n. 16. See Rep. 485c–d. 17. See Rep. 536d–e. 18. See 914a. 19. Thumoeidê: See 863b3n. 20. See 734b, 861b–d, also Grg. 509d–e, Prt. 352b–353a, Rep. 588e–590a, Ti. 86d–e, Reeve-2, pp. 144–149. 21. See 726a, 728c–d. 22. See Ar. NE 1168a28–1169b2, Pol. 1263b2–5, Rh. 1271b19–23. 23. See 727d5n. 24. On the interpretation of the final clause, see Saunders-2, pp. 23–24. 25. Cf. Smp. 207e6–208a6: “It’s much stranger even than this with the pieces of knowledge (epistêmê) we have: not only are some of them coming into existence and others passing away, so that we are never the same even in respect to pieces of knowledge, but in fact each single one of the pieces of knowledge is subject to the same process. For what we call going over things exists because knowledge goes out of us; forgetting is the departure of knowledge, and going over something creates in us again a new memory in place of the one that is leaving us, and so preserves our knowledge in such a way as to make it seem the

same.” On which, see Reeve-3, pp. 117–121. On recollection (anamnêsis), see Men. 81a– 86c, Phd. 72e–76b, Phdr. 248e–249d, Phlb. 34b–c. 26. See Rep. 388e–389a, 606a–d. 27. See 713d2n. 28. Eupragias histamenou . . . anthistamenon tisin praxesin: “makes him to do well  .  .  . makes him to do the opposite in certain cases” preserves the parallel. See 628d5n. 29. A return to the puppet imagery of 644d–645a. 30. See Ti. 81e2–3: “For all that is contrary to nature is painful; but whatever occurs in a natural way is pleasant.” 31. “In which pains and pleasures are moderate in point of number, size, and intensity” (Saunders-2, p. 26). 32. See 722c–e. 33. Another pun on nomos. See 700b5n. 34. A simile elaborated, with a somewhat different aim, in Polit. 279a–311c and criticized in Ar. Pol. 1265b19–21. 35. Epieikeia[i] tini dikaia[i]: “And this is the very nature of what is decent (epieikous)—a rectification of law insofar as it is deficient because of its universality. For this is also the cause of not everything’s being regulated by law—namely, that there are some cases where it is impossible to establish a law, so that decrees (psêphismata) are needed. For the standard of what is indeterminate is itself indeterminate, just like the lead standard used in Lesbian building. For the standard is not fixed but adapts itself to the shape of the stone and a decree adapts itself to the things themselves” (Ar. NE 1137b26–32). Here Plato reverses the metaphor, using decency (or equity) and justice (or law) to express the fitting degree of flexibility of the woof. Notice epieikeian at 736d7. 36. In contrast to the more exact education mentioned at 670e2–3. 37. Katharmon: Cf. Rep. 567c4. 38. See 709e–710d. 39. Dikê[i] meta timôrias: On the meaning of these terms, see 728c2–6n. 40. See 854e, 908d–909b, Rep. 410a. 41. Cf. Rep. 501a2–7: “[The philosopher-kings] would take the city and people’s characters as their sketching slate, but first they would wipe it clean—which is not at all an easy thing to do. And you should be aware that this is an immediate difference between them and others—that they refuse to take either a private individual or a city in hand, or to write laws, unless they receive a clean slate or are allowed to clean it themselves.” 42. See 707e–708d. 43. See 684d–685d. 44. The existence of this supply, if it exists, is the answer to the prayer. 45. See 735a2n. 46. I.e., the wealth, decency, attachment, conviction, and private actions of the relevant landowners. See Saunders-2, pp. 27–29. 47. See 736c5–8. 48. Reading ποσοὺς with England-1 for Budé πόσους (“how many”). 49. Cf. Rep. 546b–c, 587d–e.

50. “The wonderful number 5,040 . . . has 60 divisors, including the numbers 1 through 12, except 11, which will go into 5,038 (5,040–2).  .  .  . Presumably Plato was aware that the total number of divisors of a number is related to the number of prime factors it contains. One way of ensuring a large number of divisors (including the number 12, needed to fit the calendar divisions) would have been to multiply successive digits together, beginning with 1 and proceeding until a product suitable in size for the population of a state resulted. As a matter of fact, since 5,040 equals 1·2·3·4·5·6·7 or 7!, this is probably how Plato made his discovery. The other divisors could have then been computed by tabulating the various products of the constituent factors” (Brumbaugh, pp. 61–62). See Also Schöpsdau-2, pp. 299–302. 51. Cf. Rep. 427b–c. Delphi was the seat of Apollo’s famous oracle; Dodona in Epirus that of Zeus’. Ammon was a deity whose oracle was at Siwa in the Libyan desert. 52. Dikês: see 728c2–6n. 53. Pettôn: A pettos (plural: pettoi) is an oval-shaped stone used in playing checkers (drafts), backgammon, or the like. Since any game played with a pettos is a game of pettoi, it is not clear to which game in particular Plato is referring, or what precisely abandoning the “sacred line” amounted to, beyond the fact that it was something quite unexpected. 54. See Rep. 424a, 449c–472a. 55. Oikouisi: The verb oikein (like katoikein used in the next clause and translated as “reside”) can mean “inhabit,” but also “manage” or “direct” (LSJ s.v. οἰκέω, κατοικέω). But even in the best city and constitution (anyway as described in Rep. 449c–472a), only the philosopher-kings (and perhaps the guardians) could plausibly be described as “gods” or “children of gods.” The shift from oikein to katoikein may be intended to suggest the change of meaning. 56. But even the very best city is not immortal in the way gods are. See Rep. 545d–547a. 57. Reading ἡ μία with England-1 for Budé τιμία (“in honor”). 58. The living ones are parents, the dead ones ancestors. See 717b. 59. See 772d–e, 924d, and, where the law is used as an example, 721c. 60. See 708b, 736a. 61. The thought is found in a poem of Simonides, quoted in part at 818b1–2 and at Prt. 345d. 62. See 690c, 757b. 63. See 745a. 64. See 754d. 65. See 701a4n. 66. See 644a4n. 67. On the translation of this sentence, see Saunders-2, pp. 30–31. 68. Cf. Rep. 554a–555a. 69. I.e., in addition to necessities. 70. A is good and justly gets $300. He spends $100 on necessities, spends $100 on fine things, and saves $100. B is not good. He gets justly and unjustly $600. He spends $100 on necessities, spends $0 on fine things, and saves $500. C is utterly bad, because he gets justly and unjustly $600 and spends (say) $500 unjustly, $100 on necessities, and $0 on fine things, saving nothing. A is good and neither very rich nor very poor; B is not good and very rich; C is utterly bad and very poor.

71. Hupothesis: Ar. Pol. 1261a16 identifies the hypothesis of the constitution described in Rep. as “its being best for a city to be as far as possible entirely one.” 72. See 627e–628a, 718b, 738d–e, 828d–829a. 73. See Rep. 464d–465c. 74. Tokôn mêde boskêmatôn aischron: A tokos is both a child and interest on capital (see Rep. 507a); boskêmata means “fatted beasts,” such as cattle and sheep (LSJ s.v. βόσκημα). I take the two to be linked: the principal is fattened or increased by the interest as a beast is fatted by the child in its womb (= the food in its stomach). Brisson-Pradeau-1, p. 400 n102, and Saunders-1 take the reference to be to prostitution; others, such as Bury-1, translate literally. England-1, p. 531, more plausibly suggests “vile money-breeding—or moneyfeeding either.” 75. See 631c, 697b–c, 728e–729a. 76. See 740b–741d. 77. Kata ploutou chrêsin: On the importance of this requirement, see Saunders-2, pp. 31– 32. 78. See 756e–757d. 79. Aristotle takes the permission to be to acquire four times the allotment in addition to the allotment: “he permits someone’s total property to increase up to five times its original value” (Pol. 1265b21–22). 80. Goddess of the hearth, considered as the sacred center of the home. 81. See 624b2n. 82. I.e., so that each allotment has as nearly equal a mix of rich and poor men as possible. 83. See 702c8–d8n. 84. See 671b–c. 85. Phratrias kai dêmous kai kômas: A phulê, which is not a tribe in our sense but an administrative division most probably of military origin, was a principal component or division of the citizen body. Thus in the system developed by Cleisthenes for Attica in 508/7 BC, the land was divided into three zones: city, shore, and inland. Each of these was in turn divided into ten sections called trittyes, to each of which was assigned between 1 and 10 of the 139 existing settlements, including villages and towns, which were all called demes. Three units, one drawn from each of the three zones, were put together to form a tribe. Each of the resulting geographically scattered ten tribes was named after a local hero, and membership in it made hereditary in the male line. These tribes were then assigned or took on various political functions, such as brigading units for the army and constituencies for the election of magistrates. Before this reorganization, which had the effect of breaking up old political allegiances, every Athenian male belonged to a clan (or brotherhood), and clans functioned as social units concerned with family and descent. Under Draco’s laws (621 BC), for example, a clan was required to support the family of one of its members if he was a victim of unintentional homicide or to take on the role of his family if he had none. 86. The subjects referred to are arithmetic, geometry, solid geometry, harmonics, and kinematics. See Rep. 522b–531d. 87. Amathê: Amathia is usually “ignorance,” but here the adjective amathês is the opposite of eumathê (“quick at learning”) and refers to an inability not a lack of information.

88. Agchinous: See Def. 412e. 89. Panourgia: See Menex. 247a: “It is evident that all knowledge (epistêmê) that is separated from justice and the rest of virtue is unscrupulousness, not knowledge.” Cf. Ar. NE 1144a23–29: “There is, then, a capacity called cleverness, and this is the sort of thing that, when it comes to the things that further hitting a proposed target, is able to do these and to hit upon them. If, then, the target is a fine one, this capacity is praiseworthy, but, if it is a base one, it is unscrupulousness. That is why both practically-wise people and unscrupulous ones are said to be clever. Practical wisdom, however, is not the capacity of cleverness but does not exist without this capacity”; EE 1221a36–37: “The unscrupulous person tries to get more (plenonektikos) in every way and from every source.” 90. See Rep. 436a: “the love of money  .  .  . is said to be found not least among the Phoenicians and Egyptians.” 91. See Ti. 24c–d, Herod. 1.142.1–2, Hp. Aër. 92. See 713d2n, 738c–d.

{160} BOOK 6 ATHENIAN: Well then, after all that has now been said, pretty much |751a| the next task for you would be the establishment of offices for the city. CLEINIAS: Yes, that’s right. ATHENIAN: There are these two parts involved in the arrangement of a constitution: first the establishment of offices and officials—how |751a5| many offices there must be, and what way they must be established; then, the assignment of laws to each office—what sorts they’ll be, how many, and which ones would be fitting |751b| for each office.1 But let’s pause for a moment before we make the selection and say a word about it that it’s fitting to say. CLEINIAS: What’s that? ATHENIAN: This. The sort of thing, I imagine, that’s clear to everyone: because |751b5| the task of legislating is a great one, when a well-founded city puts unfit officials in charge of laws that are well laid down, not only does it no longer matter that the laws are well established (not to say that the situation is entirely ridiculous), but pretty much the greatest harms and outrages |751c| for cities would come from these. CLEINIAS: How could it be otherwise? ATHENIAN: In that case, let’s keep this in mind, my friend, in the case of your present constitution and city. For you see, in the first place, that those who accede to the powers of the offices |751c5| in the correct way must in each case have been sufficiently tested—both themselves and their families —from their childhood up to the time of their selection; and then, second, that those who are going to make the selection must be brought up in lawabiding habits, and well educated with a view to being able, by feeling disgust and approval2 |751d| correctly, to select or reject candidates as they deserve. But in this case, how could people who have newly come together, with no knowledge of each other, and who are as yet uneducated, ever be able to select officials in an irreproachable way? |751d5| {161} CLEINIAS: It would be pretty much impossible.

And yet “once we’re in the contest,” as they say, “we’re allowed no excuses.”3 And in particular, that’s now what you and I must do, since you have given an undertaking, you say,4 to the people of Crete that you will now with your nine colleagues eagerly |751e| found the city. And I, for my part, have promised you to do so |752a| with the aid of the storytelling that we’re now engaged in. Well, in telling a story, I’d surely not willingly leave it without a head, since it would appear shapeless wandering around like that!5 CLEINIAS: Very well said, Stranger. |752a5| ATHENIAN: Not only that, but as far as I’m able, I’ll do as I say. CLEINIAS: Of course, let’s do exactly as we say. ATHENIAN: Yes, let’s—if god’s willing6 and we can sufficiently prevail over our old age. CLEINIAS: But he probably is willing. |752b| ATHENIAN: Yes, probably. So let’s follow him and take up this point. CLEINIAS: Which one? ATHENIAN: How courageously and adventurously, in the present circumstance, |752b5| this city of ours will turn out to have been founded. CLEINIAS: Why do you especially say that now? What do you have in mind? ATHENIAN: The fact that we are contentedly and fearlessly legislating for inexperienced men, in the hope that they will accept the laws that have been established. |752b10| This much, though, Cleinias, is clear to practically everyone, even someone who isn’t very wise: that they won’t easily accept any of them |752c| at the start. But if we could somehow remain there for a long enough time, until those who have grown up tasting the laws as children,7 having been brought up with them and become sufficiently accustomed to them, have taken part in the selection of officials for every office in the city—if indeed in some way, by means {162} of some contrivance, |752c5| what we’re saying could come about correctly, I for one think that there would be a firm guarantee that, even after this period of time I mentioned, a city that had been educated in this way would stand firm.8 CLEINIAS: It’s reasonable to suppose so, certainly. |752d| ATHENIAN:

Let’s see, then, whether we might not in the following way provide a sufficient means to this end. You see, I declare, Cleinias, that you people of Cnossos, far more than any of the other Cretans, must not only fulfill your sacred duty9 where the territory you’re now settling is concerned, but must also take strenuous |752d5| care as far as you can that the first officials are selected in the safest and best way possible. That of the other officials is, no doubt, a more insignificant task; but it is absolutely necessary that your first Guardians of the Laws10 be selected with the utmost seriousness. |752e| CLEINIAS: What means and what principle can we find for this task?11 ATHENIAN: This. Sons of Crete, I say, as the people of Cnossos take precedence among your many cities, they must join with |752e5| those who are arriving to this community in selecting, from among themselves and those, a total of thirty-seven people,12 nineteen of whom are to be selected from the colonists and the rest from Cnossos itself. The people of Cnossos must give these as a gift to this city of yours, |753a| and make you yourself a citizen of this colony and one of the eighteen—using persuasion or, possibly, a proper measure of force. CLEINIAS: But why, Stranger, have you and Megillus |753a5| not gone shares with us in operating13 the constitution? {163} ATHENIAN: Athens is proud,14 Cleinias, Sparta too, and both are far away. But for you it hits entirely the right note, as it does likewise for the other founders, to whom our remarks about you just now also apply. Let’s state, then, that this would be |753b| the most equitable arrangement in the circumstances we face as things stand. But when time has gone by and the constitution has proved lasting, the selection process for the officials is to be something like this: All who possess cavalry or infantry weapons,15 or who have served in war in accord with the capacities of their age, |753b5| are to participate in the selection of the officials. The selection is to be made in the temple that the city thinks most honorable, and each selector is to bring to |753c| the altar of the god a tablet on which he has written the names of his nominee, his father, his tribe, and the deme16 of which he is a member, and beside it is to write his own name with the same details. For a period of no less than thirty days, anyone who wishes may remove any tablet on which it ATHENIAN:

is evident that |753c5| the name written is not in accord with an understanding (nous) of things17 and set it up in the marketplace. Those of the tablets18 that have been judged to come first, up to three hundred, the officials are to display for the entire citizen body to see, and the citizen body is to select again in the same way, |753d| with each citizen bringing to the altar the one he wishes. Of these, the officials are again to display the one hundred preferred names to all. In the third round, anyone who wishes may bring the one he wishes from the hundred, provided he walks {164} between slain sacrificial animals.19 The thirty-seven who |753d5| receive the most votes, having been examined,20 are to be appointed to office. So who are the people, Cleinias and Megillus, who will establish in the city all these things having to do with offices and examinations21 |753e| for them? We understand (don’t we?) that it is necessary for there to be such people in cities that are to be united for the first time, though who they might be, before there are any officials, is impossible to see. Yet somehow or other they must be there—and not just poor quality ones, but the highest quality ones possible. |753e5| After all, “well begun is half done,” say the proverbs, and we all praise making a fine start, indeed, in each enterprise, whereas it appears to me that well begun is more than half done, and that no one has yet sufficiently praised a start that is made in a fine way. |754a| CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely right. ATHENIAN: Knowing this, then, let’s not leave it undiscussed, nor fail to make perspicuous to ourselves the way it is going to be made. For my part, I can’t |754a5| find any way at all, except to say one word that in the present situation it is both necessary and advantageous to say. CLEINIAS: What is it? ATHENIAN: I say that this city we are going to found has no “father” or “mother” except the very city |754b| that is founding it, though not unaware that a good few of the founded ones have had—and will have—repeated disagreements with the ones that founded them. But right now, in the present situation, it’s just like it is with a child: even if at some time in the future a disagreement arises with his parents, in the present the helplessness of childhood, at any rate, he loves and is loved by |754b5| those who gave him birth, and always takes refuge with the members of his family, and finds in

them his only necessary22 allies. So, this is the bond that I say will now surely exist, binding the people of Cnossos to the new city, due to their taking care of it, and binding the new city to Cnossos. |754c| {165} I say, then, as I said just now23 (since to say something fine twice does no harm), that the people of Cnossos, collectively, must take care of all these things, selecting from those who have arrived in the colony |754c5| no less than a hundred people, the oldest and the best ones that they are able to select; and from the people of Cnossos themselves, there is to be another hundred. These are the people, I say, who must go to the new city and together take care that the officials are appointed in accordance with the laws, and examined when they have been appointed. Once this has been done, |754d| the people of Cnossos must live in Cnossos and the new city must try on its own to secure its safety and good luck. As for those who belong to the thirty-seven,24 they are to be selected to do the following things for us, both now and for the rest of time: |754d5| first, they are to be Guardians of the Laws and, second, of the written records in which each person has written down the amount of his property for the officials (except that anyone in the highest assessment class may omit four minas,25 in the second three, and in the third |754e| two minas, and one mina in the fourth). If anyone proves to possess something other than this, over and above what has been written, the entirety of it is to become public property, and in addition anyone who wishes may bring him to trial, and to a trial that is neither a fine nor an auspicious one, but a shameful one, |754e5| if he is found guilty of holding the laws in contempt because of gain. So, anyone who wishes may bring a writ against26 him for shameful gain and prosecute him in a trial before the Guardians of the Laws themselves. And if the defendant is found guilty, he is to have no share of the common property, and whenever there is some distribution made by the city, |755a| he is to go without a share, except for his original allotment, and his guilty verdict is to be written down where, for as long as he lives, anyone who wishes may read it. A Guardian of the Laws is to hold office for no more than twenty years, and is to enter office when he is no less than fifty |755a5| years old. If he is sixty when appointed, he is to hold office for ten years only, and so {166}

on in accord with this principle, and during all the years he lives beyond seventy,27 he is no longer to have in mind ruling |755b| among these officials in such an important office. Where the Guardians of the Laws are concerned, then, let these three prescribed tasks28 be stated, but when the laws are further developed, each law will prescribe for these men whatever |755b5| additional areas of supervision are required beyond the ones now stated. Now, though, we should go on to discuss the selection of other officials. After these, then, the Generals (stratêgoi) must be selected, as well as those who are (as it were) their assistants in wartime—Cavalry-Commanders (hipparchoi), |755c| Tribe-Leaders (phularchoi), and those who marshal the ranks of the tribal infantry, whom it would be fitting to call by the very name that the majority of people apply to them, “Company-Commanders (taxiarchoi).”29 Of these, Generals are to be nominated by the Guardians of the Laws from among our citizen body itself; |755c5| and from the nominees the selection is to be made each time by all those who have served in war at the proper age or are serving in it. But if anyone thinks that there is someone who hasn’t been nominated who is better than |755d| someone who has been nominated, he is to name his candidate and the one he is to replace and, swearing an oath, nominate the former. Whichever of the two is favored by show of hands is to be admitted in the selection list. The three who get the most votes by show of hands |755d5| are to become Generals and supervisors in matters of war, after being examined in the same way as the Guardians of the Laws. The selected Generals are to nominate twelve Company-Commanders for themselves, a Company-Commander for each tribe, |755e| and the process of counter-nomination for CompanyCommanders is to be the same as for the Generals, as is the vote by show of hands, and the examination. For the present, before an executive and a council30 have been selected, it is for the Guardians of the Laws to convene this assembly, |755e5| placing it in a spot that is the holiest and most spacious one possible, {167} with the hoplites in one section,31 the cavalry in another, and in a third, next to these, all those who belong to other branches of military service. All are to be part of the show of hands for the General and the Cavalry-Commanders, those

who bear shields for the Company-Commanders, while the Tribe-Leaders in turn for these32 |756a| are to be selected by the entire cavalry. As for leaders of the light-armed troops, archers, or any other branches of military service, the Generals are to appoint these for themselves. The appointment of the Cavalry-Commanders, then, is still left for us to discuss. These are to be nominated by the very same people as those |756a5| who nominated the Generals, and the selection and the process of counternomination are to be the same as for the Generals, but the cavalry is to select by show of hands, in full sight of the infantry, and the two who receive the most votes |756b| by show of hands are to become leaders of the entire cavalry. There are to be no more than two challenges to the votes by show of hands. If anyone makes a third challenge, it is for those in charge of the count of hands on a given occasion to decide it by voting among themselves. |756b5| The Council is to number thirty dozen, three hundred and sixty being a number fitted for subdivision. Dividing the number into four parts of ninety each, |756c| ninety councilors are to be elected from each of the assessment classes. First, those from the highest assessment class; all are to be compelled to vote, and anyone who disobeys must pay the declared fine. When the voting is finished, the names of the elected are to be recorded. |756c5| On the next day, they are to vote for those from the second assessment class, following the same procedure as on the day before. On the third day, for those in the third assessment class, though anyone who wishes may vote, it is compulsory for those from the top three assessment classes, whereas anyone from the fourth and lowest class |756d| is to be let off free of any fine if he does not wish to vote. On the fourth day, everyone is to vote for those from the fourth and lowest class, but there is to be no fine for anyone from the third or fourth class who doesn’t wish to vote; |756d5| but anyone from the second or first class who does not vote is to pay a fine— three times the amount of the first fine33 in the case of someone from the second class, four times in the case of someone from the first class. On the fifth day, |756e| the officials will {168} display the recorded names for all the citizens to see, and every man is to vote on these, or else pay the first fine.

And when they have selected one hundred and eighty from each of the assessment classes, |756e5| half of these are to be selected by lot and examined, and these are to be the Councilors for the year. A selection carried out in this way would be a mean between a monarchical constitution and a democratic one, which is a mean our constitution must keep to at all times. For slaves and masters would never become |757a| friends, nor would base men and excellent ones, even if they are declared to be equal in honor, since equal things given to unequal people would become unequal, unless one achieves proper measure. That is why indeed both these situations fill constitutions with factions. For there is an old saying, which is true, |757a5| that “equality produces friendship.” It’s both entirely correct and hits entirely the right note. But what exactly the equality is that is capable of this, because it is not very perspicuous, is very confusing to us. For there are two equalities which, though they are the same in name, |757b| are often pretty much opposite in fact.34 Every city and every legislator is competent to assign honors in accord with the one that is equality determined by measure, weight, and number, namely, by using the lot to regulate honor’s distributions. But the truest and best |757b5| equality is no longer something it is easy for everyone to see. For it is the judgment of Zeus, and, though it assists human beings always in small ways, yet every bit of assistance it gives to cities or to private individuals makes all things good.35 For it distributes more to what is greater and lesser things to what is smaller, |757c| and by giving each of the two what is a proper measure relative to their nature (and in particular greater honors always to those who are greater in virtue, and lesser ones to those whose possession of virtue and education36 is the opposite), it distributes what is proportionally fitting to each. For what is political, |757c5| I presume, is for us always precisely this very thing: what is just. This is what we must desire now, and this equality, Cleinias, is what we must look to as we found the city that is now putting forth shoots. |757d| If anyone were ever to found another city, it is by looking to this same thing that he must legislate, not to {169} a tyranny of the few, or of one, or even to some sort of democratic control, but always to what is

just. And this is what we have just now said it is: giving on each occasion what is equal in accord with nature to unequals. |757d5|   Nonetheless, it is necessary for a city as a whole sometimes also to use these notions37 in a slightly altered sense, if it is to avoid having a share of faction in some part or other. You see, decency and sympathetic consideration,38 as contrary to strict justice, |757e| are always an infringement, when they occur, of what is complete and exact. That is why it is necessary also to use the equality of the lot as far as regards the discontent of the masses—though even then appealing in prayer to the god and to good luck to guide the lot for them toward what is most just. |757e5| So, though both sorts of equality must necessarily be used, as far as possible the second one, the one that needs luck, must be used, as far as possible, in the least great selections. |758a| That is why, my friends, it is necessary for a city that is going to survive to do things in this way. For just as a ship sailing on the sea must always have someone to keep watch night and day, |758a5| so a city, spending its time living amid the surge of other cities and in danger of succumbing to all sorts of plots, must from dawn to dusk and from dusk to dawn have officials linked to officials, and guardians to guardians, |758b| always taking over and handing over without a break. But since a large body would never be able to do any of this quickly enough, it is necessary for most of the Councilors to be left most of the time to their own private affairs, and to managing |758b5| their own households. A twelfth part of them,39 though, is to be assigned to each of the twelve months, each single part providing guardians for one month, ever ready to meet with anyone coming from somewhere abroad or |758c| from within the city itself who wishes to give information, or to inquire about one of those topics that it is fitting for a city to answer the questions of other cities about, and to receive replies when it asks others. And it is especially |758c5| to prevent, if possible, the revolutions of all sorts that are always apt to occur at each moment in cities, but, if they do occur, |758d| to see to it that the city perceives and remedies what has been done as quickly as possible. That is why this presiding body of the city must always be in control of convening and dissolving meetings, both those required by the laws {170} and those that come suddenly upon the city. All these things, then, |758d5| a twelfth part of the Council is to regulate, while taking a rest for

eleven-twelfths of the year. In common with the other officials, this part of the Council is to keep this guard of the city at all times. In this manner, the affairs of the city would be managed |758d10| in a properly measured way. But for the rest of the territory, what supervision |758e| and what organization is there to be? Now that the whole city and the entire country have been divided into twelve parts,40 mustn’t some supervisors be appointed for the streets of the city itself, the houses, buildings, harbors, marketplaces, fountains, and especially for the sanctuaries, temples, and all things of this sort? CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: Let’s say, then, that for the temples there are to be TempleWardens (neôkoroi), |759a| as well as Priests and Priestesses.41 For the streets and buildings, and the organization of things of this sort, and for people too, to prevent them from committing injustices, and for the various beasts,42 in order that the things that are fitting for a city are produced both within the city itself and in the suburbs, |759a5| three forms of officials are to be selected. Those dealing with the things just mentioned are to be named, “City-Wardens (astunomoi)” and those dealing with the ordering of the marketplace, “Market-Wardens (agoranomoi).” Priests and Priestesses who hold hereditary Priesthoods are not to be changed, but if—as is likely in the case of people being settled for the first time |759b| where things of this sort are concerned—none or only a few have been established, the Priest and Priestesses must be established to be Temple-Wardens for the gods. Among all these established offices, some are to be elected, others selected by lot, and, with an eye to friendship, |759b5| a democratic and a nondemocratic element43 are to be mixed together in each country and city area, so that all may be as much as possible of one mind. As for the Priests, entrusting it to the god himself to have what is pleasing to him come about, their election is to be assigned to the {171} divine luck of the lot. |759c| But each person selected by lot is to be examined, first, to make sure that he is complete44 and legitimate, second, that he comes from households that are as unpolluted45 as possible, that he himself and his father and mother have lived unpolluted by any homicide, or any of the other offenses of this sort against what is divine. |759c5| All the laws

concerning the gods having been brought from Delphi,46 and Interpreters of them appointed, these are the ones to be used. Each Priesthood is to be held for one year |759d| and no longer, and anyone who is going to perform sacred rites for us in a satisfactory way, in accord with divine laws, is not to be less than sixty years old. These same laws are also to apply to the Priestesses. As for the three Interpreters (exêgêtai),47 [three] groups of four tribes are to nominate |759d5| four people, each from among themselves. The three [of the four] who receive the most votes [on a second vote by the four tribes voting together], having been examined, [the] nine are to be sent to Delphi, where one is to be selected from each triad. The examination and the age limit are to be the same as in the case of the |759e| Priests. These are to be Interpreters for life, and when one dies, the group of four tribes from which he came is to make a preliminary choice of a replacement. Treasurers in control of the sacred funds in each of the temples, and of the sanctuaries and their produce and revenues, are to be elected |759e5| from the highest assessment class; three for the largest temples, |760a| two for the smaller, and one for the most modest. The election and examination of these are to be the same as for the Generals.48 Let these be the prescriptions for the sacred things. |760a5|   As far as possible, nothing is to be left unguarded. For the city, the guards for this purpose are to be under the supervision of the Generals: the Company-Commanders, Cavalry-Commanders, Tribe-Leaders, and members of the Executive,49 and the City-Wardens and {172} MarketWardens as well (once |760b| they have them satisfactorily elected and appointed to office). The entire rest of the country is to be guarded as follows. Since we have divided the entire territory as far as possible into twelve equal parts, one tribe is to be assigned by lot for a year50 to each part, and it is to supply |760b5| five people to be like “Country-Wardens (agronomoi)” or “Guards-inChief (phrourarchoi),” and each of the fives is to choose from his own tribe twelve young men, not less than twenty-five |760c| or more than thirty years old.51 To these groups the parts of the land are to be assigned by lot for a month at a time, so that all of them gain experience and knowledge of the entire country. Two years is to be the period of office and guard duty for

guards |760c5| and officers. From the parts they are allotted first (namely, the districts of the country), the Guards-in-Chief are always to lead them round in a circle transferring them each month to the next district to the right52 |760d| (“to the right” is to be “to the dawn”). Once the year has gone around, in the second year, in order that as many of the guards as possible not only gain experience of the country in one season of the year, |760d5| but also learn as much as possible about what occurs in each district in each season, the people who are their leaders at that point are to lead them back around always changing to the district to the left, until they have completed the second |760e| year. For the third year, other Country-Wardens or Guards-inChief are to be selected, the fives to supervise the twelves. {173} During their times spent in each district their commissions are to be as follows. First, to make sure that the country is going to be as well fenced off as possible against enemies, |760e5| they are to dig ditches wherever needed, excavate trenches, and do all they can with fortifications53 to block any attempt to harm the country or its property in any way, making use of the working animals and unfree servants54 in each district for these purposes, putting the former to work and |761a| supervising the latter, but whenever possible choosing them when they are free from their own tasks. In short, they are to make every place hard to traverse for enemies, but as easy as possible to traverse for friends, whether human beings, working animals, or cattle, by taking care that |761a5| each of the roads be as smooth as possible. And in order that the rain Zeus sends does no harm to the land, but instead benefits it,55 as it flows down from the heights into all hollow valleys in the mountains, |761b| they are to take care to confine the outflow with dikes and ditches, so that by receiving and drinking up the rain from Zeus, they produce streams and springs for all the fields and regions lower down, giving even the driest regions |761b5| a plentiful supply of water—of good water. Waters that spring from the ground, whether stream or fountain, they are to make more fitting by beautifying them with plants and buildings, and, by bringing together the streams in underground |761c| pipes, make them all abundant, and, by distributing the waters in every season, beautifying any nearby sacred grove or sanctuary, channeling the water right into the temples of the gods. And everywhere the young are to |761c5| build gymnasia

for themselves and for the old as well, providing the old with warm baths for their old age. They are to lay up an abundant supply of seasoned, dry wood for the use of those who are suffering from disease, |761d| and receive with goodwill those whose bodies are worn out from farm laboring—a much better reception than they’d get from some doctor who is not very wise!56 These and all things of these sorts would produce beautification and benefit for the districts and provide a playful recreation that is not at all ungraceful. But the serious part |761d5| of the Country-Wardens’ business {174} is to be as follows. The sixty, group by group,57 is to guard their own district not only against enemies but also against those who profess to be friends. If a person, slave or free, does injustice to a neighbor or any other citizen, they are to serve as judges |761e| for the person who claims to have been done an injustice. Small cases, the five officials are to judge themselves; greater ones, where one person sues another for up to three minas,58 the seventeen (they plus the twelve) are to judge. But no judge or official is to judge or |761e5| exercise office without being subject to an audit,59 except for those whose judgment, like that of kings, is final. So too for the Country-Wardens if they are in some way wantonly aggressive60 toward those they supervise, by ordering requisitions on an unequal basis, or trying to seize and carry off things used in farming61 |762a| without the consent of the owners, or if they accept something given as a bribe, or even apportion unjust penalties. For yielding to flatteries,62 they are to be disgraced throughout the entire city. For any other sorts of injustice they commit against those in their district, |762a5| up to the value of one mina, they are to submit voluntarily to a trial before the villagers and neighbors. And in the case of more serious injustices, or on a particular occasion even in the case of lesser ones, if they refuse to submit, confident |762b| that they’ll escape prosecution due to moving every month always to a new district, then the one who suffers the injustice is to obtain leave to file charges against them in the communal courts. If he wins, he is to exact double from the one who flees and is unwilling to suffer a penalty voluntarily. |762b5|

The way of life of the officials and Country-Wardens63 during their two years is to be as follows. First, in each of the districts there are to be communal messes, where all are to dine together. |762c| If anyone absents himself, even for one day, or spends a night away without being ordered to do so by the officials or compelled by some absolute necessity that befalls him, if the five denounce him and post his name in writing in the agora as a deserter from the guard, |762c5| then he is to be disgraced as one who did his part to betray the constitution, and his punishment {175} is to be that whoever meets him and wishes to punish him may give him a beating with impunity. As for the officials themselves, |762d| if one of them does such a thing himself, all of the sixty must take care of something of this sort. If one of them perceives or learns of it and does not prosecute, he is to be subject to the same laws as the young men and is to be punished more severely, and is to be deprived of any office with authority |762d5| over the young men. Over this, the Guardians of the Laws are to keep an exact surveillance, to stop it occurring in the first place, or, if it does occur, to see to it that it meets with the punishment it deserves. Every man must bear |762e| in mind, where human beings in general are concerned, that no one would ever become a praiseworthy master unless he had been a slave, and must pride himself more on serving honorably as a slave than on ruling honorably, first, to the laws, as this is really slavery to the gods, |762e5| and, second— always, if one is young—to older people who have lived honorable lives.64 Next, anyone who has served his two years among the Country-Wardens must have acquired a taste for a day-to-day mode of life that is humble and without resources.65 For once the twelve have been selected and have banded together with the five, they are to resolve that, |762e10| since they themselves are like unfree servants, they will not have others as their unfree servants and |763a| slaves, nor employ the servants of other people (farmers and villagers) for private services, but only for public ones. In all other respects, they are to have it in mind to live through their own efforts and as their own |763a5| servants. In addition, they are to survey the whole country closely, under arms, summer and winter, so as to guard and get to know all the districts in succession. For |763b| in all likelihood gaining an exact knowledge of their own country is for all of them a branch of learning that is second to none. Which is another reason, no less than for the attendant

pleasure as well as benefit that everyone derives from these sorts of activities, that a young man must practice hunting with hounds and other sorts of hunting. |763b5| So much for these people, themselves and their practices, whether “Secret Service Men,”66 “Country-Wardens,” or whatever one wishes to call them— this way of life, whatever it is called, is what every man {176} who means to sufficiently safeguard his own city |763c| is to eagerly practice to the best of his ability. The next step in our selection of officials was to be that of the MarketWardens and City-Wardens.67 After the sixty Country-Wardens come three City-Wardens, who are to divide the twelve parts |763c5| of the city into three. Imitating the former, they are to take care of the city streets, the roads extending into the city from all parts of the country, and the buildings, to see to it that they are all in accord with legal requirements, and they are to take care of the water too, |763d| seeing to it that whatever the Guards-inChief have sent forth and delivered to them in good condition arrives pure and in sufficient quantities at the fountains, so that it beautifies and at the same time benefits the city. So these officials too must be capable people with the leisure time to take care of |763d5| common concerns. That is why, for City-Warden, every man may nominate whomever he chooses from the highest assessment class; when these have been voted on by show of hands, and the six with the most votes arrived at, |763e| those doing the supervising of these things are to select three of them by lot; when these have been examined they are to rule in accord with the laws established for them. Next, five Market-Wardens are to be selected from the second and first assessment classes. In other respects, their selection is to be the same |763e5| as for the City-Wardens, then, ten having been voted for by show of hands, five are to be selected by lot, and when these have been examined, they are to be declared officials. —All are to vote in show of hands for all officials.68 Anyone unwilling to do so, if reported to |764a| the officials, is to be fined fifty drachmas,69 in addition to being reputed a bad person. Attendance at the Assembly (that is, the communal meeting) is to be open to anyone who wishes, but it is to be compulsory for the second and first

assessment classes to do so, with a fine of ten drachmas if |764a5| he is proved not to have been present at the meeting. For the third and fourth assessment classes it is not to be compulsory, and they are not to be subject to a fine unless the officials, due to some necessity, give orders that everyone is to attend.— To go back to the Market-Wardens: they are to keep order in the marketplace |764b| as laws prescribe, and take care of the temples and fountains in the marketplace, seeing to it that no one does any injustice. {177} They are to punish anyone who does injustice with a beating or imprisonment if he’s a slave or a foreigner, whereas if a native citizen70 behaves badly where things of this sort are concerned, |764b5| then, for a fine of up to one hundred drachmas, they are to be in control of judging the case themselves, and for a fine up to twice that amount, they will judge the one doing the injustice together with the City-Wardens. |764c| The same modes of fine and punishment are also to be used by the City-Wardens in their own area of rule—up to one mina if they impose the fine themselves, and twice that amount together with the Market-Wardens. Next, it would be fitting to establish officials for musical training |764c5| and gymnastic training,71 with two sorts in each case, one for education in these, the other for contests. By “officials for education” the law means those taking care of good behavior and education in gymnasia and schools, and also |764d| taking care of the attendance and housing of the young males and females. By “officials for contests” the law means those serving as judges of contestants both in gymnastic events and in music. Again, there are to be two kinds, one lot for music, the other for gymnastic contests. |764d5| In contests, the judges may be the same for people and for horses, but in music it would be fitting to have one lot for solo singing and for imitation (given by rhapsodes, lyre players, flute players,72 and everyone |764e| of this sort) and another lot for choruses. First, I take it, officials are to be selected to judge the choruses of children, men, and young women at play in dances and in the entire systematic arrangement in which music consists. |764e5| One official, not less than forty years old, should be sufficient for these.73 And for solo singing too, one, not less than thirty years old, should be sufficient |765a| to be Introducer and to

render judgment competently between the contestants. The Ruler and Organizer of the Choruses is to be selected in the following way. All those who are devotees of this sort of thing are to go to the meeting,74 |765a5| and are to be subject to a fine if they do not. The Guardians of the Laws are to be judges of this. As for the others, if they do not wish to attend, they are not to be required to. Every elector is to make his nomination |765b| from those who are experienced, and in the {178} examination, accusation and defense are to focus on one point only: that the person selected by lot is in the one case inexperienced, and in the other experienced. Of the ten who receive the most votes by show of hands, one is to be selected by lot and, having been examined, is to rule in accord with the law for a year over the choruses. |765b5| In accord with the same considerations and in the same way, the person selected by lot is to rule for that year over those who enter contests in solo singing or singing to flute accompaniment—the person chosen by lot assigning his judgment to the judges.75 Next, judges for gymnastic contests |765c| for people and horses are to be selected from the third and second assessment classes. For this selection attendance is to be compulsory for the first three assessment classes, but the lowest class is to be let off without a fine. Three |765c5| are to be selected by lot from twenty who have been selected by show of hands—the three of the twenty selected by lot who also got the vote of the examiners in the examination. If anyone fails to pass examination after being selected by lot for any office, |765d| others are to be selected in his place by the same procedures and an examination conducted in the same way. The remaining official for the areas we have mentioned is the Supervisor of Education for females and males in its entirety. By law, there is to be one official |765d5| for these matters, who is not less than fifty years old, and a father of legitimate children, ideally of both sons and daughters, but if not, of either of the two. It is to be borne in mind both by the person himself who is selected and by anyone who selects him |765e| that this is by far the greatest of the highest offices in the city. For in the case of every creature, the initial growth, when urged on in a good way, has the most control in bringing to its fitting end the virtue of its own nature,76 and this is true of

the various plants and |765e5| animals (domestic and savage), and of human beings. A human being, we say, is a domestic animal: nonetheless, while if he gets a good education and |766a| is of a lucky nature he usually becomes the most godlike and most domestic animal, if his nurturing is insufficient or not good, he is the most savage of all earth’s creatures. That is why the legislator must not allow the nurturing of children to become a secondary or incidental matter. And because it is a first priority |766a5| that the one who is going to supervise them be selected in the best way, the {179} legislator must do everything in his power to appoint as their supervisor the person in the city who above all is in every respect best. |766b| So all the officials, except the Council and the members of the Executive, are to go to the temple of Apollo and each vote by secret ballot for the one among those who have become the Guardians of the Laws who he believes would rule over matters of education in the best way. |766b5| Whoever gets the most votes is to be examined by the other officials who elected him, with the exception of the Guardians of the Laws. He is to hold office for five years, and at the sixth year another is to be selected by the same procedure |766c| for this office. If any official holding a public office dies more than thirty days before his term of office ends, in the same way another is to be appointed to the office by those |766c5| for whom it is fitting to take care of this. And if someone who is a guardian of orphans dies, the relatives on both the father’s and mother’s side who are residents in the country, as far removed as the children of first cousins, must appoint another within ten days, or be fined one drachma for each |766d| day until they have appointed a guardian for the children. Every city would become a non-city, I presume, if it did not have established courts of justice, as fits the case. Again, if our judge77 is silent, |766d5| and (as in arbitrations) has no more to say than the opposing parties at a preliminary hearing,78 he would never be competent to make a judgment about matters of justice. That is why it isn’t easy for judges to judge well when they are many, nor yet when they are few and of poor quality. Yet what the point of dispute is on each of the two sides must always be made

perspicuous; |766e| and time together with slow and frequent questioning are an advantage in clarifying the dispute.79 That is why the litigants are to go first before a court of neighbors and of friends who are as familiar as possible with |766e5| the disputed actions. If someone does not get a satisfactory judgment in this court, |767a| he is to go to another one. If the two courts are unable to settle the matter, the third court80 is to bring the case to an end. {180} In a way, of course, even the establishment of courts |767a5| is a selection of officials. For every official is necessarily a judge of certain matters, and a judge, even if he is not an official, becomes in a way an official, and one of no small importance, on the day when by delivering his judgment he brings a trial to an end. Establishing judges, then, as if they were officials, let’s say who would be fitting |767b| judges, what matters they are to judge, and how many of them there are to be for any particular case. The court that the litigants define for themselves, by selecting judges together, is to have absolute control. For the remaining courts there are to be two criteria for resorting to them: one is when a private individual accuses a private individual |767b5| of doing him an injustice, and takes him to court wishing to get a judgment; the other is when someone believes that one of the citizens has committed an injustice against the public interest and wishes to defend the community. Now it must be stated what the judges must be like and who they are to be. First, then, |767c| there is to be a communal court for all those private individuals who are for the third time disputing with each other.81 It is to be composed in the following way: all officials, both those holding office for a year and those holding office for a longer time, on the day before the new year |767c5| starts in the month after the summer solstice, are to assemble in a single temple. After swearing an oath to the god, they are to dedicate, as first fruits (as it were), |767d| one judge, selected from each group of officials, namely, the one in each group who seems to be best and appears likely to judge the cases of his fellow citizens during the coming year in the best and most pious way. When these have been selected, their examination is to be conducted |767d5| by the selectors themselves, and if any of them fails the examination, a replacement is to be selected by the same procedures. Those

who pass examination are to sit as judges for those who have made an appeal82 in the other courts, casting their votes openly. Watching and listening to these trials |767e| is to be compulsory for the Councilors and other officials who selected the judges, but among the rest only those who wish to do so. If anyone brings a charge against one of the judges for having voluntarily given an unjust judgment, he is to go and make his accusation to the Guardians of the Laws. Anyone found guilty of such a |767e5| charge is to pay to the one he has harmed one-half of the damages awarded. If he seems to deserve a greater penalty, the judges in the case are to determine what additional penalty he is to suffer, or what payment he {181} is to make to the community and to the one who brought the charge against him. Where charges concern the public interest, it is necessary, first, to let the majority have a share in the judgment. For everyone is treated unjustly |768a| whenever someone does an injustice to the city, and they would rightly feel harshly treated if they played no part in trials of this sort. But while the starting-point of such a trial and its conclusion must be in the hands of the people, the test of it is to lie with the |768a5| three highest officials the accused and the accuser can agree on. If they are unable to reach agreement, the Council is to decide between their respective selections. But in private suits too, as far as possible, |768b| everyone is to have a part to play. For anyone who does not share in the power to judge thinks he is not a part of the city at all. That is why there must also be tribal courts, with judges selected by lot, as occasion arises, |768b5| who will—uncorrupted by entreaties83—judge the cases. But the final judgment in all such matters is to rest with that court84 which has been prepared, we say, to be as incorruptible as a merely human power, at least, can make it, for those who are unable to settle their differences |768c| either in the neighborhood courts or in the tribal courts. Now, then, with regard to our courts (which, we say, cannot easily be called either “offices” or “non-offices” indisputably85), where they are concerned a sort of superficial outline sketch |768c5| has served to describe parts of them, but it pretty much leaves out others. For the most correct place for the exact establishment and also the detailed classification of the

laws concerning suits would be toward the end of our legislation.86 Let us say, then, that these matters await us at the end. But where establishing the |768d| other offices is concerned, most of the legislation has pretty much been given. A full and exact description of each and every aspect of the internal administration of the entire city and of its political administration as a whole cannot be made perspicuous until our exposition has proceeded from the start to what comes second, |768d5| and to what is in the middle, with every part receiving its due, until it arrives at the end. But as things stand at present, since {182} our exposition has reached the selection of officials, it would make a satisfactory end point for our preliminaries, |768e| and the establishing of the laws can start without a need for any further delays or hesitations. CLEINIAS: The preliminaries you recounted, Stranger, are in accord with my understanding (nous) of things. But what you said just now by way of linking the start of what is going to be said |768e5| to the end point of what has been said is yet more attractive than those. ATHENIAN: In that case, our wise old man’s game87 |769a| has been nobly played so far. CLEINIAS: You likely mean the fine and serious work for men. ATHENIAN: Yes, likely so! But let’s reflect on whether this point seems to you as it does to me. |769a5| CLEINIAS: What sort of point, and concerning what? ATHENIAN: You know how, for example, the business of painters seems never to get to the end where each figure is concerned, but involves adding contrast or lowering contrast,88 or whatever disciples of painting call |769b| this sort of thing, and never seems to stop ornamenting, so that it never gets to the point where the paintings admit of no further improvement in terms of beauty and clarity. CLEINIAS: Yes, I know what you mean pretty much from hearsay, |769b5| since I’m not at all practiced in this sort of craft. ATHENIAN: You have missed nothing. We can still use what came up about it in our argument just now as follows: suppose that once upon a time someone had it in mind to paint the finest painting possible, one that would

also |769c| never get worse but go on getting better with the passage of time. You understand, don’t you, that as he’s mortal, unless he leaves behind a successor89 to rectify it if the painting suffers some mishap due to time, or, in the case of any deficiencies, due to his own weakness |769c5| in the craft, who will, going forward,90 make improvements by touching it up, all his very great labor will last but a short time? {183} CLEINIAS: That’s true. ATHENIAN: Well then, don’t you think that this is the sort of thing the legislator |769d| wishes? First, he wishes to write the laws as satisfactorily as he can with an eye to their exactitude. Second, as time passes and his beliefs are tested by the facts, do you think that there is any legislator that is so foolish as to be ignorant of the fact that |769d5| there are necessarily going to be very many things left, which some successor must rectify, in order that the constitution and the system of the city he has founded become in no way worse but ever better? |769e| CLEINIAS: It’s likely—how could it be otherwise—that they all wish for this sort of thing. ATHENIAN: Suppose, then, that someone had a certain contrivance for this, |769e5| a way of teaching another person by word or deed to have, more or less, a conception of how he must guard and rectify the laws, would he ever leave off explaining such a thing until he came to the end? CLEINIAS: Of course not. |770a| ATHENIAN: So isn’t this what I and you two must do now on the present occasion? CLEINIAS: What exactly do you mean? ATHENIAN: Since we are about to legislate, and our Guardians of the Laws |770a5| have been chosen, and we are “in the evening of life,”91 while they are young compared to us, we must, so we say, at once legislate and try, to the best of our ability, to make these men themselves legislators as well as Guardians of the Laws. CLEINIAS: Certainly—if indeed we’re up to it! |770b| ATHENIAN: Well, we must try and be eager about it anyway. CLEINIAS: How could we do otherwise?

ATHENIAN: So let’s say to them: “Friends, saviors of the laws, about each of the areas for which we have established the laws there are many things |770b5| we’ll—of necessity indeed—be leaving out. Nonetheless, in all but the small points, at least, and on the whole, we’ll do all in our power not to leave our sort of outline sketch, as it were, unfinished. Your task will be to fill in the outline. What you must look to as you carry out such a task, |770c| you must now hear. You see Megillus, Cleinias, and I have {184} said what it is to each other more than once, and we are agreed that it was stated correctly. We wish for your sympathetic consideration, and also for you to become our students, looking to what we have agreed with each other that a Guardian of the Laws and a legislator must look to.92 “The main point of our agreement was this. In whatever way anyone ever becomes a good man, that is, has the virtue of soul fitting for a human being, whether it’s due to |770d| a certain practice, a certain habit, a certain possession, appetite, or belief, or learning certain branches of knowledge,93 whether born a male member of the community or a female, or whether one of the young or one of the old—it is toward this thing we’re speaking of that every serious |770d5| effort is to be made throughout his entire life. And no person whatsoever is to be seen preferring any of the things that are impediments to this—not even, in the last resort, the city, if it is seen to be necessary |770e| for it to be laid waste rather than voluntarily submitting to the slavish yoke of being ruled by inferior people, or for he himself to leave the city and go into exile. All such sufferings are to be endured rather than allowing the constitution to be changed into one whose nature is to make human beings worse. |770e5| “These are the things we agreed to previously, and now you are to look to both these objects of ours as you pass in review94 our laws, you are to blame those that are unable to achieve these, but those that are able, |771a| you are to welcome, adopting them wholeheartedly, and living under them. But all other practices, which aim at other so-called goods, you are to say goodbye to.” Let the starting-point of the laws that are to come next be something like this, |771a5| commencing with sacred matters. First, we must consider again the number five thousand and forty and the number of convenient divisions

it contained and contains, both as a whole and also |771b| when corresponding to tribes, each of which we set up as a twelfth part of the whole, which is the natural equivalent of twenty times twenty-one.95 Our whole number has twelve divisions, and that of the tribe also has twelve. And each part must be considered as sacred,96 |771b5| a gift from god, corresponding to the months of the year and the revolution of the universe. That is also why every city is naturally led to regard {185} these divisions as sacred, though some have perhaps made a more correct division than others and have been luckier in making the division sacred. We, in any case, assert now |771c| that we were absolutely correct to choose the number five thousand and forty, which has as its divisors all the numbers from one up to twelve, except for eleven—and for this there is a most minor remedy, since the quotient becomes integral in one or the other way |771c5| if two households are set aside from the distribution.97 Showing this to be true, had we the leisure, would not take a very long story. But for now let’s put our trust in the present argument and oracular report,98 and, when we have divided |771d| the city in this way, after dedicating to each part a god or a child of gods, and, providing it with altars and whatever is fitting for these, let’s make two meetings a month for the purposes of sacrifice, twelve for the divisions within the tribe, and twelve for the divisions within the city itself,99 |771d5| first, for the sake of pleasing the gods and for the sake of what has to do with the gods, second, for the sake of our own familiarity and knowledge of each other, as we would say,100 and for the sake of all kinds of social interaction. You see, with a view to the community and intercourse |771e| of marriage partners, it is necessary to remove ignorance about brides’ families, brides themselves, and also about the families they marry into, by above all having everything done to insure that, as far as possible, no mistakes at all are made in matters of this sort. For the sake of a serious purpose of this sort, then, |771e5| even sorts of play must be created, consisting of choral dances for boys and girls, where they can at once see and be seen, |772a| with good reason and at an age when there are fitting pretexts for it, both naked, or up to the limits that a temperate sense of shame allows to each. The supervisors and regulators of all these matters are to be the officials and

legislators for the choruses—in conjunction with the |772a5| Guardians of the Laws, in the case of whatever we have left unprescribed. {186} It is necessary, just as we’ve said,101 where all matters involving many small points are concerned, for the legislator to leave them out, and for those who are constantly gaining experience |772b| in them from year to year, learning from practice, to make regulations and rectifications year to year, until what seems to be a satisfactory criterion for such laws and practices has been produced. A proper measure of time, and also |772b5| a sufficient one, to assign for experience in the case of each and every aspect of sacrifices as well as dances would be ten years. While the legislator who established the constitution is living, the task is to be shared with him, but after his death, |772c| each of the officials is to bring to the Guardians of the Laws whatever omissions need rectification in their own areas of responsibility, and continue to do so until each detail seems to have been completely and correctly worked out. At that point, they are to be established as unchangeable, and made use of together with the other laws |772c5| the legislator established for them at the start. In these, they are never to make any change whatsoever, but if some necessity ever seems to compel it, they are to consult all the officials, |772d| all the people, and all the oracles of the gods. If all are in concord, the change is to be made, but never under any other circumstances. Instead, by law, the objector to change is always to prevail. When anyone, then, has passed twenty-five |772d5| years of age, has observed others and been observed by them, and is confident that he has found someone who, in accord with his understanding (nous) of things, would make a fitting partner for the procreation of children, he is to marry —in any case before he is thirty-five. First, though, he is to pay heed to how |772e| he is to seek what is fitting and harmonious. For, as Cleinias says, each law must be preceded by its own prelude.102 CLEINIAS: An excellent reminder, Stranger, and you’ve picked, it seems to me, a most opportune time in the argument to make it. |772e5| ATHENIAN: Thank you. “My boy,” let’s say to an offspring of good parents, “you must make the sort of marriage that earns the good opinion of the wise, |773a| who would advise you not to avoid someone of poor parents nor

be overly keen to pursue someone of rich parents, but, other things being equal, always to prefer the one who is somewhat deficient to oneself in wealth as a partner to join with. You see, this would be to the advantage of the city, |773a5| and also of the households that are being joined. For with a view to virtue, what is evenly balanced and commensurable {187} is ten thousand times better than what is extreme. A man who knows himself to be overly reckless and hasty in approaching all of his actions |773b| must be eager to become a son-in-law to moderate parents, whereas one of the opposite nature must go for the opposite sorts of in-laws.103 And regarding marriage in general there is to be one story:104 each person is to seek in marriage a marriage that is advantageous |773b5| to the city, not that is most pleasant for himself. In accord with nature, though, I suppose everyone always goes for what is most like himself, so that the city as a whole becomes unevenly balanced as regards wealth and modes of character.105 |773c| As a result, in most cities things are especially likely to happen that we do not wish to happen in ours.” To prescribe these things about marriage in the letter of the law—that a rich man is not to marry a woman from a rich family, or a man capable of doing many things to marry one from a family of the same sort, or that those hasty in character |773c5| are to be compelled to go for marriage partners who are slower, and the slower for those who are hasty—besides being ridiculous, would arouse the anger of many. For it is not easy to understand that a city must be mixed like wine in a bowl,106 where, when the wine is poured in |773d| it seethes like mad, but when it is chastened by another, sober god, it makes a fine partnership, producing a good and properly measured drink. This is what is occurring in the “mixing”107 that is productive of children, but no one (one might almost say) is able to see it. For these reasons, then, |773d5| it is necessary to leave these sorts of things out of the law, and instead try by singing incantations108 to persuade each of them to value the even balance in his children more highly than the equality in marriages that consists in an insatiable desire for money, |773e| and to dissuade by means of reproaches the one who is seriously intent on marrying for money, rather than forcing them by means of a written law. Where marriages are concerned, then, these are to be the things said by way of encouragement, as |773e5| also are the things said previously,109 about

how one must partake of nature’s everlasting qualities by always {188} leaving behind children of children, handing them over to the god as servants in one’s place. So, all that |774a| and more is what one must say about marriage, and having to marry, by way of composing a prelude correctly. But if someone voluntarily disobeys, and keeps himself alienated and unsociable in the city, in that he is unmarried at the age of thirty-five, he is to pay a penalty each |774a5| year of one hundred drachmas if he belongs to the highest assessment class, seventy if to the second, sixty if to the third, and thirty if to the fourth. This sum to be consecrated to Hera.110 Anyone who fails to make the annual payment is to pay ten times |774b| the penalty. The fine is to be collected by the Treasurer of the goddess. If he fails to do so, he is to owe it himself, and in the inspections all111 are to give an account of such things. In terms of money, then, these are the penalties that anyone not willing to marry is to pay, and as for honor, he is to be entirely without honor from those who are younger, |774b5| none of whom is voluntarily to obey112 him. If he attempts to punish anyone, everyone is to come to the aid and defense of the one being done an injustice; and anyone present who does not come to his aid |774c| is to be declared a coward by the law and also a bad citizen. Where dowries are concerned, it was stated before, and let it be stated again, that neither getting nor giving out is an equal exchange, due to the poor not growing old in want of money.113 |774c5| For in this city {189} everyone is to possess the necessities of life. The result would be less of the wanton aggression on the part of wives114 and less of the humility and illiberality of husbands that is due to money. Whoever |774d| obeys would be doing one of the fine things. But the one who disobeys and gives or receives more than fifty drachmas for the trousseau (or more than one mina, than one and a half minas, or than two minas for someone in the highest assessment class) is to owe |774d5| as much again to the public treasury, and the sum given or received consecrated to Hera and Zeus. The Trea surers of these two gods are to manage things, just as the Treasurers of Hera were said,115 in the case of those who do not marry, |774e| to exact the fine each time, or else each of them to pay it out of his own pockets. Giving a girl in marriage is to be under the control first of the bride’s father, second of the grandfather, and third of brothers from the same father.

If there is none of these, |774e5| control is to pass to the relatives on the mother’s side in the same order. If some strange stroke of bad luck should occur, control is to pass to the nearest relatives in each case, in conjunction with the girl’s guardians. As for the premarriage rites, or any other sacred ceremonies of this sort that it is fitting to celebrate before, during, and after |775a| the wedding, each man is to ask the Interpreters,116 and believe that, when these are obeyed, everything is done in a properly measured way. As for the wedding feast, no more than five male and five female friends |775a5| are to be invited on each side, and a similar number again from each family and household. In no case is the expense to be higher than what is in accord with the property possessed—a mina for the wealthiest class, half that amount for the next, and so on, as the assessment class in each case goes down. |775b| Everyone is to praise the one who obeys the law, but the Guardians of the Laws are to punish the one who disobeys as ignorant of what is fine and as uneducated in the nomes117 of the Muses of marriage. Drinking to the point of drunkenness is not, I take it, fitting anywhere, except at the |775b5| festivals of the god who gave us the gift of wine,118 nor is it safe, especially not for someone who takes marriage seriously. It is particularly fitting for the bride and groom, who are on this {190} occasion making no small change in their way of life, to be in their right mind, |775c| and at the same time it is so for their offspring, in order that as far as possible it be conceived by parents who are always in their right mind. For it is pretty much unclear on what sort of night or day it will, with the god’s help, be conceived. And in addition, procreation mustn’t occur in bodies that are liquified119 due to drunkenness. |775c5| Instead, the fetus must be cohesive, fixed, and at rest in the part where it is being composed. A person who is full of wine, by contrast, carries himself along and is carried along every which way, maddened in body and soul. |775d| A drunk, then, is an unsteady and bad sower of seed,120 and so is likely to beget unevenly balanced and untrustworthy offspring, not at all straight in their character or body. That is why, preferably throughout the whole year and his whole life, but especially during the time when he is engendering children, a man must take care |775d5| and do nothing voluntarily that causes disease or involves wanton aggression or injustice. (For otherwise it is necessary, when these are stamped into the souls and bodies of the embryos, to engender offspring

shaped on a model that is in every way inferior.) Most of all, though, on his wedding |775e| day and night he is to avoid such things. For a starting-point, which is established as a goddess among human beings, saves everything— if she receives the honor due to her from each of her beneficiaries.121 |775e5| The man who marries must regard one of the two houses in his allotment as a sort of nest for the birth and rearing of his chicks, |776a| and, separating from father and mother, make his marriage there, and a home and a living for himself and his children. For among dear ones, a certain amount of longing seems to cement and bind together all the characters, whereas immoderate intercourse, without the longing |776a5| that time produces, makes people drift apart, due to being sated with each other. That is why the newlyweds must leave mother, father, and the wife’s relatives in their own homes, as if they had gone off to a colony themselves, and visiting |776b| and being visited in their homes, beget and nurture their children, as if passing the lamp of life on from generation to generation, always serving the gods, in accord with the laws.122 Next, possessions. What sorts should someone possess if he is to possess the most suitable |776b5| property? In most cases, they are neither {191} difficult to understand nor to acquire; but unfree servants are a difficulty in every way. The cause of this is that we speak of them somehow incorrectly, |776c| and also in a certain way correctly. For the things we say about slaves sometimes contradict the uses we make of them and, on the contrary, are sometimes in accord with those uses. MEGILLUS: What’s this again that we’re saying? You see, we don’t yet understand, Stranger, what you’re now referring to. |776c5| And that’s certainly not surprising, Megillus. For there’s practically nothing among all the Greeks that provokes more perplexity and strife than the Spartan helotry system,123 some holding that it is good, others that it is not good, and there’d be dispute, though less violent, about the enslavement of the Mariandynoi to the Heracleans, |776d| and also about the Penestai of the Thessalians.124 Looking to these and all systems of these sorts, what must we do about the possession of unfree servants? The point I was making in the course of my argument—and about which you quite reasonably asked me what I was referring to—was this. We know, I take it, ATHENIAN:

that |776d5| we’d all say that the slaves one owns must be as well disposed and as good as possible. In fact, in the past, there have been many slaves who were, for some masters, superior in every virtue to their brothers and sons, who have saved them, their possessions, and their entire households. |776e| For we know, don’t we, that these things are said about slaves? MEGILLUS: Of course. ATHENIAN: But don’t we also hear the opposite, that the soul of a slave has nothing healthy in it, and that no one with any understanding (nous) would ever trust anyone of their class? |776e5| The wisest of our poets actually says (referring to Zeus) that Far-sounding Zeus takes away half the understanding |777a| Of men, on the day slavery catches hold of them.125

So each party adopts one of these ways of thinking. One lot puts no trust at all in anyone who belongs to the class of slaves and, treating {192} them in keeping with the nature of wild beasts, uses goads and whips to make the souls of their unfree servants not merely three times but many more times |777a5| enslaved. But the other lot does entirely the opposite of these things. MEGILLUS: Of course. CLEINIAS: Well then, Stranger, in view of these differences, |777b| what must we do in our country where the possession and also the punishment of slaves is concerned? ATHENIAN: What indeed, Cleinias? Clearly, since a human being is an intractable creature, and evidently not at all willing to be or become readily managed in terms of the necessary distinction, |777b5| which consists in distinguishing in practice between a slave and a free man and master, he is certainly a difficult possession. In fact, the frequent revolts of the Messenians,126 |777c| and in cities that possess many unfree servants who speak the same language, have shown often enough in practice how many evils result from slavery, as also do the various robberies of the so-called Peridinoi127 |777c5| around Italy, and the sufferings caused by them. Looking at all this, one would be at a loss as to what must be done concerning all such matters. In fact, there are only two contrivances that remain if people are going to be slaves more readily: first, for the slaves not to be from the same country as each other |777d| and, as far as possible, not to speak the

same language; second, to treat them correctly, paying them attention not only for their own sakes, but more for our own. The correct treatment of unfree servants in that condition consists in not treating them with a sort of wanton aggression,128 and doing less (if that’s possible)129 injustice to them than to equals. |777d5| For a person shows clearly that he reverences justice by nature rather than in a fabricated way, and that he really hates injustice, in his dealings with the sorts of people it is easy for him to do injustice to. The person who in his dispositions and actions concerning slaves remains free from all stain of impiety and |777e| injustice would be most competent to sow the seeds from which virtue grows. One may say—and correctly—the same thing about a master and a tyrant, or any sort of dynasty130 that exercises dynastic rule over someone weaker than itself. {193} It is certainly necessary, when justice demands it, to punish slaves, |777e5| and not spoil them by giving them warnings, as if they were free people. When we speak to a servant it must pretty much always be to give him an order. One must never banter with unfree servants in any way, |778a| whether they are male or female. Many people, by being very senselessly fond of acting in this way toward their slaves, thereby spoiling them, make life harder, that is, harder for those people to be ruled and for themselves to do the ruling. CLEINIAS: You’re right about that. |778a5| Well then, when a citizen is as far as possible equipped with unfree servants sufficient in number and suitableness to be assistants in each of the tasks, mustn’t the houses be the next thing for us to delineate in our argument? |778a10| ATHENIAN:

CLEINIAS: Certainly. |778b| ATHENIAN: And it would seem that there must be supervision of (so to speak) the entire craft of building, since our city is new and previously without houses, and of how each thing will be, particularly the temples and walls. These things come before marriage, |778b5| Cleinias, but as things stand, since our city is coming about in words, it’s perfectly legitimate if it occurs in this way. But when it comes about in fact, we will produce these things before marriage (god willing), and then immediately complete the

latter after all these sorts of things. For now, though, |778c| let’s only go over a sort of brief sketch of them. CLEINIAS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: The temples must be built all around the marketplace and in a circle around the whole city, in the |778c5| places of highest ground (for purposes of security and also of cleanliness). Near them are to be buildings for the officials and courts, in which as being most sacred places, judgments will be received and given, partly because they concern holy matters, and partly because they are establishments belonging to the gods. |778d| And in these places there are to be courts in which trials for homicide and for all injustices meriting the death penalty would fittingly be held. Where walls are concerned, Megillus, I for one would go along with Sparta in letting the walls lie sleeping in the earth |778d5| and not make them rise up,131 and this for the following reasons. It’s a fine saying {194} of the poet’s, often repeated, that “walls must be made of bronze and iron rather than earth.”132 Besides, the plan to send |778e| young men into the country every year to dig trenches and ditches and build certain fortifications133 to keep the enemy out, and not let them cross the borders of the land at all, would rightly incur immense ridicule, if we then put up a wall around the city. When, in the first place, |778e5| a wall is not at all advantageous for a city’s health, and, in addition, usually produces a sort of state of softness in the souls of the inhabitants, by inviting them to flee for refuge behind it instead of warding off the enemy, and not to always keep guard in the city |779a| night and day, and secure its preservation in this way. Instead, it makes them think that, in being fenced around by walls and gates while they sleep, they have contrivances that will really keep them safe, as if they were not born to toil, and little knowing that ease really |779a5| comes from toil, whereas from shameful ease, in my view, toils naturally arise again. But if a wall is really necessary for people for some reason, then the building of the private houses must from the start lay their foundations so that |779b| the entire city would form a single wall, with the evenness and similarity of all the houses as they face the streets134 providing a good defense. It would not be unpleasant to look at, having the shape of a single

house, while for |779b5| ease of defense and security it would be wholly superior to anything else. Seeing to it that the buildings remain the way they were at the start would fittingly belong most of all to the inhabitants, but the City-Wardens are to supervise, even to the extent of |779c| imposing fines on anyone who is negligent. They must also supervise the cleanliness of everything in the city, and take care that no private individual encroach in any way on what belongs to the city when either building or excavating. These officials must also in particular take care that there is good drainage for the rain from Zeus, |779c5| and supervise whatever other matters, whether inside or outside the city, that would be fitting for them to manage. All such matters, and whatever else the law omits, because it is at a loss to include all the details, the Guardians of the Laws are to keep an eye on, |779d| making additional regulations according to need. {195} Now that these buildings, those in the marketplace, those of the gymnasia, and all the school buildings have been constructed and await those who frequent them, and the theaters for their audiences, let’s proceed |779d5| to the topics that come after marriage, keeping to the order of our legislation. CLEINIAS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: Let’s suppose, then, that our marriages have taken place, Cleinias. Next will come the period before childbirth, |779e| which could be at least a year. In what way the bride and bridegroom must live during this time, in a city that will differ from most cities, which is the topic that follows the things that have now been said,135 is not the easiest thing of all to talk about. There have been more than a few things of this sort previously, |779e5| but this one is even harder for the majority of people to accept than many of those. However, if we believe something to be correct and true, Cleinias, it must by all means be stated. CLEINIAS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: Whoever has it in mind to declare laws in cities |780a| for the way people must live when managing public and communal affairs, but for private ones, to the extent that legal compulsion applies,136 does not think one must declare laws, but that each is to be allowed to live his everyday

life as he wishes, and that not everything must come about through regulation—if, when he leaves private affairs unregulated by law, |780a5| he thinks that people will be willing, when it comes to communal and public affairs, to live by law, what he has in mind is not correct. Why exactly has this been said? It’s for this reason. We are going to say that our newlyweds must take their meals at the communal messes neither more nor less than |780b| they did in the time before marriage. In fact this institution was certainly found to be something amazing at the start, when it was first introduced in your areas, legislated probably due to some war, or some other matter with the same capacity, |780b5| when you were short of men and under great pressures. But once you had a taste of it and had been compelled to employ communal messes, the institution seemed to you to make a great difference to security, and in some such way as this the practice of eating in communal messes was established among you. |780c| CLEINIAS: Yes, probably so. {196} ATHENIAN: As I was saying, it was once an amazing thing to have prescribed, and for some people a frightening one, but for the person prescribing it today |780c5| it wouldn’t be similarly difficult to legislate it. But the practice that follows on this one—and which would have a natural correctness about it if it did occur, although as things stand it does not occur anywhere, making the legislator practically “card his wool into the fire,” as the saying goes, and fruitlessly do ten thousand other things of this sort—is neither easy to talk about nor, when it has been talked about, to put into effect. |780d| CLEINIAS: What is it, Stranger, that makes you seem to hesitate so much, when you try to talk about it? ATHENIAN: Listen, then, so that we don’t pointlessly spend a lot of time on this one issue. You see, everything that |780d5| participates in order and law in the city produces things that are all good, whereas most things that lack order or are badly ordered destroy the others that are well ordered. The present subject matter is indeed relevant to that. For in your countries, Cleinias and Megillus, the communal messes for the men are established in a fine and, |780e| as I said,137 amazing way, due to some sort of divine necessity. By contrast, what had to do with the women was—in an entirely

incorrect way—left untouched by legislation, |781a| nor was the practice of communal messes for them brought to light. Instead, that part of our human race which was in any case secretive and cunning because of its weakness —I mean, the female—was, due to the reticence of the legislator, |781a5| incorrectly left badly regulated. Because of this neglect many things slipped by you that would have been in a far better state, had they been regulated by law, than they are today. For it is not only, as one might suppose, a matter of a half, when the female sex is allowed to be unorganized, but to the extent that female human nature |781b| is inferior as regards virtue to that of males, to that extent the difference is more than double. If, then, this were revised and rectified, and all the practices were jointly regulated for women and men in common, it would be better for the happiness |781b5| of the city. As things stand, however, the human race is so far from having been led to this lucky situation that in other places or cities, where communal messes are not a recognized civic institution, |781c| it’s impossible for a person with any sense (nous) even to mention them. How exactly, then, without being laughed at, is someone to try in practice to force women {197} to take their food and drink in the open and in full view? You see, there is nothing harder |781c5| for this sex to bear than this. For it is accustomed to living in confinement and privacy,138 and will use every means to resist being led by force out into the light, and will prove much stronger than the legislator. Anywhere else, as I said, it wouldn’t put up with |781d| even the mention of the correct account without a huge uproar. But perhaps it would here. So if it seems that the account of the entire constitution should not miss its goal, I’m willing to explain, at least for the sake of argument, how this institution is good and fitting, if, that is, you both agree to listen, and if not, |781d5| to let it go. No, no, Stranger, the two of us are, I imagine, both amazingly and entirely disposed to listen. ATHENIAN: Let’s listen, then. But don’t be surprised if I seem to you to be starting from a long way back. After all, we’re now enjoying leisure, and |781e| there’s no urgent reason for us not to investigate what concerns laws from every possible angle and in every possible way. CLEINIAS: You’re right. CLEINIAS:

ATHENIAN: In that case, let’s go back to the first |781e5| things that were discussed. You see, every man must keep well in mind this much at least: either the race of human beings had no starting-point at all, and will never have an end, but has always been |782a| and will always be, or else an incredibly long time would have elapsed since the starting-point, when it did come to be. CLEINIAS: Well? ATHENIAN: Well, don’t we think that in every part of the earth and in all sorts of ways |782a5| there have been cities founded and destroyed, and all sorts of practices, both orderly and disorderly, and a huge variety of appetites for food, both solid and liquid, and all sorts of variations in climatic conditions, in which it is probable that animals underwent a vast number of changes? |782b| CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: Well, I suppose we believe, don’t we, that vines made their appearance at a certain point, not having existed before? Likewise, olives, and the gifts of Demeter and Kore? Wasn’t a certain {198} Triptolemus139 the messenger |782b5| for these sorts of things? And in the time when these did not exist, don’t we think that animals turned to eating each other, as they do now? CLEINIAS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: Indeed, human sacrifice is something we see |782c| persisting even now among many peoples. And it’s just the opposite, we hear, among others, where there was once a time when they didn’t dare to taste even beef, and sacrificed not animals to the gods, but round cakes, honey-soaked grain, and other “pure” sacrifices of these sorts, and avoided flesh, |782c5| on the supposition that it wasn’t pious to eat it or to pollute the altars of the gods with blood.140 We humans who existed in those days lived what is called an “Orphic” life,141 keeping entirely to things without souls, and entirely avoiding things with souls. |782d| CLEINIAS: Yes, what you’ve described is certainly what’s said, and it’s easy enough to believe.

