Latvia in World War II 9780823295999

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Latvia in world war 11

Latvia in World war 11

Valdis o. Lumans

Fordham University Press I New York 2006

Copyright © 2006 Fordham University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means-electronic, mechanical, photocopy, recording, or any other-except for brief quotations in printed reviews, without the prior permission of the publisher. World War II: The Global, Human, and Ethical Dimension, No. 11 ISSN 1541-0293 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lumans, Valdis 0. Latvia in World War II j Valdis 0. Lumans.-1st ed. p. cm.-(World War li-the global, human, and ethical dimension, ISSN 1541-0293; 11) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-o-8232-2627-6 (alk. paper) ISBN-10: o-8232-2627-1 (alk. Paper) 1.

Two.

World War, 1939-1945-Latvia.

2. Latvia-History-German occupation, 1941-

II. Title: Latvia in World War 2.

D8o2.L3L86

2006

940.53' 4796-dc22 Printed in the United States of America o8 07 o6 5 4 3 2 1 First edition

III. Title.

IV. Series.

To my parents, Olgerts and Skaidra Lumans of Daugmale, Latvia

Contents

Foreword ix Introduction

1

1 Prewar Latvia

10

2 Latvia's Road to war 3 Latvia and the Outbreak of war

68

4 The soviet Occupation and Annexation

5 sovietizing Latvia: The Year of Terror:

112

6 The German Invasion and occupation of Latvia

7 Latvia and the Ostland

175

8 Latvia and the Holocaust

210

9 The Latvian Legion 10 Latvians at the Front

11 German Retreat and soviet Return

Epilogue Bibliographic Essay 473 Notes 401 Bibliography 495 Index 529

341

Foreword

Most Americans remember the Second World War as the good war. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the German declaration of war against the United States that followed a few days later served to unify Americans around the need to defeat Japanese militarism and Nazi aggression. Americans made many sacrifices and more than 40o,ooo would be killed in this war, but the continental United States would be spared a direct enemy attack. A nation gripped by a decade of Depression emerged as a veritable arsenal of democracy for the Allied cause. The war produced a full-employment economy, allowing the bottom half of the U.S. population to gain a greater share of the national wealth. The United States together with her Allies forced both Japan and Germany to surrender unconditionally. For Latvia, the good war narrative simply will not work. As Val Lumans documents in Latvia in World War II, the Second World War devastated this small Baltic nation. Even before the war began, Latvia's republic gave way in 1934 to a dictatorship vainly struggling to maintain the country's autonomy in the face of the growing power of the Soviet Union and Germany. Under the terms of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, Hitler gave his blessings to Stalin's plans to annex Latvia and her sister republics, Lithuania and Estonia, into the Soviet Union. In 1940, Soviet troops marched into Latvia and the other Baltic republics, meeting little resistance. In order to stifle any resistance and purge bourgeois elements, Stalin's secret police rounded up scores of Latvians for execution or imprisonment. When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Latvia was quickly conquered by German troops. Many Latvians suffered grievously under German rule, especially the Jewish communities, which were almost entirely obliterated by the Nazi Holocaust. Moreover, the Second World War spawned deep divisions among Latvians. Some Latvians gladly collaborated with the German occupation even by helping round up and killing Jews for their Nazi overlords. Others linked their

x I Foreword fortunes and fought bravely for the Soviet Union. Liberation by the Soviet Union in 1945 remained an ambiguous affair as many Latvian nationalists found their hopes for independence dashed and a wave of repression aimed at collaborators and opponents of Stalin's rule. Even after V-E Day the fighting in Latvia did not completely stop as scattered bands of antiCommunists continued to attack Soviet troops into the early 1950s. Not until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 would Latvia regain independence. Valdis Lumans's study is long overdue, especially given the flowering of historical writing that occurred in Latvia in the 1990s. This book will be the first comprehensive account of the political, economic, social, diplomatic, and military history of Latvia in the Second World War. For scholars, especially those who study the Baltic States and Eastern Europe in the Second World War, it will provide an invaluable synthesis of the existing scholarship for Latvia. For the general reader, Latvia in World War II will contribute to better understanding the global history of this conflict and offer a sobering perspective of the Second World War. Latvia in World War II will be the first in a series of monographs published by Fordham University Press examining the impact of the Second World War on the countries engulfed by the conflict. In the case of some countries like Latvia, much of the relevant scholarship is not in English and is inaccessible to all but a small circle of scholars. Next to appear in the series will be Thomas Christofferson's account of France during the Second World War. Christofferson's work is a sorely needed addition to the literature and will offer a new and exciting synthesis of France. Much like Latvia, France would also be conquered by Germany, but France's story would be far different, especially after 1945. Christofferson's study promises to overturn some well-worn myths about France, especially the degree of French collaboration with the Nazis. Christofferson's study and comprehensive histories planned for Hungary, Brazil, and Germany will fill an important gap in the scholarship of the Second World War. Given the global nature of the Second World War, we anticipate it will take at least a decade to commission and publish works dealing with the more than eighty countries affected by this conflict. We anticipate bringing out comprehensive accounts of all the countries engaged at war-as well as such neutral nations as Portugal, Switzerland, and Sweden. Along with publishing works dealing with nations at war, Fordham's series is committed to including a broad range of monographs, as well as mem-

Foreword I xi

oirs, autobiographies, and other works dealing with the global, human, and ethical dimension of the Second World War. G. Kurt Piehler Series Editor World War II: The Global, Human, and Ethical Dimension

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Writing the history of Latvia in World War II has been an exercise in reconciling myth and reality. For this Latvian immigrant, who from the age of five grew up as a Latvian in exile aspiring to be nothing more than an American kid, the myth coalesced as I learned everything I knew about Latvia within the narrow confines of my immediate family. As I grew up in South Florida, far from any Latvian community of substantial size, it was left to my family alone to impart to me what they believed were the essentials of being a Latvian in exile, trimda. Their image of what Latvia was, is, and would be, was all I would come to know about my homeland until the realities of my everyday life gradually chipped away at that vision, culminating in the writing of this book and bringing me to this epiphany-the realization that much of what I had learned about Latvia was more myth than reality. What startled me most about my discovery was not that my conception of Latvia and Latvians, in particular their experience in World War II, was more fable than truth, but rather that so many others, with far greater knowledge, deeper insights, and more direct personal experiences with the subject than I, believed and clung faithfully to the same myth. My image of Latvia began to form with my first childhood awareness in DP camps in Germany, and then continued to coalesce after our arrival in the United States. My father, Olgerts Lumans, a veteran Latvian Legion junior officer, my mother, Skaidra Lumans, a former University of Latvia student, and my maternal grandparents, Karlis and Alma Klavins, both schoolteachers in Daugmale-my family's hometown in Latvia-collectively taught me and my younger sister, Zinta, that everything Latvian was inherently good, and Latvia itself was a veritable paradise. They reminisced nostalgically and yearned for the good old days of the Ulmanis years, or Ulmana Laiki-associated with the rule of the last president of prewar independent Latvia, Karlis Ulmanis, who, as I was told, personified all Latvian virtues. In a corner of our living room my family even arranged a shrine to this man-displaying his photograph, a small Lat-

2

I Introduction

vian flag, and a wood-carved Latvian national emblem. In short, theirs had been a simple but comfortable rural existence enjoying the pleasures of folk-song festivals, visits to Riga, and celebrating midsummer's John's Eve (fanu vakars)-a time when life was good. Just as intensely and deeply as we idealized Latvia, and as we bestowed on its memory a virtual sanctity, we vilified its antithesis, everything Bolshevik. Anything Russian or communist represented the diametric opposite, the incarnation of evil, cruelty, and infamy. For us the Soviet occupation of 1940-1941, the Year of Terror-or Baigais Gads in Latvian-was literally hell on earth, and the deportations of June 1941 previewed the genocide that Stalin plotted for the Latvian people, Tauta. Whereas my Latvian family all but canonized Ulmanis as a saint, we loathed Stalin as consummate evil, the devil personified. As for the Germans, in our minds they were wonderful and generous people, appreciated not only for waging war against the vile Soviet beasts, but also for providing us a haven of refugee once the "Red devils" returned to Latvia. Yes, Hitler was wrong for doing some of what he did-so ran our mantra-but he was good for the German people, and although German rule in Latvia was unpleasant for some, overall Hitler was not as bad as alleged. After all, it was not Hitler that brought war to Latvia; the Reds were the guilty ones. According to our view the Germans came to Latvia in 1941 as liberators. As I can recall, what happened to the Jews of Latvia was never mentioned, and I heard little or nothing about their wartime experience-most assuredly nothing about Latvians killing Jews. And as far as I knew, the only victims and martyrs in this tragic tale were Latvians. As for Americans, despite offering us refuge and a fresh start, their casual informality, easygoing, even permissive lifestyle, boisterous and impertinent familiarity, and their taken-for-granted affluence-along with seemingly hundreds of other perceived shortcomings-ranked them second best in most comparisons to Latvians. No doubt these reproachful judgments resulted from the bitterness my parents held toward Americans for fighting alongside the Soviets-and at least partly they ascribed responsibility for their fate and that of their homeland to their present hosts. Indeed, they drew the conclusion, which they kept to themselves, that the wrong side had won the war. Granted, over time, as my folks came to understand their adopted country, its ways, and its people, their views changed in a more accepting direction, and ultimately they became more American than they ever cared to admit.

Introduction I 3 I eventually realized that my well-intentioned family, in order to perpetuate their heritage, had imparted to me the views of the educated Latvian middle class, a chauvinistically nationalist and fervently antiSoviet perspective that idealized the prewar Latvia of Ulmanis and his rural, ethnically Latvian vision for Latvia-flavored with a dash of sympathy for the German cause. It was their socially and politically biased interpretation of these tragic events and by no means a deliberate fabrication of the facts that provided the foundation for the myth. But simultaneously with the forging of my fantasy image of Latvia, I was consciously striving to become an American. I was determined to become and be accepted as just another American, and as I adjusted to life outside my home, everyday realities began to encroach on and challenge my Latvian notions and images. The first dent in my Latvian myth came with the recognition that Americans, specifically my friends and my teachers, were caring, kind people and every bit as good and nice as the few Latvians I knew and the idealized ones I imagined. I also became aware that the life I lived growing up in the United States was far preferable to the romanticized life of my parents in the Latvia of their past, one far too rustic and restricting for me. After all, Latvia had no baseball or rock-and-roll. The full disclosure of my vision of Latvia falling short of reality came in college, beginning at the University of Florida, where I gradually gravitated to history. It was in my history classes that I first encountered the truths that challenged and undermined several of my basic premises regarding Latvia's experience in the war. For instance, I ran across references to Ulmanis as a dictator rather than as the great patriot and defender of Latvian freedoms. I also learned about the horrors of Hitler's Third Reich, and although my classes reaffirmed many of my views on Stalin's Russia, for the first time I placed the two dictatorships on the same totalitarian, abominable level. Furthermore, I became aware of the nature and scope of the Holocaust and the fact that it also had occurred in Latvia. And I discovered that Hitler had forced the Americans into the conflict on the Soviet side by declaring war on the United States, not the other way around. The most compelling thrust at my naivete was the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 and its secret clause that included Latvia among those states that Hitler, heretofore an object of my family's grateful admiration, had abandoned to the despised Russians. The truth was that Hitler, no less than Stalin, was responsible for Latvia's misfortunes and sad fate. These and many other revelations steadily eroded my fundamental notions about Latvia's experience in the war. Reality was displacing the myth, and the process of its dissipation whetted my interests in pursuing

4 I Introduction this subject further, at the graduate level. As I reflect on my epiphany, I realize that from this point on the course of my personal quest to understanding the Latvian wartime experience paralleled and generally corresponded to concurrent developments in the writing of Baltic history, a microcosmic reflection of contemporary historiography on the subject. In graduate school, still at the University of Florida, I expected to investigate the nature of Latvia's relationship with Nazi Germany and its role in the war, thereby satisfying my personal interests and putting to good use my Latvian language. For my master's thesis I decided to examine one aspect of Latvia's relationship with Hitler's Reich, the role of Latvia's Baltic German minority in the diplomacy between the two states. Source materials were adequate for studying this topic at the master's level, but to my disappointment my mentors informed me that due to limited access to documents and archives located in the Soviet Union, including Latvia itself, the pursuit of this subject at the doctorate level would be prohibitive, for all practical purposes unfeasible. I was not alone in my frustration. In the 1970s-and continuing into the 198ospolitically motivated inaccessibility to Soviet documents narrowed, although did not completely preclude, the choices of viable, scholarly research topics this side of the iron curtain on Latvia and the Baltic States. Cold war circumstances determined that practically everything written on the Soviet Union, its constituent lands, and Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe depended on the trickle of documents made available by their authorities and upon the few materials accessible in the West. For doing research related to World War II in Europe, German sources divulged the most valuable documentation for the serious scholar. As a result of this paucity of sources, in the 1970s few scholarly works were being produced on Latvia and the Baltic States. The presses by no means stopped entirely, but they cranked out mostly memoirs and polemical works, either of a didactic nature informing a presumably ignorant and uncaring world of the tragedy and iniquities of Latvia's fate, or as pleas for international justice and recognition for the Latvian national cause. Little legitimate, objective history appeared, at least by the standards I had learned and accepted. And to my further consternation, the majority of these works, including those in English, seemed to perpetuate myths similar to the one I had learned at home. The efforts of Latvian scholars and others of prominence to support and promote that version of events only deepened my disillusionment and convinced me to abandon the subject as a legitimate object of scholarly inquiry. If this was the history being produced on Latvia, I wanted no part of it.

Introduction I 5

Among the new truths revealed to me in the course of my graduate work that further discredited my crumbling myth was Hitler's personal dislike for Latvians. Somewhere along the way I also discovered that our DP camp at Herrsbruck had been a satellite camp of the notorious Flossenburg concentration camp-thereby for the first time, at least in my mind, associating the fate of Jews and our own DP experiences more closely together. I also discovered that the Latvian role in the Holocaust amounted to more than providing a venue for murdering Jews and that the revered Latvian Legion had been a part of the Waffen SS. This last realization raised the issue of whether some of the latter's more nefarious deeds should also be inscribed on the Legion's legion's list of accomplishments, along with fighting the Russians on the Eastern Front. Several other considerations diverted my personal quest from its initial course. One was the tight academic job market and the limited opportunities for employment; what institution would hire an expert in Baltic history? Studying the Baltic States at that time made as much sense to me as Soviet historians studying Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois and expecting to make a successful academic career of it. Another was the potential marketability of the subject, for after all, there were no more than some two million Latvians living in the entire world, and the majority would be denied access to my labors. Therefore I decided to pursue my historical inquiry not by focusing on the Baltic States and Latvia, but by way of studying German history, the history of National Socialism and its wartime impact on Europe, including the Baltic region and Latvia. Besides, I perceived a certain fascination bordering on sensationalism both within academe and the general public with anything to do with National Socialism, Hitler, and Germany's wartime experiences. My advisor at the time, the late Max Kele, agreed with my new focus but suggested I go elsewhere to continue my inquiry, to Chapel Hill. At the University of North Carolina I was fortunate to hitch my academic and professional future to Gerhard L. Weinberg and fully redirect my scholarly interests to the field of German wartime history. Whereas the study of the Baltic States, indeed anything to do with the Soviet Union, was restricted by the paucity and inaccessibility of sources, the captured German documents and the diplomatically guaranteed access to German archives offered American scholars of National Socialist and wartime Germany a treasury of materials. For my primary research subject I decided to expand on my master's thesis, the Baltic Germans and their role in Latvian-German relations, and comprehensively examine the relationship of all the ethnic German (Volksdeutsche) minority groups of

6 I Introduction

Eastern Europe to Hitler's Third Reich. I further adjusted the focus to include the study of a Nazi organization, the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, which was ultimately controlled by the SS and was responsible for coordinating all Third Reich activities related to these minorities. This study became my dissertation, and eventually in book form it appeared as Rimmler's Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945. As a result of my decision to concentrate on the Volksdeutsche of Eastern Europe my research and writing turned to topics related to the SS and the disparate German minority groups of Eastern Europe. As my research interests digressed along this new path, I relegated my personal interest in Latvia and its wartime experiences to a back burner, satisfying it by keeping up with recently published secondary literature on the subject Little changed in the researching and writing of Latvian and Baltic history until the early 1990s, when the unraveling and then the total implosion of the Soviet Union culminated in the restoration of the independence of the Baltic States. These astounding geopolitical events precipitated correspondingly monumental upheavals in the historical field. Starting in Eastern Europe, then spreading to the successor states of the Soviet Union, including the Baltic States, and finally to Russia itself, access to heretofore off-limits repositories and documents offered scholars unprecedented opportunities to research formerly restricted topics. Even scholars of Nazi Germany benefited from this boon, as previously prohibited archives in East Germany and throughout Eastern Europe divulged new materials to supplement the already available ones, particularly those reflecting localized German activities in occupied Eastern lands. As these revolutionary tremors reached the Baltic States, the scope and nature of historical inquiry changed suddenly and dramatically for the better. The kind of archival access scholars had been accustomed to in the West materialized, and many from abroad streamed to these freshly unlocked sources. Native Baltic scholars not only gained access to formerly withheld materials but also for the first time enjoyed the freedom to break away from their own historical myths-those prescribed by dogmatic Marxist ideology and Soviet political imperatives-and to pursue historical issues to wherever their research might lead. Historical topics previously limited in both the East and the West to hardly more than polemical debates rehashing the same overworked sources and following well-beaten paths of argumentation to mostly predictable conclusions, could now be examined anew, in light of new evidence and with greater freedom of investigation. The result was a prolific outpouring of historical

Introduction I 7 studies, great and small. Scholars engaged in Baltic studies appeared to be making up for lost time by eagerly diving into the archives to examine materials denied them for so long, hoping to discover clues and answers to historical puzzles that had perplexed and stumped them for years. I watched this scramble from afar, as scholars employed in Baltic history, especially those who had been more patient and had not abandoned their historical journeys as readily as I had, seized upon this fresh opportunity. However, I was reluctant to retool and shift my scholarly focus and research agenda at this late date. As this whirlwind of energized scholarship swirled around me, and as I followed it the best I could through the latest professional literature, my main preoccupation became figuring out how to exploit the newly accessible resources in my own research field. After all, the opening of archives throughout Eastern Europe offered me new opportunities to delve into Volksdeutsche · issues, shifting from the German perspective-as necessitated by the primary utilization of German documents-to those of the host, non-German peoples as they dealt with this troublesome ethnic minority. New materials on the SS and its activities had also become available to scholars throughout Eastern Europe, in particular SS behavior related to implementing Nazi racial precepts in the occupied lands-another one of my research interests. As I contemplated new projects and pondered how to secure funding for research trips, an unexpected opportunity appeared as from the blue, a chance to return at least temporarily to the original historical interests that launched me on my path as a historian. A friend and colleague, Paul Cimbala, presently at Fordham University, informed me that Kurt Piehler of the University of Tennessee Knoxville was planning a series of books on European states in World War II to be published by Fordham University Press. Each book would focus on a single state and examine its involvement comprehensively, not only the military dimensions of the war, but also its home front, economy, culture, politics, in short, all areas and aspects of the wartime experience. This opportunity recharged my interest, and I contacted Professor Piehler. We agreed that I would write the volume on Latvia on the condition that this would be a synthesis and a survey of existing secondary literature, both old and recent, not a work based on my own primary archival research. What attracted me to this project above all was the chance to satisfy my long-standing desire to examine and rectify in an organized, systematic and thorough way what I had learned about this subject and sort out fable from reality.

8 I Introduction As I immersed myself in this enterprise and proceeded to review the extant literature on Latvia in World War II, I concluded that the timing was right for a synthesis of this sort. After some preliminary research, to my pleasant surprise I discovered that to the best of my knowledge nothing of its kind existed. Much has been written on virtually every aspect of Latvia's involvement in World War II, but no single work has attempted to pull it all together in any sort of meaningful, balanced, assimilated synthesis. This topic appears within general historical studies of the Baltic States and of Latvia alone, but no works focus on it as the central subject and none cover it as broadly and comprehensively as does my present study. Therefore I believe this book will provide both scholars and the general reading public a service by bringing together in an overview most of what has been written on Latvia's experience in World War II up to this point. As research on the subject continues, and new studies utilizing the recently available sources appear, my survey of both old and recent works should provide a convenient starting point to pursue the subject further. Someday the authoritative opus on this subject will be written, but in my estimation that still lies in the future. This cornucopia of new studies must be first synthesized and digested before a defining work based solely on this latest wave of research on Latvia during its most difficult years reaches fruition. It is also my guarded contention that at least for the near future the latest research will not radically alter any of the main themes nor dramatically add to a new understanding of the issues that I have identified and laid out in this work. These will remain for some time to come the germane issues and questions regarding this subject, not because I have posed them, but because the existing literature has defined these as the parameters and guidelines of subsequent inquiries. Even my main interpretations, based on analyses and evaluations of the conclusions of others, should withstand most challenges unless and until truly revealing and substantially different historical evidence surfaces. And if my salient points cannot withstand the new discoveries, so be it. I only hope that what I have collected, synthesized, encapsulated and presented here will stimulate further research and critical appraisals, irrespective of where they may lead.

* * * In the way of acknowledgement I would first like to thank my colleague and friend Paul Cimbala of Fordham University first for informing me of this opportunity to fulfill a lifelong aspiration and then for encouraging

Introduction I 9 me to follow through on this quest. I also am grateful to Kurt Piehler of the University of Tennessee, the general editor of this series, for making my enterprise possible by providing a scholarly venue. I would also like to express my gratitude to the University of South Carolina Aiken for releasing me from my teaching and administrative duties through the granting of a sabbatical, without which-due to my administrative responsibilities as Department Chair and my teaching duties, I would still be visiting libraries, surfing the internet searching for materials on the subject, perusing those sources, shuffling note cards, and hoping someday to begin the actual writing of this book. My appreciation also goes to Professor Aldis Purs of Manchester University, who read the manuscript and provided invaluable comments, corrections, and suggestions. Whatever factual or interpretive mistakes one may find in this work result exclusively from my own shortcomings and from not heeding his prudent recommendations. I would be remiss if I did not mention the Interlibrary Loan section of the USC Aiken Library, specifically Brigitte Smith, who acquired the lion's share of my literature, often from the most remote and obscure repositories. A tip of the hat also goes to Girma Negash, my department colleague at USC Aiken, for his steadfast encouragement and for suggesting epicurean incentives as stakes in our comradely competition to get our books into print. And finally I acknowledge my family, my wife Patty, and my children Alex and Christine, for their patience, understanding and simply putting up with my preoccupied existence for the last couple of years, as my unswerving focus on this writing project displaced just about everything else in my life. And yes, Christine and Alex, although it may not have appeared so at times, I really enjoyed writing this book. I hope that the results of my labors will instill in you a greater appreciation and understanding for the Latvian half of your heritage.

1

Prewar Latvia

When asked why his book on World War II, A World at Arms, was so long, the prominent historian of the war, Gerhard L. Weinberg, wryly replied, "It was a big war!" Indeed it was, encompassing the entire globe, affecting either directly or indirectly almost every region and state on earth, touching hundreds of millions of human beings, including some two million Latvians. In its destructiveness the war did not distinguish between large and small nations, nor did it make any distinctions in its capacity to affect every aspect and dimension of national life. Significant differences did exist, however, in their abilities to direct events leading up to the war, alter the course of the war, and determine its outcome and consequences-the latter being valid only in the case of the victors. The great nations, those primarily responsible for the conflict, always held the initiative, while the small states such as Latvia, caught up in the maelstrom of events, had little if any control over their own destiny. Even though circumstances often compelled the major powers to follow the flow of events rather than chart courses of their own choosing, the lesser states seldom if ever enjoyed the luxury of choice. By virtue of geographic chance these smaller states happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time and simply got in the geopolitical way of the larger powers. Try as they might, with few exceptions, they could not escape the scythe of war. Some sought refuge in declarations of neutrality, hoping that like the proverbial ostrich they too could cover their heads in the sand and thereby avert danger. Others looked for safety through collective security by attaching themselves to a coalition usually including at least one great power, but paradoxically that path almost always ensnared them in the very trap they had tried to avoid. One such small state that despite its evasive efforts was drawn into this world-wide conflict against its will was Latvia. Latvia, as did other states of its size, played the ostrich as long as it could, but with unfortunate results: total inundation by the flood of events.

Prewar Latvia I

11

Latvia, located on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea between its two fellow Baltic States, Estonia to the north and Lithuania to the southwhose experiences in World War II were cut from the same pattern as Latvia's-suffered from its unlucky geography. Throughout their history the Latvian people and their land have been geopolitical prizes fought over by two regional powers, an expansionist Russia to the east and a no less aggressive Germany in its various permutations to the west. Latvia's unenviable historic dilemma has been described with several appropriate metaphors. One places Latvia between a "hammer and anvil."' Another more classical analogy dooms Latvia to maneuver between "Scylla and Charybdis." This author prefers the old American colloquialism, "between a rock and a hard place." World War II was only the most recent phase of the historic RussianGerman struggle for control of the eastern Baltic region. Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler, respectively the wartime leaders of the Soviet Union and the German Third Reich, resumed an aggressive, expansionist competition over the Baltic in the 1930s that originated at about the time Latvians were first drawn into the European sphere in the thirteenth century. Despite its strong attraction to covetous neighbors, the Baltic region and Latvia in particular, contrary to what some Latvian nationalists would like to think, was not the epicenter of World War II. It was not even the main prize in this epic struggle. Latvia was merely one of several states in the Baltic region, which in turn was only one territorial stake, albeit a strategically important one, in the conflict between Stalin and Hitler, whose armies were engaged along a vast front that arguably was the most critical theater in deciding the outcome of the war in Europe. This battleground, commonly referred to as the Eastern front-even though it was Russia's western front-for all of its importance, was only one of several theaters of this world-wide conflict. Setting Latvia's wartime experience within this broader, global perspective may diminish somewhat its relative role in the overall scope of the war, but it does not detract at all from the fact that for the world's two million Latvians, World War II was and remains of paramount importance. Its repercussions as well as collective and individual memories of it inescapably and indelibly remain with all Latvians today. Although World War II in Europe formally began on September 1, 1939 with Germany's invasion of Poland, and one can date Latvia's active entry into the war as June 22, 1941, the day Hitler attacked the Soviet Union and Latvia became a battlefield, neither date serves as a satisfactory starting point for a comprehensive examination of Latvia's experi-

12

I

LATVIA IN WORLD WAR II

ence in this conflict. One must look further back into Latvia's prewar history in order to comprehend its wartime experience fully and to appreciate the tremendous changes that the war wrought for this small state and its people. With the recovery of Latvian national independence in 1991, the loss of which for the majority of Latvians was the most traumatic result of the war, contemporary Latvians have pondered the nature of the resurrected Latvia, an exercise in which the war assumes a pivotal point of departure. Latvians as a nation must decide whether and to what degree they should return to the prewar past and the Latvia disrupted and transformed by the war, or without turning back nostalgically should they reconcile themselves with and build upon the consequences of the war and move ahead toward a new Latvia in a very different Europe. 2 In either case a clear understanding of Latvia's experience in World War II is germane to Latvia's future and its place in a modern Europe. Essentials of Early Latvian History

Latvia is one of the three Baltic States, along with its neighbors Estonia and Lithuania, located on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea. It covers just over 25,000 square miles (ss,7oo sq. km.), making it about the size of West Virginia and larger than many other European states, including Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium. For a western boundary it boasts of 310 miles of coastline that for future economic development is a welcomed asset but in the past has been a source of trouble, attracting the unwanted attention of an expansionist eastern neighbor, Russia, which historically has coveted this coastline for the widening of its "window" and access to the West. Prewar Latvia also had 862 miles of land frontiers, 211 of which it shared in common with the Soviet Union. Latvia's two ice-free ports of Liepaja (Libau in German) and Ventspils (Windau) made the country even more appealing to its eastern neighbor, as did its principal river, the mighty and storied Daugava (Diina to the Germans, Western Dvina to the Russians), the topographical centerpiece of Latvian life that stretches-to the historic misfortune of Latvians-as a navigable waterway hundreds of miles eastward, far into the Russian interior. For Latvians Mother Daugava carries both literally and figuratively the lifeblood of the Latvian nation or people, the Tauta-a term that translates precisely into the German Volk and the Russian Narod, but has no direct English equivalent. Riga, Latvia's capital city located on the northern bank of the Daugava near the great river's mouth and the Gulf of Riga, became a leading economic entrepot, competing

Prewar Latvia I 13

with other great Baltic ports, Stockholm, Danzig, Helsinki, and most notably St. Petersburg. As a state, Latvia is divided into four administrative-geographical regions (apgabali), although its official emblems display only three stars, which supposedly represent its three regions. The westernmost region is Kurzeme, bounded by the Baltic Sea to the west, the Gulf of Riga to the north, and Lithuania to the south. It generally corresponds to the western part of the historic province of Kurland, or Courland. Latvia's two ice-free ports of Liepaja, the second largest of Latvia's cities, and Ventspils are located on the Kurzeme coast. Directly east of Kurzeme and south of the Daugava lies Zemgale and the venerable city of Jelgava (in German, Mitau), the former seat of the Dukes of Kurland. Mostly north of the Daugava and also on the Gulf of Riga stands Vidzeme, the southern part of the historic province of Livland, also called Livonia, whose northern sections joined with the historic province of Estland to become the modern state of Estonia. The easternmost region of Latvia is Latgale, with its multiethnic city of Daugavpils (Diinaburg in German, Dvinsk in Russian), the third largest in Latvia. Latgale, which stretches from north to south along the entire eastern frontier bordering Russia, was not part of Imperial Russia's three Baltic provinces. In prewar Latvia not only Latvians but ethnic Russians, Poles, and over half of its Jews lived in Latgale. The Latgalian dialect, influenced by the proximity of Lithuanian, Polish, and Russian speech, distinguished these eastern Latvians from western Latvians. Their predominant religious denominations, Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy, also separated them from other Latvians, the majority of whom practiced Lutheranism. Over the years Latgalian ethnic distinctions gave rise to prejudices on the part of other Latvians, manifested at times as no more than demeaning Latgalian jokes, but too often as economic and social discrimination. Latvians first encountered Western Europe through the medieval German Drang nach Osten, the drive to the East, a cultural, economic, and above all military expansion that crossed the Elbe and planted the German presence along the southern Baltic Sea coast. Hitler and other expansionist-minded Nazis openly advertised their twentieth-century eastward aggression as the resumption of this medieval thrust. As early as the twelfth century German merchants plied the Baltic Sea and traded with the people of the Baltic littoral. By the thirteenth century, crusading orders such as the Teutonic Knights and the Brethern of the Sword brought both the sword and the cross to the region, in the process annihilating much of the local population and subjugating the rest. The Church

14

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also got into the expansionist act when Bishop Albert of Bremen founded the city of Riga in 1201. In short, the Knights conquered the land and enserfed the Latvians and Estonians; the Church christened them; and Hansa merchants completed this early form of imperialism by monopolizing the region's commerce. Over time, the conquered territories coalesced into three distinct provinces of Kurland, Livland and Estland, with the commercial and religious center of Riga enjoying a somewhat autonomous status. Historic developments in Lithuanian territories followed a different course, and although Lithuania became one of the three modern Baltic States, it was not one of the three historic Baltic provinces. By the fourteenth century Lithuania was becoming a major power in its own right, having established with the help of its then junior partner Poland its domain from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and having adopted Roman Catholicism, which differentiated Lithuanians from their predominantly Protestant Latvian and Estonian neighbors. Eventually the German masters of the three Baltic provinces succumbed to outside pressures and accepted the sovereignty of Polish, Swedish, and eventually Russian rulers. Their local system, however, remained intact, as this privileged and landed German aristocracy continued to dominate a Latvian and Estonian peasant majority socially and economically into the twentieth century. Russian interest in this area was stoked somewhat later than the German, but once the Russians staked their claims, their drive from the east was no less relentless than the German push from the west. By the thirteenth century Russian princes such as Alexander Nevsky already challenged the German knights for supremacy in the region. The Russian thrust reached full intensity in the sixteenth century under Ivan IV, "The Terrible," who even in his madness recognized the strategic importance of access to the western seas. Nearly constant warfare plagued the region from the sixteenth century onward as Poland, Sweden and Russia fought over the area, with the Germans and Latvians caught up in the middle. Matters stabilized in the eighteenth century under Czar Peter I, "The Great," who emerged victorious from these Baltic wars in 1721 and added Estland and Livland to the Russian Empire. In 1772 the equally imperialistically minded Catherine II, "The Great" claimed Latgale, which she added to Vitebsk province, just to the east of the Baltic provinces. In 1795 she seized the remaining territory destined to become a part of modern Latvia, the Duchy of Kurland, which joined Livland and Estland as the three Russian Baltic provinces. The Russians had won this early phase of the struggle for the Baltic.

Prewar Latvia I 15 Into the nineteenth century, the Baltic Germans, through their ownership of the land, continued to dominate the local life of the Baltic provinces, although in an experiment in agrarian reform in the early 18oos the Russian Czar liberated the Latvian and Estonian serfs, a preview of the general emancipation of Russia's serfs in 1861. Freedom came as a mixed blessing, since the Russian rulers did little to help Latvian peasants acquire land. By 1914 Latvian peasants controlled only 40 percent of the land, while some 8oo Baltic German families-to whom Latvians referred as the "Barons"-possessed enormous, prosperous estates that comprised nearly so percent of all agricultural land. The Russian state owned the rest.3 The mass of land-less and small-holding Latvian peasants turned out to be an asset when Russia began to industrialize in the 188os and 1890s. This readily available labor force migrated to the cities, mostly to Riga, which by the end of the century had become one of the leading industrial centers of the Russian Empire.4 By the outbreak of World War I, according to some studies, the Latvian region was the most industrialized part of Russia.s The development of railroads along with the existing river traffic on the Daugava compounded the amounts of goods shipped from the Russian interior to the West through the port of Riga, which by 1914 surpassed even St. Petersburg in the volume of Russian transit trade. Latvian ports accounted for nearly 30 percent of Russian exports and 25 percent of all Russian trade, with Riga handling the lion's share. Some called Latvia the "Belgium of the East."6 Economic development caused both population growth and a demographic shift from the countryside to the cities, and on the eve of World War I the population of the territories that became Latvia numbered over 2,soo,ooo. Riga's population alone leapt from 282,000 in 1897 to 517,000, becoming the fifth largest city in the Empire.? Much of this growth resulted from the relocation of Russians and other ethnic groups from non-Latvian regions of the Empire, a trend presaging the post-World War II influx of non-Latvians into Latvia, similarly seeking greater economic opportunities and a higher standard of living. Latvia's industrialization, accompanied by urban growth, as evidenced by its rapid development before World War I and again after World War II, remains for better or for worse an undeniable part of Latvia's economic and social heritage. Industrial growth, population dislocation, the question of land in the countryside, all contributed to mounting tensions and unrest among Latvians living within the autocratic Russian Empire. So did a cultural awakening during the latter part of the nineteenth century that raised the

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awareness of a distinct Latvian nationality. This movement gave birth to and nurtured nascent political stirrings among Latvians, some nationalist, others socialist in nature, with the latter helping to articulate and direct the discontent in the countryside and encouraging criticism of the industrialization process. These sources of unrest, common to all of Russia and not just to the Baltic region, exploded in revolution in 1905. Upheaval swept the Baltic, most heatedly in the countryside, where Latvian peasants burned hundreds of manor houses and murdered German "barons." The workers in the cities struck, demonstrated, and in general raged against the economic system, while the tiny but emboldened Latvian intelligentsia demanded national recognition. In the end this uprising failed, and the Russians brutally suppressed the Latvians, executing some 3,000 and exiling thousands more to Siberia. Another 5,000 fled abroad, including two of this author's granduncles. 8 The Revolution of 1905 stirred up passions in the Baltic and placed the Russian autocracy on notice. World war 1 and Revolution World War I was the great crucible from which emerged newly independent nation states throughout Eastern Europe, including the Baltic States of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. When the Great War began in August 1914 two major fronts developed, one in the West and another one in the East, the latter running through Russian territory from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The principal combatants in the East were the Germans and Austrians on one side, the Russians on the other. Caught up in the fighting in both camps were the diverse national groups living in the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, including Lithuanians, Estonians and Latvians, all three peoples initially fighting as soldiers for the Czar. Hostilities eventually reached the Baltic, and by summer of 1915 the Daugava River, flowing through the Latvian heartland, had become more or less a stationary boundary of the northern sector of the Eastern front. As the Germans advanced, the Russians evacuated to the interior as much of the Latvian industrial plant and population as they could, forcibly relocating more than 70o,ooo Latvians to Russia and initiating an era Latvians refer to as Refugee Times (beglu laiki). Not only did the war reduce the Latvian population, but it also resulted in two other developments critical for Latvia's future, one economic, the other militarypolitical. While the Russians carried off much of Latvia's industrial machinery and rolling stock from north of the Daugava, including Riga, the

Prewar Latvia I 17 Germans plundered the lands to the south. As a result, what had once been the most industrialized region of the Russian Empire was denuded of its industrial base.9 Concurrently, after the Russians retreated behind the Daugava, Latvia became a major battleground. As the flow of battle turned against them, Russian commanders realized they could better exploit the fine fighting qualities of the thousands of Latvians scattered throughout the Russian army by consolidating them in exclusively Latvian units. In August 1915 they created several Latvian infantry regiments known as the Latvian Rifles, or Strelnieki, and by 1916 eight Strelnieki regiments fought for the Russians.' Then the Russian Revolution erupted, the first phase occurring in March 1917. In stages the revolution destroyed the Russian autocracy and initiated a period of chaos, anarchy and civil war before Lenin's Bolsheviks finally imposed their rule over Russia and ultimately created the Soviet Union. Revolutionary councils, or soviets, sprang up everywhere, including Latvia.u It was in the midst of this turmoil that the Strelnieki joined in the revolution, but which revolution and on whose side became a crucial question at the time and a matter of historical controversy later. Soviet sources claim that all but a small number of these Latvian soldiers joined the Bolsheviks, served Lenin zealously in his consolidation of power, and in the ensuing Russian Civil War became the mainstay of the Red forces-earning from some observers the sobriquet of "Lenin's praetorian guard."'z An adage circulated at the time: Lenin made a revolution, based on Russian stupidity, Jewish brains, and Latvian bayonets."'3 Latvian nationalists assert to the contrary that only negligible numbers of Strelnieki supported the Bolsheviks, and those that did either had been duped or had misunderstood Lenin's goals.'4 More balanced views acknowledge the critical role of the Strelnieki in the revolution, but note that they split, some supporting the Bolsheviks, others siding with the Latvian nationalists who were arming for a War of Independence.'s The significance of the Strelnieki issue, in particular the relative support they granted both the Bolsheviks and the Latvian nationalists, becomes apparent when trying to determine the true level of sympathy Latvians held for communism. Evidence of Strelnieki support for the Bolsheviks bolstered Soviet contentions in 1940 that Latvia, riding a wave of popular sympathies for Lenin's group, would have joined the socialist camp earlier had not foreign intervention prevented it, thereby enabling the bourgeois clique to take over Latvia. And later, with the post-World War II Soviet reoccupation and reincorporation of Latvia, the Soviets claimed legitimacy by tracing the thread of alleged Latvian affinity for 0

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socialism back to the Strelnieki-in the Soviet view, indisputable evidence of genuine Latvian preference for the Soviet system. What followed next in Latvia within the context and circumstances of the Russian Revolution, the Russian Civil War, and Germany's military defeat, defies description and explanation within the scope of this brief summary. It suffices to say that in the years 1917-1920 a three-way struggle ensued among Latvian nationalists, including "White" Strelnieki, fighting for Latvia's independence; the Soviets along with their Latvian socialist allies, including the "Red" Strelnieki, fighting for a socialist Latvia; and regular German forces in the Baltic, teaming up with local Baltic German militias and assorted bands of German Freikorps adventurers, struggling to salvage what they could of German dominance in the area. To complicate matters further, toss into the mix occasional White Russian forces carrying their civil war against the Reds into the Baltic, as well as some expedient British and French intervention on the side of the Latvian nationalists. ' 6 At times the nationalist Latvians fought alongside the Germans against the Reds, at other times against them. It was within this topsyturvy turmoil that nationalist Latvian soldiers began singing the ditty, "We'll beat those Reds, and after that the Blue-Grays," the latter color referring to the Germans. This soldier's tune not only reflected the realities of their struggle, but also previewed another conflict some twenty years later, when Latvians once again had to identify their national enemies, and the same two were still in their sights. German and Russian participation aside, at least in part this conflict was a Latvian civil war, as Red Latvians fought against nationalist Latvians. Neither side wanted to admit to internecine strife, since both camps claimed broad popular support, and too many Latvians on the other side-enough for a civil warcontradicted their assertions. In the midst of this tumult one group of Latvian intelligentsia and soldiers proclaimed national independence on November 18, 1918. Declaring independence was easy, as nation builders discovered throughout Eastern Europe, but making it stick was an entirely different matter. It was their declaration of independence that gave the nationalist Latvians a cause and a reason to call their struggle their War of Independence, or their Freedom Battles, Brivibas Cinas. In the final phase of the conflict in early 1919 Latvia briefly but bitterly experienced Soviet rule, the recollection of which would go a long way in the next twenty years in forming Latvian opinions, both official and popular, regarding communism, the Soviet Union, and their potential threat to Latvia. This menacing, lasting impression of the lielinieki, the

Prewar Latvia I 19 literal Latvian translation for Bolsheviks, carried over into the World War II years and served as a frightening reminder, especially for nationalist Latvians, what one could expect in a Soviet Latvia. For their part the Soviets lauded this fleeting success as the beginning of the inevitable socialist revolution in Latvia: Although interrupted, the revolution would resume someday and would inevitably result in creating a Soviet Latvia. The Soviets perceived their occupation and incorporation of Latvia in 1940-1941 as well as their return in 1944-1945 in this context-as the resumption and the belated but successful completion of their earlier effort. In early December 1918 the revolutionary Red Army crossed into Latvia, and on December 17 in Valka helped install a government under the Latvian communist, Peteris Stucka. The Red Army, under the command of another Latvian, Jukums Vacietis, drove on to Riga, captured it on January 3, 1919, and proclaimed a Soviet Latvian Republic. The nationalist government fled to Liepaja and found safe haven with the British navy. One of the historic questions for Latvians regarding this initially successful Soviet campaign is the ethnic composition of the Red Army. Latvian nationalists ignore or minimize Latvian participation in its ranks and depict the invaders as a "Soviet" force, implying these were Russians alone. Soviets and the Latvian Left contest this view and maximize the Latvian component among the victors, asserting that it reflected popular Latvian sentiment and fulfilled true Latvian aspirations.'? Equally tendentious remains the question of how much of a popular mandate the ephemeral Soviet regime enjoyed. If one believes the head of the American mission to the Baltic at that time, Lt. Col. Warwick Greene, then communist claims of having a broad popular mandate were substantiated. According to Greene only the German presence kept Latvia from entirely going Bolshevik. ' 8 A Soviet source added contemptuously that unlike the nationalists, "The communists in Latvia did not need any outside military support in order to restore Soviet power."'9 The consensus seems to agree that a larger number of Latvians than the nationalists would care to admit initially backed Bolshevik rule, but shortly the "Red terror" and other excesses turned much of the population irreversibly against the lielinieki.20 In January 1919 the Soviets commenced with a reign of terror against their enemies, including the wealthy, landowners, the clergy, political opponents, and anyone else they regarded as a class enemy or a traitor. Arrests, kidnappings, torture, and shootings became the order of the day. One source estimates that by late April the Reds had executed more than 6,ooo people in Riga alone.>'

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A combined German and nationalist Latvian force finally drove the Reds out of Riga on May 22. The Bolshevik grip on Riga mercifully was short, so observed the nationalists; outside intervention interrupted it before its time, so ran the Soviet mantra. A "White terror" then surfaced, as the tables turned and the Bolsheviks and their accomplices fell as prey to firing squads and ferocious retribution. 22 The Reds retreated eastward into Latgale, from where in January 1920 Latvian nationalists, this time with help from the Poles, cleared out the survivors. The Red Latvians withdrew into Lenin's Russia, which first signed an armistice with the new Latvian state on January 30, 1920, and then on August 11, 1920, concluded a peace treaty, formally recognizing Latvia's independence from Russia. 2 3 Peteris Stucka, head of the erstwhile Soviet Republic of Latvia declared ominously, "With great joy we shall hail the day when Latvia will become reunited with the great Russia on the basis of the Soviet system." 4 The fate of the Red Latvians after their arrival in the Soviet Union was mostly disappointment and betrayal. They joined the estimated 200,000 ethnic Latvians living in Russia before the war and the remnants of the 7oo,ooo Latvian wartime refugees as a permanent ethnic fixture of the early Soviet Union. Some 24o,ooo Latvians returned to Latvia in the early 1920s, leaving behind what should have been around 6oo,ooo65o,ooo Latvians, but these numbers do not add up. The 1926 Soviet census counted only 151,000 ethnic Latvians, and only 126,ooo could be accounted for in 1939. Many may have been absorbed into and counted with other national groups, but hundreds of thousands of others must have perished in the chaos of war, revolution, civil war, forced collectivization, and Stalin's purges. 25 Some of these Latvians, however, in particular the Red Strelnieki, assumed positions of importance in the new Soviet state, the Communist Party, and especially in the Red Army. Jekabs Peters helped Feliks Dzerzhinsky organize the notorious secret police, the Cheka; Jukums Vacietis commanded the Red armies in the early years of the Russian Civil War; Jekabs Alksnis commanded the Soviet air force in the 1930s; Janis Rudzutaks, was a member of the Politiburo, 1926-1932; and Janis Berzins directed the Soviet military intelligence. 26 Although Stalin liquidated several of these prominent Red Latvians along with many others in his purges in the late 1930s, enough survived to return to Latvia with the first Soviet occupation in 1940 and then again in the reoccupation of 1944-1945 to complete what Stucka and others had begun in 1918-1919. 2

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21

Independence and the Political System Latvians and their Baltic neighbors were among the many peoples of Central and Eastern Europe that exploited the circumstances of the Great War to declare and secure their national independence. Some contemporary statesmen regarded Latvia as well as the other new states cogs in the Cordon Sanitaire, a term connoting their existence as a quarantine barrier between the "real" Europe to the west and the undesirable and potentially threatening Soviet Union to the east. 7 With the principle of national selfdetermination as their gospel and their justification for being, the Latvians constructed a democratic republic, based on the lofty ideals of political liberalism and democracy as espoused by the victorious powers at Paris. Ironically Latvia's chief nemesis, the Soviet Union, was the first state to recognize its independence on August 11, 1920, followed by the main Western powers on January 26, 1921. Inclusion in the League of Nations occurred on September 22, 1921, and the United States, already trying to distance itself from European involvement, officially granted its approval on July 28, 1922. 28 The population of independent Latvia declined from its prewar numbers. In 1914 slightly over 2,5oo,ooo people had lived in the territories that became Latvia, but in 1920 only some 1,6oo,ooo still remained. The population steadily grew as refugees returned, and in 1935 the last preWorld War II census counted just over 1,950,000 inhabitants. The war not only had reduced the population but it also had resulted in an internal migration from the cities to the countryside. Whereas in 1914 approximately 40 percent of the population was urban, in 1920 the urban percentage was 24-although gradually this portion recovered somewhat. Riga alone had lost residents from a prewar high of 520,000 to 181,000, although by 1935 the numbers had climbed back to 385,000. 9 It would be this demographic shift and the corresponding change in the nature of Latvian society that enabled Karlis Ulmanis and those who shared his image of a predominantly rural society with an agrarian economy and a traditional, close-to-the-soil Latvian culture to match, to mold their vision of Latvia. Contrary to the Latvian nationalist ideal, Latvia was not exclusively Latvian. The principle of national self-determination had been impossible to implement perfectly, and Latvia, like all other states of Central and Eastern Europe, new and old, contained significant ethnic and national minorities whose existence seemed to mock the concept of national states. Dissatisfied national minorities were partly accountable for the instability throughout the region in the coming two decades and contrib2

2

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uted to the volatility that flared up into another world war. Ethnic Latvians comprised only 75 percent of Latvia's citizens; the rest belonged to national minorities. According to the last Latvian prewar census, that of 1935, the ethnic configuration of Latvia consisted of the following: Latvians, 1,472,612 (75·5 percent); Russians, 206,499 (10.5 percent); Jews, 93.479 (4.7 percent); Germans, 62,144 (3.2 percent); Poles, 48,949 (2.5 percent); White Russians, 26,867; Lithuanians, 22,913; Estonians, 7,014; others, 10,025.3° Riga, the capital city, was barely an ethnically Latvian city, having a population only slightly more than half Latvian. Nearly 20 percent of its dwellers were German, a proportion substantially down from prewar years, and Jews comprised nearly 15 percentY Latgale, the easternmost province, was by far the most ethnically heterogeneous region, with sizeable communities of Russians, Jews, Poles, and White Russians living amidst a Latvian population whose "Latvianism" was already suspect to some Latvian cultural and racial purists. In good conscience the new Latvian regime tried to deal with the national minority issue by declaring to international bodies such as the League of Nations its intent to respect minority rights. It also guaranteed these rights in its constitution, allowed for extensive cultural autonomy, including the establishment of state-supported, non-Latvian language schools for minorities, and constructed a political system of proportional representation that provided for political participation based on a minority's sizeY These patently liberal concessions pleased few. The minorities' leaders seldom thought their constituents' rights were adequately secured and criticized the system throughout the life of the Republic. Conversely, most ethnic Latvians believed that in a country created for Latvians, nonLatvians wielded far too much influence, politically, culturally, and above all economically. At least initially the Baltic Germans owned most of the land, and Germans along with Jews controlled what many Latvians thought was more than their fair share of Latvian commerce, industry, banking, and trade. Tensions over the nationality issue simmered until the world economic crisis of the late192os and early 1930s, when shrill demands from Latvian nationalists led to the gradual erosion of many minority rights, cultural as well as economic.33 One measure the new regime resorted to in order to redress the most glaring and nagging minority-related issue was agrarian reform, directed expressly against the Baltic German landowners, the historically despised "barons."34 Similar nationally inspired actions occurred throughout Eastern Europe. Although at least in part intended to offset the communist appeal in the countryside by promising "land to the land-less," the most

Prewar Latvia I 2 3

compelling reason for land reform was national, a palliative for the national psyches of many emerging nations in which the historic landowning class constituted a national minority and the majority of land-less peasants belonged to the majority nationality. Land redistribution presumably redressed this historic injustice and returned the land to its rightful, native farmers. This measure paid dividends, above all political, by creating a grateful constituency of native farmers bound in perpetual loyalty to their benefactors, the national government. This for certain was true in Latvia.3s Economic results, however, as Latvians and others discovered, failed to meet expectations. Productivity declined, due to the parceling of the profitable latifundia into smaller plots, whose returns could not match the prereform bottom line. But the economic results mattered little, since the political, moral, and psychological dividends more than compensated for the diminished economic returns. Latvian agrarian reform legislation came into force on September 16, 1920. As a result the state confiscated all farms over one hundred hectares (a hectare equals about two and a half acres), including the estates of most Baltic Germans, and deposited all land in a "land bank." Landowners who had not resisted the nationalists in the War of Independence could keep fifty hectares. Those who had opposed the new state, mostly Germans, lost it all-without compensation. Latvian veterans of the War of Independence, who stood first in line to obtain land, received parcels up to thirty hectares, sometimes more. The reallocation of land created new farms as well as added to existing small farms, with the number of independent farms almost doubling, from 14o,ooo to nearly 24o,ooo, eventually to 275,000. The state retained for itself almost all forestland, setting a precedent of state ownership and control that over the next twenty years crept into other sectors of the Latvian economy.3 6 The agrarian reform, however, failed to rectify land hunger and left thousands in the countryside without land or with plots too small for productive farming. Latgale, with its ethnic mix in its countryside and therefore with fewer privileged Latvian freedom fighters, remained a region of chronic rural poverty, a condition the Soviets eagerly exploited in their takeover in 1940. Another significant consequence of agrarian reform was its alienation of the Baltic Germans, the primary losers in this campaign. Many dispossessed and embittered Germans left Latvia, only to return "carpetbagger-like" in 1941 on the coattails of the German invasion. One such Baltic German was Alfred Rosenberg of Estonia, who left the Baltic for Germany, where he endeared himself to Adolf Hitler, who later appointed him as the Reich satrap for the conquered territories in

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the East. Throughout the interwar years the Baltic German property issue remained a major point of contention and a constant irritant in LatvianGerman relations.37 The Latvians also laid the political foundations for their new state. On February 15, 1922 they adopted a constitution (Satversme), which provided for a democratic, parliamentary political system. In doing so Latvia marched in step with the general trend throughout Europe, declaring, if not always implementing, the much ballyhooed principles that were to make the world safe for democracy. The Constitution of 1922 established a multiethnic state that at least on paper displayed to the outside world Latvia's commitment to the most current, internationally accepted political correctness. Beneath the surface, however, virulent nationalistic sentiments resented what they construed as compromises of Latvian sovereignty.38 Despite heavy criticism the Constitution of 1922 not only served the first Latvian Republic for twelve years, but in 1991, with the restoration of independence, the resurrected Latvian Republic returned to that same document, with some modifications.39 The Constitution provided for a democratic electoral system of universal suffrage. Its central institution and font of national sovereignty was a 10o-member, unicameral parliament, the Saeima. Elections every three years determined its composition, based on proportional representation. Extremely democratic provisions allowed any five people to form a political party, and if that party received one percent of the popular vote, it was entitled to a deputy in the Saeima. A majority in the Saeima had responsibility for forming a government, selecting a cabinet of ministers, choosing a prime minister, and electing the state president for a threeyear term. With a proliferation of political parties it became impossible for any one party to secure a majority of its own, and therefore, as was the case with many parliaments throughout Europe during the so-called interwar years, governments relied on coalitions of parties. In 1925, twenty-six parties were represented in the Saeima; the one percent minimum excluded many others. Such liberality inevitably led to frequent changes of ministries, as political leaders struggled to keep majorities, which unfortunately led to charges of parliamentary instability and incompetence from critics. From 1920 until the end of democratic parliamentary rule in 1934, eighteen different cabinets ruled.4o If Latvians are to be faulted for constructing an impractical political system, so are others, including those Scandinavian paradigms of democracy, Sweden with fifteen governments, Finland with eighteen, and Norway with twelve during the same periodY Even larger, more democratically experienced

Prewar Latvia I 25

states were not immune to the afflictions of the multiparty parliamentary system. The birthplace of European popular democracy, France, was notorious for its cabinet changes, and it would be the inability to build and control majority coalitions that led to the demise of the politically pluralistic Weimar Germany and the ascendancy of Adolf Hitler. It was this alleged instability that opponents of democracy in 1934 exploited to destroy democracy in Latvia and institute an authoritarian dictatorship. The political configuration of independent Latvia consisted of five main party groupings: the nationalistic right, the agrarians, the democratic center, the national minorities, and the left, with the two principal groups being the agrarians and the left. The right-of-center Agrarian Union, the party of Karlis Ulmanis, a founding father of the Latvian Republic and preeminent and dominant figure, led the agrarians. Educated abroad, including a degree at the University of Nebraska, Ulmanis envisioned an agrarian, rural Latvia that revered the cultural traditions of the Latvian Tauta and its attachment to the soil. It was Ulmanis and the agrarians that had benefited most from the political dividends of agrarian reform. They were the backbone of Latvian politics, and of the eighteen prime ministers between 1918 and 1934, thirteen were from the Agrarian Union. At times serving as prime minister, at times in other positions, Ulmanis dominated Latvian politics. The key to agrarian success was the ability to attract elements of the political right-which spoke for 8 percent to 9 percent of the electorate and included extreme nationalists as well as many intellectuals who wanted a more "Latvia for Latvians"-and at least some of the center, 9 to 13 percent of the deputies, mostly professionals and business interestsY The second major political block was the left, with its mainstay, the Social Democratic Labor Party, the largest political party in the Latvian system. The left parliamentary block numbered thirty-six to thirty-eight until 1931 when it slipped to twenty-eight, in part because of the crackdown on the extreme left wing of the block. The national minorities, who counted on fifteen to eighteen representatives, at times managed to set aside their own differences to side as often as not with the left opposition.43 The fact that the Social Democrats were the largest Latvian political party disputes the assertion that independent, pre-World War II Latvia was the traditional rural society Ulmanis and others envisioned and nurtured. By their very existence the Social Democrats belied the notion that Latvian society was a homogeneous body of farmers and nationalistic zealots. Although they staunchly supported agrarian reform, the Social Democrats mainly represented the interests of the industrial workers,

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with their strength in Riga and the industrial port city of Liepaja. This party generally promoted a less nationalistic and a more democratic tone in politics and policies. Voldemars Bastjanis, a Social Democrat deputy, became a postwar exile critic of Ulmanis. 44 Briefly, from December 1926 to January 1928, the Social Democrats actually participated in ruling Latvia as part of a left-of-center coalition government, the only one of its kind in the first Latvian Republic4s. The Latvian communists were cast as pariahs on the extreme political left. After the experience of the short-lived Latvian Soviet Republic in 1919 and with the victory of the nationalists, the Latvian Communist Party (LCP) was banned. Much of the LCP escaped to the Soviet Union, where it set up shop under close Soviet supervision and waited for better days. Inside Latvia a few hundred activists, hounded by the authorities, managed to organize an underground network, and at their peak, during the depression years, their numbers may have risen as high as 1,ooo.46 The LCP received something of a reprieve under the Social Democrats in 1926-1928 when the left-of-center government allowed it to organize as a political party under an alias, the Workers and Peasants Party. In the 1928 and 1931 elections this Marxist party attracted around 6 to 7percent of the popular vote. The agrarians and the political right campaigned mightily to abolish this communist front group, not realizing that in the long run it would do the nationalists a favor by revealing the weak popular appeal of the communists in free elections. On the pretext of having uncovered a communist plot in November 1933, the government proscribed this latest permutation of the LCP and arrested its deputies and rank and file. 47 Outside the realm of political parties and located on the extreme political right stood two other political organizations. One was the quasiofficial, militia-like Aizsargi, the Homeguard, the most ardent Ulmanis supporters. More extreme, and approaching Hitler's Nazis in style, rhetoric, organization, and ideology, was the ultra-nationalistic Perkonkrusts, or Thundercross. Both groups played prominent roles in Latvia's transition in the 1930s from pluralistic democracy to intolerant nationalism and authoritarian dictatorship. The Aizsargi embodied the Ulmanis agrarian-nationalist ideal. Organized in March 1919 as local self-defense forces, these Latvian vigilantes provided local security during the struggle against the Soviet Republic and the Red Army incursion. Subsequently the Aizsargi grew into a nationwide paramilitary force that served political and cultural purposes along with military and police functions. Ini-

Prewar Latvia I 27 tially mandatory for all those not fighting in regular military units, in 1922 service in this semi-official organization became voluntary.4 8 The Aizsargi were organized territorially with units in each township (pagasts), grouped in nineteen regiments, one for each of Latvia's counties (aprinkis). Eventually the Aizsargi added an aviation branch, naval units, armed railroad detachments, a women's auxiliary (aizsardzes), and a youth branch (jaunsargi). Initially under the Ministry of the Interior, the Aizsargi received training from the Latvian Army and in wartime came under the authority of the War Ministry as a virtual national guard. Former Army Chief of Staff Hugo Rozensteins described the Aizsargi as "apolitical," placing themselves above party politics, interested only in instilling in the Latvian Tauta a proper patriotism and a martial spirit to go with it.49 Unconvinced of their purported apolitical nature, in 1928 the prominent Social Democrat, Bruno Kalnins, suggested replacing the Aizsargi with a rural militia, since the organization was associated with and dominated by the landed class, not the population as a whole.so Kalnins got nowhere with his proposal to curb this powerful force. The Aizsargi displayed their true apolitical colors on May 15, 1934, when they provided the muscle for the coup that ended democracy in Latvia and established the Ulmanis dictatorship. In June 1936 Ulmanis decreed himself their highest leader, or Vadonis-a term that translates precisely as Fuhrer-and in April1937 removed the organization from the Ministry of the Interior and placed it under the authority of the Ministry of Public Affairs, a nebulous, new ministry whose main purpose seemed to be keeping Ulmanis in power. The army also sought to control the Aizsargi, but Ulmanis jealously drew them more firmly under his personal power as an armed political force. By January 1940 the Aizsargi constituted a formidable force of 32,000 armed and trained men (4o,ooo according to some), substantially larger than the official armed forcesY The other right-wing extremist group was the Perkonkrusts, or the Thundercross, whose radical extremists criticized the Ulmanis regime from the far right for not being nationalistic enough. In the early 1930s Perkonkrusts sprouted from several right-wing, ultra nationalist, antiSemitic precursors, including the anti-Semitic intellectual Arveds Bergs. Bergs belonged to the University of Latvia fraternity (Korporacija), Lettonia, an incubus for modern Latvian anti-Semitism. In the early 1920s Berg helped found the Latvian National Club, which openly espoused anti-Semitism and anticommunism. Its membership consisted mostly of intellectuals, in particular members of Lettonia and Selonija fraternities, .among them Gustavs Celmins, a brother in Selonija. In the early 1930s

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Celmins joined a new organization called Ugunskrusts (Fire Cross), a resurrected version of the moribund National Club.sz It sported as its emblem the Ugunskrusts, the native Latvian version of the swastika, which years before the Nazis came to power-by coincidence and not by Celmins's design-already adorned the fuselages and wings of Latvian military planes. In 1932 Celmins assumed leadership of the Ungunskrusts, and when authorities banned it in 1933, Celmins revived it under the new name, Perkonkrusts. The latter, like its predecessor, dedicated itself to the overthrow of the democratic republic and advocated getting rid of all nonLatvian ethnic groups in Latvia, proclaiming its motto as "Latvia for Latvians; for Latvians work and bread." 53 Although known for its antiSemitism, Perkonkrusts spewed its venom on all non-Latvian and liberal groups, and if there was a consummate enemy, it was the Baltic Germans, not Jews. The Perkonkrusts had to revise its ranking of foes with the outbreak of the war and the looming power of Nazi Germany. Celmins boasted of a Perkonkrusts membership of over 12,000, but more likely no more than 6,ooo donned their gray shirts, berets and knee boots.s4 Perkonkrusts became the most persecuted and prosecuted group in Ulmanis's Latvia, probably because of its appeal to the same constituencies as Ulmanis, traditionalists and nationalists. The differences between the two appeared mostly in degree rather than in kind, although antiSemitism-as will be discussed later-never became a prominent theme under Ulmanis, who limited the rights of all non-Latvian ethnic groups without discriminating specifically against Jews. As early as January 1934 Ulmanis outlawed Perkonkrusts and began arresting its members. Celmins himself served some prison time before being expelled from Latvia in 1937. He eventually found his way to Germany, offered his services to the Nazis, and in 1941 returned to Latvia with hopes of building a Latvian version of the Nazi Party, which failed miserably.ss Perkonkrusts' chief contribution to the prewar political scene was to bestow upon antiSemitism a certain respectability, which Latvians freely lavished on intellectuals without paying nearly enough attention to the particulars of their in tellect.S 6 Independent Latvia's Culture Once independent, the Latvians exercised their nationalism as fervently in the area of culture as in their politics. Latvian became the official language, although legislation and the constitution conceded the ethnic minorities some formal use of their languages, for instance, in their schools.

Prewar Latvia I 29 Celebrations such as the Eighteenth of November (Independence Day), midsummer's John's Eve, and the numerous commemorations of the deeds of the heroes of the Freedom Battles marked the Latvian holiday calendar. Nothing, however, could match the spirit and spectacle of the national song festivals, which premiered in 1873 as the quintessential expression of Latvian cultural nationalism and would be staged every five years, with regional ones in intervening years. Latvians also prided themselves in their literature, both in quality and quantity, prose as well as poetry, and proudly offered their devotion to the arts as evidence of belonging to the cultural mainstream of the West. Latvians valued education as a basic necessity of life, and revered izglitiba-a high level of cultural refinement and education-as the most laudable personal attribute. Latvians had possessed one of the highest literacy rates in the former Russian Empire, and with independence education received high priority, as the Republic built an extensive public school system that reduced the illiteracy rate to one of the lowest in Europe.57 The pride and joy of Latvia's educational system undoubtedly was the University of Latvia, established in 1919 on the foundations of the former Riga Polytechnic Institute. By 1939 it had 446 faculty and 7,247 students. In addition to the university, Latvia had three other institutions of higher learning, the Academy of Agriculture in Jelgava, the State Conservatory for music studies, and the Academy of Arts.s 8 One disturbing feature of the University of Latvia was the importance of the exclusive fraternities, korporacijas, elitist academic associations Latvians had copied from the German universities, even singing the same student songs, but in Latvian instead of German. Fraternity and sorority members prided themselves as the cream of Latvian society, far more so than the partying fraternities of American colleges. Their loyalties ran deeper than those of any other Latvian social grouping, and fraternity members honored their connections through appointments in business, government and the bureaucracy. The korporacijas, two in particular, Selonija and Lettonia, also became the breeding grounds of ultranationalism and anti-Semitism.s9 In religious matters the Latvians officially acknowledged the separation of church from state, even though public schools offered religious instruction, the state subsidized religious institutions, and the Ministry of the Interior set up a special Department of Religious Affairs to supervise religious activities. In 1935 around 55 percent of Latvia's population, 1,075,641, had registered as Lutherans; 476,963, or 24 percent, as Roman Catholics; 174,389 as Greek Orthodox; 107,195 as Russian Old Believers;

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and 93,406 as "Hebrews.''6o The largest denomination, the Lutherans, split between a Latvian majority and a German minority. With independence the Latvian majority felt it was only just that the largest and most revered churches, which heretofore had been German, should be turned over to Latvian congregations. Consequently, the friction between Latvians and Latvia's Germans crossed over into church matters. As for Latvia's Catholics, most of them living in Latgale, the Vatican signed a concordat with Latvia in 1922 and granted them their own Archbishop of Riga. The Orthodox faithful of Latvia had to readjust their religious orientation from the Patriarch of Moscow, whom they regarded as a Soviet stooge, to the Patriarch of Constantinople, making the Orthodox Christians of Latvia officially Greek rather than Russian Orthodox. 6 ' The Economy Independent Latvia inherited an economic wasteland. The war had devastated its economic foundations. Industry, which at the turn of the century was moving the future Latvia to the forefront of the European economic scene, no longer existed. The Russians had hauled away to Russia as much of the industrial plant and machinery as possible, and the war and the Germans destroyed the rest. Demolished port facilities lay unusable, rolling railway stock was gone, as was most of Latvia's shipping. Since reconstruction required vast amounts of capital, which Latvia lacked, Latvians had to start from almost nothing to rebuild the economy, and under such circumstances they turned to its basic resource, land. Out of necessity Latvia, which had been advancing toward industrialization, retreated to agriculture. 62 Latvia's leaders hoped that agriculture could generate the capital needed for economic development-or in this case recovery-a recourse adopted by many developing countries, including the Soviet Union in its efforts to industrialize. Agriculture on its own, however, could not provide the necessary capital in Latvia, thanks to agrarian reform and the resulting decline in productivity. In order to encourage and support agriculture the government assumed a direct role in all areas of the economy, and consequently state intervention characterized independent Latvia's economy, which evolved as a mix of state and private enterprise, with the former steadily gaining at the expense of the latter. Post-World War II claims of independent Latvia's commitment to free-market capitalism were the figments of exile imaginations that appealed to the capitalist tenets of Western cold war rhetoric. With an absence of free-flowing capital the state not only supported agriculture, but also supervised the recon-

Prewar Latvia I 31

struction of industry. In general, industry took a back seat to agriculture, and those industries related to the land, such as food processing and timber, prevailed over heavy manufacturing. 6 3 Unfortunately for Latvia's economy, its statesmen promoted policies counterproductive to the goal of economic development. Just as they pushed through agrarian reform for political and nationalistic reasons rather than economic purposes, their obsession with reducing nonLatvian influence and ownership of the economy retarded the recovery effort. Radical extremists such as the Perkonkrusts were not the only ones advocating a Latvia for Latvians. Economic nationalism permeated mainstream Latvian economic thinking, and resentment of non-Latvian ownership of enterprises as well as control over credit and available capital manifest itself in legislation that further circumscribed what remained of free-market capitalism in Latvia. Especially with the onset of the depression, the fact that Germans, Jews, and Russians controlled so much of the Latvian economy evoked increasingly strident demands for Latvianizing the economy. Even relatively enlightened statesmen such as the diplomat Alfreds Bilmanis referred to "unpatriotic national minorities" and to "this credit advantage so cleverly achieved by the Germans and Jews." 64 The Latvians had to rebuild not only factories and farms, but also the supporting infrastructure from the ground up, including transportation and communications. Most Latvian shipping, so critical in trade and in reestablishing Riga as a major port, had been lost. In 1920 only forty-five ships were seaworthy, and though Latvia rebuilt its merchant fleet, in 1939 it had no more than 103 ships, totaling 200, ooo tons. 65 The railways too were in deplorable condition, and what track and equipment remained was dilapidated and obsolete. The lines, built during imperial times, were connected to the Russian interior, poorly suited for domestic transportation or for readjusting the direction of trade westward. As for road transportation, Latvia had barely entered the automobile age. In 1938 horses still outnumbered gasoline-powered vehicles 400,100 to s,829.66 The banking and financial systems were also in disarray and stoked the ire of economic nationalists who resented disproportionate nonLatvian influence in yet another area of endeavor. Since Latvian banking had relied heavily on St. Petersburg, independence led to a natural dislocation in capital flow. The British and the Germans, especially the latter, stepped in to fill the void. Both invested in Latvia, but stifling state economic control and nationalistically inspired intervention scared away much potential capital. When contemplating introducing a new currency,

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the Latvians experimented with a Latvian ruble, but it flopped. Eventually the regime settled on the Lat, with its gold content fixed at the value of the Swiss Franc. From income earned by state monopolies on flax and timber exports, gradually the state built up a tidy gold reserve. 67 Singled out with preferential treatment and expectations for providing for the economic welfare of Latvian society, Latvian agriculture slowly adjusted to new circumstances, in particular to adapting to the switch from agriculture based on large estates to smaller, individual homesteads. Initially the fragmented system resulted in low productivity, but with time yields improved. Help came from two sources, the state and the advent of the cooperative movement. The cooperative movement, which had its origins in the prewar era, became the mainstay of the rural economy. The co-ops provided financial assistance, information, and helped stabilize prices by establishing something like a quota and price system that regulated supply. The state became involved in the cooperative system as well and supplied farmers with ready credit and subsidies to keep them solvent. 68 Rebuilding agriculture took time, since replenishing livestock herds, especially dairy cows, did not happen overnight. Determining which crops to produce and how much also was no easy matter at a time of worldwide volatility in commodity prices. For example, in the 1920s Latvia imported grain, since most farmers found producing for the unpredictable world grain market a risky business. The depression, however, impelled the state to step in and seize for itself even greater control of agriculture. Since the import of grain drained away valuable currency at a time when profitable exports such as timber dropped in demand, the state shut off grain imports and ordered farmers to plant grain and make Latvia self-sufficient. The government paid subsidies to keep grain prices up and encouraged farmers to plant rye and wheat, and by the late 1930s Latvia produced enough grain for its own consumption as well as for export. Government intervention in the dairy sector also boosted production, eventually making Latvia a major dairy exporter. 69 The most dependable commodity that earned foreign currency through export, provided capital for economic development, and paid for many of the state's expenditures was timber, Latvia's "green gold." Since agrarian reform had turned over virtually all forest land to the state, the state monopolized the timber business and used the income to finance its expenses, such as subsidies for agriculture. Through both good and bad economic times the timber industry kept Latvia financially afloat.7°

Prewar Latvia I 33

Industrial reconstruction presented an even more formidable task than agricultural recovery. Not only did plants have to be rebuilt and machinery procured, but new arrangements had to be made for acquiring raw materials. Latvian prewar industry had relied on Russian raw materials, but that source was gone, as was its principal source of energy. Russia had also been Latvia's primary market. Although prospects looked dim for an industrial revival to a level anywhere near that of prewar times, Latvia began a slow and painful recovery. From only 1,430 industrial enterprises and 61,000 industrial workers in 1920, Latvia's industry grew to 5,700 concerns and 2os,ooo workers in 1937. Latvia, however, shifted away from its former reliance on heavy industry such as metallurgy, chemicals and shipbuilding, to textiles, lighter metalworking, woodworking, and the food industry.?' Foreign trade had to be rebuilt as well. Latvia's pre-independence economic reliance on Russia had ended, and although Latvia's leaders had expected to carry on trade with the new Russia and to continue serving it as a transit for Western trade, Latvia failed to become a commercial bridge to the Soviet Union. The dislocations of war, the revolution, Baltic independence, the legacy of hard feelings, all were impediments too great to overcome. Even a trade treaty signed with the Soviet Union in June 1927 brought little improvement. A few suggested trade with Latvia's Baltic neighbors, Estonia and Lithuania, as an alternative to Russian trade, but their economies were too similar to be of much use to one another, and subsequently their economic relationship became more a rivalry than a mutually beneficial endeavor.?, The most viable alternative to trade with the Soviet Union was a reorientation toward the West, paradoxically toward two economic rivals, Germany and Great Britain. Germany took the lead in this competition in the early 1920s, due in part to its proximity and its historic familiarity with the Baltic region. But by the mid-1920s Great Britain began to compete with Germany, as Latvia, trying to move closer to England politically, made a concerted effort to nurture that relationship. Since England purchased more from Latvia than it sold, and paid in sterling, Latvia realized a nice profit with which it could purchase goods from Germany, from which it bought more than it sold. An unintended triangular trade relationship developed, with Latvia selling to England and buying from Germany. During the worldwide depression, Latvia's trade with its two main partners decreased, as did all international trade, but then revived in the early 1930s. Its trade with England in fact increased, but up to the outbreak of war Germany remained its number one trade partner-even

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though British sterling looked even more attractive in these economic hard times than before, preferable to Germany's clearing system, a process of large-scale barter that usually worked in Germany's favor.73 As Latvia overcame wartime economic dislocation, readjusted its economic priorities, and started the process of recovery, it began providing the good life for much of its population, at least by Eastern European standards. Although Soviet observers and the Latvian left have concluded to the contrary, unemployment, except for the depression years, did not become a major problem. The income gap remained relatively narrow, with few very wealthy individuals and concomitantly little poverty, another observation the left has disputed. A Scandinavian-like state welfare system provided for health care, and other social amenities helped minimize the pains of social-economic misfortune. Granted, life was more difficult during the depression, which in Latvia peaked from around 1929 to 1932, after which most economic indicators began to improve. For many Latvians the years of independence economically were overall the good old days, to be remembered fondly and nostalgically.

Foreign Policy From its creation Latvia, as did many other small and newly independent states, placed its faith in the League of Nations as a defender of the rule of law in international affairs. Although at odds with the League on some issues, particularly compensation for confiscated Baltic German land, Latvia's leaders believed that only the rule of international law and respect for national sovereignty could guarantee its continued existence. Along with placing their faith in the League of Nations, which Latvia joined in September 1921, Latvia's diplomats emphatically proclaimed neutrality. Under the circumstances of having temporarily weakened neighbors, Germany and the Soviet Union, neutrality was a reasonable approach in the early 1920s.?4 Latvian statesmen were not so na"ive, however, to place complete trust in the League and their own unilateral declarations of neutrality. They realized the potential danger from their two covetous neighbors, which sooner or later-one or the other, or both-would recover and threaten Latvia again. Latvians therefore sought additional insurance by courting the Western powers, victors in the war and the proclaimed defenders of the new status quo. Since France was preoccupied with building a collective security system to control Germany, Latvia turned toward England. The English were accustomed to carrying the flag along with trade, and as English economic interests in the Baltic grew, so did the political profile of the Union Jack in the region.7s Latvians did not

Prewar Latvia I 35 think of their tilt toward England as compromising their neutrality, since they associated England with the League and presumed it an advocate of international democracy and fair play. Unfortunately for Latvia her powerful and for the time being dormant neighbors did not agree; England's presence did not go unnoticed. Along with its overtures toward the West, Latvia also courted its two Baltic neighbors, Estonia and Lithuania. It hoped to create if not a Baltic Union, then at least a Baltic Entente, drawing the three Baltic States into closer cooperation, especially for defensive purposes. Although Latvia had little difficulty delineating borders with its neighbors, constructing a closer relationship, not to mention an alliance, proved next to impossible. After several conferences, some of which included Finland, hopes for a meaningful Baltic Entente faded. At least one Latvian diplomat blamed the other states for this failure.7 6 Such casting of blame suggests the essential reasons for the failure of the effort-national arrogance on the part of all three states that precluded compromise and disparaged any concessions that might impinge on their sovereignty or even appear to slight their national honor. Issues such as Lithuania's dispute with Poland over Vilnius and its potential difficulties with Germany over Klaipeda (Memel) also obstructed the effort, since the other two were wont to become involved. The only concrete result of these Baltic efforts was a ten-year defensive alliance between Latvia and Estonia concluded November 1, 1923.77 The Soviet Union, disclosing a paranoia that would characterize its response to virtually all Baltic diplomatic initiatives in the coming years that excluded it, voiced its displeasure and accused Latvia and Estonia of anti-Soviet hostility.7 8 Latvia's relationship with the Soviet Union in the early 1920s remained tranquil and proper but fraught with suspicion on both sides. After their experience with brief Soviet rule in 1919 it took Latvians a while to overcome their distrust of the Soviet Union. For the time being the Soviets remained silent on any revanchist claims, but communist unrest in Estonia and Lithuania alarmed Latvia and raised its suspicions. Afraid of being denied any influence in the region and wary of Baltic neutrality that clearly leaned to the West, the Soviets offered nonaggression pacts to the Baltic States. Latvia and Estonia would have been amenable to a pact between the Soviets on one side, the Baltic States jointly on the other, but they shied away from signing any bilateral agreements in which the giant partner dominated the lesser. Nothing conclusive came of this enterprise until the left-of-center government led by the Social Democrats came to power in Latvia in late 1926. Negotiations resulted in

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the initialing of a Latvian-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty on March 9, 1927, but a trial of alleged Soviet spies postponed the signing. And with the fall of the left-wing cabinet and the resumption of rightist rule the signing was put off indefinitely. The Soviets and Latvians managed to conclude a trade treaty in June 1927, but the optimistic expectations of a trade wind· fall did not materialize.79 Soviet declarations of peaceful intentions finally paid dividends in February 1929, when the Baltic States, including Latvia, signed with the Soviets a less substantive agreement than the tabled nonaggression treaty, the so-called Litvinov Protocol. By signing this document they agreed to accept the principles of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 1928-which committed all signatory states to condemn war as a means to solve international disputes-even before it went into effect Europeanwide. Responding to the apparently peaceful intentions of the Soviets, on February 5, 1932, Latvia finally dusted off and signed the nonaggression treaty with the Soviet Union, which on April 4, 1934, both signatories extended for ten more years. In July 1933 the two parties also signed a convention defining "aggression" and agreed that neither would take aggressive measures toward the other. 80 At a time of rising tensions in Europe, securing from the Soviet Union commitments to peace and respect for international rules regarding sovereignty, undoubtedly allowed at least some Latvians to sleep more soundly. On September 18, 1934, the Soviet Union even joined the League of Nations, further evidence that the Soviet Union was no longer as great a threat to Latvia and its neighbors as before. Ominously, however, Germany had withdrawn from the same organization the previous year. German-Latvian relations during the first decade of Latvian independence were more limited in scope. The major issues were either economic or related to the status of the Baltic German minority in Latvia. The Weimar Republic, in its effort to win re-acceptance in the European community of nations through a policy of fulfillment, also took recourse to the auspices of the League of Nations, especially as it advocated the interests of the Baltic German minority in Latvia. 8 ' This quiescent, cooperative but resolute course in foreign affairs digressed sharply in an aggressive direction with the advent of the National Socialist regime in 1933. Consequently Latvian foreign policy experienced a significant shift, from one in which the Soviets were the only potential threat to Latvia's security and independence, to one that identified a new danger on the horizon, Nazi Germany. With Adolf Hitler's ascendancy to power, Latvia, as well as the rest of Europe found itself facing radically new and more hazardous

Prewar Latvia I 37

international circumstances, conditions and events that ultimately resulted in war. Latvia's Armed Forces Latvia emerged from its War of Independence with an armed force of 75,000 men, some of whom returned to Latvia from as far away as Vladivostok. Many had fought against each other at one time or another, and throughout the next two decades differences among these veterans led to squabbling but never seriously hampered their performance of duties. The military hierarchy according to the Constitution started at the top with the State President, who in time of war became the supreme commander. Normally the armed forces came under the civilian authority of the Minister of War, which, though a civilian post, was usually filled by military men. The highest military position was the Commander of the Army, and assisting him was an Army Staff, with a Chief of Staff at its head. 82 One of the first tasks of the Latvian Army was to demobilize and trim down. After sending most men home the army stood at a peacetime strength of approximately 2o,ooo men, which included some 2,ooo officers, 4,000 noncommissioned officers-which Latvians classified as instructors-and some 14,000 enlisted men. This somewhat top-heavy establishment was not unusual for a peacetime army that relied on an active duty cadre and a readily available standing reserve of 1oo,ooo men in time of war. The Latvians subdivided the army into four infantry divisions, each named for one of Latvia's four regions: Kurzeme, Vidzeme, Latgale, Zemgale. Each division consisted of three infantry regiments and one artillery regiment. Other units were added with time, such as communications, supply, sappers, and transportation.H3 The Military Law of July 17, 192 3, prescribed a military obligation for all Latvian men between the ages of seventeen and fifty. As of 1927 the draft age was twenty-one, though volunteers could enlist with their parents' permission at seventeen. Obligatory active duty until 1931 was eighteen months, which at that time was reduced to ten months, with longer terms in specialized units. Having completed active service, a soldier went on "leave until further notification," a status lasting three years; then he served in the ready reserve until the age of forty, after which he owed ten more years of duty in the land guards (zemes sargi). This system kept an estimated 18o,ooo men trained and in various stages of readiness.S4 Eventually the Army calculated the Aizsargi as an additional reserve pool to be mobilized in emergencies.

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Army training, traditions, and modes of operation at least initially followed those of the czarist Russian army, in which most Latvian officers had served. Some German practices were incorporated as well. With time the army assumed a more Latvian character, as it developed its own Latvian traditions and ways. Although Latvian officers received training at the War School (Karaskola), they also traveled to military schools in France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other states for additional preparation. Military training did not begin with one's active duty. By law military training became part of the public school curriculum, which required two hours of military training weekly in the last two years of schooling. 8s In addition to the army the armed forces also included a navy and an aviation wing. The Latvian Navy got its start in 1921 by salvaging a sunken German minesweeper, which after repairs became the navy's flagship, Virsaitis. Most other vessels came from France, including two French submarines, Ranis and Spidola, purchased in 1926. When these two modern, French-built submarines stopped at Kiel on their maiden voyage to Latvia, German Admiral Erich Raeder openly admired the Uboats, at a time when postwar restrictions prohibited Germany from having its own. Latvia also procured from France a sub-tender built in 1908, the Varonis, and two mine trawlers of 1926 vintage, the Viesturs and !manta. Because of the French origins of these vessels, many Latvian naval officers trained in France. The fleet also added a cutter, Brinums, a yacht, Kometa, and a few other small vessels. Two large icebreakers, Krisjanis Valdemars and Lacplesis and a few smaller ones supported naval operations. As. early as 1922 the navy added its own aviation wing with a purchase of six seaplanes from Sweden. Most of these vessels and planes operated out of the main Latvian naval base at Liepaja and from smaller installations at Riga and Ventspils. By 1933 the navy's manpower stood at nearly soo, including fifty-nine officers and 435 NCO's and sailors. 86 The Latvian air force began flying in 1919 with eight airplanes left over from the war. Latvia purchased ten more planes from England the same year, and began collecting an odd assortment of inexpensive aircraft from all over, several from Italy and Czechoslovakia. Slowly the numbers of air machines grew, although their military value was questionable. By the 1930s the aviation branch had acquired a disparate assortment of over 100 aircraft, but only forty-two were modern enough for combat. These planes and soo-some men comprised an aviation regiment with several squadrons of fighters, reconnaissance, and training craft. The main air base was located at Spilve, outside of Riga. The Aizsargi aviation units and in 1936 naval aviation also came under the air force. 8 7 Strik-

Prewar Latvia I 39 ingly, the emblem adorning Latvian military aircraft was a red ugunskrusts-the swastika. This runic emblem, predating the rise of Hitler and National Socialism in Germany, was indigenous to Latvia and not an imitation. The Finns painted the same design on their aircraft, but in blue. 88 As of 1935 Latvia's border guards officially became part of the armed forces. Under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, they operated as a fully militarized formation of some 100 officers and 1,200 men. 89 It would be along the 211 mile-long stretch of the eastern border with the Soviet Union, just one day before the Soviet occupation of Latvia in June 1940, that border guards became Latvia's first casualties of the war. As for armaments, in the early 1920s Latvian weaponry consisted of a hodgepodge of mostly outdated leftovers from World War I, primarily of German or Russian stock. With time the Latvians turned toward the West as its main supplier, but with mixed results. Whereas the French sold topof-the-line equipment, such as the submarines and other naval vessels, the English first dumped surplus weapons on the market, although by the 1930s they sold more up-to-date arms. Photographs from the period illustrate this eclectic approach to arming the Latvian military, with some Latvian units wearing French helmets and others sporting German ones.9o Eventually the Latvians produced their own light ammunition, but heavier ordinance came from abroad.9' Maintaining a military was costly, and Latvia tried to do it on the cheap. Nevertheless, throughout the 1930s the military budget consumed on the average 20 to 24 percent of the national budget, and on the eve of war in 1939 it reached 27 percent. 92 The Latvian military also had to address the problem of national minorities. The fervently nationalistic, ethnically Latvian officer corps simply did not trust non-Latvians to serve Latvia loyally. They seldom assigned non-Latvians to sensitive, critical duties. The cadre often perceived non-Latvian soldiers as "revolutionary" and suitable only for labor units, in which they used spades, not rifles.93 Few non-Latvians could crack the officer corps, and those that did, encountered limits to advancement. Russians, Poles, Jews and Latvians from Latgale normally were stationed in western parts of Latvia, whereas presumably more reliable western Latvians usually served in the critical eastern border areasoften referred to as duty in "the Far East" or even Siberia.94 The politically conservative officer corps also singled out Social Democrats and other left-leaning soldiers as troublemakers and strictly controlled what soldiers could read and listen to on the radio. Soldiers deemed "unreliable" often ended up in labor battalions rather than in frontline units.9 5

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Prior to the 1930s the Latvian Army command gave little thought to strategy and plans. Even though a general fear of the Soviet Union prevailed, other than stationing troops near the Soviet border, the military did little else. Latvians built no fortifications, nothing resembling a defensive line, not even in the late 1930s when the Soviets began clearing vast stretches of borderlands and building a system of towers, pillboxes, and railroads that approached the Latvian border.9 6 It was not only the Latvian military that lacked a comprehensive strategy, but so did the three Baltic States together. Even though outside military experts often calculated the armies of the Baltic States as one, nothing resembling a unified force existed, nor did a plan exist to coordinate Baltic forces. Only once, in 1930, did Estonian and Latvian officers even meet to discuss closer military cooperation, and only once, in 1931, did they hold joint maneuvers.9 7 Independent Latvia in most respects fit into the common mold of the newly created national states of Eastern Europe. Latvians had constructed a political system based on the liberal, democratic principles espoused by the victors of the Great War, and for better and worse it worked well enough to keep the new state functioning. Latvia's economy experienced drastic readjustments, but with time it delivered the good life for most of its citizens and sustained a standard of living that compared favorably with most states of Eastern Europe, if not the West. Latvia's cultural accomplishments became sources of national pride, in particular the high level of education the state provided its people. Granted, the national minority problem remained a chronic irritant, but this too was kept from boiling over. To be a viable, fully recognized state, it had to have an army, and Latvia had one, a military force quite adequate for its mostly symbolic and ceremonial mission. As for Latvia's foreign policy, its implementation preserved the Republic, in particular its independence. In pursuit of this objective its statesmen had relied on the goodwill of the great powers, the League of Nations, and its own declaration of neutrality, a loud message to one and all that Latvia wanted to be left alone to follow its own destiny. All of this functioned well enough for a while, until the early 1930s, when international events beyond Latvia's control and internal developments brought on by Latvians themselves led Latvia step by step down the road to war and calamity.

