Latin American Thinkers of Peace (Global Political Thinkers) 3031361067, 9783031361067

Citation preview

GLOBAL POLITICAL THINKERS SERIES EDITORS: HARTMUT BEHR · FELIX RÖSCH

Latin American Thinkers of Peace Edited by Roberto Domínguez · Andrea Oelsner

Global Political Thinkers

Series Editors Hartmut Behr, School of Geography Politics & Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle, UK Felix Rösch, School of Humanities, Coventry University, Coventry, UK

This Palgrave Pivot series presents ground-breaking, critical perspectives on political theory: titles published in this series present influential political thinkers on a global scale from around the world, with interpretations based on their original languages, providing synoptic views on their works, and written by internationally leading scholars. Individual interpretations emphasize the language and cultural context of political thinkers and of political theory as primary media through which political thoughts and concepts originate and generate. The series invites proposals for new Palgrave Pivot projects by and on authors from all traditions, areas, and cultural contexts. Individual books should be between 25,000 and 50,000 words long according to the Palgrave Pivot format. For more details about Palgrave Pivot, an innovative new publishing format from Palgrave Macmillan, please visit www.palgrave.com/pivot. Emphases shall be on political thinkers who are important for our understanding of: - the relation between individual and society and conceptualizations of both; - forms of participation and decision-making; - conceptualizations of political deliberation and discourse; - constructions of identity; conceptualizations of the ‘human condition’ of politics; - ontologies and epistemologies of the political/of politics; - conceptualizations of social and political change and/or tradition; and - conceptualizations of political order, their rise and fall.

Roberto Domínguez · Andrea Oelsner Editors

Latin American Thinkers of Peace

Editors Roberto Domínguez Political Science Suffolk University Boston, MA, USA

Andrea Oelsner International Relations University of San Andrés Buenos Aires, Argentina

Global Political Thinkers ISBN 978-3-031-36106-7 ISBN 978-3-031-36107-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36107-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Arpad Benedek/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1

The Nobel Peace Prize and Latin American Thinkers of Peace Roberto Domínguez, Andrea Oelsner, and Diana Gastelum

1

2

Carlos Saavedra Lamas: A Vision for Peace Ariel González Levaggi and Maximiliano Zuccarino

15

3

Adolfo Pérez Esquivel: Active Non-Violence Andrea Oelsner and Rolando J. Bompadre

33

4

Alfonso García Robles: Architect of Disarmament Rafael Velázquez Flores and Luis Ochoa Bilbao

55

5

Óscar Arias: Liberal Peace and Costa Rican Exceptionalism José Antonio Sanahuja and Cristina Eguizábal

83

6

Rigoberta Menchú Tum: Defender of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Itzel Pamela Pérez Gómez and Ana Vanessa Cárdenas Zanatta

7

Juan Manuel Santos: Diplomacy for Peace (2010–2018) Paula Ruiz Camacho and Martha Ardila

8

Javier Pérez De Cuéllar: Lifelong Vocation for Global Peace Sebastien Adins and Oscar Vidarte Arévalo

107

125

149

v

vi

CONTENTS

9

Latin American Thinkers of Peace and Global IR Roberto Domínguez, Andrea Oelsner, and Apoorva Sridhar

Index

171

181

Notes on Contributors

Sebastien Adins holds a Ph.D. in Political Science (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú). He is a professor of International Relations at Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP). He is the director of the International Relations undergraduate program and coordinator of the Research Group on International Order and Regional Orders (GIOR), both at PUCP. He has delivered lectures at several universities in South America and Europe. Martha Ardila holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations (Universidad Autónoma de México). She is a Faculty of Finance, Government, and International Relations professor at the Externado University in Colombia. She is a member of the Observatory for the Analysis of International Systems (OASIS) research group at the same university. Oscar Vidarte Arévalo holds a Master of Arts in International Relations from the Pontifical Xavierian University (Colombia). He is a professor of International Relations and Peruvian Foreign Policy at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru. He is currently the Peruvian Foreign Policy Research Group coordinator of the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru. He has also developed studies in International Security at Delaware University (US). He has delivered lectures in several universities in Latin America.

vii

viii

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Rolando J. Bompadre received his Law degree from the University of Buenos Aires and is completing his Ph.D. in Spanish Studies at the University of Edinburgh. He has edited the volume of essays Volver a Las Islas. Lecturas sobre la novela de Carlos Gamerro (Buenos Aires: Edhasa, 2022), and has taught courses on Human Rights, Constitutional Formulas and Political Systems, Latin American literature, and academic writing at several universities in the UK and Argentina. Ana Vanessa Cárdenas Zanatta is a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) and a professor at Universidad Anáhuac Mayab. She has been visiting scholar at the Central University of Chile and an associate consultant for international relations, security, protocol, gender equality, and political marketing at PoliTips (Chile and México). She was a member of the editorial board of the newspaper Reforma between 2011 and 2014. In 2021, she was appointed by the Ministry of the Interior as part of the Mexican women leaders. Roberto Domínguez is an International Relations professor at Suffolk University. Ph.D. in International Studies (University of Miami). He was a Jean Monnet fellow at the European University Institute. He has participated in research and consultant projects for the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Library of the US Congress, and Transparency International. Cristina Eguizábal holds a Ph.D. in Latin American Studies (University of Paris III, Sorbonne Nouvelle). Doctor Eguizábal has been an associate professor at the University of Costa Rica and a researcher in several institutions, including the Arias Foundation supporting President Oscar Arias’ peace-building efforts in Central America. Before retiring, Doctor Eguizábal was the ambassador of Costa Rica to Italy. She is an active member of Costa Rica Integra and Transparency International Costa Rican chapter. Diana Gastelum obtained her B.S. from Suffolk University (Boston) in Environmental Policy and International Relations. She is a senior program coordinator for an Energy Consulting Firm in California and a reports editor for an international non-profit. Previously, she was a research assistant focusing on Latin American politics and International Relations.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

ix

Ariel González Levaggi holds a Ph.D. in International Relations and Political Science (Koç University, Turkey) and is an associate professor at the Political Science and International Relations Department at the Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina (UCA). He is a senior researcher at the Center for Research and Strategic Studies of the Argentine Navy, advisor to the Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI), and senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Luis Ochoa Bilbao is a Ph.D. in Sociology (Benemerita Autonomous University of Puebla-BUAP). He is a professor in International Relations professor at BUAP. His research interests focus on international relations topics and Mexican foreign policy. He is a member of the National System of Researchers (SNI). He is the dean of the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences at BUAP. Andrea Oelsner holds a Ph.D. in International Relations (London School of Economics and Political Science-LSE). Associate Professor and Director of the Political Science and the IR Programs at the University of San Andrés (Argentina). She was a Jean Monnet fellow at the European University Institute and a senior lecturer at the University of Aberdeen (UK). Itzel Pamela Pérez Gómez holds a Master of Arts in Asian and African Studies (El Colegio de México) and is a professor in International Relations at Universidad Anahuac Mayab (Yucatan, Mexico). She has developed expertise and training in Conflict Analysis and Resolution (Helsinki University). Professor Pérez Gómez is a member of the Civil Association Mary Queen of Peace, where she is head of the Peacebuilding Department, and a member of the Women Political Scientist Network. Paula Ruiz Camacho holds a Ph.D. in Political Studies from the Externado University of Colombia and in International Relations from the University of São Paulo (Brazil). She is a Faculty of Finance, Government, and International Relations professor at the Externado de Colombia University. She is a member of the Observatory for the Analysis of International Systems (OASIS) research group at the same university. José Antonio Sanahuja holds a Ph.D. in Political Sciences (Complutense University, Madrid, Spain). Professor of International Relations at the Complutense University of Madrid, he is currently director of the

x

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Carolina Foundation and Special Advisor for Latin America and the Caribbean to the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and vice-president of the European Commission, Josep Borrell (ad honorem). He has been a Robert Schuman fellow at the European University Institute. Apoorva Sridhar holds a B.A. from Delhi University, India, & Master’s from Cardiff University, Wales, UK. She has spent most of her career working as an investment analyst at Investment Management Firm in Boston. In this role, she has been responsible for conducting & designing research analysis on regional emerging equity markets. Rafael Velázquez Flores is an International Relations professor at the Autonomous University of Baja California (UABC). He obtained his Ph.D. in International Studies at the University of Miami. His research interests focus on Mexican foreign policy mainly. He was a president of the Mexican International Studies Association (AMEI). He is a Mexican Academy of Science (AMC) member and the National System of Researchers (SNI). Maximiliano Zuccarino holds a Doctoral degree in History (Universidad Nacional del Centro, Buenos Aires-UNICEN). He is a researcher at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in International and Local Problems (UNICEN). As a postdoctoral fellow of the National Scientific and Technical Research Council of Argentina (CONICET) from 2011 to 2019, he participated in various research projects on topics related to Argentina’s foreign policy.

Abbreviations

APDH ATT AUC COMBIFRON CONADEP COPREDAL CUC DESARMEX ELN FARC FARC-EP FPA IA IFOR ILO IMF INTA IR JEP NGO OAS OASIS ODA ONUSAL ONUVEN

Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights Arms Trade Treaty United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia The Binational Border Commissions National Commission for the Disappeared Denuclearization of Latin America Committee of Peasant Unity Office of Mexican Disarmament National Liberation Army Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army Foreign Policy Analysis International Arms International Fellowship of Reconciliation International Labour Organization International Monetary Funds National Institute of Agrarian Transformation International Relations Special Justice for Peace Non-Governmental Organization Organization of American States Observatory for the Analysis of the International System Official Development Assistance United Nations Observer Mission In El Salvador United Nations Observer Mission for the Verification of the Elections in Nicaragua xi

xii

ABBREVIATIONS

P5 PEI PLN PRI SALT SEM SERPAJ SERPAJ–AL SPD SRE START I UBA UCA UN UNASUR UNDP UNESCO USAID USSR WHO

United Nations Security Council Institutional Educational Plan National Liberation Party Institutional Revolutionary Party Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Mexican Foreign Service Peace and Justice Service Peace and Justice Service in Latin America Social Democratic Party (German) Foreign Affairs Secretary’s Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty University of Buenos Aires Central American University United Nations Union of South American Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United States Agency for International Development Soviet Union World Health Organization

CHAPTER 1

The Nobel Peace Prize and Latin American Thinkers of Peace Roberto Domínguez, Andrea Oelsner, and Diana Gastelum

Introduction This book examines the contributions of seven Latin American thinkers and activists to the construction of peace and reconciliation. In their respective social, political, and historical contexts, they all have had access to the Global Public Square (Hamilton, 2021), disseminated their ideas, and projected the actions they undertook in Latin America worldwide and across numerous social science disciplines. The Nobel Peace Prize unites these seven peace leaders. Carlos Saavedra Lamas (1936), Adolfo Pérez

R. Domínguez (B) International Relations, Suffolk University, Boston, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected] A. Oelsner Political Science, University of San Andrés, Buenos Aires, Argentina e-mail: [email protected] D. Gastelum International Energy Analyst, Minneapolis, MN, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Domínguez and A. Oelsner (eds.), Latin American Thinkers of Peace, Global Political Thinkers, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36107-4_1

1

2

R. DOMÍNGUEZ ET AL.

Esquivel (1980), Alfonso Garcia Robles (1982), Óscar Arias Sánchez (1987), Rigoberta Menchú Tum (1992), and Juan Manuel Santos (2016) are Nobel Prize laureates for their contributions to peace. As the only Latin American elected United Nations Secretary-General (1982–1991) and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of UN Peacekeeping forces (1988), the inclusion of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was deemed essential. The analysis of seven Latin American peace thinkers and activists is grounded in current debates on leadership and intellectuals in International Relations. The literature on intellectuals in IR has been indispensable for expanding our understanding of international affairs from the perspective of practitioners (foreign policy leaders) as well as ideas (theoreticians) (Neumann & Waever, 1997; Rose, 2013). This book examines agents of peace who did not necessarily develop their leadership through practice and theory of international relations. Rather, they embraced diverse narratives and actions to build reconciliation which the Norwegian Nobel Committee acknowledged, and in turn, this paved the road eventually for the Global Public Square of leadership and ideas. The chapters in this volume take a conceptually eclectic approach to systematizing the circulation of ideas embraced by each actor. The central premises of the analysis are founded on three fundamentals of mainstream constructivism: change over time and space, socialization, and the interaction process (Fierke, 2021). First, all the key figures analyzed in this book experienced changes in their perspectives on time and space throughout their lives. Changes in international and domestic political, economic, and social forms of organization challenged their ideas, and they themselves were able to contribute toward generating change. Socialization emphasizes the significance of norms, rules, and language in the development of their own worldviews. The third component, the interaction process, refers to their interactions with other key actors in the peace processes. These could range from their negotiation partners, allies or opponents, and the victims of violence to transnational and external actors with whom they could build networks.

A Common Approach for the Analysis The contributions to this volume take on a common framework to develop a systematic analysis of the seven Latin American thinkers of peace. All chapters have a similar structure, which has facilitated the

1

THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE AND LATIN AMERICAN …

3

drawing of significant conclusions at the end of this project. These bring the fore key common traits, regional connections, historical continuities, as well as differences, breaks, and singularities. Three main areas constitute the focus of the analysis on each Nobel Prize laureate. The first section in each chapter presents a brief biography of the laureate and categorizes the relevant literature published on them. This section assesses the still unexplored avenues for research on the peace actor’s work. The second section of each chapter adopts the same approach to examining the thinkers and activists before and after being awarded the Nobel Prize. The section discusses the rationale of their actions by exploring the link between ideas/language and actions (speech-acts). Far from a historiographic or biographical analysis, the analysis seeks to identify how inflection points or critical junctures challenged their assumptions and reinforced or produced a change in their understanding of peace. To frame it within the constructivist perspective, the concepts of the logic of appropriateness, role location, and ascribed roles are helpful for the analysis. During their lifetime, these key figures made decisions and undertook actions guided by the logic of appropriateness: i.e., a logic informed by norms and rules that defined what constituted legitimate behavior. In turn, role location refers to the interactional process whereby individuals are allocated an appropriate role within a social structure (Thies, 2017). The role may be that of union leader, mediator, decision-maker, and diplomat, inter alia. The ascribed role is given to actors by others, often based on factors outside their own control (Thies, 2017). In the case of this volume, the Nobel Peace Prize was ascribed, opening new avenues for reaching further audiences and networks. The third part of the analysis revolves around the thought and ideas of the Latin American Nobel Prize winners and their impact upon debates on peace and international relations. Their ideas and concepts of peace are mapped onto a matrix that combines two variables: positive or negative peace, on the one hand, and domestic or international scope, on the other. The notions of positive and negative peace refer directly to a distinction introduced by Johan Galtung (1964) in the inaugural number of the Journal of Peace Research. Building upon the concepts of direct (physical) and indirect (structural) violence, Galtung argues that negative peace involves the absence of war and direct violence by an actor. Instead, positive peace implies the absence of indirect violence, which is violence originated in the very structure of society (Galtung, 1969). The Peace Research agenda, founded by Galtung, covers both dimensions of our

4

R. DOMÍNGUEZ ET AL.

matrix, as in addition to emphasizing the importance of positive peace in contrast to negative peace, peace theory pursues peace both across state borders and within state borders. In other words, it is as interested in the achievement of peace at the international level as it is at the domestic one. Naturally, the debate generated around the democratic peace theory cannot be sidelined in a continent such as Latin America with its recent history of dictatorships. Building upon the Kantian perspective, the seminal contributions by Michael Doyle (1983), Bruce Russett (1993), and John Mueller (2004) offer theoretical insights as well as empirical and statistical evidence of the idea that democracies tend not to behave violently toward each other. For Doyle, democratic peace rests on the liberal values and norms of democratic societies, which include a preference for peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, and negotiation and compromise. In turn, Russett’s quantitative studies provide statistical support to the democratic peace theory. Mueller, instead, maintains that the phenomenon of democratic peace is not just the result of the presence of democratic institutions, but it is also related to the decreasing popularity and effectiveness of war, especially in modern times. The democratic peace theory is, thus, clearly part of the liberal theory agenda dealing with interstate relations. Each chapter connects the laureate’s thought and domestic and international narratives with theoretical concepts of, and theoretical approaches to International Relations. Hence, the interpretations of the contributions of each of the seven peace leaders are open to implicit and explicit conceptualizations, including but not limited to realism, liberalism, constructivism, post-colonialism, peace studies, and gender and green studies. Based on the contributions of each chapter, the book seeks to engage the ideas of peace within the framework of Global IR. One of the recent concerns in International Relations is the parochial fragmentation of the discipline. For the past decades, the field of International Relations has expanded its analytical horizons with research programs focused on non-Western views, methodological pluralism, and alternative ontologies. While the outcome has been positive and enriching for the discipline of IR, some level of fragmentation, binarism, and parochialism has led to islands of monologues within academic communities. In the past decade, Global IR has noticed the necessity of widening IR by taking in insights from local/national/regional IR scholarship, not rejecting mainstream theories, and avoiding the hermetic separations between the West and

1

THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE AND LATIN AMERICAN …

5

the non-West (Acharya & Buzan, 2019; Kuru, 2020). In this regard, the final part of this project explores and interprets how the thinkers’ explicit and implicit ideas open dialogue beyond the binaries of West and nonWest and Global North and Global South. In this regard, the concluding part of this project explores how each one of these thinkers contributes to pluralistic universalism, which holds that true universalism recognizes “the diversity of the world while exploring any shared or connecting meanings, practices among states, societies, and civilizations” (Acharya, 2021: 306).

The Global Public Square and the Nobel Peace Prize The Nobel Peace Prize is the unifying factor among the six peace actors covered in this book. The seventh peace figure, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, was not awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, though he received it on behalf of the UN Peacekeeping Forces in 1988. Additionally, his position as Secretary-General of the United Nations placed him in the global public sphere. Recognizing a person or institution for their contribution to global peace and reconciliation raises their visibility, allowing them to advocate for peace causes and participate in the global public square. However, the causes of global peace involve numerous unrecognized global leaders from various fields. It would be impossible to recognize all leaders who annually mitigate sources of conflict, violence, instability, and threats to people. There will always be disagreements as to who the best Nobel Prize nominee is each year, which is inherent to the award. Hence, the Nobel Peace Prize is emblematic of one of the multiple challenges at the top of the global societal agenda during a particular historical period. The annual award nonetheless serves as a symbol of global collective memory. Also, one thing is noticeable, though; the award has historically tended to show an overwhelming gender bias. The fact that only one of the Latin American laureates is a woman—Rigoberta Menchú Tum— reflects a more general tendency among the Nobel Peace Prize winners, given that since 1901 only 18 women have been awarded the Prize. As a general background for the chapters in this book, it is worthwhile to contextualize critical aspects of the Nobel Peace Prize. Alfred Nobel’s legacy included donating most of his fortune to a series of prizes in physics, chemistry, physiology or medicine, literature, and peace. The Nobel Peace Prize has been awarded 103 times between 1901 and 2022

6

R. DOMÍNGUEZ ET AL.

to 140 Nobel Prize laureates (110 individuals and 30 organizations— some more than once): The International Committee of the Red Cross received the Nobel Peace Prize thrice (1917, 1944, and 1963); and The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has received the Nobel Peace Prize twice (1954, 1981) (Nobel Foundation, 2023a). The Committee is composed of five members appointed by the Storting (Norwegian parliament). The Nobel Peace Prize is awarded in Oslo, Norway, not in Stockholm, Sweden, where the Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, Physiology or Medicine, Literature, and the prize in economic sciences are awarded. The selection of Nobel Peace Prize laureates by the Norwegian Nobel Committee is preceded by the nomination of candidates by any person who is qualified to nominate. Anyone who meets those qualifying requirements may submit a Nobel Peace Prize nomination, and any person or organization nominated by qualified individuals can become a candidate. The nominees’ names and other nomination-related information cannot be revealed for 50 years after the award. In 2022, there were 343 Nobel Peace Prize candidates, including 251 individuals and 92 organizations. There are 305 Nobel Peace Prize candidates for 2023, of which 212 are individuals, and 93 are organizations. For eight consecutive years, the number of applicants has exceeded 300. 2016 saw the current record of 376 candidates set (Nobel Foundation, 2023c). The Norwegian parliament, the Storting, appoints the five-member Norwegian Nobel Committee, which is responsible for the final evaluation of nominees and selection of Nobel Peace Prize laureates. While the Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, Physiology or Medicine, Literature, and the prize in economic sciences are awarded in Stockholm, Sweden, the Nobel Peace Prize is awarded in Oslo, Norway. The nominations cycle starts in September when the Norwegian Nobel Committee prepares to receive nominations. To be considered for the Nobel Peace Prize award, the Norwegian Nobel Committee accepts nominations until the first day of February of that same year. During the months of February and March, the Committee evaluates the candidates’ merits. As a result, a short list is prepared. From March to August, the Nobel Institute’s permanent advisers review the short list of nominations. In addition to the Institute’s Director and Research Director, the body of advisers generally consists of a small group of Norwegian university professors with broad expertise in subject areas with a bearing on the Peace Prize. Reports are

1

THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE AND LATIN AMERICAN …

7

also occasionally requested from other Norwegian and foreign experts (Nobel Foundation, 2023b). In October, the Nobel Peace Prize laureates are selected by the Nobel Committee through a majority vote. The Committee seeks to achieve unanimity in selecting the Nobel Peace Prize laureate. On the rare occasions when this proves impossible, the selection is decided by a simple majority vote. The decision is final and cannot be appealed. Only when this process is complete are the names of the Nobel Peace Prize laureates announced. The Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony takes place on 10 December in Oslo, Norway, where the laureates receive their Nobel Prize. It consists of a Nobel Prize medal and diploma and a document confirming the prize amount. The list of nominees is not made public either to the media or to the candidates themselves. In any names circulate prior to the award, this is not done by the Nobel Committee but rather it may be pure speculations or information publicized by those who made the nomination of a candidate. It is only after 50 years have passed that the Nobel Foundation discloses any information regarding the nominations, the nominees, the nominators, and the investigations and opinions related to the award process (Nobel Foundation, 2023c). The Nobel Peace Prize has been subjected to criticisms and debates. On two different occasions, Nobel Prize winners declined the award. The first was Jean-Paul Sartre, Nobel Prize laureate in Literature in 1964, who did not accept the Prize as he had consistently refused all official honors. The second to decline it was Le Duc Tho, who shared the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. They were awarded the Prize for negotiating the Vietnam peace agreement. However, Le Duc Tho stated that he could not accept the Nobel Peace Prize given the situation in Vietnam. Another four Nobel laureates were forbidden by their governments to accept the award. These were the cases of Richard Kuhn, Adolf Butenandt, and Gerhard Domagk, who were coerced by the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler to decline the Prize—though they were later able to receive the diploma and the medal, but not the prize amount. The fourth case was Soviet Boris Pasternak, who was awarded the 1958 Nobel Prize in Literature. However, the Soviet Union authorities forced him not to accept the Nobel Prize. And another three Nobel Peace Prize laureates were under arrest in their home countries due to their social and/or political activism when the Prize was awarded. These were German pacifist and journalist Carl von Ossietzky (1935), Burmese politician Aung San Suu

8

R. DOMÍNGUEZ ET AL.

Kyi (1991), and Chinese human rights activist Liu Xiaobo (2010) (Nobel Foundation, 2023a). These facts and controversies reveal that the Nobel Prize, and especially the Nobel Peace Prize, ultimately, is a decision often permeated by politics. Some scholarly work has been produced on the Nobel Peace Prize. The Nobel Prize awarded to President Barack Obama was criticized because his administration had just begun, and its merits were unclear. According to Adams (2012), the expectation was that awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to President Obama would “cause a cascade of effects moving outwards to the global scale; the Prize would presumably work through Obama to pacify US foreign policy and, thus, the world” (Adams, 2012: 552). In 2012, the European Union was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Manners and Murray (2016) contend that the award can be interpreted through the lens of two narratives: the “Nobel narrative” of peace and the “new narrative for Europe.” Regarding the Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, Kolstad (2020) explains the magnitude of the impact on the Chinese government by assessing the extent of the Chinese response to the award, which included freezing political and economic relations with Norway, imposing sanctions on fish imports and other products, and limiting diplomatic interaction. Havnevik (2021) argues that the 2020 Nobel Peace Prize to the World Food Program (WFP) would have been better placed if WFP shared credit with FAO and IFAD—UN agencies that are complementary of and overlapping with WFP in operations and activities, but with greater emphasis on understanding and addressing the fundamental causes of hunger and conflict. To join the scholarly debate about the Nobel Peace Prizes, this book offers a systematic analysis of seven Latin American peace actors.

About the Chapters The chapters follow the chronological order of the Nobel Peace Prize award to each Latin American thinker, concluding with a chapter devoted to the United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. The authors build a bridge between the Spanish-speaking world and the English-speaking community in the global discourse. All of the contributors are experts in International Relations from various countries in Latin America. They are familiar with the contexts which inspired the ideas of Nobel Peace Prize laureates to become peacemakers.

1

THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE AND LATIN AMERICAN …

9

The book begins with Ariel González and Maximiliano Zuccarino’s research on the 1936 Nobel Peace Prize winner Carlos Saavedra Lamas, an experienced Argentine politician and diplomat who became the first Latin American to receive this recognition. The chapter discusses the context of the interwar period and how Carlos Saavedra Lamas promoted the signing of the Anti-war Treaty of Non-aggression and Conciliation (1933) and played an active role as the mediator of a regional ad hoc group to end the Chaco War (1935). Saavedra Lamas made three significant contributions to understanding peace and conflict resolution in Latin America. First, he viewed peace in a negative light as the absence of war and thus a precondition for economic growth. In addition, he highlighted systemic and domestic obstacles to achieving stable peace, such as international anarchy and economic nationalism. Second, Saavedra Lamas approached the problems of the interwar period from a liberal internationalist standpoint, emphasizing the significance of international treaties and international organizations. Thirdly, he suggested consultations based on Latin American solidarity to resolve active conflicts between sovereign states. In addition, he advocated for the universalization of a consultation system created at the Pan-American Conferences. According to his critics, the intellectual discussions of Saavedra Lamas conflicted with his diplomatic practice. His participation in the Chaco War peace negotiations reflected pragmatism regarding political, geostrategic, and economic interests, for which he was often labeled Machiavellian. Andrea Oelsner and Rolando Julián Bompadre examine the ideas of the 1980 Nobel Peace Prize winner Adolfo Pérez Esquivel. The authors interviewed and researched Pérez Esquivel’s journey since the 1960s when he joined Christian peace and social justice movements. His work as secretary-general of an ecumenical network established in 1974 to coordinate human rights activism throughout Latin America, the Latin American Peace and Justice Service (Servicio Paz y Justicia–América Latina) paved the way for his nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. His 1977 arrest was the result of his outspoken advocacy on behalf of the thousands of people who simply “disappeared” during the Argentine military dictatorship. From the perspective of a thinker and leader of ideas, his worldviews have remained consistent over the decades and have influenced a great number of people in Latin America. His advocacy for human rights prompted him to emphasize the importance of social activism in building peace in his writings. In a broader context, he has criticized the globalization of markets and the end of the welfare state concept,

10

R. DOMÍNGUEZ ET AL.

which indicates that governments are no longer committed to ensuring the well-being of their citizens. Developing the political will to address the problems of hunger, marginalization, and exclusion should be included in the advocacy for human rights list of essential issues. His emphasis on the security of individuals and vulnerable groups (rather than the security of the state), his notion of positive peace (as opposed to just the absence of war), and his definition of institutionalized violence (beyond violence understood as merely physical harm) place him along the field of Peace studies rather than traditional IR theories. Since receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, Pérez Esquivel has actively assisted in organizing other Nobel Laureates to address global conflicts and gross human rights violations. The Architect of Disarmament, Alfonso García Robles, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982. Rafael Velázquez and Luis Ochoa examine his leadership in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean negotiations (Treaty of Tlatelolco). As a career diplomat, García Robles gained insight into the inner workings of international negotiations through his various official positions in Mexican foreign policy and international organizations, most notably as the Director of the Political Affairs Division of the United Nations Secretariat. Between 1964 and 1967, he chaired all the panels discussing the military denuclearization of Latin America, demonstrating his exceptional negotiating and diplomatic abilities, which were the foundation of his significant contributions to the Treaty of Tlatelolco process. His diplomatic career reached its pinnacle when, from 1975 to 1976, he served as Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations. In this capacity, he advocated for the Third World, disarmament, and peaceful dispute resolution. Disarmament diplomacy and the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Tlatelolco Treaty negotiations were particularly important. His publications, diplomatic practice, and dedication to peace and opposition to nuclear weapons could be included in the liberal tradition of International Relations because the Tlatelolco Treaty implied the creation of institutions to mitigate global anarchy and norms to govern state behavior. However, his reasoning is also grounded in realism, as the Tlatelolco Treaty places security as its primary concern. In other words, states are eager to establish a disarmament regime to enhance national security. President Óscar Arias, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987, devised a strategy to end the brutal civil wars ravaging Central America. José Antonio Sanahuja and Cristina Eguizábal interviewed President Arias for their chapter. In August 1987, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El

1

THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE AND LATIN AMERICAN …

11

Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua approved the proposed peace plan. It sought free elections, protection for human rights, and an end to foreign interference in domestic affairs. Later, as an educator and peace broker, he developed worldviews regarding the post-conflict strategies to help to reconcile societies. Arias advocated perspectives to reduce violence at the domestic level (e.g., disarmament and suppression of armed forces in Panama) as well as the international level (e.g., cessation of support for irregular forces such as the Contras), based on his active agenda as a practitioner of peace. He worked on the connection between democracy, peace, and development in the El Salvador and Guatemala peace agreements from a positive peace perspective. Arias has embraced the theories of economic liberalism and the stability of the international liberal order from the perspective of International Relations. Itzel Pamela Pérez Gómez and Vanessa Cárdenas analyze the social movement for People’s Indigenous Rights led by the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú, from Guatemala. Since then, Menchú has been the voice of numerous groups in Latin America seeking to improve their living conditions and to access equal rights. Through the Pavarotti Educational Center, Menchú continues to empower and educate indigenous people about their political rights to foster their communities’ social, economic, and political growth. In terms of her ideas, Menchú has contributed to the “Education for Peace” perspective on peace and conflict resolution, embracing a positive peace approach. She has also participated in academic circles and civil society cooperation, promoting the notion that local and civil alliances are more effective than diplomatic and political means for achieving peace. Menchú’s significant contributions have embraced inclusive perspectives. Paula Ximena Ruiz Camacho and Martha Ardila examine the ideas and actions of the 2016 Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. President Santos’ pacifist and liberal character, which the authors attributed to his training as a journalist, came to the fore following a significant departure from the security perspective implemented by the previous government. Similarly, his international experience and academic training convinced him that the Colombian conflict must be resolved through dialogue. Santos’ close relationship with national political elites and the public positions he held for two decades enhanced his understanding of the country’s power structures and the military situation of the FARC-EP during the negotiations. His concepts of Territorial Peace, Justice, and Political Participation have

12

R. DOMÍNGUEZ ET AL.

been recognized as significant academic advances for the nation, although implementing the peace agreement has not been without difficulties and controversy. The military and business sectors with diverse peace visions have supported these ideas, assisting Santos in developing a multidimensional concept of peace. In this context, this chapter describes the efforts of President Santos as laying the groundwork for future negotiations with other armed groups, contributing to global debates on development, peace, and justice, and concepts of democracy, security, and political participation in the context of Colombia. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1920–2020) is the only Latin American to have served as United Nations Secretary-General (1982–1991). Oscar Vidarte and Sebastien Adins argue that the Peruvian diplomat received the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the Peacekeeping Forces in 1988, despite not receiving the Prize himself. Before assuming the position of Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar had accumulated extensive experience as a diplomat representing his country. In addition, he had spent eight years in various capacities within the United Nations. Influenced by thinkers such as Raymond Aron and the Latin American tradition of nonintervention, he was known as a traditional, sovereigntist, and discreet diplomat. From this quite realistic perspective, he recognized the institution’s weakness and dependence on the great powers from the start of his work as the first UN official. In the context of the end of the Cold War, Pérez de Cuéllar distinguished himself as a norm entrepreneur and defender of more liberal principles only during his second term. Thus, his ideas significantly influenced the reconceptualization of peacekeeping operations, which emphasized the protection of human rights and the execution of new tasks, such as electoral monitoring. In addition, as he realized the growing significance of social and economic causes of international conflict and the role of preventive diplomacy, he gradually shifted from a negative to a positive view of peace. This more liberal perspective would be strengthened by his leading role, as Peru’s foreign minister, in the 2001 Organization of American States’ adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Acknowledgements Felix Roesch and Hartmut Behr, the editors of the Palgrave Book Series Global Political Thinkers, have remained keen supporters of our project. In a casual conversation with Professor Felix Roesch a few years ago, the idea of writing a unified volume on Latin American Voices in International Relations was first conceived. In 2021, as we were adjusting to the new normal

1

THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE AND LATIN AMERICAN …

13

brought on by the pandemic, the co-editors of this book began communicating via Zoom. Early in 2022, we reached out to a select group of scholars with expertise in the intellectual worlds of Argentina, Peru, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Colombia. In February 2022, we held an online seminar to discuss the book’s general structure, following up with a series of individual meetings with each of the experts. We organized a panel for the International Studies Association’s Annual Convention in March. Crucial to this project was the possibility of conducting interviews with three Latin American Nobel Peace Prize laureates. Paula Ximena Ruiz Camacho and Martha Ardila interviewed Juan Manuel Santos; Jose Antonio Sanahuja interviewed Óscar Arias Sánchez; and Andrea Oelsner interviewed Adolfo Pérez Esquivel. Also, we appreciate the interviews of former ambassadors and current professors Eduardo Pizarro (Colombia) and Miguel Ruiz Cabañas (Mexico) for the chapters that analyzed the work of Juan Manuel Santos and Alfonso García Robles, respectively. To all, our appreciation for the time they dedicated to meeting with some of our contributors, responding to their questions, and sharing with us their first-hand experiences. In late 2022, once the draft manuscript was ready, the Series editors provided us with feedback, and two anonymous reviewers gave us helpful and constructive comments. Madison Allums, Commissioning Editor at Palgrave, was especially helpful and productive in finalizing the contract’s specifics. Uma Vinesh, Project Coordinator at Palgrave, has been exceptionally patient and competent in guiding the publication of this book. Finally, while the list of loved ones and friends who have helped us in some way to make this project a reality is long, we would like to mention a few of you: Marco Aegon Polo Sridhar, Apoorva Sridhar, Diana Gastelum, the three fantastic Deborah Tasselkraut, Tomás Balbino, and Connor Fernández, who kept students content, engaged, and uncomplaining during the most intense periods of this project, and clan Bompadre—Rolando, Lucía, Carola, and Mateo, who have gotten used to putting up with a sleep-deprived clan member. Buenos Aires and Boston April 2023

References Acharya, A. (2021). Global International Relations. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki, & S. Smith (Eds.), International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (5th ed.). Oxford University Press. Acharya, A., & Buzan, B. (2019). The Making of Global Internacional Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR in Its Centenary. Cambridge University Press. Adams, P. C. (2012). Trajectories of the Nobel Peace Prize. Geopolitics, 17 , 553– 577.

14

R. DOMÍNGUEZ ET AL.

Doyle, M. W. (1983) Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 12(3), 205–235. Fierke, K. M. (2021). Constructivism. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki, & S. Smith (Eds.), International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (pp. 163–182). Oxford University Press. Galtung, J. (1964). An Editorial. Journal of Peace Research, 1(1), 1–4. Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal for Peace Research, 6(3), 167–191. Hamilton, R. J. (2021). Governing the Global Public Square. Harvard International Law Journal, 62(1), 117–174. Havnevik, K. (2021). The World Food Programme and the Nobel Peace Prize 2020. Forum for Development Studies, 48(3), 371–396. Kolstad, I. (2020). Too Big to Fault? Effects of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize on Norwegian Exports to China and Foreign Policy. International Political Science Review, 41(2), 207–223. Kuru, D. (2020). Dialogue of the “Globals”: Connecting Global IR to Global Intellectual History. All Azimuth, 9, 229–248. Manners, I., & Murray, P. (2016). The End of a Noble Narrative? European Integration Narratives After the Nobel Peace Prize. Journal of Common Market Studies, 54(1), 185–202. Mueller, J. (2004). The Remnants of War. Cornell University Press. Neumann, I. B., & Waever, O. (1997). The Future of International Relations. Masters in the Making? Routledge. Nobel Foundation. (2023a). All Nobel Peace Prizes. The Nobel Foundation. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/lists/all-nobel-peace-prizes/ Nobel Foundation. (2023b). The Nobel Peace Prize. https://www.nobelprize. org/prizes/peace/ Nobel Foundation. (2023c). Nomination and Selection of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates. https://www.nobelprize.org/nomination/peace/ Rose, G. (2013). Masters of International Relations: Top Thinkers on the Top Problems. Council on Foreign Relations. Russett, B. (1993). Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World Princeton. Princeton University Press. Thies, C. (2017). Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in Latin America. Foreign Policy Analysis, 13, 662–681.

CHAPTER 2

Carlos Saavedra Lamas: A Vision for Peace Ariel González Levaggi and Maximiliano Zuccarino

Introduction During the uncertain interwar period, Carlos Saavedra Lamas, an experienced Argentine politician, and diplomat, negotiated the Anti-war Treaty of Non-aggression and Conciliation (1933) and developed an active role as a mediator of a regional ad-hoc group that brought an end to the Chaco War (1935), thus becoming the first Latin American to receive the Nobel Prize. Saavedra Lamas proposed three main contributions to understanding Latin American peace and conflict resolution. First, he understood peace in a negative way as a prerequisite for economic development and underlined both systemic and domestic obstacles to a stable peace, such as international anarchy and economic nationalism. Second,

A. G. Levaggi (B) Political Science and International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina, Buenos Aires, Argentina e-mail: [email protected] M. Zuccarino Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in International and Local Problems, UNICEN, Tandil, Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Domínguez and A. Oelsner (eds.), Latin American Thinkers of Peace, Global Political Thinkers, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36107-4_2

15

16

A. G. LEVAGGI AND M. ZUCCARINO

he presented an interwar liberal internationalism approach toward war avoidance typical of developing international treaties and sustaining international organizations. Third, he proposed the notion of consultation grounded on American solidarity as a way not only to channel tensions among sovereign states but also to resolve active conflicts. In that sense, he proposed to universalize the system of consultations developed at the Pan-American Conferences. Still, he presented arguments against formal institutionalization while the use of force was not ruled out completely. However, his ideas were in tension with his diplomatic moves, characterized by their critics as excessively Machiavellian and selfish, in addition to a set of conflicting political, geostrategic, and economic interests that were in play during the Chaco War’s peace negotiations. The first section of this chapter explores the social and political background of Saavedra Lamas and argues that he was an insider of the traditional Argentine elite. Later, it presents a review of the publications about Saavedra Lamas. Under the subtitle The Rise and Fall of a Pacificist, the second section delves into the intricacies of the networks, alliances, and animosities he faced as an actor of peace.

Saavedra Lamas: Traditional Argentinean Elite Carlos Alberto Saavedra Lamas was born in Buenos Aires on November 1, 1877. He was the son of Mariano Abraham Saavedra Zavaleta and Luisa Lamas Somellera (of the Santa Fe Lamas family, whose ancestors came from Uruguay and became very influential in Rosario city politics in the mid-nineteenth century). His great-grandfather, Cornelio Saavedra, was President of the First National Government Board, and his grandfather, Mariano Saavedra, was Senator, Deputy, and Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires for two terms. On October 3, 1910, Saavedra Lamas married Rosa Sáenz Peña González, who also came from another patrician family: daughter and granddaughter of the former Presidents of the Republic, Roque, and Luis Sáenz Peña. She would eventually become President of the Sociedad de Beneficencia de la Capital Federal between 1939 and 1940. As a result of his marriage and rich family legacy, Saavedra Lamas was an insider of the traditional Argentine elite in its heyday. After graduating as a lawyer from the University of Buenos Aires (UBA), Saavedra Lamas began his career in public administration as Secretary-General in the Municipality of Buenos Aires, under the administration of Marcelo T. de Alvear, to later, between 1908 and 1915, won a

2

CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS: A VISION FOR PEACE

17

seat as National Deputy, and later resigned to become Minister of Justice and Public Instruction of the Nation under the government of Victorino de la Plaza. After that, he did not hold any public office until he was appointed Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1932, a position he held until February 20, 1938. After that, in 1941, he was elected Rector of the UBA until 1943 (Olmos Gaona, 2000). While away from public office, between 1916 and 1932, Saavedra Lamas devoted himself to building a prolific academic and professional career. Besides being a full professor at the Universidad de La Plata and at the University of Buenos Aires, he also published works such as the Código de Trabajo, Reformas Orgánicas a la Enseñanza Pública, Tratados Internacionales de Tipo Social, La Crise de la Codification et la Doctrine Argentine du droit international , and La Concepción Argentina del Arbitraje y la Intervención. His outstanding personality in the field of Law and International Relations was enhanced by the permanent interactions he held with law experts such as Alejandro Álvarez, Luigi Luzzati, Albert de Lapradelle, Paul Pic, Adolfo de Posada, and others. He also participated in relevant international conferences such as the meeting of the American Institute of International Law and the sessions of the Institute of International Law, both held in Washington in 1927; the International Labor Conference that he chaired that same year in Geneva; and the Codification Conference of The Hague in 1930. He received several decorations due to his contributions being acknowledged by the governments of Bolivia, Peru, Netherlands, France, Germany, Brazil, and the Vatican (Gaona, 2000). In this way, Saavedra Lamas took charge of the Foreign Affairs portfolio, preceded by notable fame and a vital curriculum and experience in international law as a scholar and expert. During his term at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he reached the peak of his political career amid peace negotiations of the Chaco War, along with the elaboration of the Anti-war Pact, in 1933, that bears his name and which catapulted him to the international sphere as the first Latin American to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 1936, then becoming the Chair of the Assembly of the League of Nations. After leaving the Argentine Foreign Ministry in 1938, he practically withdrew from political activity. However, he permanently established a position of opposition to the governments that would follow, particularly to the one that emerged from the 1943 revolution and to Peronism. In this self-imposed retirement, he died in Buenos Aires on May 5, 1959.

18

A. G. LEVAGGI AND M. ZUCCARINO

The contributions of Saavedra Lamas have been studied from different disciplines. In International Relations and Latin American Studies, his ideas and initiatives have barely received attention in the literature about the regional cooperative trajectory (González Levaggi, 2020) and zones of peace (Kacowicz, 1998; Oelsner, 2005). To fill this absence, the goal of this chapter is precisely to interpret his ideas from the angle of the IR debates and peace studies. However, Argentine historiographic publications have carried out several investigations on the figure of this great thinker and active internationalist, although they lack the necessary impartiality either as detractors or apologists. The latter and perhaps the most representative work is Rosendo Fraga’s, Carlos Saavedra Lamas: Estudio Preliminar, published in 1991. Fraga presents a benevolent view of the minister, pondering his qualities and highlighting his achievements, as when he states that “the fact of being the first Latin American to receive this prize (Nobel) gave Saavedra Lamas a special projection in the countries of the region, but his diplomatic tact prevented this from generating envy or resentment that could harm Argentine foreign policy” (Fraga, 1991, p. 52). In this sense, Fraga is concerned with highlighting the approval with which this award was received, both at home and abroad. At the same time, he reproduces testimonies that relativize the confrontations he had with the then President Justo. However, he also collects some in which it is evident that Saavedra Lamas was not unaware of— and even endorsed—the material aid provided by Argentina to Paraguay during the Chaco War. Sandra Pérez Stocco (2010, 2014) recovers Saavedra Lamas’ vision of statesmanship when analyzing his participation in the Conference for the Consolidation of Peace, held in Buenos Aires in December 1936. The author affirms that, on that occasion, the minister “planned a meeting of a magnitude that would not be limited to the search for peace as a theoretical and idealistic declaration but would succeed in unraveling social, demographic, legal and economic issues to build more solid bases, not only for the peaceful coexistence among the American States and the resolution of conflicts but also to advance towards a more complete integration. (…) The mission of the future Conference would be to consolidate peace in the continent but to achieve it, the idea of coordinating the pre-existing American pacts and implementing solutions to the problems of economic and commercial order was put forward since this was what hindered relations between the peoples of this continent” (Stocco, 2010, pp. 1–3).

2

CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS: A VISION FOR PEACE

19

Based on his archives, Alejandro Olmos Gaona (2000, unpublished) presents a critical view of Saavedra Lamas’ actions. He highlights the permanent differences with Justo (which would have resulted in the frustration of Saavedra Lamas’ presidential aspirations) and even hesitates about the authorship and originality of the Anti-war Pact, questioning how the sudden changes of mood and opinions of the minister influenced the peace negotiations of the Chaco, operating in the same sense, according to him, his ambitions of prominence. “So annoying was his behavior many times that in a lunch attended by President Justo, the mediators Spruille Braden from the United States, Nieto del Rio from Chile, and José F. de Paula Rodrigues Alves from Brazil, severely criticized him, qualifying his attitude as ‘fatal for the peace of America’, he affirms” (Olmos Gaona, unpublished). Finally, his greatest criticism points to how he obtained the Nobel Peace Prize, which is summarized in the following paragraph: “In a separate file and with the indication of being destroyed, there were encrypted telegrams with the attached translation made by the key office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where a large part of the negotiations carried out by a group of diplomats to obtain the Nobel Peace Prize for Saavedra Lamas was documented. It is evident that many documents are missing, but with those that exist, there is more than enough material to discover the political maneuvers, diplomatic manipulations, and pressures on men, countries, and institutions carried out by the Chancellor, due to a more than debatable personal ambition, and the particularities of his discreet but effective working method and the ability to leave other competitors in the way” (Olmos Gaona, unpublished). Beyond all these questions, he contributes to reconstructing the profile and personality of the minister and recognizes that “his enormous capacity for work cannot be disputed, nor the solvency with which he dealt with the matters entrusted to him (…). In addition to his remarkable knowledge of international law, labor legislation, and economic issues, he had a solid doctrinal background and a remarkable ability to handle men and situations, which allowed him to succeed in difficult moments. In addition to his prodigious memory, he was also a keen speaker of ideas and it was never easy for his opponents to refute his arguments” (Olmos Gaona, unpublished: 9–10). Arturo Jauretche is another author who questioned Saavedra Lamas’ performance. In particular, Jauretche focuses on the management of the Chaco peace negotiations (and if we insist so much on this point, it is because of his actions that led to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize),

20

A. G. LEVAGGI AND M. ZUCCARINO

pointed out: “The fire makers were in charge of making peace and became firemen, and the same forces that achieved this transformation obtained a prize for the chief of the firemen” (Galasso, 1982). Finally, from a more systemic perspective, Escudé and Cisneros (2000) identify Saavedra Lamas as a realist. They argue that his proposals and conduct within the context of the Chaco War ultimately responded, to the interests of the government he represented, but not to an unwavering pacifist vocation. In this sense, the authors argue that a plausible explanation is that while the Paraguayan forces were in an offensive situation, the Argentine minister argued that the moment was not yet propitious for a settlement between the belligerents since any delay in the negotiations would imply more territory for the authorities of Asunción.