ATHENIAN: “What was the point, then,” I suppose someone might ask, “in your repeating all these things now?” |782d5| CLEINIAS: You suppose correctly, Stranger. ATHENIAN: In that case, Cleinias, I’ll try to explain what comes next, if I can. CLEINIAS: Go ahead. ATHENIAN: Observation tells me that for human beings everything depends on three needs or |782d10| appetites, and if they are led correctly by these, virtue results, but if they are led badly, the opposite does. These |782e| are first, the need for food, and, second, the need for drink, which are present as soon as they are born, and for which, in all their forms, every creature has an instinctive passion, is full of a mad craving, and is deaf to any suggestion that it must do anything else except satisfy the appetites for all these things and their pleasures, |782e5| and always rid themselves of all the pain. Our third and greatest need, however, and our sharpest passion, which, though the last to start, |783a| sets people ablaze in a total frenzy, is the most wantonly aggressive and burning one: it is {199} the passion for sowing the seeds of offspring. These three diseases,142 turning toward what is best and away from the (so-called) “greatest pleasure,” one must try to restrain with the three |783a5| greatest restraints—fear, law, and the true reason143— appealing to the Muses, of course, and the gods of contests, to help quench their growth and their flow.144 |783b| Let’s put the procreation of children after marriages, and put nurturing and education after procreation. If the arguments moved forward in this way, perhaps each of our laws would reach completion, to145 the point where, when we come to146 communal messes (and whether such |783b5| associations must in fact be for women or for men only), we would perhaps see better from near at hand, when we had come closer to these.147 And the obstacles to these, which are without legislation now, we’ll treat as obstacles ourselves when making prescriptions, and, as |783c| was said just now, when we get a more exact view of these matters, establish laws that are more appropriate and fitting for them.148 {200} CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely correct. |783c5|

ATHENIAN: In that case, let’s guard in memory the things that were said just now, since perhaps we’ll have need of all of them at some point. CLEINIAS: What things in particular are you telling us to remember? ATHENIAN: The ones we distinguished by the three terms we used. We spoke of eating, I think, second, of drinking, and, third, of the violent |783c10| excitement of sexual pleasures. |783d| CLEINIAS: We’ll certainly remember all the things you’re now telling us to, Stranger. ATHENIAN: Good. Let’s proceed, then, to the newlyweds and instruct them how, and in what way, children are to be produced. And if we can’t persuade them we’ll threaten them with certain laws. CLEINIAS: What do you mean? ATHENIAN: The bride and the groom must have in mind to do all they can to provide the city with the finest and best children possible. Now all human beings who are partners in any activity |783e| produce things that are all fine and good if they pay attention to themselves and to the activity itself, but if they don’t pay it, or don’t possess understanding (nous), they produce just the opposites. So the groom must pay attention to the bride and to procreation, and the bride must do likewise, especially |783e5| during the time when they don’t yet have children. And their supervisors |784a| are to be the women we have chosen,149 in whatever number, whether greater or smaller, the officials decide to appoint, and at whatever time. Each day they are to meet at the temple of Eileithuia150 for up to one-third of a day.151 And at their meeting, |784a5| they are to notify each other if any of them sees any husband or wife among those of procreative age who looks to something other than what was prescribed in the sacrifices and sacred rites of marriage. The period for procreating, and the guarding of those |784b| who are procreating, is to be no longer than ten years, in cases where the generation of offspring is abundant. If some are childless on coming to the end of this period, they are to divorce, making a determination {201} in common, with the help of their families and the female officials, as to what is due to each of the two parties. |784b5| If some dispute arises about what is fitting and due

to each, they are to choose ten of the Guardians of the Laws, to whom they are to turn the matters over, and abide by whatever they prescribe. |784c|   The female officials are to go into the houses of the young people, and by admonitions or threats try to put a stop to their error or ignorance. If they are unable to do so, they are to go to the Guardians of the Laws and tell them, and they are to put a stop to it. And if even |784c5| they cannot do it, they are to make it known publicly, posting up a sworn statement that they are indeed unable to make so-and-so better. The one who is posted up, and does not win |784d| in court against those who posted it, is to suffer dishonor in the following ways: he is not to attend weddings or the thanksgiving feasts for the birth of children; and if he does attend, anyone who wishes may—with impunity—punish him with a beating. The same laws are to apply to the wife: she is not to participate in the women’s |784d5| processions and honors, attend weddings, or celebrations of the birth of children, if she has been similarly posted up for being immoderate and did not win in the trial. When children have been produced |784e| in accord with the laws, if a man has sexual intercourse with a woman who is not his wife, or a woman with a man, and the other parties are still of procreating age, they are to suffer the same penalties as were specified for those still procreating. But thereafter, the man or woman |784e5| who is temperate in such matters is to be held in high repute generally,152 while the one who is the opposite is to be honored in the opposite way—or rather, dishonored. When the majority of people observe proper measure in this area, let it be unregulated by law, |785a| and lie in silence. But when they are immoderate, let legislation be put into effect in accord with the laws established at that time.153 The first year is, for each person, the start of his whole life. It is to be recorded in the family shrine154 as the start of life for a boy or girl. |785a5| Next to this is to be written, on a whitewashed wall in every clan,155 the number of rulers who give numbers to the years.156 The names of the {202} members of the clan alive at any given time are to be inscribed nearby, and those of the ones who have departed life are to be erased. |785b| The age criterion for marriage is to be: from sixteen to twenty—marking off the longest period of time—for a girl, and from thirty to thirty-five for a

boy. For entering office: forty for a woman, thirty for a man. As regards military service: |785b5| for a man, twenty to sixty, and for a woman (in whatever military service it seems women are to be employed), after she has borne children, each is to be assigned what is fitting and practicable until she is fifty years old.     1. See 735a. 2. Reading πρὸς τὸ δυσχεραίνοντάς with Saunders-2, p. 33 for Budé πρώτους δυσχεραίνοντάς τε. 3. A proverbial expression, like our “no port in a storm,” also quoted at Crat. 421d. 4. See 702c. 5. Cf. Grg. 505c–d, Phdr. 264c, Phlb. 66d, Ti. 69b. 6. See 632e7, 739e5. 7. See Rep. 540e–541a. 8. See 641b–c. 9. See 738b–d. The verb is aphosiôsasthai, which includes the idea of purifying from pollution. See 873b7, 874a2, Euthphr. 4c2, Phd. 60e2, 61a8, Phdr. 242c3, Phlb. 12b1, and LSJ s.v. ἀφοσιόω. 10. See 926e. 11. On the details of the selection process, which have been much disputed, see Saunders4. 12. Despite the claims made at 746d–747b on behalf of the number 5,040, 37 is not a factor of it. The inclusion of Cleinias is the culprit. His position is perhaps to be analogized to that of Athena: when even numbered juries end in a tie, the accused goes free on the supposition that he has earned “the vote of Athena.” 13. Ekoinônêsatên: On the translation of this verb, see Saunders-2, p. 34. 14. Mega phronousin: Literally, “think big.” “In saying that the enterprise was ‘beneath the dignity’ of Athens and Sparta, the Athenian may well have meant to hint that the interference of two such great powers would be dangerous to the independence of the new state, to say nothing of the want of harmony between them” (England-1, p. 549). 15. Hopla: See 706c1. Both men and women are eligible to select and be selected. See 771d–772a, 785b; cf. Rep. 451d–454e, 540c–d. 16. See 746d8n. 17. Mê kata noun: Here this can hardly mean “not to his liking” or “doesn’t please him,” since this would entail that anyone could object to any tablet and would, in effect, give every selector two or more votes, one for his own candidate, and one against as many other candidates as are not to his taste. It seems better, then, to take the objection as not to the person named but to the way the tablet is filled out (wrong name, wrong father, wrong deme, not a member of the deme) and so not in accord with an understanding of the voting regulations that have just been described. It is grammatically unclear whether objectors have thirty days to register their objection, or whether the offending tablet must be set up in

the marketplace for thirty days. But it makes most sense, given the number of votes to be examined, to take the temporal restriction as applying to the entire process of detecting and displaying defective votes. 18. I.e., the ones that survive the first round of objection. 19. Making the vote a solemn one, one made under oath (see Burkert, pp. 250–254) and so restricting ho boulêtheis (“anyone who wishes”) to the very serious objector. See Saunders2, p. 35. Cf. 755d3. 20. Krinantes: Here equivalent in meaning to dokimasantes. See 753e1, 754d1, 755d7, e4, and next note. 21. Dokimasiôn: Dokimasia in Athens was the process of determining whether, for example, someone should be granted citizenship, or was eligible for military service or to hold the office to which he had been elected. 22. I.e., natural or blood based. 23. See 752d–753e. 24. See 752e. 25. Mnôn: A mina was the weight of 100 drachmas (or, as an amount of money, the 100 drachmas themselves). A drachma weighed about 0.15 ounces and was a day’s pay for someone engaged in public works. So a mina weighed 15.15 ounces, or just about 1 pound. The classes are described at 744c–d. 26. Grapsamenos: A graphê was a specific sort of legal action in Athenian law, of which the graphê asebeias (“write of impiety”) brought against Socrates in 399 BC and described at Ap. 24b–c and quoted at DL 2.40.263–265 is a well-known example. See BrissonPradeau-1, pp. 407–408 n34, Reeve-2, pp. 84–87. 27. Reading καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὅπως ἄν τις πλέον ὑπερβὰς ἑβδομήκοντα ζῇ with OCT for Budé καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὕτως·ἄν τις πλέον ὑπὲρ ἑβδομήκοντα ζῇ. See Brisson-Pradeau-1, p. 408 n37, Schöpsdau-2, p. 379. 28. (1) Guardianship of the laws and their implementation, (2) guardianship of the property records, (3) judges in trials of shameful gain through filing false property holdings. 29. The terms in parentheses are those that were also used in Athens. 30. See 756b–e. 31. See 706c1n. 32. Au toutois: The reference is unclear. See England-1, p. 557. 33. That decreed for people who don’t vote for members of the highest assessment class (756c5). 34. Numerical equality and equality in accord with worth, or proportional equality. See Grg. 508a–b, Ar. NE 1131b32–1132a2, Pol. 1302a7–8. 35. Pant’ agatha apergazetai: Cf. Ap. 30b2–4: “It’s not from wealth that virtue comes, but from virtue comes money, and all the other things that are good for human beings, both in private and in public life.” On its interpretation, see Reeve-2, pp. 124–144. 36. See 653b, 673a. 37. I.e., natural equality and the associated notion of what is just. 38. To suggnômon: Suggnômê, which is like pardon or forgiveness, is discussed in Ar. NE 11143a19–b17. On decency, see 735a2n. 39. This is the Council’s Standing Committee (see 755e).

40. See 745b–c. 41. See Burkert, pp. 95–98. 42. See Rep. 563c. 43. Dêmon kai mê dêmon: If dêmon refers to the citizen body, mê dêmon is unintelligible in the context. It seems better, then, to take one to refer to an element that favors democracy or popular government (as in Saunders-1, Bury-1) and the other to one that does not. See LSJ s.v. δῆμος III.2 and, for discussion, Brisson-Pradeau-1, p. 410 n58, Schöpsdau-2, pp. 399–400. 44. Holoklêron: I.e., that his body has no parts missing, in particular, that he has not been castrated (see LSJ s.v. ὁλόκληρος) but also that it has not been defiled, e.g., by his having prostituted himself (see Aeschin. In Tim. 188.19–20), although this may be better included under the clause against pollution that comes next. 45. Kathareuousôn: See 716e3n. 46. See 738c. 47. Reading τρεῖς with OCT for Budé τρὶς. The very compressed and much debated description of the selection procedure is carefully discussed, and alternatives criticized, in Saunders-2, pp. 35–40, whose proposals the translation embodies, with material added in [ ] for clarity. 48. See 755b–d. 49. See 755e, 758a–d 50. Kat’ eniauton: This seems inconsistent with the requirement that the term of office of the Country-Wardens is to be two years (760c5). (See Brisson-Pradeau-1, pp. 411–412 n67, Schöpsdau-2, p. 410 for discussion.) But perhaps the idea is that halfway through the twoyear period, another group from another tribe is selected and gets ready to take over from the first a year later. This would insure preparedness and continuity in a way that biennial elections would not. Notice that 760e2–3 (“for the third year. . . .”) does not specify when the new fives and twelves are to be elected, suggesting that this has already been settled here. 51. It is unclear whether the 5 are to choose so that (a) (5 + 12) × 12 = 204 assistants are selected or so that (b) (5 × 12) × 12 = 720 are. Texts favoring (a) are 760e3, 761e3, 762e9– 10. I have followed Morrow-2, p. 186 n81, in translating hekastô[i] tôn pente (760b7) to preserve its consistency with these texts; 761d6 appears to favor (b) but does not, since in each region there will be not 60 but 65 (60 assistants + 5 Country-Wardens). 52. Epi dexia: The meaning is “counterclockwise.” See Braunlich. In Ti., the “movement of the Same” is made to “revolve to the right (epi dexia)” (36c5–6), and “whenever an argument concerns an object of reason, and the circle of the Same runs well (euporos) and reveals it, the necessary result is understanding and knowledge” (Ti. 37c1–3). On the significance of the phrase in Smp., see Reeve-3, pp. 32–34. 53. See 778e for more details. 54. Oiketais: An oiketês is sometimes, in particular, a household (oikos) slave but often just a doulos, or slave of any sort (as at 776b8–c3). See LSJ s.v. οἰκέτης. In Lg., although douloi and oiketai are occasionally distinguished (as at 763a1–2), both are always unfree people. A huperetês (“servant”), on the other hand, may be a free person (as at 715c7, 774a1). Hence oiketês is uniformly translated as “unfree servant.” 55. A topic returned to at 779c, 844a–d.

56. See 720b–c. 57. The sixty elected Country-Wardens in groups of five. See 760b5–c1n. 58. See 754e1n. 59. See 945c–948b. 60. See 630b6n. 61. See 760e9. 62. Thôreias: See 633d for an explanation of what is included under this head. 63. Only the group of five is meant. See 761e2–3 and 760b6, where two names are proposed for them. 64. See 715b–d, 717b–d. 65. Reading ἀπόρου with Brisson-Pradeau-1 (pp. 413–414 n87) for Budé ἀπύρου, which gives the sense “acquired a taste for a daily ration of humble and uncooked food.” 66. Kruptous: A nod to the Spartan kruptoi described at 633b–c, but the Country-Wardens are actually quite different in their functions and operations. See Morrow-2, pp. 189–190. 67. See 760a–b. 68. Cheirotoneitô de pas panta: See England-1, pp. 580–581. 69. See 754e1. 70. Epichôrios: Usually means simply “native” (see LSJ s.v. ἐπιχώριος), but in the Laws it usually refers in particular to native citizens. See Brisson-Pradeau-1, p. 414 n97. 71. See 642a4n, 672c6n. 72. Cf. 669e–670a. 73. See 813a5–6. 74. Ton sullogon: Probably not the Assembly, as 764a3 might suggest, since the obligations to attend and the permission not to are extended to different people in the two cases, but rather an election meeting. 75. Eis tous kritas apodidous ho lachôn tên krisin: The meaning is disputed but seems to refer to the examination by the relevant judges of the person selected by lot. See Saunders– 2, pp. 41–42. 76. See 627e4n. 77. Dikastês: In Athenian law, large juries, whose members voted without discussion, served the functions that in our legal system are assigned to judges. So a dikastês is both judge and juror. See MacDowell-2, pp. 35–40, Morrow-2, p. 288. 78. Anakrisis: In the Euthphr. Socrates is about to attend the one that precedes his trial. On its nature, see MacDowell-2, pp. 239–242, and on arbitration (diaita), pp. 203–211. 79. On the translation of this and the preceding sentence, see Saunders-2, pp. 42–43. 80. See 767c1–4. 81. See 766e3–767a3, Morrow-2, pp. 261–264. 82. Phugousi: Pheugein usually means “flee,” “take flight,” “escape” (see LSJ s.v. φεύγειν) but here seems to have a somewhat technical meaning. See England-1, p. 592. 83. See Ap. 35b9–c5: “It doesn’t seem just to me to entreat the jury—nor to be acquitted by entreating it—but rather to inform it and persuade it. After all, a juror doesn’t sit in order to grant justice as a favor, but to decide where justice lies. And he has sworn on oath not that he’ll favor whoever he pleases, but that he’ll judge according to law.” 84. See 767c1–4. 85. See 767a–b.

86. See 956b–958c, also 855c–856a, 876a–c. 87. See 685a7–8. 88. Chrainein hê apochrainein: The exact meaning of these terms is unclear, but the idea is that of adding pigment or taking it away to increase or lower contrast, so as to produce illusionistic effects. See England-1, p. 597, Schöpsdau-1, p. 443. 89. See Smp. 207d–208b, Reeve-3, pp. 117–121. 90. Eis to prosthen: Either in the sense of “in the future” or in the sense of “making advances in the craft.” The latter is perhaps more likely. For discussion of the difficulties in translating, see Saunders-2, pp. 44–45. 91. Attributed to Empedocles at Ar. Po. 1457b23–24. 92. See 630c–632c. 93. See 670e2, 965b1. 94. Reading ἐπάνιτε with England-1, p. 602, for Budé and mss. ἐπαινεῖτε (“praise”). 95. I.e., 420. See 737e–738b, 746d–747b. 96. See 771d. 97. One way: (5,040 – 2) = 5,038 ÷ 11 = 458. The other way: (5,040 – 2) = 5,038 ÷ 458 = 11. See Brisson-Pradeau-1, p. 418 n123, also 738a5–b1n. 98. Phêmê[i] kai logo[i]: While phêmê can be an utterance of any sort, it is often in particular an utterance prompted by the gods, or a prophetic saying (LSJ s.v. φήμη). The context suggests that the religious overtones are intentional—notice too muthos (“story”) in the previous sentence. Logos, on the other hand, points more toward “account,” “reason,” and “argument.” See 626d5n. 99. “The point is that each month each person will attend the festival both of his tribe and of his local community (deme)” (Saunders-1, p. 25 n7). See also 745c–e. 100. See 738d–e. 101. See 770b–771a. 102. See 722c–723d. 103. See Polit. 309a–310e. 104. Muthos: See 771d1n, and epa[i]donta (“singing incantations”) at 773d6 and paramuthia (“by way of encouragement”) at 773e5. 105. Tropôn êthesi: See 968d2. 106. See 637e3n. 107. Meixei: Mixis, which means “mixing” or “mingling,” also means “sexual intercourse” (see LSJ s.v. μίξις II). 108. See 659c–660a. 109. See 721b–c. 110. As goddess of marriage. 111. Euthunais: Euthuna (“inspection”) was a device designed to insure (typically) democratic control of officials. In Athens a board of ten inspectors and ten assistants was elected by lot. Officials were subject to inspection by it at the end of their term in office to see whether they had taken bribes, embezzled public funds, or been guilty of maladministration. See Ar. Ath. 54.2. Pas: Not all citizens (England-1, p. 611), but all treasurers. See Brisson-Pradeau-1, p. 419 n139. On Inspectors in Magnesia, see 945b– 948b.

112. Hupakouetô: One meaning is “hearken” or “give ear,” but here the more likely sense is “submit,” “comply,” “give way,” or “obey” (LSJ s.v. ὑπακύω I.3, II.3). Look at 762d5–6 with 762e6–7. 113. What was stated before, at 742c2–3, is this: “a person marrying or giving in marriage is neither to give nor to receive any dowry whatsoever.” Since that is what is being said again here, hôs isa anti isôn estin to mête lambanonti mêt’ ekdidonti must mean essentially the same thing, though the object of ekdidonti (and so of lambanonti) is a bride not a dowry. That it does is insured by the fact that getting or giving a bride traditionally involves getting (for the bridegroom) and giving (for the bride’s family) a dowry. Dia chrêmatôn aporian gêraskein tous penêtas is difficult and various alternatives for gêraskein, in particular, have been proposed (see England-1, pp. 611–612). I take the clause as explaining why neither getting nor giving a dowry (along with the bride) is an equal exchange (as it wouldn’t be if giving one condemned the poor to poverty in old age or getting one relieved them of it). The next sentence explains why this is so. See also Schöpsdau-2, pp. 459–460. 114. Because the dowry traditionally remained her property and reverted to her family if the couple divorced or she died without children. The consequent threat to her husband of its loss thus remained a potent weapon. See MacDowell-2, pp. 87–89, 144–145. 115. See 774b, 759e–760a. 116. See 759c–e. 117. Or “laws.” See 700b5n. 118. I.e., Dionysus. 119. Diakechumenôn: Opposite of eupages (“cohesive”) in the next sentence. See Ti. 46d, Ar. Mete. 382a23–31. 120. Speirein: See 777e2. 121. On the importance of starting-points, see 753e, 765e, Rep. 377a–b. The goddess is Hera. 122. See 721c, 773e. 123. The helots were the semienslaved farming population of Laconia; after the Spartans conquered Messenia, most of its population were made helots too. On their precise status, see MacDowell-3, pp. 31–42. See, too, Ar. Pol. 1269a34–b12, 1271b41–1272a1, 1272b19. 124. The Mariandynoi and Penestai had statuses similar to that of the helots. On the latter, see Ar. Pol. 1269a36. 125. Homer, Od. 17.322–323, with some differences from our text. 126. Inhabitants of Messenia, a region in the southwestern Peloponnese. 127. A group of pirates or brigands, who may have been the descendants of slaves. 128. See 630b6n. 129. I.e., if less than none at all is possible. 130. See 680b2n. 131. See Grg. 519a, Ar. Pol. 1330b33–1331a18. 132. Source unknown, but the thought that armed men are better than walls is found in Alcaeus Fr. 112 Campbell, in Aeschylus, Persians 349, and elsewhere. 133. See 760e.

134. “This arrangement of the houses was apparently not to be confined to those on the edge of the city. The ὁδοί [‘streets’] would cut the town up into blocks enclosed in continuous walls” (England-1, p. 625). 135. I.e., in the discussion of marriage at 772d–776b. 136. Hoson anagkê: See Saunders-2, pp. 45–46. 137. See 780b3. 138. Respectable, well-to-do women in most Greek states were confined to the household (Rep. 579b8) and were largely excluded from the public spheres of culture, politics, and warfare. See Gould. 139. Demeter was the goddess of corn, grain, harvest, and fertility, Kore her virgin daughter, and Triptolemus the hero who conveyed the secret of these things to mankind. On Demeter and Kore, see Burkert, pp. 159–161, and on Triptolemus, pp. 67–68. 140. See Petrovic (Index Nominum et Rerum s.v. sacrifice) and on pollution, 716e3n. 141. See 669d5n. 142. Nosêmata: The appetites in their naturally inflamed states are diseases of the soul. 143. The “turning” is of the people who have the diseases (as autois at 782d11 indicates), not of the diseases themselves. See England-1, p. 636. 144. Epirroên: “When someone’s appetites are strongly inclined in one direction, we surely know that they become more weakly inclined in the others, just like a stream that has been partly diverted into another channel” (Rep. 485d6–8). 145. Reading εἰς with Schöpsdau-2 for Budé ὡς. 146. Reading ἡνίκ᾽ ἂν with Bury-1 for Budé ἡνίκα. 147. Prosmeixantes autois: “αὐτοῖς = the men and women concerned (not the συσσίτια [communal meals], as usually interpreted); cf. Politicus 290c ἔτι δὴ προσμείξωμεν ἐγγύτερον ἐπὶ τοὺς μήπω βεβασανισμένους [‘let’s get still closer to those we have not yet cross-questioned’], and 289d. ἴσως [‘perhaps’] reminds us of ἴσως ἄν in 781d2. The Athenian and his companions do in fact envisage having a fairly close knowledge of the characters of the colonists. See 736abc” (Saunders-2, p. 47). Against this, however, stands the fact that autôn (783b8), auta (c2), and autois (783b7) all seem to refer to (neuter) sussitia (b5), so that autois does not refer to the men and women involved (Schöpsdau-2, p. 491). Nonetheless, Saunders’ point can perhaps be preserved if we take the sussitia in question to involve, in particular, the habits and customs of the relevant colonists. 148. Ta te epiposthen autôn  .  .  . taxantes auta epiposthen poiêsometha: “To take τὰ ἐπίπροσθεν as ‘preliminaries’ as many interpreters do . . . seems hardly good enough . . . ‘before’ in a temporal sense is not what ἐπίποσθεν means (pace LSJ). The basic meaning is (spatially) ‘in front of’, ‘before.’ . . . But in particular τὰ ἐπίπροσθεν indicates things that are put ‘in front’ by way of an obstacle to being approached or seen” (Saunders-2, p. 47). The idea, then, is that when legislating in the abstract the, e.g., conventional privacy of women (781c) and of family life more generally (788a–c) are seen as potential obstacles to the legislation regarding communal messes proposed for them, so that more appropriate and fitting laws may be forthcoming with an increase in knowledge. 149. No mention of these has been made before, but see 929e–930a. 150. Goddess of childbirth. See Burkert, pp. 25–26, 170–171. 151. On ὥρας (“of an hour”), which Budé retains but treats as equivalent to ἡμἐρας (“of a day”) and Schofield-Griffith omits, see Bury-2.

152. Panta eudokimos: Presumably because sexual appetite is so strong. See 783c–d. 153. See 783b–c. 154. See 717b, 723e, 740b–c, 927a–b. 155. See 746d7n. 156. In clan calendars, years were identified by the names of the officials who held certain offices during them. See OCD s.v. calendar, and on festival calendars, Burkert, pp. 225– 227.

{203} BOOK 7 ATHENIAN: Now that male and female children have been born, |788a| it would be most correct, I take it, for us to talk next about nurturing and education. To leave this undiscussed is entirely impossible, but speaking in the form of instruction and admonition rather than in that of laws would evidently be more appropriate for us. For in private life, in the home, many |788a5| small things not visible to everyone take place, which—due to each person’s pain, pleasure, and appetites being different—go |788b| against the advice of the legislator, and would readily make the characters of the citizens very varied and not like each other. And this is a bad thing for cities. For while, because of the smallness and frequency of these things, to make laws that assign punishments for them |788b5| is unfitting and unseemly, it does corrupt even the laws established in writing to have people become accustomed to act contrary to law1 in small and frequently occurring things. So, while to legislate about |788c| these things involves difficulty, to keep silent is impossible. But I must try to clarify what I’m saying by (as it were) bringing to light examples, since at the moment what’s being said seems somewhat dark. CLEINIAS: That’s very true. |788c5| ATHENIAN: Well then, it was correct to say,2 I suppose, that a correct nurturing must show that it is capable of producing bodies and souls that are the finest and best possible. CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: And, I suppose, to take the simplest point, that the finest bodies |788d| must grow up as straight as possible, right from earliest infancy. CLEINIAS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: Well now, isn’t it our understanding that in every living thing the first spurt produces by far the greatest and strongest growth, so that in fact |788d5| many people would strongly contend that, after the age of five, human beings do not grow double in height, at least, in the next twenty years? CLEINIAS: True.

{204} ATHENIAN: Well then, don’t we know that rapid growth, if it flows on |788d10| without a lot of commensurable exercise, produces innumerable evils |789a| in bodies? CLEINIAS: Of

course. ATHENIAN: So it’s when bodies are getting the most nourishment that they need the most exercise. |789a5| CLEINIAS: What’s that, Stranger? Are we going to prescribe the most exercise for newborn babies and very young children? ATHENIAN: No, not at all, even earlier than that, for those being nourished inside their mothers. CLEINIAS: What are you saying, my good friend? Do you mean the fetuses? |789a10| ATHENIAN: Yes. But it’s not at all surprising that you are ignorant |789b| of the gymnastic training for those of that age. But, strange though it is, I’d like to explain it to you. CLEINIAS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: Well, we Athenians can better understand this sort of thing |789b5| because among us some people play games more than they should. You see, among us, not only boys but also men of a certain age raise young birds to fight each other. But, when they are training beasts of this sort, they are far from thinking that the exercise they give them when they stir them up to fight in contests against |789c| each other is sufficient. For in addition to this, they each keep birds concealed about them, small ones in their hands, larger ones under their armpit, and go walking around for many, many stades,3 |789c5| not for the sake of the good condition of their own bodies, but for that of these young birds. And by doing this much, they show to any observant person that all bodies are benefited from the invigorating movements produced by all sorts of shakings and movements, |789d| whether they are moved by their own efforts, or in wheeled vehicles, at sea, on horses, or by any other sort of moving body.4 And because of these movements they digest the solid and liquid nourishment that is capable of providing us with health, beauty, |789d5| and other sorts of strength.

Since that’s how these matters stand, what should we say that we must do subsequently? Do you wish us to risk ridicule by explicitly {205} directing, when establishing laws, |789e| that a pregnant woman is to go for walks, and that when the child is born she is to mold it like wax,5 while it is still pliant, and keep it swaddled up until it is two years old? And what’s more, are we to compel nurses, by means of legal penalties, to be forever carrying the children around in some way to fields, temples, or relatives, |789e5| until they are capable of standing without difficulty, and even then, to toil on carrying them until they are three years old, being on guard in case their legs, being still young, become distorted by being somehow leaned on with too much force? And are we to require the nurses to be as strong as possible, and for there never to be just one of them? And in the case of each of these, |790a| if it doesn’t happen, are we to write down a penalty for those who don’t do them? Or aren’t there many reasons we shouldn’t, since much of what was just mentioned would result? CLEINIAS: What’s that? |790a5| ATHENIAN: The huge amount of ridicule we’d incur, not to mention the unwillingness of the nurses (with their womanish and slavish characters6) to obey. CLEINIAS: Why, then, have we said that these laws are to be stated? ATHENIAN: For this reason. Those in cities with the characters of masters and free men may perhaps listen, and so come to the correct understanding |790b| that unless the private household is managed in the correct way in cities, it is pointless to expect communal affairs to have any of the sort of stability of established laws. And when he understands this, he would make use himself of the laws mentioned just now and, using them to manage |790b5| his household and city well, achieve happiness. CLEINIAS: Yes, very likely so. ATHENIAN: For that very reason, then, let’s not leave off such legislation until we’ve explained the practices having to do with the souls of very young children |790c| in the same way as we’ve started to tell a story about their bodies. CLEINIAS: Alright.

ATHENIAN: So let’s take it as a sort of fundamental principle, applying to both |790c5| body and soul, that the nursing and movement of the very young, if it takes place as far as possible throughout the entire day and {206} night, though beneficial in all cases, is especially so in the case of the youngest, who are to live, if it were possible, as if they were always being rocked by the sea. But as things stand, what must be done concerning the newborn |790d| nurslings among children is to come as close as possible to this. One must also take as a sign of this7 the fact that the women who nurse little ones and the women who perform the ritual cure for Corybantic conditions,8 adopt it and know it to be useful from experience. For I suppose you know that when mothers wish to lull to sleep |790d5| children who have trouble sleeping, what they administer is not stillness, but the opposite (namely, movement), by constantly shaking them in their arms, and not silence, but some sort of lullaby, |790e| effectively (as it were) charming the children by playing the flute (as in cases of Bacchic frenzy)9 in making use of this cure consisting of the movement that is at once dance and song. CLEINIAS: And what in particular, Stranger, are we to treat as the cause of this? |790e5| ATHENIAN: It’s not very hard to see. CLEINIAS: How so? ATHENIAN: Both these conditions, I take it, involve being terrified, and the terror is due to some sort of poor state of the soul. So when someone administers an external shaking to such conditions, |791a| the external movement administered controls the internal movement of fear and frenzy, and, having controlled it, makes a calm stillness appear in the soul in place of the painful palpitation of the heart that took place in each of them. |791a5| This is an altogether desirable thing. In the one case, it makes them fall asleep; in the other, where the people are wide awake, by means of dancing and flute playing, along with the help of the gods, to whom they each make well-omened sacrifice, it produces states of being sensible in us instead of frenzied ones. |791b| This—though {207} briefly expressed, of course—is an argument that has a certain plausibility to it. CLEINIAS: Indeed, it has.

ATHENIAN: But if this is the effect these sorts of things have, |791b5| the following must also be borne in mind in the case of these,10 that every soul that is haunted by terrors from childhood would be all the more likely to become accustomed to feeling fears. And this, I take it, everyone would agree is a training in cowardice, not in courage. CLEINIAS: Who could doubt it? |791b10| ATHENIAN: Contrariwise, practice in courage straight from childhood consists, |791c| we’d say, in overcoming the terrors and fears that assail us. CLEINIAS: Correct. ATHENIAN: So to this one part of the virtue of the soul, |791c5| we can say the exercise of very young children by means of movements makes a great contribution. CLEINIAS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: Moreover, the absence or presence of disagreeableness in the soul plays no small part in whether goodness of soul or badness of soul |791c10| would result. CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: What way, then, can we find to have whichever of these two qualities we choose implanted, |791d| straight from birth, in the newborn? We must try to explain how and to what extent someone could attain this. CLEINIAS: Yes, of course. ATHENIAN: I say, then, that the doctrine held among us11 is that selfindulgent softness |791d5| makes the characters of the young disagreeable, irascible, and too easily moved by small matters, whereas the opposite, violent and savage enslavement, by making them humble, unfree, and misanthropic, renders them unfit to live in the same city with others. |791d10| CLEINIAS: How, then, must the city as a whole nurture those who cannot yet understand speech |791e| or taste education in any other form at all? {208} ATHENIAN: More or less like this. Every animal is accustomed, I imagine, to utter roars as soon as it is born, |791e5| and not least one belonging to the human species, who, in addition to the roars, is also more especially given to tears than the others.

CLEINIAS: He certainly is. ATHENIAN: When nurses try to discover what sort of thing a baby has an appetite for, they judge from these very signs12 when they offer it things. If it stays silent when the thing |792a| is offered, they think they did well to offer it, whereas if it weeps and roars, they think they did not do well. You see, babies make clear what they love and hate by their tears and roars— signs not at all fortunate. And this period goes on for at least three years, which is no small part |792a5| of one’s life to spend badly or not badly. CLEINIAS: That’s right. ATHENIAN: Doesn’t a person who is disagreeable and not at all gracious seem to you to be inclined to be doleful and more full of complaints, for the most part, |792b| than a good person should be? CLEINIAS: He seems so to me at least. ATHENIAN: Well then, suppose someone were to try offering every contrivance to insure that, during the three-year period, the one we are nurturing13 will incur the least possible |792b5| amount of suffering, fears, and pains of all sorts, don’t we think that he would thereby make its soul more cheerful and more gracious? CLEINIAS: Clearly so, Stranger—especially, if one could provide many pleasures for it. |792c| ATHENIAN: There I must part company with you Cleinias, my admirable friend! You see, doing that sort of thing is for us the greatest corruption of all; and the greatest corruption of all comes always at the start of nurturing. But let’s see if there’s anything in what we say. |792c5| CLEINIAS: Tell us what you mean. ATHENIAN: Our argument now concerns no small matter. So you too, Megillus, must consider it and help judge between us. You see, my argument says that the correct way of life must neither pursue pleasures nor, conversely, entirely avoid pains. Instead, it must embrace |792d| {209} the middle course, which I called by the name “graciousness” just now. Making a good guess in accord with a sort of oracular report, this is what we all call precisely the disposition of a god.14 And it is this state, I say, that must be pursued by any of us who is going to be correspondingly divine: he must

not allow himself |792d5| to become wholly inclined toward pleasures (for he will not thereby be out of the reach of pains), or allow anyone else of us— old or young, male or female—to suffer this, least of all, if he can help it, the newborn. For it is then that, |792e| due to habit, the entirety of character is implanted in the most controlling way in all of us. Further, I for my part would say (if I were not going to seem to be playing a joke) that of all women, those who are carrying babies in their stomach must especially be taken care of during their year of pregnancy, in order that a pregnant woman will neither be furnished with certain pleasures, |792e5| whether many or greedy,15 nor with pains either, but that she will live through that period honoring what is gracious, kindly, and gentle. CLEINIAS: There is no need, Stranger, for you to ask Megillus which of us two |793a| has spoken more correctly. For I myself grant you that all must avoid a life of unmixed pain or pleasure, and always cut a sort of middle path. So what you’ve said is correct, and you’ve heard it endorsed too! |793a5| ATHENIAN: You’re quite right, Cleinias. Here, then, is a further point for the three of us to keep in mind. CLEINIAS: What point? ATHENIAN: That all these things we are now going through are what are called “unwritten laws” by the majority of people; and |793a10| what they call by the name “ancestral laws” is nothing other than |793b| the totality of such things. Moreover, the argument started just now,16 that one must neither call these things “laws” nor leave them undiscussed, was correct. For these are the bonds of every constitution, linking all the things established in writing, |793b5| and laid down, with those yet to be established in the future, in exactly the way that ancestral and entirely ancient laws {210} do: if they have been established correctly and have become customary, they envelop and are the utter salvation of the laws already written, but if, in an out-of-tune way, they stray outside what is correct, |793c| they are like supports in buildings that buckle in the middle and make the entire structures collapse, one part lying under another, first the supports themselves and then—once the ancient ones have collapsed—the parts that were later built in a correct way. |793c5| Keeping this in mind, Cleinias, we must bind your new city together by every means, not neglecting any, great or small, as far as we can

(whether one calls them “laws,” “habits,” or |793d| “practices”). For a city is bound together by all such things, and neither great ones nor small ones are stable without each other. So it must not be surprised if an influx of many seemingly17 small laws or habits makes our list of laws |793d5| longer. CLEINIAS: You’re right, and we will keep it in mind. ATHENIAN: Well then, if up to the age of three years for a boy or girl, one could carry out these things exactly, and not |793e| treat what has been said as a side issue, no small benefit would be produced for the young who are being brought up. But in the case of three-, four-, five-, and even six-yearolds, to form the character of their soul would require games and, to free them from self-indulgent softness, punishment—not |793e5| punishing in a dishonoring way, but in just the way we talked about for slaves: neither punishing them with wanton aggression, which would produce anger in those being punished, nor making them self-indulgently soft by leaving them unpunished.18 This same thing must be done |794a| also in the case of those who are free. Games come naturally to children of this age, pretty much discovered by the children themselves whenever they get together. And all the children,19 from the ages of three to six years, must get together at the village temples, |794a5| those of each village getting together in the same place. The nurses are still to supervise the children of this age for moderation or intemperance, while the nurses themselves and the entire herd are to be supervised by the twelve women previously selected, |794b| the Guardians of the Laws appointing one to each group to keep it in order for a year. These women are to be selected by the women in control of supervising marriages,20 one from each tribe, and of the same age as themselves. The one appointed is to pay an official visit to the {211} temple |794b5| each day and always punish the person doing injustice—a male or female slave or a foreigner she may punish on her own authority by making use of certain unfree servants of the city’s, but if the accused is a citizen, and disputes the punishment, |794c| she is to take the case to the City-Wardens to make a judgment, but if he does not dispute it, she is to punish even a citizen on her own authority.21 After the age of six, the sexes are to be separated—boys made to spend their time with boys, and likewise virgin girls with virgin girls. Each is to

turn to lessons, |794c5| the males going to teachers of riding, archery, javelinthrowing, and using a sling (and females too, if they can somehow be brought to agree, |794d| up to the point of lessons, at least, especially those in the use of weapons).22 In fact, what is currently established concerning these sorts of things is ignored by almost everyone. CLEINIAS: In what way? |794d5| ATHENIAN: In believing that in the case of the hands, right and left are by nature different as regards their uses in each of our activities—whereas, of course, in the case of the feet and the lower limbs it is evident that there is no difference at all in the fruits of their labor. But due to the ignorance of our nurses and mothers, we have each become (as it were) |794e| “lame” in our hands. For the natural aptitude of the two arms is pretty much equal; it is we ourselves who, through our habits, have made them different by not using them correctly. In some tasks, of course, where it doesn’t make a big difference (holding the lyre in the left hand, |794e5| the plectrum in the right, and that sort of thing), no harm is done. But to use these as models for others, where there is no necessity to use them in that way, is pretty foolish. This is shown by the |795a| Scythian custom of not using the left hand to draw the bow and the right only to fit the arrow to it, but of using both hands alike for both actions. There are many, many other such examples— in driving chariots, for example, and other activities—where |795a5| one can learn that by making the left hand weaker than the right they are making something contrary to nature. Which, as we said, in the case of a plectrum made of horn {212} and instruments of this sort, doesn’t make a big difference. But when it is a case of using iron ones in war |795b| (bows, javelins, and the like), it does make a big difference, most of all when weapons are to be used against weapons. There is a vast difference here between the one who has learned it and the one who has not learned, between the one who has been trained in it and the one who has not been trained. You see, just as someone completely |795b5| trained in pankration,23 boxing, or wrestling is not incapable of fighting with his left side, and so is not lame or foot-dragging when someone compels him to change over and work hard on that side, in the very same way in regard to weapons and |795c| everything

else, it must be considered the correct thing, I think, that whoever has two sets of limbs with which to defend himself and attack others must, as far as possible, not allow either of them to be idle or untrained. Indeed, if someone were born with the nature of Geryon or a |795c5| Briareus,24 he should be able to throw a hundred projectiles with his hundred hands. All these things, then, are to be supervised by the female and male officials, the former |795d| keeping an eye on the games and the nurses, the latter on the lessons, to see to it that all the boys and girls will grow up sound-footed and sound-handed, and to the extent possible will not harm their natures through habits. The lessons would, I take it, in virtue of their use, be twofold (so to speak), those concerned with the body being gymnastic training, and those |795d5| that are for the sake of goodness of soul,25 musical training. Gymnastic training, in turn, has two parts: dancing and wrestling. Of dancing, one sort |795e| is the dancers imitating the speech of the Muse,26 where they safeguard27 both high-mindedness and freedom at once; the other sort, which is for the sake of good health, agility, and beauty, is the bending and stretching of the limbs and parts of the body that is fitting, also assigning to |795e5| each the rhythmic movement proper to it, which movement befittingly pervades and accompanies every sort of dance. {213} As for wrestling, the sorts of things Antaeus or Cercyon |796a| introduced into their crafts to gratify their unseemly love of victory, or that Epeius or Amycus did into boxing,28 since they are useless in a war situation, don’t merit the honor of being discussed. But the things belonging to correct wrestling (release for necks, for hands, and for torsos), |796a5| when practiced with a love of victory that results in a settled method which is seemly,29 and for the sake of strength and health—these are useful in all situations, and must not be omitted. But we must prescribe for the students and the teachers too, when we come to this point in the laws, |796b| that the latter are to give all such lessons in a kindly way, and the former receive them in a spirit of gratitude. Nor must one omit whatever in choral performances it is fitting to imitate: the performances in armor of the Curetes here in Crete, or those of the Dioscuri |796b5| in Sparta.30 And at Athens too, I believe, our virgin

mistress,31 charmed by the play of the chorus, thought that one must not play empty-handed, but equipped with full armor, |796c| and go through her entire dance that way. These are the sorts of things that it would be fitting for boys and also girls to imitate in every point, honoring the gift of the goddess,32 on account of its usefulness in war and for the sake of festivals. And our children, I take it, from the outset, and {214} for whatever time they are not yet old enough |796c5| to go to war, would be required, whenever they take part in a solemn procession or parade to any of the gods, always to be equipped with weapons and horses, and in this way, with quicker or slower movements in their dances and marches, make their supplications to the gods and the children of gods. Contests, too, and practicing for contests, must be engaged in for no purposes other than these,33 if at all. |796d| For then, Megillus and Cleinias, these are useful in peace as well as war, both to the constitution and private households, whereas other sorts of exercises for the body, whether playful or serious, are not for free people. |796d5| I have now pretty much described the gymnastic training that in the first arguments34 I said would need to be described, and it is quite finished.35 But if you have something better to offer, speak up and put it forth. |796e| CLEINIAS: It’s not an easy thing, Stranger, if we pass these things by, to have anything better to say about gymnastic training and contests. ATHENIAN: Well then, what follows next in order concerns the gifts of the Muses and Apollo. We thought at the time36 that we had discussed all this, |796e5| and that things having to do with gymnastic training alone remained. Now, though, the things that must also be said, and said first to everyone, are clear. So let’s speak about these next. CLEINIAS: We certainly must. ATHENIAN: Lend me you ear, then. Yes, you have lent it in the |797a| previous discussions; nonetheless, with something so very strange and unexpected, great care must be taken by the speaker and by the listener, and especially now. For I’m going to give an account that I’m not unafraid to state. All the same, summoning up the confidence somehow, I’ll not shrink from it. |797a5| CLEINIAS: What exactly is it, Stranger, that you have to say?

ATHENIAN: I say that in all cities there is a universal failure to understand that games generally are a controlling factor where establishing laws is concerned, and whether the ones established will be stable or not. For where this matter is settled, and provides that the same people always play the same ones, |797b| in the same circumstances, and in the same {215} way, and delight in the same toys, it also allows the serious institutions that are established to remain undisturbed. On the other hand, where the games undergo change and are always being assailed by innovation and other sorts of alterations, and the young never call the same things |797b5| “likable,” and where what is graceful or disgraceful in the outward appearances of their bodies37 or in their various accoutrements is not always indisputably fixed, but where, instead, the one who is especially honored is the one who is always innovating or introducing some novel thing distinct from the accustomed ones, |797c| with respect to shapes, colors, and everything of that sort, then we would say, and be absolutely correct in saying, that there is no greater disgrace than him for a city. For, without its being noticed, he changes the characters of the young, making them dishonor |797c5| what is old and honor what is new.38 And I say again that there is nothing more damaging to cities in general than this saying or doctrine. Listen while I tell you how great an evil it is. CLEINIAS: Do you mean the fault of criticizing the old things in |797d| cities? ATHENIAN: Exactly. CLEINIAS: In that case, you’d find us no bad listeners to this part of your argument, but rather the most well disposed ones possible. |797d5| ATHENIAN: Yes, I expect so. CLEINIAS: You have only to speak. ATHENIAN: Come on, then, and let’s listen to each other and speak to each other on this topic with greater care than ever. Change, we’ll find, is by far the most dangerous thing in everything (except in something bad39), whether it’s the seasons |797d10| generally, the winds, dispositions of bodies, or characters of souls—in a word, not in some things but not in others, except, |797e| as I said just now, bad things. So if one looks at bodies, one sees how they become accustomed to all sorts of food, drink, and exercise, even though at first they are upset by these, and how, in time, out of these

very things they grow flesh that is suited |797e5| to these, and come to like, be accustomed to, and familiar with this entire |798a| regimen, and live lives that in terms of pleasure and health are {216} the best possible. And if someone is ever compelled to change again to one or other of the reputable regimens, he is upset by illnesses at the start and at length recovers with difficulty, when he gets accustomed to the food again. |798a5| It is precisely the same, one must suppose, with people’s thoughts and the natures of their souls. For if they are brought up under laws that by some divine good luck have remained unchanged for many long periods of time, |798b| so that no one has any memory or has even heard of things ever being otherwise than they now are, then the entire soul feels reverence for them and is afraid to change any of the things that were established at that time. Somehow or other, then, the legislator must invent some contrivance to insure that this is the way |798b5| the city will be. Here, then, is where I, for my part, find one. All suppose, as we said before,40 that no great harm results from changes in children’s games, since they are just games, so they don’t prevent them, |798c| but give in and go along, and do not rationally calculate that it is necessary for those boys who innovate in their games to become men of another sort than the previous generation, and who, being of another sort, seek another way of life, and, seeking it, |798c5| want other practices and other laws. That after this will come what we just now said is the greatest evil for cities is something none of them is afraid of. Other changes, |798d| ones of the sort affecting outward appearances, would do less evil, but frequent change in what has to do with the praise and blame of people’s characters is the greatest change of all, I think, and the greatest care must be taken to avoid it. |798d5| CLEINIAS: Of course, it must. ATHENIAN: Well then, do we still believe our previous arguments, where we said that the things that had to do with rhythms and music as a whole are imitations of the characters of better and worse people? Or what? |798e| CLEINIAS: As far as we’re concerned, anyway, our doctrine has not changed at all. ATHENIAN: We say, then, that every contrivance must be devised to prevent our children from wanting to join in other sorts of imitations, |798e5| whether

dances or songs, and to prevent anyone from persuading them to, by putting all sorts of pleasure in front of them. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely right. {217} ATHENIAN: Does any of us have a better craft for this purpose |799a| than that of the Egyptians?41 CLEINIAS: What purpose do you mean? ATHENIAN: Making all dances and all songs sacred. First, they must regulate the festivals, by computing |799a5| for each year what they are, at which times they must occur, and in honor of which gods, children of gods, or daimons on each occasion, and, after that, what hymns must be sung at the sacrifices to the gods on each occasion, and which sorts of dances must celebrate the sacrifice then. These regulations are first to be made by certain people, |799b| and then all the citizens are to make a sacrifice in common to the Fates42 and all the other gods, and by pouring libations consecrate each of the songs to its respective gods and other divinities. And if anyone tries to introduce other hymns or dances besides these for any of the gods, the Priests and |799b5| Priestesses together with the Guardians of the Laws are to prevent43 him, and are acting piously and in accord with law in preventing him. And if the one prevented does not voluntarily accept prevention, he is to be subject for the rest of his life to a charge of impiety at the hands of anyone who wishes to bring it. CLEINIAS: Rightly so. |799b10| ATHENIAN: Well, now that we have embarked on this argument, let’s behave |799c| in a way that’s fitting for us. CLEINIAS: What do you mean? ATHENIAN: Any young person, I imagine, not to mention old men, who sees or hears something out-of-the-way and not at all customary, |799c5| would never, I imagine, rush to agree with whatever is perplexing about those things right away, just like that. No, he’d stand there like someone who, on coming to a meeting of three roads (whether alone or happening to be traveling with others), and not knowing his path very well, would ask himself or the others |799d| about what was perplexing {218} him, and wouldn’t rush forward headlong before he’d in some way settled by investigation which way the road leads. And that, in fact, is what we must

do at present. For in our argument concerning laws, because the point that occurred to us just now is strange, it is necessary, I imagine, to make a thorough |799d5| investigation into it, and not, at our age, and about such important matters, too readily claim to be in a position to confidently affirm anything perspicuous off the cuff. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true. ATHENIAN: Then we’ll devote some time to this, |799e| and only when we’ve investigated it sufficiently, regard it as settled. But in order that we not be pointlessly prevented from completing the regulations accompanying the laws that we have arrived at now, let’s go on to the end of them. And perhaps, if the god were willing, the path itself as a whole, |799e5| on reaching its end, would make sufficiently known what is now perplexing. CLEINIAS: Excellent, Stranger; let’s do as you say. ATHENIAN: Then one must declare, we say, this strange thing, |799e10| that our songs become “laws”44 in just the same way, it would seem, as the ancients too gave this name to songs accompanied by the lyre. So they perhaps wouldn’t have disagreed entirely with |800a| what’s being said now. Maybe one of them, while asleep or awake, as if in a dream, I imagine, prophesized it. In any case, this is what our doctrine about this is to be, that no one is to sing a note or make a movement in dance contrary to the publicly approved and sacred melodies, or the entire body of choral dance for the young, any more than |800a5| he would do anything contrary to any of the other “laws” whatsoever. Whoever obeys is to go free of punishment; but whoever disobeys, as was said just now, is to be punished by the Guardians of the Laws, the Priestesses, and the Priests. Shall we lay down |800b| these things now in words?45 CLEINIAS: Yes, let’s lay them down. ATHENIAN: In what way, though, could someone legislating these things not make himself totally ridiculous? Well, let’s look at the following point about these, which is something like this. |800b5| The safest thing to do is first to mold some models for them in words. And I say one of the models is something like the following. Suppose a sacrifice has {219} taken place and the sacred offerings have, in accord with law, been burned, and then some private individual, a son or a brother let’s say, while standing near the altars

and the sacred offerings, were to start blaspheming, utterly blaspheming. |800c| Wouldn’t his outburst, as we’d say, fill his father and the rest of his relatives with despondency, foreboding, and a sense of ill omen? CLEINIAS: Of course. |800c5| ATHENIAN: Well, in our part of the world this is what happens (one might almost say) in almost every city. For when some official has performed some public sacrifice, a chorus—or rather a multitude of choruses—comes along after it, and, standing not far from the altars, but sometimes right next to them, pours |800d| a flood of utter blasphemy over the sacred offerings. With words, rhythms, and the most mournful harmonies possible they harrow the souls of their listeners, and whoever makes the city that has just offered sacrifice weep the most, this is the one who wins the victory prizes. This “law,” |800d5| then, is not one we vote for, is it? And if it is ever really necessary for our citizens to hear such lamentations, on certain impure and inauspicious days,46 wouldn’t it be more fitting for certain choruses to be hired from outside, |800e| like the hired mourners that accompany funerals with a Carian sort of music?47 Such, I imagine, would be a fitting occasion for songs of this sort, and what’s more the garb befitting funeral songs, I imagine, wouldn’t be crowns, |800e5| or golden ornaments, but—to be free of talking about these topics as quickly as possible—entirely the opposite. But with regard to something of this sort, I again put as a question to ourselves: are we satisfied to lay this down as the first of our models for songs? CLEINIAS: Which? |800e10| ATHENIAN: Auspicious speech. In particular, mustn’t we have a kind of song that is entirely and in every respect auspicious speech? Or am I not to ask, but just establish it |801a| this way? CLEINIAS: Yes, by all means establish it. For this “law” wins by unanimous vote! {220} ATHENIAN: What, then, would be the second law of music, after auspicious speech? |801a5| Isn’t it that, on each occasion, there be prayers to the gods to whom we are sacrificing? CLEINIAS: Of course.

ATHENIAN: And the third law, I think, would be that the poets must know that prayers are requests to the gods and so must pay very careful attention never to request a bad thing under the mistaken impression that it is good. |801b| For the state of things would be ridiculous, I think, if a prayer of this sort were made. CLEINIAS: Of course, it would. ATHENIAN: Now weren’t we convinced a little while ago48 by our argument |801b5| that no silver or gold Plutus49 was to have a statue erected for him or find a home in our city? CLEINIAS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: What model lesson, then, are we to say this argument states? Isn’t it this, that the race of poets |801b10| is not entirely competent to know very well what is good and what not? |801c| A poet, then, who makes this error, that is, prayers that are incorrect, either in words or as regards melody, due to this error, will make the citizens pray for opposite things, I take it, where the greatest matters are concerned. And yet, as we have said, you won’t find many errors |801c5| greater than this.50 So are we also to establish this as one of our laws and patterns51 concerning music? CLEINIAS: Establish what? Tell us more perspicuously what you mean. ATHENIAN: That a poet is to compose nothing contrary to the city’s laws, and its just, fine, or good things, and is not allowed |801d| to show any of his compositions to private individuals until they have first been shown to the judges appointed to deal with these matters, and to the Guardians of the Laws, and been approved by them. (In effect, we’ve got our judges already appointed in those whom we selected52 to be {221} legislators concerning musical matters and the |801d5| Supervisor of Education.) Well then, I ask my oft-repeated question: are we to lay this down as the third law and model pattern? How does that seem to you? CLEINIAS: That it is to be laid down, of course. ATHENIAN: After this, it would indeed be most correct to sing |801e| hymns to the gods and encomia combined with prayers. And after the gods, there would likewise, along with encomia, be prayers to the daimons and heroes, such as would be fitting for each of these.

CLEINIAS: Indeed. |801e5| ATHENIAN: After which, indeed, the law that could now immediately follow, without fear of objections,53 is this: whatever citizens have ended their lives, having performed fine and laborious deeds with their bodies or souls, and been obedient to the laws, are to gain encomia for themselves, as would be fitting. |801e10| CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: For those still living, however, to honor them with encomia and hymns |802a| isn’t safe—not until a person has run through his entire life and reached a fine end. And in our city all these things are to apply to men and women in common, who have become conspicuous for their goodness. Songs and dances, for their part, must |802a5| be established as follows. Among the works of the ancients, there are many old and fine pieces of music, and likewise too dances for bodies, from which we may, without fear of objection, select what is fitting and in tune with the constitution being established. To make the choice of these, |802b| Examiners are to be selected who are no younger than fifty years of age. Whichever of the ancient works seems satisfactory to them is to be accepted, but whichever seems deficient or entirely unfitting is (in the latter case) to be entirely rejected, and (in the former) to be looked at further |802b5| and emended, with the help of poets and musically competent men, whose poetical capacities they should make use of, without, however, placing any reliance on their pleasures and appetites, except |802c| in rare instances. Instead, by interpreting the wishes of the legislator, they are to organize dance, song, and choral performance generally as far as possible in accord with his54 understanding (nous). {222} In truth, every regulated musical pastime becomes immeasurably better when it gets regulated, |802c5| even with no serving of the honeyed Muse.55 (After all, pleasure is common to all the Muses.) You see, if someone were to spend his whole life, from childhood up to the age of steadiness and good sense, with a temperate and regulated Muse, then every time he hears the opposite one, he would hate her and call |802d| her unfree.56 But if he was brought up with the common and honeyed Muse, he’ll say that the opposite of this one is cold and unpleasant. So, as was said just now, in terms of pleasure or unpleasantness at least, neither gains the

advantage over the other, while for the rest, |802d5| the one makes those brought up under her influence better, whereas the other makes them worse. CLEINIAS: Well said! ATHENIAN: Further, it would be necessary, I imagine, to distinguish by a pattern the songs fitting for females from those fitting for males, and |802e| attach suitable harmonies and rhythms. For it is a terrible thing to sing out of tune with a whole harmony, or out of rhythm with a rhythm, because no one has assigned to the songs what is fitting to each of these.57 So it’s also necessary to legislate at least the outlines of these. |802e5| And it is necessary to assign both necessary accompaniments to both. But the ones that belong to the females are determined by the actual difference in the nature of each of the two sexes, and it is by means of this that one is to make them perspicuous. High-mindedness,58 then, and an inclination toward courage one must say to be manly, while what inclines to moderation and temperance, |802e10| one must, in the law and in the accompanying argument,59 say to lean more toward what is more womanish. So much, then, for this regulation. What must be discussed |803a| next is the teaching and handing on of these very things: in what way, for whom, and when each of them is to be done. Just as a shipbuilder at {223} the start of his building indicates the shapes of the vessels by laying down the keels (tropideia), |803a5| so I’m doing the same thing, it seems to me, in trying to distinguish the outlines of ways of life, in accord with the characters (tropous) of souls,60 thereby really laying down their keels: investigating in a correct way |803b| by means of what sort of contrivance and what possible sorts of characters we are to be best conveyed on this voyage, the voyage of our life. To be sure, human affairs are not matters worthy of great seriousness;61 yet it is necessary to treat them seriously—which is not a lucky thing. But since we are here on earth, |803b5| if we could somehow do this in a fitting way, it would perhaps be something that is exactly suitable. But what exactly do I mean? Perhaps someone would take me up—and correctly take me up—on this point. CLEINIAS: Indeed, they might. |803c| ATHENIAN: I mean that what is serious is to be treated seriously, and what isn’t serious is not, that a god is by nature worthy of total and blessed

seriousness, while a human being, as we said previously, has been devised as a sort of plaything of a god,62 and that this is really |803c5| the best thing about it. So every man and woman must go through life in this way, playing the finest games possible, which is the opposite to how they’re thought about nowadays. CLEINIAS: In what way opposite? |803d| Nowadays, I imagine, people think that what is serious must be done for the sake of what is playful. For it is held that what has to do with war, which is a serious matter, must be well conducted, for the sake of peace.63 But the fact is that in war there really wasn’t—nor is there now nor will there ever be—any play (paidia) or any |803d5| education (paideia) that is worth our while talking about. Yet it is just this, we say, that we regard as the most serious thing.64 So it is the life of peace that each individual must most of all go through best. What, then, is the correct way to do this? One must spend one’s life playing certain sorts {224} of “games”—sacrificing, |803e| singing, dancing—so that one will be able to win the favor of the gods for oneself, defend oneself against one’s enemies, and be victorious over them in battle. As for what sorts of things one must sing and dance in order to achieve these goals, the patterns for these have been stated, |803e5| and the paths along which one must go, as it were, marked out, in the expectation that the poet is right when he says: ATHENIAN:

Telemachus, some things you will think in your own heart, |804a| And some a daimon will suggest. For I do not think That you were born and brought up against the will of the gods.65

So our nurslings too must have the same thing in mind: they must believe that while what has been said is enough to have said, |804a5| the daimon and god will suggest things to them about sacrifices and choral performances— which particular gods they must offer their particular |804b| “games” to and win the favor of, and on which occasions, so as to spend their lives in accord with the character of their nature, being puppets for the most part, but partaking a little in truth, nonetheless.66 MEGILLUS: You wholly denigrate, Stranger, this human race of ours. |804b5| ATHENIAN: You shouldn’t wonder at that, Megillus, but instead forgive me. You see, it was looking toward the god and away from other things that

made me feel and speak the way I spoke. Let our race not be a paltry thing, then, if you like, but something of some serious worth. |804c| As for what comes next, it has already been said67 that public buildings both for gymnastic training and teaching are to be arranged at three locations at the center of the city, and on the outskirts, again at three locations around the city, gymnasia and open spaces for horses, as well as for archery and the release of other long-range projectiles, |804c5| are to be arranged where the young can learn and practice. If these were not sufficiently well described at that time, let’s now speak of them in the argument that goes with laws.68 In all these places there are to be resident teachers of each thing, foreigners persuaded by wages to instruct |804d| those who attend in all matters pertaining to war as well as to music.69 And it must not be that they attend if the father wishes, {225} and if he doesn’t, they leave lessons alone, but rather, as the saying goes, “every man and child,”70 so far as he is able, |804d5| must of necessity be educated, on the supposition that they belong to the city more than to their forebears. Mind you, my law would say all the same things about females as about males, even that females |804e| must be trained in the same manner.71 And I would say so without at all fearing the argument that neither horse-riding nor gymnastic training, though they are fitting for men, are fitting for women. You see, although I was already persuaded by the ancient stories I’d heard, I now know that there are (so to speak) |804e5| countless thousands of women around the Black Sea, the ones they call Sarmatians,72 who are ordered to train in the same manner as the men in the use not only of horses, but of bows |805a| and other weapons as well. Besides these things, I indulge in the following sort of rational calculation about these matters: I say that if indeed it is possible for these to take place in this way, then the most senseless thing of all is what happens now in our part of the world, where men and women do not, with all their strength, |805a5| and all with one accord, practice the same things. For in this way practically every city is and goes on being almost half a city instead of a double one, on the basis of the same expenditures and efforts—although this would be an extraordinary error for its legislator |805b| to make.

It would seem so, anyway. Yet a whole lot of what we are saying now, Stranger, is contrary to the constitutions we’re accustomed to. Nevertheless, when you said73 that we were to allow the argument to run its course, and, when it had run its course well, |805b5| only then choose what seemed to be the case, you very much hit the right note, and made me reprove myself for what I just said now. So whatever it pleases you to say next, go on and say. |805c| CLEINIAS:

ATHENIAN: What would please me, Cleinias, as I said before, is this: if the possibility of what we have discussed taking place hadn’t been sufficiently proven by the facts, one might perhaps speak against the argument, |805c5| but now, I imagine, a person who cannot in any way accept this law must seek some other way of opposing it. Our command, though, is not going to be extinguished by such means, nor are we going to deny that, in education as well as in other things, our female sex must {226} to the greatest extent possible share them with |805d| the male sex. And, in consequence, that is how one must think about these matters. Look, if women do not share their entire way of life in common with men, isn’t it necessary for there to be some other regulation for them? |805d5| CLEINIAS: Yes, that is certainly necessary. ATHENIAN: So, which of the constitutions now on display should we establish in preference to this communal one that we are now prescribing for them? Should it be that of the Thracians and many other races, who use their women to farm, tend cattle, herd sheep, and |805e| to serve no differently than slaves? Should it be the way it is among us and everyone in our region? For among us, as you know, these things are dealt with in this way nowadays: “jumbling together all our property in one house,”74 as the saying goes, |805e5| we hand it over to the women to manage, and put them in charge of the shuttles and all wool-spinning.75 Or should we, Megillus, prescribe the intermediate one, the Spartan one?76 Must girls live, sharing in gymnastic |806a| training and musical training, while the women, though set free from wool-spinning, have to weave themselves a life that is to some extent a result of training,77 and is by no means bad or worthless, as caretakers, managers, and child-rearers, so as to come to a sort of middle ground, but not to |806a5| taking part in war. So even if some chance ever compelled them to fight for their city and their children, they wouldn’t be

able to handle bows and arrows (like certain Amazons), or ever take part |806b| skillfully in the use of any other projectiles, or be able to take up shield and spear in imitation of the goddess,78 so as to be able to resist nobly the destruction of their own fatherland, and to strike at least fear in the enemy (if nothing more) by being seen in some sort of battle-array. |806b5| Living that sort of life, they wouldn’t at all dare to imitate the Sarmatians,79 whose women would seem like men by comparison with them. {227} Well, anyone who wishes |806c| to praise your lawgivers on this account, let him praise them. But for my part, I abide by what I said before: a legislator must be a complete not a half-complete one; and to allow the female sex to live in self-indulgence, spend money, and live an unregulated way of life of, while supervising |806c5| the male sex, is to leave the city with pretty much half a completely happy life instead of double that. MEGILLUS: What are we to do, Cleinias? Are we going to allow the Stranger to run down Sparta for us like this? CLEINIAS: Yes. You see, freedom of speech having been granted him,80 we must let him go on until |806d| we have gone through the laws in a way that is sufficient in every respect. MEGILLUS: You’re right. ATHENIAN: Then it’s pretty much up to me to try forthwith to speak about what comes next, isn’t it? |806d5| CLEINIAS: It certainly is. ATHENIAN: What would the way of life of people be, then, for whom a proper measure of the necessities would be provided, for whom what pertained to the crafts was handed over to others, and whose farms, entrusted to slaves, yielded produce from the earth sufficient for people |806e| who are living moderately—people for whom separate communal messes would be provided for the men, and nearby ones for the members of their households (both the girls and their mothers), in each of which the communal messes would all be assigned to male and female officials |806e5| who would dismiss them at the end of each day, having observed and watched over the conduct of the messmates, and after that, |807a| the official and others, having poured a libation to whichever gods that night and day might happen to be sacred to, would in due course go home?

For lives ordered in this way, is there no necessary and entirely fitting activity left, but rather is each to live like a grazing bullock, |807a5| fattening himself up? No: that’s neither just, we say, nor fine, nor is it possible for someone who lives that way to fail to get what is fitting, and what pretty much befits an idle and frivolously fattened-up animal is to be torn to pieces by some other animal—one of those |807b| worn to skin and bone thanks to their courage and exertions. {228} This is precisely why we’ll probably never achieve these things with sufficient exactness,81 so long as women, children, and households are in private hands, and all such things are established |807b5| for individuals as privately theirs. But if what is second best after that, what is being described now, could come about for us, it would be very acceptable. And there is an activity left, we claim, for people living in this way, |807c| and not the smallest or most trivial one either, but the greatest of all those that it is only just to be assigned by law.82 For compared to a life entirely lacking in leisure for all other activities, that of someone who yearns for victory in the Pythian games83 or Olympic Games, |807c5| the life of a person who is occupied with the cultivation of the body in all respects and of the soul in respect of virtue—the life that is most correctly called “life”—is doubly or yet more than doubly lacking in leisure. For no side issue, in the form of |807d| other activities, must hinder him from giving his body its fitting exercises and nourishment, or his soul its teachings and habits. The entire night and day are scarcely sufficient for the person who is doing this to get the complete and sufficient benefit |807d5| from these things. So, since this is the nature of things, there must be a regulation, for all the free people, dealing with how they spend all their time, |807e| starting almost from dawn and continuing pretty much without a break up until dawn and the rising of the sun on the next day. Certainly, there are many things, frequent small details having to do with household management that it would appear inappropriate for a legislator to mention84—such as, in particular, about |807e5| the sleeplessness fitting at night for those going to guard an entire city without interruption and {229} in an exact fashion. For if any of the citizens spends the whole night asleep, and is not seen by his entire household to be always the first to awaken and get up, |808a| this must be regarded by everyone as shameful and unworthy of a free person,

whether something of this sort is to be called a “law” or a “practice.” What’s more, for a mistress in a house to be awakened by some of her maids, and not be herself first to wake the others, |808a5| is a shameful thing, and the male and female slaves and the children must say it is so to each other, as—if it were possible—must the whole entire house itself. Everyone, in fact, must stay awake at night to do a large part of their political |808b| and household business, the officials in relation to the city, the mistresses and masters in their private households. You see, a lot of sleep doesn’t naturally suit our bodies or souls, or the activities |808b5| having to do with all the matters we mentioned. For no one, while asleep, is worth anything, any more than one who is not alive. Indeed, whoever of us cares most for living and thinking keeps awake as |808c| long as possible, only safeguarding for himself as much sleep as is useful for health, which isn’t much, once the habit is well ingrained. And the officials who are awake at night in cities are a cause of fear to evildoers, both enemies and citizens, and are more admired and honored by just and |808c5| temperate people, because they are beneficial to themselves and to the entire city. In fact, a night spent in this sort of way would, in addition to everything else just mentioned, furnish a certain courage to the souls of the individuals who reside in the cities. With the return of day, around daybreak, children |808d| must, I imagine, be turned over to their teachers; for just as no sheep or other flock must live without a herdsman, so neither must children live without some sorts of tutors,85 nor slaves without masters. Of all creatures, though, a child is the hardest to manage. |808d5| For insofar as he most of all has within him a source of thought that is not yet trained, he becomes plotting, shrewd, and the most wantonly aggressive of creatures. That is why he must be fettered with many |808e| sorts of bridles (as it were)—first (when he is set free from nurses and mothers), with tutors for the childishness of childhood, later on, with teachers of all sorts of subjects and lessons, as if he’s free. But as if he’s once more a slave, any free man who comes across them |808e5| is to punish the child himself, his tutor, and his teacher, if any of them commits an error of some sort.86 On the other hand, {230} anyone who comes across them and fails to punish them in just fashion is, first, to be subject to the greatest disgrace, |809a| and then the Guardian of the Laws chosen to be in

charge of children87 is to keep an eye on this person who comes across what we’re talking about and fails to punish when he’s required to punish, or does not punish as fits the case. And, keeping a sharp eye out and exercising especially careful supervision over the nurturing of the children, this official of ours is to guide their |809a5| natures, by always turning them toward what is good according to the laws. This official himself, though, how is the law itself to educate him sufficiently? For up to now, the law has not said anything |809b| perspicuous or satisfactory at all, though it has treated some things and omitted others, whereas to the best of its ability it must omit nothing that concerns him. On the contrary, the entire argument must be interpreted for him, it order that he may be both enlightener and nurturer to the others. “Now what has to do with choral performances, melodies and dances, and what sort of pattern for them |809b5| must be chosen, rectified, and regarded as sacred—all this has been discussed.88 However, works in writing, though without meter,89 what sorts of it there are and what way they are to be managed by you, excellent Supervisor of Children, for those being brought up by you, we have not discussed. Although |809c| you do have in the argument what they must learn and practice for war, the following are the things that have not yet, my friend, been sufficiently explained to you by the legislator: first, literature; second, the lyre and rational calculation (which we said each must grasp to the extent that it related to war, household management, |809c5| and the management of the city); and further, whatever it is useful, for these same purposes, to learn about the revolutions of the heavenly bodies—the stars, sun, and moon—to the extent that it is necessary for every city to manage its affairs around these. (What sorts of things are we talking about? The organization |809d| of days into monthly periods, and the months into particular years, in order that each of the seasons, sacrifices, and festivals receiving the ones fitting for it, by being held in accord with {231} nature, and, keeping the city alive and awake, would render honor |809d5| to the gods, and make human beings wiser about these matters.) Now pay attention |809e| to what’s going to be said next. “When we said that, in the first place, you do not have a sufficient explanation of literature, what were we complaining about in saying it?

This: that the argument hasn’t yet explained to you whether the person who is going to become a citizen who observes proper measure |809e5| must pursue the subject to the point of exact accomplishment or whether he must not pursue it at all. And likewise too where the lyre is concerned. So we say that they must indeed be pursued. In the case of literature, with a child of ten, this must be for roughly three years, in that of the lyre, starting at thirteen, a proper measure of time |810a| to remain at it would be another three years—which times must be neither longer nor shorter. And whether he loves learning or hates it, neither his father nor the child himself is to make—contrary to law—the time spent in them either longer or shorter. Anyone who disobeys is to be excluded from the honors bestowed on children, |810a5| which are to be mentioned shortly.90 “What exactly the children must learn in these periods and the teachers teach, you first have to learn about yourself. They must work at literature |810b| up to the point at which they are able to read and write. But exact accomplishment in speed or beauty is not to be required of those whose natural capacity does not, in the prescribed years, develop sufficiently quickly. “Now as regards lessons in the writings of poets |810b5| that are not accompanied by the lyre, some of which are in meter, and some of which are without rhythmical sections, works spoken91 like ordinary speech alone, destitute of rhythm and harmony—among these are some harmful writings |810c| left to us by some of the many people who have composed such works.92 How are you going to deal with these, my most excellent Guardians of the Laws? Or rather, what in the world would be the correct prescriptions for the legislator to prescribe for you to use? He’ll be very much at a loss, I expect.” |810c5| CLEINIAS: About what exactly, Stranger? Evidently, it’s yourself you’re speaking of as being really at a loss. {232} ATHENIAN: You’re right in supposing so, Cleinias. But as the two of you are my partners in this investigation of laws, it is necessary to tell you when it appears free of difficulties and when it doesn’t. |810c10| CLEINIAS: Well, what is it about them now and what prompts you to speak of it? |810d|

ATHENIAN: I’ll tell you. You see, to say things that are contrary to many tens of thousands of tongues is in no way free of difficulties. CLEINIAS: You surprise me! Does it seem to you that only a few small things we’ve said |810d5| previously about establishing laws are contrary to what the majority of people say? ATHENIAN: What you say is indeed perfectly true, Cleinias. For you’re telling me, as it seems to me, that since the same road that is hateful to a large number of people is beloved by perhaps no fewer others (or if fewer indeed, certainly not inferior ones)—you’re telling me, I say, |810e| to venture along with the latter and proceed boldly on the path of legislation now marked out in our present arguments, and not hang back. CLEINIAS: I certainly am. |810e5| ATHENIAN: In that case, I won’t hang back. I say, in truth, that we have numerous poets, composing in hexameters, trimeters, and absolutely every meter mentioned,93 some aiming at a serious effect, others at a humorous one. As countless thousands of people say, the young who are correctly educated must be brought up on and |810e10| steeped in these poets, so as for us to make the young, through public readings, to have heard much and learned much, to the point of learning whole poets by heart. |811a| Others make a collection of excerpts of all the poets, and piece together whole passages out of them, saying that our children must learn these by heart and commit them to memory, if—from much experience and much learning— they are going to become good and wise.94 So, are you now telling me, |811a5| who’s been granted freedom of speech,95 to show these people where they are correct in what they say and where they are not? CLEINIAS: Yes, I certainly am. ATHENIAN: What could I possibly say, in one word, about all these people that would be sufficient to the case? I think pretty much the {233} following: everyone |811b| would agree with me that each of them has said many correct things, but also many that are quite the opposite. And if that is how things stand, then I say that much learning is fraught with risk for children. |811b5| CLEINIAS: What advice, then, would you give to the Guardian of the Laws? ATHENIAN: About what?