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Latvia's Road to War

Most historians agree that World War II in Europe began with Germany's attack on Poland on September I, I939, but many would also concur that the origins of the conflict should be traced to a point six years earlier. Since responsibility for starting the war solely lies with Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany, one can arguably regard Hitler's ascent to power on January 30, I933, as the first step toward war. Similarly, when pinpointing the start of Latvia's involvement in this war, one may justifiably select the date when Latvia, like Germany, gave up on democracy and resorted to its own version of a nationalistic dictatorship. On May IS, I934, a little more than a year after Germany abandoned democracy, Latvia did the same in a coup that brought to power the authoritarian regime of Karlis Ulmanis. For better and for worse, from that date onward Ulmanis and those closest to him, just like Hitler and his Nazi coterie in Germany, were exclusively responsible for Latvia's fate-so far as Latvia could maneuver within the parameters set by external circumstances. Ulmanis and his clique directed Latvia's domestic as well as foreign policy, which, though aiming desperately to avert conflict, inexorably swept a helpless Latvia right into the abyss. The coup of May 15, 1934

Justifications for the Coup of May IS, I934, and the consequent dismantling of Latvia's democratic, constitutional system fall back on the same excuses offered elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe during the I930s, when all states in the region, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, succumbed to the antidemocratic appeal and gave up on political pluralism. The reason most frequently tendered by Ulmanis supporters, including the majority of postwar Latvian exiles, was political instability, allegedly engendered by parliamentary factionalism resulting from an overly democratic constitution. According to Latvian apologists for the coup, special interests, the political left, and the national minorities supposedly exploited the constitutional system to their self-seeking advan-

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tage, ultimately leading to the demise of democracy; they, not Ulmanis, foreclosed on democracy. • Furthermore, so runs their expiating defense, by 1934 parliamentary politics had irreparably atomized and polarized, dooming the political process to futility, and the Latvian people, tired of the parliamentary squabbling, yearned for and deserved a stronger executive. Some Ulmanis faithful averred that his action prevented imminent civil war and preempted coups from both the extreme right, the Perkonkrusts, and from the left, the Social Democrats' militant sports association. z Ulmanis's detractors on the other hand depict the coup as no more than a disingenuous ruse and an alarmist pretext for suppressing democracy. As for the threat of civil war and impending coups, they note that he never provided any credible evidence for either. These critics lament that Ulmanis, frustrated with an obstinate Saeima and powerless to alter the political system by peaceful, political means, resorted to extra-parliamentary, illegal measures.3 At least one adversary, the Social Democrat Bruno Kalnins, regards Ulmanis's trip to Hitler's Germany in 1933 as a learning experience and the inspiration for installing in Latvia what he had observed in Germany.4 Another justification for the coup blames the world economic crisis, which supposedly required firm political leadership to prescribe the rejuvenating remedy. Economic data, however, puncture this argument. The recovery had already begun in 1932, two years before the coup, and by 1933 the Latvian economy had clearly turned the corner toward recovery, thanks to the measures taken by the allegedly incompetent and self-serving Saeima. Neither the coup nor Ulmanis's rule turned the tide, and the notion that only a more resolute regime could deal with the depression is at best a convenient excuse and deceptive myth.s Other supporters of the coup have gone beyond the temporary crisis of the depression to blame endemic shortcomings in the Latvian economy, including "over-industrialization, credit inflation, an excess of middlemen, expensive government experiments, the neglect of agrarian interests, and the lack of a truly national economic policy," as faults that required correction through the nationalistic economic policies of Ulmanis. 6 Paradoxically some on the left agree with the Ulmanis camp that the nature of the Latvian economy led to the coup. They blame the economic crisis for the timing of the coup and the advent of what they refer to as fascist rule, but dogmatically they perceive the chronic ills of world capitalism as making the crisis inevitable. Their litany preaches that the world's capitalists, great and small, including Latvian bourgeois capitalists, tried to save the collapsing eco-

Latvia's Road to War I 43

nomic system by turning to fascism, capitalism's last, desperate gasp of life as it teetered on the brink of a socialist revolution.? The most plausible explanation for the coup is indeed political, but it cannot be attributed solely to the impasse created by an allegedly inefficient Saeima. As much as anything else, fear of declining electoral popularity on the part of the Agrarians precipitated the takeover. Although the left bloc had lost some strength in the 1931 elections, the Social Democrats still remained the largest single party. Granted, the agrarians managed to pull together another ruling coalition, but its electoral support was shaky. Consequently, in order to preserve his slipping political grip, in late October 1933 Ulmanis proposed constitutional reforms to reduce the number of parties, elect the state president by a direct popular vote, and in general curtail the authority of the parliament and grant more power to the executive. The dispute went unresolved, with the Saeima refusing to yield, until Ulmanis, annoyed with not getting his way and obstructed mainly by the Social Democrats, decided to act. 8 Select military men, including Minister of War Janis Balodis, Riga Garrison Commander Krisjanis Berkis, and the leader of the Aizsargi, Alfreds Berzins, conspired with Ulmanis to plan and execute the coup.9 On the night of May 15, 1934, the conspirators proclaimed a state of emergency. While army units seized control of bridges and key government buildings in Riga, armed Aizsargi raided the headquarters of the Social Democrats and other political opponents throughout the country. The plotters arrested one fourth of all Saeima deputies, mostly Social Democrats-some 2,ooo nationwide-a brazen move that shocked the West and did irreparable harm to Latvia's democratic image abroad. The insurgents also detained many Perkonkrusts loyalists. Riga's Central Prison became the primary detention center for Ulmanis's opponents-as it would in later years under both the Soviet and German occupationsand his accomplices erected a temporary concentration camp outside Liepaja to confine the overflow. Accommodating judges meted out a range of sentences, from a few months to several years.'' "Not a shot was fired, no blood was shed," was the favorite refrain of Ulmanis's sympathizers. Cynically yet disingenuously they tried to wrap this blatant transgression in the mantle of legality by justifying the coup on certain articles of the very same constitution their leader had abrogated. ' The Latvian public knew nothing of the coup until the following day, May 16. That morning in Riga, the center of the coup, traffic ran normally, although people on their way to work could not but notice armed Aizsargi and soldiers standing guard and marching around. Later that day 10

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Ulmanis informed the nation by radio that this action was not an attack on democracy, and claiming that Latvia had barely avoided an extremist takeover, he credited himself, the army, and the Aizsargi for saving Latvia from chaos. He promised to bring the nation (Tauta) back together by eliminating classes as well as other distinctions: there would be no more urban Latvians, no more rural Latvians. He also assured the public that the suspension of the Constitution and the dismissal of the Saeima were temporary expedients, and he would restore both as soon as he had a chance to revise the Constitution, a promise that remained unfulfilled, as did the one to lift the state of emergency once he restored order. Ulmanis's sympathizers cite the absence of resistance to the coup as undeniable proof of widespread approval for this action.'3 Of course there was no opposition; it was all in jail. President Alberts Kviesis, although taken by surprise, assented to the usurpation of authority and routinely scribbled his approval on all subsequent measures that crossed his desk. As of May 18, Ulmanis, as both prime minister and foreign minister, asserted authority to legislate by decree, pending a national referendum approving his rule and a new constitution-another empty commitment. Some of his fellow conspirators, such as Minister of War Janis Balodis,later urged him to honor his promises, but Ulmanis always found some excuse to procrastinate. When the term of President Kviesis expired in April 1936, Ulmanis-perhaps emulating Hitler's example upon the death of Reich President Hindenburg-took the post for himself, becoming both prime minister and president. His personal rule culminated with his appropriation of the title of Vadonis, which translates as "the Leader," or inauspiciously, "der Fuhrer." Do not question his wisdom; just trust him.'4 Arrests of critics on both the right and the left continued into the summer and throughout the years of Ulmanis's rule. Eventually most of those apprehended during the coup were released, but up until the Soviet occupation 200 to 300 political detainees languished in Latvian jails. To Ulmanis's credit, no one was executed for political reasons. Several ranking army officers known for their democratic inclinations were furloughed or "retired," including, paradoxically, the future commander of the Latvian People's Army under the Soviets, General Roberts Klavins, and General Rudolfs Bangerskis, who under the German occupation became the inspector general of the Latvian Legion.'s Ulmanis did keep one promise-to rule above party politics, without parties. He abolished all political parties, even his own Agrarian Union, and relied more than ever

Latvia's Road to War I 45 before on like-minded army officers, and above all on the Aizsargi, the paramilitary incarnation of the dissolved Agrarian Union.' 6 Many have tried to describe Ulmanis's rule, calling it fascist, authoritarian, a benign dictatorship, and a presidential dictatorship. The choice of labels, however, makes little difference, for what matters is that Ulmanis suspended democracy in Latvia. Although his rule was mild in comparison to harsher regimes such as Mussolini's, and far less brutal than Hitler's, he can be faulted for denying the Latvian people the freedom of expression and limiting their options as Latvia faced a deteriorating international situation. In the coming years Ulmanis alone, with his handful of advisors, would make all the decisions for the Tauta,

The Ulmanis Dictatorship The personal rule of Karlis Ulmanis, to which many Latvians refer as the Ulmanis Times (Ulmana Laiki), lasted six years, from the coup of May 1934 until June 1940 and the Soviet occupation of Latvia.'? Proclaiming the new political system a "Government of National Unity," Ulmanis as Vadonis selected trusted and similarly thinking men to serve him. General Janis Balodis remained Minister of War, and Ulmanis appointed General Krisjanis Berkis, commander of the Riga garrison-whose loyalty was essential to the coup-Commander of the Army. Another close confidant was the leader of the Aizsargi, Alfreds Berzins, who assumed the post of Minister of the Interior, Latvia's chief authority in matters of security and the police. In 1937 he also received the newly created Ministry of Public Affairs (Sabiedrisko Lietu Ministrija), which some have described as a propaganda ministry for its control of the press, certain cultural affairs, and eventually the Aizsargi. Berzins deservedly earned the sobriquet "president's evil genius" by serving Ulmanis as Latvia's chief censor and shutting down newspapers, periodicals, and unfriendly organizations. ' 8 Another close and reliable associate was Vilhelms Munters, who in 1936 became Foreign Minister; he and Ulmanis were solely responsible for-and could also be blamed for-Latvia's subsequent foreign policy.' 9 One further pivotal and fascinating character joining the inner circle in 1938 was Alfreds Valdmanis, who received the portfolio of the finance minister This political chameleon was Latvia's version of the early nineteenth-century French minister Talleyrand, who made himself useful to one regime after another. Valdmanis served Ulmanis, then resigned, lived in Latvia through the Soviet occupation, became an indispensable figure in the Latvian Self-Administration under German occupation, resigned

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again, spent the remaining war years in Germany under mysterious circumstances, survived the war, and eventually emigrated to the West. Ulmanis, who fancied himself as the Latvian Oliver Cromwell, collected an array of titles and concomitant authority. By the Army Law of January 1, 1935, he became supreme chief of the armed forces, and in March he decreed that he would assume the state presidency after Kviesis's term expired in April. He retained the state of emergency until February 15, 1938, when he promulgated a new Law for the Defense of the State and thereby prolonged extraordinary authority indefinitely, providing the regime all necessary powers to continue its dictatorial rule, including the detention of anyone for six months in the interest of state security. Institutionally the regime was reorganized along corporate lines, something comparable to Mussolini's Fascist Italy. Venting his displeasure with the course of affairs, the extreme nationalist and passionate Ulmanis critic, Arveds Bergs, caustically observed, "A good dictatorship is worse than the worst democracy." 22 Little opposition surfaced against the dictatorship. Most Saeima members resignedly submitted to the new regimen without much fuss. Some even endorsed the new system, especially when Ulmanis rewarded them for good behavior by granting them lifetime pensions and even by paying off some of their personal debts. 3 But not everyone went quietly. Ulmanis repeatedly repressed and harassed the two extremes, the Perkonkrusts on the right, the Social Democrats and communists on the left. Bruno Kalnins, a prominent socialist, observed that "the lack of political freedom under Ulmanis so embittered the working population that one was ready to strike down the national dictatorship with the help of the Russians." 4 A more recent observation concludes that "Ulmanis in his anti-parliamentary, anti-socialist putsch came to be the biggest Communist-maker in Latvia since ... the Great Russian Russifiers." 2 s The Ulmanis regime substantially and fundamentally revamped the Latvian economy. Although statistics reveal that by 1934 the economy was on the road to recovery from the depression, Ulmanis claimed credit for the turnaround and perpetuated many state programs implemented for dealing with the crisis. 26 The effect of these measures was an apparent rise in the standard of living and the impression that Latvia had entered a period of prosperity under Ulmanis. The most important economic consequence of Ulmanis's rule was the accelerated growth of state control. One could justifiably describe Latvia's economy under Ulmanis as state capitalism, under which private enterprise gradually lost ground to state control, ultimately to state ownership. 7 In comparison to Nazi Germany, 20

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Latvia imposed far more central state control over its economy. In fact, in the proportion of state ownership of the economy, among all European states it ranked second only to the Soviet Union. 28 Ulmanis's principal economic goal was, as it was for many European leaders trying to recover from the crisis, self-sufficiency and immunity from the vagaries of the world economy-ambitious goals in an increasingly integrated and complex world economy. Another economic objective was nationalistically motivated: to put into practice the slogan Ulmanis usurped from the Perkonkrusts, "Latvia for Latvians." A statecontrolled, centrally planned economy would reduce foreign as well as domestic non-Latvian influence in the economy, the aim of many Latvian nationalists backing Ulmanis. The agrarian reform of the 1920s had broken the Baltic German grip on the countryside; it was time to finish the job in the rest of the economy. 9 As Ulmanis centralized and "Latvianized" the economy, he heeded the advice of accomplices such as Andrejs Berzins, who advocated the axiom that "all modern economies are planned economies."Jo The regime constructed chambers for different sectors of the economy that informed and advised the government upwards, while they transmitted the government's decisions downwards to their respective sectors for enactmentY The most disingenuous economic weapon at Ulmanis's disposal was the Latvian Credit Bank (Latvijas Kreditbanka) founded in April 1935. Its president, the same Andrejs Berzins, the foremost proponent of state control, became a veritable economic czar through this new institution. The initial and purported purpose of the Kreditbanka was to take over and administer ailing banks and insolvent businesses in a type of state receivership, but from the outset this thinly veiled guise for confiscation deemed non-Latvian enterprises as failing far more often than Latvian ones. As of January 17, 1938, the government authorized the Kreditbanka to liquidate as private holdings and confiscate as state property any enterprise without having to prove financial difficultiesY The regime had granted itself a free hand to expropriate virtually the entire Latvian economy, if it so pleased. It immediately liquidated one of Latvia's largest enterprises, the Latvijas Kokvilnas Razojumi (Latvia's Cotton Products), which not by coincidence was owned by a consortium of mostly nonethnic Latvians: eleven Germans, ten Jews, and only two Latvians. 33 Subsequent decrees absorbed much of the Latvian economy within state control and steadily forced out non-Latvian owners and capital. The handwriting was on the wall for non-ethnic Latvians in Latvia's economy. 2

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The regime's craving for central control and its drive for autarky spread to all sectors of the economy-industry, commerce and agriculture. Ulmanis's economic advisors steered Latvian industry toward producing mainly for home consumption and to develop those areas using the fewest imported raw materials, in order to maintain a positive foreign exchange balance. Accumulating an exchange surplus, in particular a gold reserve, became part of the government's overall economic strategy.34 Lumber and timber remained the major foreign trade commodities, as did flax, another government monopoly and source of revenue. Processed foods, particularly pork and dairy products, earned additional foreign profits, most of which dropped directly into the government's coffers. The government pushed especially hard for self-sufficiency in grain production. During the 1920s Latvia had imported grain, mostly because world market prices were deflated and too volatile for Latvian farmers to produce for profit, but since grain imports siphoned off valuable foreign exchange, the state halted grain imports and encouraged farmers to raise grain by providing generous subsidies to bolster prices. By the late 1930s Latvia produced enough grain for both domestic consumption and export.Js Grain and other farm subsidies were costly, but once in place, these remained a permanent, major expenditure. Costly projects also drained the state treasury, including the building of a huge power station and dam at Kegums on the Daugava, southeast of Riga. Kegums, once completed, stood as a symbol of national progress and economic success. Contracted in 1936, it was built mostly with Swedish credit and engineering.36 Fortunately for Latvia the Swedes invested when they did, because shortly afterwards the regime's nationalistically motivated economic policies began chasing away foreign credit and investments. The short-sighted and chauvinistic Latvian leaders smugly congratulated themselves for providing a modicum of prosperity, building up a level of self-sufficiency, collecting a favorable foreign exchange balance, and creating a more Latvian economyY By 1938 at least one of Latvia's economic barons, Finance Minister Valdmanis, perceived signs of a coming malaise, even an economic descent. Without the influx of new foreign capital and because non-Latvian domestic investments were discouraged, the system could not continue to rely on a favorable balance of trade indefinitely. The balance on the positive side of the ledger was already shrinking, as costly building projects, farm subsidies, and military costs rapidly consumed the profits. Little was set aside as capital for economic expansion.38 It was just a matter of time until the overcentralized, state-controlled economy would face

Latvia's Road to War I 49 serious difficulties. The war preempted an impending economic crisis, but most Latvians only remember the prosperity of the Ulmanis years, oblivious to what lay around the corner. A final point about the prewar economy needs to be stressed: The centralization and nationalization of so much of the economy under Ulmanis facilitated its takeover by the Soviets in 1940-1941. The state owned or controlled so much of the Latvian economy that the Soviets merely had to seize the control mechanisms; Ulmanis and his associates had already accomplished much of the nationalization themselves. As far as the general public was concerned, the majority seemed satisfied with Ulmanis. He was especially popular among landowning farmers, army officers, and the nationalist intelligentsia, most of whom enjoyed the good life and the modest prosperity he sustained. They did not seem to mind press censorship, since what the censors allowed in print coincided with their own views.39 They trusted the Vadonis and virtually worshipped the national harmony he endorsed. Few dared to voice any opposition, and those that complained too much were arrested or even exiled. Nevertheless, to Ulmanis's credit authoritarianism not terror ruled Latvia, at least not terror by Hitler's or Stalin's standards. An English woman residing in Riga in 1938, after having lived recently in German-annexed Austria, was astonished to learn "we were living under a dictatorship."4o Although life under Ulmanis was good for many Latvians, everyone did not share in it equally. In its effort to remake "Latvia for the Latvians," the regime not only introduced economic measures injurious to the national minorities but it also gradually curtailed their cultural and political rights. The minorities lost their political representation with the suspension of the Saeima and found their cultural organizations more closely monitored and restricted. Step by step one regulation after another shut these down or circumscribed their activities. For instance, new language restrictions limited the official use of non-Latvian languages, and in March 1936 an antiminority decree confiscated all nonethnic Latvianowned land within fifty kilometers of the border, allegedly for national security reasons.4' One charge that could not be readily levied against Ulmanis in his antiminority campaign was anti-Semitism. As will be discussed in more depth in a later chapter, Ulmanis cracked down hard on the Perkonkrusts, Latvia's most outspoken anti-Semites, and his censors prohibited anti-Semitic literature. Although most Jews realized the regime had not singled them out, they nonetheless sensed their economic foundations weakening and saw their political and cultural organizations

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banned or restricted. Naturally they faced the future with some trepidation. 4z Over the years a few dissenters dared speak out against the system and its leader, and rumors of coups popped up from time to time. Minister of War General Janis Balodis, a close associate and an accomplice in the 1934 coup, urged Ulmanis to restore constitutional rule, and Deputy Prime Minister Skujinieks resigned in early 1938 over this same issue.4 3 One of Ulmanis's most outspoken critics, the Social Democrat deputy, Voldemars Bastjanis, who survived the war to denounce Ulmanis and his regime from exile, admonished him for forgetting that "people do not exist for the state; the state exists for the people, as in all democracies." He later lamented that an entire generation of young Latvians in exile were learning about Ulmanis from their parents, who, being mostly Ulmanis supporters, conveyed an inaccurate, overly positive image of their leader.44 Another writer rued the fact that due to Ulmanis the Latvian public lost interest and ceased to be involved in political affairs.4 5 The most deplorable of Ulmanis's measures probably was his censorship of the press. As one leading historian notes, "gagging of the press," especially on anything related to Hitler and Stalin, kept the Latvian people in the dark on matters related to their fate.4 6 Because of Ulmanis's imperious ways, when the Soviets occupied Latvia on June 17, 1940, for some Latvians the country was no longer a free republic but an authoritarian dictatorship whose fall they actually welcomed.4? Military Preparations for war

Ulmanis and his intimate circle of military advisors assumed total responsibility for Latvia's preparations for war. As the international situation darkened, and Latvia's position on the world scene became increasingly precarious, the military belatedly had to rethink its role as an expensive, ceremonial symbol of national sovereignty. Shortly after the coup Ulmanis had praised the military: "Our most beautiful and most honorable task is to become the defenders of our native land (dzimtene)."4 8 And as late as November 1938 Minister of War Balodis defiantly declared that "We do not want war, but we will defend our state from all who threaten it." 49 In late March 1939, following Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia and the Memelland, Foreign Minister Vilhelms Munters boasted that whereas Germany was turning Lithuania into a protectorate, "If we were threatened with such a danger, we would fight to the last drop of blood ... no stone in Riga would be left standing on another."so General Krisjanis Berkis, commander of the army, huffed similar bravado: "Without

Latvia's Road to War I 51

a fight we will not give up our nation's arms, our nation's and fatherland's freedom, never and to no one."s' Bold words alone do not make for a national defense; in reality Latvia was woefully prepared for warY Whereas foreign observers had once rated the Latvian military the best among the Baltic States, by 1937 they had reassessed it as the poorest: The army was inadequately equipped, overly nationalistic, and too intolerant of ethnic non-Latvians. A British officer judged the army as adequate for carrying out a partisan war, but not for much more.s3 In addition to Ulmanis, those responsible for the military included Minister of War Balodis, Commander of the Army Berkis, Army Chief of Staff Hugo Rozensteins, Commander of the Border Guards. General Ludwig Bolsteins, and Foreign Minister Munters. Minister of Public Affairs Alfreds Berzins, who seemed to have his fingers in every pie, also had a hand in running the military. Military men with more liberal, democratic leanings had been relieved, or like the future head of the Latvian Legion, General Rudolfs Bangerskis, retired. Though all were dedicated patriots, widening differences of opinion on the part of Ulmanis's counselors over issues such as military spending and preparations impaired Latvia's military readiness.s4 Ulmanis's personal inattention to the military compounded the lack of preparation. Ulmanis was not against the military, but as one historian puts it, "It was unfamiliar to him."ss When it came to allocating limited resources in the late 1930s his priorities still favored subsidizing the countryside and maintaining the modest prosperity that was the key to his popularity. His reliance on and patronizing of the Aizsargi played a role as well, as he depended inordinately on this group for political support, to the neglect of the military. 5 6 Not realizing until March 1938 that due to foreign currency shortages Latvia had not adequately stockpiled strategic materials for war, Ulmanis hastily created a State Defense Fund, a supplementary source of financing for the military. Needed revenues were to be collected in part as additional direct taxes on real estate, workers' salaries, imports and other items, and in part as voluntary contributions. As a last resort he also summoned a new State Defense Council-essentially the same clique of insiders-to help direct belated military preparations.57 An area of glaring neglect was Latvia's military aviation. Prior to the creation of the State Defense Fund and in order to build up and modernize the pathetically inadequate aviation branch, in 1934 the regime had established the Aviation Fund, to be collected entirely from voluntary donations. The response was generous and enabled the military years later to purchase some modern aircraft, including thirty up-to-date fight-

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ers from England that it proudly displayed on Aviation Day, August 21, 1938. But relying on private largess was no way to build up an air force, and in April 1939 the Aviation Fund was turned over to the general Defense Fund.s 8 In September 1939 Latvia's air force consisted of 168 airplanes of dubious military value, most of which were suited for air shows but were no match for the air forces of hostile neighbors. 59 The procurement of arms also remained a critical problem. Latvia had no defense industry to speak of and continued to acquire arms abroad. This was a costly proposition because of the currency exchange problem. To raise cash Latvia even sold some old coastal artillery pieces to Republican Spain. 6o It managed to purchase the aforementioned fighter planes from England and also some tanks from Czechoslovakia, but as war approached, its main suppliers, concerned with their own military stocks, became reluctant to sell to others. One country still in the arms business, however, was Germany. In 1938 and 1939 Latvia purchased German arms, buying some from Krupps, others from Skoda-the formerly Czech armaments concern, which as of March 1939, belonged to the Reich-but few were delivered in time. Indicative of Ulmanis's inability to grasp fully Latvia's perilous military situation was his reluctance to import arms from Germany for fear of German spies entering Latvia under the guise of military experts training the Latvians in the use of the new weaponry. 6 ' Disagreements within Ulmanis's clique also prevented Latvia from constructing something as basic and simple as fortifications along the frontiers. Meanwhile in full view of Latvian border guards the Soviets leveled stretches of forests on their side of the frontier to create fields of fire, built bunkers and watchtowers, evacuated civilian populations from the area, and laid down railroad lines almost up to the Latvian border· 62 In planning their strategy Latvia's military leaders appropriately identified two potential military threats, the Soviet Union from the east, Hitler's Germany from the south. Although disagreeing over which one posed the greatest danger, they tried not to offend or provoke either of their martial neighbors, and in view of their proclaimed neutrality avoided any appearance of tilting toward one or the other. In this spirit the Latvian general staff attended the annual display of Soviet power, the May Day parade in 1936, and in return invited Soviet officers for an official visit. In a similar gesture in April 1939 several Latvian officers, including General Oskars Dankers, the future head of Latvia's Self-Administration under German occupation, and Army Chief of Staff Hartmanis accepted invitations to Berlin to celebrate the Fuhrer's fiftieth birthday. 63

Latvia's Road to War I 53

Unable to decide whether the German or Soviet threat was the greater peril, the Latvian military contemplated two contingencies. Since an attack from the Soviet Union and the east was one possibility, they developed plan A, which anticipated giving up Latgale and deploying westward. In case of an assault by Germany from the south through Lithuania, they proposed to withdraw northward, hence plan D. A third consideration envisioned aggression from both directions and the activation of plan K, which, unfortunately, offered no feasible routes for retreat. In addition to crossing to one side of the Daugava or the other, these schemes futilely calculated cooperation with Estonia in case of plan A and a partnership with Lithuania in the event of a German attack and the implementation of plan D. 64 Although they presumed cooperation with its neighbors, Latvia's military leaders never worked out anything concrete with their "allies." The Estonians, as they drew closer to Germany, viewed the Soviets as their principal threat and hesitated to become involved in any conflict with Germany. Lithuania on the other hand perceived Germany, not the Soviet Union, as its prime source of danger, and declined to do anything that might alienate the Soviets. In October 1939, shortly after the outbreak of war, the American envoy to Latvia was astounded with the lack of coordination among the Baltic States. In his opinion the Baltic armies would be of no military value at all. 6 s His appraisal was right on target.

Latvia's Diplomatic Road to war Ulmanis and his confidants, in particular Vilhelms Munters, who formally became Foreign Minister in 1936, also charted Latvia's foreign policy. In retrospect this enterprise, as matters unfolded, was another act of futility, since the Latvians had absolutely no control over their fate. External circumstances, above all the interests of the great powers, set the parameters for maneuvering, which were extremely narrow at best. The immutable geopolitical facts of life were still in force, and these dictated that Latvia, caught between two bellicose, expansionist powers, could do little more than respond to international events set in motion primarily by Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin. According to one prominent historian of prewar diplomacy, Hitler seized the diplomatic initiative in Europe in 1936 when he launched a "diplomatic revolution" that step-by-measuredstep pursued a course of aggression that ultimately and inevitably led to World War 11. 66 Stalin on the other hand mostly reacted to Hitler's moves and exploited conditions arising from Hitler and the Western powers jockeying for diplomatic advantages. 6 7 With time, however, Stalin, while

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trying to ward off Hitler, firm up Soviet security, and in general avoid being drawn into a capitalist war in which he had no interest, occasionally assumed the initiative and advanced his own expansionist interests. High on his priority list stood the reclamation of the western territories lost by Russia as a result of war and revolution. Latvia's statesmen did not stray far off their course of neutrality, although their faith in the League of Nations faded after Germany dropped out and the League subsequently proved impotent to stop aggression in Ethiopia, China and elsewhere. Latvia tilted slightly from its neutrality and away from Germany when Hitler belligerently and loudly proclaimed his intent to revise the postwar settlement. Somewhat comforting was the Soviet Union's entry into the League of Nations in 1934, which assuaged some Latvian qualms about the potential Soviet threat, Latvia's original menace. 68 Through its Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov the Soviet Union seemed genuinely interested in constructing a collective security system to hem in a reinvigorated and potentially warlike Germany-especially after Hitler stridently announced in March 1935 his intentions to rearm. Litvinov's efforts culminated in May 1935 with the signing of treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia that became the lynchpin of his collective security system. Latvian statesmen cautiously perceived in these steps a reaffirmation of peaceful Soviet intentions, for after all, the Soviets were inclining toward the Western powers, Latvia's first preference in patrons. 69 Litvinov pursued his campaign for collective security with a concerted effort to expand his system into an Eastern-European-wide security system, an "Eastern Locarno"-in reference to a series of treaties of friendship and cooperation signed by European states in 1925.? As early as April, even before signing pacts with France and Czechoslovakia, Litvinov had offered treaties of mutual assistance to the Baltic States. After weighing this offer for about a month, both the Latvians and Estonians rejected it, since such a commitment would have violated their neutrality.?• Not to be outdone, at the end of May Germany countered the Soviet diplomatic offensive with its own offer of nonaggression pacts to all European states. The signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in June 1935 added even greater urgency to the Soviet initiative, since this accord seemed to imply that the British had abandoned the Baltic Sea to Germany. Diplomatic competition was heating up.7 While the great powers maneuvered at the highest levels of statesmanship, Estonia and Latvia renewed their efforts to foster cooperation, and on February 17, 1934, they signed a treaty to strengthen their defen0

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sive alliance of 1923. Lithuania also expressed its interest in joining the other two, and the three commenced negotiations for a "Baltic Entente." From the outset the Entente was doomed to irrelevance, since its statesmen expressly excluded Lithuania's disputes with Poland over Vilnius and with Germany over Klaipeda (Memel)-two potentially serious matters. On September 12, 1934, envoys of the three states met in Geneva to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation for ten years. The final product had little to do with guaranteeing security and merely committed the three governments to consult with each other on issues of common concern. The foreign ministers of the Entente agreed to meet regularly, but mutual suspicions and national self-interests relegated the Entente to being no more than a paper entity.73 The only tangible result of the Entente was securing in 1936 a non-permanent seat for Latvia on the Council of the League of Nations as the representative of the so-called Baltic bloc.74 Amidst this diplomatic flurry in mid-1935 Ulmanis summoned home his diplomats from abroad for a conference. From June 28 to July 3, 1935, Ulmanis and Munters-at the time Foreign Secretary and not yet Foreign Minister-postulated the principles of Latvian foreign policy. Ulmanis warned his envoys that Latvia was entering hazardous and uncertain times, caught between Germany and Russia. In Munters's estimate, Germany posed more of a hazard, since the Soviet Union was not yet strong enough to risk conflict. Nevertheless, recalling the Soviet horrors of the revolutionary years, Munters hesitated to place trust in Russia and France for Latvia's security. He suggested three possible options for Latvia: let matters follow their course and do nothing; rely on the League of Nations and reemphasize Latvia's neutrality; or join the Russian security system. After hearing reports and impressions from the emissaries, who, like the military, disagreed whether Russia or Germany was the principal threat, Munters apprised them of Latvia's foreign policy for the near future: Although the best guarantees for Latvia's security would be collective arrangements, Latvia must not choose sides and must continue its course of neutrality, avoiding or at least postponing any conflicts for as long as possible. Above all Latvia did not want others interfering in Latvia's independence or using Latvia as an object of international barter.7s Easier said than done. As the Soviets pursued collective security, events in 1936 exacerbated international anxieties. When Hitler marched troops into the demilitarized Rhineland in March 1936 without a resolute response from the Western powers, the Baltic States assumed even greater importance in Soviet strategic considerations. The Red Army even printed additional

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military maps of the region.7 6 And on the occasion of the high-level Latvian military visit to Moscow for May Day 1936, Marshal Voroshilov informed his Baltic guests that the Soviet Union regarded the Baltic area as critical to its forward security against Germany.n Open threats followed Voroshilov's hints, the first coming from Leningrad Party Secretary Andrei Zhdanov. At the Congress of Soviets on November 29, Zhdanov warned: "Round us are small countries which dream of great adventures or allow great adventurers to manipulate their territory. We are not afraid of these little countries but if they do not mind their own business, we shall be compelled to open our borders and it will be too bad if we are compelled to use the Red Army on them."7 8 After Zhdanov's tirade, Soviet diplomats tried to mend fences by assuring the Baltic governments that the Soviet Union had no aggressive designs on them, but once the threat was out, a pall set over future relations. In February 1937, Marshal A. I. Yegorov returned the favor of an official visit to the Baltic capitals, including Riga, as did a Soviet press delegation in August 1937. The Soviet cruiser Marat even made a courtesy call at Riga, a peaceful precursor to its more bellicose mission in June 1940.?9 These awkward gestures convinced few Latvians of Russian sincerity and good will. Despite amicable Soviet assurances, another shift in Latvian sympathies occurred, this time slightly back toward Germany. Munters, who at times was accused of being too pro-German, reaffirmed neutrality as the correct path for Latvia-in other words, Latvia would play the ostrich game. Latvian statesmen, sensitive to their commitment to neutrality, carefully refrained from saying or doing anything that might offend either of their large neighbors. They also concealed from the Latvian public as much as they could of the perplexing realities of the international scene and made sure the press deleted anything disparaging of Germany or the Soviet Union. Having straddled the fence, in the coming years Munters regularly scrambled between Berlin and Moscow, assuring both the Germans and Russians that Latvia remained neutral and posed a threat to neither. 80 Hitler's expansionist intentions became manifest with the annexation of Austria in March 1938, an audacious act that shocked the Latvian leaders into rethinking their neutrality once more. After giving it some thought, but failing to see any new options, they continued on their preset course. Latvia's persistent reaffirmation of neutrality irked the Soviets, who, in view of Hitler's aggressive behavior, perceived it as being proGerman. In June 1938, as the crisis over Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland intensified, the Soviet newspaper Pravda warned the Baltic States that

Latvia's Road to War I 57

"escape into neutrality does not assure for small sates safety from danger which could arise in the event of war between the great powers."8 ' The Soviets, suspecting Latvia's inability or lack of resolve to defend its neutrality, realized that a militant Germany, if it so desired, could walk right through Latvia on the way to the Soviet Union. Only closer Soviet ties with Latvia and the other Baltic States could guarantee them the necessary security. For the Soviets the infamous Munich Conference of September 1938 and the ceding of Czechoslovakian territory to Hitler by France and Great Britain vindicated their alarm. It was evident the Western powers would not fight to stop Hitler, and therefore the Soviets had to ensure their own safety. 82 As for the Latvians, Munich reaffirmed neutrality as their only viable policy. They too realized that the Baltic States could not depend on the Western powers for protection, and their only hope lay in both Germany and the Soviet Union respecting their neutrality. On December 21, as an unequivocal confirmation of its neutrality, Latvia formally legislated its stance, copying Sweden's renowned, and up to that point successful, declaration of neutrality. Estonia and Lithuania followed suit. 8 3 The final dissolution of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 strengthened both Soviet and Latvian determination to pursue their respective policies. While the Latvians declared their neutrality to one and all, for the Soviets Baltic neutrality was no longer an acceptable option. In a speech to the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union just days before Hitler ordered troops into Prague, Stalin announced as his most cherished goal peaceful relations with all neighboring states, as long as there were no direct or indirect threats to Soviet borders. A few days later a spokesman for the Red Army ominously warned that the Soviet Union must be prepared, if attacked, "to carry the war to the territory of the enemy ... and to increase the number of Soviet republics." 84 Two weeks later Hitler brought his incremental aggression to the very doorstep of the Soviet Union and Latvia-to Lithuania, precisely the kind of development the Soviets construed as an "indirect" threat. As early as September 1938, Germany had begun pressuring Lithuania to return Klaipeda and its environs-more commonly known as the Memelland-a strip of erstwhile East Prussian territory Lithuania had seized after World War I at a time of German weakness. Hitler wanted it and its mostly German population back. On March 20, 1939, with Czechoslovakia wiped off the map, Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop summoned Lithuanian Foreign Minister Juozas Urbsys and demanded the immediate

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return of the Memelland. Aware that no support was forthcoming from the West, and without consulting the Soviets, the Lithuanians complied. On March 22 they signed a treaty returning the disputed territory to Germany. On the next day Hitler steamed into Klaipeda on the cruiser Deutschland.8 s All the Latvians could do was watch. The Soviets, however, were not content to watch passively as Hitler's expansion approached their frontier. On March 28 in Moscow Litvinov summoned Estonian envoy August Rei and Latvian envoy Fricis Kocins. Litvinov lectured them on the seriousness of the situation and how crucial Baltic independence was to the Soviet Union, stressing that the Soviet Union regarded any efforts by third countries to violate Baltic independence as a threat to itself. Moscow could not "remain an idle bystander of open or masked attempts to destroy their self-determination and independence."86 Litvinov added that if Latvia granted special rights and access to its territory and ports to another state, the Soviet Union would find that unacceptable and a violation of the 1932 nonaggression treaty. In essence Litvinov had claimed Latvia and Estonia for the Soviet sphere of interest, whether they liked it or not. On April 7 the two envoys officially responded to Litvinov, expressing gratitude for Soviet concern for their well-being but objecting to any interference with their independence and sovereignty. They reserved the right to define their own interests, fulfill their obligations, and tend to their own security.87 Frustrated with Latvian and Estonian stubbornness, Litvinov turned directly to France and Great Britain and on April 17 proposed a mutual assistance pact that would commit the three to defend from aggression all states lying between the Baltic and the Black Seas, including the Baltic States. Britain rejected the proposal outright, declining to guarantee the Baltic States but agreeing to continue discussions, which dragged on into the summer. For their part the Soviets persisted in their demands to force guarantees upon reluctant recipients. As for Latvia, it just wanted to be left alone, and Soviet persistence not only raised anxieties among Latvian diplomats, but also induced yet another diplomatic shift, one drawing closer to Germany. 88 Then on May 3 a totally unexpected, dramatic change in personnel occurred when Stalin replaced Litvinov as Foreign Commissar with Vlacheslav Molotov. This surprise move made little difference in the ongoing conversations regarding the Baltic States, but it had major ramifications for an even weightier matter-as will be examined shortly-a radical diplomatic realignment that paved the way to war. Although Latvia and Estonia had refused Soviet offers of guarantees, they were more receptive to overtures from Germany. Germany had al-

Latvia's Road to War I 59

ready renewed a trade agreement with Latvia in November 1938, thereby drawing Latvia closer economically. As Hitler continued on his aggressive course, his diplomats worried that if it resulted in a conflict with the Soviet Union, Latvia could not prevent the transit of Soviet forces across its territory-precisely the same concern as on the Soviet side, only with the roles of the aggressor reversed. 89 Relentless Soviet pressure, along with unwelcome intervention by the President of the United States, encouraged something like a Reich-Baltic rapprochement. While commenting on Hitler's aggression on April14, 1939, President Franklin Roosevelt publicly mentioned a number of European states, including Latvia, as being threatened by Nazi Germany. Miffed by these accusations, German diplomats indignantly inquired with Latvia and others whether they felt imperiled by Germany. Although at first evasive, a week later Munters assured the Reich minister in Riga, Ulrich von Kotze, that Germany posed no threat to Latvia, but that under present international conditions Latvia could not help but be concerned.9o In order to repair Germany's damaged international image and dispel anxieties about its purportedly martial intentions, on April 28 Hitler offered nonaggression pacts to several states Roosevelt had singled out, including Latvia and Estonia. As negotiations-which began in early May-proceeded apace, in a gesture of good will the German naval vessel Brummer called at Liepaja. Bands played the German national anthem as well as the Horst Wesel Lied.9' By June 7 the treaty was ready to sign. Hitler personally met with Munters, who had come to Berlin for the occasion, chatted about arms sales, and made a pitch for Germany's excellent weapons. Then they signed the Latvian-German Treaty of Non-Aggression, to be in force for ten years and committing the signatories "to maintain peace between Latvia and Germany in all circumstances."92 With this signing Latvia had concluded nonaggression treaties with both of its menacing neighbors. Perhaps these bookend treaties would be of some value in preserving its independence, so thought, or rather so hoped, Latvian statesmen. The English observed that the Latvians were not particularly pleased with having to sign the treaty, but they acceded to it as a less risky alternative to Soviet guarantees.93 The Soviets, in particular the new Foreign Commissar Molotov, viewed the agreement with Germany as clear evidence that the Latvians could not be trusted to maintain strict neutrality. The nervous Latvians and Estonians, who had signed similar pacts with the Soviet Union, solemnly declared to the Soviets that they had not assumed any new obligations compromising their neutrality, and by sign-

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ing they had simply counterbalanced the 1932 treaties of nonaggression with the Soviet Union. The Soviets did not buy this explication and decried these latest treaties as an undeniable tilt favoring Nazi Germany.94 Months earlier, as the Sudeten crisis unfolded, Stalin had already surmised that he could not leave the fate of the Baltic States to themselves, and negotiating with them was an annoying waste of time. Furthermore, though willing to listen to the Western powers and hear their offers, he decided to deal simultaneously with another agent, Germany, not only about the Baltic States but over far broader issues and stakes, of which the Baltic States, including Latvia, were only one. The Nazi-soviet Friendship and Non-Aggression Treaty Unknown to the Baltic States, at about the time of the tragic conclusion to the Czechoslovakian crisis in March 1939 a process had commenced by which they would lose whatever control they still might have had over their destiny. Their fate was one of the many disputes resolved in the subsequent negotiations between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union that on August 23, 1939, resulted in the signing of the GermanSoviet Friendship and Non-Aggression Treaty. Also known as the HitlerStalin Pact, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, or simply the Nazi-Soviet Treaty-with the order of the signatories readily reversed-this treaty articulated what many historians still regard as the most astounding diplomatic realignment of all time. It also signaled the green light for the outbreak of World War II in Europe. Whereas the declarations of friendship and nonaggression were published for the world to see, a secret clause, hidden away from public view and known only to the highest authorities of both signatory powers, concealed the keys to the futures of several Eastern European states, including Latvia. The course of events that led to the conclusion of this agreement followed a tortuous path, and it is not the intent here to present a detailed step-by-step account of the process. This brief summary simply provides a context within which to explain the considerations and interests of the two main protagonists that determined the fates of the Baltic States. As noted earlier, it was Hitler who seized the initiative on the European international stage shortly after coming to power in January 1933. Although stridently demanding revision of the post-World War I settlement in favor of an allegedly maltreated Germany, Hitler had far greater ambitions in mind. Hitler's basic foreign policy goal, made clear in Mein Kampf and elsewhere, was to secure additional living space, Lebensraum, for the German Volk to colonize and Germanize. Within its post-Versailles

Latvia's Road to War I 61

boundaries Germany could not ensure an adequate food supply or natural resources to achieve its destined greatness.9s Therefore securing additional living space was an essential step toward Hitler's ultimate goal of building a new racial order in Europe, over which a racially pure German Volk and its racially kindred Germanic allies would reign through a powerful Greater German Reich. The coveted Lebensraum lay in the East-the direction of the historic Drang nach Osten-primarily in Russia and its border states, which included the Baltic region. Another indispensable tenet in Hitler's racial Weltanschauung divided humankind into two racial groups. The racially superior Herrenvolk, or ruling people, included not only Germans but also other Germanics, such as the Scandinavians. The rest, the vast majority of humankind, belonged to the Untermensch, the racially inferior "subhumans," a category that embraced among others, Asians, Africans, Slavs, and the ultimate subhumans in Hitler's mind, the Jews.9 6 Another premise of this "race and space" scenario presupposed that Germany could not acquire Lebensraum by peaceful, solely diplomatic means, but only through war. In Hitler's mind war was an ennobling experience, and only through the shedding of blood could the German Volk truly appreciate and bond with the soil. Hitler shared these convictions with his highest military subordinates on November s, 1937, preserved in the notorious Rossbach Memorandum, which outlines Hitler's carefully measured progression toward the military conquest of the coveted space. Conveniently for Hitler and the Nazis, non-Germans, including Slavs and the majority of the world's consummate Untermensch, the Jews, inhabited the proposed Lebensraum in the East. Since in Hitler's mind they were subhumans, he could readily dispense with them. Hitler's contemplated war, therefore, aimed not only to conquer the Lebensraum, but also concomitantly to subjugate, even eradicate Eastern Europe's subhumans. Yet another basic assumption of Hitler's thinking, which translated into iniquitous policy, was his association of communism with Jews. In his mind the two were virtually synonymous: Moscow to him was the center of a Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy that plotted to deny the German people their rightful legacy of greatness; indeed, it threatened all of European civilization. The war for Lebensraum would secure for the German Volk the vital space needed for expansion and would at the same time eradicate the den of Hitler's consummate nemesis, Jewish-Bolshevism.9 7 Hitler never shied away from expressing his views, and it was his unrelenting diatribe against Bolshevism-along with other targets of his vitriol-that beginning in 1933 attracted the Kremlin's attention. For the

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next five years the Soviets and Nazis assailed one another with a ceaseless bombardment of hostile propaganda, although with a lot less substance than appeared on the surface. Neither side was really sure how much of the other's rhetoric was bombast, but Stalin in particular took the posturing seriously enough to launch the Soviet diplomatic offensive on behalf of collective security. Hitler on the other hand, seizing the initiative, proceeded with his diplomatic preparations for the inevitable eastward push. Hitler's diplomatic campaign never lost sight of its ultimate goal of rearranging the European order and the prerequisite conquest of Lebensraum, even though his calculated short-term diplomacy at times seemed to contradict and even work counterproductively against his more distant objectives. Unfortunately many European statesmen in the 1930s could not distinguish Hitler's diplomatic means from his ideologically determined ends. One of Hitler's primary and most effective tactics was to lull Europe's statesmen into a false belief that by revising the Versailles settlement and lifting restrictions on Germany he could be satisfied and another war could thereby be averted. Their misreading of Hitler's intentions directly resulted in the policy of appeasement, the well-intentioned but tragically flawed means to preserve peace. Hitler's announcement of rearmament, his march into the Rhineland, the annexation of Austria, the occupation of the Sudetenland, the destruction of Czechoslovakia, and the seizure of the Memelland all contributed toward realizing the final goal. These were not ends in and of themselves, as the Sudeten crisis and its partial resolution at Munich in September 1938 illustrate. Hitler cared little about the Sudeten Germans and uniting them with the main body of the German Volk; he simply exploited them as a pretext for the destruction of Czechoslovakia-which, by the way, Hitler would have preferred to accomplish through war and not diplomacy. The liquidation of Czechoslovakia in turn was supposed to pave the way for his next conquest, Poland. Eventually this sequence of aggression would lead to the Soviet Union. Therefore, Hitler's agreement with Stalin in August 1939 was no more than another apparently contradictory measure that would help Hitler achieve his ultimate goals. The obsequious behavior of Great Britain and France at Munich in September 1938 left Stalin doubtful about their reliability. If, while bargaining from a position of military strength, they made concessions to Hitler in order to avoid a fight, what would they do later when Hitler's rearmament campaign brought the Reich closer to military parity? At this juncture Stalin seriously began to consider jettisoning Litvinov's crusade

Latvia's Road to War I 63

for collective security. The dilemma for Stalin, however, was devising another, more effective strategy to achieve Soviet security. One possibility occurred to him: concluding a pact with the devil himself, Adolf Hitler. After Munich, from autumn 1938 into early 1939, the Soviets pursued low-level, Soviet-German economic negotiations, looking for possible openings that might lead to a more fruitful dialogue.9 8 Stalin spoke publicly on March 10, a few days before Hitler's final dismantling of Czechoslovakia. He condemned the gathering clouds of war but saved most of his venom not for the Reich, but for the West, which he accused of trying to instigate a war between the Soviet Union and Germany, getting "others to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them."99 Stalin intended his speech as a gesture to Hitler, a hint of openended possibilities. When Hitler finished off Czechoslovakia a few days later, the Soviets predictably voiced disapproval, but their reaction was unexpectedly mild. Whatever qualms Stalin had about altering his course had vanished. It had become a question of who would concede the most in the interest of Soviet security. It was also during these difficult days in April 1939 that the Soviets offered guarantees to Latvia and Estonia, only to have them rebuffed. Although Stalin had lost confidence in the West, he still thought that the West might be amenable to guaranteeing the integrity of the Baltic States, and as discussed earlier, did not abandon the collective approach entirely. At this point Stalin still had no alternative. As for Hitler, having finished off Czechoslovakia and seized the Memelland, the Fuhrer prepared for his next conquest, Poland. This time he would not be denied a war, as had been the case with Czechoslovakia. As for the Western powers, they resolved that Hitler had hoodwinked them for the last time and decided to get down to some serious talks with Stalin, even though they could not get past the first pothole in the road to an alliance, a guarantee of the Baltic States. Decidedly disadvantageous to their cause was the fact that Hitler, as he moved from victim to victim, had little interest in the Baltic States at this juncture-with the exception of Lithuania.' Meanwhile, as Stalin negotiated with England and France, he searched for the best way to avoid a hazardous situation, fighting a war without reliable allies. On May 3 the Kremlin flashed the sign that Stalin was dissatisfied with the current situation and sought a drastic diplomatic and military realignment. As noted earlier, Stalin replaced Foreign Commissar Litvinov, a Jew, with Vlacheslav Molotov. The fact that Litvinov was a Jew was of vital significance, since the officially anti-Semitic Nazi regime in 100

0 '

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Berlin would be more willing to talk with a non-Jew. Equally important was the message that Soviet reliance on collective security, so closely associated with Litvinov, would no longer be the sine qua non of Kremlin's quest for security.' 02 Molotov at first picked up where Litvinov left off in the discussions with the West. In early June he suggested a tripartite guarantee by France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union for a list of states potentially threatened by Germany, including the Baltic States. Suspecting self-serving motives on the part of the Soviets, the Western diplomats balked at including "indirect" aggression as a justification for intervention in the Baltic States. Molotov agreed to drop the pretext of indirect aggression, but suggested nonetheless to include a secret protocol that empowered the signatories to guarantee expressly a number of states, among them the Baltic States. After initial resistance, by late July the French and British finally acceded to a secret protocol guaranteeing the three Baltic States. By then, however, Molotov had lost all confidence in his potential partners and suggested instead that as a clear sign of their commitment they should send a military delegation to negotiate concrete military arrangements. l03 The West complied and dispatched a delegation in early August, but by then other developments had overtaken these negotiations, making them futile and irrelevant. Hitler, meanwhile, busied himself planning and preparing for a war with Poland. As in the case of Czechoslovakia, Hitler carefully cultivated certain disputes as pretexts for war, including demands for the return of Danzig and the Polish Corridor, territories Germany had lost to Poland after World War I. He also reviled the Poles for their purported persecution of ethnic Germans. The last thing he wanted, though, was a diplomatic solution, for he had decided on war and was concentrating on setting up the most advantageous conditions for the fray. He dismissed French and British talk of defending Poland as empty saber rattling, lacking any resolve, and even if they honored their word, he discounted their military effectiveness. He was, nevertheless, concerned with facing a coalition that also included the Soviet Union. Even though he belittled Soviet military capabilities, he preferred the Soviets inactive, sitting on the sidelines. On the other hand, if they offered economic support or even military aid, he would not turn it down.' 4 The breakthrough came in early July, when in the course of GermanSoviet trade discussions between low-level Soviet and German diplomats the issue of mutual interests in the Baltic came up. The Soviets inquired whether Germany had any political aims in the Baltic States beyond an 0

Latvia's Road to War I 65 economic presence, and after consulting Berlin the German envoys responded that no problems "exist anywhere along the line from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea."ws Once the ball was rolling, it was just a matter of time before a deal was struck. By the end of July Germany was prepared to recognize Soviet interests in the Baltic region in return for a nonaggression pact that would ensure Soviet neutrality in the coming war against Poland. By mid-August Hitler had consented to a joint German-Soviet guarantee of the Baltic States, and on August 21 Stalin felt preliminary negotiations had moved far enough for Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to come to Moscow to close the deal.' 06 During the Moscow talks, mostly between Molotov and Ribbentrop but with Stalin's occasional personal intercession, the principals agreed to insert a secret protocol to accompany the general text of the treaty. The general text, containing the provisions for friendship and nonaggression, would be made public, but not the secret clause, which divided a stretch of Eastern Europe from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea into German and Soviet spheres of interest. The clause stipulated that the two partners could do as they pleased in their respective zones without the other raising any objections. This is exactly what the Soviets had been trying to extract from the West, a free hand to "guarantee" the security of the states falling in their area of interest. Hitler offered Finland, Estonia, eastern Poland, and the northeastern part of Rumania, Bessarabia, to the Soviets, all territories that had once belonged to czarist Russia, while Germany would claim the rest of Poland and Lithuania. The two partners would split Latvia, dividing it at the Daugava River. Stalin preferred instead to have all of Latvia in his domain, above all the ice-free ports of Liepaja and Ventspils on the Kurzeme coast. Approval for this request required a late-night, last-minute phone call from Ribbentrop to Hitler in Berlin. Hitler was in accord; all of Latvia went to Stalin, and that same night, August 23, 1939, the treaty was signed, the dirty deed was done. 7 The secret clause was so incriminating that the Soviet Union denied its welldocumented existence until1989.' 08 Announced on the following day, the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty shocked the world. The two inveterate, incorrigible enemies, who had been assailing each other mercilessly for years, suddenly were proclaiming friendship and promising not to fight one another. Among the most astounded and anxious observers of this astonishing reversal were the people and regimes of the states lying between Germany and the Soviet Union. Although the Latvian people received a censored, upbeat version of events in their press, with ample assurances that no harm had 10

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been done to their interests, rumors soon abounded that there was more to this treaty than met the eye. Latvia's envoy in Berlin, Edgars Krievins, suspecting a deal at the expense of Latvia, nervously inquired with the chief of the Political Department of the Reich Foreign Ministry, Ernst Woermann, about any additional, secret provisions. Woermann denied any.'o9 Although the Latvian military perceived the treaty as a disastrous calamity, leaving the Baltic helpless, Foreign Minister Munters put his usual positive spin on anything regarding Germany or the Soviet Union by depicting the document as an instrument of peace in the region. To the Latvian public their leaders presented a calm demeanor, but toward the Reich they betrayed their genuine concerns and fears. Their inquiries ran into a stone wall in Berlin and received no more than routine assurances that Latvia's integrity had not been compromised.llo It still remains unclear when and how much the Latvians learned about the secret specifics of the treaty as it involved them. Rumors circulated, but not until October, with the advent of several developments that forced both the Germans and Soviets to disclose their true intentions, did the Latvians became aware of their fate as prescribed by this agreement. The specifics of the secret stipulations would become public knowledge during the course of the postwar Nuremberg trials, but as far as the Soviets were concerned, up to the eve of the Soviet Union's implosion the secret protocol did not officially exist. lll Controversy surrounds, and arguments still abound regarding the motives for this Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression, in particular its clandestine section. Reasons for the pact and explanations for the purposes it served for one partner and the other are as many as there are commentators. There still is no single, authoritative final word on the purposes of the treaty or its historical importance. Any attempt to summarize the issues here would fall short of doing all interpretations justice, but one must draw some conclusions, especially in respect to its impact on Latvia. Although possibly disagreeing on specifics, those knowledgeable about the treaty would agree that it gave Hitler the go-ahead to launch his attack on Poland and begin World War II, which he did one week later on September 1. Hitler had secured not merely Soviet neutrality, but active Soviet participation in the German war effort, first through deliveries of valuable strategic materials and eventually even military intervention. Above all the treaty guaranteed Hitler that no matter what the Western powers did once he attacked Poland, the Soviets would not interfere, at least not contrary to German interests. He had also secured a free hand in much of Poland, which he would exploit as the first install-

Latvia's Road to War I 67 ment of his cherished Lebensraum. Later, as he turned westward toward France and Western Europe, he could do so without worrying about a threat to his eastern borders. As for Stalin, the most common interpretation depicts him as wisely playing for time, holding Hitler off as long as possible from the inevitable attack. Stalin was no fool and knew that sooner or later Hitler would attack the Soviet Union. He seemed to understand better than most the expedient nature of the treaty, especially for Hitler, for whom it was another, seemingly contradictory diplomatic measure that contributed to achieving his ultimate goal. This interpretation of Stalin postponing the inevitable for as long as possible maintains that as long as the treaty was in force Stalin could continue to industrialize, build up his armed forces, and reconstruct an officer corps decimated by his own purges in the late 1930s. Some have also argued that not only did Stalin gain time, but he also established an additional security zone for the Soviet Union by occupying the "barrier states" between himself and his predestined foe. Yet another view credits the treaty with placing Stalin in a position to reclaim most of the territories Russia had lost after World War I, a goal near and dear to the heart of this Russian chauvinist. And even though Stalin preferred to tend to "socialism in one country," his own Soviet Union, one should not dismiss entirely the attraction of carrying on the communist world revolution beyond Soviet borders. When assessing the treaty's significance and purpose, Soviet historians have added their peculiar twists to the aforementioned interpretations. Naturally, they completely ignore the secret clause. As for the apparent contradictions in this diplomatic reversal from staunch resistance to Nazism to complicity, they depict these as part of a calculated plan by their infallible leader: In signing this treaty the prescient Stalin provided the Soviet Union two more years in which to arm as well as to relocate both population and industry to the interior. Additional territory also created a defense in depth, keeping enemy forces farther away from the motherland. Furthermore the agreement befuddled the coalition of capitalist, imperialist nations-France, Great Britain and Nazi Germanywhose true, ultimate goal was not to fight each other, but to destroy the Soviet Union. As for the peoples of the occupied territories, the Soviet version asserts that the Soviet occupation protected them from the horrors of fascism for two years longer." 2 Most Latvians, however, refer to that extra time, in particular the last year, from June 17, 1940, to June 22, 1941, as the Year of Terror, Baigais Gads.

3

Latvia and the outbreak of war

The Start of War: September 1, 1939

With assurances in his pocket that the Red Army would not interfere, Hitler launched his attack on Poland on the morning of September 1, 1939. Hitler finally had his war. German armies raced through Poland, unleashing the Reich's contribution to modern warfare, the highly mobile, mechanized Blitzkrieg, the lightning war. Meanwhile in Riga, hearing of the attack, President Ulmanis hastily summoned a meeting of his cabinet. Fearful that the war might spread beyond Poland, the regime issued yet another public affirmation of neutrality, hoping to gain a respite until the approaching storm dissipated or swerved from its course. The possibility that it could strike squarely was too horrific to contemplate. • The following day the German envoy in Riga, Ulrich von Kotze, forwarded to Berlin Latvia's reaffirmation of neutrality! Aside from repeating their intent to maintain neutrality the Latvians did little else but call up some naval reservists and set up a few antiaircraft batteries around Riga. Anxious not to provoke its great neighbors, especially the one presently on a rampage, the Latvian regime decided against a mobilization. Latvia did, however, shore up its border security along its shortest border, that with Germany's victim, Poland.3 On September 3, after failed attempts to avoid having to fulfill their obligations to Poland, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. Germany responded by setting up a naval blockade of the Baltic Sea, which the British answered with a counter-blockade in the North Sea. For Latvia these belligerent acts spelled economic disaster by disrupting its Baltic trade, the lifeblood of its economy. Unemployment leaped as enterprises dependent on foreign trade-which included most businesses in Latvia, either directly or indirectly-laid off workers. As something in the way of a panacea the regime introduced a mandatory and subsequently despised job program that sent unemployed factory workers and even bureaucrats from the cities into the countryside to toil in forests and peat bogs and on farms as cheap labor.4 Failure to stock up on strategic materi-

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als also wreaked havoc on Latvian life as shortages of raw materials, in particular fuels, compounded by the abrupt halt in most imports, brought the war home to all Latvians.s The coming winter would be bitterly cold, and the fuel shortages along with emptying shelves, made life in Latvia during the first months of war difficult, if not intolerable. Official assurances that Latvia had adequate supplies of everything did not instill confidence nor halt a run on goods; by September 8 Riga ran out of salt. 6 If there was a silver lining to the cloud of war, it was stepped-up trade with Germany, although the balance in the exchange of goods based on the German clearing system tilted even more in Germany's favor. Under the circumstances it was either Germany or no one as a trading partner.? The outbreak of war and the countervailing blockades left the Latvian merchant marine fleet dispersed across the seas, with more than a dozen ships caught in German ports alone. The Germans eventually released these, but others, as far away as America, could not return without running the blockades. The North Sea had become a shooting gallery for merchant shipping, and even neutral vessels plied these waters at great risk. Consequently many Latvian ships did not return to the Baltic and spent the wars years sailing under various flags, including those of the United States and Great Britain. Vessels stranded in Latvian harbors, frozen in during the winter of 1939-1940, eventually were seized by the Soviets. Very few Latvian ships survived the war to return to their home ports. 8 For the Latvians a spiritually deflating, diplomatically sensitive, and economically burdensome reminder of their own vulnerability was the influx of refugees from Poland. Polish civilians as well as military personnel pleaded for asylum. Prominent Poles beseeched Riga's foreign consulates for permission to continue on to Sweden, England, or any other safe refuge. In all, Latvia received around 2,ooo Polish civilian refugees and interned about s,ooo military personnel, including the crews of some seventy-two Polish aircraft that had landed in Latvia in late September before Poland's final capitulation. The Latvian military sequestered the fliers at Cekule near Riga and refurbished the planes as trainers for the Latvian air force, ironically marking the Polish planes with the Latvian ugunskrusts, the swastika in redY The Polish internees posed a dilemma for the Latvians. Although the Latvians were inclined to help the Poles, releasing them to find their way to England violated their own neutrality. Nevertheless, thanks to Latvians looking away, some 300 Poles managed to reach Sweden. The outbreak of war also stranded a sizeable contingent of 17,000 Polish seasonal ag-

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ricultural laborers who had not yet returned home from their summer work. Many of the Poles remaining in Latvia were swept away by Soviet deportations during the Soviet occupation, and as for those that evaded these deportations, the Germans later shipped them off in the other direction as slave labor. 10 As the German assault drove relentlessly eastward through Poland, in two weeks approaching the line of demarcation between German and Soviet zones of influence, Stalin became nervous about Germany's progress, especially the prospect of Reich troops occupying Polish territory allotted to the Soviets. Therefore, on September 16 the Soviets informed their German "friends" that they would take action, and on the next day, September 17, the Red Army attacked Poland from the other direction. Before the end of September Polish resistance was crushed. The Soviets depicted their brief campaign as a liberation reunifying the Ukrainians and White Russians of Eastern Poland with their kindred nationals living in the Soviet Ukraine and White Russia. Two years later, after the German-Soviet conflict had begun, Soviets modified their official version of events-and subsequent historical accounts-by noting the prescience and benevolence of Stalin, who magnanimously had intervened in Eastern Poland to protect the local population from German aggression. The Soviet incursion into Poland heightened the level of alarm in neighboring states. Though on invasion day, September 17, the Soviet Union assured the three Baltic States that it intended to "conduct a policy of neutrality" toward them, their anxiety grew.' 3 On that same day Munters queried von Kotze once more, demanding to know Germany's position on Latvia's future. He also inquired whether the Germans knew Soviet intentions-more specifically, how far they expected the Soviets to advance into Poland and whether Latvia could expect "unintended" border violations. A sheepish Von Kotze referred to Germany's nonaggression treaty with Latvia as the basis for their relationship, and as for Soviet intentions, he discounted the possibility of Soviet incidents as long as the Baltic States gave the Soviets no cause. Contrary to von Kotze's assurances, the situation along the Latvian-Soviet frontier did not remain tranquil. Latvian border guards no longer faced Soviet border guards across the line, but regular Red Army soldiers. On September 26 a nervous Von Kotze himself informed Berlin of threatening Soviet troop concentrations not far from Latvia's eastern border. 4 Sensing an impending, common danger from the east, the Estonian military suggested a meeting with the Latvian war minister and commander of the Latvian Army to coordinate action. The Latvians declined, 11

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using the lame excuse that their Minister of War, Balodis, was too busy with the interning of Polish soldiers to meet. The real reason for rejecting the Estonians was fear of provoking the Soviets, since they might impute anti-Soviet purposes to such a gathering. '5 It was clear that the Baltic States could not and would not act in concert at this critical juncture, and the crisis would only deepen. Furthermore, secret decisions affecting their fate were being made without their knowledge. Resettlement of the Baltic Germans For Hitler's purposes the arrangement with Stalin worked like a charm. The Soviets had cooperated fully in the destruction of Poland, and prospects for further assistance bode well, including naval collaboration and economic benefits in the way of Soviet deliveries of vast amounts of valuable strategic materials.'" Then on September 25, sooner than Hitler had anticipated, Stalin informed Berlin that he was about to claim his share of the Baltic according to the August 23 agreement. He specified not only Latvia and Estonia, but also Lithuania, which was not part of the original allocation. In exchange for Lithuania he offered compensating the Reich with the Warsaw and Lublin areas of Poland.' 7 On September 27 Ribbentrop flew off to Moscow for the second time, to readjust the respective spheres of influence. Except for a strip of Lithuania adjacent to East Prussia, which possessed a large concentration of ethnic Germans, Hitler was willing to trade. The following day, September 28, with the scratch of a pen the Germans transferred Lithuania to the Soviet sphere, setting up the Soviets to cash in their claims to all three of the Baltic States.' 8 On the same day that Ribbentrop signed the supplementary protocol-no less confidential than the original-Reichsfuhrer SS Heinrich Himmler requested another agreement with the Soviets, articulating the resettlement (Umsiedlung) of Baltic Germans from Latvia and Estonia to the Reich and its conquered territories in Poland. Even though the Baltic States were still independent, Reich statesmen knew that this status would shortly expire, and the Soviets would be in control. No sooner requested than done. On September 28 Ribbentrop also concluded a protocol acknowledging the Reich's intent, with Soviet approval, to remove the German minority from Latvia and Estonia. Since the majority of Lithuania's Germans resided in the frontier strip that was to remain in the German sphere, they were omitted.' 9 Some time between September 25 and 28 Hitler had decided to relocate the Baltic Germans, whose lineage went back to the first Germans in the Baltic, the medieval Hansa merchants and the crusading knights. 20

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Hitler expected the 6o,ooo Baltic Germans of Latvia and the zo,ooo of Estonia to abandon their ancestral homelands in the interest of his foreign policy. Hitler had two considerations in mind, diplomatic and racial. His diplomatic purpose was to prevent these people from becoming a point of contention between himself and Stalin. At the time of the signing of the Latvian-German Non-Aggression Pact in June the Baltic Germans had already expressed their displeasure, expecting Hitler to march into Latvia, annex it, and restore them to their former prominence!' Hitler therefore knew that as soon as Stalin seized the Baltic and began Sovietizing it, these Germans would beg for his help. Having proclaimed himself the defender of all Germans everywhere, he had two options: On the one hand he could come to their aid, but responding would jeopardize his friendship with Stalin, which he was not yet prepared to terminate. On the other hand, he could allow Stalin free play in the Baltic, but doing so would betray the trust of the Baltic Germans and discredit his leadership in the eyes of all Germans. He chose neither, and instead short-circuited his dilemma by opting for a third course, removing the potentially troublesome minority. This same consideration, eliminating points of friction from his relationship with Stalin, led Hitler to order resettlements of ethnic Germans from Eastern Poland, Bessarabia, and eventually Lithuania. This same diplomatic imperative had also prompted Hitler to relocate the ethnic Germans of the Italian South Tyrol-in the interest of preserving his partnership with his Italian friend, Mussolini. The second motivation for the resettlement was racial. It was one of the first population engineering measures taken to Germanize the Lebensraum and help with the construction of the new European Racial Order. It was probably Himmler who suggested to Hitler that the Baltic Germans could be the building blocks in the demographic reconstruction of Poland, Hitler's first eastern conquest. Himmler was rapidly becoming the foremost Reich authority on racial matters, and it was he who called Ribbentrop in Moscow with the request to secure Soviet approval for the resettlement-presumably with Hitler's consent.Z3 At the same time Himmler, with Hitler's blessing, began organizing a new 55-dominated organization, the Reichskommissariat fur die Festigung deutschen Volkstums, (RKFDV), the coordinating body for all programs related to Germanizing the Lebensraum, including certain aspects of the Holocaust.z4 Although long-range plans for the Baltic envisioned its colonization with Germans, including the return of the Baltic Germans, at least for the time being, both for diplomatic reasons and for taking the first steps toward 22

Latvia and the Outbreak of War I 73 Germanizing Poland, Hitler deemed the resettlement of these Germans as crucial to his cause. One further reason for the resettlement was fear for German safety. With rumors circulating that the Reich would hand Latvia over to the Soviets, Reich authorities seriously worried about Latvians venting their anger on the local Germans. 2 s A contingency plan anticipated such an eventuality, and Berlin ordered legation chiefs in Riga and Tallinn to declare all Baltic Germans citizens of the Reich entitled to Reich protection. If needed, Von Kotze was to demand the declaration of martial law for the safety of the minority. 26 Matters turned decidedly for the worse in the first days of October, after the Soviets summoned Latvian statesmen to Moscow to negotiate a Mutual Assistance Pact-to be discussed in the next section. Since news of the pact with the Soviet Union became public knowledge at about the same time as did the resettlement, Reich authorities feared that the Latvian public might connect the two events and would retaliate against the Baltic Germans before the Reich could rescue them. Matters then unfolded in rapid succession. On October 4 von Kotze, fearing for the safety of the minority and underscoring the urgency of the situation, telegraphed Berlin. The following day, October s-also the day of the signing of the Mutual Assistance Pact-Berlin instructed its envoys in Tallinn and Riga to inform the local regimes that the Reich was placing the Baltic Germans under its special protection. 27 As if that were not perplexing enough, the next day a bombshell dropped, the public announcement of the Latvian-Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty. Then on October 7, von Kotze revealed to Munters Germany's plans to relocate the Baltic Germans-although by then the Latvians were aware of this project, since Hitler had trumpeted it to the world in a Reichstag speech the preceding day. The Fuhrer had solemnly declared the resettlement as a measure that would ensure peace throughout the region. It was also on the seventh that Ribbentrop finally disclosed the specifics regarding the spheres of interest to Reich envoys in the three Baltic capitals. Not a word of this was to be shared with the Baltic regimes. 28 The resettlement protocol signed with the Soviets only secured Soviet assent to the resettlement; it did not prescribe the details. Since Latvia still remained a sovereign state, the Germans had to negotiate a formal resettlement treaty with its government. Latvian negotiators, principally Munters, dragged out the process and did not sign the treaty until October 30, two weeks after the Estonians signed. The resettlement would be voluntary, and those opting to leave would lose their Latvian citizenship;

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those choosing to stay would no longer be considered German. 9 Latvians were fully cognizant that the Baltic Germans, though despised as a group by most Latvians, represented something of an insurance policy for Latvia. As long as these Germans remained in Latvia, Hitler would not permit a Soviet takeover. Once they were gone, nothing stood in Stalin's way. Ulmanis resignedly reproached the repatriating Germans: "Leave, leave, and don't return."3o His reaction reflected widespread Latvian public sentiment: Most Latvians understood the dire consequences of their departure, but they also were pleased to see this troublesome minority leave. As for the Germans, who for years had endured the curtailment of their cultural and economic activities, most were eager to depart, the sooner the better. The imminent Soviet threat as well as the increasingly unfriendly deportment of the Latvian public accentuated the urgency. Reich propaganda employed both the carrot and the stick in its appeal to the Baltic Germans. Openly it enticed them with images of a wonderful future in the Fuhrer's Reich; but behind the scenes-since the Soviets were still friends and anything unfavorable could not be communicated overtly-it warned of the Soviet horrors they would surely face if they remainedY It was the fear of Stalin rather than the appeal of Hitler that decided the matter for most Baltic Germans. The thorniest issue to resolve was economic-the disposal of Baltic German property. This matter held up the conclusion of the treaty until October 30. According to the final accord the Germans could take along all personal belongings, but they had to transfer all real estate, businesses, cash, savings, portfolios, and certain other properties to the trusteeship of the Umsiedlungs-Treuhand-Aktien-Gesellschaft (UTAG), a Reich agency to be set up in Latvia. Land would be placed into the Latvian Land Bank, the institution created in the 1920s during the agrarian reform. A joint German-Latvian commission calculated the total amount of property left behind, and the Latvian government promised to reimburse UTAG with this amount as it sold off German property; by June 1940 all of the land had been auctioned. Latvia also paid compensation through additional exports to the Reich, as Latvians were expected to produce above and beyond what they already shipped to the ReichY The arrival of German evacuation ships and rumors of an impending Soviet takeover resulted in runs on banks and the panic selling of Latvian currency. In an effort to maintain calm the Latvian authorities on October 8 imposed restrictions on buying, selling, and exporting certain luxury items and valuables, such as furs, jewelry and artwork.33 At one point gossip reported Germany lacking soap, which led to the panic buying of 2

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soap in Latvian stores.34 Throughout October the Germans packed and then loaded their belongings on ships for Germany. Although Reich citizens left earlier, the first Baltic Germans did not depart until November. A few Latvians with German connections left with the Germans. A scandal broke when word leaked out that Latvian Foreign Minister Munters's mother and sister had registered to leave with the Germans.3s As the last evacuation ships left in mid-December, some Latvians displayed their bitterness toward the Germans and a newly found fondness for the Soviets: In movie theaters showing Sergei Eisenstein's recent release Alexander Nevsky, a film about a medieval Russian prince, audiences cheered for the Russians fighting against the German "black knights."3 6 By December 15, 1939, the deadline for completing the resettlement, nearly so,ooo Baltic Germans had departed from Latvia. According to the Reich press some 1,6oo Baltic Germans remained behind to conclude business. The press, praising the unanimous response of the Baltic Germans to the call of their Fuhrer to return home to the Reich, failed to mention that in fact some 13,000 had disobeyed his summons and stayed in Latvia. They would no longer be officially regarded as Germans, for once they spurned the Fuhrer's offer to resettle, the Reich abandoned them to their fate as Latvians. With the resettlement the Reich had no further interests in Latvia except for collecting what Latvia owed for the resettlers' propertyY The future of those remaining in Latvia, Latvians and non-Latvians alike, was in Soviet hands. Unknown to most Latvians another development, transpiring simultaneously with the resettlement, had sealed their fate. The Latvian-soviet Mutual Assistance Pact On September 14 a disabled Polish submarine, the Orzel, limped into Tallinn harbor, hoping to find safe haven and repairs. The Estonians, anxious to preserve their neutrality, interned the submarine and its crew. On the night of September 17-18 the crew of the Orzel overpowered their Estonian guards and headed for sea, escaping through a hail of Estonian fire-although the aim and enthusiasm of the Estonian gunners for hitting the Orzel was suspect. The Soviets, closely observing all military activity in the Gulf of Finland and the approaches to Leningrad, noticed the escape and vehemently protested to the Estonians. The Soviet navy searched the waters for the Polish sub, which as of September 17 was a belligerent vessel. Using the submarine incident as pretext, the Soviets accused the Estonians of being incapable, or worse, unwilling to defend their neutrality. On September 24 Estonian Foreign Minister Karel Seiter

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arrived in Moscow to smooth things over. Molotov chastised Seiter harshly and fumed that in order to ensure Soviet security in the region, Estonia must sign a Mutual Assistance Treaty allowing Soviet naval, air, and army bases in Estonia. Soviet occupation of the Estonian islands-strategically critical to the defense of the approaches to Leningrad-was of utmost importance. Molotov promised that Soviet forces would not interfere in Estonia's internal matters.3 8 On the way home Seiter detoured to Riga to inform the Estonian envoy there what had transpired. The Estonian diplomat in turn unofficially leaked this development to Latvian Foreign Minister Munters.39 As Soviet planes flew intimidating sorties over the Estonian capital of Tallin, on September 26 the cabinet deliberated on the Soviet demands. The Estonian military had received orders not to fire on the provocative flights. Seeing no other options, the Estonians agreed to accept the Soviet offer, and Seiter returned to Moscow on the next day. In his conversation with Seiter Molotov blamed the recent sinking of a Soviet steamer on an unidentified submarine, protesting that Soviet security in the Baltic was imperiled unless drastic steps were taken. Under duress on September 28, Seiter signed the Estonian-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact, which was to remain in force for ten years. According to the treaty the Estonians agreed to turn over military bases to the Soviets and to allow the stationing of 25,000 troops, and the Soviets promised to refrain from any interference in Estonia's internal affairs. 40 Having secured Estonia as a reluctant ally, the Soviet Union turned to its next partner in waiting, Latvia. The pact with Estonia, and those soon to follow with Latvia and Lithuania, arose directly from Stalin's agreement with Hitler to split up Eastern Europe according to their deal of August 23. Although most observers, contemporary ones as well as subsequent historians, regard these agreements as the first deceptive steps toward the eventual occupation and the consequent incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union, the Soviets interpret things differently: Instead of deceitfully scheming to seize the Baltic States, Stalin was simply concerned for Soviet security and the integrity of the smaller states, which obviously could not defend themselves. The Soviets confronted aggression; they were not the aggressors. Indeed, these Soviet accounts of events maintain that broad segments of the Baltic populations favored the treaties, which assured them protection from an expansionist Germany.4' While the Soviets were pressuring the Estonians to sign the pact, they intimidated the Latvians by concentrating as many as six Red Army clivi-

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sions near Latvia's frontierY Having duly impressed the Latvians with this brazen show of force, on September 30 Molotov summoned the Latvian minister in Moscow, Fricis Kocins, and demanded that Latvia send someone to Moscow to negotiate a mutual assistance treaty similar to the one the Estonians just signed. The world had changed, observed Molotov, and one had to change with the times. The Latvian cabinet met the following day to discuss the proposal. Minister of War Balodis objected to bargaining with the Soviets, but he was overruled, and the cabinet decided to send Munters, who, along with a small negotiating team, arrived in Moscow on October 2.43 Munters and Kocins met with Molotov and Stalin himself. The Soviet leaders stressed Russia's need for security and access to the sea, specifically the use of the naval bases at Liepaja and Ventspils. Stalin also expressed his desire for air bases and suggested stationing so,ooo Soviet troops in Latvia-a number more than twice the size of the Latvian military. He assured Munters that he had no interest in Latvia's internal affairs and he would leave alone Latvia's existing system. When Munters alluded to Latvia's neutrality and nonaggresion pacts with both Germany and the Soviet Union as guarantees of security in the area, Stalin responded with a brief history lesson on Peter the Great's quest for outlets to the sea, emphasizing the fact that his predecessor got what he wanted. In reference to Latvia's peace treaty of 1920 with the Soviet Union, Stalin advised Munters: "That which was determined in 1920 cannot remain for eternity."44 When Munters cautioned that the entry of Soviet troops could lead to unrest, even an uprising of local communists, Stalin wryly replied that there were no real Bolsheviks outside the Soviet Union: "What you have in Latvia, those are Trotskyites, and if they create problems, you can shoot them."4s Evidently annoyed at Munters's dalliance, Stalin disclosed to the Latvian Foreign Minister the realities of the August 23 agreement: The Baltic States lay within the Soviet sphere of interest and they could expect no support from Germany. Stalin added, "If we like, we could occupy you, but we don't want to exploit the situation."46 When talks resumed the following day, October 3, they assumed a foreboding tone, as Stalin and Molotov became impatient to conclude this matter. When Munters objected to the stationing of so,ooo troops in Latvia, Stalin interrupted, "You do not trust us, and we don't quite trust you either. ... We could seize you, but we do not do it .... We do not wish to delay."47 The conversation was over. Without specifying the consequences of refusal, Stalin dictated to Munters an ultimatum to accept the

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proposal within forty-eight hours, leaving him just enough time to return to Riga and consult with Ulmanis. That same night Munters relayed Stalin's ultimatum to the Latvian Cabinet. At least one minister, Finance Minister Alfreds Valdmanis, counseled making at least a symbolic gesture of resistance rather than totally caving in. Other ministers, aware of the massing of Soviet troops on the frontier, suggested instead that complying with the Soviet demand might not be so bad after all. Surely these Soviets were more civilized than the Bolsheviks of 1919-1920. During this exchange fissures in the "Government of National Unity" appeared and continued to widen in the coming months as pressure mounted on the regime. Valdmanis, who had favored closer ties with Germany, blamed Munters for the present debacle: His overreliance on the Western powers and his determination to remain neutral had brought Latvia to this crisis.48 Valdmanis was not the only dissenter. The elder statesman Mikelis Valters had warned Ulmanis that Munters's policies, which Ulmanis seemed to have adopted as his own, had lulled Latvia into a false sense of security.49 Valdmanis wryly observed that the ministers who had earlier blustered most passionately "to die standing up than to continue living on your knees" were among the most ardent in beseeching Munters to arrange a ship for the government's flight.so Valdmanis's objections to signing the treaty were shortly followed by his resignation, which was prompted by rumors of his role in an alleged coup attempt.s' Overruling Valdmanis and one or two others, Ulmanis, Munters, and the rest agreed to yield to the Soviet demands and hope for the best. When Soviet demands were accepted without even token resistance, Latvia's fate was sealed. Blame for this tragic outcome lies with UlmanisY One may argue in Ulmanis's defense that he had no other options but to accede to Soviet demands, and with Soviet forces concentrated on the border anything but full compliance would have ended in a foolhardy and bloody calamity. After all, Ulmanis was not the first national leader to buckle under the threat of overwhelming force. In March 1939 statesmen in Prague had yielded to Hitler under similar conditions. But Ulmanis's fault runs deeper than the immediate crisis he may or may not have brought about. It goes all the way back to his decision in May 1934 to seize control and responsibility for Latvia's destiny, suspending the Saeima and thereby excluding all other Latvians from the decision-making process. Perhaps the results of this crisis would still have been the same, but the nation, if given a chance to express its views, at least could have had the satisfaction of knowing that what followed was a conse-

Latvia and the Outbreak of War I 79 quence of the public will, not the decisions of a few men meeting secretly behind closed doors. Having been denied any say in the deliberations over the Mutual Assistance Treaty-not even hearing about the seriousness of the situation until the signing was announced-the Latvian Tauta as a whole could only share in suffering its fateful consequences.s3 Munters returned to Moscow and signed the Treaty of Mutual Assistance on October s, 1939. The treaty, in force for ten years, provided for the stationing of 30,ooo-some sources claim 25,000-Soviet troops throughout Latvia, a reduction from the original demand for so,ooo. Since the treaty provided no means for counting Soviet forces, the real number could have been higher, possibly closer to the original so,ooo. Although the Soviets would occupy the major Latvian naval bases at Liepaja and Ventspils and deploy coastal artillery batteries between VentspHs and Pitrags, they pledged to honor the Latvian request of no naval bases at Riga. The Latvians also consented to turn over several airfields to the Soviets. The bases were to be leased, and Soviet compensation would come in the way of deliveries of imports from the Soviet Union, including armaments. Furthermore, the Latvians would provision the Soviet troops, the cost of which would be calculated in with the Soviet lease payments.s4 The most assuring provision of the treaty for the Latvians was Article V, which expressly stipulated that "the enforcement of the present pact shall in no way impair the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, including their political structure, their economic and social systems, and their military activities."ss The signatories also agreed to have their respective militaries work out the details and the implementation of the agreement. The treaty was announced the following day, October 6, the same day that the Reich informed the Latvian government of its intention to resettle the Baltic German minority. Whatever hopes still remained of retaining a German presence in Latvia as a counterbalance to the Soviets were dashed. The Soviets also imposed a Mutual Assistance Treaty on Lithuania, signed on October 10, with provisions similar to those in the Estonian and Latvian treaties. The October 6 edition of the Riga morning daily, Rits, broke the story of the treaty to the Latvian public, assuring Latvians that it guaranteed their sovereign rights and "served the interests of peace and safety."s 6 The state-controlled press all across the land parroted the officially approved line, packaging the treaty to the public in the most positive light: The Soviets had not pressured the Latvian government; it had chosen to sign on its own volition.57 Over the radio Ulmanis welcomed the treaty as a means to avoid war and assured the Tauta that Soviet occupation of the

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bases was limited and that Moscow had promised to refrain from any domestic interference. Everyday life would go on as usual. Ulmanis added that the Latvian army remained Latvia's primary defense, and nothing could change that; trust him.s 8 At first the Latvian people seemed to take all this calmly, but as news of the resettlement concurrently became public knowledge, collective anxiety and even panic, were hard to conceal or subdue. The Soviet envoy in Riga reported to Moscow the widespread fear of the upper classes for their safety. Purportedly the elite not only dreaded the anticipated arrival of the Red Army but were also frightened by the menacing demeanor of Latvia's workers, who quietly but confidently awaited the entry of the first Red Army contingents. These dispatches predicted that the days of the "fascist" dictatorship were numbered.s9 On October 13 a Red Army delegation arrived in Riga to work out the details of the base occupation. General Martins Hartmanis, former Latvian chief of staff, faced the Soviets in these talks. The Latvians acquiesced to handing over the naval bases at Liepaja and Ventspils as well as nearby air bases, but balked at the renewed Soviet demand for naval bases in Riga as well. The Latvians won this point, but the 120 miles distance from the nearest major base to Riga made little difference in practical military considerations. 60 Besides occupying former Latvian bases, the Soviets built new ones, which eventually consumed some 1,500 Latvian farms. The negotiators also delineated a strip of land fifty kilometers deep from the coast inland as the Soviet military zone. 6 ' On October 23, as Latvia and the Soviet Union signed a supplementary protocol specifying the bases to be transferred as well as designating locations for the new ones, the cruiser Kirov led several Soviet naval vessels into the Liepaja naval base. The first units of the Red Army arrived on October 29 at the Zilupe border railway station. 62 Simultaneously with the negotiations over the military bases, the Latvians and Soviets also concluded a trade treaty. This agreement, signed October 18, raised the level of trade between the two signatories and mutually granted extensive transit rights for each other's goods across the other's territory. 6 3 The finale to these developments came on October 31, when Molotov spoke to the Supreme Soviet on the status of Soviet foreign policy. To assuage the nervous and disarm the critics, Molotov pledged, "These pacts are based on mutual respect for the political, social, and economic structure of the contracting parties ... we declare that all nonsense about Sovietizing the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs."64 He expressed

Latvia and the Outbreak of War I 81 some concern about the state of "neutrality" between Germany and the Soviet Union, but declared that overall it remained satisfactory. Molotov also alluded to the incorporation of Polish territory into the Soviet Union, a measure that attracted the attention of the Baltic States and heightened their level of anxiety. He broached yet another topic, Finland, to which the Soviet Union would offer an arrangement similar to the ones extended to the Baltic States. "Our demands are minimal," so assured Molotov.6s Subsequent events in Finland, unfolding at the time of the hectic evacuation of the Baltic Germans and the arrival of the first Soviet troops, graphically demonstrated to Latvians their vulnerability. The Flnno·Russian "Winter War" of 1939-1940

In the secret protocol of August 23 Hitler had also surrendered Finland, along with Latvia and Estonia, to the Soviet Union's sphere of interest. As far as the Soviets were concerned Finland was no different from the Baltic States. Its territory was of strategic importance because of Finland's proximity to Leningrad and its approaches, and Finland, like the Baltic States, had also belonged to Russia prior to the war and revolution. Having collected the three Baltic States in his fold, later in October Stalin turned toward Finland and demanded the conclusion of another mutual assistance treaty, insisting upon redrawing their common borders in the vicinity of Leningrad, which the Finns strenuously rejected. Frustrated by Finnish stubbornness the Soviets quit negotiations on November 9, and on November 29 severed diplomatic relations. On the following day the Soviets launched the "Winter War" with the bombing of Helsinki and other prominent targets. 66 The Finno-Russian War vividly previewed to the Latvians and others the lengths to which the Soviets would go to enforce their will. The rest of the world watched with repulsion and trepidation as tiny Finland stood up to the giant Red menace. The Western powers voiced disgust for this audacious act of aggression, but in the end they did little else than kick the Soviet Union out of the League of Nations. Fascist Italy and Franco's Spain offered more substantial material assistance to the Finns than did the West, but Germany obstructed their efforts by not allowing Italy to ship planes and arms across its territory. Germany, true to its Friendship and Non-Aggression Treaty with the Soviets, remained scrupulously neutral in this war. Hitler stood by as Stalin cashed in the next installment of the secret clause commitments. 67 Hitler and his generals did, however, observe the war closely and noted the Red Army's ineptness against a far smaller and weaker foe. Right or wrong, Hitler's

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perception of the Soviet Union and its Red Army as a stumbling giant incapable of matching modernized, mechanized German forces guided his future strategic calculations. Among the nearest spectators of the hostilities in Finland were the regimes and people of the Baltic States. Having signed mutual assistance pacts with the Soviet Union, treaties similar to the one the Finns were fighting to avoid, and with ever more Soviet troops arriving in their lands daily, the Baltic governments could do no more than reaffirm their neutrality and watch from the sidelines. In fact, at the League of Nations the neutral Baltic States abstained when the vote came up to expel the Soviet Union for its aggression. 68 Nonetheless a few Latvian volunteers found their way to Finland to fight, including Gustavs Celmins, leader of the Perkonkrusts, whom Ulmanis had earlier exiled from Latvia. 69 The censored Latvian press concealed the true course of the war from the public and portrayed the aggressor, the Soviet Union, as "a great power friendly to Latvia."7a Although the Latvian regime bent over backwards not to give the Soviets cause to erase what remained of their national integrity, at least one Soviet account of Latvia's behavior during the Winter War perceives Latvian hostility toward the Soviet Union and concludes correctly that much of the Latvian military favored the Finns.?' As they followed the fighting in Finland, Latvia's leaders ruminated over the path not taken. What if they had resisted rather than meekly complied with Soviet demands? Several of Ulmanis's postwar critics seem to think that valor rather than discretion might have been the correct course of action.7 A former Estonian statesman later conjectured with the benefit of hindsight that the three Baltic States fighting alongside Finland might have been able to shake "the feet of clay of the Soviet giant.''73 One Baltic response to the outbreak of the Finno-Russian war was to resume dialogue among the three Baltic States. As early as November, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian statesmen and officers began discussing possible coordination of their efforts and policies, including defense. They feared that once the Soviets concluded the war with Finland, they might take further steps in the Baltic.74 Nothing of substance came of this initiative, and hopes that somehow, miraculously, the Finns could defeat the Soviets faded. Overwhelming Soviet human and material resources took their toll on the Finns, who received abundant moral support from the outside world, but little material aid. By March 1940 the Finns were ready to quit and accept Soviet terms, and on March 12 Finland signed a peace treaty. Finland's defeat stood as a chilling reminder that small states 2

Latvia and the Outbreak of War I 83

could not deter the will of the great powers, certainly not of those determined to have their way with the lesser states. Realizing that the West would not intervene in the Baltic and that Germany concurred with Soviet policy in the region, two days after the Finns signed the peace treaty, the foreign ministers of the Baltic States convened in Riga in a somber mood. All they could do was honor their agreements with their Soviet partner and hope for the besus Unfortunately the Soviets viewed this meeting as well as other attempts to coordinate their actions with suspicion, as measures hostile to the Soviet Union, and violations of their treaty commitments.76 Having completed its war with Finland, the Soviet Union sharply modified its behavior toward the Baltic States, decidedly for the worse.