The Rise and Fall of a Pacifist Saavedra Lamas was a member of the traditional Argentine elite that ruled the nation until the 1943 Revolution when Juan Domingo Peron emerged most influential political figure in Argentinean politics in the twentieth century. The density and breadth of his contacts, his participation in countless forums, assemblies, and organizations, and the recognition of receiving the Nobel Peace Prize led this analysis to argue that he had a well-oiled international connection consistent with the standards of the time. Despite the worldwide deep crisis during the interwar period, Saavedra Lamas continued to raise the flag of political and economic liberalism—with a marked pro-British influence—in opposition to the protectionist and interventionist readjustment of the world economy resulting from the 1929 stock market crash and the rise of totalitarian movements in Europe. Reviewing his participation in different instances and forums of political, economic, academic, and legal nature, in which he was able to disseminate his thoughts and the Argentine doctrine of international law thanks to activism that not remain only at a theoretical level but also advanced toward concrete practice, it can be pointed out that: he was President of the American Congress of Social Sciences (1916), Argentine delegate to the International Commission of American Jurists (1927), President of the XI International Labor Conference (1928), President of the Pan-American Commercial Conference (1935), President of the Chaco Peace Conference (1935–1938), President of the XVII Assembly of the League of Nations (1936), and President of the Inter-American

2

CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS: A VISION FOR PEACE

21

Conference for the Consolidation of Peace (1936). In all these events, he played an outstanding role crowned by grandiloquent speeches, opening and/or closing the sessions in many cases (which added to his participation in numerous tributes), and signing treaties and protocols derived from his diplomatic endeavor. In short, an incessant activity during at least twenty years of his life corresponded to the most transcendent period of his public action. In this context, it is worth mentioning his supreme effort to link Argentina—in his capacity as a national government official—with the largest bureaucratic structure existing at the international level: the League of Nations, which was created after World War I with the primary goal of maintaining world peace. Under his position at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in his eagerness to achieve a rapprochement with Europe, Argentina joined the League of Nations even though the United States did not. Thus, Saavedra Lamas himself justified the need for this entry to the Cámara de Diputados de la Nación during its treatment: “(it is) with our great traditions in pacifist matters a place where we should be, where we should have been since ancient times, because it matters and means, at the same time, a center of economic action, which in the present circumstances is of great importance” (Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, 1932, p. 820). Pacifist vocation, Europeanism, and a vision and capacity to manage international alliances were skills that Saavera Lamas displayed as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Simultaneously, he embraced some traditional principles or realism by attaching great importance to the practical, material effects of an eventual Argentine entry into the League. Another example of this realism, always linked to economic interests, can be deduced from his words in the context of the Chaco peace negotiations: “those of us who have collaborated in the ideological concessions of the Protocol -he said- have not thought of a gratuitous donation of rights and advantages that are forbidden to sovereignties. We have started from the basis of the necessary interdependence, which translates the advantages granted into reciprocal utilities” (Saavedra Lamas, 1937, p. 83). Thus, we have here a pragmatic Saavedra Lamas, who invariably orients his discourse in favor of peace, but not at any price, but taking into consideration multiple variables to obtain concrete benefits. This would lead us to suppose that the accusations against him regarding the manipulation of situations and the management of time during the Chaco peace negotiations in an attempt to obtain the greatest possible profit are perhaps well-founded or that

22

A. G. LEVAGGI AND M. ZUCCARINO

he was possibly aware of the economic and military aid that was being given to Paraguay while he, alleging a pretended neutrality, sought to set himself up as the mentor of peace. Two turning points deserve to be highlighted from the concrete contributions to peace: the Anti-war Pact of 1933 and his mediation in the Chaco War in 1935. The Anti-war Pact achieved peace between Bolivia and Paraguay in the armed conflict. Its importance lies not only in the fact that it was helpful from a practical point of view but also complemented with pre-existing treaties, leading many world countries to sign and ratify it. In this sense, Saavedra Lamas himself stated that the Pact, which arose from the desire that the Chaco War should be the last one, “aspires to the consolidation of world peace, insofar as it begins by creating a pacifist regime that ensures it in a continent (…). In no case has it entailed the abrogation, or even the suspension, of the existing pacifist treaties or pacts, with which it is coordinated (…). This is what (…) is intended to be done with respect to (…) the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Briand-Kellogg and several resolutions of the Pan-American Conferences” (Saavedra Lamas, 1937, pp. 48–50). The treaty consisted of 17 articles that condemned wars of aggression and the settlement of territorial problems using violence; declared that any differences arising between the signatories would be submitted to peaceful settlement; and provided for establishing conciliation commissions, which were to deal with disputes. In addition, the signatories undertook not to recognize territorial changes effected by other than peaceful means and to take a stand against any state resorting to political, legal, or economic measures not authorized by international law, specifying that in no case would diplomatic or armed intervention be admitted. As it was open to the adhesion of all the States of the world, by January 1, 1937, the Pact had already been ratified by 26 countries (including Bolivia, Brazil, the United States, and several European nations) and five others, including Paraguay, had adhered (Saavedra Lamas, 1937, p. 124). This, in short, enhances the value of the Pact, which obtained a global scope, universalizing the pacifist spirit with which it was conceived. The 1932–1935 Paraguay–Bolivia war was over the possession of the Chaco Boreal region. After a sustained but fluctuating diplomatic mediation effort, Saavedra Lamas brought the warring parties together with representatives of the United States, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay at the Chaco Peace Conference, which took place between May and June 1935. As a result, the belligerents signed the Peace Protocol establishing the

2

CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS: A VISION FOR PEACE

23

definitive cessation of hostilities, which would later be ratified by signing the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Limits between Paraguay and Bolivia in July 1938. Foreign Affairs Minister Saavedra Lamas gives an account of the work carried out to obtain the initial protocol as follows: “we obtained (…) after intense efforts (…) the initial suspension of hostilities, the twelve-day truce which we later extended indefinitely. We appointed a Neutral Military Commission constituted by the highest exponents of the culture and capacity of our armies which moved to the field of operations to determine its lines of separation and to resolve under its supervision and control the cases of discrepancy. We established (…) the necessary security measures and, entering into the very depths of its guarantees, we provided for the demobilization of the armies until the military troops were reduced to restricted numbers (…) We established the obligation of not making new acquisitions of war material (…) and in putting all these measures into practice, we consecrated a commitment of non-aggression between the ex-belligerents” (Saavedra Lamas, 1937, pp. 76–77). Furthermore, with the vanity that characterized him, he affirmed that rarely in the international annals “will there have been a mediation, a collective conciliation effort, that has acted so extensively and so intensely, that has carried out such an integral and complex work, covering all the phases of the main problems and their derivatives that comprise a war” (Saavedra Lamas, 1937, p. 78). As mentioned, his role in conducting the mediation process ended up being crucial to his nomination and subsequent accreditation for the Nobel Peace Prize. In addition to his strong rhetoric and positions, his fluid international networks also earned him a series of enmities, for example, with the then U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, with whom there was a reciprocal antipathy. However, both supported their respective nominations for the Nobel Peace Prize, awarded to Saavedra Lamas in 1936 and Hull a few years later. To the list could be added the Brazilian and Chilean foreign ministers during the Chaco conflict, the Argentine Minister of War Manuel Rodríguez, some leaders of the League of Nations, and successive Bolivian representatives in Argentina. A surprising animosity developed with Vicente Rivarola, Paraguayan ambassador to Argentina, with whom he disagreed more than once. In the context of ministerial competition and national cabinet differences that involved Saavedra Lamas, Rivarola Coello intervened, in March 1934, seeking to make Minister Rodríguez permanent against the Chancellor, knowing his

24

A. G. LEVAGGI AND M. ZUCCARINO

influence over President Justo, “a little in the hope of provoking the withdrawal of Dr. Saavedra Lamas from the Cabinet, which I think could be beneficial for our diplomatic efforts” (1982, pp. 235–236). However, and even questioning his management, in his Memoirs, Rivarola would finally recognize the outstanding role played by the Argentine minister: “His multiple and complex personality, I could not say that I came to understand it despite having studied and observed it, with commitment and interest, from the moment I became aware of the preponderant and decisive role he was called to play (…). At times firm and sure, and at times fickle and uncertain in his decisions and confused in his words, only I know how much I have pondered in my inner struggles to understand and judge him, sometimes with faith and confidence, and other times with suspicion and distrust (…). As a personal and absolute man, even selfish if you will, he often acted in his pacifist and conciliatory yearnings and desires as if he were the only one called to make peace (…). In any case, I recognize today, honestly and sincerely, that Doctor Saavedra Lamas, with his clear intelligence, his vast enlightenment, his dedication at all times, and his capacity for work, has been the mediator who has done most to avoid, first, and stop, later, the war that Bolivia unleashed against Paraguay” (Peña Villamil, 1994, pp. 172, 173). This recognition by one of his critics—as well as that of Cordell Hull, who, despite being one of his staunchest opponents, admitted that the decision to award him the Nobel Peace Prize was well deserved “because of the extraordinary services to the cause of peace rendered by the Argentine Foreign Minister, not only in recent months but during the many years he has devoted to the noble task” (Fraga, 1991, p. 44)—allows us to understand what follows. Despite all the above, Saavedra Lamas was a high-profile public personality who enjoyed international prestige acquired throughout a long political career but also—and above all as a jurist and tireless defender of the observance of international law. Another key issue in Saavedra Lamas’ political and international career was his disagreement with President Agustín P. Justo (1932–1938). In this sense, the socialist leader David Tieffemberg points out the differences between divergences between the two but that “blood did not reach the river because they were all in the same business.” The exchancellor Nicanor Costa Méndez (1966–1969, 1981–1982) points out that it was then believed that Justo wanted to accelerate the rapprochement with the United States while Saavedra Lamas responded more to the traditionally pro-British policy, which was a reason for dissidence

2

CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS: A VISION FOR PEACE

25

between the two, there being no doubt that they did not sympathize with each other (Fraga, 1991, pp. 57–58). Likewise, the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Saavedra Lamas constituted a further cause for discord. According to Rodolfo Martínez (Jr.), “they say that the real recipient of the Nobel Prize should have been Justo because if it had been only for the way in which Don Carlos (Saavedra Lamas) had articulated things, peace would not have been achieved. It was said at that time that the candidate for the Nobel Prize was Justo, and because the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Saavedra Lamas there was a displeasure” (Fraga, 1991, p. 57). Gaona shares his opinion and affirms that the prize caused Justo enormous discomfort. The President had been a decisive factor in the termination of the war, forcing some positions that put an end to the confrontation and perhaps he believed himself to be the logical recipient of the award. He was unaware of the secret negotiations carried out by the Foreign Ministry and its ambassadors and had no other alternative but to accept the inevitable, but this distanced him definitively from his Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As Félix Luna points out, awarding the prize “would have provoked Justo’s jealousy and frustrated the presidential aspirations of his collaborator” (Olmos Gaona, unpublished). The distinction he received not only generated uneasiness and resentment within the government but also abroad. The Chilean President, Arturo Alessandri, openly expressed his displeasure for what he considered “an act of injustice to the work of Chile,” considering that Saavedra had hindered peace as far as he could, but that he had used diplomatic means to “get himself elected president of the League of Nations and, from that high position, he obtained the injustice of having the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to someone who did not deserve it, for all the difficulties he had made” (Riviera Polo, 2012). Another with whom he had frequent and harsh confrontations was Spruille Braden, the North American delegate to the Chaco peace conference. In the autobiography written by Braden in 1970, the Argentine minister is the object of insults, scorn, and various adjectives—antiAmerican, egomaniac, vain, ambitious, stupid, and inept, among others—, including a negative opinion about his winning of the Nobel Prize (Rapoport, 2009). Braden wrote: “It is generally known that Carlos Saavedra Lamas, the inordinately egotistical Argentine Foreign Minister, wanted to cause as much trouble as possible for the United States. No one among Latin Americans had any doubt that Saavedra Lamas would delay peace until the whole world knew that he was the peacemaker. Awarding

26

A. G. LEVAGGI AND M. ZUCCARINO

the Nobel Prize to Saavedra Lamas was a great disappointment for me (…). He was vain, pathologically ambitious, essentially stupid, and a bad man” (Fraga, 1991, p. 30). After having been Minister of Foreign Affairs and Rector of the University of Buenos Aires, with the progressive decline of the traditional Argentine elite, the relative weight of the figure of Saavedra Lamas began to wane. On the one hand, the ex-Chancellor was seen as part of the group that governed the country during the “infamous decade” in a context of corruption and electoral fraud, to which was added the criticism of his performance during the Chaco War. In this sense, an open letter was circulated by the writer and journalist Wenceslao Jaime Molins to Saavedra Lamas, in which he pointed out: “I have the honor to tell you that your policy in relation to the Chaco War is absolutely wrong (…). Bolivia has been right in distrusting from the first moment a marginal policy that did not shine for its equanimity nor for its transparency. More than Paraguay and Bolivia, it is the mistaken Argentine policy that has been to blame for the war. Because we, and no other country but us! were able to avoid it with the simple expedient of even cordiality, without annoying prerogatives for anyone, nor false looks, nor precautions, nor suspicions about the future (…). History, no doubt Mr. Minister, will ask us to account for this mistake” (Ayala Moreira, 1959, p. 371). Along the same lines, in a speech delivered in the Cámara de Diputados on September 29, 1942, the socialist Mario Bravo would affirm: “The Argentine Government fomented that fratricidal, destructive, bloody war (…) a disastrous policy of lies, of calculations, of deceit (…). Many generations will pass before we can make this part of the world believe that we have practiced with them a policy of fraternity; it will be necessary that much water falls on the bloody hands of some candidate for President1 so that he can appear as the prototypical character of the romantic and loving unity of Pan America” (Ayala Moreira, 1959, p. 370). Although he was a controversial and strongly questioned figure both inside and outside the country, Saavedra Lamas had a vast network of contacts and was able to establish bureaucratic alliances, which in Argentina led him to occupy various important public positions and, abroad, materialized especially through the link and participation in political and legal organizations of the Old Continent since, as will be seen below, he was a convinced Europeanist.

2

CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS: A VISION FOR PEACE

27

The Saavedra Lamas Peace Triangle: Absence of War, Liberal Internationalism, and Mediation The professional experience enriched Saavedra Lamas’s worldview and led to deep reflections on international law and diplomacy. Two writings stand out in particular. First, the work Por la paz de las Américas , published in 1937, is a compilation not made by Saavedra Lamas but with his consent, where his most important speeches and conferences between 1916 and 1936 are collected. Secondly, his essay Vida Internacional was published initially as a Prologue to Volume II of International Law by Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile. Por la paz de las Américas gathers Saavedra Lamas’ key thoughts and contributions on multiple issues. Among them stand out his defense of democracy as a political regime, his criticism of the traditional hemispheric actions of the United States and its Monroe Doctrine, and his position on the favorable and desirable effects of European influence. Concerning the United States, he stated that: its idea of hegemony leads it to exclude the action of Europe on America and perhaps to substitute it (...) (but) the Latin American countries (...) and our country as the first of them, are in a very different situation; all its desire for progress, all its work of improvement, all its desire for transformation, must consist precisely in bringing Europe closer to Latin America and taking America towards Europe, in a fruitful work of harmonization. (...) The intelligent and irreplaceable course of its international activity (...) is thus directed towards Europeanization and the reduction or elimination of distances (...). We must therefore be encouraged by the desire and even the hope of creating such a dense network of conventional relations that it covers the vast domain of the ocean and identifies us, if possible, as a single community. Thus (...) within Pan-Americanism we would maintain the balance of the Saxon world with the Latin world. (Saavedra Lamas, 1937, pp. 262–263)

This deep-rooted Europeanism, this supreme admiration for Europe and its development, is what, as has been said, confronted him with President Justo, while opening the doors of the Old Continent, where he developed a fruitful legal and political activity and weaved a vast network of contacts, favoring the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize.

28

A. G. LEVAGGI AND M. ZUCCARINO

Considering this position from which he started, three elements are key to understanding Saavedra Lamas’ contribution to the Latin American vision of international peace and security. First, he understood peace negatively as a prerequisite for economic development, highlighting both systemic and internal obstacles to a stable peace, such as international anarchy and economic nationalism. In Vida Internacional, the by-thenformer Argentine minister took up the failed experience of the League of Nations and criticized the structure of the United Nations because of the conviction that “peace can only be maintained by force” while denying “any regime of democratic equity that assumes the sovereign equality of states before a supreme consecration of the ‘necessity’ that generates the present regime” (Saavedra Lamas, 1948, p. 14). Saavedra Lamas’ personal experience, a scholarly focus on international law, and the post-WWI context were central in the development of their ideas in which the avoidance of the war was critical to repeat a new conflagration’s bloodshed and the way to avoid it should be through the respect for international law and the use of international mediation. An exception to the negative peace approach is his perspectives on the “Cuestión Social ” (social reforms) in which he draws a parallel between a collective bargain (convención colectiva) between employees and employers and a treaty of peace since he characterized the strikes as an example of economic war among rivals. In this sense, the lack of social justice threatens domestic peace (Boasso, 2015, pp. 54–55). Secondly, he presents an interwar liberal internationalist approach to avoid armed conflagrations, which is typical of the development of international treaties and support organizations. In Por la paz de las Américas , the author presented the need to contemplate in a comprehensive manner, beyond the legal aspect, the geographical situation and the economic and commercial benefits when dealing with an international conflict; the defense of the Argentine legal tradition and principles in international law, with special emphasis on the submission of disputes to mediation and arbitration; demographic and migratory aspects; PanAmericanism in its political, economic, and commercial aspects (criticism of artificial barriers and in favor of a liberal economic policy to reduce restrictions in international trade); the principle of domicile in international law (following the historical line of Argentine doctrines such as those of Drago and Calvo, in favor of the principle of non-intervention of one State over another); various aspects related to labor legislation and

2

CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS: A VISION FOR PEACE

29

workers’ rights; and, of course, the staunch defense of the peaceful settlement of disputes, which undoubtedly made him, from a theoretical point of view, one of the main proponents of peace and defenders of international law during the first half of the twentieth century in the world. In practice, through his public actions, as we have seen, this is much more questionable. Third, he proposed the notion of consultation based on hemispheric solidarity as a way not only to channel tensions between sovereign states but also to resolve active conflicts. In this sense, he proposed universalizing the system of consultations developed in the Pan-American Conferences but presented arguments against formal institutionalization as long as the use of force was not completely ruled out. Some of his most emphatic speeches on peace, respect for international law, and the need for a peaceful solution to conflicts can be seen in the work Por la paz de las Américas , in two iconic moments of his career. In the framework of the Peace Consolidation Conference held in Buenos Aires in December 1936, he stated that its objective was “to ensure the benefits of peace in their mutual relations and with all the peoples of the earth, to condemn wars of aggression, to abolish the practice of interventions and to dislodge the use of violence forever, strengthening the means to preserve peace or restore it following the lofty concepts of law, justice, equity, and international morality” (Saavedra Lamas, 1937, p. 23). In the opening remarks of the Chaco Peace Conference, he said: “History is watching us; it has opened its bronze tablets and is writing these events. The Argentine Government and Chancellery have only one aspiration: that future generations recognize and say that the Chaco war was extraordinary for a fundamental reason because war destroys the law, demonstrates the illusory nature of its applications, and to this Chaco war, we claim to have given a characteristic feature, that of creating rights, that of serving to establish principles and that of maintaining and exalting them in practice. When the belligerents were in the heat of combat, the Argentine Foreign Ministry told them: ‘Your violence will not modify your rights’. It was the declaration of August 3, which we initiated, obtaining the adhesion of nineteen nations of America” (Saavedra Lamas, 1937, pp. 69–70). Finally, Vida Internacional reviews the main contributions such as the Anti-war Pact of 1933, the mediation through the formula of conciliation in the Chaco War, the role of the International Labor Organization as the only international organization remaining after

30

A. G. LEVAGGI AND M. ZUCCARINO

the disappearance of the League of Nations, and the normative development of the American Conferences that anticipated the creation of a regional organization in the face of the Bogotá conference.

Final Considerations During the first half of the twentieth century, Saavedra Lamas was a central figure in the international relations of Latin America. As the first Latin American Nobel Prize recipient, he had a significant impact on how to address international conflicts on the periphery of world affairs in a still European-centered world. However, the demise of the Society of Nations next to the beginning of the Second World War and his political decline in Argentina took away the brightness and projection of his ideas and contributions. The chapter presented three main contributions to the Latin American understanding of peace and conflict resolution: a negative way to understand peace based on a legalist approach, an alignment with the pacifist, liberal internationalist ideas to avoid war by the development of international treaties and multilateral organizations, and, finally, presenting consultation and mediation as means to solve active or latent conflicts. Saavedra Lamas had a clear vision for peace that could implement at the regional level. Still, they failed to universalize in a global context of militarism, rearmament, and fascism in the late 1930s.

Note 1. In allusion to Saavedra Lamas, who at that time had ambitions and promoted his pre-candidacy for the Presidency of the Nation.

References Ayala Moreira, R. (1959). Por qué no ganamos la guerra del chaco. Talleres gráficos bolivianos. Bandeira, L. A. M. (2004). Argentina, Brazil and the United States de la Triple Alianza al Mercosur. Conflicto e integración en América del Sur (1ª). Grupo Editorial Norma. Boasso, P. A. (2014–2015). Carlos Saavedra Lamas y sus ideas acerca del Derecho Laboral en la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Res Gesta, 51. http:/ /bibliotecadigital.uca.edu.ar/repositorio/revistas/saavedra-lamas-ideas-der echo-laboral.pdf

2

CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS: A VISION FOR PEACE

31

Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Diario de Sesiones. (1932, September 27 and 28). Conforti, C. (2016). Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Peace Mediator in the Chaco War. Revista de Mediación, 9(2), 1–5. Escudé, C. (1983). Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos y la declinación argentina 1942–1949. Editorial de Belgrano. Escudé, C., & Cisneros, A. (2000). Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina. Fraga, R. (1991). Carlos Saavedra Lamas. Estudio Preliminar. Centro de Estudios Unión para la Nueva Mayoría. Galasso, N. (1982). (comp.). Las polémicas de Jauretche. Los Nacionales Editores. Gayán, H., & Martín, A. (2007). Aporte para un estudio del linaje Saavedra. http://cablemodem.fibertel.com.ar/genealogiafamiliar/genealogi asaavedra.htm González Levaggi, A. (2020). Confrontational and Cooperative Regional Orders Managing Regional Security in World Politics. Routledge. Kacowicz, A. (1998). Zones of Peace: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective. SUNY Press. Oelsner, A. (2005). International Relations in Latin America: Peace and Security in the Southern Cone. Routledge. Olmos Gaona, A. El secreto en las negociaciones internacionales. La paz del Chaco y el Premio Nobel de la Paz. “Inédito”. Olmos Gaona, A. (2000). Saavedra Lamas y el Premio Nobel de la Paz. Todo es historia, 400, 14–36. Peña Villamil, M. (1994). Las relaciones paraguayo-argentinas durante el conflicto del Chaco (1925–1935). Anuario de la Academia Paraguaya de la Historia, 23, 169–199. Pérez Stocco, S. (2010, March 10–12). Carlos Saavedra Lamas. Una mirada sobre la Conferencia Interamericana de Consolidación de la Paz. In IV Congreso Interoceánico de Estudios Latinoamericanos “La Travesía de la libertad ante el bicentenario”. Mendoza. Pérez Stocco, S. (2014). La paz del Chaco. Carlos Saavedra Lamas y la participación de la Cancillería Argentina (1932–1938). Jauel. Polo, F. R. (2012). Arturo Alessandri Palma: su visión y actuación en política internacional. In Arturo Alessandri Palma y su época: Vida, política y sociedad. Ediciones Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional. Rapoport, M. (2009, April 29). Braden y la guerra del Chaco, 12. http://www. pagina12.com.ar/diario/contratapa/13-124105-2009-04-29.html Rivarola Coello, V. (1982). Diplomatic Letters. Eusebio Ayala. Vicente Rivarola. Chaco War. Buenos Aires. Saavedra Lamas, C. (1937). Por la paz de las Américas. M. Gleizer.

32

A. G. LEVAGGI AND M. ZUCCARINO

Saavedra Lamas, C. (1948). Vida Internacional. In M. C. Tocornal (Ed.), Derecho Internacional (2nd ed.). Editorial Nascimento. Stone, L. (1986). El pasado y el presente. Fondo de Cultura Económica. Zuccarino, M. (2013, July–December). Las élites dirigentes nacionales, el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, y el conflicto del Chaco: un análisis histórico y prosopográfico. Humania del Sur, Revista de Estudios Latinoamericanos Africanos y Asiáticos, 15, 153–178. ISSN: 1856-7959. Facultad de Humanidades y Educación de la Universidad de Los Andes. Zuccarino, M. (2016, January–June). La élite socio-política nacional y la Guerra del Chaco. Los cancilleres argentinos en el periodo de entreguerras. Cuadernos de Política Exterior argentina, 123, 63–78. ISSN: 0326-7806. Centro de Estudios en Relaciones Internacionales de Rosario (CERIR) - Universidad Nacional de Rosario. Zuccarino, M. (2018, December). “De la Comisión de Neutrales de Washington a la Conferencia de Paz en Buenos Aires. El rol desempeñado por la Argentina en las negociaciones de paz del Chaco”, Dossier titulado: “80 años de la paz de la Guerra del Chaco. 1938–2018”. Res Gesta, 54, 103–126. ISSN: 0325772X/ e-ISSN: 2525-0884. Instituto de Historia, Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales del Rosario, Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina. Zuccarino, M. (2019, June). Europeísmo versus panamericanismo: su incidencia en la posición del Gobierno argentino ante la Guerra del Chaco. Revista de Historia americana y argentina, 54(1), 83–127. ISSN: 0556-5960/ISSNe: 2314-1549. Instituto de Historia Americana y Argentina, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo.

CHAPTER 3

Adolfo Pérez Esquivel: Active Non-Violence Andrea Oelsner and Rolando J. Bompadre

Introduction Adolfo Pérez Esquivel was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1980 in recognition of his non-violent struggle for the rights of marginalized and oppressed groups in Latin America. In the year of the award, he defined himself in an interview as ‘a people’s man,’ who shared the road together with the people, and who, above all, shared their hope (Bofill et al., 1980, p. 6). His campaigns in defense of human rights were carried out in a particularly hostile environment, with repressive and exclusionary dictatorial governments in power throughout Latin America. In the context of the challenges that he faced, his manyfold achievements are most remarkable. Firstly, Pérez Esquivel managed to build and

We would like to thank Deborah Tasselkraut for her valuable research assistance. A. Oelsner (B) University of San Andrés, Buenos Aires, Argentina e-mail: [email protected] R. J. Bompadre University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Domínguez and A. Oelsner (eds.), Latin American Thinkers of Peace, Global Political Thinkers, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36107-4_3

33

34

A. OELSNER AND R. J. BOMPADRE

lead a regional network of Christian and ecumenical non-violent organizations with links extending beyond the region. Secondly, despite his constant search for social justice and his profound Christian beliefs, Pérez Esquivel went against the predominant view among progressive groups of the time that only violent revolution had a chance of achieving social change; moreover, this view was gaining foot even within some sectors of the Latin American Catholic Church. Third, he defended, maintained, and consistently practiced the concept of active non-violence—a position different from both the defense of the armed struggle and the principle of pacifism. Fourth, his struggle took place during a period of—and against—authoritarian governments across Latin America, which cannot be understood apart from the context of the Cold War and the United States’ support of these regimes. This chapter discusses the life, thought, and social activism of Adolfo Pérez Esquivel—the Argentine son of a Spanish immigrant and a woman of aboriginal descent who died when he was still a toddler. He was brought up amidst poverty and orphanhood, had to work from an early age, sought inspiration from Mahatma Gandhi, Thomas Merton, Martin Luther King, and Paulo Freire, suffered detention and torture, stood true to his commitment to the active non-violent struggle on behave of the rights of the poor, and (at the time of writing) still remains engaged in social activism well into his nineties. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The first section offers a brief overview of Adolfo Pérez Esquivel’s life, highlighting certain early experiences and events that left an imprint on his later social and political activism. The second section reviews the literature on Pérez Esquivel as well as his own writings and conceptual contributions. The third section focuses on his work ‘on the ground,’ analyzing the social, political, and global environment which framed his efforts to build a regional and international network of social organizations with a Christian and active non-violence position, and covering the activities pursued by Peace and Justice Service (SERPAJ, according to its Spanish acronym), the organization he established, from its beginnings to the present day. The fourth section connects Pérez Esquivel’s and SERPAJ’s underlying philosophy with broader debates within the disciplines of International Relations and Peace Studies. Central to this discussion are the concepts of active non-violence, institutionalized and structural violence, and negative and positive peace. The conclusions highlight the merits of the Nobel

3

ADOLFO PÉREZ ESQUIVEL: ACTIVE NON-VIOLENCE

35

Peace Prize award to Adolfo Pérez Esquivel and puts it again in a global context.

Brief Biographical Overview Adolfo Pérez Esquivel was born in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on 26 November 1931 to a Galician immigrant father and a mother of indigenous Guarani descent. Three aspects of his childhood left such a profound mark on him that they clearly influenced his later choices and commitments during his adult life. The first childhood experience to leave an imprint was the poverty of his family; the second, his religious upbringing; and the third, his indigenous grandmother and his close contact with discrimination and prejudice. Regarding his deprived background, Pérez Esquivel recounts that as a young child the family used to live in a conventillo—a large house with several rooms, each rented out to a different family—in his natal San Telmo neighborhood. Back then, San Telmo was a traditional yet rundown area at the southern edge of the city of Buenos Aires. Lodgers were typically of immigrant and/or working-class background as well as descendants of former slaves. Indeed, in our interview with Pérez Esquivel, he considered the conventillos to be the equivalent of the ‘present-day shanty towns’ that surround most Latin American great urban centers.1 To add to these underprivileged circumstances, at the early age of three, Pérez Esquivel lost his mother. His father was a fisherman who struggled to support and look after his four children by himself. Sometimes he would be hired to join the crew of a larger fishing boat and the children had to fend for themselves during their father’s long periods at sea. Eventually, their difficult financial and family situation compelled the father to take the decision of separating his children and placing them with different relatives or at educational institutions. As his father valued religious education, he decided to send his young son to a patronage run by the Carmelite congregation. Separated from his family, though, the boy Pérez Esquivel resented being left with the nuns. Nonetheless, at the patronage he discovered his passion for drawing and for sculpting, to which he was introduced by the works of an old nun. Pérez Esquivel remained with the Carmelites until the age of ten, when he moved back to his maternal grandmother’s house in Haedo, a suburb in the outskirts of Buenos Aires. He described her as an ‘almost illiterate but

36

A. OELSNER AND R. J. BOMPADRE

profoundly wise Guarani woman’ (Pérez Esquivel et al., 2013, pp. 14– 15). Also, the years with his grandmother are key to understanding Pérez Esquivel’s later development. They made him aware of the fact that prejudice and discrimination were not only widespread in Argentina, but also, they were institutionalized forms of violence, given that it was at school that children—including himself—were taught that ‘the indigenous people were lazy, bandits and thieves’ (Pérez Esquivel et al., 2013, p. 15). He admitted having felt embarrassed about inviting classmates home for fear they would meet his indigenous and peasant grandmother of dark skin—and later feeling ashamed of his previous embarrassment. This woman, dearly loved by Pérez Esquivel, died when he was 16 or 17 (Pérez Esquivel et al., 2013, pp. 15–16). During those years, Pérez Esquivel attended a school run by the Franciscan order and began joining them in deprived neighborhoods to help children learn to read, write, and count. He got increasingly involved with religious organizations as he discovered that their work put into practice ‘the truly spiritual and social dimension of the Gospel’ (Pérez Esquivel et al., 2013, pp. 15–16). Thus, his first memories were informed by his own needs and the experience of growing up among immigrants and working classes. In this respect, Pérez Esquivel is unambiguous: ‘No one had to teach me what poverty is for I lived through it, I was one of them.’2 In addition to being familiar with destitution and discrimination, Pérez Esquivel got used to working hard since even before finishing primary school. He would work as a newsboy, a gardener, and an errand boy during the day, and attend classes and study in the evenings. Still in his teens, Pérez Esquivel traveled for the first time to visit family in Misiones, a province in the northeast of Argentina. From there, he crossed the border to southern Brazil and Paraguay. In the fields, he caught his first glimpse of a Latin American reality dominated by the exploitation of rural workers. The many trips that followed made him aware that in Latin America there co-existed two very different worlds: in his own words, ‘a world of the privileged and a world of the excluded’.3 Pérez Esquivel continued working and studying during his student years, which he spent in the High School of Fine Arts at the National University of La Plata. He graduated at the age of 25 and for the next 15 years, Pérez Esquivel worked as an artist and as an art teacher at the

3

ADOLFO PÉREZ ESQUIVEL: ACTIVE NON-VIOLENCE

37

university level and in secondary schools (Bacon, 1999, p. 471; Bofill, 1980, p. 8). Much of his artistic work was done in parish churches, often in collaboration with artists with whom he would share a sensitivity for working-class life and sufferings—among them, painter Benito Quinquela Martín (1890–1977) and architect and sculptor (and son of a celebrated painter) Carlos de la Cárcova (1903–1974). Similarly, he started interacting with emblematic politicians of the Socialist tradition, particularly Alfredo Palacios (1880–1965) and Alicia Moreau de Justo (1885–1986).4 He met his wife Amanda Guerreño when he was 15. They enrolled together in the High School of Fine Arts at La Plata, where she studied piano and composition. Later, she also became a Red Cross nurse and worked at a Missionary Center. The oldest of their three children, Leonardo, joined his father in his non-violence activism already in the critical 1970s. Adolfo Pérez Esquivel began working actively on non-violent resistance in Argentina in the decade of 1960. Particularly important to him was a visit by Jean and Hildegard Goss-Mayr from the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR). It was in those years that there emerged the idea of a regional organ that would coordinate the campaigns of nonviolent liberation organizations throughout Latin America. In Uruguay in 1968, it was decided that such a regional organ would be established and that it would publish a periodical bulletin in order to facilitate the exchange of information among Latin American non-violent groups. In 1971, the first meeting of representatives of these groups took place in Alajuela, Costa Rica, bringing together religious leaders from the whole continent. In 1973, Pérez Esquivel founded and began publishing the periodical newsletter Peace and Justice. Finally, in Medellín, Colombia, in 1974, Adolfo Pérez Esquivel was elected coordinator of the Latin American NGO Peace and Justice Service, with its headquarters in Buenos Aires (Bofill et al., 1980, p. 11). Since the publication of the Peace and Justice bulletin and even more so since the establishment of Latin American SERPAJ as a Christian ecumenical social organization, the name of Adolfo Pérez Esquivel became inseparable from that of the network of Latin American nonviolence movements. His figure became synonymous with the struggle for regional liberation and a commitment to non-violent methods to fight injustice and institutionalized violence.

38

A. OELSNER AND R. J. BOMPADRE

In a political environment of repressive dictatorships, his social and political actions resulted more than once in his detention. For instance, he was arrested in Brazil in 1975 and in Ecuador the following year. The most brutal experience of detention took place in his native Argentina, governed by a military dictatorship at this time. In Easter 1977 he was at the Police Central Department renewing his passport, when he was detained without any judiciary order having been issued against him. He was kept in a clandestine torture center for over a month. Eventually, on 5 May 1977, he was boarded onto one of the infamous ‘death flights’ that the Armed Forces regularly arranged to throw prisoners alive into the River Plate or the sea. Pérez Esquivel’s life was saved at the last minute, he suspected, by international pressure. According to Pérez Esquivel (cited in Felix, 2019, p. 245), ‘they were unable to throw me out of the airplane thanks to the enormous international solidarity and the campaign people were organising in Europe and other places for my release.’ However, he was not liberated then, but rather sent to a high security prison near La Plata, where he was kept in inhumane conditions in minute cells, and with severely restricted activities. Pérez Esquivel thought that the purpose of this treatment was to morally and psychologically break the conviction of those fighting for the defense of human rights through non-violent methods rather than obtaining information about the activities of the SERPAJ, because these were publicly available (Pérez Esquivel et al., 2013, p. 18). While still in prison, he was awarded the Memorial Peace Prize John XXIII bestowed by an international Catholic organization. This international recognition arguably added weight to the external pressure for his release. He was eventually put under home arrest in June 1978, from where he continued coordinating the SERPAJ’s campaigns and activities. In October 1980 he was invited to the Norwegian Embassy in Buenos Aires, where he was officially notified that he would be awarded that year’s Nobel Peace Prize. In his acceptance speech, Pérez Esquivel asserted that he received the Prize in the name of the people of Latin American and especially in the name of the poorest and smallest of my brothers and sisters, who are the most beloved children of God. I receive it in the name of my indigenous brothers and sisters, the peasants, workers, and young people, in the name of the thousands of members of religious orders and of men and women

3

ADOLFO PÉREZ ESQUIVEL: ACTIVE NON-VIOLENCE

39

of goodwill, who renounce privileges to share the life and way of the poor, and who struggle to build a new society.5

The award fulfilled a double purpose, one positive and one negative. It sought to recognize the work of Pérez Esquivel and this action program, which, as seen, went far beyond Argentina. The second purpose, instead, was to send a clear penalizing message to the country’s dictatorship as well as to other similar regimes throughout Latin America (Borrat, 1980). In sum, the particular circumstances of his early life and his profound engagement with and leadership role of active non-violence marked a trajectory that culminated in his being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1980. However, the award did not mark the end of his commitment to peace and social justice, for at the time of writing this chapter Pérez Esquivel continues to be active in his political and social work, still influenced by his personal history and beliefs.

The Writings on and of Adolfo Pérez Esquivel The literature dealing with the SERPAJ and Adolfo Pérez Esquivel has some degree of variety in terms of the type of output and angle, but it is generally homogenous in terms of how his activism and work are assessed. In what regards the type of writings produced, they can be grouped up into three categories: pieces and interviews published in media outlets; a more limited number of academic articles and book chapters; and Pérez Esquivel’s own outputs, some of which are books, some are conversations, and others are prologues and forewords to other authors’ books. As for the first type, there is a significant number of shorter and longer interviews with him and articles about him published in newspapers, magazines, newsletters, and bulletins around the time that he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1980. There are frequent entries by religious leaders and missionaries, such as Tom Cornell (1978), Richard Chartier (1980), Rosa Frank (1980), and Phil McManus (1982) in Fellowship, the magazine published by the peace organization Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), and in Worldview. There are, too, more recent biographical notes, such as Fernández and Tamaro (2004). In particular, the independent magazine on thought and culture El Ciervo, published in Barcelona, often devoted space to covering Pérez Esquivel’s initiatives and letters, as well as interviews with him (see, for instance, Bofill et al., 1980; Borrat, 1980; Pérez Esquivel, 1980; El

40

A. OELSNER AND R. J. BOMPADRE

Ciervo, 1981; Gomis, 1982). This can be explained by the close cultural and even personal links between Latin America and Spain. In 1975, Spain had started its transition toward democracy after Franco’s death, and in the following years offered refuge to many Latin American exiles escaping their own dictatorships. In addition, there are a few academic articles which either focus on the work carried out by SERPAJ and Pérez Esquivel, or explore more generally issues such as the peace movements, transnational social networks, and non-violence. In so doing, these research pieces study in more, or less, depth the case of the SERPAJ. They tend to be more recent outputs published in the English language, and while some are more analytical, others are more narrative (see Bissio, 2021; Catoggio, 2015; Pagnucco, 1997; Pugh, 2018). Several other pieces collect and review Pérez Esquivel’s profile and speeches (Bacon, 1999; Terchek & Conte, 2001). These have mostly highlighted his grass-root engagement with peasant and aboriginal communities, as well as with urban workers. Finally, there are a number of books, articles, prologues, and columns written by Adolfo Pérez Esquivel himself (Pérez Esquivel, 1983, 1986, 1991a, 1991b, 1995, 2008). There are, too, books of him in conversation with other figures (Ikeda & Pérez Esquivel, 2021; Pérez Esquivel et al., 2013). However, it is worth noticing that while Pérez Esquivel was already an avid reader as a young child, he has never been a scholar. Therefore, most of the work written by him collects his thoughts and experiences usually in a rather unsystematized manner. Even so, it is possible to identify recurrent concepts and ideas in his writings, which could be said to be summarized in his Award acceptance speech: the notion that the only way for active non-violent resistance is through solidarity among the many; the concern for the situation of the poor, which, in Latin America, means fundamentally the aboriginal populations, the peasants, and the workers; and the presence of a Christian God, whose commandments are the guide through violent times. These notions, which are present in most of his writings of the 1980s, have to be understood in the context of the Cold War and of human rights abuses on the part of governments most often than not supported by the United States. As will be discussed in section “Building Peace”, Pérez Esquivel had a broader view of what human rights entailed, not limiting them to physical security, and consequently also a more comprehensive view of what peace would entail.

3

ADOLFO PÉREZ ESQUIVEL: ACTIVE NON-VIOLENCE

41

Building Peace This section reviews the process of establishing SERPAJ, and the work the latter undertook under the leadership of Adolfo Pérez Esquivel. Next, the social, political, and global background against which Pérez Esquivel set out to build a network of Christian and ecumenical non-violent social organizations with a regional reach and extra-regional links is analyzed. The activities pursued by Peace and Justice Service are also reviewed. Given his own modest origins, Pérez Esquivel’s identification with the poor did not come as ‘a sudden illumination.’ Rather, his social and political commitment grew naturally as a consequence of being ‘one among the many’ who had lived through injustices and suffered deprivation.6 Thus, his becoming a peace activist evolved as the logical consequence of a process that had begun in his school years. Back then, he collaborated with social initiatives within parish churches, helped renowned artists with sensitive approaches to the social and economic sufferings of the working classes, and was involved in other organizations undertaking a wide range of activities related to the promotion of human rights. The social and political context of the 1960s also pushed him toward peace. At the time, an increasingly influential part of the Catholic Church—the Movement of Priests for the Third World—advocated for active involvement in social reform. Their concern was no longer exclusively with the spirituality of the poor, but also with their material conditions. These demands became explicit in the wake of the Vatican Council II, when Pope Paul VI attended the 1968 Latin American Bishops’ Council meeting in Medellín—then, recalling ‘the legitimate defense against tyranny […] [Latin America] became a proper setting for the emergence of another violence, temporary and redeemable: “the just violence of the oppressed”’ (Catoggio, 2015, p. 293). The Church’s traditional message was adapted and the concept of ‘liberation theology’ was coined in order to reflect the social conflicts of the period. It maintained that ‘violence from below’ was the consequence of ‘violence from above.’ In addition, it condoned the crossing of the evernarrower line between denouncing social and economic precarity on the one hand, and taking concrete action against it on the other (Romero, 2002, p. 185). Increasingly, the Movement of Priests for the Third World and its liberation theology endorsed the call to subordinate the secular political order to the dogmas of the spiritual world, which were to materialize

42

A. OELSNER AND R. J. BOMPADRE

the kingdom of God on Earth and the redemption (liberation) of the poor through the Marxist revolution (Altamirano, 2011, pp. 152–153). By that time, there were groups within the Marxist tradition that did no longer regarded religion as a merely ‘structural force of oppression or legitimisation of exploitation, but rather recognised Marx’s ambivalent claims about religion that reflected real human experience, allowing for a more sympathetic consideration of Christianity that saw its capacity for revolt’ (Bradbury, 2021, p. 328). Pérez Esquivel was aware that his non-violence position went against the view that saw revolutionary violence as the only road toward social transformation. This latter perspective was embraced by progressive sectors of the Latin American Catholic Church, including Catholic elites of young university students.7 Despite his holding the opposite position, he acknowledged that ‘we are all the children of Medellín […] all the efforts of renewal of the Christian life and all the initiatives of a struggle for justice find their foundation and justification in the conclusions of the 1968 Medellín meeting. The Latin American non-violent groups, too, came out of it’ (Pérez Esquivel, cited in Catoggio, 2015, p. 296). The decision to build the Latin American SERPAJ and define its basic structure in Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1968 is arguably a turning point consolidating Pérez Esquivel as a peace leader, for only a few years later, in 1974, SERPAJ was indeed established at a regional level and he was put in charge of coordinating all non-violent activism groups in Latin America (see Odell, 1981, p. 10). By then, Pérez Esquivel had already become a well-known figure with a solid reputation among those promoting active non-violent change, an undertaking he had been engaged in since 1971, thus securing continental recognition. Some of those initiatives included helping refugees from Chile (Felix, 2019, p. 245; see also Ikeda & Pérez Esquivel, 2021, p. 5) and starting to publish Paz y Justicia (Peace and Justice) in 1973, a bulletin devoted to spreading the value of nonviolent social resistance and popular struggles, and critically engaging with those religious positions that upheld the use of violence as a legitimate instrument for social transformation. Soon, the bulletin and its message of ‘firm belief in God and the power of nonviolence to alleviate poverty and misery’ (Bacon, 1999, p. 472) was being distributed in other Latin American countries. Together with the bulletin’s reach, also Adolfo Pérez Esquivel’s name and reputation grew across the region. Not long thereafter, the earlier proposal of creating a region-wide peace organization materialized with the foundation of the

3

ADOLFO PÉREZ ESQUIVEL: ACTIVE NON-VIOLENCE

43

Latin American Peace and Justice Service (SERPAJ–AL, after its Spanish acronym: Servicio Paz y Justicia–América Latina). This new network was constituted by people from the Methodist Church in Argentina, such as Methodist bishops Federico Pagura, Carlos Gattinoni, and Aldo Etchegoyen; Catholics from Brazil, like bishops Dom Hélder Câmara and Antonio Fragoso, and cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns; and the bishop of Riobamba in Ecuador, Leonidas Proaño, known as the bishop of the indigenous. This group made it possible for Pérez Esquivel to lead an initiative which Bishop Pagura had started a few years before in Mendoza. In the early 1970s, SERPAJ began to deploy an increasingly active agenda. At their 1974 meeting in Medellín, the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) entrusted Pérez Esquivel with the creation and coordination of a network of Latin American organizations devoted to promoting non-violent actions extending from Mexico to Argentina and Chile. The network was to be guided by ‘a) a commitment with the oppressed in their search of integral respect of human rights, in order to build a more just and fraternal society; b) to live the Gospel together with the poor, and c) the non-violence orientation’ (Pérez Esquivel, cited in Catoggio, 2015, p. 296). Importantly, in an interview Pérez Esquivel (in Bofill et al., 1980, p. 6) acknowledged that at Medellín it became clear that ‘isolated work would die, regardless of how good it is. It was necessary to share the experiences. And so it was that we advanced little by little and in solidarity confronting conflicts.’ In this sense, Pérez Esquivel was strategic as to the regional SERPAJ’s tasks and goals. In a recent interview, he put it in these words: I believe that SERPAJ’s work is to build networking. Knowing that the problem experienced in one place is everyone’s problem is our strength. When vulnerable groups are isolated, it puts their lives in danger. Therefore, despite the peculiarities of each SERPAJ on the continent, the active defence of human rights based on non-violence is our distinguishing trait. (Felix, 2019, p. 245)

Due to his increasing responsibilities at SERPAJ, which demanded frequent travels throughout Latin America, Pérez Esquivel decided to give up his teaching jobs and to fully devote himself to the promotion of active non-violence. This often involved organizing and supporting events and

44

A. OELSNER AND R. J. BOMPADRE

meetings with urban and rural workers, indigenous peoples, and victims of human rights abuses. The integral perspective of SERPAJ meant that it was also involved in helping to develop local economic programs (Bacon, 1999, p. 472). Pérez Esquivel’s first action as a coordinator of the Latin American non-violent organization came in 1974, when he led an international campaign to denounce the Bolivian military regime, led by General Hugo Banzer, for the murder of two hundred indigenous people—known as the ‘Massacre of Cochabamba Valley’ (Pérez Esquivel et al., 2013). Later that year he publicly expressed his solidarity with the Paraguayan peasants’ communities, which had been decimated by General Alfredo Stroessner’s dictatorship. Often, these actions and campaigns required that Pérez Esquivel be physically present on the ground of the events. This, in turn, also led to him and other activists frequently being detained and/or deported from those countries. Pérez Esquivel was arrested in Brazil in 1975, in Ecuador in 1976, and in Argentina for 14 months. In late 1975, in the oppressive months leading up to the coup d’état that would put an end to María Estela Martínez de Perón’s government, Pérez Esquivel participated in the creation of the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH) (Pérez Esquivel et al., 2013, pp. 16–17). This organization was established by personalities from different political, religious, and civil origins with the aim of promoting the defense of human rights in the country. It was the first organization to later collect information about missing, arrested, tortured, or murdered individuals under the dictatorship of 1976–1983 (the so-called National Reorganization Process). During those years he also helped launching the Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights and accompanied the Mothers and Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo in the search for their missing children and their children’s babies born in clandestine detention and torture centers (Bacon, 1999, p. 473; Pérez Esquivel, 1986, p. 61). The methods envisaged for the non-violent struggle were mainly three, understood as different stages. The first stage involved discovering the injustice and denouncing it directly to the responsible actor. If dialogue failed, a second stage was to be put in motion, which aimed to mobilize society through public hunger strikes and persuasion. Finally, if still unsuccessful, SERPAJ would appeal to civil disobedience (Catoggio, 2015, p. 307).

