Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy 3030745635, 9783030745639

Citation preview

Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy Edited by Vanessa Bravo · Maria De Moya

Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy

Series Editors Kathy Fitzpatrick, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA Philip Seib, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA

At no time in history has public diplomacy played a more significant role in world affairs and international relations. As a result, global interest in public diplomacy has escalated, creating a substantial academic and professional audience for new works in the field. The Global Public Diplomacy Series examines theory and practice in public diplomacy from a global perspective, looking closely at public diplomacy concepts, policies, and practices in various regions of the world. The purpose is to enhance understanding of the importance of public diplomacy, to advance public diplomacy thinking, and to contribute to improved public diplomacy practices.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14680

Vanessa Bravo · Maria De Moya Editors

Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy

Editors Vanessa Bravo School of Communications Elon University Elon, NC, USA

Maria De Moya College of Communication DePaul University Chicago, IL, USA

ISSN 2731-3883 ISSN 2731-3891 (electronic) Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy ISBN 978-3-030-74563-9 ISBN 978-3-030-74564-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74564-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

The sophistication and relevance of public diplomatic practices of countryspecific organizations engaging with diaspora communities and diaspora communities engaging with their homeland and host/home-country institutions have increased significantly over the last several decades. Information, communication, and transportation technologies have accelerated this development. The stakes are high and global, regional, and national complexities demand ongoing academic research, discussions, and knowledge sharing amongst scholars and professionals. I am very proud of my former doctoral students, advisees, and current colleagues Vanessa Bravo and Maria De Moya for their timely publication of Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy with authors from across the subcontinent. Since meeting them in Florida and following their career progress in Illinois and North Carolina, I have witnessed their passion and dedication for the research and teaching areas of specialization. They are elevating voices of the Global South who have been underrepresented in the literature; scholars and teachers who have significant insights and perspectives to share about a timely topic and an evolving region with a challenging present and an uncertain future. Latin American scholars also introduce literature in Spanish and Portuguese that are not well known by many scholars and professionals in other continents. This is not only beneficial for the editors and selected authors, but for scholars and students of modern public diplomacy all over the world.

v

vi

FOREWORD

This original edited volume fills a large void in the public diplomacy literature because of its emphasis on diaspora groups; that is, the current and former citizens of nations who now reside in other countries or continents, while still having strong personal, political, economic, and/or cultural ties and holding great influence in their country of origin or birth. The focus on Latin America from a strategic communication perspective is also unique and long overdue. Since their doctoral work, Vanessa and Maria have developed a relevant research agenda that this book amplifies and furthers. The participation of a variety of Latin American scholars is evidence of the reach and impact of the editors’ work over a decade. The timing of this book could not be better, and it is welcome. As a global phenomenon, the deadly pandemic has contracted regional economies, stressed their health systems, and threatened weak government structures and other national institutions. Recovering from this contraction or recession will take years. Acknowledging that COVID-19 has impacted every country on earth, Latin American diasporas, especially those living in advanced economies, will play an important role in the recovery plans of their homelands where they have roots, family members, relatives, friends, and perhaps economic or political interests. The conceptualization chapters and case studies included in this publication will help scholars and strategic communication professionals working on behalf of Latin American nations to understand and prognosticate the power and influence of diaspora communities in challenging times for their homelands. The power and influence of diasporas may increase because of greater migration flows caused by the deteriorating political, economic, and social conditions of countries in the region. Although, national governments may restrict and even block migration flows. The fact that this book includes a good representation of countries in the subcontinent, including the largest in land mass and population, will facilitate future comparative research. This type of inquiry is most needed in a period when economies, societies, and political systems participate in ongoing globalization or deglobalization activities and programs. Nationalism and protectionism may slow down trade and international exchanges within the region and among nations, however. In different levels of interdependence, comparative research also allows for the identification of trends and cross-cultural, multicultural studies, gathering and analyzing rich qualitative and quantitative data that document phenomena beyond geographical borders and national idiosyncrasies.