From "Protectorate" to occupation Several observers have characterized the status of the Baltic States following the signing of the Mutual Assistance Pacts in October 1939 as "protectorates."?? Contrary to protestations of Latvian statesmen such as Alfreds Bilmanis, who rejected allegations that the Baltic States had become Soviet satellites, their freedom of action had been severely crippled.78 For the next eight months the governments of the three Baltic States continued to function as nominally independent entities, but strictly limited in their actions by their "protector." For the time being, although the Soviet Union controlled their foreign and defense policies, in internal matters it still allowed them to function as before. The Soviets strictly isolated their soldiers from the Latvian public in order to minimize chances of unpleasant encounters; Red soldiers were restricted to their bases, and Latvians were prohibited from entering. Only Soviet officers with special permission were permitted off of the bases. By most accounts the Soviets behaved well-at first.79 As contacts inevitably occurred, the Latvians beheld the individual Soviet soldiers with condescending pity, both for their appearance and their inability to cope with the wealth they discovered in the supposedly impoverished, repressive capitalist West. Frumpy, shabbily dressed and shod Soviet women, mostly Red Army officers' wives, bore the brunt of Latvian contempt and ridicule. 80 The stationing of Soviet troops in Latvia, as proved to be the case in Lithuania and Estonia, presented a morale problem for the Soviet military. Since the occupying soldiers discovered relative prosperity and a far higher standard of living than existed in Russia, the Red Army worried about their "contamination."8 • Since the Red Army paid for everything in Latvian currency, the lat, which they received at the special exchange

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rate of one ruble for one lat-with the official rate at ten rubles for one lat-Soviet soldiers enjoyed a financial windfall. Unaccustomed back home to the availability and variety of goods they found in Latvia, and with their pockets full of lats, Soviet troops, in particular officers and their wives, went on shopping binges, buying everything in sight.82 One exasperated Soviet officer tried to explain the glaring contrast between Latvian abundance and Soviet shortages to his men by faulting the exploitation of Latvian workers: Thanks to cheating their workers, Latvian capitalists could afford to produce and display goods on store shelves. In the Soviet Union, where the masses were adequately paid, everyone could afford to buy up available goods in stores, which resulted in the empty shelves. 8 3 Despite Latvia's October 18 economic agreement with the Soviet Union, which increased trade between the two partners, the Latvian economy continued its downward spiral. As unemployment numbers as well as prices rose, a shot in the arm came from an unexpected source, Germany. Although it had surrendered all political and military influence in the Baltic, it had retained some economic interests. Apparently the Soviets, who themselves continued delivering trainloads of strategic goods to the Reich, did not object to these residual economic ties, and on December 15 the Reich and Latvia signed a trade pact that directed 70 percent of Latvia's exports to Germany. 8 4 This arrangement, like earlier ones, was based on the Reich's barter-like clearing system with a built-in German advantage. But under the circumstances a bad deal was better than no deal. Soviet observers depicted the belt-tightening measures of the regime as "bourgeois" repression directed primarily against Latvia's workers. They also condemned-hypocritically, one might add-the restricting of one's freedom to change jobs and they singled out for special condemnation the sending of unemployed urban workers into the countryside to perform slave labor on farms and in forests. According to Soviet accounts, unemployment continued to climb, and strikes swept the country that winter. 8 s In short, revolutionary conditions were intensifying. Descriptions of the public mood during the "protectorate" period are mixed. The situation remained tranquil enough, due in part to the government's ongoing press campaign praising the arrangement with the Soviets and casting as good a spin on the situation as possible. For example, Minister of Public Affairs Berzins spoke on December 22 assuring the Latvian public of a secure future and imploring them to keep their faith in Ulmanis, their Vadonis. 86 The authorities did all possible to prevent incidents, and whenever these occurred, they covered them up. Traffic

Latvia and the Outbreak of War I 85

accidents involving the Soviet military, fights between Russians and Latvians, and similar potentially inflammatory incidents were concealed from public view. Soviets involved in these altercations always got off blameless and never paid for damages. The press could receive heavy fines for writing anything that might displease the Soviets, and individuals could be arrested just for speaking to Red soldiers. 8 7 With time the public stress level rose. The Soviets, directing their operations in Latvia from their legation in Riga, incessantly upped their demands, and as they did, the cumulative effect of the base occupation took its toll on the Latvian population. By the spring of 1940 it seemed that the Soviets were intentionally trying to provoke the Latvians. Soviet submarines destroyed fishing nets, but paid no compensation; two drunken Red Army officers shot a Latvian driver, and nothing came of it. 88 The Soviets blamed this deterioration of relations on the Latvian government, accusing it of plotting a campaign to tarnish the friendly relationship. 8 9 While publicly exuding optimism and confidence that all was for the best, behind its calm exterior the Ulmanis regime prepared for the worst. Diplomats abroad as well as leading figures at the top, such as Foreign Minister Munters, despaired for the future, wondering when the final strike would come against what remained of Latvia's independence. Although a long shot, among themselves they hoped for a German-Soviet clash as their only deliverance from this predicament.9o In the meantime they grasped for any straws that might at least postpone the day of reckoning. Purportedly others, primarily in the military, decided not to sit by idly but to take action. Rumors of a military coup began circulating in January 1940, but nothing happened. The Latvian leadership got wind of the rumored plot, and if there was any truth to the allegations, the conspirators abandoned their plans.9' Ulmanis, sensing his policy of fulfillment and cooperation with the Soviets challenged from within, and realizing that his excessive optimism convinced no reasonable Latvians that things were normal, went on the offensive. He decided to steal the thunder of his detractors and belatedly confessed to the Latvian public the seriousness of the situation. When in early February 1940 the Kremlin fetched its three envoys in the Baltic States home for consultations, and high-level gossip speculated that the Soviets were preparing further demands, on February 10 Ulmanis addressed the Latvian nation. He reaffirmed his policy of cooperation with the Soviets, but he confessed that the situation had become more perilous. He warned that the time might soon come for all men to don the

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uniform. They should set aside their boots and clothing and on short notice be prepared for anything.9 As gossip of coups abounded, disagreements within Ulmanis's circle resulted in more defections. Although Ulmanis suspected former Finance Minister Valdmanis, who had already resigned, as a likely accomplice, he reserved his principal ire for Minister of War Balodis, a former partner in the May 1934 coup whose nagging reminders of his promise to return to democratic, constitutional rule had become a constant irritant. Balodis's name had also surfaced as a possible conspirator against Ulmanis, and some quarters had him leaning closely to the Soviets. Consequently, on April 3 Balodis resigned under pressure. Other pro-democratic cabinet members were also eased out, as Ulmanis's clique, instead of becoming more inclusive at this time of national crisis, became narrower still.93 The situation continued to deteriorate, to the point that on May 17, in anticipation of losing its freedom entirely, the regime in Riga granted full governing powers to Latvia's envoy in London, Karlis Zarins, with Alfreds Bilmanis in Washington as his alternate. The government also began shipping its gold abroad, to England and the United States.94 Following Balodis's resignation Ulmanis shuffled the military leadership, although at this late date one cannot take this last minute posturing too seriously. Despite these and other efforts, Latvian military preparedness declined to even lower levels. Back in late October 1939 Ulmanis had appealed to the nation to contribute even more to the nation's Defense Fund, to which the Latvian people responded with z,soo,ooo additional lats, but for what purpose? As the government turned over military installations to the Soviets and relocated to new ones that autumn, whatever contingency plans for Latvia's defense had existed became irrelevant. For example, forced out of Liepaja and Ventspils, the Latvian Navy moved to Riga, where it sat frozen in for the winter of 1939-1940.95 The Soviets also promised to help arm the Latvian Army. Twenty new tanks arrived but with inappropriate ammunition, while other recently acquired weapons either lacked necessary operating parts or came with the wrong ones. The Soviets appeared to be in no hurry to correct these "mistakes."96 Military futility reached its nadir on November 11, 1939, when the Latvian Army celebrated its twentieth anniversary. 97 Troops in Riga marched smartly, formations of aircraft flew overhead, and Ulmanis spoke confidently, but all this was nothing more than an empty, theatrical display, a ceremonial parade. Latvia's leaders had already decided not to use the military to defend the nation. 2

Latvia and the Outbreak of War I 87

The military staffs of the three Baltic States consulted one another a few times in 1940, but nothing substantive materialized.9 8 On April 9 Ulmanis once more reorganized the War Council (Kara Padome), whose members met to examine the possibility of resistance-if for no better reason than to ease their own consciences and to document for posterity that in this time of crisis Latvia's leaders had weighed all options, including that of resistance. Two weeks later the War Council decreed a Law for the Defense of the State that rearranged the military chain of command, expressly placing Ulmanis at the top, but did little else.99 Whether this posturing was meant for public consumption, to demonstrate to the Latvian public that their government was not sitting idly on security matters, or as a last-minute gesture of defiance toward the Soviets is irrelevant. Regardless of what actions the Latvians took, they could not divert the flow of events. By late spring of 1940 the only actions that counted were those of the Soviets. Although Soviet versions of events describe the eventual occupation and subsequent incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union as a spontaneous socialist revolution, born of the revolutionary ardor of the Latvian working class, evidence overwhelmingly points to a different scenario. From the time of the August 23 signing of the Nazi-Soviet Treaty the Soviet Union choreographed and executed the gradual absorption of the Baltic States, including Latvia. As early as 1939 the Soviet military had published operational maps of the three Baltic States, prematurely designated as Soviet Socialist Republics. 100 Another incriminating piece of evidence is a secret NKVD order of October 11, 1939, providing detailed instructions for the arrests and deportations of "anti-Soviet" elements in the Baltic States once these states were annexed. 101 And after the Soviet occupation of the military bases, the Soviet legation in Riga arranged for the entry of hundreds of so-called civilian technical experts to work with the military. Most of these experts were undercover NKVD agents, engaged in the preliminaries of weaving their surreptitious police network across the land. 102 Another protagonist in these events was the Latvian Communist Party (LCP). At the time of the base occupations the Latvian regime released a few communists from jail as a gesture of good will. Although these party loyalists made themselves available for revolutionary service, the Soviet Legation in Riga, the nerve center of Soviet interests and activities, instructed them to lie low. At this sensitive juncture the Soviets tried to prevent any disruptive incidents that could implicate them in meddling in Latvia's internal affairs. Most of the Latvian communist leadership had

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fled to the Soviet Union after their failure to create a Soviet Latvia in 1919, only to be exterminated in Stalin's purges. The survivors, however, began to reappear by late 1939 to provide a Latvian flavor for the imminent Red takeover. •o3 With the reappearance of their comrades, the local Latvian communists became bolder, and as the Soviet Legation lengthened their leashes, party activists responded by fomenting unrest in the form of anti-regime demonstrations and strikes. The legation also became a center for disseminating revolutionary propaganda, including pamphlets, books, journals and films. Although this reinvigorated activity on the left alarmed Minister of Public Affairs Berzins, foreign observers dismissed the local communist threat as noisy, disorganized, and having limited popular appeal.•o4 The one social problem the communists exploited with some success was rising unemployment, which they ascribed to the failures of the fascist regime, but in fact it was a consequence of the wartime disruption of Latvia's trade. 10s The signal for moving ahead with a total Soviet seizure of power seems to have been given at the February 11, 1940, Moscow meeting of all three Soviet emissaries to the Baltic. As soon as they concluded the war with Finland in mid-March the Soviets turned up the volume on revolutionary propaganda and intensified pressure on the Baltic regimes through a campaign of provocation. The left in all three states became more audacious in its criticism and denunciation of the respective governments.106 On March 29 Molotov, speaking before the Supreme Soviet, repeated his assurances to the Baltic States that "Despite the intimidation practiced by imperialistic circles hostile to the Soviet Union, the national independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and their autonomous policies have in no way suffered." He even predicted that their relations with the Soviet Union would improve.' 7 Molotov's reassurances notwithstanding, the Latvian public and its leadership hoped for the best, but feared the worst. 0

4

The soviet occupation and Annexation

Hitler's progress in his western campaign determined the timing for the Soviet occupation of Latvia. With Hitler's Blitzkrieg racing through the Low Countries and France in May 1940 and approaching Paris itself by early June, Stalin decided to exploit Hitler's preoccupation with that front to complete the Soviet seizure of the Baltic States. If he waited too long, the chance might slip away. Molotov later confessed that "It would have been unforgivable if the Soviet government had failed to take advantage of the opportunity, which may never recur."' The Soviets, however, preferred not be perceived as crass opportunists, cravenly picking up Hitler's crumbs while he was distracted elsewhere. Once the Soviets had completed the occupation of the Baltic States, the Soviet press denied any connection between the timing of the action and German military fortunes in the West; it was a mere coincidence. The Soviet media described the annexation process as an indigenous, spontaneous socialist revolution, which henceforth became the standard Soviet interpretation of these events. Hitler's involvement with France was one consideration for moving against the Baltic States when Stalin did, but anxiety might have been another. The New YorkTimes reported on May 19 that "Kremlin officials are shaking in their boots ... [they] realize that a Germany dominating all Europe would have Russia at her mercy."3 Stalin may not have been shaking in his boots, but as Germany's victory seemed certain, he realized that the Soviet Union might have to face Germany alone, especially if England made peace with Hitler. Control of the Baltic region suddenly assumed even greater urgency in Soviet strategic contingencies.4 One must keep in mind that the Baltic was not the only territorial prize at issue. The Soviets also coveted Rumania, which, because of its oil, actually ranked higher as a German strategic priority. In the August 1939 treaty Hitler had conceded the Soviets the northeastern part of Rumania, Bessarabia, but not the rest. Even though the Reich had written off the Baltic States, it was not willing to surrender the rest of Rumania, which it unilat2

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erally claimed for its own.s The predestined confrontation, when it finally erupted, would not be fought solely over the Baltic States, but rather over a broad range of clashing interests, of which the Baltic States were only one. The Baltic States could only watch as events spinning off from the deteriorating relationship between the two giant antagonists determined their future. Although they needed no reminders about their unenviable circumstances, they received them. On May 16, 1940, Izvestia, reporting on Germany's drive through the Low Countries, cynically observed: "The recent war events ... once more prove that neutrality of small states which do not have power to support it, is a mere fantasy. Therefore, there are very few chances for small countries to survive and to maintain their independence."6 The Soviet press also accused Latvia of repeatedly violating the Mutual Assistance Pact and acting unfriendly toward the Soviets.? This transparent warning to Latvia and its Baltic neighbors placed them on notice that their moment of reckoning was imminent; it was just a matter of timing. The Soviets, through their legation in Riga, also pressured Latvia internally by instigating anti-government unrest from the local leftprovocations by the illegal, underground Latvian Communist Party (LCP). After the defeat of Finland in March agitation in the form of strikes and other disturbances, all choreographed by Soviet agents, increased, and activists demanded the overthrow of the "fascist" government. In response Latvian authorities, at wit's end, arrested some troublemakers, which only worsened the situation by fomenting further agitation, thereby playing right into Soviet hands. 8 The depth and breadth of this turmoil remains a matter of historical conjecture. Whereas the Soviets have portrayed a massive wave of popular discontent, Latvian nationalists have depicted these incidents as a minimal annoyance. The disorder nevertheless served Soviet purposes by destabilizing the Ulmanis regime and distracting it from focusing on the crisis at hand. These engineered actions by the left produced the desired conditions that the Soviets construed as revolutionary, the basis for subsequent claims that the occupation was not imposed by an invading foreign army but rather manifested the indigenous, popular hatred for the regime. According to this script the Latvian working class, led by the LCP and not the Red Army, overthrew the bourgeois regime in a socialist revolution and steered Latvia toward its inevitable destiny with socialism, which had been interrupted in 1919. Not only was this a popular, socialist revolution brought on by festering revolutionary conditions-so ran the Marxist litany-but

The Soviet Occupation and Annexation I 91

it was also peaceful, concluded without bloodshed. Although mostly fictitious, this became the standard Soviet explanation of events, and Soviet historians faithfully adhered to it until the collapse of the Soviet Union.9 The Ultimatum

Whereas Estonia had been the first of the Baltic States compelled to sign a Mutual Assistance Treaty, Lithuania would be the first reduced to the status of a subservient Soviet subject. The incident the Soviets exploited to justify their next move was the disappearance of two Red Army soldiers stationed in Lithuania in late May 1940, supposedly kidnapped by the Lithuanians. The Soviets accused the Lithuanians of this deed and even implicated two members of the Lithuanian parliament as accomplices. This event occurred on the heels of a mysterious suicide of another Soviet soldier, whose death the Soviets intimated to be also Lithuania's fault. To accentuate the gravity of the situation the Soviets ordered troop movements inside Lithuania. On June 7 Lithuanian Prime Minister Antanas Merkys flew to Moscow to discuss the alleged kidnappings as well as the troop movements; three days later Foreign Minister Juozas Urbsys joined him.' Matters climaxed on June 14 when Molotov chastised the Lithuanians for plotting against the Soviet Union, alleging the Baltic States were engaged in an anti-Soviet conspiracy. He then handed them an ultimatum in which he accused them of acting unfriendly toward the Soviet Union and incapable of fulfilling the Mutual Assistance Treaty. The only remedy, so insisted Molotov, was a change in government and stationing additional Soviet troops in Lithuania. He granted a short deadline for responding to these demands or suffering the consequences, a Soviet military invasion. Without much ado the Lithuanians submitted to the demands, and the next day, June 15, Soviet tanks rolled into Lithuania. Lithuanian President Antanas Smetona fled just before the Red Army arrived. The total occupation of the Baltic States had begun. The Latvians had paid close attention as the Lithuanian crisis unfolded. Anxious to preempt any conceivable Soviet objections against Latvian behavior, on June 1, two weeks prior to Lithuania receiving its ultimatum, Commander of the Latvian Army Krisjanis Berkis left on a goodwill mission to Moscow. In meetings with Molotov and Marshall Klimenti Voroshilov, General Berkis even offered to expand military cooperation. The Soviets assured Berkis that all was satisfactory in their relationship, but made sure that on his return train trip on June 12 he noticed the concentration of Soviet troops along the railway lines to Latvia.' 2 Con0

11

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trary to Soviet assurances, all was not well, as demonstrated the night of June 15 at the Latvian village of Maslenkis on the Soviet frontier. The same day as additional Red Army units marched into Lithuania, Soviet troops attacked a Latvian border-guard outpost at Maslenkis, killing two border guards, a woman, and a child, and abducted eleven border guards and thirty-two civilians. The Latvians protested the incident to the Soviet authorities, who promised to investigate, but rapidly moving events diverted official attention. 3 The purpose for this atrocity remains unclear. One may only speculate that it was intended to provoke the Latvians into a response the Soviets could use to justify another ultimatum, which already awaited its delivery. At the least this incident, along with the massing of the Red Army along the Latvian border, intensified the fear factor and provided additional intimidation for what followed the next day, June 16. Since May the Soviets had complained about Latvia's poor attitude toward the alliance, so it did not come as a complete surprise when in the early afternoon of June 16 Molotov summoned Fricis Kocins, Latvia's envoy to Moscow, and handed him an ultimatum similar to Lithuania's. The foreign commissar accused the Latvians of infidelity and of being in league with Estonia and Lithuania in a conspiracy threatening the Soviet Union, which could tolerate the situation no longer. Molotov demanded a change in government, from the Ulmanis regime to a pro-Soviet one, and the stationing of additional troops in Latvia. He gave the Latvians six to eight hours to respond and warned Kocins that Soviet troops were coming whether the Latvians accepted the demands or not. Shortly after Kocins left with his ultimatum in hand, the Estonian minister arrived to receive his. 4 With Lithuania already occupied, the Maslenkis massacre freshly in mind, Soviet forces camping along the border, and the arrival of the Soviet cruiser Marat to block the port of Riga, Ulmanis and his cabinet considered the Soviet ultimatum. Sunday, June 16 should have been a national day of joy and celebration as 8o,ooo Latvians gathered in Daugavpils for the national song festival, the ultimate event on Latvia's cultural calendar, featuring 14,000 choral singers, while hundreds of thousands more listened at home on the radio. Ulmanis had planned to attend, but with the critical situation brewing in neighboring Lithuania and with impending danger on the frontiers, he stayed in Riga. s Having studied the ultimatum, Ulmanis approached Reich envoy, von Kotze, and inquired whether Germany would sell Latvia weapons in case of a war. Von Kotze answered in the negative, as he also did to Ulmanis's query 1

1

1

The Soviet Occupation and Annexation I 93

of whether the Reich would allow the Latvian army and government to withdraw through Klaipeda (Memel). Von Kotze then repeated what had by then become his rote response to any questions related to the Soviet Union: "Germany would not be interested in the problems of the Baltic States."' 6 At five in the afternoon Ulmanis addressed the nation by radio in lieu of his canceled appearance at the song festival. Calmly he spoke of the future and the possibility of bad times ahead and pleaded above all for patience, no matter how difficult things might become. Once Ulmanis concluded his talk, the combined choirs at Daugavpils sang the Latvian national anthem, "God Bless Latvia," three times. A despondent crowd headed home at sunset to spend their last hours in an independent Latvia.'? Following the president's radio address the cabinet reconvened to discuss the Soviet demands. At least one minister recommended rejecting the ultimatum on the grounds that the Soviet demands were baseless, but others quickly dismissed that gesture as empty posturing. The possibility of military resistance was also broached, but cooler minds prevailed, dismissing that gallant but doomed gesture as suicidal. Despite all recent efforts to upgrade, Latvian forces were still inadequately armed and had ammunition for no more than one week's combat. In addition to the massed Soviet forces on the frontier, at least 30,000 Soviet troops were already positioned inside Latvia. Furthermore, the Latvian military still had not entirely regrouped from the dislocation following the surrender of their bases to the Soviets.' 8 Ulmanis's critics note that although armed resistance might have been a viable option back in October 1939, before the Latvians handed over the military bases to the Soviets-at least then Soviet forces stood outside Latvia's borders-any thoughts of resistance in June 1940 were ludicrous.'9 The Soviets later pointed to the Latvian decision not to resist as evidence of Latvia's unconditional acceptance of their terms and the legitimacy of subsequent events. That evening the cabinet agreed to accept the Soviet ultimatum: The government "consents to the Soviet demand for the admission of Soviet military forces upon Latvian territory, in the same spirit of mutual trust in which it had hitherto fulfilled the stipulation of the treaty of mutual assistance." o Ulmanis then resigned as prime minister, but retained the post of president. That night Latvian and Soviet officers began working out the details of the arrival of more Soviet troops. 2

2 '

June 17,1940, and Its Aftermath

Before daybreak on Monday, June 17 an estimated 2oo,ooo Soviet forces crossed the Latvian frontier in the south from Lithuania, which had al-

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ready been occupied two days earlier, and in the east, directly from the Soviet Union. The column from the south headed toward Riga, the one from the east, toward Daugavpils. The event has been described both as an invasion crushing Latvian freedom and as the entry of friendly forces to help defend the country-the former being the nationalist interpretation, the latter being the Soviet version. Latvian officers assigned to meet and guide the Soviet forces were brusquely informed their assistance was not needed. 3 The Latvian Army as well as the Aizsargi had been alerted for mobilization, and preparations had been made at ammunition distribution points, but the final authorization for action never came. Instead, orders expressly instructed the armed forces not to resist or obstruct Soviet troop movements. Latvian soldiers watched in helpless frustration as Soviet tanks rolled by; Latvian fighter aircraft, purchased by donations to the aviation fund, never left the ground. Several Latvian officers could not bear the humiliation of an unchallenged occupation and shot themselves. z4 True to its practice of keeping the Latvian people in the dark for as long and from as much as possible, the government waited until midday to announce over radio what was happening. The newspapers did not report the invasion by Soviet forces until the evening edition. 2 s Therefore it came as a complete shock when in the early afternoon-actual times vary, from noon to three-thirty-Soviet tanks rumbled down the avenues of Riga on their way to seize strategic locations throughout the city. Red Army troops occupied the area around the central post office, which also housed the radio station and the main telegraph office. Soldiers took over the port, while still others captured the main airfield at Spilve, outside Riga; Soviet naval vessels blockaded Riga harbor. 26 Minister of Public Affairs Alfreds Berzins protested to the Soviet Legation the invading army's interference with Latvian radio broadcasts, only to be curtly informed that henceforth the Soviet military would supervise all communications. Musical programs could continue as planned, but all else had to be cleared first with the commander of the Soviet forces, General Pavlov. Essentially Latvia was being cut off from the outside world. 2 7 The scene at the main Riga railway station is the one most frequently described because of the reception the Soviet tanks received. Hundreds, perhaps as many as 2,ooo people greeted the Soviets and milled around the tanks. Myriad descriptions of the tumultuous scene correspond to the social backgrounds and political inclinations of the observers. From the railway station the author's mother witnessed the scene with her father: "I had never seen people like that in Riga. Where did they come from?" 22

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The Soviet Occupation and Annexation I 95

Most Latvian nationalists and the "upstanding" people of Riga described the crowds meeting the tanks as rough looking thugs, including local communists and mostly non-ethnic Latvians. Many were Russians, either from the local minority or the so-called technicians brou~ht into Latvia over the past several months as provocateurs from outside, meaning the Soviet Union. Reportedly they were drunk, rowdy, and armed with streetfighting weapons. Some carried improvised banners welcoming the Soviets. According to these disparaging accounts the demonstrations were not spontaneous, but were pre-arranged, carefully choreographed displays for public and foreign consumption, tools of Soviet propaganda. A prominent place in these adverse versions of events is reserved for Jews. Repeatedly Latvian nationalists have alluded to gangs of Jewish youths "dancing" around the Soviet tanks. 28 The purported presence of so many "joyous" Jews at this welcoming celebration became part of the myth of widespread Jewish collaboration during the year of Soviet occupation. This fable of the dancing Jews greeting the Soviet tanks strengthened the convictions of virulent Latvian antiSemites.29 It would also go a long way in turning what was for many other Latvians at most a latent anti-Semitism into an overt anti-Jewish animus. Since the experience of Latvia's Jews will be discussed thoroughly in a later chapter, it suffices to say here that much but not all of the Jewish community in Latvia initially looked favorably on the Soviet incursion. The majority of Jewish pro-Soviet sympathies, however, were not based on a preference for communism but rather on the realization that Soviet occupation was a more desirable alternative to German conquest. By then the Jews of Latvia were cognizant of the European-wide Jewish experience with the Nazis, and the Soviets seemed to offer the only hope of protection from Nazi terror.Jo After a while the Soviet tank crews by the railway station became annoyed with the unruly celebrants. One Red soldier knocked down a demonstrator, gruffly scolding him, "Shut up! We want to get some sleep!" Reportedly one Soviet tank fired into the crowd, leaving some dead and woundedY As the mobs became even more disorderly, clashes with the Latvian police broke out. According to some commentators Red Army officers had asked the police, which until then had discreetly stood aside, to disperse the crowds, and when they tried to comply with the request, all hell broke loose. The police alone could not restore order, so the Latvian army arrived to help quell the ensuing riot around the stationsquare, resulting in some deaths and many injuries. The author's mother still recalls the mob throwing policemen into a nearby canal. Later the

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Soviet Legation protested to the Latvian government for brutally preventing the people from expressing their sympathies for the Soviet forcesY Soviet versions of events differ diametrically from these descriptions. According to the Red account the people of Riga, mostly industrial workers, came out on their own volition to greet their Soviet friends peacefully, with good-humored intentions and flowers. Some foreign press reports actually corroborate this rendition, noting garlands of flowers festooning Soviet tanks.33 The pro-Soviet description concurs with the antiSoviet version that clashes between the demonstrators and the police occurred, but from the Soviet perspective it was the police and the Latvian authorities that incited the violence: "This bloody reprisal against the peaceful demonstration stirred hatred and indignation among Latvian workers."34 Demonstrations welcoming the Soviets also occurred in Daugavpils and over the next few days in other Latvian cities, including a massive one in Liepaja on June 19, which according to the Soviets culminated in the crowds seizing control of the city.3s In the midst of this tumult rumors swept Riga that Ulmanis had fled the country. In order to dispel this speculation Ulmanis drove around Riga in an open automobile. Later that evening he again spoke to the nation over the radio, explaining that the Soviet troops entered Latvia with the approval of the government, and friendly relations with the Soviets would continue. In his serene voice-to which Latvians had become accustomed during this crisis-he implored the Tauta not to panic and to keep true to the Latvian spirit, assuring Latvians that no harm would come. "I am remaining in my place, you remain in yours," assured the president.36 Latvians preferring not to remain in their place had no choice but to stay; the regime had suspended the issuance of any visas permitting flight from the country.37 On the same day, June 17, Molotov announced to the Reich ambassador in Moscow, von Schulenburg, of the occupation of the Baltic States. Blaming France and Great Britain for making the Soviet move necessary through their intrigues and attempts to sow discord in the region between Germany and the Soviet Union, he informed the Reich of special Soviet emissaries arriving in the Baltic States shortly. From Berlin, Ribbentrop reiterated the Reich's lack of interest in the region and alluded to these developments as matters for the Soviet Union and the Baltic States: "There is no reason for nervousness on our part."38 The next day, June 18, the cruiser Marat steamed into the port of Riga and disgorged a large number of plainclothes Soviet agents, who quickly melted in with the "revolutionary" bands to keep the antigovernment

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agitation going. That same day, in a move the left has described as a lastgap measure to save the regime, Ulmanis declared a state of siege and granted the military extraordinary powers to maintain order.39 June 18 also marks the arrival from Moscow of the special Soviet emissary, Andrei Vyshinski, the deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs.4o That night around ten-thirty, Vyshinski visited Ulmanis to inform the president of his special status and explain that his purpose was to ensure the fulfillment of the ultimatum. Meanwhile at the Soviet Legation, Legation Secretary Ivan Vetrov, a veteran NKVD officer, hastily compiled names for a new Latvian government, one of the Soviet demands. Evidently Vetrov interviewed prospective candidates at the legation, as several renowned Latvians were recognized coming and going.4' By the late morning of June 19 the list was ready, and Vyshinsky submitted it in person to Ulmanis. Confronted with the roster, Ulmanis asked if he could suggest some changes, a request that Vyshinski denied. Ulmanis then took the line-up to the cabinet, which met that afternoon for the last time and approved Vyshinski's recommendations. With demonstrators still cluttering the streets of Riga, Soviet tanks on virtually every corner, and the Marat's heavy guns aimed at the city, Ulmanis had no other options but to accept.42 The only public act of defiance was the peaceful placing of flowers at the Freedom Monument. As mounds of flowers appeared daily, the authorities forbade people to go near the monument-but somehow more flowers continued to appear.43 Contrary to Soviet claims that the events following the June 17 invasion spontaneously reflected the wishes of the Latvian people and that the Red Army did not interfere in these developments, the role of the Red Army was paramount. Even some pro-Soviet versions concede that the Red Army paralyzed the Latvian "bourgeoisie," thereby preempting resistance and possibly preventing a civil war.44 Without question the presence of more than 2oo,ooo additional troops and another 1,ooo tanks, organized into twelve divisions and five armored brigades, along with soo warplanes, intimidated Latvians and deterred any resistance. Under such duress Ulmanis signed and conceded anything the Soviets demanded.4s In contrast to keeping a low profile during the eight preceding months of the base arrangement, Soviet troops and tanks were omnipresent, guarding communications facilities, bridges, and government buildings, and camping out in parks.46 The Reich's chief Riga diplomat, von Kotze, reported with some trepidation to Berlin on June 21 that the Soviets had brought so many troops into Latvia that their purpose could no

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longer be merely a defensive one and feared that their true objective might be Germany.47 An English observer who had witnessed the German arrival in Vienna compared that takeover to the Soviet incursion in Latvia with the analogies of "a man attacking a meadow with a [German] scythe, or one flattening it with a [Soviet] bulldozer."48 During these wild days the role of the Latvian Communist Party (LCP), to which pro-Soviet writers attribute the planning and execution of the socialist revolution, was minimal. The Red Army provided the muscle, the NKVD the brains. While NKVD officer Vetrov assisted Vyshinsky with political matters, another operative, Simeons Shustin, laid out the NKVD's secret police network throughout the land. Shustin and hundreds of other agents, some already in Latvia for months and others arriving on the Marat, had prepared well for their mission of directing "the revolution."49 The indigenous communists at full strength numbered no more than 400 or sao, not nearly enough for a homegrown revolutionalthough fellow travelers quickly came out of the woodwork to expand their numbers. Few communists had remained in Latvia in the early 1920s, since virtually all had fled to the Soviet Union, where Stalin had decimated them in the purges. Nonetheless Vyshinski had discovered a fair number of survivors in Russia and brought them to Latvia. Among the Latvian communists returning in June 1940 was the first secretary of the LCP, Janis Kalnberzins, who had been targeted for liquidation, but was spared by oversight. A steady stream of Soviet Latvians arrived in the country after June 17 to serve as Soviet and LCP functionaries.sa Although Vyshinski and his Moscow-selected team directed events, they relied on locals to present a public face. Those appearing on Vetrov's list for the proposed government included democratically inclined intellectuals, known progressives, sundry opponents of the Ulmanis regime, and only two genuine communists, Vilis Lacis and V. Latkovskis. For the post of prime minister the Soviets fingered Augusts Kirchensteins, an elderly, well-intentioned academician and a reputed political democrat with "few original ideas." His own brother had been executed in Stalin's purgesY The Cabinet also included General Roberts Dambitis, who had been too democratically inclined for Ulmanis, as minister of war. The two communists, Lacis and Latkovskis, respectively received the posts of minister of the interior and deputy minister of the interior-the positions responsible for the police. Evidently the list contained vacancies, and some positions went unfilled for several days because not enough willing and politically reliable people of sufficiently high stature could be foundY The national government ceased to exist on the morning of June 20, when

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the new cabinet took over. Ulmanis, who had resigned as prime minister, retained the presidency for one more month. General Ludvigs Bolsteins, commander of the Border Guards Division, distraught over these developments, shot himself. The authorities tried to conceal his suicide, but as word spread of his death, the papers reported the cause as a heart attack.s3 Formation of the new People's (Tautas) Government was formally announced on June 21. Kirchensteins and Lacis spoke to the nation by radio, promising that they would maintain a free and independent Latvia. They assured the Latvian public that the Soviet Union had no intentions to violate Latvia's independence. Friendship with the Soviet Union would guarantee Latvia's sovereignty.s4 A few days later, however, Kirchensteins informed the gathered diplomatic corps that Latvia's status would be similar to Outer Mongolia's-not quite what most Latvians had in mind when they listened to his radio speech.ss Kirchensteins' first official measure on June 21 granted amnesty to political prisoners and released them from prisons, a gesture freeing prisoners on the political left, but not those on the right, such as Perkonkrusts members. To the surprise and disappointment of the Soviets, only about 100 prisoners were available for release from Riga's Central Prison. Nationwide the new government found only 250 political prisoners to set free, hardly enough to validate claims of widespread political repression.s 6 In order to celebrate the prisoner release properly, the new regime organized a mass demonstration to march to Central Prison and greet the liberated prisoners. Some 70,000 to wo,ooo people marched, including many genuine supporters but also many office and factory workers coerced into this "spontaneous" demonstration of socialist solidarity. Riga's workers, white collar as well as blue, henceforth became accustomed to participating in these orchestrated demonstrations. After greeting the freed prisoners, with banners flying the crowd moved to the Soviet Legation to thank the Soviets for all they had done for Latvia. Vyshinski addressed the masses from the balcony, committing the Soviet Union to protecting Latvian workers: "Long live free Latvia, long live friendship between Latvia and the Soviet Union," exclaimed Vyshinski.57 From the Soviet Legation the marchers wound their way to the Saeima to congratulate Kirchensteins and then continued on to Riga Castle, the residence of the president, where they serenaded Ulmanis with the singing of "The Internationale" and shouts of "Down with Ulmanis!" The police and Aizsargi had been ordered off the streets; the heavy guns of the Marat turned toward the castle.s 8 Similar demonstrations, greeting released prisoners and vouching solidarity with the new government, also marched in Lat-

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via's other major cities, Daugavpils, Jelgava, Liepaja and Ventspils, not to mention numerous smaller cities and towns. Once in power, the Kirchensteins government strictly obeyed Vyshinski's orders and took the first steps toward creating a "people's" Latvia. This launched a year of Soviet rule to which many Latvians bitterly refer as Baigais Gads, the Year of Terror.s9 Changes in the highest echelons of the Latvian Army occurred on June 21, when Ulmanis, under orders from the new government, relieved Commander of the Army General Krisjanis Berkis and replaced him with General Roberts Klavins, a critic of Ulmanis and a casualty of the May 1934 Coup. General Roberts Dambitis had already been designated to become the new Minister of War. 60 Near the top of Vyshinski's agenda stood the disarming of Ulmanis's cherished paramilitary force, the Aizsargi, whose role as an auxiliary for both the police and the army was unwelcome. On June 23 the new regime decreed the disarming of the entire population, including the Aizsargi, threatening severe punishment for anyone who did not comply within three days. In many instances local communists had already seized Aizsargi offices and meeting halls throughout the country. On July 10 further legislation officially disbanded the Aizsargi, the main pillar of support for the old, "fascist"regime. 61 Kirchensteins' government moved quickly to consolidate its control over labor. On June 23 it liquidated the much-despised Labor Exchange, which had forced unemployed workers into the countryside to toil for humiliatingly low wages. 62 Then on June 26 it issued a law creating workers' committees in enterprises with at least twenty employees that cooperated with the local LCP in seizing these concerns. Simultaneously the LCP revamped Latvia's trade unions, replacing their former leaders with communists, and on July 16 the LCP established a Trade Union Central Bureau to control and coordinate the labor movement. In late June all across Latvia committees under the supervision of local communists as well as emissaries from Riga replaced pro-Ulmanis civil servants and officials with more politically reliable functionaries. Along with these early changes came the replacement of newspaper editors with a more pliant pro-Soviet press. 6 3 With the change in government the LCP assumed a higher profile. Kirchensteins legalized the LCP immediately, and under the leadership of First Secretary Kalnberzins, the Latvian Communists assumed a more prominent role. Their newspaper, Cina (The Struggle), banned along with the LCP under the former regime, cranked up its presses. 64 Membership numbers also grew as sympathizers took the opportunistic plunge and

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joined the LCP. The LCP's main function as the theoretical leader of the Latvian working class supposedly was to advise the government on the will of the people and set the political agenda, which in reality worked in reverse-transmitting to the public Moscow's agenda as dictated by Vyshinski and the Soviet Legation. On June 24 the LCP submitted to the government an agenda that laid the foundation for a socialist Latvia, including closer ties with the Soviet Union; a new constitution guaranteeing the people's civil rights; securing the position of the new government; the creation of a people's militia; and rebuilding the military as a people's army. The LCP also recommended the nationalization of landed property and its redistribution to the land-less, state ownership of banks and industry, and democratizing the state administration. 6 S On the foreign policy scene the People's Government invalidated several existing agreements, in particular the defense treaty with Estonia and those maintaining the Baltic Entente. 66 The security forces at Vyshinski's disposal enforced his decrees. The Red Army had cowed the public as well as the Latvian military, police, and the Aizsargi, and above all it was the NKVD, the Soviet secret police, which firmly gripped the population in a reign of terror. Having spread its network throughout the land, by July the NKVD began with its primary method of intimidation, arrests. Within a few months, according to some sources, Latvian jails overflowed with anti-Soviet Latvians, far more than the 250 political prisoners the Soviets released on June 21. Perkonkrusts members were among the first apprehended, since the former regime had already conveniently incarcerated so many. Others, such as Aizsargi leaders, police officials, and administrators accused of "fighting against the revolutionary movement," "helping the international bourgeoisie," "belonging to "counterrevolutionary organizations," and of simply being "anti-Soviet elements," also began disappearing. 67 According to one staunchly anti-Soviet source, the NKVD was already searching out suitable execution sites. 68 One should note that Soviet accounts of these events never mention this repressive aspect of the Soviet occupation. Even with its sophisticated and extensive security web the NKVD could not accomplish its tasks alone and created its own local armed auxiliary, the Workers' Guards. The guards, organized in the first days of July by the Central Committee of the LCP, supported the government "in its struggle against counter-revolutionary groups." 69 Formed in Riga, the organization spread to the rest of Latvia and ultimately included some 10,000 men and women, mostly from the working class in the cities and agrarian laborers and the land-less in the countryside, who armed them-

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selves with weapons seized from the banned Aizsargi. In addition to the Workers' Guards, the NKVD and the LCP also relied on the growing membership of the Latvian branch of the Komsomol, the Party's youth association.70 And as was the case back home in the Soviet Union, one of the most effective tools of the police state was the network of informers that kept the authorities abreast of the activities of real and suspected enemies of the state. Yet another crucial step in establishing full control over state security extended NKVD authority over the police, beginning with the replacement of former officials with NKVD-approved police. Not trusting even the revamped police entirely, in late June Minister of the Interior Lacis created the auxiliary police, some 6,ooo strong, consisting mostly of peasants and workers. A month later he transformed this auxiliary police into the People's Militia, yet another resource for the NKVD and a source of strength for the new regime.?' During this first month of occupation Latvia not only moved toward the initial stages of a socialist society and polity, but it also changed in appearance. When the latest wave of Red Army soldiers arrived in Riga on June 17 their officers warned them about the prosperity they would encounter. They explained that what they saw in shops would be no more than a deceptive exhibit of capitalism, a window dressing, and soon enough the city would return to normal, with shortages of all kinds. They were right. Within days store windows were empty, as increasingly were the shelves-due to shopkeepers withdrawing goods from public display, not as part of a capitalist ploy. The cleanliness for which Riga was known disappeared in a whirl of trash, since no one swept the pavements, garbage waited for pick-up, parks went unkempt, and stores turned off their lights. All too noticeable was the pervasive gloom and physical shabbiness of much of the population, as glum residents scurried about in their oldest, drabbest attire, since dressing well could identify one as a "bourgeois enemy of the people."7z Elections of July 1940

The sequence of events in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania in the summer of 1940 previewed the post-World War II Soviet takeovers of Eastern European states so faithfully that one could suggest the occupation of the Baltic States was a test run for future Soviet efforts to extend control elsewhere. Starting with the military occupation and the arrival of Soviet political and security personnel, the takeover in the Baltic States-similar to those in postwar Eastern Europe-next created a provisional government in which communists numerically played a small role but claimed

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important portfolios, including the Ministry of the Interior. Then, with the Red Army standing by and the deck stacked against any political opposition, a "progressive," pro-Soviet election front swept into power by what on the surface appeared to be legitimate electoral means. It was at this point that the models parted ways. Whereas the states of postwar Eastern Europe nominally retained their independence as they moved on to become People's Democracies and satellites of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States experienced one additional stage after the elections-their incorporation into the Soviet Union. Up until the formation of the Kirchensteins government everything was going according to the Kremlin's plans, appearing to follow legal, constitutional means. After all, Ulmanis, the legitimate state president, was signing off on all measures submitted by a cabinet he himself had approved. Besides, one could readily dismiss any questioning of the legality of these measures with the reminder that Latvia had not been functioning constitutionally since May 15, 1934. Even though Soviet writers have depicted the transformation of Latvia starting on June 17 as a socialist revolution, the Kremlin at the time preferred the appearance of Latvians introducing changes through their own parliamentary procedures, not by way of a violent upheaval. Therefore toward the end of June Vyshinski and his counterparts for Lithuania and Estonia briefly returned to Moscow for further consultations.73 Holding elections in all three Baltic States came next on the Kremlin's program. No doubt Vyshinski already knew that the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union lay just around the corner, and overtly democratic elections would preempt anticipated objections to the annexation and legitimize the process. After a briefing by Vyshinski the People's Government on July 5 heralded national parliamentary elections for July 14 and 15, though the brief interval afforded precious little time for any political groups to organize and campaign. Since what Vyshinski had in mind would violate the existing electoral law, the government modified the law by a procedure critics have construed as illegal, thereby making the law and the elections void.74 These same critics ignore the fact that Ulmanis's suspension of the constitution was in itself an illegal act that resulted in bypassing three Saeima elections.7s Kirchensteins at least could boast that his People's Government with the help of the Soviet Union had returned the ballot to the Latvian people. With the announcement of elections another immense demonstration of over 1oo,ooo people took to Riga's streets, waving red flags and carrying banners demanding a Soviet Latvia. Ominously some placards called for Latvia's joining the Soviet Union. Marchers in

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other cities and towns over the following days also called for a Soviet Latvia and admission to the Soviet Union.7 6 Although the new electoral law condoned free and open nominations and multiple electoral lists, in practice the new Central Electoral Commission accepted only one list, that of the Working People's Bloc. The bloc brought together a coalition of trade unions, other left-oriented groups, and the LCP itself.?? The commission took recourse to endless loopholes and technicalities to prevent any other electoral lists from appearing on the ballot but the one approved by the government. A coalition calling itself the Latvian National Union and consisting mostly of democratic, noncommunist parties and critics of Ulmanis, including General Janis Balodis, accepted the new government at its word that the elections would be free and compiled an electoral list called the blue list by many Latvians. A Soviet historian later described this group as a "small group of active busy-bodies of the former bourgeois political parties."78 To ascertain the legality of this maneuver, one of the leaders of the dissident group even asked Vyshinski in person whether a competing list would be acceptable. Vyshinski replied, "I wish you and your friends every success."79 The Latvian National Union had stepped into a trap. On July 9 the NKVD raided and closed down its headquarters, arrested its leaders, and over the next few days apprehended virtually all those named on the list. Most eventually were deported to the Soviet Union, thereby becoming among the first of many victims to Soviet repression. 80 The Soviet press commented that "Some representatives of the wealthy class of citizens, calling themselves Latvian democrats, have started to organize their own list of candidates, in spite of the fact that all really democratic citizens already joined the Working People's Bloc."8 ' As elections approached, the LCP did all in its power to maximize the voter turnout. Factory workers, bureaucrats from offices, soldiers in military units, and others working together in large groups were ordered to march together to the polls, thereby ensuring fewer defections and absentees. Not voting could lead to serious consequences. Election officials marked voting cards, and lacking the stamp could label one as an "enemy of the people." Since only one list appeared on the ballot, poll attendants noticed those not marking the ballot or mutilating it so that the vote could not be recorded. 82 The elections garnered the expected results, an overwhelming electoral victory for the Working People's Bloc. Although in the last free elections in 1931 the leftist parliamentary bloc that more or less corresponded to the Working People's Bloc received

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only 7 percent of the vote, in July 1940 the Bloc claimed 97.6 percent of the electorate. 8 3 According to the authorities, 94.7percent of the eligible voters turned out for the elections. The results were to be revealed on July 17, thereby providing a decent interval for the "counting" of ballots. Someone jumped the gun, however, when Tass reported in London on July 14, while the polls were still open in Latvia, the precise predetermined final percentage of the electoral landslide. 84 After the announcement of the results more mass demonstrations ensued, repeatedly chanting the slogans of "We demand a Soviet Latvia" and "We demand that Latvia becomes the fourteenth Soviet Republic."8 s A demonstration of a different kind occurred at a soccer match in Tallin between Latvian and Estonian teams, when suddenly Latvian and Estonian flags blossomed throughout the stands. Soviet tanks and armored cars dashed to the stadium to restore order. 86 In Riga, in the meantime, Vyshinski steadfastly denounced any talk of the imminent loss of Latvia's independence as vicious, unfounded anti-Soviet rumors, but events unmistakably and inexorably led in that direction. 8 7 With an election mandate in hand, the cabinet decreed that Kirchensteins would replace Ulmanis as state president as of noon July 21, the same day the new Saeima convened. 88 Accompanied by yet another huge street demonstration on July 21 the newly elected People's Saeima with Kirchensteins presiding met in the Latvian National Theater, where Latvian independence had been proclaimed on November 18, 1918. The new parliaments of Estonia and Lithuania, elected on the same day, also convened for the first time on July 21. 8 9 One speaker after another denounced the old regime, lauded the new one, and lavished encomium on the Soviet Union for making it all possible. Among the well-wishers was a delegation of Riga workers who greeted the Saeima and then demanded two immediate measures-the proclamation of Latvia as a Soviet Republic and admission of Soviet Latvia into the Soviet Union. With wild acclaim, the deed was done, as the Saeima voted unanimously to accept both proposals. Those present expressly referred to their momentous decision as a continuation of a job left undone in 1919, the creation of a Latvian Soviet Republic.9o Actually the vote of the Saeima was a mere rubber stamp, since on the previous day the Soviet press had already saluted Latvia as the fourteenth Soviet republic.9' On that same day the presidents of Latvia, Karlis Ulmanis, and of Estonia, Konstantin Pats, were forced to resign; the president of Lithuania, Antanas Smetona, had already fled the country. The Soviet envoy to Riga asked Ulmanis whether he had a preference for exile, the Soviet

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Union or a Western country. Ulmanis chose Switzerland, but when the time came for his departure on the next day, the Soviets shipped him off to the Soviet Union, to Voroshilov in the Caucasus; he died in captivity in Central Asia in 1942.9 2 His deportation presaged those of hundreds of other prominent Latvians, including General Janis Balodis, who had been arrested as one of the candidates bold enough to stand for election. Another early deportee was Foreign Minister Vilhelms Munters, who, unlike many of the others, managed to survive imprisonment and returned to Latvia in the 1950s.93 In the ensuing days the Saeima appointed a committee to rewrite the constitution and picked a delegation to deliver its recent decisions to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.94 As president, Kirchensteins ordered Latvia's diplomats abroad to return home. None obeyed, and the May 17, 1940 delegation of special powers to Latvia's envoy in London, Karlis Zarins, went into effect. In retaliation for their defiance Kirchensteins officially dismissed both Zarins and Latvia's minister to the United States, Alfreds Bilmanis, declared them traitors, revoked their citizenship, and confiscated their property in Latvia, which became the standard punishment of those who fled or were already abroad and refused to return.9s The outside world observed the events in the Baltic States, but few were fooled by the theatrics. Winston Churchill admitted he understood the Soviet Union's strategic interests in the Baltic region, but he still refused to surrender the gold Latvia had sent to England for safekeeping.96 On July 23 United States Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, rebuked the Soviet Union for undertaking "the devious process whereunder the political independence and territorial integrity of the three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, were to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more powerful neighbors."97 The American admonition, although a strong condemnation of Soviet actions, did nothing to deter the Soviet Union, which prepared for its next step.

Incorporation into the soviet Union Having received a mandate from the People's Saeima, on July 30, 1940 Prime Minister and President Kirchensteins headed a delegation of twenty to Moscow to request the admission of Latvia into the Soviet Union. According to Soviet reports, huge crowds at stations in Daugavpils, Smolensk, and other stops along the way cheered their train as it passed through, and with bands playing, thousands greeted the arrival of the Latvians at the Byelorussian Station in Moscow. This time, noted one Soviet observer, the "Latvian bourgeois government" could not get help

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from the West-a reference to Western intervention after World War I which, according to the patent Soviet line, accounted for the failure of a Soviet Latvia in 1919. At last the socialist revolution of 1940 would run its predestined course to fruition.9 8 The grand occasion for inducting the three Baltic States into the Soviet Union was the meeting of the seventh session of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union from August 1 to August 7· In addition to the Latvians, attending also were delegations from Estonia, Lithuania, and Bessarabia, which, together with Northern Bukovina, a fellow former province of Rumania, were slated to become the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. After countless welcoming speeches and comradely adulation Kirchensteins spoke, as did representatives of the other prospective Soviet Socialist Republics. The spotlight, however, would be on Foreign Commissar Molotov. In his address Molotov chided the Western powers for trying to foment animosity between the Soviet Union and Germany, although observers noticed that his tone toward the West was not as harsh as usual. He regretted that the mutual assistance treaties had not worked as intended and blamed their failure on the bourgeois regimes of the Baltic States that had made the stationing of additional troops necessary. Subsequently the Baltic peoples through free parliamentary elections had elected new, democratic governments that overwhelmingly expressed their popular will to join the Soviet Union. Molotov added that some outsiders, such as the Americans, were displeased with Soviet success in the Baltic States and went on to attack the United States for "grabbing" Baltic gold and refusing to turn it over to its legitimate owner, the Soviet Union. Commenting on the war, he warned that it could go on for a while, and therefore the Soviet people must maintain "mobilized preparedness" and avoid being caught with their guard down by "our foreign enemies." Eventually he got to the matter at hand, recommending the incorporation of the Baltic States as well as the Moldavian Republic. 99 Over the next few days, one by one the candidate republics formally requested admission, and the Supreme Soviet unanimously approved each one as a Soviet Socialist Republic. The Moldavian SSR came first, approved and incorporated on August 2. Then came Lithuania on August 3, followed by Latvia on August 5, and Estonia on August 6. As of August s, 1940, Latvia no longer existed as an independent state. It became the fourteenth constituent republic of the Soviet Union, a status that as far the Soviet Union was concerned did not end until 1991. 100 Once news reached Latvia of its admission to the Soviet Union, crowds swarmed into the streets to celebrate becoming brand new citizens of the Soviet Union.

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That was the formal, overt response. In contrast to official joy, the true, pervasive mood of the vast majority of Latvians was of "total dismay" and hopelessness. Vyshinski, having completed his work in Latvia, returned to Moscow, leaving the task of transforming Latvia into a true SSR to the local Latvian communists and the omnipresent NKVD.' On August 13 the Latvian delegation returned to Riga. One of the first chores of the new SSR government was to disband the diplomatic establishment entirely, since Latvia was no longer an independent state. Kirchensteins had already summoned Latvia's diplomats home-albeit unsuccessfully. He had also begun the process of shutting down all foreign missions in Riga, ordering foreign diplomats to leave by September 1, though some received extensions. As the foreign diplomatic corps departed, no outsiders were left to observe subsequent developments.' 3 The British, although refusing to recognize the annexation, nevertheless informed the Latvian mission in London that Great Britain would no longer include Latvians on the official diplomatic list, but they could retain their diplomatic privileges. The United States also refused to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic States and told Latvia's minister in Washington, Alfreds Bilmanis, to continue business as before. 4 Not only did Kirchensteins order Latvia's diplomats to return but he also required all Latvians abroad to register with the local Soviet diplomatic mission by November 1 or lose their citizenship. Those disobeying would have their property confiscated, be declared as traitors, and could even receive the death sentence. Their refusal to return could also result in unpleasant consequences for relatives in Latvia.ws As matters turned out, only Germany and Sweden formally recognized the annexations of the Baltic States. Eventually other states extended de facto recognition, but the United States remained steadfast in its refusal to approve the incorporation. 106 Before the drive for the complete "Sovietization" of Latvia could begin, the legal and institutional foundations had to be in place. This was accomplished with the Saeima's adoption of a new, Soviet-styled constitution on August 25. For the most part emulating the Soviet constitution, the Latvian document established the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic as an integral part of the Soviet Union. It subordinated the Latvian SSR and its laws to those of the Soviet Union; its institutions would become replicas of the Soviet model. Since a new constitution required a revamped judicial system, beginning in early November a series of decrees replaced the old system with a Soviet styled judiciary.' 7 The Saeima became the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR, with Kirchensteins holding the top 10 '

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post as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The Cabinet of Ministers metamorphosed into the Council of People's Commissars, with Vilis Lacis, a veteran Latvian communist, as its chairman. 108 As in the dual Soviet system of party and state, the LCP, in theory and by law the vanguard of the Latvian working class, under First Secretary Kalnberzins assumed the leading political role in the new system. The LCP advised the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Commissars, itself taking directions from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). As of August 8, the LCP became a branch of the CPSU. 109 One additional institutional connection between the Latvian SSR and the Soviet Union was membership in the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. Latvia could send seven delegates to the Council of the Union, twenty-five to the Council of Nationalities. In November the government announced that elections for these posts would be held in January 1941. As could be expected the LCP, the only remaining legal, constitutionally valid political party, received 98.4 percent of the vote." 0

The second Resettlement One unfinished matter still had to be resolved before the Soviets could fully bring Latvia into the socialist fold. Contrary to official pronouncements, all Baltic Germans had not emigrated in late 1939. As long as these people remained, even though the Reich had formally declared them nonGermans, the Soviets hesitated to do entirely as they pleased. Furthermore, with its annexation of Latvia the Soviet Union had assumed responsibility for Latvia's financial commitments resulting from the resettlement; Latvia still owed the Reich a substantial sum as compensation for the property the Baltic Germans had left behind. In addition to this debt Germany claimed ownership of considerable investments and capital in the country. As the Soviets launched their nationalization campaign, which anticipated the confiscation of German property and other economic interests, the issue of Latvia's financial obligation became more pressing and required resolution. When the Soviets launched their nationalization campaign the few remaining Reich diplomats in the Baltic capitals reminded the Soviets that the Reich expected them to respect German economic interests. Not only had the Reich continued a brisk trade with Latvia, it claimed investments of one kind or another somewhere between 1oo,ooo,ooo and 12s,ooo,ooo Reichsmarks (RM). In addition to this sum UTAG still controlled Baltic German property worth at least another so,ooo,ooo RM, and the Reich wanted to settle these economic matters once and for all."'

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Furthermore, by June 1940 the Baltic Germans remaining in Latvia realized they had made a mistake by refusing the Fuhrer's magnanimity back in October 1939 and pleaded with the Reich for another chance to leave. The Soviets had already demonstrated they were not discriminating in the ethnicity of their victims, as Baltic Germans began disappearing along with ethnic Latvians and other non-Latvians, including Jews." 2 In the Reich the matter of the remaining Germans in Latvia, as were all affairs related to ethnic Germans throughout Europe, was within the purview of Reichsfuhrer SS Heinrich Himmler. Himmler at first refused to consider giving these disobedient non-Germans a second chance, believing that doing so would set a precedent for other Germans who defied the Fuhrer but then expected a reprieve. Himmler nonetheless relented and on August 15 instructed the Reich Foreign Ministry to negotiate a supplementary resettlement, the Nachumsiedlung, for those Baltic Germans stranded in Latvia and Estonia. 3 He also requested the Foreign Ministry to negotiate the resettlement of the Germans from Lithuania. Initially the Reich had expected to receive the border area of Lithuania in which most of its ethnic Germans lived, but as matters worked out this transfer did not occur and the removal of this minority had become advisable. Negotiations over the resettlements were part of the negotiations over outstanding economic issues. Unlike in the deliberations over the earlier resettlements that the Reich held with the still independent Latvian and Estonian governments, in these later discussions, following the annexation of the Baltic States, it dealt directly with the Soviets. While arranging these negotiations Molotov informed Berlin that Reich diplomatic missions in the Baltic capitals would have to close by September 1 and transfer their activities to the Reich embassy in Moscow."4 A German delegation arrived in Moscow on August 24, 1940. Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop passed up this latest chance to visit Moscow and in his place sent lesser diplomats. After considerable haggling over their respective economic claims and counterclaims, on November 26 the two parties agreed that the Soviet Union owed the Reich 15o,ooo,ooo RM. The Soviets would pay this sum during the course of 1941 and 1942 mostly through continued Soviet deliveries of agricultural goods and raw materials to the Reich. s The repatriation of the remaining Germans presented no serious obstacles, although the Soviets wrangled over the point-somewhat sarcastically-that there could be no Germans left in Latvia and Estonia since they all had left in 1939." 6 By January 4, 1941, the Soviets were ready to sign an economic agreement. In addition the Soviets and Germans signed treaties on the three Baltic resettlements 11

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and the rectification of the border between the Reich and former Lithuania. Since Ribbentrop was not present to sign the treaty in person, on January 10 Molotov brought in Anastas Mikoyan as his signing standin.u7

The conditions of this evacuation differed from those of 1939. First, the Reich regarded the Baltic Germans opting to leave Latvia in early 1941 as refugees, not entitled to the privileges granted the earlier resettlers. In addition, UTAG took over refugee property and credited each refugee with a lump sum value. This amount became part of the comprehensive calculations of the economic agreement. By mid-January resettlement teams were back in Latvia, registering those who had procrastinated or had refused to leave earlier. As in autumn 1939, many Latvians jumped at this final opportunity to get out while they could; some successfully passed themselves off as Germans, while others failed. The Reich press reported that along with the Lithuanian Germans, the Baltic Germans from Latvia and Estonia who had "remained for business purposes" also availed themselves of this opportunity to leave. Amazingly the 1,6oo reported back in December 1939 as staying behind to tend to German economic interests had by January 1941 grown to 10,ooo.u8 It is noteworthy that while the negotiations for the supplementary resettlement and the economic agreement were proceeding, not to mention the evacuation itself, Hitler had already decided to attack the Soviet Union, and the Reich's armed forces were secretly preparing for the operation. But in the interim, Latvians endured Soviet rule in complete isolation.

5

sovietizing Latvia: The Year of Terror

The NKVD and soviet Latvia

After the failure of Soviet rule in Latvia in 1919, Peteris Stucka, the head of the ephemeral Soviet Latvian government, had confidently prophesied the future reunification of Latvia with Russia under the Soviet system.' Now that the predicted reunification had materialized, the building of the Soviet system in Latvia could commence. The process began with the occupation of June 17, but it gained momentum after the formal incorporation in August. With the political system firmly under Soviet control, all other areas of activity including society, the economy, culture, and everyday life in general experienced a thorough transformation as the new regime aimed to convert Latvia into a constituent Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union. In order to fit in as a full-fledged SSR, Latvia had to adopt and adapt to the Soviet socialist model, a transformation for which the Latvian Communist Party (LCP) assumed primary responsibility. As its membership expanded from a few hundred to over a thousand by the time of the annexation, the LCP with the help of Soviet advisors, mostly NKVD agents, organized a nationwide network with branches and cells at every administrative level. By June 1941 the number of full members had risen to 2,557 with over 1,ooo candidate members. 2 In order to monitor and enforce compliance with the dictates of the LCP, as early as March 1940 the Soviets created special NKVD formations for duty in the newly incorporated areas. Since the Soviet Union was concurrently preparing for war, NKVD personnel were organized into military-like units and even received military ranks.3 It was the NKVD that defined and identified the enemies of the state and compiled lists of those to be removed. Among its early tasks in Latvia was the replacement of police, local officials, and administrators of the old regime with reliable personnel approved by the LCP. Although at first most civil servants were required to stay on the job-to prevent the bureaucratic chaos that abrupt personnel changes would create-wholesale purging of the system began in August 1940.4

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Simultaneously with its purge of the Latvian officialdom the NKVD sought out a broad array of "counterrevolutionary" foes, which included virtually everyone with a "bourgeois" background. Among the principal targets were Aizsargi, members of Perkonkrusts, veterans of the War of Independence, and recipients of various military decorations, but the police net also snagged some whose offenses were as innocuous as singing Latvian folk songs or not singing "The Internationale." Beginning as occasional arrests and the disappearances of individuals, the process escalated into a sweeping campaign of terror that continued unabated until the German invasion. A particularly insidious decree of November 6 retroactively validated for Latvia all Soviet legislation defining "enemies of the state," a blacklist of twenty-nine categories. This measure empowered the NKVD to arrest almost anyone, since this lengthy roster of foes cast its shadow of suspicion over the majority of Latvians. Secret police appearances at night became a dreaded but common feature of Soviet Latvia.s For many Latvians the horrific nature of this police regimen justified characterizing the year of Soviet rule as the Year of Terror, or Baigais Gads. Another category of enemies designated by the NKVD were so-called saboteurs, who intentionally-so it was alleged-obstructed the path to socialism by destroying or damaging machinery and other state property, or who simply got in the way by not cooperating enthusiastically enough. Even absenteeism from work could be construed as sabotage, punished with long prison sentences or even the death penalty. One source estimates that prior to the mass deportations of June 14, 1941, the authorities had already arrested over 6,ooo people, of whom more than 1,300 were executed. As noted earlier, Latvia's prisons soon filled to overflowing, and Riga's Central Prison became the dreaded icon of consummate terror. 6 The fate of many of those apprehended was deportation to slave labor camps throughout the Soviet Union. Contrary to Soviet assertions that "without almost noticing, and without blood-letting a socialist revolution occurred in Latvia," the quality of life changed perceptibly with the incorporation.? The new rulers transformed everyday social and cultural life, banning clubs, organizations, and all social activities not expressly permitted. Those who had naively hoped for a freer life after the stifling authoritarianism of Ulmanis, sooner or later were disappointed, as countless restrictions and arbitrary rules burdened an individual's every move. The occupiers declared Russian the official language and renamed streets throughout Latvia for Soviet heroes, a disruptive practice that the Germans repeated in July 1941.8

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The Soviets also prohibited the singing and playing of the national anthem, as they did the flying of the national flag .. Using the honorifics of "sir" and "madam" was discouraged as a bourgeois residue, inappropriate for a truly democratic society. Even time was revolutionized, as clocks were adjusted to synchronize Latvian time with Moscow time. Furthermore, Sunday was abolished as a day of rest; instead, every sixth day became a day off, a measure lauded as an "improvement ... on the Almighty's one day in seven."9 Former national holidays were forbidden, while traditional ones such as Christmas were strongly discouraged. In their place communist celebrations such as May Day and November 7, commemorating the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, moved to the head of the holiday calendar. 10 Particularly unsettling for the residents of Riga was the defilement of this once beautiful city's appearance. Sanitation workers, finding menial labor demeaning in a proletarian society of equals, no longer cleaned the streets and seldom picked up garbage. Posters, banners, and pamphlets sullied buildings and littered the sidewalks and streets. The situation degenerated to the point that the authorities decreed cleaning up the city as everyone's socialist duty. u The normally rule-abiding population, demoralized by the sudden disruptions, ignored this appeal as they did many rules of civic decency. For example, public intoxication and rudenessanomalous behavior for the staid residents of Riga-became commonplace. Along with the city's increasingly seedy visage, residents had to put up with the clamor disrupting the once dignified tranquility of Riga's boulevards and avenues. Tanks were always clanking down the streets, troops were marching, and aircraft roared overhead. Omnipresent loudspeakers, while blaring out the "Internationale," intermittently thanked the Soviet Union for Latvia's improved being and exhorted the people to strive for even greater socialist accomplishmentS. 12 Another noticeable change was the sharp descent in the standard of living. In comparison with many European states directly caught up in war, Latvia remained a land of relative well-being, but shrinking supplies of goods, including foodstuffs, threatened what little remained of Latvia's comfortable lifestyle. As early as June 1940, as items disappeared from store shelves, a black market formed to step into the supply and distribution void. By January 1941 long lines waiting for scarce goods became a feature of Latvian urban life. 3 Even with the declining standard of living, rising prices, and diminishing purchasing power, Latvia still looked good to many outsiders, especially to Russians and Soviet Latvians, who streamed to Latvia, both as permanent residents and as visiting shoppers. 1

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A factor contributing to the drop in Latvian living standards was official looting, as the Soviets carted off all sorts of items in short supply back home. Empty Russian trains festooned with banners proclaiming cargoes of food and other necessities for starving Latvians arrived in Latvian railway stations, loaded up with Latvian goods, and returned full to capacity to the Soviet Union. Although calculated as legitimate trade, these uncompensated shipments were tantamount to wholesale robbery.'4 The response from the majority of Latvians to these and other odious Soviet measures was at first passive resignation. With time, the collective mood shifted to indignation and then to outright hatred. One must keep in mind nonetheless that other Latvians, though probably in a minority, at least sympathized with a system that afforded them new opportunities, higher status, and power they had never before enjoyed. After all, not everyone had shared Ulmanis's nationalist and rural vision of Latvia. There were also those who at least initially adopted a wait-and-see attitude, hoping that the new system, although imperfect, would at least be tolerable. Still others naively expected that the new regime would restore the democracy Ulmanis had terminated. Very few openly opposed the regime-in no small part due to the vigilance and thoroughness of the Soviet security apparatus. The few courageous individuals who challenged the system, a few military officers and students, quickly disappeared. '5 Other forms of discontent included hazardous flight across the sea to Sweden or Germany, while at home farmers showed their displeasure by producing less, and even many workers-the favored Soviet constituency-worked more slowly. Some Latvians dissented by attending church services, still others did so by speaking Latvian on occasions when Russian was required. ' 6 A silent gesture of protest continued throughout the year of Soviet rule, the aforementioned placing of flowers at national monuments. Defying threats of severe punishment, flowers appeared at the Freedom Monument and the National War Memorial, poignant reminders that at least some of the people were dissatisfied with the People's Latvia.'?

Sovietizing Latvian society and culture The Sovietizing process penetrated deeply into Latvian culture and society, as the metamorphosis extended far beyond cosmetic changes, such as the renaming of streets or the littering of Riga. First a series of isolating measures cut Latvia off from the outside world, a preliminary objective of the new regime. The closing of Riga's foreign missions and expulsion of diplomatic envoys severed a valuable two-way conduit of information

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flow, and those stationed in Moscow were prohibited from visiting the Baltic capitals. The Soviet authorities expelled foreign press correspondents along with the diplomats, and since the state controlled Latvian radio and newspapers, no news except for what the Soviets chose to release reached the public. Nothing in the way of uncensored information entered Latvia, nothing left, and the few souls who dared to listen to foreign broadcasts did so at the risk of their lives. Two favorite targets of Soviet propaganda were neighboring Sweden and Finland. Whereas Latvians got an earful of concocted stories about rampant inflation and unemployment in Sweden and the virtual collapse of civilized society in Finland, they heard nothing about the true course of the war. The Latvian news media became no more than a propaganda organ, faithfully relaying the state's official views on "Famine in Europe" and "Workers' persecution in capitalist states."' 8 One may recall that the censored press under Ulmanis controlled the media and may have paved the way for the Soviets, but in comparison to the Soviet news system the Ulmanis press had been a paradigm of pluralism. Clearly there existed a difference in degree, if not entirely in kind. Soviet control of the written word extended to literature. As early as August 7 the state seized all printing shops, and all offices kept close check on typewriters and printing machines to prevent any unauthorized publishing. '9 Prior to publication everything had to pass the censor's scrutiny, which favored sycophantic panegyrics to the Soviet system and especially to its great and infallible leader. The first index of banned books appeared in November 1940, a compendium of ninety-two pages with supplements published in February and March 1941, respectively ninetynine and twenty pages in length. Whereas the Ulmanis regime had banned approximately 100 Marxist and other politically objectionable books, the Soviet blacklist prohibited over 4,000. 20 By their own admission the Soviets purged libraries of nationalistic "literature and trash" but restocked books by "Soviet writers, world classics, and progressive men of letters." 21 In mid-October the authorities organized writers into the Latvian SSR Writers Union and brought composers and artists under their watchful care the following February. 22 Conformity with the prescribed political themes and literary topics became the prerequisite for acceptable artistic expression. A vital area of control in any dictatorship is the educational system. Beginning in July the state took over all schools, eliminating private and parochial institutions altogether. The authorities then imposed a strict separation of state and church by prohibiting all religious instruction in

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the state schools. In order to ensure correct attitudes and ideologically acceptable instruction, nationalistically inclined, reputedly anticommunist teachers were removed or transferred and replaced by more reliable instructors, many of whom had been fired during the Ulmanis years. School administrators were also subjected to inspection in respect to their political predilections and personal backgrounds. It is estimated that the new regime relieved 1,500 teachers from their duties, while transferring another 7,ooo less noxious teachers to new schools. The NKVD applied its draconic measures to the politically most offensive teachers and school administrators by arresting some, deporting others. 3 A somewhat "leftist" reputation and participation in the Revolution of 1905 saved the author's grandfather-a school principal in Daugmale-from this initial cleansing of the education establishment. Reshuffling personnel was only one area of school reform, as schools switched from the twelve-year system to the Soviet eleven-year system. 4 This modification was a minor inconvenience in comparison to the difficulties encountered in revising the curriculum. Marxism, history of the Soviet Union, and similar subjects became standard classroom fare, while the teaching of Latvian history and its bourgeois culture was deemed ideological apostasy. Special classes for teachers, including the "Party Short Course" on Marxism, instructed them in the new ways of Soviet pedagogy. 25 One particularly perplexing obstacle to overcome was finding enough acceptable textbooks. Most of the old books were judged politically unorthodox and were relegated to the pulp mills; new ones had to be written or translated from the Russian, a time-consuming process that delayed school reopenings in the fall. Routine, everyday practices had to be altered as well. In place of the daily singing of the Latvian national anthem schoolchildren sang "The Internationale," and new school holidays, such as May Day and November 7 replaced the former ones. In addition to the regular public schools, the regime also provided for adult education as well as special party schools for the training of communist cadres, and the general population was expected to attend six-week crash courses in "people's democracy."z 6 The pinnacle of the Latvian educational system, the University of Latvia, also endured restructuring and Sovietizing. A thorough purging of faculty proceeded apace, as politically unsatisfactory instructors were removed, often replaced by politically compliant but academically unqualified Soviet Latvians, who also replaced much of the University of Latvia's administration. The reformed university introduced a new degree program in Marxism-Leninism and abolished both the Protestant and Catho2

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lie theology programs, along with their respective departments!? The traditional, elitist enclave of student life, the fraternities (Korporacijas), which the authorities correctly identified as being supportive of the old regime and hostile to the new, also received the ax. In the coming months fraternity members appeared prominently on NKVD lists for arrests, eventually for deportations. 28 One of the few anti-Soviet demonstrations in Soviet Latvia occurred at the university on December 16, 1940. Soviet troops, presumably of the NKVD, surrounded students protesting changes and arrested some fifty demonstrators, who simply disappeared.29 As the authorities removed students hostile to the new order, they expanded admissions for those with heretofore limited access to the university, such as children of workers and Jews. Similar reforms also revolutionized Latvia's other institutions of higher learning, the Jelgava Agricultural Academy, the Conservatory, and the Academy of Arts. In addition the Soviets introduced an educational innovation, the People's Universities, technical-vocational institutions intended primarily as evening schools for workers.3o Schools were not the only youth-oriented institutions affected by the Soviet takeover. The Soviets, in particular the LCP, brought to Latvia the whole panoply of communist youth organizations. At the outset they abolished all existing youth organizations, including the Boy Scouts and the Mazpulki, the Latvian version of American 4-H clubs and the youthful manifestation of Ulmanis's agrarian idealY In their place the LCP substituted the Latvian Union of Working Youth, which numbered over 3,000 by the time of the incorporation. Toward the end of July the LCP introduced the Young Communist League, better known as the Komsomol. For a while the two communist youth organizations coexisted, but after the incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union and the LCP into the CPSU, the Komsomol absorbed the Union of Working Youth and in October formally joined the All-Union Komsomol. In addition to the Komsomol the LCP also founded the Latvian branch of the Pioneers for younger childrenY Religious life, anathema to the Soviets, became a prime victim of persecution. The officially atheistic state would not condone competition with the Church for the hearts and souls of Latvians. Latvian religious institutions, the Lutheran, Catholic, and Orthodox churches as well as Jewish synagogues rivaled the LCP and the state as objects of loyalty and devotion-a competition totally unacceptable to the new masters. Furthermore, the religious establishment, especially the Lutheran Church, had been a bastion of support for the old, nationalist regime. The Roman

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Catholic Church, because of its international connections and loyaltieswhich in Soviet eyes were no less insidious than links to the former regime-suffered along with the Protestants. Subsequently the Soviets suspected all forms of organized religion and marked them for censure and official abuse.33 Following the annexation, attacks on the churches shifted into high gear. As already noted, the Soviets extirpated all religion from education by eliminating religious instruction from the public schools, seizing all church schools, and abolishing the theological programs at the university. The authorities harassed churches, closed many down, and hounded ministers, priests, and rabbis; many were arrested, some disappeared. As noted, Sundays were abolished as days of religious observance, and workers were given every sixth day off, which management staggered in order not to give all workers the same holiday. This rotation of non-work days and the fact that Sundays could not be taken off, limited the number of people worshipping together, and when they did worship, so-called atheist brigades disrupted their services.J4 Streets named for churches and with religious references were renamed, as Bishop Street became Darwin Street, and Jesus Church Street was renamed Atheist Street.3s The eventual nationalization of property included expropriation of church holdings, as the state converted church buildings into theaters, museums, and in one case even a bowling alley. A church in Liepaja was turned into a circus. Cloisters and other buildings became barracks and even tractor stations.36 From the outset of Soviet rule the clergy became targets of police persecution, which escalated into more severe forms of terror. In the first half-year of their reign the Soviets deported or executed some forty priests as enemies of the state. Some clergy managed to flee, but as a group churchmen were inordinately represented on the deportation lists. The experiences of Jewish rabbis paralleled those of the Christian clergy. Popular allegations of Jewish-Bolshevik collaboration and the all-too-common Latvian assumption that Jews received preferential treatment under the Soviets cannot stand up to a close scrutiny of the facts, certainly not in respect to the Judaic religious establishment. The commonplace tormenting of rabbis, the closings of synagogues, and the harassment of their congregations all belie the allegations propagated by many Latvians that the Soviets favored the Jews as a privileged group.37 Trade unions were another type of institution singled out for liquidation. After all, in a state supposedly created and maintained for the workers, trade unions as representatives of the workers were superfluous.

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Workers' committees replaced the unions in the workplace, and for workers with leftist inclinations these creations were an improvement over the former, state-controlled unions. Theoretically the Soviet system liberated workers, but the introduction of constraints such as the infamous "work book," which recorded a worker's complete work experience along with comments by superiors on matters totally unrelated to employment, such as political attitude, restricted the individual's choices and amounted to a means of surveillance that was anything but liberating.38 One must keep in mind, however, that Ulmanis had also curtailed union activities, and by the time of the Soviet occupation they hardly functioned as autonomous representatives of workers' interests. As a rule, in matters of employment those on the political left clearly benefited, whereas those on the politically unreliable, bourgeois, nationalist right suffered job discrimination. Former policemen, Aizsargi, army officers, and other anti-Soviet elements, once fired from former positions, could find only the most menial, unskilled, lowest paying jobs open to them.39 It is difficult to appraise the overall impact of Soviet labor policies on those they most affected, Latvia's workers-the social element most alienated by the Ulmanis dictatorship and the one that had welcomed the advent of Soviet rule most enthusiastically. On the one hand anti-Soviet critics point to the end of trade unions, the introduction of the work book, and restrictions on the choice in employment as just few of the measures contrary to workers' interests. On the other hand pro-Soviet commentators have directed attention to the positive contributions: the increased educational and career opportunities for workers, the end of unemployment, and other social and economic benefits the Soviets brought Latvian workers.¥> For some workers skepticism regarding Soviet measures and behavior set in sooner than it did for others, well before Soviet rule expired. For others the year of Soviet control was not enough time for incipient Soviet policies to make an impact one way or another on their overall well-being. Many simply adopted a wait-and-see attitude that was still on hold when Soviet time in Latvia was up. Before most workers developed the bitter, cynical disillusionment that became the norm in the postwar years and ultimately hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union, the war interrupted and prematurely suspended the socialist transformation in Latvia.