CLEINIAS: About the model he must look to in deciding what he would allow all the children to learn and what he would prevent them from learning. Tell us, |811c| and don’t hesitate in speaking. ATHENIAN: My good Cleinias, I may possibly have been lucky in a way. CLEINIAS: In what regard? |811c5| ATHENIAN: In not being altogether at a loss for a model. You see, as I look now at the arguments we’ve been going through from dawn up to this present moment (and they appear to me to be not without a certain inspiration from the gods), they seemed to me to have been spoken all in all much like a sort of poetry. And it is perhaps not at all |811c10| surprising that there came over me a feeling of enormous pleasure |811d| when I looked upon my own arguments (as it were) collected together. For indeed of the numerous arguments I’ve learned or listened to, whether in poems or spoken in prose, like this, these clearly appeared to me to be the most properly measured of all, anyway, and the most fitting for the young to hear. For the Guardian of the Laws |811d5| in charge of education, then, I couldn’t, I think, have a better model to propose than this, that he order the teachers to teach these, as well as things that are connected and similar to them, to the children. |811e| And, presumably, if in going through the poems of the poets, or things written in prose, or things simply said without being written down, he comes across things that are brothers, you might say, of these arguments, he must in no way let them go, but get them written down. And then , first of all, |811e5| he must compel the teachers themselves to learn these writings and praise them; and if any of the teachers are not pleased with them, he must not make use of them as co-workers. On the contrary, those who in their praise cast their vote with him are the ones he must make use of, entrusting it to them to teach and educate the young. Where the discussion of teachers of literature |812a| and indeed literature itself is concerned, let my story end there and in that fashion. {234} CLEINIAS: Well, as regards our objective,96 Stranger, it doesn’t appear to me, anyway, that we’ve traveled outside the boundaries of the arguments we undertook to give. As to whether we are generally taking the right path or not it is perhaps hard to say with any confidence. |812a5|

ATHENIAN: Yes, that’s something, Cleinias, that will likely be clearer when, as we’ve often said, we arrive at the end of our excursion concerning laws. CLEINIAS: That’s right. |812b| ATHENIAN: Then after the teacher of literature mustn’t we next address the lyre teacher? CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: It seems to me, then, that, when distributing to the lyre teachers what is fitting |812b5| for their teaching and education as a whole in such things, we must recollect our previous arguments. CLEINIAS: Which arguments are you talking about? ATHENIAN: We said,97 I think, that the sixty-year-old singers of Dionysius must have especially keen perceptions |812b10| of rhythms and harmonic compositions, in order that, |812c| in the case of imitation in melodies (whether the imitating is done well or badly), when a soul is in the power of the feelings produced, there be someone capable of picking the likenesses of what is good and of what is the opposite, someone who can reject the latter and offer the other in public, and can sing to and |812c5| enchant the souls of the young, challenging each of them to join in pursuing the acquisition of virtue by means of these imitations. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true. ATHENIAN: For these reasons, then, both the lyre teacher and his pupil must, |812d| for the sake of making the notes of the strings98 perspicuous, use the notes of the lyre in such a way as to give out its sounds in unison with the sounds of the song. As for the use of different notes and ornamentation99 on the lyre, when the strings play one set of tunes and |812d5| {235} the composer of the melody another,100 and what’s more the combination of small intervals with wide ones,101 fastness with slowness, high pitch with low, whether in concord or in octaves,102 and similarly |812e| when people fit all sort of variations in rhythm to the notes of the lyre—none of these sorts of things is to be offered to those who are to grasp quickly, in three years, what is useful in music. For opposites103 disrupt each other |812e5| and make learning difficult, whereas our young must learn everything as easily as

possible, since the necessary subjects prescribed for them are neither minor ones nor few in number. So where music is concerned, our Educator104 is to supervise things in this way. As for the actual melodies |812e10| and words, which sorts and which of them the teachers of choral performance are to teach, all this has been explained previously in our discussion.105 |813a| We said that they had to be made sacred, each sort harmonizing with the relevant festival, in order to benefit cities by furnishing them with pleasure of a lucky sort. CLEINIAS: You did explain that—and it’s true. ATHENIAN: Absolutely true, moreover! And the official chosen to be our Supervisor of Music106 |813a5| is to take over and supervise these matters with the help of favorable luck. We, however, must supplement what was said previously about dancing and gymnastic training for the body in general. |813b| Just as we’ve filled in the gaps in our teaching in the case of music, let’s also do the same thing for gymnastic training. For the boys and girls must learn to dance, surely, and to train.107 Isn’t that so? |813b5| {236} CLEINIAS: Yes. ATHENIAN: In that case, with a view to their exercise, it would not be unserviceable for there to be dancing-masters for the boys and dancingmistresses for the girls. CLEINIAS: Let it be that way then. ATHENIAN: So now let’s summon once again the person who’ll be involved in most of these issues, |813b10| the Supervisor of Children,108 who, since he is supervising both musical training |813c| and gymnastic training, won’t have much leisure. CLEINIAS: How will he be able, at his advanced age,109 to supervise so many things? |813c5| ATHENIAN: Easily, my friend. You see, the law has given him and will give him permission to take as his helpers in this supervision any men or women he wishes from among the citizens. He will know the people he must choose, wishing not to err in this, since he wisely stands in awe of, and knows well, the importance of the office, |813d| and is intimate with the argument that when the young have been, and are being, brought up well,

everything is plain sailing for us, but if not—well, it doesn’t merit talking about, nor do we propose to talk about it in front of a new city, out of respect for those who take very special note of bad omens.110 Now a lot has already been said about these matters too,111 about dances and about movement for every sort of gymnastic training. For we’re establishing sorts of gymnastic training and all the bodily exercises having to do with war—for archery, every sort of throwing, use of the sling, every sort of fighting in armor, |813e| tactical maneuvers, marching of armies, every sort of army encamping, and for whatever one must learn pertaining to cavalry training. For there must be public teachers of all these subjects, who receive their wages from the city, and |813e5| the boys and the men in the city must be their pupils. And the girls and women must be knowledgeable in all of them112 (while they are still girls, they will have practiced all the dancing and fighting in armor, {237} and as women they will have grasped maneuvers, orders of battle, and putting on and taking off |814a| weapons), if for the sake of nothing else than that if it were ever necessary to leave en masse and wage war outside the city, the guards of the children and the rest of the city must have at least this level of competence.113 Or, on the other hand, |814a5| (which is not something one can swear is impossible), if some external enemies, whether Greeks or barbarians, invade with great strength and force, and compel them to wage war around the city itself, then it would be a great evil for the constitution, I imagine, if the women have been so shamefully |814b| brought up that they did not do as even motherbirds do, who fight for their young against even the strongest beast, and are willing to die and brave any danger, but instead rushed straight to the temples, filling all the altars and shrines, |814b5| and splattering the race of human beings with a reputation of being by nature the most cowardly of all beasts. CLEINIAS: By Zeus, Stranger, if this ever happened in a city, quite apart from the evil of it, it would be utterly disgraceful. |814c| ATHENIAN: Then won’t we establish this as a law, that—up to the level we have described at least—the women must not be unengaged in the exercises that have to do with war, but that all male citizens and female citizens must engage in them?

CLEINIAS: I, for one, would go along with that.114 |814c5| ATHENIAN: As regards wrestling, moreover, we’ve said some things, but we have not discussed what I would say is the greatest point, nor is it easy to put into words without at the same time demonstrating it with one’s body. So let’s decide about this at the time when word accompanied by deed can show this, |814d| among the various things we talked about, in a perspicuous way—and, in particular, that of all movements, the sort of wrestling we have in mind is by far the most closely related to fighting in war, and what’s more, that the former is to be practiced for the sake of the latter, not the latter learned for the sake of the former. |814d5| CLEINIAS: You’re right about that, at least. ATHENIAN: So for now let this much be said about the function of wrestling. Where the other sorts of movement of the entire body are {238} concerned, in calling the greatest part a sort of “dancing,” |814e| one would be speaking correctly. It must be regarded as being of two forms, of which one is the imitation of bodies that are finer115 in dignified movement, the other the imitation of bodies that are uglier in base movement. Of the base kind there are again two sorts, and of the excellent kind two others. |814e5| Of the serious kind, the warlike one, that is, the one involved in violent exertions, is that of fine bodies plus a courageous soul; the other kind is that of a soul, temperate in its properly measured pleasures, involved in doing good deeds (if someone were to call this the “peace-like” dancing, he’d be speaking of it in accord with its nature). The warlike of these, being distinct |815a| from the peace-like, one would correctly call “Pyrrhic,” where they imitate the avoidance of all sorts of blows and projectiles by head turning and yielding of every sort, by side-leaps upward, or crouching down, and also try to imitate the opposites of these—imitations |815a5| of moving into the contrary aggressive gestures involved in shooting projectiles from bows, throwing javelins, or delivering blows of any sort. There is correctness and vigor in these cases, when imitation of good bodies and souls takes place, in which most |815b| of the limbs of the body are kept straight.116 This sort is correct, the imitation of the opposite of these being understood to be not correct. In peace-like dances, the point one must consider in each case is whether the performer in choral performances does or does not succeed in correctly (in

accord with its nature) taking part in the fine dancing, |815b5| in a way fitting for men who live under good laws. So, in the first place, it is necessary to separate dancing that is a matter of dispute from the kind that isn’t a matter of dispute. Well, what sort of dancing is this, and how is it to be |815c| separated from the other sort? Whatever sort is Bacchic, and whatever sorts keep company with it, in which under the name of “nymphs,” “Pans,” “silenuses,” and “satyrs,”117 they (as they say) imitate drunk people in performing certain purifications and rites—this |815c5| entire kind cannot easily be defined as peace-like, warlike, or anything else you like. But pretty much the best way to define it seems to me to be this: put it in a class separate from the warlike, |815d| separate from the peace-like, say that it is {239} not a political kind of dance, and let it lie there. Now let’s return to the warlike and peace-like dances, since it is indisputable that they are our affair. |815d5| As for that of the unwarlike Muse, in dances where people honor the gods and children of the gods, it constitutes one entire kind, which takes place with a sense of well-being. And this we may subdivide into two: one sort of it, |815e| involving great pleasures, is fleeing from certain hardships and dangers into good circumstances; the other sort, where the pleasures procured are gentler than in the other, is when existing good circumstances are preserved or increased. In such circumstances, I imagine, every person makes bodily |815e5| movements that are greater when the pleasures are greater, and smaller when they are smaller. Further, when he is more moderate and better trained in courage, they are smaller, but when he is a coward |816a| and less well trained in temperance, he gives himself up to greater and more violent changes in movement. In general, anyone using his voice, whether in song or in speech, is utterly incapable of keeping his body entirely still. That is why imitation, |816a5| by means of gestures, of things being said, gave rise to the entire craft of dancing.118 Now, in all these circumstances, one of us moves in a harmonious way (emmelôs), while another does so in an out-of-tune way (plêmmelôs). So, in fact, one has only to reflect on many |816b| ancient names to applaud how well and in accord with nature they were given. One of these, in particular, applied to the dances of people in times of well-being who are themselves

properly measured in their pleasures—how correctly and “musically” he named them |816b5| (whoever he was), and how in accord with reason, when he gave them all the name “harmony dances (emmeleias),” and established two forms of fine dances, the warlike “Pyrrhic” ones, and the peace-like harmony ones, giving each its fitting and harmonious name. For these, then, the legislator |816c| must prescribe patterns, while the Guardian of the Laws119 must seek them out, and when he has examined them, combine them with the rest of the music, and distribute to each of the sacrificial festivals what is fitting for it. When he has in this way made all these in order |816c5| sacred, he must make no further change at all in anything that pertains to either dancing or singing. Thus the same city and citizens spending their time in like manner, in the same pleasures, and being as much alike as possible, |816d| will live well and happily.120 {240} The movements of fine bodies and noble souls in the dances (and we said what sorts of dances they must be) have now been fully discussed, but it is also necessary to look at and get to know those of ugly bodies and thoughts, and |816d5| of those people who turn to the movements comedy uses to produce laughter, through speech, through music, through dance, and through the imitations of the movements in all these that make material for comedy. For one cannot learn what is serious without learning what is ridiculous, or indeed any opposite at all without its opposite, if one is going |816e| to become wise—though one cannot do both of them, if one is going to partake of even a small part of virtue. Indeed, this is precisely why one must learn about the ridiculous ones, so that one may never, due to ignorance, do or say anything ridiculous, when it is not necessary. |816e5| Imitation of these sorts of things is to be assigned to slaves and hired foreigners, and no one must ever take it at all seriously, nor must any free citizen,121 whether woman or man, be seen learning these things, and there is always to be something new appearing in their imitations.122 |816e10| Where the playthings that produce laughter, which we all call “comedy,” |817a| are concerned, then, let the law and the argument123 be laid down in this way. But what about the so-called serious ones, the poets of ours who deal in tragedy? Suppose some of them came to us at some point and asked something like this: “Strangers, |817a5| are we to frequent your city and

country or not? And are we to bring our poetry with us? What have you decided to do about these sorts of matters?” What would be the correct answer for us to give to these divinely inspired men regarding this?124 You see, it seems to me to be to say this: |817b| “Most excellent Strangers, we ourselves are poets of a tragedy that, to the best of our ability, is at once the finest and the best possible. In any case, our entire constitution has been composed as an imitation of the finest and best life, which we for our part claim is in reality |817b5| the truest tragedy. Now you are poets, but we too are poets of the same things, and are your rivals as craftsmen and performers of the finest drama, which true law alone is able by nature to produce—or such is our |817c| hope. Do not imagine, then, that we’ll so easily, at least, allow you ever to set up your stage in our marketplace, {241} and bring on actors with fine voices that are louder than ours, or that we’ll allow you to curry favor125 with children, |817c5| women,126 and the mob as a whole, speaking of the very same practices that we do, but saying not the same things we say but things that are also for the most part the ones most opposed to them. You see, we’d have to be pretty much completely mad ourselves, as would the entire city, if it allowed you |817d| to do the things just mentioned, before the officials had decided whether your works are fit to be spoken and suitable for public performance or not. So now, children and offspring of the gentle Muses, we’ll first show your songs to the officials for comparison with ours, |817d5| and if what is said by you proves to be the same, at least, or even better, we’ll give you a chorus, but if not, my friends, we can never do so.” Where choral performance in general is concerned, then, and the learning of the subjects having to do with it, these are to be |817e| the customs prescribed by the laws, with separate ones for slaves, on the one hand, and for masters, on the other127—if you agree. CLEINIAS: How could we not agree, for now at least? ATHENIAN: In that case, for the free people, there still remain three subjects.128 |817e5| One consists of rational calculations and what has to do with numbers; a second is the craft of measurement of length, breadth, and depth, considered as one subject; a third deals with the revolution of the stars as they naturally travel in relation to each other. None of these subjects

in all their exact detail |818a| must be labored at by the majority of people, but only by a certain few. Who they are we’ll explain toward the end, since that would be the fitting place.129 But for the majority of people, while it would be shameful for most of them not to know those parts of these subjects that are most correctly said to be necessary, |818a5| yet it’s not easy nor even at all possible for everyone to pursue them in exact detail. What is necessary in these one cannot throw off from oneself. On the contrary, it’s likely that whoever first formulated the proverb was looking to these when he said, “even a god will never be seen |818b| fighting against necessity”— meaning, I think, those necessities that are divine,130 since, as applied to human necessities (which are {242} what the majority of people look to when they say such a thing), it is of all sayings by far the most simpleminded. |818b5| CLEINIAS: What, pray, are the necessities in these subjects, Stranger, that are not of this sort, but divine? ATHENIAN: Those, as I believe, that if a person didn’t either practice or learn at all, he could never become a god to human beings, or a daimon, |818c| or a hero, capable of exercising supervision over human beings in a serious way.131 A human being, certainly, would fall far short of becoming divine if he were not capable of recognizing one, two, or three, or odd and even numbers, or of knowing how to count at all, |818c5| or if he couldn’t reckon up the nights and days, having no experience of the revolutions of the moon, sun, and other stars. So to think that all these subjects are not necessary for a person who is going to attain pretty much any knowledge of the finest subjects |818d| is the height of foolishness. What parts of each of them must be learned, to what extent, and when, and which must be learned together with which, and which separately from the others, and the entire question of their mixing—these are things that one must correctly grasp first, |818d5| going on, guided by these, to learn the other subjects.132 For this is the way necessity by nature constrains it to be—the one that none of the gods fights against now or will ever fight against. {243} CLEINIAS: It certainly seems, Stranger, that what’s been said is somehow correct, |818e| and that what you say is in accord with nature.

ATHENIAN: Yes, Cleinias, it is that way. But it is difficult, having made a preliminary prescription in this way, to transform these things into laws. Instead, if you agree, we could make laws in a more perspicuous way another time. |818e5| CLEINIAS: You seem to us, Stranger, to be scared off by our traditional lack of experience in these subjects.133 But you’re wrong to be afraid. So don’t keep anything hidden on that account, but try to tell us what you think. ATHENIAN: I do indeed fear what you’re now mentioning, |819a| though I fear even more those who’ve come to grips with these subject, but come to grips in a bad way. You see, total lack of experience in anything is not at all a terrible thing, nor the greatest evil. Far greater damage is caused by much experience and much learning combined with |819a5| evil guidance. CLEINIAS: That’s true. ATHENIAN: One must declare, then, that free people must learn as much of each of these subjects as the whole mob of Egyptian children |819b| learns along with reading and writing. For, in the first place, as regards rational calculations, lessons in mathematics have been invented for very small children that combine learning with play and pleasure, whether distributing apples, or garlands of flowers, so that the same numbers of these are adjusted to larger and smaller groups, |819b5| or selecting boxers and wrestlers to sit out or be paired together, in turn and in order, and as the sequences naturally come about.134 Moreover, by way of play, the teachers jumble together wine-saucers made of gold, bronze, silver, and other such materials, while the students |819c| distribute these in groups that are again somehow wholes.135 In this way, as I said, by adapting the uses of arithmetical necessities to children’s play, they benefit their students when it comes to the ranks, marches, and campaigns of armies, and again when it comes to management of households, and |819c5| make them into people who are altogether more useful to themselves and more fully awake.136 {244} After that come lessons in measurement, in length, breadth, and depth, which delivers |819d| them from a certain sort of ridiculous and shameful ignorance of all these things, present by nature in all human beings.137 CLEINIAS: What sort of ignorance do you mean?

ATHENIAN: My dear Cleinias, when I heard about this myself, quite late in the day, |819d5| I too was utterly astonished by our situation where these things are concerned. It seemed to me to be not a human one but more that of nursling pigs of some sort. I was ashamed not only for myself but for all Greeks. |819e| CLEINIAS: Ashamed of what? Tell us what you mean, Stranger. ATHENIAN: I am telling you. Better, though, I’ll show you what I mean by asking questions.138 And please give a short answer. You know what length is, I imagine. CLEINIAS: Of course. |819e5| ATHENIAN: What about breadth? CLEINIAS: Absolutely. ATHENIAN: And that these are two things, and that depth is a third of these? CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: And doesn’t it seem to you that all these are commensurable |819e10| with each other? CLEINIAS: Yes. ATHENIAN: Length, I imagine, you believe to be by nature capable of being properly measured by length, breadth by breadth, and likewise depth by depth. |820a| CLEINIAS: Absolutely. ATHENIAN: But if some are not “absolutely”—nor even slightly—capable of it, if some are and some are not, while you hold that all are, what do you think your situation is with respect to these things? |820a5| CLEINIAS: It’s clear that it’s a wretched one. ATHENIAN: What about length and breadth in relation to depth, or breadth and length in relation to each other? Don’t all we Greeks think {245} about these things in this way, namely, as somehow or other commensurable with each other? |820a10| CLEINIAS: Undoubtedly, we do. |820b| ATHENIAN: But if, on the other hand, they are not at all, not in any way, capable of this, and yet, as I said, all we Greeks think they are capable of it,

oughtn’t we to feel ashamed on behalf of all of us and say to ourselves: “You best of men among the Greeks, isn’t this one of those things that we said139 |820b5| it was shameful not to know, even though knowing the necessary ones is no very fine thing.”140 CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: And in addition to these, of course, there are other matters that are closely related to these, in which many errors are engendered in us that are brothers to |820c| these errors. CLEINIAS: Which ones? ATHENIAN: The relations that the commensurable ones have by a sort of nature to the incommensurable ones. For, of course, it is necessary, by investigating these, to know one from the other, |820c5| or to be utterly wretched, and by constantly posing problems to each other141 (a pastime that is much more pleasant for old people than checkers) compete for victory in periods of leisure that are worthy of these problems.142 CLEINIAS: Perhaps so. In any case, it seems that checkers and these subjects |820d| are not very far apart from each other.143 {246} ATHENIAN: In that case, Cleinias, these are the things that I, for my part, say the young must learn. For they aren’t harmful or difficult, and if they are learned in the midst of play, they will be of benefit, |820d5| and will do our city no harm at all. But if anyone disagrees, we must listen. CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: Well then, if they are seen to be this way, it’s clear that we’ll accept them, but if they are seen not to be this way, they’ll be rejected. CLEINIAS: Yes, clearly. |820e| ATHENIAN: So must we not now, Stranger, lay these down, as being among the necessary subjects, in order that there be no gaps in our laws? They are to be laid down, however, outside the rest of the constitution,144 like pawned items that are redeemable, in case either we (the ones establishing it) or you (the ones for whom it is being established) |820e5| should turn out to be not all satisfied with them. CLEINIAS: That’s a fair way to establish it.

ATHENIAN: Next, astronomy. See if the proposed learning of it by the young would please us, or the opposite. CLEINIAS: You have only to state it. |820e10| ATHENIAN: Well, there’s something greatly amazing having to do with these things, and something altogether and in every way intolerable. CLEINIAS: What’s that? |821a| ATHENIAN: When it comes to the greatest god and the cosmos as a whole,145 we say that one must neither inquire into these nor busy oneself with looking for causes, since it is not at all pious to do so.146 {247} Yet it seems that if entirely the opposite were to occur, it would occur correctly. |821a5| CLEINIAS: What do you mean? ATHENIAN: What I’m going to say is contrary to common belief, and one might think it unfitting for those who are older.147 But when a person thinks that some subject is fine, true, beneficial to the city, and altogether dear to the god, there is certainly no way at all that it is yet possible |821b| not to talk about it. CLEINIAS: Likely so. But what subject dealing with the stars are we going to find to be of that sort? ATHENIAN: My good friends, practically all of us Greeks tell a falsehood nowadays |821b5| about the great gods, the sun and the moon. CLEINIAS: What falsehood’s that? ATHENIAN: We say that these never follow the same path, and other stars along with them, the ones we name “wanderers.”148 CLEINIAS: By Zeus, Stranger, that’s true. For even in |821c| my lifetime, I have often seen with my own eyes how Phosphorus, Hesperus, and certain others, never take the same course, but wander all over the place; and as for the sun and moon, we all know, I take it, that these149 are constantly doing this. |821c5| ATHENIAN: So these are the things, Megillus and Cleinias, that I now say our citizens and young people must learn about the gods in the heavens,150 up to the point of learning enough |821d| about all these matters, {248} so that they do not blaspheme about these, but always use words of good omen when sacrificing or when reverently saying their prayers.

CLEINIAS: That’s right—if, of course, it’s possible to learn |821d5| what you’re talking about in the first place. If so, and if we are now saying something about these matters that is incorrect, and, having learned this subject, we will get it right, then I too agree that to this extent, at least, this sort of thing must be learned. This being so, you must try to explain fully what you’re talking about, and we’ll try to learn by following you. |821d10| ATHENIAN: Well, though what I’m talking about isn’t easy to learn, it isn’t |821e| altogether difficult either, nor does it take a huge amount of time. Here’s a proof151 of this: I, who heard of these things neither in my youth nor all that long ago, could explain them in not much time at all. And yet, if they were really difficult, I’d never be able, at my age, to make them clear to you, |821e5| at yours. CLEINIAS: That’s true. What, though, is this subject that you say is amazing and fitting for young people to learn, |822a| but not known to us? Try to tell us this much about it, at least, as perspicuously as possibly. ATHENIAN: Let me try. You see, my very good friends, this doctrine that the sun, the moon, and the rest of the stars |822a5| sometimes wander is not correct. But entirely the opposite holds. Each of them always travels in the same circular path, and not in many but in one, though each appears to move in many. On the other hand, the fastest of them is again incorrectly believed to be the slowest, and vice versa.152 If this is how things naturally hold, |822b| but we believe them to hold not in this way, what would be the result? Well, if at the races for horses at Olympia, or the long-distance races for men, we thought about things in this way, and we named the fastest as slowest and the slowest as fastest, and composed encomia in which we sang of the |822b5| loser as victor, I do not think that our encomia would be either correct or welcome to the runners, and they are human beings! Now, though, when it is the {249} gods that we are committing the same errors about, do we not think that what would have been laughable and incorrect there |822c| is, here and now and in dealing with these matters, no laughing matter at all, and surely one not at all pleasing to the gods, when we are singing hymns to the gods that repeat a false rumor? CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true—provided, of course, that this is the way these things are. |822c5|

ATHENIAN: So if we show that they are this way, then are all such things to be learned, up to the relevant point at least, while if they are not shown, they are to be left alone? Is that to be our agreement? CLEINIAS: Certainly. |822d| ATHENIAN: In that case, we must now say that our laws regarding the subjects belonging to education have reached an end. But hunting and everything of that sort must be thought about in the same way. For it looks as though the task prescribed for the legislator is yet greater than |822d5| establishing laws and then being let go, and that there is something else in addition to laws, something that is naturally intermediate between admonition and laws. We have often met with this in our arguments, for example, |822e| in those concerning the nurturing of very young children.153 For we cannot leave them undiscussed, we say, but to think, in speaking about them, that they are established as laws would be the height of foolishness. When, then, the laws and the whole constitution have been written down in this way, the praise |822e5| accorded to the citizen who is outstanding in virtue is not complete when someone says that this citizen is the best servant of the laws and is especially obedient to them, and that this is the good person. More complete is the praise that speaks of him in this way, as having passed his life in consistent obedience to those writings |823a| in which the legislator is legislating, praising, or blaming. This is the statement that is most correct when it comes to praising a citizen. And what a legislator really must do is to write not only laws, but in addition to laws, things that seem fine or not fine to him, that go hand in hand with laws. |823a5| And the consummate citizen upholds these things no less than the ones backed by legal penalties. We would make what we mean clearer, if we brought the present topic before us as a sort of witness. You see, hunting is a very large sort of |823b| affair, pretty much all of which is now encompassed by this one {250} name.154 For the hunting of aquatic creatures is of many sorts, that of birds is of many sorts, and that of land animals is of very many sorts, including not only that of wild creatures, but also—it’s worth keeping in mind—the |823b5| hunting of human beings, some of which are parts of war, though many sorts of it (some praiseworthy, others blameworthy) are even parts of friendship.155 Also, thefts of robbers and of army encampments for army

encampments are hunts. When the legislator is establishing the |823c| laws having to do with hunting, though he can’t make all this clear, yet neither can he establish threatening laws with prescriptions and penalties applying to every sort of hunting. What, then, is to be done about such things? Well, the one party, the legislator, must praise and blame matters concerning hunting with a view to |823c5| the toils and practices of the young, whereas the other, the young person, must obey what he hears, and not be deterred either by pleasure or by toil, and more than each of the things enacted by law and accompanied by threat of penalties, he must honor the words accompanied by praise, and |823d| carry out their prescriptions. After this introduction, what would come next is properly measured praise and blame of hunting, with the sort that makes the souls of the young better being praised, and the opposite sort blamed. |823d5| So let’s put what comes after it in the form of a prayer addressed to the young: “Friends, may you never be seized by any appetite or passion for hunting at sea, angling, or indeed for hunting aquatic creatures at all, or for |823e| those wicker traps that do your lazy hunting for you, whether you’re asleep or awake. May no longing for the hunting of human beings at sea and for piracy come upon you and make you into cruel and lawless hunters. And may it never in the least enter your mind (nous) to engage in theft in the |823e5| countryside or in the city. Nor, again, may a wily passion for hunting birds, which is not very appropriate for a free person, ever come upon any of the young.156 {251} “What is left for our athletes, then, is only the hunting and catching of land animals, of which one sort, characteristic of |824a| lazy people who take turns sleeping, is called ‘night-hunting,’ and is not praiseworthy, nor is the sort that includes periods of rest from toils, where people subdue the wild strength of beasts by nets and snares rather than by the victory of a toil-loving soul. |824a5| The only sort left for everyone, then, and the best sort, is the hunting of four-footed beasts with horses, dogs, and the bodies of the hunters themselves, who hunt in person and conquer all their prey with fast movements, blows, and projectiles—the only sort, that is, for those who care about divine courage.”157 Concerning the praise and blame of all these things, then, what has just been said |824a10| would be the argument, while the law would be this: “No

one is to prevent these hunters, who are really sacred,158 from hunting with dogs wherever and however they wish; but the night-hunter, who puts his trust in nets and snares, no one is ever to allow to hunt anywhere. The birdhunter is not to be hindered on fallow-lands or on mountainsides, |824a15| but any passer-by is to drive him off cultivated or sacred lands. A fisherman is allowed to hunt everywhere, except in harbors, sacred streams, ponds, and reservoirs, provided only that he make no use of vegetable juices to make the waters turbid.”159 At this point, then, one must now say that all the laws having to do with education |824a20| have reached an end. CLEINIAS: And

well may you say so.

    1. I.e., the unwritten law embodied in the legislator’s advice. 2. See 643a–644b, 652b–654a, 673a. 3. See 704b6n. 4. See Ti. 88b–89b. 5. See 746a. 6. On women, see 781c–d, and on slaves, 777b–778a. 7. Tekmairesthai: See 821e3n. 8. The Corybantes were worshipers of the mother goddess, Cybele, who induced ecstatic mental states in themselves through music and dance. But these were also thought to cure mania (“corybantism”) homeopathically. See Ustinova. Plato mentions Corybantes or corybantism at Cri. 54d, Ion 534a, 536c, Euthd. 277d–e, Smp. 215c–d, Phdr. 228b. 9. “All Bacchic frenzy and all movements of that sort are, among instruments, most characteristic of the flute” (Ar. Pol. 1342b4–5). Bacchus is another name for Dionysus—on whom, see 637b2n—the effect of whose rites is not being distinguished from those of Cybele. On points of translation, see Schöpsdau-2, pp. 511–512. 10. Reading αὐτοῖς with Saunders-2 for Budé αὑτοῖς. 11. See 694d–695b, 728e–729a. 12. Tekmairontai: See 821e3n. 13. Retaining τὸ τρεφόμενοg. 14. See Phlb. 33b, Epin. 985a, with Reeve-3, pp. 169–174. 15. Margois: The adjective margon occurs only here in Plato (though in some texts of the pseudo-Platonic Alc. 2, it appears at 148a9, where it should perhaps be corrected to mega ergon). As applied to appetites, it means “greedy” or “gluttonous” but also “lewd” or “lustful” (LSJ s.v. μάργος 2, 3). That “greedy” is its meaning here is suggested by Ar. Pol. 1335b12–14, which may have our text in critical view: “even pregnant women should take care of their bodies and not stop exercising or adopt a meager diet.” But “lustful” may also be correct. See Schöpsdau-2, p. 516. 16. See 788b. 17. Reading δοκοῦντα with Bury-1 for Budé δοκούντων. See Schöpsdau-2, p. 520. 18. See 777d–778a. 19. I.e., all the citizen children. See Saunders-2, pp. 54–55. 20. See 784a. 21. “A child would almost certainly not take kindly to punishment—is he to be entitled to a trial, at the age of six at most? This is ridiculous. The reference must entirely be to adults. Presumably they would be unruly persons making a nuisance of themselves near the schools—possibly parents. Whoever they are, this passage gives no handle at all to the suggestion that metic [i.e., free, foreign, noncitizen] children, let alone slave children, are educated on the same footing as the children of the Magnesia citizens” (Saunders-2, pp. 54–55). 22. See 804e–805b.

23. Pagkration: A mixture of boxing and wrestling, combined with kicking and strangling. Biting and gouging were forbidden, but nearly everything else, including breaking and dislocating limbs, was allowed. 24. Geryon was a monster with a triple body, Briareus, one with a hundred hands. 25. See 791c10. 26. I.e., what the poet writes under the inspiration of the Muse. See 682a3–5. 27. “μιμουμένων [‘imitating’] is said of the pupils, φυλάττοντας [‘they safeguard’] is said of the teachers” (England-2, p. 253). 28. Characters from Greek epic. The giant Antaeus (also mentioned at Tht. 169b) was the son of Poseidon and Gaia (Earth) and was invincible as long as he remained in contact with the latter. Cercyon was also son of Poseidon, to whom the use of legs in wrestling was attributed. Epeius (mentioned at Ion 533b), with Athena’s help, made the famous Trojan horse (Homer, Od. 8.493, 11.523) and is mentioned as a boxer (Homer, Il. 23.665–669). Amycus, another son of Poseidon, is alleged to have invented boxing gloves. All were finally defeated. 29. Meta philonikias te kai katastaseôs diaponoumena met’ euschêmonos: This love of victory (philonikia) contrasts with the unseemly (achrêstou) love of victory of Antaeus and Cercyon, so that katastaseôs met’ euschêmonos should contrast with achrêstou, where this is the result of the things these fighters introduced into their crafts. Many translations —“with a firm and graceful pose” (Bury-1), “without resort to undignified postures” (Saunders-1), “adopting an elegant stance” (Schofield-Griffith)—don’t quite capture this. 30. The Priests of the Idean Zeus each year reenacted the dance of the Curetes, Cretan spirits who hid the infant Zeus in a cave on Mount Ida and drowned out his cries with the sounds of clashing weapons and cymbals, thereby protecting him from his vengeful father, Cronus. The Dioscuri (Castor and Pollux) were the twin sons of Leda and the Spartan king Tyndareus (in the case of Castor) and of Zeus (in the case of Pollux), who famously seduced Leda in the form of a swan. Their dance, too, evidently involved armor. 31. Athena. 32. I.e., dancing in armor. 33. I.e., usefulness in war and festivals. 34. See 672b–673d. 35. Although more will follow at 813a–817a and, on contests, at 828a–834e. 36. I.e., in the first arguments. 37. Schêmasin: The word schêma has many meanings (see 700b1n and LSJ s.v. σχῆμα) but here covers deportment, gestures, dress, hairstyles, how they look generally, and other relatively superficial visual aspects of people (see 798d2). 38. See 700a–701c. 39. See 816e. 40. See 787a7–9. 41. See 656d–657e. 42. “And there were three other women.  .  .  . They were the daughters of Necessity, the Fates, dressed in white with garlands on their heads—Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos—and they sang to the accompaniment of the Sirens’ harmony, Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, and Atropos of the future” (Rep. 617b8–c5).

43. Exergein: The primary meaning of the verb is “shut out from a place, debar,” but it can also mean “prevent, preclude” (see LSJ s.v. ἐξέργω). I take it that the innovator isn’t simply being shut out from the festival celebrations, but prevented from innovating. 44. Nomous: See 700b5n. 45. See 702d1n. 46. Days on which no public ceremony took place, which were used for taking libations to tombs. See Greene, p. 329. 47. The Carians were a non-Greek people from western Anatolia, noted for their use of the flute—an instrument thought particularly suited for conveying emotion. See 669e2n, Aristophanes, Frogs 1302. Carians are mentioned at La. 187b and Euthd. 285b–c, and flutes and laments at Rep. 387d–388e, 398d–399d, 411a–b. 48. See 741c–742c. 49. The god of wealth, who is often represented as being blind. See Rep. 554b. 50. See 801b. 51. Tupôn: “You and I [Socrates] are not poets at present, Adeimantus, but we are founding a city. And it is appropriate for the founders to know the patterns (tupous) on which the poets must base their stories, and from which they must not deviate. But they should not themselves make up any poems” (Rep. 378e–379a). 52. See 764c–766c. 53. Phthonôn: Or “without inciting feelings of envy.” Notice oudeis phthonos at 802a8. 54. Reading αὐτοῦ with Bury-1 for Budé αὐτῶν. 55. Cf. “If you admit the honeyed Muse, whether in lyric or epic poetry, pleasure and pain will be kings in your city instead of law and the thing that has always been generally believed to be best—reason” (Rep. 607a5–7). 56. See 701a4n. 57. I.e., for a woman (man) to sing out of tune with the harmony fitting for females (males), or out of rhythm with the fitting rhythm. See 669c–670a. 58. See 709e8n. 59. En te tô[i] nomô[i] kai logô[i]: I.e., in the law and what goes along with it by way of justification. See 719e–722a. A similar formula with the same meaning occurs at 804c7–8. 60. Cf. “Are you aware . . . that there must be as many forms of human character as there are of constitutions? Or do you think constitutions arise from oak or rock and not from the characters of the people in the cities, which tip the scales, so to speak, and drag the rest along with them?” (Rep. 544d5–e2). 61. Cf. “Do you imagine that a thinker who is high-minded enough to look at all time and all being will consider human life to be a very important thing?” (Rep. 486a8–10). 62. See 644d. 63. See 625c–626c, 628d–e. 64. See, e.g., 743c–e. 65. Homer, Od. 3.26–28. Telemachus, the son of Odysseus, is being addressed by Athena. 66. See 644d–645a (puppets), 730c1–4 (truth). 67. Briefly referred to at 761c, 779d. 68. Tô[i] logo[i] meta nomôn: See 702a1n. 69. See 813d–814b. 70. A proverbial expression like our “every mother’s son,” or “every man jack.”

71. See 793e–795d, Rep. 451b–457c. 72. Offspring of Scythians and Amazons. See Herod. 4.110–117. 73. The reference is not entirely clear, but see 739a–b, 746b–d, 799c–e. 74. A proverbial expression like our “putting all our eggs in one basket.” 75. Cf. “If you want a woman’s virtue, that is not difficult to describe. She must manage the household well, look after its contents, and be obedient to the man” (Men. 71e5–7). 76. On which, see Ar. Pol. 1269b12–1270a34. 77. Askêtikon dê tina bion: Not a “rather laborious” (Pangle) or “hardworking” (Sanders-1, Schofield-Griffith) life, since then we get no explanation of why it “comes to a sort of middle ground.” The idea is that the “Spartan woman is, by the training she had as a girl, made capable of more than mere household duties, though . . . she does not put her athletic training to its legitimate use, and drill as a soldier” (England-2, p. 279). 78. I.e., Athena. See 796b–c. 79. See 804e7n. 80. See 805b. 81. Reading ταῦτα . . . ὡς καὶ νῦν, εἰ ζητοῖμεν ἄν with Saunders-2 for Budé ταῦτα . . . ὡς καὶ νῦνὶ ζητοῖμεν ἄν. The reference of ταῦτα (“these things”) is unclear. Saunders-2, p. 57, suggests it means “our ideal in these matters.” Notice that even when private wives, children, and property are prohibited, as they are for the guardians and philosopher-kings in the Republic, what is achieved is only an approximation to the ideal: “Is it possible for anything to be carried out exactly as described in words, or is it natural for practice to have less of a grasp of truth than speech does, even if some people do not think so? . . . Then do not compel me to demonstrate it as coming about in practice exactly as we have described it in words. If we are able to discover how a city that most closely approximates to what we have described could be founded, you must admit that we have discovered how all you have prescribed could come about” (473a1–b1). When these are not prohibited, we have a less exact—a less adequate—approximation. 82. Hupo dikaiou nomou: Literally, “by just law.” But see Saunders-2, p. 58. 83. Panhellenic games held in Delphi in honor of Apollo, combining athletic and musical contests. 84. See 788a–c. 85. Paidagôgôn: A paidagôgos was a slave charged with accompanying a child, especially on his way to school. See Lys. 223a. 86. As was the case in Sparta. See Xen. Lac. 2.10. 87. I.e., the Supervisor of Education. See 765d, 801d. 88. See 800b–801a (chosen), 802a–c (corrected), 799a–b (regarded as sacred). 89. En grammasi men onta: Things requiring a knowledge of grammata (809e3), that is, of reading, writing, grammar, and literature. Aneu de metrôn: As opposed to music and poetry, which “involve meter” (810b6). See Saunders-2, p. 58. It is useful to compare Plato’s proposals with standard Athenian practices in education. These are described in Beck, pp. 72–146. 90. Plato does not in fact fully return to this topic, but see 819b. 91. Such works were often recited to audiences, since written copies were expensive. See Ap. 26d–e. Notice anagnôsesin (“public readings”) at 810e11. 92. See 890a–891b.

93. See Rep. 399e–400c. 94. Polupeirias kai polumatheias: See 819a, Phdr. 275a–b. 95. See 806c–d. 96. Hupothesin: See 743c5n. 97. See 664b–d, 668a–671e. 98. Chordôn: Literally, “strings.” On the entire passage, see Barker, pp. 162–163, parts of the notes in which I reproduce. 99. Heterophônian kai poikilian: “Both probably referring to instrumental decoration of a melody” (Barker, p. 163 n107). 100. “This indicates that the ‘heterophonic’ accompaniment was not part of the original composition, which was constituted by the melody alone: the ‘embroidery’ was the invention of the performer” (Barker, p. 163 n108). 101. “Plato’s meaning here seems to be that the singer sings a wide interval, while the accompanist fills in the gap with a sequence of small ones” (Barker, p. 163 n108). 102. Retaining καὶ ἀντίφωνον. The reference is probably to “an accompaniment that does not decorate, but strictly parallels the melody, either at an octave above or at a fourth or a fifth” (Barker, p. 163 n111). 103. I.e., fast–slow, high–low, and the others. 104. I.e., the Supervisor of Education. 105. See 800e–803a. 106. I.e., the Supervisor of Education, see 764d–e. 107. Gumnazesthai: The verb can mean “to train naked,” hence “exercise in the nude” (Pangle), but often also means wearing a tunic, or undergarment, without a cloak: “the female guardians must strip, clothing themselves in virtue instead of a cloak” (Rep. 457a6– 7). See also 833d4–5, 633c4n. 108. The Supervisor of Education, again. 109. No younger than fifty. See 765d. 110. Which even speaking about possible evils (especially in connection with something newborn) might be taken to be. 111. See 794c–796e, 804c–805b, 806a–c. 112. Epistêmonas: Notice mechri mathêseôs (“up to the point of the lessons”) at 794d1. 113. Those who leave en masse are the male soldiers; the guards of the children and the rest of the city are the women, who have the level of military competence needed for this. On the grammatical difficulties in the passage, see Saunders-2, pp. 58–60. 114. Contrast 805b–c. 115. See 630c7n. 116. See 655a–b. 117. Nymphs were divinities associated with woods, streams, and springs, who often inspired the men who encountered them with a mad infatuation. Pan, a son of Hermes, was a minor nature god associated with shepherds. Silenus was a companion and tutor to Dionysus (637b2n). The silenuses, as a group, were satyrs, male nature divinities, with the ears and tail of a horse, and (later) with the legs and horns of goats, characteristic of Pan. In Smp. Alcibiades likens Socrates to a silenus. See Reeve-3, pp. 19–22. 118. See 653d–654a. 119. In particular, the Supervisor of Education.

120. See 741a–b. 121. Eleutherôn: An eleutheros is often simply a free person, citizen or foreigner. But here, as elsewhere, it is in particular a citizen (or a child of citizens who will be a fully fledged citizen when he is of age), who is as such, of course, free. See 845c3n, Morrow-2, p. 323 n88. 122. “For fear that familiarity might give them too strong a hold on the public mind” (England-2, p. 306). 123. Tô[i] nomô[i] kai logê[i]: See 803a1n. 124. See Rep. 398a–b, 605c–607d. 125. Dêmêgorein: I.e., do what a popular leader (dêmagôgos) does. 126. See 658d3. 127. See 816e. 128. See 809c–d. 129. See 965b–969d. 130. The proverb occurs in a poem by Simonides of Ceos (c. 556/532–466/442 BC), discussed at Prt. 345d. 131. Mê tis praxas mêde au mathôn to parapan ouk an pote genoito anthrôpois theos, oude daimôn oude hêros hoios dunatos anthrôpon epimeleian . . . poieisthai: I take tis to refer to a person, whether human, divine, daimonic, or heroic, and genoito to go only with the dunatos clause. So the meaning is “no human being, god, daimon, or hero could become capable. . . .” Praxas . . . mathôn: The contrast is roughly between practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge. The former is required for, e.g., using theoretical astronomical knowledge to “reckon up the nights and days,” since it involves observing the position of the heavenly bodies at a particular time—notice apeirôs (“having no experience”) at 818c7 and the implicit contrast between polupeiria (“much experience”) and polumathia (“much learning”) at 819a4–5. For discussion, see Saunders-2, pp. 61–63. 132. Cf. “I take it that if the investigation of all the [mathematical] subjects we have mentioned arrives at what they share in common with one another and what their affinities are, and draws conclusions about their kinship, it does contribute something to our goal [namely, knowledge of the good] and is not labor in vain; but that otherwise it is in vain.  .  .  . Then isn’t this at last, Glaucon, the theme (nomos) itself that dialectical discussion sings? It itself is intelligible. But the power of sight imitates it. We said that sight tries at last to look at the animals themselves, the stars themselves, and, in the end, at the sun itself. In the same way, whenever someone tries by means of dialectical discussion, and without the aid of any sense perceptions, to arrive through reason at the being of each thing itself, and does not give up until he grasps what good itself is with understanding itself, he reaches the end of the intelligible realm, just as the other reached the end of the visible one” (Rep. 531c9–532b2). 133. Which was legendary in the case of the Spartans. See Hp. Ma. 285b–d. 134. “The passage is far too vague for precise controversy about its meaning” (Saunders-2, p. 63). 135. Holas pôs: What unifies the wholes is left vague. 136. See 747b. 137. Cf. Rep. 602c–d. 138. Cf. Lys. 206c4–6.

139. Reading ἔφαμεν with Saunders-2 for Budé [ἔ]φαμεν. 140. See 818a. 141. Cf. “They do not ascend to problems or investigate which numbers are in concord and which are not, or what the explanation is in each case.—But that would be a daimonic task! —Yet, it is useful in the search for the beautiful and the good! Pursued for any other purpose, though, it is useless” (Rep. 531c2–7). On checkers, see 739a1n. 142. I.e., long enough to do justice to the problems. See Saunders-2, p. 65. 143. Cf. “No one, Socrates, would be able to contradict these claims of yours. But all the same, here is pretty much the experience people have on any occasion on which they hear the sorts of things you are now saying: they think that because they are inexperienced in asking and answering questions, they are led astray a little bit by the argument at every question, and that when these little bits are added together at the end of the discussion, a big false step appears that is the opposite of what they said at the outset. Like the unskilled, who are trapped by the clever checkers players in the end and cannot make a move, they too are trapped in the end, and have nothing to say in this different kind of checkers, which is played not with pieces, but with words” (Rep. 487b1–c3). 144. England-2, p. 317 (followed by Brisson-Pradeau-2, p. 313 n151), thinks—perhaps correctly—that “outside the rest of the constitution” is “a spurious addition, made by someone who did not understand the metaphor.” 145. See 899b. 146. “The possession of this science might be justly regarded as not for humans,  .  .  . so that, according to Simonides, ‘a god alone can have this privilege,’ and it is not fitting that a human should not be content to inquire into the science that is in accord with himself” (Ar. Met. 982b27–32). See also Ap. 18b7–c3: “The first thing justice demands, then, men of Athens, is that I defend myself from the first false accusations made against me and from my first accusers. . . . They say there’s a man called Socrates, a ‘wise’ man, a thinker about things in the heavens, an investigator of all things below the earth, and someone who makes the weaker argument the stronger. Those, who’ve spread this rumor, men of Athens, are my dangerous accusers, since the people who hear them believe that those who investigate such things also do not acknowledge the gods.” 147. “Any startling novelty seems more in place as coming from a young man than from an old one” (England-2, p. 318). 148. Planêta: The source of our word “planets.” 149. Reading ταῦτα with England-2 for Budé ταῦθ᾽ ἅ. 150. Ouranon: “Let us first state what we say it is to be a heaven and in how many ways, in order that what we are inquiring into will become clearer to us. In one way, then, [1] we say that the substance belonging to the outermost revolution of the universe is heaven, or the natural body that is on the outermost revolution of the universe, since more than anything else it is the last upper region that we usually call ‘heaven,’ the one in which we say that everything divine also has its seat. In another way, [2] it is the body that is continuous with the outermost revolution of the universe, in which we find the moon, the sun, and some of the stars, since we say that these bodies too are in the heaven. Further, [3] we say that the body that is encompassed by the outermost revolution is heaven, since we are accustomed to say that the whole and the universe is heaven” (Ar. Cael. 278b9–21). In general, in Lg., “the heavens” gives the right sense, when, as here, [1] or [2] is meant, and

“the universe” when, as at 886c2, 889c3, [3] is meant. The gods referred to are the divine heavenly bodies or, more precisely, their souls. See 899b3–7. 151. Tekmêrion: “A necessary sign is a proof (tekmêrion). . . . Now I call ‘necessary’ those from which a deduction comes about. That is why indeed such a sign is a proof; for when people think that it is not possible to refute what has been stated, they think they are putting forward a proof, on the supposition that the matter has been shown and come to an end (peperasmenon). For tekmar and peras are the same in the ancient tongue” (Ar. Rh. 1357b3–9). Plato’s use of the cognate verb tekmairesthai in Lg. reflects elements in Aristotle’s definition. See 790d2, 792a1 (signs), 849e5 (limits). 152. See Ti. 38b–39e. “Over twenty-four hours, the slowest (Saturn) appears to have kept pace with the constellations in the zodiac much better than the quickest (the moon)” (Schofield-Griffith, p. 288 n95). 153. See 788a–c, 793a–d. 154. See Sph. 219e–223b, and on the role of hunting in the Greek city, Anderson, pp. 17– 56. 155. As when an older man “hunts” a younger one to take sexual possession of him and make him his beloved (see 836c2n). Notice “the lovers’ hunt (hê tôn erôtôn thêra)” at Sph. 222d10, the description of Love (Erôs) as “a mighty hunter (thêreutês deinos)” at Smp. 203d5–6), and the following characterization of such a hunt: “If you make a conquest of a boy like this, then everything you’ve said and sung turns out to eulogize yourself as victor in having won such a boyfriend. But if he gets away, then the greater your praise of his beauty and goodness, the more you will seem to have lost and the more you will be ridiculed. That is why someone who is wise in the craft of love (ta erôtika) doesn’t praise his beloved until he caught him: he fears how the future may turn out” (205e2–206a3). 156. But see 824a14–17. 157. See 631c–d, 633c–634b. 158. Since they foster “divine courage.” 159. Hopôn anatholôsi: Hopos is a juice, while anatholoun means “make turbid” (LSJ s.v. ἀναθολόω). Cf. “[Eels] quickly suffocate if the water is not clean, because their gills are small. That is why, when people are hunting eels, they disturb the water” (Ar. HA 592a5– 7), and “Fishes are killed by mullein (plomô[i]); which is why people hunt them by poisoning them with mullein in the rivers and lakes, while the Phoenicians even poison those in the sea” (HA 602b31–603a1). Plomos or phlomos is verbascum sinuatum.

{252} BOOK 8 ATHENIAN: Following on these things, the festivals are to be arranged |828a| and legislated, with the help of the Delphic oracles,1 prescribing which sacrifices to which gods it would be better and more desirable2 for the city to perform. The times and number of them, on the other hand, would probably pretty much remain up to us to legislate. |828a5| CLEINIAS: Probably so, as regards the number of them. ATHENIAN: The number, then, is what we must speak of first. Let there be no fewer than three hundred and sixty-five of them, |828b| so that there will always be at least one official performing a sacrifice to some god or daimon, on behalf of the city, the people, and their possessions. The Interpreters, Priests, Priestesses, and Prophets must get together with the Guardians of the Laws to arrange whatever details the Legislator is compelled to omit. And |828b5| what’s more, these same people are to be the arbiters for just what has been omitted by him. You see, the law will state that there are to be twelve festivals for the twelve gods, after whom each |828c| tribe is named, and they are to make monthly sacrifices to each of these, and also choruses, musical contests, and gymnastic contests, assigning them in accord with what is fitting for the gods themselves and each of the seasons, and dividing women’s festivals among them, both those |828c5| that it is fitting to have separate from the men’s and those it is not. Further, the gods of the underworld and what belongs to them must not be mixed with what one must call the “heavenly” gods and what belongs to them, but must be kept separate, by assigning them, in accord with law, to Pluto’s month, |828d| the twelfth one.3 You see, a god of this sort must not be disgusting to warlike people, but must be honored as always being the best for the human race. For I would in all seriousness assert that union for soul and body is not better than separation.4 |828d5| In addition, if they are going to make these divisions in a satisfactory way, they must keep in mind that one would not find another {253} city nowadays that is the likes of ours where leisure time and abundance of necessities are concerned, and that it, just like a single human being, |828d10| must live well. And for those who live happily, it is necessary, first, |829a| not

to do injustice to others nor to suffer injustice themselves at the hands of others.5 Of these, the former is not very difficult, but what is utterly difficult is acquiring the power to avoid suffering injustice. In fact, it cannot be completely achieved unless one becomes completely good. This very same thing, then, |829a5| applies to a city: if it becomes good, its life is one of peace, if bad, one of war, both external and internal. And this being pretty much how things stand, it is not during a war that each must train for war, but during the life of peace. |829b| So each city with any understanding (nous) must engage in military maneuvers for no less than one full day a month, more often, if it seems good to the officials, paying heed neither to cold nor to hot weather. The men themselves, and the women and children too, must do so, whenever |829b5| it seems good to the officials to bring out the entire populace, but sometimes they must do so in sections. Also, they must always be devising fine games to accompany the sacrifices, so that there will be certain battles fit for a festival that imitate the battles of war as vividly as possible. And at each of these |829c| they must distribute victory prizes and public honors, and compose poems of praise or criticism for each other, in keeping with the sort of person each is becoming both in contests and also in life as a whole,6 honoring the one who seems to be best and criticizing the one who does not. |829c5| The poet who is to compose things of this sort, though, mustn’t be just anyone, but must, in the first place, be no less than fifty years of age, nor, again, can he be one of those who have a sufficient mastery of poetry and music within themselves, but have never done any fine and remarkable deed whatsoever. |829d| On the contrary, those who are themselves good and honored in the city as craftsmen of fine deeds—these are the ones whose poems must be sung, even if their compositions are not by nature musical. The selection of these is to be in the hands of the Educator7 and the other Guardians of the Laws, |829d5| who are to grant the privilege of freedom of speech in musical compositions to these people alone. To the others no permission is to be given, and neither is anyone to dare to sing music that has not been approved (not even if {254} it is sweeter than the hymns of Thamyras or Orpheus8), |829e| but only those poems that have been judged

sacred and have been assigned to the gods, or those by good men who have been judged to offer praise or blame in a properly measured way. As regards both military maneuvers and freedom of speech in poetry, I say that |829e5| the same things must apply equally to women and to men. The legislator must consider things side by side, reasoning with himself as follows: “Come now, what sort of people am I to nurture once I have established this whole city? Aren’t they contestants in the greatest of contests, |830a| in which their competitors are numberless?”—“They certainly are,” one who spoke correctly would respond.—“Well then, if we were nurturing boxers, or pankratists,9 or contestants in some other similar sort of contest, would we have entered |830a5| the contest without, in the time beforehand, fighting daily with someone? If we were boxers, certainly, for a great many days before the contest, wouldn’t we have been learning to fight and practicing, imitating all those things we were going to employ |830b| on the day we are fighting for victory? Wouldn’t we get as close as we could to what it’s really like, just putting on practice gloves instead of leather thongs,10 in order to practice the striking and dodging blows as satisfactorily as possible? And if |830b5| we happened to be very short of sparring partners, would we, fearing the laughter of senseless people, not dare to hang up a soulless likeness11 and practice on that? Going still further, if we were ever short of all of them, whether ensouled or soulless, in |830c| a desert of sparring partners, wouldn’t we even dare to spar12 in reality with our own selves? Or what in the world else would one call the sort of practice that consists of simply making boxing movements with the hands? CLEINIAS: There’s pretty much nothing else to call it, Stranger, than |830c5| what you’ve just said. {255} ATHENIAN: What then? Will the fighting force of our city dare to enter the greatest of contests on each occasion less prepared than one of these sorts of contestants, when it is fighting for life, children, property, and the city |830d| as a whole? And will their legislator, fearing that the way they train with each other may appear ridiculous to some people, not lay down laws prescribing minor military exercises, without weapons, ideally for each day, when it is at these that choruses |830d5| and gymnastic training as a whole are directed? And won’t he prescribe that certain major exercises

involving weapons be held no less often than once a month, in which they hold contests for superiority with each other throughout the entire country, |830e| competing in occupying positions and laying ambushes, and imitating the entire craft of war, so that they are in reality fighting with practice gloves,13 and projectiles that come as close as possible to real ones, but using less dangerous weapons, in order that the games they play against each other be not altogether lacking in fear, |830e5| but provide objects of fear and in a certain way make clear who is of good courage14 and who is not, and, by correctly distributing honors to the one and criticisms to the other, make the whole city useful in the real contest |831a| that lasts throughout life? 15 And what’s more, if someone is killed in such circumstances, on the grounds that the homicide is involuntary, won’t the legislator lay it down that the killer, once he has undergone purification in accord with law, has clean hands,16 having the thought that not many people will die this way, |831a5| and that others who are no worse will grow up in turn, but that if fear (as it were) died, he will not find a test for who is better and who is worse in terms of courage, and that this is in no small degree a greater evil for the city than the other. |831b| CLEINIAS: We, at least, Stranger, would agree with you that such things must be legislated and practiced by the entire city. ATHENIAN: Do we all know what the cause is in cities nowadays of why these sorts of chorus-related activities and contests |831b5| are pretty much in no way ever practiced, except to a very small extent? Are we {256} to say that this is due to the ignorance of the masses and of those who established the laws for them? CLEINIAS: Maybe so. ATHENIAN: No, not so at all, Cleinias, my blessedly happy friend. On the contrary, one must say that there are two causes of this, |831c| which are fully sufficient to explain it. CLEINIAS: What are they? ATHENIAN: The first is a passion for wealth,17 which deprives a person of the leisure to take care of anything except his private |831c5| possessions, and when the entire soul of every citizen is hung up on this, it would never be able to take care of anything except daily profit. Whatever learning or

practice conduces to this, everyone is eager to learn and practice for himself, whereas the rest he laughs at. This, |831d| we must say, is one factor, one cause of why a city is unwilling to take seriously either this or any other fine and good practice. On the contrary, because of an insatiable desire for gold and silver, every man is willing to put up with every craft and contrivance, whether finer |831d5| or more unseemly, if he is going to become wealthy, and to do any action, whether pious or impious, or even entirely shameful, without feeling any disgust whatsoever, if only it can provide a total satiety, as if he were a wild beast, of every sort of food and drink, |831e| and likewise of every sort of sexual pleasure. CLEINIAS: You’re quite right. ATHENIAN: So lay this down, the one I’m describing, as one cause that prevents cities from practicing any other fine activity, and in particular |831e5| those related to war, in a satisfactory way. It turns those people who are by nature moderate into merchants, shipowners, and mere servants, while it makes those who are courageous into pirates, burglars, temple robbers,18 and hostile and tyrannical people—even |832a| in some cases when they aren’t defective in nature, but just plain unlucky. CLEINIAS: What do you mean? ATHENIAN: Well, how could I not describe as utterly |832a5| unlucky those very people who are compelled to go through life with their own souls perpetually hungry? {257} CLEINIAS: Alright, this is one cause. Now, Stranger, what do you say the second cause is? ATHENIAN: You do well to remind me. |832a10| CLEINIAS: This, you say, is one cause, namely, the lifelong insatiable seeking, which leaves each person without leisure, and becomes an obstacle |832b| to each person’s correctly practicing for war. Let it be so. Now tell us the second cause. ATHENIAN: Do you think I’m not telling you, but rather putting things off, because I’m at a loss? CLEINIAS: No, but it does seem to us that a sort of hatred has caused you to chastise |832b5| the sort of character you describe more than is required by the

present argument. ATHENIAN: You’re absolutely right to rebuke me, Strangers. You’d like to hear what comes next, it seems. CLEINIAS: Just say it! ATHENIAN: For my part, I say that the non-constitutions are causes, those that I’ve often mentioned |832c| in the earlier arguments—democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny.19 None of these is a constitution; on the contrary, all would most correctly be called “factions.” For none of them is the voluntary rule over voluntary subjects, but rather the voluntary rule over involuntary subjects, always with a certain element of force, where the ruler, fearing the ruled, will never voluntarily allow him to become fine, |832c5| wealthy, strong, courageous, or in any way warlike. These, then, are the two principal causes of pretty much all evils— certainly the principal ones of these evils. But the present constitution, which we are now establishing by our laws, has escaped both of the causes we are describing. For it brings, surely, |832d| the greatest leisure, the citizens are free from each other’s interference, and, as a result of these laws of ours, they are least likely, I imagine, to become lovers of money. So it’s likely, and in accord with reason, that a constitution of this sort (once the argument for its establishment has been correctly brought to an end) would be the only one of those presently existing |832d5| that would accept the warrior education, and also recreation, that has been described in detail. CLEINIAS: Fine. {258} ATHENIAN: Following after this, mustn’t it be remembered once and for all about all gymnastic contests that whichever ones |832e| are related to war must be practiced and have victory prizes, but whichever ones aren’t must be omitted? Which these are, though, it would be better to describe and legislate at the start. First off, then, mustn’t contests for running and for speed in general |832e5| be established? CLEINIAS: They must. ATHENIAN: In any case, the greatest thing for war is bodily quickness of every sort, one being of the feet, the other of the hands as well—the one important for fleeing and overtaking, the other |833a| for tangling with the enemy in close combat, where strength and vigor are needed.

CLEINIAS: No doubt. ATHENIAN: Though without weapons, of course, neither is of very great use. |833a5| CLEINIAS: Certainly not. ATHENIAN: So, first, in our contests (just as nowadays), the herald20 will summon the stade runner,21 who is to enter carrying weapons. We will not establish prizes for an unarmed contestant. First to enter, then, is the one who runs a stade with his weapons; second, |833a10| the one who runs two stades; third, the one who runs a horse-course;22 and fourth, |833b| the longdistance run.23 The fifth, whom we’ll dispatch first, fully armed, is to run a distance of sixty stades to a temple of Ares and back, in heavier armor, be named a “hoplite,” and run over a smoother course; the other,24 an “archer,” in full archer’s armament, is to run one hundred stades to a temple of Apollo and Artemis,25 over hills and all sorts of territory, and then back. Having established the contest, |833c| we’ll await their return, and award victory prizes to the winner of each. {259} CLEINIAS: That’s right. ATHENIAN: We should think of these contests as threefold, one |833c5| for boys, one for youths, and one for men. For the youths we are to set the length at two-thirds that of the full course, and for children at one-half, when they compete either as archers or as hoplites. As for the women, within the stadium itself, prepubescent girls are to compete stripped26 in the stade, double-stade, |833d| horse-course, and long-distance races. Girls over thirteen, until married, are to continue to take part up to the age of twenty at most, and eighteen at least,27 and are to come down to compete in these races dressed in fitting apparel.28 |833d5| These, then, are to be the races for men and for women. As regards trials of strength, instead of wrestling and the sorts of he-man contests of today, there is to be combat in armor, one fighting against one, |833e| two against two, with up to ten against ten fighting each other. As to what must be avoided or done in order to win, and up to how many times, just as in the case of wrestling now, where those involved in wrestling itself have established laws for themselves regulating what sort of thing is characteristic of someone who wrestles well, |833e5| and not well, so in the

same way here too, we must summon the top fighters in armor and ask them to help us establish laws concerning these contests, as to who is a rightful winner, what must be avoided or done, and a similar |834a| regulation to decide the loser. The same things are also to be legislated for females who are not yet married. The pankration29 mode of fighting must be replaced by light-armed combat as a whole, using bows and arrows, light shields, javelins, and stones thrown by hand |834a5| or sling. Concerning these too we must establish laws and assign rewards and victories to the one who does best in conformity with the relevant laws. After these matters, the next thing would be making laws concerning horse racing. In Crete,30 of course, |834b| we don’t have much use for horses, nor are there many to use, with the inevitable result that less serious attention is paid either to their rearing or their racing. As for chariots—in general, no one among us keeps one, nor is there any appreciable |834b5| love of honor directed at them, so that if we establish {260} contests for chariot racing, when it is not native to the country,31 we would neither have any understanding (nous), nor seem to have any. On the other hand, if we establish prizes |834c| for riding horses, as colts, half-grown horses, and fullgrown horses, we would be providing a sport for horses that is in accord with the nature of the country. So, among these very horsemen, there is to be, in accord with law, a race and a competition for victory, |834c5| and judgment in all the races themselves and of the riders in armor when they dismount is to be assigned jointly to the Tribe-Leaders and CavalryCommanders.32 But if we were to establish contests for those without weapons either in gymnastics or here in horse racing, we would not legislate correctly. And as a mounted |834d| archer or javelin thrower, a Cretan is not without his uses, so in these too there is to be rivalry and contests for the sake of recreation. As for women, it isn’t worthwhile to force their participation in these events by laws and prescriptions, but if, as a result of their |834d5| previous education developing into habit, their nature allows it, and it does not feel disgust at it, then girls and unmarried women are to participate, and be allowed to do so without incurring censure.

So now we have at length actually and entirely completed our argument about contests and instruction in gymnastic training, whether for contests or |834e| for what we are to work hard at in school.33 And, in fact, most of our argument about musical training has likewise been completed. Rhapsodes, however, and their retinue, and the choral contests that are necessary at festivals are matters to be arranged after the gods, and those who accompany |834e5| gods,34 have had their months, days, and years assigned to them,35 whether they are to be held every two years or every four years, or in whatever way |835a| or manner the gods may give a notion of concerning their order and distribution. On the occasions then settled, one must also expect the contests in music to be held in sections arranged by the judges of the contests, the Educator of the young,36 and the Guardians of the Laws, who are to meet together for this very purpose and, themselves acting as legislators, |835a5| decide for all choruses and chorus contests, when, by what people, and with what people, the contests are going to be done. What sorts these must be for each contest, as regards words, songs, and harmonies mixed with {261} rhythms and dances, has often been stated by the |835b| first legislator, and the secondary ones are to make their laws by following him closely, assigning fitting competitions to each sacrifice at fitting times, so as to provide festivals for the city to celebrate.37 |835b5| Now as to these matters and others of this sort, it is not difficult to comprehend in what way one must obtain their regulation by law, nor that their being altered here and there would bring neither a great gain nor a great loss to the city. There are things, though, that make a difference, and not a small one, where to persuade |835c| people is difficult—indeed a task for a god above all, were it somehow possible for prescriptions to come from him. As things stand, however, in all likelihood what’s needed is some bold human being, who especially valuing frankness, will say the things that seem to be best for the city and the citizens—who, |835c5| in the midst of corrupt souls, will prescribe what is fitting and in keeping with the entire constitution, speaking in opposition to the greatest appetites, and who, with no human helper, will act alone, following reason alone. CLEINIAS: What argument, again, Stranger, are we talking about? You see, we don’t yet |835d| understand.