3

ADOLFO PÉREZ ESQUIVEL: ACTIVE NON-VIOLENCE

45

As of 1977, national branches of SERPAJ were opened, such as the ones in Chile and in Argentina (different from the Latin American headquarter, also in Buenos Aires) with the aim of fighting repression and resolving the acephaly issue which arose out of Pérez Esquivel’s first detention in Chile. A year later, in 1978, national branches were integrated into three regional coordinating groupings: the Southern Cone, the Andean region, and Central America and the Caribbean. The process of institutionalization of SERPAJ continued, with the creation of a Collegiate Council in 1980 gathering the coordinators from the different national SERPAJs, and with the opening of SERPAJ-Europe run by Methodist pastor Joke Schravesande. All this was possible, to a great extent, due to the support given by European Christian churches and peace movements (Catoggio, 2015, p. 300). If in the 1970s and early 1980s the main purpose of non-violence involved the fight for human rights and for the return to democratic rule, after that period its focus shifted to dealing with the consequences that those long dictatorships had left in these nations. In his own country, Argentina, Pérez Esquivel turned down President Raúl Alfonsín’s invitation to be part of the National Commission for the Disappeared (CONADEP) that the new democratic government was appointing right after the end of the dictatorship (Crenzel, 2008, p. 60). According to Pérez Esquivel, Alfonsín—a lawyer who was also a fellow member of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH)—had already agreed with the Armed Forces that the military responsible for human rights violations would be put exclusively on military trials, while he demanded that those officials had to be judged by civil tribunals (Pérez Esquivel et al., 2013, p. 20). The military trials actually judged—and absolved—those officers, yet they were passed in the appellation to the civil court, who eventually condemned the nine members of the three Juntas to different, even lifelong, sentences, and the loss of their military ranks, also dismissing any justification for their conduct (Romero, 2002, pp. 262–263). Consequent to the words he pronounced in Oslo at the Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony, Pérez Esquivel donated the sum received to aboriginal populations (El Ciervo, 1981)—for he considered that he received the Prize in their name—and to the establishment of the House of Latin American Nobel Prizes.8 Since then, Pérez Esquivel’s commitment to non-violence has continued reaching new horizons, many of them beyond Latin American boundaries. In 1987, for instance, he

46

A. OELSNER AND R. J. BOMPADRE

took part in the Ship for Peace, which sailed from Panama to Corinto (Nicaragua) and the Ship of Solidarity, headed toward Poland. Later, he was involved in activities demanding the end of Apartheid rule in South Africa. During the following decade, he took part in non-violent events addressing the wars in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Iraq, as well as the violence in Tibet (Pérez Esquivel et al., 2013, p. 20). Peace and Justice Service submitted the proposal—which was adopted—through UNESCO to the United Nations Organization, that the year 2000 be declared the ‘International Year of Peace Culture’ and the first decade of the new millennium, the ‘International Decade of Peace and NonViolent Culture for the Children of the World’ (Pérez Esquivel et al., 2013, p. 20). In the interview we conducted with Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, he summarized the more recent work of Peace and Justice Service. In the last few years, its initiatives have focused on obtaining judicial endorsement of the claim that human rights crimes and crimes against humanity are imprescriptible. They have also campaigned for the recognition of the role of women within society—particularly, in education, politics, and science. Pérez Esquivel highlights the potentiality of women as agents of liberation in societies such as Haiti, Honduras, Brazil, and Peru (where SERPAJ founded soup kitchens in the particularly beaten area of Ayacucho). Other work revolves around non-violent struggles against cultural domination that leads to acculturation. Inspired by Gandhi, SERPAJ promotes an ecological and mystical return to the land, to simple things, in the form of communal and ecumenical peasants’ work. Acting upon this, SERPAJ founded two Villages of Youth for Peace (Aldeas de Jóvenes para la Paz) in the suburbs of Buenos Aires (General Rodríguez and Pilar). Their purpose is not just aimed at job training but also to educate for life: ‘non-violence is not limited to social and political action, but inspired in life: craftsmanship, solidarity, communal work.’9

Ideas of Peace and IR Theory By now, it is apparent that core to Adolfo Pérez Esquivel’s conception of social struggle is the disciplining principle of non-violence. As was the case of other experiences early in his life that left an enduring mark, he encountered the notion of non-violent struggle when he was very young; and indeed, it stayed with him since. A bookseller he had befriended when

3

ADOLFO PÉREZ ESQUIVEL: ACTIVE NON-VIOLENCE

47

still a boy gave him two books; a biography of Mahatma Gandhi and a copy of The Seven Storey Mountain by Thomas Merton, a Trappist monk. This timely introduction to non-violent resistance resonated with him when he later read the Sermon on the Mount, a clear non-violence call in the Gospels (Felix, 2019, p. 245). It resonated more so after the philosopher and Catholic activist Joseph Jean Lanza del Vasto, a disciple of Gandhi, visited Argentina and gave a series of lectures at the University of La Plata in the mid-1960s. The influence this had on him was so profound that Beatriz Bissio (2021, pp. 26–27) states that Pérez Esquivel soon became ‘the main exponent of what we might call the “followers of Gandhi’s ideas and methods of resistance”.’ Pérez Esquivel’s embrace of active non-violence was inspired as much by the Gospels and his Catholic faith, as by Gandhi’s teachings. As discussed earlier, active non-violence as a form of struggle was not necessarily the choice to be expected from a progressive Latin American Catholic in the late 1960s. However, for Pérez Esquivel, adherence to the principle of non-violence was an ethical imperative, which audacity needs to be acknowledged in the context of the time (Borrat, 1980, p. 9). According to Pérez Esquivel, non-violence constituted the response to institutionalized violence: Most of the time when people talk of nonviolence, they talk about street action, about confrontation with the police. But the issue goes beyond the police to the system. Nonviolence means work in education, in health, in the environment, in economics—a nonviolent economics, because the economy we now have is very violent. We lack alternatives that expand the social, political, economic, and technological horizons of nonviolence to their fullest extent. It is necessary to begin to have a much more holistic vision of how nonviolence can liberate. (Pérez Esquivel quoted in Pugh, 2018, p. 133)

Many of these non-violence ideas had their origin in pre-WWI Europe. Symptomatic of this was the creation of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR), which soon established itself as the Christians’ voice against the war (Catoggio, 2015, p. 296). It was only during the Cold War that the non-violence movement reached Latin America, not least thanks to the efforts of Jean Goss and Hildegard Goss-Mayr, who organized a journey through the region to spread the non-violence message of IFOR.

48

A. OELSNER AND R. J. BOMPADRE

It is worth noticing these non-violence campaigns were coincidental with emerging academic voices of the time. These were critical of traditional approaches to peace and conflict for their state-centric perspective and their focus on material power and physical violence. One such voice was that of Johan Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist widely regarded as the founder of Peace Research, who was influenced by Mahatma Gandhi, just as Pérez Esquivel was. Indeed, Thomas Weber (2004, p. 31) contends that there is ‘a strong causal Gandhian underpinning to Galtung’s peace research.’ For instance, for Galtung pacifism ought not to be understood as inaction in dealing with social conflicts. Instead, he focused on developing non-violent strategies to bring about social change in line with the ‘Gandhian conception of pacifism as a positive philosophy of action, not simply a moral posture of refusal’ (Lawson, cited in Weber, 2004, p. 34). Those three core ideas of Adolfo Pérez Esquivel—active non-violence, institutionalized violence, peace—are central, too, to Johan Galtung’s theoretical development—non-violence and ‘peace by peaceful means’ (Galtung, 1965, 1995, 1996), structural violence (Galtung, 1990; Galtung & Höivik, 1971), and negative and positive peace (Galtung, 2011). Of these, the concept of active non-violence is of course the most salient in Pérez Esquivel. The full concept of ‘active non-violence’ was articulated in the ‘Basic Doctrinal Principles of the Peace and Justice Service’ (SERPAJ, 1979). It represented a ‘liberating road’ for the poor and the oppressed; ‘a definitive rejection of social indifference, religious fatalism and political conformism’ (SERPAJ, 1979, p. 1). They understood active non-violence as ‘a set of acts of rupture with all domination, with all injustice, with all violence’ (SERPAJ, 1979, p. 1). This led the Service to opposed the ‘Atlantic Southern Cone’s totalitarian regimes’ by promoting ‘profound changes in the political, social, economic and cultural structures’ (SERPAJ, 1979, p. 2). All this was to be pursued by non-violent actions and from within the popular movement of the Latin American urban and rural poor and oppressed (SERPAJ, 1979, pp. 2–3). While for the SERPAJ, this has a Marxian reminiscence, for Galtung, the idea of non-violence relates to the ability to transform conflicts in a constructive and creative way addressing all levels, from micro to macro, so as to minimize all forms of violence. However, this is present in Pérez Esquivel (cited in Borrat, 1980, p. 10), too, for whom ‘non-violent individuals do something which is completely revolutionary: they do not accept the rules of the game that are imposed upon them. They seek

3

ADOLFO PÉREZ ESQUIVEL: ACTIVE NON-VIOLENCE

49

other responses that are not conditioned by the adversary [… who] then find themselves discovered, with their methods, they repression system.’ To both Pérez Esquivel and Galtung, there is a strong link between peace, conflict, and development. In Pérez Esquivel, this is present in his discourse about the poor, the working classes, and the underprivileged. Indeed, the precarious conditions of the poor have always been at the core of his social and political thought and action. In dialogue with Daisaku Ikeda (Ikeda & Pérez Esquivel, 2021, p. 2), he expressed it with these words: All human beings are born with equal rights. Thus, they have the capability to choose their own way of life, to exercise their freedom, and to select their chosen path. Unfortunately, however, many are denied those fundamental rights.

Galtung (1985, p. 156), it appears in the idea that ‘human growth and development’ should be a matter of peace research. Yet this link between peace, conflict, and development is closely related to Galtung’s concept of ‘structural violence’, which is not too dissimilar to Pérez Esquivel’s notion of ‘institutionalized violence’ and broad understanding of human rights. McManus (1982, p. 17) explains that ‘the starting point for Sevicio’s human rights work is the understanding that human rights include […] also the rights of the people to food, jobs, and the basic necessities of life.’ Institutionalized violence highlighted the situation of ‘dependency, alienation, domination and violation of the fundamental rights of the peoples and workers of the Atlantic Southern Cone’ of Latin America (SERPAJ, 1979, p. 1). For Pérez Esquivel, active non-violence was a liberating road leading to freedom from social and institutional injustice, which was structured through the institutions of the state and the market (Ikeda & Pérez Esquivel, 2021). Galtung’s structural violence refers to an indirect form of violence which is not directed at producing bodily harm. Rather, it is a form of violence present in the social, political, and economic structures, and takes the concrete form of exploitation, alienation, marginalization, poverty, and deprivation (Galtung, 1969). In sum, without him being an International Relations scholar and most likely not familiar with IR theories, it is possible to ‘translate’ Pérez Esquivel’s guiding ideas into the language of Peace Research. As with other critical IR academics, also for SERPAJ the central subject of security

50

A. OELSNER AND R. J. BOMPADRE

is the individual rather than the state. Much in line with Marxist perspectives but without ever openly acknowledging it, the position endorsed by Pérez Esquivel is that liberation is about making individuals conscious that they are persons (Bofill et al., 1980, p. 6). And finally, his non-violent struggle against injustice and oppression resonates with ‘non-Western theorizing about democracy, namely that economic development cannot be separated from democratic politics and that economic policies must speak to the good of everyone, including the poor’ (Terchek & Conte 2001, p. 281).

Final Considerations In this chapter, we have highlighted the merits of Adolfo Pérez Esquivel to become the 1980 Nobel Peace Prize laureate by reviewing his commitment to peace and peaceful change during critical times in Latin America. As discussed, his choice and decision to only support non-violent methods was not the obvious one for a young Christian social activist, as he was. However, there were other important changes under way in the international environment. His award coincided with the publication of the Brandt Report, a report written by the Independent Commission for International Developmental Issues chaired by former German Chancellor Willy Brandt. The report put significant emphasis on the fact that global security needed to address social, economic, and political disparities between the Global North and the Global South. Like Pérez Esquivel himself had also done before, security and peace were linked to developmental, social, and economic issues. Moreover, Pérez Esquivel did not just refer to domestic inequalities when he said at his acceptance speech that ‘the institutionalised violence, misery and oppression generate a dual reality, fruit of the political and economic systems that create injustice, sanctifying a social order that benefits only a few: the rich becomes ever richer at the expense of the poor who becomes ever poorer.’10 Indeed, global inequalities and the role of the United States in the abuse of the human rights of Latin Americans have always been present in his conception of institutionalized violence and his peace strategies. One of those peace strategies involved Pérez Esquivel’s skillful ability to build transnational networks (Pagnucco, 1997, p. 124). Weaving together his religious convictions and his belief that peace cannot be built through war ‘as one cannot build anything through demolition’ (Pérez Esquivel, 1983, p. 124) allowed him to integrate his cause into a larger non-violence community and make it his own.

3

ADOLFO PÉREZ ESQUIVEL: ACTIVE NON-VIOLENCE

51

The conflict and peace mindset of the 1970s and 1980s sometimes appears to still exert a strong influence on his worldview. In recent times, he defended somewhat more controversial political regimes, like Nicolás Maduro’s dictatorship in Venezuela (Ortelli, 2020). He has remained a critical voice of the globalization of markets and the end of the welfare state concept, which he takes as indications that governments are no longer committed to ensuring the well-being of their citizens. In any case, his earlier energy does not seem to waving away. In 2022, almost fifty years after his last painting and sculpture exhibition, his work was again exhibited in Buenos Aires. In his art, too, his commitment to social issues and to Latin American realities is apparent. In his paintings, Peru’s sacred mountains and Mayan and Aztec pyramids are present, as are the Brazilian favela slums, the polluting factories, the farmers, the miners, and of course, the Pachamama, the mother goodness venerated by the Andean people. Finally, when we interviewed Adolfo Pérez Esquivel in preparation for writing this chapter, he shared with us that he was writing a book entitled Spirituality in uncertain times (Espiritualidad en tiempos de incertidumbre), which deals with the war, of which he witnessed much in Iraq, Africa, and Latin America itself, and with ‘spirituality, which is always present with different faces and different cultural influences.’11

Notes 1. Personal interview with Adolfo Pérez Esquivel (Buenos Aires, 20 September 2022). 2. Personal interview with Adolfo Pérez Esquivel (Buenos Aires, 20 September 2022). 3. Personal interview with Adolfo Pérez Esquivel (Buenos Aires, 20 September 2022). 4. Personal interview with Adolfo Pérez Esquivel (Buenos Aires, 20 September 2022). 5. Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, ‘Acceptance Speech’. https://www.nobelprize. org/prizes/peace/1980/esquivel/26127-adolfo-perez-esquivel-accept ance-speech-1980/ [accessed 15 March 2023]. 6. Personal interview with Adolfo Pérez Esquivel (Buenos Aires, 20 September 2022). 7. Personal interview with Adolfo Pérez Esquivel (Buenos Aires, 20 September 2022). See also Borrat (1980, p. 9). 8. Personal interview with Adolfo Pérez Esquivel (Buenos Aires, 20 September 2022).

52

A. OELSNER AND R. J. BOMPADRE

9. Personal interview with Adolfo Pérez Esquivel (Buenos Aires, 20 September 2022). 10. Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, ‘Acceptance Speech’. https://www.nobelprize. org/prizes/peace/1980/esquivel/26127-adolfo-perez-esquivel-accept ance-speech-1980/ [accessed 15 March 2023]. 11. Personal interview with Adolfo Pérez Esquivel (Buenos Aires, 20 September 2022).

References Altamirano, C. (2011). Peronismo y cultura de izquierda. Siglo XXI. Second extended edition. Bacon, A. (1999). Peace Profile: Adolfo Pérez Esquivel. Peace Review, 11(3), 471–477. Bissio, B. (2021). Gandhi’s Satyagraha and Its Legacy in the Americas and Africa. Social Change, 51(1), 23–37. Bofill, R., Pérez Esquivel, A., & Urdeix, J. (1980). La esperanza de un continente. El Ciervo, 29(350), 6–11. Borrat, H. (1980). Pérez Esquivel, Nobel de la Paz: No violento entre violentos. El Ciervo, 29(357), 9–10. Bradbury, P. (2021). Marxism in the Emergence and Fragmentation of Liberationist Christianity in Argentina. Journal of Latin American Studies, 53, 323–348. Chartier, R. (1980). Adolfo Pérez Esquivel: Behind the Man and the Prize. Fellowship, 46(12), 7–9. Catoggio, M. S. (2015). Activismos no violentos bajo dictaduras militares en Argentina y Chile: el Servicio de Paz y Justicia, 1974–1983. Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas, 52(1), 291–314. Cornell, T. (1978). Prisoners of Conscience in Argentina. Worldview, 21(4), 27– 28. Crenzel, E. (2008). La historia política del Nunca Más. La memoria de las desapariciones en la Argentina. Siglo XXI. El Ciervo. (1981). Adolfo Pérez Esquivel después del Nobel. El Ciervo, 30(360), 20–21. Felix, L. (2019). The Work We Do Is Solidarity Work. I Do It Out of Faith, Out of Social, Cultural and Political Commitment: Interview with Adolfo Pérez Esquivel. Sur, 16(29), 243–248. Fernández, T., & Tamaro, E. (2004). Biografía de Adolfo Pérez Esquivel. In Biografías y Vidas. La enciclopedia biográfica en línea. Barcelona. Available https://www.biografiasyvidas.com/biografia/p/perez_esquivel.htm. from Accessed 10 Jan 2023.

3

ADOLFO PÉREZ ESQUIVEL: ACTIVE NON-VIOLENCE

53

Frank, R. (1980). Premio Nobel de la Paz y la no violencia. Mensaje, 295, 712– 714. Galtung, J. (1965). On the Meaning of Nonviolence. Journal of Peace Research, 2(3), 228–256. Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal for Peace Research, 6(3), 167–191. Galtung, J. (1985). Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses. Journal of Peace Research, 22(2), 141–158. Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural Violence. Journal of Peace Research, 27 (3), 291– 305. Galtung, J. (1995). Nonviolence and Deep Culture: Some Hidden Obstacles. Peace Research, 27 (3), 21–37. Galtung, J. (1996). Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization. Sage. Galtung, J. (2011). Peace, Positive and Negative. In D. J. Christie (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology. Available from https://onlinelibrary.wiley. com/doi/abs/10.1002/9780470672532.wbepp189. Accessed 16 Jan 2023. Galtung, J., & Höivik, T. (1971). Structural and Direct Violence: A Note on Operationalization. Journal of Peace Research, 8(1), 73–76. Gomis, J. (1982). Por El Salvador: Ayuno y oración en Washington. El Ciervo, 31(374), 20–22. Ikeda, D., & Pérez Esquivel, A. (2021). The Power of Hope: Thoughts on Peace and Human Rights in the Third Millennium. I.B. Tauris. McManus, P. (1982). Shadow of Arrests Over Servicio Conference. Fellowship, 48(4–5), 17–18. Odell, L. E. (1981). Forerunners of Servicio. Fellowship, 47 (10–11), 14–15. Ortelli, I. (2020, October 14). Adolfo Pérez Esquivel criticó el “informe Bachelet” sobre Venezuela y dijo que va “a hablar” con Alberto Fernández. Clarín. Available from https://www.clarin.com/politica/adolfo-perez-esq uivel-critico-informe-bachelet-venezuela-dijo-va-hablar-alberto-fernandez_0_P NK7hbjLd.html. Accessed 17 Feb 2023. Pagnucco, R. (1997). The Transnational Strategies of the Service of Peace and Justice in Latin America. In J. Smith, C. Chatfield, & R. Pagnucco (Eds.), Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State (pp. 123–138). Syracuse University Press. Pérez Esquivel, A. (1980). Formar Conciencia. El Ciervo, 29(357), 4. Pérez Esquivel, A. (1983). Christ in a Poncho. Witnesses to the Nonviolent Struggles in Latin America. Orbis Books. Pérez Esquivel, A. (1986). Despite All That Has Happened, I Have Neither Lost My Capacity for Astonishment, Nor the Sense of Obligation to Join the Liberation Efforts. NACLA Report on the Americas, 20(5), 61–65.

54

A. OELSNER AND R. J. BOMPADRE

Pérez Esquivel, A. (1991a). Prólogo. In C. M. Beristain & F. Riera (Eds.), Afirmación y resistencia: La comunidad como apoyo (pp. 5–6). Virus Editorial. Pérez Esquivel, A. (1991b). To Discover Our Humanity. In P. McManus & G. Schlabach (Eds.), Relentless Persistence: Nonviolent Action in Latin America (pp. 238–251). New Society Publishers. Pérez Esquivel, A. (1995). Caminar… junto a los pueblos: Experiencias no violentas en América Latina. Lugar Editorial. Pérez Esquivel, A. (2008). Foreword. In M. Meyer (Ed.), Let Freedom Ring: A Collection of Documents from the Movements to Free U.S. Political Prisoners. PM Press. Pérez Esquivel, A., Cauduro, G., Iñíguez Zambrano, M. C., & Liwski, N. (2013). Los pueblos constructores de derechos. Eudeba. Pugh, J. (2018). Weaving Transnational Activist Networks: Balancing International and Bottom-Up Capacity-Building Strategies for Nonviolent Action in Latin America. Middle Atlantic Review of Latin American Studies, 2(1), 130–144. Romero, L. A. (2002). A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century. The University of Pennsylvania Press. SERPAJ. (1979). Principios doctrinales básicos del Servicio Paz y Justicia. SERPAJ. Available from https://memoriaabierta.org.ar/wp/wp-content/upl oads/2020/06/principios-doctrinarios-cl.pdf. Accessed 8 Feb 2023. Terchek, R. J., & Conte, T. C. (2001). Theories of Democracy: A Reader. Rowman & Littlefield. Weber, T. (2004). The Impact of Gandhi on the Development of Johan Galtung’s Peace Research. Global Change, Peace & Security, 16(1), 31–43.

CHAPTER 4

Alfonso García Robles: Architect of Disarmament Rafael Velázquez Flores and Luis Ochoa Bilbao

Introduction The 1959 Cuban Revolution brought the Cold War to the Latin American region and caused the most severe diplomatic crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union. The world was on the verge of witnessing a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. Fortunately, both parties reached a diplomatic compromise and avoided a potential war. In response to the 1962 Missile Crisis, several Latin American governments, led by Mexico and Brazil, initiated negotiations to achieve a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in the region to prevent a similar

R. Velázquez Flores (B) School of Economics and International Relations, Autonomous University of Baja California, Tijuana, Mexico e-mail: [email protected] L. Ochoa Bilbao School of Political and Social Sciences, Benemerita Autonomous University of Puebla, Puebla, Mexico e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Domínguez and A. Oelsner (eds.), Latin American Thinkers of Peace, Global Political Thinkers, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36107-4_4

55

56

R. VELÁZQUEZ FLORES AND L. OCHOA BILBAO

crisis. As a result, several nations signed the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1967, which prohibited using nuclear technology for military purposes in Latin America. This agreement elevated Mexico’s diplomatic standing, and the country became a leading advocate for peace and disarmament diplomacy. Alfonso Garcia Robles was a crucial figure in the negotiation process. In 1982, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his outstanding contributions to the Tlatelolco Treaty and the cause of disarmament. This chapter summarizes and analyzes the international political thought of Alfonso Garcia Robles. The main argument is that the Nobel laureate became a world reference in peace studies and an outstanding paladin in the efforts to consolidate the disarmament process in the world. He turned into the most outstanding Mexican diplomat regarding disarmament diplomacy. His most relevant achievement was the successful negotiation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty), which banned using atomic energy for military purposes in the region. In this sense, his ideas and contributions to world peace transcended when other zones and international organizations adopted similar agreements. This chapter sustains that Garcia Robles’s disarmament ideas may influence directly or indirectly other denuclearization processes in the world. At the same time, the text tries to demonstrate the following premise: the general perception in the academic and diplomatic realm is that the Liberal approach of the International Relations discipline embraces Garcia Robles’s ideas. This theoretical vision pinpoints that institutions and international norms constrain state behavior. In this perspective, the Mexican diplomat followed the traditional principles of Mexican foreign policy, such as Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Non-Intervention, and Self-Determination. Under this interpretation, Garcia Robles adopted a “principled” stance in his diplomatic activities. However, this chapter suggests that Garcia Robles’s ideas also reflect the Realist, Constructivist, and Marxist paradigms. On the one hand, Realism indicates that states search for power in the international sphere and that national security is one of the most important motivations for foreign policy actions. In this framework, a possible interpretation was that Garcia Robles advocated security in the region with the Tlatelolco Treaty and promoted Mexico’s national interest. Hence, this posture reflected a dose of “pragmatism” as well. On the other hand, Constructivism suggests that national identity and collective norms are key variables to understanding state comportment. In this context, Garcia Robles

4

ALFONSO GARCÍA ROBLES: ARCHITECT OF DISARMAMENT

57

attempted to build a regional identity to turn Latin America into a zone free of nuclear weapons. Finally, Marxism assumes that possessing nuclear weapons could represent a form of imperialism. Therefore, underdeveloped states must fight against this domination to reduce the gap between strong and weak nations, as the Latin American nations struggled to prohibit nuclear weapons in the regions through the Tlatelolco Treaty. The chapter consists of three sections. The first section provides a brief overview of Garcia Robles’s biography and the existing literature regarding his contribution to peacebuilding, as well as a summary of the key concepts, theories, and ideas that guided his work in the peacebuilding process. The second section examines how inflection points or critical junctures in Garcia Robles’ life challenged his presuppositions and reinforced or prompted a shift in his thinking. The third section of the chapter attempts to map Garcia Robles’ concepts and theories of peace and identify the local and global ideas of the Mexican diplomat.

Building a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons The Mexican twentieth century featured important figures who contributed to designing a national foreign policy of great prestige. After the Mexican Revolution, diplomats and intellectuals such as Isidro Fabela, Gilberto Bosques, Luis Padilla Nervo, and Octavio Paz participated as ambassadors in diplomatic missions and the construction of international institutions. Throughout that century, Mexican diplomats promoted the defense of international law and advocated pacifist ideals. In this context, Alfonso Garcia Robles occupied a privileged place in the country’s diplomatic history. About His Career Jose Alfonso Eufemio Nicolas de Jesus Garcia Robles was born in Michoacan on March 20, 1911. He studied law at the Mexican National University Law School in 1930. In the following years, he attended the University of Paris in 1936 and the Academy of International Law of The Hague in 1938. Antonio Gomez Robledo recalls that Garcia Robles was referred to as le Jeune maitre (the young master) for his association with great luminaries of international law at the time, including La Pradelle, Mirkine Guetzevitch, Basdevant, Le Fur, Alejandro Alvarez, and Francisco Leon de la Barra (Gomez Robledo, 2013, p. 10).

58

R. VELÁZQUEZ FLORES AND L. OCHOA BILBAO

In 1939, Garcia Robles represented the National University of Mexico at an international congress in Bergen, Norway. His stay would coincide with a telegram he received from his friend telling him of a vacancy as the Third Secretary of the Mexican Legation in Sweden. He began his work in the Mexican diplomatic service in Stockholm in October 1939 (Marin Bosch, p. 16), just a few days after the German invasion of Poland. In those years, Mexico was already a relevant partaker in the international concert. Mexico participated in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, a series of international treaties to establish laws defining the rules during a war. Likewise, Mexico was present at most of the American International Conferences from 1889 to 1939. These meetings aimed to create regional institutions and norms to regulate American countries’ economic and political interactions. On September 9, 1931, Mexico joined the League of Nations. Years later, Isidro Fabela, the representative of Mexico before the League of Nations, defended Ethiopia against the Italian invasion and denounced the German occupation of Austria (Ochoa et al., 2019). Mexico also gained international respect for its support for the Second Spanish Republic, for refusing to recognize the military government of Francisco Franco, and for its asylum policy that welcomed nearly 25,000 Spanish refugees. The convulsive years of the Second World War were the framework of the diplomatic career of Garcia Robles. At the beginning of 1941, he returned to Mexico at the request of the Undersecretary of Foreign Relations, Jaime Torres Bodet. At that time, the country was facing international problems due to the oil expropriation decreed on March 18, 1938, by President Lazaro Cardenas. As a professional and diplomat, Garcia Robles constantly dealt with war and peace issues. In 1941, he was the head of the Foreign Affairs Secretary’s (SRE) Postwar Problems Section. Later, he became the deputy director of the Jose Gorostiza-led General Political Affairs and Diplomatic Service. During this time, Garcia Robles penned the analysis of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and disagreed with the five permanent members’ veto power in the Security Council. Immediately after, Mexico abstained from voting on the resolution regarding the veto. Miguel Ruiz Cabañas argues that only three nations abstained from voting, angering the US government (Ruiz Cabañas, 2022). In 1946, Garcia Robles was the Director of the Political Affairs Division at the United Nations Secretariat. In the Under-Secretariat for Political and Security Affairs, one of his responsibilities was representing the Secretary-General before the Special Political Commission of the General

4

ALFONSO GARCÍA ROBLES: ARCHITECT OF DISARMAMENT

59

Assembly. For the first time, he was involved in nuclear weapons issues (Marin Bosch, p. 19) and served on several UN commissions relating to international conflicts. He was a member of the United Nations Special Commission for Palestine and the Commissions for Indonesia, Kashmir, and the Suez Canal. These diplomatic experiences influenced Garcia Robles’ worldview. From then on, he was keenly interested in finding peaceful solutions to global conflicts. In 1957, he left New York to return to Mexico and hold the position of Director in Chief for Multilateral Affairs and Europe, Asia, and Africa. As a result, he increased his global and multilateral affairs expertise in different regions and international organizations. In this context, Garcia Robles contributed to Mexico’s United Nations Conferences on the Right to the Sea (between 1958 and 1960) (Marin Bosch, p. 22). It was evident that the diplomat was interested in the codification of International Law, particularly in maritime issues. Therefore, participating in this conference gave him ample experience negotiating international law. Afterward, President Adolfo Lopez Mateos appointed him ambassador of Mexico to Brazil in October 1961, a position he held until April 1964 (Marin Bosch, p. 24). During this period, he witnessed the Cuban Missile Crisis, which enormously impacted his future. The possibility of a nuclear war influenced his ideas about disarmament. It was necessary to guarantee a legal instrument to prevent the presence of atomic arms in the region to avoid the possibility of a war in the continent. According to Miguel Ruiz Cabañas, it was not a coincidence that Garcia Robles was ambassador to Brazil when Lopez Mateos and João Goulart, the Brazilian president, started to talk about the necessity of a legal instrument to ban nuclear weapons in Latin America (Ruiz Cabañas, 2022). Later, both presidents summoned other Latin American leaders to explore the possibility of a treaty to achieve such a goal. returned to Mexico shortly after a coup d’état overthrew the democratic government of President João Goulart in 1964. From May 1964 to November 1970, he was promoted to Undersecretary at the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs. In this job, he held relevant responsibilities in Mexico’s foreign policy. During that period, he drafted the Resolution 2131 (XX) of the General Assembly on December 21, 1965, which led to the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States and Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty. As an undersecretary, he directly participated in decision-making and could influence Mexico’s most critical foreign policy decisions. As seen at the

60

R. VELÁZQUEZ FLORES AND L. OCHOA BILBAO

multilateral level, Garcia Robles upheld the traditional tenets of Mexican foreign policy, as the Liberal approach sustains. During those years, Garcia Robles worked on his most challenging task: preparing the treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America. It all started with a joint declaration in April 1963 by the presidents of Mexico, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador when Garcia Robles was still Mexico’s ambassador to Brazil (Marin Bosch, 25). As Undersecretary of Foreign Relations, Garcia Robles presided over all the meetings for the military denuclearization of Latin America, which took place between 1964 and 1967. The Mexican diplomat was crucial in reaching an agreement and presenting Latin America’s position against the problem of nuclear weapons. The purpose was to ensure the prohibition of nuclear weapons throughout this extensive territory, from Mexico to Argentina. Hence, the Latin American governments would not be involved in conflicts between great rival powers (Aguilar Casas, 2014). In November 1964, Garcia Robles participated in the Preliminary Meetings for the Denuclearization of Latin America (COPREDAL) (Marin Bosch, 26). There were five COPREDAL meetings from 1965 to 1967. The last one took place on February 1967. Finally, the Treaty of Tlatelolco received unanimity approval, and the signing process began on February 14 (Armanet, 1987). Many countries participated as observers, even nations that already had atomic arms. The great success of the treaty was the additional protocols 1 and 2, which obliged all nations to respect the nonproliferation zone. The United States and the Soviet Union ratified these protocols (Schiavon, 2022). During the session of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1967, as president of the Mexican Delegation, Garcia Robles presented to the international representatives the treaty recently signed by the Latin Americans. This was a significant achievement in his diplomatic life that gave him worldwide recognition. Recognizing his diplomatic career, he entered the Colegio Nacional (National College) on July 20, 1971.1 In his entrance speech, he gave a general account of the negotiation process in the UN before the Treaty of Tlatelolco signing. In the speech, he highlighted that at the beginning of the 70s of the twentieth century, only Latin America had managed to consolidate a free zone of nuclear weapons due to the stagnation of negotiations in Africa and Central Europe (Garcia Robles, 2013, p. 35). From 1971 to 1975, he was the Mexican ambassador to the United Nations and presided over the Group of 77. There, he worked

4

ALFONSO GARCÍA ROBLES: ARCHITECT OF DISARMAMENT

61

on resolutions to promote denuclearization. His diplomatic career peaked when he became Secretary of Foreign Relations from 1975 to 1976. In recognition of his work as an international diplomat, Garcia Robles was Mexico’s permanent representative at the Conference on Disarmament based in Geneva in 1977. With his ample experience in this field, he became the dean of diplomats in disarmament matters. In addition, he was president of the Mexican delegation at the First Special Session for Disarmament of the UN General Assembly. Due to his efforts for humanity and denuclearization, this first special session was successful. In 1981, Alfonso Garcia was appointed Ambassador Emeritus from Mexico and received several diplomatic decorations from countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America for his efforts in disarmament. According to Jorge Schiavon, he became the “most important and most complete Mexican multilateralist diplomat of the twentieth century and the most important world diplomat in disarmament issues” (Schiavon, 2022). The most critical moment of his career was receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982. A year earlier, Juan Pellicer, the Mexican ambassador to Norway at the time, delivered a note to the Nobel Peace Prize committee informing of the formal support of the Mexican government for Santiago Genoves.2 The director of the Nobel Peace Institute, Jakob Sverdrup, received the note and informed Ambassador Pellicer that the Canadian diplomat, William Epstein, had proposed Alfonso Garcia Robles for the prize (Pellicer, 2016). In those years, some Mexican diplomats had also proposed that President Luis Echeverria receive the award (ibidem). However, the case of Garcia Robles was different since his name came at the proposal of a friendly country. In addition, he would receive the award with Alva Myrdal, a tireless Swedish promoter of disarmament, the same issue that promoted the candidacy of the Mexican diplomat. In 1981, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees received the Nobel Prize. Nevertheless, on October 13, 1982, Alva Myrdal and Garcia Robles obtained the Nobel Peace Prize that they received from King Olav and his son Harald. According to Ruiz Cabañas, he obtained the award because he had become the “symbol” of disarmament in Latin America, the United Nations, and the world. Ruiz Cabañas also mentioned that when the award was announced, and Garcia Robles entered the committee session at the UN headquarters, people in the room received him with a five-minute applause (Ruiz Cabañas, 2022).

62

R. VELÁZQUEZ FLORES AND L. OCHOA BILBAO

After the prize, he worked as a Mexican “Special Ambassador for Disarmament” in Geneve, where he worked for the cause of denuclearization. He used to present 10 or 12 resolutions yearly in the UN, saying what had to be done to stop the arms race. He was persistent until the nuclear powers paid attention to him and sent the reports that the resolutions demanded. Alfonso Garcia Robles died on September 2, 1991. He dedicated more than 50 years of his life to international politics. Many considered him a relevant figure in the search for peace in the twentieth century. Reviews of His Work Throughout his life as a diplomat, Garcia Robles also dedicated himself to writing articles and books on various international issues that make up a relevant work of Mexican internationalist thought. His works are fundamentally related to his experiences as a diplomat. His most outstanding works include: Le Panamericanisme et la Politique de Bon Voisinage (Paris, 1938); Premier Congrès d’Ètudes Internationales (1938); La Question du Petrole au Mexique et le Droit International (1939); La Clausula Calvo ante el Derecho Internacional (1939); La Conferencia de San Francisco y su obra (1946); La desnuclearizacion de la America Latina (1965); and La anchura del mar territorial (1966). On the subject of oil, Garcia Robles undertook, in 1939, a series of conferences in Paris, The Hague, and Brussels that would later be published under the title La Question du Petrole au Mexique et le Droit International (The Question of the Mexican Oil and the International Law) (Marin Bosch, p. 16). Garcia Robles was also responsible for writing Mexico’s response to the Dumbarton Oaks draft, which later became the UN charter. His conclusions were published under the title La Conferencia de San Francisco y su Obra (The San Francisco Conference and his Works) [Published again in the book México en la Postguerra (Mexico in the Postwar)] (Marin Bosch, p. 18). There is a good number of books published by García Robles. However, their contents differ from monographic studies, those that collected his interventions as a diplomat, and those that gathered his speeches. In a strict sense, it cannot be said that there is a specific theoretical work on international politics in García Robles’s publications. His books should be considered documents that illustrate Mexico’s official foreign policy profile in the second half of the twentieth century. Its

4

ALFONSO GARCÍA ROBLES: ARCHITECT OF DISARMAMENT

63

contents reflect the arguments and positions of Mexico as a nation that García Robles expressed before international organizations. However, it is easy to assume that a good part of the argumentation manifested in his speeches and interventions has been thought up, elaborated, and reviewed by García Robles as a diplomat in charge of leading the representation of Mexico before the international community. This implies that García Robles was a professional diplomat and addressed the issues and interests of Mexico in depth. In the published work of García Robles, it can be found four lines of diplomatic action in which he worked: the role of Mexico in the General Assembly of the United Nations, particularly in the disarmament issue; the participation of Mexico in the Geneva Conferences on the Width of the Territorial Sea; the negotiations on nuclear disarmament in Latin America and the Treaty of Tlatelolco; and Mexico’s foreign policy topic. As for the first subject, he published in 1970 the book Mexico en las Naciones Unidas (Mexico in the United Nations). In this text, he describes his participation in the organization and the role of Mexico in the General Assembly. His main point was that Mexico defended the tenets defined by the UN charter, such as nonintervention and peaceful settlement of disputes. In 1972, he published the book El Desarme y las Naciones Unidas (The Disarmament and the United Nations), which reproduced some of his speeches in the General Assembly. In 1977, the book La Conferencia de Revisión del Tratado Sobre la No Proliferación de las Armas Nucleares (The Conference on the Revision of The Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty) was published. Finally, two texts appeared in 1979 and 1980. The first one was La asamblea general del desarme (The General Assembly of Disarmament) and the second one was El comite de desarme (The Disarmament Committee). García Robles published two books on the negotiations over the territorial sea width. The first is entitled The Geneva Conference and the Territorial Sea Width, published in 1959. The second is entitled The Territorial Sea Width and appeared in 1966. In both cases, they are monographs that describe, in detail, the international negotiations in which Mexico actively participated in codifying international law on the authority of the coastal states over their territorial waters. In the first book, García Robles described how the issue of the territorial sea width was left pending at the Geneva Conference held in 1958. The second book is a study that García Robles prepared for the Inter-American Juridical Committee, a permanent body of the Inter-American Council

64

R. VELÁZQUEZ FLORES AND L. OCHOA BILBAO

of Jurists held in July 1965 sessions dedicated to the issue of the territorial sea width. In both texts, one can appreciate García Robles’s interest in promoting the codification of territorial waters in international law. The general idea in both books raises the importance of this issue, which is contemplated in international law and accepted by the community of nations, especially for small, new, or developing nations, as was the case of Mexico (García Robles, 1959, p. vii). García Robles wrote that “the territorial sea is subject to the sovereignty of the coastal state which, therefore, has rights over it essentially analogous to those it exercises in its own territory” (García, 1959, p. vii). Accepting this power was also desirable to achieve full recognition of the integral sovereignty of states, including the weakest within the international system. The content of the text The Geneva Conference and the Territorial Sea Width is informative and descriptive. It was designed, as García Robles himself writes, to “provide an easily consultable work tool for jurists, diplomats, teachers and other officials from Spanish-speaking countries who […] have to deal with the Law of the Sea” (García, 1959, p. vii). García Robles begins by establishing the background of the conference and highlights Resolution 1105, approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations on February 21, 1957. This statement is not anecdotal since it is intended to demonstrate the consensus reached by the UN precisely to address the issue of the territorial sea width, especially about the interest of new, small, weak, or developing nations. Regarding the result of the Geneva Conference, García Robles lists the four approved conventions. In the same way, he stressed that the conference ratified the conclusion of the Hague Conference in 1930, which recognized the sovereignty of a State over its territorial waters. The issue in dispute between nations was the nautical miles recognized by the international community as the territorial sea. García Robles stated that Mexico and most coastal states sought to modify and renew the spirit of international law on the sea. He intended to rebalance power on that issue. Mexico and the coastal states demonstrated to modify the “3-mile rule” that maintained the “hegemony of the ‘Concert of Europe’ over the sea.” This hegemony, García Robles wrote, was not congruent with the new times nor the history of the bilateral treaties that Mexico and the United States had signed. Indeed, García Robles described the results of the Treaty of Guadalupe (1848) and the Treaty of Mesilla (1853), in which Mexico and the

4

ALFONSO GARCÍA ROBLES: ARCHITECT OF DISARMAMENT

65

United States recognized the sovereignty of the territorial sea in 9 nautical miles. García Robles defended the recognition of customary law between Mexico and the United States in the practices and norms adopted in bilateral treaties. This refers to the conception of a “formal source” of international law. Moreover, the logic of García Robles is that the “formal source” of the rule. The international three nautical mile agreement was obsolete and had to give way to a new global agreement. Unfortunately, the author writes, the Geneva Conference was left unfinished on this issue, and he expressed hope that it could be resolved at the second conference. Nor was this the case at the Second Conference held between March and April 1960. In this case, García Robles did consider it a failure as a result of “the respective positions of the great maritime and fishing powers, on the one hand, and the coastal States, on the other, that remained in the same terms of not modifying the three-mile rule” (García Robles, 1966, p. 103). For this second conference, García Robles already considered the Latin American nations as a solid block in promoting a new international agreement on the right to the sea (García Robles, 1966). The Mexican diplomat’s proposal before the Inter-American Juridical Committee was to insist on modifying the current international standard on the width of the territorial sea based on “existing international practices on the subject” (García Robles, 1966, p. 111). In this sense, he recommended to the American states the following article in a regional convention that would have to be carried out shortly: “Every American state has the right to fix the width of the territorial sea up to a limit of twelve nautical miles measured from of the applicable baseline” (García Robles, 1966, p. 115). This new international rule would be adopted in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, held on April 30, 1982. In the works of García Robles, this seminal proposal was intended to create a new legal order and end what he considered the hegemonic power of strong states. Without saying it, he was using a Marxist perspective. The main Garcia Robles contribution to the literature was on the Tlatelolco Treaty. He published six manuscripts between 1965 and 1979. The first was the article published in 1965 in the Mexican journal Foro Internacional, entitled “La desnuclearización de la América Latina” (The Denuclearization of Latin America). In this paper, he narrated the labor of the first commissions that were negotiating the Tlatelolco Treaty. In

66

R. VELÁZQUEZ FLORES AND L. OCHOA BILBAO

the same year the treaty was signed, he published perhaps his most influential book: El Tratado de Tlatelolco. Genesis, alcance y proposito de la proscripcion de las armas nucleares en America Latina (The Treaty of Tlatelolco. Genesis, Scope, and Purpose of the Proscription of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America). In this text, the author abundantly described the treaty’s origin, goals, negotiation phases, and key articles. In the 70s, he published the books: La Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares (The Proscription of the Nuclear Arms), Tratado para la prohibicion de armas nucleares en America Latina (The Treaty for Prohibition of Nuclear Arms in Latin America); 338 Dias de Tlatelolco (338 Days of Tlatelolco); and The Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. In his texts, Garcia Robles emphasized that his ideas and Mexico’s participation in the Tlatelolco Treaty were based on the traditional principles of foreign policy, such as nonintervention, self-determination, legal equality of states, and peaceful settlement of disputes. Therefore, his thought and the conduct of the nation were rooted in the Liberal perspective of the International Relations discipline. In other words, Mexico was applying a “principled” foreign policy. This situation explains why the general perception was that Liberalism and other theoretical approaches explained Garcia Robles’s thoughts were not considered. However, it was evident that his efforts for denuclearization were linked to security reasons and associated with national interests. Therefore, Realism was present with a significant dose of pragmatism. It is possible to affirm that Garcia Robles’s publications helped to create a particular identity in Latin America, one that is based on a zone free of nuclear weapons. About foreign policy, Garcia Robles published only two pieces. The first was Politica Internacional de Mexico (Mexican International Policy), and the second was Seis años de politica exterior de Mexico, 1970– 1976 (Six Years of Mexico’s Foreign Policy 1970–1976). These two manuscripts were official accounts of the main actions carried out by Mexico during the Luis Echeverria tenure. In the same way, both texts emphasized the importance of Mexico’s foreign policy principles. Besides Garcia Robles own works, there are an important number of books and articles written by several authors who commemorate and honor the Nobel Prize winner. On the Internet, one can find a great number of pieces that describe Garcia Robles’s biography and highlight his achievements. Some of them come from governmental sites and others are from private sources. Nonetheless, some books in Spanish make a

4

ALFONSO GARCÍA ROBLES: ARCHITECT OF DISARMAMENT

67

tribute to the diplomat. One of the most prominent is the book Homenaje and Alfonso Garcia Robles. Premio Nobel de la Paz 1982 (Tribute to Alfonso Garcia Robles. Nobel Peace Prize 1982), published by UNAM in 2013. In this text, several authors write chapters that highlight the diplomat’s efforts and contributions to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, mainly in Latin America. In the justification, they state that the tribute was carried out “for his effective, orderly and scrupulous performance in international forums; for his legal work; for that non-utopian desire to see the world free of the nuclear threat.” The general vision of the book is that Garcia Robles always resorted to International Law in his activities. For instance, they say that Garcia Robles “made law an instrument for peace and diplomacy, the most effective tool for the peaceful settlement of national and international affairs.” Thus, the authors of the book uphold the interpretation that Garcia Robles’s ideas were embedded in the Liberal and Institutional tradition of International Relations. There are no explicit mentions of Realism, Constructivism, and Marxism as theoretical approaches to explain his thinking. However, they implicitly accept that the proscription of nuclear weapons in Latin America was an instrument for regional security, a form to create a particular identity and a way to reduce the differences of power between states who have nuclear arms and those that do not possess them. In the book, former Garcia Robles’s coworkers participate in some chapters. For example, the Ambassadors Pablo Macedo and Sergio Gonzalez Galvez present their work experiences alongside Garcia Robles. Not only do they show the human being, the boss, the diplomat, and the teacher he was, but they also highlight his merit in achieving the signing and adoption of the Tlatelolco Treaty. There are also notable academics who also participate in the book. For instance, Pedro Gonzalez Olvera, Rosa Isabel Gaytan, Leticia Bobadilla, Alfonso Sánchez Mugica, and Edmundo Hernandez-Vela contribute with chapters in this book. Miguel Marin Bosch, who closely worked with the Nobel laureate wrote 1985 a book entitled Alfonso Garcia Robles. Mexico, Nobel De La Paz (Alfonso Garcia Robles. Mexico, Nobel of Peace) published by the SRE. In this text, the author describes his experiences working with him. Rafael Medina also authored the book Alfonso Garcia Robles Premio Nobel de la Paz, padre del desarme nuclear en America Latina (Alfonso Garcia Robles Nobel Peace Prize, Father of the Nuclear Disarmament in Latin America), published by UNAM in 2017. Finally, Juan Pellicer wrote an article in the Revista de la Universidad de Mexico in 2016: “Alfonso

68

R. VELÁZQUEZ FLORES AND L. OCHOA BILBAO

Garcia Robles, momentos previos a un premio nobel” (Alfonso Garcia Robles, Previous Moments to a Nobel Prize). As the others, these texts emphasize Garcia Robles’s contributions to disarmament. Andres Becerril, a Mexican reporter, pointed out in a recent report that “Garcia Robles was the architect of the strategy and the negotiation that resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco” and that this episode made him “a world leader” who worked “for achieving a denuclearization of the world” (Becerril, 2011). He also highlighted that Garcia Robles, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, “initiated relations with China, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Mongolia that belonged to the socialist bloc and opened bridges with Syria, Jordan, Guinea, Senegal, Tanzania, Zaire, Morocco, Cyprus, Yemen, and Bangladesh.” Finally, “as foreign minister, Garcia Robles was head of the Mexican delegation that President Luis Echeverria sent to the Fifth Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in August 1976 in Sri Lanka” (Becerril, 2011). As a partial conclusion, the existing literature highlights the liberal and institutional vision of Garcia Robles. The primary interpretation is that the Mexican diplomat resorted to International Law to carry out his job and achieve his key task: the Tlatelolco Treaty. In the same sense, he defended the traditional principles of Mexico’s foreign policy. The general perception assumes that the Liberal approach of the International Relations discipline is the only option to explain these events and Garcia Robles’s thoughts. Thus, the collective imagination does not consider explicitly that other theoretical perspectives can also be used to interpret his ideas.