Nationalization and the Economy The economy was of paramount importance for the Soviet system, whose ideological base rested on the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. As the Soviets

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interpreted Marxism in their own, peculiar Russian way, beginning under Lenin's leadership and then continuing with Stalin, the point of departure of a socialist economy was state ownership of all property. The socialist state, presumed to be the political incarnation of the working class and its interests, controlled all property in the name of the people. Private property was limited to a few personal possessions; the rest was administered through the institutions of the Soviet state. In this centrally controlled, planned economy, also referred to as a command economy, political "command" and not market forces determine prices, supply, and other economic essentials. Concurrently with the extension of Soviet political control and military power over the Baltic States, the Soviets forced Latvia and its Baltic neighbors into the Soviet command economy as envisioned and constructed by Stalin. The integration of Latvia into the Soviet economic system began even before the military occupation. Among the earliest measures binding the Latvian and Soviet economies was increased trade, based on the agreement of October 18, 1939, which, as mentioned earlier, many Latvians characterized as looting. Requisitioning for the Red Army stationed within the country and increased shipments to the Soviet Union, especially after annexation, siphoned off much of Latvia's production from its own use, leading to shortages and an overall decline of living standardsY Economic assimilation continued apace after formal incorporation. In late August 1940 the Latvian SSR established several People's Commissariats for industry, each corresponding to an industrial sector. Commissariats for other compartments of the economy soon followed. Simultaneously a State Planning Commission began formulating a blueprint that coordinated the entry of Latvia's economy into the Soviet Union's third FiveYear Plan program. By October 1 several areas of Latvia's economy were already functioning according to that plan, even though the Central Committee of the CPSU formally approved Latvia's ninety-four-pages-long plan only on February 10, 1941.4 State ownership of all means of production and distribution, industrial, commercial, and agricultural dominated the planning document, and nationalization of all property became the order of the day. Before discussing nationalization, several immediate measures affecting the economic being of the population should be mentioned. One dealt with currency. At the time of the base occupation in autumn 1939 the Latvians agreed in part under pressure, in part as a gesture of good will, to an exchange rate of one lat for one Soviet ruble-a decided advantage for the Soviets, since the going exchange rate was one lat for ten rubles. 2

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The same one-to-one rate remained in effect throughout the occupation period.43 The currency situation became critical with the June 17 invasion, when many stores stopped taking paper money and silver quickly went out of circulation, as people began hoarding coins because of the uncertain future. In late July the newly elected People's Government tried to reassure the public that it would stabilize and maintain the lat, but to no avail. The panic was on, and people stopped depositing money and tried to withdraw all they could. In response the regime acted quickly by first limiting any bank withdrawals to fifty lats and then in late July to one hundred lats per month. Further regulations restricted moving money between accounts.44 Then on November 25, 1940, the ruble became legal tender alongside the lat-at the exchange rate of one to one-and on March 25, 1941 it replaced the lat entirely. Anyone still holding lats lost them all. At the same time, the authorities also confiscated what remained of bank accounts, allowing a withdrawal of up to 1,000 rubles and keeping everything above the limit.4s This marked the end of personal savings, financially wiping out much of the thrifty Latvian middle class. The disadvantageous exchange rate and the eventual conversion to the ruble, tantamount to a 90 percent slash in purchasing power, contributed to the downward spiral in the standard of living, as did the restrictions on withdrawals and the ultimate confiscation of private bank accounts. Soviet wage and price policies, unabashedly intended to benefit the favored constituency under the new regime, industrial workers, further accelerated the decline. As early as June 21 the government first raised industrial wages, followed by hikes for state workers. Conversely it reduced and then capped salaries at the higher end of the pay scale. Throughout the summer the regime continued to increase workers' wages, and by mid-September urban workers' salaries had increased thirty to forty percent. Rural wages advanced by only 20 percentreflecting the inherent antiagrarian bias of the Soviet system.46 In late September workers' groups throughout Latvia thanked the authorities for the pay increases, but a few days later, on October 1, the government announced steep price increases that canceled out the recent wage gains. Consumers were shocked. The cost of clothing shot up so percent, groceries twenty-five; prices on shoes, woolens, and furs sky-rocketed by more than 100 percent.47 The authorities explained the price leaps as alterations necessary to bring the Latvian economy up to par with the Soviet economy. The present difficulties, so they claimed, resulted from adjustment pains, and in the long run Latvians too would enjoy Soviet prosperity.48 In order to

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offset the price jumps, on November 10 the regime raised wages once more, but on November 25, the same day that it declared the ruble as legal tender alongside the lat, it broad-sided the public with yet another round of price increases. Bread went up another 6o percent, butter 100, percent, sugar soared 200 percent. The cost of wool clothing leaped 400 percent, cotton by 110 percent.49 The regime tried to divert blame away from itself and declared a campaign to eradicate sabotage and price gouging, to which they attributed both the upward spiraling of prices and the downward plummeting of purchasing power and living standards.so Soviet currency policy as well as wage and price manipulations directly and adversely affected the economic condition of the Latvian public. The modest prosperity of the Ulmanis years had dissipated, remaining only as a bittersweet memory. Compounding the problems engendered by these price and wage policies was the broad sweep of nationalization. The disruption and dislocation resulting from the confiscation of virtually all property by the state contributed to the economic mess through diminished productivity. Supply suffered, as did quality, contributing to additional scarcities and the further escalation of prices. The Soviets nonetheless hailed the nationalization process as the end of the exploitation of the Latvian working class by the national bourgeoisie. Just as the Soviet incursion and its concomitant political measures had broken the bourgeois grip on the Latvian state, nationalization would undermine their economic control. Ironically, the Soviet assumption of total state ownership of the economy completed a process begun by UlmanisY Thanks to Ulmanis's extension of state control-if not always formal ownership-over private enterprise, Soviet nationalization progressed rapidly. Prior to the Soviet takeover an estimated 73 percent of all enterprises already were de facto if not de jure property of the state, and over 98 percent of the shares of joint-stock companies belonged to the State KreditbankaY Nationalization of industry therefore entailed more of a change in leadership and management rather than the state's seizure of completely private property. As a preliminary to and in anticipation of nationalization, on July 20, 1940 the People's Government forbade the liquidation of joint-stock companies and forced all businesses to continue operating as before. To do otherwise would be construed as sabotage. 53 Two days later the new Saeima submitted legislation providing for the nationalization of banks, large industrial concerns and land. All of these entities not already owned by the state would become state property without compensation. On July 25 the Saeima passed the bill without much ado.s4 The day before the

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passage of the law the Saeima liquidated all boards of existing enterprises and replaced them with more amenable personnel, mostly workers themselves; business experience was not necessary. 55 Having workers and others loyal to the new regime on these committees would facilitate the transfer of control. The Minister of Finance supervised the process prior to incorporation, after which some 6oo commissars took over the direction of nationalized enterprises. Some were native but most were recent arrivals from the Soviet Union. The Ministry of the Interior helped screen the new appointees and evaluated the fitness of former managementusually retained long enough to ensure a smooth transition-to continue as employees. Although few domestic objections to the process could be heard, loud protests came from abroad, denouncing the expropriation of foreign-owned capital. In this respect the Soviets perpetuated yet another one of Ulmanis's policies, the driving out of foreign investments and capital.s 6 By December 1940 some 85 percent of industry was nationalized, the remainder consisted mostly of small shops and trades. In February 1941 most of the latter also came under state ownership, and by June 1941 only 5 percent of Latvian industry remained in private handsY Nationalization revealed its inherent flaws soon enough. With fellow workers running the enterprises and with former owners and managers demoted and often toiling along with the common workers, work discipline deteriorated. Many workers did as they pleased and worked at their own pace, on tasks of their own choosing. Symptoms of the same endemic faults that plagued the Soviet economy many years later-when the whole system teetered before its eventual collapse-soon became manifest. Slipshod work and lower productivity caused the new management to chide the workers that "we must work better under socialism than under capitalism."ss Workers' complaints, at first tolerated, with time were added to the growing list of activities deemed sabotage, and work stoppages were forbidden. Strikes were regarded as betrayal of the working class. Along with industry all banks were nationalized, and in this sector the Ulmanis regime had also prepared the ground well. The scattering of truly private banks Ulmanis's economic experts had left standing for the Soviets to expropriate came under the control of the State Bank of Latvia, which in turn was merged into the Soviet banking system. One of the main functions of the restructured State Bank of Latvia was to allocate funds for the nationalization process. As of August no securities or anything of the sort could be bought or sold, and all had to be turned over to the State Bank of Latvia, which in fact meant expropriation. Jewelry, gold,

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silver, precious stones, all were confiscated. With the destruction of private banking and the looting of personal accounts, the public was left without a place other than mattresses to store money. In December the state created special savings institutions for this purpose, but once the deed of financial betrayal had been done, the public no longer trusted the state with what little money was lefts9 Next to go on the block following the nationalization of industrial concerns and banks were large commercial enterprises such as department stores. The law of September 28, 1940, designated retail businesses doing an annual turnover of over wo,ooo lats for nationalization. This measure affected nearly 1,200 stores and some 58 percent of all trade. The rest survived until May 1941, when following a campaign denouncing speculators and economic parasites, the so-called medium-sized enterprises, those doing over so,ooo rubles worth of business annually, succumbed to state ownership. 60 Ownership of housing also came under socialist review. As early as July 31, the Minister of the Interior, in order to prevent neglect of rental property by owners anticipating the seizure of their buildings, decreed that all owners were responsible for maintenance and for providing heat for their buildings. Failure to comply could be deemed hostile to the state. This stricture was reinforced by a law of August 14 establishing government control over all private apartment houses earning a certain minimum amount in annual rents. 6 ' On October 28 the inevitable nationalization decree for housing expropriated more than 12,000 large apartment buildings, with at least 9,000 in Riga alone. As in the case of industrial enterprises, special commissars, many of them women, took over the management of apartment buildings. In some instances, depending on the whims of the commissar in charge, the former owner could stay on as a caretaker or janitor, while in other instances the erstwhile proprietor was evicted. 62 Having seized the buildings, the authorities reallocated living space. With the influx of military dependents and an assortment of security, political and economic officials from the Soviet Union, housing, especially in Riga, became scarce. In addition, Latvian working class families with many children received high priority for new, more spacious housing. As a result former residents often found themselves assigned to smaller, more cramped quarters or literally kicked out onto the street. The confiscation of housing spread to individual dwellings as well. Houses above a specified size became state property, and the owners had to vacate the premises. The nationalization of buildings extended to

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movie theaters, hospitals, pharmacies, hotels, and restaurants. Even three circus facilities came under state ownership. 6 3 Transportation also fell victim to nationalization. Here too the previous regime had already made significant inroads in terms of state control. The state already owned railroads, but private ownership still operated some shipping and other forms of land transport. In mid-August the Soviet railways network absorbed the Latvian railroads, and the following January all other land transportation companies not already state-owned became state property, including their facilities, vehicles, buses, trucks, and even personal automobiles. 6 4 Seizure of land vehicles went smoothly, but shipping was a different matter. As discussed earlier, on July 27 the People's Government summoned all of Latvia's ships to return home, with dire consequences threatened for those that disobeyed. Few complied, and when on October 5 the state nationalized the merchant fleet, only some fifty-eight ships were accessible, mostly river craft rather than seafaring vessels. 6 5 soviet Agrarian Reform The Soviet version of agrarian reform became an integral part of the socialist transformation. Contrary to election promises made in July 1940 that private land was inviolable, the People's Government nationalized agriculture. In order to broaden its support, which came primarily from urban industrial workers, the regime tried to enhance its appeal in the countryside by focusing on small-holders-those owning less than ten hectares of land-and the landless. In order to court this constituency the People's Government added agrarian reform to its platform. 66 Under the pretext of bringing economic justice and democracy to the countryside, the regime intentionally attacked the economic underpinnings of Ulmanis's primary support, the bourgeois farmers. Clearly Soviet agrarian reform, like that of 1920, served political purposes. Whereas the 1920 land redistribution aimed at destroying Baltic German power, the 1940 agrarian reform dispossessed the very class that had benefited from the earlier land reform. Veterans of the War of Independence, many of them Aizsargi-Ulmanis's primary political supporters-had been the principal recipients of land in 1920 and had diligently farmed medium-sized plots of land that averaged around thirty hectares in size. Of the more than 270,000 farms in independent Latvia, only some 1,100 were larger than 100 hectares, and fewer than 79,000 were smaller than ten hectares. Since the 79,000 small-holders as well as some 16o,ooo landless rural laborers

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had not fully enjoyed the benefits of the earlier land redistribution, the Soviets intended to rectify what they considered an injustice. 67 On July 22, 1940, the same day that it announced the nationalization of industry and banks, the People's Saeima proclaimed state ownership of all land. Land, forests, lakes, rivers, all henceforth belonged to "the people." Individual landholdings, no longer private property, would be limited to thirty hectares, and all larger parcels would be seized by the Land Bank and then redistributed to those with fewer than ten hectares of land or none at all. A week later, on July 29, a more specific law detailing the reallocation of the land authorized the Land Bank to seize and dispose all land belonging to the Church and other "enemies of the state."68 The Land Bank expropriated 96o,ooo hectares from over 48,ooo individual farms. About 38,ooo farms were allowed to keep thirty hectares, while 1o,ooo farms, whose owners for various reasons were designated enemies of the state, were parceled out of existence. By August 31 the government had received over 155,000 applications for land. Surveyors worked into late September measuring land lots for reallocation, eventually creating 52,000 new farms and awarding another 23,000 homesteads additional land. These enlarged and new farms, encompassing around ten hectares each, created a new social class in the countryside called the "ten-hectare-people." The NKVD and local Workers' Guards enforced the land transfer and swiftly squelched any resistance. 69 In essence Soviet agrarian reform, by seizing the land as state property but allowing individual farmers to farm the land, had set up a tenant farming system. As happened with nationalized industry, productivity in the state system of agriculture dropped. Large farms, reduced in size and with a diminished labor force took the hardest hit. Farmers tried to work the land without hired help-who had received their own plots of land-but producing at the same level as before with only the immediate family as labor was physically impossible. As for the new ten-hectare plots, although larger than the tiny small-holdings that existed before the reform, these were still too small for efficient, profitable farming. Another problem in the "reformed" countryside was the shortage of housing and facilities such as barns; many of the new farms came with no buildings, and it would take time to construct the necessary facilities, including farmhouses. Animals and livestock had to be reshuffled as well. Consequently, it would be a while before even the most industrious novice farmers could adjust to the new circumstances and raise production levels enough to sustain one's own family as well as to make the required deliveries to the state.?a To its credit, the regime tried to help by providing credit to

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new farmers for construction and purchasing needed equipment, but resources and personnel were limited. The state also introduced to the Latvian countryside the Soviet innovation, the Motor-Tractor-Station (MTS), which provided modern, mechanical assistance in cultivating and harvesting crops. An additional government innovation was the horse-lending center, where horses seized from those with too many-by Soviet standards-could be borrowed by the "horse-less." The reformed system was intended to nurture cooperative behavior, leading eventually-as many bourgeois Latvian farmers dreaded-to collectivization.7' The agrarian reform, initiated concurrently with the government's manipulation of wages and prices, accelerated the general decline in the standard of living, since the disruption of normal farm life resulted in less food for consumers. On top of that deficiency, the regime's price policy made things worse by removing realistic incentives to increase the food supply. Prices for farm products, although raised by hefty amounts, did not keep up with the pricing of manufactured goods, and for most farmers the rewards of their labor in the form of items available for purchase were not worth the effort. The official price they received for their produce did not apply to that part requisitioned as mandatory deliveries, for which the government paid far less. On March 31, 1941, the regime decreed a new requisitioning law, setting up a new schedule of quotas for delivery. Anything produced above the quota the farmer could sell, but under the circumstances most farmers were fortunate just to meet their obligatory quotas, with little or nothing left to market. To the misfortune of many farmers, failure to fill quotas was declared a criminal act of sabotage.7 2 Although the People's Government as well as that of the Latvian SSR unstintingly denied it, Soviet agricultural policies anticipated impending collectivization. Rumors portending collectivization abounded, and several measures in the spring of 1941 seemed to presage collectivization as the ultimate fate of Latvia's agriculture.73 To most everyone's surprise the agrarian reform had bypassed some fifteen large farms, totaling z,ooo hectares. Authorities explained that these farms would provide agricultural models-but models for what? The answer became evident in February 1941 when the state expropriated these farms in their entirety and turned them into state farms, the Sovkhoz, thirty-one state farms in all. In March the authorities seized more farms, mostly those that prior to the reform had exceeded thirty hectares. The government also repossessed-no doubt to its chagrin-some 7,000 ten-hectare farms that had already failed.74

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As a step toward eventual collectivization the regime encouraged cooperative efforts, providing additional land for farmers who pooled their land, equipment and labor. In March legislation allowed for organizing voluntary cooperatives, offering incentives such as helping with the building of communal facilities, providing readily accessible tractor stations, and even new housing. In early June 1941, shortly before the German invasion, the state built the first kolkhoz, or collective farm, in Latgale, appropriately named after Stalin. The war interrupted the collectivization movement before it got off the ground, but it would return in the postwar years with a fury.7s The People's Army and Lltene One institution singled out for a particularly thorough Sovietizing was the Latvian Army. The so-called democratization of the armed forces began just a few days after the Soviet occupation of June 17.?6 The new powers intended to transform the Latvian Army, a bastion of support for the old regime and a hotbed of Latvian nationalism, into the People's Army, Tautas Armija. The army would be a hard nut to crack. Veterans of the War for Independence comprised the Latvian Army's senior officer corps; its younger officers came of age in the nationalistic atmosphere of Ulmanis's Latvia; and its soldiers consisted mostly of farmers' sons instilled with the patriotic spirit of the rural, traditional Latvia promoted by the Ulmanis system. Ethnic non-Latvians and urban workers were an undesirable, discriminated subculture in the Latvian armed forces and entirely unwelcome in the officer corps. The process to convert this stronghold of Latvian nationalism into a "democratic" institution promoting socialist ideals started at the top. General Roberts Dambitis replaced General Krisjanis Berkis as Minister of War; General Roberts Klavins, a patriot who had criticized Ulmanis and had been relieved from duty after the 1934 coup, became the Commander of the People's Army; and Colonel Martins Jeskis assumed the duties of Army Chief of Staff. None of these men had any illusions about Latvia's ultimate fate, but they believed they could somehow mitigate the process. None of the three survived the war. Klavins died in a Soviet slave labor camp in Siberia; Jeskis disappeared in the GULAG as well; and Dambitis perished at Dachau.n Shortly after assuming his post as Minister of War, General Dambitis addressed the nation, informing the public of the changes in the military and emphasizing that only close cooperation with the Soviet Union could preserve Latvian independence.78 Purges throughout the ranks followed the changes at the top, as both officers and soldiers judged unreliable

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were released. Some simply went home, while others began disappearing-arrested, shot or deported. Several even committed suicide.79 Emulating Red Army practices, common soldiers formed committees within their units. As could be expected, discipline deteriorated, since even hints of disloyalty perceived by lower rank informers could lead to an officer's removal and disappearance. 80 Another innovation borrowed from the Red Army was the assigning of political officers, or politruks, to all divisions, regiments, independent units and military offices. As of July 4 they monitored officers for reliability and instructed the troops in the socialist spirit. The prominent Social Democrat, Bruno Kalnins, assumed the post of Chief Political Officer of the Army. Though mostly Latvians, the politruks acted on orders from Soviet authorities. 8 ' In addition to purging the army, the People's Government disbanded the Aizsargi, who had provided the military with an auxiliary armed reserve and had maintained close ties to the army both organizationally and spiritually. 82 On October 10 the border guards were also abolished, with many of its officers arrested, deported, or murdered. 8 3 In sum, the purges and personnel replacements reduced the Latvian Army by nearly a half.84 Following the annexation General Klavins, fearing the possible dissolution of the army and the dispersal of Latvian soldiers throughout the Red Army, implored Vyshinski to intercede and help preserve exclusively Latvian units in the Red Army. Whether it was Vyshinski's intervention that made the difference is unknown, but the decision came down to integrate the entire Latvian People's Army into the Red Army in late August as a unit, the 24th Territorial Strelnieki Corps. 8 s The 24th Corps came under the command of the Baltic Military Region-in Russian, Pribaltijskii Vojennij Okrug-or in short, PRIBOVO, which had been created in June 1940 at the time of the Soviet occupation. PRIBOVO, headquartered in Riga, guarded the Baltic region from the Lithuanian border with East Prussia to the Gulf of Finland. 86 The Lithuanian Army became the 29th Corps, and the Estonian Army became the 22nd Corps. These national concessions were extraordinary, since in 1938 the Red Army had dissolved its last territorial units. 87 On September 27 General Klavins issued his final orders as commander of the Latvian People's Army: the transfer of 720 officers to the 24th Corps and the return of all military attaches still abroad. Those that disobeyed and refused to return would be regarded as deserters. Among the "deserters" were Lt. Col. Viktors Deglavs, military attache in Kaunas, and Lt. Col. Aleksandrs Plensners, attache in Berlin, both of whom returned to Latvia-but not when ordered by Klavins, rather with the in-

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vading German forces in 1941. 88 Klavins retained command of the estimated 8,ooo-strong 24th Corps, with General Oto Udentins as chief of staff. The 24th Corps consisted of two divisions, the 181st Strelnieki Division, which consolidated the former Kurzeme and Vidzeme Divisions, and the 183rd Strelnieki Division, which absorbed the remnants of the Latgale and Zemgale Divisions. The 24th Corps also contained artillery, cavalry, and sundry support units. The Latvian 24th Corps along with the 22nd Estonian Corps were assigned to the 27th Soviet Army, with its staff headquarters in Riga. 8 9 The Latvian Navy and the aviation branch went the way of the army. The Soviet Red Banner Baltic Fleet appropriated the Latvian Navy along with the Lithuanian and Estonian navies. With its new bases at Ventspils and Liepaja, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet had broken out of its confinement in the Gulf of Finland and extended its area of operations to the Lithuanian-German border.Yo As part of the Red Banner Fleet, Latvian naval vessels received Soviet numbers: Virsaitis became Soviet vessel T297; Viesturs, T-298; !manta, T-299. Most of these ships, along with the two submarines, remained stationed at the Liepaja naval base, which became the major Soviet naval facility outside the Gulf of Finland.9' The Latvian aviation wing became the 24th Corps Aviation Squadron.9 On February 23, 1941, the anniversary of the Red Army, all Latvian military personnel in the Soviet Armed Forces took an oath of loyalty in Russian: "I swear ... to my last breath to be loyal ... to my Soviet homeland and worker-peasant government. I am always prepared to follow orders of the worker-peasant government, to defend my homeland-the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."93 The sincerity of these obligatory oaths is open to question. Oaths of loyalty notwithstanding, the Soviets still did not trust the Latvian military, not even with most of its counterrevolutionary elements weeded out. An event that revealed the Soviet lack of confidence in the Latvians was the October 1 removal of Latvian political officers, who were replaced by imported Russian politruks.94 With the Latvian military securely imbedded in the Red Army, the NKVD continued its drive to eliminate the unreliable and the suspect, in particular officers; some were released and furloughed, others arrested, deported, or executed. As for those released, their reprieve usually proved only temporarily, since sooner or later they too fell victims to Soviet "justice."95 Enlisted men were not immune to NKVD terror. When a group of Latvian soldiers marched by singing patriotic Latvian songs, a nearby Red militiaman ordered them to cease. When they refused, he summoned the local 2

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NKVD, which arrested the corporal in charge and several other soldiers and sentenced them to seven years at hard labor.9 6 By most reports-Soviet ones being the exception-a Latvian soldier's life in the Red Army was tough. Soldiers were kept busy from morning to night with little respite, to prevent them from thinking too much about their miserable situation and from planning to do something about it. When not training or performing manual labor they were compelled to listen to interminable lectures on the merits and virtues of the Soviet system. Complaining and grumbling only attracted the NKVD. Agents and informers infiltrated the ranks, and the omnipresent politruks kept close watch on all activities.97 With the changeover to the 24th Corps, Soviet ranks and insignias replaced Latvian ones; Russian became the duty language; and Red Army drill and methods of operation became standard. Poorly paid, inadequately equipped, Latvian soldiers retained their Latvian uniforms, but the red star replaced the Latvian sun emblem on caps. Seldom did Latvian troops have access to weapons with live ammunition, and on night maneuvers additional militia and Russian Red Army personnel accompanied Latvian units-to prevent desrtions. With the reduction in the number of Latvian troops, the surplus equipment, uniforms, and weapons were shipped to the Soviet Union. As late as 1943 German forces encountered Soviet soldiers wearing old Latvian uniforms. In the Korean War United Nations forces captured some communist artillery pieces that had Latvian insignias and serial numbers crossed out.9 8 By spring 1941 scrutiny and supervision by the politruks became smothering, and army life became unbearable. The level of suspicion and insecurity noticeably rose, while fellow soldiers and officers continued to disappear. An unsettling portent of things to come was the replacement in May of General Klavins by a Russian general; the same fate befell Chief of Staff Udentins.99 Evidently their efforts to demonstrate socialist loyalty to the Soviets had failed. At about the same time the 24th Corps received urgent orders to relocate to Camp Litene in northern Latgale for bivouac, which heightened suspicions, since Litene was far too small a facility to accommodate the entire Corps. Reluctantly the Latvian units assembled at Litene, although some prescient officers and men took to the woods instead of reporting. Upon their arrival some of the men were demobilized and sent home, thereby decreasing the numbers encamped. Replacing the released Latvians were Russians, who arrived in a steady stream, soon outnumbering the Latvians.' Soviet officers increasingly restricted Latvian activities and movement at Litene until their existence could be likened to that of detainees. On 00

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June 11 and 12 Russian officers replaced Latvian regiment and division commanders. These Latvian officers supposedly were to be sent to Moscow for training, but instead their destination was the slave labor camp at Norilsk on the Yennissei River, far above the Arctic Circle. Norilsk literally became the end of the road for hundreds of Latvian and other Baltic officers.' On the night of June 13 all remaining Latvian officers at Litene were instructed to congregate and sleep in one designated area. The ax fell the following day, June 14. That morning some 120 officers were ordered on trucks to be taken to another locale for training. Instead they were driven into the woods where they were surrounded by NKVD troops, who proceeded to disarm them. One Latvian officer pulled out a hidden pistol and shot a NKVD agent before being shot himself. The NKVD then tied up the rest and murdered them. That afternoon the NKVD apprehended the remaining officers at Litene and drove them off to be either shot or deported to Norilsk.' 02 For most of the soo or more Latvian officers deported, including General Klavins, the former commander of the People's Army and the 24th Territorial Corps, Norilsk was a death camp. Some have referred to Norilsk as the Latvian equivalent of Katyn, the site where the Soviets executed several thousand captured Polish officers. 103 When news of the shootings, arrests, and deportations filtered back to the camp, hundreds more escaped to the woods. Those unable to flee ended up as the latest victims of Soviet terror. According to some counts 4,665 Latvian soldiers, including officers of all ranks, NCO's (instructors), and enlisted men, suffered arrests, deportations, or murder in the Year of Terror. Only 3,000 Latvian soldiers remained with the 24th Corps to face the invading Germans a week later. 104 0 '

Deportations of June 1941

The Latvian soldiers and officers at Litene were unaware that Latvians throughout the country endured the same terror simultaneously. On the night of June 13-14 the NKVD struck at the civilian population as well, a nightmarish climax to the Year of Terror. Indeed the same enormities struck Estonia and Lithuania on that same night. The arrests, shootings, and deportations of the soldiers were part of a massive operation throughout the Baltic region to eliminate the remaining enemies of the state. To the present-day Latvians commemorate this sorrowful affair as one deserving national mourning. In too many laments to cite, Latvians have described these deportations as virtual genocide, aimed at annihilating the Latvian nation, the first step in clearing the land of Latvians and

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replacing them with Russians-a Soviet version of Nazi-like population engineering. According to this nationalist view Latvians were arrested, deported, and murdered solely because they were Latvians. 10s The countervailing Soviet version, however, justifies the deportations as part of the "class struggle" and a preemptive measure intended to nip in the bud a suspected rising by counter-revolutionary remnants of the bourgeois regime. Allegedly in the spring of 1941 acts of sabotage had increased and events seemed to be moving toward an imminent revolt, supposedly coordinated with the German attack on the Soviet Union. The deportations, to which Soviets have alluded as relocations, were intended to destroy a potential fifth column preparing to serve the enemy. Besides, so the Soviet expiation continues, the victims were paying for their former crimes against the Soviets and their sympathizers: The deported included army officers who had murdered Soviets and their supporters in 1919-1920, police and prison officials who had tormented workers, bourgeois political leaders and anti-Soviet activists, former estate owners, businessmen, factory owners, and high state officials, all confirmed enemies of the state. These exculpating narratives, however, ignore the fact that thousands of women, children, the elderly, and other innocents who by no stretch of the imagination could be indicted as criminals were also brutalized and victimized. Soviet explanations of these infamies, written since the Khrushchev "thaw," have ascribed these actions to Stalin's excesses. 106 Neither the Soviet nor the Latvian nationalist explanations for the deportations suffice. As brutal and inhumane as it was, the operation clearly was not part of a planned campaign of genocide, since it did not target the whole Latvian nation but rather certain political, vocational and social groups. Besides, non-ethnic Latvians-by Latvian definitions-including thousands of Jews, also appeared on the NKVD lists that night. Documentary evidence as well as subsequent events lead to the conclusion that the annihilation of the Latvian people as a whole, in the same sense as the Germans planned and carried out the extermination of Jews, was not in store. A more appropriate analogy would be Stalin's liquidation of the Kulaks as a class in Russia in the 1930s. These industrious Russian farmers, along with their families, were designated class enemies, and as such were arrested, deported, and murdered, thereby previewing the fate of select groups of Latvians. As for the Soviet assertion that the deportations nipped an anti-Soviet plot in the bud, all of the 14,693 people deported on the night of June 13-14 were by no means accomplices in an anti-Soviet plot. ' 7 A more balanced and frankly, but 0

Sovietizing Latvia: The Year of Terror I 135 regrettably, more accurate assessment of Soviet intentions, one lying somewhere between the two extremes, attributes three goals to the Soviets: "To remove all active and patriotic elements, leaders and intellectuals from the population; to break the will of resistance by exposing the gruesome fate of those who did not conform; to weaken the nation physically." 108 The lame Soviet excuse that the deportation preempted a subversive plot lost all credibility with the discovery of a document, dated October 11, 1939, the notorious NKVD order number 001223. Deputy Commissar Ivan Serov of the NKVD, the same Serov who operated out of the Soviet Legation in Riga during the initial occupation, had issued "Procedures for Carrying out the Deportations of Anti-Soviet Elements from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia," which minutely prescribed how to implement the deportations.' 9 Issued secretly a few days after the signing of the Mutual Assistance Pacts, this document reveals the true intentions of the Soviets from the outset. It was clearly not the Latvian regime violating the Mutual Assistance Pact or plotting with the Estonians and Lithuanians that prompted Latvia's seizure and consequent annexation. In all probability the Soviets had planned the occupation at least as far back as August 23, 1939, and the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Treaty. As noted earlier, although some arrests and deportation began with the June 17 occupation, the first major sweep of arrests occurred about the time of the July elections. On the night of July 11-12 numerous public leaders were arrested, and after months of imprisonment, most were deported to Siberia. Beginning in July Serov regularly compiled lists of nationally prominent figures, while local committees, troikas, consisting mainly of LCP members and NKVD agents, made local selections. It is estimated that the police arrested 200 to 300 people a month during the remainder of 1940.llo Knowledge as well as rumors of arrests provided the necessary intimidation for the campaign of terror, spreading fear of as well as hatred for Soviet rule. Soviet commentators have dismissed and reviled this loathing as "bourgeois resistance," expressed in arson, various acts of destructive sabotage, and "beastly" opposition against the workers' state.'ll In growing numbers people expecting imminent arrest-including the author's father-either fled to the woods or began moving from place to place throughout the country, always a step or two ahead of the NKVD knock on the door. Several prominent figures managed to evade arrest. Alfreds Berzins, former minister of public affairs and one of Ulmanis's closest colleagues, escaped by way of Estonia to Finland. Former Finance 0

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Minister Alfreds Valdmanis remained in Latvia but miraculously avoided detection. As mentioned earlier, ethnic Latvians were not the only prey. In early 1941 the NKVD arrested two distinguished leaders of the Jewish community and former Saeima deputies, Mordechai Nurock and Mordechai Dubin, and deported both to slave labor camps. The order for the mass deportations of June came on May 19. All was to proceed as outlined in Serov's October 1939 guidelines.ll3 Serov personally supervised the operations in Latvia and Estonia, while Viktor Abakumov took charge in Lithuania. In preparation for the undertaking, which envisaged the detention and deportation of more than ten thousand people, NKVD offices throughout Latvia stepped up logistical activities, lining up personnel and transportation. Convoys of heavy trucks arrived in early June, as did additional trains and wagons at Riga's railway stations. The Tornukalns station in Riga was designated the transportation hub for the operation. Rows upon rows of freight and livestock cars lined the station's sidetracks. On June 12 militia reinforcements began arriving at Tornukalns and at some fifty-five other railway stations across the country. ll4 This carefully coordinated operation began simultaneously on the night of June 13 in all three Baltic States as well as distant Moldava, formerly Rumanian Bessarabia. The Soviets focused on over twenty categories of "enemies of the people," including numerous clergy, leaders of the press, and members of the fraternities, along with teachers, businessmen, intellectuals and other so-called counter-revolutionary adversaries. This time, unlike the earlier arrests that had singled out individuals, entire families were designated for "relocation," some soo in all. lls During the night and into early morning trucks rumbled through Latvia's city streets and along its country roads to pick up their human cargo. On each truck a squad of six armed men and women, some NKVD officers, others members of the militia or Workers' Guards, drove to addresses on their assigned lists to collect their doomed victims. Families had anywhere from a few minutes to a few hours to pack a few belongings. Then the trucks carried them off to assigned railway stations where families were separated, usually never to see each other again-wives from husbands, even children from their parents. Anything of value was stolen from them. The deportees then were crammed forty to a car into freight and livestock wagons with barred and barbed-wired windows, with no provisions for food, water, or sanitation. Once locked, the doors remained sealed until reaching their destinations. Some trains left shortly, others waited for days. Meanwhile the deportees, not knowing their fate nor 112

Sovietizing Latvia: The Year of Terror I 137 comprehending this ghastly nightmare, waited inside the locked wagons, often without food or water. Some went insane; others died. Not everyone went peacefully. When the NKVD came for Lt. Col. Karlis Zalitis, he shot the arresting officer before turning the gun on his own family and himself. " 6 Controversy surrounds the role of Jews in the deportations and as accomplices in the Soviet terror in general. The upcoming chapter on Latvia's Jews will address this issue more completely, but for the time being let it suffice to say that Jews proportionately played no greater role in the deportations than did other segments of the population at large. The fact that one of the leading NKVD officials in Latvia was Simeons Shustin, a Latvian Jew from Moscow, contributed to the growing myth of the close comradeship of Latvia's Jews and the Bolsheviks. Many postwar emigres, mostly fervently anti-Soviet Latvian nationalists, fabricated and perpetuated a distorted, entirely false image of a Jewish conspiracy against the Latvian people. The truth is that far more ethnic Latvians than Jews participated as Soviet henchmen in the deportations of their fellow countrymen. Furthermore, Jews disproportionately suffered greater losses in the deportations than did ethnic Latvians. The estimated s,ooo Jewish victims of June 13-14 constituted over 5 percent of Latvia's Jewish community. The ethnic Latvian portion of those arrested, more than 9,000 of the total 14,693-after subtracting the s,ooo Jews-amounted to 1.2 percent of Latvians. Of the 6o,ooo Baltic people abducted on the night of June 13-14 approximately 12,000 were Jews. Particularly hard hit were non-Latvian Jews from Poland and points farther west who had sought asylum in Latvia from the Germans. The Soviets distrusted their foreign connections and viewed them as potential spies and foreign agents. "7 Six months later transports of Jews from the Reich destined for slaughter in Latvia began arriving at the same Tornukalns railway station from which thousands of Latvian Jews had been deported to the Soviet Union." 8 More than 8oo railway cars scattered Latvian deportees across the vast Soviet Union, to Central Asia, as far east as Kamchatka, and beyond the Arctic Circle, to camps such as Kolyma, Vorkuta, Norilsk, Karaganda, and Potma. Although lacking the notoriety of Nazi concentration camps (KZ) such as Dachau and Buchenwald, for their inmates as well as in the collective memory of the Baltic peoples and other victims of Stalinist terror, these GULAG facilities have assumed a no less iniquitous and deservedly sinister image, the icons of quintessential inhumanity. Many members of the Latvian intelligentsia ended up at Solikamsk, while for most military officers, as mentioned earlier, Norilsk was the end of the line. Women

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usually were assigned to factory labor, while men were posted at hard labor such as cutting timber and working in gold and coal mines. The harsh elements, inadequate clothing, lack of food and shelter, and above all the relentless, physically draining labor took a deadly toll, and for most deportees incarceration in these camps amounted to a death sentence."9 As matters turned out, at least for the Jews that survived this ordeal, their fate as Soviet prisoners was slightly more fortunate than that of Jews left behind in Latvia, because two weeks later the Germans arrived. Some disagreement still lingers over the final count of victims not only for the June operation but for the entire Soviet occupation. As for the numbers of people seized on June13-14, the most frequently cited number is 14,693. Of these 8A36 were men, 6,257 were women. A few counts are slightly higher, a few lower. 120 It appears that the NKVD lists for June 13-14 contained 16,205 names, some of which evidently managed to evade arrest and deportation' 2' The numbers of those taken away should be separated into those deported immediately, nearly 1o,ooo, and those arrested, around 4,500. Of those arrested it was discovered after the German arrival and the unearthing of graves at Riga's Central Prison and other locations that the NKVD had murdered 1,355.' 22 One should add to these counts the more than 6,ooo people deported after the night of June 14 and the more than 12,000 humans not accounted for. The consensus figure for the total number of Latvians deported, murdered or missing during the Year of Terror is 34,250.' 23 Along with the 34,250 Latvians some 39,000 Lithuanians suffered the same fate, as did 61,000 Estonians.'24 The far higher number of Estonian victims is attributed to the fact that the Soviet occupation lasted longer in Estonia. It was the German invasion beginning on June 22, 1941 that disrupted the eradication of the "bourgeois enemies of the people" in the Baltic States. As the Soviets fled and the Germans marched in, additional NKVD lists were discovered for follow-up operations in July. Had it not been for the German invasion, most assuredly tens of thousands of more Latvians would have fallen victims to Soviet terror, including this author's maternal family. 12 s The deportations of June 13-14, indeed the entire experience of the Latvian people during the Baigais Gads, are recalled as being among the most sorrowful events of Latvian history. However tragic and cruel, in absolute numbers as well as proportionally, the Latvian casualties of Soviet terror, however, do not add up to genocide and certainly not up to the magnitude of the Holocaust. But assessing a terrifying experience such as these deportations is not merely a matter of numbers, nor even of motives. As was the case with the Holocaust, the victims were living,

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breathing, feeling human beings. It made little difference to individuals whether the arresting authority came from the NKVD or the Gestapo. It made little difference whether the freight car carrying that human being away from home and family was operated by the German or Russian railway. It mattered little whether one ended up in this horrible predicament because of being categorized as a class enemy or as a racial enemy. And it also hardly counted in the nightmarish shattering of an individual's world whether one's end came in the slave labor camps of the Soviet GULAG or the concentration and death camps of the German SS. All humans suffer the same pains and losses. For those who survived the Soviet terror, another wave of disruption was about to crash, and many would not be as fortunate this time around. That would most certainly be true for Latvia's Jews, for whom the German invasion and occupation-only two weeks away-would be incomparably worse than Soviet rule. For ethnic Latvians the arrival of the Germans would be more complex. Their experience, for the most part, would be a mixture of relief and continued dread. After the rule of the despised Bolsheviks, most Latvians, at least initially, welcomed the Germans as liberators who freed them from the surrealistic nightmare of the Year of Terror. The reaction of many of those who had suffered personally from Soviet rule, from the loss of loved ones, friends, and homes, went beyond welcome to outright collaboration. For the next several years, as Latvia experienced the war firsthand, choices for Latvians would not be as simple to make as they once had been. Even right from wrong would be more difficult to discern.

6

The German Invasion and occupation of Latvia

Preliminaries At 3:00 A. M. on Sunday, June 22, 1941, an artillery barrage of unprecedented firepower, firing from 7,200 artillery pieces, emblazoned the early morning skies all along the 1,250 mile western frontier of the Soviet Union. With these deadly luminaries as a fanfare, Hitler launched his invasion of the Soviet Union, the fabled Operation Barbarossa. The artillery bombardment softened the way for a massive assault of more than 3,ooo tanks, at least 2,500 aircraft, an estimated 3,ooo,ooo German soldiers, and another half million allies This formidable force, divided into three army groups, Army Groups South, Center, and North, altogether consisted of seven armies and four armored (Panzer) groups, a total of 148 German divisions along with at least forty allied divisions.' Some 200 Red Army divisions-more than 2 million strong, with untold reserves to the rear-supported by 6,ooo aircraft and 10,000 tanks faced the German onslaught. The world had never witnessed combat of this magnitude. Army Group North, which had assembled in East Prussia, was the smallest of the three assault groups, containing two German armies, the 16th and 18th, and the 4th Panzergruppe, twenty-nine divisions in all. With its ultimate objective of Leningrad in its distant sights, Army Group North charged northward through the Baltic States, determined to destroy as much of the Red Army as it could. On June 26, only four days after beginning their attack, units of the 4th Panzergruppe had reached the Daugava River at Daugavpils in eastern Latvia. 2 After nearly two years the shooting war had finally come to Latvia. The clash was not unexpected. Both major combatants as well as those caught in the middle or dragged along had resigned themselves to the inevitability of this conflagration. It was just a question of when, and one person alone, Adolf Hitler, determined the timing. His carefully calculated, step-by-step course of aggression had finally brought him to the borders of the Soviet Union. No pangs of conscience troubled Hitler as he shredded the Friendship and Non-Aggression Treaty. To him the agree-

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ment with Stalin had been a temporary expedient-a means to an endthat helped him achieve his ultimate goal, and in that respect it had served him very well. It had prepared the way for the destruction of Poland, and when he attacked the West in May 1940 he was confident enough of Stalin's friendship to leave only a minimal force in East Prussia. His confidence at the time rested at least in part on the fact that Stalin had not yet made his final move in the Baltic region and also on his knowledge that postponing the inevitable conflict for as long as possible was in Stalin's interest. Hitler had also benefited from the Soviets faithfully supplying his war machine with trainload after trainload of strategic goods. 3 Another factor in Hitler's timing was the military situation in the West. In Hitler's scheme, victory in the West by necessity preceded an attack in the East. He was halfway there with his defeat of France, but England stubbornly held on. By late July 1940 he had concluded that a naval invasion of England was not feasible, but one possible way to compel England to quit the war was to isolate it from any potential allies. He could do little if anything about the United States, which, with an army smaller than Belgium's, he dismissed as peripheral and not a major factor in these considerations; but the Soviet Union was another matter entirely. Hitler reasoned that by crushing the Soviet Union first, he could snuff out any British hopes for success, and they would come to their senses and give up.4 In this calculation Hitler appeared to be reversing his means and ends, as the defeat of the Soviet Union had become the means for knocking England out of the war. But appearances aside, this reversal did not abandon Hitler's ultimate design, the destruction of the Soviet Union and the conquest of Lebensraum. Hitler had altered the sequence of events, not his final objective. In addition to undermining British resolve and securing Lebensraum, Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in order to settle several simmering strategic disputes, in Finland and in the Balkans. Since its victory in the Winter War, the Soviet Union had been pressuring Finland for further concessions, which, if granted, threatened Germany's presence in the Baltic Sea, in particular its critical trade in strategic materials with neutral Sweden. Belatedly Hitler was beginning to appreciate the geopolitical importance of Finland. Southeastern Europe had also become an area of contention. Here Stalin not only demanded more of Rumania than Hitler had yielded back in August 1939, but he was also trying to enhance Soviet influence with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Although Hitler had conceded Finland and Bessarabia in 1939, heightened Soviet demands in the sum-

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mer of 1940 exceeded what Hitler had bargained for. 5 Enough was enough. At a meeting with his highest military commanders at the Berghof on July 31, 1940 Hitler postponed the invasion of England indefinitely and revealed his plans for an attack on Russia the following spring. "The sooner Russia is crushed, the better," confided the Fuhrer to his generals. 6 As for the Soviets, they continued to honor their obligations to Germany, determined to avoid war for as long as possible. Based on their Marxist-Leninist interpretation of events, the Soviets viewed the war in the West as a capitalist war of imperialism, a struggle for domination of markets and resources. After all, the hostilities in the West beginning in May 1940 featured three capitalist superpowers, "fascist" Germany against "plutocratic" France and Great Britain, the quintessential capitalist pieces that perfectly fit into the Soviet paradigm of a war of imperialist conquest.? This Marxist ideological construct of an imperialist war could not accommodate, and therefore was dismissed as nonsense, the notion of a racially motivated war for the conquest of Lebensraum-which happened to be Hitler's equally dogmatic view of the coming conflict. The Soviets had hoped that the capitalist struggle would drain both sides to the point of exhaustion and that the drive for imperialist conquest would subside before it reached Soviet borders. Germany's surprisingly quick and facile victory in the West dashed Soviet expectations and forced the Russians to rethink their prospects. Stalin's decision to occupy the Baltic States militarily in mid-June 1940 and to incorporate them fully into the Soviet Union resulted from this recalculation. He would have occupied and annexed them eventually, but Germany's success in the West determined when. According to the prevailing Soviet military view, the seizure of the Baltic States added depth to Soviet defenses and pushed the eventual front farther from Soviet borders. Their territories provided a protective buffer zone, a strategic improvement to counter anticipated German aggression. 8 Others have disagreed with this appraisal and have regarded the inclusion of the Baltic States in Soviet strategic considerations a grave mistake. Since at the time of the German invasion the region was not yet fully integrated into the Soviet defense system, rather than strengthen the Soviet position, possession of the Baltic States only increased the amount of territory and length of front to defend.9 Although the Soviets did all in their power to delay the start of war for as long as they could, at the same time they prepared for the inevitable. As early as June 1940 Stalin placed the Soviet economy on a wartime

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footing, and the Red military worked night and day to rebuild its command-depleted by Stalin's purges in the late 1930s-and to modernize and stock up its arsenal.IO The following November 7, at the celebration of the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, the annual Red Army display of Soviet military might was more impressive than ever, clearly an intimidating preview intended to deter enemies abroad and bolster confidence at home." The Soviets also held out the olive branch, when shortly after the November 7 exhibition of Soviet power Molotov flew to Berlin to discuss and try to preserve the deteriorating friendship. During meetings with Hitler and Ribbentrop on November 12 and 13, Molotov broached Soviet intentions to annex Finland, expecting the Germans to agree to it. But to the contrary, Hitler withheld his consent, thereby limiting the Soviet sphere of interest not only in the North, but also in Southeastern Europe. At one point air raid sirens forced their gathering to relocate to a bomb shelter. While waiting for the emergency to pass, Hitler boasted that England was as good as finished, evoking a response from the Soviet guest: "If you are so sure that Britain is finished, then why are we in this shelter?" 12 Molotov's inconclusive visit hardly, if at all, eased tensions-although officially the media in both Berlin and Moscow described the talks as fruitful, reaffirming the friendship between the two powers. On the surface all still appeared tranquil when on January 10, 1941, the two partners signed the aforementioned economic agreement that also approved the supplementary resettlement of the remaining Baltic Germans'3 Unknown to the Soviets-indeed to anyone but the highest Reich leadership-on December 18, 1940, Hitler had already issued Directive Number 21 for Operation Barbarossa, the code name for the attack on the Soviet Union, originally scheduled for May 15, 1941. The relationship continued to worsen, and in early March 1941 the nervous Soviets protested to the Bulgarian government for allowing German troops into the country. And after a military coup in Belgrade on March 27 ousted a pro-German regime, the Soviets signed a nonaggression pact with the new Yugoslavian government on April 5-just one day before Hitler invaded the country.'4 It would be this improvised, diversionary campaign that caused the postponement of Operation Barbarossa from May 15 to June 22. One encouraging development for the Soviet Union in the midst of an otherwise unraveling situation was the signing of a neutrality and nonaggression treaty with Japan on April 13 that precluded the Soviets having to fight a two-front war. Soviet forces from the

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Far East could be deployed to the Western front to help repel the impending German attack.'s As the Soviets strengthened their forces along their western frontiers, the Germans became wary of the growing numbers of Red troops, which were far greater than needed for an adequate defense; this raised speculation that perhaps a Soviet offensive was in the offing. Evidently in May 1941 the Red Army gave some serious thought to launching a preemptive attack against Germany. General Georgi Zhukov, chief of the Soviet General Staff, and Marshall Semeon Timoshenko, people's commissar for defense, proposed just such a plan to Stalin, who rejected the idea, preferring instead to appease Hitler and nurture the so-called friendship for as long as possible.' 6 Throughout May and into June diplomatic and intelligence reports warning of an imminent German attack flooded the Kremlin from all directions. Stalin ignored these warnings, dismissing them as misinformation and insidious Western provocation, and placed his trust instead in wishful thinking and his own infallibility. Molotov likewise dismissed these warnings: "Only a fool would attack Russia."'7 German Plans for the Baltic and Latvia Just as Hitler seized and then held the initiative in determining the sequence and timing of his aggression, including his decision to attack the Soviet Union, he also set the guidelines for what would follow the presumed military victory. Hitler articulated his long-gestating ideas and flights of racist fancy as general guidelines and then expected his minions to turn these into plans and implement them as policies. As discussed earlier, his ultimate goal was a demographic reconstruction of Europe based on race, the creation of a New European Racial Order, which a racially pure German Volk would dominate. Essential to this New Order was Lebensraum, additional living space, which would provide the critical agricultural space and natural resources to ensure prosperity and the wellbeing of the Volk for generations to come. In Mein Kampf Hitler proclaimed that he would acquire the needed space at the expense of Russia, as Germans resumed the Drang nach Osten and followed the path traveled by their venerable ancestors, the Teutonic Knights. ' 8 As noted earlier, in anticipation of conquering the East, Hitler expected the racially pure and superior Germans, the Herrenvolk, to Germanize the soil by destroying or enslaving the resident subhumans, the Untermensch, the Slavs and the Jews. These basic imperatives of "race and space" were fundamental to his vision of the Germanized East. Contemporary Soviet observers as well as later Soviet historians, however,

The German Invasion and Occupation I 145 faithfully accepted and parroted the doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist interpretation of Hitler's war as an imperialist, capitalist war, a crusade to crush socialism and restore capitalism in the land of Lenin. Even though the German system of domination and exploitation briefly erected in the occupied parts of the Soviet Union hardly resembled competitive capitalism-and in most respects differed little from the highly centralized Soviet command economy and the one-party repressive police state-the Soviets stuck to this rendition of events until the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.'9 As early as May 1939, before he attacked Poland, Hitler reiterated his ideologically-motivated purposes when he confided to his military commanders that the coming war with Poland would not be over Danzig-which he had proclaimed, and the rest of the world believed, to be his objective. Instead it would be over Lebensraum and the issue of who would live there and control its resourceS. ° Conquest of living space had been Hitler's objective in September 1939 and consistently remained the primary goal-only extended farther to the east-that motivated Hitler in his campaign against the Soviet Union. On the morning of June 22, with the invasion underway, he blatantly and intentionally deceived the German people by declaring the purpose of the war against the Soviet Union to be the destruction of Jewish-Bolshevism and assured one and all that he had nothing against the peoples of Russia. 2 ' But contrary to this pronouncement, the war would not be limited to a "crusade against Bolshevism" to liberate the Russians and other peoples from the Soviet yoke. Instead, Hitler planned for and ordered his soldiers to wage a war of annihilation, whose ultimate purpose was to destroy or enslave the peoples of the conquered East and to seize their land. Corresponding to these ideologically oriented goals of brutal conquest and ruthless extermination, the nature of the conflict departed from the accepted rules of warfare. Hitler cast aside the notion of a limited war regulated by gentlemanly conventions and humane inhibitions and envisaged a no-holdsbarred war of total destruction. As one historian noted, if Hitler had merely wanted concessions from the Soviets, he could have readily arranged these. 2 3 Hitler and his subordinates aimed not only at the complete and merciless slaughter of the enemy's armed forces, but also the cold-blooded liquidation of much of the civilian population. The Germans calculated the remorseless exploitation of the region's resources, in particular its food supply, into the planning of this campaign. The Wehrmacht's commanders knew fully well that their blueprints for war envisioned living off the 2

22

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land, even though it would mean starvation for millions of the indigenous population. They did not factor in this suffering as an unfortunate but necessary imperative of war, but rather as a conscious goal that would cruelly contribute to the demographic reconstruction of the region. 4 This war would furthermore transfer from the West to the conquered East Hitler's campaign to eliminate Jews from his New Order. From the outset Hitler and his planners regarded the murder of Jews an essential element of Operation Barbarossa. 2 s Killing Jews was as important an objective as capturing Leningrad or Moscow. Hitler shared his general views for the East in early March 1941 in a conversation with Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel, chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW). The Fuhrer preferred creating a civilian administration for Russia, since he did not wish to burden the military with occupation problems. As for extirpating Bolshevism from the East, he relegated that task to Himmler's SS. Since Hitler had always assumed an inherent, insoluble bond between Bolshevism and Jews, the eradication of one presupposed the elimination of the other. Once the Germans exterminated the Jewish-Bolshevik leadership, the stupid proletarian masses would be incapable of rebuilding a state. Germans would rule and administer even the most remote regions of conquest, even those not designated for outright annexation to the Reich as Germanized Lebensraum. 26 Having deprived the peoples of the conquered lands of their leaders, the ruling Germans would utilize them according to the Reich's needs. No more than helots, the local population would be kept at as low a cultural and educational level as possible. Although the idea of exploiting local nationality differences as well as their common antipathy toward the Soviet system crossed Hitler's mind, he dismissed such considerations as unnecessary. He expected to achieve his goals without having to rely on the natives, who, after all, might expect concessions in return for their services. He did not need them and most certainly did not want to be obligated to them in any respecP? In Hitler's racist world view they did not belong on the same plane of humanity as Germans. As for the Baltic States, Hitler's plans swirled in a constant state of flux. In late July 1940, at about the same time as he decided to attack the Soviet Union, Hitler planned to annex the Baltic States along with the Ukraine and White Russia (Belarus) to the Greater Reich, to be ruled by German governors. Then, by April 1941 he was talking about drawing a line from Archangel in the north to Astrakhan in the southeast as the eastern boundary of German conquest. Within that area stood the Baltic 2

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States, designated initially as "protectorates."zB Finally, on the very eve of war Hitler again anticipated annexing the Baltic area as part of the Germanized Lebensraum, with the racially less desirable part of the population expelled eastward, and the racially acceptable elements converted culturally into Germans. As far as he was concerned, these small states no longer had the right to exist, and restoration of their statehood was out of the question. 9 Hitler's plans and visions for the East, both in the short term and for the more distant future, set the parameters and charted the general direction of policies; they provided guidelines rather than served as specific blueprints. In most instances, but not always, Hitler left the details to his subalterns to work out as they implemented what they thought were his wishes. In the process they often quarreled over spheres of authority, ultimately approaching the Fuhrer as their supreme arbiter. These jealous and competing lieutenants in turn depended on their inferiors to execute their orders. As a result subordinates at the bottom of the German chain of command-those who actually implemented policy-frequently found themselves impaled on debilitating dilemmas by having to please rival superiors and executing conflicting orders. Not uncommonly, this ambiguous and contradictory delineation of authority, endemic to the Nazi system-and this would be especially true in the occupied East-left the person responsible for carrying out orders acting on his own judgment of what he thought his superiors expected, from one's immediate supervisor all the way to the top of the command hierarchy, the Fuhrer himself. In addition to Hitler, other high-ranking Nazis conjured up their own fantasies of the conquered East, usually taking care to keep theirs within the scope of the Fuhrer's parameters. As time for implementation drew near, they vied with one another to sell the Fuhrer on their schemes. One such expectant supplicant was Alfred Rosenberg, a Baltic German from Estonia who fancied himself as the Nazi Party's foremost ideologue on racial matters and its leading expert on Russia and the Baltic. Although in the early 1920s Rosenberg caught Hitler's eye and rose in his esteem, by the 1930s his star was waning. Hitler personally cared little for Baltic Germans, finding them arrogant and aloof: "I find it difficult to get on with the Baltic families; they seem to possess some negative sort of quality, and at the same time to assume an air of supremacy, of being masters of everything."3o Rosenberg had presumed that one day Hitler would rely on him, the foremost expert on Russia and the Baltic in the Nazi camp, to produce the grand blueprint for the East and then supervise its realization. He 2

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was wrong. Besides lacking political acumen, which other, more astute Nazi comrades exercised more effectively with the Fuhrer, Rosenberg differed from Hitler on an essential racial point: Whereas Hitler relegated all of the peoples of the East to racial inferiority, Rosenberg valued some of them racially high enough to become Germany's partners, worthy of future Germanization-a notion Hitler rejected as unnecessary, even undesirable. Based on his own racial gradation of Eastern peoples, Rosenberg envisioned constructing a system of national, non-Russian states in league with a dominant German Reich against "Muscovy."J• In early April 1941 Rosenberg sketched a plan for the occupied East in which he divided conquered Soviet territory into seven units: Muscovy (Greater Russia), White Russia, Ukraine-Crimea, the Don region, Caucasus, Turkestan, and the Baltic States. The Baltic States along with former Polish lands were to become German colonies, from which the Germans would expel the racially undesirables farther east. The racially acceptable non-Russian peoples would help the Germans rule RussiaY In early May 1941 Rosenberg submitted his plan to Hitler. Hitler indicated no interest in creating a non-Russian state system in the East and preferred instead the total exploitation of the entire region and the destruction or subjugation of all national groups.33 Also in contrast to Hitler, Rosenberg understood and appreciated the antipathy of the non-Russian peoples toward Russians and their common hatred-held in common with many Russians themselves-toward the Soviet system. Unfortunately for Rosenberg his sympathy with certain non-German nationalities and disagreement over some of the Fuhrer's basic tenets and racial assumptions were a major factor in his falling out of grace.34 Several of Hitler's other subordinates seemed to apprehend his vision more fully and consciously fashioned their proposals more to his satisfaction. As a result, the Fuhrer granted them as great a share, if not greater, in the ruling of the occupied East than what he conceded to Rosenberg. One such favored subordinate and rival to Rosenberg was Reichsfiihrer SS Heinrich Rimmler. Rimmler, anxious to extend the police powers he and the SS enjoyed in the Reich to the East, shrewdly deduced that one way to enhance his authority was to propose a plan for the East that fundamentally coincided with Hitler's ideas. Rimmler had already made it known that he favored eliminating most of the inhabitants of the East by relocation and extermination. Unlike Rosenberg, he decried any non-German rule in the region and dismissed the feasibility of Germanizing non-Germans.Js With these basics in mind, he made his pitch for authority in the East when in the

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fall of 1939 he commissioned an official in the planning offices of his brand new, Fuhrer-approved organization, the Reichskommisariat fur die Festigung Deutschen Volkstums (RKFDV), to develop a comprehensive plan to submit to the Fuhrer. As chief of the RKFDV, Himmler augmented his position as the foremost executor of Nazi racial policies, a role Rosenberg had coveted. The RKFDV plan, which through several permutations came to be known as Genera/plan Ost, incorporated Rimmler's ideas, which fundamentally coincided with Hitler's views. In June 1940 Himmler submitted it to Hitler. After a quick perusal Hitler approved the plan, which advocated the thorough exploitation of the conquered lands and the deportation or annihilation of a large part of the population. Himmler was on his way to a preeminent role in the East.3 6 Having secured Hitler's assent, Himmler and the SS went on to become the principal police authority in the region and primary executors of Reich racial policy, as outlined in this scheme-which would evolve through several more versions. "The East belongs to the SS" became Rimmler's and his organization's motto.J? As for German plans for Latvia and Latvians, these varied, but in general they all fit within the broader scope of Hitler's vision for the occupied East. Most German race and space architects designated the Baltic region as an area for German colonization, territory to be incorporated into the Greater Reich. No leading Nazi, not even Rosenberg, gave serious consideration to the restoration of anything like independence or sovereign statehood. Subsequent Latvian aspirations for some sort of national recognition would be in vain.3 8 Baltenland, the name tossed around in prewar discussions for the region before settling on Ostland, in the minds of some Nazis, including Rosenberg, held a slightly higher status than the rest of the occupied East.39 One proposal even suggested increasing the size of the Baltic area by extending its eastern borders at the expense of Russia as far as Velikie Luki.4a To underscore the absorption of the Baltic States into the Greater Reich, some Nazi visionaries tossed around new names, suggesting Peipusland for Estonia and Dunaland for Latvia.4' The relative racial worth of the Baltic peoples as determined by Nazi racial experts played a critical role in the disposition of the Baltic peoples as well as their land. One SS memo dated December 1938 described the three Baltic peoples as "dying races" that should be replaced by more dynamic people-presumably Germans.4z In the estimates of other racial engineers the Baltic peoples ranked ahead of most peoples of Eastern Europe racially, entitling them to special consideration and more humane treatment.43 This latter, more complimentary view, one shared by Rosen-

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berg, seems to have carried the day, both in theory as well as in the day to day activities under the German occupation. Rosenberg did, however, distinguish among the three Baltic nationalities. For Rosenberg, who hailed from Estonia, the Estonians represented the elite of the Baltic peoples. He hypothesized that Estonian blood was so percent Scandinavian, and therefore Estonians were readily Germanizable. As for Latvians, their valuable blood count was not as high as that of the Estonians, which in his mind accounted for the Latvian proclivity for Bolshevism. He predicted that the Latvian intelligentsia would resist assimilation and therefore should be deported deep into Russia, along with the majority of Latvia's population. In Rosenberg's racial hierarchy the Lithuanians were the least valuable of the three and consequently had to be relocated en masse to the Russian interior.44 Although conceding some good blood to Latvians, Nazi racial experts disagreed on the exact amount and their corresponding potential for Germanization. SS researchers speculated that between 10 and 30 percent of Latvians-mostly from western Latvia-were suitable for Germanization, the rest for deportation.4s As late as February 1942 some SS offices were still debating the relative racial value of the Baltic peoples, finally concluding that Estonians and Latvians, racially somewhere between Germans and Slavs, in part could be Germanized, possibly as many as 6so,ooo to ?OO,ooo. The rest, in particular the Latvians, should be sent to Russia as administrators.4 6 The final arbiter in these matters, Adolf Hitler, held a low personal opinion of Latvians. In reference to the haughtiness of Baltic Germans, Hitler once observed, "They [Baltic Germans] ... have for centuries been the rulers among an inferior race, they are ... inclined to behave as if the rest of humanity were composed exclusively of Latvians."47 As events transpired, it turned out that none of the visions for the East-most assuredly nothing that crossed Hitler's desk-became the official blueprint for the reconstruction of the East. As competing Reich authorities and agencies quarreled over competencies and jurisdiction, plans fell by the wayside and their authors, if in positions of authority, introduced measures piecemeal in view of circumstances and whatever internecine politics allowed. The only inviolable constraint was the Fuhrer's will, and everyone was expected to work within its limits-as one interpreted it at the moment. When in the winter of 1941-1942 the German offensive bogged down and some Germans began to realize that the promised victory was not inevitable, the ambitious and ideologically motivated plans for the reconstruction of the East began to yield to the pragmatic exigencies of waging

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war. As German military fortunes declined even further, inexorably after the defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943, some of the Fuhrer's most basic premises changed. Although certain fundamental goals such as the extermination of the Jews remained unaltered to the end, Hitler compromised his heretofore refusal to utilize non-German peoples as allies in the struggle against Bolshevism.48 For example, the racial value of Latvians in German estimates amazingly improved as the war went on. A racial report of June 1944 described Latvians as being "in their majority racially worthy and generally related to us."49 As a result of competing and contradictory plans, overlapping and confused jurisdictions and competencies, and the constant ebb and flow of the war, the Germans never settled on a final, authoritative plan for Latvia and the Latvians.so Operation Barbarossa Because of the timing of his impromptu Balkan campaign launched in early April 1941 to punish Yugoslavia for overthrowing its pro-German government and to rescue the forces of his Italian friend, Mussolini, embarrassingly bogged down in Greece and Albania, Hitler delayed the attack on Russia from May 15 to June 22Y He personally and minutely supervised all aspects of Operation Barbarossa, imposing his strategic and even tactical opinions on a reluctant but malleable military command. His low esteem for the Red Army's capabilities as well as his equally low opinion of the cohesiveness of the Soviet Union figured prominently in the grand strategy of the operation.s> Rebuffing suggestions from his generals to concentrate German forces in an attack on Moscow, Hitler divided his invading armies into three groups, Army Group South, Army Group Center, and Army Group North. He ordered Army Group South to occupy the Ukraine, seize the Crimea, and then move on to take the oil fields of the Caucasus. He assigned Army Group Center, the strongest of the groups, to strike directly at Moscow, while Army Group North, the weakest group, attacked through the Baltic States toward its main objective, Leningrad. Ultimately German forces were to reach a line stretching from Archangel in the north, passing east of Moscow to Astrakhan in the southeast, occupying territory and destroying Russian forces along the way. Hitler was so confident of victory that he expected the campaign to last no longer than two to three months. Whereas in spring 1940 he had equipped his armed forces with weaponry designed especially for the type of fighting envisioned in the West, for the Russian campaign he provided nothing new. Why bother. He was

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certain the Soviet Union would quickly collapse after the first stunning blows. 53 Preparations for Operation Barbarossa reflected the barbaric nature of the warfare to be waged. Not only did the SS create special murder units, the Einsatzgruppen, but the regular military, the Wehrmacht, issued directives that allayed any inhibitions about crossing the lines of acceptable combat behavior. On May 13 the Army High Command distributed the infamous Commissar Order, authorizing the shooting of all Soviet political officers and Communist functionaries. The army also legitimized the shooting of civilians and taking harsh reprisals against the local population in the interest of German security and issued express instructions absolving German soldiers of any responsibility for excesses that might occur in the performance of their duties. Guidelines sanctioning the inhumane treatment of prisoners of war underscored the fact that this was to be a racial war of annihilation, with no quarter given or expected.s4 Orders reaffirming the ruthless but necessary nature of combat in the East were issued well into the campaign. For instance, instructions of October 10, 1941, reminded German soldiers of their mission to eradicate Bolshevism and its Jewish and Asiatic practitioners and explicitly conveyed the message that it was either you or they; humane reservations could only undermine one's own safety and well-being.ss These and equally chilling directives facilitated achieving a principal goal of Operation Barbarossa, the murder of Jews and other Untermenschen. The Baltic States lay within the area of operations of Army Group North, whose assignment was to advance through the Baltic States on its way to Leningrad and points north and east. Along the way it was to wipe out enemy forces in the Baltic and occupy the vital Baltic ports, from Liepaja in the south all the way to the Soviet home naval base of Kronstadt, thereby denying these bases to the Soviet Baltic Red Banner Fleet.s 6 Army Group North, under the command of Field Marshall Ritter von Leeb, began assembling in East Prussia in late April. This group consisted of two armies, the 16th under the command of Col. General Ernst Busch and the 18th led by Col. General Georg von Kuchler, and the 4th Panzergruppe (Armored Group) commanded by Col. General Erich Hoepner. German forces in this northern theater numbered twenty~nine divisions, the smallest of the three invading army groups, but in the estimates of German military planners more than adequate for dealing with the opposing Soviet forcesY Soviet military strength deployed in the Baltic area was no less formidable: an estimated 6so,ooo men, one of the largest concentrations on the

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Russian "western" front. When the Soviets annexed the Baltic States they consolidated all armed forces in the region into the Special Baltic Military District, known by its acronym of PRIBOVO. The day after the outbreak of war, on June 23, the Soviet command reconstituted these forces into a front-the Northwestern Front-the Red Army organizational equivalent to the German army group. In the course of its campaign Army Group North first encountered the Red Army's Northwestern Front in the Baltic region and then later the Northern, or Leningrad Front, defending northwestern Russia.s 8 The Northwestern Front, under the command of Col. General F. I. Kuznetsov, with its headquarters in Riga, included three armies: the 8th Army, led by Lt. General P. P. Sobbenikov, stationed along the Baltic Sea coast; the nth Army, under the command of Lt. General V. I. Mozorov, on the East Prussian frontier; and the 27th Army, commanded by Lt. General N. Berzarin, standing in reserve along the Daugava River. The latter, the 27th Army, contained the Latvian 24th Territorial Corps along with the Estonian 22nd Corps. In all the Soviets had twentynine infantry divisions, four cavalry divisions, four armored divisions and seven armored brigades in the B'altic.s9 In addition, the Baltic Red Banner Fleet under Admiral V. F. Tributs had at its disposal excellent facilities and bases along the Baltic Coast, the most important one at Liepaja. A sizable armada of Soviet naval vessels was stationed here and in Latvia's other naval bases. 60 As planned, Army Group North attacked from East Prussia northward in two prongs, with the 16th Army on the right, the 18th on the left flank. The German assault rapidly broke through Soviet lines and never looked back, slowing down only to seize strategic points along the way. On the third day of the campaign, June 24, the 16th Army seized the two major Lithuanian cities, Kaunas and Vilnius. 6 ' As the Germans barreled through Lithuania they bypassed thousands of Soviet troops, who scattered in disarray, only to be rounded up by Lithuanian self-defense bands. It would be within these first few chaotic days that both in Lithuania and in Latvia armed national partisans and self-defense irregulars wreaked bloody vengeance on Red Army stragglers, Soviet functionaries, and Jews. The German invasion first struck Latvia from the air, bombing Riga as well as the prime concentration of Soviet military bases in and around Liepaja. Hoepner's armored columns, one speeding toward Daugavpils in southeastern Latvia and another driving farther west toward Jekabpils, spearheaded the two thrusts into Latvia by land. On June 26 German tanks reached Daugavpils, and encountering little opposition as well as discovering an intact bridge over the Daugava, quickly seized a bridge-

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head. Reportedly local Jews had helped the fleeing Soviets set fire to Daugavpils before the Germans arrived. Whether true or not, the local Latvian population believed this tale, and it would cost local Jews dearly. 62 In western Latvia the 18th Army made its way to Liepaja, the main Soviet naval base on the Baltic. The Soviets, aided by the local militia, resisted fiercely, but the Germans prevailed and captured Liepaja on June 28. Its seizure procured Army Group North a prize port and naval base to support its continued offensive. 63 Prior to the German arrival, on June 23 the Soviet cruiser Kirov along with several submarines and torpedo boats outmaneuvered German air attacks and relocated from Liepaja to Riga. The destroyer Lenin and five submarines, including the formerly Latvian subs, Ranis and Spidola, damaged by German air raids, remained in Liepaja harbor, to be scuttled before the Germans arrived. 64 Admiral Tributs, following the orders of Soviet Navy Commander in Chief N. Kuznetsov, scattered the rest of the Baltic Red Banner Fleet, including the Latvian warships Virsaitis, Viesturs, and !manta, throughout the Gulf of Riga. On June 27 the vessels regrouped and steamed north for the Gulf of Finland, escorting a convoy of merchant ships loaded with cargoes of looted Latvian goods, anything that could be loaded quickly and could help with the Soviet war effort. Evacuating with this convoy were communist functionaries, both Russian and Latvian, as well as civilian dependents. The last ship to depart from Riga on June 29 was the Kirov. Heavily damaged by German air raids, it was towed by the Latvian icebreaker Lacplesis. Nearly the entire way the fugitive Soviet convoy endured relentless German air raids, and only a few vessels-but including the Kirov-docked at their destination. 6 s The formerly Latvian aviation wing experienced as calamitous a fate as the ships. A few aircraft of the 24th Corps Aviation Escadrille took to the air against the Germans, but were immediately shot down. Several planes managed to escape to Russia, while most never got off the ground and became German prizes of war. 66 The final assault on Riga itself began on June 29 with air raids, an intense artillery barrage, and the construction of pontoon bridges to replace the main bridge over the Daugava the Soviets had demolished. The Soviet 8th Army, retreating through Riga, had failed to destroy the railroad bridge, over which German tanks rumbled into Riga. One of the casualties of German bombardment apparently was the wooden spire of St. Peter's Church, the second tallest wooden tower in Europe. The attack also heavily damaged parts of Old Town, the historic medieval quarter. Controversy surrounds this destruction, with German and anti-Soviet

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sources blaming the retreating Russians for deliberately setting fires in Riga, including historic buildings such as the old Hansa merchant guild house, the Black Heads House, and even the aforementioned spire of St. Peter's. 67 Soviets to the contrary attribute the destruction solely to the heavy German air attacks that began on June 23 as well as to the supporting artillery barrage. 68 Although in their historical accounts of the battle for Riga the Soviets refer to the Red Army courageously battling "fascist" forces, most reports mention regular Red Army units of the 8th Army mostly as withdrawing from the city and being harassed by "national bandits" and "bourgeois traitors." 69 Rather than stand and fight, it appears that the regular Red Army troops evacuated Riga, as they did most other Latvian cities. Soviet sources compensate for this apparent lack of valor on the part of their regular forces by emphasizing the resistance of the local militia, the Komsomol, and other irregular groups in Riga as well as in other cities, particularly in Liepaja, the stronghold of Latvian communism. They laud the determined popular opposition to the invading Germans: Thousands of men and women throughout the Baltic States and not just in Latvia rose up to defend their "socialist fatherland" from "fascist" aggression.7o By July 1 the Red Army had abandoned Riga, allowing the Germans to enter the city. The Red Army's performance in Latvia can best be described as almost continuous retreat, chaotic retreat at that, and rearguard action. As a result, Latvia suffered relatively little physical damage and experienced minimal heavy combat in this initial phase of the war. As for the performance of the erstwhile Latvian army, that of the 24th Territorial Strelnieki Corps paralleled the overall Soviet experience. At the start of hostilities the 24th Corps, assigned to the 27th Soviet Army, consisted of two grossly undermanned Latvian divisions totaling some 3,000 demoralized men. Having just a week earlier suffered mass arrests, executions and deportations at Camp Litene, morale within the 24th Corps was abysmal. As soon as fighting began and the soldiers of the 24th Corps realized that withdrawal from Latvia to Russia lay in store for them, even more deserted. Many surrendered to the Germans at the first opportunity; some turned their weapons against their Russian comrades; and others evaded capture by the Germans and joined partisan bands whose loyalties at first were ambivalent.?' The 24th Corps, which the Soviets officially disbanded on June 30, withdrew from Latvia along with retreating Red forces. Some of its men departed on their own volition, but many were forced by their Russian comrades to withdraw at gunpoint. In early August the Red Army assembled the remnants of the 24th Corps

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along with Latvians from other Soviet military units at Gorohoveca near Gorki and consolidated them into the 201st Latvian Strelnieki Division, which first saw action in the defense of Moscow-where an estimated 2,ooo Latvians died. As had been the case with the creation of the 24th Corps and would continue through the war years, the Soviets, as they built new Latvian military units, designated them as Strelnieki units, in recognition of the historic role of Latvian soldiers in the service of the Soviet cause.7 2 As the Red Army retreated from Latvia the local Soviet authorities frantically tried to organize a civilian evacuation. Some managed to escape with the convoy of ships from Riga, but the majority of refugees, including tens of thousands of Jews, headed eastward by land routes toward the Russian border. The sudden appearance on June 26 of German tanks in eastern Latvia at Daugavpils cut off many refugees from their flight to Russia. Sources vary, as estimates of the number of Latvians that fled along with the retreating Soviets range anywhere from 40,000 to 70,000. Among the refugees were some 2o,ooo Latvian Jews. In all likelihood more Jews would have escaped if the Soviets had not initially barred many from crossing the border. By the time the Soviets opened their border to all refugees the Germans had severed the main escape route, dooming many Jews to their destruction.73 Soviet functionaries and many of their Latvian collaborators, including Kirchensteins and his cohorts, along with the LCP leadership, managed to evade capture. Most of these Red Latvians first fled to Kirov, then to Moscow, where they waited out the war and prepared for their return.74 Because of the rapid advance of the Germans and above all of Stalin's hesitancy to acknowledge the imminence of the German attack, the Soviets failed to dismantle and cart off much of Latvia's industrial plant. Effective German bombing of railway centers such as Daugavpils also hindered the process. And since the Germans already possessed much of Latvia by the time Stalin announced his scorched earth policy on July 3, much of Latvia's economic structure remained operational, ripe for German pickingJs One of the major Soviet failures in these frenzied days was botching the destruction of the Kegums hydroelectric dam on the Daugava. Thanks to the obstructionist efforts of some Latvian operators, the Russians managed to inflict only minor damage. Having captured the hydroelectric facility mostly intact, throughout their occupation the Germans regarded its protection a high priority.76 One last minute item of unfinished Soviet business was the final disposal of prisoners. The NKVD managed to cart off some 3,700 political

The German Invasion and Occupation I 157 prisoners to the Soviet Union, but rather than leave behind those they could not transport in time, the NKVD executed them. Among the most chilling occurrences during these frightful days was the unlocking of NKVD prisons, in hopes of liberating prisoners, as Soviet sympathizers had done in June 1940. Liberators found few prisoners alive to testify to the grim horrors they had witnessed and experienced. Many corpses were exhumed in the yard at Riga's Central Prison, more than 1,300 murder victims throughout Latvia. It is not clear, however, whether these were last minute murder victims or people executed a week earlier as part of the June 13-14 operation.n The grisly unearthing of tortured and mutilated bodies of prisoners along with the still fresh memories of the deportations created a paradoxical atmosphere for the first days of the occupation: Concurrent with the elation of "liberation" an ugly mood for revenge permeated all. By most conventional military standards, by mid-July Army Group North apparently had successfully completed the first phase of its operation. It had driven the Soviets out of Lithuania and Latvia and had regrouped to resume its northeastward drive. It had failed, however, to ensnare large Soviet forces, force them to fight a pitched battle, and to annihilate them. Instead, the Soviets had managed to withdraw most of their troops in the direction of Leningrad. Although Army Group North had driven out the enemy from strategically important territory while suffering relatively few casualties itself, in Hitler's war of extermination the killing of large numbers of the enemy was just as important as taking territory.7 8 From Latvia the German forces pursued the Russians northward into Estonia and eastward into Russia. Units of the German 18th Army drove toward Tallinn, Estonia's capital on the southern shores of the Gulf of Finland. As the Red Army retreated through Estonia and neared the strategically critical approaches to Leningrad, Soviet soldiers regrouped, finally stood their ground, and fought. It took the Germans a month to reach the Gulf of Finland. On August 7 they broke through to the Gulf just east of Tallinn, thereby cutting off the Red Army defending the city. On August 19 the Germans assaulted Tallinn and after a week of intense combat captured it on August 26, occasioning a hurried evacuation of Soviet troops, a veritable Russian Dunkirk. Soviet forces on the Estonian Islands held out until October.79 The German occupation of Estonia tightened the noose around Leningrad, the primary objective of Army Group North. While one German column invaded Estonia, the rest of Army Group North had turned eastward from Latvia directly toward Russia. By July 4

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these troops had reached Ostrov just across the Latvian border and soon they were at the gates of Pskov, taking that city as well. As Russian towns and cities fell one by one, it looked as though it was just a matter of time-and not much of it at that-before Army Group North reached Leningrad. Operation Barbarossa seemed to be progressing on schedule. 80 According to most historians the timing of the German attack had caught Stalin by surprise. Even though copious intelligence reports and even last-minute warnings of German military movements reached Stalin, he did not act until it was too late. Evidently he was determined not to let the Germans or for that matter anyone else provoke the Russians into fighting-since he attributed provocation primarily to the English as a ploy to end the German-Soviet "friendship." When it came, the suddenness and power of the German assault shocked and paralyzed the Soviet leader. But once he regained his composure, he reasserted control of the Soviet system and assumed the role of Hitler's counterpart, the supreme warlord. On June 30 Stalin reshuffled the CPSU as well as the military leadership in preparation for total war. Then on July 3 he addressed the Soviet people on radio, proclaiming a great patriotic war for the fatherland. Drawing on his own store of bellicose rhetoric, Stalin swore that this would be a fight to the finish, a struggle without mercy. Soviet soldiers would fight to their last breath to hold Soviet land, but failing that, all abandoned Soviet land would be scorched. Nothing was to be left for the Germans to use. 81 Even though one Soviet military defeat followed after another, with hundreds of thousands of troops encircled, killed, or captured, and hundreds of square miles abandoned daily, the Soviet system refused to collapse. Soviet tenacity and cohesion appeared to mock Hitler's prediction that a few strong blows would bring the whole edifice tumbling down. When engaged on their home territory, Soviet soldiers resisted fiercely. 82 By October hints of a shift in momentum could be discerned as the German offensive slowed in the face of a more determined and better organized Soviet defense.