FOREWORD

vii

Vanessa and Maria represent an emergent class of scholars and teachers who came from Latin America to the United States to further their education and career progression. They belong to a small community of scholars who have dedicated their academic careers to documenting their areas of specialization from a Latin American perspective. In turn, their positions in U.S.-based universities have created opportunities for scholars in the subcontinent, such as authoring the chapters in this book. Documenting public diplomacy and diaspora groups require a transnational approach. Federal and state governments, nongovernmental organizations, large national and multinational companies, religious institutions, and other groups use modern public diplomacy strategy and practices to engage and move diasporas into action on behalf of their homeland. The relationships these organizations and entities cultivate and develop for the benefit of a given nation or region happen in a matrix model; that is, from south to south, south to north, north to south, north to north, and so forth. This book includes exchanges targeting diasporas in a variety of countries in the Global North and Global South. This is another important contribution of this publication. The future of the world during or after the pandemic is challenging to predict, despite examples of significant events that have impacted humanity throughout history. However, the cultural, social, economic, and political ties that diaspora groups have with their country of origin will surely never go away and will likely stand the test of the unusual times we experience. I am confident that these intellectual efforts result in future research collaboration and publications among the editors and contributors of this edited volume. Academia and the strategic communication industry will benefit greatly with more documentation of the Latin American perspective. In fact, challenges and opportunities that the region has faced for decades can inform the dramatic conditions that other latitudes are facing today and will face in the future. I remember when I introduced the Latin American Public Relations School of Thought in the early 2000s; a perspective that emphasizes social roles of strategic communication professionals using organizational resources to further the well-being of internal and external audiences, as well as the overall betterment of engaged and impacted communities as a result of organizational decisions and actions. The social role of strategic communication is now at the core of strategic communication

viii

FOREWORD

in programs of organizational purpose and/or brand/corporate responsibility. Knowledge creation and evidence-based education is no longer reserved for advanced economies. There are talented scholars and established higher education programs all over the world, including the Global South, that contribute to the understanding of global and multicultural phenomena. The authors and their institutional affiliations are examples of the anticipated research and education excellence that contribute to the documentation and understanding of disciplines of study and practice such as public diplomacy and diaspora relations. Vanessa, Maria, and Latin American colleagues, ¡enhorabuena!, your intellectual contribution is greatly appreciated. I am honored you invited me to add my thoughts on your relevant and timely work. Juan-Carlos Molleda, Ph.D. Edwin L. Artzt Dean and Professor School of Journalism and Communication University of Oregon Eugene, USA Acknowledgments The co-editors of this book want to acknowledge and deeply thank the support, throughout the entire process of co-editing and writing this volume, of Elon University (www.elon.edu) and DePaul University (www.dep aul.edu). We also thank the authors who contributed their excellent research to this volume and, especially, we wholeheartedly thank Dr. Juan-Carlos Molleda, our long-time mentor and friend, for honoring us by writing the Foreword to the book. Gracias a todos. Dr. Juan-Carlos Molleda is a tenured Professor and the Edwin L. Artzt Dean of the School of Journalism and Communication at the University of Oregon since 2016. Molleda has accumulated more than two decades of experience teaching and researching public relations and communication management at the University of Florida (2000–2016), University of South Carolina (1997–2000), and Radford University (1995–1997). He received his bachelor of science in social communication degree (1990) from Universidad del Zulia in Venezuela, a master of science in corporate and professional communications (1997) from Radford University in Virginia, and a doctor of philosophy degree in journalism and mass communications with an emphasis on international public relations and international business (2000) from the University of South Carolina. Since his doctoral studies in South Carolina, Molleda has become a leading teacher and scholar in global corporate public relations management. In 2010, he was

FOREWORD

ix

awarded the University of South Carolina’s School of Journalism and Mass Communications Outstanding Young Alumni Award. Molleda is a member of the Institute for Public Relations’ Board of Trustees, The LAGRANT Foundation’s Board of Directors, and the Plank Center for Leadership in Public Relations’ Board of Advisors. Between 2007 and 2013, he also held leadership positions (Secretary, Vice Chair, and Chair) with the Public Relations Division of the International Communication Association (ICA).