ATHENIAN: That’s not surprising. I’ll try to explain it to you yet more perspicuously. You see, when I arrived at the topic of education in the argument, I envisaged young men and young women associating with each other on friendly terms. |835d5| A fear came over me, naturally, as I wondered how someone is to manage a city of this sort, in which men and women are well nourished, released from the excessive and unfree exertions that do most to quell wanton aggression, and where sacrifices, festivals, and |835e| choral performances are the chief concern of everyone throughout life. How exactly, in this city, are they ever going to avoid the appetites that so often cast so many down into the depths, and that reason, in trying to become law, orders them to abstain from? As for the majority |835e5| of appetites, it is no surprise that the laws prescribed previously managed to control them. You see, the proscription of excessive wealth |836a| is of no small benefit to temperance; the entire system of education has properly measured laws that look to the same thing; and, in addition, there is the eye of the officials trained not to look anywhere else, but to keep constant watch on the young themselves. |836a5| And for other appetites, in all human probability, this maintains proper measure. {262} But when it comes to sexual passions for children (male or female), or of men for women, or women for men, which have had countless |836b| consequences for individual human beings and for whole cities, how is one to guard against these? And what drug is one to apply, in each of these cases, if one is to find an escape from this danger? It is in no way an easy matter, Cleinias. And, in fact, although in not a few other matters Crete as a whole and Sparta have perhaps given us no small help in establishing laws that are at odds with the ways of life of the majority of people, in regard to sexual matters (just between ourselves) they are entirely opposed to us. You see, if someone follows |836c| nature and establishes the pre-Laius38 law, saying that it was right not to have with males and young people the sorts of sexual relations one has with females, introducing wild beasts as evidence, and pointing out that |836c5| males do not touch males for these purposes, because it is not in accord with nature, he would perhaps be using a plausible argument,39 but it is not at all in concord with your cities. In addition, the object that we say the legislator must always look to40 is not in agreement with these practices. |836d| For we are always seeking for which

among the established things conduces to virtue and which does not. Come then, suppose we agree to legislate now that this practice is a fine one, or not at all a shameful one—what contribution would it make to virtue for us? Would it engender a courageous character |836d5| in the soul of the one seduced, or qualities of a {263} temperate kind in the soul of the seducer?41 Would anyone ever be per suaded of these things, rather than, just the very opposite, blaming the softness of the one who gives in to pleasures and is incapable |836e| of standing up to them, and censuring the one undertaking to imitate a female for his likeness to what he imitates? Is there any person, then, who will legislate something of this sort? Practically none—at least, if he keeps in mind what a true law is. How, then, are we to establish |836e5| the truth of this? It is necessary to look at the nature of friendship (philia), appetite (epithumia), and what are called “sexual passions” (erôs), if |837a| one is going to think correctly about these matters. For these are really two things, and another third form composed from the two, but because they are all encompassed by a single name,42 total perplexity and darkness is produced. CLEINIAS: How so? |837a5| ATHENIAN: Well, we call someone a “friend,” I suppose, when, with respect to virtue, he is like to like, or equal to equal; but we also call the one who is needy a “friend” to the one who is wealthy, though being opposite in kind. And when either of the two becomes intense, we call it “sexual passion.” CLEINIAS: That’s correct. |837b| ATHENIAN: Now, among us, the friendship between opposites is terrible, fierce, and not often reciprocal,43 while the friendship of those who are alike is gentle and reciprocal throughout life. As for the friendship that is a mixture of these—in the first place, it isn’t easy to learn what exactly |837b5| the person feeling this third sort of passion even wishes to occur in himself; next, because he’s pulled in opposite directions by its two parts, with one telling him to pluck the youth’s bloom and the other forbidding him to do so, he is perplexed. For the one who has a passion for the body, hungering for the bloom |837c| as for ripe fruit, tells himself to take his fill, assigning no value to the character of the beloved’s soul. On the other hand, the one who regards an appetite for the body as beside the point, gazing at it more than

having a passion for it, with soul really having an appetite for soul, |837c5| regards it as wanton {264} aggression when body takes its fill of body, and, holding in awe and reverencing what is temperate, courageous, highminded,44 and wise, would wish to remain always chaste with a beloved who is chaste. You see, the passion that |837d| is a mixture of the two is the one we described just now as a third kind. Since, then, there are this many kinds, must the law prohibit all of them and prevent them from existing among us? Or isn’t it clear that the one that is for virtue, whose appetite is for the young person |837d5| to become as good as possible, is one we would wish to be present in our city, and that we would forbid the other two, if we could? Or what is our view, my dear Megillus? MEGILLUS: Everything you’ve said just now about these same lovers, Stranger, is in every respect correct. |837e| ATHENIAN: It certainly looks as if I have you singing along with me, my friend, as I guessed I might. As for your law in Sparta, there’s no need for me to inquire about that: it’s enough to accept your agreement to the argument. Later on I’ll come back to |837e5| these same lovers and try to sing enchantments to persuade Cleinias.45 But let’s assume that you’ve both conceded my point46 and by all means proceed with our laws. MEGILLUS: You’re absolutely right. ATHENIAN: I have, you see, a certain means of establishing this law right here and now, which is in one way easy, but in another |838a| way altogether the most difficult possible. MEGILLUS: What do you mean? ATHENIAN: We know, I take it, that even as things stand most human beings, however lawless they may be, are strictly |838a5| precluded from sexual intercourse with people who are beautiful—and not involuntarily, but in the highest degree voluntarily. MEGILLUS: When do you mean? ATHENIAN: When someone has a brother or sister who is beautiful. And where a son or a daughter are concerned, the same law—though unwritten —most |838b| satisfactorily guards (as it were) against sleeping with them,

whether openly or secretly, or being ready to have any other sort {265} of sexual contact with them. On the contrary, an appetite for this sort of intercourse never even enters the majority of people’s souls. |838b5| MEGILLUS: That’s true. ATHENIAN: And isn’t there a little saying that quenches all pleasures of these sorts? MEGILLUS: What saying do you mean? ATHENIAN: The one saying that these things are not at all pious, but hateful to the gods, and the most shameful of shameful things. And isn’t the cause of its doing so this, |838c| that no one ever says otherwise, but rather, from the day of his birth, each one of us hears people always and everywhere saying these things, not only in comedies, but frequently in altogether serious tragedies? And when they bring on a Thyestes, or an Oedipus, or a Macareus, |838c5| who secretly had sex with his sister,47 aren’t they seen willingly inflicting death on themselves as a just punishment for their faults? MEGILLUS: You’re absolutely right, at any rate to this extent, that a saying has amazing power, when no one |838d| ever even tries to breathe a word against its law.48 ATHENIAN: So what I said just now was correct, that when a legislator wishes to enslave a certain appetite that especially enslaves human beings, it’s easy to see, certainly, what way |838d5| he should handle it, namely, that if he made this saying sacred in the eyes of everyone (slaves and free, children and women, and the whole city without exception), he will have provided the firmest possible foundation for this law. |838e| MEGILLUS: Certainly. But how it will ever be possible to bring it about that everyone is willing to say such a thing . . . ATHENIAN: You’re right to pull me up on that. You see, this was the very thing I was talking about, when I said49 that, in furtherance of this law, |838e5| I had a means of getting sexual intercourse to be used in accord with nature for the production of children—of getting people to avoid sex with males, so as not to deliberately kill off the human race, as well as from sowing seed on rocks and stones, where it will never take root {266} and develop its true nature, |839a| and also keeping away from any female soil in which

one wouldn’t wish one’s seed to grow. If this law becomes permanently established and in control, just as the law about sex with parents is now in control, if it were rightly |839a5| victorious over the other sorts of sex, that would have countless benefits. For, in the first place, it is laid down in accord with nature; it prevents sexual frenzy and madness, as well as all forms of adultery, and all immoderate drinking and eating; it makes men be affectionate friends to their own wives; |839b| and there are, to be sure, very many other benefits that would come about, if one were able to be in possession of this law. But if some impetuous and young man were standing here, bursting with seed, listening to the establishing of this law, he would probably abuse us for establishing senseless |839b5| and impossible customs, and fill the place full with his outcries. It was mainly with this sort of thing in mind that I made the statement that I had in hand a certain means, which was in one way easiest of all, and in another the most difficult, |839c| of making this law, once established, stand fast. For it is, of course, very easy to see that it is possible, and easy to see in what way, since we say that if this custom is made sufficiently sacred, it will enslave every soul and, with the help of fear, make it |839c5| obedient to the established laws. Yet it has now come to the point where it doesn’t seem to people that this law could ever come about, even so. It’s just the same as in the case of the practice of communal messes, where there is a refusal to believe that it’s possible for a whole city to be able to live through life carrying on this practice, |839d| even though it has been proven by the facts and by its existence among your people—and yet even in your cities it doesn’t seem natural in the case of women. It was due to this, due to the strength of the refusal to believe, that I said that both these50 are very difficult to fix in place by means of |839d5| law. MEGILLUS: You’re right about that at least. ATHENIAN: Do you wish me, though, to try to state an argument having a certain degree of plausibility that it isn’t beyond human powers, that it can be done? |839d10| CLEINIAS: Do you think I don’t? ATHENIAN: Would someone find it easier to avoid sexual pleasures, |839e| and be more willing to do what is prescribed about these and act moderately, if

his body is in good condition, and not untrained or in poor shape? {267} CLEINIAS: Much easier, I imagine, if it’s not untrained. ATHENIAN: Well, we know by report about Iccus of Tarentum,51 don’t we, due to the Olympic Games and other contests? |840a| Because of his love of victory, his craft, and the courage together with moderation he possessed in his soul, so the account goes, he never had any sexual contact with a woman—or boy, for that matter—during the whole time of his intensive training. And in fact the same account, I believe, is told about Crison, Astylus, Diopompus, and |840a5| very many others.52 And yet they were much less well educated with respect to their souls than these citizens of yours and mine, Cleinias, though with respect to their bodies much more swollen with desire. |840b| CLEINIAS: It’s true, as you say, that the ancient accounts about these athletes are quite emphatic that these things really once happened. |840b5| ATHENIAN: So, for the sake of victory in wrestling, running, and things of this sort, those men had the fortitude to abstain from the affair that the majority of people consider a happy one. Are our boys, then, going to be unable to hold out for the sake of a much finer victory—indeed, the finest one of all, as we’ll charm them into believing, no doubt, |840b10| by telling them so from childhood in stories, oracular reports, and in the melodies we sing? |840c| CLEINIAS: What sort of victory? ATHENIAN: The victory over pleasures. If they are in control of these, they will live happily, but if they are defeated, entirely the opposite. In |840c5| addition, will not the fear that the thing itself is utterly impious make them able to control what their inferiors have controlled in the past? CLEINIAS: Yes, probably so. ATHENIAN: Since that’s the point we’ve reached where this law is concerned, then, |840c10| and since we’ve fallen into perplexity due to the vice of the majority of people, |840d| I say that our law concerning these matters must go forward regardless, and say that our citizens must not be inferior to the birds and many other wild beasts, who are born into large flocks, and live celibate, pure, and chaste lives until breeding age, |840d5| and when they

do reach this age they pair off as they prefer, male with female, female with male, and live out the rest of their time piously {268} and justly, remaining faithful to their first agreements in affection.53 |840e| Surely, our citizens must at least be better than wild beasts! But if they let themselves be corrupted by most of the other Greeks and barbarians, when they see and hear of the great power among them of the “irregular” Aphrodite (as it is called), and |840e5| thus become unable to gain control of it, then the Guardians of the Laws must become legislators and devise a second law for them. CLEINIAS: What law would you advise them to establish, if |841a| the one being established now escapes their control? ATHENIAN: Clearly, the one coming next to it, as second, Cleinias. CLEINIAS: Which one do you mean? |841a5| ATHENIAN: There was a way54 to make the strength of the pleasures be as undeveloped by practice as possible, namely, by diverting the influx of nourishment for it to other places in the body by means of exertions. And this would happen if shamelessness were not involved in the indulgence in sexual pleasures. For if, because of shame, people rarely indulged in this sort of behavior, |841b| they would, by infrequent indulgence, find this Aphrodite a less tyrannical mistress. So let secrecy in the doing of such acts (as opposed to not doing them at all) be regarded as a fine thing by our citizens, acknowledged by custom and by unwritten law, and the absence of secrecy a shameful one. In this way, there would be a secondary shameful thing and a secondary fine thing |841b5| laid down in law, having a secondary correctness; and those people whose natures have been corrupted, whom we call “defeated by themselves,”55 being one kind, when surrounded |841c| by three kinds would be forced not to go against the law. CLEINIAS: Which are they? ATHENIAN: The god-fearing, the honor-loving, and the one accustomed to have an appetite not for bodies but for fine |841c5| habits of soul. Though what I’m now mentioning,56 as if in a story, is perhaps wishful thinking,57 by far the greatest goods would come about in every city, if indeed this wishful thinking were to materialize. But maybe (god {269} willing) we could enforce one of the following two laws about sexual pleasures: either no one |841d| is to dare to have sex with any noble and free citizen58 except

his own wedded wife, or sow unhallowed, bastard seed in concubines, or sterile seed, contrary to nature, in males; or else we are to exclude sex between males altogether, |841d5| and in the case of women, if anyone has sex with a woman (whether purchased or acquired in some other way) other than one who enters his house, with the blessings of the gods, in sacred marriage, not keeping it secret from men and |841e| women generally, if we legislated that he be deprived of all honors in the city,59 on the grounds that he is really an alien, we would, no doubt, seem to be legislating correctly. So this law, whether it must be called one law or two, is to be laid down concerning sexual desires |841e5| and all sexual passions, as to our acting rightly or not rightly |842a| in our intercourse with each other due to these sorts of appetites. MEGILLUS: For my part, Stranger, I would eagerly accept this law from you, but Cleinias must tell us himself |842a5| what he thinks about these issues. CLEINIAS: I’ll do so, Megillus, when it seems to me an opportune moment has arrived.60 For now, though, let’s allow the Stranger to proceed yet further with the laws. MEGILLUS: All right. ATHENIAN: Well then, moving on, we’re now pretty much |842b| at the point where communal messes have been established—a thing which we say would be difficult elsewhere, whereas in Crete, no one would suppose it needed to be some other way. As for the way they should be, whether as here in Crete or as in Sparta, or whether there is a third |842b5| form of communal mess beyond these that is better than both of them—this doesn’t seem to me to be a difficult thing to find out, and no great good would come of finding it out, since in fact they’re established in a way that hits the right note as things stand.61 {270} The next thing is the organization of the means of life, |842c| and in what way it would be in keeping with these messes. In other cities, the food would be supplied in all kinds of ways, that is, from many sources—at least twice as many as for our citizens. For most Greeks are supplied with nourishment both from the land and from the sea, |842c5| while our people get it from the land alone. For the legislator, this makes things easier. You see, not only will half the laws be sufficient, in fact far fewer than half, |842d| but

furthermore they’ll be more fitting for free people. For the legislator in that city—having, for the most part, got rid of ship-owning, merchandizing, retail trade, innkeeping, customs duties, mining, loans, compound interest, |842d5| and countless other things of these sorts, saying goodbye to these— will legislate for farmers, herdsmen, beekeepers, and for those who guard their stock and superintend their equipment. Having already enacted the greatest laws, |842e| dealing with marriage, the begetting and nurturing of children, and furthermore with education and the appointment of officials in the city, it is necessary for him now to turn in his legislation toward the food supply, and the people who labor together in regard to precisely this. |842e5| In the first place, then, there must be laws called “Agricultural Laws.” And let that of Zeus God of Boundaries be stated first as follows: No one is to move the boundary-markers of the land, whether belonging to a neighbor and fellow citizen or to one sharing a border with him, in the case where his holding is on a frontier, neighboring some other foreigner, realizing that to do this is in the truest sense to change what mustn’t be changed.62 Everyone is to prefer |843a| to try to move the largest stone that is not a boundarymarker rather than move a small stone marking a boundary between friend and enemy, protected by an oath sworn before gods. For in the one case Zeus God of Fellow Tribesmen is witness, in the other Zeus God of Foreigners, and when these are stirred up they bring the most hostile |843a5| wars. He who obeys the law is not to suffer the bad things it inflicts, but he who holds it in contempt is to be subject to two penalties, the first at the hands of the gods, the second from the law: No one is voluntarily to move the boundary-markers of his neighbor’s |843b| land; if someone does move them, anyone who wishes is to report him to the relevant landowners,63 and they are to take him to court. If someone is found guilty in a case of this sort, on {271} the supposition that he has tried to redistribute the land in secret or by force, the court is to assess what |843b5| the loser is to suffer or pay. Then there are the many minor grievances that occur among neighbors, which by dint of repetition, breed an immense amount of enmity, and make being neighbors a harsh and very bitter thing. |843c| That is why neighbor must take every care not to do anything inimical to neighbor, and must

above all take very special care, among other things, always to avoid the least degree of encroachment. For to do damage is not difficult, everyone can do it, but to provide aid for it |843c5| is not at all something everyone can do. Whoever, then, does overstep boundaries and encroach on what is his neighbor’s is to pay for the damage, and, for the sake of his shamelessness and illiberality being cured, |843d| is also to pay a further sum of twice the damages to the injured party. In these and in all cases of these sorts, the Country-Wardens are to act as inspectors, judges, and assessors; in more serious cases, as was said earlier,64 the entire staff of the relevant twelfth part of |843d5| the territory; in lesser ones, the Guards-in-Chief. If anyone allows his cattle to graze on someone else’s land, they are to inspect the damages, reach a judgment, and assess the penalty. If anyone appropriates someone else’s bee swarms, following along at the pleasure of the bees,65 and, by knocking them down, makes them his own, he is to pay damages. If anyone burning timber |843e| fails to watch out for his neighbor’s timber, he is to pay whatever penalty seems appropriate to the officials. So too if anyone planting trees fails to leave a proper measure of distance from his neighbor’s land—as has been stated in a satisfactory way by many legislators,66 whose laws one must make {272} use of, and not demand that the grand director of our city67 legislate about all the many small matters that can be handled by any random legislator. For example, where the water supply for farmers is concerned, |844a| there are some old and excellent laws laid down that are not worth diverting into our discussion. However, anyone who wishes to bring water to his land is to bring it, starting from the public springs, but is not to intercept the visible streams of any private individual. He may bring it by whatever path he wishes, |844a5| except through houses, certain temples, or tombs, and is to do no damage beyond the actual cutting of the channel. If there are some naturally dry districts, where the rain sent by Zeus keeps off the land, |844b| and there is a scarcity of necessary drinking water, the owner is to dig down to the clay in his own land, and if he fails to find any water at this depth, he is to obtain from his neighbor as much drinking water as is necessary for each |844b5| member of his household. If the neighbor’s water is also scarce, a ration of water is to be assigned by the

Country-Wardens, and he is to fetch this each day, and share his neighbors’ water in this way. And if, when the rains from Zeus come, anyone |844c| having land on lower ground damages the farmer above him, or someone living in the contiguous house, by not allowing the water to run off, or conversely, if anyone above is careless about the runoff and does damage to one below, and if as a result they are not willing to come to an agreement with each other about the issue, anyone who wishes |844c5| is to call in a City-Warden (in the city), or a Country-Warden (in the country), to prescribe what each party is to do. Anyone who fails to abide by the prescription is to undergo a trial for having a grudging and hard-to-please soul |844d| and, if found guilty, is to pay double the damages to the injured party for refusing to obey the officials. Autumn fruits are to be shared in the following way. The goddess herself,68 in her generosity, |844d5| has given us two gifts: the plaything of Dionysus, which cannot be stored, and the fruit which is naturally fit for storing. So the law regulating the fruit harvest is to be this: Whoever tastes common-quality fruit, grapes or figs, before the time for the vintage following closely on the rising of Arcturus,69 |844e| whether picked from {273} his own lands or from his neighbors’, is to pay fifty sacred drachmas to Dionysus, if he picked it from his own, a mina,70 if from his neighbors’, two-thirds of a mina, if from anyone else’s. On the other hand, anyone who wishes to gather |844e5| what are now called “high-quality” grapes or what are now named “high-quality” figs, is to harvest them however and whenever he wishes, if he takes them from his own estates, but if he does so from other people’s without their permission, he is to be fined every time, in accordance with |845a| the law, “don’t move what you didn’t put down.”71 If a slave, without the permission of the master of the lands, touches fruits of this sort, he is to be whipped, and given as many lashes as there are grapes in the bunch or figs picked from the tree. A resident alien who buys |845a5| high-quality fruit is to gather it as he wishes. If a foreigner, visiting the country, wants some fruit to eat as he travels along the roads, he is to pick some of the high-quality fruit, if he wishes, for himself and one attendant,

without paying for it, as a gift of hospitality; but the law is to prohibit |845b| foreigners from sharing the so-called common-quality fruits and things of this sort. If master or slave, unaware of this law, picks this fruit, the slave is to be punished with a whipping, and the free person dismissed with a warning and instructed to pick the other fruit, |845b5| which is not fit to be stored as raisins, wine, or dried figs. Where pears, apples, pomegranates, and everything of this sort are concerned, there is to be nothing shameful about taking them in secret, but if anyone under the age of thirty is caught at it, |845c| he is to be beaten (without wounds) and driven off, and for a free citizen72 there is to be no legal redress whatsoever for such beatings. A foreigner is to be allowed a share of these sorts of fruits, just as with grapes and figs. And if someone older picks these to eat |845c5| on the spot, carrying nothing away, he is—just like a foreigner—to have a share of all these sorts of fruits; but if he disobeys the law, he is to be subject to disqualification as a competitor where virtue is concerned,73 if, |845d| when the time comes, someone reminds the judges of these sorts of things about him. Where gardening is concerned water is of all things the most nourishing, but it is easily spoiled. You see, soil, sun, and |845d5| winds, which {274} together with water nourish the things that sprout from the earth, are not easily spoiled by poisoning, diverting, or stealing, but the nature of water is such that all these things are possible. So that is why it needs the help of law. |845e| So let the law concerning it be this: If anyone voluntarily spoils someone else’s water, whether from a spring or a cistern, using poisons, excavations, or thefts, the injured party is to take his case to the CityWardens, registering the damage |845e5| done. Anyone found guilty of doing damage by poisonings, in addition to the fine, is to purify the springs or water cistern, in whatever way the Interpreters’74 laws relate it must be done in a particular case by the individuals involved. Where the bringing home of all crops is concerned, anyone who wishes |845e10| is to be allowed to bring home his own by any path, |846a| provided that either he does no one any damage or else makes a profit himself that is three times as great as his neighbor’s damage. The officials are to be the inspectors of these, and of all other cases where someone does voluntary

damage, forcibly or secretly, to an involuntary party or something of his, |846a5| by the use he makes of his own possessions. In all cases of this sort, where the damage is under three minas,75 the injured party is to obtain redress by showing the damage to the officials. But if a person has a larger claim against another, he is to obtain redress against the one doing injustice |846b| by bringing the case before the communal courts. If one of the officials is held to have decided the damages by an unjust judgment, he is to be subject to double the damages to the injured party. Injustices on the part of the officials in regard to a given complaint are to be brought before |846b5| the communal courts by anyone who wishes. Since there are countless minor laws in accord with which penalties are imposed, having to do with written complaints, summonses, and evidence that a summons was served (whether before two witnesses, or however many there are to be), and all things |846c| of this sort, these cannot be left unlegislated for, and yet are not worth the attention of an elderly legislator. So the young are to make these laws faithfully imitating the laws previously established, making the minor ones with an eye to the major ones, from experience of the cases where it is necessary to make use of these, |846c5| until it seems that all have been laid down in a satisfactory way. Then, having made them unchangeable, they are to live making use of these, which by this point have attained proper measure. {275} As for the various craftsmen, we must do things this way. |846d| First, no native citizen76 is to work at any craftsman-like craft,77 nor is any servant of a man who is a native citizen. You see, it’s enough for a man who is a citizen to possess that craft, one requiring much practice and many studies, |846d5| namely, of preserving and procuring the communal order of the city; and this one does not require only to be practiced as a side issue. And exact work in two pursuits or crafts is something pretty much no human nature is competent to do—nor yet to practice one |846e| and supervise another who is practicing it.78 So the first thing that must be laid down in our city is this: No metalworker is at the same time to be a carpenter, nor is a carpenter to supervise others who are metalworkers instead of practicing his own craft (alleging |846e5| that in supervising many unfree servants who work for him,

he naturally supervises them better, because he gets a larger profit from that than from his own craft); rather, |847a| each single individual in the city is to have one craft and from this is also to acquire a living. The City-Wardens must work hard at maintaining this law, and if one of the native citizens turns more to some other craft than to the practice of virtue, |847a5| they are to punish him with reproaches and dishonors until they restore him to his proper course; and if a foreigner practices two crafts, they are to punish him with prison, fines, or expulsion from the city, and so compel him to be one person only |847b| and not many. As regards craftsmen’s wages, the commissioning of their works,79 and any injustices done to them by another or done by them to another, cases involving up to fifty drachmas the City-Wardens are to adjudicate; cases where more than this is involved, the communal courts |847b5| are to decide in accord with law. No one in the city is to pay any duty on either exported or imported goods. No one is to import frankincense or any other foreign incenses of this sort relating to the gods; purple |847c| dye80 or any pigments for dyeing not produced in the country; or anything pertaining to any other craft requiring foreign imports for something that isn’t necessary; nor, on {276} the other hand, is anyone to export anything that it is necessary to keep within the country. Of all |847c5| these matters the inspectors and supervisors are to be the twelve Guardians of the Laws who are next in order when the five oldest are excluded. Where weapons and all other instruments of war are concerned, |847d| if there is a need to import some product of craft, organic material,81 metal object, cordage, or sorts of animals, the Cavalry-Commanders and Generals are to be in control of the import and export of these, since handing them over |847d5| and receiving them belong in the city, and the Guardians of the Laws are to establish fitting and satisfactory laws for these. But retail trade for the sake of making money in this or other war materiel82 is not to take place in any part of the country as a whole or in our city. |847e| As for the food supply and the distribution of agricultural produce, if something close to Cretan law in correctness were to be adopted it would probably meet the case. All must divide all agricultural produce into twelve

parts, in the order in which it is to be consumed. |847e5| And each of the twelve parts—for example, of wheat and barley (and the distributions of all the other crops are to follow suit, as well as of all the animals that may be for sale in each district)—is |848a| to be divided proportionally into three parts, one of which is for the free citizens, one for their unfree servants, while the third is for the craftsmen and foreigners in general, including any resident alien communities in need of the necessary nourishment, and those |848a5| who are visiting at a particular time, due to some need of the city or of some private individual. When all the necessities have been divided up, this third part alone is of necessity to be for sale; there is to be no necessity to sell any of the other two parts.83 But how exactly would these divisions be most correctly made? |848b| Well, in the first place, it’s clear that our division is in one way equal, but in another way unequal. CLEINIAS: What

do you mean? ATHENIAN: It’s necessary, I take it, for there to be a worse and a better for each of the sorts of things that grow |848b5| and are nourished by the earth. {277} CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: In this respect, then, none of the three parts is to be better than the others, neither what is distributed to the masters and slaves, nor again what is for foreigners; instead, with respect to the equality of |848b10| qualitative similarity, the distribution is to assign the same to all. When each citizen has taken his two parts, he is to be in control of the distribution |848c| to slaves and free citizens, and is to distribute as much and of whatever quality he wishes. Any surplus is to be distributed by measures of amount and by number in this way: taking the total number of animals that must be fed from the land, he is to make his distribution accordingly. |848c5| The next topic is their houses, which must be arranged in separate locations. A fitting arrangement for these is as follows: there are to be twelve villages, one in the center of each of the twelve districts;84 and in each village the first thing is to select sites for a marketplace with its temples |848d| for the gods and for the daimons85 who form a retinue for the gods; and if there are any local gods of the people of Magnesia,86 or shrines of some other deities preserved in memory, they are to pay them the same

honors as did the people of old. And to Hestia, Zeus, and Athena, |848d5| and whichever of the others is patron of a given twelfth part of the territory, temples are to be established everywhere. Building, in the first instance, is to be around these temples, where the ground is highest, |848e| to form a stronghold for the garrison that is as secure as possible. And the rest of the territory is to be equipped by dividing the craftsmen into thirteen parts; the one to be settled in the city is again to be divided into twelve parts, corresponding to the twelve parts of the city as a whole, |848e5| and distributed round about it in the suburbs; and in each village the kinds of craftsmen useful to the farmers are to be settled with them. The supervisors of all these are to be the Chiefs of the CountryWardens,87 who are to determine how many and of what kinds each place needs, and where they are to be settled, so as to cause the least annoyance and most |848e10| benefit to the farmers. In the same way, those in the city |849a| are to be the responsibility of and be supervised by the board of CityWardens. The Market-Wardens, for their part, are to take care of each of the things having anywhere to do with the marketplace. After seeing to it {278} that no one does any harm to the temples |849a5| adjoining the marketplace, they must, in the second place, supervise people’s behavior, keeping an eye out for wanton aggression and moderation, and punishing anyone who is in need of punishment. With regard to commodities, they are first to see to it that each of the ones assigned to be sold by citizens to foreigners is sold in accord with the law. And there is to be |849b| just one law: On the first day of every month, the agents (that is, the foreigners or slaves who act as agents for the citizens) are to bring out the part that is to be sold to foreigners, starting first with the twelfth part of the corn. A foreigner is to buy corn, and whatever has to do with corn, |849b5| for the whole month at this first market. On the tenth day of the month, the respective parties are to sell and buy liquids sufficient for the whole month. And on the twentieth day of the month, there is to be a third88 market, for livestock, in whatever quantities the individual parties need to sell or buy, |849c| and also for all the equipment or things for sale by the farmers—for example, animal skins, clothing of any sort, woven material,

felt, or anything else of these sorts—that it is necessary for foreigners to acquire from others by purchase. But retail trade in these, or in barley, wheat |849c5| ground into flour, or any other sort of foodstuff at all is not for the citizens89 or their slaves, nor is anyone to sell or to buy from someone of this sort. It is in the |849d| foreigners’ markets that a foreigner is to sell to craftsmen and their slaves, doing the trading in wine and grain that is called “retail” by most people. And when the butchers have cut up the animals, they are to dispose of it to foreigners, craftsmen, |849d5| and the unfree servants of these. And any foreigner who wishes is on any day to buy any sort of firewood in bulk from the agents in the country districts and sell it himself to foreigners in whatever quantities he wishes and whenever he wishes. All the other sorts of |849e| articles and equipment that each individual needs are to be brought to the common market and sold in the place for each, where the Guardians of the Laws and Market-Wardens, together with the City-Wardens, have marked out fitting quarters, with limits established90 for the stalls. |849e5| In these they are to exchange money for articles and articles for money, not giving away anything without getting something in exchange. And anyone who does give something {279} away, as it were on trust, whether he gets back what is due to him or not, is to be content, as there is no longer any legal remedy where these sorts of |850a| transactions are concerned.91 If what is bought or sold is greater, or of greater value, than is in accord with the law stating how large an addition or subtraction from someone’s property must be before either transaction is to be done, then the excess is to be immediately registered with the Guardians of the Laws, whereas the opposite |850a5| is to be erased.92 The same things are to apply to resident aliens93 where the registration of property is concerned. And anyone who wishes is to enter with resident alien status on the following terms: There is a settlement94 for foreigners open to the one who wishes and is able to settle there, provided he possess a craft |850b| and does not stay longer than twenty years after the date of registration. He is to pay no alien tax, not even a small one, except that he be temperate, nor any other taxes on any purchases or sales. When the time

has expired, he is to take his property and leave. |850b5| But if during those years he turns out to have become noteworthy for some sufficiently good deed done for the city, and he is confident he can persuade the Council and the Assembly to grant by controlling vote his request for a postponement of his deportation, or even permission to stay |850c| for life, he is to present himself and make his case to the city, and whatever he persuades it to do, is to be carried out to the full. For the children of resident aliens, who are craftsmen and are over the age of fifteen, their period of resident alien status is to start when they reach the age of fifteen. |850c5| On these conditions, each may stay for twenty years and then is to leave for wherever he likes. If he wishes to stay, he is to stay by making his case in the way indicated. One who leaves is to go, after first getting the inventory of his property erased, which he |850d| previously registered with the officials.     1. See 759c–d. 2. Ameinon kai lô[i]on: A formula used in consulting oracles. 3. Pluto was the god of the underworld. See Crat. 403a, 403d–404a. “Scirophorion (June) seems to have been called Pluto’s month because it marked the turn of the year, when the fresh spring has lost its vigor” (England-2, p. 327). 4. See, e.g., Grg. 524a–c, Phd. 64d–65a, 85a–b. 5. See 663a, Cri. 48c–49e, Grg. 472d–479e, Rep. 353e–354a. 6. See 831a1–2. 7. I.e., the Supervisor of Education. 8. Thamyras was a legendary singer from Thrace, who boasted that he could beat the Muses in song. They retaliated by depriving him of his gift. He is also mentioned at Ion 533b, Rep. 620a. On Orpheus, see 669d5n. 9. See 795b6n. 10. Sphairas: Soft padded gloves. Himantôn: Leather thongs wrapped around the hands to protect them in boxing contests. 11. Eidôlon: See 959a–b. 12. Skiamachein ontôs: “Shadowbox,” as we might say. But here what makes “in reality (ontôs)” applicable is that one isn’t fighting even a shadow, but simply empty air. See Saunders-2, pp. 67–68. 13. Ontôs sphairomachein: By analogy with skiamachein ontôs, but now almost an oxymoron. In skiamachein one isn’t really fighting against anyone, so one isn’t really fighting at all. In sphairomachein one is really fighting against another, but with practice gloves, so—in another sense—not really fighting.

14. Eupsuchon: Literally, “good souled,” but meaning “of good courage” or “stout of heart.” See LSJ s.v. εὔψυχος. 15. See 631e–632a, 647c–d, 829c4. 16. See 865a–866d. 17. See 705a, 742d–743c. 18. Temples served as public treasuries, so that a temple robber is the equivalent of a present-day bank robber. 19. See 712c–713a, 714a–b, 715a–b. 20. Kêrux: The person who made announcements on behalf of the city government and carried out other official duties. See 917e2. No provision for their election or selection is made in Lg. 21. Again, roughly two hundred yards. 22. Double the length of its predecessor, or four stades. See 704b6n. 23. About twelve stades. 24. I.e., the other fully armed contestant in a race in full armor outside the stadium but one almost certainly competing in a sixth race, not in the fifth one against the hoplite. For a careful discussion of the many difficulties the passage involves, see Saunders-2, pp. 71–74. 25. Goddess of hunters and hunting. Apollo, though not a hunter, is also associated with the bow and arrow. See Burkert, pp. 143–152. 26. Gumnais: See 813b5n. Here it may simply mean “without armor.” See England-2, pp. 335–336. 27. See 785b. 28. Stolê[i]: Or “armament.” See LSJ s.v. στολή. 29. See 795b6n. 30. See 625c–d. 31. See 681c–d. 32. On whom, see 755c–756b. 33. See 796e, where a premature end was declared, and 813a–816d. 34. E.g., daimons and heroes. 35. See 828a–d. 36. I.e., the Supervisor of Education. 37. See 797d–802e, and on the secondary legislators, 771c–772d. 38. King of Thebes, husband of Jocasta, and father of Oedipus, raped and abducted Chrysippus, the son of Pelops, the king of Pisa in the Peloponnese, who had given him refuge, and is credited (by Euripides in his Chrysippus) with being the first man “to fall in love with a person of his own sex” and the “‘inventor’ of homosexuality” (Dover-3, p. 200). But whatever about that, paiderasteia, or boy-love, between an older man (erastês) and an adolescent boy (erômenos) was an accepted practice in Classical Athens and other Greek cities. Sex was common in such relationships, with the boy playing the passive role. Once he reached manhood, however, and his bloom of youth faded, that was supposed to change. On pain of losing his citizen rights, he could no longer be a passive sexual partner. Instead, he was expected to marry, have children, and become an erastês in his turn. Though erotic in nature, the relationship was conceived as primarily educative. By associating with someone who was already a man, a boy learned virtue and how to be a man himself. Rites of passage in some primitive warrior societies also involved sexual

contact between men and boys, and it is sometimes suggested that Greek paiderasteia too had its roots in a warrior past. 39. Reading τάχ’ ἂν χρῷτο πιθανῷ λόγῳ with Schöpsdau-3 for Budé τάχ’ ἂν χρῷτο ἀπιθάνῳ λόγῳ (“the argument he uses would probably be unpersuasive”). In the next clause καὶ is adversative (“but . . .”). 40. See 630d–631a, 688a–c, 705d–706a, 770b–771a. 41. Tou peisthentos  .  .  . tou peisantos: Also, “the persuaded” and “the persuader.” See Saunders-2, pp. 74–75. 42. Namely, philein, which corresponds roughly to our verb “love,” as when we say that we love (philein) our family, love (epithumein) chocolate, and love (eran) our sexual partners. 43. Koinê: Literally, “common.” 44. See 709e8n. 45. A promise unfulfilled in the sequel. 46. To de moi dedomenon hupo sphô[i]n itô: On the translation of this clause, see Saunders-2, p. 75. 47. Thyestes had sex with his daughter Pelopia, who later committed suicide. Oedipus killed himself (or, in some versions, blinded himself) because he believed he had unwittingly committed incest with his mother. Macareus, son of Aeolus, had a child by his sister Canace. On Aeolus’ orders, she exposed the child and killed herself. 48. I.e., the unwritten law that underlies it. See 838b1. 49. See 837e–838a. 50. I.e., communal messes and the avoidance of nonreproductive sexual intercourse. 51. A noted pentathlete and trainer, also mentioned at Prt. 316d. 52. Crison, “the runner from Himera” in Sicily (Prt. 335e), won the sprint in three successive Olympic Games, in 448, 444, and 440 BC. Astylus of Croton, also a runner, won in 488 and 484 BC. Diopompus was a runner from Thessaly. 53. Philias: Literally, “friendship” or “love.” 54. See the reference to “excessive and unfree exertions that do most to quell wanton aggression” at 835d8–e1. 55. See 626e, 633e. 56. I.e., the appetite not for bodies but for fine habits of soul. 57. See Rep. 499c, 540d. 58. Gennaiôn . . . eleutherôn: The first “surely excludes foreign women,” while the latter, which could simply mean “free,” is “probably to be taken in the more restrictive sense of ‘citizen’ women” (Saunders-2, p. 76). 59. Atimon tôn en tê[i] polei epainôn: In some cases, to be atimon is to be deprived of (certain) citizen rights, but—despite the next clause—this can hardly be its implication here, since deprivation of rights is prohibited in Magnesia. See 855c1–2, and on atimia in Athens, MacDowell-2, pp. 74–75. 60. As none in fact does. 61. See 762b–e, 780a–781b, 783b–c. 62. See 684e1. 63. Reading γεωμόροις (as at 737e2, 919d6) with Schöpsdau-3 for Budé γεωργοῖς (“farmers”). “We should have expected τοῖς ἀγρονόμοις [‘the Country-Wardens’] (see

below, d3)” (England-2, p. 359). 64. See 761d–e. 65. Tê[i] tôn melittôn hêdonê[i] sunepomenos kai katakrouôn houtôs oikeiôtai: The phrase has been understood in different ways. In some, the pleasure is that of the appropriator: “If any beekeeping enthusiast gets carried away and starts appropriating other people’s swarms” (Schofield-Griffith). In others, it is the pleasure the bees take in certain noises and those who make them: “If anyone appropriates someone else’s bee swarms, working on the pleasure bees take in certain noises, and thus getting them to like him” (Pangle). In others still both ideas are in play: “If any, yielding to his taste for bees, secures for himself another man’s swarm by attracting them with the rattling of pans. . . .” (Bury-1). Although Pliny, Natural History 11.22, claims that bees “delight in the clash and clang of bronze and collect together at its summons,” there is no evidence that they are in fact attracted in this way or that Plato’s contemporaries thought they were. Moreover, it seems utterly implausible that a law about stealing bee swarms would restrict itself to those stolen in a particular way (“rattling pans”) or to a particular sort of thief (“beekeeping enthusiasts”). Hence I have followed the interpretation proposed in Brisson-Pradeau-2, p. 323 n88, which avoids these problems. 66. See, e.g., Plutarch, Solon 23.5–6. 67. Ton meizô poleôs kosmêtên: I.e., the legislator. 68. Hê theos: For Athenians hê theos usually refers to Athena. But (pace Morrow-2, p. 438) that is unlikely to be its reference here. Probably Opora, the goddess of the ripened fruit of late summer, is meant. See Schôpsdau-3, p. 227. 69. The autumn equinox. 70. See 754e1n. 71. Attributed (in a slightly different form) to Solon, DL 1.57.139, and quoted again in yet a different form at 913c8. 72. Eleutherô[i]: On why the reference is in particular to a citizen here (as, e.g., at 816e8), see Saunders-2, pp. 76–77. 73. See, e.g., 731a–b. 74. Hoi tôn exêgêtôn nomoi: Not the laws they make but the laws for them to interpret, in particular those of Delphi (759c7). The pharmakeia “here mentioned was probably not commonplace poisoning but witchcraft, and to get rid of such spells was a religious business” (England-2, p. 365). 75. See 754e1n. 76. Epichôrios: Not just a native inhabitant but in particular a native citizen. See Morrow2, p. 112 n51. 77. Ta dêmiourgika technêmata: In contrast to the one that consists in the practice of virtue. See 847a5. 78. See Rep. 370b–d, 394e. 79. Anaireseôn tôn ergôn: See 920e–921d, notice anairoumenô[i] at 921a8. 80. Porphuran: A pigment made from the mucus of predatory sea snails (Murex), which was extremely difficult and expensive to harvest and produce. It was usually imported from Tyre in Lebanon. 81. Phutou: Literally, “plant.” See LSJ s.v. φυτόν.

82. Mête allou: On the restriction of the phrase to war materiel, see Saunders-2, p. 77. At 849c–d, other sorts of retail trade are allowed, and at 743d, 745d–e, and 949e, some moneymaking is tolerated. 83. Tôn de duo merôn mêden epanagkes estô pôlein: “The economic organization of Magnesia should preclude any need to sell the first two shares of the food supply; circumstances demand that one part should go on the market—that destined for craftsmen and foreigners in general” (Saunders-2, p. 78). 84. See 745b–c. 85. See 713d2n. 86. First mention of the name of the new city. 87. Presumably the so-called Guards-in-Chief. See 760e2. 88. Reading τρίτη with Saunders-2 for Budé τρίτῃ. 89. Astois: Not just a city or town resident but in particular a citizen. See Morrow-2, p. 112 n51. 90. Tekmêramenoi: See 823e1n. 91. See 742c, 915d–e. 92. Exaleiphesthô de to enantion: The verb exaleiphein is here the contrary of anagraphein (“register”), as its use at 850d1 confirms. The opposite is the opposite of an excess, which is a subtraction from the (citizen) seller’s inalienable property. The person to whom it is sold must register it as now his. It is this registration that is then canceled, so that the property reverts to its original owner, who could not legally sell it in the first place. On the law in question, see 744d–745b, 754e–755a, 914c–d. 93. Metoikôn: Often translated as “metics.” On the rather different status of resident aliens in Athens, see MacDowell-2, pp. 75–79. 94. Oikêseôs: “One or other of the special areas for houses of metics, to which the incoming alien will find himself directed” (Saunders-2, p. 80). Consequently, there must be a place available in such a settlement, something that depends on the needs of the farmers and ultimately of the citizens.

{280} BOOK 9 ATHENIAN: The judicial proceedings consequent on all the |853a| previous activities would naturally follow next in the orderly arrangement of the laws. Of the matters that require judicial proceedings, some have been discussed, namely, those having to do with farming and whatever accompanies these. But the greatest ones have not yet been discussed, enumerated |853a5| one by one, stating1 what penalty each must carry, and who precisely the judges are to be. These are the things that must next |853b| be stated. CLEINIAS: That’s right. ATHENIAN: In a certain way, though, the very act of legislating for all the things that we are now about to do this for is indeed shameful in a city such as this, which we say will be well managed and furnished with all that is correct for the practice of virtue. The very idea that in such a city someone could grow up to share in the worst sorts of depravity found in other cities, so that it is necessary to legislate anticipating it and threatening it, as if someone of this sort were to appear, and to establish laws for their deterrence |853c| and for their punishment when they do appear—well, as I said, this idea is in a certain way shameful. However, we are not, like the ancient legislators, making laws for heroes who were the children of gods, when, as the account now goes, both they themselves were descended from gods |853c5| and were legislating for others descended from such beings. On the contrary, we are human beings legislating in the present day for the seeds of human beings. So we are not open to blame for fearing lest any of our citizens might become as it were a “hard-shelled seed,”2 so tough |853d| by nature as to not admit of softening. And just as those seeds cannot be softened by fire, so these people cannot be softened by our laws, strong though they are.3 It is for the sake of these people, then, not in order to please them, that the first law I would state |853d5| concerns temple robberies,4 should any {281} one dare to do this. Indeed, that a correctly brought up citizen would ever be infected with this disease is not a thing we would wish nor is it in the least to be expected, but their unfree servants, foreigners, or the slaves of

foreigners, may well attempt many things of this sort. Especially for their sake, then, but also |853d10| as a precaution against the general weakness of human nature, |854a| I will state the law concerning temple robberies and all the other things of this sort that are either hard to cure or incurable.5 In accord with the principle agreed on earlier,6 though, preludes that are as short as possible must preface all these laws. By way of discussion and encouragement, |854a5| then, one might say this to that fellow whose evil appetite, entreating him by day and arousing him by night, drives him to carry off some sacred object: “My extraordinary fellow,7 the evil thing that now moves you |854b| and turns you toward temple robbery is neither human nor divine, but a sort of stinging fly8 that grows naturally in human beings as a result of ancient injustices that are unexpiated, and so it is still moving around in its abominable course, and you must use all your strength to take precaution against it. And what |854b5| the precaution is, you must now learn. When any of these sorts of notions takes you, go straight to offer expiatory sacrifices; go, as a suppliant, straight to the temples of the gods who ward off evil; go straight to the company of the men among you that are said to be good; listen to them as they say that |854c| every man is to honor what is fine and just, and try to say it yourself. But as for the company of evil men, flee from it, without turning back. And if, due to your doing these things, the disease abates somewhat, well and good; if not, then, fixing your eye upon death as a nobler thing, release yourself from life.” |854c5| These are the preludes we are to sing to those who have in mind any of these impious deeds that are destructive of the city. For the one who obeys, the law must keep silent,9 but for the one who disobeys, after the prelude, it is to sing in a loud voice: “Whoever is caught robbing a temple, if he is a slave |854d| or a foreigner, is to have his offense branded on his face and hands, is to be whipped, receiving as many lashes as the judges decide, and is to be thrown out naked beyond the borders of the {282} country.” For maybe after paying this penalty he would become better, having learned temperance. You see, |854d5| no penalty that is in accord with law aims at what is evil, but pretty much produces one of two effects: it either makes the one who receives the penalty either better or less depraved.10 |854e|

On the other hand, if some citizen is ever found doing such a thing, committing one of the great and unspeakable injustices against gods, parents, or city, the judge is to think of this man as already incurable, his argument being that even with getting the sort of education and nurturing he got |854e5| from childhood, he still didn’t refrain from the greatest evils. The penalty for this person is to be death, the least of evils, and due to which he will become an example that will benefit others, once he has disappeared as someone disrespected, beyond the |855a| borders of the country.11 As for his children and his family, if they escape the character traits of their father, they are to be honored and honorable mention made of them as having well and courageously escaped from evil toward good. But for the city to confiscate the property of people of these sorts would not be fitting |855a5| in a constitution in which the allotments are to remain always the same and equal in number.12 As for payments of fines, whoever commits an injustice and is thought to deserve a monetary fine, he is to pay it, provided there is anything left, over and above the full equipment of his allotment. He is to be fined up to that amount, |855b| but not more. By looking carefully at the exact facts about these matters based on the registers,13 the Guardians of the Laws are to make a perspicuous report to the judges on each occasion, in order that no allotment remain idle due to a lack of money. If someone is thought to deserve |855b5| a larger fine, and does not have friends who are willing to answer for him, and collectively contribute to set him free, he is to be punished with long-term imprisonment in places open to public view, and other sorts of humiliation. But no one, for one single offense, is ever to be entirely deprived of his citizen status,14 |855c| not even if he be banished from the country for it. No, the punishments are to be death, imprisonment, beating, sitting or standing in some degrading positions, standing before temples on the extremities of the country, {283} or payments of fines in the way we previously said |855c5| this penalty is to be paid. In cases involving the death penalty the judges are to be the Guardians of the Laws together with the panel of judges consisting of those officials from the previous year who were selected as best.15 Taking cases to court, |855d| summonses, and things of this sort, and the procedure to be followed, must be the concern of the younger generation of legislators,16 the voting, though,

is our task to legislate about. The vote is to be taken publicly. But before this, and face-to-face with the accuser and the defendant, |855d5| our judges are to be seated very closely together in order of seniority, and all the citizens who have the leisure to do so are to attend and be serious witnesses of such trials. First the accuser is to make a single speech, second the defendant. After |855e| these speeches, the most senior judge is to start his examination, going into the things that have been said until the investigation is sufficient. After the most senior one, each of the others in turn is to go through whatever he found wanting in some way in what was said or not said by either |855e5| of the litigants. And anyone who finds nothing wanting is to turn the examination over to someone else. Of the things said, the ones that seem pertinent are to be ratified by adding the signatures of all the judges |856a| to the written records, which are to be deposited on the altar of Hestia. The next day the judges are to reconvene in the same place and go through an examination of the case in the same way and add their signatures again to the things said. When they have done this three times, and have taken the evidence and the witnesses sufficiently into account, |856a5| each is to cast a sacred vote, swearing before Hestia to give, to the best of his ability, a just and true verdict,17 and in this way bring to an end this sort of trial. After cases having to do with the gods come cases having to do with the subversion of the constitution. |856b| Whoever enslaves the laws by bringing them under the rule of human beings, and the city subject to a political party,18 and does all this illegally, by means of force and {284} the stirring up of faction, this person must be regarded as the greatest enemy of the whole city. |856b5| And the one who takes part in nothing of these sorts, but who does hold one of the highest offices in the city, and either these escape his notice or, though they do not escape his notice, due to cowardice, he fails to take vengeance on behalf of his own fatherland—such |856c| a citizen must be regarded as second in evil. Any man who is even of little good is to inform the officials by prosecuting the plotter for violent, not to mention illegal, overthrow of the constitution. The judges for these people |856c5| are to be the same as for temple robbers, and the entire trial is to be conducted in the same way for these as for those, and winning a majority vote is to bring the death penalty.

To put it in one word: the disgrace and punishment of a father is to follow none of his children, except in a case where the father, |856d| grandfather, and great-grandfather have all, one after another, been condemned to death. These, with their own property, except for what is part of a fully equipped allotment, the city is to deport to their original fatherland. Then, of |856d5| the sons of citizens who have more than one son not less than ten years of age, ten are to be selected by lot from among those nominated by their father or their paternal or maternal grandfather, and the names of those winning the lottery are to be sent to Delphi, |856e| and the one the god chooses is to be established as allotment-holder in the vacated house—be it with better luck. CLEINIAS: Excellent. ATHENIAN: And as a partner, where the judges who must try the cases and the procedure of the trials are concerned, |856e5| a third law is to be laid down for cases where one person prosecutes another on a charge of treason. And concerning the children, likewise, whether they are to remain or leave the fatherland, this one law is to apply to the three cases of the traitor, the temple robber, and |857a| the one who destroys the laws by force. Again, for a thief, whether his theft is large or small, a single law is to be laid down for all cases, and a single legal penalty. First, he is to pay twice the value of the stolen article—if he is found guilty |857a5| in a case of this sort and has enough property, over and above his allotment, to pay. If he does not, he is to be imprisoned until he does pay or persuades the one who has had him prosecuted to let him off. If someone is found guilty of stealing from the public, |857b| when he has persuaded the city or paid double what was stolen, he is to be released from prison.19 {285} CLEINIAS: What exactly, Stranger, can we mean by saying that it makes no difference to the theft whether what is taken is large or small, whether from sacred or |857b5| secular places, not to mention all the other dissimilar aspects a theft may possess, whose various sorts the legislator must attend to by imposing penalties that are not at all similar? ATHENIAN: Excellent point, Cleinias! I was pretty much getting carried away, as it were, when you bumped into me, woke me up, and reminded me |857c| of something I mentioned previously, which is that where establishing of laws is concerned nothing has ever been worked out at all correctly, as

we can in fact infer from what has arisen just now.20 What, again, do we mean by saying this? It wasn’t a bad comparison we made, when we compared all those people who are being legislated for today to slaves being medically treated |857c5| by slaves.21 You see, it is necessary to know well the following: if one of those doctors who undertake to practice medicine on the basis of their experiences, without an account,22 were ever to come across a free doctor conversing with a free patient, |857d| coming close to doing philosophy in the arguments being used, getting a grip on the disease from its starting-point, and ascending to the entire nature of bodies,23 he would quickly and violently laugh and would have no “arguments” to state other than |857d5| those about such things that are always readily accessible to most so-called doctors about such things. “You stupid idiot,” he’d say, “you’re not medically treating the patient, you’re almost educating him, as if what he needed was to become a doctor rather than healthy.” |857e| CLEINIAS: And wouldn’t he be right in saying such things? ATHENIAN: Maybe he would—if, at least, he were also to keep in mind that anyone who goes through laws in the way we are doing now, is educating the citizens, not just making laws. Would he not also appear |857e5| to be right in saying this? CLEINIAS: Probably so. ATHENIAN: However, at the moment we’re a bit lucky. CLEINIAS: In what way? {286} ATHENIAN: In that there is no necessity at all to make laws, but |857e10| just to investigate for ourselves an entire constitution, trying |858a| to see the best as well as the most basic,24 and in what way it would come to be if it ever did. Moreover, it is now open to us, it seems, to investigate the best one, if we wish, or the most basic one, where laws are concerned. So let’s choose |858a5| which seems good to us. CLEINIAS: The choice we’re proposing is a ridiculous one, Stranger, and we’d simply be acting like legislators who were constrained by some irresistible necessity to legislate on the spot, because |858b| tomorrow it will be too late. But for us (god willing) it is possible to do as stonemasons do, or people starting on some other construction, to accumulate materials in no

particular order, from which we’ll select the ones that are suitable for the construction that’s going to be produced, and what’s more |858b5| to make the selection at our leisure. Let’s take it, then, that we are not now building from necessity, but rather still accumulating some things, at our leisure, while constructing others, so that it’s correct to say that some of our laws are already being established while others |858c| are being provided for. ATHENIAN: In any case, Cleinias, that way our unified vision25 of the laws would be more in accord with nature. In fact, let’s now take a look, by the gods, at the following point about legislators. |858c5| CLEINIAS: What point exactly? ATHENIAN: We have in our cities, I take it, writings, and arguments in writing, by many other people, but also writings and arguments of the legislator. CLEINIAS: Of course. |858c10| ATHENIAN: Are we, then, to pay attention to the writings of the others, of poets and those who, in prose or poetry, |858d| have put down in writing a record of their advice about life, but not pay attention to those of the legislators? Or are we to pay most to it? {287} CLEINIAS: Yes, by far the most. |858d5| ATHENIAN: But surely the legislator must not be the only one who is not to give advice about fine, good, and just things, teaching people what they consist in and how they must be practiced by those who are going to be happy? CLEINIAS: No, of course not. |858d10| ATHENIAN: But then is it more shameful for Homer, Tyrtaeus,26 |858e| and the other poets to put down bad things in writing about life and practices, and less so for Lycurgus, Solon,27 and all those who have become legislators and written things down? Or rather isn’t it indeed correct that of all the writings in cities, |858e5| the ones written about the laws are seen, when the scrolls are unrolled, to be by far the finest and best, while the writings of the others either follow these or, if discordant with them, are seen to be ridiculous? |859a| So what way do we think writings about laws must be in cities? Must the writings appear in the shapes of a father and mother filled

with love and possessed of understanding (nous), or in that of a tyrant or despot, as orders and prohibitions, written |859a5| on the walls, and left at that? So the question we ourselves have now to consider is whether we are going to try to speak about laws in this former way and, whether or not we are capable of it, at least show eagerness. |859b| And if by going this path, we must undergo something—well, let’s undergo it! May it be a good thing, and, god willing, it will be. CLEINIAS: Well put! Let’s do as you say. |859b5| ATHENIAN: First, then, since we have put our hand to it, it is necessary to investigate in an exact way what concerns temple robbers, stealing in general, and all acts of injustice, and we must not feel annoyed28 if, in the midst of legislating, we have established some laws, while still investigating |859c| about others. For we are in the process of becoming legislators, but are not legislators yet, though perhaps we could become them. So if it seems good to investigate the things I mentioned, in the way I mentioned, let’s investigate them. CLEINIAS: Absolutely. |859c5| {288} ATHENIAN: As regards fine and just things as a whole, then, let’s try to get a clear view of the following: the points on which we now agree with ourselves, the points on which we disagree with each other, and—since we would certainly say that we are eager, if nothing else, to differ from most people, at least—the points also on which most people disagree among themselves. |859d| CLEINIAS: What sort of differences among us do you have in mind? ATHENIAN: I’ll try to explain. About justice as a whole, just people, things, or actions, we all agree in a way that all these are fine, so that |859d5| if someone were to confidently affirm that just people, even if they happen to be shamefully ugly in their bodies, were, simply in virtue of their supremely just character, entirely fine29—well, practically no one who speaks in this way would seem to be speaking out of tune. |859e| CLEINIAS: And rightly so, no? ATHENIAN: Maybe. But let’s notice that if everything that possesses justice is fine, then the “everything” includes the things we undergo and the things

we do, in pretty much equal numbers. |859e5| CLEINIAS: So what? ATHENIAN: Well, a thing we do, to the extent that it is just, shares in the just to pretty much the same extent as it participates in the fine. CLEINIAS: And so? |859e10| ATHENIAN: So to agree that something undergone, to the extent that it shares in the just, is to that same extent fine, wouldn’t |860a| involve our argument in any discord? CLEINIAS: True. ATHENIAN: But if indeed we agree that there might be something one suffers that, though just, is shameful, then the just and the fine will be in discord, |860a5| since just things are being said to be most shameful. CLEINIAS: What do you mean? ATHENIAN: Not anything difficult to understand. You see, what the laws established by us a little while ago might seem to be declaring is entirely the opposite of what’s being said now. |860a10| CLEINIAS: Of what? {289} ATHENIAN: We established a law—justly, I take it—that the temple robber and the enemy |860b| of well laid-down laws should be put to death.30 And then, when we were about to establish a great many laws of this sort, we stopped, since we saw that these things one suffers were unlimited in extent and in magnitude, and that the most just ones were also |860b5| the most shameful.31 So surely just things and fine things will at one moment seem to us to be altogether the same, and at another to be absolute opposites, will they not? CLEINIAS: It looks like it. ATHENIAN: It is in this way, then, that most people speak discordantly about these sorts of matters, |860c| fine things and just things being so called without analysis.32 CLEINIAS: It certainly appears so, Stranger. ATHENIAN: Then let’s look again at our own position, Cleinias, to see how far it, |860c5| in turn, is concordant where these things are concerned.

CLEINIAS: What sort of concord, and with what? ATHENIAN: In the previous discussions I think I explicitly said in some way —well, if I didn’t say it previously, you must take me to be saying it now . . . |860c10| {290} CLEINIAS: What? ATHENIAN: That all bad people are, in all respects, involuntarily |860d| bad. And this being so, it is necessary, I take it, that the next argument follows. CLEINIAS: What argument? ATHENIAN: That though the unjust person is, I take it, bad, the bad person is involuntarily |860d5| such. But it is absurd to say that a voluntary thing is ever done involuntarily. The person, then, who does injustice would appear involuntarily unjust to the one who holds that injustice is something involuntary. And what’s more, as things stand, I must agree with him. For I agree that everyone does injustice involuntarily. And if, from a love of victory or a love of honor, anyone says that “yes, there are those who are unjust involuntarily, |860e| yet many do injustice voluntarily,” my argument is the former and not the latter. So, in what way, again, would I speak in consonance with my own arguments? Suppose you two, Megillus and Cleinias, were to ask me, “If that’s so, |860e5| Stranger, what advice have you for us about legislating for the city of the Magnesians? Are we to legislate or not?” “Of course, we are,” I’ll say. “And are you going to distinguish between the involuntary and the voluntary injustices for them, and are we to establish greater penalties for the voluntary errors and injustices, and lesser |860e10| ones for the others? Or equal ones for all of them, on the grounds that there aren’t really any voluntary |861a| injustices at all?” CLEINIAS: What you say, Stranger, is perfectly correct. What use, then, are we to make of these arguments we are stating now? ATHENIAN: That’s a good question. The first use we are to make of them is this. |861a5| CLEINIAS: What? ATHENIAN: Let’s recollect how, a moment ago, we correctly said that we were in a state of great confusion and discord about just things.33 With that in mind, let’s question |861a10| ourselves again: “Where the puzzlement about

these is concerned, we have neither |861b| found a way out of it, nor defined what exactly the difference is between these things, which in all cities and by all the legislators who have ever lived are regarded as two forms of injustices, voluntary ones and involuntary ones, and are treated this way |861b5| in the laws they make. Is the argument now being {291} stated by us, like something being stated by a god, going to say only this much and escape, giving no account at all as to why what it says is correct, but in a way just laying down the law?” That’s impossible. Rather, it’s necessary, |861c| before legislating, to show somehow both that these are really two things and what the difference is between them, in order that whenever someone imposes the penalty on either of them, everyone will be able to follow what is being said, and to judge somehow whether what was imposed is fitting or not. |861c5| CLEINIAS: What you say appears correct to us, Stranger. We must indeed do one of two things, either not say that all injustices are involuntary, or else, by first drawing distinctions, show that this is the correct thing to say. |861d| ATHENIAN: Now then, of these alternatives, the first is absolutely unacceptable to me, namely, not saying something while believing it to be true. For that would be neither lawful nor pious. In what way, though, are they two things, if they do not differ from each other in being involuntary and |861d5| voluntary? In what other sort of way they differ, then, is what we must somehow try to show. CLEINIAS: Well, about this anyway, Stranger, there is no other possible way to think. ATHENIAN: In that case, let’s try to show it. Come then, in the |861e| partnerships and associations of citizens with each other, many injuries are likely to occur, and among these what is voluntary and also what is involuntary exist in abundance. CLEINIAS: Of course. |861e5| ATHENIAN: In which case, no one is to set down all injuries as injustices, thereby thinking that the injustices among them become, in this way, of two kinds, some voluntary, others involuntary. For, of the total, the involuntary injuries are no less in number or magnitude than the voluntary ones. Consider, though, whether I’m making sense in saying what I’m about to

say, |862a| or not making any at all. For what I say, Cleinias and Megillus, is not that if one person harms another, not wishing to do so, but involuntarily, then, though he acts unjustly, he does so involuntarily, nor indeed am I going to legislate in this way, as one making a law for an involuntary injustice. On the contrary, I’ll set down |862a5| an injury of this sort as not an injustice at all, either greater or smaller, for the victim. But in many cases, when a benefit is wrongly conferred, we’ll say that the one responsible for the benefit does an injustice—if, that is, my view prevails. You see, my friends, it’s pretty much the case that {292} if someone |862b| gives some object to someone, or, on the contrary, takes it away, such an action mustn’t, on this basis, be called simply “just” or simply “unjust.” Instead, what the lawgiver must look to see is this: whether it is by making use of a just character and a just way of acting that someone benefits or injures someone in some way. He must look to |862b5| these two things, injustice and injury, and the injury he must, as far as he can, make non-injurious by means of the laws, restoring what has been lost, setting upright again what has been knocked down, |862c| and producing a remedy for what has been killed or wounded; and when he has achieved atonement, by means of compensation, in regard to those who did a particular injury and those who suffered it, he must always try by means of the laws to replace disagreement with friendship in them. CLEINIAS: That’s right, anyway. |862c5| ATHENIAN: Further, as regards unjust injuries and also gains (if by doing an injustice to someone, a person causes him to gain), he is to treat these as diseases of the soul, curing whichever ones are curable. And our cure for injustice must be said to incline in this direction. CLEINIAS: In which? |862c10| ATHENIAN: This: when anyone commits an injustice, great or small, the law |862d| is to teach and compel him in every way either never again to dare voluntarily to do such a thing, or else to do it very much less often, and in addition to pay compensation for the injury. To effect these things, whether by means of deeds or words, or with pleasures or pains, honors or dishonors, |862d5| fines, or even gifts, and, in general, in any way at all that one can make someone hate injustice and love (or not hate) the nature of

justice—this is precisely the task for the finest laws. But suppose the legislator perceives that someone is |862e| incurable in this respect, what penalty and law is he to establish for someone like that? He will know, I take it, that in all cases like this not only is it better for the people themselves not to go on living, but also that they will confer on the others a double benefit if they were to depart from life—by serving as an example for others not to do injustice |862e5| and by emptying the city of evil men.34 And so it is necessary for the legislator to assign death as |863a| punisher for errors of this sort, though never otherwise.35 {293} CLEINIAS: In a way what you’ve said seems perfectly reasonable. We’d be glad, though, to hear stated yet more perspicuously how the difference between injury and injustice and |863a5| between voluntary and involuntary actions have got blended together in these cases. ATHENIAN: Then I must try to do as you ask, and explain the matter. It’s clear, indeed, that there is this much, at least, about the soul that you say |863b| and hear in speaking to each other, namely, that one of the elements in its nature (whether a condition36 or a part) is the spirited element,37 and this innate possession, contentious and hard to fight, overturns many things by its nonrational force. CLEINIAS: Of course. |863b5| ATHENIAN: Moreover, we do not call pleasure the same as the spirited element, and we say that it holds dynastic power on the basis of strength of the opposite sort, since it is by forcible38 persuasion together with deception that pleasure does whatever it wishes. CLEINIAS: Exactly. |863b10| ATHENIAN: Thirdly, one wouldn’t be speaking falsely if one said that ignorance |863c| is a cause of errors. It would be better, though, for the legislator to divide this in two, regarding it in its simple form as a cause of light errors; its double form is where a person is ignorant because he is gripped not only by simple ignorance but also by the belief that {294} he has wisdom (sophia), |863c5| on the supposition that he knows completely what he does not know at all.39 When this sort of thing is accompanied by strength and force, the legislator must set them down as causes of great errors, and ones that show a want of musical education;40 but when

accompanied by weakness, like children’s errors |863d| and elderly people’s, though he will set these down as errors, and will prescribe laws as for those who commit errors, they will be gentlest of all and the ones showing the most sympathetic consideration. CLEINIAS: That sounds reasonable. |863d5| ATHENIAN: Now, practically everyone speaks of one person as being in control of pleasure and spirit, and of another as being defeated by them; and it is this way. CLEINIAS: It certainly is. ATHENIAN: But in the case of ignorance, at least, we’ve never heard that one of us is in control of it, |863d10| while another is defeated by it. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true. |863e| ATHENIAN: But these things, we say, all urge a given person in the direction of his own wish, though often he is being drawn in opposite directions at the same time. CLEINIAS: Yes, very often. ATHENIAN: So now I can define for you in a perspicuous way, without embellishments, |863e5| what I, for my part, say the just and the unjust are. For the tyranny in the soul of spirit, fear, pleasure, pain, fits of envy, and appetites, whether it does some injury or not, I call “injustice,” generally speaking; whereas the belief about what is best |864a| (in whatever way a city or particular individuals may think there are to be41 these things), if this, by doing the controlling in souls, regulated every man, even if at all mistaken,42 then everything done in this way, and the element in each person that is obedient to this sort of rule, |864a5| one must say is just, and the best thing for the entirety of human life. A harm of this sort is believed by most people to be an “involuntary injustice.” But for us, {295} as things stand, this isn’t merely a contentious argument about names. On the contrary, since it has been shown that there are three forms of errors, |864b| these must first of all be yet more firmly recalled to memory. Our first form is from pain, which we call “spirit” and “fear.” CLEINIAS: Indeed, it is. |864b5|

ATHENIAN: A second, in turn, is from pleasure and appetites. A third, distinct one is from expectations and belief aiming43 at the truth about what is best. When this itself is divided into three by being cut twice, we get five kinds,44 as we now claim. And for these five kinds, laws different from each other must be established, which are of two sorts. |864c| CLEINIAS: Which are? ATHENIAN: One covers actions that on each occasion are done by violent means45 and openly; the other, actions done secretly, involving darkness and deception; and sometimes what is being done is even being done by means of both of these46—in |864c5| which case our laws would have to be most harsh indeed, if they are to play their fitting part. CLEINIAS: Yes, probably so. ATHENIAN: After that, then, let’s go back to the point from which we digressed,47 and complete the establishing of the laws. We had, |864c10| I think, laid down the laws dealing with those who steal things from the gods and those |864d| dealing with traitors, and also with those who destroy the laws with a view to subverting the existing constitution. Of course, a person might perhaps do one of these things while mad, or suffering from diseases, extreme old age, or in a state of childishness, whereby he is no different at all from mad men. |864d5| If it should become evident to the judges chosen for the occasion, either from the doer of the action or the one alleging it by way of an excuse on behalf of the doer, that one of these circumstances obtains, and he is judged to have broken the law while so disposed, |864e| he is by all means to pay the exact compensation for any injury he has inflicted on anyone, but is to be freed from other {296} penalties, unless he has killed someone and has not purified his hands of blood. In that case, he is to leave for another country and place and live for a year |864e5| in exile; and if he comes back before the time that the law determines, or even sets foot in his own country at all, he is to be put in the public prison for two years by the Guardians of the Laws, and then released from imprisonment. Now that we have made a start on murder, we must try48 to establish in |865a| their entirety laws dealing with every form of homicide;49 and first let’s speak about the violent involuntary cases.

If someone in a contest or in the public games has involuntarily killed someone who is not an enemy,50 whether death occurs immediately or later as a result of the blows, |865a5| or likewise in war, or in military training (when practicing the javelin without armor or imitating some military action involving certain sorts of weapons), |865b| once he has been purified in accord with the law received from Delphi dealing with these matters, he is to be free of pollution.51 So, too, where doctors in general are concerned, if the patient dies due to things they did involuntarily, according to the law, they are to be free of pollution. If one person, by his own hand, kills another |865b5| involuntarily, whether by means of his own unarmed body, an instrument, a projectile, giving him some drink or food, applying fire or cold, or depriving him of air, whether he does it himself with his own body or by means of |865c| other bodies52—in all cases, it is to be regarded as someone who killed by his own hand, and he is to pay the following penalties: If it is a slave he kills, he is to make the death non-injurious and a non-loss to the master, thinking of the case where his own slave had been killed, or else pay a penalty |865c5| of twice the value of the dead person, a determination of the value to be made by the judges. He is to employ purifications that are greater and more numerous than those who kill in games, and such Interpreters as the god selects are to be in control of these matters. If it is his own |865d| slave he kills, once he has purified himself, he is to be freed, in accord with law, from the imputation of murder. {297} If it is a free person someone kills involuntarily, he is to purify himself with the same purifications as the one who killed a slave, and there is a certain saying that comes from the ancient stories that he is not to esteem lightly. |865d5| It says: When a person who has lived in the spirit of freedom dies by force, he feels anger, when he is newly dead, against the perpetrator, and being filled with fear and horror at the violence |865e| he suffered, and seeing his own killer coming and going in the places once familiar to himself, he is horror-stricken; and, being troubled himself, does all he can, with memory as his ally,53 to make trouble for the perpetrator himself |865e5| and his activities.

That is why the perpetrator is to avoid his victim for all the seasons of an entire year, and abandon all his accustomed places throughout his entire fatherland. And if the deceased is a foreigner, then his killer is also to avoid the foreigner’s country for the same period of time. If someone voluntarily obeys |866a| this law, the deceased’s next of kin, who is the one to watch to see that all these things come about, is to have sympathetic consideration,54 and, by making peace with him, would show especially proper measure in all cases. If someone disobeys, and dares, in the first place, to approach |866a5| the altars and offer a sacrifice while unpurified, and then, further, is unwilling to complete the aforementioned time in exile, the deceased’s next of kin is to prosecute the killer for homicide, and, if he is found guilty, |866b| all the penalties are to be doubled. If the next of kin does not prosecute for what has been suffered, it is to be as if the pollution has come round to him, due to the victim supplicating him on behalf of his suffering, and anyone who wishes is to prosecute this person, |866b5| and compel him, by law, to keep away from his own fatherland for five years. If a foreigner involuntarily kills one of the foreigners who is living in the city, anyone who wishes is to prosecute him under the same laws. |866c| If he is a resident alien, he is to be banished for a year; if he’s an out-and-out foreigner, in addition to the purification, and whether it’s a foreigner, a resident alien, or a citizen he has killed, he is to avoid for his entire life the country in the control of these laws.55 If he comes back {298} illegally, the Guardians of the Laws |866c5| are to punish him with death, and if he has any property, they are to hand it over to the victim’s next of kin. If he comes back involuntarily, then if it is by sea (if he is shipwrecked near the country), |866d| he is to camp out where his feet will be wetted by the sea, and watch for an opportunity to sail away, and if by land (if some people drag him in by force), the first city official who comes across him is to set him free and dispatch him beyond the borders unharmed. |866d5| If someone kills a free person by his own hand, but the deed was done due to anger,56 then we must first distinguish two cases of this sort. For sometimes it is done due to anger by people who, all of a sudden, and killing unpremeditatedly, destroy someone with blows |866e| or something of

this sort, owing to a momentary impulse, and immediately feel regret for the deed done. But killing is also done due to anger by those humiliated by words or dishonorable deeds who, pursuing revenge, later kill |866e5| someone, killing with premeditation, and feeling no regret for the deed done. So it looks as though we must set these down as two sorts of homicides, both pretty much done due to anger, and most justly described as being somewhere in the middle between voluntary and involuntary. |867a| Nonetheless, each of them is a likeness of one of the two: the one who guards his anger and doesn’t take his revenge all of a sudden on the spur of the moment, but, with premeditation, does so later on, is like the voluntary killer, whereas the one who does not store up his angers and acts from them on the spur of the moment, |867a5| all of a sudden and unpremeditatedly, is like the involuntary one. Yet even so, he is not an entirely involuntary one, although he is like one. That is why it is difficult to define homicides done due to anger |867b| and decide whether they are to be legislated for as voluntary ones or some of them as involuntary ones of a sort. The best and truest thing to do is to classify both of them as likenesses, distinguish between these by the involvement or the absence of premeditation, and legislate harsher penalties |867b5| for those who kill with premeditation and in anger, and milder ones for those who kill unpremeditatedly and all of a sudden. For one must more heavily punish the likeness of the greater evil, and less heavily that of the lesser one. So that is what our laws, too, must do. |867c| CLEINIAS: Absolutely. ATHENIAN: In that case, going back again, let’s say: if someone kills a free person by his own hand, and the deed is done due to a certain sort of anger and without premeditation, he is to suffer the other things |867c5| {299} that are fitting for the person to suffer who has killed without anger, but is also to be compelled to spend two years in exile chastening his own spirit. The person who kills due to anger, but with premeditation, is to suffer in other respects the same |867d| again as the former, but he is to spend three years in exile, whereas the other went into exile for two, being punished for a longer time due to the greater evil of his spirit.57