German "Liberation" of Latvia On the first day of Operation Barabrossa, Latvians listening to foreign reports on their radios learned of the attack. As one witness noted, "Few cities had ever welcomed their own bombing as eagerly as Riga." 8 3 For many Latvians the outbreak of war between the Germans and Russians had answered their prayers-a clash between the two giants was their only chance for deliverance from Soviet oppression. When and wherever German forces entered Latvian territory, Latvians greeted them elatedly

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with cheers and tears as liberators. The year of the Red terror, Baigais Gads, was over. 84 Even before the Germans reached Riga, on June 28 some local armed insurrectionists captured the Riga radio station and broadcast Latvia's liberation and the imminent formation of a national government. The seizure of the station, to which Latvian nationalists proudly point as evidence of Latvian initiative and participation in driving out the Soviets, was short-lived. The following day Red Army forces recaptured the station and shot the insurgents. 8s Controversy surrounds the claim of some Latvian nationalist sources that Latvian forces already controlled Riga when the Germans arrived on July 1. 86 If so, it was not the result of Latvian military action driving the Soviets out but the consequence of the Red Army abandoning the city ahead of the German onslaught, leaving armed Latvians free to wander around the city's streets at will. As soon as Latvians realized the Soviets were gone, they swarmed into the streets; Latvian flags flew everywhere, and church bells pealed. The once-again-liberated radio station repeatedly played the Latvian national anthem, "God Bless Latvia." Boisterous crowds milled around and heaped mounds of flowers on national monuments. Jubilant multitudes descended on the Freedom Monument to celebrate what they regarded as their liberation. When one of the first German soldiers to enter the city rode by on a motorcycle, the crowd swept up the astonished German, draped him with garlands of flowers, and tossed him in the air to cheers of "Hurrah!"87 Later that day the Germans took over control of the radio transmitter from the Latvians, and the commander of the German forces in Riga, General Georg von Kuchler, announced the German liberation of Latvia. For the time being he permitted the Latvians to play their national anthem and fly their flags. 88 Throughout their occupation the Germans never ceased to remind the Latvians that they had freed them from the Bolsheviks and that therefore the Latvians were obligated to them. Latvians would subsequently redeem the heavy debt to the Reich many times over by producing for its war effort and by providing manpower, both as labor and as combatants. The precise role of armed Latvians in driving the Russians from their land remains murky. Latvian nationalists have been inclined to credit Latvians with at least a share in their own liberation; hence the importance of the seizure of the Riga radio station by Latvian insurgents prior to the German arrival. From the time of the Soviet occupation individuals fleeing from the Soviet authorities had gone into hiding; some fled to the woods with weapons and became a nuisance for the Red authorities. But it was not until the deportations of June 13-14 and the Soviet efforts to

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liquidate the Latvian military at Litene that bands of Latvians organized for concerted armed resistance. 8 9 According to some observers the Latvian national partisans, many of them Litene survivors, did not wait for the arrival of the Germans and on their own initiated a mass insurrection that prompted Soviet broadcasts to admit that Latvia was in revolt. One source claims that as many as 6o,ooo Latvians fought in the partisan movement.9° Others proffer more moderate claims, estimating only some 6,ooo to 7,000 active resistance fighters.9l Bitter Soviet complaints of armed gangs harassing and sniping at retreating Red Army units and murdering stragglers seem to corroborate their efficacy.9 2 A particularly active group was the band of one hundred men under Lt. Col. Karlis Aparats from the defunct 24th Corps. Operating around Aluksne in northeastern Latvia, this unit skirmished with retreating Red Army soldiers, including the security force accompanying the fleeing Soviet Latvian dignitaries Kirchensteins and Kalnberzins. In all some 120 national partisans died during these guerrilla operations.93 In addition to the partisans, other armed irregulars, referred to as selfdefense units, spontaneously sprang up all across Latvia and joined in the hunt for Red Army stragglers and fleeing communist functionaries. In Riga as well as in the countryside Latvians flocked to these formations. Alongside former soldiers, those volunteering as self-defense men included former members of the Aizsargi and Perkonkrusts, many of whom had suffered under the communist regime or had lost friends or relatives. Personal revenge was a strong motive for joining these groups, as was concern for restoring order and even hopes for reestablishing Latvian sovereignty. Many former military men believed that organizing these armed bands was the first step in resurrecting a Latvian national army. In Riga Lt. Col. Voldemars Veiss and Lt. Col. Roberts Osis enlisted men from among the s,ooo or so volunteers to show up. Similar scenes played out in most of Latvia's towns and cities as local nationalists tried to bring things under their control. Initially no central authority unified these vigilante-type units.94 The days of these independent formations were, however, numbered. Shortly after their arrival the Germans disarmed and disbanded them, but then turned around and enlisted many of their men into auxiliary police units under direct and strict German supervision. Besides tormenting retreating Red Army units and shooting stragglers and communist functionaries, the partisans and the self-defense units engaged in another unsavory activity, persecuting and murdering Jews. The perpetration of these diabolical deeds against thousands of Jews in the first few days of the war in Latvia-to be examined more fully in the

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chapter on the Holocaust-raises another historically disagreeable issue, that of the "spontaneous" Latvian killing of Jews. Much evidence points to Latvian culpability in the widespread, allegedly spontaneous tormenting and murdering of Jews prior to the arrival of the Germans, days before the Germans had a chance to instigate these pogroms.9s This was particularly prevalent in the countryside where Latvians in villages and townships not yet reached or visited by Germans performed their vile deeds without German coaxing. In contrast to the spontaneity argument stands the view of many nationalists that these actions happened only after the Germans arrived and resulted directly from Germans actively encouraging Latvians to take these measures.9 6 Evidently some Latvian commentators want to have it both ways. While arguing that Latvian fighters began spontaneously freeing Latvia before the Germans arrived, they deny the possibility of the spontaneous murder of Jews. Not only did Latvians attempt to construct their own security apparatus, restore order, and mete out their version of justice, they also took steps toward reestablishing what they hoped would become something like a Latvian government. On the afternoon of July 1, the day the Germans entered Riga, prominent Latvians that had survived the Soviet terror assembled at the Latvian Club under the chairmanship of Col. Ernests Kreismanis to form a provisional government. This group called itself the Latvian Organization Center (LOC) and appointed Bernhards Einbergs, a former government minister, as its head. Its membership consisted of army officers and various figures from the former, pre-Soviet regime. In an effort to broaden its base it invited representatives of an array of political groups. One group in particular attracted the attention of the LOC, the Perkonkrusts, the virulently nationalistic, anti-Semitic organization banned by Ulmanis.9 7 Since by nature the Perkonkrusts had a greater affinity than any other Latvian organization to German National Socialism, the LOC thought it advisable to co-opt representatives of this group. The leaders of Perkonkrusts, in particular Gustavs Celmins, hesitated to join any coalition, since they expected to become the darlings of the new Nazi masters and by themselves become the favorites of the German occupiers. Celmins had fled to Germany during the Soviet period and nurtured contacts there, returning in June 1941 as a special officer (Sanderfuhrer) with the Wehrmacht. Celmins aspired to become a Latvian Quisling, a willing collaborator prepared to serve the invaders, but the Germans shunned him and bestowed their favors on a different faction. As individuals many Perkonkrusts members served the Germans faithfully, even zealously, but as an organization it failed to become the Latvian

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version of the Nazis. Shortly Perkonkrusts split, between those willing to collaborate with the Germans and those who eventually joined the antiGerman resistance. The erratic Celmins himself sided with the latter group, and in March 1944 the Gestapo arrested him and threw him into a concentration camp.9 8 A few days after the initial meeting, LOC leader Einbergs approached the highest SS authority in Latvia at the time, SS Brigadefiihrer Walther Stahlecker, commander of Einsatzgruppe A, to discuss forming something like a provisional government. Stahlecker, who had just arrived in Latvia with orders to murder racial and political enemies and not to erect a native government, reproved Einbergs and made it clear that the Germans and not the Latvians were in charge; he had no use for the LQC.99 The LOC then changed tactics, offering itself as a functioning administration that could facilitate the German occupation. It turned to a character that became the pivotal liaison between the Germans and the Latvians for the next year or so, former Finance Minister Alfreds Valdmanis, who, having survived Soviet rule, resurfaced on July 4· Valdmanis, who seemed to enjoy infinite connections and trust, agreed to work with the LOC and consented to contact a couple of Latvian officers with close German connections, Col. Aleksandrs Plensners, former Latvian military attache in Berlin, and Lt. Col. Viktors Deglavs. Both had spent time in Germany and had recently returned with the invading forces. The two had close ties with the Wehrmacht and expected to play important liaison roles, intending to use their influence to reconstruct a Latvian army. Plensners agreed to join with Valdmanis and others to set up an informal shadow administration that would simply start running Latvia, hoping that the Germans accepted their fait accompli. The affable and charismatic Valdmanis would shortly ingratiate himself with the Germans as well, particularly with General Franz von Roques, the head of the Reich's military government for the Baltic. ' The intrigues among the Latvians themselves became indescribably complex, as they schemed and quarreled for German recognition. The outcome of all this, thanks to Valdmanis and his propinquity to von Roques as well as his ability to charm Stahlecker, was tacit German recognition for his group, which included the LOC and Plensners, as the Latvians favored to help the German occupiers. The Germans preferred to deal with this circle rather than the more extreme Celmins and his PerkonkrustS.101 Already within the first few days of the occupation it became evident to these Latvians that the restoration of Latvian autonomy, not to mention independence, was out of the question. At best Valdmanis, the 00

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colonels, and the LOC hoped to strike as good a deal as possible. As the Germans settled in they reined in Latvian freedom of action even more. Not only did Stahlecker veto any sort of Latvian government, but on July 8 he decreed the disarming of all Latvians and forbade the wearing of uniforms. 102 This meant the dissolution of the self-defense units and the national partisans, for the time being snuffing out aspirations for resurrecting an independent, armed Latvian military. In the midst of these developments on July 18 Lt. Col. Deglavs, one of the Latvian officers trained in Germany, was found dead, shot in the head. Officially ruled as a suicide, the mysterious circumstances of his death suggested possible German foul play. Several other Latvian officers also died under suspicious circumstances.' 3 Deglavs may have been one of the first prominent Latvian casualties of German terror, which would replace the Soviet terror just recently expelled. 0

German Military Rule

Beginning with the day German troops marched onto Latvian soil German rule in Latvia, until further notice, was military rule. Hitler had granted all executive authority in combat zones, including rear areas, to his army commanders. In respect to Operation Barbarossa a directive of March 13, 1941, delineated guidelines for military administration. It prescribed surprisingly few details and virtually no political instructions. Since military administration was expected to last only for the duration of the campaign, and since Hitler and his commanders anticipated a rapid, victorious campaign, the army's control of the rear areas was merely a temporary expedient that would give way to more permanent, civilian administrative arrangements. 104 The military administration plan prescribed a three-tiered division of occupied territory, approximately 200 kilometers deep. The immediate combat zone, where frontline commanders wielded total authority, required no administration. The Army Rear Area backed up the front zone of each army, and behind that stood the Army Group Rear Area, for the entirearmy group. For Army Group North the commander of the Army Group Rear Area was General Franz von Roques, who assumed his duties first in Kaunas on July 9 and by July 17, as the front advanced farther north, moved his headquarters to Riga. Although covering the rear for Army Group North, von Roques did not answer to the Army Group commander but rather to Army Quartermaster General Eduard Wagner. 10s Von Roques exercised his authority through martial law and his own judgment in its interpretation. He personally commanded three army se-

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curity divisions spread out across all of Lithuania and eventually all of Latvia. Estonia remained part of the front and did not come under his jurisdiction. As the highest Reich administrative authority von Rogues's charge entailed maintaining order as well as regulating civilian life in the rear areas and dealing with the local, native population. His execution of these and other tasks aimed at securing the rear areas and maximizing support for the combat efforts at the front. Since the negligible forces at his disposal were inadequate for his mission, by necessity von Roques had to rely on supplementary local manpower. 106 It was this glaring vulnerability-the Reich's shortage of troops in rear areas-that Valdmanis and his clique of Latvians hoped to exploit to their advantage. Franz von Roques typified the officer Hitler and the Nazis reviled as "ultra-reactionaries," professional soldiers of the old school that could hardly conceal their disdain for the Nazis. His chief of staff, Lt. Col. Arno Kriegsheim, was cut from the same material. While briefly in Kaunas, von Roques had complained to the commander of Army Group North, Ritter von Leeb, about the mass shootings of Jews he had witnessed. Leeb resignedly replied, "We have no influence in these measures. The only thing to do is keep clear of them. 107 Both von Roques and Kriegsheim failed to heed Leeb's advice and indiscreetly spoke out against German brutality, especially toward Jews. With Operation Barbarossa still in its early stage in the summer of 1941, von Roques openly referred to the SS killing squads as Kopfjager, or headhunters, and had the temerity to call a top-level Nazi such as Ribbentrop an "idiot." 108 Kriegsheim acted no more circumspectly when he publicly voiced doubts that Germany could win the war and recoiled from the execution of Jews as a deed unworthy of Germans. 109 As a good and obedient soldier von Roques nonetheless performed his duties of maintaining peace and order in his domain. He enforced martial law, introduced a curfew, and made the disarming of the population his highest priority. Shortly after his arrival in Riga von Roques also met with Valdmanis and acknowledged their mutual interest in arranging a smoothly functioning administration. Sizing up Valdmanis and his group as relatively level-headed and not overly demanding, von Roques sanctioned their participation in Latvia's administration, under German supervision, of course. By no means did von Roques condone anything like Latvian independence, but he favored conceding a degree of autonomy, which he prudently regarded as a prerequisite for an effective occupation and for maximizing Latvian contributions to the German war effort. Consequently, during his brief reign in the Baltic von Roques es-

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tablished a relationship of mutual trust with the Latvians." It was von Roques who decided to liquidate the Perkonkrusts, finding Celmins and his extremists too much like the German Nazis he loathed.'" Although appreciated by the Latvians around Valdmanis, von Roques rubbed powerful Nazis the wrong way, mostly for his outspoken criticism of German behavior in the Baltic. Rosenberg for one believed the army-meaning von Roques-had conceded too much authority to the locals." 2 The SS, initially in the person of Stahlecker, not only clashed with the military administration over interpreting policy, but also as a rival coveting its authority. Von Roques's stay in Riga was short. Higher powers back in Berlin decided that with the rapid advance of the front they could dispense with army rear status in the Baltic. One may surmise that military considerations alone did not terminate military rule in Latvia. No doubt von Roques's unsolicited and unwelcome criticism of certain German activities in the region, as well as his accommodating policy toward the Latvian local administration, contributed to his removal. On July 25 Rosenberg's civilian administration assumed control over Lithuania and Latvia south of the Daugava. A little more than a month later, on September 1, the army surrendered its authority in northern Latvia as well."3 Although the army yielded its administrative responsibilities, it retained its presence in occupied Latvia and Lithuania. Both lands, relatively distant from the front, became major supply and logistics bases and transportation connections to the Reich as well as comfortable rest and recuperation havens for wounded and weary German soldiers. The army also maintained support bases throughout Latvia and set up numerous headquarters in Riga. In order to ensure that the civilian Reich authorities properly performed their duties in the interest of the war effort at the front, the army attached several liaison offices to Rosenberg's administration. "4 During his tenure in Riga, von Roques's most vexing nemesis was Walther Stahlecker, commander of EinsatzgruppeA. Although Hans Priitzmann held the post of HSSPF for the Baltic and therefore nominally executed SS prerogatives in the region as well as functioned as Himmler's primary security officer, Priitzmann's relative passivity allowed the more dynamic-and more ambitious-Stahlecker to usurp most SS authority for himself."s Although von Roques had to rely on Stahlecker's cooperation in maintaining order in the area, and Stahlecker had played a crucial role in disarming the local self-defense and partisan bands, basic differences over the nature and form of German rule in the occupied East prevented smooth cooperation. A point of contention was the treatment 0

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of Jews, but rather than taking a stand on the issue, as he already had in Lithuania-except for incidental jibes-von Roques stayed out of the matter, looked the other way, and left Stahlecker alone to perform his murderous duties. It was also Stahlecker who recruited ready and willing Latvians for police tasks that included the tormenting and slaughtering of Jews. The 55 Instrument of Terror As Heinrich Rimmler's actual if not nominal SS representative in the Baltic, Walther Stahlecker personified the slogan, "The East belongs to the SS." Rimmler set Stahlecker on his murderous course in May 1941 when in preparation for his role as the Fuhrer's exclusive authority in all police matters for the Occupied East, he ordered the creation of special killing formations. Work on these units began at the Border Police School at Pretzsch, where the SS organized four mobile, motorized units of some 900 men each, which became known as the Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei-Sicherheitsdienst (Sipo-SD). " 6 To serve as killers Rimmler collected personnel from various SS branches and offices, relying heavily on security and police organs. Einsatzgruppe A, for instance, comprised 990 men, including 89 from the Gestapo; 41 from the Criminal Police (Kripo); 133 from the Order Police (Ordnungspolizei); and 340 from the Waffen 55."7 Each Einsatzgruppe was subdivided into Sonderkommandos and Einsatzkommandos. After a series of conversations in the spring of 1941 and with the occasional intercession of Hitler, the SS and the army worked out an arrangement whereby the Einsatzgruppen would operate in the rear areas of the army. Rimmler assigned an Einsatzgruppe to the rear area of each of the three Army Groups, with an extra fourth one attached to the South. The SS, although not the sole authority, would exercise exclusive police powers in these areas, and liaisons between the army and the SS tried to keep misunderstandings to a minimum. ns Rimmler ordered Einsatzgruppe A to follow Army Group North, performing security tasks and maintaining order, which amounted mostly to murdering communist functionaries and Jews. An additional task, "fighting partisans," in practice provided the SS with a green light and an additional excuse for killing civilians, primarily Jews. Rimmler appointed Stahlecker as commander of Einsatzgruppe A.ll9 After initiating the killing operations in Lithuania Stahlecker, empowered with SS police and security authority, arrived in Riga on July 1 along with elements of his Einsatzgruppe A , days ahead of von Roques. For his

The German Invasion and Occupation I 167 SS headquarters he requisitioned the medieval Ritterhaus.' 20 Stahlecker encountered a chaotic situation and what he perceived to be a lack of any political direction.' 2 ' Although his exact relationship with HSSPF Priitzmann is not clear, by virtue of the police powers granted to him by Himmler, at least initially in Riga Stahlecker directed the local Gestapo, the primary SS organ of terror and intimidation.' 22 The politically astute Valdmanis surmised before most other Latvians did that the SS, through the security police and the Einsatzgruppe, was the principal force to reckon with under the German occupation. All others, as von Roque also figured out soon enough, stood powerless against it. Instead of liberating Latvia from terror, the German invasion had simply replaced one form of terror with another: Gestapo terror supplanted NKVD terror.' 2 3 One of Stahlecker's first tasks was to help von Roques disarm the various Latvian self-defense and partisan groups. Aware that the German security forces at his disposal-his own Einsatzgruppe personnel along with the army's three undermanned security divisions-would be incapable of restoring and maintaining order and establishing German control over the area, he immediately enlisted many of the disarmed Latvians into his own service as auxiliaries. The extensive utilization of native personnel in performing the gruesome business of annihilating political and racial enemies distinguished Einsatgruppe A from the other Einsatzgruppen, none of which relied as heavily on local help. 12 4 The SS had also brought along Latvians from the Reich, many of whom it had trained as SD agents and who became the nucleus of a Latvian SD_,,s The majority of Stahlecker's Latvian recruits, however, enlisted in their homeland within the first few days of the occupation. Several Latvians had already begun gathering security forces on their own initiative, and with Stahlecker's arrival offered him their services and recruits. Two of the more prominent collaborators, Lt. Col. Voldemars Veiss and Lt. Col. Roberts Osis, helped organize auxiliary police units made up of former soldiers, policemen, Aizsargi, and Perkonkrusts members. Veiss formed an auxiliary police unit of some 400 men who placed themselves at Stahlecker's disposal. There was no shortage of volunteers; hundreds had to be turned away. 126 In the provinces other Latvians, such as Karlis Aparats in northern Latvia, had organized units for similar purposes.' 2 7 The most reprehensible Latvian security group founded at this time was that of Viktors Arajs, whose murderous exploits made him a legend in his own time-and whose activities will be discussed more thoroughly within the context of Latvia's Holocaust. 128

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Another SS creation manned by Latvians and serving its security forces was the Lettische-Kartei, or SD Card Index, an office directed by Feliks Peteris Rikards, who had been recruited and trained by the SD. The Lettische-Kartei employed some sixty workers and several hundred informers throughout the country who collected and compiled incriminating information on suspected enemies for the SD. Virtually all of the staff had belonged to the Perkonkrusts or one of the elite university fraternities, Korporacijas. Many, like Rikards, belonged to both. This circle of ultranationalist anti-Semites around Rikards, who had a propensity for intrigue, came to be known within the SD as Sondergruppe R, and functioned as a valuable tool within the SD until March 1943, when it was disbanded because of the suspicious contacts of some of its membership, including Rikards, with the nascent Latvian resistance.' 9 Although Jews suffered disproportionately during the early days of the occupation, at least officially Stahlecker's security apparatus, with the help of Sondergruppe R, identified communists as its principal target. Soviet functionaries as well as members of the Latvian Communist Party who either had failed to escape or on their own decided to remain and resist the invaders from underground became victims of the new police terror. As Stahlecker familiarized himself with the terrain, and with the connivance of his Latvian accomplices, he expanded his list of enemies beyond communists to other political undesirables.'3° During the first few months of the occupation the numbers of arrests and executions mounted. Although the purported objective of Stahlecker's mission was the restoration of order and the maintenance of security, from the very outset its implementation assumed a dynamic of its own, going beyond security measures to the extermination of the preeminent enemy of the Third Reich, Jews. With the appearance of the Germans, "communist" became a catchall term for SS victims that included Jews. The popular myth of Jewish collaboration with Soviet rule spewed its deadly consequences as Jews and communists became synonymous, indistinguishable targets of bloody vengeance. Latvian police and security units, encouraged by their German masters, perpetrated a merciless round of anti-Jewish atrocities reminiscent of pogroms, the officially sanctioned anti-Jewish campaigns of death and destruction common to czarist Russia. As the count of victims climbed in formal SS reports, it became difficult to ascertain exactly how many were genuine communist functionaries and how many were Jews, murdered on the pretext of suspected communist sympathies. "Death to commissars and Jews!" became a common appeal to wanton 2

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murder. 13 1 According to some sources, especially Soviet ones, along with the murder of communists and Jews, the Germans brought another institution to Latvia, the concentration camps, to be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter. The Germans shortly extended their system of concentration camps across all of Latvia, which did not have enough prisons to hold all those detained. 132 Deportations to the Reich soon followed, beginning with many captured Latvian soldiers of the 24th Corps as well as thousands of Soviet sympathizers, among them people who had benefited from Soviet land redistribution, the "ten-hectare people." This latter group became the leading non-Jewish victims of German terror in Latvia.133 During this initial phase of violence Stahlecker's attention briefly turned from liquidating political and racial enemies to the extermination of the inmates of mental hospitals, a practice reminiscent of the so-called Euthanasia campaign in Germany. 134 Based on earlier, preinvasion directives as well as subsequent instructions for dealing with the civilian population, Stahlecker, his SS security personnel, and his Latvian minions carried their nefarious operations into rural areas. Here they tagged the generic term "partisans" to their prey, and just as the hunt for urban communists had escalated into the widespread killing of Jews, the pursuit of partisans in small towns and villages victimized mostly Jews. As one of the leading SS partisan hunters in the East, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, testified after the war, fighting partisans simply provided an excuse and a convenient euphemism for the true purpose of these operations-exterminating Jews, Gypsies, and the Slavic population of the occupied territories. '35 The complete eradication of the village of Audrini and the liquidation of its entire population in early January 1942-often referred to as the Latvian Lidice, in reference to the infamous German obliteration of a Czechoslovakian town in retaliation for the assassination of Reinhardt Heydrich-epitomized SS terror in Latvia. In late December 1941 German security forces skirmished with a band of communist partisans near Rezekne in eastern Latvia, losing several of their men as casualties, When German security agents suspected that the nearby village of Audrini had harbored some of the partisans, they surrounded the village and apprehended all of the more than zoo residents, including women and children. In early January the Germans publicly executed thirty of the men in the Rezekne town square and took most of the remaining people of Audrini into nearby woods and shot them. They then burned and razed the village. 136 Although Audrini was the most publicized mass atrocity, it was not the only case of murdering civilians and hostages as punishment for

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attacks on Germans. In early January 1942, at about the same time as the Audrini massacre, the Germans executed forty-seven men and women of the Latgale village of Barsuku after they discovered the body of a murdered security official near their community.'37 As one commentator later noted, "The Germans seemed to be trying to outdo the Soviets in their brutality."•3 8 While Stahlecker preoccupied himself with SS security matters, and von Roques went about his business as the chief military administrator, others back in the Reich-anxious to stake a claim to a piece of the Baltic-met on July 16 in the presence of the Fuhrer to decide the next steps in imposing German rule over the occupied East. Previous plans and proposals for the occupation had provided no more than general guidelines, and with the rapid military advance and prospects of the campaign in Russia ending shortly, a more explicit plan for a permanent disposition of the region became urgent. One might also portray the gathering as a dividing of the spoils. Those joining Hitler at this meeting, known as the Angerburg Conference, included Nazi Party Secretary Martin Bormann, Chief of the Reich Chancellery Hans Lammers, Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel representing the military, self-proclaimed Baltic expert Alfred Rosenberg, and Plenipotentiary of the Four-Year Plan Reichsmarshall Hermann Goring. Curiously, Heinrich Himmler, who had a huge stake in the matters at hand, was absent, as were any other SS representatives.'39 Several issues required the Fuhrer's intervention. For one, disputes over competencies needed sorting out. Besides the military, the SS, and Rosenberg, a fourth contestant had tendered a claim for a piece of the action. Two weeks earlier, on June 29, in response to Goring's entreaties for a share of the Eastern spoils, Hitler had appointed him as the foremost economic authority in the East. As the Plenipotentiary of the Four-Year Plan, Goring already held primary responsibility for the Reich's economic war effort. •4o In addition to making room for Goring in the East it was time to issue a definitive statement on the nature of the occupation. Increasingly officials within the Nazi hierarchy, both high and low, were enlisting local peoples in the service of the Reich-an approach that fundamentally clashed with Hitler's expectations of ruthlessly exploiting the human as well as physical resources of the region to the maximum. '4' In order to preclude any misunderstandings and to ensure unyielding compliance with his expectations, Hitler expounded his most recent vision of the conquered East. In his discourse the Fuhrer unambiguously underscored the exploitative nature of the occupation. The local popula-

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tion had no rights, and there could be no talk of statehood or anything of the sort. The natives were to receive the harshest treatment; even a suspicious glance warranted shooting the offender. If they wished, the occupiers could promise anything, but only as tactical ploys to facilitate control. Hitler emphatically stressed that only Germans could carry arms, all others were to be disarmed-a stricture, apparently unknown to Hitler, already being violated in the Baltic. As for the future status of the Baltic, it would be incorporated into the Greater Reich. In regard to contested jurisdictions, although Rosenberg had expected the Fuhrer to decide in his favor by removing the Army from contention, making him the primary civilian authority, and checking the creeping power of the SS, Hitler conceded little. The army, although surrendering its role as chief administrator once the front had advanced far enough, remained a chief player in the region. Hitler also reaffirmed the authority of the SS and added to the competition by inserting Goring into the fray. Henceforth four major entities vied for control of the East: the army; the security forces of the SS; Goring and his Four-Year Plan; and Rosenberg's civilian administration. Sufficient ambiguity clouded Hitler's explication to ensure just enough strife among these four powers over the limits of their jurisdictions to require his intervention and thereby ensure his primacy. On the following day Hitler nonetheless rewarded the slighted Rosenberg's loyalty by conferring upon him the lofty-sounding title of Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, the leading civilian authority. The Baltic part of these territories received the name Ostland.'4 At least on paper Rosenberg's dream of becoming the master of the East and of Ostland had materialized. In fact, however, the struggle for power in these territories among the four major contestants was about to become even more contentious. Since the German invasion came right on the heels of the first round of Soviet deportations, their arrival appeared to most Latvians to be the deliverance they had hoped for, a form of divine intervention. Nothing, so thought the majority of Latvians, could be worse than the Soviets. Initially, what appeared for many Latvians as relatively benign treatment, seemed to presage better times ahead.'4 3 Coincidental with the positive Latvian reception of the conquerors was the German attitude toward the Baltic region and its peoples, which, although envisioning exploitation and eventual incorporation into the Reich, conceded to them a somewhat privileged status, at least in comparison to the rest of the conquered peoples of the East. '44 But disillusionment surfaced soon enough as the occupiers arrogantly spurned Latvian gestures of good will and offers of 2

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collaboration, except on German terms. Growing numbers of Latvians came to realize their hopes for a restoration of national sovereignty were nai:ve and delusory. The liberators were becoming oppressors.'4S As the Germans tightened their control over Latvia and the Baltic and sorted out their conflicting missions and prerogatives, Latvians could only shake their heads and wonder what happened to the German liberation. After a while the best that could be said of German rule was that in comparison to Soviet rule it was the lesser of two evils. For some Latvians, however, most certainly for Latvia's Jews, the ranking of the evils was reversed.

7

Latvia and the Ostland

The ostmlnlsterlum and the Ostland Adolf Hitler had envisioned Germans returning to the Baltic along the same route traveled by medieval German crusaders, and like these Black Knights of Latvian national lore, Hitler's minions expected to conquer the land and either exterminate or subjugate the natives. Countless modernday "knights" along with their plans, red tape, and carpetbags, descended upon the Baltic in the wake of Operation Barbarossa. The conference of July 16, 1941, which the Fuhrer convened for delineating spheres of authority and clarifying responsibilities in the Occupied East, had accomplished little in this respect. Although Hitler reaffirmed total exploitation of the land and annihilation of much of the indigenous population as the general premises for the occupation of the Soviet Union, he left unresolved the question of precisely who was to do what. Instead of simplifying the situation, Hitler had in fact complicated it further by inserting Hermann Goring and his Four-Year Plan economic office as a fourth major competitor vying for a share of the spoils-along with the army, the SS, and Rosenberg's civilian administration, nominally the main authority in these lands. Alfred Rosenberg and his eager satraps-to-be received an apparent vote of confidence the following day, July 17, when Hitler officially named Rosenberg the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and thereby formally institutionalized his earlier commission as special authority in Eastern matters.' As a Reich minister, Rosenberg received a Reich Ministry of his own, the Ostministerium, which presumably enjoyed the confidence of the Fuhrer, exercised Reich authority, and at least at first glance seemed to be preeminent in matters pertaining to the conquered lands. In reality, as unfolding developments revealed, the ministry and its minister wielded less power than their three leading rivals, the army, the SS, and Goring's economic empire. Not only did Rosenberg's competitors more often than not get their way in jurisdictional disputes, but even his subordinates often ignored him and ruled their fiefdoms by

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their own devices. They comprehended all too well the power configurations and rivalries involved in administering and exploiting the Occupied East and learned to play Rosenberg against his challengers to their own advantage. Rosenberg did not help his cause any by managing his distant domains from his desk in Berlin, issuing directives to his vassals in the East, but seldom venturing out to see the realities in person. He did not visit Riga, the capital of the Ostland, until May 1942, and seldom after that. 2 The infrequency of his audiences with Hitler also indicates the impotency of the Ostministerium and its chief: After the July 16, 1941, conference the two met no more than six times the rest of the war.3 Rosenberg's authority as the principal civilian administrator of the Occupied Eastern Territories-at least on paper-extended to all of the occupied Soviet Union, excepting the front and its immediate rear areas, over which the army retained control, and those territories awarded to Finland and Rumania. With the Fuhrer's assent Rosenberg subdivided his realm into four major territorial units, designating each a Reichskommissariat: the Ukraine, the Caucasus, "Muscovy," and the Ostland. Actually Rosenberg got no further with implementing his plans than the Ukraine and Ostland, since the other regions remained battle zones, and the army never relinquished its administrative responsibility to his civilian rule. Each Reichskommissariat was further partitioned into Generalbezirke, or General Districts. The Reichskommissariat Ostland included the four Generalbezirke of White Russia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia.4 Rosenberg and his staff, which he began collecting in spring 1941, busied themselves organizing the Ostministerium offices in Berlin, from where they wove a network of links to local branches in the Occupied East. For his deputy he selected Gauleiter of Westphalia Alfred Meyer, who divided the ministry into four main departments and at least thirty sub-offices.s Evidently Rosenberg had a greater propensity for form than for matter. For instance, he took particular care in selecting a distinctive uniform for his staff. In a Berlin teeming with uniformed officials resplendent in the unique braids and haberdashery of their respective offices, Ostministerium personnel strutted about in mustard-colored uniforms, evoking a derisive comparison to Goldfasanen, or golden pheasants. In fact Rosenberg, as had most everyone else, preferred field gray uniforms, the color of the military, but the army had objected. Besides, a surplus of yellow-brown cloth purchased for the Reich Labor Front was readily available and cheap. 6 Selecting loyal and competent officers, especially for the highest posts on location, also preoccupied Rosenberg. Although he had assumed that

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he would appoint his subordinate Reichskommissars, this was not to be. With the connivance of Bormann, Hitler, not Rosenberg, appointed the Reichskommissar for the Ukraine-the irascible and radical Nazi, Erich Koch, the Gauleiter of East Prussia. Since Koch shared Hitler's predilection for treating the Ukrainian population harshly, the Fuhrer insisted that Rosenberg-who at one time had even contemplated setting up an Ukrainian national entity-must appoint Koch, who was more likely to rule the Ukraine according to Hitler's cold-blooded preferences. Rosenberg subsequently counted Koch among his enemies rather than as a trusted lieutenant.? The Reichskommissar for the Ostland, Hinrich Lohse, an erstwhile salesman and since 1925 the Gauleiter of Schleswig-Holstein, marched in closer step with Rosenberg. As early as April 1941 Rosenberg, with Hitler's approval, selected Lohse as governor of Baltenland, the future Ostland. Lohse had ingratiated himself with Rosenberg through his membership in the latter's Nordic Association as well as for his north German background, both of which in Rosenberg's mind qualified him to resume the historic role of the Hansa in the Baltic area. 8 Some have described Lohse as "the very essence of a Nazi small-town big shot ... gross, vain, silly man, walrus-like appearance."9 Another source pictures Lohse as a romantic opportunist interested in "castles, hotels, and administrative palaces," thinking as much of setting up his progeny as himself: "I am not working for myself. I work so that my son, who has just been born, can some day put the hereditary ducal crown [of Kurland] on his head."w In postwar testimony Alfreds Valdmanis, the Latvian politician instrumental in balancing Latvian interests with German rule, spoke kindly of Lohse for conceding some cultural leeway to Latvians, purportedly obstructing the murder of some Jews, and intervening with the Gestapo to save Latvians and Estonians from imprisonment and even death." Lohse arrived in Riga on September 1 just as military rule ended in Latvia. Until the withdrawal of von Roques's gray-uniformed administrators from Riga, Lohse had ruled the initial installment of Ostland from Kaunas.' 2 As for the administration of Latvia itself, the Generalkommissar for Generalbezirk Lettland (General District of Latvia), Dr. Otto-Heinrich Drechsler, arrived in Riga at about the same time as Lohse.'3 Drechsler, a dentist and former mayor of Liibeck-yet another official with a Hansa connection-sided with the moderates in respect to allowing the native Latvians some local authority. Like Lohse, he sympathized with the notion of Latvian autonomy and favored conceding some self-administration to the Latvians. Unlike most civilian administrators in the Ostland,

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however, Drechsler worked well with the SS, in particular the SSPF for Latvia, Walther Schroder-but he did not get along with HSSPF Jeckeln after the latter's transfer to Riga; few did. 4 Rosenberg further sectioned Generalbezirk Lett/and into six Kreisgebiete, or regions: the City of Riga; Riga region; Mitau (Jelgava); Wolmar (Valmiera); Libau (Liepaja); and Dtinaburg (Daugavpils). To each he asssigned a chief administrator, the Gebietskommissar. s Even these regional commissars ruled as autonomous potentates, often disregarding not only Rosenberg's authority in Berlin but also that of their immediate superiors in Riga. For example, Baron Walter Eberhard von Mendem, a Baltic German and Gebietskommissar of Mitau Gebiet, had returned to Latvia as a typical carpetbagger on the coattails of the invading German armies. Von Mendem set up residence in the historic ducal palace in Jelgava and assumed the role of a would-be twentieth-century duke of Kurland-an aspiration evidently shared by others. 16 The City of Riga received a special and separate administrative status. Whereas the rest of Latvia eventually came under a Latvian Self-Administration, Riga did not. Regarding Riga as an exclusively German city, Rosenberg ceded Latvians no control over it whatsoever and appointed his father-in-law, Hugo Wittrock, a fellow Baltic German, as its mayor and chief administrator. Wittrock, an ardent and outspoken enemy of anything Latvian, intended to convert Riga back to its historic German character. Looking ahead to Germanizing all of Latvia, Rosenberg considered Riga the centerpiece of this project and charged Wittrock to begin the process immediately. One of Wittrock's first measures was to resume the Soviet practice of renaming Riga's streets-only this time around, in German and for German celebrities, both past and present. Freedom Avenue (Brivibas lela) became Adolf Hitler Strasse, and even Goring had a street named after him. Wittrock commemorated his son-in-law by renaming Rainis Boulevard-named for Latvia's most illustrious and beloved playwright-Alfred Rosenberg Ring. Riga's venerable buildings and churches, many of them of medieval German origin, reverted to German control and use. '7 Wittrock's vision of Germanizing Riga was not at all far-fetched. Riga became the hub of German administration for the Ostland, housing German offices and functionaries both high and low. The burgeoning German military and bureaucratic presence, accentuated by a kaleidoscopic array of uniforms, suffused a German atmosphere across the city. In addition to the offices and golden-dad personnel of the local Ostministerium hierarchy, including Lohse's Reichskommissariat Ostland, Drechsler's Gen1

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eralbezirk Lettland, and Wittrock's Riga municipal administration, Riga also housed SS offices and staffs, Goring's economic interests, and endless other military and civilian German institutions and agencies. By 1944, 2,235 Germans worked in Latvia for the Ostministerium alone, and many thousands more German civilians found employment somewhere in the country.' 8 No wonder the Reich suffered from a wartime labor shortage. Out in the countryside, in the cities, towns, and the basic rural units, pagasts or townships, German officialdom spread its tentacles, but by necessity, due to the shortage of German personnel, reliable Latvians staffed most of the lower, local positions, but wherever possible, under German supervision. The German hierarchy, from offices in Riga down to the lowly pagasts, ruled by decrees published both in German and Latvian, and expected the Latvians at the end of the chain of command to execute their orders.'9 Unlike the Soviets, who at least went through a pretense of legislation, neither the Ostland administration nor the General Commissariat of Latvia provided for a legislative process. As for a legal foundation-and to the discomfiture of most Latvians-the Germans failed to restore the former Latvian legal system and continued to rely on Soviet laws, which, unless and until explicitly revised or invalidated by German decrees, remained in effect. 20 The flood of decrees emanating from the various levels of the disparate and competing authorities, contributed to pervasive administrative dysfunction, uncertainties, and confusion. At the bottom of the command pyramid Latvian officials had the unenviable duty to fulfill the most odious tasks, such as collecting taxes, accounting for requisitions of one kind or another, and even filling labor quotas. With time the deluge of administrative orders encroached on every walk of life and human activity. As an example of the absurdly meticulous lengths to which German officials went to regulate life in their domains, the General Commissariat in Riga itemized the pricing of geese, distinguishing between those with or without heads, alive, or dead. For some Latvians the German penchant for order and scrupulously tending to bureaucratic minutiae became more stifling and repugnant than heavyhanded Soviet tactics. 2 3 In addition to the aforementioned bureaucratic impediments, a formidable array of interlopers from outside the Ostministerium hampered Rosenberg's efforts to assert his administrative supremacy in the Occupied East. Besides his three main challengers, the army, the SS, and Goring's economic interests, Rosenberg had also evoked the enmity of Nazi Party Secretary Martin Bormann, who jealously guarded access to the Fuhrer. 21

22

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Bormann, a radical on occupation policies and supportive of the Fuhrer in his exploitative predisposition to ruling the region, disparaged Rosenberg's more accommodating manner. Although Bormann claimed no share of the spoils, his proximity to Hitler made him a powerful force in Third Reich infighting, one to be reckoned with in all political considerations and intrigues.>4 Alongside Bormann and the Nazi Party apparatus stood Hermann Goring, one of the three main challengers to Rosenberg's pretensions. From the beginnings of the Nazi movement Goring had been accumulating titles and concomitant authority, including among others, the nebulous one of Reichsmarshall, the commander of the Luftwaffe, President of the Reichstag, and-perhaps the most appropriate if not the most efficacious-official Reich Hunting Master.,s His most important position in respect to the East was that of Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, a title Hitler had granted him in August 1936, making him responsible for preparing the Reich's economy for war and thereby entitling him to intrude into any economic activity. As the designated economic czar, Goring formulated his own plans for the conquered East. In May 1941 his staff generated a blueprint for the comprehensive economic exploitation of the East, referred to as the "Green File." 26 Goring's crowning achievement came on June 29, 1941, when Hitler awarded him a share in ruling the East. As Plenipotentiary of the Four-Year Plan, his expanded jurisdiction granted him a license to plunder the occupied Soviet Union's economic resources to his heart's content. Shortly Goring pieced together a consortium to coordinate the process, Wirtschaftsfilhrungsstab Ost, which nominally included Rosenberg's ministry as a partner, but in reality challenged the prerogatives of the Ostministerium in economic matters. Eventually Rosenberg had to negotiate a compromise with Goring, creating for the latter an economic liaison office in the Ostministerium. 7 As noted earlier, with Hitler's blessing Rimmler's SS inserted its sinister presence in the conquered Soviet Union and remained a major contender for power throughout the war years. The commanders of the Einsatzgruppen, following the advancing armies and cleansing the land of communists and Jews, were the earliest representatives of SS interests in the East. In the Baltic the commander of Einsatzgruppe A, Walther Stahlecker, fulfilled this assignment in the wake of Army Group North. Stahlecker and the Higher-SS and Police Fuhrer (HSSPF) for the Ostland, first Hans Prutzmann, and then as of October 1941 Friedrich Jeckeln, exercised SS police powers in the region not only while it was an army rear area, but also after it came under the civilian administration. Distrust 2

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and competition over turf strained the relationship between the SS and the Ostland administration, no less than it had affected the dealings between the SS and the military administration. 28 Although they shared a mutual personal dislike, Himmler and Rosenberg nevertheless attempted to resolve their differences. Consequent to conversations in fall1941 between the SS and the Ostministerium the two parties agreed to capitalize on the position of HSSPF, one assigned to each Reichkommissariat, as their principal liaison. Although this agreement stipulated that the respective Reichskommissar was superior to the HSSPF attached to his staff-one of Himmler's concessions to Rosenberg's vanity-in actuality the HSSPF ignored the civilian administration and acted independently, doing the bidding of Himmler and subordinate to the SS chain of command. 9 Rosenberg's and Lohse's foremost SS nemesis was HSSPF for the Ostland and northern Russia, SS Obergruppenfiihrer Friedrich Jeckeln, who had specialized in murdering Jews and other civilians in southern Russia and the Ukraine prior to his arrival in Riga.3o The HSSPF in turn assigned an SS Police Leader (SSPF) to each Generalbezirk. As early as August SS Brigadefiihrer Walther Schroder had appeared in Riga as SSPF for Generalbezirk Lettland and helped with many of Stahlecker's SS tasks in Latvia. Stahlecker eventually returned to his primary duties as chief of Einsatzgruppe A, which not only continued its bloody operations in the Baltic States but also pursued more vigorously its latest specialty, antipartisan warfareY In mid-1942 in anticipation of escalating Waffen SS recruitment efforts in the Baltic, Himmler and Rosenberg agreed to strengthen their ties through an extraordinary liaison. Gottlob Berger, the head of the SS Hauptamt, its primary personnel office, and chief recruiter for the Waffen SS, became Himmler's special emissary to the Ostministerium. Through this symbiotic arrangement Rosenberg secured greater SS support in fighting off competing Reich authorities, especially Nazi Party powers Martin Bormann and Josef Goebbels; and for his part Himmler enhanced his ability to recruit local manpower in the Ostland for his Waffen SSY As for Rosenberg's relationship with the army, although von Roques and his staff surrendered administration to Rosenberg's civilian subordinates, the army retained a dominant presence in the Baltic. It left behind in each Reichskommissariat a special Wehrmacht officer equivalent in rank to a division commander to represent the army's interests. General Friedrich Bramers served as the first army plenipotentiary in Riga.33 The army's presence not only remained substantial, but for as long as the war continued military needs consistently ranked higher in priority than 2

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virtually any civilian matters. The army, as did Rosenberg's other rivals, instituted liaisons with the Ostministerium, but disagreements mostly over economic issues marred smooth cooperation. The army habitually elevated its demands, principally by requisitioning provisions and supplies that the Ostministerium and its local functionaries could not always deliver. Furthermore, long after von Roques's departure the civilian officialdom grumbled about the army's "excessive tolerance" toward the Baltic locals.34 Besides the three major challengers to the Ostministerium's primacy, other Reich interlopers also expected authority in their respective areas of competency, both in Berlin and on location in the Baltic. For example, the Reich telegraph and postal service demanded exclusive authority over its activities in the occupied lands, and the Reich Transportation Ministry presumed that it controlled all railway lines in the region. Organization Todt, a hybrid Reich labor and economic office, also extended its operations to the region. Throughout the lifespan of the civilian administration a seemingly inexhaustible line of Reich offices and agencies tendered claims for a piece of the action and dispatched their emissaries to the region to stake out claims and protect their interests. Often these envoys connected links from their headquarters in Berlin directly to the East-at times with the Fuhrer's blessing-without consulting and in effect bypassing Rosenberg's chain of command. The overlapping and competing competencies led to so much confusion that observers in Berlin pejoratively referred to Rosenberg's Ministry as the Chaosministerium.Js When in 1942 Hitler's freshly anointed economic Wunderkind, Albert Speer, entered the fray, a frustrated Rosenberg sought the FOher's mediation to preserve a semblance of authority for himself-not through Bormann, a known enemy, but instead through chief of the Reich Chancellery, Hans Lammers. Hitler assured Rosenberg that he would tolerate no further erosion of his prerogatives and ordered Lammers to protect Rosenberg's interests. But this latest promise, as earlier ones, meant little. In August 1942 Rosenberg, at wit's end with his inability to defend his domain, confided to Lammers that the situation in the East rendered his Ostministerium superfluous.36 Unfortunately for Rosenberg, no one sympathized with his plight. Indeed, one party even perceived in this chaos an opportunity to advance its own agenda and interests-the Latvian leadership, which would exploit the confusion stirred up by their German masters to restore as much as they could of Latvian sovereignty and self-rule.

The Latvian 5elf·Admlnlstratlon Latvian leaders had hoped the Germans would approve some sort of provisional government, but realizing this concession was not forthcoming,

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they lowered expectations and decided to form a native administration that would prove useful to the Germans-and through which they could regain at least some autonomy. As the ideal political status to emulate, the Latvians looked to the puppet state of Slovakia, which, after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, Hitler had recognized as a nominally independent state, but allied with and subservient to the Reich.J? The Latvians would have been content with Slovakia's position, but their chances of securing even Slovakia's limited autonomy for Latvia were as delusory as the popular misconception that the German invasion had restored Latvia's freedom. German promises and intimations for more self-rule in the future turned out to be deliberate deception, concealing the sad truth that the Germans intended to allow the Latvians no greater national freedom than had the Russians.3 8 During the first few days of the occupation the Latvian Organization Center (LOC), in its bid for autonomy, had drawn to itself several influential figures such as former Finance Minister Valdmanis and Lt. Col. Plensners, both with direct and apparently influential connections to the occupiers. As the LOC offered itself to the Germans, it found itself contending for recognition with the Perkonkrusts and then with yet another coterie of Latvians, the one attached to General Oskars Dankers, who arrived from the Reich on July 18. As a soldier, Dankers had earned decorations during the Wars of Independence and afterwards had risen to the command of the Kurzeme Division, but he had not belonged to the most influential inner military circles. A few days after the Russians occupied Latvia, Dankers-known to be pro-German and a member of the Latvian delegation that had traveled to Berlin for Hitler's fiftieth birthday-along with his family had fled to Germany, where through some Baltic German contacts he attracted Rosenberg's attention. Rosenberg had seen in this lackluster, relative unknown a potential yes-man who could serve German interests well. He took Dankers and a small group of Latvian exiles under his wing and prepared them for their return to Latvia, intending to set them up as his personal Latvian liaison.39 Although Dankers later insisted that he returned to Latvia on his own in August, and only after his arrival did General von Roques offer him the post of chief Latvian administrator, more likely Dankers and his retinue traveled with the full knowledge and approval of high Reich authorities, with at least Rosenberg's consent and perhaps even with the Fuhrer's personal blessings.4o Upon his arrival in Riga Dankers realized that Valdmanis and his LOC partners had already solidified their presence and influence with the leading occupiers, including both Stahlecker and von Roques, and he might be the odd man outY

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Just as the Germans quarreled over shares of jurisdiction, the Latvian factions intrigued and bickered among themselves, mostly over access to the Germans. After negotiations and maneuvering too intricate to relate within the limits of this survey, the Dankers and the Valdmanis groups arrived at a compromise, to which von Roques gave his blessing on August 21. Later, with some personnel alterations, the chief civilian administrator, General Commissar Otto Drechsler of Generalbezirk Lettland, recognized this Latvian coalition as a de facto Self-Administration, fully functioning by the end of 1941 as the Pasparvalde.4 At a meeting at the Ostministerium in February 1942 Rosenberg broached the issue of a local, native administration with his subordinates. Although several objected, Rosenberg legitimized what already had occurred in fact, the establishment of a Latvian Self-Administration, and on March 7 he formally decreed self-administration for the Ostland. He left the implementation up to the general commissars, but reminded them that in no way did Self-Administration imply national sovereignty or constitute provisional governments. Germans would rule; the native peoples at most would help administer. Furthermore, these self-administrations would not represent the Latvian people as collegial bodies. Each native official answered as an individual administrator to his respective General Commissar directly.43 On March 16 General Commissar Drechsler formally constituted the Self-Administration (Landeseigene Verwaltung Lettlands) or Zemes Pasparvalde for Latvia, defined its jurisdiction, and approved its personnel. Adhering to Rosenberg's guidelines, Drechsler appointed seven Latvian Directors General, each one responsible for an administrative area, or directorate: Interior, Economy, Finance, Education, Justice, Transport, and Comptroller. These directorates more or less corresponded to the erstwhile Latvian ministries, with two major omissions-War and Foreign Affairs, whose restoration would have implied sovereignty. Each director would routinely work with a supervising German from Drechsler's office. The directors were to report directly and individually to Drechsler-although they met regularly to discuss critical matters as a group in order to coordinate their efforts vis-a-vis the General Commissar. At the outset Drechsler violated his own stricture against collegial action by designating Dankers, who held the post of Director General of the Interior, as the "first" director general among equals, a spokesman for the rest and the one he preferred to deal with personally.44 Before finalizing the selfadministrations for the Ostland, on May 8 Rosenberg had to secure the approval of the Fuhrer. Rosenberg convinced Hitler that having their own 2

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self-administrations would encourage the Baltic peoples to work for the Reich and assured him that this magnanimity would not obstruct the eventual absorption of the Ostland into the Reich. With the Fuhrer's approval in hand, Drechsler had the general directors swear loyalty to himself and the Reich.4s Within parameters set by the Germans, the Latvians practiced their self-administration as widely as possible. What some critics have called collaboration, the Latvian leadership justified as an opportunity to attenuate German rule and to secure for the Latvian people as good a life under the occupation as possible. Although the Latvians could broach issues and raise concerns, the Germans had absolutely no obligation to listen or act on their advice. The Self-Administration had no power to initiate any measures, nor could they intercede formally on behalf of the Latvian people. In essence the Self-Administration amounted to no more than an administrative organ created to facilitate the German occupation and execute what the Germans wished-precisely what the Germans had intended. The Germans made a good choice by choosing the unassertive Dankers as the leading figure in the Self-Administration. Although Dankers forcefully stated his case and spoke his mind when among his fellow Latvians, in the presence of the Germans he meekly tuned down his demeanor and turned compliant. Members of the Pasparvalde as well as other Latvian insiders disparagingly alluded to the servile Dankers as Herr Dankerschon.46 Since the Self-Administration included a few former Ulmanis supporters, at least partly they regarded themselves as legitimate successors to that regime. But Latvia's diplomat-in-exile in Washington, Alfreds Bilmanis, refused to recognize them as such. Bilmanis by necessity courted the Western allies of the Soviet Union, a difficult and sensitive task that precluded both bitter condemnation of the Soviet Union and any gestures of allegiance toward the Self-Administration serving the Germans.47 Understandably the Self-Administration courted only recognition from the power that mattered at the moment, the German Reich, and it would be from its officials in the Baltic that the Latvians sought the concession they valued most-political autonomy.48 The matter of autonomy finally came to a head at a meeting of the general directors on November 4, 1942. By then the directors realized they could expect few if any more gratuities from the Germans in regard to self-rule unless they pursued it more forcefully. After more than a year of German occupation the Latvians had served the Germans in various ways and had obediently delivered whatever the Germans demanded. As

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will be discussed more thoroughly later, by then many Latvians had already fought as soldiers for the Germans, others labored for them both in Latvia and the Reich, and most everyone else produced endlessly for their war effort. The Germans, however, with their insatiable needs, shamelessly and regularly hiked up their exactions from the Latvians. The directors sensed and ultimately concluded that Latvian willingness to cooperate had its limits; the euphoria of liberation had worn off. The public's patience was wearing thin with the patent German reminder that because they had liberated Latvia from the Soviets the Latvians owed limitless services to the Germans. At the November 4 meeting one of the directors ruefully noted that "The Germans know for what they are fighting. Our people do not."49 At this juncture Alfreds Valdmanis, arguably the most independently minded of the general directors, decided the time had come to stand up to the Germans. Unless Latvians had a reason to support the German cause, the present level of Latvian cooperation could not be sustained. Immediately after the November 4 meeting he took it upon himself to articulate Latvian frustrations and aspirations in two memos to the German authorities: the first was written on November 11, the second was dated November 30. In these communications, essentially pleas for autonomy, he addressed the "Latvian Problem." Valdmanis suggested that if the Germans expected the Latvians to continue producing and working for their war effort, they had to provide the Latvians with a meaningful incentive. National autonomy, in the form of granting Latvia political status comparable to Slovakia's, not only would ensure continued support for German war interests, but would stimulate enthusiasm for even greater contributions. He boldly guaranteed that if the Germans committed themselves to granting national autonomy, the Latvians could easily raise an army of 100,000 men to fight on their side.so From this point on, the Latvian leadership made Latvian contributions to Germany's war effort contingent upon reciprocal steps toward autonomy. Although the Germans could require and forcibly extract both material and human resources, the military situation compelled them to do so with as little exertion as possible. While the Latvians discussed autonomy in early November 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad neared its moment of decision, and when the devastating German defeat climaxed in early 1943, the Latvians as well as other German subjects found themselves in far better bargaining positions. With the reversal of their military fortunes following Stalingrad, the Germans had to squeeze even more from their clients and the vanquished-but with a minimal expenditure of

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resources and with maximum returns. As they faced the prospects of military defeat at a time of dwindling manpower reserves for both their military and labor force, the Germans had to reevaluate their attitude toward and relationships with their subject peoples. In order to confront the Germans on the issue of autonomy Valdmanis first had to overcome the timidity of his fellow general directors -especially Dankers, who spoke fearlessly when among his fellow directors, but wilted obsequiously in German presence-which he accomplished by early December 1942, when the general directors as a body concurred with Valdmanis's views on autonomy. The German reactions to the challenge varied. In a letter to Himmler in December Gottlob Berger, the chief Waffen SS recruiter, brushed off the idea of autonomy as dangerous, but eventually the SS became more amenable in the interest of recruiting manpower for the Waffen SS in lands under German rule, including LatviaY As for Latvia's local German overlords, whereas Drechsler leaned toward greater autonomy, Lohse repudiated granting Latvia Slovakia's status, arguing that other states such as Estonia and Belgium would demand the sameY For Lohse autonomy meant the decentralization of the Ostland and the weakening or even the end of his rule. Drechsler, whose role as the primary German authority in Latvia would hardly change, befriended the cause for greater autonomy. Drechsler agreed to meet with the general directors on January 29, 1943, to discuss autonomy, especially since the Latvians seemed intent on binding this pressing issue with their continued cooperation, turning this into a quid pro quo arrangement. The matter had assumed even greater urgency because of SS plans to intensify the recruitment of nonGermans, including Latvians, into the Waffen-SS. When at this meeting Dankers once more folded and failed to state the Latvian case vigorously, Valdmanis took the floor and bluntly informed Drechsler that the general directors would help create Latvian SS units only with a reciprocal commitment from the Germans for greater autonomy. The building of Latvian "volunteer" units would be feasible only if Latvian soldiers knew they were fighting for an independent Latvia. He added a few other caveats, including the privatization of property that had been nationalized by the Soviets and a halt to the persecution of Latvian patriots-topics to be discussed at greater length shortly. Drechsler responded to these demands with the excuse that he would take these matters to higher authorities. Shortly after this confrontation Valdmanis resigned from his directorship and left for the Reich under mysterious circumstances. He lived out the war years under the close watch of the SD, but otherwise in what ap-

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peared to be relatively comfortable circumstances.s3 The question of autonomy, which had become contingent upon the recruitment of Latvian volunteers for the Waffen-SS, did not fade away. Rosenberg, whose schemes for the Baltic had always pictured a more accommodating scenario than Hitler's, drew up yet another plan, one proposing that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania become state entities, something like protectorates. In early February 1943 Rosenberg submitted this plan to Hitler, who, on Bormann's advice not to relent with the brutal exploitation of the East, rejected it.s4 Evidently in Hitler's estimate the military situation had not yet deteriorated to the point that necessitated political concessions to nonGerman subjects and compromises with his ideological principles and visions for the East. During the militarily pivotal year of 1943 the Reich's highest leaders increasingly and more heatedly split on the matter of utilizing non-Germans in the war effort: Should they continue total exploitation, the approach favored by the hard-liners including Hitler, or should they modify these harsh policies in a more accommodating direction? After all, so argued the more pragmatic Nazis, less oppressive rule would result in higher economic productivity. As for Latvia, in June 1943 Drechsler revealed his sympathies in a secret report criticizing German rule as being counterproductive in its brutality and exploitation. As efforts to recruit for the Waffen-SS escalated-a topic to be discussed in the chapter on the Latvian Legion-the SS command switched to the pragmatic side of the issue and became more supportive of whatever measures reaped the largest harvest of volunteers, including more self-rule.ss In late September 1943 RFSS Himmler traveled to the Baltic and hinted to local national leaders in Riga and Tallinn that autonomy was around the corner. He even claimed Hitler had already approved a plan and it was just a matter of time before they would enjoy more self-rule. In return, however, the Fuhrer expected corresponding gestures of good will, including the introduction of a general military obligation and even greater contributions to the Reich's other endeavors. It is doubtful at this point, however, that Hitler had committed himself to any such scheme, and most likely Himmler told the Latvians what they wanted to hear just to secure their cooperation in the SS recruitment. Rosenberg, although predisposed to granting greater self-rule in the Baltic, suspected Rimmler's insincerity, since the latter seemed to be stealing his own thunder and attempting to rearrange the Ostland on SS terms.s 6 Once raised, the sticky autonomy issue required resolution and intercession by the Fuhrer. This came at a meeting on November 16-17 at the Fuhrer's headquarters,

Latvia and the Ostland I 187 attended by Rosenberg, Bormann, Himmler, Lammers, and Lohse. Hitler expressly rejected any concessions for political autonomy and fervently insisted on keeping subject states under firm German control, although in regard to cultural autonomy he agreed to think about it as a postwar concession. The Fuhrer had spoken; the issue of political autonomy was dead .57 Even though the Fuhrer had declared against expanding self-rule, other Germans dealing with the Latvians fraudulently continued to entice them with prospects of further concessions. For example, on November 18, Latvian National Independence Day, one day after Hitler's definitive pronouncement, Dankers spoke at elaborate ceremonies in Riga's Opera House. Since the Germans had forbidden any commemoration of this event in 1941 and 1942, the fact that they permitted this ceremony in 1943 seemed to indicate a shift in policy. Unaware of Hitler's moratorium on any further talk of autonomy, but encouraged and elated by being able to celebrate this national holiday, Dankers appealed to the Latvian people to respond to the summons for military mobilization. Gullibly believing empty German promises, Dankers declared, "Let us do our duty and believe confidently in a free Latvia." A rousing applause greeted his call for further sacrifices on the part of the Latvian people in hopes of further German generosity. The audience then solemnly sang the national anthem-another purely symbolic gesture allowed by the Germans that so many Latvians misinterpreted as a step toward national autonomy.s 8 Going into 1944 Reich authorities kept alluring Latvians with vague intimations of greater self-rule, while escalating quotas for their goods and services. Some, such as the army and the SS and to a degree Rosenberg's hierarchy, continued to advocate a more magnanimous policy-one more likely to enhance results in the way of requisitions. On the other side of the issue Bormann, Goebbels, and other hard-liners stubbornly stuck to the policy of unbridled exploitation.s9 Latvia under German Rule: The Economy The short-term goal of German rule in the Baltic, including Latvia, anticipated total, comprehensive economic exploitation, supporting both German military operations in the northern sector of the Eastern front as well as on the Reich home front. Once they got beyond quarreling over jurisdiction, Reich authorities formulated occupation policies in view of this basic mission, which culminated in the wanton plundering of Latvia's resources. 60 What the Soviets had begun, the Germans perpetuated. These immediate goals also laid the foundation for the future. Hitler expostu-

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lated that the conquest of Lebensraum in the East would ensure more than adequate economic resources, in particular agricultural goods, for many future generations of Germans. Since both immediate and more distant goals presupposed the exploitation of the region's foodstuffs for the benefit of Germans and to the detriment of the local population- . even to the point of starvation-German economic plans also coincided with and reinforced the waging of a racial war, the eradication of an expendable and unwanted non-German population. 6 ' Not only would ruthless German economic exploitation aid in the war of annihilation, through economic practices tantamount to robbery it would also help reduce the cost of war. The Reich military charted the course for merciless exploitation when in spring 1941 it formulated plan Oldenburg. This scheme anticipated utilizing the conquered territory with absolute disregard for the well-being and needs of the non-German peoples. It recognized two harsh realities: First, "The war can be pursued only if ... the entire German Armed Forces can be fed at the expense of Russia." Second, ''Thereby tens of millions of men will undoubtedly starve to death if we take away all we need from the country." 6 z German economic policies in occupied Latvia as elsewhere, indifferent to human suffering, faithfully followed these principles. The army led the way in mapping the direction of Reich economic policy in the East, but at least two other contenders also claimed economic authority. Rosenberg, first as the Fuhrer's designated expert on Eastern aff~irs and then as of July 17, 1941, the chief civilian administrator of the region, expected to wield preeminent authority in economic matters for the Occupied Territories. Rivaling Rosenberg, however, was the Fuhrer's Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan Hermann Goring. Goring based his prerogatives on Hitler's charge of June 29 to coordinate the exploitation of the East with the overall operation of the Reich's war economy-a commission superseding all other economic authority. 63 Clearly this simmering imbroglio also required intercession by the Fuhrer, who subsequently ordered Goring, Rosenberg, and the army to work out means for coordinating economic activities in the East, a difficult task to say the least. Not only did they have to create a coordinating center, but they also had to reconcile their individual preferences for utilizing local resources. The army insisted that it held the highest priority and reserved the right to use local agriculture as well as industrial products for itself, sending only the excess back to Germany. Goring, on the other hand, declared these territories as analogous to colonies, whose goods would be shipped back to the Reich at fabulous profits for Reich-based

Latvia and the Ostland I 189 monopolies. As for Rosenberg, it was in his interest to run a smoothly functioning administration for the present and prepare the land for future Germanization; supervising the economy was simply part of his overall administrative duties. 64 The end result of their deliberations emerged on June 9, the Wirtschaftsfuhrungstab Ost (WiFStab Ost), or the Economic Command Staff East, under the chairmanship of Goring. Grouped under the auspices of the WiFStab Ost were several Wehrmacht economic entities, including the Office for Armament Economy (Wi Ru Amt) under General Georg Thomas, and economic liaison offices of the Ostministerium. 65 Other Reich economic interests such as the Economic Ministry had to work through the WiFStab Ost when dealing with the East. Although organized as a coordinating center that represented all three major constituents equally, Goring dominated the new creation. Rosenberg found himself, as usual, the least of the three partners. 66 In 1942 two additional interlopers tendered their economic claims in the East. In March 1942 Fritz Sauckel appeared in the picture as the Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor, and in June 1942 Albert Speer presented his credentials as the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions as well as the Inspector General for Water and Energy in Newly Occupied Eastern Territories. 67 During the years of German occupation these new intruders planted local branches throughout the Ostland, expecting local Reich authorities such as Lohse and Drechsler as well as Latvian administrators to comply with their latest requisition quotas and demands. Having to serve so many economic masters inevitably engendered further strife among German administrators and evoked more grumbling and resentment from Latvians. Worsening the situation were thousands of additional personnel descending upon the Baltic, swelling the German civilian contingent. 68 Not only did the Germans frustrate Latvian aspirations by refusing to restore political autonomy, they also disappointed the Latvians by not returning property nationalized by the Soviets to previous owners. On August 19, 1941, Lohse declared the Reich's ownership of all property belonging to the Soviet state as of June 20, 1941. That which the Soviets had nationalized belonged to the Reich, not to Latvians, a claim justified by German conquest and the blood of German soldiers. 69 Dispossessed Latvian property owners were dismayed to learn that the Germans intended to respect Soviet policies in regard to property and that former Latvian proprietors would even have to pay rent for utilizing state property.7o The reason for retaining and building on the Soviet socialist economic system seemed to be control. Just as Ulmanis's extensive na-

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tionalization of Latvian industry had facilitated the Soviet takeover and the confiscation of all remaining private property, Soviet nationalization performed a valuable service for the Germans, who simply seized the reins of the centralized, state-controlled economy left behind by the Soviets.?' In justifying the retention of the Soviet system, Lohse wrote in February 1942 that it mattered not whether the economic system of the Ostland was Bolshevik or capitalist; the best system was the one that produced most for the war effortF Since the Germans followed a precedent set by Ulmanis-as had the Soviets before them-Latvians found it futile to argue for the restoration of private enterprise. Although the Germans claimed the Reich's inheritance of all Soviet property, they nonetheless expressed their intention to reprivatize it at some vague, later date. As early as October 1941 Lohse decreed privatization of certain crafts, but complicated regulations made the process prohibitive. A few other token privatization measures were authorized, but by June 1942 only some 700 of the tiniest enterprises in the entire country had reverted to private ownership.73 The Germans did not take reprivatization seriously until the fortunes of war turned in 1943, as they looked for additional incentives, along with promises of autonomy, to entice greater Latvian contributions to the war effort. On February 18, 1943, Rosenberg announced the return of property in the same spirit as the tantalizing German prospects of political autonomy-in exchange for Latvian compliance with increased German demands: All property seized by the Soviets except that designated in the public interest would return to private ownership. In practice, however, restrictive prerequisites and bureaucratic red tape inhibited the process and discouraged many from applying for the restoration of their property. Applicants had to submit to investigations and promise in writing to support the Reich, which meant in fact complying with each and every German request that might arise, thereby encumbering the recipient with perpetual obligations-a virtual modern-day serfdom. At least one source estimates that by the end of their occupation the Germans had returned to their rightful owners no more than a fourth of all reclaimed property.7 4 In financial matters the Germans also emulated their Soviet predecessors, imposing on the Latvians another round of pauperization. The Germans first declared a price freeze at the Soviet level and then proceeded to introduce yet another new currency, the Ostmark, which circulated alongside special military currency. The Ostmark was valued one tenth of a ruble, slashing Latvian purchasing power by another 90 percent. A series of currency regulations beginning with the Decembers, 1941, For-

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eign Currency Law for the Ostland prescribed additionally burdensome restrictions on Latvia's finances and currency use, including limiting the circulation of the currency to the Ostland. For the average Latvian sending money abroad even for business purposes became nearly impossible.7s Decrees also regulated Latvian banking, which were brought under the monopolistic control of Reich banks. The Dresdner Bank took over the operations of Latvijas Banka, the former state bank, while other Reich banks installed branches throughout Latvia and the rest of the Ostland. Although the Germans allowed the restoration of private bank accounts, these, like the reprivatization of property, amounted to little more than symbolic window dressing to fool Latvians into thinking that better times had returned. The primary purpose of the banking system in Latvia was to have a financial conduit between Latvia and the Reich to facilitate Latvia's economic exploitation.7 6 Another German financial measure intended to make the economic exploitation of the East even more profitable was freezing prices, including those in Latvia, at no more than 6o percent of Reich prices. This disparity artificially made Latvian goods cheaper than German goods, enabling German enterprises and individuals to purchase Latvian goods at low prices, thereby netting nice profits as well as stretching the value of the Reichsmark back in the Reich on goods imported from Latvia. In the other direction, prices on German goods were set artificially high, generating further profits. Welded to the Reich's bartering system of foreign trade, Latvians could not refuse to pay exorbitant prices for overpriced German goods nor withhold their undervalued goods from the German market. 77 Although most German plans envisioned the Ostland's economic future as primarily agricultural, the region contained a number of industrial concerns that could produce for the war effort. Hostilities had hardly damaged Latvian industry, and since the Soviets had failed to evacuate the industrial plant, the Germans inherited much of Latvian industry as the Soviets had left it. Even the hydroelectric facility at Kegums was up and running within days after the German invasion.78 In October 1941 Drechsler terminated state ownership of small artisan shops, which could henceforth operate as private enterprises, but he did not relinquish state control over larger industrial enterprises. It was Goring and his staff, however, and not Drechsler and the civilian administration that supervised the reallocation of state-owned industry to the control and management of various Reich economic organizations and trusteeships (Treuhander), all ultimately drawn under the authority of his Wirtschasfts-

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fuhrungsstab Ost. In the process Goring founded numerous companies designated as Ostland-Gesellschaften that managed various spheres of Latvia's economy. Among the most important industrial sectors were textiles, processed foods, and Latvia's "green gold" timber and lumber industry.79 In the order of importance to the Reich's war economy Latvia's agriculture by far surpassed its industry. At an economic conference chaired by Goring on November 8, 1941, Reich economic leaders reaffirmed the Reich's goal of exploiting the East's resources and adopted as general policy "General Principles for an Economic Policy in Newly Occupied Eastern Territories." Although the agenda spanned the entire spectrum of the economy, it focused on agriculture, in particular the production and distribution of foodstuffs. The plan prioritized the provisioning of troops in the East as the highest, followed by German troops on other fronts, the civilian population in the Reich, and finally the local indigenous population, whose standard of living would be significantly reduced. Extracting as much produce as possible became the goal of Reich economic planners for the East, including Latvia. 80 In agriculture as in industry Goring's Wirtschaftsfuhrungsstab Ost (WiFStab Ost) predominated. A special company created under its auspices, Central Trading Company East (Zentralhandelsgesellschaft Ost), received a monopoly on the requisitioning and distribution of agricultural goods. It authorized and coordinated the activities of a range of private as well as state agricultural concerns, spinning off countless other companies labeled with complex acronyms. These companies supervised production and deliveries in their particular sector, such as dairy products, poultry, or pork. The mission of this conglomeration of enterprises, from their headquarters in Berlin to the lowliest branch offices in a Latvian pagasts, remained maximum utilization of Latvia's agricultural resources. German bureaucrats tirelessly reminded Latvian farmers that their contributions reflected their gratitude for the Reich's liberation of their country. 8 ' The Soviet system of state ownership of property remained in force in the countryside, since Lohse's decree declaring the Reich's possession of all Soviet property applied to landed property as well. Latvian farmers were to farm their land uninterrupted as tenants of the state. 82 The Germans did reverse some Soviet measures in the countryside, including certain provisions of the land redistribution of 1940. In September 1941 they restored to the original owners their use of the "ten-hectare" parcels the landless and the small-holders had received, not to rectify a wrong,

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but rather in the interest of more efficient farming. The dispossessed either became rural laborers in Latvia or were among the early waves of deportees sent to the Reich as forced labor. 8 3 As was the case in Latvia's industry, retaining the Soviet agricultural system facilitated the transfer of control from the Soviets to the Germans. In early 1942 the Germans liquidated all kolkhozes and state farms along with their tractor stations and horse borrowing centers, absorbing their land, equipment, and facilities into Goring's agricultural empire. For the workers little changed. They continued to farm and fulfill quota deliveries, but to the Germans instead of to the Russians. 84 Rosenberg's February 1943 decree for reprivatizing property extended to farmland, but reprivatization in the countryside, as in industry, was contingent upon meeting certain preconditions, including passing the litmus test of political reliability, swearing loyalty to the Reich, and promising to meet delivery quotas. Relatively few Latvian farmers took advantage of the Reich's generosity. 8 s The Germans adopted the centralized quota system from the Soviets. Central authorities in Riga set prices of farm products and formulated production and delivery quotas calculated on the size of land holdings. Every kind of farm product came under the quota system, from milk and eggs to grain and meat. Since the authorities also set prices, farmers received very little for their produce. Usually they received payment in the form of coupons for rationed items that more often than not were unavailable. At the pagasts level the Landwirtschaftsfuhrer (Agricultural Officer) supervised the local farmers, assigning individual quotas, regulating what they planted, how much, and above all monitoring their deliveries. Failure to meet quotas could be severely punished, with the loss of one's land, or even worse, for repeated offenders. Anything produced above the quota could be kept for family consumption, but selling the surplus openly was forbidden. Farmers were to deliver any surplus to the collection center where they received a fixed price for their goods. 86 A particularly reprehensible additional obligation for Latvian farmers was compulsory labor in forests or on roads, at times on vacant farms. Another repugnant German practice entailed drafting farmers along with their horses and wagons for temporary transportation service. These irregular compulsory duties along with making requisition deliveries, made life close to intolerable for Latvian farmers-indeed, a return to serfdom under the new barons. 8 7 The chronic Latvian labor shortage in the countryside became critical under the occupation. Prior to the war Latvia had imported tens of thousands of seasonal agricultural workers, but the main source of seasonal

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migrant workers, Poland, had dried up with the German occupation. Exacerbating matters, the Germans siphoned off many native laborers to work in the Reich. The rural areas lost even more manpower as the Reich escalated efforts to recruit Latvians for its military. By late 1942, with a shrinking manpower pool, the Germans introduced mandatory agricultural labor duty for various classes of people, especially at harvest time. For instance, school children above a certain age owed three months agricultural labor per year. In the interest of greater production Reich offices allocated labor to the larger, more efficient farms first, with smaller farms usually having to make do with the immediate family. As the war continued and requisition demands as well as labor and military obligations increased, farm productivity dropped, and more often than not farmers could not meet their quotas. 88 Since the invading German armies intended to live off the conquered countryside, exploitation in the form of confiscating agricultural goods began almost immediately. As early as August 1941 the 16th Army demanded pigs and livestock. Such recurring demands continued throughout the period of occupation with no apparent end in sight. 8 9 An especially noxious German practice was the requisitioning of horses for the Reich military. Although the Reich military possessed and was renown for its modern and mobile weaponry, to a surprising degree the Germans still relied on horsepower for transportation; more than 6oo,ooo horses helped pull Operation Barbarossa into the Soviet Union. Horsepower, like manpower, had to be replenished, and the Germans did so at the expense of the occupied countryside, including Latvian agriculture. According to one source, by early 1942 the Germans had already seized over 10,ooo horses, and by the end of the German occupation Latvians had lost more than 1oo,ooo horses to requisitioning.9o The plundering of livestock and produce increased in 1944 as the retreating Germans grabbed everything in sight either for immediate consumption or for deliveries to the Reich. Despite their most concerted, even ruthless, efforts the Germans never managed to achieve their anticipated level of agricultural exploitation.9' There was only so much to squeeze out of the Latvian farmer. German priorities in food allocations, which placed the local population last after provisioning the German military and shipping produce to the Reich, inevitably doomed the Baltic region, including Latvia, to food shortages. Food shortages cannot be attributed solely to the Germans, however, since these conditions had already existed under the Soviets, but German occupation policy of total exploitation nonetheless exacerbated an already dismal situation. Food shortages were especially critical

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in the cities, where illegal black markets-another legacy of the Soviet year-developed and thrived.9 As early as July 1941 the Germans began rationing food, even doling out the common Latvian staple, the lowly potato. Food rationing reflected German racial discrimination. Latvian rations diminished with time in comparison to German rations, and by 1943 Latvians received only one-third to one-half of Germans portions.93 Despite the declining food supply in Latvia, when in August 1942 Goring convened a conference on foodstuffs, some participants grumbled that life in Latvia was still too good, implying that quotas could still be hiked higher.94 Latvians thought otherwise. Raising Latvian food rations to the German level became another Latvian bargaining chip along with increased political autonomy in negotiations over Latvian military service. 2

The Reich and Latvian Labor The German occupying powers expected their subject peoples, including Latvians, not only to produce and deliver goods to the Reich but also to work for the Reich. As prewar Germany rearmed, reintroduced a military obligation, and mobilized for war, by virtue of a series of decrees in 1938 and 1939, it also declared a mandatory labor obligation for its citizens. The Reich could conscript any German to work for its war effort.9s If Germans had to toil, so would the conquered peoples, either at home or elsewhere, including the Reich itself. Due mostly to racial reservations-a reluctance to import racially inferior non-German workers into the racially "pristine" Reich-initially the Reich had not expected to import foreign labor, but as millions of German men left the work force for the military, replacements had to be found, above all in agriculture. In 1939 Goring, whose Four-Year Plan duties inserted him into the labor business as well, suggested the use of prisoners of war as labor. 96 With the outbreak of war against Poland in September 1939 the Germans began impressing foreign labor for service in the Reich by imposing a compulsory labor obligation on all adult Poles. After this initial step, the floodgates opened, and during the war years the Reich imported millions of nonGermans-some voluntarily, but the overwhelming majority as forced labor-from all across its domain, including Latvia.9 7 With the invasion of the Soviet Union the Reich continued the labor policies introduced in Poland. Designated as inferior Untermenschen, the peoples of the Soviet Union were destined to serve the Germans as laborers. In Latvia the recruitment of labor for the Reich began almost immediately and intensified as the Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD), the Reich Labor Service, settled in its new Latvian offices. The nascent Latvian Self-Ad-

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ministration helped the German effort by creating a Labor Department (Darba Parvalde) within the General Directorate of the Interior. By the late autumn 1941 hundreds of volunteers had signed six-month labor contracts and left to work in the Reich. 98 The initial stream of volunteers soon slowed to a trickle, as the more eager departed. Unfavorable reports from the Reich contributed to the decline in volunteers. Living conditions were deplorable, as was the pay, which was only a fraction of what Germans earned for the same work. The German authorities regularly and unilaterally extended the six-month term of contract, leaving young Latvians often toiling in intolerable, concentration camp-like circumstances well beyond their expected length of service.99 In order to restart the dwindling flow of labor to the Reich, on December 19, 1941, Rosenberg decreed a labor obligation for everyone in the Occupied East between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. Failure to register for labor service could result in severe punishment. Furthermore, one's obligatory labor service could be assigned outside Latvia. Even before Rosenberg's December 19 decree the RAD, with the active connivance of the Latvian press intensified its campaign of labor recruitment and appealed to young Latvians to volunteer for work in Germany. Latvian as well as German propaganda promised exciting new opportunities in the Reich. The response remained negligible until the issuance of the mandatory labor obligation. As a result the number of volunteers grew, but most likely the increase resulted from the consideration that volunteering would lead to a better job and better treatment than if one waited to be drafted, an event that was just around the corner. Since the Germans preferred volunteers to impressed workers, in 1942 they introduced another incentive, making one year's RAD service a prerequisite for entry into the University of Riga, the former University of Latvia. In labor procurement local Latvian labor boards played an instrumental role registering young people and selecting draftees when volunteers alone failed to fill quotas. 102 The labor procurement business took another turn on March 21, 1942, when Hitler named Fritz Sauckel Reich Plenipotentiary of Labor. Charged with procuring one million additional workers from the East, Sauckel realized that the voluntary approach would not reap the desired results. Determined to meet his quota, Sauckel pledged, "I have received a charge from Adolf Hitler and I will get a million workers for Germany without regard to their preferences, whether they want to or not."w3 The coercive measures he employed in order to reach his goals placed him on the side of the extremists such as Bormann on Eastern issues. With the help of 100

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Latvia and the Ostland I 197 local labor offices, including the Latvian Darba Parvalde, beginning in April 1942 Sauckel organized and directed a number of campaigns for foreign workers. Dankers, as the representative of the Self-Administration, signed one document after another facilitating Sauckel's efforts in Latvia, and the SD placed its coercive, terror methods at the disposal of the recruitment drive. 104 Soon enough the recruitment assumed the nature of a manhunt. By the fall of 1942 some 8,ooo people had been rounded up in Latgale and sent off to Germany as forced labor. In one village German security forces simply grabbed all able-bodied people, packed them onto trucks and shipped them off to the railway station and then to their final destination in the Reich. Germans regarded Latgalians as racially and socially inferior to other Latvians and therefore more appropriate victims for their press gang methods. The ten-hectare farmers, the main beneficiaries of Soviet rule in the Latvian countryside, were also among the leading candidates for deportation and impressed labor. s As the Reich's military fortunes ebbed further, its insatiable appetite for labor grew. But so did the need for military manpower, which had a higher priority. While visiting Riga in April1943, Sauckel agreed to exempt Latvians and Estonians from the latest labor drive as a concession to the SS. The SS had just commenced with a major recruitment campaign for the recently approved Latvian Legion and feared that a concurrent labor drive could have undesirable repercussions. The SS relied on the goodwill and services of the labor office in yet another way and took recourse to Rosenberg's obligatory labor decree to help in its recruiting. Local labor offices summoned eligible young men for mandatory labor duty and then offered them the option to enlist instead with the Waffen-SS as volunteers for the legion. 106 By spring 1943 labor conscription had arrived in Latvia, abandoning even the pretense of voluntarism. In response to the intensified labor induction campaign, which started almost simultaneously with the mobilization for the Latvian Legion, increasing numbers of young Latvians took to the woods and went into hiding. Some found their way into partisan bands that this time around resisted the Germans instead of the Soviets. 107 Throughout the remaining war years labor needs competed with military needs, and the latter received higher priority and the lion's share of inducted manpower. Not to be denied, Sauckel decided to compensate for losses to the military by increasing the number of women drafted, suggesting a quota of w,ooo from Latvia. The Self-Administration, in one of its few instances of assertiveness, resisted and managed to reduce the number of Latvian women forced into the German labor pool by imple10

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menting and having the Germans honor various deferments. Furthermore, most but not all women drafted for employment remained in Latvia, a concession begrudgingly recognizing the value of Latvians as compliant subjects whose collaboration deserved some reward. ' 08 The Germans did not deport all forced labor to the Reich. Much of it remained in Latvia. As early as fall1941 the authorities introduced stints of mandatory agricultural labor for teenaged Latvian students, mostly during the summers. 9 Although such obligatory youth labor could be described as benign, comparable to required youth labor in Germany, a more insidious form of mandatory labor predominated, under conditions justifiably described as slave labor. Shortly after the occupation the Germans constructed labor camps to house forced laborers working in local enterprises, forests, and farms. One pro-Soviet source estimates that by December 1942 some 130 labor camps existed in Latvia, housing over 20,000 inmates.' The inmates of these camps constituted a mix-both men and women-including ethnic Latvians, suspected partisans mostly from White Russia but also other points east, Soviet prisoners of war, and Jews. The ethnic Latvians for the most part comprised the politically unreliable, including the pro-Soviet ten-hectare people. The Germans also constructed separate facilities for POWs. From the start of Operation Barbarossa the Germans built many POW camps in Latvia in which racial, ethnic, and political criteria determined the inmates' fate. The racially and politically undesirable POWs perished, either by execution or being left to die by exposure and hunger in open-air, barbed wire encampments. Those judged racially higher, as well as many Red Army officers and NCOs became laborers, either in Latvia or somewhere farther to the west, including the Reich itself. In Latvia as well as in the Reich most POWs toiled as agricultural laborers to help alleviate the critical agrarian labor shortage. In 1942 some 28,ooo Soviet prisoners slaved on Latvian farms.''' Since the Germans executed most captured partisans, few ended up in labor camps. Large numbers of suspected partisans-meaning elements of the civilian population from partisan areas of operationexperienced fates similar to those of regular Soviet POWs, slave labor, either in the Baltic region or in the Reich. With the escalation of partisan activity and retaliatory antipartisan operations in 1943, an influx of as many as 100,000 civilians inundated labor and concentration camps in the Baltic. Although the next chapter will examine the issue more thoroughly, the Germans exploited Jewish labor as well. After the mass exterminations of Latvian Jews ended in late 1941, the few thousand survivors 10

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Latvia and the Ostland I 199 along with deported western Jews not immediately murdered upon their arrival in Latvia became part of the slave labor force in Latvia. "3 In all, during the years of occupation the Germans deported anywhere between 2,ooo,ooo and 4,8oo,ooo million people, depending on the source, from the Occupied Eastern Territories to the Reich. Among them were more than 2 3,000 Latvians. "4 culture and Everyday Life under German Rule German plans for the Occupied East called for obliterating anything resembling a high national culture-for example, not permitting education above the fourth grade level. The Germans, however, excepted the Baltic peoples from this stricture. Although dominating them militarily, administratively, and economically, to a surprising degree the Germans gratuitously allowed the Baltic peoples some freedom in cultural matters. They even deigned to introduce German as the official language and expected the Latvians and the other Baltic peoples to use it and teach it in their schools. Although most Latvians thought this a distasteful imposition, Germans regarded this as a privilege of sorts, since using the German language presaged Germanization rather than enslavement or destruction. After all, they did not expect the Untermensch Russians and Ukrainians to learn their language. All three of the Baltic peoples stood well above the Slavs in German racial estimates, a status reflected in occupational policies, in particular in regards to their culture.us By conceding and compromising on cultural matters-which the less ideologically minded Germans regarded as mostly symbolic gestures anyhow-the Germans also assuaged Latvian national sensitivities, raised morale, and improved the likelihood of Latvian collaboration and contributions to the war effort. 6 The Germans obliterated all Soviet symbols in Latvia, any visible trappings of their presence and replaced them with their own. They repealed the Soviet prohibition on any national displays and even permitted the flying of the Latvian national flag, but in moderation, with numerous restrictions, and always with an accompanying Reich flag. Even the national anthem, with certain limitations, returned to the Latvian repertoire. They also approved the singing of Latvian folk songs, but with time they learned to distinguish between the innocuous and those with national implications, and proscribed the latter. Initially, but not permanently, the national song festivals and the celebration of November Eighteenth remained on the index of banned events.u 7 Although the Germans decreed the Hitler salute for everyone, they found this practice too difficult to ll

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enforce. Besides, the Nazi greeting quickly became the brunt of derisive jokes and ridicule. The Latvian public found measures such as the elimination of references to the Latvian nation in everyday names and titles more objectionable, for instance, the renaming of the Latvian National Opera as the Riga Opera House and changing the University of Latvia to Riga University. Many also took umbrage at the aforementioned renaming of Riga's streets." 8 Another galling measure was the issuance in 1943 of identification cards that categorized Latvians along with Lithuanians and Estonians as citizens of the Soviet Union. This odious act, however, corresponded to the general, fundamental principle of the German occupation: recognizing as legitimate the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States in 1940."9 The Germans revamped the most important Latvian cultural institution, the school system, more to its liking, eliminating all vestiges of the Soviet educational system. In doing so the Germans excepted Latvia from the fourth-grade limit on schooling prescribed for much of the Occupied East, eventually restoring all higher levels of education. As early as 1942 they revived the gymnasia, the Latvian equivalent to American collegetrack high schools. Following the Soviet precedent the Germans purged the schools of politically undesirable teachers and staff, and on the advice of local Latvians incarcerated and even executed some procommunist and leftist-leaning teachers and administrators. Just as the Soviet occupiers had restructured the curriculum and reworked pedagogical materials, the Germans supervised yet another round of revisions, but not as extensively. 120 In the process the Germans allowed considerable latitude to the Latvians, trusting that Latvian bitterness toward the Soviets guaranteed changes in the correct, pro-German direction. The Germans required the Latvian public schools to eliminate, or in practice at least minimize, the teaching of the Latvian national idea and compelled teachers to promote Latvia's future status as part of the Greater German Reich. In general the Germans refrained from interfering with the Latvian schools as long as their personnel remained politically acceptable and the curriculum content favored the Reich and its interestS. 121 Higher education did not fare as well, as the Germans kept it on a shorter leash. Initially they closed down the University of Latvia. Only after a weeding out of faculty and staff-some arrested and sent to concentration camps-and following a revision of the curriculum, the renamed University of Riga reopened a few scientific and technically oriented programs in November 1941. In 1942 the university incrementally restored other programs as well, including philosophy, law, and eco-

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nomics. The history program remained closed until acceptable German historians arrived. With time the university, under close SD supervision, aligned itself with National Socialist precepts, especially in the liberal arts and biology. Racial theory and German interpretations of history became part of the "nazified" curriculum. Only in 1943 did theology, eliminated by the Soviets, return as a discipline. 122 In July 1942 the Germans decreed an unpopular requirement at the university: one year of RAD service in the Reich as a prerequisite for admission. In doing so they intended not only to help alleviate the Reich labor shortage but also to indoctrinate bright young Latvians in the virtues of "Germanness," hoping that the sojourn in Germany might hasten their Germanization. 123 Another means by which the Germans intended to win over Latvians and help in their long-term transformation was through a youth organization patterned on the Hitlerjugend (HJ). Launched shortly after the German arrival, this project never got off the ground. Neither did the Latvian attempt to reorganize the Boy Scouts and the Mazpulki, the Latvian version of Four-H Clubs, an endeavor that ran into determined German opposition.124 Not until early 1942, under the initiative of Reich Commissar Drechsler and with the cooperation of a decorated Latvian soldier and former Scout leader, Capt. Aleksandrs Mateass, talks commenced regarding the creation of a Latvian youth organization, a hybrid hopefully satisfactory to both Latvians and Germans. These long-drawn-out efforts culminated in April1943 with the forming of the Latvian Youth Organization (Latvju Jaunatnes Organizacija) (LJO). By the end of 1943 it counted 6,ooo to 7,000 members. Although the Latvians had envisioned the LJO as a training ground for a future Latvian nation, the Germans thought otherwise and employed the LJO as a convenient conduit for sending young Latvians into the Reich war machine, either in Latvia or the Reich. Those of military age went directly from the LJO into a branch of the military, either Latvian or German. By 1944 some of its younger members, both boys and girls, ended up as laborers, others as flak, antiaircraft gun operators. 12 s The Germans extended their relatively tolerant cultural policy to the area of religion. Although they completely eradicated Judaism in Latvia, beginning by burning and destroying its synagogues and then murdering most of its practitioners, the Germans reinstated Christian churches, which the Soviets had persecuted fiercely and had nearly extirpated. Although Hitler, Rosenberg, Rimmler, and other Nazi bigwigs despised Christianity as effeminate and unworthy of heroic Germans, they understood its symbolic and spiritual importance to their subjects and tolerated

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it, at home in the Reich as well as in conquered lands. 126 Upon their arrival in Latvia the Germans declared possession of all church property, as they did for all property that had belonged to the Soviet state, but they allowed Latvian congregations to resume religious services. In Riga and other locales with large German communities, enlarged by an influx of military and administrative personnel and returning Baltic Germans, the authorities handed over the larger, more historic churches, such as the main Dom cathedral in Riga, to German congregations.' 27 At first, except for monitoring the clergy, the Germans avoided direct involvement in congregational matters. A few recalcitrant, uncompromising clergy fell victims to German terror, some being executed, others deported to the Reich. 128 On June 19, 1942, Lohse issued the authoritative Reich position on the church and religion for the Ostland, "The Decree regarding the Legal Status of Religious Organizations," thereby subordinating Latvian churches to German supervision by requiring church leaders to register. The General Commissioner reserved the right to appoint or dismiss any clergy and to liquidate any church organization, judged primarily on the criterion of political loyalty.' 9 In an incongruous and somewhat contradictory stipulation the occupation authorities required Latvian clergy to include in their prayers a plea for the self-proclaimed unbeliever, Adolf Hitler, and for his army, the liberators of Latvia. They also had to pray for German victory, and only after these preliminary supplications could they beseech divine intervention for Latvia and the Tauta.'3o By late 1943, as some patriotic Latvian clergy tended to digress to more nationalistic themes in their sermons, German persecution of "unreliable" churchmen increased. In October 1944, as the Soviets reoccupied much of Latvia and the Germans withdrew to the Reich, the retreating Germans forcibly took with them the leading Protestant, Orthodox, and Catholic prelates.'3' German censorship constituted another unpopular feature of cultural life rule that carried over from Soviet domination. German censorship, as had the Soviet version, aimed at perpetuating Latvia's isolation from the outside world as well as enforcing ideological conformity and stifling Latvian national aspirations. As had the Soviets before them, the Germans prohibited listening to foreign radio broadcasts, threatening offenders with severe penalties. They permitted postal communications within Latvia and some limited communications with the rest of the Ostland and even the Reich. To a limited extent Latvians could also maintain contact in writing with neutral countries, but censors stamped all mail arriving from abroad with the admonition, "Reply is undesirable." Telephone ser2

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vice was local only, and the telegraph was off limits to all native Ostland civilians. Restrictions on travel reinforced the communications isolation. Although one could travel relatively freely throughout Latvia, for the average private individual, crossing the borders even into other parts of the Ostland was practically impossible.'3 2 German censors closely scrutinized and controlled the Latvian press, helped in their efforts by a severe paper and newsprint shortage. Only a few periodicals enjoyed the luxury of publication, and politically reliable editors, many of them Perkonkrusts intellectuals, printed news and cranked out opinions-often anti-Semitic-approved by and favorable to their German masters. The semiofficial newspaper, Tevija (Fatherland), edited by a Perkonkrusts zealot, became the primary medium of news and information for Latvians. Notifications of labor or military mobilization, the latest requisitioning campaign, and countless decrees appeared in this mostly propaganda tableau.'33 It should be recalled, however, that the Germans did not introduce the practice of censorship and conforming to the government's will; neither had the Soviets. Government control of the Latvian press originated with the Ulmanis coup of May 15, 1934. Books fared no better with the censors than did the press. The paper shortage as well as the censor's scissors emasculated Latvian literature. Little worthwhile literature came off Latvian printing presses during the German years, and Latvian translations of approved German works were most likely to get their allotment of paper and ink. Just as the Soviets had savaged Latvian bookstores and libraries, destroying, burning and grinding undesirable books into pulp, the Germans followed suit. Library holdings that had avoided Soviet destruction along with recent Soviet additions suffered literary annihilation under the new rulers. Scientific and technical books survived the rampage better than did literature and books in the humanities and social sciences, but even scientific books, if authored by Jews, often found their way to the pulp mashers and bonfires. '34 Latvian libraries and cultural institutions such as museums came under the authority of a Baltic German by the name of Nils von Holst, who in his own way hoped to contribute to the Germanization of Latvia. Von Holst and his successors alternated between closing and opening the Latvian State Library before finally leaving it open, but under German control and the German appellation of Landesbibliothek. A similar fate befell the Latvian State Historical Museum, as well as countless other cultural and artistic institutions throughout Latvia. '35 The paradoxical German cultural policy of concurrently laying the foundations for a future Germanization of Latvia while granting conces-

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sions to Latvian cultural autonomy, along with calculated economic exploitation, daily shortages of food and other goods, recurring rounds of requisitions, and endless arbitrary decrees to obey, made life under the German occupation perplexing and anything but normal. A particularly onerous practice was the seemingly endless call for voluntary donations of one type or another. For example, aside from regular requisitions, taxes, and other demands, in winter 1941-1942 the Germans collected donations of warm clothing. The following spring the occupiers appealed for scrap metals, ultimately seizing church bells. These "donation" campaigns went on and on. 36 The most brazen and the most resented features of daily life were the elitist privileges Germans enjoyed in full public view of Latvians. As the military situation stabilized in late summer 1941, and the front moved eastward, countless opportunistic German civilians arrived in Latvia, putting additional pressure on housing, food, consumer goods and eliciting popular indignation. As members of the Herrenvolk, these carpetbaggers expected privileged treatment; their arrogance knew no bounds. Germans could dine at exclusive restaurants off limits to Latvians that served delicacies unavailable to the Latvian public and shopped at special stores for goods unattainable by Latvians, even though in many instances Latvians had produced these goods in Latvia. Germans valued one local commodity above all others, butter, routinely carrying large quantities of this delicacy back with them to a butter-less Reich. Even entertainment, including operas, theaters, and concerts pandered to German tastes. Perhaps the most egregious example of inequality was the wage scale, according to which Germans received three to four times as much as Latvians for the same work. 37 Another adversely affected area of life was health care. With shrinking resources and increasing wartime demands, Latvian medical care deteriorated. The German military appropriated numerous Latvian health facilities as military hospitals, further impairing health care for civilians. 38 In order to deal with the growing medical crisis as well as chronic shortages of everyday necessities, the Latvians took matters into their own hands. Since the Germans forbid the reestablishment of the Latvian Red Cross, and Latvians could expect little or no material help from the Germans, in October 1941 Latvian leaders organized a welfare system, Tautas Palidziba, The People's Aid, under the chairmanship of General Director Dankers. This welfare organization collected and distributed donations to needy Latvians, including victims of the Soviet occupation, dependents of Latvian soldiers at the front, and even a growing list of 1

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victims of the Germans. Tautas Palidziba faced its greatest challenge in the summer of 1944 when the invading Red Army forced tens of thousands of refugees into Kurzeme, and it alone cared for their housing and sustenance.'39 The Changing Latvian Mood

From the onset of the German occupation the Latvian Self-Administration as well as the German authorities tried to project as glowing an image as possible of the wartime situation in Latvia. But as the initial luster of the liberation wore off, and as more Latvians came to realize the true intentions of the conquerors, animus against the Germans grew, in particular within the Latvian intelligentsia. By 1942 German intelligence reported that although most Latvians still thought positively of the Germans, public sentiments definitely had shifted toward the opposite direction. Increasingly Latvians resigned themselves to the notion that one evil had replaced another. Many concluded that Latvia's only hope lay in Germany and the Soviet Union bleeding each other dry, allowing the Anglo-Americans to intervene and come to Latvia's rescue.'4° As the Latvian mood shifted from elation to disillusionment, Latvians realized they could expect little sympathy from the occupiers. As long as the war progressed well enough, the Germans felt no compulsion to compromise and modify their exploitative occupation policies. By late 1942 and early 1943, as German fortunes of war turned, circumstances compelled the Germans to take greater notice of Latvian grievances and to start making concessions. As news of the loss at Stalingrad reached Latvia, expectations of a German defeat became widespread, and the idea of Germans and Russians fighting to the finish and the Western powers picking up the pieces gained credibility.'4' Although Latvians had to keep these pessimistic and anti-German opinions to themselves, wary of informers and German security forces discovering their defeatist sentiments, the SD surreptitiously but accurately gauged Latvian attitudes. The Germans responded to the shifting Latvian attitude in two contradictory ways. On the one hand Reich security forces stepped up their repressive measures in order to preempt any attempts to take advantage of German misfortunes and undermine their cause. On the other hand the authorities responded with tokens of generosity. These latter concessions and gestures of good will did not arise from altruism, but rather from the pragmatic consideration that increased Latvian contributions to the Reich's war effort could be effected only through a more flexible relationship. As German authorities initiated ef-