Contents

1

Introduction: Diasporas from Latin America and Their Role in Public Diplomacy Vanessa Bravo and Maria De Moya

Part I 2

3

4

5

1

Diaspora Relations: States Courting the Diaspora

Transnational Social Protection and the Role of Countries of Origin: The Cases of Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Ecuador Karla A. Valenzuela-Moreno State–Diaspora Relations in El Salvador and Colombia: Building Legitimacy at Home While Trying to Protect and “Court” Citizens Abroad Vanessa Bravo Diaspora Engagement Policies in Argentina: The Unfolding of a Still Lukewarm Approach Ana Margheritis Chileans in China and How They View Their Role in Public Diplomacy: Between Entrepreneurship and State Policies Claudia Labarca and Philippe Werner-Wildner

27

53

75

97

xi

xii

CONTENTS

Part II Diaspora-led Public Diplomacy 123

6

The New Cuban Diaspora Maria De Moya and Vanessa Bravo

7

#RickyRenuncia: The Hashtag That Took Collective Outrage from Social Media to the Streets Yadira Nieves-Pizarro and Juan Mundel

159

Civil Society as an Advocate of Mexicans and Latinos in the United States: The Chicago Case Tania Gómez Zapata

189

8

9

10

11

12

The Diaspora of Bahia and Afro-Brazilian Culture in Contemporary France Clarice Ferreira Menezes, Deborah Rebello Lima, and Leonardo de Souza Boy The Strategy of the Venezuelan Diaspora: Collaboration, Representation, and Reconstruction of Venezuelan People in Colombia, Latin America and the World Tomás Páez Bravo Mexican Diasporic Women in Public Diplomacy: A Case Study of “Mex and the City” in the United States Eduardo Luciano Tadeo Hernández Brazilian Ethnic Media in the United States: An Analysis of Their Social Control and Pluralistic Functions in an Electoral Context Juliana Fernandes

Part III 13

235

259

285

Conclusion

Conclusion: Lessons Learned and Future Research Maria De Moya and Vanessa Bravo

Index

215

311

325

Notes on Contributors

Dr. Vanessa Bravo is Department Chair and Associate Professor in Strategic Communications at Elon University, in North Carolina. After working for almost 15 years as a Journalist, Editor, and Communications Director in Costa Rica, she obtained her doctorate in Mass Communications and her certificate in Latin American Studies at the University of Florida, in 2011, and she started working at Elon that same fall. In the USA, she has been a Fulbright Scholar and a Fellow of the Newspaper Association of America, of the Plank Center for Leadership in Public Relations and of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communications (through the Institute for Diverse Leadership in Journalism and Communication). Her work has been published in journals such as The Hague Journal of Diplomacy,Public Relations Review, Public Relations Inquiry, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Rising Powers Quarterly, and the International Journal of Communication, among others. Bravo, who received the Faculty Excellence in Research Award from Elon’s School of Communications in 2017, is proudly Costa Rican and an American citizen. Dr. Maria De Moya is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Public Relations and Advertising program in the College of Communication at DePaul University, in Chicago. An immigrant from the Dominican Republic, she holds a Ph.D. in Mass Communication from the University of Florida, and an M.A. in Journalism from New York University, where she was a Fulbright scholar. Before joining academia she worked xiii