The Tireless Effort for Nonproliferation and Peace Alfonso Garcia Robles was influenced by the Mexican postrevolutionary events and the inter-world war period in his early years. These two episodes likely influenced his studies and future career. First, he studied law in Mexico and later took courses abroad, in France and Netherlands. There, he had close contacts with world famous International Law experts. At the same time, the Mexican Revolution produced very important and prestigious diplomats, such as Isidro Fabela, Gilberto Bosques, and Luis Padilla Nervo. Definitely, all of them influenced him to take International Law as his specialization and foreign service as his profession. Once he started his career, Garcia Robles witnessed the Second

4

ALFONSO GARCÍA ROBLES: ARCHITECT OF DISARMAMENT

69

World War while working at the Mexican Embassy in Sweden. The horrors of this global conflict and its effects greatly influenced his peace thoughts. Garcia Robles also experienced the grave calamities of the nuclear bombs in Nagasaki and Hiroshima in August 1945. That event represented his first inflection point. As a human and a diplomat, he was determined to do something to stop using that type of military technology on populations. The most decisive inflection point was the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. That inflection point convinced him to carry out a task to seek a legal instrument to ban nuclear weapons in the Latin American region. Thus, the idea of the Tlatelolco Treaty came about. Garcia Robles’s extensive experience in key positions within the SRE in Mexico City, as ambassador to Brazil, and as a UN official enabled him to participate in and closely observe power relations at the national and international levels. These diplomatic and professional experiences enabled him to network with influential external political actors, including presidents, foreign ministers, and ambassadors, primarily from Latin America, Africa, and Asia. For example, he presided over the Group of 77, which consisted of Third World nations. Most agreed on denuclearization; therefore, forming alliances to promote the global disarmament process was possible. Garcia Robles invented a new structure at the SRE called DESARMEX (the Office of Mexican Disarmament) as an example of his closeness to power. He appointed himself as responsible for this special office and worked there from 1977 to 1988. He was like a “Special Ambassador to Disarmament” (Ruiz Cabañas, 2022). There, he created a highly professional team with ample expertise in disarmament diplomacy. This group turned into a domestic bureaucratic alliance accompanying Garcia Robles in his activities and goals. The list included outstanding Mexican diplomats, such as Jorge Castañeda, Ismael Moreno Pino, Miguel Marin Bosh, Sergio Gonzalez Galvez, Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo, Miguel Ruiz Cabañas, Pablo Macedo, and others. Most of them were members of the Mexican Foreign Service (SEM in Spanish), and they held important positions at the SRE. For instance, Jorge Castañeda was Foreign Affairs Secretary, and some were undersecretaries. Garcia Robles became his mentor and taught them all the secrets of diplomacy. The clue was that their decisions must adhere to the traditional principles of Mexico’s foreign policy, but at the same time, any action would have to promote

70

R. VELÁZQUEZ FLORES AND L. OCHOA BILBAO

Mexico’s national interest. In other words, the best policy was a combination between Liberalism and Realism. Thanks to this team, Mexico turned into a responsible world actor to lead the fight against nuclear arms. This bureaucratic alliance allowed success in the negotiations of the Tlatelolco Treaty and paved the way for Garcia Robles to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982. Alfonso Garcia Robles also built an important alliance with the Swedish diplomat and writer Alva Myrdal, who had also accompanied him in many of the negotiations in favor of international disarmament (Comexus). Besides, she carried out important studies on the effects of a nuclear war on humans. Thanks to this collective work, the fight against nuclear weapons was reinforced and some objectives were achieved. For these reasons, both received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982. After the Nobel Prize, Alfonso Garcia Robles received several recognitions and distinctions. In Latin America, Alfonso Garcia Robles is best known for his diplomatic work. Those who knew him said he was a kind, hard-working, and cordial person. In particular, he is considered a defender of pacifism, a promoter of disarmament, and a defender of Mexico’s foreign policy principles. These arguments justified the inscription of his name “with gold letters on the wall of honor of the Legislative Palace of San Lazaro” by decree on April 25, 2003 (Camara de Diputados). It is one of Mexico’s highest honors to its citizens. Only the names of great heroes of the country are on that wall. On the official page of the Nobel Prize, in his portrait is written: “But it was as a diplomat that Garcia Robles achieved his greatest triumphs.” The last time he visited the UN Headquarters, he was lauded as “Mr. Disarmament” (Ruiz Cabañas, 2022). Garcia Robles also received numerous diplomatic decorations from many parts of the world for his contributions. He became a member of the Honorable Council of the Mexican International Studies Association (AMEI in Spanish) and was admitted to the Mexican Academy of International Law. The National University of Mexico created the Alfonso Garcia Robles Award and some scholars even created the Alfonso Garcia Robles Mexican Institute for Peace Studies. After winning the Nobel Prize, there were many examples of the institutionalization of peace campaigns. One of the most important examples is the Fulbright- Garcia Robles program. This program provides scholarships to US and Mexican students and professors to carry out graduate studies or research fellowships in Mexico or the United States. The rationale of this program is that

4

ALFONSO GARCÍA ROBLES: ARCHITECT OF DISARMAMENT

71

through education, bilateral understanding, cooperation, and peace could foster. Garcia Robles himself was an institution. As mentioned above, for his tireless efforts for nonproliferation, he was dubbed “Mr. Disarmament.” In the United Nations, he was well-known and successful in his job due to his understanding of the UN’s functioning. He was the main inspirator for the “Special Periods of Disarmament” at the United Nations. Due to his knowledge of the issue, many of his proposed resolutions were accepted. Many people respected him and listened to what he used to say. For example, his most famous phrase was: “Humanity faces a choice: to stop the arms race and proceed with disarmament or face annihilation.” Many people became aware of the dangers of nuclear war due to his efforts. Garcia Robles was against the countries that did not comply with the international law of disarmament. In an interview, Miguel Ruiz Cabañas, who worked with him, mentioned an anecdote. Garcia Robles deemed that there were important advances in the disarmament process during the détente and the administration of James Carter. The United States and the Soviet Union experienced some rapprochement when they signed treaties to reduce their nuclear weapons arsenal. However, in 1981 Ronald Reagan took power and launched his Strategic Defense Initiative, which halted the advances. According to Ruiz Cabañas, Garcia Robles was furious. Then, there was a meeting in the United Nations building in which Reagan would deliver a speech. On purpose, Garcia Robles was late at the meeting and cross the hall in the middle of Reagan’s discourse. This caused some confusion, but Garcia Robles demonstrated he was mad at the US president (Ruiz Cabañas, 2022). This episode shows that Garcia Robles was a whole institution in disarmament diplomacy. Garcia Robles was also a defender and promoter of creating new institutions to guarantee the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. However, his greater achievement was the establishment of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL in Spanish), an international organization promoting nuclear disarmament in Latin America and the Caribbean. OPANAL was created due to the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1969 and aimed to forbid the use of nuclear technology for military purposes in the region. Garcia Robles’s ideas certainly influenced the establishment of the agency. Therefore, OPANAL will be, in the future, the instrument to guarantee the absence

72

R. VELÁZQUEZ FLORES AND L. OCHOA BILBAO

of nuclear weapons in Latin America. This, of course, is a personal merit of Garcia Robles.

Mapping Concepts and Theories: More Than the Liberal Tradition Most authors in Mexico deem that Garcia Robles’s ideas are framed in the liberal tradition of the International Relations discipline. This vision of the world determines that foreign policy behavior is constrained by international law and world organizations. The interpretation that Garcia Robles’s ideas come from the liberal mainstream derives from the fact that he was a lawyer. His academic training influenced him to adopt, in his diplomatic career, a stance oriented by rules and laws. Secondly, the standard interpretation is that Mexico’s foreign policy tradition has followed a path grounded in principles and institutions. Therefore, Garcia Robles’s ideas and decisions were made on this consideration. Thirdly, the Mexican diplomat became the main proponent of disarmament in Latin America. This fact gave him a halo of idealism and public opinion deemed him an idealist. Garcia Robles’s position gave him world prestige and made him a peace champion. The review of the writings and ideas of Garcia Robles also paves the way to interpret and find some positions that partially meet some of the premises of other theories. Using Realism to explain Garcia Robles’s contribution is feasible. In the case of the Tlatelolco Treaty, an uninformed contribution was that the emphasis of the agreement was on regional security. As a key assumption, this theoretical approach considers security a top priority in world affairs. In other words, Mexico was interested in guaranteeing national security through the absence of nuclear weapons in Latin America. In this context, promoting denuclearization in the region was rational and unitarian, as Realism poses it because public opinion and domestic groups favored it. Besides, the Tlatelolco Treaty was highly convenient for the United States since the agreement would eliminate nuclear competence among Latin American countries and avoid that any external power, such as the Soviet Union, would dare to place nuclear weapons in the region, as Khrushchev did in Cuba. Consequently, the treaty could eliminate a significant threat to US national security in the context of the Cold War. Therefore, an unintentional Garcia Robles’s contribution to peace studies and International Relations was that the realist tradition also embraced his work and some of his ideas.

4

ALFONSO GARCÍA ROBLES: ARCHITECT OF DISARMAMENT

73

By the same token, Adolfo Garcia Robles made an ample contribution to sea international law. An implicit goal was to regulate this area so Mexico could exploit maritime resources. In other words, certainty in sea relations represented Mexico’s national interest. For example, the government was aware that oil resources were in the Gulf of Mexico, and it was important to establish limits with the United States. In the same way, defining sea territorial limits was also part of Mexico’s national security because the government could better protect the country from external threats and make a profit from oil exploitation. From a Geopolitical point of view, Mexico wanted to have control of what was considered a territorial possession. This could be translated into bargaining power and foreign policy capabilities. In the case of Constructivism, it is possible to explain Garcia Robles’s ideas and contributions through this theoretical approach. For example, it is safe to say that the diplomat’s thinking was based on a Latin American identity. The objective was to construct an image of a region free of nuclear weapons. Indeed, Latin America became the first zone to implement a denuclearization process in the world. There were efforts to follow suit in other parts of the planet, but there were obstacles to achieving that goal (Garcia Robles, 1965–1966). Therefore, the region became an example for the world in this subject. The Tlatelolco Treaty generated a Latin American identity based on a zone free of nuclear weapons and that multilateral cooperation was the key feature in inter-American relations. Moreover, it was clear that Garcia Robles was interested in constructing collective norms in the continent to prevent possible conflict. The purpose was to generate the idea that the absence of nuclear power in the region could bring lasting peace among Latin American countries. As for the Marxist vision, the Latin American countries interpreted the possession of nuclear weapons represented a kind of imperialism from the military powers and a form of subordination from the weak countries. Therefore, Latin American countries must prevent such arms in their territories and avoid any form of domination. In the same sense, atomic bombs triggered a gap between rich and poor nations. That was why Latin American countries should fight against the unequal power structure through effective mechanisms. Consequently, a disarmament agreement could counterbalance the gap and prevent regional conflict. As for categorizing concepts and ideas, at the domestic level of analysis, a positive peace could be that Garcia Robles’s ideas were embedded in the assumption that Mexican public opinion and domestic groups favored

74

R. VELÁZQUEZ FLORES AND L. OCHOA BILBAO

disarmament. For example, during an OAS meeting in October 1962 amid the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Mexican government voted in favor of a resolution that demanded that the Soviet Union withdraw nuclear rockets from Cuba (Keller, 2019). Even though Mexico used to support Cuba in other OAS meetings, public opinion backed up the government’s decision this time. Mexico was a pacifist country, so the government adopted that posture and there were no complaints that the vote represented an alignment with the US interests. It is evident that Garcia Robles was aware of this tendency and this consensus became a key base for his work in favor of the disarmament cause. A negative domestic peace could be that a pacifist stands in Mexico’s foreign affairs did not guarantee human rights, respect, and democracy in the country. By that time, the nation was governed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI in Spanish), which ruled the country from 1930 to 2000. In Garcia Robles’s times, PRI always won the presidency and all the key political posts in Mexico. However, it had to resort to nondemocratic mechanisms to win the elections. Thus, in diplomatic matters, the nation was a paladin for disarmament, but domestically the society did not enjoy a real democracy. As for human rights, this issue area was not a priority for the PRI regime, and there were cases of human rights violations in several parts of the country. The most impacting case was the slaughter of hundreds of students in October 1968 in Tlatelolco, just one year after the signing of the Tlatelolco Treaty and behind the building where the negotiations took place. Even though Mexico was fighting abroad for denuclearization as a basic human right, there were cases of governmental abuse on this subject inside the country. At the international level, a significant driver for Garcia Robles’s thinking was the Cold War and the Cuban Missile Crisis threat. These events were a relevant incentive for him to promote peace. From Garcia Robles’s perspective, denuclearization was necessary to guarantee world peace. In other words, peaceful instruments, such as international law norms and world organizations, were essential for Latin America and the world. This perspective came true when the UN General Assembly approved the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. Later, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted in 2017 and entered into force in 2021. Therefore, it is safe to say that Garcia Robles’s ideas and contributions to world peace transcended through several generations.

4

ALFONSO GARCÍA ROBLES: ARCHITECT OF DISARMAMENT

75

The negative peace idea is that the prohibition of nuclear weapons did not guarantee the absence of war. First, several countries already possessed that kind of armament. Therefore, an atomic confrontation was always latent. Besides, states could resort to other types of arms to engage in a military conflict. After the Tlatelolco Treaty, several wars in many parts of the world occurred. The denuclearization process did not end with the appetite of other nations to develop atomic weapons. For instance, there is evidence that Iran and North Korea are trying to generate nuclear technology for military purposes. Fortunately, the world has not yet witnessed the use of atomic bombs after Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Some nations mainly attempt to possess the nuclear capability for two reasons. First, they want to use this technology as a dissuasive element. In other words, it would not be rational to attack a country with this weapon. Secondly, some nations seek to acquire atomic energy as a bargaining power element. Negotiating or achieving foreign policy objectives is easier when a nation counts on nuclear power. Local and Global Ideas At first glance, Alfonso Garcia’s ideas and contributions seemed limited only to the Latin American region. However, it is safe to say that his thought and work transcended other geographical zones and world institutions. Undoubtedly, the Tlatelolco Treaty, which was a success partially due to Garcia Robles’s determination, set an example for other regions. Later, more zones wanted to follow suit. After some decades, several regions agreed to ban nuclear weapons in their territories.3 Only Europe and the Middle East have not yet achieved a regional treaty to ban nuclear weapons. As mentioned before, a year after the Tlatelolco Treaty was signed, the United Nations approved the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. This instrument prohibited the proliferation of this kind of weapon but recognized and accepted five countries that already possessed, by then, nuclear arms. Its main objective was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. A few years after the Tlatelolco Treaty, the US and the Soviet Union governments reached important agreements to reduce nuclear weapons. Within a Cold War rapprochement context, Richard Nixon and Leonid

76

R. VELÁZQUEZ FLORES AND L. OCHOA BILBAO

Brézhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in 1972. Later, in 1979, James Carter and Brézhnev agreed on the SALT II. These treaties aimed to limit the number of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM). However, the agreements were canceled when Ronald Reagan launched his Strategic Defense Initiative. Years later, both states started to negotiate new treaties. In 1991, George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), and in 1993 Bush and Boris Yeltsin signed START II. Both arrangements sought to provide for deep reductions of US and Soviet/Russian strategic nuclear weapons. However, the Soviet Duma did not ratify the Start arrangements. These agreements resulted from the US and the Soviet Union’s interests. However, it is possible to affirm that they were also the product of international pressure to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. In this case, it is highly possible that Garcia Robles’s ideas and the Tlatelolco Treaty indirectly influenced these treaties. In 1996, the UN General Assembly endorsed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which mainly aimed to ban nuclear weapons test explosions. However, the agreement had not entered into force since some countries have yet to ratify it. Nevertheless, the most advanced accomplishment in this subject came when the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was authorized by the United Nations in 2017. This treaty seeks to prohibit nuclear arms and promote their total elimination. The agreement came into force in 2021. It is safe to say that Garcia Robles’s ideas partly contributed to and influenced negotiations to reach all the mentioned treaties. Therefore, Alfonso Garcia’s ideas became a pluralistic universalism as they transcended through time and today prevail in the international system.

Final Considerations Alfonso Garcia Robles left an indispensable legacy for peace studies in the field of International Relations. His primary contributions included his role in negotiating the Tlatelolco Treaty and his work toward disarmament. In 1982, his dedication to denuclearization earned him the Nobel Peace Prize. He will be remembered as an exceptional diplomat who confronted the world’s great powers to achieve his objectives. Even though it is commonly believed that Garcia Robles’s ideas are rooted in the Liberal tradition of International Relations, it is possible to assert that they also have strong ties to Realism, Constructivism, and Marxism.

4

ALFONSO GARCÍA ROBLES: ARCHITECT OF DISARMAMENT

77

His ideas and contributions are founded on a liberal and institutional viewpoint, to begin with. He applied international law and international organizations to promote disarmament, and his proposals were founded on normative principles. In addition, a large number of Third World nations agreed regarding nonproliferation. By establishing norms, these nations hoped to make it more challenging for nuclear powers to violate the law or use or deploy nuclear weapons in other nations. Second, Garcia Robles was also concerned about the Latin American region’s national security. Consequently, the Tlatelolco Treaty also represented the national interests of these countries. Since the objective was to provide security, it made sense to support nonproliferation. This plan contained a substantial amount of pragmatism in this regard. Even for the United States and the Soviet Union, Garcia Robles’ work was advantageous, as it eliminated nuclear competition in other regions. The Tlatelolco Treaty also attempted to balance power between states with and without this technology. Thirdly, Garcia Robles’s arguments were also informed by the constructivist perspective. The prohibition also established a Latin American identity as a nuclear-free zone. The formation of collective norms and ideas was crucial to this end. Similarly, the perception of insecurity was an impetus for developing a mechanism to prevent the presence of nuclear weapons in the region. Possessing nuclear weapons is a form of imperialism that widens the gap between wealthy and impoverished nations. Therefore, subordinate states must combat this unequal power structure. Alternatives to achieving this objective were the conclusion of disarmament treaties and cooperation. Thoughts of Alfonso Garcia Robles transcended time and space. The Tlatelolco Treaty, his most significant contribution, served as a model for additional regions and international organizations. Other geographic zones also established nonproliferation treaties, the United States and the Soviet Union reached several agreements, including SALT and STAR, and the United Nations endorsed some legal instruments prohibiting nuclear weapons. Consequently, Alfonso Garcia Robles’s ideas and contributions went global.

Notes 1. El Colegio Nacional is a public institution dedicated to the dissemination of scientific, artistic, and humanistic culture, free of charge, with free access, and without any curricular or registration restrictions. President Manuel

78

R. VELÁZQUEZ FLORES AND L. OCHOA BILBAO

Avila Camacho created El Colegio Nacional on April 8, 1943. The idea for its foundation came from the philosopher Antonio Caso as an action in favor of culture and civilization against the barbarism of the Second World War. The inspiration came from the Collège de France. Its inauguration took place on May 15, 1943. 2. Santiago Genoves was of Spanish origin and dedicated himself to teaching life in Mexico as an anthropologist. He arrived in Mexico as a refugee from the Spanish Civil War. In 1969, he received the International Peace Council Award. In 2006, he received the Great Cross of Civil Merit by Spain for his role as an “outstanding representative of the Spanish exile in Mexico.” His most important publications are El mono inquisitivo (Planeta, 1973), Expedicion a la violencia (UNAM, 1993), and Principios de criminologia (Tirant Lo Blanc, 2006). He died on September 5, 2013 (Chouza, 2013). 3. Rarotonga Treaty (South Pacific 1985), Bangkok Treaty (Southeast Asia 1995), Pelindaba Treaty (Africa 1996), and Semipalantinsk Treaty (Central Asia 2006).

References Aguilar Casas, E. (2014). Alfonso Garcia Robles, la diplomacia mexicana en favor de la paz mundial. Instituto Nacional de Estudios de Estudios Historicos de las Revoluciones en Mexico (INEHRM). Available at: https://inehrm.gob. mx/es/inehrm/AlfonsoGarcia_RlaDipMex Armanet, P. (1987, January–March). La zona desnuclearizada latinoamericana en la perspectiva de la cooperación regional. In Estudios Internacionales, 20(77), 19–38. Becerril, A. (2011, March 20). Nuestro primer Nobel, Alfonso Garcia Robles. No fueron Mario Molina ni Octavio Paz. Excelsior. Available at: https://www. excelsior.com.mx/node/723380 Brixey-Williams, S. (2019). Reporting on Nuclear Disarmament. Success and Failure in 25 Years of Disarmament Diplomacy. British American Security Information Council. Camara de Diputados. Alfonso Garcia Robles 1911–1991. Available at: https:// www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/muro/pdf/garciar_perfil.pdf Chouza, P. (2013, September 11). Santiago Genoves, el antropologo que se embarco en la balsa ‘Acali’. El Pais. Available at: https://elpais.com/soc iedad/2013/09/11/actualidad/1378936340_785074.html Comexus. Quién fue Alfonso Garcia Robles. Available at: https://www.comexus. org.mx/acerca.php. Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos. (2018). Alfonso García Robles. Defensor del Derecho a la Paz Galardonado con el Premio Nobel de la

4

ALFONSO GARCÍA ROBLES: ARCHITECT OF DISARMAMENT

79

Paz. Available at: https://www.cndh.org.mx/noticia/alfonso-garcia-roblesdefensor-del-derecho-la-paz-galardonado-con-el-premio-nobel-de-la-paz Enriquez, A. (Ed.). (2013). Homenaje a Alfonso Garcia Robles. Premio Nobel de la Paz (1982). UNAM. Fernandes Caetano, G., & Cunha Leite, A. (2018). La politica exterior de Dilma Rousseff y Enrique Peña Nieto (2011–2015). La equidistancia protocolaria del eje ‘Mariachi-Bossa Nova’. Foro Internacional, LVIII, 2(232), April–June, 313–342. Garcia Robles, A. (1938a). Le Panaméricanisme et la Politique de Bon Voisinage. Les Éditions Internationales. Garcia Robles, A. (1938b). Premier Congrès d’Ètudes Internationales. Organisé par l’Association des Études Internationales. Garcia Robles, A. (1939a). La Question du Pétrole au Mexique el le Droit International. Les Éditions Internationales. Garcia Robles, A. (1939b). La Cláusula Calvo ante el derecho internacional. Garcia Robles, A. (1944). La Sorbona ayer y hoy. UNAM. Garcia Robles, A. (1946a). El mundo de la postguerra. Garcia Robles, A. (1946b). La conferencia de San Francisco y su obra. Garcia Robles, A. (1946c). Ecos Del Viejo Mundo. Minerva. Garcia Robles, A. (1965–1966). La desnuclearización de la América Latina. Foro Internacional, VI, 2–3 (22–23), 323–340. Garcia Robles, A. (1966a). La Conferencia de Ginebra y la anchura del mar territorial. El Colegio de Mexico. Garcia Robles, A. (1966b). La anchura del mar territorial. El Colegio de Mexico. Garcia Robles, A. (1967). El Tratado de Tlatelolco. Génesis, alcance y propósito de la proscripción de las armas nucleares en América Latina. UNAM. Garcia Robles, A. (1970). México en las Naciones Unidas. UNAM. Garcia Robles, A. (1972). El Desarme y las Naciones Unidas. El Colegio Nacional. Garcia Robles, A. (1975). La Proscripción De Las Armas Nucleares. El Colegio de Mexico. Garcia Robles, A. (1976a). Política internacional de México. SRE. Garcia Robles, A. (1976b). Tratado para la prohibición de armas nucleares en América Latina. Garcia Robles, A. (1976c). Seis años de política exterior de México, 1970–1976c. SRE. Garcia Robles, A. (1977a). 338 Dias De Tlatelolco. FCE. Garcia Robles, A. (1977b). La Conferencia de Revisión del Tratado Sobre la No Proliferación de las Armas Nucleares. El Colegio Nacional. Garcia Robles, A. (1979a). La asamblea general del desarme. El Colegio Nacional.

80

R. VELÁZQUEZ FLORES AND L. OCHOA BILBAO

Garcia Robles, A. (1979b). The Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Occasional Paper 19. The Stanley Foundation. Garcia Robles, A. (1980). El comité de desarme. El Colegio Nacional. Garcia Robles, A. (2013). Ópera Prima Obras. El Colegio Nacional. Gomez Robledo, A. (2013). Presentacion. In Alfonso Garcia Robles. El desarme y las Naciones Unidas. Discurso de ingreso (27 de noviembre de 1972) (pp. 9–15). El Colegio Nacional. Gómez Robledo, J. M. (2008). Las garantías otorgadas mediante declaraciones unilaterales contenidas en resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. In El Tratado de Tlatelolco Memoria de su Cuarenta Aniversario (pp. 131– 138). Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. Keller, R. (2019). Responsibility of the Great Ones: How the Organization of American States and the United Nations Helped Resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis. Journal of Latin American Studies, 51, 883–904. Marin-Bosch, M. (1984). Alfonso García Robles. Mexico, Nobel De La Paz. SEP/ SRE. Marin-Bosch, M. (1985). Alfonso Garcia Robles: una entrevista. Juridica, Anuario del Departamento de Derecho de la Universidad Iberoamericana, 17 , 14–32. Medina, R. (2017). Alfonso Garcia Robles Premio Nobel de la Paz, padre del desarme nuclear en América Latina. UNAM. Morales, D. (2014). Asilo politico en la embajada de Mexico en Brasil, 1964– 1966: El primer contingente de exiliados de la dictadura militar. II Jornadas de Trabajo sobre Exilios Politicos del Cono Sur en el siglo XX . Available at: https://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/trab_eventos/ev.3970/ev.3970.pdf. Ochoa, L., Prado, J. P., & Ayala, J. (2019). Isidro Fabela: Contexto mundial y derecho internacional en la politica exterior de la Revolucion. Revista IUS, 13(43), 207–229. Pellicer, J. (2016). Alfonso Garcia Robles, momentos previos a un premio nobel. Revista de la Universidad de Mexico, 148(junio), 81–86. Torres, J. (2022a). Protección de regiones-ciudades fronterizas ubicadas entre Estados con armas nucleares y Estados sin armas nucleares: nuevas normas en el derecho internacional. In Estudios Fronterizos, 22. United Nations. (2010). Convenciones de Ginebra sobre el derecho del mar de 1958. Audiovisual Library of International Law. Available at: https://legal. un.org/avl/pdf/ha/gclos/gclos_ph_s.pdf.

4

ALFONSO GARCÍA ROBLES: ARCHITECT OF DISARMAMENT

81

Interviews Ruiz Cabañas, M. (2022). Former Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, an Expert on Mexican Foreign Policy, and Used to Work with Alfonso Garcia Robles. Interview carried out on November 2. Schiavon, J. (2022). Expert on Mexican Foreign Policy and International Relations Theory. Interview carried out on November 2. Torres, J. (2022b). Expert on Disarmament. Interview carried out on November 26.

CHAPTER 5

Óscar Arias: Liberal Peace and Costa Rican Exceptionalism José Antonio Sanahuja and Cristina Eguizábal

Introduction Óscar Arias is a singular figure regarding the concepts, policies, and practices for peace in Latin America and worldwide. After the armed conflicts in the 1980s, democratization and pacification will be associated with his name in the history of Central America. Among other factors, the structural changes in the international system, including the end of the Cold War and the East–West conflict, paved the way for the success of the Esquipulas II peace plan or “Arias Plan,” which eventually would have earned him the Nobel Peace Prize demonstrate the importance of individual and collective agency as well as spatial and temporal coordinates. Factors such as Costa Rica’s historical trajectory, Arias’ leadership, the

J. A. Sanahuja (B) International Relations, Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] C. Eguizábal Costa Rica Integra and Transparency International Costa Rican Chapter, San Jose, Costa Rica © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Domínguez and A. Oelsner (eds.), Latin American Thinkers of Peace, Global Political Thinkers, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36107-4_5

83

84

J. A. SANAHUJA AND C. EGUIZÁBAL

political mastery of the peace plan, his ability to take advantage of critical junctures that emerged in the complex reality of Central America in the 1980s, and his capacity to generate an ethical discourse on the need and opportunity for peace (a powerful logic of “second Cold War”), and to mobilize a broad network of support in Latin America and the European Union in the face of U.S. opposition, all contributed to the success of the peace plan. This chapter examines the trajectory and contributions of Óscar Arias based on the three social-constructivist variables that define the theoretical framework of this volume: localization, which encompasses time and space; socialization, which refers to norms and discourses; and interaction, which refers to the actors, their social relations, and the roles sought by others. The chapter identifies the junctures or turning points that, based on these three variables, explain the figure of Óscar Arias and his contributions to peace through his thinking, discourses, and actions. To this end, the chapter examines Óscar Arias’s biography, focusing on his formative years and political beginnings. The “Arias Plan” and the factors that explain its emergence and viability, as well as other contributions to demilitarization, disarmament, and arms control made subsequently. The chapter concludes by examining the relationship between Arias’ thinking and action and the major currents in peace studies and the field of International Relations, and the connection between Arias’ vision and the ideas and practices of the “liberal peace,” which, from the perspective of global International Relations, represents a particular reinterpretation, imbued with Costa Rican exceptionalism, of the dominant visions in the post-Cold War era.

Early Career and the Road to Presidency Óscar Arias Sánchez was the son of a powerful landowning and political family. The family resided in Heredia, a coffee-growing region close to the capital city of San José that was known for its conservatism. However, his grandfather and father were prominent politicians involved in innovative sectors of the country. His grandfather served as Finance Minister during the presidency of Alfredo González Flores, the founder of the Costa Rican Central Bank, and his father represented Heredia in the National Assembly for the National Liberation Party (in Spanish, Partido de Liberación Nacional, PLN) on multiple occasions. In 1978, Arias Trejos ran as the vice-presidential candidate for the PLN in Luis Alberto

5

ÓSCAR ARIAS: LIBERAL PEACE AND COSTA RICAN …

85

Monge’s first unsuccessful bid for the presidency. The PLN was founded in 1951 by Pepe Figueres following the 1948 revolution. It was the result of an alliance between social democrats and sectors of the oligarchy. As the governing party, the PLN played a crucial role in the establishment of the modern Costa Rican state, which was unique in Central America in that it abolished the permanent institution of the army and established a broad welfare state, universal education and health care, and strong public services. Arias Sánchez graduated from the University of Costa Rica with degrees in law and economics. Then he pursued doctoral studies at the University of Essex and received a master’s degree in political science. However, he was already active in PLN politics at the time. He had joined the second administration of Pepe Figueres, first as a financial advisor at the presidential palace working directly with the president, and then as the head of the newly created national planning office, responsible for budgetary and development issues. President Daniel Oduber, who succeeded Figueres, another “liberacionista,” requested that he remain in this position and promoted him to minister of national planning and economic policy. Arias became the government’s youngest minister at the age of 34. During this period of his career, Arias amassed an extensive network of influential international players, particularly Europeans. Both Figueres and Oduber were extremely active members of International Socialist, the international organization for social democratic political parties. The Costa Ricans developed particularly close ties with the German SPD and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the party’s foundation. All of these international connections would prove invaluable to Arias during the conflict in Central America. In 1977, Óscar Arias resigned as minister to run for office as the Heredia Province representative for the PLN in the National Assembly. A year later, he resigned again after being elected general secretary of the party. During this period, he was able to write several books on Costa Rican and Latin American socioeconomic and development issues and spent at least five years preparing for his own presidential campaign. Arias ran as the candidate for peace and advocated Costa Rica’s continued neutrality as a means of preserving the country’s peace economic recovery (Arias, 1989, pp. 72, 74; Rojas, 1990; Solís, 1983). The Latin American debt crisis of 1982 had left Costa Rica’s economy in very poor condition and highly reliant on external financing. The crisis undermined the

86

J. A. SANAHUJA AND C. EGUIZÁBAL

country’s traditional agro-export and industrialization model, which was geared toward a Central American market that had collapsed because of the violent conflicts ravaging the region. Particularly severe were the sharp devaluation of the colon and Costa Rica’s unpayable external debt. With the expansion of the armed conflict into Costa Rican territory, the escalating military activity against Nicaragua by the irregular forces of the Southern Front of the “Contra” with U.S. support grew. Concerning the regional crisis, as a candidate he frequently stated, “Costa Rica is not a part of the Central American crisis, but Costa Rica is part of the Central American crisis.” Unusually for a Costa Rican leader, he promised the Costa Rican people in his inaugural address to actively promote peace in the region. Arias was elected President in 1986.

Leadership and Opportunities for Building Peace Arias Sánchez faced a tense international environment following his inauguration as president of Costa Rica. Early on, the Reagan administration (1981–1989) became obsessed with Central America. Washington was alarmed by the Sandinista government’s positions on Cuba, nationalization, nonaligned foreign policy, and revolutionary rhetoric. The neo conservative intellectuals who had replaced the Carter administration’s foreign policy establishment figures were convinced that they were dealing with a “new Cuba” and the regional spillovers of the Sandinista revolution (El Salvador and Guatemala were ravaged by civil war at the time, and they could not allow it to occur on their watch) (Carothers, 1991). Reagan’s Central American policy, which rejected negotiation, was based on a military rollback of Nicaragua’s government and the Central American guerrillas, and in pursuit of this objective, it employed a “low intensity warfare” that also fueled the East–West tensions of the 1980s’ so-called “second Cold War.” Washington decided to train and arm the opposition to the Sandinista regime, utilizing the Guatemalan model of 1954 as a model. Thus, the “contras” counter-revolutionary army was formed and stationed in neighboring nations. The front base would be in Honduras, where the United States was already training the Honduran military. However, establishing a rear base in Costa Rica was not straightforward (Coatsworth, 1994; Hamilton et al., 1988; Leogrande, 1998; Travis, 2016).

5

ÓSCAR ARIAS: LIBERAL PEACE AND COSTA RICAN …

87

The Internationalization of the Central American Conflict To disengage, at least partially, from the Central American crisis, the Costa Rican government under President Monge declared (active) neutrality. The U.S. and Costa Rican bourgeoisie exerted enormous pressure on the Monge administration to adopt a more aggressive stance against the Sandinista and in support of Washington’s confrontation strategy. Monge permitted the construction of a military airport near the Nicaraguan border in order to facilitate the contras’ access to food and arms without abandoning neither the neutrality foreign policy discourse nor the open border refugee policy. Concerned about the potential for escalation, the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela launched an initiative in the early 1980s to counter President Reagan’s bellicosity and slow the rate of destabilization in Central America. The initiative was named after the island of Contadora in Panama, where the first meeting took place. The negotiations with and between Central Americans were arduous. There were genuine disagreements among the five governments, particularly between Nicaragua and El Salvador, but there was also a perception among Central Americans that Contadora was not impartial and that the Mexican government in particular harbored strong Nicaraguan sympathies (Eguizábal, 1992). All parties agreed in principle to a Contadora Charter outlining a small number of general commitments. However, it was unsuccessful due to Washington’s opposition to the de facto recognition of the Sandinista government. The Contadora Group did accomplish the genuine internationalization of the crisis and the participation of virtually all Latin American and European governments (Kaufman, 1985). When Arias took office, the Central American crisis had progressed from civil conflict to full-scale Cold War confrontation. Diplomacy at the international level had failed to contain it. It was time for the Central Americans to assume leadership. The Esquipulas Process In the face of intense pressure from the Reagan administration, the primary objective of both the Monge and Arias administrations’ foreign policy was to maintain a degree of autonomy in order to seek non-military solutions to the regional crisis (Rojas & Solís, 1988). External assistance

88

J. A. SANAHUJA AND C. EGUIZÁBAL

from Latin American and European nations and regional action were two components of their formula for increasing autonomy, but initially they were insufficient due to the United States’ power asymmetry. As a result of the debt crisis and the need for financial support from Washington, the Monge administration was unable to avert a military escalation. The Arias Administration, however, took advantage of the Reagan Administration’s weakened position as a result of the Iran-Contras scandal to expand Nicaragua’s margins of autonomy and assert a peace initiative that was a repudiation of the nearly decade-long Contra war waged by the United States (Travis, 2017) and whose accomplishments can be described as historic (Eguizábal et al., 2017; Escalante, 1989). However, the dilemma between economic and political autonomy persisted, and Costa Rica faced economic aid cuts and increased conditionality from U.S.-led Bretton Woods institutions (Sanahuja, 2000). President Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala convened the first Esquipulas negotiations on May 25, 1986. He invited his Central American counterparts to the city of Esquipulas, located on the Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Honduran borders. The city is renowned throughout the region for housing the Christ of Esquipulas sanctuary, a traditional pilgrimage site for the residents of the three neighboring countries and a place of worship for all Central Americans. This first reunion yielded little fruit. However, the presidents agreed to continue meeting, and the Esquipulas Peace Process was initiated. Following this initial meeting, Arias Sánchez returned to San José with the resolve to work diligently on a peace agenda to which his Central American colleagues would subscribe (Arias, 1986). The beginning of the “Iran-Contras” affair or “Irangate” can be viewed as a crucial turning point for the peace process. When Arias attempted to prevent the opening of a clandestine airfield that the CIA hoped to use to reactivate the Contra, whose operations from Costa Rican territory, under the command of Edén Pastora, had been dismantled by the Sandinista Popular Army, he faced intense pressure from the United States (Hackel & Siegel, 1987, pp. 44–46). In November 1986, when the U.S. Attorney General disclosed the first details of the Iran-Contras affair, the situation changed abruptly. Some of those responsible for Reagan’s Central American policy, including prominent members of the National Security Council such as Oliver North and John Poindexter, resigned from their positions, and Reagan established the Tower Commission to investigate the matter. The Tower Commission report was made public in

5

ÓSCAR ARIAS: LIBERAL PEACE AND COSTA RICAN …

89

February 1987, and the U.S. Congress discussed its findings in June and July. These developments afforded Arias Sánchez unanticipated options. Aware of the political opportunities given by the Iran-Contra scandal and the credibility gained by its stance toward the Contras, the administration acted swiftly and skillfully. Arias convened a meeting of Central American presidents in San José, excluding Nicaragua so as not to provoke U.S. opposition, in January 1987. At the February 15 meeting, Arias unexpectedly presented a new peace plan that called for the cessation of U.S. aid to the Contras and a timeline for the democratization of Nicaragua. The other three governments responded positively to this proposal. In April, the Contadora group expressed support for the Plan, and Nicaragua, which was amid an economic crisis and eager to demobilize the Contra, also began to view it favorably. Arias was able to prevent Reagan’s opposition from preventing its acceptance by Honduras and El Salvador with the assistance of some Democratic Party leaders (Arnson, 1993; Coatsworth, 1994, pp. 198–201; Roberts, 1990). In San José, he had assembled a “kitchen cabinet” that collaborated with him on the proposal. It consisted of his brother, Rodrigo Arias, who was Minister of the Presidency at the time, his former classmate, friend, and advisor, John Biehl, and Rodrigo Madrigal Nieto, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time. Guido Fernández, a prominent journalist who would later become Costa Rica’s ambassador to the United States, intermittently joined them. This plan, with some modifications, was presented at the Esquipulas II meeting on August 7, 1987, when the five presidents signed the Arias or Esquipulas plan, thereby ushering in a new and more fruitful phase of the regional peace process. Arias presented a unified Central American front to support peace to the world by convincing the Central Americans to sign his plan. His colleagues had accepted his suggestion and adopted it as their own. He had begun by directing the discussions and concluded by successfully mediating the parties’ disagreements. According to Travis (2017), this process illuminates Arias’ method of mediation and negotiation, which was based on direct deliberation with the presidents in a closed space until an acceptable solution based on mutual and interconnected concessions was reached. This approach evokes the “communities of speech” of Habermas’ communicative action, as well as the ethics of discourse based on consensus and the overarching rationality implied by the triad of peace, democracy, and development on which the Esquipulas peace process was founded. Regarding Arias’ unique role, Wehr and

90

J. A. SANAHUJA AND C. EGUIZÁBAL

Lederach (1991) argue that it corresponds to a new type of mediatornegotiator, which they refer to as “insider-partial” as opposed to the conventional “outsider-impartial third party.” The latter is distinguished by the trust accorded to him by the parties, in contrast to the more aloof stance adopted by the external mediator who is neutral. Arias’ Plan, formally titled “Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America,” called for a cessation of hostilities and established a series of secondary measures and procedures that promoted national reconciliation in each country; cease fires; internationally observed free elections; the end of assistance to irregular military forces; arms reduction within established armies; and refugee aid. The Contadora Group was tasked with establishing an International Verification and Follow-up Commission to assist governments in adhering to the accord (Rojas, 1989; Solis, 1996). At this crucial juncture, Arias’s leadership and mediation role coincided with those of other actors, including the European Community (Sanahuja, 1994), the Democratic Party in the U.S. Congress (Arnson, 1993), and the Latin American countries that supported the process through the Rio Group, which was formed in 1986 from the previous Contadora and Support Groups.