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forts to mobilize Latvian manpower for its military as well as its labor force, they increased Latvian food rations and optimistically intimated to Latvian leaders that further gratuities were in the offing.'4 The Latvian mood nevertheless remained pessimistic-for many, even hostile. As one Latvian noted, "We hate the Germans from the depths of our hearts ... [but] we must ... show them a smiling face. They undoubtedly help us keep the Bolsheviks outside of our borders."'43 This quote succinctly described the Latvian dilemma: Latvians still preferred the resented Germans to the despised and feared Russians. Throughout the remainder of 1943 the Germans practiced a more benign policy toward the Latvians while simultaneously upping demands for manpower and requisitions. As a concession, in early June the Germans approved reconstitution of the Aizsargi. Then on June 14 they sanctioned the public Latvian commemoration of the June 1941 deportations, which they had not allowed a year earlier. '44 Also, with German consent the Latvians resumed their cherished song festivals in July, producing one that attracted 2,ooo singers and an audience of 4o,ooo.'4s The Germans reinforced these gestures with propaganda emphasizing the Latvian-German partnership in their common struggle against Bolshevism. By the end of October 1943 the principal focus of German propaganda became the alleged sellout of the Baltic States by the Western powers to the Soviet Union at the Moscow Conference of Allied foreign ministers in late October. The German media targeted the conference as evidence to contravene rumors of a split appearing in the anti-German alliance, thereby hoping to dash popular expectations of the Anglo-Americans coming to Latvia's aid. General Director Dankers joined in the propaganda campaign, much of it via radio, denouncing the Soviets and praising the Germans.'4 6 The propaganda barrage emphasizing the Latvian-German partnership against Bolshevism peaked in November 1943. The first salvo came on November 13 at a Latvian-organized, Soviet-style demonstration of Latvian labor in Riga. Although a bomb blast killed four people just an hour before the mass gathering was to convene in the Dom cathedral square-probably set by the communist underground-more than 100,000 demonstrators vented their anger against the Moscow Conference. Speeches condemned the Soviets as well as the Western Allies and boldly declared that Latvia would never again belong to the Soviet Union. Concluding the demonstration, the marchers repeatedly sang the Latvian national anthem.'4 7 Since this massive display of support for the Germans so closely resembled the Soviet demonstrations of 1940-1941, and since it came at a time of declining morale and general displeasure with the 2

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occupation, one cannot help but wonder about the sincerity and spontaneity of its participants. The climax of the propaganda campaign occurred a few days later with the first celebration of November Eighteenth, Latvian National Independence Day since 1939, coincidentally, the twenty-fifth anniversary. The Soviets had strictly forbidden any acknowledgement of this event in 1940, as had the Germans both in 1941 and 1942. With only about a week remaining before the symbolic day General Commissar Drechsler had reluctantly approved its recognition. Nonetheless, even with belated preparations, Latvians celebrated throughout the land. In Riga a long program of events commemorated the occasion. Processions to the Brothers Cemetery-the Latvian equivalent of Arlington Cemetery-the Freedom Monument, and other symbolic venues of national significance marked the day. The closing ceremonies, attended by German dignitaries as well as Latvians, were held in the Riga Opera House. Patriotic music and speeches praising Latvia's friendship with the German Reich culminated in Latvians thanking the Fuhrer for delivering Latvia from Soviet terror. Optimistic pronouncements of continued cooperation and a bright future for the Latvian-German partnership provided further grist for the proGerman propaganda mill. '48 But even these gestures intended to assuage Latvian national sensitivities could not raise gloomy spirits nor make adequate amends for previous affronts. An additional factor responsible for the darkening Latvian mood and growing anti-German opinion was the omnipresent vigilance of German security forces, specifically the local branches of SD and Gestapo. These dreaded and ubiquitous police organs, introduced during the brief period of military rule, continued to operate during the tenure of the civilian administration and beyond. They sustained a German brand of terror that in some respects and for many Latvians surpassed the Soviet terror of Baigais Gads. Introduced by Walther Stahlecker, chief of Einsatzgruppe A, it was perpetuated by HSSPF Ostland, Friedrich Jeckeln, who had arrived in Riga in October 1941.'49 Although Jeckeln's principal task in Riga entailed the annihilation of Latvia's Jews (to be covered in the next chapter) he assumed Stahlecker's other security duties as well. Jeckeln enforced German police control over Latvia and the Ostland through repressive SS measures that did not ease until the bitter end of the German occupation. Just prior to departing Stahlecker reported in mid-October that he had finished off more than 1,8oo communists, and by 1942 nearly 3,ooo "communists" and over 300 "partisans" had been liquidated, many others arrested.•so Since most average, ethnic Latvians regarded

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themselves as entirely separate and distinct from the primary SS victims, communists and Jews, except for a few individuals SS terror did not affect them-not at first. By 1942, as the SS expanded its categories of those liable to arrests, executions and deportations, ethnic Latvians, some of them staunch nationalists, began taking notice of the repression, as acquaintances and even family members-people not belonging to the primary categories of Reich enemies-fell victim to the SS. The escalating terror along with the other Latvian grievances against the Germans occasioned the shift of public opinion away from the notion of Germans as liberators to Germans as a different but still repugnant version of Soviet rule. Not only the politically unreliable and the suspicious fell as victims, but as mentioned in the discussion on labor, the SS also helped round up rising numbers of Latvians for deportation to the Reich as workers. The ten-hectare people, the poorer elements of the rural population, were among the first to go, as were Latgalians. Public knowledge of incidents such as the Audrini massacre of January 1942 also contributed to the growing atmosphere of fear. As the SD became more deeply involved in monitoring the loyalties of Latvian administrators and others in places of responsibility, increasingly broader segments of the Latvian public experienced German terror directly. Although estimates vary, as many as 12,000 to 18,ooo ethnic Latvians lost their lives as casualties of German rule. At least 6,ooo to 7,000 Latvians experienced German concentration camps firsthand, and anywhere between 32,000 to so,ooo ended up in Germany not of their own volition. These substantial numbers of ethnic Latvian victims of German terror should lay to rest forever any nostalgic myths of benign German rule. Latvian citizens of every class, region, and ethnicity suffered under German rule, the same as they did under Soviet control during the Baigais Gads. Despite token German gestures to mollify injured Latvian national pride and repeated Latvian reaffirmation of loyalty, the gloomy popular mood, reflecting both resentment and fear, belied official Latvian optimism and proclamations of good will. By early 1944 the military situation along the northern sector of the front clearly had deteriorated, and many Latvians feared the worst, the eventual return of the Soviets. 53 Symbolic gestures and concessions to Latvian national sensitivities could not offset the growing bitterness toward the unrelenting requisitions and the Reich's voracious appetite for more manpower. Nor could they compensate for and alleviate the fear and anxiety that gripped so many Latvians. The 151

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Latvia and the Ostland I 209 trickle of refugees that managed to escape from Latvia across the Baltic Sea to Sweden during the German occupation became an important bellweather of true Latvian sentiments. As one escapee noted in late 1943, "Bolsheviks robbed Latvians openly, and the Germans also rob Latvians, but the Germans regard Latvians as fools, who can be convinced of the good intentions of the Germans .... "'54

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Latvia and the Holocaust

One of the most controversial and divisive topics pertaining to Latvia's experience in World War II remains the Holocaust, the murder of Jews in occupied Latvia by both Germans and Latvians. Confronting the issue of Latvian participation in the extermination of Jews still troubles many Latvians and clouds their historical memories. Decades after the war seemingly irreconcilable differences of opinion still obfuscate certain aspects of this phenomenon, and disconcerting questions still go unanswered, at least not conclusively, and with little affirmative consensus. Among the still unanswered questions, that of Latvian complicity stands above the rest. Although only an obtuse few still contest the fact that Latvians killed Jews, many continue to question the nature and extent of their participation: Was it voluntary and spontaneous, or did the Germans induce or compel Latvians to kill other human beings? And how many Latvians participated in these atrocities? Do these numbers justify condemning an entire nation as culpable? Did anything inherent in Latvian society or culture preordain or contribute to a predilection for murdering Jews? Furthermore, what role, if any, did an indigenous, Latvian anti-Semitism play in all this? These and many other contentious questions, however, are not unique to the Latvian experience. The preeminent instigators and perpetrators of the Holocaust, the Germans, still struggle with these same issues and are still looking for adequate explanations, as are Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Rumanians, among others. Many of these and other perplexing controversies still linger, and most likely will never be resolved to everyone's satisfaction. All we can realistically hope for is a better understanding. Latvians only slowly came around to addressing the Holocaust. At first they mostly ignored it. Latvian emigres wrote about every facet of Latvia's wartime experience except the Holocaust. For example, in his A History of Latvia, published in 19 51 and for years regarded by many as the authoritative history of Latvia in the English language, Alfreds Bilmanis, former Latvian minister to Washington and for years a leading figure

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in the Latvian exile community, said this about the Jews under German occupation: "The early advent of the Gestapo in the Ostland satrapy presaged the program of persecution for the Jews."' That is all; not another word. In its 1962 publication, Latvia, intended to publicize the plight of Latvia under Soviet oppression, the Latvian Legation in Washington referred only once in the entire text on the fate of the Jews: "The Jews especially were persecuted and exterminated in a most savage manner."2 Latvian postwar exiles, overwhelmingly anti-Soviet, copiously cranked out works lamenting and denouncing heinous Soviet atrocities against Latvians and the criminality of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States, but hardly, if ever, did they mention the extermination of Jews.J When the first accounts of the murder of Jews in Latvia appeared in print and implicated Latvians, beginning with Max Kaufmann's Die Vernichtung der Juden Lettlands in 1947, the emigres vehemently attacked these as Soviet propaganda and falsifications of history. According to the exiles only Germans, not Latvians, murdered Jews.4 The Soviet historical camp, which spoke for Latvians in the postwar Latvian SSR, also evaded the Holocaust as such. The Soviets, including Soviet Latvians, by no means ignored the atrocities perpetrated by the "fascists" and their lackeys, among them Latvians, but according to their rendition of events the perpetrators committed these ghastly crimes against all citizens of the occupied Soviet Union, not just the Jews. Soviet accounts seldom single out Jews as the primary victims.s Even today, in the reconstituted, independent Latvia, the experience of Latvia's Jews under German rule and Latvian complicity remain controversial topics. In November 1991 at ceremonies commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the mass slaughters of tens of thousands of Latvian Jews at Rumbuli, just outside Riga (an event to be discussed later in this chapter), Parliamentary President of the Latvian Republic Anatolijs Gorbunovs spoke of the murder of innocent victims. But then he went on to suggest that these innocents had brought the tragedy on themselves through their pro-Soviet sympathies and actions in the year of Soviet occupation, a common yet baseless justification for anti-Jewish persecution also advanced by many Latvian exiles. These chilling words shocked and repulsed many of those present, including a handful of Jewish survivors and members of the tiny Latvian Jewish community, who knew better. 6 Over the years, beginning in the 196os with the publications of the first major general works on the Holocaust, the volume of literature generated on the Holocaust has compensated for the initial neglect. Holo-

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caust literature, including specific works on the Holocaust in Latvia, have enlightened the public to the point that contemporary Latvians have a far better comprehension of Latvian involvement in the Holocaust and that comments such as those of Latvia's president cannot pass unnoticed or without public reprobation. As the resurrected Latvian Republic charts its future course, works such as Andrew Ezergailis's The Holocaust in Latvia and Bernard Press's The Murder of the Jews in Latvia, although differing on major points of interpretation, have confronted the Holocaust and have made ignoring it impossible.? Just as postwar Germans painfully have had to come to terms with their historic responsibility for the Holocaust in order to forge a new Germany, so must contemporary Latvians come to grips with this disturbing legacy of their World War II experience. Jews In czarist Latvia In order to examine the Holocaust in Latvia and the nature and degree of Latvian complicity adequately, one must begin with at least a brief overview of the historical journey of Latvian Jews. The earliest mention of Jews in the lands that became Latvia appears in business ledgers of 1536 that refer to traveling Jewish merchants. 8 Most historians, however, begin the narrative of Latvian Jews in 1561, when the King of Poland took sovereignty over the lands of the Teutonic Knights, which included Kurland, Livland, and Latgale. Taking advantage of the benevolence of its monarchs, Jews from all across Europe, in particular the Ashkenazi Jews of Germany speaking their hybrid German dialect that became modern Yiddish, migrated to Poland. Persecuted elsewhere, Jews found refuge in Poland, whose kings valued them as general purveyors of modernization, experts in advanced finance, and practitioners of a progressive urban lifestyle. Of the three regions that centuries later became Latvia, Latgale proved most propitious and hospitable to Jews. Jewish artisans, tradesmen, and businessmen established themselves and their Judaic culture in Latgalian towns such as Daugavpils and Rezekne as well as in smaller villages and settlements.9 The Duchy of Kurland and its capital city of Mitau (Jelgava) also attracted Jews, and although their residence in Kurland remained precarious, Jews constituted a small but permanent fixture in what became southwestern Latvia. To the north, the local authorities of Livland (Livonia)-destined to become northern Latvia and southern Estoniaprohibited Jewish settlement, and this region never attracted a significant Jewish population. The city of Riga, like its Livland hinterland, discour-

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aged permanent Jewish settlement, although the German city fathers welcomed their transient business and services. Over time a few Jews discovered ways to remain in Riga and its environs for longer periods of time, eventually permanently. A consequence of momentous importance for this region's Jews came in the eighteenth century with Russia's incremental seizure of these lands, beginning with Peter the Great's conquest of Livland and Estland in 1721. With the first Partition of Poland In 1772, Russia also seized Latgale with its large and thriving Jewish community and attached it to Vitebsk province. Realizing the sudden acquisition of large numbers of unwanted Jews, to whom Russia denied permanent residency, Empress Catherine II designated twenty western, mostly formerly Polish provinces as the Pale of Settlement, a region of Russia where Jews could reside permanently. Latgale, as part of Vitebsk province, became part of the Pale. Livland, Riga, and the Duchy of Kurland, which Russia annexed in 1795, remained outside the Pale. Although banned from permanent residence in the provinces of Kurland and Livland, Jews nonetheless found ways to evade these restrictions and eventually settled in these lands of modern Latvia. During the course of the nineteenth century, the Russians eased their restrictions on Jewish residence, and the Jewish population of the Baltic Provinces and Riga, which the Russians allotted to Livland, grew. 3 Although freer in choice of residence, Jews continued to suffer discrimination, even periodical persecution under the Russians. The Latvian majority, which lived in the countryside and worked the land mostly as land-less agricultural laborers, got along relatively well with the Jews. Jews, however, gravitated to cities, towns, and villages, where they plied various trades, crafts, and in particular the retail business. In fact the Jewish community came to look down disparagingly on Latvians as a nation of peasants. It was in the towns and cities that late nineteenthcentury Russian economic development brought the Jews into a partnership with Germans. Germans, not Latvians dominated Baltic city life, and as a result Jews struck up a close relationship with the Germans. As Russia industrialized, including the Baltic region, the mostly urban Jews helped develop Baltic commerce, banking, and even the stock market. As a result many prominent and successful Jews tended to disavow their traditional Jewish roots and assimilated into German society. In Riga, Livland, and much of Kurland German became the language of choice for Jews. Few bothered to learn Latvian. By 1914, 33,600 Jews lived in Riga, another 68,ooo in Kurland. '4 The region containing the largest number of Jews, 10

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however, remained Latgale, with its preponderantly Jewish city of Daugavpils. More than 8o,ooo Jews resided in Latgale, with so,ooo in Daugavpils alone, a city of some 1oo,ooo. On the eve of World War I the Jewish population of the territories soon to become Latvia amounted to 18s,ooo.'s Culturally the Jews of the future Latvia reflected considerable diversity. The overwhelming majority, over 8o percent, spoke Yiddish, while Hebrew remained the religious and intellectual language of the community. In addition to the two "Jewish" languages most Jews spoke at least one, often two other languages, usually German in the west, Russian in the east. The Jews of Riga spoke either German or Russian as their other language, in many cases as their first language. Very few Jews bothered to master Latvian and as a rule learned just enough to carry on whatever business they had with Latvians.' 6 In matters of faith the majority of Latvian Jews, particularly those of Latgale, adhered to the Hassidic tradition of Eastern Europe. In the west the Germanized Jews practiced Orthodox or even Reformed Judaism. As was the case in Jewish communities worldwide, others regarded themselves as Jews without active religious observance.'? Latvian Jews also participated in current social and political movements. Zionism, the late nineteenth-century movement promoting a Jewish national state in Palestine, appealed to many Jews. Numerous Jews also became involved in the social democratic labor movement, in particular its Jewish version, known as the Bund. Daugavpils became an important center for this Marxist political movement that attracted leftist Jews from throughout the Russian Empire. In the Revolution of 1905 Jewish activists allied themselves with Latvian radicals in demanding social justice, economic equality, and at the minimum a Latvian national autonomy that recognized Jewish cultural autonomy. ' 8 The fortunes and numbers of Latvian Jews plummeted during World War I. The czarist government, aware of the close Jewish ties with Baltic Germans, suspected them to be potential spies and traitors. These concerns were well-founded, as Jews throughout western Russia welcomed the invading Germans. Jews generally admired Germans as being the most progressive Europeans in respect to the emancipation of Jews and greeted them as liberators from Russian discrimination and persecution-an extreme irony in view of the Jewish response to the arrival of Germans in World War II. As German forces advanced northward toward Kurland, in April1915 the Russians forcibly evacuated some 4o,ooo Jews into the Russian interior and dispersed them throughout the country.

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Others fled east on their own as refugees from hostilities. Altogether some 127,000 Latvian Jews left the region for Russia, and no more than 36,ooo eventually returned; the rest remained in Russia or perished. '9 With the onset of the 1917 Russian Revolution the overwhelming majority of Jews welcomed the overthrow of the reactionary czarist regime. Many but not all Jews supported the Bolsheviks. Although numerous Jews as individuals joined Lenin's revolutionary faction and even assumed leading roles in his Bolshevik movement, the leading Jewish socialist organization, the Bund, opposed them, as did other more moderate dissident groups. 20 As the Latvian War of Independence coalesced from these revolutionary circumstances, many Jews also joined the Latvian nationalist cause. Over 1,ooo Jews fought alongside Latvian nationalists, and perhaps as many as 100 died for an independent Latvia. Four Jews earned the Lacplesis Order, the highest Latvian military decoration, and eleven others received the Three-Star Order, the next most revered medal. The Latvian Provisional Government even included a Jew, Professor Paul Mintz. Despite their overall cooperation and apparently common purpose, all was not well in the Latvian-Jewish relationship. Although numerous "bourgeois" Jews perished at the hands of the Bolsheviks during Soviet rule in 1919, the fact that Jews participated in that ephemeral but bloody occupation provided the basis for the Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy theory that became etched in the minds of many right-wing Latvian nationalists and the small but vocal circle of virulent Latvian anti-Semites. 22 One incident in particular marred the future Jewish disposition toward Latvians in an independent Latvia. In 1919, as the nationalists drove the Reds eastward through Latgale, the officers of one unit of Latvian freedom fighters gave their "boys" a half hour to do as they pleased in the Jewish village of Varaklani. The locals endured a brief but frightful orgy of murder, rape, and robbery. 2 3 Even though Varaklani appears to have been an isolated incident, and only a handful of extreme anti-Semites took the alleged Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy seriously, both ominously portended a strained relationship between ethnic Latvian and Jewish citizens in the new Latvian Republic. 2 '

Jews in Independent Latvia War, revolution, and the struggle for Latvian independence reduced the number of Latvia's Jews from some 185,000 on the eve of war to just over 79,000 in 1920, some 5 percent of Latvia's population. As Jews and other former residents returned to Latvia, their numbers slowly rose, and ac-

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cording to the last pre-World War II census 93.479 Jews lived in Latvia. 24 Latvia's Jews also experienced an internal migration, mostly from Latgale to Riga, thereby raising the number of Russian-speaking Jews in the capital. The four administrative provinces of Latvia in 1935 counted 2,458 Jews in Vidzeme (northern Latvia); 12,012 in Kurzeme (southwest); 7,363 in Zemgale (south-central Latvia); and 27,974 in Latgale, the easternmost province. Riga itself contained 43,672 Jews, who comprised just over 11 percent of its population. The Jewish community of Daugavpils, which once had counted over 5o,ooo Jews among its residents, had shrunk to 12,000, and approximately 7,000 Jews resided in Liepaja, independent Latvia's second largest city. 2s As observed earlier, independent Latvia emerged as a multiethnic state whose national minorities constituted a fourth of its population. During the years of independence Jews comprised around 5 percent of the population, making them Latvia's second largest ethnic minority, behind only the Russians. 26 Although some Eastern European states chose not to grant their Jews official recognition as a national minority, a concession that implied granting cultural autonomy, and expected them to assimilate and be counted with the rest of the citizenry, the Latvians decided to acknowledge their separate national status and conceded generous cultural privileges. Although at first glance the awarding and protecting of minority rights appears to be a largess, official minority status brought mixed blessings, especially for Jews. 27 Granted, the recognition of protected minority status allowed each national group to nurture its culture, but it also officially defined each group as being separate and distinct from the main national body, the ethnic Latvians. Unfortunately, official distinctions reinforced traditional, social, and cultural separation and obstructed the full integration of Jews into Latvia's multiethnic society.28 The ethnic Latvian majority tended to regard themselves as the guardians and beneficiaries of the Latvian state and all others as virtual outsiders who happened to live within its borders. This proclivity on the part of the Latvian majority at least partly accounts for the ease with which some Latvians later joined in the persecution of Latvia's Jews, and others passively and indifferently stood aside and watched. After all, in their minds Jews were not true Latvians. The Latvian state also guaranteed its minorities full political rights, just one feature among others that made the new state a substantial improvement over the czarist empire for most Jews. 29 Rather than unite into one ethnically based political party, Latvia's Jews split into several, reflecting their political, economic, and religious diversity. But once in

Latvia and the Holocaust I 217 the Saeima the Jewish delegation-representing 5 percent of the population and ranging between three and six in the hundred-member parliament-usually, though not always voted as a bloc. The leading Jewish party, Agudat Israel, represented mostly Orthodox Jews and promoted the traditional, religious-based Jewish existence in the new Latvia. Its most prominent figure, Mordechai Dubin, maintained close political ties with the Agrarian Union as well as a strong friendship with Karlis Ulmanis. Thanks to his personal relationship with Ulmanis, Dubin and the Agudat emerged as the preeminent Jewish political force in the new state, usually sending two deputies to parliament.3° In addition to Agudat, the Mizrahi party represented pro-Zionists; the Hebrew National Democratic Party promoted business interests; the leftist Ceire Zion combined Zionist and socialist interests; and the Bund nurtured and represented the Marxist labor tradition. The leftist Bund more often than not sided with the Latvian Social Democrats than with the Jewish blocY Although their proportional representation in the Saeima gave little cause for complaint, Jews found themselves excluded from the administrative side of the new state system. The civil service blatantly discriminated against Jews and essentially locked them out. No amount of pleading or objections from their leaders, even those as influential as Dubin, could rectify this injustice. In 1925 only twenty-one Jews held posts as civil servants out of a total of 5,291 in all of Latvia. Only one of Latvia's 4,316 policemen was a Jew, and the judicial system employed not a single Jew among its 1,682 workers. The military also denied Jews career opportunities. The state altogether employed only 200 of its more than 90,000 Jewish citizensY Ethnic Latvians believed that Latvia belonged to them and they alone were entitled to its benefits. One prominent Latvian, a close colleague of Ulmanis, Margers Skujinieks, cynically attributed the low number of Jews in the civil service not to ethnic discrimination but to the Jewish preference for high-salaried careers in business rather than low-paying civil service jobs.33 Denied any participation but political in the new Latvian state, Jews concentrated on their traditional economic pursuits in commerce, banking, and certain trades. Overwhelmingly urban-93 percent-only 1 percent of Latvia's Jews labored in agriculture, an auspicious demographic fact in a state whose leadership strongly favored the agrarian economic sector over commercial-industrial pursuits, and rural society over the urban lifestyle. Nearly half of all Jews in Latvia were engaged in trade and commerce, while most of the rest worked in industry, the professions, and health care.34 Unfortunately for Jews, their disproportionate

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presence in certain areas of the Latvian economy evoked resentment and reinforced the popular stereotype of wealthy Jews dominating Latvian commerce and finance and thereby exploiting ethnic Latvians in their own state. For instance, six Jewish banks controlled 6o percent of all Latvian bank capital. Jews also owned 20 percent of industry, 28 percent of stores, and 36 percent of securities. Although Jewish business knowhow and international connections helped rebuild Latvia's devastated post-World War I economy, and Ulmanis on many occasions expressed gratitude for Jewish economic expertise and resources, their economic role and success only exacerbated popular Latvian indignation and widened the gap between ethnic Latvians and Jews.Js Jewish social and cultural life also followed a course distinct and separate from that of the Latvian mainstream. In these activities as well Jews felt a greater affinity for the local Germans than for Latvians. Since nearly half of Latvia's Jews lived in Riga, the capital became the center of Jewish social and cultural life. Orthodoxy along with its Hassidic variant dominated the Judaic religious establishment in Riga, which supported some sixty synagogues, including the venerable Gogol Street Choral Synagogue, and operated a Yeshiva for educating its rabbis. The Jewish community in Daugavpils, the second-largest in Latvia, maintained at least forty synagogues and prayer houses.3 6 As for secular education, the state supported Jewish language public schools, as it did schools for all national minorities. Most Jewish schools used Yiddish, although some Hebrew language schools operated. Prior to 1934 parents could choose the nationality of their children's schools, and although the majority of Jews sent their children to Yiddish and Hebrew language schools, many also attended German and Russian schools. The more progressive and secularly inclined Jews considered German schools superior to all others and sent their children there instead of to Jewish schools; very few Jewish children attended ethnic Latvian schools. After 1934, when Ulmanis declared that students had to attend either their own language schools or Latvian schools, most Jews attending German schools transferred to those teaching in Yiddish and Hebrew.37 For higher education, most Jews sent their children abroad, since the University of Latvia severely restricted the admission of Jews. Although at the university's opening about one-fifth of its student body consisted of Jews, with time and under nationalistic pressure the percentage steadily dropped. Under Ulmanis the proportion of Jews studying at the university declined to 6 percent, which nearly equaled the demographic 5 percent. The Riga Jewish community as a whole possessed a high level of

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education and could boast many advanced degrees, but only a handful of Jews taught on the university faculty. Excluded from the elite Latvian korporacijas, Jews organized their own fraternities, Vetulia and Hasmonea.38 Jews also established their own museums, cultural centers, theaters, publishing houses and hospitals. They also sustained their own journals, press, and literature and produced internationally renowned musicians, writers, and artists, including the prominent philosopher-historian, Sir Isaiah Berlin, a product of this community. One could generally describe Jewish cultural life, especially in Riga, as vital, rich, creative, and diverse. Overall, Jews along with many Latvians regarded these years as the good years, labie gadi.J9 Then came the Ulmanis coup of May 15, 1934, and in its train followed a nationalistic reaction far less tolerant of non-Latvian minorities. Although no law or decree expressly mentioned Jews, their chauvinistically inspired provisions adversely affected the Jewish community. In the days following the coup, Ulmanis abolished all political representation, and some Jews ended up along with other real or potential political enemies in jail or in one of the temporary concentration camps.4o Ulmanis also curtailed cultural autonomy, demanding conformity with the Latvian mainstream and in the process proscribing and abolishing numerous organizations that had provided the cultural and social foundations for the Jewish community. The ruling that all students must attend either their own ethnic schools or Latvian schools, which denied Jews the option of attending superior German schools, piqued many Jews. To the consternation of more progressive and secularly inclined Jews, such as the Zionists and the Bund, Ulmanis handed over the administration of the Jewish schools to his good friend Dubin and his religiously oriented, traditional and conservative AgudatY Jews found other measures irritating and disruptive as well, such as having to use Latvian in some official transactions, since for most of them Latvian was their least familiar language. Getting used to the curtailment of their lively and opinionated press by government censors annoyed many Jews and tested their patience. Probably the economic policies of the Ulmanis regime affected the Jews most adversely. Heeding the call of "Latvia for Latvians," actions intended to Latvianize the economy hit Jews the hardest. Since by "Latvians" Ulmanis and his supporters literally meant ethnic Latvians and not merely citizens of Latvia, Jews began to understand the full ramifications of their heretofore cherished cultural and national autonomy. Although the outbreak of war in 1939 cut short the Latvian drive to nationalize all capital goods and enterprises, Jews

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already felt the economic pressure, and some decided to emigrate. 42 One may surmise that it may have been just a matter of time before the economic basis of Jewish existence in Latvia-as had been the case for many Baltic Germans in the countryside-became untenable and that most Jews would have left Latvia. Perhaps this was the unspoken goal of these measures. But despite Ulmanis's nationalistic, antiminority policies, few Jews regarded him as a bigoted anti-Semite. After all, he cracked down hardest on the extremist, overtly anti-Semitic Perkonkrusts. He also kept Latvia's borders open for Jewish refugees from Nazi persecution well after other states stopped offering them sanctuary. Ulmanis treated all nonethnic Latvians with the same intolerance as undesirable obstacles standing in the way of realizing his vision of a predominantly agrarian, ethnically Latvian, Latvia.43 The harm Ulmanis's policies did to the Jewish economic base and their cultural autonomy in the interwar period nonetheless raises a troubling issue, that of Latvian anti-Semitism. Did these measures deliberately target the Jewish community, and if so, what role did anti-Jewish prejudices play in their implementation? It stands to reason that if an overt anti-Semitism already existed in pre-World War II Latvia, then under the anti-Semitic German occupiers Latvian adherents perpetuated it into the war years, and this bigotry ultimately contributed to the Holocaust in Latvia. It is, after all, indisputable that within the first six months of the German occupation, and with the active participation of Latvians, nearly all of Latvia's Jews had perished. With whom does responsibility lie, and what motivated the killers? The foremost scholar of the Holocaust in Latvia, Andrew Ezergailis, observed that anti-Semitism exists with or without official state promotion. 44 It is therefore here, within the Latvian people, Tauta, within their culture, society, and even their self-image and identity that one must seek clues as to their culpability and motivations in the murder of their fellow citizens. Most Latvians writing on anti-Semitism in Latvia conclude that Latvian culture and history reflect little in the way of virulent, overt antiJewish prejudices. Although some anti-Jewish attitudes existed, so acknowledge some, anti-Semitism did not saturate the collective Latvian mentality.4s Most concur that little in Latvia's past suggests even the possibility of a cataclysm such as the Holocaust befalling its Jews. The historical record discloses-with the exception of isolated incidents such as the outrage at Varaklani-no Latvian pogroms, no destruction of synagogues or any atrocities of that kind, and what anti-Semitism existed can mostly be attributed to Russians, not to Latvians.46 As a rule the Latvian cultural

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heritage, including literature, has treated Jews decently. The stereotypical image of Jews in Latvian folklore reflects a benign but condescending attitude. Pity, not hostility, more often than not has characterized Latvian attitudes toward Jews. One popular representation depicts the Jew as the itinerant peddler, the paunu zids, traveling through the countryside selling his wares. Another portrays him as the peripatetic tailor, spending nights in Latvian homes as a welcomed guest. The seminal repository of Latvian folklore, its folk songs, or Dainas, often disparage Germans and Russians but commonly treat Jews either in a good-natured way or at worst with indifference. Some references to Jews are less than flattering, even deprecatingly anti-Semitic, but seldom hostile.47 For example: "Oh little black-bearded Jew, How sweet is your tobacco! I snuffed it just once, It made my trousers tremble!"

"Pray God I grow up soon To be a Jew's bride. A Jew has gloves, a Jew has stockings, A Jew has pretty handkerchiefs."4 8

Several Jewish writers commenting on the subject of Latvian antiSemitism agree that "the roots of 'bloodthirsty anti-Semitism" simply do not appear in Latvian culture. Some are puzzled why Germans decided to set up their "slaughterhouse" in Latvia and used Latvians as executioners.49 They too attribute existing anti-Semitism in the region principally to Russians.so Not all Jews, however, concur with this benign view of Latvian attitudes. Some adamantly impute not only responsibility for the murder of Jews to Latvians but also a malevolent, traditional anti-Semitism that materialized into action once given the opportunityY One may safely conclude that the potency of Latvian anti-Semitism or the lack of it was and remains a matter of perspective and interpretation. The irrefutable fact remains that with the founding of Latvia, variations of anti-Semitism surfaced. Granted, the Latvian state promulgated no anti-Jewish legislation, but the exclusion of Jews from the civil service and limiting their opportunities in the military undeniably manifested at least a latent anti-Jewish prejudiceY As one prominent Jewish observer noted, in the 1920s a "glass wall of anti-Semitism separated us Jews from the Latvian majority of the population."s3 Strident advocates of anti-Semitism also appeared. Arveds Bergs, a prominent Latvian nationalist and intellectual, began popularizing anti-Jewish sentiments in his widely circulated writings. Beginning with Bergs, the foremost purveyors of antiSemitism in Latvia became the intellectuals, not those one might consider as "rednecks."s4 One major exception among the intellectuals was the be-

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loved Janis Rainis, by consensus Latvia's favorite poet and a true democrat who championed the plight of non-Latvian minorities, including Jews. Berg and members of his right wing, anti-Semitic association, the National Club, vilified Rainis as a "Jew lover."ss In the 1930s the nationalistic atmosphere turned decidedly for the worse, and anti-Semitism became more pronounced, but even then it did not become a widely popular phenomenon, and its appeal did not reach beyond a small but increasingly shrill minority. In part, one may ascribe its growing but limited appeal to the economic crisis, for which Latvian anti-Semites-as was the case throughout much of Europe-blamed wealthy Jews. The fact that the state officially considered Jews and other minorities as distinct and separate from ethnic Latvians facilitated attacks on the proverbial scapegoat. Some attribute the growth of this ugliness to Nazi Germany, whose blatant and official anti-Semitism attracted admirers and imitators throughout Europe. Founded in the early 1930s the Perkonkrusts under the leadership of Gustavs Celmins advocated "Latvia for Latvians" and blamed Jews not only for Latvia's economic troubles but also for its putative political inefficiency and instability. Members of Perkonkrusts demonstrated regularly and occasionally engaged in street violence against Jews. After Ulmanis banned the organization it continued its activities mostly surreptitiously, but at times openly and defiantly. In the interest of public order-the fundamental requisite of Latvian society-the police quickly squelched these disturbances.s 6 Much of the Perkonkrusts membership consisted of well-educated intellectuals, including many university students, in particular brothers in the elite Korporacijas, Selonija, Talavija, and Letonija. At least one prominent Latvian, the world-class flier, Herberts Cukurs, Latvia's version of Charles Lindbergh (whose sympathies with Hitler's Germany are also well documented) closely associated himself with Perkonkrusts and its nefarious causeY Gustavs Celmins as well as other Perkonkrusts writers such as Adolfs Silde-who became one of the most prolific postwar emigre writers on the wartime years-cranked out volumes of anti-Semitic venom to stir up popular hatred against the Jews.s 8 In 1938 Celmins confided to a Perkonkrusts colleague: "Jewish fate will be determined finally and radically ... in European state[s] there will be not a single Jew."s9 Latvian translations of passages from the outrageously anti-Semitic Protocols of the Elders of Zion-a late nineteenth-century concoction of the czarist police written to stir up anti-Jewish feelings and vilify Jews for allegedly organizing an international conspiracy-began circulating as well. 6a

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Not until after the Soviet occupation did the anti-Semites succeed in breaking through to win over broader segments of the Latvian public. Latvian anti-Semites as well as the invading Germans convinced the public that much of the horror they had endured under the Soviets could be blamed on Jews collaborating with the Soviets. Although the notion of the inherent Jewish-Bolshevik connection had survived as part of the national myth, only fervent anti-Semites took it seriously until the Soviet occupation. After all, as one historian observes, "Just about every Latvian family had a communist in its background, not just Jews." 6 • Following the flight of the Soviets, as Latvians awoke from their nightmare and unearthed grisly evidence of Soviet butchery, anti-Jewish contempt cultivated in the 1930s metamorphosed into violent and deadly pogroms and massacres. 62 The unfounded but widely accepted misconception that Jews on the whole had directly participated in and benefited from Soviet rule, became a major factor in transforming the fanatical anti-Semitism of a small group of extremists along with whatever anti-Jewish feelings lay latent within the Latvian public into a compelling urge for revenge, which ultimately led to the annihilation of nearly all of Latvia's Jews. Latvia's Jews and soviet Rule Of the thousands of Latvian Jews that remained in the Soviet Union after war and revolution, some, along with ethnic Latvians, joined the communists and even rose to positions of importance in the party and state. After suffering heavy losses in Stalin's purges in the 1930s, many survivors returned to Latvia with the Soviets in 1940, reaffirming in Latvian minds the close association between Jews and Bolsheviks. 63 The incident that became etched in the collective Latvian mind and reinforced the putative Jewish-Bolshevik partnership as indisputable fact was the enthusiastic welcome some Jews purportedly displayed toward the Soviets on June 17, which gave rise to the image of the "dancing Jews" celebrating the arrival of Soviet tanks. 64 Even though only a small number of Jews greeted the Soviet armed forces, the majority indeed sighed in relief, preferring the Soviets to the alternative, Hitler's Germans, the news of whose murderous exploits in nearby Poland having already reached Latvia. 6 s Some Jews believed and others hoped that the Soviets had improved their behavior since 1919 and would rule more reasonably, more humanely. After all, they promised elections and other "liberating" reforms. Other Jews had sharply felt the pain of discrimination under Ulmanis and perceived in the Soviets a chance to tear down obstacles to advancement and to enhance their opportunities in education, the civil service, and other

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formerly denied areas of Latvian life. Progressive and secularly inclined Jews had chafed at the stifling control of the tradition-bound Agudat over Jewish social and cultural life since 1934. For these and other reasons most Jews, even if they did not enthusiastically welcome the Russians, at least did not resent or fear Soviet occupation as much as did ethnic Latvians.66 Before the Soviets imposed their total control, Latvians in the police, army and Aizsargi, convinced that Jews had conspired with and invited the Soviets, incidentally assaulted Jews, engendering rumors of imminent pogroms. 67 One should add that not only Jews but also Latvia's ethnic Russian minority and even some ethnic Latvians hastened to greet the Soviets. 68 Most but not all Jews welcomed the Soviets. When war erupted in September 1939 a few Jews, especially the more affluent ones, had already recognized the double-edged threat looming-the Germans who had declared them a racial foe and the Soviets who labeled them class enemies-and fled the country. Jews also became aware of the unhappy fate of well-to-do Jews in Eastern Poland after the Soviets conquered that land. 69 The Soviet occupation of Latvian bases later that fall prompted a number of Jewish businessmen to liquidate their holdings and flee abroad, thereby undoubtedly saving their lives, either from Soviet terror or from the German genocide soon to follow.?o As the June 16, 1940, song festival in Daugavpils proceeded as scheduled under clouds of uncertainty, the local Jewish community held a solemn ceremony at the main synagogue, reaffirming their loyalty to and confidence in the beleaguered Latvian government.?' In the July elections that led to the formation of the People's Government and eventually to Latvia's annexation, leftist and more democratically inclined Jews endorsed the official Latvian Worker's Bloc electoral list, above all for its advocacy of eradicating anti-Semitism.7 2 The Soviets even decreed that henceforth Jews should be called Ebrejs (Hebrews) rather than Zids (Jew), the latter regarded as a somewhat pejorative term.73 Furthermore, as the new authorities removed politically unreliable Latvians from the civil service, the police, and the army, many Jews saw discriminatory barriers lifted and opportunities galore. Jews from the illegal communist underground surfaced to fill important posts. Since only a handful of Jews had previously served as state employees and officials, the sudden influx gave the impression to some Latvians that Jews predominated in positions of importance, even though in absolute numbers far more ethnic Latvians and imported Russians served the Soviets than did Jews. Most of the Jews working for the Soviets did so in the cities,

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and practically none held posts in the rural areas. Once the Latvian SSR came into being, no Jews held posts in the higher reaches of its government. At best, Jews served at the middle and lower levels of administration.74 One prominent exception was the head of state security in Soviet Latvia, Simeon Shustin, a Latvian Jew from Russia and the individual most responsible for the reign of terror of the Baigais Gads. Shustin, a Jew and a high-level NKVD officer, personified the pervasive Latvian conviction that a Jewish-Bolshevik partnership existed.7s Shustin aside, preponderant evidence confirms that Jews did not control Soviet Latvia in 1940-1941. One prominent historian of the subject estimates that Jews comprised no more than 5 percent of Soviet functionaries in Latvia.7 6 The Soviet regime also forced open the Latvian Army to Jews and other ethnic minorities, erasing previous restrictions to serving mostly in labor units and on low security assignments, and made admission to the Latvian military academy, the Infantry School, accessible to Jews. The new class of political officers in the army, the Politruk, attracted a disproportionate number of Jews.n Many Jews also availed themselves of the opportunity to serve in the newly created Workers' Guard, established in early July 1940. Some units consisted almost entirely of Jews, thereby making Yiddish the language of operations.78 Even though Soviet rule benefited many individual Jews, in the final appraisal Jewish communal life suffered. As the Soviets eradicated all vestiges of former Latvian social and cultural life and shut down all noncommunist organizations and associations, they treated Jewish civic life no differently.79 They eliminated the autonomy of Jewish schools and brought them under strict state control, an act deplored by the majority but welcomed by more liberal-minded Jews who appreciated ending the religiously oriented Agudat's control over education. The Soviets also forced Hebrew schools to switch to Yiddish in an effort to undermine further the traditional, religious-based education that the teaching of Hebrew perpetuated. Although curtailing the "Jewishness" of lower education, the authorities increased opportunities for Jews in higher education by facilitating their admission to the University of Latvia. 80 In their campaign to extinguish Latvia's religious establishment the Soviets struck the Jews as severely as they did Christians. They banned all religious associations, which for most Jews meant the end of any meaningful communal, Jewish life. Although the authorities permitted services and kept most synagogues open, they severely circumscribed the scope of religious observation. For one, they abolished the Sabbath as a special day of rest, as they did all Jewish religious holidays-and as they

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did Sundays and Christian holidays-and in time rabbis and others within the religious establishment encountered Soviet religious persecution and police terror. 81 As the destruction of the social and cultural base of Latvian Jewry spread throughout the land, many Jews decided to relocate to Riga to seek anonymity and the communal support disappearing in the countryside. 82 Along with the calamitous loss of cultural and social existence came the ruin of Jewish economic being. The nationalistically motivated policies of the Ulmanis regime had already forced some Jewish entrepreneurs out of business and even out of the country. Others managed to escape just before the Soviet occupation, disposing of at least some of their property and assets, but many prosperous and bourgeois Jews remained to await an uncertain fate. Subsequent and total nationalization of industrial and commercial property obliterated their economic existence. 8 3 Although the Soviets officially condemned anti-Semitism as a nationalistic, "fascist" evil, one year of their rule resulted in far greater injury to Jewish interests than twenty years of alleged anti-Semitic Latvian oppression. Nevertheless, despite the destruction of their social, economic and cultural base, until the arrival of the Germans a fair number of Jews remained loyal to the Soviets, if not as active accomplices then at least as sympathizers who realized that the alternative, German occupation, would be far worse. Although the wealthy suffered, as did those trying to maintain and defend their religious and cultural institutions, numbers of Jews, in particular the youth, enjoyed the enhanced opportunities and regarded what others viewed as Soviet oppression as not being much worse-if at all worse-than that of the former Latvian regime. A leading pro-Soviet Jewish voice, Max Schatz-Anin, chaired a special cultural council that replaced the former leadership. He and others, including the publishers of the Yiddish version of the Communist Party news organ, Kampf, heaped encomium on the new regime and unabashedly praised the improvements and freedom the Soviets had brought the Jews of Latvia. 84 The climax of Soviet terror and repression, the deportations of June 1941, proportionately did more harm to the Jewish community than to ethnic Latvians. Just as in the case of ethnic Latvians, arrests and deportations of prominent Jews began well before the mass action of June 13-14. As early as August 1940 the Soviets began arresting and deporting Jewish political, social, and religious leaders. In late 1940 the NKVD apprehended the most distinguished Jew in Latvia, Mordechai Dubin, and exiled him to Siberia, but thanks to American intercession, he was released

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by the Soviets after the war-only to be rearrested and sent back to Siberia, where he died. Another prominent victim was Paul Mintz, a professor of criminology at the University and a former government member. From the outset rabbis, like Christian pastors and priests, also disappeared in the Soviet machine of repression. Zionists, because of their international connections and interests, became the Soviets' favorite Jewish prey. 8s Although in June 1941 the Workers' Guards, many of whom were Jews, provided much of the personnel for the mass deportations, this fact did not spare Jews. An estimated 5,000 Jews, constituting over 5 percent of the Jewish community in Latvia, suffered the same horrors and indignities on the night of June 13-14 as did ethnic Latvians. Former Jewish politicians, religious and community leaders, businessmen, the affluent, and known Zionists, were swept away to remote corners of the Soviet Union. 86 Deportations of Jews continued until the very end of Soviet occupation. The day after the Germans attacked, the Soviets deported as suspected German spies 250 German and Austrian Jews who had sought asylum in Latvia. 87 Of the Jews shipped to Russia, one source estimates a one-third-survival rate. Since only some 1,ooo of the 70,000 Jews remaining in Latvia after the deportations and Soviet evacuation survived subsequent German rule, some have cynically and morbidly suggested that the Soviet deportations actually saved Jewish lives. 88 In a twist of irony most of the remaining Jews in Latvia attempted to flee to the Soviet Union when the Germans attacked on June 22, 1941. Some, such as Dr. Vladimir Mintz, who perished later in Buchenwald, resignedly believed flight to the Soviet Union was pointless. The Reds had already taken his house and car and had deported many friends and relations. What succor could he expect from the Soviets ?8 9 Most others, however, tried to escape eastward, either on the trains departing for the Soviet Union, with Red Army convoys, or by any other means of conveyance, including on foot. As one Jew warned another, "If you are running, run to Russia, don't hide in the villages-they'll rob and kill you. I don't trust the Latvians."9a To their astonishment, upon reaching the eastern border the first groups of Jewish refugees encountered NKVD troops and border guards preventing them from crossing into Russia; many resignedly turned back to face the Germans. Evidently the Russians initially feared agents and spies were crossing with the refugees, and by the time they finally opened the border only some 10,000 to 15,000 Jews managed to escape. As early as June 26 the Germans captured Daugavpils, in effect cutting off the main Jewish escape route to Russia and thereby ensnaring the rest.9'

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Many Latvian Jews who managed to flee spent the rest of the war years serving the Soviets, either by working in the war industry or fighting in the ranks of the Red Army. Some lived to return to Latvia.9• On his way out on June 26 Simeon Shustin, the feared NKVD agent and a Soviet Latvian Jew, hastily signed his last death sentence for seventy-eight Latvians: "Considering the social danger they represent, all must be shot."93 It would be Shustin's cold-blooded final official action along with other similar last-minute outrages that helped seal the fate of Latvia's remaining Jews, those that could not escape. These final Soviet cruelties, so closely following the mass arrests and deportations, accentuated the continuous reign of terror since June 17, 1940. Because of the prominence of a few Jews such as Shustin in these atrocities, many Latvians ascribed responsibility for Soviet terror at least in part to all Jews, and this misconception would go a long way in determining the destiny of Latvia's Jews.94 The revenge motive, as propagandized and manipulated by the Germans to a terrorized and receptive Latvian public, helps explain but not justify why some Latvians actively and with obvious relish murdered Jews and why most of the rest stood by passively and either approved or remained indifferent. Few spoke out in defense of their fellow Jewish citizens. As a result, only a handful of Latvians are enrolled on the list of the Righteous Gentiles, shamefully one of the shortest national lists of those who risked their own lives and fortunes to save Jews during the Holocaust.9s Operation Barbarossa and Latvia's Jews With the launching of Operation Barbarossa, the fate of Latvia's Jews became entwined with that of all European Jewry under German ruletotal annihilation, as the means to implement the "Final Solution to the Jewish Question," the German-concocted euphemism that years after the war came to be called the Holocaust. As with all of his endeavors, Hitler provided the general guidelines of policy on Jews, and his subordinates executed what they interpreted to be his wish. At times Hitler specified his orders in minute detail, but seldom passed these on in writing, preferring instead to instruct his top henchmen directly, orally. In this manner Hitler decided upon and then ordered the extermination of Europe's Jews as the Final Solution. His ideologically inspired vision for Jews calculated their extirpation from the German Reich and eventually from the conquered Lebensraum. Circumstances would determine the method and the timing. His most often cited statement revealing his intentions for Europe's Jews was his "prophecy" of January 30, 1939, as war loomed on

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the horizon: "This war will not end as the Jews imagine, namely, in the liquidation of all the European and Aryan peoples; the outcome of this war will be the extermination of Jewry."9 6 Hitler repeatedly and smugly referred to this menacing prognostication once the war and the murder process were well under way. Sporadic persecution and even murder of Jews began shortly after Hitler assumed power in January 1933 and escalated in stages, with events such as the Austrian Anschluss, Kristallnacht, and the break-up of Czechoslovakia marking the way as milestones in the process. But the outbreak of war in September 1939 presented Hitler with the opportunity to systematize the process and bring it to full fruition. Beginning with the conquest of Poland, not only did Hitler inherit numbers of Jews far greater than those already under his dominion, but he also gained control over the first installment of Germanizeable Lebensraum. Furthermore, the hostilities of war provided Hitler a more appropriate context for the brutalizing and murder of Jews, which henceforth he regarded as a vital dimension of the war; in addition to annihilating the military enemy, the German forces also slaughtered the racial enemy. War against the Jews became a prominent aspect and overt goal in Hitler's persecution of the war. The violence and horrors of war helped cover up his heinous deeds, and being sensitive to possible disapproval from the German public, not on moral grounds, but in the interest of order and appearances of decency, Hitler and his subordinates favored a distant venue for murder, keeping these atrocities as clandestine and as far away from the Reich as possible.97 Although with the conquest of Poland the murder of Jews became the common means for dealing with the racial enemy, not until the attack on the Soviet Union did Hitler and his colleagues finally agree that total extermination of all Jews everywhere would be the Final Solution. Having already declared the upcoming conflict with the Soviet Union as an ideological-racial war of annihilation with the primary goal of destroying Jewish-Bolshevism, Hitler relied on it as both the inspiration and the context for determining and timing once and for all the fate of his most vehemently despised enemy, world Jewry. As ever-greater numbers of Jews came under his authority, the question of what to do with them became even more pressing. The plans for Operation Barbarossa anticipated the murder of certain categories of Jews and other racial and political enemies, but not until the operation was under way did Hitler and his cronies decide on the systematic extermination of all Jews as the exclusive means to the Final Solution.98 Since Hitler envisioned the Baltic region as a cru-

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cial piece of the Lebensraum as well as a theater of military operations, decisions regarding the Final Solution of Eastern Jews inevitably affected Latvia and its Jewish population. The exact timing of the decision to enact the murder of all Jews as official Reich policy remains in dispute. Not only does the timing of the decision remain open to question, but so too does the motivation. Did Hitler decide to kill all the Jews out of a sense of euphoria, from optimistic assessments of inevitable victory, after which he would be accountable to no one about the fate of the world's Jews? Or did he determine his course of action as a result of misgivings about the final outcome of the conflict, realizing that he must complete the destruction of the Jews while he still had the opportunity? As early as March 1941 Hitler had decided to murder Soviet political leaders as well as certain categories of Jews-as had been the case in Poland-but it remains unclear whether one can interpret this order to Rimmler as the green light for expanding limited, selected executions to the wholesale slaughter of all Jews.99 Some regard July 1941 as the time of decision as Hitler, confident of victory, resolved to wait no longer for the total extermination. The fact that the Einsatzgruppen shifted their operations into full gear beginning in July seems to confirm a clear decision, as does the infamous and incriminating July 31 Goring commission to Heydrich to proceed with the "complete solution of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe."lOo A letter authored by the infamous Adolf Eichmann, dated August 28, refers to the "coming Final Solution now in preparation."'0' One might, however, regard these preliminaries as steps toward building a consensus favoring the Final Solution that culminated in October in the decision to stop the emigration of Jews and to begin with their deportation from the Reich to the East. This gradual concurrence among the principal figures seemed to climax in Hitler's decision in late October to cross the line unambiguously: "It is good if preceding us is terror that we are exterminating the Jews." 102 Whichever the date for the fateful and ultimate decision, the fact is irrefutable that as the Germans entered Latvia in the final days of June 1941, the murder of its Jews commenced. As discussed earlier, the SS, in particular its special killing teams, the Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, and their subunits, the Einsatzkommandos, served as the primary executioners in the occupied territories, including the former Baltic States. Reinhard Heydrich, responsible for these units and for eliminating political and racial enemies behind the advancing German front, allocated the four Einsatzgruppen to the rear areas of German army groups. In addition to the Einsatzgruppen,

Latvia and the Holocaust I 231 the SS created three new HSSPF (Higher SS and Police Leaders) positions for the Occupied East, each attached to an army group and responsible for all SS activities in the rear area, including those of the Einsatzgruppen operating in his area. •o3 The two SS officers assigned to this mission in the Baltic and Latvia were Hans-Adolf Priitzmann as HSSPF for Russ/andNord und Ostland and Walther Stahlecker as chief of Einsatzgruppe A. Another significant appointment was Friedrich Jeckeln, who initially served as HSSPF Russ/and-Sad, but his success as a practitioner of mass murder-above all as the commander of the slaughter of Jews at Babi Yar-occasioned a switch of posts with Priitzmann in late October. 104 On June 17, a week prior to the invasion, Heydrich informed the Einsatzgruppen chiefs of their deadly mission to execute political enemies as well as certain categories of Jews. The ambiguity of his instructions left enough room for interpretation to grant them a virtual carte blanche to murder any and all Jews. Heydrich also ordered the Einsatzgruppen not to hinder any native anticommunist or anti-Jewish measures; indeed they should actively encourage such actions. 10s Then on July 2, with Operation Barbarossa in full swing, he forwarded similar orders to the newly created HSSPFs. 106 As for Rimmler, having left the organizing of the SS killing apparatus to Heydrich, for the rest of the war he set up semipermanent headquarters at Angerburg, East Prussia, some twenty miles from Hitler's headquarters at Rastenburg. From there he traveled throughout the East on his specially equipped train, Heinrich, fulfilling his duties as the primary authority in security matters in the East, which, based on a broad definition of security, entitled him to primacy in Jewish matters in the region.•o7 Stahlecker and units of Einsatzgruppe A deployed from Tilsit in East Prussia on June 22 and by the next day began murdering Jews in Lithuania, culminating on June 28 with a mass shooting in Kaunas, where they remained until July 3· From Lithuania units of the killing commandos moved on to assignments in Latvia, some reaching Liepaja by June 27, Jelgava by June 28, and Riga on the day of its occupation, July 1. Also arriving on July 1, Stahlecker established Riga as his main base. Einsatzgruppe A remained in Latvia for some ten days before some of its units proceeded east and north into Russia and Estonia. Elated by the early German military successes, Stahlecker, as did most Germans, expected the rapid advance to continue unimpeded all the way to Army Group North's destination, Leningrad. He left only minimal SS security forces behind in Lithuania and Latvia and ordered the rest forward. The HSSPF Ostland, Priitzmann, first from his headquarters in Kaunas, then briefly

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in Riga, appears to have deferred to Stahlecker on local SS matters and seems to have played a relatively passive role in Latvia. 108 Stahlecker's preeminence in Jewish affairs in the Ostland did not go unchallenged. Even after the Fuhrer's July 16 meeting, which supposedly clarified jurisdiction in the East and reaffirmed Himmler's role as the chief security officer, Reichskommissar for the Ostland, Hinrich Lohse, issued his own guidelines for the treatment of Jews. Although the first round of anti-Jewish actions with the help of Latvian and Lithuanian volunteers had already begun by then (a topic to be discussed in depth shortly), Lohse's policy amounted to something like "ghettoization," preserving Jews as a labor force instead of exterminating them. He protested vociferously about the "wild executions" already occurring, but Stahlecker and his henchmen ignored him. •o9 Himmler, eager to supervise SS operations on location, intervened personally in the implementation of anti-Jewish measures during a threeday Baltic jaunt beginning on July 29. Kurt Daluege, chief of the Ordnungspolizei, had also complained about the civilian administration and its hesitancy to do much more than concentrate Jews in a ghetto and protested not only their passivity but also their interference with SS efforts. In Kaunas Himmler met with Lohse, who initially administered the Ostland from Lithuania until military rule ended in Latvia, and in person voiced his displeasure with Lohse. Upon his arrival in Riga Himmler took matters into his own hands and issued several anti-Jewish regulations, including the mandatory wearing of the yellow star. Other anti-Jewish measures followed in rapid succession, such as the announcement in August of the creation of a ghetto in Riga. It also appears that Himmler left more diabolical instructions for his SS subordinates for what he expected to follow ghettoization in the region.••a Emboldened by Himmler's personal intercession, on August 6 Stahlecker responded to Lohse's directives, defending SS actions as indispensable for maintaining order and wiping out communists. Stahlecker rejected the idea of saving Jews for work, for after all non-Jewish locals could be used as labor. Besides, he added, the question of Jewish labor was moot; he operated on higher orders that demanded their liquidation. Pressured by their respective superiors, the two settled on a "compromise" that granted a virtual free hand to Stahlecker and the SS. Lohse conceded that his guidelines applied only to instances not covered by Stahlecker's authority. This agreement did little to mollify Lohse, as the incorrigible Stahlecker continued to infringe upon what Lohse believed to be his jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, rather than the fate of Jews, appeared 11 '

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to be Lohse's principal concern in challenging the SS in matters regarding Ostland's Jews.' 12 The issue of utilizing Jews as labor instead of killing them did not disappear and resurfaced throughout the remaining war years. The SS men most instrumental in deciding Jewish matters had set their priorities, and for most of the Jews of Latvia, indeed for all of Europe's Jews, the Holocaust awaited them as the Final Solution. Shortly after Himmler's visit the HSSPF for the Ostland, Priitzmann, confided that Himmler had ordered him to "resettle" criminal elements, which to him meant dispatching them to "the next world.""3 And in a conversation with representatives of the Ostministerium on October 4, 1941 Heydrich once more rejected the idea of saving Jews for labor, since that would interfere with solving the Jewish question once and for all."4 Stahlecker, at the time the man primarily responsible for executing highest SS orders in the Ostland, reported later in October, "The goal of the cleansing operation of the Security Police, in accordance with the fundamental orders, was the most comprehensive elimination of the Jews possible.""s Eventually the persistence of the SS paid off, and after a long conversation with Himmler on November 15 Rosenberg informed his subalterns that the Jewish question would "be solved in the biological eradication of the entire Jewry of Europe."" 6 His domain, the Occupied Eastern Territories, would provide the main venue for that process until more efficient procedures of extermination were developed in Poland. Latvians and the Murder of the Jews: The Pogroms The murder and widespread abuse of the Jews of Latvia began immediately with the German invasion. In some instances German killing squads did the dirty work, but in other cases, by all appearances and based on eyewitnesses' accounts, Latvians "spontaneously" performed these savageries, reminiscent of the infamous Russian pogroms. The nature of this violent mayhem and the nationality of the perpetrators have become issues of historical controversy. As contemporary witnesses and subsequent researchers-Jews, Germans, and Latvians alike-assessed these events, different versions emerged as to who performed these acts, where primary responsibility lay, and to what degree these actions resulted from the spontaneous impulses of Latvians. The foremost authority of the Holocaust in Latvia, Andrew Ezergailis, ascribes primary blame to the Germans and concludes, "Whatever the role of Latvian partisan forces in slaughtering Jews, it was the Nazi invasion of Latvia that made it possible.""? According to his view the killings began only after the Germans

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arrived and only after they organized the process into a systematic campaign of murder. This explanation does not deny that Latvians participated in these outrages, but it disputes the notion that Latvians spontaneously perpetrated these atrocities on their own, out of anger and revenge for what Jews allegedly had done to Latvians during the Soviet occupation. According to this view inflammatory German propaganda emphasizing Jewish-Communist collaboration during the Soviet year goaded a few Latvians into taking reprisals against the Jews: A limited number of zealous Latvians collaborated in the murder of Jews, thereby tarnishing Latvians as a nation that willingly served the German occupation in this malevolent enterprise. Considerable documentary evidence corroborates German instigation. Prior to the launching of Operation Barbarossa Himmler and Heydrich had expressed hopes that the local people in "some spontaneous surge of anti-communism and anti-Semitism would carry out the Filhrerbefehl without any strain and effort on part of the Einsatzkommandos."ll9 Then with the campaign already under way, on July 2 Heydrich instructed Stahlecker and other Einsatzgruppen commanders to provoke the locals into these "spontaneous" killings and to make these appear to be their work rather than that of the Germans. He expressly ordered them not to hinder the indigenous population in initiating these "self-cleansing" actions, although they should not let these armed "self-defense circles" think that their complicity might earn political concessionS. Easier said than done, at least according to those responsible for inciting these spontaneous actions. Stahlecker, for one, complained about the difficulty of moving the Latvians to action, but he nonetheless managed to form several Latvian units to assist in these atrocities. He attributed the lack of enthusiasm to the Soviet eradication of the anticommunist Latvian intelligentsia, leaving only the more passive elements of the population. 121 Despite having to overcome Latvian inertia, the Germans were intent on sharing responsibility for their actions. In order to incriminate others and correspondingly diminish their own culpability in the murdering of Jews, the Germans regularly photographed and filmed Latvians and other non-Germans performing these heinous deeds. Contrary to Stahlecker's laments that Latvians declined the roles of "willing executioners," others have characterized Latvian complicity as eager and widespread. As one observer surmised, "If Hitler found 'willing executioners' among his own people, he also found them among his conquered subjects. The Holocaust was far from being merely a GermanJewish phenomenon." 3 Many contemporary witnesses as well as subse118

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quent commentators confirm that Latvians did not wait for the Germans to appear before dealing with the Jews, but began their reprisals as soon as the Soviets withdrew. According to these testimonies vigilante-like bands, organized by the Latvians themselves, not by the Germans, had the bloody process well underway when the Germans arrived. ' 2 4 Several SS men instrumental in the killings bore witness that Latvians served the Reich well in this task. Friedrich Jeckeln, when asked why Latvia became the destination of European Jews slated for extermination, declared, "Latvia was a suitable place for murder." 12s And Erich von dem Bach-Zeleski, SS murderer par excellence, testified after the war that the Reich decided to set up its extermination program in the East because the Russians, in particular Stalin, had at their disposal people accustomed to such tasks, "for example, the Latvians."' 26 Latvians assisted in the German effort to incite other Latvians to antiJewish action without much if any prodding from the Germans. As early as July 1941 the Riga press, controlled by Perkonkrusts members and sympathizers from the ultranationalistic camp, promoted hatred toward Jews in articles such as, "The Jew-Source of Our Destruction." This and other equally vitriolic anti-Semitic diatribes associated the Jews with the Soviet reign of terror: "Because Jews had sought to destroy the Latvian nation, they could not be permitted to survive as a national or a cultural entity, and therefore all Jews would have to die."' 27 A publication of July 9 spewed, "This nation was driven to its knees by the hands of Jews and Asiatics, who, like highway robbers, killed everybody who did not lick their boots." 128 And yet another provocative, anti-Semitic tract of August 13 unabashedly proclaimed, "The period of bloody terror of the Red beasts has opened our eyes and has shown us clearly that they are not wolves ... or other predatory animals, but Jews ... did our people have to suffer this horror just because at the head of the CHEKA was a vicious Jew?"' 2 9 In an inflammatory article, "Dzive bez Zidiem" (Life Without Jews), written after the creation of the Riga ghetto in October 1941, the prominent Perkonkrusts writer, Adolfs Silde, openly applauded the physical, permanent isolation of Jews from Latvians: To root out Jews from our midst ... is not only retribution for horrendous terror, which from them we suffered during Bolshevik times. The ghetto is not a large concentration camp, from which after a while Jews are released. No, it is a permanent isolation of Jews, so that we can for all times push them from among us .... we welcome German policies of Jewish isolation from Latvians. For us Latvians this is a historic and deeply significant hour. It is also our wish, which

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manifests in these acts. For these decisions we are no less thankful than for our liberation from the Kremlin's power yoke.'3°

With sentiments such as these circulating widely-albeit an extreme and presumably a minority view-one may safely conclude that it took little if any German prodding to persuade certain Latvians to take drastic measures against Latvia's Jews and join in the Latvian phase of the Holocaust. Precisely when the Holocaust began in Latvia also remains problematic. Several commentators have referred to the days between the flight of Soviet forces and the arrival of German troops in some parts of Latvia as an "interregnum," a brief interval of time that offered Latvians their first opportunity to kill Jews. Others insist that there was no interregnum and no killings occurred until the Germans arrived.•J• If indeed the window of opportunity did open, the salient question then arises: Did Latvians avail themselves of this opening to start killing Jews, or did they wait until the Germans arrived? Jewish eyewitnesses point incriminatingly to these intervening days as the start of the first phase of the Latvian Holocaust, instigated by Latvians themselves, not by the Germans.•J, As one sorts out the conflicting evidence, one can only deduce that no amount of research will ever reconcile these discrepancies, and this dispute shall go unresolved ad infinitum. Although uncertainties obfuscate the initial participation of Latvians in this gruesome business, virtually everyone agrees that Walther Stahlecker was the most instrumental figure in the first stage of the Holocaust in Latvia. By most accounts he arrived in Riga on July 1, the day German forces captured the capital. With him came elements of Einsatzgruppe A, including Einsatzkommando 2, whose men became the principal killers of Jews and other enemies in Latvia. The commander of Einsatzkommando 2, SS Sturmbannfuhrer Rudolf Lange, became Stahlecker's chief deputy and primary executor of terror and murder.•JJ Also during the first few days of the occupation several hundred Latvians wearing the uniforms of SS security branches, the Sipo and SD, returned from Germany. These arrivals, trained in the craft of police terror, constituted the nucleus of a Latvian SD, the most reliable Latvian collaborators to serve the Germans. As noted earlier, the Perkonkrusts loyalist and brother in Selonija Korporacija, Feliks Rikards, who had been in the pay of the SD since March 1941, played a crucial role in introducing willing Latvian collaborators to his SD superiors. Stahlecker and Lange, utilizing information compiled by Rikards and his colleagues-who became the nucleus

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of the Lettische Kartei, the office maintaining files on so-called enemies of the Reich-dispatched these zealous accomplices throughout the Latvian countryside to organize and direct the slaughter of communists and Jews.'34 Stahlecker, with the help of Rikards and others, also recruited local Latvians to do his bidding, some described as "savage Jew haters."'3s Among Stahlecker's local Latvian recruits were Lt. Col. Voldemars Veiss and Viktors Arajs. With Stahlecker's blessing, on July 1 Veiss quickly organized an auxiliary police unit of some 400 Latvians to seek out, apprehend and destroy the "enemy," primarily communists and Jews. Although it is unclear whether he did so before or after his meeting with Stahlecker, on July 1 Veiss broadcast a call for Latvian volunteers over Riga radio to enlist with his "auxiliary police" and rid Latvia of traitors, including Soviet functionaries, communists, and Jews. '3 6 On the same busy day Stahlecker also met with a former Latvian policeman, Viktors Arajs, another Perkonkrusts member introduced to him by Rikards. Stahlecker, delighted with discovering the anti-Semitic Arajs, sanctioned the formation of yet another unit of collaborating Latvians, some zoo- to 300-strong under Arajs's direction. This band was destined to become the most vicious band of murderers serving the Germans in Latvia, the notorious Arajs commandos, or "Arajs's Boys."'37 To what degree, if at all, Veiss and Arajs had already organized their followers and taken anti-Jewish measures prior to meeting with Stahlecker remains debatable. Arajs, as did Veiss, turned to the media for soliciting recruits and issued a plea in the semi-official newspaper, Tevija, for "all nationally-conscious Latvians-Perkonkrusts members, students, officers, Aizsargi and others ... to participate in the cleansing of our country of destructive elements."'38 The response to these appeals was overwhelming, as thousands volunteered. Shortly after the meetings with Stahlecker the Latvian killing squads, some under Arajs, some under Veiss and even others, dispersed throughout Riga to root out the "enemy." The process quickly spread across Latvia, to other towns and cities and into the rural countryside. '39 The motives of the Latvians volunteering for this heinous duty varied. Revenge probably motivated most of them. Many of those involved had lost relatives and friends either in the recent deportations or earlier during the year of Soviet occupation. One former policeman whose wife and children had been deported to Siberia on June 14 expressed the bitterness of many: "I will kill every Jew in sight."'4° The Germans exploited this passion for vengeance and stoked Latvian hatred for Jews by forcing hap-

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less Jews to exhume corpses of those murdered by the Soviets. The Germans hoped that Latvians witnessing these macabre unearthings would impute to the Jews digging up the corpses responsibility for putting them under the ground.'4' Other Latvians rationalized the destruction of the enemy as an act of patriotism. Many military men deeply resented being denied the chance to resist the Soviets in 1940, and by taking up weapons, even if belatedly, they could at least partly assuage their frustrations by what they regarded as defending their fatherland and the Latvian Tauta. The tenuous association of Jews with Soviets coalesced as indisputable fact in many of their minds, and they readily targeted both as national enemies to be dealt with mercilessly, even though the murder of Jewish women and children stretched the definition of "enemy" far beyond reason. Greed and power got the better of others. Early on the Germans allowed these units-gangs more aptly describes them-to loot and plunder their Jewish prey, a good enough reason to participate for some. Undoubtedly personal anti-Semitism incited a few individuals, although as discussed earlier, rabid hatred for Jews never was nor became a significant component of the collective Latvian mentality. '4 Along with these personal reasons one must weigh another factor that facilitated moving a person from urge to action. Two decades of officially sanctioned distinctions between ethnic Latvian and non-Latvian citizens of Latvia, especially Jews, had not only legitimized and internalized anti-Semitism for many Latvians but had also added credibility to the popular notion that Jews were not genuine Latvians. This common supposition even helped some individuals take their personal dislike of Jews, whatever its origin, to the extreme, the murder of Jews. Along with the question of motive arises the question of which Latvians performed the butchery. Aside from the relatives of the victims of Soviet brutality, the most common constituency, these killing gangs also attracted men with experience in weaponry, most prominently former soldiers and policemen.'43 The extreme, nationalistic political right also contributed accomplices, above all the Perkonkrusts, whose bitterness over their persecution under the Soviets as well as their openly professed anti-Semitism converged in an orgy of violence. From their headquarters on Krisjana Valdemars Street, the Perkonkrusts directed a reign of terror throughout Riga. They set up their own prison in the basement, where countless Jews, both men and women, suffered the cruelest and most inhuman tortures, humiliations, rape, and murder.'44 Working closely with Perkonkrusts in these torture chambers tormenting and murdering 2

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Jews were university students, brothers from the elite Korporacijas, and as noted earlier, also members of the Perkonkrusts. 4s Yet another organization, the Aizsargi, proscribed and persecuted under the Soviets, provided enthusiastic accomplices, especially in the rural areas. Dressed in their pre-Soviet gray-green uniforms they searched homes, public places, trains, and other locations for Jews. 4 6 Since the Germans feared that these gangs might congeal as the nucleus for a revived Latvian national army, they forbid the wearing of uniforms and allowed these "security" forces to distinguish themselves only with armbands of Latvian national colors, dark red and white. One must underscore that these Latvians participating as partners in murder had all volunteered. At this early stage the Germans neither drafted nor forced anyone to perform these deeds. Indeed, they had to turn hundreds of willing executioners away. 47 A closer look at the composition and activities of the preeminent Latvian killers, the Arajs Commandos, provides additional insights into the issue of Latvian guilt in the murder of Jews during the early phase of the Holocaust in Latvia. This gang of indigenous murderers had no counterpart in any other land or region under German rule. 48 The leader of the group popularly known as Arajs's Boys, Viktors Bernhards Arajs, was born in 1910 in Baldone, the son of a Latvian blacksmith and a wealthy Baltic German mother. After finishing secondary school in 1930 Arajs performed his obligatory military duty and then studied law at the University of Latvia. He did not complete a degree, but he joined the elite Lettonija fraternity, which may have helped him get a job as a policeman, rising to the rank of lieutenant. In an odd turnaround the opportunistic Arajs, a policeman and member of both the Perkonkrusts and a fraternity-thereby belonging to three categories of "enemies of the people" as declared by the Soviets-somehow convinced the Soviets of his reliability and returned to the university to complete his studies. He later claimed that he became disillusioned with the Soviets when they began arresting some of his fraternity brothers and friends and fled to the forest to join anticommunist partisans. With the arrival of the Germans, Arajs, ever the opportunist, emerged from hiding and through Feliks Rikards ended up at Stahlecker's headquarters on July 1, offering to serve the Germans as the persecutor of Jews and his former communist comrades. 49 Arajs had expected to become Riga's police chief, but when that post failed to materialize, he settled for command of the auxiliary police under Stahlecker's SD auspices. He recruited former Perkonkrusts members as well as fraternity brothers and others willing to join in his bloody adven1

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tures and drunken orgies of looting, murder, torture, and rape. He seized as headquarters for himself the luxurious residence of a Jewish banker on Valdemars Street and turned it into a house of horror for Jews, a veritable robbers den, where he and his "boys" tortured and murdered Jews for sport and kept Jewish women for sexual entertainment. The Arajs Commandos officially came to be known as the Latvian Security Police and SD Auxiliary Force. •5o From their lair "the boys" preyed on the Jews of Riga and then took their murderous escapades literally on the road, driving through the Latvian countryside from town to town in their infamous blue-colored Swedish-built Riga transit buses.'5' Arajs was proud of his moniker, "Arajs the Jew killer," and particularly relished comparisons with NKVD chief Simeon Shustin, whom many regarded as the foremost Soviet butcher in Latvia, and whom Arajs equated as his Jewish counterpart.'5 2 Several of Arajs's men scoffed at his purported exploits, crediting him mainly as their supplier of vodka, the "lubricant" for the Holocaust in Latvia.'53 An equally insidious figure in Arajs's entourage was the illustrious aviator, Herberts Cukurs, whose solo flights to distant corners of the world had made him a Latvian household name and national celebrity. Cukurs, the "Latvian Lindbergh," took sadistic delight in personally joining in the shooting of Riga's Jews in the summer and fall of 1941, which earned him the sobriquet, "the butcher of Riga." In 1965 his corpse was discovered in the trunk of a car in Montevideo, probably the victim of an Israeli Mossad agent. '54 Arajs's gruesome vocation took him outside of Latvia to hunting Jews in neighboring Lithuania and eventually to Minsk in White Russia. Not only did the Arajs Commandos kill Jews, but at one time or another also communists, Gypsies, and the mentally ill and disabled. '55 By the end of 1941, with most of Latvia's Jews dead, the Arajs Commandos reluctantly accepted a new mission. Although occasionally the SS still used them in the killing of Reich and Western European Jews sent to Latvia for extermination, the SS assigned the Arajs Commandos to fighting partisans, a duty not much to their liking, since armed partisans, unlike their earlier victims, could shoot back.'5 6 Over time the Arajs gang grew to well over 1,000. Seeing in Arajs the collaborationist par excellence, in the fall of 1942 the SD sent him and several of his comrades to the Reich for additional training. Eventually, due to the imperatives of war, the Germans broke up his gang and reassigned its men to security units that eventually became part of the Latvian Legion. As for Arajs, he remained the darling of the Germans to the end, earning promotions and attending several SS leadership courses in the Reich.'57 Captured by the British after

Latvia and the Holocaust I 241 the war but released, Arajs assumed an alias, Viktors Zeibots, and lived in anonymity in West Germany until 1975 when the authorities discovered and apprehended him. During the course of a long trial Arajs claimed patriotism as the primary motive for his murderous actions and tried to deflect blame to the Germans for perfidiously enticing him to act in the way he did. In 1979 the German court rejected his alibi and sentenced him to life in prison, where in 1988 he died, unrepentant. To the end he fancied himself a Latvian patriot and faulted the Germans for his own diabolical deeds: "With the Germans it is thus, if they get hold of your small finger, then the whole of you is lost, because soon enough one is forced to do things that one would never do if one could get out of it." ss Arajs seemed to forget that he had volunteered-as in fact had all Latvians serving the Germans from 1941 through 1942-for his diabolical duty, and by all accounts he had relished his job. One reliable source estimates that the Arajs gang murdered as many as 26,ooo people in Latvia, mostly Jews, mostly by shooting. s9 Although all corners of Latvia experienced this early phase of the Holocaust simultaneously, Riga, the seat of German rule as well as headquarters of the main Latvian killing formations, assumed centrality in the process. Riga also contained the largest concentration of Jews in Latvia. As soon as Arajs received his charge from Stahlecker, his minions went into action, searching for Jews, evicting them from their homes, beating them, arresting them, and plundering their belongings. The thoroughness, wanton destructiveness, and ferocity of these anti-Jewish actions justified the label of pogroms. 160 Riga descended into a primeval abyss of mayhem. First hundreds, then thousands of Jews with no charges brought against them were thrown into prisons and jails around Riga or in the basement and cells of Perkonkrusts headquarters on Valdemars Street. Many were murdered here, but as the numbers of captured Jews overflowed these facilities, men, women, and children were either transported to or were forced to march to wooded areas such as Bikernieki Forest just outside the affluent Riga residential suburb of Mezaparks (Kaiserwald) to be shot. Here, on their favorite killing ground, the murder squads, consisting of both Latvians and Germans-the ethnic proportions and leaderships varying according to the source-refined their mode of operation for shooting their victims. With occasional variations in the routine, Jews first dug ditches as their own graves, stripped off their clothing, either lay prone inside the ditches or knelt beside them, and waited for the executioners to shoot them. 161 Although individual killings began immediately, the first mass shootings by Arajs's men occurred on July 6 or 7 1

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with the execution of some 2,000 people, and then continued on a regular basis, several per week, into August. On some nights the murderers managed to shoot up to 1,000 human beings.' 6• In addition to the evictions, beatings, arrests, tortures, and shootings, Jews endured other outrages as well. Perhaps the most reprehensible was the burning of synagogues beginning on July 4· It did not suffice to burn and destroy Riga's synagogues, but the Latvian arsonists, claiming they acted on German orders, burned them with live Jewish women, children, and men crammed and locked inside. Riga's main synagogue, the Gogol Street Choral Synagogue, went up in flames with hundreds of people inside. Chapels at Jewish cemeteries, usually with some hapless Jews inside, met the same fate. By the time the frenzy of arson ended, only one synagogue remained standing in Riga, spared only because of its proximity to several historically valuable buildings. 16 3 According to one count, Latvian volunteers along with their German masters murdered by one means or another as many as 8,ooo Jews in the first week or two of the German occupation of Riga. 164 Jews residing in other Latvian cities experienced fates similar to those of Riga's Jews. Since the Germans reached Liepaja, Latvia's second largest city, a few days before occupying Riga, what befell its 14,000 Jews previewed what was to come in Riga and elsewhere. As early as June 27 the first Jewish casualties fell to German terror in Liepaja. 16 s The first mass shootings in Liepaja took place in elegant Rainis Park, with executions continuing into July there as well as on beaches and sand dunes outside the city. 166 But it was not until the latter part of July, with the help of the Arajs Commandos arriving on their blue bus that the shootings shifted into high gear. As was the case in Riga, the precise ethnic composition of the firing squads cannot be ascertained. Some sources claim Germans did most of the shooting, while others attribute these atrocities primarily to Latvians. The ethnicity of the perpetrators notwithstanding, by the end of July some 4,000 Jews from Liepaja and its environs had been massacred.167 It was Himmler's visit to Liepaja in mid-September and his discovery of a sizable Jewish community still living there that prompted him to order the liquidation of all Latvia's Jews. It was also the reckless and openness of the Liepaja executions along the beaches that elicited Lohse's complaints and his aforementioned showdown with Stahlecker, which eventually resulted in his loss of authority in Jewish matters to the SS. 168 Another large community of Jews, some 12,000, resided in Daugavpils. German forces arrived here as early as June 26, followed shortly by units from Einsatzgruppe A. According to some documents, the Germans had

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to prod the Latvians into action. After the Germans appeared, mysterious fires suddenly erupted, which the Germans blamed on Jews. They also resorted to their disingenuous ploy of forcing Jews to dig up the graves of Soviet victims, thereby inciting Latvians to retaliate.' 69 In no time at all Aizsargi, former military men, police, and other Latvians rounded up Jews and began shooting them. By the end of July the local "self-defense" units had murdered as many as 4,ooo Jews.'7° As was the case in Riga and Liepaja, conflicting evidence precludes ascertaining the respective German and Latvian roles in organizing and performing the executions. Some sources maintain that Latvians in Daugavpils had already begun rounding up and liquidating Jews before the Germans appeared on the scene.'7' Although large numbers of Jews in the three largest Latvian cities perished within the first months of the German occupation, the majority of urban Jews survived into early fall, only to be forced into the ghettos. This was not the case in another city, Jelgava (Mitau), where under the leadership of Martins Vagulans, a kindred spirit of Viktors Arajs in murdering the defenseless, and also a Perkonkrusts member, local Latvians destroyed by shootings, synagogue burnings, and other atrocities virtually the entire Jewish community of more than 1,500. By the end of July the good people of Jelgava could boast their city was Judenfrei, free of all Jews. '7 2 One could go on with further accounts of the abuse and murder of Jews by both Germans and Latvians during the early months of occupation in other Latvian cities and towns. In a few communities some of the Jewish population survived, in others, as in Jelgava, virtually all Jews perished. In the countryside, in the small towns, villages, and pagasts, annihilation of the local Jewish population was absolute, with few if any survivors. The historical issue here, too, remains the complicity of local Latvians in the massacres. Although some observers claim that the killings in the countryside were German-instigated, others question the ability of the Germans to reach so many nooks and crannies to stir the locals into action. m In the rural areas and small towns the blue buses of the Arajs Commandos played an important role. Beginning in mid- to late July and continuing into early autumn, squads of twenty to forty armed men traveled around shooting Jews that locals-often Aizsargi and police familiar with the local population-had already rounded up. Reinforced with liquor, smoked lamprey, and sausages, Arajs's boys continued their murderous business until the Latvian countryside as a whole could be declared Judenrein. '74 Lohse, commenting in August on the shootings of

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Jews, declared that the clearing of Jews from the countryside would be total. As for the cities, he continued to think in terms of utilizing Jews as labor. 7s By early September the Germans, with substantial help from their Latvian auxiliaries, had completed the liquidation of Jews living in Latvia's provincial towns and the rural countryside. As the pogroms in the cities slowed, and few living Jews remained in the provinces and the countryside to murder, the SS had recorded 29,246 executions in Latvia, of which 17,886 were Jews. 76 By mid-October Stahlecker reported the liquidation of 30,025 Latvian Jews, nearly half of the estimated 70,000 that had remained in Latvia when the Germans arrived. Large numbers of urban Jews, however, had survived in several cities, including the three largest, Riga, Liepaja and Daugavpils. Some SS reports approximate the number of survivors at 34,000 to 38,ooo, including 29,000 in Riga.l77 For these survivors the pogroms were only the first phase of their tribulations. After an interlude, more horrors followed. The reason for halting this first, "spontaneous" phase of the Holocaust in Latvia short of the total liquidation of the Jewish population remains unclear. In the countryside the process continued unabated until virtually all Jews had been murdered, but in the larger cities sizable segments of the Jewish population survived the first round. By most accounts, and as previously discussed, the goal of Stahlecker's Einsatzkommandos in Latvia had been the systematic annihilation of all Jews, and stopping short of completing the task does not appear to have been part of the script. 78 Lohse's resistance to the wholesale shootings in the interest of saving Jews for the labor force may have played a small part. His objections to the anti-Jewish measures as disturbing the local population probably carried more weight than his plea for preserving the Jews for labor. A less public, more orderly process would be preferable. Another consideration may have been the over-reliance on Latvians in the executions, which the authorities feared might encourage Latvian demands for greater self-rule as recompense.l79 Consequently a more centralized, better organized and more concerted action, undeniably under German direction and supervision, could achieve the ultimate goal more effectively and with less political baggage. The decisive voice in this matter was that of Heinrich Himmler. After his second visit to Latvia in September, during which he discovered a considerable number of Jews in Liepaja, he concluded that the killing of Jews in the Ostland lagged behind the campaign on the southern front. In early fall Stahlecker and much of his Einsatzgruppe A left the Ostland 1

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to murder Jews closer to the front and to take up their new task, anti partisan warfare. Stahlecker's departure left the highest SS authority in the region the HSSPF Ostland, Hans-Adolf Prtitzmann, whose less vigorous approach to exterminating Jews left much to be desired. Himmler therefore ordered an exchange of SS leaders. He transferred Prtitzmann to southern Russia and the Ukraine and brought the former HSSPF from that area, Friedrich Jeckeln, to Riga to take over as HSSPF Ostland and complete the eradication of the region's Jews, including those of Latvia. 180 Meanwhile the surviving Jews of Latvia received a temporary reprieve. During this brief lull before the final storm, they experienced another aspect of Jewish life under German rule: the ghetto. Founding the Ghettos With the arrival of the Germans, Latvia's Jews not only endured the violent first phase of their Holocaust but also encountered a flood of rules, regulations, and restrictions that isolated the survivors from other Latvians and dehumanized what remained of their existence. This legalistic process culminated in the creation of Jewish ghettos in Latvia's largest cities. These discriminatory regulations corresponded to anti-Jewish measures imposed throughout Hitler's domain, beginning in the Reich itself and extended to its conquered territories. Registration with the authorities was the first requirement. Risking abduction, physical abuse and attacks, Jews registered with the local police. Many did not return from this mission. Then followed prohibitions forbidding them to frequent public places, walk on sidewalks, use public transportation, or even stand in public lines. Jews could own no trucks, cars, or radios, and Jewish women could not wear hats or use umbrellas. By mid-July the Germans confiscated all remaining private Jewish property, and as of August 1, following Himmler's first visit to Riga, Jews had to display the yellow star on their clothing, both on front and back. A particularly injurious directive limited Jews to receiving only half-rations. The intent and the cumulative effect of these restrictions forced Jews outside the protection of the law and legally left them with no means to withstand the storm of torment and violence. 181 It is estimated that the authorities executed 4,000 to s,ooo Jews for not wearing the star or for violating one or another of these insidious regulations. 182 The Germans also issued decrees patterned after the Nuremberg Laws, banning marriages between Jews and non-Jews and defined Mischlinge, or part-Jews. Some even prescribed sterilization as a medical remedy to Latvia's racial "problem." 18 3 One of the most onerous laws decreed manda-

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tory, uncompensated labor for all Jews. Jews henceforth received no wages for their labor, and enterprises employing Jews had to pay a special usage fee to the German authorities. 184 This practice became the economic basis for the Jewish slave labor system and at least in part subsidized the concentration camp operations. This deluge of regulations climaxed in mid-August with the decision by the civilian administration to create a Jewish ghetto. This measure followed Rimmler's visit to Riga two weeks earlier, during which he expressed displeasure over the slow pace of implementing anti-Jewish regulations and the lack of cooperation and enthusiasm on the part of Lohse's administration. Since Lohse and Rosenberg all along had favored segregated ghettos as the solution to the Jewish question, at first glance the announcement to construct the Riga ghetto appeared to be a victory of sorts for the Ostministerium. But Rimmler knew better. The ghetto provided only a temporary arrangement, useful merely as a better means to control the Jews until he straightened out some personnel problems and resumed his campaign to annihilate all remaining Latvian Jews. It also appeared to be a concession to the civilian administration, supposedly demonstrating Rimmler's flexibility and willingness to cooperate with fellow Nazis. 18 s The local authorities selected as the site for the ghetto the least desirable section of Riga, a twelve-block section of the Moscow suburb, a rundown area inhabited mostly by ethnic Russian workers and impoverished Jews. Building the ghetto, beginning in early September, amounted to removing non-Jewish residents and encircling the designated blocks with double rows of barbed wire. An area that had housed some 7,ooo people in already crowded and squalid conditions would henceforth contain approximately 30,000. By October 25, all of Riga's Jews had moved their families and their few remaining belongings to the ghetto and commenced their new way of life. Having survived the initial wave of violence, they hoped that the Germans would permit them to live if not entirely undisturbed within the ghetto, then at least a more predictable and safer existence. As in other ghettos in German-occupied Europe, the Jews organized their own council, police, and communal life, including an educational system. 186 The Germans and their Latvian accomplices, including the Arajs gang, guarded the ghetto and sealed it off from the rest of Riga. Arajs's incursions into the ghetto became notorious, much-feared exercises in unbridled violence. These drunken forays became commonplace, at which time the inmates tried to hide girls and young women. Merciless guards, wielding power over life and death, used any and all pretexts to abuse and