xiv

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

as a Journalist, later transitioning to public diplomacy/strategic communication work serving as an Outreach Specialist for the Public Affairs Office of the US Embassy in Santo Domingo, and as the Development Outreach Communication Specialist for the US Agency for International Development (USAID) mission to the Dominican Republic. She has been a Fellow for the Plank Center for Leader in Public Relations and for the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC) Institute for Diverse Leadership. Her research centers around Public Diplomacy, International Public Relations, social identity, and community-building, with a focus on ethnic communities, such as Latinos. Leonardo de Souza Boy is currently a Master’s Degree student in the History Department with a concentration in Cultural History at University of Paris-Saclay (France). He has a Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations at Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). He worked for one year at the Institute for Cultural Relations Policy, in Hungary. He also worked as a Venue Manager at the Organizing Committee of the Rio 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games for two years. He published a chapter in Política Para as Artes in 2018, an expert book about Brazilian cultural policies. Areas of Research: International Cultural Relations, Patrimony, and Foreign Policy. Dr. Juliana Fernandes is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Advertising at the University of Florida. Juliana’s research interests focus on the uses and effects of negative information in persuasive communication messages and how social and traditional media are used as a strategic tool during political campaigns. Juliana’s work has been published in the Journal of Advertising, International Journal of Advertising, Journal of Current Issues in Advertising, Mass Communication & Society, Journal of Public Relations Research, Journalism, American Behavioral Scientist, American Journal of Media Psychology, Journal of Social Media in Society, and in several book chapters in edited collections. Dr. Clarice Ferreira Menezes is a Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of the Department of Development, Agriculture and Society of Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. She holds a Master’s Degree in International Studies (with specialization in History and Politics) from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Geneva, Switzerland) and a Ph.D. in History, Politics, and

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xv

Cultural Heritage from Fundação Getúlio Vargas (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). Her main areas of research are International Cultural Relations, Brazilian Foreign Policy, and History of International Relations. Dr. Tania Gómez Zapata has a Ph.D. in Politics focusing on public diplomacy and soft power (Queen Mary University of London, UK), a Master’s Degree in Globalization and Communications (University of Leicester, UK), and a Bachelor’s Degree in Journalism (Escuela de Periodismo Carlos Septién García, Mexico). She has presented her research at international conferences in Europe, the USA, and Latin America, and delivered seminars to undergraduate students at Queen Mary University of London. Currently, she is an Associate Professor at Universidad de las Américas Puebla (México) in the Department of International Relations and Political Science, and the Department of Communication. She is also a member of international organizations LASA, ISA, and ICA. Dr. Claudia Labarca is an Associate Professor at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, School of Communications, where she teaches in undergraduate and graduate programs. She holds a Master’s Degree from Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, and in 2012 she obtained her Ph.D. at the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, UK. She is the Author of several papers and book chapters dedicated to the role of non-state actors in international relations and the role of trust and communications in international country image formation. She is also the Author of the book Ni Hao Mr. Pérez, Buenos días Mr. Li, for Ediciones UC. This book has been translated to Chinese and English languages by China Intercontinental Press. Her research interests are focused on the areas of trust building, strategic communication, public diplomacy, and advertising. Dr. Ana Margheritis is a Reader in International Relations at the University of Southampton and an Associate Fellow at the ILAS, School of Advanced Study, University of London, UK. She previously worked at the University of Florida, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and Tulane University in the USA, as well as Universidad Torcuato Di Tella in Argentina. She also held visiting positions in France, Spain, Italy, the USA, Brazil, Mexico, and Ecuador. She is the Author of four sole-authored books (including Migration Governance Across Regions. State-Diaspora Relations in the Latin AmericanSouthern Europe Corridor, 2016, and Shaping Migration Between Europe