As for the return from exile in these cases, it is to be as follows. This matter, though, is difficult to legislate exactly. For sometimes the person the law treats as |867d5| harsher might be gentler, and the gentler one harsher, and the latter might have committed the act of homicide in a more savage way, the former in a gentler one. But, for the most part, things are as was stated just now. |867e| So the Guardians of the Laws must serve as the appraisers of all these. When the period of exile in each case has elapsed, they are to send twelve of their number to the borders of the country as judges, who during this time |867e5| are to have carried out a yet more perspicuous investigation of the actions of the exiles,58 and these are also to serve as judges where pity and permission to return are concerned, and the exiles, for their part, are to abide by the sentences of such officials. And if, after his return, an exile of either sort ever again does the same action because he is defeated by his anger, |868a| he is to go into exile and never return. If he does return, he is to suffer the same fate as the returning foreigner.59 If, due to anger, anyone kills his own slave, he is to purify himself, if someone else’s, he is to pay twice the damage to the owner. |868a5| If any of these sorts of killers disobeys the laws and, being unpurified, pollutes the marketplace, games, or other sacred places, anyone who wishes is to prosecute |868b| both the relative of the deceased who is allowing this and the killer, and is to compel the one to demand and the other to pay double the amount of the fines and of the other actions,60 and is by law to keep the payment for himself. If |868b5| a slave kills his own master due to anger, the relatives of the deceased are to do whatever they wish to the killer, except for anything {300} whatsoever that allows him to go on living, |868c| and be free of pollution. If it is some other free man that a slave kills due to anger, his masters61 are to hand over the slave to the relatives of the deceased, who are to be compelled to put the perpetrator to death, though in whatever way they wish.62 |868c5| If, due to anger, a father or mother kills a son or daughter by beating them or in some violent way (something that does happen, though rarely), the killers are to undergo the same purifications as the other killers and be exiled for three years; and when the killers return, |868d| wife is to be

separated from husband, and husband from wife, and they are never again to have children together, nor are they ever to share a home, or be a participant in sacred rites with those whom they have deprived of a son or brother. Anyone who is impious |868d5| where these matters are concerned and disobedient is to be subject to prosecution for impiety by anyone who wishes. If a husband kills his wedded wife due to anger, or likewise if a wife does the same thing to her husband, |868e| they are to undergo the same purifications and spend three years in exile. When the perpetrator of such a thing returns, he is not to share in the sacred rites with his children, nor ever to eat at the same table with them. If the parent or the offspring |868e5| disobeys, he is to be subject to prosecution for impiety by anyone who wishes. If a brother kills his brother or sister due to anger, or a sister her brother or sister, the same purifications, and likewise the periods of exile, as were picked for the parents and offspring, are to be picked in these cases too: |868e10| he is never to share a home, or share in the sacred rites, with the brothers he has deprived of brothers and the parents he has deprived of children. If anyone disobeys, he is—correctly and with justice—to be |869a| subject to prosecution under the already stated law having to do with impiety in these matters. If anyone is so lacking in control of spirit toward his parents that he dares, in the madness of anger, to kill one of his parents, and, before he died, |869a5| the deceased voluntarily acquitted the perpetrator of murder, then, when he has performed the same purifications as those who commit involuntary homicide, and as many other actions as they are to do, he is to be free of pollution. But if the deceased did {301} not acquit him, the perpetrator of such a thing is to be subject to many laws: |869b| for assault, he would be subject to the most extreme penalties; likewise, for impiety and shrinerobbing (for robbing his parent of his soul).63 So if indeed it were possible for one and the same person to die many times, then it would be most just for the patricide or matricide, who perpetrated the deed due to anger, to die many deaths. For this is the one case where, even if someone is defending himself against death, no law will allow killing |869c| a father or mother, the

ones who brought him as a natural being64 into the light of day, but will legislate that he must put up with all manner of suffering rather than do anything of this sort. What penalty would be fitting for this person under the law other than death? For the person, then, |869c5| who kills his father or mother due to anger, the penalty to be laid down is death. If a brother kills a brother in a time of faction, in a battle or some such way, acting in self-defense against one attacking first, he is to be free of pollution, as if he had killed an enemy. |869d| Likewise, if a citizen kills a citizen, or a foreigner a foreigner. If a citizen kills a foreigner in selfdefense, or a foreigner a citizen, he is to be free of pollution in the same way. Likewise if a slave kills a slave. But if, on the other hand, a slave kills a free person in self-defense, |869d5| he is to be subject to the same laws as the patricide. And what has been said about acquittal for the killing of a father is to apply in the same way to every acquittal in cases of this sort: if anyone voluntarily grants this |869e| acquittal to anyone, the killing is to be as if involuntary, and there are to be purifications for the perpetrator and, by law, he is to spend one year in exile. Well, that’s enough said about killings that involve violence, are involuntary, and come about due to anger. |869e5| Next we must speak about those that are voluntary and come about from utter injustice and premeditation, due to being defeated by pleasure, appetite, or fits of envy. CLEINIAS: That’s right. ATHENIAN: First, then, let’s once more do the best we can to say |869e10| how many things of this sort there are likely to be. The greatest is appetite, |870a| when controlling a soul made savage by desires. This is chiefly found where in most people there is the greatest and strongest desire, where money has the power to engender countless passions for its greedy {302} and unlimited acquisition, |870a5| because of the badness of their nature and their lack of education.65 And the cause of this lack of education is the singing of evil praises of wealth on the part of Greeks and barbarians. For by selecting it as the first among goods, when it is really third,66 they ruin both the next generations |870b| and themselves. You see, the finest and best thing of all for every city is that the truth be told about wealth, which is that it is for the sake of the body, and the body for the sake of the soul. So, since

there are goods for whose sake wealth naturally exists, it would come third, |870b5| after virtue of body and virtue of soul. This argument, then, should become a teacher, teaching that the person who is to be happy must seek not simply to be wealthy, but to be justly and temperately wealthy. And |870c| if this were so, no killings would occur in cities needing to be purified by other killings. But, as things stand, precisely as we said when we started to discuss these things, this is one cause, and the chief one, that produces the most serious of trials for voluntary killings. Second is a state of an honor-loving soul, |870c5| when it engenders fits of envy, which are harsh companions, especially for the one who possesses the envy, but in a secondary way also for the best of those in the city. Third are the cowardly and unjust fears that bring about many killings, when someone is doing or |870d| has done something that he wishes no one else to know is happening or has happened. So they get rid of potential informers about these by death, when they are unable to do so in any other way. These remarks are to be the preludes for all these cases, and in addition |870d5| to these, there is an account that many people, hearing it from those seriously involved in the mystery-rites67 concerned with such matters, are earnestly persuaded by. It is to the effect that vengeance for such acts is exacted in Hades, and that those who return here again of necessity pay the penalty that is in accord with nature, |870e| which is to have the very thing done to him that his victim suffered, and then to end his life by a similar fate, at the hands of another. Now, to the person who is persuaded and is utterly afraid of such a penalty, on the basis of the prelude itself, it isn’t necessary to sing the law in addition to this. |870e5| But for the one who isn’t persuaded the following law is to be stated in writing: |871a| {303} If anyone premeditatedly and unjustly kills by his own hand any of his fellow citizens,68 he is to avoid the places legally proscribed, so that he is not to pollute the temples, the marketplace, the harbor, or any other common meeting place,69 whether or not any person issues a declaration of exclusion70 against the |871a5| perpetrator in these terms. For the law declares it, and is always seen, and will always be seen, declaring it on behalf of the

entire city. And anyone who fails to prosecute as he must, or fails |871b| to declare the exclusion, if he is a relative of the deceased, no more distant than a cousin, on either the male or female side, would, first of all, receive the pollution and enmity of the gods, because the enmity of the law turns the edict of the gods71 against him; |871b5| and, second, he is to be subject to prosecution by anyone willing to seek vengeance on behalf of the deceased. And the one willing to take vengeance is to carry out everything pertaining both to the rites of purification and whatever other ritual practices the god72 has handed down concerning these matters, |871c| and when he has issued the declaration, is to go and compel the perpetrator to submit to the exaction of the penalty in accord with law. That all this must be accompanied by certain prayers and sacrifices to certain gods who make it their concern |871c5| to prevent killings from occurring in cities, is something it is easy for the legislator to make clear. As for which gods these are, and what way these sorts of cases are to be taken to court most correctly in terms of the divine, that the Guardians of the Laws, together with the Interpreters, the prophets, and the god are to frame laws for, and take these cases |871d| to court. The judges in these cases are to be the same ones as were said to give controlling judgment of those who commit temple robberies.73 If a person is found guilty, the punishment is to be death, and—in order to show that he is not forgiven, in addition to avoiding the impiety involved—he is not to be buried in the country of his victim. If he runs away |871d5| and refuses to stand trial, he is to go into permanent exile. And if one of these people does set foot in the land of the murdered person, {304} the first of the deceased’s relatives or of the citizens who comes across him is to kill him with impunity, or bind him and hand him over to the officials |871e| who tried his case, to be killed. The one prosecuting is always to demand bail at the same time from the one he is prosecuting, while the latter is to provide guarantors who are judged worthy by the court of judges concerned with these matters—he is to present three worthy guarantors |871e5| who are to pledge themselves to produce him at his trial. If a person refuses, or is unable, to provide

guarantors, the court, taking him and binding him, is to guard him and produce him for judgment at his trial. If a person, though he doesn’t kill by his own hand, plans the death of another, |872a| and after killing him by planning and premeditation, continues to live in the city, despite being responsible for the killing and not purified of it in his soul, then for this person too, on these charges, the parts of the trial concerned with these are to proceed in the same way, except as regards bail. If he is found guilty, he is to be granted burial in his own country, |872a5| but in other respects things are to proceed in the same way as described for the previous case. These same regulations about killing done by one’s own hand or by plotting are to apply to foreigners in relation to foreigners, to citizens and foreigners in relation to each other, and again to slaves |872b| in relation to slaves—except as regards bail. As regards this, as was said,74 just as citizens who kill by their own hand are to provide bail, so the person who issues the declaration of exclusion for the murder must at the same time demand bail also from these ones. If a slave voluntarily kills a free person either by his own hand or by planning |872b5| and is found guilty, the city’s public executioner is to take him in the direction of the tomb of the deceased, to a place from which he can see the tomb, and give him as many lashes with a whip as his prosecutor enjoins; and if the murderer is still alive after the beating, the executioner is to put him to death. If someone |872c| kills a slave who has done no injustice, fearing that he might inform about the killer’s own shameful and evil deeds, or some other such reason, then just as he would have been subject to a charge of murder if he had killed a citizen, he is likewise to be subject in the same way to the same things |872c5| for the death of a slave of this sort. Now if, however, cases occur which it is both a terrible thing and not at all an agreeable one even to make laws about, but where not to make laws is impossible (such as voluntary and utterly unjust murders of {305} relatives, |872d| either by a person’s own hand or by plotting, and which occur for the most part in badly managed and badly nurtured cities, but could also occur, I suppose, in a country where one would not expect them), then the account

related a moment ago75 must be related again, |872d5| in the hope that anyone who hears us will be better able to voluntarily keep himself away from the sorts of murders that are in every way the most impious. For the account or story, or whatever we are to call it, has been handed down from the ancient priests, and is perspicuously stated. It is to the effect that watchful Justice, the avenger of kindred blood, |872e| makes use of the law mentioned just now, and prescribes that the perpetrator of this sort of deed is necessarily to suffer the very same things as he did. If ever someone has killed his father, he must submit to suffering the same violent fate at the hands of his own children and their attempt to kill him at some time. And if |872e5| someone has killed his mother, it is necessary that he himself be reborn sharing in the female nature,76 and having been born, later on lose his life at the hands of his offspring. For when common blood has been polluted, there is no other purification, nor is the pollution disposed to being washed clean, until the |873a| soul of the perpetrator pays back killing for killing, like for like, and by this appeasement lays to rest the anger of the entire family. So a person should be held back by the fear of such penalties inflicted by the gods. But if there are those who are overtaken by a misfortune so wretched that they dare, voluntarily and with premeditation, to steal away the soul |873a5| from the body of a father, mother, brothers, or children, the law of the human legislator concerning these matters will legislate as follows concerning these matters: The declarations of banishment from places legally |873b| proscribed, and the provisions for bail, are to be the same as those stated for the previous cases. And if anyone is found guilty of such a murder, of having killed one of these people, the officials who are the assistants of the judges are to kill him and cast him out naked, at an appointed place outside the city where |873b5| three roads meet. And all the officials, acting on behalf of the city as a whole, by bringing a stone and throwing it at the head of the corpse, are to purify the entire city. After this, they are to carry it to the borders of the country and, in accord with the law, cast it out unburied. |873c| What, though, about the one who kills the person who is nearest and (as they say) dearest of all? What must he suffer? I mean the person who kills himself, violently robbing himself of his fated share of life, when not ordered to do so by any legal decision of the city, {306} nor compelled by

some exceedingly painful and inescapable stroke of bad luck |873c5| that has befallen him, nor been allocated some irremediable shame that he cannot live with, but from idleness and an unmanly lack of courage imposes this unjust penalty on himself. For this person, it is the god77 who knows the rest of the things—what the rites |873d| of purifications and burials must be in this case, and the next of kin must question the Interpreters and the relevant laws about these, and then act in accord with their instructions in these matters. But for those who perish in this way, burials are, first, to be solitary, |873d5| with no one buried in the same grave; second, they are to be ignominious, in those bordering territories of the twelve parts that are barren and nameless,78 and without either headstone or name to indicate the graves. If a working animal or any other sort of animal kills anyone |873e| (unless something of this sort occurs while they are contending for a prize in some public contest), the relatives are to prosecute the one who did the killing for homicide, and the judges are to be whichever and however many of the Country-Wardens the relatives prescribe. If the animal is found guilty, |873e5| they are to kill it and cast it out beyond the borders of the country. If any soulless object robs some human being of his soul, provided it is not a lightning bolt or some sort of projectile coming from a god, but is of some other sort that can kill someone, either through his falling on it or its falling on him, then the next of kin must appoint the nearest neighbor to pass judgment on it, |874a| as an act of purification from pollution on behalf of himself and the whole family; if the object is found guilty, they are to cast it beyond the borders, just as was stated in the case of animal-kind. If someone is found dead, though the killer is unknown, and even though they search for him in no careless way he cannot be discovered, the |874a5| declarations are to be the same as in the other cases, but to be declared against “whoever has perpetrated the murder,” and the prosecutor, after filing a lawsuit79 is to make an announcement in the marketplace to whoever killed so-and-so, found guilty of murder, |874b| that {307} he is not to set foot in the temples nor anywhere in the victim’s country, since if he should be found and known, he will be put to death and cast out, unburied,

from the victim’s country. Let this, then, be laid down as one of our controlling laws dealing with homicide. |874b5| Up to this point we have been dealing with cases of this sort and in this way. Now for cases and circumstances in which the killer would rightly be free of pollution. They are to be as follows: If he catches a thief entering his house at night to steal his property and kills him, he is to be unpolluted. If he kills a robber in self-defense, |874c| he is to be unpolluted. If anyone sexually violates a free woman or boy, he is to be killed with impunity not only by the one wantonly and violently aggressed against, but also by the victim’s father, brothers, or sons. If a husband finds his wedded wife being violated |874c5| and kills the violator, he is by law to be unpolluted. If anyone kills someone while saving his father—who is doing nothing impious—from death, or his mother, children, brothers, or the mother of his children, he is to be entirely free of pollution. |874d| Well then, about the living soul’s80 nurture and education (which are the things whose presence makes its life worth living and whose absence does the opposite), and about what the penalties must be in cases of violent death, let this be the legislation. What has to do with the nurture and education |874d5| of bodies has also been discussed,81 and what follows these, namely, the acts of violence, both voluntary and involuntary, that they do to each other, we must define as best we can, stating what they are, how many they are, and what penalties it would be fitting for each to receive. |874e| These, it seems, are the things it would be correct to legislate next. As for woundings, then, and maimings that result from woundings, even the least competent of those who turn to the arrangement of laws would arrange them next after cases of death. Now woundings are to be distinguished just as |874e5| homicides were distinguished: involuntary ones, those due to anger, those due to fear, and voluntary premeditated ones. A prefatory statement, then, must be made about all these sorts of cases, to the following effect: It really is necessary for human beings to establish laws for themselves and to live in accord with the laws, or else be no different at

all from beasts that are the most savage in every respect.82 |875a| The cause of these things is this, that no human being’s {308} nature is innately competent both to recognize what is advantageous to human beings in regard to a constitution, and, recognizing it, to be always able and willing to do what is best. For, first, it is difficult to recognize that |875a5| it is necessary for a true craft of politics to care not for what is private but for what is common, since what is common binds cities together, whereas what is private tears them apart, and that it is advantageous, both for what is private and for what is common, that what is common be established in a fine way more than |875b| what is private.83 Secondly, even if someone does get a sufficient grasp on the craft to recognize that this is how these things naturally are, and after this rules a city as an autocrat not subject to inspection,84 he’d never be able to stick to this doctrine and spend |875b5| his life always nurturing what is common in the city so as to have the leading role, and nurturing what is private so as to follow the common. On the contrary, his mortal nature will always urge him toward having too large a share85 and the pursuit of private advantage,86 irrationally avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure, and putting both of these ahead of what is more just and better. |875c| And producing darkness within itself, it will fill both itself and the whole city to the brim with every sort of evil. Yet if ever, by some divine dispensation, some human being was born who was by nature capable of getting a sufficient grasp on it,87 he wouldn’t need any |875c5| laws to rule over him. For no law or order is stronger than knowledge,88 nor is it in accord with divine law89 for understanding (nous) to be an obedient subject or slave of anything, but rather to be ruler of all things, if indeed it is genuine |875d| and, in accord with nature, really free.90 But, as things stand, such a nature is nowhere at all to be {309} found, except to a small extent.91 That is why we must choose what is second best, namely, order and law, which see and look to things that hold for the most part, but are incapable of seeing what holds in every case.92 |875d5| The reason these things have been stated is this: we are now going to prescribe what someone who wounds or in some way injures another must suffer or pay. Of course, it’s open to anyone to take us up on any point and

ask, quite correctly, “What wounding? Or of whom, or how caused, or when, are you talking about? |875e| You see, there are countless instances of these, and very great differences between one instance and another.” Now it’s impossible to turn over all or none of these to the judges to judge. But there is, in fact, one thing that applies to all of them that it is necessary to turn over to them to judge whether each particular instance of these |875e5| took place or did not take place. Besides, to turn over nothing about what the penalty must be for someone who has done one of these injustices, |876a| or what he must suffer, and for the legislator himself to legislate about all of them, of little importance and of great importance, is pretty much impossible. CLEINIAS: Well, after this, what is our argument to be? ATHENIAN: This: that some things must be turned over to the judges, whereas others |876a5| must not be turned over, but legislated by the legislator himself. CLEINIAS: Which ones, then, must be legislated and which turned over to the judges for judgment? ATHENIAN: Well, it would next be most correct to say that in a city in which the judges are wretched and silent,93 keep hidden |876b| their beliefs, deliver their judgments in secret, or (something yet more terrible than this) when they aren’t silent but full of noisy disturbance like a theater, judging each of the speakers in turn with roars of approval or disapproval, then the whole city is |876b5| usually in a grievous condition. To be compelled by some necessity to legislate for such judges is no lucky task. Nonetheless, if compelled, the legislator must turn it over to them to prescribe the penalties only in the smallest cases possible, |876c| but must explicitly legislate most things himself—if indeed he would ever legislate for this sort of constitution. {310} But in a city in which the judges are established, to the extent possible, in a correct way, and where those who are going to do the judging are well nurtured, and go through a very exact examination,94 |876c5| there it would be a correct, good, and fine thing to turn over to such judges the judgment of most things having to do with what those who are found guilty are to suffer or pay. For us, here and now, not to legislate for them, then, about the greatest and |876d| most common instances, which even rather

poorly educated judges would be able to see distinctly, and able to attach to each error the value of what is suffered and done, is not something subject to blame. So, since those we’re legislating for are above all in tune, we think, |876d5| with becoming judges themselves in such cases, most decisions must be turned over to them. Nonetheless, just as we’ve often said and also done in enacting the earlier laws, where we stated an outline and patterns for penalties, giving models |876e| to the judges of how never to go outside the bounds of justice, was then absolutely correct, it is what must also be done now as well, as we return once again to the laws. Our written law on wounding, then, is to be laid down as follows: If anyone |876e5| is minded to deliberately kill someone who is not an enemy95 (except for those the law sends him against), but wounds him, without being able to kill him, then the one who was so minded and who has wounded in this way does not deserve pity, is to be regarded as having killed him, |877a| and is to be compelled to stand trial for homicide. Yet out of respect for his not entirely bad luck, and for the daimon96 who took pity both on him and on the person he wounded, saving them, the one from his wound becoming fatal, the other from accursed luck and misfortune—out |877a5| of gratitude to this daimon and so as not to oppose it, the one who did the wounding is to be spared the death penalty, but is to be exiled to some neighboring city for the rest of his life, making |877b| free use of all the income from his property. As for injury, if he has done some injury to the wounded person, he must pay in full to the one injured, the value to be assessed by the court that judged the case, and the judges to be those who would have judged the homicide case if the victim had died from the impact |877b5| of the wound. If a child wounds his parents, or a slave his master, in this way, with premeditation, death is to be the penalty. {311} If a brother wounds a brother or a sister, or a sister wounds a brother or sister, in this way, and is found guilty of wounding with premeditation, death |877c| is to be the penalty. A wife who wounds her own husband, intending to kill, or a husband his own wife, is to go into permanent exile. If they have sons or daughters who are still children, their guardians are to administer their property and |877c5|

take care of the children as if they were orphans. If they are grown men, they are not97 to be compelled to provide maintenance for the exile, and they are to take possession of the property. If a childless person falls foul of a misfortune of this sort, the relatives of the exile, |877d| as far as the children of the cousins, on both sides, the men as well as the women, are to meet together and, in consultation with the Guardians of the Laws and the Priests, |877d5| appoint an heir for this household, the five-thousand-andfortieth in the city, thinking about the matter in this way and by reference to the following principle: none of the five thousand and forty households belongs to its occupant, nor even to his entire family, as much as it belongs to the city, both as public property and as private property; and of course the city must keep its own households as |877e| holy and as lucky as possible. When, then, one of the households becomes at once unlucky and unholy, to such an extent that its possessor leaves no children in it, but dies, either unmarried or else married but childless, either found guilty of voluntary |877e5| murder or of some other error having to do with the gods or citizens for which death is the penalty explicitly laid down by law, or when someone without grown male children goes into permanent exile, the house is first to be purified and freed from pollution in accord with law. Then the relatives, |877e10| as we said just now, are to meet together with the Guardians of the Laws to look for |878a| the family in the city which has both the best reputation for virtue and good luck, and in which several male children have been born. One of these they are to adopt on behalf of the dead man’s father and ancestors to be a son of theirs, and are to name him after one of them, |878a5| as an omen, praying that he will be a begetter of children for them, a guardian of the hearth, and an attendant to secular or sacred things with better luck than his adoptive father, and in this way establish him as lawful heir. |878b| As for the one who committed the error, they are to let him lie without name, children, or property, when such misfortunes overtake him. {312} It is not the case for all the things there are, so it seems, that the boundary of one is contiguous with the boundary of another, but where there is a bounding area, which extends |878b5| between the two boundaries, touching each of them, it would be intermediate between the two. And, in particular, the occurrence between the involuntary and the voluntary of

what is due to anger, we said,98 is something of this sort. So about woundings that occur due to anger let the law be as follows: If someone is found guilty, he is in the first place to pay double |878c| damages, if the wound turns out to be curable; if incurable, he is to pay quadruple damages. If it is curable, but causes great shame and disgrace to the wounded party, he is to pay triple damages. In cases where one person wounds another and injures not only |878c5| his victim but also the city, by rendering him incapable of helping his fatherland against enemies, in addition to the other damages, he is to pay for the injury to the city. For in addition to his own military services he is also to serve on behalf of the incapacitated person |878d| and take his place in the ranks in military exercises. If he fails to do so, he is to be subject to prosecution for avoidance of service, in accord with law, by anyone who wishes. The amount of the damages, whether double, triple, or quadruple, is to be assigned by the judges |878d5| who found him guilty. If one relative wounds another in any of these ways, the family members and relatives, women and men, as distant as children of cousins on the female and male side, are to meet together and, having reached their verdict, are to hand over the assessment of damages |878e| to the natural parents. If the assessment is disputed, those on the male side are to be in control of making the estimate; if they are unable to do so, the matter is finally to be turned over to the Guardians of the Laws. When woundings of this sort are inflicted by children on parents, it is necessary for the judges to be people over the age of sixty who have children who are not adopted but genuinely theirs. If a person is found guilty, they are to assess the penalty for such an offender, as to whether he is to be put to death, suffer something else greater than this, or something not much less. None of the perpetrator’s family is to act as judge, not even |879a| if he has lived for as long a time as the law has stated. If a slave wounds a free person due to anger, the owner is to hand the slave over to the wounded party, to treat him as he wishes. If he fails to hand him over, he is to remedy the injury himself. If anyone alleges the affair |879a5| to be a contrivance resulting from collusion between {313} the slave and the wounded party, he is to dispute the case.99 If he fails to win, he

is to pay triple damages. If he does win, he is to have the one who contrived it with the slave brought to trial for kidnapping. Anyone who involuntarily wounds another is to pay simple damages; for luck |879b| is something no legislator is competent to rule over. The judges are to be those picked for cases of children wounding parents, and they are to assess the damages. All the things done to people that we’ve mentioned are violent; and every kind |879b5| of assault is violent as well. So the point that every man, child, and woman is always to bear in mind about these sorts of things is that in the eyes of gods, and of humans who are going to be saved and be happy, |879c| what is older is in no small degree more worthy of reverence than what is younger. So to see an assault by a younger person on an older in a city is a shameful thing and hateful to the gods. On the other hand, it is fitting for every young person who is struck by an older one to bear his anger with equanimity, thereby laying up for his own old age a store of that reverential honor. Let the law, then, |879c5| be as follows: Everyone, in deed and word, is to show respect for one older than himself. Anyone, man or woman, who is twenty or more years our senior is to be considered as a father or mother and shown reverence. Indeed, for the sake of the gods of childbirth,100 a person is always to keep his hands off |879d| the entire generation of those capable of having fathered or borne him. Likewise, he is to keep his hands off a foreigner, whether longtime resident or newly arrived. For neither as instigator nor in self-defense is he ever to dare to chastise a person of this sort with blows. But if he thinks |879d5| a foreigner has wantonly and brazenly struck him and must be punished, while he is to avoid hitting him, he is to arrest him and take him before the City-Wardens, in order that he will be far from daring ever to strike a citizen101 in the future. The City-Wardens, for their part, |879e| are to take him and question him, showing proper respect, in their turn, for the god of foreigners.102 If the foreigner really seems to have struck the citizen unjustly, they are to put a stop to his foreign brazenness, by giving him as many lashes with a whip as the blows he struck. But if |879e5| he did not do

injustice, they are to warn and rebuke the one who made the arrest, and dismiss both. {314} If a person strikes someone of the same age, or is older but childless, whether it is a case of old striking old, or |880a| young striking young, he is to defend himself, as is in accord with nature, without weapons, with his bare hands. But if someone over forty years of age dares to fight someone, whether starting it or acting in self-defense, he is to be spoken of as boorish, unfree, and servile, and if he |880a5| finds himself incurring a degrading penalty, it would be fitting. Anyone who is easily persuaded by these sorts of encouragement would be tractable; but the one who is hard to persuade, and thinks nothing of the prelude,103 should have the law ready for him, which is to this effect: If anyone strikes a person twenty years or more his senior, |880b| then, in the first place, any passer-by, if he is neither the same age nor younger, is to try to separate them, or else be, in accord with law, a bad person. If he is the same age as the one being struck, or younger, he is to defend him as if the one being done an injustice were a brother, father, or some yet more senior relative. |880b5| In addition, the one who dares to strike his senior, as just described, must stand trial for assault, and, if he is found guilty in the trial, is to be imprisoned for not less than a year. If the judges |880c| award a longer period, the period awarded him is to prevail. If a foreigner, or a resident alien, strikes someone twenty years or more his senior, the same law concerning help from passers-by is to have the same |880c5| force. A person found guilty of such a charge, if he’s a foreigner and not a resident, is to pay a penalty of two years in prison; if he’s a resident alien who has disobeyed these laws, he is to be imprisoned for three years, unless the court awards him a longer |880d| period as penalty. A passer-by in any of these cases who fails to give help, in accord with law, is to pay a penalty too: a member of the highest assessment class, one mina; of the second, fifty drachmas; of the third, thirty; and of the fourth, twenty.104 The |880d5| court in such cases is to consist of the Generals, Company-Commanders, Tribe-Leaders, and Cavalry-Commanders. Laws, it seems, are made, some for the sake of good people, in order to teach them the mode of social intercourse with each other that would enable

them to live in friendship, others for the sake of those who have escaped an education, |880e| and, having a hard105 sort of nature, have not been so softened that they do not go toward all manner of {315} evil. They are the ones who must be held responsible for the things that are about to be said, and it is for them that the legislator is compelled to make these laws, |880e5| wishing that no need for them would ever arise. For whoever will dare ever to lay hands on father or mother, or their further forebears, by way of violent assault, fearing neither the wrath of the gods above nor that of the so-called Avengers106 beneath the earth, but |881a| despising the ancient sayings repeated by everyone, as if he knew things he doesn’t know at all,107 breaks the law—this person stands in need of some extreme deterrent. Death, however, is not an extreme one, and the sufferings said to await these people in Hades, though they are more |881a5| extreme than it, and are the most veridical, have no deterrent effect on souls of this sort. For if they did, there would never be assaults on mothers, or impious, reckless, attacks on other forebears. Hence the punishments for these people |881b| in their life here on earth must, as far as possible, be no less than those in Hades. So our next pronouncement is to be this: If anyone dares to strike his father or mother, or their fathers or |881b5| mothers before them, and is not in the grip of madness, then, in the first place, any passer-by is to render assistance, just as in earlier cases. If a resident alien renders assistance, he is to be invited to a front seat at the public games; if he does not render assistance, he is to go into permanent exile from the country. If a non-resident alien renders assistance, he is to have a commendation; if he doesn’t render assistance, |881c| a censure. If a slave renders assistance, he is to be made free; if he does not render assistance, he is to be given a hundred lashes with a whip—by the MarketWardens, if the incident occurred in the marketplace; by the resident CityWardens, if in the city but outside the marketplace; |881c5| and by officers from the Country-Wardens, if somewhere in the countryside. If the passer-by is of citizen birth,108 whether child, man, or (for that matter) a woman, in every case he is to render aid, crying out against the

impiety. The one who does not render aid is, in accord with law, to be subject to |881d| the curse of Zeus, protector of family and parents. {316} If anyone is found guilty of assault on his parents, in the first place, he is to go in permanent exile from the city to some other part of the country, and he is to keep away from all sacred places. If he does not avoid them, the Country-Wardens |881d5| are to punish him with a beating and entirely as they wish. If he returns to the city, the penalty is to be death. If any free person eats with such a person, or drinks with him, or associates with him in some other communal activity of this sort, |881e| or even, merely on meeting him somewhere, touches him in greeting voluntarily, he is not to enter a temple, marketplace, or the city at all, until he has been purified, considering his having associated with an accursed bad luck. If he disobeys the law and illegally pollutes temples and city, any official who perceives this and does not take to court someone of this sort is to have this be one of the most serious accusations against him in the inspections.109 |882a| Again, if a slave strikes a free person, whether foreigner or citizen, a passer-by is to render assistance, or else he is to pay the fine stated for his assessment class.110 The passers-by, together with the person struck, are to bind him and hand him over to the one done an injustice, |882a5| who is to take him, put him in shackles, and give him as many lashes with a whip |882b| as he wishes, short of diminishing his value to his master, to whose ownership he is to return him, in accord with law. And let the law be: Any slave who strikes a free person, not on being ordered to by the officials,111 is to be taken in bonds by his owner from the person struck, |882b5| and not to be released until the slave persuades the person struck that he deserves |882c| to live unbound. The same laws are to apply to women in relation to women in all cases of this sort, and to women in relation to men, and men in relation to women.

    1. Retaining ῥηθὲν with Schöpsdau-3. 2. Kerasbolos: Literally, “struck by a horn.” Such things were thought to become hornlike. The term is used to describe beans and other such seeds that do not soften when boiled, as well as people who are stubborn or inflexible. See LSJ s.v. κερασβόλος. 3. See 718d–719a, 765e–766a. 4. See 832a1n. 5. On the idea of crime as a disease in Plato, see Rep. 444b–e, Saunders-6, pp. 139–195. 6. See 722a–724b. 7. Thaumasie: See 626e1n. 8. Oistros tis: An oistros is a gadfly that infests cattle, but the term is used metaphorically to mean a sting or anything that drives people mad, such as any vehement desire or mad passion. See LSJ s.v. οἶστρος. 9. See 870e–871a. 10. See Prt. 324a–c, Grg. 525b–d, Rep. 380a–b. 11. Cf. Xen. Hell. 1.7.22. 12. See 737c–e, 739e–741d. 13. See 744d–745b, 754e–755a, 914c–d. 14. Atimon: See 841e2n. 15. See 767d. 16. See 846c. 17. Athenian jurors swore an oath whose gist seems to have been something like this: “I will cast my vote according to the laws (kata tous nomous) and using my most just consideration (gnômê[i] tê[i] dikaiotatê[i]).” See Demosthenes, Against Aristocrates 96. On the differences between Plato’s proposals and Athenian judicial procedures, see Morrow-2, pp. 280–295, and on Athenian procedures themselves, MacDowell-2, pp. 235– 259. 18. Hetairias: A hetairia in Athens was a political club or association. See Calhoun. 19. For another law on theft, see 941b–942a. 20. The law on theft is later somewhat modified. See, e.g., 941b–942a. 21. See 718b–723e, especially 720a–e. 22. Aneu logou: I.e., the account that provides the sort of knowledge of causes that the craft of medicine does. See 632d5n. 23. Cf. “Of doctors who pursue their craft in a more philosophical way, the vast majority begin with physics” (Ar. Sens. 436a19–b1). 24. To anagkaiotaton: Literally, “the most necessary.” I.e., the constitution that meets the most minimal standards for being a constitution at all; “the irreducible minimum” (England-2, p. 388). See 715b. 25. Sunopsis: “The subjects they learned in no particular order (chudên) in their education as children, they must now bring together into a unified vision (sunopsin) of their kinship with one another and with the nature (phuseôs) of what is.  .  .  . For the person who can achieve a unified vision (sunoptikos) is dialectical, and the one who cannot isn’t” (Rep. 537b8–c7). Notice chudên at 858b4 and kata phusin at 858c3.

26. See 629a–630d, 660e–661a. 27. Solon was an Athenian statesman and poet (c. 640–560 BC) and architect of the Athenian constitution. His poems in defense of his laws appear in Gerber, pp. 108–165. On Lycurgus, see 630d6n. 28. Duscheranteon: See 654d3n. 29. Kala . . . aischroi . . . pagkalous: See 630c7n. 30. See 854e–855a, 856b–c. 31. The discussion breaks off at 857a–b when Cleinias objects to the magnitude of the punishment suffered for theft being the same regardless of the value of what is stolen. The Athenian is pointing out that differences are pretty much unlimited and so hard to capture in legislation. The next point refers to punishments, like the death penalty, that are unlimited in extent and in magnitude or importance. These are most just, since they properly reflect the seriousness of the crimes, but they are also most shameful, since to be justly put to death for a capital offense is a shameful thing. This is the point of the question Socrates raises at his trial for such an offense: “But perhaps someone may say: ‘Aren’t you ashamed, Socrates, to have engaged in the sort of occupation that has now put you at risk of death?’” (Ap. 28b3–5). See Reeve-2, pp. 108–109. 32. Ta kala kai ta dikaia dierrimmena prosagoreutai: Dierrimmena is a perfect passive participle of the verb diarriptein, which occurs only here in Plato’s genuine works but is also found in the pseudo-Platonic Seventh Letter at 343d1 (Burnyeat & Frede), where it is coupled with elegchein (“examine”) and clearly means “analyze.” This is pretty certainly how it should be understood here and not as meaning that fine things and just things are “flung apart” (Bury-1) or “separate” (Pangle). The proposal in LSJ s.v. διαρρίπτω I.3 to read dierrimmena as meaning “indiscriminate” comes close to recognizing this. The idea is that because most people don’t analyze the notions of the just and the fine, they treat them both as pretty much the same and as completely opposite, in applying them in the ways they do. It is this that leaves them prey to the Socratic elenchus (from elegchein). Cf. Rep. 478e–479d. 33. See 859e–860a. 34. See also 728c, 735e, 854e, 942a, 958a. 35. Cf. Rep. 409e–410a, Polit. 308e–309a. 36. Pathos: Usually, “feeling” but here better translated more neutrally. 37. Ho thumos: The aim of thumos is “control, victory, and high repute” (Rep. 581a9–b1), so that it is “honor-loving” (553c1) and “victory-loving” (550b6). Cf., e.g., 870a5–8. At the same time, thumos and orgê (“anger”) are often used interchangeably, as at 731d4, 867a5, c6, 869a3, 878b8, 879c4, 935a4. In the pseudo-Platonic Definitions, in fact, orgê is defined as “the urging of the spirited element (thumikou) in the soul toward vengeance” (415e11). Aristotle too uses thumos and orgê (“anger”) in this way (e.g., Rh. 1369a7, b11) and very often uses thumos in contexts where its aggressive side is highlighted (NE 1116b15– 1117a9). But he also identifies thumos as the source of love and friendship: “thumos is what produces friendliness, since it is the capacity of the soul by which we love” (Pol. 1327b40–1328a1). Presumably, then, we should think of his thumos as passionate—as “hot and hasty” (NE 6 1149a30)—rather than as always aggressive. And this may be true of Plato’s notion as well. In the Cratylus, epithumia derives its name from “the power that

opposes the spirited element (epi ton thumon iousa), while ‘thumos’ derives from the raging (thusis) and boiling of the soul” (419d8–e1); ideas also found at Ti. 70b. Yet thumos, it seems, can also be sweet, as glukuthumias at 635c8 attests. Hence thumos is usually translated as “spirit” but as “anger” when it is clearly being used as equivalent in meaning to orgê. See also, Brisson, pp. 297–300, Reeve-3, pp. 93–100. 38. Reading βιαίου with Saunders-3 for Budé οὐ βίᾳ (“not by force”). 39. Socrates calls this sort of ignorance “the most blameworthy ignorance” (Ap. 29b1–2). See also Phlb. 49a–c. 40. See 691a. 41. Reading ἔσεσθαι with Schöpsdau-3, p. 304 and the mss. for Budé (following Bury-1) ἐφέσθαι. 42. Kan sphallêtai ti: On the translation, see Schöpsdau-3, p. 304. 43. Reading ἔφεσις with Saunders-3 for Budé ἄφεσις. Aiming does not imply hitting, as “even if at all mistaken” (864a4) makes clear. Ignorance can be exculpatory if it itself is not blameworthy. 44. Errors: (1) from pain, (2) from pleasure and appetites, (3) from simple ignorance, (4) from double ignorance accompanied by strength and force, and (5) from double ignorance accompanied by weakness. 45. Biaiôn: Bia, previously “force,” is now more naturally translated as “violence.” 46. I.e., it involves actions done by force and openly and actions done secretly. 47. See 857b. 48. Reading φόνου δὴ καθάπερ ἠρξάμεθα, πειρώμεθα with OCT for Budé φθόνος οὐδείς, καθάπερ ήρξάμεθα, [πειρώμεθα] (“We need not hesitate, now that we have made a start, to establish. . . .”). 49. On Athenian homicide laws and legal procedures, see MacDowell-1, MacDowell-2, pp. 109–122. 50. Philion: I.e., a fellow citizen or fellow countryman. Also at 876e6. 51. Katharos: See 716e3n. 52. As when his body hits another body that, in turn, causes the victim’s death. 53. I.e., the murderer’s guilty memory of what he has done. 54. See 757e1n. 55. For a careful discussion of the legal complexities involved in this law, bearing on who can prosecute a homicide under Athenian law, which Plato is largely following, and what sort of legal action he can bring, see Saunders-2, pp. 81–85. 56. Thumô[i]: See 863b3n, notice orgais at 867a5. 57. Megethei thumou: Literally, “magnitude of his spirit.” But the idea seems to be less the sheer strength of the spirit involved and more a matter of the size of the evil it represents (as 865b8 suggests) in the agent’s soul, leading not just to immediate action but to premeditation and perhaps long-term planning of revenge. A larger anger might be harder to repress; a smaller one, repressed, might lead to premeditated killing. 58. I.e., of the killings they committed, not what they did while in exile. See Saunders-2, pp. 85–86. 59. I.e., death. See 866c. 60. Presumably, the costs of the purification rituals, and so on.

61. Hoi despotai: “A curious general plural  .  .  . or does it possibly mean the master and mistress of the slave?” (England-2, p. 412). 62. “The resentment of relatives is allowed full play, in one of the nastiest of Plato’s laws: for in Athens such personal vindictiveness was prevented by having the slave killed by the public executioner” (Saunders-6, p. 228). 63. See 931a. 64. Tên ekeinou phusin: Literally, “the nature of that person.” 65. See also 831c–d. 66. See 697b. 67. Teletais: On which, see Burkert, pp. 59–60, 276–304. 68. Emphuliôn: Literally, “fellow tribesmen” but probably to be understood more generally as at Rep. 565e4. 69. See 868a. 70. Apagoreuê[i]: In Athenian law this has to be ratified by the basileus (the official particularly concerned with religious matters) before taking effect. See Ar. Ath. 57.2, MacDowell-2, p. 111. 71. See 866b. 72. I.e., the Delphic Apollo. See 865b1. 73. See 855c–d. 74. See 871e. 75. See 870d–e. 76. See 904d6n. 77. Again, the Delphic Apollo. See 865b1. 78. En tois dôdeka horioisi merôn tôn hosa agra kai anônuma: Horioisi almost certainly refers not to the borders of nameless and barren areas within Magnesia itself but rather to bordering territories that are outside it. See LSJ s.v. ὅριον. 79. Epidikasamenon: Not “after the prosecution is successful” (Pangle) or “when the prosecutor has established his case” (Saunders-1), since there was no one to prosecute successfully. On this middle voice of the participle, see LSJ s.v. ἐπιδικάζω II, Schöpsdau-3, pp. 339–340. For the same reason ton phonon tô[i] drasanti and tô[i] kteinanti ton kai ton are generalizing “whoever has perpetrated the murder” and “whoever killed so-and-so.” 80. I.e., the soul that is in a body. 81. See 813d–817e. 82. See 766a. 83. See 923a–c. Cf. Rep. 420b5–8: “in establishing our city, we are not looking to make any one group in it exceedingly happy, but to make the whole city so as far as possible.” 84. See 774b3n. 85. Pleonexian: See 906c. 86. Idiopragian: The word occurs only here in Plato. 87. I.e., of the craft of politics. Notice labê[i] hikanôs at 875b3 and hikanos . . . paralabein at 875c4–5. 88. Epistêmês: I.e., of the craft of politics. 89. Themis: “[The god] can’t be lying: that isn’t themis for him” (Ap. 21b6–7). 90. Cf. Rep. 499b2–c1: “All the same, we were compelled by the truth to say that no city, no constitution, and no individual man will ever become perfect until some chance event

compels those few philosophers who are not vicious (the ones who are now called useless) to take care of a city, whether they are willing to or not, and compels the city to obey them —or until a true passion for genuine philosophy flows by some divine inspiration into the sons of the men now wielding dynastic power or sovereignty, or into the men themselves.” 91. See Rep. 496a–e. 92. See Polit. 292b–302b, especially 294a–c, 297e, on why rule by laws is second best and on the issue of rule by law vs. rule by a human being, Ar. Pol. 1286a7–1287b25. 93. Aphôna: See 766d. 94. See 753e1n. 95. Philion: See 865a5n. 96. See 713d2n. 97. Reading μὴ with Saunders-2, pp. 88–90 and the mss. for Budé ἤδη (“if they are already grown men, they are to be compelled. . . .”). 98. See 866e–867a. 99. See 936c–e. 100. See 784a4n. 101. Epichôrion: Also at 879e3. See 846d2n. 102. I.e., Zeus. See 730a2. 103. Beginning at 879b. 104. See 744c–d 105. Ateramoni: Like kerasbolos at 853d1. 106. Reading τιμωρῶν with Bury-1 for Budé and mss. τιμωριῶν. See Schöpsdau-3, p. 363. 107. Cf. “No one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all goods for people, but they fear it as if they knew for certain that it’s the worst thing of all. Yet surely this is the most blameworthy ignorance of thinking one knows what one doesn’t know” (Ap. 29a6– b2). 108. Epichôrios: See 846d2n. 109. Euthunais: See 774b3n. 110. See 880d. 111. See 794b–c.

{317} BOOK 10 ATHENIAN: After assaults, let one universal law |884a| be stated concerning all sorts of violence1 as follows: No one is to carry off or drive off anything belonging to others, or use anything belonging to his neighbors, if he hasn’t persuaded the owner. For from things of this sort all the evils mentioned have stemmed, |884a5| do stem, and will stem. Of those that remain, the most serious are the intemperate and wantonly aggressive2 acts of the young, which are serious in the highest degree when they are against sacred things, exceedingly serious when against things that are public as well as holy, or are held in common by the members of a part of the city, such as the members of a tribe or of some other community of this sort. Those against private scared things and tombs are second |885a| and second in seriousness. Third is when someone commits an act of wanton aggression (apart from the cases discussed earlier3) against parents. A fourth kind of wanton aggression is when someone, ignoring the rulers, drives off, carries off, or uses something belonging to them without persuading them. A fifth would be treating in a wantonly aggressive way, calling for judicial redress, the citizen status that each individual citizen has. A law is to be given openly4 for each of these cases. For temple robbery, whether violent or in secret, what is to be suffered has been summarily stated.5 But what things are to be suffered by someone who, in word or in deed, is wantonly aggressive where the gods are concerned, |885b| when speaking or acting, must be stated after the encouragement.6 Let it be as follows: No one who believes in the existence of gods, in accord with the laws,7 has ever voluntarily done an impious deed or uttered a lawless word, |885b5| unless he is suffering from one {318} of three things: either he does not believe this, namely, what I’ve just said;8 or, second, he believes they exist but give no thought to human beings; or, third, he believes they are easily persuaded by offerings of sacrifices and prayers.9 CLEINIAS: So what should we do or say to these people? |885c| ATHENIAN: Let us first listen, good sir, to the things that I surmise they say —by way of despising us—to make fun of us.

CLEINIAS: What sort of things? ATHENIAN: These are the things that they might perhaps, when teasing us, say: “Strangers |885c5| from Athens, Sparta, and Cnossos, what you say is true. For some of us don’t believe in gods at all, while others believe them to be as you say. So we demand of you, just as you demanded where laws are concerned,10 that before you threaten us harshly, |885d| you try to persuade us and teach us that gods exist, stating sufficient proofs, and that they are too good to be turned against justice due to being charmed by certain gifts. For as things stand, when we hear these and other such things from whose who are said |885d5| to be the best of the poets, orators, prophets, priests, and thousands and thousands of others, most of us do not turn to not doing injustices, but rather, after having done them, try to make amends. So from legislators who claim to be not |885e| savage but gentle, we demand that persuasion be used on us first. Even if you do not speak much better than the others about the existence of gods, but are in fact better as regards the truth, perhaps we might be persuaded by you. Well then, if we say something properly measured, try |885e5| to respond to our challenge.” CLEINIAS: But doesn’t it seem an easy matter, Stranger, to assert with truth that gods exist? ATHENIAN: How so? |886a| CLEINIAS: Well, in the first place, there’s the earth, the sun, the stars, the universe as a whole, and the beautiful orderly procession of the seasons, divided into years and months; and then there’s the fact that all Greeks and barbarians believe that gods exist. |886a5| {319} ATHENIAN: I’m afraid—for I’d certainly never say that I’m ashamed —in case these depraved people somehow despise us.11 For you two don’t know about the cause of our disagreement with them, but believe that it’s only because of a lack of control of pleasures and appetites that their souls are impelled toward the impious life. |886b| CLEINIAS: But what cause in addition to these could there be, Stranger? ATHENIAN: Something that you two, since you live entirely outside it, would scarcely know about, but that would escape your notice. |886b5| CLEINIAS: What are you talking about now?

ATHENIAN: A very dangerous sort of ignorance that seems to be the greatest wisdom. CLEINIAS: What do you mean? ATHENIAN: In Athens there are accounts set down in writing (which |886b10| do not exist in your countries, because of the virtue of your constitutions, so I’m told), some of them |886c| in a sort of meter, others without meter, speaking about the gods. The most ancient tell how the universe’s12 first nature and that of the rest came to be, and then, going not much beyond the starting-point, they go through the birth of the gods and how, having come to be, the gods had intercourse |886c5| with each other.13 As to whether these have some other effect on their hearers, whether fine or not fine, it is not easy to evaluate, for they are by ancient authors, but as regards services and honors for parents, I, at least, would never praise them either as beneficial, or even as |886d| in any way stating what is really the case.14 Well, what has to do with the ancients, we must leave and say goodbye to, and must speak of in whatever way is pleasing to the gods. On the other hand, what comes from our modern wise people we must—to the extent that it is a cause of bad things—censure. Now, what is achieved by the arguments of such people is this: when I and you state proofs that |886d5| gods exist, and put forward these very things—sun, moon, stars, and earth —as gods and divine beings, those who are persuaded {320} by these wise people would say that these things are earth and stones,15 and incapable of giving |886e| any thought to human affairs, but have been somehow disguised by arguments that produce persuasion. CLEINIAS: The argument you’ve mentioned, Stranger, is certainly dangerous, even if it was the only one. But as there are, in fact, very many, |886e5| it is yet more dangerous. ATHENIAN: So what now? What are we to say? What must we do? Are we to defend ourselves, as if someone were bringing an accusation against us before impious people, where they say to us who are accused in connection with our legislation, that we are doing terrible things in legislating on the supposition that gods really exist. |887a| Or, letting matters stand, are we to say goodbye, turning back to laws again, in case our prelude becomes longer than the laws? For the argument, once developed, would not be brief,

if we wished, by means of properly measured arguments, to demonstrate to those with an appetite for impiety |887a5| the things they told us to speak about, to turn them toward fear, and, having made them feel disgust,16 only after that then legislate what is fitting for them. CLEINIAS: But, Stranger, we’ve often said17—anyway, given the short time we’ve been talking—this |887b| very thing, that in the present circumstances there’s no need to prefer short-speaking over long. For there’s no one hot on our heels, as the saying goes. So, it would be ridiculous and bad for us to give the impression that we choose the shorter in preference to the best. |887b5| But it makes no small difference, of course, that our arguments that gods exist and are good, honoring justice much, much more than human beings do, have some degree or other of persuasiveness. For this would be pretty much our finest and best prelude for |887c| all the laws. So without feeling disgusted18 or being hurried along, with whatever capacity we have for persuasiveness in regard to such arguments, let’s go through them in as satisfactory a way as we can, leaving nothing out. |887c5| ATHENIAN: It seems to me that the argument you’re now talking about calls for a prayer, since you urge us on so spiritedly; and it is no {321} longer possible to put off stating it. Come, then, how should someone speak, without spirit,19 about the gods, arguing that they exist? For it is, of course, necessary to find hard to bear, even to hate, those who are responsible for our having had to produce these arguments, |887d| and having to produce them now, because of their not believing the stories which they heard from their nurses and mothers from the time they were young children still being nurtured on milk, when they were spoken—whether with playful or serious intent—like incantations.20 They heard them, too, |887d5| in the prayers at sacrifices, and saw spectacles accompanying them, which are most pleasant for a young person to see and hear, being performed at sacrifices. They saw their own parents’ absolute seriousness when in prayers and supplications, on their own and their children’s behalf, they conversed with gods, on the supposition that they |887e| most of all really exist. At the rising of the sun and moon, and at their settings, they heard and saw the prostrations and adorations of all the Greeks and barbarians, in every sort of misfortune and in times of doing well, not on |887e5| the supposition that these gods do not really exist, but on the supposition that they most of all really exist, and

give no grounds whatever for the suspicion that they are not gods. Those people despise all this, on the basis of not one single satisfactory argument, as those who possess even a shred of understanding (nous) would affirm, and now compel us to say what we are saying. How, I ask, could someone, in gentle |888a| words, admonish and at the same time teach these people that, first, gods do exist? Yet it must be dared. For both sides mustn’t be mad at the same time, at least, some of us due to gluttony for pleasure, others due to having their spirit aroused by such people. So, let our prefatory speech |888a5| to these who are in this way corrupt in their thinking proceed, without spirit, something as follows, and let us speak gently, quenching our spirit, as if in dialogue with one such person: “My child, you are young, and time, as it goes by, will make you change many of the beliefs you now hold into their opposites. |888b| So wait until then before becoming a judge of the greatest things—and the greatest, which you now consider nothing, is to live in a fine way, or not, in thinking correctly about the gods. Now, in the first place, by reminding you of one great thing about them, I couldn’t ever be uttering a falsehood. |888b5| It is to this effect: “Neither you alone nor your friends are the first and foremost to have held this belief about the gods; on the contrary, people who have {322} this disease, whether many or few, are always springing up. And I, who have come across many of them, can tell you this: no one who has held from youth this belief about gods not existing |888c| has ever continued persisting in this way of thinking till old age. The other two feelings about the gods, however, do persist (not in many people, but they persist in some): that while the gods do exist, they give no thought to human beings; also the one after this, |888c5| that they do give thought to them, but are easily appeased by sacrifices and prayers. For if you’re persuaded by me, you’ll wait until a doctrine about these things becomes as perspicuous as possible to you, investigating whether things stand thus or otherwise, and learning from others, |888d| and above all from the legislator. In the meantime do not dare do anything impious concerning the gods. For those who establish the laws for you must try now and in the future to teach about how these things stand.” |888d5| CLEINIAS: What’s been said up to now, Stranger, is as fine as fine could be with us.

ATHENIAN: Absolutely, Megillus and Cleinias. But without our noticing it, we’ve fallen into an amazing argument. CLEINIAS: Which do you mean? |888d10| ATHENIAN: The one believed by many to be the wisest |888e| of all arguments. CLEINIAS: Explain yet more perspicuously. ATHENIAN: Some people say,21 I take it, that all things that come to be, have come to be, and will come to be do so by nature, |888e5| by craft, or due to luck. CLEINIAS: Is that not right? ATHENIAN: Well, it’s at least likely, I imagine, that what wise men say is correct. Let’s follow them, in any case, and investigate what exactly |889a| the ones over on that side actually have in mind. CLEINIAS: Absolutely. ATHENIAN: It’s likely, they say, that the greatest and finest of these are produced by nature and chance, the smaller ones by craft, |889a5| which, receiving from nature the source of its greatest and first works, molds and constructs all the smaller ones that we all call “crafted.” CLEINIAS: What do you mean? {323} ATHENIAN: I could state it yet more perspicuously as follows. Fire, water, earth, |889b| and air all exist due to nature and luck, they say, whereas none of these exists due to craft; and the bodies, on the other hand, that appear after these22—those having to do with the earth, sun, moon, and stars —come to be thanks to these, being entirely soulless. And each moving due to luck, |889b5| in virtue of the capacity each has, when they meet and somehow harmonize properly, hot things with cold ones, dry ones with wet ones, and soft ones with hard ones, and all such things which, by mixing with their opposites in accord with |889c| luck, have of necessity been mixed together—in this way and in accord with these factors, the universe as a whole23 and all the things in the heavens have come to be, and, in turn, once all the seasons had come to be from these,24 all animals and plants, not due to understanding (nous), they say, nor due to some |889c5| god, nor due to craft, but as we were saying, due to nature and luck.

Craft is later, coming to be from these25 later on. Itself mortal and coming from mortals, it later brought certain playthings into being, |889d| which do not partake much of truth, but are sorts of images akin to the crafts themselves, such as painting produces, and music, and whatever crafts are assistant to these.26 Some of the crafts, though, do bring something serious into being; these are the ones whose |889d5| capacity makes common cause with nature, such as medicine, farming, and gymnastic training. And, in particular, some small part of the craft of politics, they say, goes shares with nature, although most of it is due to craft. Hence, too, legislation in its entirety is not due to nature, but due to craft, |889e| when its enactments are not true. CLEINIAS: What do you mean? ATHENIAN: Gods, my blessedly happy friend, are the first thing that these people say exist due to craft—not due to nature, but due to certain laws, which differ from one place to another, depending on |889e5| what each group agreed to among themselves when they established their laws. And what’s more, they say that though some things are fine due {324} to nature, others are fine due to law, and, in particular, the just ones do not at all exist due to nature—instead, people are always disputing with each other and always changing these, and each change they make, when they make it, has control at that time, |889e10| having come to be due to craft and laws but certainly not due to a certain nature. |890a| All these, my friends, are the views of men who, in the judgment of young people, are wise—prose writers and poets who say that what is most just is whatever can win by force.27 From this come the impieties that attack young people, who suppose that gods are not as the |890a5| law prescribes they must be thought to be; and factions occur because of these, when they draw people toward the life that is correct in accord with nature, which is in truth to live controlling the rest and not being a slave to others in accord with law. CLEINIAS: What an argument you’ve gone through, Stranger, and what ruin |890b| for young people, both in public life in cities and in private households!

ATHENIAN: That’s certainly true, Cleinias. So what do you think the legislator is to do, in the face of things established from olden times? Is he simply to stand up in front of the city and threaten all the people |890b5| that unless they say that gods exist, and think and believe that they are such as the laws say they are (and about fine and just things, about all the greatest ones, and whatever tends toward virtue or vice, the account is the same, namely, that it is necessary to think and act |890c| in precisely the way the legislator has instructed in writing), and that whoever does not show himself obedient to the laws must in one case die, in another be punished with a beating and imprisonment, in another with dishonor, and in others with poverty |890c5| and exile? But when it comes to persuasion for these people, is he, at the same time as he establishes the laws for these, to have none of it attaching to his words, to make them as gently acquiescent as possible? CLEINIAS: Not at all, Stranger. On the contrary, if indeed there turns out to be |890d| even some little bit of persuasion having to do with matters like these, then even a legislator of little merit must in no way grow tired, but must, as the saying goes, “throw his entire voice into it,” and become an ally of the ancient argument that gods do exist, and all the other things you went through just now. And, in particular, |890d5| he must come to the aid of law itself and craft, as things that exist due to nature, or to something not inferior to nature, if indeed they are—in accord {325} with a correct argument—the offspring of understanding (nous),28 which is what you seem to me to be saying; and, as things stand, I’m putting my trust in you. ATHENIAN: That’s most spirited29 of you, Cleinias! But, I ask you, isn’t it difficult |890e| to follow things said in this way, by means of arguments offered to crowds of people, and, moreover, having enormous length? CLEINIAS: What, Stranger? About drunkenness and music, we put up with ourselves speaking at this sort of length, but we’re not going to put up with this about gods |890e5| and things of this sort? Quite apart from which, it is, I imagine, a great help to wise legislation, because when the prescriptions pertaining to laws are put down in writing, as |891a| if being handed over to be tested for all time, they remain fixed.30 So, one must not fear either if they are difficult to listen to at the start (since a slow learner will be able to go back and look at them often), or if they are lengthy, but beneficial. And

because of these things, it is neither reasonable nor |891a5| pious, it seems to me anyway, for any man not to come to the aid of these arguments as much as he possibly can. MEGILLUS: What Cleinias says, Stranger, seems excellent to me. ATHENIAN: It certainly is, Megillus, and we must do as he says. |891b| Of course, if arguments of this sort hadn’t been sown like seed in (one might almost say) all human beings, there’d be no need of arguments in defense of the existence of gods. But as things stand, they are necessary. When, then, the greatest laws are being destroyed by bad people, |891b5| who is more fitting to come to their aid than the legislator? MEGILLUS: No one. ATHENIAN: Well then, Cleinias, respond to me again. For you must be my partner in the arguments. It looks as though the person saying |891c| these things believes that fire, water, earth, and air are the first of all things, and names these very ones “nature,” whereas soul comes from these later. Although, it’s probably not a matter of “looking as though,” but rather of his really making it manifest to us in his argument. |891c5| CLEINIAS: It certainly is. ATHENIAN: Then haven’t we, by Zeus, discovered a sort of source of the senseless belief of those people who have ever undertaken inquiries {326} into nature? Look at and examine the entire argument. For of course it would make no small difference if those who make use |891d| of impious arguments, and teach them to others, were revealed to be using the arguments not well, but in an erroneous way. And this seems to me to be the case. CLEINIAS: You’re right. But try to tell us in what way they’re erroneous. |891d5| ATHENIAN: It seems, in that case, that we must touch on pretty unfamiliar31 arguments. CLEINIAS: You must not hesitate, Stranger. You see, I understand you think that we’re going outside the province of legislation, if we touch on such arguments. But if there is no other way at all than this for there to be concord as to what are now, |891e| in accord with law, described as gods

being correctly so described, then, my admirable friend, you must speak in this way. ATHENIAN: In that case, it seems that I should now state this pretty much non-customary argument. What is the first cause of the coming to be and passing away |891e5| of all things is declared by the arguments that have put the finishing touch to the soul of the impious to be not first, but later, while what is later has been declared first. This is the source of their being in error about the real existence of gods. CLEINIAS: I don’t yet understand. |892a| ATHENIAN: It’s soul, comrade, that nearly everyone seems to have been ignorant of: what it is, what power it has, and, among other things about it, in particular, its coming to be—that it is among the first things, coming to be before all bodies, |892a5| and that it, more than anything, is the startingpoint32 of all change in them and any new arrangement. And if this is how it is, wouldn’t what belongs to soul of necessity come to be before what belongs to bodies, since it is itself older than |892b| body? CLEINIAS: That is necessary. {327} ATHENIAN: So belief, supervision, understanding (nous), craft, and law would be prior to hard things and soft ones, heavy things and light ones. |892b5| And, what’s more, the greatest and first works and actions, because they are among the first things, would be those of craft, while the things that are due to nature, and nature, which they incorrectly name in this way, would be later, because their starting-point is from craft and understanding (nous). CLEINIAS: In what sense “incorrectly”? |892c| ATHENIAN: By “nature” they mean the source33 having to do with first things. But if the soul will appear first, and not fire or air, and it is soul that has come to be among the first things, it would be pretty much most correct to say that it is especially due to nature. This is how things are |892c5| if one can demonstrate that soul is older than body, but otherwise not at all. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true. ATHENIAN: So shouldn’t we next set out to do precisely that? |892d| CLEINIAS: Of course.

Let us be on our guard, then, against a thoroughly wily argument, in case we, because we are old, are beguiled by its youthfulness, and |892d5| it eludes us and makes us look ridiculous, and we seem to be people taking aim at great things but missing even the small ones. So consider: if we three had to cross a very fast-flowing river, and I, who happened to be the youngest of us, and with experience of many fast flows, said that I should |892d10| try first by myself, leaving you in safety, |892e| and investigate whether it is passable for you older men as well, or what the situation is, and if it appeared to be that way, I’d then call to you and by means of my experience help you to pass over, but if it was impassible by you, the risk was to be mine, what I said would seem properly measured. Well, in fact |892e5| the argument coming up now is pretty fast-flowing and perhaps practically impassable for your strength. So in case it produces vertigo and dizziness by moving around and asking questions you are unused34 |893a| to answering, putting you in an unseemly, inappropriate, and distasteful position, it seems to me that I should do the following: first, I question myself, with you listening in safety, and after this I answer myself back, and go |893a5| through the entire argument {328} in this way, until the soul has been completely dealt with and soul has been demonstrated to be prior to body. CLEINIAS: That seems excellent to us, Stranger. Do as you say. ATHENIAN: Come, then, if ever we must invoke the aid of a god, let it be now. |893b| At the demonstration of their own existence, let us in all seriousness invoke their aid, and holding on, as it were, to a sort of safety rope, let us enter the present stream of argument. When I am tested about such matters by means of questioning |893b5| of the following sort, it seem safest to answer like this. When someone says, “Stranger, is everything stationary and nothing in movement? Or is it completely the opposite of that? Or are some things in movement, others at rest?”—“Presumably, some are in movement,” I’ll reply, “others |893c| at rest.”—“Then isn’t there some region35 in which the stationary things are stationary and the moving things are in movement?”—“Of course.”—“And some would presumably do this in one location, others in several.”—“Do you mean those things that have the capability of standing still at the center,” |893c5| we’ll say, “and to move in one spot, just as the circumference of circles revolves, which are described as standing still?”36 ATHENIAN:

—“Yes.”—“And we understand that in the case of this revolution anyway, the largest circle and the smallest go around at the same time, and such movement distributes itself to the small ones and large ones proportionally, |893d| being less or more in accord with proportion. That is why it has become a source of all the amazing things, imparting to large and small circles at the same time slow speeds and fast speeds that are in agreement— an effect one might expect to be impossible.”—“That’s |893d5| absolutely true.”—“And in speaking of things that move in many places you seem to me to mean the ones that move with a spatial movement due to which they are always passing to another place, sometimes having a base37 of one point, sometimes more, due to rolling. And each time they |893e| meet each other, they are split apart by the ones standing still, whereas when they meet others traveling in the opposite direction, they aggregate and become one thing that is intermediate between the two.”—“Yes, I agree that things are just as you say.”—“And |893e5| when they aggregate there is increase, and when they {329} disaggregate there is decrease, for as long as the established state38 of each persists; but if it doesn’t persist, there is destruction due to both processes. Now what |894a| condition has to be present whenever the coming to be of anything occurs? Clearly it’s whenever the starting-point, receiving increase, proceeds to the second change, and from this to the next, until, on reaching the third, it admits of perception by perceivers.39 It is by changing |894a5| and moving from one place to another in this way that everything comes to be. And it is really a being whensoever it persists, but when it changes into another state, it is entirely destroyed.” |894b| So haven’t we mentioned all the movements in such a way as to grasp them by numerically ordered kinds40—except, my friends, for two. CLEINIAS: Which two? ATHENIAN: Those two, my good friend, that pretty much our entire present investigation is for the sake of! {330} CLEINIAS: Be more perspicuous. |894b5| ATHENIAN: It was for the sake of the soul, wasn’t it? CLEINIAS: Certainly.

ATHENIAN: In which case, let the movement that is always capable of moving others but incapable of moving itself be one sort; and let the movement that is always capable of moving itself and others—by way of aggregations and disaggregations, |894b10| increases and the opposite, and comings to be and passings away—be one other sort among all the movements. |894c| CLEINIAS: Let it be so. ATHENIAN: Then the one that always moves another and is changed by another, let us put it down as the ninth kind; while the one that moves itself and others, corresponding to all ways of acting |894c5| and being acted on, and is really to be called the change and movement of all the things that are, this we’ll say is pretty much the tenth. CLEINIAS: By all means. ATHENIAN: So, which of our approximately ten movements would we |894c10| most correctly select as being the most powerful of all and |894d| especially active? CLEINIAS: It’s necessary to say, I imagine, that the one capable of moving itself is ten thousand times superior, while all the others come after it. ATHENIAN: That’s right. So mustn’t one or two of the incorrect statements |894d10| we made just now be corrected? CLEINIAS: Which ones do you mean? ATHENIAN: What was said about the tenth was pretty much incorrectly stated. CLEINIAS: In what way? ATHENIAN: It is first in coming to be and in strength, according to the argument,41 |894d10| and the one that comes after it, we hold, is second to it, although it was absurdly said a moment ago to be |894e| ninth. CLEINIAS: What do you mean? {331} ATHENIAN: This. When we find one thing producing change in another thing, and this one always in yet another, will one of these things be ever the first to produce |894e5| change? And how is what is moved by something else ever going to be first among the things that are altered? For that’s impossible. But when something, having moved itself, alters another,

and that other alters another, and in this way thousands and tens of thousands of moving things come about, what |895a| will the starting-point of all of their movements be except the change of the movement that has moved itself? CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely right; and one must concede these things. ATHENIAN: Let us, then, ask a further question, and again |895a5| answer it ourselves. If all things, coming to be together,42 were somehow to stand still, as most of these thinkers dare to say, which of the movements we mentioned would necessarily be the first of them to come to be? Surely, it’s the one that moves itself. For it would never |895b| be changed by another prior one, since there is no prior change43 among them. So, since the movement that moves itself is the starting-point of all movements, and the first to come to be among things that were standing still and to exist among moving things, we’ll say that it is necessarily |895b5| the oldest and most powerful change of all, while the one that is altered by another and moves others is second. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true. ATHENIAN: Well, now that we’re at this point in the argument, |895c| let’s answer this. CLEINIAS: What? ATHENIAN: If we ever saw that this movement had come to be in something made of earth, made of water, or fiery, whether separate or mixed together, whatever |895c5| would we say the condition of such a thing is? CLEINIAS: Are you asking me whether we’d call something “alive,” when it moves itself? ATHENIAN: Yes. CLEINIAS: “Alive,” of course. |895c10| {332} ATHENIAN: Well then, when we see soul present in things, is it ever anything other than this very same thing? Mustn’t we agree that they’re alive? CLEINIAS: The case is no different. ATHENIAN: Stop there, by Zeus! Wouldn’t you be willing |895d| to consider three points with regard to each thing?

CLEINIAS: What do you mean? ATHENIAN: One is its being,44 one is the account of its being, and one is its name. And what’s more, there are two questions you could ask about everything. |895d5| CLEINIAS: Why two? ATHENIAN: Each of us sometimes puts forward the name itself and demands the account; other times he puts forward the account itself and asks for the name. |895d10| So, do we wish to say the following now?45 CLEINIAS: What? ATHENIAN: Being divisible into two, I take it, exists in various things and also in |895e| number. The name for this in the case of number is “even,” and the account is “a number divisible into two equal parts.” CLEINIAS: Yes. ATHENIAN: That’s the sort of thing I’m talking about. Aren’t we referring to the same thing in either case, whether we’re asked for the account, |895e5| and give the name, or asked for the name, and give the account? By the name “even” and by the account “number divisible into two” aren’t we referring to the same thing? CLEINIAS: Absolutely. ATHENIAN: Now, that for which the name is “soul,” what is the account of it? Do we have |895e10| another besides what was just now stated, “the movement capable of moving itself”? |896a| {333} CLEINIAS: Are you saying that “what moves itself” holds of the very same being (ousia) as what we all refer to by the name “soul”? ATHENIAN: I am indeed saying it. And if it is so, are we still |896a5| anxious that it hasn’t been satisfactorily demonstrated that the soul is the same thing as the first coming to be and the first movement of what is, what has been, and what will be, and of all their opposites,46 since it has indeed been shown to be the cause of all change and movement |896b| in all things? CLEINIAS: No, it has been demonstrated most satisfactorily that soul is the oldest of all things, since it is the starting-point of movement.

ATHENIAN: And isn’t the movement that comes to be in one thing because of another, |896b5| but that never supplies self-movement to anything, in second place, or however many numbers down as anyone would wish to count it, since it is a change in a body that is really soulless? CLEINIAS: That’s correct. |896b10| ATHENIAN: So we’d be speaking correctly and authoritatively, if we made the absolutely true and absolutely final statement that soul came to be prior to |896c| body,47 while body is secondary and later, and that, in accord with nature, soul rules, whereas body is ruled.48 CLEINIAS: That is absolutely true. ATHENIAN: And of course we remember what we agreed to earlier,49 that if soul were shown to be older than body, then what belongs to the soul would be older than what belongs to the body. CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: Temperaments, character types, wishes, rational calculations, true beliefs, sorts of supervision, and memories would have come to be prior to lengths, |896d| breadths, depths, and strength of bodies, if indeed soul came to be prior to body. CLEINIAS: Necessarily. {334} ATHENIAN: So isn’t it necessary to agree after this that the soul |896d5| is the cause of good things and bad, fine things and shameful, just things and unjust ones, and of all the opposites, if indeed we are to set it down as cause of all things?50 CLEINIAS: How could it be otherwise? ATHENIAN: Indeed, if soul manages and resides in all things |896d10| that are in movement anywhere, isn’t it also necessary that it manages |896e| the universe?51 CLEINIAS: What of it? ATHENIAN: One soul or several? Several—I’ll answer for both of you. I imagine, in any case, that we are to assume no fewer than two, the one |896e5| that is a doer of good and the one that is capable of doing things of the opposite sort.52

CLEINIAS: Absolutely correct. ATHENIAN: Very well, then. So soul leads all things in the heavens, earth, and sea by its own movements, which are named “wishing,” “investigating,” “supervising,” “deliberating,” |897a| “believing correctly and falsely,” “being pleased,” “being pained,” “being confident,” “being afraid,” “hating,” and “loving,” and by all the related or primary-working movements which, taking over, in turn, the secondary movements of bodies,53 lead |897a5| all things to increase and decrease, disaggregation and {335} aggregation, and to what follows on these, namely, heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hard and soft, white and black, bitter and sweet. Soul makes use of all of these, and every time it takes understanding (nous) —which |897b| is rightly a god to gods54—as a helper and guides all things toward what is correct and happy, while when it associates with lack of understanding it produces in all things the opposites of these. Are we to set these things down as being so, or do we still hesitate in case it is somehow otherwise? |897b5| CLEINIAS: Not at all. ATHENIAN: Then which kind of soul are we to say is in control of the heavens and their entire revolution? The one full of wisdom and virtue, or the one that possesses neither? Do you wish us to answer these questions as follows? |897c| CLEINIAS: How? ATHENIAN: We should say: If, my marvelous friend, the entire path and movement of the heavens, and all the things in it, has the same nature as the movement, revolution, and rational calculations of understanding (nous), and |897c5| proceeds in a related way, then it is clear that one must say that the best soul supervises the entire cosmos and leads it along that sort of path. CLEINIAS: That’s correct. ATHENIAN: But if it proceeds in a mad and disorderly way, then it’s the evil soul that does so.55 |897d| CLEINIAS: That’s also correct.

{336} ATHENIAN: So, what sort of nature, then, does understanding’s (nous) movement have?56 At this point, friends, we come to a question that is difficult to answer in a wise way, which is why it is just now for you to take me on as a helper in answering. CLEINIAS: Good. ATHENIAN: In that case, let’s not by (as it were) looking directly at the sun, thereby bringing on night at midday, produce our answer, as if understanding (nous) could ever be seen and known sufficiently with mortal eyes. |897d10| It’s safer to observe it by looking at an image |897e| of what is being asked about.57 CLEINIAS: What do you mean? ATHENIAN: Let’s take as our image the movement, from among those ten movements, that understanding (nous) resembles. Recollecting it with you,58 |897e5| I’ll make our joint answer. CLEINIAS: Excellent. ATHENIAN: In that case, do you still remember at least this much of what was said earlier, that we set it down that, of all things, some are in movement, while others are at rest. CLEINIAS: Yes. ATHENIAN: And further, that of those in movement, some move in one place, while others move in several. |898a| CLEINIAS: That’s right. ATHENIAN: Now, of these two movements, the one moving always in one place by necessity moves around some center, since it is an imitation of things turned on a lathe, and has, in every way, the greatest {337} possible kinship and likeness |898a5| to the revolution of understanding (nous).59 CLEINIAS: What

do you mean? ATHENIAN: Well, I presume that if we said that in both cases, in that of understanding and that of the movement that is moving in one place, movement was in relation to the same things, in the same way, in the same place, around the same things, toward the same things, and in accord with |898b| one account and one arrangement,60 likening them to the movements of

a sphere turned on a lathe, we’d never appear to be poor craftsmen of fine images in words. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely correct. |898b5| ATHENIAN: On the other hand, wouldn’t the movement that never moves in the same way, nor in accord with what is the same, nor in the same place, nor around the same things, nor toward the same things, nor in one place, nor in an order, nor in an arrangement, nor in respect of some account, be akin to complete lack of understanding? CLEINIAS: It most truly would. |898b10| ATHENIAN: So now there is no longer any difficulty in saying explicitly that, |898c| since soul is what we find leading everything around, it must be said that the revolution of the heavens is of necessity led around while being supervised and ordered by the best soul or by the opposite sort. |898c5| CLEINIAS: But, Stranger, on the basis of what has now been said at least, it isn’t pious to say anything other than that soul—one or several—that possesses every virtue leads these things around. ATHENIAN: You’ve paid most excellent heed to the arguments, Cleinias. But pay heed, too, to this further point. |898d| CLEINIAS: To what? ATHENIAN: If indeed soul leads all of them—sun, moon, and the other stars —around, doesn’t it also lead around each one? CLEINIAS: Of course. |898d5| {338} ATHENIAN: Well, let’s construct arguments about one of these, ones that we’ll find to plainly apply to all stars. CLEINIAS: Which one? ATHENIAN: The sun. Every human being sees its body, but no one sees its soul—nor indeed the soul of the body of any other living beings, |898d10| living or dying.61 But there is every reason to believe that we find this kind of thing has grown around bodies,62 entirely imperceptible by all bodily |898e| modes of perception, but open to being understood by understanding alone.63 So by means of understanding and thought, let us grasp the following about it.

CLEINIAS: What? ATHENIAN: If indeed the soul does lead the sun around,64 when we say that |898e5| it does so in one of three ways, we will pretty much not miss the mark. CLEINIAS: Which ways? ATHENIAN: Either soul resides within this perceptible spherical body and leads it around wherever it goes, just as our soul leads us around everywhere; or, from somewhere outside, |898e10| provides itself with a body of fire or some sort of air (as some people argue), |899a| and by force and by its body pushes body; or, third, being itself stripped of body, but possessing some other exceedingly amazing powers, it provides guidance.65 {339} CLEINIAS: Yes, it is necessary that it is by doing at least one of these three |899a5| that soul leads all things. ATHENIAN: This soul, then,66 whether it brings light to all of us by being in the chariot of the sun, or from outside it, or however or in whatever way it does so, must be regarded as a god by every man. Must it not? |899a10| CLEINIAS: Yes; at least by everyone who hasn’t reached, I suppose, the ultimate in lack of understanding. |899b| ATHENIAN: Concerning all the stars, then, and the moon, and concerning the years, months, and all the seasons, what other account will we state than this same one: that since soul or souls are plainly causes of all these things, and since these souls are good with respect to every virtue, |899b5| we’ll declare them to be gods, whether—since they are living beings—they order the entire universe67 by being present in bodies, or in whatever way and however they do it? Is there anyone who, agreeing with these things, will maintain that all things are not full of gods?68 CLEINIAS: There is no one, Stranger, who is so out of his wits. |899c| ATHENIAN: In that case, Megillus and Cleinias, let us state terms to the one who didn’t believe in gods earlier and dismiss him. CLEINIAS: What terms? |899c5| ATHENIAN: Either to teach us that we aren’t speaking correctly when we set down soul as first in the coming to be of all things, and everything else that we said followed from this, or, if he’s not able to say better things than us, he is to be persuaded by us and live believing in gods for the rest of his life.

So let’s see whether what we’ve said to those who do not |899d| believe in gods, as to their existence, is already enough, or whether it is insufficient. CLEINIAS: It, Stranger, is least insufficient of all. ATHENIAN: In that case, let this be the end of our arguments with these people. But the one who does believe that gods exist, but that these give no thought |899d5| to human affairs, we must speak gently to. {340} “Best of men,” we’ll say, “the fact that you do believe in gods is probably due to some kinship with the divine that leads you to what is of a like nature, and to honor and believe in its existence. But the private and public strokes of good luck of bad and unjust people—who in truth |899e| are not happy, although they seem to be very happy (albeit in a way that strikes a false note) in the songs that incorrectly sing of them and in all sorts of accounts—lead you toward impiety. Or, again, perhaps you see people nearing the end of old age |899e5| who have bequeathed positions of highest honor to their children’s children, |900a| and you are disturbed now when among all these you see (either by hearing of it or even by seeing it all with your own eyes) some who have engaged in many and terrible acts of impiety, and by means of these very acts, have gone from small things to tyrannies and |900a5| the greatest ones. Then, due to all these sorts of things, since you are clearly unwilling to blame the gods for being the cause of such things, because of your kinship with them, you are led by want of reason and by an inability to feel disgust at the gods to the position you have come to now, |900b| so that they seem to exist, but to despise and be careless of human affairs. So in order to prevent your present belief from coming to a graver condition of impiety for you, if we can somehow free you from its pollution69 by means of arguments |900b5| when it approaches, let us try to connect the next argument to the one we went through from the start against the person who didn’t believe in gods at all, and make use of it in the present case.” You, Cleinias and Megillus, take the part of the young man |900c| in answering, just as you did before. But if something troublesome comes up in the arguments, I’ll take over from you both, as I did just now, and take you across the river.70

CLEINIAS: Well said. You do these things in this way, and |900c5| we’ll do what you say as far as we can. ATHENIAN: But perhaps there’d be no difficulty in demonstrating to this person, at least, that the gods supervise small things no less71 than the especially large ones. For he was present, I take it, at the things that were said just now, and heard that, because of being good |900d| with respect to every virtue, the supervision of all things most properly belongs to them. {341} CLEINIAS: He certainly did hear this. ATHENIAN: The next thing, then, is for our opponents to join with us in examining what |900d5| virtue of the gods we mean when we agreed that they are good. Come then, do we say that being temperate and possessing understanding (nous) belong to virtue, and their opposites to vice? CLEINIAS: We do say that. ATHENIAN: What about this? That courage belongs to virtue, but cowardice |900e| to vice? CLEINIAS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: And will we say that, of them, the latter ones are shameful and the former fine? CLEINIAS: Necessarily. |900e5| ATHENIAN: And will we say that whichever of these are bad are fitting for us, if indeed for anyone, but that the gods have no share, great or small, in such things? CLEINIAS: Everyone would agree that this too is so. ATHENIAN: What about this? Will we put negligence, idleness, and selfindulgence under |900e10| virtue of soul? What do you say? CLEINIAS: How can you ask? ATHENIAN: Under the opposite, then? CLEINIAS: Yes. ATHENIAN: And the opposites of these under its opposite? |901a| CLEINIAS: Its opposite, yes. ATHENIAN: So what about the person who is self-indulgent, negligent, and idle, who the poet says “most resembles stingless drones”?72 Won’t he be

entirely like that in our view? |901a5| CLEINIAS: What the poet says is absolutely correct. ATHENIAN: Then a god must not be said to have the very sort of character that he himself hates, nor must anyone who tries be allowed to say such a thing. CLEINIAS: No indeed. How could he be? |901a10| {342} ATHENIAN: So, suppose it is fitting for someone to act and to supervise something |901b| especially well, and his understanding (nous) supervises large things but neglects the small ones, on the basis of what sort of argument are we to praise someone like that and not strike an entirely wrong note? Let’s look at it this way. Aren’t there two forms of things that the one who acts in this sort of way |901b5| may be doing, whether he is a god or a human being? CLEINIAS: What two ways are we referring to? ATHENIAN: Either he neglects small things, thinking that it makes no difference to the whole, or, if it does make a difference, he neglects them due to laziness and self-indulgence. |901c| Or is there some other way that negligence occurs? For I take it that when it’s indeed impossible to supervise all things, it won’t be negligence of either small or great things, if someone, whether a god or some inferior person, fails to supervise things because he lacks the power and |901c5| is incapable of supervising them. CLEINIAS: Of course not. ATHENIAN: Now let those two—who both agree that the gods exist, though the other one says that they can be appeased by entreaty, |901d| while this one says that they’re careless of small things—reply to the three of us: “First, do you both admit that gods know, see, and hear all things, and that nothing of which there are modes of perception and knowledge73 can escape their notice?” Is this how things are said to be,74 |901d5| or not? CLEINIAS: It is. ATHENIAN: What about this? Are they also able do all the things that mortals and immortals can? CLEINIAS: How will they not agree that this too is so? |901d10|

ATHENIAN: Also, we five have agreed that gods |901e| are good75—in fact, best. CLEINIAS: We certainly have. ATHENIAN: So isn’t it impossible to agree that they do anything at all due to laziness and self-indulgence, if they are as we agreed them to be? |901e5| {343} For in us, at least, idleness is an offspring of cowardice and laziness an offspring of idleness and self-indulgence. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true. ATHENIAN: None of the gods, then, is negligent due to idleness or laziness. For cowardice, I take it, they have no share of. |901e10| CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely right. ATHENIAN: So, if indeed they do not neglect things |902a| small and few having to do with the whole, what is left is either that they’d do this knowing that it is absolutely necessary to supervise none of these things, or what is there left except the opposite of knowledge? CLEINIAS: Nothing. |902a5| ATHENIAN: So, my noblest and best of men, are we to put you down as saying that they are ignorant, and due to ignorance neglect what must be supervised, or that, though they know what is necessary, they do what the most inferior of men are said to do, who, knowing that other things are better to do than what they are doing, due to being defeated by certain |902b| pleasures or pains, do not do them? CLEINIAS: Of course not. ATHENIAN: Don’t human affairs share in ensouled nature, and isn’t humankind also the most god-fearing of all living creatures? CLEINIAS: Likely so. ATHENIAN: And we say, surely, that all mortal living creatures are the possessions of gods, as is the whole universe.76 CLEINIAS: Of |902b10| course. In that case, let someone now say that these are small things or great ones to the gods, since in neither case would it be fitting for our ATHENIAN:

owners, |902c| as the most careful and best of supervisors, to neglect us. For, in addition to this, let’s in fact also consider this further point. CLEINIAS: What? ATHENIAN: It has to do with perception and power. Are they not |902c5| naturally opposite to each other as regards ease and difficulty? CLEINIAS: What do you mean? {344} ATHENIAN: To see or hear small things is more difficult, I take it, than great ones, whereas it’s easier for everyone to lead, control, and supervise things small and few rather than their opposites. CLEINIAS: Yes, much easier indeed. |902d| ATHENIAN: Take a doctor who is assigned a whole body to treat, and he wishes and is able to take care of the big parts, but neglects the small ones, will the entire body ever do well for him? |902d5| CLEINIAS: Never. ATHENIAN: Nor for captains, generals, or household managers, nor yet for politicians of a sort,77 nor for any other such person will the many and the great do well in isolation from the few and the small. |902e| For even stonemasons say that large stones don’t lie well without small ones. CLEINIAS: How could they? ATHENIAN: So let’s never think that the god is inferior to mortal |902e5| craftsmen, who, the better they are, the more exactly and perfectly they use their one craft to complete the works that are fitting for them, both small and large; nor ever think that the god, who is wisest and wishes and is able to supervise, won’t in any way supervise any of the small things |903a| that are easily supervised, like some idle or cowardly person who is being lazy in the face of exertions, but only the large ones. CLEINIAS: Let’s never accept, Stranger, such a belief about gods. For we’d be thinking a thought that is |903a5| in no way pious or true. ATHENIAN: We seem to me now to have had a very properly measured discussion with the one who loves to accuse the gods of neglect. CLEINIAS: Yes.