After the Nobel Prize: Mediation and Normative Entrepreneurship In October 1987, the Nobel Prize committee announced that Óscar Arias had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to promote peace in Central America. By recognizing Arias, the committee also acknowledged the Costa Rican tradition of forgoing military expenditures by disbanding its armed forces. The internationalization of the Central American crisis, Contadora’s accomplishments and limitations, and the Costa Rican pacifist tradition had also paved the way for the peace award (Abrams, 1988). In 1988, Arias established the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress with funds from the Nobel Prize. The foundation established the Center for Human Progress, which focuses on gender equality and development projects, and the Center for Peace and Reconciliation, which focuses on peacebuilding efforts. In 1993, the Center for Organized Participation was included. Arias continued to serve as Costa Rica’s “chief diplomat” on behalf of Esquipulas until 1990, maintaining his colleagues’ commitment to

5

ÓSCAR ARIAS: LIBERAL PEACE AND COSTA RICAN …

91

the accord and rallying the support from the international community. After 1987, perceptions within the U.S. Congress were shifting (Fernández, 1989) and the traditional balance between conflict and cooperation in the relationship between the USSR and the United States shifted in favor of cooperation. Central America was the region where this new equilibrium was felt most strongly. Regarding compliance with the Esquipulas agreement, the records of the governments of Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua’s Sandinistas have been spotty at best. However, in November 1988, more than a year after the peace plan was signed, Nicaragua reversed course and began fully participating in the process, no doubt encouraged by its supporters, Cuba and the USSR in particular. The Sapoá agreement between the Sandinista government and the Contras in 1988 paved the way for opposition-won democratic elections in Nicaragua in 1989 and the subsequent demobilization of the Contras. After the end of the Cold War, Central America’s strategic importance diminished, making possible other peace agreements: El Salvador in 1992 and Guatemala in 1996, both conceptually and operationally linked to the Esquipulas Peace process. The Nobel Prize had significantly increased the domestic and international prestige and stature of Óscar Arias as an actor of peace. In this new phase of the Cold War, his plan to end the armed conflict in Central America was increasingly the only viable alternative. Arias was only fully engaged with the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress, the foundation’s official name, until he left office in 1990. Since that time, Arias has become one of the loudest advocates for disarmament and demilitarization. It is one of his strongest convictions, which is rooted in Costa Rican exceptionalism. Arias, who has lived in a country without an army since 1948, has always touted its advantages for social development and democracy. In Arias’ own words: “Throughout Costa Rica’s history as an independent nation, it has forged a distinctive style of development in the troubled world of Latin America. The abolition of the army and the national civilian vocation, in contrast to those of heavily armed neighbors, are likewise exceptional (Arias, 1989, p. 343). These beliefs inspired two courses of action: demilitarization, disarmament, and arms control. The demilitarization processes of Panama and Haiti are two clear examples. After the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 and the surrender of General Noriega, who was charged with drug trafficking crimes in the United States, Arias sent a public letter to the Panamanian people introducing this proposal. The Centre for Peace and Reconciliation of the Arias Foundation established a permanent

92

J. A. SANAHUJA AND C. EGUIZÁBAL

office in Panama City. It collaborated with political actors, the media, and nongovernmental organizations to advocate for Panama’s demilitarization (Arias, 2005, p. 127). It was a five-year process that included a vote in Congress and a referendum, amid allegations that the foundation may have violated Panamanian law. In October 1994, the parliament voted to abolish the armed forces by amending the constitution. Then, Arias and his foundation shifted the focus to Haiti. A military coup d’état against Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s progressive government in 1991 led to massive violations of human rights, a migration crisis with thousands of Haitians attempting to reach the U.S. coast, and a 1994 U.S. intervention to restore democracy. With the army weakened and discredited, Arias saw an opening to abolish the Haitian military. Arias and the center’s staff traveled to Haiti in November 1994. At a news conference held at the National Palace, Arias stated, “The Haitian people should not miss this opportunity to get rid of the armed forces” (Cox, 2007, p. 81; Rohter, 1994), requesting a constitutional amendment. In 1995, the Foundation conducted the first public poll in the history of Haiti, which revealed that two-thirds of the population favored disbanding the army. The returned President Aristide then declared that he would disband the army. The Arias Centre for Peace and Reconciliation established an office in Haiti and launched an outreach program on the advantages of demilitarization, in addition to arranging for Haitian leaders to visit Costa Rica and Panama to learn from their experience. In February 1996, one day prior to the transfer of power from Aristide to the next president, the Haitian senate passed a resolution to disband the country’s armed forces. Throughout the legislative process, the Arias Foundation provided continued assistance to make this decision a reality. Arias has also been involved with the Carter Center, an organization founded by former president and 2002 Nobel Peace Prize winner Jimmy Carter. Arias has worked with The Carter Center through two departments: the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government and the International Negotiating Network. They consist of current and former Western Hemisphere heads of government as well as other prominent figures who monitor and mediate elections in public or in private. Arias accompanied Jimmy Carter and former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in 1996, when the Carter Center supported the Nicaraguan elections. Arias participated in the Carter Center mission that oversaw the Nicaraguan elections in 2001. Arias also served as a mediator between Zelaya and Roberto Micheletti during the 2009 constitutional crisis in

5

ÓSCAR ARIAS: LIBERAL PEACE AND COSTA RICAN …

93

Honduras, which was precipitated by Zelaya’s ouster by a coup. The de facto government rejected Arias’ seven-point proposal, which called for Zelaya’s limited return to the presidency, amnesty, and early elections. Disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation are additional areas in which Arias has played a prominent international role, in this case as the leader of a large coalition of Nobel Peace Prize laureates and other prominent figures. They actively participated in the conception and adoption of the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty for conventional arms, a treaty that covers a vast array of weapons, including small arms, tanks, combat aircraft, and warships. The ATT was approved by the United Nations General Assembly in 2013 and entered into force in 2014 following ratification by fifty states. To date, 113 states have ratified it. In 1995, the Arias Foundation established an international commission to investigate the conventional arms trade. This included South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Guatemalan Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta Mench, East Timorese leader José Ramos-Horta, the Tibetan Dalai Lama, and Amnesty International. The International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers was drafted by this Commission and presented to the United Nations in May 1997 with the support of Józef Rotblatt, Elie Wiesel, and Betty Williams, among others. The Code is considered the direct predecessor of the Arms Trade Treaty, which was ratified in April 2013 by the United Nations General Assembly. Disarmament, development, and democracy (three constant tenets of Arias’s beliefs and actions) constitute the ultimate justification for this proposal. Arias questioned the magnitude of the arms trade and its impact on social and economic development on the one hand. Prior to the launch of the Code of Conduct, Arias denounced the fact that military spending amounted to more than $800 billion, and that only 5% of this amount would make it possible, within 10 years, to ensure universal coverage of education, health care, drinking water and sanitation, and end hunger, and an additional 5% would make it possible to eradicate world poverty (Arias, 1999, p. 3; Arias et al., 1995). In contrast, the proposal highlighted the absence of regulation and moral standards in the arms trade. Consequently, the Code of Conduct established rigorous standards for democracy, human rights, and peacebuilding. Arms-producing nations should restrict their arms sales to dictators, military aggressors, and conflict zones, limiting them instead to democratic nations, i.e. those that hold free and fair elections, protect freedom of speech and the press, and respect human rights. In addition, purchasing nations were required to demonstrate that their health and

94

J. A. SANAHUJA AND C. EGUIZÁBAL

education spending exceeded their military spending. Also required was the disclosure of the arms trade to the public. Under Arias’s direction, the Arias Foundation campaign contributed to significant advancements in the regulation and transparency of the arms trade, particularly with regard to small arms and light weapons. The UN adopted a “Programme d’action pour prévenir, combattre et éliminer le commerce illicite des armes légères et de petit caliber” (Programme d’action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons) in 2001. 133 UN Member States had already reported their data by 2005. The General Assembly adopted resolution 61/89 in 2006 titled “Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Establishing Common International Standards for the Import, Export, and Transfer of Conventional Arms.” The IA preparatory committee was established. In 2009, during his second term as Costa Rican president, Arias presented the draft to the United Nations. The United Nations held formal negotiations on the Treaty from July 2012 to April 2013, when the text was adopted. In 2014, it entered into force with 130 signatories and 113 States Parties. The demilitarization of Panama and Haiti and the proposals for an Arms Control Treaty are significant outcomes of Arias and the Arias Foundation’s roles as international actors: they became leaders and “entrepreneurs of norms” by drafting and promoting new international standards and norms in this field. In some pertinent cases, Arias followed the same path as the Esquipulas II Agreement: to capitalize on historical junctures or crises and to position himself as a leader and mediator offering a course of action aligned with the main tenets of liberal peace, framed in the dominant script of democracy and development of the 1990s. The ascendance of the Nobel Prize winner made things easier at that time.

Liberal Peace and the Post-Cold War Moment Arias has predominantly been a “doer” rather than a “thinker.” Beyond his early academic work, most of his writings are short articles for the press and the public and collections of speeches that address contemporary issues (Arias, 1989, 1990a, 1990b, 2005, 2007, 2010). Arias’ style of political rhetoric is consensual, and generally appeals to shared values, and he frequently reduces politics to a spiritualized discourse with generic signifiers, capable of appealing to broad majorities. Consequently,

5

ÓSCAR ARIAS: LIBERAL PEACE AND COSTA RICAN …

95

his messages are relatively vague, making it difficult to trace his reasoning and options (Rojas, 1992). According to Frye and Suchan (2017), after receiving the Nobel Prize, Aria’s narrative incorporated elements that are characteristic of the discourse of Nobel Prize awardees. Throughout most of his political career, his political philosophy was rooted in the fundamental principles of representative democracy: his writings and speeches emphasized the importance of dialogue; the necessity of genuine development based on an efficient economic structure, combining open markets and social protection; and equality of opportunity for all and solidarity toward the needy. As a result, he defined the national interest of Costa Rica as strengthening the democratic system of government based on dialogue between various social sectors and interests. As a result of the regional crisis, Arias’ definition of Costa Rica’s national security, which was based on neutrality and demilitarization, was expanded to include peace in Central America as the country’s primary foreign policy objective, which he believed was the only way to protect his country’s national interest. Peace in Central America could only be achieved, according to him, through regional and national dialogue and democratic forms of government. Peace, understood as the absence of direct violence, was insufficient; it required political democracy and socioeconomic development to be maintained. Arias’ views on economics and development were largely consistent with the social democratic tradition of the PLN, which was rooted in the construction of the modern Costa Rican State after the 1948 civil war. Those views also represented the neoliberal turn that his party took in the 1980s and 1990s, favoring the reduction of the size of the State, privatizations, and the opening to foreign investment (Arias, 2005, pp. 151–166, 260). Arias maintained in his discursive repertoire several topics from the global South, such as critiquing the protectionism of developed nations, the foreign debt trap, and the need for enhancements to financing for development (Arias, 1989, pp. 315–318). Nonetheless, he followed the economic policies of the so-called “Washington Consensus” that was widely adopted in the 1990s. During the first Arias administration (1986– 1990), which was heavily burdened by the debt crisis, a portion of the substantial economic aid from the United States was used to promote the liberalization and deregulation of Costa Rica’s economy, export diversification, and the signing of the first structural adjustment program with the World Bank. This sparked a conflict with his planning minister,

96

J. A. SANAHUJA AND C. EGUIZÁBAL

Ottón Solís, resulting in his resignation and exit from the government. Additionally, Arias’s administration adopted the Reagan administration’s policies promoting free economic special zones, export diversification in “non-traditional” products, and enhanced access to the U.S. market via the Caribbean Basin Initiative (Sanahuja, 2000, pp. 218, 361). During the second Arias administration (2006–2010), the country’s economic agenda was dominated by Arias’ proposals to privatize public corporations and the negotiation of a free trade agreement with the United States (Arias, 2005, pp. 155–166), both of which were strongly contested and required a national referendum for approval. Arias has continued to cite statism and protectionism as examples of economic mismanagement and authoritarian inclination. These are common themes in his criticisms of the Chavez administration in Venezuela. In this instance, he relies on Amartya Sen’s (1981) assertion that “there has never been a famine in a consolidated democracy” (Arias, 2015, on Sen, 1981). Since 2010, the rise of authoritarian populism in the Americas has been one of Arias’ primary concerns. Óscar Arias is a proponent of the so-called “liberal peace” prevalent in the post-Cold War period, as evidenced by his speeches and public interventions, as well as the political logic underlying the Esquipulas peace agreement. The theoretical foundations implicitly include the Kantian “democratic peace” thesis, which in its conventional formulation asserts that democracies do not fight among themselves and are less prone to violence and armed conflict in domestic and international politics by promoting democratic norms and institutions that allow social and political conflicts to be channeled peacefully through institutionalized mechanisms (Salomón, 2001; Davenport, 2007; Doyle, 1997; Russett, 1998). In his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 in Oslo, Arias stated, In Central America, we do not seek peace in isolation, the peace that will one day be followed by political progress, but peace and democracy, together, indivisible, an end to the shedding of human blood, which is inextricable from an end to the suppression of human rights. We neither judge nor condemn the voluntarily chosen and never exported political or ideological systems of other nations. We cannot compel sovereign states to adopt forms of government they have not chosen for themselves. However, we can and do insist that every government respect the universal human rights, which transcend national borders and ideological classifications. We

5

ÓSCAR ARIAS: LIBERAL PEACE AND COSTA RICAN …

97

believe that peace and justice can only exist simultaneously, never independently. If a nation mistreats and betrays its own people, it is more likely to do the same to its neighbors. (Arias, 1989, p. 370)

Similarly, Arias expressly distances himself from the traditional postulates of political realism and power politics as the foundations of peace: “The world’s most powerful leaders continue to adhere to the ancient Roman proverb that ‘he who wants peace must prepare for war.’ By adhering to this absurd assumption, we have created a world where the acquisition of weapons takes precedence over the feeding of children, thereby exacerbating the cycle of poverty, injustice, and conflict that we are attempting to break” (Arias, 2005, p. 133). In Óscar Arias’ typical normative discourse, rather than realism, what is observed is a systematic critique of arms trade and the militaryindustrial complex, focusing on how it influences U.S. foreign policy, and at times assuming the interests of the arms industry as a causal variable of war and armed conflict. Therefore, it continues to advocate for stricter international rules governing the arms trade. During his second term (2006–2010), Arias proposed the “Costa Rica Consensus”: an initiative for debt relief and resource mobilization for social investment and environmental protection in nations that reduced military spending (Sauma, 2017, p. 52). As stated by Arias in an interview with the chapter’s authors: Regarding this thesis [democratic peace, authors’s note], my conviction is that the United States, being a democratic country, has been a warlike country since its birth in 1776. The military-industrial complex is a key factor. In the Ukrainian war, President Biden’s aid amounts to 40 billion dollars that will go to the military industry to manufacture or replenish weapons for Zelensky’s government. There is no incentive to end the war, and a ceasefire is urgently needed given the high cost of war in terms of civilian death and destruction and so-called “collateral damage”. In contrast, there are now no “carrots” to bring to the table the parties in conflict.

Arias has supported a concept of “positive peace” based on the concept of human security promoted by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which is comprised of three elements: the link of human security with life and with a concept of human dignity based on justice; a concept of democracy that is not limited to its

98

J. A. SANAHUJA AND C. EGUIZÁBAL

formal dimensions, and includes deliberation, dialogue, and the participation of all people; and economic justice, which appeals to an inclusive economic system. Arias argues that this is incompatible with the burden of foreign debt, which necessitates that more development aid be financed by reducing defense budgets (Arias, 2000, pp. 14–16, 19). The democratic peace thesis has also been supported by rational choice approaches to International Relations and social sciences, which assert that as development processes approach the rational ideal of liberalism that combines electoral democracy, the rule of law, and free markets, the propensity for authoritarianism and violence decreases in societies and states. Rising income levels—a crucial factor in sustaining middle classes and open societies—and international economic interdependencies, which are associated with the global expansion of the market economy, would make authoritarianism more difficult, reduce the propensity to violence and war, and increase the economic costs of interstate war or internal armed conflict, thereby discouraging their occurrence (Macginty & Williams, 2016). After Esquipulas II, in addition to cessation of hostilities, disarmament, and democratization, it was assumed that the restoration of regional economic integration and the expansion of economic interdependence would also contribute to the maintenance of lasting peace. In addition to the economic integration treaties, the Central American nations signed a Regional Democratic Security Framework Treaty in 1995, which represented a 180-degree turn from the Cold War-era conceptions of national security. Arias assumed this viewpoint frequently in its speeches and writings: that authoritarianism and the absence of freedoms, along with underdevelopment, poverty, and inequality, are the root causes of armed conflicts; and, conversely, these impede, interrupt, or hinder development processes, and can lead to what Paul Collier (2003) has termed conflict traps, in which violence and poverty are intertwined. In Central America, as in other cases of post-Cold War conflict to peace, Arias assumed that democracy and development prevent war and contribute to peace by promoting the (re)establishment of democratic institutions and norms, which is a prerequisite for resuming socioeconomic development processes. For Arias, democracy and development based in the free market would ultimately be the foundations of a pax democratica, within the state as well as in relations between states, and the positive relationship between peace, understood as the absence of violence, and democracy and development

5

ÓSCAR ARIAS: LIBERAL PEACE AND COSTA RICAN …

99

would be the only way to ensure a holistic, long-term, and durable peace. As Arias stated: “If we really want to prevent conflict, we must also pay attention to the demands of social justice. Ignoring the links between poverty and conflict is foolish. Yet many leaders and analysts treat each problem separately, as if they were unrelated. I argue that if we succeed in alleviating poverty and reducing social inequality, we will see a sharp decline in the amount of conflict in the world” (Arias, 2005, p. 132). The rationale behind liberal peace must be understood in the context of the dominant theories of Western social sciences, particularly Weberian sociology and the subsequent paradigm of modernization, which links capitalism and its imperatives of secularization, rationality, and efficiency to the process of state-building, democratic development, and the regulation of political and social conflict (Suhrke & Chaudary, 2009, p. 390). This school of thought and practice views war and armed conflict as discrete, atypical events whose occurrence can be examined based on causal variables—often quantitative indicators—related to statehood, the robustness of democracy, or particular socioeconomic determinants (Cramer, 2006). In broader terms, Óscar Arias’s liberal vision of peace can be understood as a thesis of philosophy of history with discernible Western roots, which has developed as a school of academic and political thought, and a form of governmentality that was widely developed in the 1990s by the United Nations system and other multilateral organizations in peacebuilding and development missions. However, Arias failed to recognize the contradictions between his liberal approach to peace and the international system’s restrictions on development financing, which have undermined numerous post-Cold War peace processes. The peace agreements in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, in accordance with the Arias Plan’s comprehensive vision, achieved peace, democracy, and development and entailed, following the cessation of hostilities, broad political reforms and inclusive economic growth that would enable the integration of ex-combatants into the country’s social and political life through education, employment, and access to productive assets. This necessitated the mobilization of extraordinary resources for investment, and for developing nations, external assistance was essential. After the wars and the peace agreements in Central America, several aid donors emerged. Most European nations increased their contributions, but the United States, the region’s primary source of economic and, above all, military aid during the Central American wars, all but ceased providing assistance. Simultaneously, the countries

100

J. A. SANAHUJA AND C. EGUIZÁBAL

of the region were compelled to adopt the austerity policies demanded by international financial institutions, and neither domestic nor foreign investment grew as anticipated. These factors and the anticipated opposition from entrenched oligarchies prevented the implementation of many of the reconstruction and development commitments that, according to these postulates, would be necessary for lasting peace. After over a decade of war and armed conflict, the incompatibility between the adjustment policies promoted by USAID, the IMF, and the World Bank and the peace agreements was one of Central American nations’ most complex challenges. These policies failed to alleviate poverty, facilitate ex-combatants’ reintegration into civilian life, and, in short, establish the proper conditions for national reconciliation and democratic consolidation. Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, United Nations officials involved in the peace process in El Salvador, were privileged observers of this problem and warned early on of the peril of adjustment programs guided by the narrow criteria of the Washington Consensus when peace or democracy are at stake. According to de Soto and Castillo, adjustment posed a difficult dilemma: should stabilization be sacrificed for the implementation of the Accords, or should adjustment take precedence even if it endangered peace? According to both authors, the lack of coordination between the IMF and the United Nations caused El Salvador to resemble “a patient on the operating table, with two surgeons separated by a curtain, operating simultaneously on different vital organs, and without communicating” (Soto & Castillo, 1994, p. 74). James K. Boyce (1995) also pointed out the consequences of this dilemma: “El Salvador will not achieve prosperity or peace without policies that correct inequality in the distribution of power and wealth.” These dilemmas, which were resolved in favor of stabilization policies and expenditure control, are at the root of the cycle of criminal violence, frequently perpetrated by excombatants, that the region has experienced since the 1990s, when some countries in the region became the most violent on earth. As Arias stated in an interview with the authors on July 22, 2022: In the peace-democracy-development equation, it is the latter component that fails. Post-conflict reconstruction is the key. After the Sapoá [Nicaraguan] peace agreements with James Baker [as US Secretary of State] and later in the peace accords in El Salvador and Guatemala, the major powers did not support it. There was no equivalent of a Marshall

5

ÓSCAR ARIAS: LIBERAL PEACE AND COSTA RICAN …

101

Plan, as is now being discussed in the case of Ukraine. There are funds for war but not for reconstructing countries that have been left in ruins. Global military spending is ten times official development assistance—two trillion dollars a year compared to some $180 billion in ODA—and 12 times what was spent on aid compared to COVID-19.

Final Considerations In the distinctive trajectory of Óscar Arias in favor of peace and democratization in Central America, two key elements intersect: on the one hand, a socialization process guided by his political formation in social democracy; on the other hand, Costa Rican exceptionalism. Peculiar contemporary Costa Rica emerged from the 1948 civil war and the legacy of subsequent President Pepe Figueres. The institutional path dependence, the abolition of the army as a permanent institution, the development of a broad social state, a wealth distribution pattern more egalitarian than that of neighboring countries, and the consolidation of political culture based in consensus and democratic institutions stand out as distinctive realities (Solís, 2023). Arias is the result of the intertwining of ideas, discourses, norms, and institutions resulting from a case as specific and unique as that of the nation he eventually led as president. Arias, the politician and peacemaker, is also the result of critical time and space junctures where he could forge and deploy a particular role as a leader, negotiator, and mediator. The Central American crisis was influenced by the bipolar confrontation and the risk that Costa Rica, despite its declared neutrality, could be dragged into the armed conflicts in the region; the Iran-Contra window of opportunity; or, already in the postCold War era, the U.S. interventions in Panama and Haiti. As stated in these pages, once the external mediation of the Contadora group failed, Arias assumed a novel role as an internal mediator-negotiator and secured the acceptance and signature of the Esquipulas II Agreement. This agreement is presented, beyond its interesting internal logic, as an example of ethical discourse that enjoys broad support, as it is viewed as a possible, necessary, and appropriate course of action by both the Central American governments themselves, the protagonists of the process, and by external actors, who accepted the leadership role of Arias and Costa Rica: the Latin American countries, organized in support of this process in the Rio Group; and the European Community.

102

J. A. SANAHUJA AND C. EGUIZÁBAL

This “logic of appropriateness” was fostered by an understanding of peace, democracy, and development (the three components of the Esquipulas II equation), which was firmly rooted in the liberal peace tradition of the West. Arias linked war and violence to authoritarianism, injustice, and underdevelopment, establishing the Esquipulas II Peace Accord as a precedent for post-Cold War liberal optimism. Its arguments against armaments and the causal relationship between that fact and the propensity to wage war heralded the post-Cold War era’s progress in reducing military expenditures and arms control and limitation. The Arms Trade Treaty is one of his most significant legacies and demonstrates Arias’ leadership ability and assumption of a new role as a “normative entrepreneur” that capitalized on the ascent of a Nobel Peace Prize winner. Arias’s economic and social development vision is fundamental to his vision of a pax democratica. It may contain some approaches typical of Third World thinking in the 1970s, but Arias demonstrated an alignment with the liberalization and openness policies of the Washington Consensus and neoliberalism, which eventually led to globalization. His concept of “positive peace” linked the absence of violence with the eradication of poverty and inequality, but in his liberal view, this could be achieved through the integration of Central American economies with the U.S. and global markets. A little more than a quarter century after Esquipulas II, the persistence of inequalities, the impossibility of building solid democratic states, and, most importantly, the reappearance of violence in a new cycle dominated by organized crime are evidence of the limitations of the liberal peace approach in a globalized and unequal world.

References Abrams, I. (1988). Behind the Scenes: The Nobel Committee and Oscar Arias. The Antioch Review, 46(6), 364–373. Arnson, C. (1993). Crossroads. Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976–1993. The Pennsylvania State University Press. Boyce, J. K. (Coord.). (1995). Adjustment Toward Peace: Economic Policy and Post-War Reconstruction in El Salvador. PNUD. Carothers, T. (1991). In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Towards Latin America in the Reagan Years. University of California Press. Coatsworth, J. (1994). Central America and the United States. Twayne Publishers.

5

ÓSCAR ARIAS: LIBERAL PEACE AND COSTA RICAN …

103

Cox, V. (2007). Oscar Arias Sánchez. Bringing Peace to Central America. Chelsea Publishers. Cramer, C. (2006). Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries. Holst. Doyle, M. W. (1997). Ways of War and Peace. W.W. Norton. Eguizábal, C. (1992). De Contadora a Esquipulas. Washington y Contadora en un mundo cambiante. Anuario De Estudios Centroamericanos, 18(1), 5–15. Eguizábal, C., Yancy Espinoza, C. A., & Benavides, T. (2017). La paz en Centroamérica, 1987–1990. El Plan Arias desde dentro. CEXECI. Escalante, E. (1989). La propuesta de paz para Centroamérica del presidente de Costa Rica Óscar Arias Sánchez: ¿Un caso de autonomía relativa? Relaciones Internacionales, 26, 37–49. Fernández, G. (1989). El desafío de la paz en 7Centroamérica. Editorial Costa Rica. Frye, J., & Suchan, M. (2017). Nobel Peace Speech. ESSACHESS—Journal for Communication Studies, 10(1), 55–72. Hackel, J., & Siegel, D. (1987). In Contempt of Congress. The Reagan Record in Central America. Institute for Policy Studies (IPS). Hamilton, N., Frieden, J. A., Fuller, L., Pastor, M., & Jr (Eds.). (1988). Crisis in Central America. Regional Dynamics and US Policy in the 1980s. Westview Press. Kaufman, S. (1985). Demistifying Contadora. Foreign Affairs, 64(1), 74–95. LeoGrande, W. (1998). Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992. University of North Carolina Press. Macginty, R., & Williams, A. (2016). Conflict and Development. Routledge. Roberts, K. (1990). Bullying and Bargaininig. The United States, Nicaragua and Conflict Resolution in Central America. International Security, 15(2), 67– 102. Rohter, L. (1994, November 22). Some Aristide Supporters Seek Abolition of Military. New York Times, A8. Rojas, C. F. (1992). Spiritualizing the Political. A Rhetorical análisis of Oscar Arias’ Discourse on Peace (Unpublished PhD Thesis). Ohio University. Rojas, F. (1989). El proceso de Esquipulas: Desarrollo conceptual y mecanismos operativos. Revista De Relaciones Internacionales, 27 (2), 224–247. Rojas, F. (1990). Política exterior de la administración Arias Sánchez (1986– 1990). Universidad Nacional. Rojas, F., & Solís, L. G. (1988). ¿Súbditos o aliados? La política exterior de Estados Unidos y Centroamérica. FLACSO/Porvenir. Russett, B. (1998). A neo-Kantian Perspective: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations in Building Security Communities. In E. Adler & M. Barnett (Eds.), Security Communities (pp. 368–394). Cambridge University Press.

104

J. A. SANAHUJA AND C. EGUIZÁBAL

Salomón, M. (2001). El debate sobre la paz democrática: Una aproximación crítica. Revista Española De Estudios Políticos (nueva Época), 113, 237–265. Sanahuja, J. A. (1994). Relations between the European Community and Central America in the 1990s: Continuity, Reactivation or Change? In K. Biekart & M. Jelsma (Eds.), Peasants Beyond Protest in Central America (pp. 141–206). Pluto Press/Transnational Institute. Sanahuja, J. A. (2000). La ayuda norteamericana en Centroamérica 1980–1992. Universidad Complutense. Sauma, Y. (2017). El Consenso de Costa Rica: Iniciativa de la segunda administración del Dr. Óscar Arias Sánchez. Universidad de Costa Rica. Sen, A. (1981). Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Clarendon Press. Solís, L. G. (1983). Neutralidad y no intervención en la historia de Costa Rica. Relaciones Internacionales, 6(1), 73–80. Solís, L. G. (1996). El papel de la verificación en los acuerdos de paz, democracia y desarrollo sostenible en Centroamérica. In F. Rojas (Ed.), Medidas de confianza mutua: verificación (pp. 117–142). FLACSO Chile. Solís, L. G. (2023). Costa Rica: The Demilitarisation of Politics. An Exceptional History. In D. Kruijt & K. Konings (Eds.), Latin American Military and Politics in the Twenty-first Century. A Cross-National Analysis (pp. 76–88). Routledge. Soto, A., & Castillo, G. (1994). Obstacles to peacebuilding. Foreign Policy, 94(Spring), 69–83. Suhrke, A., & Wimpelmann Chaudary, T. (2009). Conflict and development. In P. A. Haslam, J. Schafer, & P. Beaudet (Eds.), Introduction to International Development. Approaches, Actors, and Issues (pp. 384–405). Oxford University Press. Paul Collier et al. (2003). Breaking the conflict trap. Civil war and development policy. World Bank. Travis, P. W. (2016). Reagan’s War on Terrorism in Nicaragua: The Outlaw State. Lexington Books. Travis, P. (2017). Oscar Arias and the Treaty of Esquipulas. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History. https://oxfordre.com/latinamerica nhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore-978 0199366439-e-393. Accessed 23 March 2023. Wehr, P., & Lederach, J. P. (1991). Mediating Conflict in Central America. Journal of Peace Research, 28(1), 85–98.

5

ÓSCAR ARIAS: LIBERAL PEACE AND COSTA RICAN …

105

Works by Óscar Arias Arias, Ó. (1986, September 24). Paz en Centroamérica: libertad y democracia para cinco pueblos. Speech given at the United Nations XLI General Assembly. Arias, Ó. (1989). El camino de la paz. Editorial Costa Rica. Arias, Ó. (1990a). La semilla de la paz. Selección de discursos. Presidencia de la República. Arias, Ó. (1990b). Horizontes de Paz. Editorial Trejos Hermanos Sucesores. Arias, Ó. (1999). The Force of Reason. In M. Bruce and T. Milne (Eds.), Ending War. The Force of Reason (pp. 1–9). Palgrave Macmillan. Arias, Ó. (2000). Confronting Debt, Poverty and Militarism: A Human Program of Support for the Developing World. Journal of Third World Studies, 17 (1), 13–20. Arias, Ó. (2005). Hagamos juntos el camino. Discursos, artículos y ensayos. Partido de Liberación Nacional. Arias, Ó. (2007). Sigamos avanzando (Vol. I). Presidencia de la República. Arias, Ó. (2010). Con velas, timón y brújula. CEXECI. Arias, Ó. (2015, January 27). El fin inminente de la revolución bolivariana. El País. Arias, Ó., Friedman, J., & Rossiter, C. (1995, December 21). Less Spending, More Security: A Practical Plan to Reduce World Military Spending. Christian Science Monitor. https://www.csmonitor.com/1995/1221/21191.html. Accessed 27 March 2023.

Interview Interview with Oscar Arias by the authors of this chapter, July 22, 2022.

CHAPTER 6

Rigoberta Menchú Tum: Defender of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Itzel Pamela Pérez Gómez and Ana Vanessa Cárdenas Zanatta

Introduction Rigoberta Menchú Tum is one of the few indigenous women and the only Latin American woman to have received the Nobel Peace Prize. Her remarkable work focuses on discourse and activism in defense of Guatemala’s indigenous peoples, the promotion of ethnocultural reconciliation, and the achievement of social justice. This chapter analyzes Rigoberta Menchú’s initiatives to promote peace as well as her profile. Her contributions are analyzed in the context of International Relations

I. P. Pérez Gómez (B) · A. V. Cárdenas Zanatta Universidad Anáhuac Mayab, Merida, Mexico e-mail: [email protected] A. V. Cárdenas Zanatta e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Domínguez and A. Oelsner (eds.), Latin American Thinkers of Peace, Global Political Thinkers, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36107-4_6

107

108

I. P. PÉREZ GÓMEZ AND A. V. CÁRDENAS ZANATTA

Theories. Similarly, the role of Menchú in local and regional reconciliation developments is also analyzed in order to assess the impact of her legacy in peacebuilding processes. The chapter is organized in the following manner. The first section examines her life as an activist and reviews the literature dealing with her profile. The second section turns to examining her actions and words through the lens of the theories of peace and international relations. It identifies her as an activist primarily within the tradition of positive peace and, to a lesser extent, negative peace too. Furthermore, Menchú’s emphasis on interethnic and intercultural dialogue and cooperation as the key to achieving peace moves her activism away from a realist perspective in international relations and closer to a constructivist one. Finally, her notion of peace through “Education for Peace” and her commitment to an alternative form of education promoting cooperation, understanding, multiculturalism, and community service are highlighted. In this section, the initiative of the Nobel Peace Laureate is also situated within a discourse of “Education for Peace” provided by other indigenous peoples who, like the Guatemalans, seek to vindicate their cultural rights and highlight multiculturalism and the recognition and teaching of their language as the key to ending discrimination, exclusion, and consequently conflict within their respective nation-states. This chapter intends to contribute to the peace studies literature on Rigoberta Menchú, about whom not enough has been written academically.

From Social Activism to the Nobel Peace Prize The Nobel laureate was born into a traditional Quiché family on January 9, 1959. She was the sixth child of farmers Vicente Menchú and Juana Tum Cotojá. An eight-day-long welcoming Quiché ceremony followed her birth. In her autobiography I, Rigoberta Menchú (1984), she refers to her community as Quiché, though later the spelling was changed to K’iche’. Quiché is both the name of the Guatemalan province—El Quiché—and the name of the Mayan ethnic group Menchú was born into, which is one of Guatemala’s 22 existing ethnic groups (DeBiagio, 1997). She has had a close relationship with her community since her youth, owed to her parents and the Quiché traditions (Wagner, 2007). Rigoberta’s birth was marked by displacement, as her parents were forced to leave their land in 1960 and relocate to Chimel, where they struggled to survive off the land. They were required to travel to the

6

RIGOBERTA MENCHÚ TUM: DEFENDER OF INDIGENOUS …

109

coast at certain times of the year to work on farms. Rigoberta and her family got to learn about labor exploitation on these farms: They experienced firsthand the fact that the wages were insufficient to sustain a healthy lifestyle and diet. For instance, two of her brothers died of starvation at an early age (DeBiagio, 1997). Few indigenous farm workers spoke Spanish, making it challenging to convey their precarious situation. Regarding political freedom, they voted for the candidate favored by the landowners (Wagner, 2007). In this context, her father was a town leader and representative, who occasionally traveled to Guatemala’s capital city for meetings at the National Institute of Agrarian Transformation (INTA) when there were land disputes. Rigoberta accompanied him on some of these travels and thus began her activism at a very young age. When she was 13 years old, Rigoberta went to the capital city to work as a maid. The poor treatment she received there led her to raise awareness of the oppression under which her people lived (Wagner, 2007). Concurrently, there were protests and demonstrations by the indigenous people as the government gave their land to the landowners. The inhabitants of Chimel were expelled from their homes in 1967—but when they refused to leave their land the government sent in the army to loot and steal from their homes (DeBiagio, 1997). The landowners allowed the natives to return to the territory and work as laborers. However, if they refused to accept that the land was not theirs, they would be expelled again. Rigoberta Menchú’s father, Vicente Menchú, began to organize the indigenous resistance as a community leader. The INTA proposed an agreement requiring indigenous people to stay and work the land for two years, after which they would hand it over to the landowners. When Rigoberta’s father objected, he was accused of endangering the sovereignty of the state. Vicente Menchú was arrested and sentenced to a year and two months in prison (DeBiagio, 1997). After being released, he resumed the fight and worked closely with the peasant unions. Not long thereafter, the army kidnapped, tortured, and abandoned him very badly injured on the side of a road. Due to constant death threats, he remained in hiding once his health was restored. In this context, Rigoberta became increasingly involved in the indigenous people’s cause. She realized that her entire community, not just her father, had to fight for their land. Furthermore, her interest grew and expanded to represent the plight of other indigenous Guatemalans.

110

I. P. PÉREZ GÓMEZ AND A. V. CÁRDENAS ZANATTA

In 1977, Menchú joined a formal group of peasant activists, who were not all indigenous. There, she encountered barriers to participating, firstly because she was indigenous and secondly because she was a woman. Nonetheless, her natural talent for speaking and addressing people helped her advance within the group (Wagner, 2007). Danielle DeBiagio (1997) emphasizes that one of the factors that contributed to Rigoberta Menchú’s rise to prominence was her ability to connect with others through her stories—stories of tragedy and exploitation which were shared by many people beyond the Quiché community. Thus, Menchú Tum assumed a more active role in her community by encouraging the previously passive women to join in the fight. She united the community by transforming her father’s struggle into the community’s struggle through her leadership. For instance, when the land was divided into plots to separate the inhabitants, they displayed a unified position (DeBiagio, 1997). This experience brought the community closer together in preparation for a possible army attack. The Catholic religion played a crucial role at this time as many indigenous people adopted liberation theology. Once Rigoberta Menchú was certain that her own community was able to defend itself, she felt confident enough to expand her teachings on resistance and mobilization to other communities too. In 1977 the Committee of United Peasants (CUC) organized strikes in the mining and agricultural industry, showing its strength. However, the government did not recognize the Committee (DeBiagio, 1997). When General Luis García came to power, a time of terror began for the indigenous communities. The discovery of oil on their lands encouraged the government to take more decisive actions against them to displace them. Thus, without having anywhere to go, Indians went to the cities where the army committed a massacre of men, women, and children. In response, the CUC became more active in their strikes to ask for decent wages and respect for indigenous communities, their religion, customs, and culture (Wagner, 2007). The more organized the communities were, the more the army and the García government became involved in committing massacres, rapes, kidnappings, torture, and other crimes against them. Rigoberta joined the CUC in 1979 and soon became a leader and a fugitive simultaneously. Although she went from community to community, accompanying her people, she could not return to her village because they were persecuting her and her family. In that same year, the army

6

RIGOBERTA MENCHÚ TUM: DEFENDER OF INDIGENOUS …

111

kidnapped and killed her 16-year-old brother and others as a message to all those involved in the movement (Wagner, 2007). In 1980, Vicente Menchú died in a fire at the Spanish Embassy when they were marching to try to take it over to draw international attention. Soon after, Rigoberta’s mother was accused of belonging to the guerrilla. She was kidnapped, raped, and tortured, and eventually she was left to die. Despite these tragedies, Rigoberta Menchú’s activism continued (DeBiagio, 1997). In early 1980, many organizations joined the CUC, including revolutionary groups of workers, the revolutionary Christians of Vicente Menchú, the student front of the Robin García University, and the Popular Front January 31 (DeBiagio, 1997). The actions of these fronts to weaken the government and the landowners included boycotts, installation of barricades, and propaganda bombs, always trying not to harm civilians so as not to delegitimize their struggle. At this point, Rigoberta was a wanted person by the army, and was forced to escape to Mexico City and beginning a life in exile. Once in Mexico, she met her 12-year-old sister, who was also in the struggle, and together they continued their commitment to their people. During her exile, the media asked her to give her testimony about the situation of the indigenous peoples in Guatemala, thus giving them a voice and becoming one of the spokespersons for the indigenous cause in Latin America. Once the army’s obsession with Rigoberta subsided, the two sisters were able to return to Guatemala and began working in the Vicente Menchú revolutionary Christians movement (DeBiagio, 1997). Her activism led her to become a speaker both inside and outside of Guatemala to denounce the oppression and discrimination against the indigenous people. In 1992 Rigoberta Menchú was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her fight for social justice and ethnocultural reconciliation. This recognition took taking the struggle of Guatemalan indigenous people to the international level. With the money from the Nobel Prize, she established the Vicente Menchú Foundation, which aims to support development projects for the indigenous people of her country. On February 18, 1993, she became UN Goodwill Ambassador for the International Year of Indigenous Peoples to represent the UN Secretary-General. In addition, she and Nelson Mandela were named honorary members of the Committee of Non-Governmental Organizations of the Kingdom of Belgium (Wagner, 2007). On August 10, 1993, the General Council of the University of Guadalajara awarded her an honorary doctorate in “recognition of her

112

I. P. PÉREZ GÓMEZ AND A. V. CÁRDENAS ZANATTA

contributions in the field of defending human rights and defending indigenous peoples, in favor of dignity, [the] justice and peace.” In addition, she received honorary doctorates from the Central American University (UCA) of Nicaragua on October 8, 1992; from the National University of El Salvador on February 2, 1993; from the National University of Costa Rica on February 5, 1993; from the University of Oklahoma, United States, on May 8, 1993; and from the University of Cochabamba, Bolivia, on August 19, 1993 (Wagner, 2007). In 1995 Rigoberta Menchú made explicitly clear her distance from the guerrilla movement in protest at the Mayan peoples’ exclusion from the peace talks between the guerrillas and the Guatemalan government. In order to further mark her differences with the CUC, she changed the name of the Foundation she created from her father’s name to her own name—Rigoberta Menchú Foundation. In this way, she took his place as a representative, not of the guerrilla movement but of the indigenous Guatemalan population (Wagner, 2007). By 1996, Menchú Tum had already received 14 honorary doctorates and was awarded the Legion of Honor by French President Jacques Chirac, among other recognitions for her campaigns. Furthermore, through the Rigoberta Menchú Foundation, she has continued her activism by taking the cause of her people to international forums through her participation in conferences and meetings, becoming a spokesperson for peace and a promoter of education for peace, this placing the violence and injustice carried out in Guatemala on the world map. The literature on Rigoberta’s profile has consisted primarily on memoirs and testimonies written in collaboration with her. Particularly noteworthy are I, Rigoberta Menchú (1984) with Elisabeth Burgos Debray and Rigoberta: La Nieta de los Mayas (1998) with Dante Liano and Gianni Miná. Anthropologists such as David Stoll have investigated the events, discovering discrepancies between versions Rigoberta published and material that emerged from his own research and numerous interviews. One example is that Menchú was not illiterate but instead attended boarding high schools run by Catholic nuns and has known how to speak Spanish since then. Another example relates to the description that she gives of the starvation of her brother Nicolás, which other members of the Menchú family subsequently denied. She denounced the evidence provided by Stoll as racist and colonialist. Despite these discrepancies between what Menchú narrated in her memoirs and other testimonies, Menchú Tum frames herself and her work within

6

RIGOBERTA MENCHÚ TUM: DEFENDER OF INDIGENOUS …

113

social anthropology, the study of indigenous movements, and decolonial studies. Above all, she has taken the role of the spokesperson for the Mayan peoples in Guatemala, as shown in the following paragraphs of her book I, Rigoberta Menchú (Menchú, 1984, p. 19): It’s hard for me to remember everything that’s happened to me in my life since there have been many terrible times but moments of joy as well. The important thing is that what has happened to me has happened to many other people too: My story is the story of all poor Guatemalans. My personal experience is the reality of a whole people.

It is noteworthy that, since winning the Nobel Peace Prize, her biographers and the literature interested in her profile—even the literature coming from Peace Studies—have not taken a gender perspective to examine the activism of this indigenous woman. Rigoberta Menchú herself has not presented her community work and peace struggle from a feminist perspective in her own publications. According to Danielle DeBiagio (1997), since her youth activism, Menchú Tum has preferred not to highlight the fact that she was a woman, as this ran the risk of separating indigenous men from indigenous women, when in fact it was a cause of the entire community. In this sense, Menchú’s profile provides an opportunity to analyze peace studies issues from a gender perspective.