Latvia and the Holocaust I 24 7 even murder inmates. 187 The ghetto, however, became the source of labor that Lohse had envisioned and immediately began contributing to the war effort. Jews, assembled into work details, marched out daily to toil in various enterprises, both German- and Latvian-operated, earning valuable revenue for the occupying powers. 188 The Germans built two other major ghettos in Latvia, one in Daugavpils, the other in Liepaja, both of which, like Riga, still contained substantial numbers of Jews. The Daugavpils ghetto actually preceded the Riga ghetto. In July, as the initial wave of shootings subsided, the local Germans and their Latvian counterparts rounded up some 14,000 Jews from Daugavpils and outlying areas of Latgale and crammed them into the old Daugavpils fort, "the Citadel." Since the incarcerated by far exceeded the space and allotted resources, the Germans proceeded with another round of executions, killing those incapable of working, the old, the infirm, and the very young. 189 The creation of a formal Liepaja ghetto appears to have followed rather than preceded the liquidation of all but the sturdiest and most work-capable Jews. Founded as late as June 1942, the Liepaja ghetto housed around 8oo souls and differed little from a concentration camp in size and purpose. Whereas the majority of the inmates of the much larger ghettos in Riga and Daugavpils still faced their final reckoning in November 1941, those of Liepaja had already survived the main round of mass executions. 9° Unknown to the inhabitants of the Riga and Daugavpils ghettos, their reprieve would be short-lived. By the time the guards shut the gates of the Riga ghetto on October 25 their ultimate fate was already sealed, and the next phase of their travails would soon commence. Himmler had already replaced HSSPF Russland Nord und Ostland Hans-Adolf Priitzmann with the more dynamic Friedrich Jeckeln, who had already garnered impressive credentials in southern Russia and the Ukraine for killing large numbers of Jews quickly and efficiently, including those at the Babi Yar ravine outside of Kiev. Himmler had calculated that at the current rate of killings in the Ostland, it might take another twenty months just to slaughter Riga's Jews. Although the SS was already experimenting with the gassing of Jews at Auschwitz, and several death camps were under construction in Poland, he was anxious to speed up the process. Jeckeln, a zealous and cold-blooded SS man, had proven that he was up to the challenge. 9 The days of the Riga ghetto were numbered. 1

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The Final Solution In Latvia In late October Friedrich Jeckeln arrived in Riga and after settling into the historic Ritterhaus as his headquarters, he set in motion the "Jeckeln

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system," the process that had worked so well for him in the Ukraine and ultimately would exterminate the remaining Jews of Latvia. At a meeting on November 12 at his East Prussia headquarters Himmler ordered his new HSSPF Russland Nord-Ostland to eradicate the Riga ghetto and complete the annihilation of Latvia's Jews that Stahlecker had begun. Anticipating objections from Lohse, Himmler instructed Jeckeln to inform Lohse that the Reichsfiihrer SS had ordered the liquidation of the ghetto and that its destruction was the wish of the Fuhrer himself.'9 Jeckeln dutifully forwarded Rimmler's message to Lohse, apprising his nominal superior in the Ostland of his deadly intentions: These orders came from the highest authorities, and Lohse was not to interfere. The chastened Lohse, reluctant to appear weak on Jews, assured Jeckeln that his reservations applied only to "wild," unorganized killings, not to the extermination of Jews in principle. '93 On November 15 Himmler revealed to Lohse's superior, Rosenberg, his plans for the Riga ghetto and its Jews. This operation would be one of the first installments of the systematic extermination of all European Jews. Rosenberg, sensing the futility of further resistance, caved in, and promising full support for the "biological extermination of all the Jews of Europe," assured the Reichsfiihrer SS of Lohse's cooperation in this monumental task. Himmler then informed Heydrich of his instructions to Jeckeln as well as of his conversation with Rosenberg. Shortly after receiving the news Heydrich sent out invitations for a major conference on the Jewish Question to convene in Berlin on December 9· The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7 and the consequent American declaration of war on Japan forced the postponement of this critical meeting to January 20, 1942, a gathering that came to be known in history as the Wannsee Conference.'94 Jeckeln minutely planned all dimensions of the operation to liquidate the Riga ghetto. He personally selected the killing field, a clearing only a few hundred meters from the railway station at Rumbuli, approximately ten kilometers east of Riga on the Riga-Daugavpils railway line and the main highway. He chose this site because of its relative isolation, yet proximity to Riga and accessible transportation. Its sandy soil would simplify digging graves and covering up the killings. Jeckeln was also aware that the first transports of Jews from the West would be arriving sometime in November, and therefore the sooner he vacated the ghetto to make room for the new arrivals, the better.' 95 The Latvians, from the SelfAdministration at the top down to the auxiliary police participating in 2

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the operation, played no role in planning the action and knew nothing of it until a day or so before the evictions and shootings began.'96 Jeckeln appointed Rudolf Lange to command the operation. Lange assembled and assigned tasks to all available German security forces, including men of the Ordnungspolizei and the SD. He also utilized Latvians, including members of the Riga police, Latvian SD men and the Arajs Commandos. These Latvians provided most of the manpower in this intricately choreographed mass extermination; perhaps as many as 1,500 Latvians participated. Jeckeln gave them the task of rounding up the Jews in the ghetto, transporting or marching them to Rumbuli, guarding them along the way, and assisting in any way possible at the shooting site, even lending a hand in the actual shootings. Russian POWs dug the ditches that served as mass graves for the victims. '97 The SS thought of everything, even preparing a warehouse in which to store the loot and plunder belonging to the murdered Jews.'9 8 Jeckeln's Rumbuli operation would be the largest mass killing of Jews since Babi Yar, perpetrated in late September, and prior to the full-throttle functioning of the death camps beginning in 1942.'99 The ghetto inmates knew nothing of what awaited them until November 27, when their German wardens announced the liquidation of the ghetto and began cordoning off a small section with barbed wire. The Jews had little sense of what "liquidation" of the ghetto meant, although having already experienced and survived the earlier atrocities and shootings, they most certainly expected nothing good to come of it. On November 29 the Germans assembled the men of the ghetto, selected some 4,000 of them, and marched them to the wired-off area, which afterwards came to be known as the "small ghetto." They also separated some sao women from the rest and sent them away to work camps. The criteria for these selections had been the apparent physical ability to work-the young and sturdy. The rest, those deemed incapable of hard labor, remained in the main ghetto, the so-called large ghetto! That night, November 29, the significance of the day's earlier selections became evident. Latvian police units led by German SS officers descended upon the large ghetto and with calloused brutality drove people out of their lodgings and into the streets. The Germans had already soused their Latvian henchmen with liquor. Viktors Arajs and his sidekick Herberts Cukurs joined in the rampage, mercilessly beating and shooting as they pleased. Those unfortunates who could not rouse themselves or moved too slowly, Arajs, Cukurs and their followers shot. Those that resisted or refused to go were also shot on the spot. Blood literally 00

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flowed in the streets. Bodies and body parts lay strewn in the apartments and buildings; splattered blood covered walls and floors. On the streets the police herded the terrified mass of humanity into columns of about 1,ooo each and at timed intervals began marching them toward Rumbuli. Those that could not walk either were shot or loaded on trucks and buses to be transported to their executions. Along the road, stragglers and those that fell by the wayside met their ends with a bullet, probably fired by a Latvian guard. The guards shouted "Atrak! Atrakf" (Faster! Faster!) at the columns of terrorized people. Although Latvian civilians had no access to the ghetto, they could see and witness the happenings on the way to Rumbuli. They could hear the shooting, shrieks, and wailing, in the ghetto, on the road, and at Rumbuli. The first columns of the doomed left the ghetto around 6:oo in the morning on Sunday, November 30 and arrived at Rumbuli an hour later. Although Latvians were not the primary executioners on this occasion, under the direction of Arajs and Cukurs they brought the Jews to the killing place and secured them while they awaited their execution. The Jews undressed, walked up to the prepared pits, and drunken German policemen gunned them down with machine guns. Officers with pistols then finished off those that exhibited signs of life. Other Jews, who later became victims themselves, then covered the first layer of victims with dirt, and then the next round of victims approached the pits for their turn. This process continued all day until sunset. Since the mass shootings did not guarantee instant death, many Jews were buried alive. According to some sources, the burial ground undulated for some time afterwards. 3 Jeckeln, who believed in leading by example, supervised the entire operation in person. He later applauded the participating Latvians for having "strong nerves for executions of this sort." 2 o4 By the time the shootings ended, the Germans and their Latvian helpers had murdered an estimated 14,000 to 15,000 people. After the shootings of November 29-30 approximately 11,000 Jews still remained alive in the so-called large ghetto. On the night of Sunday, December 7, drunken Latvian police along with their German commanders once more descended on the ghetto. This time the survivors knew exactly what lay in store for them, but were powerless to resist. As they had a week earlier, Arajs and his boys along with other Latvian security forces rounded up the remaining Jews and repeated the frenzied atrocities of the previous week. They shot those trying to hide, the reluctant, and the incapacitated, assembled the rest into columns, and marched them off to Rumbuli, although for some unknown reason several columns 20 '

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ended up at the nearby Bikernieki Forest for their execution. Rudolf Lange again served as the foreman of the operation and faithfully adhered to the "Jeckeln system" implemented in the earlier action. Jeckeln also attended the shootings, as did briefly Reichskommissar Lohse, who stopped by to survey what was happening in his commissariat.zos It was during this second Rumbuli operation that one of the victims, Frida Michelson, miraculously escaped by hiding under a pile of discarded clothing and lived to write an eyewitness account of these horrorS. 206 By the end of the day on December 8, the Germans and their Latvian accomplices had shot another 11,000 humans, bringing their total number of victims for two days of murder at Rumbuli to some 26,ooo. Himmler' s order to liquidate ghettos extended to the one in Daugavpils, an action actually preceding the one in Riga. During November 8-10, Jews were driven on trucks from the Daugavpils ghetto to nearby Mezciems for their execution. Under German supervision-and perhaps as a trial run for the larger Rumbuli operation-the Arajs Commandos, having arrived on their blue buses, shot an estimated 3,ooo Jews. Further shootings in the area occurred the following May.zo7 As for Liepaja, most Jews that had survived the initial "wild pogroms" met their fate a week after the second Rumbuli action, December 15-17. Local Latvian police and SD agents rounded up their prey and held them in local jails until time for their murder. At night they brought the victims to the sand dunes some fifteen kilometers north of Liepaja near the fishing hamlet of Skede. According to several accounts it appears that both Germans and Latvians did the shooting. At Liepaja a milk can of rum was brought out around noon, from which the killers dipped cups of alcohol to fortify themselves. In three days the executioners shot 2,731 more Jews, leaving only some 8oo survivors of the Liepaja Jewish community. These survivors formally became the residents of the Liepaja ghetto in June 1942. 208 By the end of these planned mass executions, no more than 6,soo to 9,000 of the estimated 70,000 Jews that had remained in Latvia when the Germans invaded six months earlier were still alive. Rumbuli and the other murder operations in Latvia, however, constituted only the first stage of Hitler's systematic Final Solution to the Jewish Question. 2 "9 More was yet to come. The liquidation of Latvia's ghettos annihilated most of the inmates but did not close down the ghettos. The Daugavpils ghetto continued operating with some 1,ooo inmates. In Liepaja it was only after the mass killings that the housing for the 8oo survivors became an official ghetto. And in Riga the small ghetto of some 4,ooo male residents essentially

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became a work camp, as did in fact those in Daugavpils and Liepaja. The large ghetto in Riga continued to exist but henceforth served a new purpose. As the Rumbuli operation killed off most of its residents, simultaneously other occupants arrived, Jews from the West, mostly from the Reich itself. The large ghetto came to be known as the Reichsjuden Ghetto, or German Ghetto, and became a vital cog in the SS killing machine before the death camps in Poland started operating fully. It functioned mainly as a transit camp, where Jews from the West remained long enough for the authorities to determine their fate. For most it meant one more journey, to Rumbuli, Bikernieki or another killing site. For a select few, those judged capable of working, the German Ghetto provided temporary shelter until their transfer to a work camp, or beginning in 1942, to the new facilities in Latvia's SS system, the concentration camps. 210 Riga's small ghetto continued to function into 1942 with a population of several thousand. As most ghettos, it organized its own council (Judenrat) and police force that served as intermediaries between the inmates and the Germans. Its residents daily went to work in various enterprises in and around Riga, laboring for the war effort and earning the Germans additional revenues. In late October 1942 an incident occurred that outraged and frightened the authorities and was destined to become an important entry in the annals of the Jewish wartime resistance, evidence proudly displayed to contravene the notion that Jews passively acquiesced in their fate. Eleven young men from the little ghetto acquired some weapons, absconded with a truck, and took off on the highway to Daugavpils hoping to join the partisan resistance. Betrayed by an informer, they drove into a Gestapo ambush. In the ensuing shoot-out the Jews killed three Gestapo agents and lost all but two of their own, whom the Germans later caught and executed. In retaliation the Germans executed the entire thirty-nine-man ghetto police force as well as 100 additional hostages. Himmler, who never fully accepted the idea of saving Jews as laborers and skeptically discounted their potential importance to the war economy, used this incident to strengthen his case for eliminating ghettos altogether and in early 1943 ordered the final phasing out of ghettos. Those capable of working would be sent to labor and concentration camps; the rest would be killed. As a result, in 1943 the workers from the small ghetto gradually were dispersed to various camps in Latvia and the Reich, many to the new camp of Kaiserwald (Mezaparks) near Riga. By November 1943 the Germans shut down the Riga ghetto altogether. 212 2 "

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Western European Jews and Latvia The Holocaust in Latvia began with the murder of Latvian Jews and continued with the killing of European Jews shipped to Latvia for extermination. In September 1941 Himmler commenced with the final racial cleansing of Germany by deporting all Reich Jews to Lodz in occupied Poland. When complications arose, including the fact that the death camps were not yet ready, he decided to send them even farther east, to Riga and Minsk. In early October, after Heydrich informed Hitler of the change in plans, the Fuhrer approved removing all Jews from Reich territory by the end of the year. With Hitler's consent in his pocket, Heydrich set the operation in motion, charging Adolf Eichmann with the task of working out the logistics and arranging transportation. '3 Since by then Hitler and his closest circle had agreed on the physical extermination of Jews as the Final Solution, it was understood that sending them to Riga and other points east meant murdering them. Until the death camps became fully operational mass executions at Riga and other eastern locations remained the principal method for liquidating Reich and western Jews. In late October Rudolf Lange informed Lohse and Drechsler that Heydrich planned to transport Jews to Riga for this purpose, with the first train arriving on November 10. The transport did not arrive, however, until November 29, precisely on the eve of the first Rumbuli operation and just in time to include these people in the shootings of the thousands of Latvian Jews from the Riga ghetto, but by mistake. 2 '4 Since concentration camp facilities at sites around Riga had not yet been completed and Latvian Jews still occupied the ghetto, the SS decided to move these newly arrived people directly from the train along their conveyer-belt of death to Rumbuli. Arriving at Riga's Skirotava railway station, a stockyard terminal that became the destination for Jews from the West, they were among the early morning victims of the November 30 shootings. This transport, however, which included decorated Jewish veterans of World War I-a category which still held a special place in Hitler's thinking and at least for the time being were to be spared-was supposed to go to Theresienstadt, the showplace concentration camp for special inmates. By mistake it ended up in Riga. On November 30 Himmler learned of the error, telephoned Heydrich, and ordered: "Jewish transport from Berlin, no liquidation!" Before Heydrich could reach Jeckeln and stop the shooting, the latter had dutifully completed the task. Jeckeln even telephoned Himmler to boast how smoothly things had transpired. Himmler, enraged over the blunder and unwilling to shoulder any blame, 2

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summoned Jeckeln for a scolding and until further notice rescinded the order to kill all Jews sent to Riga. 2 's Since Eichmann's transports continued rolling on to Riga-the next one arriving on December 10-and Rimmler's revised orders prohibited shooting the new arrivals, the SS in Riga decided to house them in the large ghetto, which as of December 8 had been almost completely vacated. Of course the ghetto, smeared with blood and littered with gruesome corpses from the latest action, needed some cleaning. As more transports arrived and the ghetto population grew to some 15,000 by January 1942, the Riga SS resumed the selection process that led to the executions of some, the preservation of others. It is not known whether Himmler had consented, but after picking out Jews capable of working, the Riga SS dispatched the others directly from the trains to Bikernieki Forest to be shot. The Arajs gang regularly participated in these shootings. 6 Whatever qualms the Riga SS had about resuming the shootings-not from moral considerations but rather from fear of Rimmler's wrath-the Wannsee Conference of January 20, 1942, allayed them. At this meeting Heydrich announced to those in attendance, which included Rudolf Lange, Jeckeln's chief executioner in Riga, that Goring had charged him solely responsible for the Final Solution. Heydrich reconfirmed the Final Solution as the Reich's strategy in occupied Europe toward Jews, a policy and practice already in effect. Lange returned to Riga with an unambiguous directive to continue with what he and the Riga SS had been doing all along-killing Jews. 217 Ten days later, on January 30, Hitler himself publicly reiterated his prophecy that the world war would end in the destruction of the world's Jewry. 218 From this point forward nothing obstructed finishing off the remaining Jews of Europe, including those transported to Riga. From November 1941 through July 1942, more than 25,000 Jews from all across German-occupied Europe had arrived in Riga. '9 Only a few thousand survived the war. Throughout the first half of 1942, as trainloads of Jews arrived from the West, the selection process continued. Those designated for work ended up either in the small ghetto, in a labor camp, or in one of the newly constructed concentration camps. Those deemed incapable of work were marched directly to Bikernieki Forest to be shot. 220 In mid-summer 1942, at least partly in response to what some depicted as a Reich "food crisis," Hitler ordered once and for all the liquidation of all Jews, contemptuously sweeping aside all arguments for preserving some as labor: After all, every Jewish mouth deprived a German of nourishment., It was at this juncture that Himmler decided to shut down completely all ghettos 2 '

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Latvia and the Holocaust I 255 and to distribute the few surviving Jews capable of working to labor and concentration camps. The unfit were to be shot. As the number of inmates in the Riga ghetto dwindled, so did the executions, as transports that had formerly brought Jews to Riga shipped them instead to Auschwitz and the other death camps, at last up and running in Poland. Latvia's place as a killing venue for Jews did not end entirely, since those assigned to concentration camps and labor camps still died through overwork, starvation, and general abuse-what the Germans called planned attrition. Occasionally fresh shipments of Jews showed up in Latvia unexpectedly, such as a number of Lithuanian Jews in September 1943 and some 4,500 Hungarian Jewish women in the spring of 1944. 3 222

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The Concentration camps One further institution of SS terror in Latvia and an implement of the Holocaust was the concentration camp system, originating in Hitler's Reich and spreading throughout German-occupied Europe. As the number of arrests overwhelmed Latvian detention facilities, the SS began constructing concentration camps, to serve the same purpose they did in the Reich and elsewhere, the physical removal and isolation of enemies of the Reich, racial, political, and others. For many of those incarcerated in these camps, they also became death camps. Concentration camps (KZ, the common German acronym for Konzentrationslager) mushroomed all across Latvia. Rudolf Lange, Jeckeln's right hand man, assumed responsibility for constructing and then operating the KZs in Latvia. The largest and most notorious of the KZs was Salaspils, built some eighteen kilometers east of Riga just off the main Riga-Daugavpils highway, on the same route as Rumbuli. Spreading across forty hectares, Salaspils originated as a camp for Russian POWs. During its existence Salaspils contained a disparate assortment of Reich "enemies" of diverse backgrounds and "offenses" from all across Europe. Germans commanded and operated Salaspils, but mostly Latvians, including members of Arajs's gang, provided its guards. Lange served as the first commandant and maintained a harsh, dehumanizing regimen rivaling the cruelest in the entire SS camp system. 4 By late 1941 enough of Salaspils was completed to house its first inmates, and by January 1942 it already contained 1,500 prisoners, whose count may have reached as high as 6,ooo at one time. Until its closing in September 1944 Salaspils served diverse purposes. Deported Jews from the West were its first prisoners. Of those judged capable of working, some were brought to Salaspils instead of the ghetto, and when Himmler 22

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closed down the ghetto, Salaspils became a work camp for Jews. Their labor as well as that of non-Jewish inmates financed the building and operation of the camp. Jews actually comprised a small portion of the inmates, since the camp, which continued to house Soviet POW's, also became a camp prison for Latvian, other Baltic, and Slavic political prisoners.zzs The SS also used the camp as punishment for its own men, including Latvians. In late 1943 a dispute arose over the incarceration of hundreds of Latvian soldiers in Salaspils for sundry infractions, including desertion. Well into 1944, Latvian military leaders argued for their release, suggesting assignment to a hard labor battalion as a more appropriate punishment, especially at a time of military crisis and a shortage of manpower. 226 Salaspils served yet another purpose, as temporary housing for forced labor from White Russia and western Russia on their way to the Reich. In 1943, with the intensification of the antipartisan campaign in White Russia and northwestern Russia, thousands of civilians, including children, allegedly accomplices of the partisans, ended up in Salaspils. As for Latvians, the imprisonment of large numbers of Latgalians from eastern Latvia, whom the Germans regarded as racially inferior to other Latvians and who disproportionately constituted the majority of the ten-hectare people, supplemented the Salaspils population."" 7 Although nominally a "work and education" camp like all other KZs, Salaspils earned the reputation of a death camp, the term usually reserved for the extermination camps of Poland such as Belzec, Majdanek, and Sobibor, whose sole purpose was to murder people. The Germans had intentionally calculated living and working conditions at Salaspils to be so harsh that thousands of inmates died through hunger, illness, cold, and sheer exhaustion. The Germans referred to this attrition as "destruction by labor," a "natural" cause of death.zzb Not only did prisoners die of these "natural" causes, but shootings, hangings, and more sadistic means of murder became commonplace for the slightest of infractions. In late 1942 Commandant Lange even tried out gas vans to help speed up the "attrition" process of Jews and other racially undesirable inmates. One source counts as many as 53,700 fatalities at Salaspils, for whom it truly was a death camp. 9 Evidently all those confined at Salaspils did not accept their fate passively. In March 1943 several prisoners working in rock quarries secretly collected explosives, intending to use them in an uprising. Lange discovered the plot, however, and shot all those implicated as well as many innocents.z3o 22

Latvia and the Holocaust I 257 Salaspils, though the most notorious KZ in Latvia, was not the first. That distinction goes to Jungfernhof (in Latvian, Jumprauvmuiza), an old, dilapidated estate some five kilometers outside Riga, not too far from the Skirotava station. Laborers, mostly Reich Jews working on the construction of Salaspils KZ, first lived at Jungfernhof. As more Jews arrived from the Reich and other parts of Western Europe, some of those not liquidated immediately were sent to this KZ. By February 1942 an estimated 2,500 Jews worked out of Jungfernhof. With the construction of barracks Jungfernhof became a profitable labor camp whose dwellers slaved on farms, in nearby peat bogs, and in rock quarries. Reportedly the horrendous conditions here exceeded even those at Salaspils. The cruelty of its camp commanders became legendary, and the fact that the Arajs Commandos provided many of its guards assured the inmates of the worst treatment imaginable. 3' The concentration camps truly came into their own after the dissolution of the Riga ghetto. In June 1943, Himmler ordered Jeckeln to transfer all ghetto Jews to KZs. 3 Although the inmates preferred the communal life of the ghetto, it was not for them to decide. In the interest of closer control and higher profits Jews still capable of working were reassigned to various KZs not only in Latvia but also in the Reich. Those deemed too incapacitated to work were killed. In addition to Salaspils and Jungfernhof other KZs sprouted all across Latvia, including Milgravi, Strazdumuiza, Spilve, Lenta, and Bisumuiza in the vicinity of Riga, as well as KZs in the environs of Daugavpils, Jelgava, Madona, Tukums, and Valmiera. Hundreds of smaller, satellite work camps dotted the countryside as well. In the summer of 1943 the SS erected a large camp at Dundaga, on the coast in northern Kurzeme, which shortly expanded into two camps, one for men, the other for women, with a combined inmate count as high as 2

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6,000. 2 33

The largest of the newly constructed camps, rivaling in size Salaspils itself, was Kaiserwald (Mezaparks in Latvian), the Riga suburban site-by several accounts one of the most beautiful spots in Riga-which witnessed some of the earliest executions of Riga's Jews. Its construction began in early 1943, and by July it opened for prisoners, initially some 2,ooo, mainly from the disbanded little ghetto. By this time, accurate counts of remaining Jews in Latvia-dispersed to countless work and KZ camps-became impossible, with estimates ranging from as low as 2,ooo to nearly 8,ooo. 2 34 Kaiserwald and its satellite camps, including the Dundaga camps, became the main facilities for Jews, while Salaspils held mostly but not exclusively non-Jews. 3s The Kaiserwald administration 2

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followed the standard KZ mode of operation practiced in the major Reich KZs such as Dachau and Buchenwald. Here as in other camps in Latvia the SS commanded while Latvians and other non-Germans such as Ukrainians provided most of the guards and staff. As one source observed, its harshness and cruelties left Kaiserwald one vast Jewish cemetery. 2 36 By late 1943, with the Germans retreating all along the front, Himmler ordered closing down KZ operations and relocating the inmates to camps farther west, including to the Reich itself. He also took care to destroy the evidence of the Reich's reprehensible deeds by ordering the exhuming and incineration of incriminating corpses. As early as December 1943 the SS began destroying the grisly evidence by forcing Jews to dig up bodies at Rumbuli, Kaiserwald, Salaspils and other shooting sites and to burn them. This attempted cover-up continued into the spring and summer of 1944. Selection for this duty was tantamount to a death sentence, since the Germans, intent on hiding their secrets, executed the work details in order to silence the witnesses. 2 37 As the Soviets approached Latvia, and as the Germans and their accomplices fled, dragging along inmates slowed their own escape. Consequently, as time permitted, they shot those they could not take along. The last guards, a detachment of Lithuanians, fled from Salaspils on the night of September 29, 1944- 38 As early as August 1944 the Germans had begun forcibly evacuating the inmates of the KZs, mostly by shipping them to Danzig and Gotenhafen. The majority of the deportees, and virtually all of the non-Jewish ones, ended up in the Stutthof KZ near Danzig, from where some went on to other KZs. As the Soviets continued their westward advance and crossed into the Reich itself, many of the deported Jews that had survived into the winter of 1945 perished on the infamous death marches, aimless wanderings of columns of wretched humans whose guards could not think of anything better to do with them than to march them from place to place. 2 39 One final mention should be made of Stutthof KZ near Danzig. Although located outside Latvia, as early as March 1942 Stutthof, because of its proximity to the Baltic, became the KZ of choice for the Germans to incarcerate troublesome Latvians. By December 1943 some 3,ooo Latvians languished in Stutthof, and by the conclusion of the war a total of some 6,ooo Latvians had ended up in this KZ, including prominent Latvians that had tried unsuccessfully to organize an underground resistance movement. By 1944 Stutthofbecame so overcrowded with evacuated prisoners from the East-containing an estimated 11o,ooo-that the authori2

Latvia and the Holocaust I 259 ties turned part of the camp into an extermination facility with its own gas chamber and a crematorium for its Jewish inmates and arrivals. 4° As early as summer 1941 Latvia had become the venue for yet another type of death camp, the prisoner of war camps for captured Soviet soldiers. Although the purpose of a POW camp is to hold captured enemy combatants and keep them alive, the extraordinarily high death rate of Soviet soldiers in German POW camps, much of it planned and intentional, justifies the title of "death camp." In Latvia alone 330,000 Soviet POW's perished in these camps. Actually the designation of "camp," which implies at least a minimum of shelter and sustenance, is a misnomer, since these POW camps often amounted to no more than open-air barbed-wire enclosures. Inmates lived totally at the mercy not only of their captors but also the elements. Holes in the ground often provided the only shelter. Most died by "natural" causes, but many fell victims to executioners' bullets for the slightest of infractions, or at times for no apparent reason. In all the Germans constructed some eight or nine Stalags along with their satellite camps in Latvia. The most notorious facility was Stalag 350 near Riga, with conditions reputedly worse than those at Salaspils KZ. Other major POW camps were located at Daugavpils, Jelgava, Liepaja, Rezekne and Valka. 2 4' The existence of the POW camps alongside the KZs made Latvia one of the primary stages on which the Germans played out their ideology of race and space, conquering the Lebensraum and either annihilating or enslaving the allegedly Untermenschen population. 2

The Holocaust in Latvia: An Assessment Beyond any doubt the Holocaust occurred, it occurred in Latvia, and although the Germans directed it, Latvians participated as willing, voluntary accomplices. The question remains, however, how many Latvians and which Latvians contributed? After the war the Latvian head of the Self-Administration, General Director Oskars Dankers, denied any official Latvian role in or even knowledge of the murder of Jews. Although documents corroborate his claims that Latvians had no authority in these matters, his claim of ignorance is untenable. Some of his subordinates, including military officers Voldemars Veis and Roberts Osis, helped organize and commanded units of Latvian volunteers on the front lines of this sordid campaign of murder. Surely Dankers knew very well the scope and nature of these operations as well as the degree of Latvian participation. 4 2

2

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As for the participants, the foremost historian on the subject, Andrew Ezergailis, concludes that Latvians directly engaged in murdering Jews did not exceed soo, although he concedes that up to 1,ooo Latvians might meet Western criteria of war crime guilt. He also ascribes most of the responsibility to one group, the Arajs Commandos, numbering around 300 during the main killing period. Although these findings debunk the assertion of many Latvian emigres that only Germans, not Latvians murdered Jews, they seem to underestimate the extent of Latvian participation. The numbers of possibly culpable Latvians do not add up. He himself estimated at least 1,500 Latvians assisting the Germans at Rumbuli, by helping to clear out the ghetto and then accompanying the Jews to the killing site. ,43 In the process Jews lost their lives at the hands of Latvians, and surely these were not only Arajs's boys. Latvians also helped secure Jews at the shooting sites while, by many accounts, the Germans pulled the triggers. It only stands to reason that these Latvian accomplices should be counted among those directly involved. Others besides the Arajs Commandos participated in the early phase of the shootings and synagogue burning throughout Latvia. Thousands served in units that participated in "security" actions prior to going to the front in late 1941 and early 1942 in the ranks of armed police battalions. Although the peripatetic Arajs and his blue buses seemed to be omnipresent at shootings throughout Latvia, they could not have perpetrated them all. And what about the locals that rounded up Jews for Arajs to shoot? Should they be absolved of responsibility? Furthermore many Latvians who guarded the ghettos and the concentration camps either directly or indirectly contributed to the demise of thousands of Jews. In addition there were those Latvians active in antipartisan operations (to be discussed in the following two chapters) whose duties included murdering civilian suspects and partisan sympathizers, which included large numbers of Jews. Although an accurate count may never be possible, one may safely conclude that the number of Latvians involved in the murder of Jews by far surpasses a few hundred; the count probably reaches well into several thousands. The most incriminating evidence that points to broad Latvian complicity in the murder of Jews remains the eyewitness testimony of victims, as well as of some German perpetrators. Both sources attribute substantial blame to Latvians. Although one can question the reliability of his testimony, at his postwar trial Jeckeln credited Latvians with having more nerve for killing Jews than did Germans and in general credited much of the responsibility for the Holocaust to the Latvians themselves. 2 44

Latvia and the Holocaust I 261 As for Jewish witnesses, one survivor bitterly laments, "We shall never forget the crimes the German people perpetrated on us, nor shall we forget how the Latvian people behaved toward us."z4s Repeatedly, Jewish accounts single out Latvians as active participants, not just bystanders and mindless German lackeys.Z46 Besides, some Latvians unabashedly concurred with Jewish perceptions of Latvian anti-Jewish attitudes. In 1942 Adolf Silde, a member of Perkonkrusts and one of the most prolific postwar writers on Latvia's wartime experience, wrote the following: "If we assess the most outstanding events of the past year, we cannot remain silent about the great joy we feel about the solution of the Jewish question in our country.''z47 Although Silde heartily approved of German policies in 1942, in the postwar years he and other exile writers shifted their focus from attacking Jews to exculpating Latvians as a whole from responsibility for murdering Latvia's Jews. Silde and other apologists justified Latvian actions and thereby tried to absolve Latvians of responsibility by focusing on Jewish complicity in Soviet atrocities against Latvians. He and others alluded to the entire litany of anti-Jewish accusations, from welcoming the Soviets to participating intimately in the system of Soviet terror supposedly intended to annihilate the Latvian Tauta. In this effort to obfuscate Latvian guilt, some have even argued that the proportion of Latvians welcoming the Germans was far less than that of Jews greeting the Soviets. Unable to deny the Holocaust entirely or even excuse Latvian participation, many exiles eventually tried to equalize and balance the suffering of Jews and Latvians. According to this rationale, both groups suffered greatly in World War II, Latvians as well as Jews. The Latvians endured Soviet terror; the Jews were victimized by the Germans. On both sides extreme elements collaborated with the occupying persecutors to harm the other: Some Latvians helped the Germans, some Jews assisted the Soviets. The final results, according to this way of thinking, somehow canceled out and absolved mutual guilt.Z48 Numbers, however, discount the scales of "equal suffering." By the end of February 1942 the SS reported 6s,ooo Latvian Jews executed, most murdered by men of the Einsatzgruppe A and their Latvian auxiliaries.Z49 By the end of the war only 100 of Riga's Jews were still alive; only 1,000 of the 70,000 remaining in Latvia at the time of the German invasion had survived.zso Proportionately and in absolute numbers Jewish losses under the Germans were far greater than ethnic Latvian losses under the Soviets. Not only did Latvia's Jews meet their end, but so did Jewish deportees from other parts of Europe. Soviet sources claim that altogether as many

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as 24o,ooo Jews died in Latvia. s' Others dispute this count and offer lower estimates of their own, a mind-numbing array of calculations and confounding data recorded at different times, originating from various geographic and administrative sources. 2 s2 It is doubtful whether anyone will ever tabulate the correct, precise number of Jews killed in the Latvian phase of the Holocaust. And one finally concludes in exasperation-after trying to sort out the plethora of data-that exact numbers contribute little to comprehending the enormity of this phenomenon, even in its localized version in Latvia. Does it really make a difference whether the accurate death count of Jews in Latvia was 6s,ooo or 24o,ooo? What truly matters is the indisputable fact that the Holocaust did occur and that Latvia provided a convenient and major arena. It also matters that many Latvians participated. And finally it matters, above all, that the Holocaust eradicated a historic, integral segment of Latvia's population, which despite efforts by prewar Latvians to isolate it from the Latvian national body had contributed to the unique ethnic, social, cultural, economic, and political mix that once was Latvia. The Holocaust remains an indelible part of Latvia's experience in World War II, and as Latvians ponder their future, they must reconcile themselves with this haunting part of their historical legacy-whether they like it or not. 2

9

The Latvian Legion

At his July 16, 1941, meeting on reviewing policies for the occupied East Adolf Hitler declared in no uncertain terms: "It must always remain a cast-iron principle that none but Germans shall be allowed to bear arms. Even when ... it might seem expedient to summon foreign peoples to arm, it would be folly to do so. One day it would be sure to prove our absolute and irretrievable undoing. Only the Germans must be permitted to bear arms."• Unknown to the Fuhrer, his subordinates in the field, including those in Latvia, had already violated his dictum by enlisting non-Germans for armed police duty. Beginning as units of auxiliary police under the auspices of the SS, these incipient Latvian armed units grew into militarized police battalions, which ultimately evolved into two Latvian infantry divisions. The critical point of this transformation occurred on February 10, 1943, when Hitler allowed exigencies of war to get the better of him, swallowed his pride and racial arrogance, and contravening his earlier orders, consented to the establishment of a Latvian Legion. For Latvians the Latvian Legion remains to this day the most scrutinized and contested subject related to Latvia's experience in World War II. Whereas many Latvians simply avoid confronting the Holocaust, dismissing it as personally irrelevant or just too disturbing to contemplate, virtually all Latvians have opinions on the Legion. Just as controversy surrounds the Holocaust and the issue of Latvian complicity in it, uncertainty and disagreement also cloud the collective Latvian historical image of this hybrid military formation. Manned by Latvians, organizationally it belonged to the German Waffen SS, the armed units of Himmler's Schutzstaffel SS. Sorting out the facts and seeking understanding of the circumstances of the Legion's founding, the nature of its being, and the scope of its activities still confound Latvians as they resurrect their state and decide which features of their wartime legacy to accept as part of their common, Latvian national experience and which to discard as incongruous anomalies or even as un-Latvian.

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The First Latvian Armed units Among the principal organizers of the Latvian armed units that fought for the Germans in World War II and eventually became the Latvian Legion were several hundred Latvian officers who had fled to Germany either just prior to or during the Soviet occupation. Many of them escaped with the second wave of Baltic German resettlers in early 1941. Since the Soviets had arrested, deported, or shot most Latvian generals, those seeking refuge in the Reich and who subsequently accepted leading positions under the Germans were mostly lieutenant colonels and colonels. These field grade officers, not generals, would build up and then go on to lead Latvian armed forces into combat. Two prominent exceptions were General Oskars Dankers, who became a General Director and head of the Latvian Self-Administration, and General Rudolfs Bangerskis, who assumed the post of Inspector General of the Legion. The two Reich agencies most interested in intelligence matters, the army's Abwehr and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) of the SS, in the course of preparing for the invasion of the Soviet Union recruited these potentially useful Latvian soldiers for their "voluntary" service. The Abwehr, the Wehrmacht's intelligence and espionage branch, enlisted some 200 Latvian officers, collected them at a camp in East Prussia, outfitted them in German uniforms, and designated them Sonderfuhrer, special duty officers. The Abwehr trained them for clandestine missions in their homeland as well as for duty as liaison officers and interpreters, tasks more political in nature than military. The Abwehr did not consolidate them into a Latvian unit, but dispersed them among various German formations as needed. These officers promised in writing to fight alongside the Germans for Latvia's inclusion in Hitler's New Order. The SD, in several respects the SS counterpart to the Abwehr, collected its own collaborators and prepared them for roles with the Latvian version of the SD, under the close supervision of the parent SD organization. Among these willing collaborators donning German uniforms stood several figures intimately immersed in both military and political activities during the first weeks of the German occupation, including Aleksandrs Plensners, Viktors Deglavs, Arturs Silgailis, and Vilis Janums. All had volunteered to serve the Germans and had committed themselves to the German cause, though their dedication to that cause can be questioned. Opportunism rather than ideological or political predisposition toward National Socialism determined their choice. The Germans offered them the opportunity to return to Latvia-their only chance to do so-and failure to "volunteer" by spurning the German offer could have been per2

The Latvian Legion I 265 sonally hazardous. While in the Reich these decidedly anti-Soviet, nationalistic Latvians formed an officers' association dedicated to rebuilding the Latvian army and ultimately restoring a Latvian state, but one fully integrated within the German New Order.J Some have criticized these officers for committing Latvia to the German side, since they had no authority to do so.4 But for these career military men and sincere patriots the chance to fight against and drive out the hated Russian foe from their homeland, to join what at the time seemed for certain the winning side, and to revive their military careers, outweighed any qualms about compromising their own and others' allegiances. Latvian soldiers who had remained in Latvia also surfaced to offer their services to the German "liberators." During the year of Soviet occupation, as Latvian officers came to realize what lay in store for them, many, both high and low, went into hiding, some taking to the woods to wage guerrilla war. These irregulars, armed with old Aizsargi weapons and arms stolen or captured from the Reds, obeyed no central command but operated independently. Their numbers rose in the final weeks of the Soviet occupation, particularly after the deportations of June 13-14 and the Soviet attempt to liquidate the Latvian Army officer corps at Litene. By many accounts these nationalist partisans effectively harassed the retreating Soviet forces, and some have even credited them with liberating entire sections of Latvia.s Soviet detractors inadvertently confirmed their efficacy by reproaching them for "stabbing retreating Russian forces in the back. 6 As they ventured out from hiding, many of these officers volunteered their services to the Germans, the most prominent of this latter group being Lt. Colonel Voldemars Veiss, a former military attache to Finland whom the Soviets had released from the army as unreliable and who had the good sense to go underground. For Veiss, who lost family members and relatives to the Soviets, revenge provided enough motivation. Several nonmilitary men, such as the infamous Viktors Arajs, also surfaced and immediately endeared themselves to the occupiers.? During the first week of their occupation, the German authorities in Riga had to sort out the competing Latvian groups. Armed Latvian partisans roamed the countryside, self-defense units popped up everywhere-a chaotic, insecure situation not at all to German liking. It appears that as of July 1 Walther Stahlecker, chief of the Einsatzgruppe A, imposed his will over the situation. As noted earlier, on July I he commissioned Arajs with the task of cleaning out "enemies" from Riga, and on the same day he charged Veiss with organizing a police force. By the time the Abwehr-sponsored team of Plensners and Deglavs arrived a few

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days later, they discovered armed Latvian units already operating, not under the aegis of the Wehrmacht but that of the SS. 8 Aware of Plensners's and Deglavs's ties with the Wehrmacht, and probably suspicious of their intention to use the self-defense units as a step toward resurrecting a Latvian military, Stahlecker preempted their efforts on July 7 by placing Veiss in charge of organizing self-defense forces around Riga-under SS authority. Veiss and his sidekick, Lt. Col. Roberts Osis, formed these units as auxiliary police, similar to Arajs' group. The following day, July 8, Stahlecker ordered the disbanding and disarming of all forces except those he had approved. By then an estimated 6,ooo Latvians had joined the unsanctioned self-defense units and had to surrender their weapons. The auxiliary police forces, already busy cleansing Riga and other parts of Latvia of its enemies, remained under Stahlecker's authority, and from this point on the SS and not the Wehrmacht controlled the Latvian armed forces in World War II.9 While the organizing of the police units proceeded apace, and while leading Latvians discussed setting up something like a provisional government, on July 18 Lt. Col. Deglavs, known for his ambitions to turn these incipient armed units into a reconstituted Latvian army, was found dead, shot in the head. 10 Although reported as a suicide, suspicion lingers about the possibility of SS foul play in Deglavs's death. Whereas Veiss and others seemed willing to work with the Germans with few if any political strings attached, Deglavs made Latvian cooperation contingent upon the political goal of restoring a Latvian army and state. Stahlecker had shrewdly derailed ambitions to transform these units into true military forces by designating them as "police," terminology that did not sit well with many former Latvian officers, who showed their displeasure by refusing to answer these first calls for volunteers. Whereas the Plensners group, sponsored by the Wehrmacht, disapproved of forming police units, evidently Veiss, Osis and others did not eschew being policemen and continued to cooperate with the SS. On July 20 Stahlecker formalized the process by officially designating Veiss's units as the Riga Order Police Auxiliary, which one month later became the Riga Order Service. On the same day Stahlecker also ordered Veiss to create an additional armed formation of soo men, named the Recruiting Reserve, divided into five companies that became the first Latvian "military" units in the war. 12 Enlistment in the armed police force was entirely voluntary. Since the initial numbers of those offering their services exceeded the needs, no compulsion was necessary. In addition to the 500 men of the Recruiting Reserve, another 1,500 joined the Riga Order Police Auxiliary, and a thou11

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sand more enlisted with other sanctioned armed groups, including prison guards, port police and railway police, 3,000 Latvians in all. These police formations wore the uniforms of the old Latvian army, shorn of military insignias but sporting green sleeve bands emblazoned with OrdnungsHilfspolize (Order Police Auxiliary).'3 In addition to the police units operating under the auspices of the SS the Wehrmacht managed to snatch some Latvians for its own auxiliaries, the Hilfswillige, or Hiwis. The Hiwis, however, did not serve in exclusively Latvian units but were scattered throughout the German Army as drivers, construction workers, and other noncombat personnel. At this point the Wehrmacht showed little interest in building non-German military units. '4 Following his visit to Riga at the end of July, Himmler commended Stahlecker's efforts at forming these Latvian police units. He expressed apprehension, however, that the Latvians might regard this measure as a step toward creating a national army. Reluctant to contravene Hitler's recent reaffirmation of not arming non-Germans so soon and so blatantly, Himmler decided to rename these units Schutzmannschaften (guardsmen units), Schuma for short, and placed them under the German Order Police, thereby camouflaging these non-German military units. In late August SSPF for Latvia, Walther Schroder, implementing Rimmler's orders, created the post of Order Police Commander Latvia, under whose leadership the Schuma units operated. The official renaming did not go into effect until November 6, although the term Schuma was already commonly used.'s The SS also created native Schuma units in other occupied lands, including Lithuania, Estonia and the Ukraine. Two types of Schuma formations appeared, the Einzeldienst-those performing ordinary police duties-and the Geschlossenen units, organized into battalions of 1,000 men each and trained for more than standard police duties.' 6 While in Riga, Himmler had ominously suggested that these armed formations could be deployed abroad. A need already existed in neighboring White Russia, where Red partisan activity behind German lines had become more than a nuisance. The first Schuma battalion, the 16th Zemgale Battalion, was ready for deployment in September, and four more were ready to go by the end of 1941. Twenty-five others would appear prior to the formal creation of the Latvian Legion, and by the end of the war the battalions numbered fortyfive.'? Initially volunteers enlisted for six-month terms, but in practice, after one signed up, he was in for the duration of the war. For uniforms the Schuma dressed in either the old khaki-yellow of the Latvian army or Soviet uniforms, with no emblems except for dark red stripes on the

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collars and armbands. Helmets and weapons came from sundry sources, largely captured from the Reich's earlier conquests, Czechoslovakia and France. Although nominally Latvian officers commanded these units, German liaison officers supervised at every level of command, straining the nascent German-Latvian comradeship, since the Germans preferred commanding to merely advising.' 8 Initially the Schuma battalions performed police and security duties, mostly scouring the countryside for Soviet stragglers and partisans as well as joining in "cleansing" actions against Jews. Schuma men, referred to as suchmani by fellow Latvians, earned a mixed reputation. For obeying their German masters so loyally and enthusiastically, suchmani to many Latvians became a pejorative term, virtually an expletive. '9 Others regarded them as patriots, helping the Germans rid the land of the Bolsheviks.zo Although trained for more than police duty, the poorly armed Schuma units were unsuited for real combat. Nonetheless, on October 22, 1941, the first Schuma Battalion, the 16th Zemgale, described by one source as cannon fodder, left Latvia and marched off to the front near Staraya Russa. 2 ' At this point the Schuma counted only 1,370 men in its ranks, but more manpower became available from other police units, which totaled over 8,ooo by that time, as well as from eager volunteers still lining up to join. 22 The numbering of Schuma batallions, which had reserved numbers 16 through 28 for Latvians-as well as 1-15 for Lithuanians and 29-40 for Estonians-had to be augmented in time with designations 266-282 and 311-313. In late 1941 Jeckeln, after completing his most pressing extermination duties, the liquidation of the Riga ghetto, boasted optimistically that he could enlist 2o,ooo Latvians in no time at all. 3 From late 1941 into 1942 the SS continued to form new battalions and dispatched them quickly to the front. Some fought at the Leningrad front, others ended up in White Russia, still others deployed as far away as the Ukraine and southern Russia. 2 4 With the conversion of the Schuma battalions into disguised combat units, and in order to establish an effective liaison with these formations, in December 1941 the newly recognized Latvian Self-Administration created for Veiss the office of Department of Internal Security within Dankers's Directorate of the Interior. In recognition of Veiss's sudden importance, Dankers also appointed him Deputy Director General of the Interior, essentially Dankers's chief assistant. 2 s With this appointment the affairs of the Schuma battalions came within the purview of the SelfAdministration. At about the same time in late 1941, as the German offen2

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sive ran up against stiff Russian opposition, the need for more manpower became a hot issue. In January 1942 Jeckeln informed the SelfAdministration that the Germans needed 15,000 to 2o,ooo more Latvians to serve in Russia, and in February the SS, which had been handling the enlistment of police, including the Schuma, turned over the task to the Latvians themselves. The office of the Director General of the Interior, more specifically Veiss's colleague, Lt. Col. Roberts Osis, assumed responsibility for recruiting. Unfortunately for the Latvians, they accepted this chore as the initial wave of enthusiasm to enlist ebbed, and the lines of volunteers shrank. 26 While Hitler adamantly held out against the arming of non-Germans, Himmler schemed to create additional non-German formations and beneath the Schutzmannschaft facade. Himmler authorized the forming of one Schuma battalion after another throughout 1942. 2 7 In order to man these new battalions the SS transferred personnel from other police units, and through inducements, pressure, and even coercion, the SS and its Latvian accomplices got the job done. But as long as the process remained voluntary, bringing entirely new blood into the police manpower pipeline became progressively difficult. Since news filtering back from the front was not good, and as word of the poor treatment of Latvians in uniform by the Germans reached home, reluctance and resistance to enlist mounted. Latvians also complained that not only did the Germans deploy Latvians far from home, dispersing them all across the Eastern front, but they also broke up the battalions; small units or even individuals often found themselves on the front line among Germans, not alongside their own countrymen. Yet another source of dissatisfaction was the label of "police", which still rubbed many Latvian military men wrong. It also became clear that the present arrangement would never result in resurrecting a Latvian army, since Stahlecker's practice of scattering Latvian formations precluded the coalescence of anything like a Latvian armed force. Therefore by early 1942 talk of another option, an exclusively Latvian military formation became topical among Latvians. Veiss, whose relationship with the Germans went smoothly as long as volunteers kept enlisting, initially had felt little need for the Latvian civilian SelfAdministration, but with the Germans exerting ever-greater pressure on him to recruit more manpower, the Self-Administration grew in its usefulness. As the latter became more interested in military affairs, it raised the issue of political autonomy as a possible quid pro quo for providing more bodies for the Schuma battalions. 28

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German-Latvian Negotiations and the creation of the Legion By December 1941 the first portents of German vulnerability raised doubts about the inevitable German victory. The Reich's military juggernaut had come to a frigid halt all along the Eastern front, stopping short of its primary objectives. In addition, in early December the enemy coalition had enlisted a new partner in the struggle against the Axis, the United States. Furthermore, the euphoric glow of German "liberation" six months earlier was wearing off for most Latvians, as German occupation policies and practices revealed that hopes for restoring national independence had been illusory at best. For many Latvians the German occupation turned out to be no improvement over Soviet rule, and for some, in particular Latvia's Jews, incomparably worse. One abrasive source of friction in the Latvian-German relationship was the recruitment and deployment of the Schuma battalions. When Dankers, speaking for the SelfAdministration, complained to Reich Commissar Drechsler about the poor training and inadequate care the battalions received and their deployment so far from home, Drechsler scolded the Latvians for failing to live up to their promises to help build these battalions and provide sufficient manpower. 2 9 As enlistment declined, the SS received invaluable assistance from Ostminister Rosenberg. On December 19, 1941, Rosenberg decreed a mandatory labor obligation for all Latvian men and women, requiring them to work for the Reich. It remains unclear whether the SS suggested imposing such an obligation, but it certainly benefited from it. Although international laws prohibited the induction of occupied people into the occupier's military, evidently they did not forbid the use of mandatory labor. As a result Reich authorities henceforth could induct Latvians into any form of nonmilitary labor service, including police work. The SS consequently devised a shrewd scheme whereby the labor office first summoned young Latvians for labor service (RAD) in the Reich or elsewhere. Once the recruits reported, the authorities presented them with a choice: labor service or a stint with the police, meaning the Schuma battalions. The choice to enlist with the Schuma technically remained voluntary, thereby abiding by the voluntary strictures of the enlistment. Both the SS and the Wehrmacht availed themselves of this opportunity to enlist "volunteers" through this deceptive means. By portraying labor service as undesirable, far from home, with difficult living and working conditions, and contrasting it to patriotic duty in the Schuma battalions fighting against Bolshevism, the SS and its Latvian accomplices managed to funnel recruits into so-called voluntary police service. During 1942 and well

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into 1943 it became common practice for inductees into labor service to choose one of three options: RAD service, the Wehrmacht auxiliaries (Hiwis), or the SS-sponsored Schuma battalions. Exposed to enticements as well as coercion-from both Latvians and Germans-the majority opted for the Schuma.3° In early January 1942 Lt. Col. Osis, soon to become the chief Latvian recruiter, met with Jeckeln to discuss the Schuma situation. In return for raising more battalions, which Jeckeln demanded, Osis recommended that the Germans improve conditions for Latvians in these units. He also suggested that the Reich should make some political concessions to the Latvian nation, gestures that would make the Latvians more amenable and responsive to German needs. With tangible gratuities in hand, he could readily raise an additional s,ooo to 6,ooo volunteers. Jeckeln listened patiently, but remained noncommittal, except for promising to take the matter to his superiors. Dankers also approached Jeckeln but got nothing more from him than a demand for more battalions and 15,000 to 20,000 more volunteersY Apparently Latvian appeals moved Jeckeln slightly, as he began hinting to Latvian officers of greater political autonomy in return for more volunteers. Jeckeln even broached the possibilities of creating a separate Latvian SS force and of elevating the Schuma battalions to the level of regiments, even divisionsY But the fate of the Latvians was not for Jeckeln to decide. The prerogative belonged to Himmler, and as late as May 1942 the RFSS cautioned: "The formation of SS units consisting of Estonians, Latvians or even Lithuanians is surely enticing: however, it is fraught with danger."33 And in July he declared, "I want pure and simply, for all time, to prevent the admission, as a result of the exigencies of war, of all men who are not from the strictest point of view qualified to be SS men."34 Eventually Himmler, facing manpower shortages for his highcasualty-sustaining Waffen-SS, and urged by several SS subordinates, including chief Waffen-SS recruiter Berger and Jeckeln, reconsidered his objections against including Baltic people in the Waffen SS. He ordered Berger to renew efforts to recruit for the SS in the Reich, among ethnic German communities throughout Eastern Europe, and even among nonGerman nationalities such as the Baltic peoples. A significant factor in this turnaround was the growing interest on the part of the Wehrmacht to enlist non-German auxiliaries. Himmler did not want to be left behind, picking up the Wehrmacht's crumbs, and by late summer 1942 he decided to build the first non-Germanic Legion, the Estonian Legion. In

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Himmler's estimate the Estonians stood highest in the Baltic racial hierarchy-indeed in the entire East-and therefore deserved first consideration for their own legion. In late August 1942 SS authorities in Tallinn announced the creation of a volunteer Estonian Legion under the aegis of the Waffen-SS.Js Since building a national legion seemed several steps closer to achieving the cherished goal of resurrecting a national army than the scattered Schuma units, Latvian aspirations shifted. Besides, creating a Latvian Legion also implied a turn toward greater political autonomy, a recognition of sorts. One further Latvian consideration favoring the legion was the worsening of German military fortunes and the prospect of a Soviet return, which-so thought some Latvians with astonishingly little sense of reality-might provoke the Western Allies to intervene, and having their own military force would place the Latvians in a better position to reclaim their independence.3 6 Therefore on November 3 Dankers along with Latvian officers Veiss, Osis, and Silgailis took their case for a legion to Walther Schroder, the SSPF for Latvia. Schroder first wanted to discuss recruiting, and in view of declining numbers of volunteers he suggested an induction of certain age groups, a recommendation to which the Germans would repeatedly return. As for the legion, Schroder passed the buck, by referring them to his superior, Jeckeln, who had already excused himself from making any firm commitment on this matter by invoking his need to consult even higher authoritiesY A political bombshell, however, was about to drop. As already noted in the discussion on politicalautonomy, on the following day, November 4, the Latvian directors general met to discuss the legion issue and autonomy. The directors agreed that these two issues, when connected, could offer a better chance for success. The Germans wanted more troops, the Latvians wanted greater autonomy, and the creation of a legion could satisfy both sides. They minced no words while among themselves, but as usual the directors became malleable in the presence of the Germans. Director General for Justice Alfreds Valdmanis, the most outspoken of them all, decided to bypass his timid colleagues and take unilateral action. On November 11 he submitted to the general commissar for Latvia, Otto Drechsler, a memo titled "The Latvian Problem," articulating the true sentiments of the Self-Administration. In it Valdmanis boldly suggested that if the Germans wanted Latvian cooperation in raising military units, they would have to recognize Latvian political needs, expressly political autonomy similar to that of Slovakia.38

The Latvian Legion I 273 As if one self-indicting, intentionally provocative memo to the Germans was not enough, on November 30 Valdmanis forwarded another one, in which he explicitly suggested that if the Reich recognized Latvia's autonomy, the Self-Administration could easily raise an army of 1oo,ooo men. 39 When Drechsler responded evasively, claiming he could not pass the memo to higher authorities because it came from only one person, all the general directors signed it. This time both Drechsler and Lohse replied, and together they rejected the terms because they inappropriately-and impudently-set conditions on German rule. Eventually word of the audacious Latvian entreaty reached Berger, who also dismissed any thoughts of a Latvian army, but nonetheless mulled over the possibility of creating a legion.4o With the buzz about a Latvian legion in his ear, and as the German military situation continued to erode, in early January 1943 Himmler visited the Leningrad front, where several Latvian battalions fought shoulder to shoulder with German forces. While inspecting the troops, he encountered two Latvian units assigned to the 2nd SS Motorized Infantry Brigade. The spirit and demeanor of the Latvians impressed Himmler so greatly that right on the spot he decided to bring together three Latvian Schuma battalions-which officially would change their titles from Schuma to Latvian Police Battalions in May 1943-and renamed the Brigade the 2nd Latvian (lettische) 55-Volunteer Brigade.4' Shortly afterwards, with Berger's urging, he took the issue of forming a legion to Hitler, whom he met in Posen on January 23. Aware of the worsening military situation and the Reich's critical need for manpower, and with the recommendation of the Reichsfuhrer SS on his mind, on the following day Hitler approved strengthening the Brigade with additional Latvian units and designating the Brigade the Latvian SS Volunteer Legion, or the Latvian Legion. On February 10, 1943, he formally signed the order creating the Legion.42 Actually the designation of the SS Brigade as the 2nd Latvian 55Volunteer Brigade carried greater significance than the title "Latvian Legion." The renaming of the Brigade as a Latvian Brigade resulted in higher status for the soldiers in these Latvian units, status of near equality with the Waffen-SS in pay, provisions, and other material benefits. The title Latvian Legion brought with it no everyday, in-the-trenches changes for the men of the 2nd Brigade. The legion designation amounted to little more than window dressing and a catchy new title. It did not exist as a distinct military entity and did not have its own command hierarchy or organizational scheme. In May 1943 Himmler defined the Latvian Legion

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as all Latvian elements of the Waffen-SS and the police, created and operating under SS auspices. Henceforth, gathered under the rubric of Latvian Legion would be all Latvian formations within the SS command structure.43 For what it was worth, having their own legion did place the Latvians symbolically on the same plane as other non-Germans privileged to have their own legions. The Latvian Self-Administration had learned of the newly granted status of legion at a meeting with SSPF Schroder on January 26. Rather than the expected elation, Schroder encountered a reserved, even sullen response and demands for the same concessions the directors had been proposing since November. Before they committed themselves to procuring volunteers for the newly established Legion the directors demanded better conditions for the Latvian people; otherwise additional volunteers would not be forthcoming. The directors repeated their call for Latvian political autonomy, giving Latvian soldiers a goal to fight for. They added several other requests, including an end to the police persecution of Latvian nationalists and a release of those already in prisons and KZs; the reprivatization of property nationalized by the Soviets; and finally equal status for Latvians with Germans in regards to wages, food, and certain rights. Schroder heard them out and promised to submit these items to his superiors, an evasive and procrastinating tactic the Germans employed endlessly to stonewall Latvian requests. 44 He then met with several Latvian officers, including Veiss and Silgailis, hoping that soldiers would be more accommodating in this military matter, but when Schroder suggested the raising of another regiment and introducing induction as a means to acquire the manpower, the officers declined to commit themselves and deferred instead to the Self-Administration.4s Frustrated with Latvian obstinacy, on January 29 both Schroder and Drechsler met with the Self-Administration. The Latvians persisted in their push for autonomy as well as requesting remedies for the other grievances, while on their part the Germans countered with demands for more troops and the introduction of mobilization-drafting Latvians for the Legion. Since Dankers's timidity in the presence of Germans once more got the better of him, Valdmanis took the floor. In an impassioned plea-which amounted to his swan song-he alluded to President Roosevelt of the United States supporting independence for the "niggers" of Liberia, and the British advocating the national cause of Persia, but what about Latvians? Valdmanis warned that unless the Germans yielded on Latvian statehood, the Self-Administration would lose credibility with the Latvian people, which would detrimentally affect the German war effort.

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He pleaded for independence or at least autonomy and stressed that Latvians preferred to receive it from the Germans, not from the West, for only the Germans were in a position to grant it and make it stick. On the issue of mobilizing Latvians, Valdmanis disingeniously argued that the SelfAdministration had no authority to order a call-up since the Germans had granted it no governing power. The meeting ended in an impasse, without any resolution.4 6 The following day the Self-Administration pondered its next move. Dankers rationalized that the Germans would begin conscription regardless of what the Latvians did and was prepared to acquiesce to the creation of the Latvian Legion on German terms, which included mobilization. He reasoned that in order to avoid losing all influence in military matters the Latvians should initiate an induction.47 Evidently the pliant Dankers, not the assertive Valdmanis, won over the other directors, who consented to an induction; the Germans did not force it upon them unilaterally. More meetings between the Self-Administration and the Germans followed, during which Dankers agreed to cooperate in building a Latvian fighting force. In exchange the Germans, including Jeckeln, Schroder, and Drechsler, promised to address Latvian grievances. Jeckeln seemed particularly amenable to improving relations with the Self-Administration, concurring with Dankers in principle that Latvians should command the Legion, and the troops would be kept close to home. He also promised to stop the harassment of Latvian nationalists, another Latvian demand.48 Resigned to accepting the Legion, on February 23 the general directors submitted a petition to Lohse, Drechsler, and Jeckeln in which Dankers stipulated the preconditions for Latvian cooperation. From national independence and other more general political requests, Dankers narrowed Latvian objectives to specific military items, such as having Latvian officers in command of the Legion, the legionnaires receiving the same benefits and treatment as Germans, the Legion training in Latvia, and the troops staying close to home.49 The Germans must have construed these minimal, purely military requests as a commitment by the Latvians to cooperate fully, for on the next day, February 24, Lohse published a summons for all Latvian men born in the years 1919-1924 to register for induction. Lohse, having consulted with the SS, hitched his summons to Rosenberg's obligatory labor service decree. Those called up could choose between RAD work and armed service: "With Adolf Hitler to victory, to arms, to work!"so In this showdown with the Germans Dankers had blinked too soon. Unknown to the Latvians their pleas for political concessions had fallen

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on a few sympathetic ears. Both Himmler and Rosenberg agreed that conceding a measure of autonomy would be the prudent course to follow in dealing with the Latvians. For Rosenberg, Latvian autonomy fit in well with his goal to build an Eastern state system under German suzerainty, and he had even drafted a decree for granting some autonomy. As for Himmler, national independence under German supervision presented an opportunity to circumvent international proscriptions against inducting conquered subjects. If Latvia had a nominally independent government, that government could legally sanction mobilization for a national military force fighting on the German sideY Both subordinates proposed their ideas to Hitler, but the Fuhrer, who had already approved forming the Legion, remained fervently opposed to granting autonomy and rejected the proposal outright, just two days before formally signing the formal authorization for the Legion on February lOY Once the Fuhrer had officially signed the Latvian Legion into existence, events moved rapidly. Having already designated the 2nd SS Motorized Infantry Brigade as an exclusively Latvian formation within the Waffen-SS, the SS in mid-February announced through Berger's office the creation of the 15th Latvian SS Volunteer Division. The 2nd Brigade as well as the proposed 15th Division would comprise the Latvian Legion. As commander of the new division the SS initially assigned SS Brigadefuhrer and General Major of the Waffen-SS Peter Hansen. Hansen's appointment ignited a chain of events that through misunderstanding and a good dose of German duplicity shrouded the birth of the Legion in acrimony and distrust. The Latvian Self-Administration had assumed, and by all indications the Germans had approved, assigning command of the Legion to a retired Latvian general, one of the few generals that had survived the Soviet occupation, Rudolfs Bangerskis.s3 The source of the misunderstanding may have been the ambiguous definition of Latvian Legion. Himmler had not yet authoritatively defined the Legion-which he would on May 24-and evidently the Latvians regarded the Legion and the newly proposed 15th Division as one and the same. Berger on the other hand either considered the two entities as distinct or simply imposed German control over both by appointing Hansen as commander of the division. In early March Himmler decided the matter by granting the post of commander of the 15th Latvian SS Volunteer Division to the Latvian, Bangerskis, with Col. Arturs Silgailis as Division Chief of Staff. Hansen, who arrived in Latvia in early March to begin organizing the new division, accepted the revised arrangement without complaint and even administered the legionnaire's oath to the two Latvian officers on March 19,

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1943. Bangerskis accepted the rank of Legion-Brigadeftihrer und General Major der Lettische SS Freiwilligen Legion.s4 Bangerskis's command of the 15th Latvian SS Volunteer Divisionexisting mostly on paper while waiting for staffing and soldiers-proved ephemeral. In late March, somewhere in the higher reaches of the SS command a change of mind occurred, possibly-and this is conjecture only-with the Fuhrer's intervention. On March 30, in a conversation over recruitment, Jeckeln informed Bangerskis that his appointment had been a mistake, a misunderstanding. On the pretext that Bangerskis was not a Reich citizen and that a division commander wielded Reich legal authority and had to be a citizen, the Germans revoked his division command.ss More likely the revocation resulted from German hesitancy to entrust a non-German with authority over a sizeable armed military formation. Non-German control over an entire division posed not only a potential military threat to German forces under certain circumstances, such as a reversal of allegiances in face of military defeat, but also provided the nucleus of a Latvian national army that many Latvian officers coveted and the Germans had no intention to revive. In order to rectify this embarrassing faux pas, on April 7 the Germans "promoted" Bangerskis to Inspector General of the Latvian Legion, a loftysounding title but lacking in command authority. In his new post he reported directly to Himmler, at first glance a privileged and important arrangement, but one with limited prerogatives since no chain of command except for his own staff existed beneath him. Mostly a liaison and public relations position, the inspector general inspected and supervised the noncombat affairs of the Legion, which at that time was defined as the 15th Latvian SS Volunteer Division and the 2nd Latvian SS Volunteer Brigade. Bangerskis had no command authority over the Latvian units in the field. Germans commanded the units of the Legion, beginning with Hansen as the reappointed commander of the 1sth Division.s 6 In addition to designating Bangerskis as Inspector General, the SS promoted him to the rank of SS Gruppenfiihrer and Lt. General in the Waffen-SS, a distinction that should put to rest any postwar exculpations that as Inspector General of the Latvian Legion he did not belong to the SS.57 As for Division Chief of Staff Arturs Silgailis, as compensation for losing his post, the SS created a unique position, Infantry Officer of the 1sth Division (Infanteriefuhrer), the highest position held by a Latvian in the 15th Division, and later in the 19th Latvian SS Volunteer Division. The Infantry Officer advised the division commander, invariably a German, and represented Latvian interests-another liaison position without

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command powers. On April 7 Jeckeln swore in Latvian officers, lieutenant colonels, as commanders of the regiments constituting the 15th Division and the znd Brigade, the highest command positions held by Latvians. 58 Commenting on these ceremonies from afar, Berger noted in late May, "By June 1 [we] must have ready a division and brigade-how, I don't care."s9 Berger left the means up to his recruiters, and in the case of Latvia, mostly to the Latvians themselves. Bargaining with the Germans in hopes of exchanging Latvian cooperation in recruitment for German political concessions had backfired on the Self-Administration. The Germans expected the Latvians to assume responsibility for inducting their own people into the Latvian Legion and sending them off as cannon fodder to fight and die for the German cause, not for Latvian statehood or even autonomy. Somehow things had gone awry. Mobilizing Latvians for the Leaions Prior to the creation of the Legion the Germans were already enlisting a few Latvians into the Schuma units under conditions other than voluntary. Rosenberg's decree making one year of service in the RAD (Labor Service) a prerequisite for university admission helped steer a few recruits in that direction. After a year's service in the Reich, seduced by propaganda and incentives as well as a good measure of pressure, a number of young Latvians succumbed and enlisted. 60 The pivotal measure in the process of circumventing prohibitions against induction but still maintaining the appearance of voluntarism remained Rosenberg's December 19, 1941, decree establishing mandatory labor service. From its inception, the authorities realized the potential of the labor obligation as a cover for bringing in "volunteers" for the Police units, but it was not until early 1943 and the creation of the Legion that German recruiters exploited this convenient law to its fullest extent. Although the Latvians were already recruiting and enlisting men for the Schuma battalions and assumed they themselves would procure troops for the Legion, in mid-February SS Standartenftihrer Hierthes arrived in Riga to set up a recruitment office. While the general directors argued among themselves and met incessantly with the Germans on one issue or another related to mobilization, Hierthes quietly established the SS Ersatzkommando Ostland, an office for enlisting volunteers for the Legion. Through his creation Hierthes proceeded to recruit on his own and sent out notices to young men to register for enlistment. What grated on the Latvians most was the fact that Hierthes summoned recruits in the name of the Self-Administration. 6 ' Before matters totally got out of

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Latvian control, Silgailis met with Hierthes on February 23 to coordinate the recruitment, for all practical purposes becoming an induction. In the course of their conversation they agreed to invoke Rosenberg's obligatory labor law as the legal basis for registering and then enlisting young Latvian men born in the years 1919-1924 for the Legion. Complicating matters further, it was on the following day, as noted above, that Lohse publicized his own summons based on the labor decree. 62 The response to Lohse's and Hierthes's appeals left much to be desired, and not until the semiofficial Latvian newspaper Tevija published the call-up on March 5 did significant numbers report. A few days later Dankers also issued an appeal in Tevija, followed by a radio broadcast to the nation on March 23. 6 3 Since the legal basis for the conscription campaign was Rosenberg's labor law, and conscripts technically registered for labor service and not the military, the venue for registration was the local labor office. It was here that those reporting had to declare their choice: either RAD labor service, the Wehrmacht as Hiwis, or the Latvian Legion. A barrage of propaganda appealing to their Latvian patriotism overwhelmed the young recruits. If that failed, the recruiters progressively tried various enticements, intimidation, and even coercion. Few could resist. The SS and Legion recruiters concentrated on the physically fit, directing others to the Wehrmacht as Hiwis, or to the RAD for work in the Reich. In addition to common soldiers the Legion also sought former NCOs and officers who had not yet reported for active duty, often applying similar pressure tactics to secure their services. 64 Many of the eligible did not comply. Some reported but managed to secure deferments from their employers as being indispensable (unabkommlich). Others simply did not show up, forcing the police to resort to press-gang methods, arresting and sending some to hard labor camps, others directly to the front. Still others took to the woods and went into hiding, several finding their way into Red partisan bands. When a group of university students protested the mobilization, the police arrested some twenty. 6 s The authorities estimated 90,000 young men born in the years 19191924 were eligible to enlist. Although numbers vary, one reliable source counted 67,584 men as having reported and registered, of which 15,000 to 18,ooo were designated as qualified for the Legion, 11,000 as suitable for the Hiwis, and another 27,000 for various labor assignments including the RAD. Of those selected for the Legion, as of April15, only 2,478 had signed up. In the case of many recruits the lack of equipment, insufficient training cadre, and inadequate training facilities slowed their processing

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and sending them off to war. 66 But for the first group of inductees, war came far too quickly, evoking outraged protests from Latvian leaders. On March 28, 1,000 brand new recruits assembled on the parade ground and in the presence of Latvian and German notables took the legionnaire's oath. Bangerskis gave a rousing, patriotic speech, which was followed by the singing of the Latvian national anthem. The next day Bangerskis received a phone call from the father of one of the recruits frantically protesting that the young men had been taken to the train station to be shipped to the front, just days after enlisting, with absolutely no training. A shocked and disbelieving Bangerskis rushed to the station. The SS officer in charge informed Bangerskis that he was only following the Reichsfiihrer's orders and that the recruits would receive training some twenty kilometers behind the front before being sent into actual combat. Bangerskis and Silgailis protested to Hansen, to Jeckeln, to anyone with authority against sending these untrained boys directly into combat, but to no avail. 6 7 It became painfully clear to Bangerskis and the Latvian leadership who was really in control of the Latvian Legion. Even the inspector general of the Latvian Legion-the man designated to care for and represent Latvian soldiers' interests-was powerless to influence events once the Germans had decided their course. The Germans continued to demand more recruits, including officers and NCOs. Since the call for volunteers after the initial rush to enlist had brought disappointing results, on May 21 Dankers ordered former officers and NCOs to register with the local police for a return to active duty. Failure to do so would result in dire consequences according to wartime laws. Threats mostly failed, since Dankers's blustering summons brought in only a few hundred registrants out of the 1,ooo or so "invited." Many former cadre purportedly did not want to fight for the German cause and regarded the entire enterprise as illegal and not in the interest of Latvia. The authorities threatened the recalcitrant with the loss of ration cards, hard labor, and even incarceration in concentration camps. The police rounded up some draft-evaders, but their resources were stretched too thin to enforce the military summons effectively. The list of enemies for the police to monitor and apprehend had expanded beyond their capacity to respond. 68 The conscription campaign continued unabated, and despite refusals to register, desertions, and disappearances, the numbers in the ranks of the Legion steadily climbed. By mid-August 1943 the units comprising the Latvian Legion totaled 28,014 men. Of these, 10,621 served in the 15th Division; 6,586 in the 2nd Brigade; 9, 710 in the police battalions, which by this time officially were no longer called Schuma; and another

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1,000 in the border guards and other units. The Wehrmacht had managed to enlist some 12,700 as Hiwis. As for the recent mobilization campaign, since March the Legion had examined and conscripted 17,000 suitable men, while another s,soo had volunteered. Of the 17,000 draftees only 11,000 reported for duty. The remainder, some 6,ooo in all, failed to appear. 69 Through the late summer of 1943 the recruitment for the Legion nominally remained a voluntary action, even though in practice it amounted to an induction. Shortly the ruse of voluntarism would be discarded altogether, and an unambiguously overt conscription would be decreed. Rimmler's visit to Latvia in mid-September 1943 set the process in motion. At a gala dinner in his honor on September 23 the Reichsfiihrer SS arranged to have Bangerskis and his Chief of Staff Aleksandrs Plensners sit at his table, along with HSSPF Ostland Jeckeln. Using all the charm he could muster, Himmler resorted to the carrot rather than the stick to win even greater cooperation from the Latvians. He praised the performance of the Latvian combat forces and suggested that a nation of such great soldiers deserved to have "its road smoothened." Informed of the critical issues and Latvian sensitivities, he told the Latvians what they wanted to hear, for instance, that Latvian soldiers should be fighting closer to home and should know they were fighting for their own country. Although during the conversation he expressed sympathy with autonomy and even restoring a Latvian state, Himmler promised only one explicit measure: German officers in Legion units would also wear, as did their Latvian subordinates, shoulder patches with the emblem "Latvija." Indeed, the Latvians had fought so well that he intended to enlarge the Latvian Brigade into a second Latvian division and combine the two divisions into a Latvian Corps. But such a measure would require even more manpower, some 8,ooo additional soldiers. He offered to secure the release of some 5,000 men from the RAD to help man the new division, but only conscription could raise the necessary supplements. Bangerskis suggested transferring 12,000 Latvian Hiwis as another source of manpower, to which Himmler-evidently preferring to avoid yet another quarrel with the Wehrmacht-responded with the excuse that such measures would take time.7° At the end of the evening Bangerskis thanked the Reichsfiihrer SS for his compliments and generosity and went home, trying to figure out whether the Latvians had come out ahead, or had fallen further behind. It soon became apparent that while Himmler was patting Bangerskis on the back, he was also picking his pocket. On October 4, 1943, the Germans launched an even more concerted recruitment drive than the

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one in the spring. This time there was little mention of volunteering. Although occasionally the labor law was invoked, essentially this campaign entailed conscription. The Germans also extended the eligibility range to the 1915 birth year, thereby broadening the existing pool of potential draftees. Threatening harsh consequences for those failing to report, the Germans broadcast a radio appeal on October 6 without consulting either the Self-Administration or the Latvian Legion staff. Once more Bangerskis and Dankers were forced to react to a German initiative. They protested the German summons, especially since the Germans called up the recruits in their names and without their consent, but in the end they compliantly acquiesced to the fait accompli, and as they had before and would do again, consented to cooperate.?' On October 12 Bangerskis published his own appeal to all eligible Latvians: "Bolshevism continued to reach out for Latvia.... Latvians could stand aside and further the possibility of invasion, or could join the Latvian Legion and help avert danger. There was no alternative." 72 By early November 1943 the Soviet threat was no longer mere hyperbole used to prod reluctant recruits into enlisting. After the Stalingrad debacle earlier in the year and the defeat at Kursk in southern Russia in the summer, the recapture of Kiev by the Red Army on November 6 dramatically underscored the Reich's precarious military situation. Even closer to Latvia, localized Soviet successes on the Leningrad front compounded the sense of urgency. From this point on the Latvians became less inclined to quibble over conscription. All pretense of voluntarism vanished when on November 10 the Self-Administration learned that Hitler himself had ordered both Latvia and Estonia to draft even more manpower from the 1915-1924 pool, a number that turned out to be 20,ooo.73 Since German results from recruiting in Latvia failed to reap expected numbers, Drechsler suggested to Dankers that the Latvians should assume full responsibility for mobilization. After more agonizing and rationalizing, the Self-Administration agreed to accept this unpleasant duty. Bangerskis reasoned: "The enemy is at the gates, and now there is no force that can stop them except the German army. It is moot to debate the induction question, whether we have the right or not."74 The SelfAdministration concurred and assigned responsibility for the conscription of Latvians to Bangerskis, the inspector general of the Latvian Legion. The Self-Administration continued to press for autonomy and in a flurry of discussions and communications with the Germans submitted yet another request. The Germans ignored this latest appeal as they had

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all others and replied curtly that the Latvians had no choice but cooperate with the conscription. The Self-Administration, resigned to following German orders and seeing no way out, agreed to conduct the mobilization, but according to the laws and procedures of the former Latvian Republic.75 Although sources differ on the date-either November 15 or 16Dankers announced the mobilization at a solemn ceremony at the aula of the university at which had gathered prominent Germans as well as Latvians, civilians as well as the military. Dankers justified the mobilization to the Latvian public on military exigency, as enemy forces threatened Latvian territory and disaster loomed for Latvia if they returned; this could not be allowed to happen. He therefore called on Latvians to sacrifice their blood, and in return they could hope for a restoration of self-rule. Bangerskis also spoke, assuring Latvians that he would administer the mobilization in a way that protected their interests. The Germans seemed not to care what the Latvians said, as long as they delivered the manpower, including former officers and NCOs.7 6 The first conscription orders went out on December 1, 1943. Although the Latvians had assumed full responsibility for the induction, the SS continued to operate its own recruitment service, the SS Ersatzkommando Ostland under Hierthes. What mattered most to the SS was having secured the official approval of the Latvian Self-Administration and having the Latvians accept responsibility for this illegal affair. The SS would, nonetheless, remain involved in the process, endeavoring to maximize the returns through intimidation and by seeking out those who failed to report. Not trusting the Latvians to make a serious effort, Hierthes monitored the Latvians and expended his enforcement powers as he saw fit. This combination of Latvian responsibility and German enforcement proved effective, as a steady stream of new Latvian blood flowed into the Legion's units. Although a precise count of recruits for this induction campaign remains elusive, by the end of January 1944, of the 2o,ooo eligible, nearly 14,000 reported, of which s,zoo were inducted. According to several sources, by this time some 40,000 Latvians were serving in the ranks of the Latvian Legion.n In early 1944 the German military situation deteriorated even further, especially once the Soviets launched a major offensive all along the northern front, which, with a few interruptions and incidental reversals would inexorably advance toward the Baltic States. Under mounting pressure all along the front, the Germans turned to the Latvians again, demanding even more men. In early January Berger invited Bangerskis and his Chief of Staff Plensners to Berlin to discuss the conscription and to exhort the

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Latvians to squeeze out even more manpower. Berger reproved his guests for the failure of the induction campaign to meet expectations and suggested that results would improve if the Germans took over the induction business, or at least if the Latvians conscripted the German way. Both Bangerskis and Plensners objected, since control over the mobilization was the last vestige of authority the Latvians held over their soldiers. They also broached the issue of giving the Latvians a cause for fighting, something that would attract more Latvians to the colors. Berger assured them that after the war Latvia would regain its autonomy and would enjoy a privileged position in the new Europe. After all, he confided: "We are not Russians, we do not need slaves .... We do not want to deceive you, nor exploit you. [You] have a great duty, to bring along the Latvian people (Tauta) to a common victory." 78 Berger added that he would like to be able to tell the Fuhrer that 7 percent of all Latvians were engaged in the struggle, and once they reached that percentage, the time would be right to pose the political question. He concluded by observing cynically but realistically, "You are forced to fight more than us. We can retreat, but what about you?"79 Back in Riga on January 25, 1944, Bangerskis and Plensners met with Jeckeln and his top two SS subordinates in Latvia, Schroder and Hierthes, to discuss the mobilization and the war situation. Jeckeln, who had recently met with Hitler, informed Bangerskis that Hitler presently anticipated exploiting military opportunities in the West and therefore expected the Eastern front to take care of itself with already available resources. This meant that the Latvians and Estonians would have to contribute even more to the defense of their own lands. He recommended that the Latvians supply 2o,ooo additional men to the common cause and assured them that these conscripts would receive the latest in weapons, the best of care, and would be used close to home, not in the Ukraine or on some other distant front. When Bangerskis expressed concern that a wholesale mobilization would leave the home front vulnerable to partisans and Russian POWs, Jeckeln suggested using the Aizsargi, assigning them to defend the rear areas and shooting all suspicious Russians. "Teach the women to shoot!" exclaimed Jeckeln. Deflecting Bangerskis's protestations that a massive call-up would interrupt farm work, Jeckeln reminded him that it was winter and no workers were needed for two or three more months. Finally, as an inducement, he agreed to grant amnesty to Latvians who so far had evaded the induction. 80 On the next day the Self-Administration discussed Jeckeln's proposals. Not only the SS but also Drechsler urged Bangerskis to speed up mobiliza-

The Latvian Legion I 285 tion. Although in view of the threatening military situation the Latvians agreed to expand Latvia's armed forces, they also continued to press for political concessions, not only for autonomy but also for another demand, the revocation of the Reich's recognition of Latvia's annexation by the Soviet Union. 8 ' A week later, they met again to discuss the latest German response. Evidently Jeckeln had lowered the mobilization quota to 10,000, and Drechsler's office informed the Latvians that the issue of self-rule was being considered "on high." As to the question of the Reich's continued recognition of Latvia as a part of the Soviet Union, the Germans intimated they were amenable to revoking it. Several directors wanted to see these "promises" in writing before they committed to stepping up mobilization. Having already tried everything in their power to bring in conscriptsincluding the threat of the death penalty-all that they could do to gather additional bodies was to expand the age range for induction. Whether or not they received written confirmation prior to acting is unknown, but Bangerskis shortly ordered calling up the 1910-1914 age groups and a few days later summoned the 1906-1909 cohorts. He intended to assign these older men to the border guards, thereby releasing younger border guards for the front. 82 Insatiable German demands did not stop with the older age groups. They also coveted the young. In April1944, as the front drew even closer, the Germans asked the Latvians to draft some 7,000 boys and 400 girls, aged fourteen through sixteen, as air defense auxiliaries, to operate searchlight and antiaircraft batteries. The Self-Administration emphatically refused to induct these children, but agreed to consider letting them "volunteer." In May the pliable Dankers visited Berlin and upon his returnevidently persuaded by one German office or another-consented to the voluntary enlistment of these minors. Since the Self-Administration understood very well the meaning of "volunteer" to the Germans, their approval of a "voluntary" recruitment knowingly surrendered these children to the Germans for induction and military service.8 3 For all practical purposes by midsummer 1944 the entire Latvian nation was at the disposal of the German war effort. On July 17, with the Red Army having reached Latvia, Jeckeln, who had been recently assigned by Hitler to organize the Ostland's territorial defenses, publicly called on the Latvian people to join in the total struggle against the Bolsheviks who had returned to their land. The Germans and their Fuhrer, so he assured the Latvian people, would not abandon them and would fight alongside them for the final victory. 8 4 This time the call for total mobilization was literally

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total-men, women, and even children-going well beyond conscription for the Latvian Legion. The Leadership and organization of the Latvian Legion While the Latvian leaders continued to quibble with their German masters over mobilization, the Latvian Legion began to coalesce. The organizing of the Latvian Legion consisted of two separate but parallel efforts. One entailed, according to Himmler's orders, transforming the 2nd SS Motorized Infantry Brigade already deployed at the front into a Latvian formation. The other amounted to building from the ground up in Latvia an entirely new division, the 15th Latvian SS Volunteer Division. In both endeavors German SS officers worked with Latvian counterparts to strike a politically acceptable balance between German military needs, which held the highest priority, and Latvian national sensitivities, which counted for less than military imperatives but could not be entirely ignored if this project was to succeed. As discussed earlier, during his visit to the Leningrad front in January 1943 Himmler had discovered the 19th and 21st Latvian Schuma (Police) battalions fighting as part of the 2nd SS Motorized Infantry Brigade. Impressed by their appearance and combat accomplishments he decided not only to convert the 2nd Brigade into a Latvian SS brigade but also to secure Hitler's approval for establishing a Latvian legion. In early February Himmler added the 16th Latvian Police Battalion to the 2nd Brigade, and in May the unit officially became the 2nd Latvian SS Volunteer Brigade, the seminal element of the Latvian Legion. 8 s Although there had been some talk of withdrawing the Latvian units from the front back to Latvia for refitting and reorganization, German front commanders refused to release them because of combat needs. They remained at the front, but henceforth as the Latvian Brigade, also called the Latvian Legion.86 Meanwhile, back in Latvia preparations were underway for building a brand new Latvian SS Volunteer Division from scratch. At the same time that Himmler ordered converting the 2nd SS Brigade into a Latvian formation, he had also ordered the founding of a new Latvian Division to become part of the Legion. The manpower for the 15th Latvian SS Volunteer Division would consist of fresh recruits, first organized into new police battalions and then into regiments. Peter Hansen, who assumed command of the 15th Division after the fiasco over Bangerskis's brief stint as its commander, was the Waffen-SS officer in charge of constructing the division. 87 Since the 15th Division created units as it received inductees, including cadre, its growth was incremental. As a result, its