ATHENIAN: By forcing him by means of arguments to agree that |903a10| what he was saying wasn’t correct. But it seems to me that we still need some stories to be sung as enchantments.78 |903b| CLEINIAS: Which ones, my good friend? ATHENIAN: Let us persuade the young man by our words that “the supervisor of the universe has put all things together in order with a view to the salvation and virtue of the |903b5| whole, and each part undergoes {345} and does what is fitting as far as it can. Rulers79 have been appointed for all time over the undergoings and actions of each of these, down to the smallest one, and have achieved their goal to the last detail. And one of these is your part, you stubborn man, |903c| and it always contributes to and looks to the universe, even though it is utterly small. But you have forgotten about this very thing, that all coming to be occurs for the sake of this, in order that a happy existence may accrue to the life of the universe—not coming to be for your sake, but you for its sake. |903c5| For every doctor and every skilled craftsman does everything for the sake of the whole—he makes a part that contributes to what is best in common, for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of a part.80 But you are displeased, because you do not understand how what is best |903d| for the whole, where you are concerned, turns out to be best for you also, thanks to the power of the common coming to be. And since soul is always put together with body— sometimes with one, sometimes with another—and undergoes all sorts of changes, due to itself or due to another soul, no other task is left for the |903d5| checkers player81 except to transpose the character that is becoming better to a better place, and the one that is becoming worse to a worse one, in accord with what is fitting for each of them, in order that it be allotted its proper fate.” |903e| CLEINIAS: What way do you mean? ATHENIAN: The way I’m describing is, it seems to me, the one in which the supervision of the universe by the gods would be easy. For if, failing always to look to the whole, someone were to mold all things by changing shapes (for example, having ensouled water come from fire82), and not one thing from many or many from one, after they have received in succession a first, second, or third coming to be, |904a| there would be an unlimited number of

transpositions in the cosmic arrangements.83 {346} But as things stand, there is an amazing easiness to the supervisor of the whole.84 CLEINIAS: Again, what do you mean? |904a5| ATHENIAN: This: “Since our king saw that all actions involve souls, and that though there is much virtue in them, there is also much vice, and that soul plus body is indestructible, once it has come to be, but—like the gods that exist in accord with law—not eternal85 (for there’d never have been a coming to be for living things |904a10| if either of these two had been destroyed), he understood that whatever in soul is good |904b| is always naturally beneficial, and what is bad harmful; seeing all these things together, he somehow contrived a position for each of the parts so that, in the easiest and best way, virtue would be victorious in the universe, |904b5| and vice defeated. In fact, he has contrived it with a view to this universe, so that when a being of a certain sort comes to be, it must always occupy a certain place and reside in certain places. As for what sort of being comes into being, he has left the causes of that up to the wishes of each one of us.86 For |904c| what one has an appetite for, and of what sort one is in one’s soul, in pretty much every case determines what sort of person each of us for the most part becomes.” CLEINIAS: That’s likely, at least. ATHENIAN: “So all things that share in soul change, |904c5| since they possess within themselves the cause of the change, and in changing they move in accord with the order and law of destiny. The smaller the changes in characters, the smaller the movement along the plane in the place, but {347} when the change is great and toward greater injustices, the movement is into the depths, and the place said to be below, |904d| to which people give the names “Hades” and others connected with it, names which terrify them, in reality and in their dreams both while they are alive and when they are released from their bodies.87 But whenever a soul gets a larger share of vice or virtue, due to its own |904d5| wish and the influence of social intercourse growing strong, then, when it has comingled with virtue divine and become exceptionally such,88 it undergoes an exceptional change of place and is transported along a sacred path to a better place elsewhere,

but when the opposite occurs, |904e| it moves its own life to the opposite place. ‘This is the justice of the gods who inhabit Olympus.’89 “My child, my young man, who believes you are neglected by gods: the one who becomes more vicious is carried toward the vicious souls, whereas in life and in every death90 the one who becomes better |904e5| is carried toward the better ones, to undergo and do what it fitting for like to do to like.91 This justice, neither you |905a| nor anyone else has ever been missed by and boasted of having escaped the gods.92 Those who put it in place have put it above all justices, and one must altogether guard carefully against it. For you will never be neglected by this justice, not if you were so small as to sink into the |905a5| depths of the earth, nor if you became so lofty as to fly up into the heavens; on the contrary, you will pay the gods the fitting penalty, either while remaining here, after being carried into Hades, or after having been transported to a yet more remote place.93 {348} “The same account, |905b| I tell you, would also apply to those you saw going from small things to great ones by committing acts of impiety or some other such thing, whom you supposed to have gone from wretchedness to happiness, and in whose actions, as in mirrors, you thought |905b5| you had seen the neglect of all the gods, because you did not know how exactly their joint contribution helps the universe. But, my most courageous of all men, how can you |905c| believe that it isn’t necessary to know this? If someone does not know it, he would never even see a pattern of life, nor ever be able to contribute an account of it, as regards its happiness or its unhappy luck. “So if Cleinias here and our present council of elders can persuade you of this, |905c5| that you don’t know what you’re saying about gods, the god himself would assist you in fine fashion. But if you should need further argument, you must—if you have any understanding (nous)—listen to us speaking to our third adversary.” |905d| For I, for my part, would claim that it has been demonstrated by us—in no entirely inferior way—that gods exist and supervise human beings. But that gods can be appeased by the unjust, if they receive gifts, is something that one must not agree to, and that in turn |905d5| must be refuted by every means in our power.

CLEINIAS: Perfectly put. Let’s do as you say. ATHENIAN: Come then, in the name of those gods themselves, in what way would they come to be appeased by us, if, that is, they could come to be so? And what, or of what sort, |905e| would they be? It’s necessary that they be rulers, I imagine, since they manage the entire universe in perpetuity.94 CLEINIAS: That’s right. ATHENIAN: But to which sorts of rulers are they similar? Or rather which sort—of |905e5| the ones we can compare to them as lesser to greater—are similar to them? Would they be drivers of competing teams of horses in a chariot race, or captains of ships? Or perhaps they might be compared to rulers of armies. Or they might even be likened to doctors taking care of bodies in the war against disease. Or |905e10| farmers awaiting in fear the seasons that are usually harsh |906a| for the growing of plants, or those who take care of flocks. For since we have agreed among ourselves that the universe95 is full of many good things, and also of the {349} opposite ones, and that there are more of those that are not good, conflict of this sort, we say, is undying |906a5| and requires amazing vigilance, and the gods and daimons are our allies, while we in turn are the possessions of the gods and daimons. Injustice and wanton aggression combined with lack of wisdom |906b| destroy us, while what saves us is justice and temperance combined with wisdom, which reside in the ensouled powers of the gods, though one can perspicuously perceive some small bit of these residing in us as well. Now there are some souls residing on earth, which are clearly beast-like, |906b5| that have acquired unjust gain, and that prostrate themselves before the souls of the guards—whether they are watchdogs, herdsmen, or those who are in every way the supreme masters—and persuade them with flattering words and votive incantations that it is possible for them (as the sayings of bad people go) to have too large a share96 among human beings |906c| and suffer no harsh treatment. But we say, I imagine, that the error just named of having too large a share of something is what is called “disease” in fleshy bodies, “plague” in seasons and years,97 and in cities and constitutions, this same thing, |906c5| by having its name changed, is injustice. CLEINIAS: Absolutely.

ATHENIAN: This, then, is the argument that it is necessary for the person to give who says that the gods always forgive those human beings who are unjust |906d| and do unjust things, so long as one assigns to them some of the unjust gains. It’s as if wolves were to assign to dogs small portions of their prey, and the dogs, made tame by the gifts, were to allow the wolves to plunder the flocks. Isn’t this the argument of those who say that |906d5| gods can be appeased? CLEINIAS: It certainly is. ATHENIAN: To which of the guardians mentioned before could any human being liken gods without becoming ridiculous? Is it to captains who are turned from their course |906e| by the pouring of wine and the smell of burnt offerings98 and ruin their ship and sailors? {350} CLEINIAS: Not at all. ATHENIAN: And surely it isn’t to drivers lined up for a race, who are persuaded by a gift to give up the victory |906e5| to the other teams. CLEINIAS: It would be a terrible image to put in words if you gave that account. ATHENIAN: Nor again is it to generals, doctors, farmers, herdsman, or to dogs charmed by wolves.99 |906e10| CLEINIAS: Don’t be blasphemous! How could it be? ATHENIAN: On the contrary, aren’t all the gods, in our view, |907a| the greatest of all guardians and of the greatest things? CLEINIAS: Yes, by far. ATHENIAN: Are we going to say, then, that those who are guardians of the finest things, |907a5| and are themselves outstanding in the virtue of guarding, are inferior to dogs and to ordinary human beings, who would never abandon what is just for the sake of gifts given in an impious way by unjust men? CLEINIAS: Not at all. It’s an intolerable thing to say. And of all those who are involved in every sort |907b| of impiety, the one who holds such a belief is in danger of being most justly judged to be of all those impious people the worst and most impious.

ATHENIAN: The three things, then, that we put forward—that gods exist, |907b5| that they are supervisors, and that they cannot in any way be appeased contrary to justice—can we say that they have, perhaps, been satisfactorily demonstrated? CLEINIAS: How could we not? And we, at least, vote together for these arguments. ATHENIAN: And yet they were perhaps expressed rather vehemently, due to our love |907b10| of gaining victory over evil people. And our desire to gain victory, my dear |907c| Cleinias, was for fear the evil ones might believe that if they were ever stronger in arguments, they could act however they wished, in keeping with these, and other similar things, they think about the gods. On account of these considerations, then, our eagerness made us speak with youthful vigor. |907c5| But if we’ve made even a small {351} contribution to the task of persuading these men in some way to hate themselves, and somehow love characters of the opposite sort, it would be well for us to have stated this prelude |907d| to the laws concerning impiety. CLEINIAS: Well, let’s hope so. But if not, at least the argument is of a kind that won’t discredit the legislator. ATHENIAN: After the prelude, in that case, the correct thing |907d5| for us would be an account that is a sort of interpreter of the laws, declaring to all the impious that they must change their ways for pious ones. For those who do not obey, let the law concerning impiety be as follows: If anyone is impious in words or deeds, the one who comes across it |907d10| is to go to the aid of the law by informing the officials, and the first officials |907e| who learn of it are to bring the accused before the court assigned to judge these cases in accord with the laws. If some official hears of it and does not do this, he himself is to be subject to prosecution for impiety by anyone wishing to punish him on behalf of the laws. |907e5| For anyone found guilty, the court is to impose one penalty for each act of impiety. Imprisonment is to be imposed |908a| in all cases. There are to be three prisons in the city: a common one for most prisoners near the marketplace, for the safe custody of a large number of bodies; one near the meeting place of the Nocturnal Council,100 named the “House of Temperance”;101 and another |908a5| one in the middle of the country, in some

empty place that is as wild as possible, and having as its name some word for punishment. Now since impiety has three causes, which we’ve gone through, and from each two kinds |908b| of impiety come about, there’d be six kinds of errormakers worth distinguishing where divine matters are concerned, which do not stand in need of equal or similar penalties. For to someone who doesn’t believe gods exist at all a just character could come by nature—these |908b5| come to be haters of evil people, and from disgust at doing injustice won’t venture to do such actions, while they both avoid people who are unjust and love just ones. But others, in addition to the belief that all things |908c| are empty of gods, may be prey to a lack of self-control regarding pleasures and pains, and may also possess strong memories and sharp faculties of learning. Not believing in gods is a condition belonging in common to both, but as regards the ruin of other people, the one would do less |908c5| evil, the other more. For {352} the former would be full of freedom of speech when he talks about gods, and about sacrifices and oaths, and by ridiculing others might perhaps make others be like himself, if he doesn’t receive a penalty. But the latter, while believing |908d| the same things as the former, is what is called “naturally clever,” and is full of cunning and trickery. From these are produced many prophets and people equipped with every sort of magic, and sometimes tyrants, demagogues, and |908d5| generals come from them, and those who plot by means of private rites, and the contrivances of those called “sophists.” Now of these people there could be many kinds, but those for whom it is worth establishing laws are two: the dissembler102 |908e| commits errors that merit—and not just once or twice—death; while the other requires both admonishment and imprisonment. Likewise, the belief that the gods are neglectful produces another two, and the belief that they can be appeased, two others. |908e5| Once these distinctions have been made in this way, the ones who have come to be impious due to lack of understanding, without any evil impulse or character, the judge is to place by law in the House of Temperance for no |909a| less than five years. During this time no other citizen is to have dealings with them except members of the Nocturnal Council, who are to associate with them to admonish103 them and for the salvation of their soul. When their term of imprisonment |909a5| has come to an end, if one of them

seems to be temperate, he is to reside among those who are temperate, but if not,104 and if he is again found guilty of such a charge, he is to be punished with death. As for those who become beast-like,105and who in addition to not believing in gods, or believing them to be neglectful or appeasable, despise human beings, and |909b| win over the souls of many of the living, by professing to conjure up the souls of the dead, and promising to persuade the gods, by using sorcery to beguile them with sacrifices, {353} prayers, and incantations, and for the sake of money set to work at destroying, from top to bottom, individuals, whole households, |909b5| and cities—if one of these people is considered guilty, the court is to punish him with imprisonment, in accord with law, in the prison in the middle of the country, and no free person is ever to visit |909c| these people, and they are to get their food from the slaves as prescribed by the Guardians of the Laws. When he dies, he is to be cast beyond the borders, unburied; and if any free person helps to bury him, he is to be subject to a charge of impiety at the hands of anyone who wishes. |909c5| If he leaves children behind, who are fit to be citizens of the city, the supervisors of orphans106 are to supervise these as if they were really orphans, in no way inferior to the others, from the day |909d| their father is found guilty. One general law must be laid down applicable to all these people, which would make many of them offend less against gods in deed and word, and in particular become less senseless, |909d5| by not allowing them to act like Priests107 contrary to law. Let the following law be laid down for all of them without exception: No one is to possess shrines in private households.108 When someone has it in mind to sacrifice, he is to go to the public ones and sacrifice, and hand over his offerings to the Priests and Priestesses who supervise their purification; and he is to join in the prayers, and anyone else he wishes is to join in the prayers with him. |909e| These things are to be done for the following reasons: Shrines and gods are not easy to establish; doing this sort of thing correctly requires a certain amount of thought.109 Yet it’s customary, especially |909e5| for all women, and for those who are sick in some way, or in danger, or at a loss (in whatever

way someone might be at a loss), or, conversely, for those who’ve received a stroke of good luck, to make sacred whatever happens to be at hand at the time and promise to establish shrines to gods, daimons, and the children of gods; and through fears |910a| caused by waking phantoms or by dreams, and likewise when recalling many such visions, they produce remedies against each of them by filling {354} every house and every district with altars and shrines, establishing them in open places110 and wherever |910a5| someone happened to have such experiences. For all these reasons, one must act in accord with the law now stated; and, in addition to these, because of the impious, in order not to be deceptive in these actions too, |910b| by setting up shrines and altars in private households, in the belief that they can secretly make the gods propitious by means of sacrifices and prayers, thereby increasing the injustice without limit, by bringing down reproaches from gods on themselves and on those who tolerate them |910b5| (though they are better people than them), and in this way the entire city, with some sort of justice, reaps the benefits of their impieties.111 The god will not blame the legislator, however, since the law is to be laid down in this way: There is to be no possession of shrines in private households. In the case of anyone who is seen possessing |910c| shrines and worshiping at ones other than the public ones, if the possessor, man or woman, has committed none of the greater and impious acts of injustice, the one who perceives this is to report it112 to the Guardians of the Laws, who are to give orders for the private shrines to be brought |910c5| to the public ones, and those who disobey are to be punished until they are brought. But if anyone is seen to have committed an impiety not of a childish sort, but that of a grown man, either by setting up private shrines or by sacrificing at the public ones to any gods whatsoever,113 the penalty is to be death, for sacrificing while not being free of pollution. |910d| The Guardians of the Laws are to judge whether it was childish or not, and are to bring the matter before the court accordingly, and are to impose the penalty for impiety in these cases.     1. Biaiôn: The meaning now leans more toward force, as something typically opposed to persuasion (note mê peisêi at 884a4), than toward outright physical violence, although this

may of course be involved. 2. See 630b6n. 3. See 869a–c, 877a–b, 880e–882a. 4. Eis koinon: On the translation of this phrase, see Schöpsdau-3, p. 368, SchofieldGriffith, pp. 365–366 n2. 5. See 854a–856a, 860b. But the distinction between cases involving violence and those done in secret is not mentioned. 6. I.e., the prelude. See 884a7. 7. I.e., as the laws portrays them. See Mayhew, p. 55. 8. I.e., that gods exist. 9. Cf. Rep. 364b–365a. 10. See 719e–723b. 11. The Athenian is afraid in case despising him leads to disregard of his arguments; he is not ashamed of what depraved people think of him. See Mayhew, p. 63. 12. Ouranou: Here meaning the universe as a whole. See 821c7n. 13. The reference is to Hesiod, Th. Cf. Rep. 377b–382c. 14. Oute hôs to parapan ontôs eirêtai: Or “as entirely stating what is really the case.” See England-2, p. 447–448. 15. Socrates attributes such views to Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (c. 500–428 BC) at Ap. 26d–e. His views are criticized at Phd. 97b–99d. 16. Duscherainein: The disgust at issue here is more than likely disgust at atheism; the fear, fear of the gods. On the relevance of disgust to virtue, see 654d, 751d. 17. See, e.g., 721e–722a, 781d–e, 858a–b. 18. Duscheranantes: Now the disgust is at having to argue with atheists. 19. Prothumôs . . . mê thumô[i]: A play on words: with zeal, yes; with anger, no. Returned to at 890e1. See 863b3n. 20. See 659c–660a. 21. On their identity, or rather, self-protective anonymity, see Sedley. 22. Not the earth and heavenly bodies but the stones and so on from which these are composed. See 886d–e, 967c, and Saunders-2, pp. 92–96, which the translation largely follows on this and other points. 23. Ouranon holon: See 821c7n. 24. I.e., the heavenly bodies responsible for the seasons and so for the fertility of plants and animals. 25. I.e., from (human) animals. 26. See Rep. 596a–598d. 27. See 714b–d. 28. See 889c5. 29. Prothumotate: See 887c8n. 30. See 772a–d, 797a–798e, 957b–958a. 31. Aêthesterôn: The adjective aêthês is replaced by the participle eiôthota at 891e4. In Ap. Socrates refers to making “my arguments in my accustomed manner (eiôthoti)” (27b2), which proceed by questions and answers (727d4n). When aêthês is used again (aêtheis at 831a1) it introduces an argument that proceeds in that way. Notice elegchomenô[i] at 892b5.

32. Archei: Or “rules over” or “governs.” But archomena  .  .  . ek (892b8) and genesin (892c2), as well as the overall context, suggests that the reference is to starting-points or first principles; 896c2–3, on the other hand, suggests that rule is at least part of what is meant in making a soul an archê. 33. Genesin: As at 889a7. 34. Aêtheis: See 891d6n. 35. Chôra[i]: Chôra (“region”) used here, hedra (“location”) at 893c4, and topos (“place”) at 893d8, to be used simply as stylistic variants of each other. 36. See Rep. 436c–e. 37. Basin: The contact point at their successive locations, so that they glide forward instead of rolling. 38. Auxanetai  .  .  . phthinei: In nonbiological contexts, auxêsis and phthisis are probably best translated as “increase” and “decrease,” respectively. But in biological contexts generally, they have a more specific meaning best captured by “growth” and—though somewhat less happily—“withering.” Hê kathestêkuia hexis: The reference is to the condition of a thing that makes it what it is, so that as long as this persists, aggregation causes the thing to increase (think of an animal absorbing nourishment), while disaggregation causes it to decrease or shrink (an animal no longer absorbing nourishment), but when it no longer persists (as when the animal dies), aggregation and disaggregation do not have these effects, and the thing is destroyed. 39. The starting-point might be (a) a point-like, or indivisible, line segment; (b) a triangle; or (c) something less precise, and perhaps less “mathematical,” than either of these. Change 1: either (1a) the growth of point-like lines into lines with extension, or (1b) that of triangles into equilateral polygons, or (1c) the complex established state of the imperceptibly small thing resulting from aggregation. Change 2: either (2a) the growth of lines into planes by lateral extension, or (2b) the growth of perfect solids whose faces are polygons, or (2c) the subsequent growth of the imperceptible thing with that complex state. Change 3: either (3a) the emergence of perceptible solids from planes; (3b) the emergence of perceptible earth, water, fire, and air from the accumulation of different perfect solids; or (3c) the emergence of the large enough to be perceptible thing with that complex state. (2) is more or less the account given at Ti. 53a–55c; (1), or something like it, is suggested in Ar. Met. 992a2–24; but (1c), which is more or less compatible with either (a) or (b), may be all that’s intended and is perhaps the most likely of the three. For discussion, see Mayhew, pp. 114–117. 40. The eight kinds mentioned are (1) movement in one place: circular movement around a fixed center; (2) movement in many places: either gliding or rolling; (3) aggregation; (4) disaggregation; (5) increase; (6) decrease; (7) coming to be; and (8) perishing. The two to come are (9) other affecting movement; and (10) self-and-other affecting movement. On the importance of numerical order, see 894d10–e2. 41. Kata logon: Or “according to reason.” 42. Panta homou: An echo of Anaxagoras B1 DK. 43. Metaptôseôs: Metaptosis is a stylistic variant on the more usual metabolê. 44. Ousia: See 668c6n. 45. Down to 895e4–8, I follow the OCT in attributing this and other longer replies to the Athenian, the shorter ones to Cleinias; the Budé attributes this one to Cleinias, the next to

the Athenian, adding “Yes” to his next longer reply. See Mayhew, p. 216. 46. A parallel account or definition of soul is given at Phdr. 245c–246a. 47. This should probably be taken to mean no more than that such soul as comes to be does so before body does, so that it isn’t asserting that all soul comes to be, leaving it open that some soul (e.g., nous or understanding) exists before anything comes to be. 48. See 892a6n. 49. See 892a–c. 50. Probably an incautious repeat of the claim at 896b1–2 that soul is “the cause of all change and movement in all things.” The same applies to “manages and resides in all things” (896d10), “leads all things” (896e8), and “guides all things” (897b3). Thus it clearly is not the cause, resident manager, driver, or guide of understanding (nous) that serves as soul’s helper in causing, managing, or guiding things correctly (897b1–3). But even the more cautious claim seems not quite cautious enough. For nous itself seems to be a sort of soul or a property of soul, since this is what the argument of 892a2–b9 requires, and many texts assert: “There could not be wisdom (sophia) and nous without soul” (Phlb. 30c9–10); “soul is the only thing there is that properly possesses nous” (Ti. 46d5–6; also 37c2–5). In other words, to say that soul is a cause of all change and movement, etc., is to say that some sort of soul is a cause, and not necessarily the same sort in all cases: nous is the cause only of good cosmic change and movement, while evil soul is the cause of bad change and movement (897c3–d1n). But even this seems somewhat in tension with the view, found at Ti. 30a–b, that there is disorderly movement that is not caused by soul. On which, see Clegg and Mayhew, pp. 131–138. 51. Ouranon: See 821c7n. 52. See 897d1. 53. Cf. Ti. 46c–e, 68e–69a on primary and secondary causes. 54. Reading θεὸν ὀρθῶς θεοῖς with the major mss. for Budé θεῖον ὀρθῶς θεὸς οὖσα ὀρθὰ (“when, having acquired divine understanding, it is rightly god”). See Schöpsdau-3, pp. 420–421, and cf. 631d5. For an adventurous view on the nature of this divine nous, see Menn, and for a more cautious one, Van Riel, esp. pp. 60–121. 55. Polit. 269e8–270a2 tells us that “one must not say either that the cosmos always turns itself by itself, or in any way that it is turned by a god in a pair of opposed revolutions, or again that two gods turn it whose thoughts are opposed to each other,” so it is hardly likely that Plato is here countenancing precisely such a possibility. Instead, it seems safest to regard this conditional as essentially counterfactual in import: if they proceed—as of course they do not (see 966e)—in a mad and disorderly way, then an evil soul would be supervising the cosmos and driving it along. See Carone, pp. 288–290. 56. Cf. “But for heaven’s sake, are we going to be convinced that it is true that change, life, soul, and wisdom are not present in that which completely is (tô[i] pantelôs onti) and that it neither lives nor thinks wise thoughts (phronein) but stays changeless, solemn, and holy, without any understanding?  .  .  . Then are we going to say that it has understanding but doesn’t have life? . . . Then are we saying that it has both these things while denying that it has them in its soul? . . . And are we saying that it has understanding, life, and soul but that it is at rest and completely changeless even though it is alive? . . . Then both what changes and change as well have to be admitted to be things that are.” (Sph. 248e6–249b3). 57. Cf. Phd. 99d–100a, Rep. 506d–511e, 516e.

58. See 893b–894b. 59. Cf. Ti. 37c1–5: “Whenever . . . an account concerns any object of rational calculation, and the circle of the Same runs well and reveals it, the necessary result is understanding (nous) and knowledge (epistêmê). And if anyone should ever call that in which these two arise, not soul but something else, what he says will be anything but true.” 60. On these different aspects of the revolution of understanding and their interpretation, see Mayhew, pp. 138–154. 61. Apothnê[i]skontos: In this case, “one might—if one’s beliefs were sufficiently primitive—expect to see the soul floating away at the moment the dying was completed” (Saunders-2, p. 99). 62. Peripephukenai: The verb periephusen occurs only here, at Rep. 612a2 (where it refers to something bodily growing around the soul), and at Ti. 78d2 (where it refers to one bodily thing growing around another). Its connotation here is intentionally vague. See 898e8– 899a4. 63. Noêton d’einai nô[i] monô[i]: Cf. Rep. 611b10–c2: “But what the soul is like in truth, seen as it should be, not maimed by its partnership with the body and other bad things, which is how we see it now, what it is like when it has become pure—that we can adequately see only by means of rational calculation (logismô[i]).” Notice the “rational calculations of understanding” (nou . . . logismois)” at 897c5. 64. Reading εἴπερ ἄγει with Schöpsdau-3, p. 425 for Budé εἴπερ ἄγει. 65. Cf. Ti. 34a8–b7: “Applying this entire train of reasoning to the god that was yet to be, the eternal god [i.e., the Demiurge] made it smooth and even all over, equal from the center, a whole and complete body itself, but also made up of complete bodies. In its center he set a soul, which he extended throughout the whole body, and with which he then covered the body outside. And he set it to turn in a circle, a single solitary universe, whose very excellence enables it to keep its own company without requiring anything else. For its knowledge of and friendship with itself is enough. All this, then, explains why this world which he begat for himself is a blessed god.” 66. Reading ταύτην δὴ τὴν ψυχήν with England-2, pp. 480–481 (see Schöpsdau-3, p. 426) for Budé Αὐτοῦ δῆτα μεῖνον· ταύτην τὴν ψυχήν (“Now hold it right there. This soul. . . .”). 67. Ouranon: See 821c7n. 68. “Thales thought that all things were full of gods” (Ar. DA 411a8 = A22 DK). 69. Apodiopompêsasthai: As at 877e9. See LSJ s.v. ἀποδιοπομπέομαι II. 70. See 892d–893a. 71. Omitting μᾶλλον δέ (“but more”) with Mayhew, pp. 216–217. 72. Hesiod, Op. 304. Cf. Rep. 552c–d. 73. Epistêmai: See 639b1n. Cf. Ti. 37a–c. 74. Reading λέγεται with Mayhew, p. 217 for Budé λέγετε (“Is this the way you say things are, or not?”). 75. See 900c–d. 76. Ouranon holon: 821c7n. 77. See 628d6. 78. Cf. 812c6, 837e6. 79. I.e., gods and daimons. See 747e, 905e, 906a, Phdr. 246e–247a, Polit. 271d–e. 80. Cf. Rep. 420b–421c.

81. Petteutê[i]: See 739a1n. The reference is to the divine supervisor of the universe (903b4–5). There is probably an allusion to Heraclitus (whose views seem to be alluded to again at 903e6): “Time is a child playing a game of checkers; the kingship is in the hands of a child” (B 52 DK). Notice ho basileus (“our king”) at 904a6. 82. Heraclitus B124 DK “The most beautiful cosmos is a pile of things poured out at random”; B36 DK: “For souls to become water is to die; for water to become earth is to die; but from earth, water comes to be; from water, soul.” 83. On this somewhat obscure passage, see Saunders-5, pp. 232–234, Mayhew, pp. 174– 184. 84. See 713d–e. 85. Explained by what the Demiurge says to the gods he makes, which are the familiar Olympian ones (the ones “in accord with law”), though identified now with the souls of the heavenly bodies at Ti. 41a7–b5: “Gods, works divine whose maker and father I am, whatever has come to be by my hands cannot be dissolved without my consent. Now while it is true that everything that is put together can be dissolved, still only someone evil would consent to the dissolution of what has been beautifully fitted together and is in good condition. That is why you, as creatures that have come to be, are neither completely immortal nor completely exempt from dissolution. Still, you will not be dissolved nor will death be your lot, since you have received the guarantee of my will.” See Reeve-3, pp. 102–109. 86. Cf. Rep. 617d6–e5: “The word of Lachesis, maiden daughter of Necessity! Ephemeral souls. The beginning of another death-bringing cycle for mortal-kind! Your daimon will not be assigned to you by lot; you will choose him. The one who has the first lot will be the first to choose a life to which he will be bound by necessity. Virtue has no master: as he honors or dishonors it, so shall each of you have more or less of it. Responsibility lies with the chooser; the god is blameless.” 87. They are terrified because “they are afraid of what they can’t see (aeides), and they assume that his . . . name, ‘Hades,’ associates him with that” (Crat. 403a5–8). 88. I.e., when it has become exceptionally divine or godlike in its virtue. 89. Homer, Od. 19.43. 90. Some deaths are followed by reincarnations: “If a person lived a good life throughout the due course of his time, he would at the end return to his residence in his companion star, to live a life of happiness that agreed with his character. But if he failed in this, he would be born a second time, now as a woman. And if even then he still could not refrain from wickedness, he would be changed once again, this time into some wild animal that resembled the wicked character he had acquired” (Ti. 42b3–c4). 91. See 728b–c. 92. Reading θεῶν with Saunders-2, pp. 101–103 for Budé θέων (participle of θεῖν “run”)— which gives the meaning “no one will ever be able to run fast enough to boast of having escaped” (Saunders-1)—and understanding ἀτυχὴς not as “luckless” (Mayhew) or the like but as at 781d3. See Schöpsdau-3, pp. 442–443. 93. Reading ἀπώτερον with Budé and Schöpsdau-3, p. 443; many editors read ἀγριώτερον (“more savage”). 94. Reading ἐνδελεχῶς with Budé and Schöpsdau-3, p. 446; Mayhew reads ἐντελεχῶς (“perfectly”). Hapanta ouranon: See 821c7.

95. Ton ouranon: See 821c7n. On what is agreed to, see 904a–b, also Rep. 379c, Tht. 176a– b. 96. Pleonektousin: Pleonexia (pleonektein is the associated verb) is an important notion in Plato’s thought. It is a sort of greed that leads one to try to outdo or do better than others and get a larger share than one is due and is thus the chief cause of injustice (Rep. 359c), since it leads one to try to get what belongs to other people, what isn’t one’s own. By contrast, doing or having one’s own is the cause of justice (Rep. 434a, 441e). 97. See Smp. 188a–b. 98. A paraphrase of Homer. Il. 9.500. See Rep. 488a–489a. 99. Kekêlêmenois: Notice dôrôn . . . kêloumenoi (“charmed by gifts”) at 885d4 and dôrois (“gifts”) at 906d4. 100. See 951d–962b, 961a–c, 968a–969c. 101. Sôphronistêrion: A nod, perhaps, to the famous phrontistêrion in Aristophanes, Clouds. 102. Eirônikon: Unlike irony as we understand it, eirôneia is correctly attributed only to someone who intends to deceive. Socrates’ enemies often accuse him of doing this. See, e.g., Rep. 337a. 103. Nouthetêsei: As Mayhew, p. 199, points out, the word literally means “placing or implanting nous in a person.” Cf. Ap. 25e6–26a4: “No, either I’m not corrupting the young or, if I am corrupting them, it’s involuntarily, so that in either case what you say is false. But if I’m corrupting them involuntarily, the law doesn’t require that I be taken to court for such errors—that is, involuntary ones—but that I be taken aside for private instruction and admonishment (nouthetein). After all, it’s clear that if I’m instructed, I’ll stop doing what I do involuntarily.” 104. I.e., if the appearance of temperance “proves (after release) to have been deceptive. The heretic, though released, is on probation” (Saunders-6, pp. 310). 105. See 906b–c. 106. See 766c–d, 922a–928d. 107. Theopolein: LSJ s.v. θεοπολέω gives “minister in things divine.” A theopolos is a Priest. The word occurs only here in Plato. 108. Hiera: Although the word also means “sacred things” (885a1) and “temples,” in this passage it has been rendered consistently as “shrines.” The apparent conflict between this prohibition and 717b4–5, where such shrines are countenanced, is perhaps to be resolved by theopolein: no one is to possess a shrine in a private household at which someone, not a Priest or Priestess, plays the role of one. 109. See 717a–b, 738b–d, 848c–d. 110. Katharois: Often katharos means in particular “free of pollution,” as at 910d1, but here, as the context indicates, it just means “open.” See LSJ s.v. καθαρός. 111. A nod to Hesiod, Op. 240–241. “Reaps the benefits” is, of course, ironic; and the sort of justice rough. See Saunders-2, pp. 103–104. 112. Eisaggelletô: An eisaggelia (pronounced eisangelia) was a specific sort of legal case or action in Athenian law. See MacDowell-2, p. 58, and, with specific reference to impiety, pp. 198–201. Here (unlike at 910d3) the meaning is almost certainly more general. See Saunders-6, pp. 314 n84.

113. Theois hoistisinoun: “[The phrase] comes in suddenly and surprisingly. To sacrifice to approved Magnesian gods would hardly be an offense, unless it were done with the wrong intentions or manner or state of mind, i.e., ‘heretically.’ Plato probably means that; but he may also be indicating that the interdiction of private shrines is also an interdiction of foreign cults” (Saunders-6, pp. 314–315 n85). If the reference were to “the dissembling atheist  .  .  . who pretends to believe that there are gods” (Mayhew, p. 210), the person involved would need to have been detected in some previous act of impiety, which would itself have to figure in the legal charge.

{355} BOOK 11 ATHENIAN: After this, then, our transactions with each other |913a| would require fitting regulation. A simple one, I suppose, might be something like this: No one, as far as possible, is to touch my property, or move it in the slightest degree, without persuading me in some way. And I, in accord with the same regulation, |913a5| and having a sensible mind, must do likewise with the property of others. So, among things of this sort, let us speak first about treasure, a store of which someone—not one of my ancestors—has laid away for himself and his family. I must never pray to the gods to let me find it; nor, if I do find it, |913b| must I move it; nor, again, must I ever tell so-called prophets about it, who somehow or other will advise me to take what was deposited in the earth. For I’d never benefit as much in money by taking a piece of property as by the solid increase in virtue |913b5| of soul and justice involved in not taking it, and, instead of a piece of property, acquiring a better property in a better part, by preferring the possession of justice in the soul to possessing property. You see, the saying “don’t change what mustn’t be changed”1 well applies to many cases, and we must speak of the present case as one of those. And one must be persuaded |913c| by the stories told about these matters, about how such things are not advantageous for our descendants.2 But if someone takes no thought for his children and, being careless of the one who established the law, takes what neither he himself, nor his father, nor a father’s father put down, without |913c5| persuading the one who put it down, thus corrupting the finest law, and the simplest ordinance of a man who was in no way ill born, who said, “don’t take what you didn’t put down,”3 and who, despising these two legislators, does take what he didn’t put down (and this is no small thing, |913d| but sometimes a vast quantity of treasure)—what penalty must such a person suffer? Well, what it is to be at the hands of gods, the god knows, but the first person to notice such a thing is to report it: to the City-Wardens, if it occurs in the city; to the MarketWardens, |913d5| if it occurs somewhere in the city’s marketplace; and if somewhere in the rest of the country, he {356} is to make it known to the Country-Wardens and their officials. |914a| Once they have been made

known, the city is to send delegates to Delphi, and whatever the god ordains concerning the money and the person who moved it is what the city, in subservience to the oracles, is to do on behalf of the god. And if the informant is a free person, he is to acquire |914a5| a reputation for virtue, but if he has failed to inform, one for vice; if he is a slave, it would be right for him to be made a free person by the city, which is to give4 his price to his master. If he has failed to inform, the penalty is to be death. Following in order after this, to accompany it, should come |914b| the same law concerning small as well as great matters: If someone voluntarily or involuntarily leaves something belonging to him somewhere, anyone who comes across it is to leave it lying, believing that such things are guarded by the female daimon of the wayside, as things made sacred to the goddess5 under the law. |914b5| If contrary to this, anyone disobediently takes it and carries it home, then, if he is a slave and it is of small value, he is to be thoroughly whipped by any passer-by who is not less than thirty years old. If he is a free person, in addition to being believed unfree |914c| and outside the community of laws, he is to pay ten times the value of what was moved to the person who left it. If one person accuses another of having any piece of his property, great or small, and the other admits that he has it, but not that it belongs to the accuser, |914c5| then, if the property has been registered6 with the officials in accord with law, the accuser is to summon the one who has it before the officials, and he is to produce it. Once it has been produced in open court, if it is clearly registered in the records as belonging to one of the disputants, |914d| he is to take it and leave; but if it belongs to someone else who is not present, whichever of the two can furnish a worthy guarantor is to take it away on behalf of the absent party, in accord with his claim to removal, and hand it over to him. If the disputed thing is not registered |914d5| with the officials, it is to be left with the three oldest officials until the trial; if the item left for safekeeping is a living creature, the loser in the case concerning it is to pay the officials for its nurture. The officials are to give their judgment |914e| in the case within three days. {357} Anyone who wishes, provided he’s in his senses, may seize his own slave for the purpose of making whatever licit use of him he pleases.7 He

may also seize on behalf of another (one of his relatives or friends) any runaway, for purposes |914e5| of safekeeping. But if anyone wishes to deliver into freedom someone who is being seized as a slave, the one who is seizing him is to give him up, while the one who wishes to deliver him is to provide three worthy guarantors, and to effect deliverance in accord with these requirements, but not otherwise. If, contrary to these requirements, someone does effect deliverance, he is to be subject to a charge of violence, and, if found guilty, is to pay double |915a| the registered value to the party injured by the deliverance. Someone may also seize a freed person if he has not rendered the requisite service to his emancipators or has not done so sufficiently. The service is to consist in: coming three times a month to his emancipator, at his |915a5| emancipator’s house, for instruction on what things, of those that are both just and that he is capable of, he must do; and, where marrying is concerned, doing so in a way that meets with the approval of his former master. As for being wealthy, he is not to be allowed to become more wealthy than his emancipator; anything more |915b| is to become his master’s. The one who has been freed is not to remain more than twenty years, but rather, like all other foreigners,8 is to leave, taking all his property, unless he persuades the officials and his emancipator to let him stay. If a |915b5| freed person, or any other foreigner, acquires property in an amount greater than the third assessment class,9 he is to leave within thirty days after the day this happened, taking his belongings, and no further request for permission to remain |915c| is to come before the officials. If anyone disobeying these laws is taken to court and found guilty, the penalty is to be death, and his things are to become public property. Such cases are to be tried in the tribal courts, unless the parties have previously |915c5| settled their charges against each other before neighbors, or before courts of their choice.10 If someone claims someone else’s animal as his own, or some other of his things, the possessor is to refer the matter |915d| to the—solvent and suable— seller or donor, or the one who with full authority transferred {358} it to him in some other way;11 if the reference is made to a citizen or a resident alien living in the city, he is to do so within thirty days, or in the case of a

foreign transfer, within five months, of which the middle month is to be that in which |915d5| the summer solstice occurs.12 When one person makes an exchange with another by buying or selling, the exchange is to be made by handing over the item in the assigned location in the marketplace, and nowhere else, and receiving payment on the spot; no purchase or sale |915e| is to be made on credit.13 If in any other way or any other places a person were to exchange one thing for another with someone else, trusting the one he’s exchanging with, he is to do this on the understanding that there are no legal remedies concerning things not sold in accord with the |915e5| regulations now being stated. Where contributions to clubs are concerned, anyone who wishes may collect contributions as a friend from friends, on the understanding that if some disagreement arises about the collection, there are to be no legal remedies of any sort for anyone where these matters are concerned. If someone has sold something and received no less than fifty drachmas, he is of necessity to remain |915e10| in the city for ten days, and the buyer is to know the residence |916a| of the seller, because of the complaints that customarily arise in such matters and because of legal restitutions. The legal restitutions, or non-restitutions, are to be as follows: if someone sells a slave suffering from consumption, kidney stones, |916a5| strangury, or the socalled sacred disease,14 or some other disease of body or mind that is longlasting and hard to cure, and invisible to most people, then, if the sale is to a doctor or a gymnastic trainer, there is to be no claim of restitution for this person in this sort of case, nor if the seller told {359} the truth to the buyer beforehand. |916b| But if some practitioner of the relevant craft sells a slave of this sort to a layperson, the buyer is to claim restitution within six months, except in the case of the sacred disease, for which he is to make it within a year. Judgment is to be given by three doctors |916b5| chosen by joint nomination of the parties. The one who loses his suit is to pay double the selling price. If a layperson sells to a layperson, there is to be a claim of restitution and judgment given as |916c| in the case just mentioned, but the loser is to pay the simple selling price. If someone knowingly sells a slave convicted of homicide to someone who also knows it, there is to be no claim of restitution for the buyer of

such a slave; but if it’s to someone who does not know, there is to be a claim of restitution |916c5| as soon as any of the buyers becomes aware of it. Judgment is to reside in the five youngest Guardians of the Laws, and if it is decided that the seller acted knowingly, he is to purify the households of the buyers in accord with the law of the Interpreters15 and pay triple the selling price to the buyer. |916d| Anyone exchanging currency for currency, or for anything else whatsoever, living or nonliving, must give and receive everything in an unfalsified condition, in compliance with the law. But as with other laws, let us also receive a prelude concerning this evil |916d5| as a whole. Every man must think of adulteration, lying, and deception as belonging to a single kind, to which most people are accustomed, speaking in a bad way, to apply the adage that each time such a thing occurs it may often be right, if it is “opportune.” |916e| But when they leave unregulated and undefined what the opportune is, and where and when it is so, they do much damage to themselves and to others by this adage. To the legislator, however, it is not open to leave this undefined; on the contrary, he must always make perspicuous what the criteria, great or small, are. And, in fact, |916e5| now is the time to define them: No one, in word or deed, is to lie in any way, or deceive in any way, or adulterate anything, calling on the family of gods as witnesses, if he is not going to become absolutely hateful to the gods. |917a| And someone who swears false oaths, thinking nothing of gods, is of this sort, as, in second place, is someone who lies in front of his superiors. Now the superiors of the worse are the better, and of the young (generally speaking) their elders —which is why parents are the superiors |917a5| of offspring, men of women and children, and rulers of ruled. For all these people it would be fitting to respect all these superiors, in any position of authority, but especially in political offices—which is the place {360} from which our present argument set out. For everyone who adulterates any of the things in the marketplace lies and deceives, and |917b| calling on the gods as witnesses, taking an oath with the laws and cautions of the Market-Wardens in front of him, shows neither respect for human beings nor reverence for gods. Indeed, it is an altogether fine practice not to recklessly defile the names of

the gods, by having |917b5| on each occasion the level of purity and strict observance of ceremony that most of us have in most matters concerning the gods.16 But for anyone who is not persuaded, the law is this: No one selling anything in the marketplace is ever to quote two prices for the thing he is selling, but is to quote a single price; if he does not get this, |917c| he is to take the thing away again, quite rightly taking it, and on this day is to put neither a higher nor a lower price on it. Praising or swearing of oaths about anything that is being sold is to be excluded. If anyone disobeys these regulations, any citizen17 passing by who is not less than |917c5| thirty years old is to punish the swearer by beating him, with impunity; but if the passer-by pays no heed to them and disobeys, he is to be subject to reproach for betrayal of the laws. If a person is selling something adulterated, and is not capable of being persuaded by the present arguments,18 |917d| any knowledgeable passer-by who is able to expose him is to expose him in front of the officials: if it is a slave or resident alien who exposes him, he is to carry off the item; if it is a citizen, and he does not expose him, he is to be declared an evil person who defrauds the gods, |917d5| but if he does expose him, he is to dedicate the item to the gods whose marketplace it is. The one who is discovered selling something of this sort, in addition to being deprived of the adulterated item, is to be whipped in the marketplace by a herald |917e| (one lash for every drachma in the price he asks for the item), after the latter has announced what he is going to be beaten for. As for the adulterations and malpractices of sellers, the Market-Wardens and Guardians of the Laws, after hearing from those with experience in each area, are to write down the things |917e5| a seller must and must not do, and post them inscribed on a stone tablet in front of the Market-Wardens’ office,19 to be laws and perspicuous sources of information {361} for those having to do with the use of the marketplace. (About what concerns the |918a| City-Wardens enough has been said earlier on,20 but if it seems that something additional is needed, they are to consult the Guardians of the Laws, write down what seems to be missing, and post on a stone tablet at the City-Wardens’ office the first and second set of laws relating to their office.) |918a5|

Hard on the heels of the practices of adulteration follows the practices of retail trade. Let’s first give advice and argument about the entire thing, and establish a law for it later. You see, all retail trade—at least, when it is in accord with nature—exists in a city |918b| not for the sake of doing harm, but entirely the opposite. For how can anyone be anything but a benefactor if, when there is an uneven and asymmetrical distribution of any sorts of goods, he makes it even and symmetrical? And this, it must be declared, is also what the power of money |918b5| produces, and this is the task, it must be said, that the trader is assigned. Hired laborer, innkeeper, and the rest, some more seemly, others more unseemly, are all capable of this task at least, of being an aid in the general fulfillment of needs |918c| and in the even distribution of property. So let’s see why exactly it seems to be neither a fine nor a seemly thing, and what has caused it to be slandered, in order that we may remedy by law, if not the whole thing, at least parts of it. This is no mean task, it would seem, |918c5| nor one requiring little virtue. CLEINIAS: What do you mean? ATHENIAN: My dear Cleinias, it’s a small part of humankind, by nature few in number and nurtured with the highest sort of nurture, that, when they encounter needs and appetites for certain things, are able to hold steadfastly to the |918d| proper measure, and that, when they have the chance to get a lot of money, soberly choose having a proper measure over a large. The mass of mankind are entirely the opposite of these people: when they have needs, they need without measure, and when they have the chance |918d5| to make gains in proper measure, they choose to make gains insatiably. That is why everything having to do with retail trade, merchandizing, and innkeeping has come to be slandered and subjected to shameful insults. But suppose (as should never happen or ever will) someone were to compel (as is ridiculous to say, but I’m going to say all the same) |918e| the best men everywhere to become innkeepers for a certain period of time, or engage in retail trade, or do something of this sort, or were {362} even to compel the women by some necessity of fate to take part in such a mode of life. Then we would know just how pleasing and desirable |918e5| each of these things is, and whether, if it were practiced in accord with a reason that was incorruptible, every such activity would be honored in the fashion of a mother or a nurse. But as things stand, when, for purposes of commerce,

someone has set up dwellings |919a| in deserted places that are a long way off in every direction, he receives travelers who are in distress with welcome lodgings, providing tranquility and calm to those driven by the violence of fierce storms, or a cool refuge from stifling heat. But after that, |919a5| instead of receiving them as comrades, and providing gifts of friendship to accompany his acts of hospitality, he treats them as if they were enemy prisoners that have fallen into his hands, releasing them only on payment of very large, unjust, and morally unclean ransoms. It is these and similar errors in all |919b| these sorts of things that have produced the slanders against these ways of aiding those in distress. For these things, then, the legislator must in every case find a drug. Now the old saying is correct: it is difficult to fight against two enemies,21 especially opposite ones, |919b5| as in the case of diseases and many other things. And indeed the present battle among these things and about these is against two, poverty and wealth, of which wealth corrupts the human soul by luxury, while poverty, by its pains, impels it to shamelessness. |919c| What cure, then, could there be for this disease in a city with any sense? The first thing is to make as little use as possible of the class of retail traders; second, to assign people to it who, if they become corrupted, would produce no |919c5| great damage to the city; third, a contrivance must be found for those taking part in such practices, whereby their characters |919d| will not so easily share in shamelessness and unfreedom of soul. After the things that have now been stated, let our law—and may good luck be with it—be as follows: In the city of the Magnesians, which the god is restoring |919d5| and founding afresh, none among the landowners, those who hold the five thousand and forty households,22 is to become a retail trader, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, or a merchant, or perform any sort of servile service for private individuals who are not his equals, except for his father and mother, those of a yet earlier generation, |919e| and all those older than he, who are free and whom he serves in a free manner. What is free and what is unfree is not easy {363} to legislate exactly, however, and is to be judged by those who have received public honors for their hatred of the one and their embrace of the other.

Anyone who, |919e5| through some sort of craftiness, does take part in unfree retail trade is to be indicted by anyone who wishes for shaming his family, before a court of those who have been judged first in virtue. If he is considered to be defiling his ancestral hearth by an unworthy practice, he is to be kept away from it by being imprisoned for a year; if it happens again, for two years; and |920a| each time he’s caught, the imprisonment is not to stop being doubled. The second law: One must be a resident alien or a foreigner if one is going to engage in retail trade. In third place, a third law: In order that someone of this sort, being a resident of our city, |920a5| be the best possible, or the least bad possible, the Guardians of the Laws are to bear in mind that they are not only guardians of those it is easy to guard against becoming lawless and bad, the ones who by birth and nurture are well educated, but are to guard even more those who are not people of this sort, |920b| but who are practicing practices that have a certain strong tendency to turn people toward becoming bad. So, since retail trade has many branches and includes many related practices (like the ones that were allowed to remain in the city on the grounds that they seemed utterly necessary23), the Guardians of the Laws are to meet concerning these matters with those who have experience in each branch of retail trade, just as we earlier |920c| prescribed in the case of adulteration,24 which is a thing akin to this. And when they meet they are to see just what ratio of receipts to expenditures produces a proper measure of profit for the retailer. The ratio of receipts to expenditures that emerges is to be posted in writing and guarded, |920c5| in some cases by the Market-Wardens, in others by the City-Wardens, in others by the Country-Wardens. And in this way retail trade would pretty much be beneficial to each person, and do the least harm to those in cities who make use of it. When someone makes and then fails to fulfill |920d| an agreement of any sort other than when it is something prohibited by laws or a decree,25 or one he was forced by unjust compulsion to agree to, or where he’s involuntarily prevented by some unforeseen stroke of luck, trials are to {364} be held in the tribal courts, |920d5| if the parties were unable to reconcile their differences before arbitrators or neighbors.26

The class of craftsmen, who have enriched our life with their crafts, is sacred to Hephaestus27 and Athena, while those who preserve the works of the craftsmen |920e| by other crafts, which are defensive, are sacred to Ares and Athena—and it is right that the class of these craftsmen is also sacred to these gods. You see, all these are in continuous service of land and people— the latter by taking the lead in the contest of war, the former |920e5| by being producers (for pay) of tools and works. So, because of their reverence for their divine ancestors, it would not be fitting for these people to lie about these matters. Accordingly, if one of the craftsmen—lacking |921a| reverence for the god who gives him his livelihood, believing in his blindness of mind that god is forgiving to one of his own—fails to complete his work within the stated time, due to vice, he is first to pay a penalty to the god, and, second, a law is to be laid down for him as follows: |921a5| He is to owe the price of the works he lied about to the person who commissioned them, and is to produce them again from the start, within the stated time, free of charge. And to one who contracts a job of work the law is an advisor that gives the same advice as to a seller,28 which was not to try to |921b| set too high a price, but to set it as simply as possible at its true value. So it prescribes the same thing to the contractor, since the craftsman certainly knows the true value. In a city of free people, then, a craft (which is a thing that is by nature perspicuous and without deceit) |921b5| is never to be what the very craftsman himself uses to craftily take advantage of laypeople; in these cases, anyone who has been done an injustice may bring a lawsuit against the one who does the injustice. But if, on the other hand, someone gives a commission to a craftsman and then fails to pay him the correct amount in accord with their legal agreement, |921c| dishonoring Zeus, the protector of cities, and Athena, who are partners in the constitution, and, through love for a small gain, loosens great ties of community, let there be the following law to protect, along with gods, the thing that binds the city together: Anyone who receives some work in advance and fails to make |921c5| payment within the agreed period of time is to pay double. If a whole year elapses, then, although all other sums of money on loan are to be interest free,29 this {365} person is to pay

one obol |921d| per month for each drachma.30 Trials for these cases are to be in the tribal courts. Now that we have made mention of craftsmen in general, it is right to speak in passing |921d5| about the craftsmen of our salvation in time of war, the Generals31 and all those expert in this craft. For these, as craftsmen of a different sort, it is the same as for the others. If one of them undertakes some public work, either voluntarily or when ordered, and performs it in a fine way, |921e| then the law will never tire of praising anyone who gives him the honors he justly deserves, since these are a military person’s wages; but if anyone receives in advance any of the fine work done in time of war and does not give wages, the law will blame him. Concerning these matters, then, let us lay down this law mixed with praise, |921e5| by way of advising, not forcing, the mass of the citizens: They are to honor those good men who are saviors of the entire city, |922a| either by acts of courage or military contrivances, but as being of the second rank, since the greatest prize is to be given to those who rank first, the ones who are especially capable of honoring the writings of the good legislators. |922a5| We have now pretty much produced regulations for the most important of the agreements people make with each other, except for those regarding orphans and the supervision of orphans by their guardians. So, after the ones now discussed, it is necessary for these matters to be somehow |922b| or other regulated. The starting-points of all these are the desires of those who are about to die to make a will, and the accidents that happen to those who have made no will at all.32 And I said “necessary,” Cleinias, having in mind the trouble and difficulty where these matters |922b5| are concerned. You see, it’s impossible to leave this unregulated. For each person would set down many things that are discordant with each other and contrary to the laws, the characters of the living, and even to their own characters in the days before they set out to make a will, if one gives permission for any will that someone may make in this way to have unconditional control, |922c| no matter what state he’s in near the end of his life. For the fact is that most of us are in some way in a mindless state and weak by the time we believe that we are about to die. CLEINIAS: What do you mean by this, Stranger? |922c5|

{366} ATHENIAN: A person who’s about to die, Cleinias, is a difficult customer, and full of words that are very frightening and displeasing to legislators. CLEINIAS: In what way? |922c5| ATHENIAN: Since he’s seeking control over everything, he’s apt to speak with |922c10| anger. |922d| CLEINIAS: Saying what? ATHENIAN: “Ye gods,” he says, “it’s a terrible thing if I’m not at all allowed to give, or not to give, my belongings to whomever I wish, and more to one and less to another of those who have shown themselves to be bad or |922d5| good to me, when sufficiently tested in times of illness, or else in old age and other strokes of luck of very sort.” CLEINIAS: Well, Stranger, don’t they seem to you to be right? ATHENIAN: What seems to me, Cleinias, is that the ancient |922e| legislators were fainthearted, and looked at and bore in mind only a small part of human affairs when they made laws. CLEINIAS: What do you mean? ATHENIAN: Frightened by those words, my good friend, |922e5| they established the law that allows a person to will his belongings unconditionally, in whatever way he wishes.33 But I and you will give |923a| an answer to those in the city who are about to die that somehow better hits the right note: “Friends,” we’ll say, “creatures simply of a day, it is difficult for you to know your own property and also to ‘know yourselves,’ as the Pythia’s inscription says.34 |923a5| So I, as legislator, lay it down that neither you yourselves nor this property belongs to you, but to your entire family, both past and future, and that your entire family and its property belong still more to the city. |923b| This being so, if someone insinuates himself into your good graces through flattery, when you are afflicted by illnesses or old age, and persuades you to make a will contrary to what is best, I will not voluntarily assent to it, but will legislate looking to what is best {367} for the entire city and family, and with a view to all this, |923b5| justly putting a lower estimation on what is best for a single individual.35 As for you, may

you travel with graciousness and goodwill toward us on the journey that you, in keeping with human nature, are now traveling; while we, for our part, will take care of the rest of your things, so far as lies within our power —not for some and for others |923c| not.”36 Let these be the encouragements and preludes for the living, Cleinias, as well as for the dying. The law is to be as follows: Whoever writes a will disposing of his property, if he is a father |923c5| of children, is first to write down which of his sons he thinks worthy to become his heir; if he is offering one of his other children to someone else who accepts to adopt that son, he is to put that in writing too;37 if there is any additional son of his who is not destined for any allotment and |923d| who is expected, in accord with law, to be sent out to some colony, the father is to be allowed to give as much of the rest of his property to this one as he wishes, except for the ancestral allotment and all the equipment having to do with it; and if there are more sons, |923d5| he is to distribute whatever there is besides the allotment among them in whatever proportion he wishes. But if any of his sons already has a house, he is not to distribute any property to him, and the same for a daughter; if she is betrothed to a man, he is not to distribute to her, if she isn’t, he is to distribute to her; but if |923e| subsequent to the will one of his sons or daughters is discovered to have an allotment in the country, they are to give up what they inherited to the heir of the person making the will. If the person making the will leaves no male offspring, but does leave female ones, he is to leave a husband for |923e5| whichever of his daughters he chooses as a son for himself, and write him down as his heir. If his son (whether natural or adopted) has died while still a child, before reaching a man’s estate, to meet this unlucky sort of case too, the person writing the will is to write down which of his children should, with better luck, |924a| come second. If anyone writing a will is entirely childless, he may select one-tenth of the property he acquired in addition to his allotment and give it to whomever he wants to give it to. All the rest he is to hand over to his adopted heir, making him his son by law, |924a5| so that he shall be blameless and the son gracious.

{368} In the case of a person whose children need guardians, if he dies after making a will and naming guardians in writing for his children, if those he wished and as many as he wished voluntarily agree to serve as guardians, then the choice of |924b| guardians that is in accord with these written instructions is to be authoritative. But if someone dies either without making a will at all, or omitting a choice of guardians, then the nearest relatives on the father’s and mother’s sides are to be authorized guardians, two |924b5| from the father’s side and two from the mother’s, as well as one from the friends of the deceased, and the Guardians of the Laws are to appoint these for any orphan who needs them. Guardianship in general, and the orphans involved, are to be supervised always by the fifteen Guardians of the Laws, the |924c| oldest ones of all, who are to divide themselves by seniority into groups of three, one group acting for one year, another for another year, until the five periods have passed in rotation; and as far as possible this is never to be abandoned. |924c5| If someone dies without making a will at all, leaving children in need of a guardianship, his children’s need is to be covered by these same laws. And if someone, meeting with an unexpected stroke of bad luck, leaves only daughters, |924d| he is to have sympathetic consideration for the one establishing the laws if he looks to just two of the three concerns a father has in giving the daughters in marriage: closeness of kinship and preservation of the allotment.38 The third, which |924d5| a father would consider, namely, looking to see which of all the citizens would in their characters and ways of life be a suitable son for him and husband for his daughter, the legislator omits, because the investigation is impossible. |924e| Accordingly, let the following law be laid down as the best we can do in these sorts of situations: If someone who dies without making a will leaves daughters only, then a brother of his from the same father, or from the same mother but with no allotment of his own, is to take the daughter as his wife along with the allotment of the deceased; |924e5| likewise, if there is no brother, but the son of a brother, provided the parties are suited in age to each other; if there is none of these, but the son of a sister, the same things apply; fourth in line, a brother of the deceased’s father; fifth, a son of his; sixth, a son of the deceased father’s sister. In the same way, for someone leaving female children only, |924e10| the family is always to be carried on in

accord with closeness of kinship, going up through brothers and the sons of brothers, with the males |925a| in a single generation coming first, the females second. {369} As for age of marriage, questions of suitability or unsuitability are to be decided by the judge on the basis of inspection, viewing the males naked, and the females naked to the navel. If the family lacks relatives |925a5| as far down as a brother’s grandsons, and likewise as far up as a grandfather’s children, then whichever of the other citizens the girl, with the help of her guardians, chooses—she and he acting voluntarily—is to become heir to the deceased’s allotment and spouse of his daughter. |925b| Further (it’s as well to be ready for everything39), there could even at times be a lack of such men in the city itself. So if any girl, at a loss to find a man from there, sees one who was sent out to a colony, and is of a mind to have him become heir to her father’s allotment, then, if he is a relative, he is to enter into possession of the allotment, |925b5| in accord with the instruction of the law; if he is from outside the family, and none of those in the city is related to her either, then he is to be authorized, in accord with the choice of guardians and of the daughter of the deceased, |925c| to marry her, return home, and take the allotment of the one without a will. If a man without any male or female children at all dies without making a will, all other matters in this sort of case |925c5| are to be settled in accord with the previous law; and a woman and a man from the family are in each instance to be authorized to go into the deserted house and the allotment is to become theirs: first, a sister; second, a brother’s daughter; third, the offspring |925d| of a sister; fourth, the father’s sister; fifth, the father’s brother’s child; sixth, the father’s sister’s child. These female relatives are to live together with the males, in accord with closeness of kinship and divine law,40 in the way we established earlier by law.41 |925d5| Now we must not fail to notice the oppressiveness of such laws, in that they sometimes harshly instruct the deceased’s next of kin to marry his female relative, and seem not to consider the thousands of impediments that spring up among people that make someone unwilling to obey such |925e| instructions, but to prefer to suffer anything rather than obey—as when those instructed to marry or to be given in marriage are afflicted by diseases

or disabilities of their bodies or mind. It might seem to some people that the legislator |925e5| gives no thought to these matters; but that impression is incorrect. So on behalf of the legislator and those governed by his laws, let something be said, pretty much as a sort of general prelude, requesting those who are given the instructions {370} to have sympathetic consideration for the legislator, because in taking care of the common good he would never be able |925e10| at the same time to manage the private misfortunes of each individual; and, on the other hand, requesting sympathetic consideration also for those governed by his laws, as |926a| it is likely that sometimes they are unable to carry out fully the instructions of the legislator, which he issued in ignorance of those misfortunes.42 CLEINIAS: What, Stranger, would be the most properly measured thing to do in such cases? |926a5| ATHENIAN: In the case of such laws, Cleinias, and those governed by them, it is necessary that arbitrators be chosen. CLEINIAS: What do you mean? |926a10| ATHENIAN: Sometimes a nephew with a wealthy father would not voluntarily be willing to take in marriage the daughter of his uncle, because he is self-indulgent |926b| and has in mind a grander marriage. Sometimes, though, because the legislator’s instruction would lead to a major misfortune, a person would be compelled to disobey the law, since it compels taking in marriage madness or some other terrible misfortunes |926b5| of body or soul, which would make life not worth living for the one acquiring them. So let the statement we are now making about these matters be laid down in a law as follows: If anyone has a complaint against the laws laid down concerning a will, whether as regards anything else whatsoever or as regards marriages, |926c| saying that if the legislator himself were present and alive, he would never have compelled to act in this way those who are now being compelled to do either of these two things, to marry or be given in marriage, while one of the relatives or a guardian says the opposite, what is to be stated is that the legislator has left those fifteen from among |926c5| the Guardians of the Laws as arbitrators and fathers for the male and female orphans.43 Those who disagree about things of this sort are to resort to them for judgment, |926d|

and are to carry out their decision as having authority. If, however, someone thinks that this entrusts too much power to the Guardians of the Laws, he is to take them before the court of Select Judges44 to get a judgment on the points of disagreement, and on the defeated party |926d5| blame and reproach are to be laid by {371} the legislator—which is a heavier penalty than a large sum of money to anyone who possesses any sense. Accordingly, for orphan children there should be, as it were, a sort of second birth. Now, after the first one, it has been stated45 what the nurture |926e| and education for each of them is to be; after the second one, though, which was a birth deprived of fathers, some way must be devised whereby the bad luck of orphanhood will involve the least possible pity for the misfortune of those who have become orphans. First, then, we say46 that the law appoints |926e5| Guardians of the Laws as fathers for these in place of their begetters, and not inferior to them, and, in particular, we assign three to the orphans each year, to take care of them as if they were their own, having given a preamble about the nurture of orphans that strikes the right note with these and with their guardians. For what we went through in our earlier arguments47 was opportune, |926e10| it seems to me, about the souls of the dead |927a| having a certain power, by which they take care of human affairs after death. These things are true, though the stories encompassing them are long. And we must trust the other sayings about such matters, so numerous and |927a5| so exceedingly ancient are they, and, once again, also trust the ones who legislate that these things are so—if, of course, they do not appear utterly senseless. But if, in accord with nature, things are this way, then the guardians are, first, to fear the gods above, who have perceptions of the orphans’ |927b| deprivation; secondly, the souls of the dead, for whom it is natural to be especially concerned about their own offspring as well as to be well disposed toward those who respect them, and ill disposed toward those who disrespect them; and, thirdly, they are to fear the souls of the living, who are old |927b5| and held in the highest esteem (because where a city is happy under good laws, the children of their children live loving them tenderly and with pleasure); they hear sharply and see sharply what has to do with these things, and are well disposed to those who are just where they are concerned, |927c| but feel a most just resentment, on the other hand, toward those who are wantonly

aggressive48 toward orphans and those deprived, because they regard these as the greatest and most sacred trust. A guardian or official must turn his mind—if there is even a small bit of it present in him—to all these, and take care |927c5| {372} over the nurture and education of orphans, and, as if doing a service for himself and his family, be a benefactor to them in every way, as far as he possibly can. The person, then, who is persuaded by the story that precedes the law, and does nothing wantonly aggressive to an orphan, will not experience palpably the anger of the legislator where these matters are concerned; but the one who is not persuaded, and |927d| does an injustice to someone deprived of father or mother, is to pay double the total damages paid by someone who has been bad to a child with both parents living. As for distinct legislation49 for guardians concerning orphans, and for officials concerning the supervision of the guardians, if they didn’t have |927d5| models for the nurture of free children in the nurture of their own children and taking care of their own property, and, furthermore, if laws concerning these very things hadn’t been gone through in a properly measured way, |927e| there would be some reason to establish laws of guardianship, as being special and very different, subtly differentiating by their special practices the life of orphans from that of non-orphans. But as things stand, among us orphanhood doesn’t much |927e5| differ in these respects from having the nurture of a father, although in terms of respect and disrespect and care bestowed, it tends to be not at all on the same level. That is why in dealing with this very topic—legislation concerning orphans—the |928a| law has been serious in both encouraging and threatening. But a further threat of the following sort might be rather opportune: Anyone acting as guardian of a male or female child and any Guardian of the Laws appointed to supervise a guardian is to show no worse affection |928a5| for the child who luck has made an orphan than for his own children, and is to take no worse care of the property of the one he is nurturing than of his own50—in fact, better care and with more goodwill than of his own. This one law concerning orphans everyone acting as a guardian is to observe. |928b|

If anyone acts otherwise concerning these matters, contrary to this law, in the case of the guardian, the official51 is to fine him, in that of the official, the guardian is to bring him before the court of the Select Judges, and fine him double the damages assessed by the court. |928b5| If a guardian seems to relatives or any other citizens to be neglecting or {373} maltreating the orphan, they are to bring him before the same court; if he is found guilty, he is to pay four times the damages assessed, |928c| of which half is to go to the child, half to the one who has judgment given in his favor. When an orphan comes of age, if he thinks that he has been badly treated by his guardian, for up to five years from the guardianship’s expiration, he is to be allowed to bring an action concerning the guardianship. |928c5| And if one of the guardians is found guilty, the court is to assess what he is to suffer or pay; if one of the officials is, and he is found to have harmed the orphan through negligence, the court is to assess what he is to pay to the child, but, if through injustice, |928d| then in addition to paying the fine, he is to be removed from the office of Guardian of the Laws, and the political community52 is to appoint another Guardian of the Laws for the country and the city in his place. Differences arise between fathers and their own children, and |928d5| between children and their fathers, that are greater than is right, due to which fathers might think that the legislator should make a law allowing them, if they wish, to make a public declaration by a herald that their son is, |928e| in accord with law, their son no longer; while the sons, on the other hand, think that they should be allowed to bring a writ of insanity53 against their fathers when they are in a shameful condition due to illness or old age. These tend to occur among people who are really altogether evil in character, since where only half |928e5| is evil—the father not being evil, for example, while the son is, or vice versa—misfortunes born of this level of hostility do not occur. Now in any other constitution, a child who has been publicly renounced would not necessarily lose his city as well, but in this one, to which these laws will apply, it is necessary for a fatherless person to go and live in |928e10| another country. For it is not possible for a single addition to be made to |929a| the five thousand and forty households. That is why the one who is to

suffer this must in all justice be renounced not by his one father, but by his entire family. The procedure in such cases is to be in accord with a law such as the following: If anyone, whether in all justice or not, is prompted by a spirit, which is in no way |929a5| one of good luck, to want to remove from his family the one he begot and reared, he is not to be allowed to do this casually or hastily. First, he is to assemble his own relatives, {374} extending as far as |929b| cousins, and likewise his son’s relatives on his mother’s side, and accuse his son before them, explaining why he deserves to be declared banished from the family by all of them; and he is to give the son an equal opportunity for arguments showing why he does not deserve to suffer any of these things. If |929b5| the father persuades them and gets the votes of more than half the relatives (excluding the father, mother, and accused son from the voting, but54 including the rest of the adult women |929c| and55 men), then in this way and in accord with these procedures, but in no other way at all, the father is to be allowed to declare his son banished from the family. As for the one banished, if any of the citizens wishes to adopt him as his son, no law is to prevent him from doing so, since, in each instance, the characters of young people naturally undergo many changes in the course of life. But if after ten years no one wants to adopt the banished person as his son, the supervisors of the surplus children56 who are to be sent to a colony are to take care of these too, |929d| so that they may participate harmoniously in that colony. If some disease, old age, harshness of character, or all of these together makes someone more excessively senseless than in most cases, and it escapes the notice of others, with the exception of those who live |929d5| with him, while as “controller of what is his own,” he is ruining the household, but the son is at a loss, being reluctant to bring a writ of insanity against him—for him a law is to be laid down as follows: First, he is to go to the oldest among |929e| the Guardians of the Laws and explain his father’s misfortune and they, having explored the matter sufficiently, are to advise him as to whether or not he should bring the writ; if they do advise it, they are to become both witnesses and joint-plaintiffs with the one bringing the

writ. |929e5| If the father loses the case, he is for the rest of his life not to control what is his own, not to dispose of the smallest part of it, and is to live in the house like a child for the remainder of his life. If man and wife are in no way able to live on friendly terms because of an unlucky incompatibility of characters, then ten |929e10| middle-aged men from among the Guardians of the Laws, and likewise ten |930a| of the women in charge of marriages,57 are to have constant supervision of such people. If they are able to effect a reconciliation, it is to be authoritative, but if the souls of the couple are much too tempestuous for that, they {375} are to do all they can to find suitable partners for each of them. And since it is likely that people of this sort |930a5| have characters that are not gentle, they must try to fit them together with mates of a more sedate and gentle character. If those who cannot live on friendly terms are childless, or have few children, the making of new marriages is to be for the sake of children too. But if they have enough children, |930b| the separation and remarriage is to be done for the sake of growing old together and taking care of each other. If a wife dies leaving both female and male children, the law being established is to advise, but not compel, her husband to rear |930b5| the children without introducing a stepmother; but if there are no children, he is to be compelled to marry, until he begets enough children for the household and the city. If a husband dies leaving enough |930c| children, the mother of the children is to remain there and rear them. But if she seems too young to be able to live a healthy life without a husband,58 her relatives are to report the case to the women who supervise marriages, and are to do |930c5| what seems best to them and to these women concerning these matters, and, if there is a deficiency of children, for the sake of children too. (A barely sufficient number of children is to be by law a male one and a female one.) Whenever |930d| there is agreement about the parentage of a child, but a decision is needed as to who the offspring is to follow along with, then if a female slave has had intercourse with a slave, a free man, or a freed man, the offspring is to belong entirely to the master |930d5| of the female slave; if a free woman has intercourse with a slave, the offspring is to belong to the master of the slave; if the offspring is of a man by his own female slave, or of a woman by her own male slave, and quite publicly so, then in the case

of the woman, the women supervisors are to send it to another country |930e| together with its father, and the Guardians of the Laws are to do likewise with that of the man, together with the woman who gave birth to it.59 {376} No god or human with any sense would ever advise anyone to neglect their parents. On the contrary, one should have the wisdom to see |930e5| that the following prelude having to do with service to the gods has a direct relation to the respect and lack of respect paid to parents: The ancient laws laid down concerning the gods are everywhere twofold. For we honor some of the gods because we see them in a perspicuous way, while of others we set up statues as their images, and when we worship them, |931a| soulless though they are, we think that the ensouled gods feel great goodwill and gratitude toward us. So if anyone has a father or mother (or their fathers or mothers) laid up, weakened by old age, like a treasure in the house, he is never to think, |931a5| while he possesses such a “shrine” at his hearth,60 that a statue61 has more authority—if, of course, the one who has it serves it in the correct way. CLEINIAS: What exactly do you mean by the correct way? |931b| ATHENIAN: I’ll tell you. For, my friends, things of this sort are indeed worth listening to. CLEINIAS: Tell us, then. ATHENIAN: Oedipus, we say, when he was treated without respect, called down upon his |931b5| children those things which, according to everyone, were heard and fulfilled by the gods.62 And Amyntor in a fit of anger cursed his own son Phoenix,63 and Theseus cursed Hippolytus,64 and countless parents have cursed countless children, from which it is perspicuously clear that the gods do listen to |931c| the curses of parents against children. For a parent’s curse upon children is like no other curse upon other people—and most rightly so. Let no one suppose, then, that when a father or mother is especially |931c5| disrespected by the children it is natural for a god to listen to their prayers, but that when a parent is respected and is highly pleased, and because of this earnestly beseeches gods in his prayers for good things for his children—well, are we not to suppose that they listen equally to such prayers, and grant them to us? If not, they could never be just distributors of good things—and that, we say, would be most unfitting for gods. |931d|

{377} CLEINIAS: Absolutely. ATHENIAN: So, let’s bear in mind, as we said a little earlier,65 that in the eyes of gods we could not possess any statue more worthy of respect than a father or forefather weak with old age (or mothers |931d5| in the same condition), and when someone worships these with tokens of respect, the god is pleased, since otherwise he would not listen to them. You see, this shrine that is our ancestor is an amazing thing—far more amazing |931e| than the ones that are soulless. For while the ones that have souls join us in our prayers when cared for by us, and do the opposite when they are disrespected, the others do neither, so that if someone treats his father, grandfather, and everyone of this sort correctly, he would possess statues |931e5| with the most authority of all for insuring a god-beloved destiny. CLEINIAS: That’s very well put. ATHENIAN: So anyone with any sense fears and respects the prayers of parents, knowing that for many people and in many cases they have been fulfilled. And since this is the natural order of things, for good people aged |932a| parents are a godsend while they are alive, up to the very last moments of their life, and when they depart are sorely missed by the young;66 but for evil people they are very fearful things. So let everyone, persuaded by these words, respect his own parents with all lawful tokens of respect. But if |932a5| any are reported deaf to these sorts of preludes, the following law would be correctly laid down to deal with them: If anyone in this city takes less care of his parents than he should, and is not more attentive and more obedient to their wishes |932b| than to those of his sons, of all of his children, and of himself, the one who is suffering something of this sort is to report it, either in person or by sending someone, to the three oldest of the Guardians of the Laws, and to three also of |932b5| the women who supervise marriages. These are to take care of the matter, punishing the wrongdoers with a beating and imprisonment if they are still young—up to the age of thirty if they are men, while if they are women they are to be punished with |932c| the same punishments until they are ten years older than that. But if they are beyond these ages and do not desist from the same acts of neglect toward parents, and in some cases are maltreating them, they are to bring them before a court of one hundred and

one citizens, the ones |932c5| {378} who are oldest of all. If anyone is found guilty, the court is to assess what he is to pay or suffer, ruling out none of the things that a human being is capable of suffering or paying. If anyone is unable to report that he is being maltreated, any of the free people who learns of it |932d| is to report it to the officials, or else be an evil person, and subject to a suit for damage at the hands of anyone who wishes. If a slave reports it, he is to be set free; if he belongs to one of the maltreaters or of those being maltreated, the board of officials is to set him free; and if he belongs to one of the other |932d5| citizens, the public treasury is to pay on his behalf his price to the owner. The officials are to see to it that no one wrongs such a slave in revenge for his giving information. Of the ways in which one person harms another with poisons, the |932e| fatal cases have been fully discussed;67 but the other injuries that someone voluntarily and with premeditation inflicts by means of drinks, foods, or ointments, have not yet been fully discussed. For what holds back the full discussion is the fact that, in correspondence with the human race, |932e5| poisons are twofold. The sort we explicitly mentioned just now is that in which injury is done to bodies by bodies in accord with nature. |933a| But another sort uses magic, charms, and so-called spells not only to persuade those who dare to cause injury to others that they really are able to do such a thing, but also to persuade the others that they are injured beyond everything by those who are able to practice sorcery. |933a5| Now just how things stand in these cases, and all others of this sort, is not easy to know, nor, if one does know, is it easy to persuade others. And it is not worth |933b| trying to persuade people68 who are in their souls suspicious of each other in regard to such things that if they ever somewhere see molded wax imitations at doorways, or at places where three roads meet, or at the graves of their ancestors, they must ignore all such things, because they have no perspicuous doctrine69 about these. |933b5| Dividing in two, then, the law concerning poisoning, according to which of the two ways someone tries to poison, one must first entreat, exhort, and advise them that they must not try to do such a thing, |933c| nor frighten the mass of people, who are as easy to frighten70 as children, nor, on the other hand, compel the legislator and the judge to cure people of such fears, since, in the first place, the person trying to poison |933c5| {379} does not

know what he is doing either in regard to bodies (unless he happens to know the craft of medicine) or in regard to magic (unless he happens to be a prophet or diviner). So let the following statement be our law concerning poisoning: Anyone who poisons someone |933d| so as to cause a nonfatal injury either to the person himself or his people, or so as to cause a fatal or other injury to his livestock or bee swarms,71 if he happens to be a doctor, and is found guilty of poisoning, he is to be punished with death; but if he is a layman, what he is to suffer or pay, the court is to assess in his case. If someone is found in effect to be injuring someone by spells, charms, or incantations, or any other poison of that sort, |933e| if he is a prophet or diviner, he is to be put to death; but if someone, without the craft of prophecy,72 is found guilty of poisoning, the same thing as previously is to be done with him, since where this person is concerned too, the court is to assess what they think he is to suffer or |933e5| pay. When one person harms another by theft or violence,73 the greater the harm, the greater the payment to the harmed party, the smaller the harm, the smaller the payment; but above all the person is to pay each time an amount sufficient |933e10| to remedy the damage. In addition, each must pay the penalty attached to his wrongdoing for the sake of temperance:74 when someone has done wrong due to someone else’s foolishness (being persuaded |934a| because of his youth, or some other such thing), his penalty is to be lighter; when it is due to his own foolishness, because of lack of self-control in the face of pleasures or pains, such as being in the grip of cowardly fears, certain appetites, feelings of envy, or tempers that are hard to heal, his penalty is to be heavier. He is to pay the penalty |934a5| not because of the wrongdoing (for what is done will never be undone), but in order that, for the future, both he himself and those who see him being justly punished may either hate injustice altogether, or at least recover to a great extent from this sort |934b| of misfortune.75 So for all these reasons, and with a view to all such factors, the laws, like no bad archer,76 must aim at what the magnitude of the punishment in each of the cases is to be, |934b5| and above all at what is appropriate. {380} And the judge must assist the legislator in carrying out this same task, whenever

some law turns over to him the assessment of what the defendant is to suffer or pay, while the legislator, like a painter, must sketch in outline tasks that are to follow |934c| what he has written.77 That, Megillus and Cleinias, is precisely what is to be done by us, in the finest and best way possible. What the assigned penalties for all acts of theft or violence are to be must be stated, to the extent that gods and sons of gods allow us to make laws about this.78 |934c5| If someone is insane, he is not to appear in our city. In each case, the relatives are to keep the people in custody in their houses, in whatever way they know of, or else they are to pay a fine: |934d| one hundred drachmas for someone from the highest property assessment (whether it is a slave or a free person that he fails to keep an eye on); four-fifths of a mina for a member of the second assessment class; three-fifths for a member of the third; and two-fifths for a member of the fourth.79 There are many people who are insane, however, and many |934d5| ways for them to be it. In the cases just now mentioned, it is due to diseases, but there are also those who are insane because of a spirit that has a bad nature and at the same time has received a bad nurture, who in small quarrels shout at the top of their voices, abusing and slandering each other—which is the sort of thing that in a city under good laws |934e| is not fitting anywhere in any way, shape, or form. So, where abuse is concerned let the one law concerning all cases be as follows: No one is to verbally abuse anyone. If one person is disputing with another in words, he is to explain and listen to an explanation, |934e5| while wholly refraining from abuse of his disputant or those present. For from people swearing and cursing at each other, and calling each other shameful names in womanish voices, that is, first from words, which are a light thing, |935a| there arise hatreds and enmities that are the most heavy to bear, in actual deeds. For the speaker is gratifying a thing not to be gratified— spirit80—and glutting his anger with evil feasts, and making savage again that in his soul which at one time was tamed by education |935a5| until he turns himself into a wild beast by rancorous living, receiving in return the bitterness of his spirit as gratification.