A Voice for Latin American Indigenous Peoples Often social leaders die in anonymity. Personality, character, the need for survival, suffering, values, economic, social, political, and cultural contexts, and even some luck all contribute to a person’s leadership achieving global recognition. While all of these elements can be found in Menchú’s life, there are four moments or turning points that have becoming crucial for her campaigns: the death of her close relatives, her exile in Mexico, the publication of her book, and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize. At a time when the violation of the rights of indigenous peoples in Latin America was systematic and invisible, the labor exploitation that Menchú endured from a young age went unnoticed by her society. Even the victims themselves felt condemned to an unalterable future. After the 1970s, the so-called “awakening” of the region’s indigenous peoples was enhanced by the establishment of organizations that increased their

114

I. P. PÉREZ GÓMEZ AND A. V. CÁRDENAS ZANATTA

political presence. However, most crimes committed against social movements were perpetrated by governments with dictatorial structures that sought to maintain control and eradicate all traces of indigenous peoples’ rebellion. Classism in Guatemalan society normalized and perpetuated violence against the Mayas. In the international context of the Cold War, indigenous people were viewed as members of revolutionary movements and treated as government enemies. Beyond her social activism, the deaths of her father and brother heightened Menchú’s fighting spirit. They prompted her to participate more actively against military oppression in organizations such as the CUC and later the Popular Front of January 31, resulting in another of the defining moments of her life: her exile in Mexico. Exile generates in people similar problems as regular migration, including a process of detachment and mourning, nostalgia, idealization of the future, and crisis. However, it is also the only way to continue living in the face of a strict ban on returning to one’s home. Menchú Tum was uprooted from her homeland after devoting her life to fighting for her people, whom she would never again see. She overcame her grief and helplessness while honoring her commitment to the indigenous Guatemalans by continuing her fight from Mexico, a neighboring country with large Mayan communities. The significance of her exile in Mexico was that it allowed her to project the beginning of her peaceful campaign internationally, thus exposing the situation of Guatemala’s indigenous peoples, the violation of their human rights, and the suppression of their customs by the regime. The book Me llamo Rigoberta Menchú y así me nació la conciencia (My Name is Rigoberta Menchú and This is How My Conscience Was Born) narrated to Elizabeth Burgos (Burgos, 1983) was one of the strategies Menchú employed to continue her pacifist struggle. This book, which became an outburst and a denunciation, helped the world understand her truth, which was also the truth of her social class, her indigenous group, women, and the reality of Latin America. The dissemination of her message revealed an unsettling reality in Guatemala, Latin America, and many other nations worldwide. Menchú received international support and protection, which facilitated her return to the country. Upon learning of her suffering, people wondered how she, who had been the victim of so much hatred and violence, could have the courage and hope to seek answers through peaceful struggle. These answers helped pave the way for the Nobel Peace Prize. The award

6

RIGOBERTA MENCHÚ TUM: DEFENDER OF INDIGENOUS …

115

recognized her moral leadership, which enabled her to build networks with governments and international organizations and form her trenches of struggle with a more significant impact. As stated in her 1992 acceptance speech for the world’s highest peace prize, this made her the first Latin American referent of the indigenous struggle: I consider this Prize, not as an award to me personally, but as one of the greatest conquests of the struggle for peace, for human rights and for the rights of indigenous peoples, who throughout these 500 years have been divided and fragmented and have suffered genocide, repression and discrimination. (Menchú Tum, 1992)

The Nobel Prize not only altered Menchú’s life but also her selfperception. As mentioned, the Nobel Peace Prize is awarded “the person who shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses” (Comité Noruego del Nobel, 2001). Rigoberta Menchú’s international recognition and its accompanying symbolism and economic resources were incorporated into its institutional patrimony she created to achieve the fundamental goals of equality.

Interpreting Ideas of Peace The ethic of peace has been central to Menchú Tum’s vision of peace (López i Palomar, 2015) based on the Mayan-Quiché reality that includes the development of a culture of peace valuing interculturality and promoting the preservation of the environment. Menchú Tum is confronted with the contradiction between a Mayan-Quiché worldview and the structure of the Guatemalan political system that regularly resorts to violence, oppression, and exclusion. From this perspective, Rigoberta Menchú’s social activism and ideas can be analyzed through International Relations and Peace Studies theoretical lenses, as both disciplines have gradually adopted more pluralistic approaches. From the perspective of Global IR, Acharya (2014) argues that there is a need for greater inclusiveness and diversity in IR. In contrast, Bilgin (2016) favors studying IR by focusing on intertwined and overlapping histories, connecting the past and the present. Exploring the ideas of Menchú Tum meets the goal of diversifying International Relations.

116

I. P. PÉREZ GÓMEZ AND A. V. CÁRDENAS ZANATTA

The ideas of Menchú Tum are useful for strengthening new emerging areas of study within IR. Georgis (2021) argues that centering Indigeneity demands scholarship that unravels the current configurations of the IR field, rather than merely adding Indigeneity as a category within neoliberal, colonial, and Westernized frameworks. In addition, Critical Indigenous Studies offer a theoretically generative framework to begin examining international issues in new ways (Georgis, 2021). In institutional terms, organizations and institutions at the international levels are the most receptive sites to advance indigenous rights. In the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations, efforts exist to promote indigeneity. However, political and cultural parameters often limit them within sovereign territorial nationalism and statism (Soguk, 2007). The work by Fernandes Maso and Sanches Rocha (2020) can help us explore the ways in which Menchú’s thought has contributed to the theory of International Relations. Citing Oliver Richmond (2008, 1), they assert that most of the IR theories fail to conduct in-depth studies on peace and to promote an understanding of the dynamics of power and conflict. Even though the literature on peace and conflict resolution has been prolific and long-lasting, it has not engaged with theories of International Relations because, in general, these follow a realist definition of peace—a “non-peace” rather. For Richmond (cited in Fernandes Maso and Sanches Rocha, 2020) International Relations represents the dystopia between war and peace postulated at the beginning of the twentieth century. Pierre Hassner (quoted in Fernandes Maso and Sanches Rocha, 2020) argues that in International Relations, Western political philosophy adopted a conceptual framework according to which the difference between domestic and international affairs was explained by the fact that, internally, modern nations were in a civil state, that is, with the monopoly of legitimate violence; in turn, at the international level, they were in a state of nature, that is, of potential war in which States reserve the right to use force as a solution instead of negotiating, war as a continuation of politics by others means.

Anna López i Palomar (2015) notes that Menchú’s worldview is influenced by three factors: The remnants of the colonial process, her family (especially her father), and the personal experiences she endured during

6

RIGOBERTA MENCHÚ TUM: DEFENDER OF INDIGENOUS …

117

the civil war in Guatemala. Firstly, regarding the remnants of colonialism, López i Palomar (2015) observes that the colonization process that began in the fifteenth century continues in various ways to this day. For example, during the civil war, individuals from indigenous populations were particularly targeted. They were kidnapped, tortured, and murdered, and there was a great incentive to rape indigenous women. Secondly, according to López i Palomar, the primary influence on the conscience of the Guatemalan peace prize recipient is represented by her parents and grandparents, given that for the Mayan culture, the sense of family is tied to the happiness of the group. Menchú Tum’s father figure was transcendent in her life. López i Palomar argues that Rigoberta inherited the values of love, life, respect, the significance of women’s roles in society, and the customs of her people from her mother. Although Salgado (cited in López i Palomar, 2015) maintains that “indigenous people and especially women never get what they want,” Rigoberta Menchú has stated that “evolution, change, without the participation of women would not be evolution and there would be no victory” (Martin cited in López i Palomar, 2015). Rigoberta Menchú’s ethical proposal aims to achieve global peace by promoting a culture of dialogue within a culture of peace. This can be linked to the review of positive peace done by Liliana A. Trifu (2018, p. 36). Through the works of various other authors, she emphasizes what positive peace has meant since the 1980s: cosmological and cultural enrichment, the presence of conditions favorable to the unfolding of life; social equity and harmony; cooperation and peaceful conflict transformation; and human interdependence with nature. López i Palomar (2015) explains that Menchú Tum’s perspective on peace is based on two Quiché concepts. First, the term utzil, which encompasses all aspects of life as well as balance and respect, which, in Menchú’s own words (cited in López i Palomar, 2015, p. 25), are the guarantors of “harmonious coexistence between all forms of life on the planet. Where cultural diversity must reflect natural variation.” The second concept is pixab, a term that evokes a complete and rich education, where spirituality, culture, health, natural resources, education, knowledge, and politics converge; a space where they can only be comprehended together because these are all interdependent and reciprocal aspects of human life (López i Palomar, 2015, p. 26).

118

I. P. PÉREZ GÓMEZ AND A. V. CÁRDENAS ZANATTA

The elements that informed and shaped Menchú’s understanding of peace disrupt the order imposed by an atmosphere of violence and oppression. Instead, her perspective on peace implies that all elements are interrelated and cohesive, which renders possible the achievement of a stable equilibrium leading to a culture of peace. All this requires equality, justice, acknowledgment, morality, and respect for nature and all living things (López i Palomar, 2015, p. 26). This is reflected in Menchú’s code of ethics (cited in López i Palomar, 2015, p. 26) and is central to the ethical proposal for a culture of peace, which is nothing more than practice and an empathic way of life. In contrast to the positive and balanced nature of peace offered by Menchú, traditional International Relations perspectives begin with a conception of negative peace, which is interpreted as the absence of war and the result of diplomatic action. In contrast to what Menchú Tum seeks to achieve with her concept of culture of peace, which would necessitate equality, the negative peace perspective holds that the driving force of international politics is the pursuit of power by states. In her 1992 Nobel Prize speech, she spelt out the view of her community regarding positive peace, including the relationship with nature. In particular, she stated that: The peculiarities of the vision of the Indian people are expressed according to the way in which they are related to each other. First, between human beings, through communication. Second, with the earth, as with our mother, because she gives us our lives and is not mere merchandise. Third, with nature, because we are an integral part of it, and not its owners. To us, Mother Earth is not only a source of economic riches that give us the maize, which is our life, but she also provides so many other things that the privileged ones of today strive for. (Menchú Tum, 1992)

Examining the concept of the politics of recognition developed by Taylor (1993), López i Palomar (2015, p. 26) argues that Taylor defends the equal value of all cultures without ignoring their differences, as interculturality holds that all humans are equal. López i Palomar (2015, p. 27) also reviews Taylor’s adoption of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s concept of the fusion of horizons, in which all cultures must merge, allowing cultural differences to survive and recognizing their importance; thus, education plays a crucial role. According to López i Palomar (2015, p. 27), in Menchú’s thought, the fusion of horizons does not exist, but she does

6

RIGOBERTA MENCHÚ TUM: DEFENDER OF INDIGENOUS …

119

defend the need to recognize cultural differences. This is key in Rigoberta Menchú’s concept of integral peace, which can only be achieved through dialogue, as it is “the responsibility of all peoples, cultures, nations, and states to build a promising future sustained by a culture of dialogue” (Menchú cited in López i Palomar, 2015, p. 27). In contrast to what has been discussed so far, Morgenthau argues that the driving force of international politics is the search for power by states, which are treated with formal equality. At the same time, the diversity between developed and underdeveloped countries is ignored, focusing instead on the problem of war (Fernandes Maso & Sanches Rocha, 2020). Fernandes Maso and Sanches Rocha (2020) add the existence of a myth that legitimizes the separation between a social, peaceful, and orderly world within states, and a political, violent, and anarchic context in international relations. Citing Galtung, they assert that a dichotomous understanding of reality promotes violent social interaction practices. By referencing Chakrabarty and Beier, they explain that the founding myth of the state serves as the basis for differentiating between the natural and the modern, and that a distinction between the “civilized” (superior) and “savage” of the world is also established. According to this line of reasoning, Fernandes Maso and Sanches Rocha (2020) assert, time is linear and progressive and war is the necessary behavioral dynamic toward Others; consequently, otherness is prohibited through violence. López i Palomar (2015) emphasize that globalization and ecology within the ethical proposal for peace are the most interesting and innovative parameters. For Menchú (cited in López i Palomar, 2015, p. 27), “peace should not be understood only as the silence of weapons.” Rather, the concept of integral peace also presupposes a harmonious relationship between humanity and Mother Earth, which is currently corrupted due to globalization’s “many issues demanding urgent attention, as they they threaten global peace” (Menchú cited in López i Palomar, 2015, p. 27).

Education for Peace and Development Education for Peace is defined as the process of acquiring values, knowledge, and attitudes associated with achieving positive peace, non-violence, and conflict resolution. That is establishing a culture of peace through education (Sharma, 2013, p. 59). Education for Peace focuses on building

120

I. P. PÉREZ GÓMEZ AND A. V. CÁRDENAS ZANATTA

the necessary mechanisms to facilitate that the people involved in educational processes (students, teachers, parents, and directors) actively participate in creating a peaceful society (Sharma, 2013, p. 60). This concept, too, has been central in Rigoberta Menchú’s view of peace. For instance, with the money awarded with the Nobel Prize, Menchú founded several organizations focused on providing support to indigenous Guatemalans in need. One of the most relevant is the Rigoberta Menchú Tum Foundation. This foundation aims to recover and enrich human values toward a world of peace, seeking ethnic, political, and cultural diversity and working for justice and democracy for indigenous peoples (Menchú, n.d). Through the Foundation, Rigoberta promotes educational programs, citizen participation, and community development. These projects have what Rigoberta calls the “Code of Ethics for Peace” within which the following principles stand out: • • • • •

There is no peace without justice. There is no justice without equality. There is no equality without development. There is no development without democracy. There is no democracy without respect for the identity and dignity of all peoples and cultures.

For Menchú, the official education of Latin American governments has a distorted vision of indigenous life and its customs. Despite this perspective, Rigoberta believes the change lies in education itself (Revista Onda, 2018). With regard to the language of instruction, in her book I, Rigoberta Menchú (1983) she maintains that Spanish is the language of the dominant culture and the educated class. However, it is helpful for indigenous communities to adopt it in their struggle against oppression. She emphasizes that linguistic divisions and lack of education continue to be an obstacle for ethnic groups to overcome their marginality and fight for their rights. Menchú traveled throughout Guatemala during her campaign to educate communities in self-defense (DeBiagio, 1997). During these tours, she realized that the diversity of languages in Guatemala poses a problem for two reasons. The first is that it hinders communication and cooperation between communities, leaving the conflict dormant and preventing the formation of a united front against the government

6

RIGOBERTA MENCHÚ TUM: DEFENDER OF INDIGENOUS …

121

(Menchú, 1984). The second reason is that it prevents indigenous people from communicating with government officials and landowners, making them easy manipulation targets. In this way, the language barrier prevents people from accessing services and defending their rights (Menchú, 1984). Then she considered how she could contribute to promoting development and preventing conflict. Menchú (1984) drew attention to how history was presented in the official educational discourse, excluding the indigenous perspective. According to her, independence did not bring freedom to the indigenous people but rather subjected them to the ladinos. This process generated conflict between ladinos and indigenous groups and was used by the authorities to justify reducing indigenous rights and heritage. She concludes that this type of education aims to prevent students from questioning current social problems related to racial discrimination, violence, and inequality. Despite using Spanish as the primary language to convey her message of peace, she has never attempted to unify the education system around Spanish, as this would have endangered Guatemala’s cultural diversity. Instead, she proposes a cooperation system between Indigenous and Latino communities in which knowledge can be shared to better comprehend any situation. Thus, the languages of the communities are preserved, and understanding and reconciliation with the mestizo population are attained. Without rejecting the formal education provided in Spanish, Menchú proposes an alternative education that first emphasizes linguistic diversity that implies a diversity of thought and is taught in the language of the educating community. Second, her perspective on education highlights the values of solidarity, community service, harmony with nature, skills for research in medicine and biology, and the promotion of apprenticeships for a sustainable society, such as weaving and maintaining orchards (Fundación Rigoberta Menchú Tum, 2022). This foundation has contributed to strengthening a culture of peace through educational programs that contain Menchú Tum’s philosophy and perspective through the Pavarotti Educational Center. This initiative of the Utzilal Tijonikel Program of the Rigoberta Menchú Túm Foundation is located in San Lucas Tolimán and currently serves 216 students. Among the educational activities carried out by the center is elaborating the institutional and educational plan—PEI—for the Transformation of young women and people of the Guatemalan communities (November 9, 2022). In addition, the meeting was held to listen to the voices of the student leaders of the Pavarotti Educational Center to create awareness

122

I. P. PÉREZ GÓMEZ AND A. V. CÁRDENAS ZANATTA

in the educational community to encourage critical thinking to rescue the collective memory of the original people (Fundación Rigoberta Menchú Tum, 2022). The abovementioned activities have contributed to spreading more inclusive models of education around the world. Overall, the social activism of Menchú has reverberated by persuading governments about the relevance of placing indigenous perspectives of education at the top of policies to recognize diversity and the rights of native peoples within Nation-States. An example is the Amazigh people in Morocco, who, through the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture, have managed to integrate the teaching of the Tamazight language into the Moroccan academy and educational system, as well as discussion forums on social issues in Tamazight to achieve the inclusion of those who make up around 50% of the Moroccan population (Morocco World News, 2022).

Final Considerations The Nobel Peace Prize recognized Menchú’s moral leadership and facilitated her access to the global public square. By sharing her philosophy and actions with governments, international organizations, and global civil societies, Menchú has become a global referent of the Latin American struggles of indigenous peoples. Her message revealed an unsettling reality in Guatemala, Latin America, and many other countries worldwide. As presented in this chapter, Menchú’s social activism and ideas are conducive to expanding the horizons of International Relations and Peace Studies, as both disciplines have gradually adopted a more pluralistic perspective. Her contribution enhances the areas of Critical Indigenous Studies. Also, from the perspective of IR, her social and pragmatic work reveals the urgent need to center Indigeneity in the current configurations of the IR field, moving away from merely adding Indigeneity as a category within neoliberal, colonial, and Westernized frameworks. As the only Latin American woman to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, her activism and continued work as become the voice for many groups seeking to improve their living conditions and access to equal rights, particularly in Latin America. She continues working through the Pavarotti Educational Center to empower and educate indigenous people about their political rights to promote social, economic, and political development in their communities. Her perspective about enduring

6

RIGOBERTA MENCHÚ TUM: DEFENDER OF INDIGENOUS …

123

peace is mainly based on educating new generations with values, knowledge, and attitudes associated with achieving positive peace, non-violence, and conflict resolution. Also, she wisely understands the need to use language as an instrument to transform as well as preserve culture. Her voice of inclusiveness is more needed than ever in a world permeated by polarization and inequality.

References Acharya, A. (2014). Global IR and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies. International Studies Quarterly, 58(4), 647–659. Bilgin, P. (2016). “Contrapuntal Reading” as a Method, an Ethos, and a Metaphor for Global IR. International Studies Review, 18(1), 134–146. https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv018 Burgos, E. (1983). Me llamo Rigoberta Menchú y así me nació la conciencia. Casa de las Américas. Comité Noruego del Nobel. (2001). La ONU y el Premio Nobel de la Paz. United Nations. https://www.un.org/es/about-us/nobel-peace-prize DeBiagio, D. (1997). Peace Profile: Rigoberta Menchú. Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 9(1), 139–144. https://doi.org/10.1080/104026597084 26039 Fernandes Maso, T., & Sanches Rocha, E. (2020, April). Alteridad: la reinvención de la paz en las Relaciones Internacionales. Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais, 121, 5–24. http://journals.openedition.org/rccs/10084; https://doi.org/ 10.4000/rccs.10084. Fundación Rigoberta Menchú Tum. (2022, November 1). El trabajo continuo del Centro Educativo Pavarotti—Fundación Rigoberta Menchú Tum le apuesta a la calidad educativa para ser de las nuevas generaciones profesionales con conciencia y grandes capacidades. Facebook post. https://www.facebook. com/FundacionRigobertaMenchúTum Georgis, M. (2021). Indigenising International Relations: Insights from Centring Indigeneity in Canada and Iraq. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 50(1), 174–198. López i Palomar, A. (2015). Rigoberta Menchú: aportaciones a la construcción de una cultura para la paz. Fòrum De Recerca, 20. http://repositori.uji.es/ xmlui/bitstream/handle/10234/172564/Lopez_Palomar.pdf?sequence=1 Menchú, R. (n.d.). Enduring Foundations. http://rigobertamenchutum.weebly. com/enduring-foundations.html. Accessed 1 November 2022. Menchú, R. (1984). I, Rigoberta Menchú. An Indian woman in Guatemala (E. Burgos-Debray, eds., Ann Wright, Trans.). Verso.

124

I. P. PÉREZ GÓMEZ AND A. V. CÁRDENAS ZANATTA

Menchú, R. (1998). Rigoberta: la nieta de los mayas. In collaboration with Dante Liano y Gianni Miná. Aguilar. Menchú Tum, R. (1992, December 10). Acceptance and Nobel Lecture. Nobel Peace Committee. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1992/tum/lec ture/ Revista Onda. (2018, November 1). Conferencia completa de Rigoberta Menchú sobre educación. Youtube video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5CI K1q3vIkM Richmond, O. P. (2008). Reclaiming peace in international relations. Millennium, 36(3), 439–470. Sharma, A. (2013). Education for Peace: Transforming the Culture of Violence. Space and Culture, 1(1), 59–68. Soguk, N. (2007). Indigenous Peoples and Radical Futures in Global Politics. New Political Science, 29(1), 1–22. Sorensen, K. (2022, July 30). Morocco’s Multilingual Amazigh: The Pursuit of Languages Amid Fight for Recognition. Morocco World News. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2022/07/350542/moroccosmultilingual-amazigh-the-pursuit-of-languages-amid-fight-for-recognition Taylor, C. (1993). Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton. Trifu, L. A. (2018). Reflexiones sobre la paz positiva. Un diálogo con la paz imperfecta. Revista de Paz y Conflictos, 11(1), 29–59. Wagner, H. L. (2007). Rigoberta Menchú Tum. Activist for Indigenous Rights in Guatemala. Chelsea House Publishers.

CHAPTER 7

Juan Manuel Santos: Diplomacy for Peace (2010–2018) Paula Ruiz Camacho and Martha Ardila

Introduction In November 2016, the government led by Juan Manuel Santos signed a final peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC, by its Spanish acronym) following more than 60 years of internal conflict and multiple negotiation attempts. Considering theoretical elements of International Relations and Peace Studies, this chapter explains how personal, political, and contextual factors shaped the perspectives of President Santos as he negotiated the Peace Agreement with the FARC guerrilla, why he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and what have been his significant contributions to the promotion of peace.

P. Ruiz Camacho (B) · M. Ardila Universidad Externado de Colombia, Bogota, Colombia e-mail: [email protected] M. Ardila e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Domínguez and A. Oelsner (eds.), Latin American Thinkers of Peace, Global Political Thinkers, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36107-4_7

125

126

P. RUIZ CAMACHO AND M. ARDILA

The social and individual context of Juan Manuel Santos and his political career influenced his perspectives on the world and peace. To explore the environment and the individual choices of former President Santos, this chapter conducted an extensive review of primary and secondary resources. The first group of documents includes his speeches as President (2014–2018), annual reports to the National Congress, and two autobiographical works included in the analysis to highlight the social context in which he grew up. Secondly, a press review of national and international sources during the peace process was conducted as a valuable exercise to understand the self-perception of the government (Ardila & Clemente Batalla, 2019). The extensive review of documents is accompanied by two personal interviews with crucial actors involved in the peace process. President Juan Manuel Santos was generous with his time and provided an interview with the authors of this chapter at the headquarters of the Compaz Foundation1 (Fundación Compaz, 2021). Eduardo Pizarro provided the second interview. Professor Pizarro, a professor at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, was close to the former president during the peace negations process, Colombian Ambassador to the Netherlands (2011–2018), and a member of the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation of Colombia and of the Fiduciary Board for the victims at the International Criminal Court. The chapter is divided into three parts: (a) reviewing his background and the literature on the peace process to understand Juan Manuel Santos as a Nobel Peace Prize winner; (b) explaining the actions for constructing peace social facts or inflection points related to the conflict and peace dynamics; and (c) interpreting the ideas of Santos using some theoretical and conceptual elements from International Relations to understand his contributions to the Colombian society, Latin America global peace.

Pragmatism and Leadership for Peace The contributions of Juan Manuel Santos to the Colombian peace process have been evaluated from different angles. From the individual level of analysis, the biographical and anecdotal publications have been written by Santos, some of his closest associates, or journalists (Dávila, 2018; Duzan, 2018; Holguín, 2021; Santos, 2019; Santos Calderón, 2018; Santos et al., 2021). Few academic studies discuss his personality and political orientation (Tappe, 2020). Several academic contributions include comparative

7

JUAN MANUEL SANTOS: DIPLOMACY FOR PEACE (2010–2018)

127

analyses, reflections, and descriptive analyses of the administration of the Santos government. The peace approach or peace diplomacy undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Santos administration is referenced in articles on Colombian foreign policy published between 2010 and 2021. Most scholarly works examine the evolution of the peace process from an analytical and descriptive state-level perspective (Cairo & Rios, 2019; Jaramillo, 2014; Rios & Cairo, 2018; Sánchez, 2000; Sarmiento-Hernández et al., 2020). Several publications within the Colombian academic community analyze the foreign policy agendas of the two presidential terms. Most emphasize that the peace process is a mechanism for the country’s international integration and evidence of the government’s dedication to achieving peace. In this regard, the Externado de Colombia University journal Observatory for the Analysis of the International System (OASIS) published contributions from renowned internationalists, primarily Colombians, who evaluated Colombian diplomacy between 2010 and 2018 (Ardila & Clemente Batalla, 2019; Galeano et al., 2019; Rojas, 2019; Sánchez & Campos, 2019). Other periodicals, such as Colombia Internacional, Análisis Politico, and Desafios, have published articles about Santos’ foreign policy. Nonetheless, this analysis needs to describe his personal life and comprehend the development of ideas concerning peace, negotiation, and reconciliation. Juan Manuel Santos grew up in a family of politicians and journalists, a prominent Colombian family that owned one of the country’s most influential media outlets, the newspaper El Tiempo, with the largest circulation. In 1938, his great-uncle Eduardo Santos served as president of Colombia under a liberal ideology. Many members of the Santos family, including Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, have held this view for decades (Tappe, 2020). In the first stages of his political career, Santos represented Colombia at the International Coffee Organization in London (Santos, 2019; Tappe, 2020). During this time, he established a network of prestigious and well-known academics and politicians, allowing him to gain extensive experience in diplomacy and multilateral negotiations. In the interview with Santos, the former president recalls being within a few blocks of an Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorist attack during his time in London. This turning point prompted him to consider pursuing peace through negotiation (Santos, 2022). This episode explains his interest in closely following the conflict in Northern Ireland (Doucet, 2016). Since then,

128

P. RUIZ CAMACHO AND M. ARDILA

according to Santos, he has devoted himself to studying global peace processes. He was constantly inquisitive about the international experiences that could be applied in Colombia, the lessons from other nations that could be used to resolve the conflict, and the types of errors that should be avoided (Santos, 2022). The South African peace process was another he closely monitored. In 1994, as Colombia’s minister of foreign trade, Santos traveled to South Africa to meet with Nelson Mandela. He learned about the progress of the South African peace process during his visit. In the conversation, President Mandela stated, “Colombia is very similar to South Africa in many ways and has a great deal of potential, but it will never flourish if there is no peace” (Santos, 2022). Santos learned a second lesson from this conversation with Mandela: “the importance of including victims of the armed conflict in the solutions” and advancing an eventual peace dialogue with them (Santos, 2022). Santos was constantly shifting between politics and journalism. He served as the newspaper El Tiempo’s deputy editor. As a journalist, he criticized the lack of clarity in the peace process overseen by President Belisario Betancur (1982–1986). At that point, Santos learned that a successful peace process should include three elements: (a) be clear to all members of society, (b) include a limited and shorter negotiating agenda, and (c) allow for the active participation of victims and armed forces (Santos, 2022). After leaving the newspaper, he started a career in politics. Before becoming president, he served as Minister of Foreign Trade (1991–1994), Minister of Finance (2000–2002), and Minister of Defense (2006–2009). The concept of contributing to peace in Colombia shaped his identity as a strategic politician with high personal ambitions who gambled on achieving peace with the continent’s oldest guerrilla group, FARC-EP (Pizarro, 2022). Santos shared in the interview with the authors of this chapter that his family has influenced his views on peace and some of his aspirations. Regarding the former, Santos mentioned in the interview that his father had a greater influence on him because he was always willing to engage in dialogue with opponents and listen to different ideas and opinions. Santos believes that he inherited this trait from his father. Therefore, he has preferred dialogue as a problem-solving mechanism (Santos, 2022). His older brother Enrique Santos, a militant in the ranks of left-wing intellectuals, was also influential in his life. Pizarro’s interview confirmed that he was an informal advisor to Juan Manuel and one of the founders of

7

JUAN MANUEL SANTOS: DIPLOMACY FOR PEACE (2010–2018)

129

the magazine Alternativa, which he co-founded with Nobel Prize winner Gabriel García Márquez in the early 1970s. Its motto was “atreverse a pensar es comenzar a luchar.” The publication condemned the atrocities committed by the Colombian Armed Forces against the civilian population. His brother was a critic of the political system and engaged in constant debates with the future Nobel laureate regarding his perception of Colombian reality and how the President acted concerning his ideas and the peace process. As Santos acknowledged in his interview, it was strategic to involve his brother in the initial phase of the secret negotiations with the FARC, as Enrique helped to build trust with the rebels. Years later, the guerrilla leaders acknowledged (to President Santos) that “sending your older brother to negotiate with us is an indication of your negotiation’s seriousness” (Santos, 2022). Santos was proactive on matters of peace and armed conflict. In 1994, he created the “Buen Gobierno” [Good governance] foundation, with which he developed a campaign in search of an end to the armed conflict and which different agents and actors of society were included. The diplomatic networks built by Santos throughout his life joined his efforts in the quest for peace. For example, the former prime minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair, a close friend of Santos, helped him with ideas for the book The third way: an alternative for Colombia (1999). He proposed alternative paths for development in Colombia (Rettberg, 2006). Other world leaders influenced his ideas and thoughts on how to achieve peace in Colombia, such as Nelson Mandela from South Africa, and Felipe González of Spain. Somehow, they contributed to developing the idea of the “Destino Colombia” [Colombian Destination] project. Destino Colombia was a prospective exercise conducted in 1997. This project, led by Professor Adam Kahane, brought together a group of businessmen and 43 Colombians, representing the national heterogeneity, to 3 workshops that lasted 14 days. The aim was to imagine the possible paths that Colombia would take in the following 16 years and the possible consequences of each. The scenarios proposed were fulfilled, ending with the signing of the Peace Accord (Rettberg, 2006). As Minister of Defense (2006–2009), Santos built a relationship of trust with the Military Armed Forces of Colombia. He designed a strategy that allowed Álvaro Uribe’s government to weaken the FARC guerrilla (Rodríguez, 2014). This allowed him to learn about the Armed Forces and their intelligence work. His leadership of the Ministry of Defense generated confidence in the Armed Forces and helped to weaken the

130

P. RUIZ CAMACHO AND M. ARDILA

FARC guerrilla. He later became a presidential candidate and won the presidency in 2010. Despite having been Uribe’s Minister of Defense, from the beginning, there was a rift between the two, due to their different positions on Venezuela and the armed movement. Three months after taking office, Santos re-established relations with Venezuela and Ecuador. Also, he distanced himself from the concept of describing the FARC and the ELN as terrorist groups and referred to an armed conflict instead. Since then, a division between Santos and Uribe would lead to polarization in the country. Pragmatism and leadership capabilities have been central to the political and ethical compass of Santos (Ardila & Clemente Batalla, 2019; Rojas, 2019; Sánchez & Campos, 2019). He demonstrated this throughout his professional life in the various government positions he held internally and internationally. Considering these aspects of his biography and some of his personal history, Santos had the characteristics to lead a peace process with the guerrilla. Further, his background and the context in which it took place led him to win the Nobel Peace in October 2016. The peace process led by Santos began in his childhood and had a moment of maturity during his time in journalism. The way he looked at the country, from the journalistic lens, his political leadership, and the vision of the country he wanted led him to seek advice from people who shared his ideas. Santos had the opportunity to advance in Colombian politics, occupying essential positions that gave him tools and contacts. Above all, he was placed in a position that allowed him to make decisions and act according to his goal.

Building Peace: Innovations and Persuasion Understanding power structures, establishing networks, and innovating institutions were crucial to establishing Santos as a peace actor. Several turning points in his life relate to conflict and peace dynamics. It began during the armed conflict when he was Defense Minister (2006–2009). Then, the construction of a peace process continued during his two presidential terms, with the second term being the most emblematic of the symbolic concept of peace.

7

JUAN MANUEL SANTOS: DIPLOMACY FOR PEACE (2010–2018)

131

Conflict Dynamics As a civil society communicator and politician, Santos made numerous contributions to the cause of peace. The majority came from the Good Government Foundation, which he established in 1994. In the 1990s, guerrillas (particularly the FARC and ELN) and illegal groups gained ground. Neighboring nations viewed Colombia as a “problem country” whose actions had a domino effect on regional stability. Due to the intensification of long-term trends, the relationship with its neighbors has become much more complex and contentious over the past few years. These projections reflect the marked heterogeneity of the relationship and the ups and downs—and deterioration—of ties with Ecuador and Venezuela. Venezuela feared the United States would invade it using Colombian territory (Rojas, 2006). In March 2008, diplomatic relations with Ecuador were severed. Following this, a triangulation of the Colombia–Ecuador–Venezuela relationship occurred, indicating that what transpired with Venezuela affected Ecuador and what transpired in Ecuador affected Colombia’s relationship with Venezuela. Nonetheless, the Colombia–Ecuador and Colombia–Venezuela crises had distinct security concepts. On the one hand, Venezuela and Colombia placed a greater emphasis on the concept of state security. In contrast, Ecuador’s official adoption of human security as a doctrinal reference signified the securitization of the social agenda in border territory (Ardila & Amado, 2009). During the government of Álvaro Uribe (2002–2010), relations with Latin America had deteriorated due to the fear that Colombia, with Plan Colombia, would promote a greater U.S. presence in the region, affecting health and the environment through fumigations to combat illicit drug crops, and causing displacement of the population, mainly to Ecuador. At the same time, Colombia favored bilateral relations and hindered the actions of concerted groups such as UNASUR. It should be remembered that, by 2008, eleven of eighteen Latin American countries were governed by center-left or left-wing presidents (Stokes, 2009) and were opposed to Uribe’s ideology. Since 2002, when Álvaro Uribe assumed the presidency, the national interest developed under a statist policy aimed at establishing and defending a Democratic Security Program within a realist scheme. It was framed in the U.S. neoconservative doctrines of preventive security, in which the State is a rational actor and “the end justifies the

132

P. RUIZ CAMACHO AND M. ARDILA

means” (Aponte & Vargas, 2011). In this context, negotiations were held with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, AUC, an illegal group that brought together private armies that used the internal conflict to carry out illicit activities such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. Between 2003 and 2006, in the process of truth, justice, and reparation, part of the AUC demobilized and integrated into civilian life (Ramírez, 2007). During this administration, foreign policy was an instrument of the Democratic Security Program, predominantly political rather than legal. It went so far as to disregard principles of international law, as it occurred with the violation of sovereignty in Venezuela in the Granda case (2005) and the bombing of the FARC camp in Angostura, Ecuador (2008). The Colombian government feared and suspected that Venezuela and Ecuador were sanctuaries for the FARC guerrillas and tacitly recognized a belligerent status. Minister of Defense, Building a Structure to Negotiate Peace In 2006, Juan Manuel Santos was appointed as Minister of Defense. During the Uribe administration, the Democratic Security Program led to the leadership of the Ministry of Defense in foreign policy, particularly with neighbors and the United States. In this context, there was a tendency to securitize and militarize the management of issues such as migration, drug trafficking, human rights, and the general border situation. This was accentuated by the high level of military cooperation received from the United States. With Plan Colombia2 and military cooperation, the Colombian army was trained in counterinsurgency activities. As Santos mentioned on several occasions, he fought all irregular groups and criminal gangs demobilized from the AUC (Palabras Ceremonia de ascenso, March, 2007). On the other hand, blows were struck against the FARC guerrillas. In March 2008, Santos devised and ordered the operation in which the number two leader of the FARC, Raúl Reyes, was killed in a bombing of a guerrilla camp in Ecuador, causing 25 deaths. Also, as head of Defense, he developed the “Jaque” operation, by which Army officers deceived the FARC, pretending to be a humanitarian mission, and rescued 15 hostages, among them the former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three Americans. Some of the hostages had already been deprived of their freedom for more than a decade. These were, in effect, intelligence operations while Santos was Minister of Defense (Rodríguez, 2014).

7

JUAN MANUEL SANTOS: DIPLOMACY FOR PEACE (2010–2018)

133

Concerning security and drug issues, he was adamant about seeking new solutions and linking drug trafficking to the FARC, pleading for international cooperation to combat it. At the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas in October 2006, he stated that it was not a problem limited to a few nations but rather a problem that affects the entire region due to the “entry of illegal weapons (…) on behalf of criminals who operate from Ecuador, Peru, Central American countries, the United States, Brazil, or Paraguay, among others” (Discurso del Ministro de Defensa, Conferencia Ministros de Defensa, 2006). He added that Colombia had implemented a comprehensive strategy to combat drug trafficking involving all responsible state agencies. In other words, he advocated for inclusiveness, collaboration, and shared responsibility. Throughout those years, the Ministry of Defense facilitated the formation of alliances and the expansion of relations with various regions of the globe. The Binational Border Commissions, COMBIFRON, were maintained; relations with North America were strengthened, not only with the United States but also with Canada; ties with Europe were maintained, especially with the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Germany; cooperation with the East was expanded, especially with India, China, South Korea, and Turkey; and new channels were established with Africa, particularly with South Africa and Sierra Leone (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2007, 2008). These ties were primarily intended to combat illegal drug and human trafficking. In turn, the meetings of the Defense Ministers of the Americas were beneficial for exchanging information and forming alliances. In the following years, these nations supported Santos’ participation in the peace process and his innovative approach to resolving other national and international conflicts. Santos as a Leader-President for Peace Juan Manuel Santos was inaugurated as president of Colombia on August 7, 2010. In his first speech as president, he presented a new image of the nation in economic, political, geographical, and social terms and “opened the doors to dialog” to foster national peace. “An exploratory phase of private peace negotiations has commenced,” he emphasized. During the first two years, he built a successful architecture to negotiate peace with the FARC guerrilla group, which was weakened when he was Minister of Defense in the previous administration. Military actions against the FARC continued. The military operation Sodoma, which took place in

134

P. RUIZ CAMACHO AND M. ARDILA

2010, followed by operation Odiseo in 2011, deserve attention because, from them, this weakened guerrilla group began to change and opened dialogue leading to a humanitarian agreement (Cardona & Gonzalez, 2016). With clear guidance, he showed leadership capacity and built international support. Several actions should be taken into consideration. International alliances were built, starting with reestablishing diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Ecuador in November 2010, three months after President Santos took office. At the same time, he returned to multilateralism. For this purpose, Colombia took a seat in the UN Security Council as a Non-Permanent Member and exercised leadership in UNASUR with María Emma Mejía and later with Ernesto Samper Pizano. In turn, he appointed María Angela Holguín as Foreign Minister, who had been Ambassador to Venezuela and the United Nations. Institutionalism was returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While during the previous administration of Álvaro Uribe, fourteen embassies were closed, they reopened, contributing to the international community’s support and legitimacy for his administration (Vargas et al., 2012). Domestically, a legal framework was formulated to lead to the Special Justice for Peace, JEP in Spanish, a novel idea to achieve a peace agreement. Law 1448 of 2011, known as the Victims Law, establishes a set of administrative, social, economic, individual, and collective measures within a transitional justice framework based on the right to truth, assistance, and comprehensive reparation for the victims of the internal conflict. This Law created a complete system in Colombia to protect, assist, care for, and comprehensively repair the victims of the conflict (Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia, 2012). Comprehensive reparation for the victims implies not only monetary compensation or the restitution of some property but also support from the State in matters of education, health, housing, employment programs, and income, among others, as well as actions to restore their dignity, memory, recovery of the truth, and the creation of conditions so that events, such as the ones they suffered, will not be repeated. It also cares for Colombian victims in other countries. Likewise, it considers a differential approach since it recognizes that people who, due to their age, gender, ethnic group, or disability situation, have suffered the effects of the conflict more severely must also receive special treatment in terms of care, assistance, and repair (Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia, 2012).

7

JUAN MANUEL SANTOS: DIPLOMACY FOR PEACE (2010–2018)

135

Three additional decrees dictate assistance, care, comprehensive reparation, and land restitution measures for ethnic groups, victims belonging to the Rom or Gitano people, and for black, afro-Colombian, Raizal, and Palenque communities. Regarding this matter, the former president firmly believes that it was a success to talk with the victims. In his words, it “helped me to continue with the peace process” (Santos, 2022). For example, the Victims Law was one of the significant contributions of Santos for Colombian Peace, and it can serve as an example for other countries. It is a human security-oriented approach. The Context of the Nobel Peace Prize (October 6, 2016) In addition to the above considerations, the context for being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize is linked to some conditions President Santos considered essential to achieving peace (Santos, 2019). He sought recognition on the issue of peace. The first linked to the need to change the correlation of forces between the guerrilla and the government in favor of the State. When other peace processes, such as the Caguán began, the FARC was very strong (1999), and the military forces were more defensive than offensive (Santos Calderón, 2018, p. 167). To strengthen the State, the Armed Forces were provided with a better budget, resources from Plan Colombia arrived, a wealth tax was created, the force was multiplied and professionalized, and intelligence was restructured with the help of experts from the United States, Israel, and Great Britain. Secondly, it required a genuine willingness on the part of the guerrillas to make peace. The first contact made in secret showed that there was a will for peace on the part of the FARC and that the guerrilla had weakened. It became clear that it was necessary to count on the experience of the advisors in other attempts to achieve peace and on trustworthy agents for both parties. Thirdly, an armed conflict had to be recognized to apply international humanitarian law and negotiate under the parameters of transnational justice, as authorized by the Rome Statute. Hence, the label of a terrorist group was abandoned. Henceforth, there is talk of an internal conflict, and the Victims Law was legislated. Fourthly, the role of the international community was very important. In particular, the good relations with Latin America and neighboring countries, especially Venezuela, due to the leadership exercised by Hugo Chávez in the new Latin American left and the fact that we share with this neighbor a porous, active, and interdependent border of 2219 kilometers. In the

136

P. RUIZ CAMACHO AND M. ARDILA

beginning, the international community was hostile. “The support of the international community and especially the neighbor countries were fundamental” (Santos, 2022). Before taking office, Santos traveled with his foreign minister to the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Spain. He then traveled to Mexico, Panama, Costa Rica, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Dominican Republic, and Haiti. During these visits, he deepened relations with the international community and obtained support for the peace process (Salgar, 2016). In addition to Cuba, Norway, and Venezuela, the role and support of the United States were very important because of Colombia’s relationship with the United States, and its military cooperation, not only in Plan Colombia but also in its intelligence. In addition, there were public– private links with U.S. businessmen. Santos had meetings with Barack Obama and then with Donald Trump. Obama was always on the lookout for talks. His Vice President (and current President) Joe Biden, his Secretary of State John Kerry, and his Ambassador to Colombia Kevin Whitaker were permanent allies. Bernie Aronson was sent to Cuba. The latter was Under Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, from 1989 to 1993, in the administrations of George Bush and Bill Clinton, and had played a prominent role in the peace talks in El Salvador (El Espectador, 23 February, 2015). For its part, the International Red Cross helped transfer guerrillas to Havana. Sometimes they traveled from Caracas. There were always delegates from Norway, Venezuela, and Cuba. Venezuela was an accompanying and facilitating country, a role that Chile later joined. Cuba and Norway were the guarantor countries present at the negotiating table. The preliminary result of the agreement to end the last armed conflict in the Western hemisphere was presented to the United Nations Security Council after nearly six years of effort. Juan Manuel Santos thanked the international community for its assistance throughout the peace negotiations and affirmed their significance. He mentioned specific characteristics of the process, such as the fact that it is the first to focus on the victims of the conflict and to include a gender approach so that men and women are treated equally (El Espectador, September 21, 2016). The SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations primarily commented on President Santos’ plans to establish peace in Colombia. He also thanked Cuba, Norway, Chile, and Venezuela for supporting the peace process. In addition, he acknowledged that United Nations President Santos kept his 2015 promise that the next meeting he would have at the United Nations would be with a signed agreement (El Espectador, 21 September, 2016).

7

JUAN MANUEL SANTOS: DIPLOMACY FOR PEACE (2010–2018)

137

Also influenced by internal circumstances are bureaucratic policies. In the context of the peace process, Juan Manuel Santos changed the FARC’s designation from a terrorist organization to a rebel group. This shift in discourse severed their ties with several political actors regarding security, peace, terrorism, and drugs. Former President Uribe advocated against the peace process and the FARC throughout this period. He emphasized that they would not hand over the country to the FARC and that the agreements would only benefit them. However, Santos was optimistic about the negotiations and the desire and will for peace, as expressed in a march on April 9, 2013, three years prior. The Plebiscite for Peace Santos considered it a democratic duty to ratify the negotiations using a Plebiscite, even though this democratic mechanism was not necessary. On October 2, after signing the first agreement (September 2016), former President Juan Manuel Santos decided to let the Colombian people ratify the peace process through a plebiscite, which was a big mistake. Although the result of the plebiscite seemed favorable in the preliminary polls, the preference for the “No” vote was won by a very small margin. Faced with this, he had to accept defeat in the plebiscite so that his actions would not affect the development of democracy and the control of public order in the country. However, Santos did not give up and summoned all opposition sectors to seek the renegotiation of the peace agreement to see where it was faltering and to reach a mutually beneficial agreement. In a short speech, Juan Manuel Santos accepted the defeat of the “Yes” vote in the plebiscite. The President mentioned that the bilateral ceasefire would be maintained and that he would listen to those who voted “No” to his main opponents, seeking to build consensus. Likewise, the President indicated that there would be a great call to the political parties to reconcile the polarization of the country. In this sense, instructions were given to the chief negotiator and the peace commissioner. After the defeat of the agreement in the plebiscite, the continuity of the process was doubtful. Although former President Juan Manuel Santos mentioned during his speech that he would seek to continue with peace, at the same time, his duty was to respect the call to democracy. It gives the power to the people to choose whether to accept the peace agreement. Due to this, the support of international actors, such as Spain, Portugal, Argentina, and Chile, gave legitimacy to the agreement (El Pais, 3 October, 2016).

138

P. RUIZ CAMACHO AND M. ARDILA

The UN’s pronouncement was fruitful for the former president to receive the award. The Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, expressed: “This is a timely message for all those who have worked so hard for peace, for the government, for the FARC, and for all the political and social forces that have expressed their desire for peace.” Awarding the Nobel Peace Prize provided legitimacy to the peace process “at a critical moment when this special recognition offers hope and encouragement necessary for Colombians” (Portafolio, 7 October, 2016). In the same way, in the Nobel Peace Prize award speech, accompanied not only by his family members but also by victims and peace commissioners, he mentioned that the Nobel Peace Prize was the backing needed for the process: We had no time to lose. On the contrary, the peace process was in imminent danger of failure and needed all the international support it could get. Moreover, we were completely convinced that you, Mr. President, being the highest leader in Colombia, had to be the one who would move the peace process forward. (Vanguardia, 10 December, 2016)

Concerning the above, the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Santos served as an instrument to legitimize the process where it was recognized by different actors of the peace process such as Ingrid Betancur3 who expressed her congratulations to President (Portafolio, 7 October, 2016). The same happened with former President Uribe, the main opposition to the peace agreement, who said, “I congratulate the President on his Nobel Prize win. [But], I hope it leads to change [Peace] agreement that are harmful to democracy” (Portafolio, 7 October, 2016). Consequently, the Nobel Peace initially gave the continuity of the process. However, to act at the social level as a legitimizing symbol of the process, it had to be endorsed by the opposition and the various actors acting during it. Thus, the points made by the opposition to the agreement were renegotiated. Finally, on November 24, 2016, a new agreement was signed.