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components arrived at the front piecemeal, not as a complete division, and most of its men ended up as replacements on the line fighting within the znd Brigade, not the 1sth Division. The 1sth Division did not appear at the front as an integrated combat formation until November 1943, and even then at only partial strength, and by all accounts poorly trained. By the end of 1943 the 15th Latvian SS Volunteer Division had a total of 15,192 men. 88 Shortly after the 1sth Division arrived at the front the SS expanded the znd Brigade to a division, the 19th Latvian SS Volunteer Division. As early as spring 1943, Berger had thought about consolidating the Latvian Waffen-SS units organizationally into a full corps. In October he followed through by creating a headquarters staff for the VI SS Volunteer Corps under SS Gruppenfiihrer Karl von Pfeffer-Wildenbruch. In early 1944 the VI SS Corps came into actual being along the banks of the Velikaya River on the Leningrad front, when on March 16 for the first time the two Latvian divisions fought side by side. After the war the Legion's veterans, organized as the Daugavas Vanagi (the Daugava Hawks), commemorated March 16 as Latvian Legion Day in honor of that event. Prior to the two divisions meeting at the Velikaya, in January the SS included their nationality and a number in parentheses in their official designation: The 1sth SS Volunteer Division added (Lettische Nr. 1 ), since it had seniority in its founding as a division; and the 19th added (Lettische Nr. 2), even though it had been in combat longer as the znd Brigade, but not as a division. In summer 1944 the two divisions underwent a final official name change, becoming the 15. Waffen Grenadier Division der SS (Lettische Nr. 1) and the 19. Waffen Grenadier Division der SS (Lettische Nr. 2). 89 In the opinion of this author, three officers appear to have stood above the rest in their importance in the founding and functioning of the Latvian Legion. Lt. Col. Voldemars Veiss had served on the general staff of the prewar Latvian Army as well as military attache to Finland. During the Soviet occupation he went into hiding, surfacing when the Germans arrived, and having received orders from Stahlecker on July 1, 1941, he organized the auxiliary police. One might regard this moment as the founding of Latvian armed forces in World War II and Veiss as the founding father.9o Veiss gathered a group of like-minded officers to help him first organize the Schuma and police battalions and then the Legion. But before Veiss and his men commenced military activities, they participated in the "cleansing" operations in and around Riga, which included the shooting of communists, political enemies, and Jews. Veiss's subsequent accomplishments as an undeniably courageous, skillful, and popu-

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lar combat officer cannot erase his earlier record as a killer working for the SS. With the establishment of the Self-Administration, Veiss became Dankers's deputy as chief director of internal security, more of a police job than military. As a regimental frontline commander Veiss was instrumental in reorganizing the 2nd SS Motorized Infantry Brigade into a Latvian formation and later became the Division Infantry Officer of the 19th Latvian SS Volunteer Division, the highest Latvian-held post. Fighting at the Volkhov front near Leningrad Veiss briefly took over command of several badly mauled units reorganized temporarily into Kampfgruppe (Battle group) Veiss.9' Heavily decorated by the Germans, in early April 1944 Veiss was fatally wounded. Tens of thousands of Latvians lined Riga's streets for his funeral procession to mourn and honor their foremost war hero.9 Unlike Veiss, Col. Arturs Silgailis rose to prominence from among those Latvians courted and prepared by the Abwehr in Germany. As had been the case with many other Latvian officers, the Soviets had removed Silgailis from the officer ranks as unreliable. Sensing what lay in store for him, Silgailis fled to Germany during the second resettlement in January 1941. After returning to Latvia with the Wehrmacht in 1941, in early 1942 Silgailis took a position with the Self-Administration as head of the personnel section, the one responsible for monitoring the trustworthiness of Latvian officials, essentially a police-like task. A close confidant of Dankers, Silgailis gravitated toward Veiss and his clique. It was this circle that hatched the plans for the resurrection of a Latvian armed force. Silgailis also ingratiated himself with the SSPF Walther Schroder and used this connection to advance the Latvian military cause. With the formation of the Legion, Silgailis assumed the post of Division Infantry Officer with the 15th Latvian SS Volunteer Division and later became chief of staff to Inspector General Bangerskis. Having been in the thick of things during the founding of the Legion and having been close to both Dankers and Bangerskis, Silgailis's importance in respect to the Legion transcended the war years. Silgailis went on to become the foremost publicist for the Legion as well as the most knowledgeable expert on the ins and outs of its founding and operations. Much of the postwar image of the Latvian Legion as a noble and patriotic force dedicated to restoring Latvian independence can be attributed to Silgailis.93 The third prominent officer in the history of the Latvian Legion is General Rudolfs Bangerskis, whose role in the machinations leading to the founding of the first Latvian military formations was negligible, but who nevertheless assumed the preeminent public role as inspector gen2

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eral of the Latvian Legion, nominally the highest post in the Legion. Bangerskis, one of the few generals of the old Latvian Army surviving the Soviet year, had remained in Latvia. Already retired in 1937, Bangerskis had hidden and generally lain low. Although his four volumes of memoirs place him in the thick of things in the forming of the Legion, evidently his role in building up the first Latvian armed forces under the Germans was minimal, certainly not as critical as the efforts of the colonels.94 Not until 1942 did Bangerskis become involved with the Self-Administration, accepting a post in the Justice Directorate. The paucity of surviving Latvian generals made Bangerskis a natural for the post of commander of the first Latvian division, but as explained above, the Germans changed their minds and assigned one of their own to the position instead. The highest-ranking Latvians would be the division infantry officers, at the rank of colonel, essentially liaison positions that went to Silgailis and Veiss.9s Bangerskis had to settle for the nominally higher, noncommand post of inspector general, a liaison position with a high enough profile on which the Germans could heap blame for shortcomings and failures. Although showing more mettle and backbone than the other surviving general in the Self-Administration, Dankers, Bangerskis was pliant enough for German purposes while possessing enough stature and credibility among Latvian soldiers and the public to be accepted as more than just a German puppet. Bangerskis's primary duty was to look out for the interests and welfare of Latvian soldiers, but as the incident of sending untrained recruits to the front illustrates, his influence went only as far as the Germans allowed. German liaison officers scrutinized Bangerskis' every move.9 6 The soldiers of the Latvian Legion followed orders from two sets and levels of commanders. Beginning with the Schuma, then the police battalions, the regiments, and finally the two legion divisions, from the platoon and company level and up through battalion and regiment levels Latvians served as commanders. The lack of experienced and willing cadre at company levels of command accounted in part for the slow mobilization and creation of Latvian units. The highest command rank a Latvian normally held was that of Obersturmbannfuhrer-the SS equivalent to the army rank of lieutenant colonel, usually the commander of a regiment. Latvian regimental commanders received orders from Germans, including the allimportant division commander. With one brief exception, when for a few days in May 1944 Silgailis actually commanded the 19th Division, highranking Waffen-SS officers commanded the Latvian divisions.97 Some, such as Peter Hansen, the architect of the 15th Division, truly respected

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the Latvians as soldiers and trusted and granted considerable leeway to their Latvian subordinate officers, while others, unable to overcome their German cultural and racial arrogance, treated their subordinates condescendingly as inferiors to be tolerated at best.9 8 The question of the Latvian Legion being or not being a genuine SS formation remains to the present day a crucial but unresolved issue. Supporting evidence exists for both sides of the debate. For their own reasons both the SS leadership and the Latvians tried to distinguish between the Legion and its legionnaires on the one hand and the SS on the other. Even the nomenclature used to distinguish Waffen SS units acknowledged distinctions between the non-German SS formations and German SS formations. Exclusively or mostly Reich German Waffen-SS divisions were designated as SS Division, for example, SS Division Das Reich. Predominantly Germanic or ethnic German (Volksdeutsche) divisions received prefixes of SS Freiwilligen (volunteer) Division. The two Latvian and one Estonian divisions, along with several other non-German units, initially also earned the designation SS-Freiwilligen Division, along with the division number-added to all SS divisions in 1942-and nationality: 15. Lettische SS-Freiwilligen Division and the 19. Lettische Freiwilligen Division. In early summer 1944 the designations changed to 15. WaffenGrenadier Division der SS (lettische Nr. 1) and 19. Waffen-Grenadier Division der SS (lettische Nr. 2).99 The Waffen-SS and the Legion were also careful to distinguish their ranks. Although the Legion formally applied Waffen-SS terminology for its ranks (for example, Sturmbannfilhrer instead of the army rank of major), unlike the true Waffen-SS, which prefaced its ranks with SS (for instance SS Sturmbannfilhrer), the Legion designated its ranks first with the prefix "Legion," later with "Waffen" (for example, Legion-Sturmbannfilhrer and Waffen-Sturmbannftlhrer), both without the SS prefix. Apologists for the Legion later pointed to the omission of the SS from the rank as evidence that Latvians formally did not belong to the SS. 100 Among themselves, however, Latvians preferred to use their prewar army ranks instead of the SS equivalents. Furthermore Latvian officers and NCOs (called instructors) commanded their men in Latvian and ran their units as much as possible according to the procedures of the former Latvian army. Their ability to do so depended primarily on the inclinations of individual German superiors and the ubiquitous liaison officers. Some sympathized with the Latvians and condoned the Latvian mode of operation, while others prohibited any deviation from standard German ways. More often than not, Latvians had to defer to Germans. In common

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with the Waffen-SS, Latvian legionnaires came under German military law and regulations, but unlike genuine SS men, Latvians did not receive Reich citizenship for their service; indeed, well into the occupation, the Germans continued to regard Latvians as Soviet citizens. After considerable haggling in February 1944 Dankers persuaded the Germans to concede to the Latvians their own military court, the Legion Court, authorized to pronounce even death sentences, a dubious benefit at best. Latvian apologists also claim that, contrary to common Waffen-SS practice, the Latvians excluded National Socialist ideology from their training, and in contrast to the Waffen-SS, Legion units provided Christian chaplains for spiritual care. 10 ' Nevertheless Latvians swore a personal oath to the Fuhrer: "In God's name I swear unlimited loyalty in the fight against Bolshevism to the commander of the German military, Adolf Hitler, and as a brave soldier, will always be prepared to give my life for this oath."wz The personal inclinations of German officers, the division commanders in particular, determined the level of provision and care Latvian soldiers received. Legionnaires were entitled to regular SS pay and compensation for dependents. Equality in benefits, at least on paper if not always in practice, was the main advantage of serving in the Legion and being part of the Waffen-SS rather than the police. Ideally the Waffen-SS provided improved care, higher pay, better rations, and up-to-date arms and equipment, more or less at the German level. In reality legionnaires usually received less than what their German counterparts did. Aware of the disparity in provisions and care, the Latvian leadership decided to raise money and supplement what the Germans issued by selling stamps commemorating the Latvian Legion. By the time the Germans approved the idea, the front was already in Latvia, and the stamps never appeared.103 The Latvians also established their own hospital in Riga, which supplemented German medical facilities and care.' 4 As for weapons, legionnaires had to make do with an odd assortment from diverse sources, usually captured French, Czech, and Russian arms. When Latvians occasionally showed up at the front with new equipment and the latest weapons, Germans often took these for themselves. ws The Legion also encountered problems with uniform issue. Standardization of uniforms took time, leaving Latvians with a mix of uniforms until regular Waffen-SS attire became available. As a result Latvians had inadequate winter clothing, and what they received was often shoddy. As for emblems, the SS forbid legionnaires to wear the SS runes on their collars. Initially they wore a solid black collar patch in place of the SS runes, but eventually men of the 15th Division wore a Latvian sun emblem, and 0

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those of the 19th Division displayed a distinctive Latvian rune as their collar patch. 106 From wartime photographs one surmises that these regulations were not always honored, since numerous Latvians appear in Waffen-SS uniforms wearing the SS lightning bolts. One cannot help but speculate whether the early black collar patches truly existed. After the war, the practice of soldiers doctoring photographs by blackening these patches to cover up the SS, may have led some to invent the all-black collar emblems retroactively. In September 1943 Himmler authorized legionnaires to wear on the right sleeve a shield-shaped emblem with diagonal red-white-red stripes and Latvija written across the top. 107 As for training, although the Latvians provided some of their own, many Legion officers attended SS schools in the Reich, including the elite Waffen-SS school Bad Tolz. Enlisted men and NCOs requiring specialized training also received it at SS schools, often in the Reich. 108 By July 1, 1944, as the fighting returned to Latvia, 31,446 men served in the Latvian Legion, assigned primarily to the 15th and 19th Waffen-SS Divisions, but also to other SS units. By this time the Legion had already suffered substantial casualties: 3,914 killed, 7,305 wounded, and 1,362 missing. 109 Although the Latvian Legion was the mainstay of Latvian armed forces in World War II, it did not include all Latvians fighting on the German side. According to several sources, as many as 146,610 Latvians served the Germans in various uniformed and armed capacities, far more than those fighting in the narrowly defined Legion of the two Waffen-SS divisions.' 10 Non·SS Latvian Armed Formations

Large numbers of uniformed Latvians also served the Germans outside the Waffen-SS command structure, some armed, some not. The largest contingent of Latvians serving the Germans in non-SS capacity worked for the Wehrmacht as auxiliaries, the Hilfswillige or Hiwis. From the earliest days of the German occupation the regular German armed forces, the Wehrmacht, not the SS, enlisted Latvians as laborers and helpers who literally worked at various tasks from drivers to construction jobs and did not fight. As such, the Hiwis were scattered throughout the German military as individuals or in small groups and did not serve in exclusively Latvian formations, as did the legionnaires. Whereas the Legion's field of operation was limited to the Northern front, the Hiwis, attached to Reich units not Latvian ones, found themselves in such remote theaters as North Africa, Italy, and France. Only at the very end of the war did the Germans arm the Hiwis and send them to the front lines. Some sources

The Latvian Legion I 293 count the number of Latvian Hiwis in the summer of 1944 as 12,000 to 13,000, although other estimates run around 23,000.'" A unique Hiwi unit, the construction battalion, contained "unreliable" elements, including many of Latvia's ethnic Russians. The Wehrmacht organized two of these battalions, whose primary task was constructing airfields and digging fortifications. Notoriously unreliable, their men deserted at the first opportunity.'' 2 The Germans also organized a Latvian Air Legion, composed of former Latvian military aviators as well as flying Aizsargi and aviation club members. In July 1943 the Luftwaffe approached a former Latvian air force pilot, Lt. Col. Janis Rucels and persuaded him to organize an Air Legion, as the Estonians had already done in 1941. By September some 1,200 Latvians had volunteered for this new flying formation. Under German supervision the Latvians set up a training school at the Grobina airfield near Liepaja, where the Germans trained not only Latvians but also Estonians. The inspector general of the Latvian Legion sent qualified men to the flight school, some as fresh conscripts others as transfers from infantry units. By January 1944 the new formation received the official designation Reserve Battle Group Ostland, 1st Night-attack Squadron."3 By March 1944 the Squadron's eighteen night bombers, Arado 66 twoseated biplanes, began flying missions, and in June the Germans expanded the outfit to two bomber squadrons. From March until October, when the Soviets occupied all of Latvia except for western Kurzeme, 1st Squadron had flown 2,900 sorties, while 2nd Squadron had completed 2AS8. In June the two squadrons were combined into a Latvian air group, Nachtschlachtgruppe 12. The commander of the 1st Luftwaffe Division, Maj. General Falkenstein, praised Latvian pilots as the best in his division. "4 In late May 1944 the Luftwaffe ordered the creation of a Latvian fighter squadron, recruiting and sending select officers and ground crews to Germany for training. Not until September did the Latvians get their wings-literally-the top-of-the-line fighter, the Focke-Wolfe 190. The first two Latvian fighter pilots and their aircraft arrived near Riga in the first days of October and joined German units stationed there. With the Red Army drawing closer, in September the training school at Grobina evacuated to the Reich near Stettin, and the air legion relocated to the relative safety of East Prussia, where it was disbanded. One reason for disbanding was fear of defections and loss of aircraft, after two Estonians and one Latvian flew their planes to Sweden. Trustworthy pilots were reassigned to German flying units, a few returned to Latvia briefly, while

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several Latvian fighter pilots flew missions on the Western front and in the defense of Berlin. Latvian ground crews were dispersed throughout Luftwaffe formations, mostly as air-defense personnel manning flakbatteries. Some were assigned to infantry units, including the 15th Division regrouping at the time in Eastern Germany.lls Another category of Latvians fighting for the Germans, but not as part of the Latvian Legion, were the Luftwaffe Auxiliaries, trained mostly as antiaircraft flak-battery gunners and searchlight operators. The age of these recruits was the stuff of tragedy; they were for the most part children, fourteen to sixteen years old, and their induction accounts for the most deplorable, most tragic incident in Latvian armed involvement in World War II. Although the Germans had broached the use of youthful recruits as flak gunners as early as fall1943, it was not until early spring 1944 that they proposed drafting 1927 and 1928 cohorts for the Air Force Auxiliary. The Self-Administration rejected the proposal so soundly that the Germans, unaccustomed to hearing no from the Latvians, even contemplated arresting Dankers. They need not have worried. Summoning Dankers to Berlin in late May 1944, the Germans persuaded him to relent, and he agreed to supply 7,000 young gunners. Although Dankers first insisted upon voluntarily enlistment, he eventually consented to induction.ll 6 By the summer the Luftwaffe had decided to transfer most ground personnel, including antiaircraft gunners, to combat units and replace them with those unfit for combat duty, including youth under military age. On July 27 Dankers, unable to entice sufficient numbers of young volunteers to man the antiaircraft guns and searchlights, issued a conscription order for 1927 and 1928 age groups. Beginning on August 2 and up to September 9, as the Red Army continued its advance deeper into Latvia, over 4,ooo Latvian youth reported, of which 3,614 passed muster and were inducted. Almost immediately these young auxiliaries suffered casualties. During one Soviet air raid on Riga on September 29 thirtyeight of these young Latvians lost their lives, 100 were wounded. According to the agreement, the auxiliaries were to remain in Latvia, but in early October the Germans began evacuating them to the Reich, many of them to Bohemia.ll 7 Yet another type of Latvian formation created under German sponsorship consisted of new border guards units. In January 1944 Jeckeln approached the Self-Administration about conscripting the 1906-1914 age groups. Since the Self-Administration expressed qualms about inducting these older men, Jeckeln promised to form them into border guard regi-

The Latvian Legion I 29 5 ments for duty exclusively in Latvia, since in the foreseeable future the front could reach Latvia. By this time Red partisan activity inside Latvia had intensified, and the border guards could be used in antipartisan operations as well. In February the Latvians managed to raise six border guards regiments, four battalions each, a total of some 17,000 men. Quickly breaking their promises, the Germans ordered these formations one by one to the front, with inadequate weapons, little if any training, primarily as replacements for the 15th and 19th Divisions. Properly speaking, since the majority of these border guards ended up with the Legion, they should be included with Waffen-SS-sponsored Latvian forces. They experienced both high casualty and high desertion rates. In early July, as the battered remnants of the border guards found their way home, Jeckeln consolidated them into Kampfgruppe Jeckeln, a futile act that did little to improve their morale and fighting caliber. " 8 While organizing the new border guard units, Jeckeln scraped the bottom of another barrel, the Aizsargi. After arduous negotiations Jeckeln finally authorized in August 1944 the reestablishment of the Aizsargi and in September re-formed them into several new police regiments. As soldiers, the Aizsargi surpassed even the border guards in their poor quality. They were much older as a whole and even less trained and less physically fit for combat. Nonetheless, the estimated 12,000 to 22,000 men represented a recruitment success in numbers. Desertion rates, however, exceeded those of the border guards, especially when in October the Germans attempted to ship these men to the Reich. "9 One final group deserves at least mention, Latvia's ethnic Russians. In January 1944 the mobilization netted several thousand ethnic Russians along with ethnic Latvian conscripts. These Russians objected to serving with Latvians, and conversely Latvians preferred not having them. Therefore the Germans assigned those judged unreliable to the Hiwi construction battalions and organized the rest-nearly 7,700 men-into ethnic Russian police battalions that served the Germans but not as elements of the Latvian Legion. 120 With the creation of the Vlasov Army, the Russian formation organized by the Germans and commanded by the former Russian General and POW Andrei Vlasov, many members of these Latvian Russian police battalions joined Vlasov's ethnic Russian force, while others were evacuated to fight in Germany. 121 Arriving at an accurate total count of Latvians serving in Germansponsored armed formations is virtually impossible-the proverbial moving target. The varying dates of counts as well as different definitions of the Latvian Legion have resulted in discrepancies. As noted above, in

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July 1944, 31A46 men served in the narrowly defined Legion of the two divisions and a few other related SS formations. Adding these 31A46 to those serving in other formations provides at least a general idea of the number of Latvians in German ranks. According to several reliable sources, other units of the Legion included 972 men; 14,884 in police battalions; 12,118 border guards; 5,240 order police; 22,262 order police auxiliary; 628 in the air legion; 12,159 Hiwis; "other [non-SSJ units," Other, no less reliable 10,585. These numbers add up to 110,294. sources, however, calculate a total of 87,550 for the Legion alone, obviously using a broader definition of Legion. 3 One of these sources offers an additional count of 22,744 Latvians serving outside the Legion, which adds up to the same 110,294. Other sources, starting with the same base of 87,550 for the Legion, calculated the total number of Latvians serving the Germans in 1944 as 146,510. 4 One may only speculate about the 36,ooo-men difference; perhaps they served in the construction battalions, the ethnic Russian units, and the Luftwaffe auxiliaries. Although slightly tangential, a brief glance at the general military experiences of Latvia's Baltic neighbors, Lithuania and Estonia, provides some telling insights into the nature of Latvian military service. The Estonian experience essentially paralleled the Latvian, with the Estonians creating their legion even earlier than did the Latvians-thanks to Rimmler's presumption of Estonian racial superiority among the peoples of the East, placing them above both the Latvians and Lithuanians. The building of the Estonian Legion presaged that of the Latvian Legion, beginning with volunteer police units and culminating in the creation of the 2oth Estonian SS Volunteer Division. By 1944 an estimated 15,000 Estonians served in their legion, some as volunteers, others as conscripts. Although the Estonian-German relationship endured some difficult times, it does not seem to have been fraught with as many quarrels as the Latvian-German partnership. s The story of the Lithuanian wartime experience differs significantly from the other two. The experience began similarly to those of its neighbors, but then diverged sharply. Indeed, critics of the Latvian civilian and military leadership under the German occupation point to Lithuanian choices as options the Latvians could have taken instead of obsequiously acquiescing to every German demand. Evidently many Lithuanians, like Latvians, "spontaneously" joined in pogrom-like massacres of Jews and communists when the Germans first arrived. The SS in Lithuania then reorganized these irregulars into volunteer Schutzmannschaft battalions, similar to those in Latvia. By July 1942 some 16,ooo Lithuanians served 122

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in Schuma battalions and other police units. Matters went smoothly until early 1943, when the SS proposed converting the Lithuanian Schuma battalions into a Lithuanian Legion, comparable to those being constructed in Estonia and Latvia. As in Latvia, most Lithuanians eager to volunteer for service had already done so, and by early 1943 few genuine volunteers responded to the call. When in March the Germans demanded conscription, the Lithuanian military leaders boldly stood up to the Germans and unequivocally said NO! Taken aback by this impertinence, the Germans declared the Lithuanians unfit to wear the SS uniform and sent forty-six prominent Lithuanians to the Stutthof KZ and closed down Lithuania's institutions of higher learning. After additional calls for induction garnered no better response the SS gave up on forming a Lithuanian Legion. 126 Whereas the Latvian leadership caved in to German demands, the Lithuanians resisted surrendering its youth to the German war machine, even when it meant personal jeopardy: incarceration in a German concentration camp. Not until February 1944, with the Red Army approaching, did the Lithuanians finally agree to form armed units to help defend the country-but consisting exclusively of volunteers. They also insisted on keeping these units in Lithuania, to be used solely for the defense of their homeland. As was the case among Latvian officers, many Lithuanian officers perceived in these units the core of a Lithuanian army that might exploit propitious circumstances to restore an independent Lithuania. The voluntary response was substantial, and within a month some 16,ooo recruits had reported. This response only whetted the German appetite, and the Germans demanded 20,000 more recruits, to be sent to the Reich as Luftwaffe auxiliaries and for other purposes. But there was a limit to Lithuanian largesse, and the Lithuanians rejected this latter demand, noting the absurdity of sending Lithuanians to the Reich when the Soviets threatened Lithuania itself. Furthermore, many Lithuanians refused to take the oath to Hitler. The Germans sensed trouble, and in May, fearing a Lithuanian insurrection, they disarmed and dissolved the units already created. As expected, an armed uprising erupted in Kaunas, resulting in the Germans shooting 100 Lithuanians and deporting even more of their officers to Stutthof. The Germans somehow managed to place nearly 4,000 of the disbanded Lithuanians in Luftwaffe auxiliary uniforms and forcibly sent them to the Reich. ' 2 7 Despite the resistance of the Lithuanian military, by January 1945 as many as 36,8oo Lithuanians were serving the Germans, substantially fewer in numbers, however, than Latvians. Of these, only 3,000 belonged

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to SS police units. The rest were assigned as Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht auxiliaries or as laborers in various unarmed work organizations such as the RAD and Organization Todt. 128 The Lithuanian case debunks, or at least partly discredits postwar excuses and justifications for Latvian complicity and collaboration in the German occupation as being unavoidable. Participation in the German armed struggle was more a matter of choice than many postwar Latvian apologists care to admit. The Latvians too could have said no if they had chosen that course. A final consideration in the matter of Latvians serving in the German armed forces is the relationship between Germans and Latvians. Although a clearer picture will emerge in the next chapter, on the Latvian experience at the front, a few observations can be made at this time. On the German side the Fuhrer personally set a tone of arrogance, basing his beliefs of German racial superiority and the concomitant inferiority of non-Germans, and refused at first to sanction non-German fighting units. Only wartime expediency impelled him to compromise and turn to Latvians and others for help. At lower levels responsible military commanders perceived the advantages of non-Germans as partners in combat much sooner than did their leader. It was also on this lower level that Latvians and other non-Germans realized how radically individual Germans differed in their personal attitudes toward them. For some Germans their presumed Herrenvolk superiority carried over as aloofness in their dealings with Latvians. For others, the rigors of a shared frontline experience instilled at least respect, even admiration or friendship for their Latvian comrades. ''9 The majority on both sides of the ethnic divide seemed to understand their partnership was one of circumstance and exigency, and the individual simply had to make the best of it. In this war few enjoyed the luxury of picking and choosing friends or enemies. Fate and the course of events took care of that. Few Germans, as one descends the command hierarchy, seriously viewed their relationship with Latvians and other non-Germans through the ideological lenses of builders of a postwar fraternity in the New Europe; the same was true for Latvians. Many in both ethnic camps did, however, take more to heart their common struggle against "Asiatic Bolshevism." For numerous Latvians, fighting the Soviets provided their principal motivation, their primary reason for taking up arms. As the luster of German "liberation" wore off, and disillusionment set in, for many Latvians the incontestable fact remained that no matter how distasteful the ties with the Germans were, only the Germans could deter

The Latvian Legion I 299 the Soviets. Therefore so many Latvians were willing to bear whatever indignities and injustices might arise from their collaboration with the Germans in order to prevent a Soviet return. 13° Countless incidents tested the tenuous partnership, and over time it deteriorated. For example, in May 1942 a Latvian officer, Rudolfs Kandis, died of a gunshot wound after an argument with a German in the officers' mess. According to the Germans the death was a suicide; the Latvian account blamed the Germans. Incidents such as this one and many others strained this forced alignment. 131 On the other hand, intercession by sympathetic German officers such as Peter Hansen, the organizer of the 15th Division, helped make the alliance at least tolerable. For his outspoken criticism and complaints toSS headquarters about sending untrained Latvians to the front as cannon fodder, Hansen eventually was relieved of his command of the 15th Division. 13 The erosion of the relationship between Germans and Latvians came piecemeal, bit by bit, as each individual, especially on the Latvian side, reached his personal limits of frustration and patience. Some arrived at this threshold sooner than others-increasingly demonstrated through desertion or lesser displays of discontent-while others dutifully continued to fight for the mutual cause to the end. By summer 1943, SD chief Ernst Kaltenbrunner observed increased resentment, even hostility both within the Latvian public and its armed forces toward the Germans and the occupation.133 The source of this manifest discontent was manifold, from casualties at the front to German requisitioning and demands back home, from the German refusal to consider the autonomy question to the mobilization campaign. Empathy for the Latvian plight occasionally came from unexpected sources, as exemplified by SSPF Schroder, confiding to Silgailis in summer 1943: "I understand you Latvians quite well. Should I have been a Latvian, and with my temper, I would have acted more violently. But please, understand me too. Germany is at war. I am here as a German official and as such I have to comply with the direction of my superiors."134 2

Latvians In the Red Army All Latvians fighting in this war did not do so on the German side. Some took up arms on the opposite side of the front in the ranks of the Soviet Red Army. Although far fewer in numbers than those fighting for the Germans, Latvians nonetheless served in the Red Army and engaged in hostilities against their kindred in the Latvian Legion. Some have even observed that in the final stages of World War II the Latvian struggle at least in part assumed the nature of a civil war. Therefore before moving

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on to examine the Latvian combat experience one should take a closer look at the "other Latvians." When the Germans struck on June 22, 1941, little remained of the 24th Latvian Territorial Corps, the erstwhile Latvian Army in its Soviet form. The NKVD had liquidated much of its cadre at Litene a week earlier and many of its enlisted soldiers had deserted and fled into hiding. As part of the Soviet 27th Army the remnants of the 24th Corps retreated into Estonia. Along with the Latvian soldiers, many of them forced at gunpoint to accompany the retreating Red Army, fled militia members, Komsomol activists, LCP functionaries, and Workers' Guards. In Estonia the Soviets regrouped and reorganized this odd collection of some 1,500 armed Latvians into the 1st Latvian Strelnieki Regiment, attached to the Soviet 8th Army. According to some sources the Soviets built two Latvian regiments in Estonia. Suffering heavy casualties, they fought and retreated through Estonia and finally withdrew into the Soviet Union.'3s In early August the Soviets officially liquidated the 24th Territorial Corps-along with its Estonian and Lithuanian counterparts-and reassembled survivors of the Estonian campaign at Gorohoveca, near Moscow. Here they were combined with Soviet Latvians collected from throughout the Red Army into the 201st Strelnieki Division. By early September the 201st Division counted 10,ooo men in its ranks. Ethnic Latvians barely constituted a majority in this Latvian division, but unlike the Latvian divisions that later fought for the Germans, the "Red" Latvian division fought under Latvian commanders, starting with its first division commander, Maj. General J. Veikins. On September 12 LCP Secretary Janis Kalnberzins administered the Red Army oath to the soldiers and presented them their red battle flags.'3 6 The 201st experienced its first test under fire in the defense of Moscow. As a reward for outstanding performance in combat, in early October 1942 the 201st was renamed the 43rd Latvian Strelnieki Guards Division, a distinction recognizing the finest Red Army units. In the presence of LCP notables Kalnberzins and Vilis Lacis on October 19 the former Latvian SSR head of government, Augusts Kirchensteins, bestowed upon the new Guards Division its Guards battle flag.' 37 In 1942 the 43rd Guards Division carried its colors to Staraya Rusa and then to the critical battles around Demyansk. In fall 1943 the unit deployed to Staraya Rusa once more to take up defensive positions as part of the 34th Army, and in mid-October relocated near Velikie Luki, not far from the Latvian border as part of the 22nd Army and the 2nd Baltic Front.'38

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The Soviets also established Latvian aviation units, built from the scraps of the 24th Territorial Corps Aviation Squadron. When in late June 1941 the squadron received orders to fly its aircraft to the Soviet Union, many of its men deserted, and only seven planes reached the Soviet Union. Its personnel, evacuated mostly by force, were reassigned throughout the Red Air Force. In early 1942 the Soviets reassembled these scattered remnants of the 24th at Ivanovo for reorganization and training as a Latvian air unit. By late September 1943, renamed the 1st Latvian Bomber Regiment, it ascended into action, assaulting German positions around Lake Ilmen. Later the Soviets added a Latvian fighter squadron. By January 1944 as part of the 2nd Baltic Front, the missions of these Red Latvian air units neared the Latvian border, and by July they began attacking targets on Latvian territory.'39 Latvian sailors also fought for the Soviets. After Latvia's annexation the Soviet Red Banner Baltic Fleet appropriated all Latvian naval vessels. When the Germans attacked, several Latvian ships survived the initial assault. Of those that remained afloat several saw action defending the Estonian Islands while others escaped to the Gulf of Finland, where they operated as part of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Within six months virtually all formerly Latvian naval vessels rested on the bottom of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland. As one by one the Latvian ships went down, the Soviets dispersed the surviving sailors throughout the fleet and sent others to work in the war industry. '4° One should note that Soviet Latvians did not contribute to the Soviet cause exclusively in Latvian units. Some Soviet Latvians attained high and distinguished ranks in the Red Army. A Latvian, Maj. General E. Magone, commanded the 45th Strelnieki Corps in 1941; another Latvian, Maj. General Janis Dzenitis, fought at Dnepropetrovsk in 1941 and helped take Danzig in 1945; and Col. General Maksis Reiters filled various high military posts in the Red Army. The most illustrious of the Soviet Latvian officers was Col. General Nikolai Berzarins, who served as the first Soviet commandant of Berlin in 1945·'4' As a rule so-called Latvian units in the Red Army did not consist entirely of ethnic Latvians-only slightly more than half, just enough to warrant the designation Latvian. Enlisted in the ranks also were Latvian Jews, who in some calculations, did not count as ethnic Latvians. Of the 1o,ooo soldiers of the 43rd Latvian Strelnieki Guards Division some 1,700 were Latvian Jews, who, according to other counts raised the percentage of Latvians in its ranks to nearly 70 percent. By the end of the war some 5,000 Latvian Jews had contributed to the Soviet war effort, with some

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2,000 losing their lives. Some were dedicated communists, convinced they were fighting for the Soviet cause against fascism; most, however, took up arms against the Germans as the greater of their two evils, a reversal of the Latvian ranking of their mutual nemeses. Overall some soo,ooo Jews served in the Red Army, including more than 100 with at least lieutenant general rank.'4 The 43rd Guards Division continued to fight into 1944, suffering high casualties along the way. In January 1944 the 43rd Guards joined in the major Soviet winter offensive at Leningrad and the Volkhov River. On the opposite banks of the Volkhov the 19th Latvian SS Volunteer Division had taken up defensive positions. It remains uncertain whether they directly engaged one another, but they fought in the same vicinity. By summer 1944, as the result of heavy losses, the Latvian proportion of the 43rd had dropped to only 37 percent. Ethnically this Latvian division was no longer Latvian, since more Russians than Latvians fought in it. '43 As the Red Army approached the Baltic, the Soviets were determined to have Latvians "liberate" their own homeland, and therefore in June they mustered all the Latvians they could find throughout the Soviet Union at Gorohoveca and created yet another Latvian division, the 308th Latvian Strelnieki Division. A Latvian, Maj. General V. Dambergs, commanded the 7,300 men and women of this undersized division. As was the case with the 43rd Guards, the 308th consisted of only 37 percent Latvians, supplemented with nearly so percent Russians.'44 It is entirely conjecture, but perhaps a Soviet consideration for building a second Latvian Strelnieki Division was to compete with the Germans, who by this time fielded two Latvian divisions. Not only did the Soviets form a second Latvian division, but they also brought in a Russian division, added it to the 43rd Guards and the 308th Strelnieki, and established the 13oth Latvian Strelnieki Corps, probably as a match for the VI Latvian SS Corps on the German side. Another Latvian, Maj. General P. Brantkalns, commanded the 13oth Corps with its Is,ooo personnel. At about the same time the 43rd Guards received a new commander, Alfreds Kalnins, yet another Latvian. In July 1944 the 308th reached the front, which by then had advanced into Latvia itself. The Soviets experienced many of the same manpower problems the Germans encountered, having to rush new troops to the front as quickly as possible. As a result the 308th arrived at the front with little training and inadequate equipment, and like its counterpart on the German side, the freshly created 1sth Latvian SS Volunteer Division, it suffered heavy casualties and performed nowhere near the level of its more senior partner. From this point on the 308th Strelnieki and the 43rd Guards, combined 2

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into the 13oth Strelnieki Corps, actively and directly engaged fellow Latvians in combat.'4s The Latvian "civil war" had begun. During the campaign in Latvia the proportion of Latvians fighting in the two Red Latvian Divisions grew considerably, up to 6o percent by October. As the Soviets advanced and occupied more Latvian territory they impressed all available men into these Latvian formations, thereby increasing the Latvian composition of the 13oth Latvian Strelnieki Corps.'46 During the second half of 1944 the Soviets mobilized an additional 57,470 Latvians on Latvian territory, and by the end of the war nearly 1oo,ooo Latvians had served in the Red Army, a mix of Soviet Latvians and Latvian citizens.'47 Another source of manpower for the invading Soviet Latvian forces consisted of deserters from the Latvian Legion. As the Legion's units withdrew from Russia into Latvia, the Soviets assaulted the retreating soldiers with propaganda, through the dropping of leaflets, newspapers, radio broadcasts, blaring loudspeakers, in short, every kind of medium at their disposal, encouraging Latvians to desert and surrender. They even sent captured POWs back to their units to urge others to desert. The message was the same in all appeals: the futility of continuing the war, the inevitability of German defeat, and the absurdity of fighting and dying for the lost German cause. The Soviets also promised humane treatment for those who responded to their entreaty. '48 In addition to the regular Red Army the Red partisans also benefited at the expense of the Legion as the numbers of deserters grew. Small units of partisans had been active in Latvia ever since the German invasion, but by 1943 the bands became bolder and, as will be discussed in the next chapter, more successful. As the Red Army approached Latvia in March 1944 a major partisan formation, the 1st Latvian Partisan Brigade of some 1,500 fighters, began operating in northeast Latvia. Another brigade appeared in June in central Latvia. According to Soviet sourceswhose credibility is suspect-as partisan units sprang up throughout Latvia in the summer of 1944, so many people were eager to enlist that they had to be turned away. An estimated 12,000 Latvian partisans had actively resisted the German occupation from 1941 into 1945·'49 On November 3, with the capital city of Riga securely back under Soviet control, the 43rd Guards received along with numerous other honors and decorations a new designation, the Riga Division. The 308th Strelnieki won the Order of the Red Flag, and the Red Army bestowed upon the 130th Latvian Strelnieki Corps the Suvarov Order, Second Class. As individuals, 17,368 Soviet Latvian Strelnieki earned decorations for valor, including three Hero of the Soviet Union medals-the highest award of

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the Soviet Union-twelve Orders of Lenin, and 169 Orders of the Red Flag.•so The fighting that earned Soviet military commendations for these "Red" Latvians must also be taken into consideration no less than the exploits of the Latvian Legion fighting on the German side when examining the overall Latvian armed participation in World War II.

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As the forces of Army Group North advanced through Latvia in late June and early July 1941 toward their principal objective, Leningrad, the Soviet Union's second city, they lingered only long enough to mop up remnants of the Red Army and regroup before continuing on their way. The Germans then resumed their two-pronged attack, with one thrust swinging northward through Estonia, and the other driving eastward into Russia, both eventually converging on Leningrad. Only when the retreating Red forces reached Russian territory and approached the Gulf of Finland in Estonia, did they stand and fight. Although the Germans failed to capture their prize in the initial assault, they surrounded the city, besieged it, and fortified the Leningrad perimeter, which settled into one of the principal theaters of the war. Another theater of sorts developed in occupied territories in the rear of this front, between Leningrad and the Baltic bases of Army Group North. In this semiwilderness of forests, lakes and swamplands, isolated Soviet units and stragglers reformed into partisan bands and commenced operations. Armed Latvians would shortly fight on both of these fronts.' On their way through Latvia the German military dropped off several groups of Latvian accomplices. As discussed in preceding chapters, in its baggage train the Wehrmacht brought several hundred Latvians trained in Germany and eager to serve in the liberation of their homeland, while others arrived with the SS, specifically with its principal emissaries in Latvia, Walther Stahlecker's trained killers of Einsatzgruppe A. Still other Latvians emerged from hiding to offer their services to the invaders. These volunteers relished taking up arms against the Soviets, if only the Germans gave them the chance. Although reluctant at first to arm nonGermans, incrementally, at ever-higher levels of authority the Germans decided to utilize Latvians and other non-Germans as supplementary, armed manpower. By late autumn 1941 unexpected developmentsabove all, determined Russian resistance-already revealed the inadequacy of the German forces, stretched too thin along the long Russian

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front to achieve the goals of Operation Barbarossa. Reich commanders, beginning with those of the Waffen-SS, realized that Latvians and other non-Germans could help secure the rear areas as well as contribute some combat troops to the main front. With this recognition began Latvian military involvement in World War II, initially as security duty in German rear areas, at first in Latvia and then beyond its borders.

The Police Battalions Operation Barbarossa expected each army group to pacify and guard its rear areas, relying on Wehrmacht as well as SS security formations. The original plan for the Occupied Territories envisioned conquering nearly one million square miles up to the Archangel-Astrakhan line, but even though the Germans never reached that line, the area under their control was sizeable, some 8so,ooo square miles. For security in its rear areas Army Group North allocated three army security divisions of relatively poor quality along with the SS Einsatzgruppe A and several regiments of order police. These rear security forces never totaled more than 110,000, a number decidedly inadequate for the task. This inadequacy manifested itself in the wake of Army Group North, which in its haste to reach its principal objective of Leningrad on schedule bypassed pockets of Soviet forces that remained in the German rear to disrupt lines of supply and communications. Their presence posed a particularly serious threat in the wooded and swampy regions of White Russia, where the Soviets organized and launched their most effective campaign of partisan warfare. Since German forces alone proved incapable of securing these rear areas and the all-important lines of communication and supply, local commanders enlisted non-Germans in combat roles, thereby violating the Fuhrer's prohibition against arming and using non-Germans in a military capacity. In order to conceal this flaunting of the Fuhrer's orders, the Germans called these armed formations "police," including the 55sponsored Schuma Battalions in Latvia.3 Within days of his arrival in Riga, Stahlecker had enlisted armed Latvians to assist with security by authorizing Voldemars Veiss to create auxiliary police units that eventually became the Schutzmannschaften, the Schuma Battalions. Charged with eradicating the enemy within, Veiss and his armed units, along with other formations such as those of Viktors Arajs, hunted the enemy, which included Soviet stragglers, Latvian communist functionaries, and Jews. The cover of war enabled these first armed Latvians to justify the shooting of unarmed civilians, including women and children, as legitimate combat. Although some scholars dis2

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tinguish the combat activities of most Schuma Battalions from those of the killing squads of the Arajs's Commandos, they admit that in "episodic and outside of routine" instances Schuma units killed Jews.4 As late as August 1942 Germans assigned to the Baltic witnessed the shootings of Jews by Germans and locals alike and described these as commonplace: "Here all Jews are being shot. Everywhere such actions are underway.... The Jews are being totally exterminated.... Jews are free game. Anybody can seize one on the streets for himself."s Another assignment for these incipient Schuma units was guarding bridges, railway lines, military bases, communications, and the like, including the valuable Kegums power plant, which the Soviets had failed to demolish before their flight. Security duty for these armed Latvians eventually expanded beyond protecting strategically important sites and facilities to guarding the ghettos, POW camps, and even the concentration camps, including Salaspils. 6 These passive security and guard duties readily escalated into tactical operations, actively seeking out and eradicating the partisan groups that were beginning to organize and operate from Latvian bases. By design these "combat" missions failed to distinguish between true enemy combatants and their civilian accomplices, resulting in the shootings of innocent locals suspected of cooperating with the partisans. This lack of discrimination characterized antipartisan operations throughout the East, including Latvia, as these forays became convenient pretexts for murdering undesirable civilians, especially Jews. The guise of combat allowed for rationalizing away atrocities as the excesses of soldiers performing unpleasant but necessary duties. The police label, however, undermined the contention that these were genuine combat operations. As a result, Latvians serving in these Schuma formationsultimately called Latvian Police Battalions-disliked the police designation and later were pleased to exchange it for Latvian Legion.? Stahlecker had led Veiss and others to believe that these nascent Latvian units would be deployed only in Latvia, but soon enough their experience and effectiveness as guards and antipartisan fighters at home recommended them for use abroad. As early as October 1941 the Germans dispatched Latvians to neighboring White Russia to help with socalled antipartisan operations, which at first amounted to little more than roundups and shootings of thousands of Jews. According to one source, on one day in July 1942 Latvians helped the SS shoot 6,ooo Jews in Minsk, and on the next day 3,ooo more. These shootings continued through 1942 and into 1943, as Minsk became a regular duty station for Latvian police battalions and a center of antipartisan operations. 8 Latvian police units

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occasionally assisted the SS in its bloody tasks in Lithuania as well. 9 Another foreign venue of operations for these earliest Latvian combat formations was Warsaw, where several Schuma Battalions arrived in July 1942 to guard the infamous Warsaw ghetto. Not only did they guard the ghetto, but they also assisted in its clearing, as these Latvian "policemen" helped the Germans send at least 30o,ooo of its residents to the gas chambers of Treblinka. It is uncertain whether Latvians lent a hand in crushing the ghetto uprising in April1943. In time the Germans deployed these police battalions all along the Eastern front from the Gulf of Finland and Leningrad in the north to the Ukraine and the Black Sea region in the south. Subsequently Latvians served as far away as Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov and in the Crimea. It was this dispersal of Latvians all across the front, fighting as small units or even as individuals in German lines rather than as consolidated Latvian formations of any size, that elicited Latvian complaints and prompted suggestions for creating a genuine Latvian military force, a Latvian Legion.' 2 The most significant early deployment of police units occurred on October 22, 1941, the dispatching of the 16th Zemgale Schuma Battalion to the Leningrad front. The 16th Battalion was the first of many Latvian battalions sent to Leningrad for frontline combat duty. The previous day, October 21, this unit, under the command of Lt. Col. Karlis Mangulis, held a splendid parade before departing, but with German officials present they marched without national colors and without the playing of the Latvian national anthem. The following day, just before embarking, and apparently with fewer Germans present, Lt. Col. Roberts Osis gave a rousing farewell address in which he linked the battalion's upcoming combat role with the restoration of Latvia's independence. On this occasion the Latvians unfurled their national colors and sang their national anthem.'3 From this point onward the primary service for the Schuma formations became combat duty at Leningrad, and through their frontline exploits the Latvians began laying the foundation for the 19th Latvian SS Volunteer Division and the Latvian Legion. It is their service at Leningrad to which most legionnaires allude proudly as their military experience in the ranks of the Legion and its predecessor units.'4 One must recall, unfortunately, that combat at Leningrad was preceded by other activities, the entire panoply of police duties, including guard duty, antipartisan operations, and even the shooting of the Reich's racial enemies, Jews. From time to time entire units at the front as well as individuals rotated to the rear, where they occasionally returned to these insidious police 10

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Latvians at the Front I 309 tasks. Therefore fighting at the Leningrad front did not necessarily preclude performing police duties in the rear. One should also keep in mind that according to Rimmler's definition, the units performing police duties in the rear areas no less than the combat battalions at Leningrad were covered by the designation, Latvian Legion.

Antipartisan Operations Although beginning with the deployment of the 16th Zemgale Schuma Battalion to the Leningrad front most Latvian police units engaged in genuine combat duty, some battalions continued performing police tasks, including antipartisan operations, a major preoccupation throughout the war years. Unlike in most other aspects of the early phase of the war in which the Germans held the initiative, in partisan warfare the Soviets acted, and the Germans responded. As the Red Army retreated in June and July 1941, isolated units, individual stragglers, as well as communist and Soviet functionaries unable to reach Soviet lines organized guerilla bands, at first for survival, but as they gained confidence they carried the war to the Germans in any way possible. Sabotage, ambushes, executions of collaborators, all became part of the partisan struggle in the rear of the enemy.'s In an attempt to coordinate and centralize control over these disparate bands, as early as June 29 the CPSU Central Committee issued guidelines and instructed the insurgents to make life as miserable as they could for the German invaders and their accessories. The defining moment in the partisan struggle came on July 3, when Stalin broadcast orders for all those behind enemy lines to strike against the foe. More explicit instructions followed, ordering partisans to disrupt the enemy's war effort, above all by targeting railroad traffic, the enemy's primary communication and transportation link between the front and its rear bases. ' 6 Within the first few months following the invasion as many as 30,000 partisans operated in White Russia while another 15,000 had grouped in the Leningrad vicinity. Eventually guerilla units emerged in all German rear areas, from Leningrad, through White Russia and the Baltic, south into the Ukraine. Terrain mostly determined the size, modes of operation, and efficacy of these groups. Partisans were least effective in the open spaces of the Ukraine, while those operating in the forests and swamps of White Russia and northwestern Russia around Leningrad achieved the most success.'? Latvia's topography, partly forested, lent itself better to partisan warfare than did the steppes of the Ukraine, but not as well as the vast

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stretches of forested and swampy wilderness in White Russia and the environs of Leningrad. In spring 1942 the Soviets ordered an escalation in partisan activities. On May 30 the STAVKA, the highest Soviet military command, acknowledging the value of guerilla warfare, but suspicious of decentralized autonomy, created the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement and appointed Marshall Klimentii Voroshilov its supreme commander. Under this centralized command and with the allocation of greater resources, the partisan movement expanded its operations. In early September Stalin issued yet another directive, "Concerning the Mission of the Partisan Movement," in which he ordered the partisans to intensify their efforts, declaring them to be "One of the decisive factors in victory over the enemy."' 8 Belying Soviet claims of overwhelming popular support for the partisans throughout the occupied territories, finding new recruits for their bands proved difficult. Soviet intelligence admitted that morale was the primary obstacle to waging this sort of warfare, living and fighting under harsh and primitive conditions. As a result the partisans resorted to compulsion and in 1942 decreed a draft of all able-bodied men in their areas of operation. The unfortunate civilians of these regions caught it from both sides. Those that the Germans had failed to abduct for labor, relocate to more secure areas, or even kill, the partisans seized and pressed into their ranks. Deserters were aplenty, as kidnapped peasants fled from the partisans at the first opportunity.'9 With the turning of military fortunes in 1943 the partisan manpower problem lessened, as more volunteers joined and many of those previously inclined to desert decided to stay with what apparently was turning out to be the winning side. Increased German savagery also sent many locals into the ranks of the partisans. With the shift in fortunes the Soviets pressed for even more partisan initiatives, declaring in July 1943 an all-out guerilla war on German railway lines. In White Russia alone, according to the Soviets, from August to November 1943 partisans demolished 2oo,ooo rails, derailed or wrecked over one thousand trainS. 20 The Germans responded fiercely to the partisan initiative, and antipartisan expeditions became more than hunts and executions of Jews, although this purpose always remained a crucial aim of these actions. At his July 16, 1941 conference on the East, Hitler addressed the partisan struggle that Stalin had recently conjured to rise up against the occupiers. Hitler placed a positive spin on Stalin's challenge and described it as an opportunity "to wipe out everyone who opposes us," implying that any-

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one could be construed as belonging to these irregulars-fair game for the Reich's security forces. On July 27 he issued the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order, which protracted the infamous Commissar Order by charging also the army, and not just the SS, with responsibility for engaging the partisans and in essence authorized and justified the annihilation of the civilian population of the Occupied East. 2 ' Consequent to the FUhrer's directive the Reich military formulated a strategy for the counterinsurgency campaign. The plan entailed creating strongpoints, bases from which German security forces forayed into the countryside to seek out and destroy partisans. As they ventured from the defended bases they employed small-scale tactics, essentially patrols, ambushes, and the liquidation of villages suspected of pro-partisan sympathies. Periodically they launched major counterinsurgency operations, sweeping across partisan-held areas with full-scale SS, Wehrmacht, and non-German combat formations, including the Latvian Schuma battalions.22 Since Hitler had given the antipartisan campaign a green light to annihilate anyone suspected of anti-German activities, civilians and military personnel alike, on occasions antipartisan missions still had little to do with partisans and provided a cover for anti-Jewish actions. As the leading expert on antipartisan warfare, Erich von dem Bach Zalewski, observed, "Where the partisan is, there is the Jew, and where the Jew is, there is a partisan." 3 Antipartisan warfare was exceptionally cruel, far worse than conventional frontline combat, with no quarter given, nor expected, a war without a front, in which one could hardly distinguish friend from foe. Localized search-and-destroy operations preyed on settlements, usually burning the villages and either abducting or shooting the inhabitants, while broader sweeps resulted in even greater physical destruction and mass liquidation of the population. The Commissar Order, Hitler's antipartisan decree, as well as the stipulation absolving any German soldier of any criminality or excesses perpetrated during antipartisan operations, permitted the unrestricted terrorizing of the inhabitants of partisaninfested areas. The seizing and shooting of hostages became a common means to combat and presumably deter partisans. In return, the partisans showed no mercy toward Germans. The ferocity of the partisans struck fear in German counter-insurgency forces that perpetuated a vicious circle of gruesome abominations. Tales as well as grisly evidence of the torture and mutilation of captured Germans instilled fear among the occupiers and a preference to have non-Germans tend to antipartisan operations. 2

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Let the Latvians do it, became a frequent refrain among German rear units. 4 Beginning in the fall of 1941 the Germans ordered one Latvian police battalion after another into the antipartisan fray across the southeastern border into White Russia. One of the earliest actions involving Latvians occurred at Slonim in western White Russia in November. Sent to fight partisans, members of the 18th Latvian Police Battalion assisted in liquidating the ghetto at Borisov and then the one at Slonim. In January 1942 the SS reported 20,000 people slaughtered in and around Slonim alonewith the complicity of Latvians.zs Encouraged by the Soviet victories around Moscow in early 1942, partisan activity intensified further, both in northwestern Russia and White Russia. As the emboldened partisans expanded their operations, the Germans reacted by dispatching more troops, including Latvians. By July, four Latvian police battalions operated in White Russia, and by fall ten Latvian units hunted "terrorists" in the region. 26 Few military accounts by Latvians note the true nature of many of their partisan victims, although they itemize in detail the Latvian units employed, the dates and locations of their operations, and always refer to the foe as partisans, terrorists, and bandits. Never, however, do they mention Jews and civilians as being their primary victims, even though the Germans themselves faithfully documented the number of Jews killed in these "antipartisan" forays. 7 In the summer of 1942 the Germans unleashed their first major antipartisan operations, assigning them innocuous code names such as Vogelsang (Bird Song), the operation launched in June in the Bryansk area. Vogelsang provided a model for subsequent operations. Two infantry regiments and one tank regiment, s,soo men in all, surrounded a wide sweep of forest land and closed the ring, destroying all villages within the circle and killing most everyone caught within the net, civilians included. The Germans reported killing some 3,000 partisans as well as 3,000 civilians, losing only fifty-eight men themselves. Such imbalances in casualty ratios characterize most so-called antipartisan actions and tend to validate the contention that these operations often entailed the rounding up and shooting of unarmed civilians rather than seeking out and fighting armed insurgents. After all, 3,000 armed partisans surely could have killed more than fifty-eight Germans before being annihilated. 28 In early fall 1942 yet another operation not far from Minsk, Sumpffieber (Swamp Fever), involved five Latvian battalions. More than 8,ooo Jews along with 389 "bandits" and 1,274 "suspects" were killed. 2 9 One source mentions the presence of units of the 2nd SS Brigade, the formation purportedly fight2

2

Latvians at the Front I 313

ing at the Leningrad front that contained several Latvian battalions at the time of Rimmler's visit the following January.3o Another source reports the presence of elements of the 16th Latvian Police Battalion-the first Latvian battalion sent to the Leningrad front-at Macjevicu in White Russia in early September 1942Y If these sources are correct, and these frontline units participated in these antipartisan operations, then one must discount the credibility of the claim that Latvian units at the front fought exclusively as combat units and did not participate in criminal police-type actions. Evidently from time to time these combat units strayed from the front to perform more insidious duties. Bolstered by their astounding military victories in early 1943, the Russians escalated the partisan war further. By February 1943 an estimated 6s,ooo partisans campaigned in White Russia, and by the summer over 1oo,ooo were in the field. Russian initiatives coincided with invigorated German counterinsurgency efforts. In January 1943, just before the German capitulation at Stalingrad, HSSPF Ostland Jeckeln planned a major operation code-named Winterzauber (Winter Magic) to clear out partisans from a sixty-kilometer-wide strip of borderland between Latvia and White Russia near Lake Osveya. Beginning in January and continuing into April, this mission utilized Wehrmacht units, Einsatzgruppe A formations, and several Latvian Schuma battalions, some 4,000 men in all. As was the case in earlier anti partisan expeditions, Winterzauber took a lethal toll, as its search and destroy sweeps burned villages, slaughtered the civilian population indiscriminately, and even managed to kill some partisans. According to a Soviet source, this action killed 193 partisans, 3,629 people suspected of being partisans, and seized 6,370 people for forced labor. Since the Soviets did not distinguish between Jews and other victims, this source provided no separate Jewish casualty countY In the course of Winterzauber, on March 2 3, a force of Latvians, Germans, and Estonians attacked the village of Sanniki. While commanding this foray in person, Walther Stahlecker, chief of Einsatzgruppe A and the brains behind most of these operations, was fatally wounded. In revenge, the attackers burned the village and shot all inhabitants.33 In February, concurrently with Winterzauber, another operation, Hornung, took place in White Russia near the Pripet Marshes. The Germans reported enemy combat losses at 2,219 and another 7,378 that received "special treatment"-meaning, shooting after capture. They also executed 3,300 Jews. German losses amounted to two Germans and twenty-seven non-Germans killed.34 Since the heavy losses on the partisan side in these engagements consisted mainly of civilians and relatively few real partisans, partisan

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numbers were hardly affected, indeed they grew, and their operations became bolder and wreaked more havoc. Their activities gradually shifted westward. In late September 1943, Latvian battalions pursued partisans not more than thirty-five kilometers from Daugavpils.3s In late 1943 and early 1944 the Red Army strengthened its contacts with the partisans in anticipation of pushing the front westward. For their part the partisans stepped up attacks on railways, to which the Germans responded with more massive sweeps, with the usual results: few German casualties, disproportionately high civilian casualties, and even some partisan losses. As these counterinsurgent hunts continued into 1944, Latvians remained regular participants, some in White Russia, others in neighboring Lithuania.36 Two concurrent but paradoxical developments in regards to the partisan problem became noticeable by this late date. Although desertions from the Legion-mauled, disillusioned, and in retreat-augmented and strengthened the ranks of the partisans, as the front crept westward, the contracting rear area constricted partisan operations, thereby facilitating more effective German antipartisan reprisals and sweepsY Assessing the overall value of the partisan war in the rear of Army Group North remains a matter of interpretation. On the one hand Soviet sources cite long lists of German and Allied casualties and impressive tabulations of material damage inflicted by the partisans on the northwestern front. On the other hand, even though the Germans admitted transportation losses and annoying interruptions of supply flow and communications, the vagaries of combat at the front and strategic factors such as the overextension of German forces rather than partisan activity determined overall military fortunes. Granted, the partisans forced the Germans to reallocate troops that otherwise could have fought at the front, but this factor only complicated the already untenable German position at Leningrad rather than decided the outcome. Besides, the antipartisan campaign can be seen as a victory of sorts for the Germans. After all, it contributed to achieving two of Hitler's main goals in the conquest of the East: the annihilation of its Jews and the liquidation of much of its Slavic population.38 In both endeavors the Latvian Schuma-police battalions contributed effectively and loyally.

Partisan war Inside Latvia When the Soviets and their accomplices fled from Latvia in late June 1941 many Red loyalists remained behind, and of these a good number evaded and survived the pogroms and police searches and went on to

Latvians at the Front I 315

organize underground cells and resistance. Organized into nuclei of three or four individuals, these nascent partisan bands began clandestine operations of sabotage, attacking isolated settlements, and murdering collaborators. These sporadic actions justified in the minds of many Latvians the police excursions into the countryside to eradicate bandits and under this opportune guise of antipartisan combat to shoot Jews as well. In order to encourage the incipient guerilla movement Moscow used the radio airways to rally the population to resistance and in early August ordered Latvian insurgents to organize. Teams of Soviet agents covertly crossed into Latvia in support of this endeavor, coordinating the cells and recruiting known sympathizers for their cause. Other commandos reportedly landed along the coast at night and slipped inland to do their mischief.39 Soviet sources claim that as early as fall 1941 a group of partisans blew up a train at Viksu pagastS.4° Two very different images of partisan activities in Latvia emerge from the relevant literature. Soviet sources tend to exaggerate the numbers of partisans, their activities and successes, as well as the amount of support among the Latvian population. To the contrary Latvian nationalist sources as well as many German ones minimize and even dismiss as irrelevant their negligible numbers, their effectiveness, and above all their popular support. On the issue of popular support, the skeptics probably come closer to the truth. Most Latvians despised the Soviets after their year of occupation and were more than willing to help round up and liquidate any remnants of Soviet terrorY The population of one region, Latgale, was the singular exception. Although by no means overwhelming, local support for the Red partisans was far greater in Latgale than in other parts of the country, due to the fact that many Latgalians had benefited from Soviet rule and the majority of Latvia's ethnic Russians lived in this region. Latgale's proximity to the Russian border also contributed to making this region the most active insurgent area in Latvia.4 Both Soviet and nationalist sources report a lull in partisan operations inside Latvia during the first winter of war, 1941-1942. Latvian police actions evidently had neutralized most partisan bands and had driven them underground or across the frontier. It was during the pursuit of one of these bands of Soviet stragglers that German security forces arrived at the village of Audrini in Latgale. In retaliation for allegedly sheltering these fleeing Soviets-as discussed earlier-the Germans burned down the village and shot 235 of its mostly ethnic Russian inhabitants, children, women, and men of all ages.43 Undaunted, in small but steadily increasing numbers the partisans returned to Latvia in the spring. According to a 2

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leading Soviet source on the partisan war in Latvia, throughout 1942 partisans skirmished with local security, Latvians and Germans alike, such as the firefight with police at Jadrova village in May. Audacious partisans often targeted rural administrative offices and officials, mostly in eastern and northern Latvia.44 The same Soviet source attributes the aforementioned escape of the Jews from the Riga ghetto and their subsequent shoot-out with German forces in late October 1942 to their desire to join up with the partisans.4s The buildup of insurgent forces in Latvia in early 1943 reflected the general Soviet attempt to strengthen the partisan campaign following the Soviet victory at Stalingrad. Both Soviet and Latvian nationalist sources agree that 1943 was the turning point for the irregular resistance. Soviet sources cite incident after incident for the rest of that year of Red guerilla attacks on German military supply dumps, communications, even patrols, listing-as could be expected-disproportionate casualty counts, heavily in the partisans' favor. Among their favorite targets were the Latvian suchmani, the men of the police battalions. Latgale, already the center of the partisan movement, became home base for four organized resistance units in all-somewhat generously called brigades-with a total of 1,ooo fighters. It was here that in April the LCP created a command staff for the Latvian partisans. Although their bases remained in Latgale, the insurgents adopted a slogan for 1943, "Farther to the West!" 46 The drive westward was no empty boast, for on September 29 partisans ambushed a truck carrying Schuma troops on the Liepaja-Ventspils coastal highway, and other partisans claimed credit for the November 16 bombing at a mass rally in Riga in support of the German cause. Soviet parachutists had also landed in northern Kurzeme to help mobilize resistance in western Latvia.47 Disagreement arises regarding the nationality of the partisans. Whereas Soviet sources stress the Latvian ethnicity of these partisans and the home-grown nature of the movement, Latvian nationalists insist that most of the Red partisans were Russians and only a few among them were Latvians.48 Toward the end of 1943 neither Germans nor Latvians could ignore partisan activities nor dismiss these as the desperate acts of isolated stragglers. Attacks on farms, even entire villages, murders, kidnappings, assaults on facilities as well as troops, justified cause for alarm. The Germans retaliated in their usual, ferocious ways, by targeting suspected sympathizers, families of known partisans, and entire communities located in the vicinity of partisan activity. Reich security forces apprehended whole families and communities and detained them in the

Latvians at the Front I 317 growing KZ system in Latvia, including Salaspils.49 Terror, however, failed to deter the insurgents, who perpetrated their atrocities with impunity, perpetuating a vicious cycle of cruelties. As a result of partisan depredations, increasing numbers of Latvians started to fear the return of the Baigais Gads.so Contemporary intelligence sources from outside Latvia tend to obfuscate the evaluation of partisan effectiveness in Latvia with contradictory testimony. Latvian refugees in Sweden denied any substantial partisan activities in Latvia and refuted both Soviet claims and indigenous Latvian fears of significant partisan activity. They admitted that many young men avoiding German induction had taken to the woods and that some Soviet parachutists were responsible for isolated incidents, but insisted no widespread campaign of sabotage or anything of the sort existedY Conflicting evidence notwithstanding, the deteriorating situation attracted the attention of the Latvian Self-Administration, which shared its concerns for the security of the home front with the German occupiers. In August 194 3 Dankers protested to Drechsler the deployment of Latvian troops abroad when the threatening domestic situation warranted keeping them home. Bangerskis took the same message to Jeckeln in September, requesting the return of the combat battalions home. Evidently their appeals fell on unsympathetic ears, and the Germans, refusing to bring back the frontline troops, suggested that the Latvians mobilize additional security forces, such as the former Aizsargi, for homeland dutyY In 1944 as the Soviets launched their counteroffensive from Leningrad and began driving the Germans back toward the Baltic, they more purposefully coordinated partisan activities with the movements of the Red Army and directed them toward specific enemy military targets abetting the retreating German armies. Their command structure became formalized as they came under the more direct and personal guidance of Soviet officers. As the Red Army approached Latvia, for all practical purposes Latgale became a forward Soviet military base.s3 According to one Latvian source, when the Soviets first occupied Latgale, it was not by the regular units of the Red Army, but rather by partisan bands pillaging, robbing, killing, and kidnapping.s4 As for the Latvian authorities, both Dankers and Bangerskis ever more desperately pleaded with the Germans to release the thirty-some Latvian battalions fighting abroad for duty back home, but to no avail. The Germans, although promising to reevaluate the situation, did nothing except suggest that the Latvians raise more security forces but, once enlisted, they sent these to the front as welJ.ss Both the Germans and Latvians learned from the Soviets the value of

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partisans. After the Soviets crossed into Latvia in 1944, the Germans reversed roles and organized nationalist Latvian partisans to operate in the rear of the Red Army.S 6 Latvians at the Leningrad Front

Hitler targeted Leningrad, the Soviet Union's second city, Peter the Great's Window to the West," the cradle of Bolshevism, and the strategic key to controlling the Baltic Sea, as one of three primary objectives of Operation Barbarossa. Along with the seizure of the capital city of Moscow and the occupation of the Ukraine-the Soviet breadbasket-Hitler anticipated the early capture of Leningrad, expecting the Red Army along with the Soviet system to collapse under the powerful blows of Germany's military might. Surely, so he thought, the fighting would be over before winter. By early August 1941 Field Marshall Ritter von Leeb's 16th and 18th Armies had reached the outskirts of Leningrad, but then Soviet resistance stiffened. Indeed, while visiting the Leningrad front in early August, Hitler met with Army Group North's commanders at their headquarters and declared the taking of Leningrad his top priority: The city must be cut off from the Baltic Sea and from the rest of the Soviet Union. Confident of achieving this goal, the Fuhrer boasted to his ally, Mussolini, that the capture of Leningrad was imminentY

LATVIA AND THE RUSSIAN FRONT

FINLAND


397 Pripet Marshes, 313 Prisoners of War. See POWs Protocols of the Elders of Zion, 222 Prtitzmann, Hans, 166, 167, 178, 231, 233, 245· 247 Pskov, 158, 329 Pskov, 330 Quisling (Latvian), 161 Raeder, Erich, 38 Rainis Park (Liepaja), 242 Rainis, Janis, 176, 222 Rancans, Jazeps, Bishop, 366 Rastenburg, 231, 329 Red Air Force, 1st Latvian Bomber Regiment, 301 Red Air Force; 24th Corps Aviation Squadron, 131, 154, 301 Red Army 8th Army, 153-ss, 300 Red Army uth Army, 153 Red Army 22nd Army, 300, 336 in Kurland, 356 Red Army 27th Army, 131, 153, 155, 300 Red Army 34th Army, 300 Red Army 51st Army, 338 Red Army 1st Latvian Partisan Brigade, 303 Red Army 45th Strelnieki Corps, 301 Red Army 130th Latvian Strelnieki Corps, 302, 303, 336 in Kurland, 356, 359, 362 reoccupies Latvia, 374, 375, 396 Red Army 181st Strelnieki Division, 131 Red Army 183rd Strelnieki Division, 131 Red Army 201st Strelnieki Division, 156, 300 Red Army 43rd Latvian Strelnieki Guards Division, 300, 301, 302, 336 in Kurland, 356, 359 occupies Latvia, 395 becomes Riga Division, 303 Red Army 308th Latvian Strelnieki Division, 302, 303 in Kurland, 356, 359 occupies Latvia, 395

Red Army 1st Baltic Front, 336-37 against Fortress Kurland, 355-63 Red Army 2nd Baltic Front, 300, 329, 336-37 against Fortress Kurland, 355-63 Red Army 3rd Baltic Front, 336-37 against Fortress Kurland, 355-63 Red Army Leningrad Front (Army Group), 153> 325, 329· 336 against Fortress Kurland, 355-63 Red Army Northwestern Front (Army Group), 153 Red Army Volkhov Front (Army Group), 325, 329 Red Army 22nd Territorial Corps (Estonian), 153 Red Army 24th Territorial Corps (Latvian), 13o- 33 , 15 3, 155 - 5 6, 160, 169, 300 Red Army; annexation of Latvia, 121, !29-33 atrocities by, 335, 346-so, 351, 375-76, 381-82 in Baltic region, 152-58 base occupation, 83-88, 90, 91-93 Battles of Kurland, 356-63 drives to the sea, 338-39, 341-46, 35363, 367 Finland, 81-83, 332 fighting against Fortress Kurland, 342, 353-63 German surrender to, 381 in Hitler's plans, 151-53 invasion of Latvia, 333-40 January 1944 offensive, 328-33 Jews in, 228, 301 June 17, 1940, 93-102 Latvians in Red Army, 299-304 Leningrad front, 305-6, 318-22, 324-28 ties with NKVD, 375-77, 397 offensive in Germany, 350-53 offensive from Leningrad, 317, 328-33 Operation Barbarossa, 140-44, 300, 309 operation Vostock, sweep of Latvia, 395-96 outbreak of war, 69-71, 76, 79-80 partisan warfare, 309-18 prewar, ss-s6 postwar with Western allies, 385-93 reacting to German attack, 152-53 reoccupies Latvia, 341-46, 373-77, 394-400 return to Latvia, 205, 285, 294, 299, 301, 333 in Russian Revolution, 19-20, 26

Index I 543 strategy, 343 summer 1944 offensive, 332, 333 Red Arrow. See Sarkana Bulta Red Banner Baltic Fleet, 131, 152, 153-54, 301, 322-24, 329, 356 Red Cross, Latvian, 204 Refugees. See Latvian refugees Rei, Augusts, 58 Reich Chancellery, 170, 180, 377, 379 Reich Labor Front (RAD), 174 forced labor, 192-94, 298 Latvian labor, 195-99, 201 ties to Latvian Legion, 270-71, 275, 278, 279> 281, 350 Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD). See Reich Labor Front Reichstag, 73, 178 Reims, 381 Reishskommisariat Ostland. See Ostland Reiters, Maxis, 301 Remagen, 352 Rendulic, Lothar, 360 resettlement (Umsiedlung), 71-75 second resettlement, 109-11, 264, 288 Resistance. See Latvian resistance Revolution of 1905, 16, 117, 214 Rezekne, 169, 212, 259, 333 Rhineland, 55, 62 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 57, 60-69, 71, 72-73> 110-11, 143, 164 Riga Central Prison, 43-44, 99-100, 113, 138, 157 Riga Ghetto, 235, 245-47, 268 escape from, 316 large ghetto, 249, 250 its liquidation, 248-53, 257 small ghetto, 249, 251-52, 257 "large" becomes Reichsjuden (German), 252 and Western Jews, 253-55 Riga Opera House, 187, 200, 206 Riga University. See Univ. of Latvia Riga as center of Latvian military organization, 266-69 center of Legion recruitment, 278-86 churches, 202 early history, 12-15 18 November, 206 evacuation of refugees, 346-50 everyday life under Germans, 199-205 fall of Riga, 339, 341-46 forced evacuation, 347-50 German attack, 153-58

as German military center, 323 center of German occupation, 163-66 Jews, 211-13, 214-15, 216, 231-33, 239-40 Jews in prewar Riga, 217, 219 June 17, 1940, 93-102, 106-6, 108-9 Kreisgebiet Riga, 176-77 KZs nearby, 257-59 "Liberation" of, 158-63 Ostland administration headquarters, 173-80, 186 pro-German demonstrations, 206 prewar, 22, 38, 43-44, 48 pogroms, 240-42, 244, 287-88 rebuilding of, 376-77 Russian Revolution, 19-20 Soviet rule, 114-15, 125-26, 130-31, 136,226 Soviets attack, 338-40 Soviets return to, 375-77, 382, 396-97 SS terror, 166-72 wartime, 68-69, 73, 76, 79, 84-85, 87, 92 Righteous Gentiles, 228 Rikards, Feliks Peteris, 168, 236-37, 239 RKFDV , 72, 149 Ronis, 38, 154 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 59, 274, 321 at Yalta, 360-61, 362, 384 Roques, Franz von, 162, 163-66, 167, 170, 175> 179> 181-82 Rosenberg, Alfred, 23, 147-51, 165, 201, 344 administration of Ostland, 173-80 at Angerburg, 170-72 economic role, 187-95 Jews, 233, 246, 248 Latvian Legion, 270, 275-76, 278 Latvian Self-Administration, 181-87, 275-76 mandatory labor decree, 196, 275, 276, 278, 279 Rozensteins, Hugo, 26, 51 Rubenis, Roberts, 369 Rucels, Janis, 293 Rudzutaks, Janis, 20 Rumania, 65, 89, 107, 141, 174, 210, 326 Rumbuli, 211, 248-53, 255, 258 Rusmanis, Lt. Col., 352 Russia, and early Latvia, 12-14 World War I, 16-20 Russian Civil War, 17-20 Russian Empire. See Russia

544 I Index Russian- Latvian relations. See Latvian-Russian relations Russian Revolution (1917), 17-20 and Latvian Jews, 215 Russians, 22, 46, 199 Russians, ethnic, in Latvia, 31, 39, 94-95, 224, 293. 315 Saiema, 24-25, 42-44, 46, 49, 78, 103, 105, 108, 123, 217 Salaspils KZ, 255-58, 307, 317 Sanniki, 313 Sarkana Bulta (Red Arrow), 356 Satverseme. See Constitution of 1922 Sauckel, Fritz, 189, 196-99 Scandinavia, 61, 150 Schatz-Anin, Max, 226 Schleswig-Holstein, 175 Schlusselburg, 326 Schomer, Ferdinand, 334, 337, 338, 345, 354. 357. 360 Schroder, Walther, 176, 179, 267, 272, 27475, 284, 288, 299 Schulenburg, Friedrich Werner von, 96 Schuma in antipartisan actions, 311, 313, 316 battalions at front, 286, 306, 307-8 in Latvia, 335 at Leningrad, 319 Lithuanian, 296-99 organizing, 267-69, 270-78, 280, 287, 289 at surrender, 381, 387 Schutzmannschaften. See Schuma Schweriner Forest, 378 SD-Sicherheitsdienst, 167, 168, 185, 197, 201, 205, 207, 370 deportations, 208-9, 235, 239-40, 248, 251 and Latvian Legion, 264, 368, 379 secret clause. See Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact Self-Administration. See Latvian SelfAdministration Selonija, 27, 29, 222, 236 Seiter, Karel, 75-76 Serbia, 372 Serov, Ivan, 135 Shustin, Simeons, 98, 137, 225, 228, 240 Siauliai, 334 Siberia, 16, 39, 129, 135, 226-27, 237, 348, 394. 398 Silde, Adolfs, 222, 235, 261, 392 Silesia, 377

Silgailis, Arturs, 264, 272, 274, 276, 277, 279, 280, 288, 289, 299, 329, 331, 348, 392 Skede, 251 Skirotova, 253, 374 Skoda, 52 Skorzeny, Otto, 370 Skujinieks, Margers, 217 Slavs, 61, 144, 150, 169, 199, 314, 400 Slonim, 312 Slovakia, 181, 184, 185, 272 Smetona, Antanas, 105 Smolensk, 106, 326 Sobbenikov, P. P., 153 Social Democratic Labor Party, 25-26 Social Democrats, 26, 39, 43-46, so, 130, 217, 364, 366, 392 Solikamsk, 137 Solzhenytsin, Alexander, 399 Sonderftihrer, 264 Sondergruppe-R, 168 Sophienwalde, 350 South Tyrol, 72 Soviet Latvian Republic (1918-1919), 192o, 26, 107 Soviet Union (USSR) role in Baltic, 11 foreign policy, 60-69 incorporation of Baltic States, 106-9 June 17, 1940, 98-102 and Latvian elections, 102-6 Latvian Mutual Assistance Pact, 75-81, 89-91 and Latvians in Red Army, 299-304 reestablish Baltic SSRs, 329 relations with prewar Latvia 21, 47 siege of Leningrad, 318-22 Supreme Soviet of, 106-7 ultimatums to Baltic States, 91-93 Soviet Union at War Latvians in Red Army, 299-304 Operation Barbarossa, 140-44, 151-58 reincorporation of Latvia, 394-400 Soviet return to Latvia, 299, 373-77 Spain, 52, 81, 319 Speer, Albert, 180, 189 Spidola, 38, 154 Spilve, 38, 94 SS Ersatzkommando Ostlund, 278, 283 SS Hauptamt, 179 SS VI Volunteer Corps (Latvian), 281, 287, 302, 328, 330, 332, 354· 381 SS-HSSPF (Higher SS Police Fuhrer), 166, 176, 178-79. 231, 244-45· 248. 270, 372

Index I 545 SS-fagdverbiinde Ostland, 370 S S-Schutzstaffel S S in antipartisan operations, 166, 179, 309-14 and army, 166 and churches, 202 and civilian administration, 173-80, 345 concentration camps, 255-59 in East, 146, 152-58, 165 Final Solution in Latvia, 247-53 forced labor, 197-99, 255-59 ghettos, 245-47 instrument of terror, 166-72, 207-8 and Jews, 166-72, 230-33 and Kurelians, 367-70 first Latvian armed units, 266-69 Latvian police units, 167-68 role in Latvian pogroms, 233-45 and Latvian provisional government, 370-73 and Latvian resistance, 363-67 and Latvian Self-Administration, 180-87 Latvians as SS criminals, 386-90 Western Jews, 253-55 See also Waffen-SS St. Peter's Church (Riga), 154-ss, and book jacket St. Petersburg. See Leningrad Stahlecker, Walther killing Jews, 162-63, 165, 166-72, 17879,181,207,231-33,234-35, 2 35-45 Legion, 265-66, 287, 305, 306, 308 Stalin, Josef, 11, 20, 49 annexation of Baltic States, 89-91 his anti-Semitism, 399 Baltic mutual assistance pact, 75-81 and Baltic resettlement, 71-75 and Barbarossa, 153-58 meets Churchill in Moscow, 357 death, 399 deportations, 134 directs end of war, 338, 343 directs reoccupation of Baltic, 375, 384 and Finland, 81-83 pact with Hitler, 6o-69 and Jews, 223, 235 partisan warfare, 309-14 prewar foreign policy, 53-60 siege of Leningrad, 318, 324-28 celebrates Leningrad victory, 329 response to start of war, 70 restoration of Latvian SSR, 394

scorched earth, 158, 309 sovietization of Latvia, 121, 129 ultimatums, 91-93 his ten great victories, 328-29 wartime strategy, 140-44 and Western wartime allies, 319-21, 325, 332, 338, 343, 384-85 at Yalta, 360-61 Stalingrad, 151, 184, 205, 282, 313, 316, 325, 326, 328, 332 Staraya Rusa, 300, 322, 324 State Defense Fund, Latvian, 51 STAVKA (Highest Soviet Military Command), 310 Stettin, 293 Streckenbach, Bruno, 381 Strelnieki, 17, 19-20 Stucka, Peteris, 19, 20, 112 Stutthof KZ, 258-59, 297, 350, 365, 369, 370 Submarines. See U-boats suchmani. See Schutzmannschaften Sudetenland, 56, 6o, 62 Sumpffieber, Operation, 312 Sweden, 14,24,38,48,s7,69, 108,115,116, 141, 209, 240, 293, 317, 349, 352, 365-66 "refugees in, 390, 391 "the Swedes are coming," 377-78, 380 Swinemiinde, 352 Switzerland, 106

Talavija, 222 Talleyrand, 45 Tallin, 73, 75-76, 105, 157, 186, 272, 323, 324, 3)4, 337, 382 Tass, 105 Tauta, 12, 25, 27, 44, 45, 79, 96, 202, 220, 237, 261, 284, 383 Tautas Balss, 363 Tautas Padome, 372-73 Tautas Palidziba (People's Aid), 204-5 Teheran Conference, 357, 361, 384 ten-hectare people, 126-29, 169, 192-93, 197-98, 208, 256 Teutonic Knights, 13, 71, 144, 173, 212 Tevija, 203, 237, 279, 336, 374 Theresienstadt KZ, 253 Third Reich. See Germany Thundercross. See Perkonkrusts Tilsit, 231 Timoshenko, Semeon, 144 Torgau, 376 Tornukalns, 136-37

546 I Index Treblinka, 308 Tributs, V. R., 153-54 Tukums, KZ nearby, 257; Soviet capture, 334-35· 346; 341 Turkestan, 148 U-boats (submarines), 332, 343, 361-62 Udentins, Oto, 131-32 Ugunskrusts, 28, 69 Ukraine, 70, 146, 148, 161, 174, 175, 199, 210, 245· 247· 258, 267, 268, 284, 308, 309, 325, 343. 344. 345· 384 Ulmanis, Karlis, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 113, 115, 116, 120, 123, 124, 126, 129, 161, 183, 189-90, 364, 392 Baltic German resettlement 74; 78, 79-80 coup, 41-45 dictatorship, 45-so, 203 foreign policy, 53-60 and)ews,217,218,219-20, 222,22324, 226 June 17, 1940, 96-102 prepares for war, so-s3 Protectorate period, 82, 84-85, 87-88, 90 resignation, 102-6 response to start of war, 1939, 68-71 ultimatum, 92-93 Umsiedlung. See Resettlement United Nations Declaration, 320 United States of America, 69, 86, 106, 107, 108, 141, 226, 248, 270, 274· 320, 321, 384-ss. 389, 391 University of Latvia, 27, 29, 117-18, 196, 200, 219, 225, 227 University of Nebraska, 25 UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration), 386 Unter den Linden, 379 Untermensch, 61, 144, 152; as labor, 195, 199· 259 Upelnieks, Kristaps, 365, 367-69 Urbsys, Juozas, 57, 91 UTAG (Umsiedlungs-Treuhand-Aktien-Gesellschaft), 74, 109-11 Vacietis, Jukums, 19, 20 Vadonis. See Ulmanis Vagulans, Martins, 243 Valdmanis, Alfreds, 45-46, 48, 78, 85, 136, 162, 164, 167, 175· 181-82, 184-87, 272-75· 392 Valka, 19, 259, 396

Valmiera (Wolmar), 176, 257 Valters, Mikelis, 78 Varaklani, 215, 220 Varonis, 38 Vassilevski, A. M., 337 Vatican, 30 Veikins, J., 300 Veiss, Voldemars, 160, 167, 237, 259, 26566, 268-69, 272, 274· 28?-88, 289, 306,307,308,326,327,329,330,331 Velikaya River (as front line), 287, 329, 330, 331, 332 Velikie Luki, 149, 300, 328 Ventspils (Windau), 12, 38, 65, 77, 79, So, 86, 100, 131 escape from, 381 in Fortress Kurland, 353-63 as German naval base, 323, 334, 340, 343. 345· 348 surrender, 381-82, 394 Versailles Settlement, 62 Vestienas, 346 Vetrov, Ivan, 97-98 Vetulia, 219 Vidzeme, 13, 37, 131, 216, 344, 346, 367 Vienna, 98, 362 Viesturs, 38, 131, 154 Viksu, 315 Vilna. See Vilnius Vilnius, 35, 55, 153, 333 Virsaitis, 38, 131, 154 Vistula River, 359 Vistula-Oder Canal, 351 Vitebsk, 14, 213, 332 Vladivostok, 37 Vlasov Army Vlasov, Andrei, 325 Vogelsang, 312 Volkhov River (as front line), 288, 301, 324, 325, 327, 328 Voroshilov, Klimenti, 91, 310 Vyshinski, Andrei, 97-102, 103-6, 130 Waffen SS antipartisan operations, 309-14, 314-18 Battles of Kurland, 356-63 cooperation with Einsatzgruppen, 166 defense of Kurland, 353-63 and Latvian Legion, 263, 271-92, 32930, 386-90 equivalent Latvian ranks, 289 first Latvian armed units, 264-69 at Leningrad, 306, 318-22, 324-28 Nuremberg IMT, 389

Index I 547 police battalions, 306-9 postwar image, 387-90 recruitment, 179, 185-86, 197 retreat to Latvia, 333-40, 341-46 retreat from Leningrad, 328-33 retreat to Reich, 350-53 Wagner, Eduard, 163 Wannsee Conference, 248, 254 War of Independence (Latvian), 17-20, 37, 113, 126, 181, 215 Warsaw, 71, 382 Warsaw Ghetto, 308 Washington, D.C., 108, 183, 211 Wehrmacht. See German Army Weimar Republic, 25 Weinberg, Gerhard L., 10 Welles, Sumner, 106 West Prussia, 350, 351, 369 Western Allies. See Anglo-Americans White Russia (Belarus), 22, 70, 146, 148, 174, 198, 240, 256, 267, 306, 307-8, 309-10, 312-14, 319, 331-32, 338, 344 Windau. See Ventspils) Winter War. See Finno-Russian War Winterzauber, Operation, 313 Wirtschaftsfuhrungsstab Ost (WiFStabOst), 178, 189, 191-92

Wittrock, Hugo, 176 Woermann, Ernst, 66 Workers' Guards, 101, 127, 136, 225, 300 Working Peoples' Bloc, 104-6, 224 World War I, 15, 16-20, 39, 41, 107, 253, 368 World War II; historical context, 10-12, 15, 400 Yalta Conference, 360-61, 384 Year of Terror (Baigais Gads), 67, 112-15, 1 33 deportations, 133-39, 159, 207, 208, 224 fear of return of, 317 return of, 375-76, 382 Yeshiva, 218 Yiddish, 212, 214, 218, 225, 226 Yugoslavia, 141, 143, 151, 359 Zalitis, Karlis, 137 Zarins, Karlis, 86, 106 Zedelghem, 385 Zeibots, Viktors. See Arajs Zemgale, 13, 37, 131, 216 Zhukov, Georgi, 144, 318, 379, 381 Zids, 224 Zilupe, So Zionism, 214, 217, 219, 227

WORLD WAR II: THE GLOBAL, HUMAN, AND ETHICAL DIMENSION

G. Kurt Piehler, series editor 1.

Lawrence Cane, David E. Cane, Judy Barrett Litoff, and David C. Smith, eds., Fighting

Fascism in Europe: The World War II Letters of an American Veteran of the Spanish Civil War. 2.

Angelo M. Spinelli and Lewis H. Carlson, Life Behind Barbed Wire: The Secret World

War II Photographs of Prisoner of War Angelo M. Spinelli. 3· Don Whitehead and John B. Romeiser, "Beachhead Don": Reporting the War from the European Theater, 1942-1945. 4· Scott H. Bennett, ed., Army GI, Pacifist CO: The World War II Letters of Frank and Albert Dietrich. 5· Alexander Jefferson with Lewis H. Carlson, Red Tail Captured, Red Tail Free: Memoirs of a Tuskegee Airman and POW. 6. Jonathan G. Utley, Going to War with Japan, 1937-1941. 7· Grant K. Goodman, America's Japan: The First Year, 1945-1946. 8. Patricia Kollander, with John O'Sullivan, "I Must Be a Part of This War": One Man's Fight Against Hitler and Nazism. 9· Judy Barrett Lit off, An American Heroine in the French Resistance: The Diary and Memoir of Virginia d'Albert-Lake. 10.

Thomas R. Christofferson and Michael S. Christofferson, France during World War II:

From Defeat to Liberation.