Besides, in such disputes everyone is accustomed, somehow, often to turn to uttering something to ridicule the opponent; |935b| and no one ever becomes accustomed to it without either altogether failing to achieve an {381} excellent character, or having in large part lost his magnanimity. That is why no one is ever to utter anything at all of this sort in a temple, |935b5| at publicly funded sacrifices, at the contests, in the marketplace, in a court, or in any communal meeting.81 The relevant official is to punish the offender, and, if he fails to do so, he is never to be a contender for public honors, as being a person who neither bothers about laws nor |935c| does the things prescribed by the legislator. And if in other places someone fails to refrain from such language, whether as starting it or defending against it, any passer-by who is older is to come to the defense of the law by driving off with a beating those who deal kindly with their anger, |935c5| that evil companion, or else be subject to the prescribed penalty. What we are now saying is that it is impossible for a person to be entangled in exchanges of verbal abuse without seeking to say funny things, and we are abusing this, when it comes about due to anger. But what exactly does that imply? |935d| Does it imply that we accept the eagerness of the writers of comedy to say what is ridiculous about people, if—without anger—they speak in this sort of way when ridiculing our citizens? Are we, then, to divide82 comedy into two, into what is playful and what is not, and allow anyone |935d5| to ridicule anyone playfully and without anger, but allow no one to do so seriously, and, as we said, with anger? This proviso is never in any way to be set aside, |935e| but who is to be allowed to do so and who isn’t is something we must put into law. No composer of comedies, or of any lampoons,83 or of lyric songs is to be allowed to ridicule any citizen whatsoever in any way at all, either in word or image,84 |935e5| whether with anger or without anger. If anyone disobeys, the judges of contests85 are to drive him completely out of the country that very day, or else pay |936a| a penalty of three minas, to be dedicated to the god whose contest it is. Those, though, who were earlier said to be allowed,86 are to be allowed to do so to each other, without anger and in play, but are not to be allowed to do so seriously or when their anger is provoked. Drawing |936a5| the distinction between these is to be turned over to the Supervisor of Education in its entirety for the {382} young.87

Whatever he approves, the poet is to be allowed to present in public, but whatever he disapproves, the poet is not to exhibit to anyone himself, nor ever be seen |936b| teaching to anyone else, slave or free. If he does, he is to be held to be a bad person and disobedient to the laws. What is to be pitied is not the person who is suffering from hunger or something else of this sort, but rather the one who is temperate, or has some virtue or some part of virtue, |936b5| but in addition to these gets hold of some misfortune. Hence it would be surprising if someone like this, whether slave or free, were so entirely neglected as to fall into abject poverty, in a constitution and city that is even moderately well managed. That is why it is safe for the legislator to establish something like the following sort of law for such cases: No one |936c| is to become a beggar in our city; if anyone does try to do something of this sort, to collect a livelihood through endless prayers for alms, the Market-Wardens are to drive him from the marketplace, the board of City-Wardens is to drive him from the city, and the Country-Wardens are to send him out of the rest |936c5| of the country and across the border, so that the country may be entirely cleansed of such a creature. If a male or female slave injures anyone else’s property, and the injured party is not himself partly responsible, due to inexperience |936d| or some other intemperate usage, the master of the one who did the injury is either to make full amends for the injury, omitting nothing, or hand over the actual person who did the injury. But if the master brings a counterclaim, alleging that the claim has come about |936d5| due to crafty collusion between injurer and injured, with the aim of depriving him of his slave, he is to bring a charge of collusion88 against the one who says he has been injured. If he wins, he is to receive double the value of the slave, which the court is to assess; |936e| but if he loses, he is both to make full amends for the injury and hand over the slave. And if a working animal, a horse, a dog, or some other animal damages the property of a neighbor, its master is to pay compensation in accord with the same regulations. |936e5| If someone refuses to testify as a witness89 voluntarily, the person who needs him is to issue him a summons; and the one summonsed is to present himself at the trial. If he knows something and is willing to testify, he is to

testify; but if he says he does not know anything, he is to {383} swear by the three gods, Zeus, Apollo, and Themis,90 that he really does not know anything, and is to be discharged from the case. On the other hand, the one |937a| who is summonsed to testify, but fails to present himself along with the one who summonsed him, is to be subject by law to a suit for damages. If someone calls one of the judges as a witness, and the judge testifies, he is not to vote on the case in which he has testified. A free woman is to be allowed |937a5| to testify and support a plea, if she is over forty years of age, and to bring an action, if she is without a husband. If the husband is living, she is allowed to testify only. A female slave, male slave, or child is to be allowed to testify and support a plea only in a murder case, if |937b| there is a worthy guarantor for their remaining until the trial, should their testimony be challenged as false. Either of the two parties is to be allowed to challenge testimony in whole or in part, provided his claim that false testimony has been given is made before the case has been |937b5| decided. The officials are to guard the challenges once they have been sealed by both parties and present them at the trial for perjury. If any person is convicted of perjury twice, |937c| no law is any longer to compel him to testify, and if he is convicted three times, he is no longer to be allowed to testify. If he dares to testify after being convicted three times, anyone who wishes is to inform against him to the official; the official is to hand him over |937c5| to the court; and if he is found guilty, he is to be punished with death. In the case of all those whose testimony is condemned at the trial, and who are found to have perjured themselves and caused the victory of the winning side, if over half the testimony of people of this sort is condemned, the case that was won on the basis of this testimony |937d| is to be tried over again, and there is to be a disputation and a trial as to whether or not the case was decided in accord with this testimony; whichever way it goes, that is to be the final outcome of the earlier trials. Though there are many fine things in human life, most of them have (as it were) blemishes91 growing on them, which pollute and defile them. In particular, is not justice among human beings in fact a fine {384} thing,

which has civilized all human affairs? |937e| And if it is a fine thing, how could legal advocacy not be a fine thing for us too? But these things, though they really are fine, are brought into discredit by a certain vice, hiding behind the fine name of “craft,” which says, first, that there is a certain contrivance for dealing with lawsuits—itself, in fact—for |937e5| pleading one’s own cause or acting as someone else’s advocate, which is able to bring about victory, whether the things that were done in regard to a given case are just or not; and, further, that this very “craft,” |938a| and the speeches that stem from the “craft,” are available as a gift to anyone—provided he gives a gift of money in return! Now in this city of ours, this contrivance— whether it is a craft or a certain experience-based knack that is ignorant of craft92—must not for all the world take root. And when the legislator demands |938a5| obedience, and that nothing be uttered contrary to justice, or removal to another country, to the ones who obey, the law is silent, but to those who disobey, this is what the voice of the law says: If anyone is held to be trying to reverse the power of just arguments in the souls of the judges, |938b| to be pleading the case again and again or acting as someone’s advocate to the disadvantage of justice, anyone who wishes is to prosecute him for perversion of justice or evil advocacy. He is to be tried in the court of Select Judges.93 If he is found guilty, the court is to assess whether it thinks he did such a thing due to love of money or love of victory. If from love of victory, the court is to assess for how long such a person as himself is not to bring a case against anyone or act as an advocate for someone. But if it’s due to love of money, then, if he is a foreigner, he is to depart from the country |938c| and never return, or be punished by death, while if he is a citizen,94 he is to die, because of having devotedly honored the love of money. And if someone is judged a second time to have done such a thing out of love of victory, he is to be put to death. |938c5|     1. Mê kinein ta akinêta: See 684e1, 736d1, 843a1, Tht. 181a8. 2. Eis paidôn genean: Alternatively, but less plausibly, “for the generation of children” (Pangle) or “for fertility” (Schofield-Griffith). 3. See 845a1–2n. 4. Reading ἀποδιδούσης with Saunders-2, p. 104, for Budé ἀποδιδοὺς, which would imply that it was the slave, not the city, who had to pay the price.

5. Probably Hecate, as goddess of crossroads and roadways, although Artemis or Selene are also possible. See Greene, p. 361. 6. See 745a–b. 7. See 777b–778a. 8. See 850a–d. 9. See 744c–d. 10. See 766e–767e, 768b–c. 11. I take anagetô to mean “refer the matter” not “return the item”; pratera to mean “seller” not “warrantor”; and axiochreôn te kai endikon (“solvent and suable”) to apply to seller, donor, and transferrer, not just the first two, as its position in the sentence might suggest; “full authority” translates kuriôs, on which see 663c7n. The idea seems to be this: A claims that X, which B has, is legally his. If A now possesses X, he refers the claim to C, who (allegedly) gave, sold, or with full authority transferred X to A (likewise mutatis mutandis if B now possesses X). The requirement that C be solvent and suable is due to the fact that C will now become the focus of A’s legal claim or B’s counterclaim. Just what happens if C is neither is unclear. For discussion, see Schöpsdau-3, pp. 466–467, and for an alternate view, Saunders-2, pp. 105–106. 12. See 952d–e. 13. See 849e–850a. 14. I.e., epilepsy, which is called the “sacred disease,” according to Ti. 85b1–2, because “it is a disease of the sacred part of our constitution,” namely, nous. 15. See 759c–e. 16. On the interpretation of the final clause, which is deprecatory in intent, see Saunders-2, pp. 106–107. 17. Astôn: See Morrow-2, p. 112 n51. 18. I.e., those in the prelude. 19. This tablet and the one in front of the City-Wardens’ office (918a4) are the only ones in the city, underlining their importance. See Brisson-Pradeau-2, p. 357 n29. 20. See 759a, 763c–e, 849a, 881c. 21. Also referred to at Euthd. 297c, Phd. 89b–c. 22. See 737c–738a. 23. See 849c–d. 24. See 917e. 25. Psêphisma: See 735a2n. The term is used only here in Lg. and is rare in Plato generally. As noted in Schofield-Griffith, p. 411 n23, Cri. 52e makes being “tricked into agreeing” an additional invalidating factor, oddly omitted here. 26. See 762a–b, 766d–767a, 768b–c. 27. God of fire, blacksmiths, and, as here, craftsmen more generally. 28. See 917b–c. 29. See 742c. 30. A drachma = 6 obols. The interest is thus 200 percent per annum. 31. See 755b–e. Cf. Rep. 395b–c, 463a. 32. Athenian laws on property, wills, adoption, and supervision of orphans are discussed in MacDowell-2, pp. 91–108.

33. See Ar. Ath. 35.2: “In the case of bequeathing property to whomever one wishes [the laws of Ephialtes and Archestratus] gave men absolute control  .  .  . ‘unless under the influence of insanity, old age, or persuaded by a woman.’” 34. The reference is to the inscription “know thyself” in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, also referred to at Alc. 124b, Prt. 343b, Phdr. 229e, Phlb. 19c, 48c, and Ti. 72a. On the Pythia, see 632d3n. 35. See 875a. 36. Ou tôn men, tôn de ou: Not “for some of your belongings and for others not,” which would add nothing, but “not for some (those benefited by your will) and for others not (benefited).” 37. See 740c. 38. See 740b–d, 766c. 39. Polla pollôn: On the translation, see Saunders-2, pp. 108–111. 40. Themis: See 875c7n. 41. See 741a–c (divine law), 924e–925a (closeness of kinship). 42. See 828b, 876a. 43. See 924b–c. 44. See 767c–e, 855c. 45. See 789b–794d. 46. Retaining φαμεν with Schöpsdau-3, p. 496. 47. See 865d–e, 872d–e. 48. See 630b6n. 49. Allên nomothesian: I.e., distinct from the prelude. See Saunders-2, p. 112. 50. Retaining ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ with OCT. 51. I.e., the Guardian of the Laws appointed to supervise the guardian. 52. To koinon tês poleôs: I.e., the assembly of citizens (see 755e, 756e) or a subset of them (see 753b–d, also 752e–753a). For discussion, see Morrow-2, pp. 205–209. 53. Paranoias graphesthai: A graphê paranoias is mentioned as a type of legal action at Ar. Ath. 56.6. See Harrison, pp. 79–80, Todd, pp. 108, 112, 245. 54. Reading δε for Budé and mss. τε. See England-2, p. 546, Schöpsdau-3, p. 498. 55. Rejecting the Budé addition of μὴ. 56. See 740c–e. 57. See 784a–c. 58. See Ti. 91b7–d1: “A woman’s womb or uterus, as it is called, is a living thing within her with an appetite for childbearing. Now when this remains unfruitful for an unseasonably long period of time, it is extremely frustrated and travels everywhere up and down her body. It blocks up her respiratory passages, and by not allowing her to breathe it throws her into extreme emergencies, and visits all sorts of other illnesses upon her until finally the woman’s appetite and the man’s sexual passion bring them together.” 59. The aim of these laws, which are more strict than any ancient ones on the subject, is to prevent anyone of slave birth from acquiring one of the five thousand and forty allotments. 60. See 869b. 61. Agalma: Also at 931d6. See 956b1n. 62. See Aeschylus, Seven against Thebes 785–791; Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus 427– 430.

63. Homer, Il. 9.430–480. 64. See 687e3n. 65. See 930e–931a. 66. Reading νέοις with Sanders-2, p. 144, for Budé νέοι (“while still young”). 67. See 865a–867c. 68. Retaining τῶν ἀνθρώπων with OCT. For discussion of the difficulties involved in the entire sentence, see England-2, pp. 554–555, Schöpsdau-3, p. 508. 69. Saphes . . . dogma: Cf. saphes . . . dogma at 888c7–8. See Saunders-6, pp. 319–323. 70. Reading δειμαίνοντας with OCT for Budé δειματοῦντας (“nor frighten the mass of people, like children, with bogeymen”). 71. See 843d–e. 72. Reading ὢν τῆς with Saunders-2, p. 115 for Budé ὃ ἄν τις. 73. For discussion of Plato’s proposals in these cases, see Saunders-6, pp. 292–294. 74. Notice the “House of Temperance” at 908a4. 75. Notice the medical metaphor at 854a–c and the importance of influencing others to be just at 728c, 862d. 76. See 705e–706a. 77. See 876c–e, and on the comparison with painting, 769a–b. 78. No list of assigned penalties follows. For discussion, see Schöpsdau-3, pp. 511–513. 79. See 744c–d, 764a, 880d. 80. Thumô[i]: Also, “anger.” See 863b3n. 81. Sullogô[i] koinô[i]: See 764a3. 82. Reading ἦ with Saunders-2, p. 116 for Budé ἤ (“or”). 83. Kômô[i]dias  .  .  . iambôn: “After having composed a plot by means of likelihoods, comic poets assign random names, and do not, like the lampoonists, compose poems about particular individuals” (Ar. Po. 1451b12–15). 84. Logô[i]  .  .  . eikoni: The latter no doubt includes impersonation or mimicry. See Saunders-2, p. 117. 85. Athlothetas: See 764c–765d, Brisson-Pradeau-1, pp. 445–446. 86. See 816e, 829c–d. 87. See 765d. 88. Kakotechnia: “A law term denoting subornation of witnesses and trumped up charges of any kind” (England-2, p. 564). See also Greene, p. 369, Schöpsdau-3, p. 519, Todd, p. 104. Cf. 879a. 89. On the rules governing witnesses in Athenian law, see Todd, pp. 96–97. 90. See 875c7n, Burkert, p. 185. 91. Kêres: The Kêres are the personified fates, which Plato refers to at Rep. 379c9–d8: “Then we won’t accept from Homer—or from anyone else—the foolish mistake he makes about the gods when he says: ‘There are two urns at the threshold of Zeus, one filled with good fates (kêrôn), the other with bad ones,’ and the person to whom Zeus gives a mixture of these ‘sometimes meets with a bad fate, sometimes with a good one.’ But the one who receives his fate entirely from the second urn, ‘evil famine drives over the divine earth.’” But here the term is used in a different one of its senses. See LSJ s.v. Κήρ II.3. 92. See 632d5n. 93. See 767c–e, 855c.

94. Aston: See Morrow-2, p. 112 n51.

{385} BOOK 12 ATHENIAN: If anyone passes himself off as an ambassador or herald |941a| from the city and enters into unauthorized negotiations with some other city, or, when he is really sent, fails to convey what he was sent to convey, or, contrariwise, if it becomes evident that, |941a5| in his capacity as ambassador or herald, he has not brought back what was sent by enemies, or indeed by friends, then there are to be prosecutions for these offenses as illegal acts of impiety against the messages and injunctions of Hermes1 and Zeus, with an assessment of what he is to suffer or pay, if he is found guilty. |941b| Stealing money is unfree, and violent robbery is shameful. None of the sons of Zeus has ever delighted in deception or violence or committed either of them. Let no one, therefore, be persuaded and, deceived by poets or in some other way by some storytellers, |941b5| strike a false note where things of this sort are concerned, and think that when he steals or uses violence he is not doing anything shameful, but just what gods themselves do.2 For that is neither true nor likely. On the contrary, anyone who does this sort of illegal thing cannot possibly be a god or the child of gods; and this the legislator, as is fitting, knows better than all poets |941c| put together. The person, then, who is persuaded by our argument is lucky, and may be lucky for all time; but the one who is not persuaded must next contend with the following law: If anyone steals any piece of public property, great or small, he is to incur the same penalty. |941c5| For the person who steals something small does so due to the same passionate desire, but with less power, while the one who moves a greater thing that he didn’t put down3 is unjust to the full extent. |941d| The law, then, does not think it fit to punish one of them with a lesser punishment than the other because of the size of the theft, but only because one of them is perhaps still curable, the other incurable. So if anyone successfully prosecutes a foreigner or a slave in court of stealing some piece of public property, |941d5| then a judgment is to be reached, on the supposition that he is likely curable, as to what he is to suffer or what fine he is to pay. But if a |942a| citizen,4 nurtured as he will {386} have been

nurtured, is found guilty of plundering or doing violence to his fatherland, then, whether he is caught in the act or not, he is to be punished with death on the supposition that he is positively incurable.5 Military service is the subject of much advice and many laws, |942a5| as fits the case, but the most important thing is that no one, male or female, is ever to be without a ruler,6 and that no one is to get into the habit of doing something, whether seriously or in play, on his own and alone. No, at all times, in war |942b| and in peace, he is to live constantly looking to and following the ruler, governed by him in even the smallest things—for example, to halt when someone gives the order, to march, exercise, wash, eat, wake up |942b5| at night for guard duty or taking messages—and in times of danger, not to pursue anyone or to retreat in the face of another, without an order from the rulers. In a word, he is to teach his soul |942c| by means of habits not to know—not to get to know at all—how to do any action in separation from the others; on the contrary, the life of everyone is to be, as far as possible, collective, together with others, and communal. For there is not now, nor ever will be, anything stronger, |942c5| better, or more craft-like than this for insuring salvation and victory in war.7 What must be practiced in peacetime from earliest childhood is this: ruling others and being ruled by others. As for anarchy, it must be entirely removed from the life of all |942d| human beings, and of all the beasts that are subject to human beings.8 And, in particular, all choral dances are to be danced with a view to public honors in war,9 and calmness in general and indifference to danger are to be practiced for the sake of the same things, as, again, is resilience |942d5| in the face of pangs of hunger and thirst, cold and the opposite, and hard beds.10 And what is most important, they are not to ruin the capacity of the head and feet by covering them all round with alien coverings, destroying the growth of their own natural felt and sandals.11 For if these extremities |942e| are kept in good condition, they have the greatest influence in the body as a whole, and the opposite when in {387} the opposite condition; and the one is the most servant-like part of the entire body, the other the most ruling one, since by nature it possesses all the controlling perceptual capacities of the body. |943a|

This is the praise that the young person must think to listen to12 concerning the military life, and the following are the laws: Anyone who is called up, or is ordered to take his turn, is to serve in the military. If anyone, due to cowardice and without the permission of the Generals, fails to do so, he is to be subject to prosecutions |943a5| for draftdodging13 before the military officers, when they return from the campaign, and the judges are to be each class that has served in the campaign, sitting separately—hoplites,14 cavalry, and each of the other classes likewise. And they are to bring hoplites before |943b| hoplites, cavalrymen before cavalry, and the others, in the same way, before soldiers of their own class. If anyone is found guilty, he is never to be a competitor for public honors in general, and is never to prosecute another for draft-dodging, or ever |943b5| be a betrayer concerning such things. In addition to these, the court is to assess what else he must suffer or pay. Next, when the desertion cases have been settled, the officers are again to hold an assembly of each class, and whoever wishes is to be judged for public honors before his own class; |943c| but any proof15 or confirming verbal testimony of witnesses he produces is to be not from a previous war, but only from the campaign in which they have just been engaged. The victory prize in each case is to be an olive wreath, which in the temple of whichever |943c5| god of war he wishes, the recipient is to dedicate, with an inscription, as a lifelong testimony that in the selection for public honors he won the first (or second or third) prize. If someone goes on military service but returns home before the time when the officers bring him home, |943d| these people are to be prosecuted for breaking ranks16 before the same people as those concerned with cases of draft-dodging. If they are found guilty, the penalties are to be the same as were established previously. Certainly, any man who brings a charge against another man must, |943d5| to the best of his ability, be very wary of bringing down on him, {388} whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a wrongful punishment. For Justice is said—and is truly said—to be the virgin |943e| daughter of Shame, and falsehood is, by nature, hated by Shame and Justice. So, while he must always be careful not to strike a wrong note in other matters where justice is

concerned, he must be especially so about throwing away weapons in battle, so that he does not, |943e5| by making an error about the necessities to throw them away, and supposing that these ones are a matter for reproach, bring undeserved charges against an undeserving person. It is by no means easy, however, to define the necessary and the shameful, but, nonetheless, the law must try somehow or other to distinguish them from each other. So let’s discuss it |944a| with the help of a story. If Patroclus had revived when he had been brought back to the tent without his weapons (as happened in thousands of other cases), it would have been open to all the base people of the time to reproach the son of Menoetius for throwing away his weapons, |944a5| which the poet claims were given to Peleus by the gods as a dowry with Thetis, and which Hector then had.17 Besides, people have lost their weapons because of being thrown down from cliffs, or into the sea, or when, in the midst of buffetings by a storm, |944b| a huge rush of water takes them by surprise, or from countless other such cases that one might sing about by way of consolation, thereby putting a fine face on an easily misrepresented evil. So one must do what one can to separate the greater and more disgusting18 evil from the opposite. Now the names |944b5| applied to these things by way of reproach pretty much involve a sort of separation. For it wouldn’t be right to employ the name “shield-thrower” in all cases, but rather “weapon-loser.” You see, the one who has his weapons taken from him |944c| by a decent amount of force wouldn’t be a “shieldthrower” in the same way as the one who drops them voluntarily; on the contrary, they differ, I take it, wholly and entirely. So let it be stated in the law like this: If someone is overtaken by the enemy and, though possessing |944c5| weapons, does not turn and defend himself, but voluntarily drops them or throws them away, thereby winning for himself a shameful life with cowardice rather than a fine and happy death with courage, then for this sort of losing weapons there is to be a charge of throwing weapons {389} away.19 But in the case described |944d| previously the judge is not to be careless about investigating the circumstances. For the cowardly20 person must always be punished, in order to make him better, but not the unlucky one, since there is no good in that. What then would be a suitable penalty for the person who, by dropping defensive weapons of this sort, turned their

power in the opposite direction? |944d5| You see, it isn’t possible for a human being to do the opposite of what a god is said to have done to Caeneus of Thessaly, changing him from a woman into having the nature of a man.21 For the opposite transformation to that, the change from man to woman,22 |944e| would be in a way the most fitting punishment of all for a man who is a “shield-thrower.” As things stand, however, to come as close as possible to this, because of his love of life,23 and in order that he run no risks for the rest of his life, but may live for the longest possible time laboring under a reproach for cowardice, |944e5| let the law for these cases be as follows: A man who is found guilty of a charge of shamefully losing his weapons of war, is never to be employed as a soldier by any General or any other military officer, or assigned to any post |945a| whatsoever. Otherwise, the Inspector24 is to fine the one who assigned the coward for it at his inspection: one thousand drachmas if he is from the highest assessment class; five minas, if from the second assessment class; three, if from the third; and one mina, if from the fourth. And the one found guilty |945a5| of the charge, in addition to being excluded, in accord with his nature, from dangers requiring courage, is also to pay compensation: one thousand drachmas if he is from the highest assessment class; five minas, if from the second; three, if from the third; and likewise one mina, as with the previous ones, if he is from the |945b| fourth class. {390} As, then, to Inspectors, what would be a fitting principle for us, seeing that some of the officials are appointed by the luck of the lottery for a single year, others from a previously selected group for a period of several years?25 |945b5| Who would be a competent Inspector of such people, in the event that one of them, bowed down by the weight of office, or his own inability to be a worthy holder of it, did something somehow crooked? It is not at all easy to find a ruling official for ruling officials who surpasses them in virtue, |945c| but, nonetheless, one must try to find Inspectors who are of divine quality. You see, this is how things stand. There are many parts vital for the dissolution of a constitution, just as for a ship or some animal, such as sinews, cables,26 tendons, and ropes, which, being of the same one nature, |945c5| are dispersed all around, but which we call by many names in many

places. And to the preservation, or dissolution and disappearance, of a constitution, this office is one part that is vital, and not the least important one. For if those who |945d| inspect the officials are better than they, and if with blameless justice they act blamelessly, the entire country and city flourishes and is happy. But if what has to do with the inspections is conducted otherwise, then the justice |945d5| that binds together all the parts of the governing body27 into one is dissolved, and as a result every office is separated from every other, and, no longer bending in the same direction, they make the city to be many cities, |945e| fill it with factions, and quickly destroy it. So that is why the Inspectors must be utterly amazing people as regards every virtue. Let’s contrive, then, to produce these somewhat as follows: Every year, after the summer solstice,28 the entire city |945e5| is to assemble in the precinct dedicated jointly to Helios29 and Apollo, in order to present three men from among themselves to the god, each {391} citizen proposing the one he considers to be in every way |946a| best (himself excluded), and who is at least fifty years of age. From these the ones with the most votes are to be chosen,30 up to half of them—if, that is, the half is an even number; if it is an odd number, they are to reject the one with the fewest votes, |946a5| leaving half of them, after the elimination by number of votes. If some are equal in number of votes, making the half larger, they are to remove the excess by eliminating the ones that are younger. The other selected ones are to be voted for again, |946b| until three with unequal numbers of votes are left. But if all have the same number of votes, or if two of them do, they are to turn the matter over to the goodness of destiny and luck, using the lot to select the victor, the second, and the third. Then, crowning them with olive wreaths, and giving public honors to all of them, they are to make the following announcement: |946b5| The city of the Magnesians, now with the help of a god again finding salvation, presents to the Sun her three best men, as its offering, in accord with ancient law, of first fruits jointly to |946c| Apollo and Helios, for as long as they follow the judgment.31 In the first year, they are to appoint twelve such Inspectors, to serve in each case until they reach the age of seventy-five; thereafter three are always to be added |946c5| each year. And these, after dividing all the offices

into twelve parts, are to test them by means of every test fitting for free people. And they are to reside, for as long a period of time as they conduct inspections, in the precinct of Apollo and Helios, where they were selected. |946d| When they have passed judgment—in some cases each by himself, in others jointly with others—on those who have held office in the city, they are to make known, by posting written notices in the marketplace, what must be suffered or paid, according to the judgment of the Inspectors, by each official. If any |946d5| official does not agree that he has been judged justly, he is to bring the Inspectors before the Select Judges;32 if he is acquitted of the Inspectors’ charges, he is—if he wishes—to prosecute the Inspectors themselves. But if he is convicted, and if death was |946e| the punishment assessed by the Inspectors, then he is, as is necessary, simply to be put to death; but in the case of the other assessments, where it is possible to pay double, he is to pay double. {392} As regards the inspections of these Inspectors themselves, it is necessary to hear what they are to be, |946e5| and in what way conducted. While they live, these people, who have been deemed worthy of the highest public honors, are to have front seats at |947a| every festival. Further, in the case of the joint sacrifices, spectacles, and other sacred ceremonies participated in by the Greeks, it is from the ranks of these, too, that they are to send out the leaders of each embassy. And they are to be the only people in the city to be adorned |947a5| with a crown of laurels. And while all of them are to be priests of Apollo and Helios, the one who is judged first among those selected each year is to be the high-priest for that year, and his is the name they are to ascribe to the year, |947b| so that it may become a measure of the time period’s number, for as long as the city lasts.33 When they die, they are to have different lyings-in-state, funeral processions, and tombs from the other citizens. All clothing is to be white, and they are to take place without dirges |947b5| or lamentations. Instead, a chorus of fifteen girls and another of males is to stand around the bier, one on each side, each group in turn singing a song of praise to the priests in the form of a hymn, |947c| celebrating their happiness in song for an entire day. At the following dawn, the bier itself is to be carried to the tomb by a hundred of the young men from the gymnasia, selected by the deceased’s relatives. First in the procession are to be the unmarried ones, |947c5| each

clad in his military attire—cavalrymen with their horses, hoplites with their weapons, and the others likewise; and around the bier itself are to be the boys at the front singing the national anthem, with the girls, and those women |947d| who are past childbearing age, following behind it; after these are to follow the Priests and Priestesses, on the supposition that the tomb is ritually purified, even though they are barred from other funeral-rites—if, that is, the Pythia34 also votes that it be so, |947d5| and done in this way. The tomb, for its part, is to be constructed underground, in the form of an oblong vault of stones that are costly35 and as ageless as possible, with stone couches placed side by side; when they have laid to rest there the one who has become blessedly happy,36 and heaped up a mound of earth in a circle, |947e| they are to plant a grove of trees around it, except on one side, so that the tomb may for all time admit of enlargement in this direction, when a mound {393} is needed for those laid to rest there. And each year, in their honor, they are to establish contests in music, gymnastics, and horse racing. |947e5| These, then, are the prizes for those who have passed the inspection of the Inspectors. But if one of them, trusting in the judgment passed on him,37 should exhibit his merely human nature by becoming bad after the judgment, the law is to command anyone who wishes to bring a charge against him. And the trial is to be held in court in the following way: |948a| The court is to be composed, first, of the Guardians of the Laws, second, the Inspectors themselves who are still living, and in addition to these, the court of Select Judges. And the prosecutor is to state his charge against the one he is prosecuting as follows: “so-and-so is unworthy of his public |948a5| honors and his office.” And if the defendant is convicted, he is to be deprived of his office, his tomb, and of the other honors he has been given. But if the prosecutor fails to obtain one-fifth of the votes, then he is to pay a fine of twelve minas if he is from the highest assessment class, eight if from the second, six if from the third, and two if from |948b| the fourth. Rhadamanthus38 deserves admiration for the way in which he is said to have judged lawsuits, in that he saw that people of that time believed in the manifest existence of gods—which made perfect sense, since at that |948b5| time most people sprang from gods, as he himself did, so it’s said, at least.

So in all likelihood he thought that he shouldn’t turn this over to any human judge but rather to gods, from whom he’d obtain judgments that were unconditional and swift. You see, by administering an oath to the disputants concerning each of the matters in dispute, he resolved things swiftly |948c| and with certainty. But as things stand, a part of humanity, we say, does not believe in gods at all, others think that they give no thought to us, while of the greatest—and worst—part, the belief is that in return for small offerings and flatteries |948c5| they will help them steal large sums of money, and free them from all sorts of large penalties. So for present-day people Rhadamanthus’ craft would no longer be fitting in trials. Since, then, people’s beliefs about gods |948d| have changed, it is necessary for the laws to change too. For in written complaints,39 sensible laws must do away with the oaths sworn by each of the parties to the {394} suit, and the one bringing an action against anyone must write out the charges, but not swear an oath, while the defendant must likewise write out his denial, and hand it over to the officials unsworn. |948d5| For it’s a terrible thing, I take it, when there are in fact many lawsuits occurring in the city, to know full well that nearly half the parties have perjured themselves, and yet have no scruple in associating with each other at the communal messes, |948e| or at other gatherings and private meetings of each sort. Let a law be laid down, therefore, that a judge is to swear an oath when he is about to give judgment,40 and the one who is selecting officials for public office is always to do something similar, |948e5| by taking oaths or bringing his voting tablet from sacred places,41 |949a| as, again, is a judge of choruses and of music in general, as well as superintendents and umpires of horse racing contests, and of all matters which—as people believe—bring no profit to a person who commits perjury. But in all cases in which it seems evident that |949a5| there is a large profit to be gained by utterly denying something and swearing an oath, in these all those bringing accusation against each other are to be judged at trials without oaths. And in general, the presiding officials at a trial are not to allow anyone to speak under oath, for the sake of persuasiveness, or to call down curses |949b| on himself and his family,42 or to use supplication (which is unseemly), or floods of tears (which is womanish); instead, along with avoiding inauspicious speech,43 he is to continue to the end, stating and listening to what is just;44 otherwise,

as if he had digressed from the argument, the officials are to bring him back |949b5| to an argument that always has to do with the thing at issue.45 {395} However, in the case of a foreigner dealing with foreigners, just as nowadays, they are to receive and give reciprocal oaths, if they wish, and these are to have authority (for they will not grow old |949c| in the city, nor, as a rule, will they make their nest in it, or produce others nurtured like themselves who are authorized to live in the country46), and in written complaints against each other, it is to be the same way throughout the trial. |949c5| In all cases where a free person disobeys the city, but not in a way that merits a beating, imprisonment, or death, but in respect of matters such as attendance at choral performances, processions, or some other such communal ceremonies or public services47 (for example, those having to do with sacrifices in peacetime or |949d| contributions in times of war)—in all such cases the first necessity is to assess the penalty. Those who refuse the assessment are to make a security deposit to those officials the city and law appoint to exact it, while those still refusing, |949d5| after making their deposits, are to have the deposits sold, and the proceeds go to the city. If a greater penalty is required, the officials in each case are to impose fitting penalties on those who are disobedient and bring them before the court, until they are |949e| willing to do what is prescribed. In a city where there is to be no moneymaking except for money made from the land, and no merchandizing, it is necessary to have deliberated about what must be done about trips abroad, out of the country, by its own citizens, and the reception |949e5| of foreigners from elsewhere. So, the legislator must give advice about these matters by first persuading people, to the extent that he can: The intermixture of cities with cities naturally mingles together characters of multifarious sorts, as foreigners mutually produce innovations in foreigners.48 So for |950a| cities that are well governed by means of correct laws this would bring the greatest harm of all. But for most cities, seeing that they do not have good laws, it makes no difference if they mix together with others by receiving foreigners among themselves or go careering about in other |950a5| cities, whenever anyone has an appetite for going to whatever

place abroad and at whatever time, and whether he is a young person or an older one. On the other hand, neither to receive others nor, at the same time, to go abroad to other places {396} themselves is altogether impossible, and, moreover, would appear savage and cruel |950b| to other people: they would get a reputation for employing the harsh language of the so-called Expulsion of Aliens Acts,49 and of being churlish and harsh in their ways. Now a reputation among others for being good people or not is something that must never be made little of. |950b5| For most people, though they fail to reach real virtue, do not equally fail in judging whether others are wicked or excellent; on the contrary, there is something divine and good at guessing present even in bad people,50 so that a vast number even of those who are very bad are well able |950c| to distinguish, in their words and beliefs, between better people and worse ones. That is why most cities find it a fine precept to prefer having a good reputation with |950c5| most people. But the most correct and most important precept is this: when you are really and truly good, chase after the life of good repute on this basis, otherwise do not do so at all—anyway, if you are going to be a completely good man. And, in particular, it would be fitting for the city we are founding in Crete to be provided with the finest |950c10| and best reputation with other people—for virtue. And there is every hope that, in all |950d| likelihood, if it comes about in accord with our account, Helios and the other gods will look upon it, along with a few others, as being among the cities and countries with good laws. What it is necessary to do, then, about travel abroad to other lands |950d5| and places and the reception of foreigners, is this: First, no one under the age of forty is ever to be allowed to go abroad anywhere in any capacity. Further, no one is to go abroad in a private capacity, although, in a public capacity, heralds, ambassadors, or observers of one sort or another are to do so. (Military expeditions abroad in wartime |950e| do not merit inclusion among these sorts of political missions.) To the Pythian Apollo, to Olympian Zeus, and to Nemea and the Isthmus,51 delegations are to be sent, to take part in the sacrifices and games in honor of these gods; and those sent are to be, as far as is in their power, the most numerous, the |950e5| finest, and the best people possible—people who will gain for the city a good reputation in these sacred and peaceable gatherings, and provide a

supply of reputation that is the counterpart to what is provided by feats of war. |951a| And when they return home they are to teach the young that the others’ institutions having to do with the constitution are in second place. {397} There are also other observers that must—with the permission of the Guardians of the Laws—be sent out, such as the following: If any of the citizens has an appetite to observe the doings |951a5| of other people at greater leisure, no law is to prevent them. For a city that lacks experience of bad as well as good people would never be able (being isolated) |951b| to be sufficiently civilized and complete in goodness,52 nor yet be able to guard its laws, unless it grasps them by means of judgment53 and not due to habits alone. For among the mass of mankind there are always some—not many— who are divine, with whom it is immensely valuable to consult, |951b5| and who naturally spring up no more often in cities with good laws than in those without them.54 These the person who lives in a city with good laws, provided he is incorruptible, must always, by going out over sea and land, |951c| make tracks to search for, thereby confirming those laws that are well laid down and rectifying any that are deficient. For without this observation and research a city will never remain completely good—nor will it do so if the observation is badly carried out. |951c5| CLEINIAS: So

how would both these aims be achieved? ATHENIAN: Like this. First, an observer of this sort for us must be more than fifty years old, moreover, he is to be one of those who has made himself a good reputation in the other areas and in war too,55 |951d| if he is going to go to other cities and be a provider of evidence56 for the Guardians of the Laws who will go to other cities. But when he has passed sixty years of age he is no longer to serve as an observer. When he has been observing for as many of the ten years as he may wish, and has returned home, he is to go to the Council57 |951d5| of those who keep watch on the laws. This Council is to be a mixture of young people and older ones, is to be compelled to meet each day from dawn until the sun has risen, and is to consist: first, of the Priests who have received public {398} honors; second, of the ten Guardians of the Laws who are oldest at the time; and, further, the Supervisor |951e| of Education in its entirety—the current one—as well as those who have left this office. Each of these is to go, not alone, but with a young person

between the ages of thirty and forty, who it pleases him to bring with him. The meeting |951e5| of these people and their discussions are always to concern the laws and their own city, anything important they may have learned elsewhere concerning |952a| such matters, as well as whatever branches of learning might seem to be advantageous to this inquiry by making things clearer to the learners, whereas to those who do not learn these, matters concerning the laws appear obscure and non-perspicuous. Whichever of these matters |952a5| the older members select, the younger ones are to learn with utter seriousness, and if one of those invited seems to be unworthy, the whole Council is to censure the one who invited him; whereas the rest of the city is to guard those among these young people who are held in high repute, |952b| watching over them and observing them especially closely, honoring them when they do what is correct, but dishonoring them more than the others, if they should turn out worse than most. It is to this Council, then, that the observer of the institutions existing among other |952b5| peoples is to go immediately on returning home, and if he has found people having something to say concerning the laying down of laws, or education, or nurture, or if he actually comes back with some thoughts of his own, he is to share them with the entire Council. If he seems to have returned neither worse nor a whit better, he is to be praised—in any case, for his extreme |952c| zeal; but if he seems much better, he is to be much more highly praised during his lifetime, and when he dies, he is to be honored with fitting honors on the authority of the assembled Council. On the other hand, if he seems to have returned corrupted, he is not to associate with |952c5| any young or older person, pretending to be wise (sophos). If he obeys the officials, he may live as a private individual; if he doesn’t—that is, if he is found guilty by the court of being a sort of busybody58 |952d| where education and the laws are concerned—he is to be put to death. If he deserves to be taken to court but none of the officials takes him, censure is to lie in store for them at the competition for awards of public honors. {399} The person who goes abroad, then, is to go abroad in this way and be of this sort. |952d5| Next, is the person coming from abroad who must get a

friendly reception. There are four sorts of foreigners that it is necessary to produce some sort of account of: The first, and perennial, visitor mostly accomplishes his visits in summer, like the migratory |952e| birds—and most of these simply cross the sea, as if they had wings, flying over to foreign cities in the summer months, for the sake of making money by trading. These must be received at the marketplaces, harbors, and public buildings outside the city, |952e5| but near the city, by the officials assigned to be in charge of them, who are to be on guard in case any of these foreigners introduces some sort of innovation; and they are to dispense justice to them correctly, |953a| while having necessary dealings—though the bare minimum—with them. The second is an observer, in the literal sense, with his eyes, and also with his ears, when it comes to those spectacles in which music is involved. For everyone of this sort hospitable lodgings for people must be prepared near the temples, |953a5| and the Priests and Temple-Wardens are to supervise and take care of such people until they have stayed for the proper measure of time, seeing and hearing what they came for, then they are to depart, if they have done and suffered no injury. And for these, |953b| if someone does injure one of them, or if one of them injures someone else, the Priests are to serve as judges, for cases under fifty drachmas. But if any greater claim is made involving them, the trials for such cases are to be held before the MarketWardens. |953b5|   The third foreigner, the one who comes on some public business from another country, must have a public reception. He must be received only by Generals, Cavalry-Commanders, and Company-Commanders.59 And the care of people of this sort must be put only in the joint hands of the Standing Committee of the Council |953c| and of the individual each one of the foreigners is lodging with.60 The fourth comes rarely, if ever. But if ever someone does come who is the counterpart from another country of our observers, he is, in the first place, to be no less |953c5| than fifty years of age, and in addition to this be expecting to see some fine thing superior in fineness to anything in other cities, or to make known something of this sort to another city. Everyone who is in fact of this sort is to go uninvited to the doors of the {400} rich

and |953d| wise,61 since he is another of this sort himself. You see, he is to go to the house of the Supervisor of Education in its entirety, trusting that he is a guest well matched for such a host, or to the house of one of those who have won a victory prize for virtue. When he has spent time teaching |953d5| and learning with some of these, he is to depart, honored as a friend among friends with gifts and fitting honors. These, then, are the laws that must govern the reception of all foreign men and foreign women arriving from other countries, and the sending abroad of our own people, honoring |953e| Zeus God of Foreigners in this way, instead of expelling foreigners by means of meats and sacrifices (as the nurslings of the Nile do now62), or else by savage proclamations.63 If anyone gives a guarantee, he is to give that guarantee in explicit terms, |953e5| with the entire transaction agreed upon in writing, and in the presence of not less than three witnesses (if the amount is under a thousand drachmas), and not less than five (if it is over a thousand). Also, the previous seller is guarantor |954a| for any seller who is not suable or is not at all solvent, and is to be equally subject to suit as the seller. If anyone wishes to search someone’s premises for stolen goods, he is to make his search in this way: |954a5| stripped64 to his loose undershirt without a belt,65 and after having sworn an oath to the customary gods that he does in truth expect to find them. And the other person is to hand over his household, including things both sealed and unsealed, to be searched. But if, when someone wishes to search, the other party does not grant permission, the one prevented, having assessed the value of what he’s searching for, is to take him to court; anyone |954b| found guilty is to pay double the assessed value in damages. If the master of the household happens to be away from home, the occupants are to allow a search of what is not sealed, while the searcher is to counterseal what is sealed, and appoint anyone he wishes to stand guard over {401} it, |954b5| for five days; if the master is away a longer time, he is to call in the City-Wardens, and so make his search, opening up even what is sealed, and then, in the presence of the household members and the City-Wardens, |954c| seal it up again in the same way.

In cases of disputed claims there is to be a time limit, after which it is to be no longer possible to dispute the possessor’s claim. In our country, there is to be no dispute in the case of lands and houses. But in the case of the other things a person may possess: If someone makes open use of a thing in the city, marketplace, and temples, and nobody else lays claim to it, but then someone says that he has been searching for it all this time, although the other person clearly wasn’t hiding it—if they spend a year this way, with the one having possession, and the other searching, |954d| then no one is to be permitted to lay claim to something of this sort once a year has elapsed. If someone makes open use of a thing not in the city or marketplace, but in the countryside, and no one confronts him within five years, then, when the five years |954d5| have elapsed, no laying claim to something of this sort is to be permitted any longer. If someone makes use of something indoors in the city, the time limit is to be three years. If he keeps it in a non-open place in the country, ten years. If he uses it while being |954e| abroad, there is to be no limit on laying claim to it, whenever and wherever it is found. If anyone forcibly prevents someone from appearing at a trial, whether a litigant or witnesses, then, if it is a slave he prevents, either his own or someone else’s, the verdict is to be nullified and lack authority;66 if it’s a free person, in addition to the nullification, the perpetrator is to be imprisoned for a year and subject to prosecution for kidnapping |955a| by anyone who wishes. If someone forcibly prevents a rival competitor from appearing in a gymnastic, musical, or other sort of contest, anyone who wishes is to report it to the judges at the contest, and they are to permit the one who wishes to compete |955a5| to enter the contest freely; if they are unable to do so, and the preventer wins the contest, they are to give the victory prizes to the one who was prevented from entering, and inscribe his name as victor in whichever temples he wishes, |955b| whereas the preventer is not to be allowed ever to set up any votive offering or any inscription regarding such a contest; and he is to be subject to prosecution for damages whether he wins or loses the contest. |955b5| {402} If anyone knowingly receives stolen goods, he is to be subject to the same penalty as the thief.

The penalty for harboring an exile is to be death. Everyone is to consider as friend or enemy the same ones the city does, and if anyone makes peace or war in private with certain people, |955c| without community backing, death is to be the penalty in this case too. If some part of the city, acting by itself, makes peace or war with certain people, the Generals are to take to court those responsible for this action, and for anyone found guilty the sentence is to be |955c5| death. Those serving their fatherland are to perform the service without bribes in the form of gifts. And it is to be no excuse, nor is it a commendable saying, that “for good deeds one should receive gifts, but not for petty ones.” You see, it is not easy to know what to do and, knowing it, to remain steadfast; |955d| instead, the safest thing is, listening to the law, to obey it, and perform no service for gifts. But anyone who disobeys and is convicted in court, is simply to be put to death.67 As for payments to the public treasury, each person’s property |955d5| is to be—for many purposes—assessed,68 and the members of the tribes are to hand in a written report of the year’s profits to the Country-Wardens. This way the public treasury will be able to use whichever of the two modes of property-taxation it wishes, determining |955e| each year either on a part of the whole assessed value, or on a part of the current annual revenue— without taking into account the payments for the communal messes.69 As regards votive offerings to gods, the offerings donated by a man with a proper measure of property |955e5| must be commensurate in value. Now the earth and the hearth70 of the household are in everyone’s eyes sacred to all gods. Therefore, no one is to consecrate a second time what is already sacred to gods. Gold and silver, whether in private houses or in temples, are possessions that in other cities are looked upon with envy, and ivory, taken from |956a| a body bereft of soul, is not a pure votive offering, while iron and bronze are instruments of war. Instead, what anyone who wishes is to dedicate at the public temples is something made of wood, of a single piece of wood, or of stone likewise,71 or {403} something woven, not involving more than a month’s work for one woman. |956a5| Both elsewhere and in woven items, white would be the color fitting for gods, and dyed items are not to be offered except in the case of military regalia. The gifts most sacred

to gods are birds and statues72 |956b| that a single artist could complete in one day. Other votive offerings are to be made in imitation of these sorts. Now that we have discussed the parts of the entire city, how many they are and what they are to be, and have also stated to the best of our ability the laws concerning all the most important business transactions, what remains |956b5| must be judicial procedure.73 The court of first resort should consist of chosen judges, chosen jointly by the defendant and the prosecutor, for whom “arbitrators” is a more fitting name |956c| than “judges.” The second court should be composed of villagers and tribesmen, divided into twelve parts,74 before whom, if the litigants do not get it settled in the first court, they are to go to contest the case, but with a greater penalty involved:75 if the defendant is defeated in the second court, |956c5| he is to pay an additional fifth part of the amount assessed in the written penalty. If anyone brings an accusation against the judges and wishes to contest the case a third time, he is to take it to the court of Select Judges; if he loses again, |956d| he is to pay one and a half times the assessed amount. On the other hand, if the prosecutor, having lost in the first court, does not acquiesce, but goes to the second court, then, if he wins, he is to take away an additional fifth part, but if he is defeated, he is to pay the same fraction of the penalty. If they |956d5| go to the third court, refusing compliance with the previous verdicts, then, if the defendant is defeated, he is to pay one and a half times the penalty, as was said, while if the prosecutor is defeated, he is to pay half the assessed penalty. As regards the drawings of lots for the courts, filling of vacancies, |956e| appointments of assistants for each of the offices, the times when each of these things must be done, the recordings of votes and adjournments, and all other necessary details having to do with judicial {404} procedures, such as the drawings of lots for earlier or later trials, compelling of |956e5| answers to charges and of appearances in court,76 and everything related to these, though we have said it before,77 it is a fine thing to repeat what is correct even two or three times. All the laws that are minor and easily |957a| discovered an old legislator may leave out, but the young legislator must fill them in. For the private courts78 would achieve proper measure if they proceeded in this sort of way.

But when it comes to the public and communal courts, and whatever courts officials must use in managing the affairs of |957a5| their several offices, there exist in many cities no small number of ordinances by decent men that are not at all unseemly. From these, the Guardians of the Laws must prepare the ones fitting for the constitution that is now being produced, |957b| drawing inferences from them, rectifying them, and testing them by experience, until each of them seems adequately laid down. At this point, putting an end to the process, thus ratifying them as unchangeable, they are to make use of them for the whole of life.79 Whatever has to do with |957b5| the silence of judges, avoidance of inauspicious speech and the opposite, and whatever deviates from the many just, good, and fine things found in other cities, has in part been discussed and will in part be discussed later on,80 near the end. And all these, a person who is going to be |957c| an impartial judge, in accord with justice, must keep in mind and must learn from writings about them that he has acquired. For of all branches of learning, the ones with the most control over making the learner become a better person are the ones having to do with the laying down of laws, if indeed they are correctly established, which they would be, |957c5| or else it would be pointless for our divine and wonderful law (nomos) to possess a name fitting for understanding (nous).81 And, in particular, as regards other sorts of speeches, whether in poems, praising or criticizing certain individuals, or in conversational prose, whether in writing or in all the various |957d| day-to-day get-togethers, where people out of a love of victory engage in dispute or even (sometimes quite pointlessly) express agreement—in the case of all these the perspicuous test would be the writings of the {405} legislator.82 These the good judge must have in store within himself as an antidote |957d5| to the other sorts of speeches, and must use to set straight both himself and the city. For the good citizens he will secure both the permanence and the increase of what is just; for the bad ones, the greatest possible change from ignorance, |957e| intemperance, cowardice, and, in a word, from injustice generally—that is, for all the bad ones who seem to be curable. As for those whose beliefs are woven into their fate,83 if they assigned death as a cure for souls in this condition (and this is something it would be just |958a| to say often), such judges and guides of judges would merit praise from the entire city.

When all the lawsuits for a year have reached an end and been decided, the following laws must apply to the execution of verdicts: |958a5| First, the official acting as judge is to assign all the property of the loser, except for what it is necessary to possess, to the winner, immediately after the vote in the given case has been announced by a herald, |958b| within the hearing of the judges. And when the month following the months for lawsuits has elapsed, if anyone has failed to discharge his debt voluntarily to the winner who is willing, the official who tried the case, in accord with the request of the winner, is to hand over the property of the loser. If |958b5| the latter has no means to pay, and the deficiency is not less than a drachma, he is not to bring a suit against anyone else until he has paid in full everything owing to the winner—though others are to have |958c| the authority to bring suits against him. If anyone, when judgment has been given against them, obstructs the official who gave the negative judgment, those who have been unjustly obstructed are to bring him before the court of the Guardians of the Laws, and anyone who is found guilty in such a case is to be punished |958c5| with death, as someone subverting the whole city and its laws. Next topic:84 for a man who has been born and nurtured, and has begotten and nurtured children, and has had business dealings with people in a properly measured way, paying penalties if he has done someone an injustice and receiving them |958d| if done one by another—for a man who, keeping to the laws, has (as is meet and right) grown old, the end would come in accord with nature. Where those who have died are concerned, then, whether male or female, the sacred rites in honor of the gods of the underworld and here that are fitting |958d5| to be performed are to be indicated by the Interpreters85 as final authorities. {406} As for tombs, they are to be nowhere on land that is cultivatable, whether the monument is small or great, but rather in places where the land has a nature suited only to receive and conceal |958e| the bodies of the dead in a way that is most painless for the living, and these places are to be filled up. On the other hand, places that Mother Earth naturally wishes to produce food for human beings, no one, either living or dead, is to deprive those of us who are alive thereof. |958e5| And they are not to heap up a mound of earth

higher than the work of five men can complete in five days. Nor are stone monuments to be made larger than needed to accommodate a eulogy of the deceased’s life of at most four lines in heroic meter.86 As for lyings-in-state, |959a| first, the corpse is to remain in the house no longer than it takes to make clear whether the person is in a deathlike swoon or really dead; and so, as suited to human beings, carrying out the corpse to the monument on the third day would pretty much observe proper measure. Secondly, as in other matters, we are also to trust |959a5| the legislator when he says that the soul is altogether superior to the body; that in actual life what causes each of us to be what he is, is nothing other than the soul, whereas the body is a lookalike that keeps pace with each of us; |959b| that it is a fine saying that the bodies of the dead are likenesses of those who have died, whereas the real being that each of us really is, our “immortal soul” as it is called, goes off to the other gods87 to give an account of itself, as the ancestral law88 says (which |959b5| to the good person is a source of confidence, but to the bad one a source of great fear); and that to one who is dead no great help can be given. It was when he was alive, you see, that all his relatives should have helped him, so that he’d have lived as justly and piously as possible while he was alive, and, |959c| after having died, be unpunished for evil faults in the life hereafter. This being so, one must never ruin one’s household in the belief that this mass of flesh being buried belongs in any very special way to oneself. Instead, |959c5| one must believe that the son or brother, or whichever real person one takes oneself to be longing for and having to bury, has departed in furtherance and fulfillment of his own destiny, and that one must make the best of what is available to us, spending properly measured amounts, as if on a soulless altar to the ones below.89 As for {407} what constitutes proper measure, |959d| if a legislator were to “prophesize”90 it, it wouldn’t be the least bit disrespectful. So let the law be this: Expenditures would be properly measured for someone from the highest assessment class, if expenditure on the entire funeral is no more than five minas; for someone from the second class, three minas; two for someone from the third; and a mina |959d5| for someone from the fourth.

The Guardians of the Laws have of necessity to do and supervise many other things, but not the least of these is that they are to live supervising children and men and people of every age; |959e| and, in particular, at each person’s death a single Guardian of the Laws is to be in charge of things, he being the one the relatives of the deceased invite in as overseer. And it is to be a fine thing for him if the arrangements for the dead person proceed in a fine and properly measured way, but a shameful one if they do so not in a fine way. |959e5| The lying-in-state and the rest are to proceed in accord with the custom concerning such matters, but the following must give way to the one legislating for a city: Whereas to prescribe that there is—or is not—to be weeping for the deceased is |960a| degrading, the singing of dirges, and cries audible outside the house, are to be forbidden. Carrying the corpse out onto the open street is to be prevented, as is crying aloud while it is being carried through the streets, and the procession is to be outside the city by daybreak. These |960a5| are to be the laws concerning such matters. Anyone who obeys them is to be free of penalty; but anyone who disobeys the one91 Guardian of the Laws is to be punished by all of them with the penalty being determined by all jointly. All other arrangements concerning the dead, |960b| whether with burial or without burial (as in the case of patricides, temple robbers, and all such people), have been discussed previously and are laid down in laws,92 so that our legislation has pretty much come to an end. |960b5| In every case, however, the end each time is not a matter of pretty much having done something, or acquired it, or founded it. On the contrary, it’s only when one has discovered a complete and permanent savior for what one has produced that one can consider that whatever needs to be done has been done—until then, one must consider the whole to be incomplete. |960c|   {408} CLEINIAS: Well said, Stranger. But explain to us yet more perspicuously what you had in mind by what you said just now. ATHENIAN: Many things, Cleinias, were correctly put into song of old, not least, I dare say, the designations of the Muses. |960c5| CLEINIAS: Which

ones in particular?

ATHENIAN: “Lachesis” for the first, “Clotho” for the second, and “Atropos” for the third savior of things fated (lêchthentôn), being likened to a woman producing in the threads she spins (klôsthentôn) on her spindle93 the power of irreversibility (ametastrophon).94 That is precisely what must also produce in the city and |960d| the citizens not only health and a savior for their bodies, but also the rule of law in their souls—or rather, a savior for the laws. And this, it seems evident to me, is what is still lacking in our laws, namely, a way in which the power |960d5| of irreversibility is to be naturally implanted in them. CLEINIAS: It’s no minor matter you’re talking about, if indeed it proves possible to find how there could be such a power in every property mentioned.95 ATHENIAN: But that it surely is possible is utterly clear now, |960e| anyway to me. CLEINIAS: In that case, let’s in no way desist until we’ve provided this very thing for the laws that we’ve stated. For it’s ridiculous—it makes having worked hard to any extent whatsoever pointless—to build on foundations that are |960e5| not at all secure. ATHENIAN: You’re right to encourage me, and in me you’ll find another of the same mind. CLEINIAS: Fine. So, what is it you say will be a savior for our constitution and laws, and in what way would it work? |960e10| {409} ATHENIAN: We said96 (didn’t we?) that there must be a Council in our city |961a| composed in some such way as this: the ten Guardians of the Laws who are currently the oldest, and, meeting with these in the same place, all those who have received public honors for virtue; further, those who have gone abroad to see if they could hear of something somewhere that might be pertinent to the guardianship of the laws, |961a5| and who, having come home safely, and, having been tested by these same people, seem worthy members of the Council. In addition to these, each member is to bring with him one of the young people, not less than thirty years old, |961b| whom he has first judged to be worthy in nature and in nurture, and, on these terms, is to introduce him to the others. If they also approve, he is to bring him along, but if not, the fact of the original judgment is to be concealed from

others, and especially |961b5| from the one who was judged unacceptable. The Council is to meet in the very early morning, when everyone is most free from other private and public activities. Wasn’t it some such thing as this that we described in our earlier accounts? |961c| CLEINIAS: Indeed, it was. ATHENIAN: Going back to this Council, then, I’d say the following. I’d say that if one were to lay this down like an anchor for the entire city, and give it the things suitable |961c5| for it, it would save all the things we wish to save. CLEINIAS: How so? ATHENIAN: The crucial moment has come for us to explain the next point correctly, and not lose any of our eagerness. CLEINIAS: You put that very well. So do as you think. |961c10| ATHENIAN: Well then, in the case of everything, Cleinias, it is necessary to understand |961d| what is likely to be its savior in each of its tasks—just as in an animal, it is soul and head that are (most of all indeed) naturally such.97 CLEINIAS: Meaning what, again? ATHENIAN: Well, it’s the virtue of these two, I take it, that provides every animal with salvation. |961d5| CLEINIAS: How? {410} ATHENIAN: Before anything else, understanding (nous) present in the soul, and, before anything else, sight and hearing present in the head. In a word, when understanding is blended with the finest of the perceptual capacities, having become |961d10| one thing, it would most rightly be called the “salvation” of each animal. CLEINIAS: Yes, probably so. ATHENIAN: Indeed, it does seem so. But what would understanding (nous), when blended with |961e| perceptual capacities, be concerned with, when it is the salvation of ships even in storms, as well as in fair weather? Isn’t it that, on a ship, the captain and the sailors blend together the perceptual capacities with the understanding of the craft of captaincy when they save themselves and everything that has to do with the ship? |961e5|

CLEINIAS: Of

course. ATHENIAN: Well, there’s no need for too many examples of such things. But consider, for instance, what in the case of an army, or of bodies, the correct target would be for a general, or a medical practitioner, to set up for himself, if he were aiming, correctly, to be their salvation. In the former case, wouldn’t it be |962a| victory and power over the enemy, and in the case of doctors and their assistants wouldn’t it be the provision of health to the body? CLEINIAS: Certainly. ATHENIAN: So if, where the body is concerned, a doctor is ignorant of what we just now called |962a5| “health,” a general of victory, or any of the other things we were discussing, it would come to light, would it not, that he had no understanding (nous) of any of these things? CLEINIAS: How could he? ATHENIAN: Well then, what about a city? If it comes to light that someone is ignorant of the target at which the politician must aim, would he, in the first place, be rightly called a “ruler,” and, secondly, would he be capable of saving |962b| this thing, whose target he did not know at all? CLEINIAS: How could he? ATHENIAN: So now, as it seems, if our settlement of the country is to be finally completed, there must be some element in it that |962b5| knows, first, this thing we’re speaking of, the target—whatever exactly it is—the politician aims at,98 and, second, what the way is in which one {411} must attain this, and which of the laws, in the first instance, and which people, in the second, give good advice to that element, and which do not. But if any city is empty of such an element, it will be no surprise if, lacking understanding (nous) |962c| and lacking perception, it acts on each occasion, in each of its actions, in a haphazard way. CLEINIAS: True. ATHENIAN: So, as things stand, is there now in our city any part or any institution that is adequately equipped to function as this sort of safeguard? Can we name one?

CLEINIAS: Certainly not, Stranger, at least not in a perspicuous way. But if I had to guess, this argument seems to me to be pointing toward the Council that you said just now99 must assemble at night. |962c10| ATHENIAN: You’ve grasped my meaning perfectly, Cleinias, and it is indeed necessary, |962d| as the argument before us now indicates, for this Council to possess every virtue—a starting-point of which virtue is not to wander around aiming at many things, but, looking to one thing, always to let fly, as it were, all its arrows at this. |962d5| CLEINIAS: Absolutely. ATHENIAN: So now we’ll understand why it’s not at all surprising that the laws of cities wander around, since different legislations look to different things in each city. And, in general, it is no |962d10| surprise to find that for some people the aim of what is just is such that certain people will rule in the city (whether they happen to be really |962e| better, or worse); for others it is such that they become rich (whether by becoming someone’s slaves, or not); and for others it is such that the eagerness for the life of so-called freedom was being cheered on;100 others, again, have a two-together code of laws, which looks to both, such that they are free and will also be |962e5| masters of other cities; while others (the wisest of all as they think) look to these, together with all such things, not any single one, since they are unable to specify any object of supreme value that all the others must look to. CLEINIAS: Then wasn’t what we affirmed a long time ago,101 |963a| correct Stranger? For we said that everything to do with our laws must always {412} look to one thing, and this, I take it we agreed, would quite rightly be called “virtue.” ATHENIAN: Yes. |963a5| CLEINIAS: And virtue, I believe we affirmed, is in some degree fourfold.102 ATHENIAN: Certainly. CLEINIAS: And understanding (nous), I think, being leader of all these, is precisely what all the other things, these three included, must look to. ATHENIAN: You are following perfectly, Cleinias. Now also |963a10| follow the rest closely. You see, we said103 that understanding (nous) for a captain, a

doctor, or a general looks to that one thing that it must |963b| look to, and now we are at the point of examining understanding (nous) for a politician.104 And, addressing it as if it were a person, we’d ask it: “My admirable friend,105 what do you, for your part, look to? What exactly, in your case, is that one thing, the like of which the doctor who possesses understanding (nous) can state perspicuously? Will you—who |963b5| are superior, as perhaps you would claim, to all these wise people—prove unable to tell us?” Or can you two, Megillus and Cleinias, describe distinctly, and state for me on its behalf, what exactly you say it is, just as I, on behalf of many others, defined their targets for you? |963c| CLEINIAS: Absolutely not, Stranger. ATHENIAN: Well, what is it that we must be eager to discern both in itself and in things? |963c5| CLEINIAS: What do you mean, “in things”? Give us an example. ATHENIAN: For example, when we said that there are four forms of virtue, it is clear that, since there are four, it is necessary to say that each is one. CLEINIAS: Certainly. |963c10| {413} ATHENIAN: And yet we call them all by one name. For we say that courage is virtue, wisdom (phronêsis) is virtue, and the other two also, as if they are not really many, but this one thing |963d| only—virtue. CLEINIAS: Absolutely. ATHENIAN: Now it is not difficult to explain what in these two (and the others) makes them different from each other, and acquire two names. |963d5| But what we give the same name, “virtue,” to in both, and also in other things, that’s no longer an easy matter. CLEINIAS: What do you mean? ATHENIAN: It’s not difficult to make clear what I mean. In fact, let’s divide between us the roles of questioner and answerer.106 |963d10| CLEINIAS: Once again, what do you mean? ATHENIAN: You are to ask me why exactly, when we call the two of them by the one name, |963e| “virtue,” we then again speak of them as two—courage and wisdom. I’ll tell you the cause: it’s because courage is concerned with fear, and even beasts share in it, as do the characters of very young children.