Theories and Ideas To understand how political and ideational factors motivated and influenced Juan Manuel Santos’ actions to lead a complex negotiation process, this section answers the central question: What were the main ideas and contributions that former president Santos offered to lead to peace in Colombia? Answering this question will help understand why he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

7

JUAN MANUEL SANTOS: DIPLOMACY FOR PEACE (2010–2018)

139

Some theoretical assumptions from international relations to understand the decision-making process at the individual level in some way influenced local and global ideas about peace. Social constructivism, for example, allows us to understand how the idea of achieving peace with the FARC through negotiation, and not only by using force, was constructed. Concepts like identity, interest, ideas, and even the narrative used in the political discourse, were key elements of Santos’ agency to lead and build a peace process during the eight years of his mandate. However, it is difficult to establish or identify the precise characteristics of the unstable and ever-changing individual level. Regarding this, it seems necessary to consider the levels of analysis identified by Kenneth Waltz (1979) in his international political work. For example, at the systemic level, the variables and attributes of the state make it easier to understand actions and reactions taken in the international arena. Because on the contrary, there is the possibility of missing something when it comes to understanding individuals’ personalities and differentiating approaches. Despite the foregoing, in studies on Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), a line of argument has been generated since the 1970s that seeks to include certain psychological and personality traits of political leaders in the decision-making (Hudson, 2014). On this line, two appropriate paths could be considered for including personality elements in foreign policy decision-making. On the one hand, from the specific attributes that make up the personality of individuals who make decisions. On the other, generalizations are made about human beings and their willingness to cooperate or establish a more social relationship with others. However, regarding the last one, there is the possibility that one or a few individuals will get around the rule that can be generalized to all those who make political decisions (Nye & Welch, 2013). On the first option, that is, the one that incorporates psychology into the study of the FPA, Nye, and Welch (2013, pp. 55–56) point out at least four approaches: 1. Cognitive psychology studies how relevant information is assimilated for decision-making. 2. Motivational psychology analyzes how fears, desires, or needs condition how we make decisions. 3. Economic rationality indicates that people behave differently according to whether they perceive an environment favorable to profits or losses, that is, people are willing to take risks when there

140

P. RUIZ CAMACHO AND M. ARDILA

are prospects for profits and, additionally, they protect their interests when defeats can occur. 4. The idiosyncrasy of the leader analyzes how dispositions facilitate or do not the obtaining of tangible results. In this vein, Valerie Hudson (2014) emphasizes that various actors/ agents can influence political processes to achieve a particular goal. On an individual level, this is the case with the peace process in Colombia, which is led by Juan Manuel Santos. According to Hudson (2014), the FPA, based on the individual level, must consider physiological variables associated with the individual cognitive process and the individual’s perception of a given situation. This is connected to the language and narrative discourse that each individual develops based on their experiences. In this regard, analyzing the life of Juan Manuel Santos enables the construction of a narrative describing how he formed his views on the need for peace in Colombia and his contribution to it. Certain situations in his personal and professional life have been extensively analyzed up to this point. The second section of this article describes how, from the various positions he held (as a businessman, journalist, and politician), the pursuit of peace was always a transversal goal, with the implication that he always believed that peace in Colombia was possible. However, personality traits alone are insufficient to comprehend or explain a peace process, so it is necessary to include additional analysis factors. The international environment, the political-institutional aspects of the State, and the influence of non-governmental actors, both internal and external, affect the foreign policy decisions of a nation. In this way, the decision-maker articulates his position based on his ideas, the collective identity of the State, and the government’s interests. In a similar vein, authors such as Alden and Aran argue that political leaders “bring their own biases and prejudices to the office, thereby affecting how they conduct themselves and the foreign policy they must direct” (Alden & Aran, 2012, p. 24). Similarly, the way a person perceives a problem, the emotions that evoke a crisis, the images and beliefs associated with an event or a particular fact, the analogies to the past, and the leadership style all influence how they perceive an issue and how they respond to it (DeRouen & Mintz, 2010). This type of argumentation has become increasingly influential. Even authors such as Valerie Hudson assert that personal values, specific memories, and beliefs or characteristics are not the only factors that influence how a problem is comprehended

7

JUAN MANUEL SANTOS: DIPLOMACY FOR PEACE (2010–2018)

141

and solved. Similarly, situations of high psychological pressure, the influence that “others may have” on those who make decisions, the roles and norms that must be assumed, and the preferences or affinities for a particular topic cause the political leader to pay greater and more concentrated attention to the issue (Hudson, 2007). Undoubtedly, the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Juan Manuel Santos is a personal achievement, a recognition of his capacity for dialog, strategy, and vision. However, for the State, it represents a symbolic capital that means the opportunity that the Colombian people can live in peace, especially after decades of armed conflict. The Duque government conceived the implementation of the peace accords differently, and with a slow implementation, but it did not neglect what the award meant for the country, prestige, and trust from which he also benefited. Differently, the process advanced by President Juan Manuel Santos contributes to the construction of rules, dissemination of values, and strengthening of international norms in the field of Human Rights, peace, and democracy. Beyond being a case study, Colombia’s peace process is an experience that other countries can learn from and emulate. For former President Santos, the Nobel Peace Prize means the international community’s recognition of the efforts made by the leaders who have wanted to negotiate the end of the conflict through peace. This, in some way, also helped change the world’s perception of Colombia, for example, during his interview Santos expressed that, at that moment, Colombia is “a virtuous circle” that gave the country “an international prestige that we have never had, not at least in that level” and recalls anecdotally that “in 200 years of relations with England, a president had never been invited to a state visit, the prize helped” (2022). The peace process led by Santos began in his childhood and had a moment of maturity during his time in journalism, from where he began to shape the ideas he would implement during his two presidential terms. The way he looked at the country from the journalistic lens, his political leadership, and the vision of the country he wanted, led him to seek advice from people who shared his ideas. Santos had the opportunity to advance in Colombian politics, occupying important positions that gave him tools, contacts, and, above all, a position that allowed him to make decisions and act in consequence of what he wanted to achieve. This phase of the construction of ideas is formed from symbolic events, such as those already described in Santos’ life. Following authors like Tonra “Ideas motivate and inspire, generate agreements, dedication, opposition

142

P. RUIZ CAMACHO AND M. ARDILA

and commitments” (2003, p. 739). Under this conception, identities and interests are reconstituted through socialization or learning around the need for peace to change the State image. Somehow achieving peace in Colombia is part of the symbolic capital left by his legacy after eight years of presidency. The peace process in Colombia shows how domestic factors affect the behavior of States within the system and, therefore, cannot be given as something predetermined. Identity is part of the ideational factors that structure peace at the domestic level in Colombia. “Identities can change through interaction” (Zehfuss, 2001, p. 319). In this sense, the concept of identity is relevant because it determines the behavior of the agent (individual) to define the interests, and in this case, the country’s agenda in domestic matters is aligned with foreign policy. From the latter, President Santos points out two fundamental aspects that allow us to understand the co-constitutive relationship between ideas and facts. Firstly, to understand Colombia’s place in the region and how others perceived it, and secondly, to recognize the armed conflict as a reality. Regarding the latter, Santos points out that “the only way that transitional justice could be applied in the country under the protection of the Rome Statute and the United Nations was by making it official that if there was an armed conflict in the country, it was a requirement” (Santos, 2022). Former President Santos considers that part of the opposition of his predecessor, Álvaro Uribe, to the peace process was based on ideological differences regarding the conceptualization of the country’s situation. For Uribe, the country had to face terrorism, but Santos considered that the country was facing an armed conflict in which many actors participated. These differences generated important political ruptures that divided and polarized the country around two irreconcilable ideas. Domestic factors arise from the international behavior of States within the system (Bozdaglioglu, 2007; Katzenstein, 1996) and, therefore, cannot be given as something predetermined. For example, identity is an ideational factor that, at the domestic level, structures peace in Colombia. The concept of identity within the constructivist approach is relevant in this study because it determines the agent’s (individual) behavior to define interests (State). However, the peace process focused on negotiations around implementing a negative peace related to the “absence of direct violence” (Gómez, 2022, p. 20). This means cessation of hostilities, disarmament, demobilization, and the search for positive peace in the Colombian conflict. The search for positive peace remained within

7

JUAN MANUEL SANTOS: DIPLOMACY FOR PEACE (2010–2018)

143

the peace agreement implementation that did not delve into the ideas of social justice (Gómez, 2022).

Conclusions After the Colombian Peace Agreement negotiations concluded, in 2016 the President Juan Manuel Santos was awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize (2016). President Santos’ pacifist and liberal disposition, which stemmed from his journalistic training, came to the fore due to a significant departure from the security perspective implemented by the previous government. His international experience and academic training gave him strong beliefs regarding the necessity of dialogue to end the Colombian conflict. In addition, his close relationship with national political elites and the public service experience held for two decades enhanced his understanding of power structures and the military situation of the FARC-EP during the negotiations. The leadership and institutional innovations of Juan Manuel Santos in the pacification of Colombia will likely endure in several dimensions. First, his work developed a Diplomacy for Peace that occurred domestically and internationally. After his administration ended, Santos visited Ukraine in July of 2022 and held talks with President Volodymyr Zelensky. Second, his ideas about Territorial Peace, Justice, Security, and Political Participation made him lead a peace agreement that transcended the national level and had an international impact. They could be considered for other peace negotiations. In the Colombian case, for example with the ELN, but also for other insurgent groups in other countries. And not only that but also for the strengthening of democracy. In this sense, recognizing the victims before the peace agreement was the most significant contribution. Listening to them helped Santos to move forward (Loaiza, 2019). Likewise, listening to the victims during the negotiations was a great learning experience for other pacification processes. Third, Santos built bridges in a very hostile context. The support of international actors and especially of the neighbors was fundamental. Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, and the United Nations joined the negotiation process. The international community was very relevant during the difficult moments of the negotiation. At the same time, Santos managed to build a concept of multidimensional security linked to the development of peace, justice, cooperation, and interaction between the State and society. The participation of businessmen and the military

144

P. RUIZ CAMACHO AND M. ARDILA

in the negotiations and the legal framework contributed to peace and international security. One of the notable findings from the literature review and the interviews entail a human dimension: managing emotions was critical not only with the counterparts but also with Santos and his negotiating team. In the negotiating process and during the plebiscite, Santos developed an atmosphere of flexibility and dialog. More importantly, trust was established, and a dignified and acceptable negotiation for both parties. Camilo Gómez, Peace Commissioner in the government of Andrés Pastrana, said “President Santos has a success story like no other with the guerrillas. His secret seems to be patience and persistence in this objective.” Former President Ernesto Samper affirmed that “Santos is essentially a strategist who understood from the beginning that the fight against the FARC is not a matter of force but of intelligence. Therein lies the secret of his success” (El Tiempo, 5 November, 2011). As indicated in the interview with President Santos, one of the lessons was involving the right people with the right ideas to make peace possible in Colombia. As a president, Santos showed that he was a strategic politician with grand personal ambitions that finally made him worthy of a Nobel Peace Prize. For the country, this recognition has a great symbolism that means international support to continue searching for positive peace. Notes 1. The COMPAZ Foundation is an organization was founded by Santos to allocate the resources from the Nobel Prize to help victims and contribute to the construction of peace and reconciliation in Colombia. 2. Plan Colombia was designed as a package of international “aid,” particularly from the United States, to fight drug trafficking. Support was given by means of intelligence, equipment, strategic direction, and fumigations in the drug war for anti-insurgent plans. The balance of the war is favorable to the interests of the United States and the Colombian government in the scenario of armed confrontation. 3. Ingrid Betancur was kidnapped in February 2002 during a visit as part of her presidential campaign to an area of southern Colombia controlled by the FARC. In July 2008 she was rescued, along with 14 other FARC hostages.

7

JUAN MANUEL SANTOS: DIPLOMACY FOR PEACE (2010–2018)

145

Acknowledgements We thank David Felipe Cardenas Beltran as research assistant.

References Alden, C., & Aran, A. (2012). Foreign Policy Analysis. Routledge. Aponte, D., & Vargas, A. (2011). No estamos condenados a la guerra. Hacia una estrategia de cierra del conflicto con el ELN . Cerac. Ardila, M., & Amado, J. A. (2009). Continuidades y cambios en las relaciones de Colombia con sus países vecinos: 2008–2009, año crítico con Ecuador y Venezuela. OASIS, (14), 55–70. Ardila, M., & Clemente, I. C. (2019). Santos: una diplomacia tradicional con cambios. OASIS, (29), 29–56. https://doi.org/10.18601/16577558.n29.03 Bozdaglioglu, Y. (2007). Constructivism and Identity Formation: An Interactive Approach. Review of International Law and Politics, 3(11), 121–144. Cairo, H., & Rios, J. (2019). Las élites políticas y la paz territorial en Colombia: un análisis de discurso en torno al Acuerdo de Paz. Revista Española de Ciencia Política, 91–113. https://doi.org/10.21308/recp.50.04 Cardona, J., & González, C. (2016). La hora de la paz y el tiempo de Santos. El Espectador. Paz y memoria. https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/ paz-y-memoria/la-hora-de-la-paz-y-el-tiempo-de-santos-article/ Dávila, V. (2018). El Nobel. Penguin Random House. DeRouen, K., & Mintz A. (2010). Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making. Camrbidge University Press. Discurso del Ministro de Defensa, Juan Manuel Santos, Conferencia Ministros de Defensa. (2006). https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Min defensa/Documentos/descargas/Sobre_el_Ministerio/Discursos_del_Min istro/20061002instalacion_cumbre_nicaragua.pdf Doucet, L. (2016). El extraordinario proceso de paz de Colombia y lo que el mundo puede aprender de él. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/ noticias-america-latina-37506432.amp Duzan, M. J. (2018). Paradojas de la Paz y del poder. Penguin Random House. El Espectador. (2015). Santos defendió presencia de Bernard Aronson en proceso de paz. El Espectador (febrero 23 de 2015). https://www.elespectador.com/ politica/santos-defendio-presencia-de-bernard-aronson-en-proceso-de-paz-art icle-545693/ El Espectador. (2016). Santos presentó acuerdo final de Paz ante Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. El Espectador (septiembre 21 de 2016). https://www.elespectador.com/politica/santos-presento-acuerdofinal-de-paz-ante-consejo-de-seguridad-de-la-onu-article-655997/

146

P. RUIZ CAMACHO AND M. ARDILA

El Pais. (2016). Palomino, S. Santos “No me rendiré, seguiré buscando la paz”. El Pais (Octubre 3 de 2016). https://elpais.com/internacional/2016/10/ 03/colombia/1475454046_397365.html El Tiempo. (2011, November 5). Juan manuel Santos, el hombre que tiene en jaque a la guerrilla. El Tiempo. https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/docume nto/CMS-10713660 Fundación Compaz. (2021). Acerca de la Fundación Compaz. https://fundac ioncompaz.org/ Galeano, H. D., Badillo, R., & Rodríguez, M. (2019). Evolución de la política exterior de Colombia en el período 2002–2018. OASIS, (29), 57–79. https:/ /doi.org/10.18601/16577558.n29.04 Gómez, D. F. (2022). Diálogos de La Habana: una comprensión desde la paz positiva y la paz negativa. OPERA, (30), 13–32. https://doi.org/10.18601/ 16578651.n30.03 Holguín, M. Á. (2021). La Venezuela que viví. Planeta. Hudson, V. (2007). Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. Rowman & Littlefield publishers Inc. Hudson, V. (2014). Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. Rowman & Littlefield. Jaramillo, S. (2014). La paz territorial. Harvard University. https://interaktivedemokratie.org/files/downloads/La-Paz-Territorial.pdf Katzenstein, P. (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. Columbia University Press. Loaiza, Y. (2019). La verdad como criterio fundamental de reparación a las víctimas en la justicia transicional colombiana. Revista Lasallista de Investigación, 16(2), 252–266. http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?pid=S179444492019000200252&script=sci_abstract&tlng=es Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. (2007). Memorias al Congreso de la República 2006–2007 . https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/ Documentos/descargas/Documentos_Home/Memorias_al_congreso_20062007.pdf Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. (2008). Memorias al Congreso de la República 2008–2009. https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/ Documentos/descargas/normatividad/EstrategiaPlaneacion/SistemaDeCon trolInterno/GPA/InformesDeGestion/9318_Memorias_al_Congreso_2008_ -_2009.pdf Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia. (2012). Ley de víctimas y restitución de tierras. http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/ley_ victimas/ley_victimas_completa_web.pdf Nye, J. Jr., & Welch D. A. (2013). Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History. Pearson.

7

JUAN MANUEL SANTOS: DIPLOMACY FOR PEACE (2010–2018)

147

Palabras del Ministro de Defensa Nacional, Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, en la Ceremonia de ascenso. (2007). Bogotá, 30 de marzo de 2007. https:/ /www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/des cargas/Sobre_el_Ministerio/Discursos_del_Ministro/20070330ascenso_sub_ ponal.pdf Pizarro, Eduardo. (2022). Interview. Portafolio. (2016). “Así apoyaron a Santos por el Nobel varios líderes nacionales y mundiales.” Portafolio (7 de octubre de 2016), sec. Gobierno. https:/ /www.portafolio.co/economia/gobierno/lideres-mundiales-felicitan-a-juanmanuel-santos-por-premio-nobel-de-paz-500882 Ramírez, A. E. E. (2007). Las limitaciones que enfrentaría la instauración de una comisión de la verdad, en el proceso de tránsito hacia la paz entre el Estado y las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). Desafíos, 16, 278–315. Rettberg, A. (2006). Destino Colombia: Crónica y evaluación de un ejercicio de participación de líderes de la sociedad civil en el diseño de escenarios futuros. Uniandes. Rios, J., & Cairo, H. (2018). Los discursos sobre la participación política en el proceso de paz de Colombia. Araucaria 20(39), 317–39. https://www.red alyc.org/journal/282/28264625016/html/ Rodríguez, G. P. (2014). Álvaro Uribe y Juan Manuel Santos: ¿una misma derecha? 84(254), 1–16. https://static.nuso.org/media/articles/downloads/ 4071_1.pdf. Rojas, D. (2019). La política internacional de la administración Santos: entre los imperativos y las aspiraciones. OASIS, (29), 7–27. https://doi.org/10. 18601/16577558.n29.02 Rojas, D. M. (2006). Balance de la política internacional del gobierno Uribe. Análisis Político, 19(57), 85–105. Salgar, D. (2016). ¿Por qué es importante el apoyo internacional al proceso de paz? El Espectador, 23 de junio de 2016, sec. Colombia +20. https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/paz-y-memoria/por-quees-importante-el-apoyo-internacional-al-proceso-de-paz-article/ Sánchez, F., & Campos, S. (2019). La política exterior de Santos: estrategia y diplomacia por la paz. OASIS, (29), 81–104. https://doi.org/10.18601/165 77558.n29.05 Sánchez, G. (2000). Guerra prolongada, negociaciones inciertas en Colombia, 29(3), 270–305. https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/126/12629302.pdf Santos Calderón, E. (2018). El país que me tocó. Penguin Random House. Santos, J. M. (2019). La batalla por la paz. Planeta. Santos, J. M. (2022). Interview with Juan Manuel Santos President of Colombia (2010–2018). Santos, J. M., Torres, J. C., & Betancourt, I. (2021). Una conversación pendiente. Planeta.

148

P. RUIZ CAMACHO AND M. ARDILA

Sarmiento-Hernández, E., Rojas-Guevara, P., & Rojas-Guevara, J. (2020). Incidencia del proceso de paz con las FARC en la política antidrogas de Colombia. Revista Científica General José María Córdova, 18(32), 816–837. https:// doi.org/10.21830/19006586.632 Stokes, S. (2009). Globalization and the left in Latin America. manuscrito no publicado. Tappe, J. (2020). Liderazgo político en el desarrollo de procesos de paz en Colombia entre 2002 y 2010: La importancia de Juan Manuel Santos. En Negociación y cooperación: Teoría y experiencias en resolución de conflictos (pp. 355–418). Universidad Externado de Colombia. Tonra, B. (2003). Constructing the CFSP: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(4), 731–756. https://doi.org/10. 1111/1468-5965.00443 Vanguardia. (2016). Proceso de Paz estaba en peligro, necesitaba apoyo internacional: Comité Nobel (10 de diciembre de 2016). https://www.vanguardia. com/colombia/proceso-de-paz-estaba-en-peligro-necesitaba-apoyo-internaci onal-comite-nobel-ERVL382503 Vargas, L., Sosa, S., & Rodríguez, J. (2012). El comercio como plataforma de la política exterior colombiana en la administración de Juan Manuel Santos (pp. 259–292). Colombia Internacional. https://revistas.uniandes.edu.co/ doi/epdf/10.7440/colombiaint76.2012.10 Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Waveland Press. Zehfuss, M. (2001). Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison. European Journal of International Relations, 7 (3), 315–348. https://doi.org/10. 1177/1354066101007003002

CHAPTER 8

Javier Pérez De Cuéllar: Lifelong Vocation for Global Peace Sebastien Adins and Oscar Vidarte Arévalo

Introduction Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1920–2020) is the only Latin American to have held the position of Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization (1982–1991). Although the Peruvian diplomat was not awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, he received it on behalf of the Peacekeeping Forces in 1988. Before assuming the position of Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar had gained extensive experience as a diplomat representing his country and eight years in different instances of the UN itself. Influenced

The present work had the collaboration of Andrea Rivas Huerta, student of the program of Political Science and Government at Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. S. Adins · O. Vidarte Arévalo (B) Pontifical Catholic University of Peru, Lima, Peru e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Domínguez and A. Oelsner (eds.), Latin American Thinkers of Peace, Global Political Thinkers, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36107-4_8

149

150

S. ADINS AND O. VIDARTE ARÉVALO

by thinkers such as Raymond Aron and the Latin American tradition of non-intervention, he had the reputation of being a traditional, sovereigntist, and discreet diplomat. From this rather realistic perspective, from the beginning of his work as head of the UN, he recognized the weakness of the institution and its dependence on the great powers. Only in his second term, in the context of the end of the Cold War, Pérez de Cuéllar distinguished himself for his defense of more liberal principles and as a norm entrepreneur. Thus, his ideas significantly impacted the reconceptualization of peacekeeping operations, emphasizing the defense of human rights and the execution of new tasks, such as electoral monitoring. Furthermore, recognizing the growing importance of social and economic causes of conflicts in the world, as well as preventive diplomacy, he gradually moved from a negative to a positive perspective of peace. This more liberal perspective would be reinforced by his leading role as Foreign Minister of Peru in negotiating the Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted by the Organization of American States in 2001.

A Life Dedicated to Diplomacy Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was born on January 19, 1920, in the city of Lima to Ricardo Pérez de Cuéllar (1924-deceased) and Rosa Guerra Cevallos. The future diplomat, raised in a wealthy Catholic family, had a quiet, albeit lonely, youth marked by a love of literature, classical music, and history (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2012). As a young man, he also took French classes, which helped him develop an appreciation for European culture and way of life. A year after graduating from Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú with a degree in law at the age of 23, he joined the Diplomatic Service. He was appointed Third Secretary in Paris as he was fluent in French a few months after the Allies’ liberation. During his seven years in the French capital, he married and had two children with Yvette Roberts. As a member of the Peruvian delegation to the first session of the General Assembly in 1946, he had his first experience with the United Nations Organization.

S. Adins e-mail: [email protected]

8

JAVIER PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR: LIFELONG VOCATION …

151

Pérez de Cuéllar remained abroad throughout the 1950s, with appointments in London, La Paz, and Rio de Janeiro. In 1962, just one year after his return to Lima, then-President Manuel Prado appointed him an ambassador. Except for his service at the Peruvian Embassy in Switzerland from 1964 to 1966, he remained in Peru until 1969, when he was appointed Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the equivalent of a Vice-Minister. It should be noted that during this time, along with Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, a new generation of Peruvian diplomats emerged, who began to distance themselves from the Foreign Ministry’s traditional legalistic and conservative bent and reached key diplomatic positions under the military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado. Despite his reservations about working for a de facto government, Pérez de Cuéllar was commissioned as the first Peruvian Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1969–1971) as part of the Velasco administration’s more ambitious and pragmatic foreign policy. After his time in Moscow, he became Peru’s permanent representative to the United Nations, a position he held until 1975, coinciding with the country’s entry as a non-permanent Security Council member (1973– 1974). This contributed to the international renown of the Peruvian government and the diplomat, particularly during his tenure as president of the Security Council. On the other hand, a four-year stay in New York revealed to Pérez de Cuéllar the immense potential of the United Nations for resolving major global problems, as well as the reluctance of the powers to act beyond their immediate interests and the divisions within the Third World at the time (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2012). After 1975, the Peruvian diplomat maintained his ties to the international organization, first as the Secretary-special General’s representative for Cyprus (1975–1977), then as assistant Secretary-General for special political affairs in 1979, and finally as the Personal Representative of Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim for Afghanistan (1981). The thenPresident of Peru, Fernando Belaunde Terry, appointed Pérez de Cuéllar ambassador to Brazil upon his return to Lima in 1981. However, the Senate cut short this decision by denying the ratification of such a designation, prompting his October 1981 request to retire from the diplomatic service. Coincidentally, in the same month, the United Nations Security Council was preparing the election process for the Secretary-General with two leading candidates. On the one hand, Kurt Waldheim, an Austrian who has served as Secretary-General of the United Nations since 1972, aspired to a third term with the backing of the Soviet Union and, albeit

152

S. ADINS AND O. VIDARTE ARÉVALO

with less enthusiasm, most Western nations. In response, Beijing and several Third World states proposed the then-Tanzanian Foreign Minister Salim Ahmed Salim, an ardent supporter of the “New International Economic Order.” After sixteen ballots over six weeks and repeated vetoes by China and the United States, both candidates withdrew from the election process. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar instructed the Peruvian Foreign Ministry not to act. At the same time, the process continued. Only after observing the stalemate in the Council did he allow him to be informed that “he was available,” without even traveling to New York to advocate for his election (de Soto, 2020). In diplomatic circles, Pérez de Cuéllar was already known for his professionalism, discretion, reticence, and respect for state sovereignty, faithful to the Latin American tradition of non-intervention (de Soto, 2020; Rieffer-Flanagan & Forsythe, 2007). This profile, plus his origin— part of the so-called “Third World” at the time, but culturally more akin to the Old World—made him seem like the “safe” option among the nine candidates for the position, especially from the perspective of the permanent members of the Security Council or also known as P5 (Idem). Thus, from his beach house near the Peruvian capital, Pérez de Cuéllar learned of his election as the new Secretary-General of the UN. The new Secretary-General faced a challenging international context. Initially, the end of the preceding decade witnessed the end of the socalled Détente, with a new arms race between the two superpowers and a confrontational discourse, particularly after Ronald Reagan was elected president of the United States. On the other hand, the United Nations faced severe budgetary issues, exacerbated by the economic crisis’s effect on the contributions of the world’s leading powers. According to Jonah and Hill, “[t]he Secretariat had become an organization that member states desired to constrain and influence, but not empower” (2018, p. 264). Faced with this situation, Pérez de Cuéllar, a seasoned diplomat, understood that the success of his administration would largely depend on the allocation of powers, which explains his insistence—supported by Article 99 of the United Nations Charter—to involve the P5 more in the resolution of several regional conflicts (Central America, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa, mainly). In addition to several historical conflicts on the UN agenda, such as the Arab Israeli conflict or the decolonization of Southern Africa, in 1982 war broke out in the Falklands. After the former United States Secretary of State failed to mediate this conflict, the new Secretary-General was tasked

8

JAVIER PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR: LIFELONG VOCATION …

153

with finding a solution to end hostilities in the South Atlantic. Although he did not achieve the desired results, Pérez de Cuéllar received praise for his approach and complete impartiality. Notable is that the United Nations did not contribute to the task of disarmament—a matter directly dealt with by Moscow and Washington—nor to preventing violence in Central America, where the Reagan administration chose unilateralism. Pérez de Cuéllar referred directly to the crisis of multilateralism and the need to give the UN Secretary-General a more prominent role in conflict prevention in his first annual report in 1982 (Newman, 2018). Pérez de Cuéllar advocated a series of budgetary reforms and measures to increase the effectiveness of the organization’s programs during his first administration, despite the lack of significant achievements for world peace. Similarly, he placed family planning and gender equality on the agenda, with the appointment of several women to key positions at the United Nations. However, his debate on the role of Secretary-General in those years would be his most enduring contribution (see below). On the other hand, he was lauded for his steadfast defense of the United Nations Charter—which he regarded as a “religion for the international community”—and his exemplary teamwork (Rieffer-Flanagan & Forsythe, 2007). For these reasons, and in an unprecedented move, the P5 representatives asked Pérez de Cuéllar to serve a second term in office. In 1987, the Security Council and the Secretary-General were able to act in a more coordinated and effective manner due to the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as the new leader of the Soviet Union and the dramatic improvement in relations between the superpowers (Newman, 2018). This new context enabled Pérez de Cuéllar to be more creative in his work and more tenacious in his defense of principles like human rights, democracy, and human dignity. The end of the war between Iraq and Iran (1988), the signing of the Geneva Agreements that preceded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (1988), the ceasefire in the civil war in Angola (1989), the independence of Namibia (1990), and the Paris Peace Accords that ended the war in Cambodia (1990) are among the most successful events of Pérez de Cuéllar’s second term (1991). Moreover, by appointing Gro Harlem Brundtland as president of the commission that published Our Common Future (1987), he contributed to conceptualizing sustainable development in those years (Manrique, 2020). Given his origins, his greatest accomplishment may have been his contribution to ending the civil wars in Central America.

154

S. ADINS AND O. VIDARTE ARÉVALO

On the one hand, it compelled the United States to permit the United Nations and members of the Contadora Group to play a more active role within its traditional sphere of influence. On the other hand, dispatching a mission of electoral observers to Nicaragua (ONUVEN, 1989) and, subsequently, a mission of observers of the peace agreements in El Salvador (ONUSAL, 1991) contributed significantly to the pacification of both countries. In 1988, in recognition of this successful management, Pérez de Cuéllar was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the United Nations Peace Forces and asked to accept a third election, which he declined. Just months after Javier Pérez de Cuéllar had left his post at the United Nations, Peru was plunged into a deep political crisis due to the so-called autogolpe of then-President Alberto Fujimori (1992) and the growing authoritarian tendency of that regime. This would begin another chapter in the life of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, formalized with his candidacy for the 1995 presidential elections. Although he lost those elections (with 22% of the votes, he finished in second place, well above the other opposition candidates), it showcased his democratic credentials. Five years later, he would once again play a leading role in Peruvian national politics by assuming the position of President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the transitory government of Valentín Paniagua, inaugurated after the resignation of Fujimori in November 2000. As foreign minister, Pérez de Cuéllar opted for the reintegration of Peru into the international community, being a fundamental pillar of this policy, the elaboration of an Inter-American Democratic Charter, approved during a special session of the OAS Assembly in 2001. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar’s professional life would culminate in the city where he had begun in 1944 when, at the request of President Alejandro Toledo, he accepted his appointment as Ambassador to France and to UNESCO, a position he held until 2004, when he already reached the age of 84. He passed away in his hometown on March 4, 2020, only weeks after his hundredth anniversary. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar is one of the leading Peruvian personalities of the twentieth century. As such, much has been written about him, and everyone agrees on his personal qualities and his role as a diplomat. References about his integrity and his deep moral convictions (Wisotzki, 2000, p. 12), as well as about his tolerance, serenity, firmness, and perseverance (Mayor, 2000, p. 29) (Carnero Arroyo, 2020, p. 756), allow us to know some of the characteristics that identify Pérez de Cuéllar as a

8

JAVIER PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR: LIFELONG VOCATION …

155

human being. However, mentioning his excellent career as a diplomat is a constant when referring to Pérez de Cuéllar. It is no coincidence that he is classified as a visionary (Pinto Bazurco, 2018, p. 74), committed to improving the world. However, because of his role as Secretary-General of the United Nations between 1982 and 1991, is that his “global political vocation,” that is, “the fight for justice on a universal level” (Mosquera, 2020), is distinguished as one of the qualities that best identifies Pérez de Cuéllar. As the only Latin American to have held such a high position, the role he played in the UN must be one of the most outstanding aspects of his diplomatic activity. There is recognition toward Pérez de Cuéllar for having worked in favor of the organization itself. Hence it is valuable that he has managed to “resolve the tensions of the moment by applying the essential values and principles of the organization” (Mosquera, 2020) and that he has revitalized the role of the UN through effective diplomacy (Valverde, 2019, pp. 1–2). Likewise, it is important to highlight that, during his mandate, Pérez de Cuéllar successfully coped with major structural transformations, such as the end of the Cold War, but also with scenarios of conflict and tension throughout the world. Therefore, as part of the role played by the UN, emphasis is placed on his intense and permanent work to maintain peace and security in the world, managing to prevent the emergence of armed conflicts between countries or intervening in the negotiated solution of existing war scenarios (Mayor, 2000, p. 29; Valverde, 2019, pp. 1–2). Another aspect that stands out in Pérez de Cuéllar’s diplomatic work is his commitment to protecting and defending human rights. In this regard, his transcendental role is recognized, as Secretary-General, not only in raising awareness on the matter (De Trazegnies, 1992, p. 16) but also for having strengthened the so-called third-generation human rights, which Pérez de Cuéllar would call “essential rights to humanity” (Ferrero, 2000, p. 24). These include the right to development, the protection of the environment, and the right to peace. Finally, Pérez de Cuéllar also played an important role in Peruvian foreign policy, carrying out outstanding work as a diplomat in challenging circumstances. Thus, in the decades of the 60s and 70s, his concern about the international impact that some measures adopted by the different Peruvian governments of that time could generate, making Peru not so questioned in the external sphere, stands out (Pinto Bazurco, 2018, p. 73). Years later, his service to the country would also be recognized

156

S. ADINS AND O. VIDARTE ARÉVALO

when he assumed the positions of President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru in a complex context of transition after the authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori.

Ideas and Norm Entrepreneurship for Peace Javier Pérez de Cuéllar does not have an extensive academic production of his own: he was a man who moved more in the world of action (of decision-making) than in the world of reflection. However, some texts and interviews allow us to identify the most critical aspects of his thought. Although he addressed different issues, his greatest concern was undoubtedly at the global level and, more particularly, the role of the UN. For Pérez de Cuéllar, the UN is an entity of great importance to the world, not only because it is a political instrument that seeks to ensure peace but also because it is part of a system that includes various sectoral organizations (such as UNESCO, ILO, and WHO, among others) and that, therefore, seeks to address the different problems that affect humanity (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1995a, p. 55). Therefore, the UN should not only be concerned about dealing with conflict scenarios in the world but also “serve as a primary instrument to expand the spirit of cooperation […] between countries” and “relentlessly seek that the rule of law and universal respect for human rights govern all international affairs” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1990a, p. 4). Thus, guided by the interest of contributing to the work carried out by the UN, Pérez de Cuéllar paid particular attention to the search for and maintenance of peace, even more so when, since the beginning of the 1990s, he warned about the emergence of new threats to peace, such as transnational crime, which saw its main manifestations in terrorism and drug trafficking (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1990b, p. 8, 2001a, pp. 209– 210). Therefore, from his perspective, it was necessary to “take advantage of all available diplomatic resources to achieve fair and lasting solutions to conflicts that threaten or endanger peace” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1990a, p. 17). However, UN peacekeeping had not been an easy task. Therefore, Pérez de Cuéllar insisted on two central changes for the achievement of this objective: (1) the redefinition of the concept of sovereignty (in order to achieve a balance between sovereignty and peacekeeping, which allow the UN to carry out its work) (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1995b, p. 167), and (2) the reduction of nuclear weapons and the control of irresponsible arms

8

JAVIER PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR: LIFELONG VOCATION …

157

sales (which also meant an affront to world security) (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2000a, p. 48). On the other hand, Pérez de Cuéllar was no stranger to the questions regarding the actions of the UN. From a critical perspective, the former Secretary-General admitted that “not all the problems of societies can be overcome through multilateral action” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1990a, p. 23) and that the UN had problems that often impeded the development of its work. However, despite these limitations, Pérez de Cuéllar was also in charge of recognizing the relevance of the organization: “It is true that it has sometimes been relegated, often surpassed,” but “it has patiently built its institutions and has mobilized its capacity to carry out the mandates assigned to it” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1990c), as well as serving as a space for the development of debates of global importance such as the protection of the environment and sustainable development (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2021, p. 20). However, what are the main limitations that the UN has shown to guarantee security in the world? The first is linked to “the political will of the countries that comprise it” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1995a, p. 55). The UN is an intergovernmental organization, which means that it depends entirely on its member states. If these do not show the political will to solve the problems, afflict the world, and use the UN to favor their interests and not the interest of peace (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1995a, p. 56), it will hardly be able to accomplish its task. This is even more serious in the world powers’ case because they have a more relevant role within the UN by having a higher level of influence. However, unfortunately, many times, the most powerful countries only give “priority to the political and economic problems of the developing world when they affect their own interests, without foreseeing the repercussions of that mistaken preference” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2012, p. 67) or even “guided because of their interests […] they choose to take steps that are not in accordance with the United Nations or with the principles of the Charter” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1990a, p. 18). In this sense, Pérez de Cuéllar had already shown a critical position regarding the so-called “veto power” of the P5 in the Security Council, considering it “the stark difference between the real world and the ideal world we have always aspired, because it is nothing other than the right that five states claim for themselves not to be governed by others” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1972, p. 39). For this reason, it is not by chance that Pérez de Cuéllar raised—already in 1972—the need to reform the Security Council to make it more representative and effective (Pérez

158

S. ADINS AND O. VIDARTE ARÉVALO

de Cuéllar, 1972, p. 40), a discussion that, by the way, is still valid to this day. The second limitation of the UN is related to “the means available to the organization to meet its objectives” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1995a, p. 56). On the one hand, there are economic restrictions since not all countries pay their contributions, either because of the economic difficulties they face or for political reasons, as is the case of the United States, one of the principal debtors of the UN (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1995a, p. 56). On the other hand, Pérez de Cuéllar was very critical of the negative attitude of the United States toward the UN in the years he served as Secretary-General since the world power would have come to consider the international organization as “a refuge for communist spies, an institution inherently hostile to North American interests and a wasteful and poorly managed organization” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2021, pp. 26, 28). On the other hand, to implement its decisions, the UN requires persuasive or coercive means that give it a greater capacity for action and influence (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1995b, p. 164), but this does not happen, so it continues to depend largely on state interests. For this reason, the “United Nations must not agree to embark on operations that exceed its capabilities, because then discredit comes: people believe that wherever the United Nations is, the problem should be solved immediately, and this is not the case” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1995a, p. 57). Another issue that caught Pérez de Cuéllar’s attention about the functioning of the UN is the role of its Secretary-General. For him, the Secretary-General represents the common interest of the member states since “his mandate is global.” Hence, despite being the first Latin American diplomat to assume such an important position, Pérez de Cuéllar never thought of himself as “the Latin American candidate” for the General-Secretariat; instead, the Secretary-General should not represent one region more than another (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2021, p. 53). The problem is that “that common interest does not always exist or, rather, is not always perceived to exist” in such a way that “the Secretary-General can be pulled in opposite directions by the member states” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1993, p. 141). Therefore, in order to avoid submitting to the influence of the countries that appointed him, more than ever, his work must be impartial and objective: “He must not allow his independence of judgment to be impaired or distorted by pressures from governments” (Perez de Cuéllar, 1993, p. 134).

8

JAVIER PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR: LIFELONG VOCATION …

159

In addition, it should be emphasized that the Secretary-General “is not a head of state who takes initiatives and imposes them. On the contrary, he is and must be a man who anticipates and warns, and who, when required, proposes solutions, respectful of the position of the parties and seeking, with independence and dedication, to gain their trust” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2012, pp. 102–103). This explains, according to Pérez de Cuéllar, the relevance that the “early warning machinery” acquires for the work of the UN Secretary-General, which is expressed through “rapid contacts with governments and their representatives, personal visits to conflict zones, and sending analysis missions” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2000a, pp. 45–46). Finally, a Secretary-General must understand the importance of his position: On one side is the Scylla of trying to inflate the role through too liberal a reading of the text: of succumbing, that is, to vanity and wishful thinking. On the other is the Charybdis of trying to limit the role to only those responsibilities which are explicitly conferred by the Charter and are impossible to escape: that is, succumbing to modesty, to the instinct of self-effacement, and to the desire to avoid controversy. (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1993, p. 126)

As mentioned above, Pérez de Cuéllar was also interested in other essential aspects, not only for the UN. First, the respect for human rights. Pérez de Cuéllar was positive not only because of the gradual development of international standards for the protection of human rights (Pérez de Cuéllar et al., n.d., p. 46) but also because of the existence of a certain worldwide awareness “that no social or political regime that does not respect the dignity and value of the human being can and should endure” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1990a, pp. 27–28). In that sense, Pérez de Cuéllar considered democracy as the political regime par excellence to guarantee human rights, emphasizing that “one cannot speak of human rights if democracy is not recognized” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2007, pp. 310–311). In any case, Pérez de Cuéllar questioned the predominance of a discourse that understood human rights as an internal matter of states and not as an issue that concerns the international community as a whole (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2000b, p. 190). For this reason, concerted action was required among all the actors that participate in the international

160

S. ADINS AND O. VIDARTE ARÉVALO

dynamic: this implies not only the commitment of the different governments to human rights but also the role that transnational actors and global civil society itself can play (Pérez de Cuéllar et al., n.d., p. 50). Second, Pérez de Cuéllar showed attention to the problem of development. From his perspective, development could not be understood only as economic development; development should have a human, lasting, and supportive character (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1992). Along these lines, Pérez de Cuéllar believed that the most developed countries had to understand that their high level of development was linked to the prosperity of all the countries in the world (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2001b, p. 196). Furthermore, it was clear that official aid was not just about altruism. For example, the only way to deal with threats of great interest to the developed world, such as terrorism—of importance after the September 11 attacks—was to fight against the poverty these extremisms feed (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2007, p. 311). He was even quite critical of the UN’s work on this issue. Although he recognized that the UN had performed an essential task in terms of development assistance, he showed significant self-criticism when questioning “the ineffectiveness of the United Nations as a system to effectively achieve economic and social development” in the world (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1995b, p. 150, 2021, p. 21). It should be noted that Pérez de Cuéllar worked intensely on the construction of a “new global ethic,” which is founded based on the idea of human rights, development, the defense of democracy, and the environment (Pérez de Cuéllar et al., n.d., pp. 45, 49). This concept can well summarize Pérez de Cuéllar’s vision of his priorities in the international arena. As part of this global ethic, Pérez de Cuéllar also recognized the importance of respect for diversity and cultural pluralism and the right of minorities to affirm their cultural identity. His concern for protecting native peoples and cultural heritage was based on his conviction that development begins in the field of culture. However, development also gives culture impetus, quality, and meaning (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1992). However, he warned that, despite the importance of the cultural component, the current globalization could affect “the values and identities of all the countries of the world” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2007, pp. 311–312), in addition to directing the world toward a process of cultural homogenization that replaces the existing diversity (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2012, p. 136).

8

JAVIER PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR: LIFELONG VOCATION …

161

The UN and the Construction of Peace Regarding Javier Pérez de Cuéllar’s contribution to peace, his position as UN Secretary-General stands out in his second period in office (1987–1991), which was the most successful due to his contributions to several peace processes, both interstate (Iraq–Iran) and intrastate (Central America). Indeed, rather than any change in the diplomat’s convictions or strategy, Gorbachev’s “New Political Thought”—and the dramatic improvement in relations between Moscow and Washington that he impulse—enabled the Secretary-General to act with more autonomy. Equally important were the good relations that Pérez de Cuéllar knew to cultivate with the P5 representatives throughout his administration, in clear contrast to, for example, Dag Hammarskjöld or Boutros BoutrosGhali (Cockayne & Malone, 2007). Thus, if the election of the Peruvian diplomat in 1981 had resulted from his discreet character and the consideration of him as a “safe option” by the world powers, the unanimous support among the P5 to promote his re-election in 1986 would have been based on the outstanding professionalism shown, and his constant dialogue with the Security Council. Finally, it should be noted that the successes presented by Pérez de Cuéllar’s team contributed to a critical reassessment of the role of the United Nations after several years of being marginalized or divided in the context of the Cold War. With good reason, after leaving the UN, George H. Bush awarded him the Presidential Medal of Freedom for “having presided over the rebirth of the UN” (Manrique, 2020). Javier Pérez de Cuéllar can be described as a pivotal figure, framed by the context of the transition from the Cold War to the “Unipolar Moment” of the 1990s, both for the functioning of the UN and in terms of the conception of issues such as the international security, development or human rights. Without having been a norm entrepreneur of the stature of Boutros-Ghali (with his redefinition of peacekeeping operations) or Mahbub ul Haq (for the conceptualization of human security), from the practice of his position, Pérez de Cuéllar paved the way for the adoption of new standards in the period after his retirement as Secretary-General. However, as will be seen below, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar has been remembered mainly, for his contributions to international/external peace, with a gradual shift from a perspective of negative peace toward a conception closer to positive peace.

162

S. ADINS AND O. VIDARTE ARÉVALO

Regarding international security, in addition to his concern about the growing importance of new challenges and threats—such as transnational crime—he was also aware of its interrelation with socioeconomic development and human rights, thus glimpsing the paradigms of “human security” (specific to the UNDP) or “multidimensional security” (from the OAS). For example, he understood that the conflicts in Central America were rooted in the enormous social and economic inequalities that marked these societies. As such, the massive social exclusion of the vast majorities, combined with “structural violence” perpetrated by governments or death squads in favor of the status quo, had led to the irruption of the guerrillas and, therefore, a manifest external interference in such civil conflicts (Rieffer-Flanagan & Forsythe, 2007). In turn, with the sending of observer missions to Nicaragua and El Salvador, Pérez de Cuéllar would leave the basis for the so-called “second generation” peacekeeping operations, institutionalized through the An Agenda for Peace report by his successor Boutros-Ghali in 1992. Although, in contrast to the traditional peacekeeping operations, they constituted mainly in order to resolve interstate disputes through the dispatch of military contingents, that “second generation” of missions is based on broader mandates in the context of internal armed conflicts, including electoral monitoring tasks (as in the case of ONUVEN) or the supervision of the state of human rights (as was shown with the ONUSAL mission), among other functions. For this reason, they have the participation of mixed military and civilian personnel, as witnessed, for example, in the UN operations in Cambodia, the Balkans, or Haiti, inaugurated shortly after Pérez de Cuéllar’s retirement as Secretary-General. However, despite the importance he gave to the defense of democracy and human rights, Pérez de Cuéllar also understood the complicated relationship that these political positions maintain with state sovereignty and the principles of non-interference, territorial integrity, and political independence of any state, present in the United Nations Charter itself—and as an important part of the Latin American political tradition. By way of illustration, regarding the repression of the protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the Secretary-General limited himself to expressing an implicit criticism of the People’s Republic: It is an internal problem in which the United Nations has no right to interfere because all governments have the right to apply martial law. The issue is how martial law is applied. It is one thing to preserve order and quite

8

JAVIER PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR: LIFELONG VOCATION …

163

another to misuse the right to apply martial law. However, it is possible to preserve order while at the same time maintaining respect for human rights. The Chinese government has the right to apply martial law, provided it is exerted in a legal manner with full respect for the Chinese people’s human rights. (cited in Rieffer Flanagan & Forsythe, 2007, p. 254)

Along the same lines, Pérez de Cuéllar, once the 1991 Gulf War ended, opposed the decision of the United States and its allies to intervene unilaterally—under the umbrella of the UN—in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds of the repression of the then leader Saddam Hussein, considering it in opposition to the spirit of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter: Asked whether a Western military presence could be established under UN authority without Iraqi consent, he replied, “No. No. No. We have to be in touch first of all with the Iraqis.” At the same time, though, he seemed prepared to look the other way if Western forces chose to act alone, so long as the United Nations was not asked to use force: “If the countries involved do not require the United Nations flag, then that is quite different.” (Cockayne & Malone, 2007, pp. 78–79)

In a certain way, this ambiguity would anticipate the subsequent discussion about the effectiveness and, above all, the desirability of so-called humanitarian interventions. As already stipulated, also in his capacity as Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs (2000–2001), Pérez de Cuéllar would continue to defend democracy by leading the drafting of the InterAmerican Democratic Charter. This document would not only establish the link between representative democracy and stability, peace, and integral development of the Western Hemisphere, but it also facilitated the Secretary-General and the Permanent Council of this organization to adopt measures in the event of an alteration of the constitutional order in any of its member states (OAS, 2001).

Interpretation of His Legacy from an IR Perspective The predominance of the realist tradition in the first decades of the Cold War was evident in the academic and political debates of those years. In the case of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the thought of the French philosopher Raymond Aron exerted great influence, especially in the book Peace and War (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1993, p. VII). Pérez de Cuéllar himself recounts

164

S. ADINS AND O. VIDARTE ARÉVALO

in his memoirs that, since his stay in France at the beginning of his career, he had an important rapprochement toward the French intellectual movement of that time (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2012, pp. 44–45). Aron was very critical of American political realism, which he considered a cynical and calculating proposal that allowed any regime to be justified. In this sense, Aron believed that politics should be understood from the domain of force (which he considered false realism) and morality. The realist could be a human being of principles. This did not imply at any time moving away from the fundamental dogmas of realism, such as the conflictive nature of the international system or the importance of the search for security by countries. However, realism seemed to be much more complex than just emphasizing a vision pessimistic of human nature. His criticism of Hans Morgenthau—father of American political realism— was his permanent tendency to simplify reality (Aron, 1963, p. 27). Following the French thinker, Pérez de Cuéllar understood international dynamics from a realist perspective without ignoring the relevance of basic moral precepts that should guide international relations. For this reason, although the Peruvian diplomat was aware of the importance of the interests of the states within the UN (even worse in the context of the Cold War), he always sought the support of the states (and of the great powers) to deal with the problems of the world. Thus, his understanding of the struggle for power typical to the international system did not prevent Pérez de Cuéllar from insisting that the international community should also pay attention to a series of objectives that are on the moral level, from the defense of human rights to the need for development for all countries of the world. His interest in world peace as Secretary-General of the UN was permanent (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2021, p. 35). Likewise, and following the realist tradition, Pérez de Cuéllar was not oblivious to the impact that the existing power structure could have on the dynamics of the UN. Evidently, his role in the UN was largely conditioned by the constraints and opportunities that resulted from bipolarity. According to Pérez de Cuéllar, at the end of 1986, “he could not point to a single conflict that had been resolved during the previous five years as a result of the efforts of the United Nations” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2021, p. 34). In any case, the problems that Pérez de Cuéllar had in his first period as Secretary-General of the UN to face the dilemmas in terms of peace and security coincide with a difficult stage of the Cold War marked by the increase in tensions and the military race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Bipolarity did not facilitate the

8

JAVIER PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR: LIFELONG VOCATION …

165

work of the UN, “It seemed to freeze international relations in a kind of glacier, moving slowly and resisting any change in direction. The Security Council was largely frozen in its power” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2021, pp. 32– 33). As it has already been pointed out, the international organization not only generated mistrust in the world powers but also found itself limited by their interests in their respective areas of influence. His second term, on the other hand, was different. The positive balance that Pérez de Cuéllar carried out during his tenure as Secretary-General of the UN is directly related to the transformations in the dynamics of power at the world level, which went, little by little, determining the end of the Cold War. The Peruvian diplomat pointed out that “in 1987, a period marked by a dramatic and profound change began, unparalleled in history for its speed” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2021, p. 35), in such a way that while the veto power was used during the Cold War by world powers on 193 occasions, between 1990 and 2012, it was only invoked on 25 occasions (Taylor & Curtis, 2014, p. 310). These new conditions—Pérez de Cuéllar found “that there was a nascent solidarity between nations when dealing with serious problems with global implications” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2021, p. 36)—will allow the actions of the UN to have a greater presence, generating great expectations about the role that the UN can have in scenarios that threaten security. On the other hand, the priorities that Pérez de Cuéllar denoted in all his years as a diplomat and as SecretaryGeneral of the UN also brought him closer to the liberal narrative of the discipline of International Relations. Hence, it is no coincidence that, from a very young age, Pérez de Cuéllar had shown interest in Kantian philosophy (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2012, p. 33). As Secretary-General, his commitment to making countries (especially world powers) realize the importance of cooperation to confront underdevelopment and defend human rights in the world demonstrates, first of all, the liberal premise that countries can, for the sake of satisfying their interests, move away from the conflict of anarchy and cooperate. In an increasingly interdependent and globalized world, poverty in Africa or Latin America should also be a topic of interest for the rest of the world’s countries. However, it also expresses the importance that the “Liberal International Order” (LIO) led by the United States was beginning to have on a global level at a time of great political and economic change. The liberal order involves a series of aspects. However, in the words of John Ikenberry, the heart of the identity of the Western liberal order “is a consensus

166

S. ADINS AND O. VIDARTE ARÉVALO

around a set of norms and principles, most importantly political democracy, constitutional government, individual rights, private property-based economic systems, and tolerance of diversity in non-civic areas of ethnicity and religion” (Ikenberry, 2006, p. 102). In this sense, Pérez de Cuéllar can be considered a benchmark of the liberal order that seems to have been consolidating after the end of the Cold War. As a politician, he showed a particular interest in defense of democracy, as evidenced by his central role as a presidential candidate and then in the Peruvian transition at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Pérez de Cuéllar always had doubts about his participation in politics, but he considered that it was his “duty as Peruvian to contribute to the return of the rule of law in the country” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2012, p. 140). Likewise, as a diplomat, both in his actions at the UN and UNESCO, he expressed great concern for the protection of human rights and respect for cultural diversity (as has already been pointed out). In addition, and no less important, his academic and professional interest in the functioning of the UN also denotes a certain influence of neoliberal institutionalism in Pérez de Cuéllar’s thought. According to Robert Keohane, for an international organization to impact international dynamics, two conditions are required: the existence of mutual interests and the degree of institutionalization of the entity (Keohane, 1993, p. 16). Precisely, one of Pérez de Cuéllar’s main criticisms of the UN is that it did not have the guidelines, the budget, or the human resources to “efficiently execute decisions of the Council that implied the use of force in internal conflicts” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2021, p. 38). For this reason, although from his perspective, in his second term as SecretaryGeneral, the world powers showed some interest in acting jointly within the Security Council, the UN institutional framework showed limitations in carrying out its work (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2021, p. 38). However, in practice, the international institutions that play such an important role for liberals in ordering the dynamics between the different actors that participate in the international system are nothing more than legal norms, that is, international law. In this sense, from a very young age, even before his intervention as Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar showed interest in international law to the point of publishing his well-known Manual de Derecho Diplomático in the 1960s (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2012, p. 30). Finally, in line with Pérez de Cuéllar’s relevance to international law, the Peruvian diplomat is also an expression of the Latin American tradition of defending the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs

8

JAVIER PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR: LIFELONG VOCATION …

167

of states and of the sovereignty of states. As Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar promoted these principles, but the UN’s conflict situations led him to rethink them. The future of the UN was to “find the right balance between respecting, or perhaps redefining, sovereignty and maintaining the peace and security of humanity” (Pérez de Cuéllar, 2021, p. 39). Nothing is more valid, even these days.

Final Considerations Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was a Peruvian diplomat who realized the changes taking place in the world and the main issues that should be part of the international agenda. Throughout his work in international relations, he emphasized the role of the UN, which is why a large part of his discourse revolved around the possibilities and limitations that this international organization had to fulfill its objectives. However, his interest in major world problems led him to address diverse issues, from those involving peace and security to those such as the defense of human rights, the development of the planet, and respect for cultural diversity. Regarding his administration as Secretary-General of the United Nations, Pérez de Cuéllar was a figure of transition, deeply influenced by the international context of the end of the Cold War. This paved the way for a reconceptualization of international security during the following administration of Boutros Boutros-Ghali and a redefinition of peacekeeping operations, moving from a negative perspective of peace to a more positive one. On the other hand, a good part of his successes as Secretary-General in matters of peace and security resulted from his constant dialogue with the permanent members of the Security Council, his discreet style, and, above all, his outstanding professionalism. Pérez de Cuéllar was not an academic but a man of action, with a pragmatic view of what diplomacy could or could not achieve, but with clearly defined principles. His thought and actions denote the existence of multiple theoretical influences, from realism to liberalism, without leaving his Latin American heritage as a diplomat from that part of the world.

References Aron, R. (1963). Paz y guerra entre las naciones. Alianza Editorial. Carnero Arroyo, E. R. (2020). In Memoriam. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1920– 2020). Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, XX , 755–757.

168

S. ADINS AND O. VIDARTE ARÉVALO

Cockayne, J., & Malone, D. (2007). Relations with the Security Council. In Chesterman de Simon (Ed.), Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (pp. 69–85). Cambridge University Press. De Soto, A. (2020). In Memoriam. Global Governance, 26, 213–220. De Trazegnies, F. (1992). In PUCP (Ed.), Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. Doctor honoris causa (pp. 9–20). Ferrero, A. (2000). Presentación del libro homenaje. In Universidad de Lima & Universidad de Salamanca (Eds.), Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. Homenaje. 80 años (pp. 21–26). Universidad de Lima. Ikenberry, J. (2006). Liberal Order & Imperial Ambition. Polity Press. Jonah, J., & Hill, A. S. (2018). The Secretariat: Independence and Reform. In Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (2nd ed., pp. 260–279). Oxford University Press. Keohane, R. (1993). Instituciones Internacionales y Poder Estatal. GEL. Manrique, L. E. (2020, March 24). Pérez de Cuéllar: la discreción de la inteligencia. Política Exterior. https://www.politicaexterior.com/perez-Cué llar-la-discrecion-la-inteligencia/ Mayor, F. (2000). Discurso de orden. In Universidad de Lima & Universidad de Salamanca (Eds.), Acto Académico. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. Homenaje (pp. 27– 40). Universidad de Lima. Mosquera, S. (2020). La huella que deja un gran diplomático. Universidad de Piura. Newman, E. (2018). Secretary-General. In Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (2nd ed., pp. 280–300). Oxford University Press. OAS. (2001). Carta Democrática Interamericana. https://www.oas.org/charter/ docs_es/resolucion1_es.htm. Viewed on 9 June 2022. Pérez de Cuéllar, J. (1972). El Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. Revista de la Academia Diplomática del Perú, 4, 35–40. Pérez de Cuéllar, J. (1990a). Memoria del Secretario General sobre la labor de la Organización. Naciones Unidas. Pérez de Cuéllar, J. (1990b). The Future and the United Nations. Harvard International Review, 12(2), 8–9. Pérez de Cuéllar, J. (1990c, December 4). El Nuevo Orden Mundial. El País. Pérez de Cuéllar, J. (1992). Por otro desarrollo: el contrato cultural. El Paí. https://elpais.com/diario/1992/12/14/cultura/724287616_850215.html Pérez de Cuéllar, J. (1993). The Role of the UN Secretary-General. In Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (Eds.), United Nations, Divided World. The UN’s Roles in International Relations (pp. 125–142). Clarendon Paperbacks. Pérez de Cuéllar, J. (1995a). Entrevista de Milagros Miranda. La ONU: cincuenta años después ius et veritas (pp. 55–57).

8

JAVIER PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR: LIFELONG VOCATION …

169

Pérez de Cuéllar, J. (1995b). Reflecting on the Past and Contemplating the Future. Global Governance, 1(2), 149–170. Pérez de Cuéllar, J. (2000a). El potencial de las Naciones Unidas para moldear el mundo del mañana (1985). Discurso en la Universidad de Harvard con ocasión del 40 Aniversario de las Naciones Unidas. In Universidad de Lima & Universidad de Salamanca (Eds.), Homenaje. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. 80 años (pp. 39–52). Fondo de Desarrollo Editorial de la Universidad de Lima. Pérez de Cuéllar, J. (2000b). Reflexiones en torno al final del siglo (Valencia, 1996). In Universidad de Lima & Universidad de Salamanca (Eds.), Homenaje. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. 80 años (pp. 185–194). Fondo de Desarrollo Editorial de la Universidad de Lima. Pérez de Cuéllar, J. (2001a). Las Naciones Unidas en un mundo cambiante. Discurso en la Universidad de Cambridge. In Harold Forsyth (Ed.), Conversaciones con Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. Testimonio de un peruano universal (pp. 199–214). Noceda Editores S.A.C. Pérez de Cuéllar, J. (2001b). Discurso al ser nombrado para un nuevo mandato como Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas (1987–1991). In Harold Forsyth (Ed.), Conversaciones con Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. Testimonio de un peruano universal (pp. 191–198). Noceda Editores S.A.C. Pérez de Cuéllar, J. (2007). Interview by Juan Francisco Berckemeyer Olaechea. El carácter más importante, absolutamente indispensable de la función del Secretario General es la independencia ius et veritas (pp. 307–312). Pérez de Cuéllar, J. (2012). Memorias. Recuerdos personales y políticos. Santillana S.A. Pérez de Cuéllar, J. (2021). Peregrinaje por la paz. Memorias de un secretario general. Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial, S.A. Pérez de Cuéllar, J., et.al. (n.d.). Una nueva ética global. Nuestra diversidad creativa (El Correo de la UNESCO) (pp. 43–56). Pinto Bazurco, E. (2018). Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. Revista Peruana De Derecho Internacional, 160, 67–78. Rieffer-Flanagan, B. A., & Forsythe, D. (2007). Religion, Ethics, and Reality. A Study of Javier Perez de Cuéllar. In Kent Kille (Ed.), The UN Secretary General and Moral Authority. Ethics and Religion in International Leadership (pp. 229–264). Georgetown University Press. Taylor, P., & Curtis, D. (2014). The United Nations. In John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (Eds.), The Globalization of World politics. An Introduction to International Relations (pp. 304–319). Oxford University Press. Valverde, F. (2019). Los 100 años de Javier Pérez de Cuéllar y los ‘Cascos Azules’ de la ONU (pp. 1–3). Universidad Peruana de Ciencias Aplicadas (UPC). Wisotzki, I. (2000). In Universidad de Lima and Universidad de Salamanca (Eds.), Acto Académico. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. Homenaje (pp. 9–13). Universidad de Lima.

CHAPTER 9

Latin American Thinkers of Peace and Global IR Roberto Domínguez, Andrea Oelsner, and Apoorva Sridhar

Introduction The analysis of the seven Latin American peace figures enables the reader to comprehend the global scope of their contributions. While they all shared Latin America as a cultural and geographical setting, their actions supported global causes. In a world characterized by polarization, fragmentation, and dogmatism, the authors of this book outline ways to build bridges for a greater collective good in which violence can be mitigated and positive peace is possible.

R. Domínguez (B) Department of International Relations, Suffolk University, Boston, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected] A. Oelsner Department of Political Science, University of San Andrés, Buenos Aires, Argentina e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Domínguez and A. Oelsner (eds.), Latin American Thinkers of Peace, Global Political Thinkers, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36107-4_9

171

172

R. DOMÍNGUEZ ET AL.

This volume seeks to remedy the inattention to the contributions of seven protagonists of peace in the most methodical manner possible. Over the past two decades a widespread consensus has developed about the nature of the International Relations and Security knowledge produced in Latin America being mostly pragmatic, policy-oriented, and applied (Tickner & Herz, 2012). Simultaneously, IR theories have proliferated worldwide, and traditional approaches are frequently challenged Acharya and Buzan (2019). Global IR is a framework or research program that promotes greater diversity and inclusion in our field (Acharya, 2021), which is appropriate for this book’s object study. There is a need to shift from the universal to the plural, and to call for convergence with the grand IR narratives in order to explain their shortcomings and identify interconnections (Deciancio & Tussie, 2022). Similarly, Bilgin (2016) prefers to study IR as a concentration on intertwined and overlapping histories that connect the past to the present. Global International Relations do not seek to supplant established theories; instead, it embraces pluralistic universalism: a shared basis among numerous nations. In 2014, Acharya (2014) argued that the fragmenting tendencies of binaries (West/Non-West; Global South/Global North), the parochialism of diversity, and theoretical orthodoxy, all contributed to the decline of global stability. One of the challenges of Global IR is the need to contextualize who can speak (scholars without borders), how to go local, and how to make the local global (Gelardi, 2020). The common ground of international relations provides numerous avenues for the seven peace actors. Diehl (2016) argues, from the perspective of security studies, that the Nobel Committee’s awarding of the Peace Prize demonstrates the significance of positive peace. By analyzing the 96 prizes awarded to 129 laureates between 1901 and 2015, his research demonstrates a growing propensity for recognizing positive peace efforts. Before 1945, 67.7% (21 recipients) of peace awards were for negative peace, while only 16.1% (5) were for positive peace; after 1945, the proportions shifted to 35.4% (23) for negative peace and 55.4% (36). In addition to the significance of positive peace, more emphasis has been placed on the importance of cultural resources available for peacemaking in “local” conflict-affected contexts,

A. Sridhar International Investment Analyst, Boston, MA, USA

9

LATIN AMERICAN THINKERS OF PEACE AND GLOBAL IR

173

particularly in non-Western countries (Johnson et al., 2022), indigenous perspectives (Funk-Unrau, 2015), and race (Azarmand, 2018). Against this background, the contrasting personal histories, the approaches to peace, and how they made their local work global will help to understand their contributions.

Different Backgrounds, Common Goal All the personalities analyzed in this book experienced a transformation over their lifetime regarding their view of time and space. Changes in the political, economic, and social forms of international and domestic organizations challenged their ideas. Similarly, they themselves contributed to generating change. Through processes of socialization, they developed their own worldviews, significantly influenced by norms, rules, and language itself. Socialization occurred in the context of these peace actors’ interactions with other key actors in the processes of building peace. These interactions range from their negotiation partners, allies or opponents, and the victims of violence, to transnational and external actors with whom they were able to build networks. The personal histories, the family context, and the upbringing of each Latin American Nobel Peace Prize laureate had varying degrees of influence on their perspectives on world peace. Their contribution to peace combines leadership, bravery, and inventiveness in various situations. The Pérez Esquivel and Menchú families were both impoverished. The Quiche traditions, the Guatemalan genocide, and the intersecting oppression of the women, the poor, and the indigenous shape the personality of the Manchu to bring the struggles of millions of people to the Global Public Square. With his Guaraní grandmother and his very disadvantaged condition, Pérez Esquivel experienced poverty, religious upbringing, and close contact with discrimination and prejudice in South America. Menchú and Pérez Esquivel’s leadership for peace centered on local and societal demands against government abuses. In contrast, the work of the other five Latin American peace thinkers occurred within state structures. Their upbringing prepared them to navigate the complexities of power and to carry out negotiations to produce effective instruments for achieving peace. Saavedra Lamas, Arias Sánchez, and Santos were all raised in families with ties to the political elites of their respective nations. The Pérez de Cuéllar family was part of Peru’s

174

R. DOMÍNGUEZ ET AL.

economic elite, while García Robles received multiple promotions within the Mexican diplomatic service. If their upbringings placed them in diverse environments, it was their determination and capacity to build networks for peaceful change that are their defining characteristics. Networking with other elites in powerful positions helped them further their peace agendas. Saavedra Lamas established fluid global networks. Juan Manuel Santos was Foreign Trade, Finance, and Defense Minister. Also, Santos’s close friend, the former British prime minister Tony Blair, assisted him with ideas for a book regarding the Third way in Colombia. Two seasoned diplomats, Pérez de Cuéllar and García Robles, created networks that would eventually become crucial allies. While Pérez de Cuéllar was elected UN SecretaryGeneral as a “safe option” by world powers in 1981, the P5’s unanimous support for his re-election in 1986 recognized his high level of professionalism and constant search for dialogue with the Security Council. After leaving the United Nations, George H. Bush awarded him the Presidential Medal of Freedom for a good reason. García Robles’ early experience as Director of the Political Affairs Division at the United Nations Secretariat enabled him to network with influential external political actors, primarily presidents, foreign ministers, and ambassadors from Latin America, Africa, and Asia. For instance, he presided over the Group of 77, which consisted of nations from the Third World. On the other hand, Arias contested Reagan’s policy toward Honduras and El Salvador with the assistance of some Democratic Party leaders. At this crucial juncture, Arias’s leadership and mediation role coincided with those of other actors, including the European Community, the Democratic Party in the U.S. Congress, and the Latin American countries that supported the peace process in Central America through the Rio Group, which was formed in 1986 from the merger of the previous Contadora and Contadora Support groups. On the road to achieving peace, there have been conflicts and obstacles. Saavedra Lamas’ international activities earned him several enemies. The Chilean President, Arturo Alessandri, openly expressed his displeasure for Saavedra’s diplomacy and considered that he did not deserve the Nobel Peace Prize. The relationship between Santos and President Alvaro Uribe, who opposed the peace agreement, deteriorated over time. In more challenging circumstances, Pérez Esquivel and Rigoberta Menchú were subjected to oppression and physical violence, strengthening their perspectives on the meaning of peace. Menchú encountered obstacles to

9

LATIN AMERICAN THINKERS OF PEACE AND GLOBAL IR

175

joining the CUC, firstly because she was indigenous and then because she was a woman. In 1995, Menchú formally separated from the guerrilla movement, claiming that the Mayan people were excluded from peace talks between the guerrillas and the Guatemalan government. In the 1960s, Adolfo Pérez Esquivel began pursuing nonviolent resistance in Argentina. In 1975, he was arrested in Brazil and the following year in Ecuador. His most brutal detention experience occurred in his native Argentina, ruled by a military dictatorship at the time. In 1977, he detained, tortured, and nearly murdered without any court order against him.

Negative and Positive Peace Peace receives most scholarly and policymaking attention under the "negative peace" rubric: the absence of war. In his comprehensive review of the debates and ideas surrounding negative peace, Diehl (2016) recalls the various adjectives applied to negative peace: precarious peace, adversarial peace, pre-peace, conditional peace, and cold peace. The absence of violent conflict remains the defining aspect of these terms (Diehl, 2016). Regarding negative peace, the goal of diminishing violence was the common denominator of the seven Latin American thinkers of peace. Negative peace refers mostly to interstate relations, though not only. Saavedra Lamas brought together the warring parties Paraguay and Bolivia with representatives of the United States, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay at the Chaco Peace Conference, which took place between May and June 1935. As a result, the belligerents signed the Peace Protocol establishing the definitive cessation of hostilities, which would later be ratified by signing the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Limits between Paraguay and Bolivia in July 1938. Óscar Arias led the Esquipulas II meeting in August 1987, when the five presidents signed the so-called Arias or Esquipulas Plan, thereby ushering in a new and more fruitful phase of the regional peace process. Arias presented a unified Central American front to support peace in the world by convincing the Central Americans to sign his plan. The International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers was drafted by this Commission and presented to the United Nations in May 1997 with the support of Józef Rotblatt, Elie Wiesel, and Betty Williams, among others. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, mainly in Latin America, was one of the most significant achievements of García Robles. OPANAL was

176

R. DOMÍNGUEZ ET AL.

created as a result of the 1969 Tlatelolco Treaty and it aimed to forbid the use of nuclear technology for military purposes in the region. In the case of Pérez de Cuéllar, his position as UN Secretary-General stands out since his second period in office (1987–1991) was the most successful thanks to his contributions to several peace processes, both interstate (Iraq–Iran) and intrastate (Central America). On the other hand, positive peace considers one or more dimensions of variation within the category of conflict-free situations. It refers to the existence (or at least the possibility) of intimate relationships or societal prosperity that surpass simple negative peace as the absence of war. Works that do not lump all situations in which there is no conflict into a single category but rather capture different degrees or types of peace are coded as positive peace. This encompasses most studies beyond the simple presence or absence of violence to examine the underlying disagreement that produces it. Several fields of study, including conflict resolution, human rights, reconciliation, justice, economic development, human security, and gender, tend to rely extensively on the concept of positive peace (Diehl, 2016). Arias established the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress and endowed it with the Nobel Peace Prize funds to promote positive peace. The foundation established the Center for Human Progress, which focuses on gender equality and development projects, and the Center for Peace and Reconciliation, which concentrates on peacebuilding initiatives. Arias has supported a concept of positive peace based on the United Nations Development Program’s concept of human security (UNDP). His notion of positive peace linked the absence of violence with eradicating poverty and inequality, but in his liberal view, this could be accomplished by integrating Central American economies with U.S. and global markets. As Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar was committed to convincing nations (especially world powers) of the significance of international cooperation in the fight against underdevelopment and the defense of human rights, demonstrating first and foremost the liberal premise that nations can, for the sake of satisfying their interests, move away from anarchy and cooperate. In a world that is becoming more interdependent and globalized, poverty in Africa or Latin America should also be of interest to the rest of the world. The Menchú Foundation continues its activism for indigenous peoples’ causes. Through her participation in conferences and forums, Menchú has become a spokesperson for peace and an advocate for peace education

9

LATIN AMERICAN THINKERS OF PEACE AND GLOBAL IR

177

by bringing the violence and injustice committed in Guatemala to the international community’s attention. Pérez Esquivel was no longer solely concerned with the spirituality of the poor, but also with their material circumstances. Recent Peace and Justice Service initiatives have centered on securing judicial approval of the contention that human rights violations and crimes against humanity are imprescriptible. In addition, they have advocated for the recognition of women’s roles in society, particularly in education, politics, and science. However, for Pérez Esquivel, adherence to the principle of nonviolence was an ethical imperative, an audacity that must be acknowledged considering the regional historical context of the 1960s and 1970s.

How Have the Seven Thinkers Engaged in Global Ideas of Peace? The Latin American thinkers of peace examined in this volume reinforced the importance of Global IR Kuru (2020). Regarding international relations theory, the thinkers have explicitly or implicitly employed concepts and potential theories to explain world problems in their narratives at the domestic and international levels. Hence, we propose a categorization consisting of two variables: implicit and explicit conceptualizations on one axis and theories on the other, including but not limited to realism, liberalism, constructivism, post-colonialism, peace studies, and gender and green studies. From an International Relations perspective, the contributions of the seven thinkers can be interpreted based on their concrete actions. While they prioritize some topics over others and are therefore inclined to follow specific theories unintentionally, they combine more than one in their actions, according to the assessment. In the grand narratives of International Relations, their pragmatism to achieve peace allowed them to defend what was pertinent to their societies. Regarding realist approaches, the role of the state and the definition of power have been crucial in locating avenues for negotiation and conflict to construct peace. Saavedra Lamas criticized the traditional hemispheric actions of the United States and had a positive position regarding European influence. García Robles understood that denuclearization was tied to security concerns and national interests. Arias distanced himself explicitly from the traditional postulates of political realism and power politics, and contested Reagan’s Honduras and El Salvador policies. Santos was able to comprehend the military’s role in constructing a peace agreement

178

R. DOMÍNGUEZ ET AL.

as defense minister. His operations Sodoma in 2010 and Odiseo in 2011 deserve attention because they weakened guerrilla groups, and began to change and to open the dialogue leading to a humanitarian agreement. Pérez de Cuéllar’s strategic compass identified the UN’s weaknesses and dependence on the great powers. The other major theory in International Relations is liberalism. The recognition of institutions as tools for resolving conflicts is, to a greater or lesser degree, shared by the majority of liberal approaches. Saavedra Lamas’ position on the positive and desirable results of European influence is based on his adherence to international law and defense of democracy. His work centered on a liberal internationalist approach to avoiding armed conflict during the interwar period, which is typical of the development of international treaties and support organizations. He compares a collective bargain between employees and employers to a peace treaty because he characterized the strikes as an example of economic warfare between competitors. In this sense, the absence of social justice endangers domestic tranquility. On the other hand, García Robles resorted to International Law in all of his endeavors. He made law a tool for peace and diplomacy, the most effective instrument for the peaceful settlement of national and international affairs in line with Liberal and Institutional traditions. Arias supported the liberalization and openness policies of the Washington Consensus and neoliberalism, which ultimately contributed to globalization. His notion of positive peace linked the absence of violence with eradicating poverty and inequality, which resonates with Peace Studies understandings of positive peace. But in his liberal view, this should be accomplished by integrating Central American economies with U.S. and global markets. For Pérez de Cuéllar, the United Nations is of great importance to the world, not only because it is a political instrument that seeks to preserve peace, but also because it is part of a system that includes various sectoral organizations (such as UNESCO, ILO, and WHO, among others) and thus seeks to address the various problems that plague humanity. Pérez de Cuéllar distinguished himself as a norms pioneer and defender of more liberal principles. Adopted by the Organization of American States in 2001, the Inter-American Democratic Charter was negotiated with a focus on human rights protection and election monitoring. Pérez de Cuéllar, on the other hand, was not unfamiliar with questions regarding United Nations actions. Critically, the former Secretary-General acknowledged that not all societal issues are amenable

9

LATIN AMERICAN THINKERS OF PEACE AND GLOBAL IR

179

to multilateral action. In addition to being concerned about the growing significance of new challenges and threats, such as transnational crime, he was also aware of their interrelation with socioeconomic development and human rights, thus gaining a glimpse of the UNDP-unique paradigms of human security or multidimensional security (from the OAS). Within the context of threats to the international order, all the Nobel Prize awardees acknowledged the injustices of the great powers. Five of the chapters highlight the criticisms to the abuse of power by the United States but also recognize the relevance of negotiating with great powers and building networks of peace. Rigoberta Menchú and Pérez Esquivel have held a more critical view of the international order and the United States. In the area of International Relations, their views fall broadly in the category of critical approaches. Menchú Tum’s view of peace is based on two Quiche concepts: utzil, which encompasses all aspects of life and balance and respect; and pixab, which evokes a comprehensive and rich education where spirituality, culture, health, natural resources, education, knowledge, and politics converge in a space where they can only be understood because they are interdependent and mutually essential aspects of human life. Pérez Esquivel has consistently defended the link between human rights, development, and positive peace, adding his efforts to effectively building transnational networks of nonviolent Christian and ecumenical organizations. His continued use of the concepts of active nonviolence, institutionalized violence, and peace finds parallel concepts in the thought of the father of Peace Studies, Johan Galtung, who talks about “peace by peaceful means,” structural violence, and positive and negative peace. Overall, the incessant and unrelenting leadership of the seven Latin American peace protagonists prove true the argument that global thinking and local action are necessary to produce lasting transformations. Building bridges of dialogue with adversaries mitigates violence and enhances the potential of peaceful coexistence. From the perspective of Global IR, the peace thinkers analyzed in this book provide avenues for promoting peace and pluralistic universalism that transcends the fragmenting tendencies of binaries threatening global peace.

180

R. DOMÍNGUEZ ET AL.

References Acharya, A. (2014). Global IR and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies. International Studies Quarterly, 58(4), 647–659. Acharya, A. (2021). Global International Relations. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki & S. Smith (Eds.), International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity (5th ed.). Oxford University Press. Acharya, A., & Buzan, B. (2019). The Making of Global International Relations. Origins and Evolution of IR in its Centenary. Cambridge University Press. Azarmand, M. (2018). The Racial Silence within Peace Studies. Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 30(Jan–Mar), 69–77. Bilgin, P. (2016). “Contrapuntal Reading” as a Method, an Ethos, and a Metaphor for Global IR. International Studies Review, 18, 134–146. https:/ /doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv018 Deciancio, D., & Tussie, D. (2022). Conclusion. Taking Stock: Latin American Contributions to Global IR. In A. Acharya, D. Deciancio & D. Tussie (Eds.), Latin America in Global International Relations (pp. 235–251). Routledge. Diehl, P. (2016). Exploring Peace: Looking Beyond War and Negative Peace. International Studies Quarterly, 60, 1–10. Funk-Unrau, N. (2015). Toward the Canadianization and Indigenization of Peace Studies. Peace Research, 47 (1/2), 29–45. Gelardi, M. (2020). Moving Global IR Forward—A Road Map. International Studies Review, 22, 830–852. Johnson, A. K., Robison, M. D., Lechartre, J., Hughes, C., & Mart, S. G. (2022). Peace Scholarship and the Local Turn: Hierarchies in the Production of Knowledge About Peace. Journal of Peace Research, XX (X), 1–16. Kuru, D. (2020). Dialogue of the “Globals”: Connecting Global IR to Global Intellectual History. All Azimuth, 9, 229–248. Tickner, A. B., & Herz, M. (2012). No Place for Theory? Security Studies in Latin America. In A. B. Tickner & D. L. Blaney (Eds.), Thinking International Relations Differently (pp. 92–111). Routledge.

Index

A Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), 71, 175 Alliances, 11, 16, 21, 26, 69, 70, 85, 133, 134 Amazigh, 122 American Institute of International Law, 17 American International Conferences, 58 American solidarity, 9, 16 Amnesty International, 93 Animosities, 16, 23 anti-ballistic missiles (ABM), 76 Anti-war Pact, 17, 19, 22, 29 Anti-war Treaty of Non-aggression and Conciliation, 9, 15 arbitration, 28 Arias, Óscar, 10, 83–85, 90, 91, 96–102, 174–176, 178 Authoritarian, 96, 154, 156

C Central America, 10, 45, 83–87, 90, 91, 95, 96, 98, 99, 101, 152, 153, 161, 162, 174, 176 Central American crisis, 86, 87, 90, 101 Chaco War, 9, 15–18, 20, 22, 26, 29 Chávez, Hugo, 135 Chimel, 108, 109 Codification Conference of The Hague, 17 Cold War, 12, 34, 40, 47, 55, 72, 74, 75, 83, 84, 86, 87, 91, 114, 150, 155, 161, 163–167 Collective bargain, 28, 178 Colombian Peace Agreement, 143 Colonial process, 116 Committee of Non-Governmental Organizations of the Kingdom of Belgium, 111 Committee of Peasant Unity (CUC), 110, 111, 114, 175

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Domínguez and A. Oelsner (eds.), Latin American Thinkers of Peace, Global Political Thinkers, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36107-4

181

182

INDEX

Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, 133 Conflict resolution, 9, 11, 15, 30, 116, 119, 123, 176 Constitutional order, 163 Constructivism, 2, 4, 56, 67, 73, 76, 139, 177 Constructivist, 3, 56, 77, 84, 108, 142 Consultation, 9, 16, 29, 30 Costa Rican Central Bank, 84 Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, 92

D De Alvear, Marcelo T., 16 Defense Minister, 130, 133, 174, 178 De la Plaza, Victorino, 17 Demilitarization, 84, 91, 92, 94, 95 Democracy, 4, 11, 12, 27, 40, 50, 74, 89, 91–93, 95–102, 120, 137, 138, 143, 159, 160, 163, 166, 178 Democratic peace, 4, 96–98 Democratic Security Program, 131, 132 Denuclearization of Latin America (COPREDAL), 10, 60, 65 Developing international treaties, 16 Diplomacy, 10, 27, 56, 69, 71, 87, 127, 155, 167, 174 Diplomacy of Peace, 67, 127, 143, 178 Disarmament, 10, 11, 56, 60, 61, 63, 68–71, 73, 74, 77, 84, 91, 93, 98, 142, 153 Domestic obstacles, 9, 15 Dominant script of democracy, 94

E Economic development, 15, 28, 50, 93, 160, 176 Economic interests, 9, 16, 21 Economic nationalism, 9, 15, 28 Ecumenical, 9, 34, 37, 41, 44, 46, 179 Education for Peace, 11, 108, 112, 119 Esquipulas II Agreement, 94, 101 Esquivel, Adolfo Perez, 2, 9, 33–35, 37, 39–42, 46, 50–52, 175 European influence, 27, 177, 178

F Fraga, Rosendo, 18, 24–26

G Garcia Robles, A., 2, 56–62, 65–77 General Assembly of the United Nations, 63, 64 Geneva Conference, 63–65 Geopolitics, 73 Geostrategic interests, 9, 16 Global political vocation, 155 Good governance, 129 Good Government Foundation, 131 Guatemala, 10, 11, 86, 88, 91, 99, 100, 107–109, 111–114, 117, 120–122, 177 Guerrilla movement, 112, 175

H Hague Conferences, 58, 64 hemispheric solidarity, 29 Honorable Council of the Mexican International Studies Association, 70

INDEX

I imperialism, 57, 73, 77 indigenous people, 11, 36, 44, 107–111, 113–115, 120–122, 176 Indigenous rights, 11, 116, 121 Institute of International Law, 17 Institutional innovation, 143 Institutionalism, 134, 166 Institutionalized, 10, 34, 36, 37, 47–50, 96, 162, 179 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), 74 Inter-American Council of Jurists, 64 Inter-American Democratic Charter, 12, 150, 154, 163, 178 Inter-American Juridical Committee, 63, 65 Interculturalism, 108, 115, 118 Intergovernmental organizations, 116, 157 internal obstacles, 28 International anarchy, 9, 15, 28 International Coffee Organization, 127 international conflicts, 12, 28, 30, 59, 133 International Criminal Court, 126 International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR), 37, 43, 47 International Labor Conference, 17, 20 international law, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24, 27–29, 57, 59, 62–65, 68, 71, 73, 77, 132, 166, 178 International Negotiating Network, 92 International Red Cross, 136 International Relations, 2–4, 10, 17, 18, 30, 34, 49, 56, 66–68, 72, 76, 84, 98, 107, 108, 115, 116,

183

119, 122, 125, 126, 139, 164, 165, 167, 172, 177, 178 International Socialist, 85 Interwar liberal internationalism, 16 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 127

L labor legislation, 19, 28 La Concepción Argentina del Arbitraje y la Intervención, 17 La Crise de la Codification et la Doctrine Argentine du droit international , 17 Latin America, 1, 4, 9–11, 27, 34, 36, 39, 40, 42, 43, 47, 51, 57, 59–61, 63, 66, 67, 69, 70, 73, 74, 83, 84, 114, 122, 126, 131, 135, 165, 171, 172, 174–176 Latin American countries, 27, 42, 72, 73, 90, 101, 131, 174 Latin American peace, 2, 8, 15, 171, 173, 179 Leadership, 2, 10, 39, 41, 83, 87, 90, 101, 102, 110, 113, 115, 122, 129, 130, 132, 134, 135, 140, 141, 143, 173, 174, 179 League of Nations, 17, 20, 21, 23, 25, 28, 30, 58 Legitimisation of exploitation, 42 Liberal economic policy, 28 Liberal International Order (LIO), 165 Liberalism, 4, 11, 20, 66, 70, 98, 167, 177, 178 Liberal peace, 84, 94, 96, 99, 102 Liberal perspective, 12, 66, 150 Liberation theology, 41, 110 local and regional levels, 108 Luisa Lamas Somellera, 16

184

INDEX

M Machiavellian, 9, 16 Mariano Abraham Saavedra Zavaleta, 16 Marxism, 57, 67, 76 Marxist, 42, 50, 56, 65, 73 mediation, 22, 23, 28–30, 89, 90, 101, 174 Menchú, Rigoberta, 11, 107–113, 115, 117, 119, 174, 179 Menchú, Vicente, 108, 109, 111 Mexican Foreign Service (SEM), 69 Mexican International Policy, 66 Military Armed Forces of Colombia, 129 Minister of Defense, 128–130, 132, 133 Minister of Finance, 128 Minister of Foreign Trade, 128 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17, 19, 21, 25, 127, 134, 151 Ministry of Justice and Public Instruction, 17 Monge administration, 87, 88 Multiculturalism, 108 Multidimensional security, 143, 162, 179 N National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation of Colombia, 126 National Institute of Agrarian Transformation (INTA), 109 National Liberation Party (PLN), 84, 85, 95 Nation-states, 108, 122 Negative peace, 3, 4, 75, 108, 118, 142, 161, 172, 175, 176, 179 Neoliberalism, 102, 178 Networks, 2, 3, 9, 16, 23, 26, 27, 34, 37, 40, 41, 43, 50, 69, 84, 85,

115, 127, 129, 130, 173, 174, 179 New International Economic Order, 152 1962 Missile Crisis, 55 1991 Gulf War, 163 Nobel Peace Prize, 1–3, 5–12, 17, 19, 20, 23–25, 27, 33, 35, 38, 39, 45, 50, 56, 61, 67, 70, 76, 83, 90, 92, 93, 96, 102, 107, 111, 113–115, 122, 125, 126, 135, 138, 141, 143, 144, 149, 154, 173, 174, 176 Non-intervention, 12, 28, 56, 150, 166 Nonproliferation, 60, 63, 67, 71, 74, 75, 77, 93, 175 Non-violence, 34, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45–48, 50, 123, 179

O Office of Mexican Disarmament, 69 Organization of American States, 12, 150, 178

P Pacificist, 16 Pacifism, 34, 48, 70 Pan-Americanism, 27, 28 Pavarotti Educational Center, 11, 121, 122 Peace Accord, 100, 102, 129, 141, 153 Peace and Justice Service (SERPAJ), 9, 34, 37–46, 48, 49, 177 Peace and security, 28, 155, 164, 167 Peaceful settlement of disputes, 29, 56, 63, 66 Peacekeeping, 2, 5, 12, 149, 150, 156, 161, 162, 167

INDEX

Pérez de Cuéllar, J., 2, 5, 8, 12, 149–152, 154, 156, 161, 163, 167 Peronism, 17 Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 163 Plebiscite, 137, 144 pluralistic universalism, 5, 76, 172, 179 Political Participation, 11, 12, 143 Por la paz de las Américas , 27–29 Positive peace, 3, 4, 10, 11, 34, 48, 73, 97, 102, 108, 117–119, 123, 142, 144, 161, 171, 172, 176, 178, 179 Post-Cold War era, 84, 101, 102 Preventive diplomacy, 12, 150 principle of domicile, 28 professional experience, 27, 69

Q Quiche, 108, 110, 117, 173, 179

R Reagan administration, 86–88, 96, 153 Realism, 4, 10, 21, 56, 66, 67, 70, 72, 76, 97, 164, 167, 177 Realist, 20, 56, 72, 108, 116, 131, 163, 164, 177 Reformas Orgánicas a la Enseñanza Pública, 17 Regional crisis, 86, 87, 95 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 11, 125, 128–130, 132, 133, 135, 137, 138, 143, 144 Robles, Alfonso Garcia, 10, 63–65

185

S Saavedra Lamas, Carlos, 1, 9, 15–30, 174, 175, 177, 178 Sáenz Peña, Luis, 16 Sáenz Peña, Roque, 16 Santos, J.M., 2, 11, 125–127, 132, 133, 136–138, 140, 141, 143, 174 Saxon world, 27 Secretary-General, 5, 9, 12, 16, 58, 136, 138, 149, 151–153, 155, 157–159, 161–167, 176, 178 Secretary of Foreign Relations, 10, 58, 60, 61 Self-determination, 56, 66 Social reforms, 28, 41 Sociedad de Beneficencia de la Capital Federal , 16 Sovereign states, 9, 16, 29, 96 Soviet Union (USSR), 7, 55, 60, 71, 72, 74–77, 91, 151, 153, 164 Special Justice for Peace (JEP), 134 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 76, 77 Structural violence, 34, 48, 49, 162, 179 submission of disputes, 28 support organizations, 28, 178 Sustaining international organizations, 16 Systemic obstacles, 9, 15, 28

T Tamazight language, 122 The Binational Border Commission, 133 The Centre for Peace and Reconciliation of the Arias Foundation, 91 The International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfer, 93, 175

186

INDEX

Tlatelolco Treaty, 10, 56, 57, 65–77, 176 Traditional Argentine elite, 16, 20, 26 Treaties, 9, 21, 22, 28, 30, 55, 58–60, 64–66, 71, 72, 75–77, 93, 98, 178 U UN Goodwill Ambassador, 111 United Nations (UN), 2, 5, 10, 12, 46, 58–65, 70, 71, 75–77, 93, 94, 97, 99, 100, 116, 134, 136, 143, 149–158, 160–167, 174, 175, 178 United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, 93 United Nations Charter, 152, 153, 162, 163 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 6, 61

United Nations Secretary-General, 2, 8, 12, 111, 153, 159, 161, 176 United States (US), 8, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 34, 40, 50, 55, 58, 60, 64, 65, 70–77, 84, 86, 88, 89, 91, 95–97, 99, 100, 112, 131–133, 136, 152, 158, 163–165, 175, 177, 179 UN Security Council (P5), 134, 136, 151–153, 157, 161, 174

V Victims Law, 134, 135

W Westernized frameworks, 116, 122 Workers’ rights, 29 World Bank, 95, 100