For it is without reason (logos) and |963e5| by nature that a courageous soul comes into existence, whereas without reason, on the other hand, a wise soul or one possessing understanding (nous) has never yet come into existence, does not exist now, or ever will exist, implying that it is a different thing. CLEINIAS: That’s true. ATHENIAN: In that case, you’ve now received an account from me |964a| of what it is in them that makes them differ and two. So you give me one in return of what makes them one and the same. And bear in mind that you’re going to tell me what in them, when they are four, makes them one, and then—once you’ve shown that they are one—you’re to demand from me to say again what in them makes them four. Yes, and after this we are to investigate in the case of a person with adequate knowledge |964a5| of whatever there is a name for and, moreover, there is an account of, whether he must know the name alone, while lacking understanding of the account, or whether, in the case of a person who is the real thing,107 it is not shameful, where matters so preeminently important and fine are concerned, to lack understanding of anything of that sort. |964b| CLEINIAS: Yes, it probably is shameful. {414} ATHENIAN: Well then, for a legislator and a Guardian of the Laws, and one who thinks himself superior to everyone in virtue, and who has received victory prizes for these very things,108 is there anything more important than these very things we are talking about now—courage, |964b5| temperance, justice, and wisdom?109 CLEINIAS: How could there be? ATHENIAN: And where these are concerned, aren’t the interpreters, teachers, legislators, and guardians of other people, when dealing with a person who needs to form a judgment or know, or with one who, once he has committed errors, needs to be punished or |964c| rebuked, superior to the others in teaching and making entirely clear what power vice and virtue have? Or is some poet who has come into the city, or someone who claims to be an educator of the young, going to come to prove better than |964c5| the one who has won the victory prize for every virtue? In a city like that, where there are no guardians competent either in word or in deed, with adequate

knowledge of virtue, is it any surprise, I ask, if this city, unguarded as it is, suffers the same fate as many cities suffer |964d| nowadays? CLEINIAS: Not at all, it probably would. ATHENIAN: Well then, this thing we’re talking about now, are we to do it, or what? Are the guardians to be prepared so as to be more exact in deed and word where virtue is concerned |964d5| than the mass of people? Or in what way will our city become like the head and perceptual capacities of wise people, as possessing within itself some such guarding element? CLEINIAS: But how, in what way, Stranger, when likening it to such a person, |964d10| are we to speak of it? ATHENIAN: Clearly we are to speak of the city itself as being the torso, |964e| and of the young guardians as being at the very top of the head, as it were, the ones who have been selected as the most naturally clever, and sharpest in every part of the soul, to look all around the city and, {415} keeping watch, hand over their perceptions to those who are the memory—that is, |964e5| to act as reporters to the older people of everything that goes on in the city; while the old ones, who are to be likened to understanding (nous), due to their being preeminently wise (phronêsis) |965a| in many matters deserving of an account, do the deliberating, making use of the young ones as their assistants in pursuit of advice. So in this way both really are the joint saviors of the whole city. Is that how we say things must be prepared, or in some other way? |965a5| Is it to have citizens who are all on the same level, and not have any who are nurtured and educated in a more exact way? CLEINIAS: But that would be impossible, my admirable friend. ATHENIAN: We must proceed, then, to a more exact sort of education than |965b| the preceding one.110 CLEINIAS: Probably. ATHENIAN: So would the one we more or less touched on just now111 happen to be actually the one we need? |965b5| CLEINIAS: By all means, it would. ATHENIAN: Didn’t we say that the person who is indeed a top craftsman or guardian in a particular area must be able not only to look to the many, but

also to press on to the one, so as to know it, and, knowing it, to put all of them together in order, with a unifying eye112 to it? |965b10| CLEINIAS: Correct. ATHENIAN: Well, can anyone at all get a more exact perception or view of anything |965c| at all than by being able to look from the many things that are unlike to the one single form?113 {416} CLEINIAS: Probably not. ATHENIAN: Not “probably,” my marvelous friend, but really. There is not a more perspicuous method of inquiry for any human being than this. |965c5| CLEINIAS: Putting my trust in you, Stranger, I certainly agree, and so let’s proceed with our discussion on this basis. ATHENIAN: So it is necessary, it seems, to compel even the guardians of our divine constitution to see in an exact way, first, just what, throughout |965c10| all four, turns out to be the same—just what it is in courage, |965d| in temperance, in justice, and in wisdom (phronêsis) that we say is one thing, and is rightly called by one name, “virtue.” It is this, my friends, provided we wish it, that we must now (as it were) press hard on, until we can state in an adequate way whatever exactly it is |965d5| that must be looked to— whether it is one, or a whole, or both, or whatever exactly its nature is.114 Or do we think that, if this escapes us, we’ll ever adequately possess what furthers virtue, when we won’t be able to say whether it is many, |965e| or four, or one? Surely, then, if we trust our own advice, anyway, we’ll have to contrive somehow or other115 for this to come about in our city. But if it seems to you that we should let the matter drop, well, drop it we must. CLEINIAS: In the name of the God of Foreigners,116 Stranger, surely one must least of all give up on |965e5| something like this, since it seems to us that what you say is absolutely correct. But how might someone contrive this? ATHENIAN: Let’s not discuss yet how we might contrive it. |966a| First, let’s make sure, by agreeing among ourselves, whether it’s necessary to do so or not. {417} CLEINIAS: But surely it is necessary, if indeed it’s possible. ATHENIAN: Well then, do we also think this same thing |966a5| about fineness and goodness? Must our guardians know only that each of these is many, or

also how it—that is, what in it—is one? CLEINIAS: It seems pretty much necessary that they must also comprehend how it is one. ATHENIAN: But what if, though they understand it, they are unable to exhibit |966b| a proof of it in an account? CLEINIAS: How is that possible? You see, the state you describe is that of a slave.117 ATHENIAN: What about all other serious matters? Isn’t our argument that those who are going to be real Guardians of the Laws |966b5| must really know the truth about them, and must be competent to interpret it in an account and to follow it in deeds, judging in accord with nature what is done in a fine way and what is not? CLEINIAS: Of course. ATHENIAN: Now, doesn’t one of the finest things of all, |966c| which we described in a thoroughly serious way,118 concern the gods, namely, to know —insofar as it is possible for a human being to know these things—that they exist, and the extent of the power they evidently control? And so, while one must forgive most of those in the city if they merely go along with what |966c5| the laws proclaim, when it comes to those who are going to participate in guarding, one must not entrust the task to anyone who has not worked hard to grasp every proof that exists concerning the gods. And not entrusting consists in never choosing as one of the Guardians of the Laws anyone who is not divine and has not |966d| worked hard on these matters, nor, again, as one of those approved119 of for virtue. CLEINIAS: Yes, it’s certainly right, as you say, that anyone who is idle or incapable where things of this sort are concerned is to be rejected on examination as being far from those who are fine people. |966d5| {418} ATHENIAN: Now we know, don’t we, that there are two points—which we went through in our previous discussions—that lead to belief in gods? CLEINIAS: Which ones? ATHENIAN: One is what we said about the soul,120 that it is the oldest and most divine of all the things whose movement, once it has received |966e| its generation, provides them with ever-flowing being. The other point has to

do with the movement (that it possesses an order) of the stars and of the other things controlled by the understanding (nous) that sets the universe in order. For no human being who looks at these in neither a careless nor an inept way has ever been by nature so godless as not to be affected by them in a way that is exactly the opposite of what the mass of people expect. For they think that those |967a| who treat of such things by means of astronomy and the other crafts that necessarily go along with it, become godless,121 having observed things to the greatest extent122 coming about due to necessities and not due to the thoughts of a wish concerned with the accomplishing of good things. |967a5| CLEINIAS: And what in fact is the true state of things? ATHENIAN: The situation is entirely opposite, as I’ve said, from the time when those who think about such things thought of them as soulless. Yet even then feelings of wonder stole into people about them, and what is now really |967b| believed was suspected by those who grasped them with exactitude, that if they were soulless they could never have been dealt with by wondrous rational calculations of such exactitude, because of not possessing understanding (nous). Indeed, there were some even at the time who dared to venture this very claim, saying that |967b5| it was understanding (nous) that set in order all the things in the heavens.123 However, the same people, again, erred about the nature of soul, {419} which is in fact older than bodies, but thinking it to be younger, they turned everything upside down again (so to speak), themselves most of all. |967c| For indeed what was in front of their eyes, everything moving in the heavens, appeared to them to be a pack of stones, earth, and many other soulless bodies, which furnish the causes for the entire cosmos. These were the views which, at the time, brought about many charges |967c5| of godlessness124 for these thinkers and caused much odium to attach to them, and, in particular, the poets took it into their heads to abuse them, by likening those doing philosophy to “bitches howling at the moon,” and saying many other mindless things besides.125 But now, as was said, the situation is entirely the opposite. |967d| CLEINIAS: In what way? ATHENIAN: No mortal person can ever become steadfastly god-fearing unless he has grasped these two things we’re now |967d5| discussing: that soul

is the oldest of all the things that have partaken of generation, is immortal, and rules all bodies, and in addition to these—something that has been said many times—that there is an understanding (nous) present in the stars which is the leader of all the beings.126 And he must also grasp |967e| the studies preliminary to these,127 and must see the connection between what concerns music and these studies, and must apply this harmoniously to the practices and customs that pertain to our characters. And he must be able to give an account128 of as many of {420} these as have an account. Anyone who |968a| cannot acquire all this, in addition to the virtues in the popular sense,129 would pretty much never become an adequate ruler of a whole city, but only an assistant to other rulers. Well, Cleinias and Megillus, now we must see whether to the laws that have been mentioned—all |968a5| the ones we have gone through—we are straightaway to add this one: that the Nocturnal Council of officials, having shared in all the education we discussed, is to be appointed by law as a guardian for the sake of its salvation. What else should we do? |968b| CLEINIAS: But, my good friend, how are we not to add it, if we can possibly do so, even to a small extent? ATHENIAN: Then this is certainly the sort of thing we must all strive for. Indeed, for my part, I’d eagerly become your assistant in this task, |968b5| because of my very long experience and investigation of such matters, and perhaps I’ll also find other assistants besides myself. CLEINIAS: Well then, Stranger, we must proceed in this direction, in which the god is pretty much leading us, rather than in any other. But what the way is for us |968b10| to bring it about, so that it will be brought about correctly, that is what we must now discuss |968c| and inquire into. ATHENIAN: It’s not possible yet, Megillus and Cleinias, to make laws about such matters,130 until the Council has been organized, that is the time to legislate what they themselves must be in control of131—but |968c5| actually the preparation for such things must take place by means of teaching, together with many conversations at meetings, if it is to take place correctly. CLEINIAS: How’s that? What are we to say this means, again? ATHENIAN: I take it that the first thing must surely be to compile a list of those naturally suited for guardianship |968d| in age, abilities in subjects of

{421} study,132 modes of character, and habits. But after this, the things they must learn are neither easy to discover for oneself, nor is it easy to find another who has made the discovery and learn it from him.133 In addition to this, there’s the issue of times: when and for how long each subject must be undertaken, |968d5| which it’s pointless to put in writing. For it wouldn’t be clear even to the students themselves whether the subjects were being learned at the opportune time, |968e| until, I take it, knowledge134 of the subject had been born in the soul of each. So, to speak of all these as indescribable would be incorrect, but they are not pre-describable, since to describe them ahead of time would make nothing that is being said clear. |968e5| CLEINIAS: Well then, my friend, what’s to be done, if that’s how things are? ATHENIAN: The saying, my friends, “in a common place and a middle one,”135 seems to apply to us, and if indeed we are willing to risk the entire constitution and throw either three sixes (as they say) or three ones—well, |968e10| that’s what must be done. And I’ll share the risk with you |969a| by stating and explaining my beliefs, at least, about education and nurture, the subject now started again in our discussion. Yet the risk would not be small, or even comparable to any others. So I recommend that you in particular, Cleinias, |969a5| pay attention to this. For in the case of the city of the Magnesians (or whoever or whatever else the god would make it be named for), it is you who will achieve the greatest fame, if you establish it correctly; at any rate, you’ll not ever escape the reputation of being a great deal bolder than any of your successors. In any case, if indeed |969b| this divine Council of ours does come into being, my dear comrades, the city must be handed over to it; on this point, among present-day legislators there is (so to speak) no dispute at all. On the contrary, it will really be pretty much a waking accomplishment of what we touched on a little while |969b5| ago in the argument, treating it as a dream, when we commingled, in a sort of composite image, head and understanding (nous)—if, that is to say, our men have been accurately selected, fittingly educated, and, once they have been educated, {422} reside in the acropolis136 of the country |969c| and become complete guardians, whose like we have never before seen in our lives as regards their virtue as saviors.

MEGILLUS: My dear Cleinias, from all that we have now said, either we must abandon the foundation of the city, or not allow this Stranger |969c5| here to depart, but by means of entreaties and every contrivance he must be made a partner in the foundation of the city. CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely true, Megillus, and I will do |969d| precisely that, and you must assist me. MEGILLUS: Assist you I will.     1. Messenger of the gods. 2. See Rep. 377d–383c, 388a–392a. 3. See 845a1n. 4. Aston: See Morrow-2, p. 112 n51. 5. On Plato’s laws concerning theft of various sorts, and on the apparent inconsistency of this law on theft of public property with the one stated at 857a–b, see Saunders-6, pp. 280– 300, esp. p. 283. 6. Anarchon: The adjective corresponding to the noun anarchia (“anarchy”) at 942d1. 7. See 699b–d. 8. Cf. “So [democratic freedom] is bound to make its way into private households until finally it breeds anarchy among the very animals” (Rep. 562e2–4). 9. See 803d–e, 814e–815b. 10. See 633b–c, 829b–c. 11. I.e., head hair (felt is made from wool or hair, hats from felt) and callouses. 12. Reading χρῆν δοκεῖν with England-2, p. 572 for Budé χρῆναι δοκεῖ (“must listen to, it seems”). 13. Graphas astrateias: On this sort of prosecution in Athenian law, see Todd, pp. 106, 183. 14. See 706c1n. 15. Tekmêrion: See 821e3n. 16. Lipotaxiou . . . graphas: See Todd, p. 183. 17. In Homer, Il. 16, Achilles lends his friend Patroclus his armor, in lieu of returning to battle himself. Emboldened by it to fight Hector, against Achilles’ instructions, Patroclus is killed by the latter, who strips him of the armor and wears it himself. Peleus and Thetis are Achilles’ parents; Menoetius is the father of Patroclus. 18. Duscheresteron: See 654d3n. 19. Dikê ripthentôn: Although not one of the attested dikai in Athenian law listed in Todd, pp. 102–105, MacDowell-2, p. 160, gives “throwing away one’s shield (sc. to run away)” as one of the offenses mentioned under the law concerning cowardice. 20. Kakon: Usually “bad” or “evil” but here, more particularly, the one suffering from kakê (943a5, 944c7)—cowardice.

21. Caenis, daughter of the king of the Lapiths, was raped by the god Poseidon, who promised to grant whatever she wished. She asked to be turned into a man and then fought as an invulnerable warrior against the centaurs. See Ovid, Metamorphoses 12.168–209. 22. See 904e6n. 23. Philopsuchias: Not “love of his soul” (Pangle) but, as at Ap. 37c6, love of the life of which soul is the principle. 24. See 774b3n. 25. See 759b–e. 26. Hupozômata: These cables seem to have girded a trireme from stem to stern and to have entered it at both places. Within it, they were connected to some sort of twisting device that allowed them to be tightened when the water caused them to stretch and become slack. 27. Ta panta politeumata: The term politeuma (politeumata is the plural) occurs only here in Plato, although the corresponding verb, politeuesthai (“to be governed”), occurs in Lg. at 626b7, 635e7, 673b3, 676c1, 693e3, 701e3, 736c1. In Aristotle, however, the politeuma is the governing body (Pol. 1278b10), and that seems to be its meaning here, since “change originates in the ruling element itself when faction breaks out within it; but . . . if this group remains of one mind, then—however small it is—change is impossible” (Rep. 545c8–d3). 28. See 767c–d. 29. The sun, considered a god. See Burkert, p. 175. 30. This includes tied votes. 31. Hepôntai tê[i] krisei: I.e., the one passed on them when they were selected. In other words, for as long as they remain in every way best. Alternatively, “for as long as they are busy with judgment.” See England-2, p. 580. But 947e7–8 favors the first alternative. 32. See 767c–e, 855c. 33. See 656b–c, Rep. 545e–547a. 34. See 632d3n. 35. Reading προτίμων with Saunders-2, p. 119, for Budé ποτίμων (“porous”). 36. See 661b. 37. See 946c2. 38. See 624b5. 39. Lêxesin dikôn: A lêxis or lêxis dikês, in Athenian law, is a written complaint lodged with the relevant Archon as a first step in a legal action. See Morrow-2, pp. 279–280. In Euthphr. Socrates is on his way to King Archon to respond to such a complaint. 40. See 856a7n. 41. See 753c. 42. As in “let me and my family be cursed by the gods if I am lying.” 43. See 800e11. 44. Cf. Ap. 35b9–c5: “It doesn’t seem just to me, gentlemen, to entreat the jury—nor to be acquitted by entreating it—but rather to inform it and persuade it. After all, a juror doesn’t sit in order to grant justice as a favor, but to decide where justice lies. And he has sworn on oath not that he’ll favor whomever he pleases, but that he’ll judge according to law.” 45. Ton peri tou pragmatos aei logon: Cf. Ar. Rh. 1354a16–28: “Pity, anger, and such feelings of the soul do not have to do with the thing at issue (peri tou pragmatos), but are

related to the juror. . . . For one should not distort [the judgment of] the juror by arousing anger, fear, or pity in him, since this would be as if someone who is going to use a standard, made it crooked. Further, it is evident that the task of the opponent is nothing at all outside of showing that [the thing at issue] is or is not the case, or did or did not occur.” 46. See 850a–d. 47. Lê[i]tourgiôn: A leitourgia is any public service paid for out of private funds, such as funding a chorus for a play, equipping a trireme for the navy, or providing a feast for the city (Ar. NE 1122b22–23). Sometimes, though, leitourgein comes close in meaning to our notion of charitable giving (1163a29, 1167b12). 48. See 704d–705a. 49. These were adopted both in Crete and in Sparta. See Prt. 342c–d, Xen. Lac. 14.4. 50. See 792d. This divine something is rational calculation. See 645a1, Ti. 90a–b. 51. The four major Panhellenic festivals. 52. Teleos: As at 950c8, 951c5. See Reeve-3, pp. 35–52. 53. Gnômê[i]: “The name ‘judgment’ (‘gnômê’) expresses the fact that to judge is to examine or study whatever is begotten (gonês nômêsis); for ‘studying’ (‘nôman’) and ‘examining’ (‘skopein’) are the same” (Crat. 411d6–8). For Aristotle gnômê is “the correct judgment (krisis) of what is decent (epieikous)” (NE 1143a20). 54. Cf. Rep. 496a–e. 55. See 950e–951a. 56. Deigma: A deigma can be a sample, pattern, sign, plan, or sketch, but it can also be something taken as evidence (see LSJ s.v. δεῖγμα), which seems to be the sort of meaning it has here. 57. I.e., the Nocturnal Council. See 908a, 909a, 961a–c, 968a–969c. 58. Idiôtês zêtô  .  .  . polupragmonôn: Socrates describes himself as living “privately (idiôteuein) not publicly (dêmosieuein)” (Ap. 32a2–3) and as being “a busybody (polupragmonô) in private (idia[i])” (31c4–5), because he converses with individuals about ethics and politics. 59. See 755c–e. 60. See 758b–d. 61. When Simonides of Ceos (c. 556/532–466/442 BC) was asked whether it was better to be rich or wise, he replied, “‘to be rich.’ ‘For,’ he said, ‘we see the wise spending their time at the doors of the rich’” (Ar. Rh. 1391a10–12). See also Rep. 364b, 489b. 62. Busiris, a king from Egypt’s legendary past, is said to have sacrificed and eaten foreign visitors (Isocrates, Busiris 31), but the reference may just be to foods and sacrifices that foreigners find repellant. 63. See 950a–b. 64. Reading γυμνὸς χιτωνίσκον with Saunders-2 for Budé γυμνὸς ἢ χιτωνίσκον. 65. So that nothing could be hidden under his shirt, without falling to the ground. Athenian law seems to have had a similar provision. See Aristophanes, Clouds 497–499, and on this law in general, Saunders-6, pp. 299–300. 66. Atelê kai akuron gignesthai tên dikên: A dikê can, among other things, be a trial or a suit, as well as a verdict or sentence. See LSJ s.v. δίκη. But in such contexts, akuron seems to have applied in particular to the verdicts or sentences.

67. I.e., without any other penalties. See 946e. 68. See 745a–b. 69. This is the only place in Lg. where such payments are mentioned. 70. Personified as Hestia. See 745b7n. 71. Monozulon: This offering is a sort of xoanon, or primitive carved figure in so-called pillar shape. See Vernant, pp. 153–155. 72. Agalmata: An agalma (from the verb agallein, meaning “to glorify or honor something”) was typically a figurative statue in honor of a god or a figurative statue of any sort: the puppets that cast their shadows on the walls of the cave are agalmata (Rep. 517d7), as are the golden agalmata of virtue that Alcibiades purports to have seen within Socrates (Smp. 216c–217a). See Reeve-3, pp. 18–34. 73. See 768c–d. 74. I.e., the pool of potential judges is to be divided into twelve parts, with the actual judges in a given case selected to reflect this division. See Morrow-2, pp. 260–261. 75. See 915c, 920d, 921d. 76. Parakatabaseôn: The word appears only here. I translate with Schöpsdau-3, p. 568. Other options are mentioned in England-2, p. 605. 77. See 768c–e, 846b–c, 876b–c. 78. I.e., the courts of first resort. See Saunders-2, pp. 122–123. 79. See 772b–d. 80. On the first two, see 766d–e, 876a–b, 949a–b; the third has not, in fact, been discussed. 81. See 714a1–2. 82. See 811c–e, 858c–859a. 83. See Rep. 617b–d. 84. The following discussion of funerals is advertised at 632c. 85. See 759c–e. 86. I.e., dactylic (  ̄ ̆ ̆) hexameters. 87. Those that are the “wise and good” gods of the underworld (Phd. 63b7). 88. See 793a–d. 89. See 931d–e. 90. Manteusaito: See 694c6n, and on the legislator’s knowledge of and need to define proper measure, 691d4, 719e5. 91. Reading ἑνὶ with Saunders-2, p. 124 (followed by Schöpsdau-3, p. 575). The reference is to the Guardian appointed as overseer of the funeral (959e2–3). 92. See 873b–d, 909a–d, 947b–e. 93. Reading ἀτράκτῳ with Saunders-2, pp. 125–127 (followed by Schöpsdau-3, pp. 586– 588) for Budé τρί. The parenthetical transliterations explain why Plato thinks the names of the fates were correctly given. 94. Cf. Rep. 617b–d. 95. Reading εἴπερ ἐστὶ καὶ δυνατὸν εὑρεῖν ὅπῃ γίγνοιτ’ παντὶ κτήματι τὸ τοιοῦτον with Schöpsdau-3, p. 588, for Budé εἴπερ ἐστὶ μὴ δυνατὸν εὑρεῖν ὅπῃ γίγνοιτ’ ἂν παντὶ κτῆμά τι τοιοῦτον. The properties, or possessions, referred to are health and a savior for the bodies of citizens and a savior in their souls for the laws. Notice sumpanata (“all the things”) at 961c6. “Mentioned” and “power” are added for clarity.

96. See 951d. Since the present recapitulation omits some members and details mentioned there, the earlier one should be regarded as the more complete and authoritative description. On the role of this Council in Magnesia, see Morrow-2, pp. 500–515. 97. Cf. Ti. 73b–d. 98. See 705d–706a. 99. Actually, in the very early morning, while it is still pretty much dark. See 961b (also 951d). 100. See 714b–e. 101. See 630e–631a. 102. See 631c–d. 103. See 961e–962a. 104. Kubernêtikon  .  .  . iatrikon  .  .  . stratêgikon  .  .  . politikon: In each case with the implication that the person is skilled in his particular craft. So that the politikos is so “in the correct sense” (628d6). 105. Thaumasie: See 626e1n. 106. See 892d–893a. 107. Ton ge onta ti: I.e., really an expert in the craft of politics. 108. See 730c–731b, 953d. 109. Cf. Rep. 504d4–505a4: “‘Why,’ he [Adeimantus] said, ‘aren’t these virtues the most important things? Is there something yet more important than justice and the other virtues we discussed?’. . . [Socrates:] ‘You have certainly heard the answer often, but now either you are not thinking or you intend to make trouble for me again by interrupting. And I suspect it is more the latter. You see, you have often heard it said that the form of the good is the most important thing to learn about, and that it is by their relation to it that just things and the others become useful and beneficial.’” 110. See 808d–822d. Notice, too, “more exact” at 965b1. 111. See 964a–d. 112. Sunorônta: Cf. Rep. 537c7: “The person who can achieve a unified vision (sunoptikos) is dialectical, and the one who cannot isn’t.” 113. Mian idean: Cf. Rep. 596a5–b2: “Do you want us to begin our inquiry with the following point, then, in accordance with our usual method? I mean, as you know, we usually posit some one particular form (eidos) in connection with each set of many things to which we apply the same name. . . . Then in the present case, too, let’s take any set of many things you like. For example, there are, if you like, many couches and tables. . . . But the forms (ideai) connected to these manufactured items are surely just two, one of a couch and one of a table.” Also Phdr. 266b4–c1: “If I think someone else has the natural capacity to look to (eis) the one and over (epi) the many, I pursue him . . . and, furthermore, those who can do this . . . I have up to now, at least, called dialecticians.” 114. Cf. Sph. 253d1–e2: “Aren’t we going to say that it takes knowledge of dialectic to divide things by kinds (genê) and not to think that the same form (eidos) is a different one or that a different form is the same? . . . So if a person can do that, he’ll be able to see in an adequate way a single form spread out all though many others, each one of which stands separate from the others, and forms that are different from each other but are included in a single form that’s outside them, or a single form that’s connected as a unit through many

wholes, or many forms that are completely separate from others. That’s what it is to know how to distinguish by kinds how things can associate, and how they can’t.” 115. Reading οὐκοῦν  .  .  . ἁμῶς δὲ πως with Schöpsdau-3, p. 595 for Budé οὔκουν  .  .  . ἄλλως δέ πως. See also Saunders-2, pp. 128–129. 116. I.e., Zeus, see 730e2, 843a7. 117. See 720b–e, 857b–e. 118. See 885b–905d. 119. Reading ἐγκρίτων with Schöpsdau-3, p. 596, for Budé ἔκκριτον. An egkrisis is, among other things, an examination of an athlete before his admittance to a competition. See LSJ s.v. ἔκρισις. Recall that membership in the Nocturnal Council is restricted to “all those who have received public honors for virtue” (961a3), and notice apokrinesthai (“rejected on examination”) at 966d5. 120. See 892a–c, 895c–896c. 121. Cf. Ap. 18b6–c3: “They say there’s a man called ‘Socrates,’ a ‘wise’ man, a thinker about things in the heavens, an investigator of all things below the earth, and someone who makes the weaker argument the stronger. Those who’ve spread this rumor, men of Athens, are my dangerous accusers, since the people who hear them believe that those who investigate such things also do not believe in gods.” 122. Reading ὡς οἷόν τε with Schöpsdau-3, p. 597, for Budé ὡς οἴονται (“as they think”). For discussion, see England-2, p. 632. Notice the late arrival of craft on the cosmic scene as described by these thinkers at 889b–d. 123. Kat’ ouranon: See 821c7. The thinker referred to is Anaxagoras of Clazomenae. See B12 DK, Phd. 97b–99d. 124. Plutarch (Pericles 32.32) tells us that a decree (psêphisma) introduced in Athens by Diopeithes sometime in the 430s BC provided for the impeachment of “those who do not believe in what has to do with the gods or teach theories about what is up in the sky.” It may be that this decree was the legal basis of Socrates’ indictment in 399 BC and that of many other intellectuals, including Anaxagoras, Diagoras, Protagoras, Euripides, and later, Aristotle as well. Very few of them were actually executed—indeed Socrates seems to be the sole exception. The evidence for these trials is surveyed in Derenne and skeptically evaluated in Dover-2. 125. See Rep. 607b–c. 126. Hêgemona . . . tôn ontôn: Cf. 631d5. 127. See 817e–822d. 128. Dounai ton logon: Cf. Rep. 510c2–d3: “I think you know that students of geometry, calculation, and the like hypothesize the odd and the even, the various figures, the three kinds of angles, and other things akin to these in each of their investigations, regarding them as known. These they treat as hypotheses and do not think it necessary to give any account of them (logon  .  .  . didonai), either to themselves or to others, as if they were evident to everyone. And going from these starting-points through the remaining steps, they arrive in full agreement at the point they set out to reach in their investigation.” See also 632d6n. 129. See 710a–b. 130. Tôn toioutôn: I.e., “the organization of the higher studies of the Council, the matter on which the Athenian himself has just offered to give assistance and of which he says he has

much experience” (Morrow-2, p. 513 n22). See also Bobonich-1, p. 572 n59. 131. Tote de kurious hôn autous dei gignesthai nomothetein: I.e., time for the members themselves to legislate this. Kurious refers, not to areas of political control but, in keeping with tôn toioutôn, to areas of knowledge. On the grammar and interpretation of this sentence, see England-2, p. 636, Schöpsdau-3, pp. 603–604. 132. Mathêmatôn: Often, especially, the mathematical sciences. See 817e–818b, LSJ s.v. μάθημα, 3. 133. See Rep. 528a–c, where the reference is to solid geometry. 134. Epistêmên: See 639b1n. 135. En koinô[i] kai mesô[i]: A saying that seems to stem from the game of pettoi (see 739a1n), meaning “take your chances and make your throw” or something like that. 136. See 624bn.

{423} Index Note: Line numbers are to the keyword in the Greek text, but are usually closely approximate to those in the translation. Bold indicates the existence of an associated note. Account (logos), 626d5 ancient, 677a1, 715e8, 840b3 in writing, 886b10 of a thing’s being (ousia), 895d4 perspicuous and adequate, 642a5 received from a god, 645b7 vs. dogmatism in legislation, 861b6 vs. experience, 720c3, 857c8 vs. name, 964a6 vs. story (muthos), 664a6; = story (muthos), 872d8 = oracular report (phêmê), 672b3 Achaeans, 682e3 Agamemnon, 706d5 Agent (proxenos), 642a4 Alien(s), resident (metoikos), in Magnesia, 845a4, 848a4, 850a6 Amazons, 806b1 Ambassador (presbeutês), 941a1 Ammon, 738c1 Amphion, 677d5 Amycus, 796a3 Amyntor, 931b7 Anarchy (anarchia), 942d1 Anger (orgê, thumos), 632a3 effect of wine on, 645d7, 649d5 See also spirit Antaeus, 796a1 Aphrodite irregular, 840e4 Apollo, 624a5 chorus of, 644b7 Delphic, 686a5 gifts of, 796e5 leader of the Muses, 653d3, 654a7, 665a5 Paean, 664b7 precinct common to the Sun and, 945e7

Pythian, 632d3, 950e2 responsible for the perception of rhythm and harmony, 672d2 temple of, 766b3, 833b6 + Zeus, 632d3, 662c6 Appetite(s) (epithumia), and tyranny, 661b2, 662a1 as a cause of killing, 870a1 common to all humans, 687c1 directed by means of games, 643c7 every mortal creature is hung up and suspended from, 732e5 evil, 854a6 for human beings everything depends on those for food, drink, and sex, 782d11 for laws, 697a7, 798c6 for practices, 798c6 greatest, 835c7 hunting at sea, 823d7 multifarious, 782a7 must be scrutinized by legislator, 631e4 natural, 751b8 nature of, 836e6 nurses try to discover a baby’s, 793e9 of poets and musically competent men, 802c1 soft vs. frantic, 734a2 soul that grasps at, 714a4 that cast many down into the depths, 835e3 that enslaves human beings, 838d4 that follows wisdom, understanding, and belief, 688b3 {424} to become a perfect citizen, 643e5 to join in imitations, 798e5 virtue due to, 770d3; if led correctly, 782d11 vs. craft, 647d4 vs. reason, 647d4, 835e3 which go against the advice of the legislator, 788b1 Arbitrator(s) (diaitêtês), 926a6 Archon, officer, official, ruler Ares, 671e3, 833b4, 920e1 Argos, 683c9 Argument (logos), 626d5 Aristocracy (aristokrateia), 681d3 Spartan constitution as a, 712d7 vs. democracy, oligarchy, kingship, 712c3 vs. theatocracy in music, 701a2 Aristodemus, 692b2 Arrogance (megalauchia), 716a5 Artemis, 833b7

Assembly (ekklesia), attendance at, 764a3 duties of, 850b8 Assyrian empire, 685c3 Astronomy, 820e8 Astylus, 840a5 Athena, 626d3, 806b3 in Magnesia, 745b7 partner in the constitution, 921c2 patron god of craftsmen, 920b7; of soldiers, 920e1 = our virgin mistress, 796b6 Atropos, 960c7 Attica, ancient constitution of, 698a9 Autocratic ruler (autokratôr), 713c7   Bacchic dancing, 815c2 frenzy, 790e3 Bad, evil (kakos), involuntariness of, 860d1 Bee swarm (smênos), harming of, 933d3 theft of, 843d8 Being (ousia), 668c6 account of, 895d4 Belief (doxa), about what is best, 864a1, b7 contrary to common (paradoxos), 821b7 correct vs. false, 897a2 mindless, 891c8 tested by the facts, 769d4 that is in accord with reason, 689a8 true, 632c5, 896d1; and stable, 653a8 untrue, 667e11 + wisdom and understanding, 688b2; + supervision, 892b4 Black Sea, 804e6 Briareus, 795c6   Caeneus of Thessaly, 944d7 Cavalry-Commanders (hipparchoi), 755c1 duties of, 760a8, 834c6, 847d4, 880d7, 953b8 selection of, 756a4 Cercyon, 796a1 Change (metabolê),

badness of, 797d9 Checkers (pettoi) analogy, 723e1, 739a1, 903d5 Chorus(es) (choros), defined, 654a5, 665a3 three, 664b4 Chresphontes, 683d7, 692b1 Cinyras, 660e5 Citizen (politês), vs. partisan, 715b5 City (cities) (polis), 624b2 best vs. second best, 739a4 emergence of, 680e7 happiness of, 683b4 City-Wardens (astunomoi), 759a7, 760b1 duties of, 763c5, 764c1, 779c1, 794c2, 844c6, 845e5, 847a3, b4, 849a2, e4, 879d7, 881c5, 913d5, 918a2, 920c6, 936c5, 954b7 selection of, 763e6 {425} Clan (phratra), in Magnesia, 746d7 Clotho, 960c7 Cnossos, 702c4 constitution in, 712e7 people of, 752e4 Colony (apoikia), as a place to send disowned sons, 929d1; surplus children, 740e7, 923d2 as a source of husbands for orphan women, 925b4 Color (chrôma), in music, 655a3, 669c4 Comedy (kômô[i]dia), in Magnesia, 817a1, 936d2 Commerce (kapêleia), 705a4 Communal messes (sussitia), difficulties in establishing, 781c2, 783b5, 839c8 drinking in, 666b3 for women, 780e1, 806e2 in Crete, 625c6, 780e1 in Magnesia, 762c1, 780b1, 806e2 in Sparta, 633a4 payment for in Magnesia, 955e4 Company-Commanders (taxiarchoi), 755c4, d8, 760a8 duties of, 880d6, 953b8 Compel, compulsion (anagkazein), to disobey the law, 926b4 to sing voluntarily, 670d1 vs. advise, 930b5

+ teaching, 862d2 Concord (sumphônia, sumphônein), 634e2 between cities, 686b3 between citizens as to the nobility of their laws, 634e2 between feelings and the account, 689b5; in children, 653b4, 6 between officials, people, and oracles in changing the laws, 772d3 between sexual laws and cities, 836b8 between the interlocutors, 661d4 between the pleasures and pains, of children and elders at obeying the laws, 659e3; and correct accounts, 696c9 in views about fine and just things, 880c6 in views about what the laws say about the gods, 891e1 in weights and measures in Magnesia, 746e2 finest and most important = wisdom, 689d7 within a legislator, 662e9, 691a5 = musical, 729a6 See also discord Confidence (tharros), 644d1 Conspiracy (kakotechnia), 936d7 Constitution(s) (politeia), 625a6 best, 712a2; vs. second, third best, 739a7 bonds of, 793b4 our divine, 965c starting-point of, 676a1 two fundamental parts of, 735a5 vital parts of, 945c3 vs. city managements, 712e10, 715b3 vs. faction, 832c2 Contest(s) (agôn), between birds, 789c2 choral, 665e7 concerning pleasure, 658a8 dance, 657d5 gods of, 783a7 gymnastic, 765c1; in Magnesia, 796d1 in solo or accompanied singing, 765b7 judges in (athlotetês), 764d4, e2, 765c2, 835a3, 955a3 vs. for education, 764c7 Control, lack of self- (akrateia), 663c7 as cause of intemperance, 734b5 regarding appetite, 886a9; and pleasures, 886a9 regarding pleasure, 636c6, 886a9; and pain, 908c2, 934a4 regarding spirit, 869a3 {426} Control, self- (enkrateia) vs. self-defeat, 626e3, 627a3, b7, c10, 633e5, 645b2 Control (kurios), 663c7

in perceptual capacities, 943a1 Corybantic conditions, 790d4 Council (boulê), duties of, 758b4, 767e2, 768a8, 850b8, 953c1 selection of, 756b6 Standing Committee of (prutanis), 758b6 Country-Wardens (agronomoi), auditing of, 761e7 duties of, 843d4, 844b7, 848e8, 873e4, 881c7, 913d6, 920c6, 936c5, 955d7 Guards-in-Chief of, 760e2, 848e8 selection of, 760b6 way of life of, 762b7 = Secret Service Men, 763b7 Courage (andreia), acquired without reason, 963e6 beast share in, 963e4 becoming perfect in, 647d1 divine good, 631d1 test for, 648b2 training in, 791b8 what it is, 633c8 without temperance, 696b11 + wisdom, 630b1 Courts in Magnesia, 956b6 communal, 762b3, 767c2, 846b1, 5, 847b5, 957a4 court of one hundred and one citizens, 932c4 court of the Guardians of the Laws, 958c4 court of the Select Judges, 928b4 officials must use in managing the affairs of their several offices, 957a5 private, 857a3 public, 957a4 Cowardice (deilia), 647c10, 649d5 test for, 648b2 Craft (technê), 632d5, 639b3, 647c6 and luck, 709c1 by nature perspicuous and without deceit, 921b5 citizen’s, 846d4 craft-like, 942c6 craftsman-like, 846d3 divine, 747b6 Egyptian, 799a2 hiding behind the fine name of, 937e4 image-making, 667c10 laws on, 846d1 vs. experience, 720b3, 938a3

vs. knack, 938a3 vs. nature and luck, 888e6 = craftily, craftiness, 919e6, 921a6, 936d5 Craftsman, craftsmen (dêmiourgos), ignorance of, 689c2 in Magnesia, 846d1, 847b2, 848a3, e3 of fine deeds, 829d3 of our preservation in time of war, 921d4 Cresophontes, 683b7, 692b1 Crison, 840a5 Criterion (horos), 626b7, 638a5, 714c3, 739d5, 744d7, 772b4, 785b3 Cronus, 713b2 Curetes, 796b5 Currency, money (nomisma), possession of foreign, 742a2 units of, 746e1 Custom(s) (nomimos), unwritten, 793a10 Cyclopes, 682a1 Cyrus, 694a4, 738c5   Daedalus, 677d3 Daimon(s) (daimôn), 713d2, 717b3, 747c4, 799a7, 818c1, 828b2, 848d2, 910a1 as our allies and possessors, 906a7 each person’s, 732c4 female, of the wayside, 914b5 of foreigners, 730a1 saving individuals from misfortune, 877a3 Dance(s) (orchis), 654e5 Examiners of, 802b1 kinds of, 814e2 vs. gymnastic training, 673a7 Dardania, 681e3 Dardanus, 702a3 Darius, 695a6, 698c5 {427} Datis, 698c4 Death (thanatos), penalty, 728c5, 854e7, 863a2, 933d5, 937c6, 938c2, 3, 5, 942a4, 946e1, 952d1, 955b8, c2, 5, d4, 958c6 Decency, decent (epieikeia), 736d7 as a metaphor, 735a2 due to habits, 741d7 Decree (psêphisma), 920d2 Delphi, 686a5, 738c1, 759c6, 856e1, 865b2, 914a2 Deme (dêmos),

in Magnesia, 746d8 Demeter, 782b4 Democracy, democratic (dêmokrateia, dêmos), 693d4, 714a3 and friendship, 759b6 as a cause of bad training for war, 832c1 best city emerges from a sort of, 710e4 control, 757d3 establishes laws for its own advantage, 714d11 in music, 701a3 in selection of officials, 756e10 not a constitution, 832c1 Spartan constitution seems like a, 712d6 vs. oligarchy, aristocracy, kingship, 712c3 Despotism (despoteia), 698a6 Dionysus, 637b2, 650a1, 653d4, 665a6 chorus of, 665b2 gift of, 672a5 plaything of, 844d6 responsible for the perception of rhythm and harmony, 672d2 Diopompus, 840a5 Dioscuri, 796b6 Discord (diaphônia), 689a7 in speaking about fine and just things, 860c2 Disgust, feel (duscherainein), 708e3 at atheism, 887a7, c2 at injustice, 908a6 at living arrangements in Magnesia, 746a1 at throwing away one’s weapons, 944b5 at what is not fine, 654d3, 728a1, 831d8 of women at taking part in military exercises, 834d6 correctly, 751d1 Dithyramb (dithurambos), 700b5 Divine good luck, 798a8 Divine man (theios anêr), 657a8, 666c6 always some among the mass of people, 951b5 Doctor (iatros), free vs. slave, 720a5, 857c8 Dodona, 738c1 Dokimasia. See examination of officials Dorians, 682e3 Dorieus, 682e4 Drinking party (sumposion), 637a5, 639d3 Drug (pharmakon), for crabbiness, 666b6 for facilitating the soul’s acquisition of reverence, 672d7

for fear, 647e1, 649a3 for slanders against retail trade, 919b4 for “unnatural” sexual passions, 836b3 Dynasty (dunasteia), 680b2   Educated person (pepaideumenos), 641b8, 643d8 vs. uneducated, 654b1 women, 658d3 Education (paideia), and virtue, 673a4, 757c4 as a safeguard against lawlessness and evil, 920b1 bastardized, 741a3 “Cadmean,” 641b6 consequences of escaping, 880e1 correct, 694c7 definition of, 643a5, 653b1, c3, 659d1 importance of, 743e1, 803d6 in choral singing and dancing, 654a4 in hunting, 822d3 in mathematical subjects, 817e5 in playing the lyre, 809e8 in written works without meter, 809e3 {428} more exact, 670e2, 965b1 small, 735a4 what it concerns, 724b3 Education, lack of (apaideusia), 659a6, 695b5, 722b7 and the desire for money, 870a6 Egypt, 656d2 Egyptians, 747c4, 799a2, 819b1 Eileithuia, 784a4 Enchantment(s) (epôdos), 671a1, 812c6, 837e6, 903b1 Encouragement (paramuthion), = prelude to a law, 720a2, 773a5, 884a7, b2, 923c2 + discussion, 854a5 Epeius, 796a3 Ephors, Spartan, 692a5 Epidemic (loimê), 709a6 Epimenides, 642d5, 677d9 Equality (isotês, to ison), as a constitutional goal, 694a7 of property, 684d5 two kinds of, 757b1 Etruria, 738c5 Eupraxia (well-being, doing well), 701e6, 732c4 Eurysthenes, 683d8

Evildoing (kakourgêma), 677a8, 728b3 Examination of officials (dokimasia), 753e1 very exact, 876c5 Experience (empeiria), 632d5, 659d3, 673c7 and knowledge of the good, 741d7 in adulterations and malpractices, 917e5 in choruses, 765b2 in curing Corybantic conditions, 790d4 in legislation, 692b4, 752b9; and higher education, 968b7 in putting laws into practice, 772b1 in retail trade, 920b7 much (polupeiria), 811a4, 819a4 of the periodic movement of the stars, 818c7 of sorts of currents, 892d10 testing ordinances by, 957b2 vs. craft in medicine, 720b3; vs. having an account, 857c8 Experience, lack of (apeiros), 639e5, 647d1, 677b6, 678b1, 733d5, 936d1 of bad and good people, 951a7   Faction(s) (stasis), 629d1, 630b2, 636b3 and subversion of the constitution, 856b4 definition, 628b2 free of, 713e2 greatest disease in a city, 744d5 nonexistence of, 636e6 Fame (kleos), vs. infamy (duskleia), 663a4 Fates (Moirai), 799b2 Fear (phobos), 644b10 divine, 671d2 two opposite kinds of, 646e4 Fine, beautiful (kalos), 630c7 and good (kalos kagathos), 741b1, 831d3 and correct, 876c6 and just, 854c2, 858d7, 890b8 relation to justice, 859e8 view on and problems about, 859d5 Flute (aulos), 669e2 Force, violence (bia), 627a5 non-rational, 863b4 one universal convention concerning, 884a2 vs. advice, 921e6 vs. necessity, 741a4 vs. persuasion, 718b2, 884a2 vs. voluntarily, 663e1

≠ compulsion, 751a5 + argument, 903a10 + compulsion, 920d3 + just punishment, 718b2 + persuasion, 711c5 Form (eidos, idea), from the many to the one, 965c2 of communal mess, 842b5 {429} of constitution, 681d8, 714b4 of dancing, 814e2, 816b7 of errors, 864b1, 3, 901b5, 908e1 of fear, 646e4 of friendship, 837a3 of homicide, 865a2 of injustices, 861b4 of laws, 630e3, 4, 714b3 of melody, 700c1 of music, 700a9 of officials, 759a6 of song, 700b1, 3 of virtue, 632e2, 963c5 of war = kind (genos), 629c6 of wisdom, 689d5 = part, 735a5, 751a4 Free, freedom (eleutheros), 665c2 as a legislative aim, 693b4 = liberally educated, 701a4 See also unfree Freedom of speech (parrêsia), 649b3, 670b4, 694b3, 806d1 in musical compositions, 829d6   Generals (stratêgoi), 755b8, 921d5 duties of, 755e1, 756a3, 760a7, 880d6, 943a5, 953b7, 955c4 selection of, 755c5 Geryon, 795c5 Gesture, scheme (schêma), 654e4 special to bodily movement, 672e8 vs. kind (eidos), 700b1 Gnômê. See judgment God(s) (theos), 643a7 as founder of Magnesia, 919d5 as good measure of all things, 716c4 as (co-)legislator, 624a3, 634e2, 662d1, 691d8, 692b6, 710d2, 712b4 as lover of mankind, 713d6 as our allies and possessors, 906a6

as possessor of certainty, 641d7 as possessors of the heaven and all mortal living creatures, 902b8 as rulers, 905e5 as source of concord, 662b1 as wisest (sophos), 902e9 avenging, 729e4 children of, 739d7 existence of, 885b4 family, 729c5 greatest, 821a2 hateful to the, 838b10, 917a1 in accord with law, 904a10 inspiration from, 738c3 local, 740a8 of childbirth, 729c7, 879d2 of foreigners, 879e2 of the underworld, 717a7, 958d5 Olympian, 717a6, 727e1 plaything of, 644d8 pollution and enmity of, 871b4 prayers to the, 700b2 projectile coming from, 873c8 province of the, 732e2 say that the most pleasant life and the best life are the same, 664b8 slavery to = slavery to the laws, 762c5 souls of sun, moon, stars as, 899b6 Strangers’ account guided by a, 682e10, 683b7, 722c6 subject altogether dear to, 821b1 vs. person who knows, 645a6 vs. some divine man, 657a8 who truly rules as despot over those who possess understanding, 713a4 wrath of the, 880e8 = cosmos as a whole?, 821a2 + luck, opportunity, craft as captain of human affairs, 709b7 Good(s) (agathos), completely, 829a5 human vs. divine, 631b6 so-called and their dependence on justice and virtue, 661a4 triadic division of, 697b4 Government, good (eunomia), 713e2 Graces, 682a5 Greed (aplêstia, philokerdia), 649d5, 736e3 {430} Guarantor (egguêtês), 871e4, 914d3, e8, 937b2, 954a1 Guardian(s) of the Laws (nomophulakes), as also legislators, 770a9, 840e7 as arbitrators, guardians, or fathers of orphans, 924c1, 926c6, e6

court of, 978c4 duties of, 816c2, 835a4, 847c6, d7, 849e4, 855b3, c7, 864e8, 866c5, 867e3, 871c9, 877d5, 878e4, 908c2, 910b5, 916c7, 917e4, 920a6, b7, 924b7, 926c6, 929e2, 10, 930e2, 932b5, 948a2, 951a4, 951d9, 957a7, 958c4, 959d7, 961a2 education of, 670e2, 735a4 in charge of education, 809a2, 811d5 real, 966b5 removal from office of, 928d2 selection of, 752e1, 754d6 what they must know, 964b3, 966b5 with wisdom vs. with true belief, 632c4 Guards-in-Chief (phrourarchoi), 760b6 duties of, 760c5, 763d1, 843d6 Gymnastic training (gumnastikê), 672c6 buildings for, 804c2 defined, 673a10 importance of, 743d7 in Magnesia, 795d6 officials for in Magnesia, 764c5   Habit(s) (ethos), 653b6 law-abiding, 751c9 Habituate (ethizein), 653b5 Hades, 727d2, 881a4, b3 Happiness (eudaimonia), 628d5 and goodness go together, 742e5 and knowledge of the use of fine things, 686e7 and practice of fine, good, and just things, 858d9 = living well, 829a1 Harmony (harmonia), 655a5 defined, 665a2 Have too large a share, have a larger share (pleonektein, pleonexia), 677b7, 691a4, 875b7, 906c1 Heavens, universe (ouranos), 821c7 Helios, 945e6, 950d2 Helotry, system of (heilôteia), 776c7 Hephaestus, 920d8 Hera, 672b4, 774b1, 774d7 Heracleans, 776c9 Heracles, sons of, 685d7 Herald (kêrux), 833a7, 917e1, 928e1, 941a1, 950d8, 958b1 Herd (agalê), analogy, 639a2, 666e3, 713d3, 734b1 Hermes, 941a6 Hesiod, 658d7, 677e2

Hestia, 745b7 altar of, 856a2 High-minded (megaloprepes), 709e8, 710c6, 795e2, 802e8, 836a7 Hippolytus, 687e3, 931b8 Homer, 624a7, 658b8, 680b4, 681e2, 706d3, 803e7, 858e1 Homosexuality, 636b5 Honor(s) (timê), a divine good, 727a4 as a military person’s wages, 921e1 correct conferral of, 696d1, 727a4, 738e3 Hoplite, hoplite weapons (hoplitês), 706c1, 755e7, 813e1 as judges, 943a8 Household management (oikonomia), 694c8 importance of mathematics in, 747b1 Human being(s) (anthrôpos), pessimism about, 718d2, 765e6, 853c7, 870a6 Hunting (thêra), 822d3 Hymn (humnos), 700b2   Iccus of Tarentum, 839e4 Ignorance (amathia, agnoia), 649d5 most important sort of, 688e4; defined, 689a8, 689b3 of the sorts of lives really available, 733d5 that seems to be the greatest wisdom, 886b8 two forms of, 863c1 {431} Illusionist painting (eskiagraphêmena), 663c2 Image (eikôn), 644c1 in music, 669a7 of virtue, 655b5 -making crafts, 667c10 Imitation (mimêma), 655d5 bad, wicked, 705c10, 706a5 correctness of, 667d5, 668b6 Immortality (athanasia), 661e1 element of present in us, 713d8 of humankind, 721a8 Incantations, (epô[i]dê, epa[i]dein), 659e2, 664b4, 665c4, 670e8, 887d4, 906b9 Injustice (to adikon), what it is, 863e5 Insanity, writ of (graphê paranoias), 928e4, 929d7 Inspection (euthuna) of officials, 774b3, 881c7 not subject to, 875b4 Inspector(s) (euthunos), 945a2, b3 divine, 945c3 selection of, 945e5

Interpreters (exêgêtai), duties of, 775a2, 828b4, 845e8, 865d1, 871c9, 916c9, 958d6 laws for the, 845e8 of the laws from Delphi, 759c7 selection of, 759d5 Ionians, 698c5 Isthmus, the, 950e3 Italy, 777c5   Judge(s) (dikastês), 766d5 of contests (athlothetês), 764d4, 935e6 Judgment (dikê), personified, 943e2 vs. retribution (timôria), 728c3 + retribution, 735e1 Judgment (gnômê), 672b5, 846b3, 946d6, 951b3 Justice (dikaiosunê), 630a7 not separate from temperance, 696c5 what it is, 863e5 Justice, court(s) of (dikastêrion), in Magnesia, 766d4   Kingship (basileia), most just form of, 680e3 Know, knowledge (epistasthai, epistêmê), 639b1 and experience of the country, 760c4 and perception, 901d5 how to do an action, 942c3 lack of, 690b10 no law or order is stronger than, 875c6 of how to confine insane people, 934d1 of how to do things, 732b1 of how to use a thing, 686d1, 5 of incommensurability of length, breadth, and depth, 820b6 of legislation, 723b8 of rational calculation, arithmetic, the craft of measurement, and astronomy, 818a5, 968e3 of slave and free doctors, 857b7 of the craft of medicine, 933c7; of navigation, 639b1; of war, 639b6, 813e7 of the name vs. the account, 964a7 pieces of, 689b2 without, 636e2 Kore, 782b5   Lachesis, 960c7 Lack of learning (amathia), 649d5

Lampoon (iambos), vs. comedy, 935e4 Law(s) (nomos, nomimon), 644d3 advising rather than compelling, 930b4 ancestral (patrios), 680a7, 959b5; = unwritten conventions, 793b1 and compulsion or force, 645a5 and understanding (nous), 957c7 common, 645a2 correct only if for the common good, 715b3 divine, 716a3 military service, 942a5 must conduce to virtue, 630e1, 631a3, 688b1, 705d7, 770d1, 836d2, 963a3 {432} of destiny, 904c8 prefatory statement to, 874e8 rectification of, 769c4, 772b3, 835b2, 846c3 servants of the, 715c7 slaves to the, 698b6, 715d5; = slaves to the gods, 762c5 task for the finest, 862e1 true, 836e5 unwritten, 838b1, 841b4 when unchangeable, 772c5, 891a2, 957b4 written, 788b7 Laws of Magnesia agriculture, 842e6 ambassadors and heralds, 941a1 beggars, 936a4 bribes for public service, 955c7 challenges to testimony, 937b3 comedy and lampoon, 935d2 conspiracy, 936d7 council of those who keep watch on, 951d5 crafts and craftsmen, 846d1 differences between fathers and children, 928d5 disputes over the ownership of possessions, 954c3 divorce, 929e9 dowries, 742c3, 774c3 forcible prevention of attendance at a trial, 954e4; at a competition, 955a2 funerals, funeral rites, tombs, 958c7 gentlest, 863d4 guarantees, 953e5 harboring an exile, 955b7 harming a person by theft or violence, 933e7 impiety, 907d9 imports and exports, 847b7 injury to property by slave or animal, 936c8

insanity, 934b6 inspections, 942b3 land and house ownership and arrangement, 741b7, 848c6 limits of property, 744d8 making a private war or peace, 955a9 marriage and reproduction, 720e9, 771e1 military service and desertion, 942a5 money, 742a1 murder and homicide, 865a1 music and dance, 800a4 oaths, 948d1 observers abroad, 951a3 objective is maximal happiness and friendship,743c5 orphans and their supervision, 924a6 perjury, 937c1 poisons, 932e1 prisons, 908a2 property taxation, 955d5 receiving stolen goods, 955b6 registration of property, 754d8 removal of property, 914b1 respect for parents, 930e4 searches, 954a5 sexual matters, 841d1 subversion of the constitution, 856b1 summonsing witnesses, 936e6 temple robbery and the like, 854d1 theft, 857a2; by fraud and violent robbery, 941b2 travel into Magnesia, 952d7 travel out of Magnesia, 949e3 treason, 856e7 treasure trove, 913a7 verbal abuse, 934e2 votive offerings to gods, 955e5 Lawlessness (paranomia), 701a6 unmusical, 700d3 Learning, much (polumatheia), 811a1, 4 Legislation (nomothesia), aim of, 757d3 starting-point of, 681c4 Legislator (nomothetês), aims at virtue, 630e1, 631a3, 688b1, 705d7, 770d1, 836d2, 963a3 and poets, 660a5, 941c1 as politician (politikos), 628d6, 657a4, 688a1, 693a6 {433} good, 671c3; writings of the, 922a4

investigates genuine and fraudulent honors, 728d6 knows how to pray correctly, 709d2 lies of, 663d8 = the grand director of our city, 843e8 Life, lives (bios), types of, 733e3 Literature (ta grammata), teaching of in Magnesia, 809c3 Live well (zên eu), = live happily, 829a1 Logos. See account, argument, reason, word Luck (tuchê), divine good, 798a8 in human affairs, 709a2 vs. nature and craft, 888e6 Lycurgus, 630d6, 632d3, 858e3 Lying-in-state (prothesis) of a corpse, 947b3, 959a1, e5   Macareus, 838c6 Magnanimity (megalonoia), 935b3 Magnesia(ns), 860e7, 919d5, 946b6 as second best, 807b6, 875d3 first mention by name, 848d3 looked on by the gods as having good laws, 950d3 Marathon, 698e4, 699a2, 707c2 Mariandynoi, 776d1 Market-Wardens (agoranomoi), 759a7, 760b1 duties of, 764b1, 849a4, e4, 881c4, 913d6, 917b2, e4, 920c6, 936c4, 953b4 selection of, 763e4 Marriage(s) (gamos), women who supervise, 784a2, 930a2, 930c5, e1, 932b6 Marsyas, 677d4 Masses, the (hoi polloi), 659a6 and pleasure, 658e6, 684c1 on goods, 661a5 Master (despotês), 640e5 Mathematics (mathêma), great power of, 747b2, 819b3 Measurement, craft of (metrêtikê), as a subject in Magnesia, 817e6 Melody (melos), 654e4 correctness of defined, 670c2 Menoetius, 944a7 Merchant (emporos), 831e6 Messene, Messenians, 683c9, 777c2

Method of inquiry (methodos), most perspicuous, 965c5 Midas, 660e5 Mina (mna), 754e1 Minos, 624b1, 630d6, 632d3, 706a8 Model, example (paradeigma), 632e4, 663e9, 692c2, 722a1, 735c5, 739e1, 746b7, 794e6, 795a4, 801b9, 811b8, c6, d6, 855a1, 862e5, 876e2, 927d5, 961e7 Moderate, moderation (kosmios, kosmiotês), tyrant, 710d7 vs. intemperance, 794a7, 815e7 + temperance, 802e10, 815e7 Money, love(r) of (philochrêmatia, philochrêmosunê), 555a7, 737a5, 747b8 death penalty for, 938c3 for the sake of children, 729a3 least likely to become, 832d2 vs. love of victory, 938b5 Money, wealth (chrêmata, ploutos), as third among goods, 697b6, 870a7 Moneymaking (chrêmatismos), 705a4 not excessive in Magnesia, 741e1 unfree sorts of, 741e3 Mother Earth, 958e3 Muses, 682a5 chorus of, 664b4 gifts of, 796e4 of marriage, 775b4 responsible for the perception of rhythm and harmony, 672d2 Music, Director of, 813a6 {434} Music, musical training (mousikê), 642a4 Carian, 800e2 correctness in, 655d1 defined, 673a4 in Magnesia, 795d7 imagistic and imitative, 668a6 officials for in Magnesia, 764c5 starting-points of, 672c6 See also unmusical   Name (onoma), knowledge of vs. knowledge of the account, 964a6 Nation (ethnos), 683a8 Natural, nature (phusikos, phusis), account in accord with, 653d6 correct regulation of drunkenness in accord with, 642a3 correctly or in accord with, 686d3

fitted to rule by, 689b3 of souls, 650b7 or habit, 655e1 or practice, 648d5 ranking of goods, 631d2 rule that is in accord with, 690c2 sexual pleasures that are in accord with and contrary to, 636b5 Titanic, 701c3 vs. by compulsion, 642e8 vs. craft and luck, 888e5 Necessity (anagkaion), divine vs. human, 818a4 Nemea, 950e3 Nemesis, 717d3 Ninos, 685c4 Nocturnal Council (nukterinos), 908a4, 909a3 as anchor of the city, 961c5 composition of, 951d8, 961a1 duties of, 951d5 savior for the constitution and laws, 960e9 Nome(s) (nomos), 700b5 of the Muses of marriage, 775b4 Nomima, 626a7 Nymph, 815c3 Observer(s) abroad (theôros), 951a3 epistemic importance of, 951a7 requisite qualities in, 951c7 Odysseus, 706d4 Oedipus, 838c5 Oligarchy (oligarchia), 714a3 as a cause of bad training for war, 832c1 best city emerging with difficulty from, 710e1 not a constitution, 832c1 vs. democracy, aristocracy, kingship, 712c3 Olympic Games, 729d5, 807c5 Olympos, 677d4 Orphan(s) (orphanos), guardianship of in Magnesia, 766c6; laws concerning, 922a7 supervisors of, 909c7 Orpheus, 669d5, 677d3, 828e1   Paean (paiôn), 700b4 Pain (lupê). See pleasure Painter (zôgraphos), 656e Palamedes, 677d3

Pan, 815c3 Pankration, 795b6, 830a4, 834a3 Passion, passionate desire (erôs), 632a1, 643d1 and drinking wine, 645d7 divine, 711d6 effects of, 649d5 to steal, 941c6 Patroclus, 944a3 Pattern (tupos), 801c7, 809b5, 876e1 vs. account, 905c2 Peleus, 944a4 Pelops, descendants of, 685d7 Penestai, 776d2 Peridinoi, 776c5 Persuade, persuasion (peithein), and pleasure and pain, 663b4 forcible, 863b8 or compel, 660a5 voluntarily (vs. involuntarily), 663b4 {435} + compulsion, 634a9, 661c6; = force, 722c1 + deterrence, 721e1 + force, 711c5, 722b6, 753a3 + threat, 783d6 Philosophy, doing (philosophein), 857d2 Phoenicians, 747c4 Phoenix, 931b7 Pindar, 690a8, 714e7 Pious (hosios), + just, 663b3, d4 Plataea, 707c3 Play (paidia), defined 667e6 Pleasure(s) (hêdonê), harmless, 667e5 of a lucky sort, 813a3 throughout life as what we all seek, 733a3 victory over, 840c4 vs. correctness and benefit, 667c6 = play, 667e6 Pluto, 828d1 Poet(s) (poiêtos), control of, 656c3, 719b5 Political, politician (politikos), and what is just, 757c5 in the correct sense, 628d6

so-called, 693a6 understanding for a, 963b2 Politics, craft of (politikê), 650b9 its aim, 875a6 Pollute, polluted (miainein, miaros), 716e3, 782c7 See also purge Pollution (miasma), 866b4, 871b3 Pray, prayer (euchesthai, euchê), 700b1 and selection by lot, 757e4 legislator knows how to, 709d2 Prelude(s) (prooimion), to laws, 722e1, 723b5, 854a3, 870d5, 880a8, 887a3, 916d5, 923c2, 925e8 See also encouragement Priests (hiereis), Priestesses (hiereiai), 741c2, 759a2, 799b5, 800b1, 828b4 duties of, 877d5, 909d9, 951d9, 953a6 Procles, 683d7 Proof (tekmêrion), 821e3 of the existence of gods, 885d3, 886d5 Proper measure, properly measured (metrion), 690e4, 691c1 as dear to the god, 716c2 as what the great legislator knows, 691d4, 959d1; and must define, 719e5 in arguments, 811d4, 887a5 in a citizen, 809e6 in a man’s property, 955e5 in business dealings, 958d in discussing laws, 927e1 in discussing the existence of gods, 885e5, 903a7 in drink (analogy), 773d3 in equality, 757a4 in laws, 836a3, 846c7 in marriage ceremonies, 775a3 in one’s treatment of a murderer of one’s kin, 866a4 in private courts, 957a4 of distance from a neighbor when planting trees, 843e5 of equipment in Magnesia, 746d6 of expenditure on funerals, 959c8, e4 of force, 753a3 of necessities of life, 806d8 of praise and blame, 823d3, 829e4 of profit in retail trade, 920c4 of property distributions, 741b4 of time before burying a corpse, 959a4 of time for foreign visitors to stay in Magnesia, 953a7 of time to gain experience in applying laws, 772b5 of wealth, 745a1

in giving advice, 892e5 in Sparta, 691e1, 692a8 in votive offerings to gods, 955e5 vs. needs and appetites, 918d2 Prophecy, prophet (manteia, mantis), 634e7, 686a4, 694c2, 828b4, 908d3 {436} Public honor (aristeia), 829c2, 919e4, 7, 946b5, e6, 948a5, 951d9, 952d4, 961a3 as a motive in war, 942d3 award of in the military, 943c1 exclusion from contention for as a punishment, 935c1, 943b4 Punishment, judicial (dikê), reformatory aim of, 728c2, 941d2, 944d2 types of in Magnesia, 855c2 Puppet (thauma), 644d7, 658c1, 804b3 Purge (katharmos), analogy of, 735b4, c7, d1, 7, e5 in the sense of purification, 815c5, 864e4, 865c6, d4, 866c3, 868e2, 8, 869e2, 873d2, 865b3, 877e9, 881e4 Pyrrhic, 815a2 Pythia, 632d3, 923a5, 947d5 Pythian games, 807b5   Rational calculation, argument (logismos, logizesthai), 644d2 as to better and worse, 644d2, 805a2 education in, 809c4, 817e6 sacred pull of, 645a1 vs. wisdom, 689c9 wondrous in exactitude, 897b4 + experience, 739a3 Reason(s) (logos), 626d5 and wisdom, 689d8 correct, 696c10 courage acquired without, 963e5 discord between pleasure and pain and the belief that is in accord with, 689a8 fear, law, and the true, 783b7 pleasure, love, pain, and hatred being in concord with, 653b4 said to be correct by the law, 659d2 trying to become law, 835e4 + deed and craft, 647d6 Recollection (anamnêsis), 732b8 Register of property (apographê), 745d7, 850d1, 855b2 Report, oracular (phêmê), 664d4, 672b3, 713c2, 792d3 = argument, 771d1 = edict, 871b4 = omen, 878a6 = renowned name, 704b1 = rumor, 822c4

= saying, 838c8, d6 Representation (apeikasia), 668c1, 668d5 Retribution (timôria), vs. judgment (dikê), 728c3 + judgment, 735e1 Reverence (aidôs), 672d8 = shame, 671d2 Rhadamanthus, 624b5, 948b3 Rhapsode(s) (rhapsô[i]dos), 658b8, d6, 764e1 in Magnesia, 834e3 Rhythm (ruthmos), 655a5 definition, 665a1 Ruler(s) (archôn), = servants of the laws, 715c7   Salamis, 698c4, 707a6 Sarmatians, 804e7, 806b6 Satyr, 815c4 Savior, salvation (sôtêr, sôteria), and virtue of the whole, 903b5 complete and permanent, 960b7 for correct use of wine, 653a3 for our constitution, 960e6 for our laws, 770b4, 793b8, 960d3, e6 greatest starting-point of a city’s, 736e4 guardian for the sake of, 968a7 in war, 647b4, 921d5, 942c6 of the city, 715d2, 922a1, 946b6 understanding as a, 961d10 understanding + perception as a, 961e2 virtue as regards, 969c3 Select Judges, 926d4, 928b4, 938b4, 946d7, 948a3, 956c8 Self-love (heautou philia), 731e2 Servant(s) (diakonos), 763a3, 832e7 Servant(s) (huperetês), 715c7 Servant(s), unfree (oiketês), 760e9 vs. slaves (douloi), 763a1 Sexual desire (aphrodisia), 650a2 incestuous, 838a8 nature of, 837a1 {437} regulation of in Magnesia, 836a7 + hunger and thirst, 783a1, c10 Shame (aischunê), 647a2, 671d2, 699c4 personified, 698b6, 943e1 vs. gold as an inheritance, 729b1

Shameful, ugly (aischros). See fine Shamelessness (anaideia, anaischuntia), 647a10 wicked, 701b2 Silenus, 815c3 Slave (doulos), 665c3, 669c6 in Magnesia, 776c3 voluntary, 700a5 Solon, 858e3 Song (ô[i]dê), 654e4 Examiners of in Magnesia, 802b1 kinds of, 700b1 Sophists (sophistai), 908d6 Sorcerer (goês), 649a4, 909b5, 933a5 Soul (psuchê), a divine thing, 728b1 account of, 896a6 and education, 743d7 as cause of good and of bad things, 896d5 as something that came into being, 896c1, 966d9, 967d6 evil, 897d1 honor due to, 726a6 immortality of, 959b4, 967d7 movements of, 897a1 rules all bodies, 967d7 superior to the body, 959a6 = the real being that each of us really is, 959b3 Sparta, 683c9 Spartan constitution, described, 712d3 Spirit, spiritedness (thumos), 633d3, 863b3 and insanity, 934d7 either a condition or a part of the soul, 863b not to be gratified, 935a3 two sorts of actions due to, 866d6 well-bred, 731b7 See also anger Spirited (thumoeidês), 731b3, d4 sweet-, 635c8 Spirit of friendship (philoprosunê), 640b8 Star(s) (astron), and city management, 809c7 and their movements as a subject of study in Magnesia, 817e8 as gods, 886d6, 899b3 as having souls, 898d3 as what a divine human being must know, 818c7

controlled by and possessing understanding, 966e3, 967b4 do not wander, 822a5 doctrine of them as soulless, 889b4, 967a8 Story (muthos), 636c8, 663e5, 664a6, 682a8, 683d3, 699e1, 712a4, 713a7, c1, 719c1, 752a3, 771c7, 773b5, 790c3, 804e4, 812a1, 841c6, 865d5, 927c9, 944a1 vs. oracular reports, 840c1 = account, 872d8 Stranger(s) (xenos), as teachers in Magnesia, 804d1 services to, 718a8 treatment of in Magnesia, 729e2, 794b7 Supervisor of Education, 765d5, 801d6, 809a2, 829d5 duties of, 936a6, 951e1, 953d3 education of, 809a7 = Educator, 812e10, 829d5, 835a4 = most important office, 765e2 = Supervisor of Children, 809b8, 813c1 = Supervisor of Music, 813a6 Sympathetic consideration (suggnômon), 770c4 for the legislator, 924d2, 925e8 for those governed by laws, 926a1 on the part of a murder victim’s family, 866a4 on the part of the law, 863d4 + decency, 757e1   Teach (didaskein), + compel, 862d2 {438} Teacher (didaskalos), 794c7, 796b1, 808d2 paid, public, non-citizen, 804c8, 813e4 Temenos, 683d6, 692b1 Temple-Wardens (neôkoroi), 759a1 Temperance (sôphrosunê), 630b1, 635e6 as more womanish, 802e10 courage without, 696b4 House of (Sôphronistêrion), 908a5, 909a1 importance of, 696e2, 697b4 in a popular vs. dignified sense, 710a3 perfection in, 647d4 Test (basanos), by Inspectors, 946b7 for a soul overcome by sexual desire, 650a3 for courage in citizens, 648b1, 831a8 of those who accede to office, 751c6 perspicuous, 957d4 where charges concern the public interest, 768a5

Test, refute, expose, prove (elegchein), 649d8, 702b2, 727d4, 805c3, 839d1, 891a2, 893b5, 905d6, 917d2, 946c7 Thamyras, 829e1 Thaumasie, 626e1 Themis, 936e9 Theseus, 687e3, 831b8 Thessalians, 776d2 Thetis, 944a6 Thracians, 805d9 Thyestes, 838c5 Titans, 701c3 Trade (emporia), 705a4 Tragedy (tragô[i]dia), in Magnesia, 817a3 Tribal courts, 768b4, 915c5, 920b5, 921d3 Tribe (phulê), in Magnesia, 745e1 Tribe-Leaders (phularchoi), 755c2 duties of, 760a8, 834c6, 880d7 selection of, 756a1 Triptolemus, 782b5 Troy, 685c5 foundation of, 681e4 Truth, truthfulness (alêtheia, alêthês), 730c1 human beings’ share of, 804b3 vs. pleasure, 667d10 Tutor (paidagôgos), 808d4 Tyranny, tyrant (tyrannis), 661b2, 777e3, 832a1 aims at its own advantage, 714d2 and legislator, 735d3, 739a6 as what a legislator wants to start with, 709e6 not a constitution, 832c1 of the few, 757d3 permanent, 661d7 Persian rule as, 693a4, 696a1 ruling office that could become a, 692b6 slave doctors as, 720c6, 722e7 Spartan constitution like a, 712d5 vs. democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, kingship, 712c5 Tyrtaeus, 629a4, b9, d1, e5, 630b5, c6, 858e1 quoted, 660e7   Understanding, mind, sense (nous), 631d5, 632c6 a god to gods, 897b2 and (true) belief, 632c6, 688b3, 892b3

and (correct) law, 674b7, 714a892b3, 957c6 and craft, 892b3 as a legislative aim, 701d9 as a cosmic force, 889c5, 890d7 as helper of soul, 897b1 as something someone may not possess, 783e5 blended with perception, 961d10 cleverness without, 644a4 communal, 694b7 craft derives from, 890d7, 892a9 does not exist without reason (logos), 963e7 for a politician, 963a2 god who truly rules as despot over those who possess, 713a5 lack of, 635e3, 897b3, 898b9, 899b1, 908e6 law derives from, 714a2, 890d7 {439} leader of all virtue, 688b3 leader of divine goods, 631d5 legislator who possesses, 742d2, 747e5 legislator’s, 802c4 levels of, 672c1 mother and father who possess, 859a4 movement of, 897d3, e4 not a slave to anything, but a ruler of all things, 875c7 not adequately knowable by mortals, 897d10 of things, 735c6 purge carried out in accord with, 636b7 rational calculations of, 897c4 resembles a movement, 897e4 revolution of, 89a5 what an individual and city must pray for, 687e9 = wisdom (phronêsis), 631c7, 632c6, 687e9, 688b3, 694b7 + eis, en = in mind, 712c1, 823e5 + prosechein = pay attention to, 628c1, d4, 652b1, 667a8, 694c7, 736b2, 783e2, 4, 801a9, 809e1 Unfree, illiberal (aneleutheros), 644a5, 741e3 and love of money, 747c6 doctors, 723a1 exertions, 835d8 Muse, 802d1 of husbands, 774d1 rhythms of the, 669c6 sorts of moneymaking, 728e5 Unjust (adikos), no one is voluntarily, 731c2

Unmusical, showing a want of musical education (amousia, amousos), 670a2, 691a7, 700c3, d3, 863c7 Unscrupulousness (panourgia), vs. wisdom, 747c3   Vice (kakia). See virtue Victory, love(r) of (philonikia), 957d3 as a cause of evildoing in cities, 677b7 as a motive in contests, 840a2; in conversations, 957d2 death as punishment for, 938c4 in trials, 938a6 involuntary injustice due to, 860d9 unseemly, 796a2 vs. love of money, 938b6 when it comes to virtue, 731a2 Victory prize(s) (niktêrion), 657e6, 658a9, 800d5, 832e3, 833c2, 943c5, 955a7 for virtue, 964b4 Village (kômê), in Magnesia, 746d8 Violence. See force Virtue (aretê), 627e4 and education, 673a4, 757c4; = education, 653b2 as what laws must conduce to, 630e1, 631a3, 688b1, 705d7, 770d1, 836d2, 963a3 divine, 904d7 image of, 655b5 in its entirety, 653b6 manly, test of, 708d7 of the constitution, 707d1 perfect, 678b3 practice of, 853b7; as a craft, 847a5 Voluntary (hekôn), 646b4 injustice impossible, 731c1 persuasion, 663b4 vs. involuntary, 632b4 + compelled, 670c9 Vulgar, vulgarity (banausos), 644a4 blameworthy, 741e4   Wall(s) (teichos), absence of in Magnesia, 778d4 Wanton aggression (hubris), 630b6, 637a3 and education, 641b4 causes of, 679c exertions that quell, 835e1 in officials, 761d7

of the young, 884a7 toward orphans, 927c3 toward servants, 777d4 {440} Wine (oinos), legislation regarding, 666a4 Wisdom, wise (sophia, sophos), 679c5, 691a7, 701a6, 863c5 craft of politics as part of, 677c6 pretending to be, 952c6 the god’s, 902e9 without understanding (nous), 644a4 vs. unscrupulousness, 747c3 = phronêsis, 689d7 Wise, wisdom (phronêsis), 630b1, 631c5 defined, 689d2 does not exist without reason (logos), 963e6 in a chorus, 665d2 in a craft, 696c2 vs. true belief, 632c5 = sophos, 640c9, d4, 689d5; = the finest and most important concord, 689d7 = stable true belief, 653a7, 688b3 = understanding, 631c7, 632c6, 687e9, 658a7, 688b3, 694b7 + passion and appetite, 688b3 + temperance and courage, 630b1; + high-minded, 837c8 Woman, women (gunê), 781a1 and religious sacrifices, 909e5 as witnesses in trials, 937a5 assaults by and against, 882c2 athletic contests for in Magnesia, 833c9 education of in Magnesia, 793e1, 804e1 foreign visitors to Magnesia, 953d8 in Athens, 805e4 in Sparta, 806a1 life of in Magnesia, 829e5 men superiors of, 917a6 nature of, 781c6 Word(s) (logos), 626d5 city in, 702e1, 778b6 laws molded in, 712bd vs. deed(s) or fact(s) (ergon), 636a5, 677e3, 679e1, 683e9, 688d5, 717d4, 727a5, 736b6, 737d6, 769e5, 805c5, 814d1, 862d5, 879c7, 885b1, 907d10, 909d4, 916e7, 935a1, 964c7   Xenos (stranger, foreigner), 624a1 Xerxes, 695d7  

Zeus, 625a4, 633a2, 636d1, 774d7, 936e9, 941a7 and Cretan legislator, 630c2 cave of, 625b2 God of Boundaries, 842e7 God of Fellow Tribesmen, 843a4 God of Foreigners, 730a2, 843a7, 953e2 in Magnesia, 745b7 Olympian, 950e2 partner in the constitution, 921c2 protector of cities, 921c2 protector of family and parents, 881d2 rain from, 761a6, b3, 779c5, 844b1 sons of, 941b3