xvi

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

and Latin America: New Perspectives and Challenges, 2018, and Coauthor and Editor of three other volumes. Her peer-reviewed articles on transnational migration, international political economy and foreign policy appeared in a wide range of peer-reviewed journals. She is former Contributing Editor to the Handbook of Latin American Studies at the US Library of Congress, and Co-editor of two special issues of international refereed journals. She has been consultant for EU Democracy Observatory at the European University Institute, as well as the UNDP, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, private firms in the area of higher education, and national research agencies of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, USA, The Netherlands, UK, and Canada. Dr. Juan Mundel is the director of Global Initiatives and Associate Professor at the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication at Arizona State University. Previously, he was an Assistant Professor of Advertising at DePaul University. Before joining DePaul, Juan obtained his Doctoral Degree in Media and Information Studies at Michigan State University, a Master of Science in Journalism at West Virginia University, and a Licenciatura (B.S.) in Corporate Communication at Universidad Blas Pascal (Argentina). He also served as Faculty Advisor for the Latino Media and Communication Program at DePaul University. Dr. Yadira Nieves Pizarro was born in San Juan, Puerto Rico. She completed a Bachelor’s Degree (2002) and a Master’s Degree (2008) from the School of Communication at the University of Puerto Rico in Río Piedras, and a Ph.D. at Michigan State University. She worked as a News Producer in WAPA-TV and later as an instructor in the Communications Department in the Inter American University, Bayamón Campus. She is a Faculty Member and oversees a program for Inter American University, Bayamón Campus. Her research looks into online journalism verification and sourcing as well as representation of minorities such as Latinos and Afro Latinos in news and entertainment media. Dr. Tomás Páez Bravo is a Sociologist who graduated from Venezuela’s Central University. He later obtained a Master’s Degree and a Ph.D. in Planning from the University College in London. Author of dozens of articles and books about the Venezuelan diaspora and other topics related to emigration and democracy, he has coordinated, since 2013, the

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xvii

Global Project of the Venezuelan Diaspora, which includes the “Observatory of the Venezuelan Diaspora” (ODV) and the Platform of the Venezuelan Diaspora. This Global Project has also published studies about the Venezuela diaspora in Spain (2015), in Venezuela (2017), and in Colombia (2019). Some of his publications include the book Latinoamérica: Democracia y Autoritarismo (Latin America: Democracy and Authoritarianism, Edit. Khalatos, Spain, 2019), and the articles El papel de la diáspora en la reconstrucción de Venezuela (The role of the diaspora in the Venezuelan reconstruction, Revista de Occidente, Julio-agosto 2019, Spain), and Emigración venezolana hacia España en tiempos de revolución bolivariana (1998–2017) (Venezuelan emigration to Spain in the times of the Bolivarian revolution, 1998–2017, Revista Internacional de Migraciones, 2018, Spain, Co-authored with Mauricio Phelan). Deborah Rebello Lima is a Doctorate candidate at the Communication and Culture Program from Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, with the following research project: Public Policies of Communication and Culture: New Dialogues or Old Silences?, a comparative study between the National Culture Public Policy Council and the Social Communication Council (2003–2014). She is a cultural manager at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, part of the team that manages the museum spaces and cultural policy of the University, and a Member and Chair of UNESCO’s Political and Cultural Management at Casa de Rui Barbosa Foundation. Dr. Eduardo Luciano Tadeo Hernández is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Universidad Iberoamericana, in México D.F., México, where he received his Ph.D. in Communication. He is also an Internationalist (UPAEP) and specialist on Korean Studies (El Colegio de México). He has worked as an Advisor for the Mexican Congress and as Assistant for the international academic project “Between Spaces”. He is the Co-founder of the Mexican Circle of Korean Studies (CMEC, in Spanish) and Member of the North American Cultural Diplomacy Initiative (NACDI). His research interests are cultural and public diplomacy; the media and the diaspora; Korean studies; foreign policy and gender. Dr. Karla A. Valenzuela-Moreno is the Coordinator of the Master’s program in Migration Studies and a full-time faculty member of the Department of International Studies at the Universidad Iberoamericana,

xviii

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Mexico City. She holds a Ph.D. in Social and Political Sciences (Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City) and a Master’s degree in Immigration and Settlement Studies (Ryerson University). She is the co-organizer of the “Virtual Seminar on Diaspora Studies.” Her research interests include diaspora studies, citizenship, transnationalism, border studies, and the integration of migrant populations. Dr. Philippe Werner-Wildner is the International Relations Director of Study Chile company. He obtained a Diploma in Strategic Communication (PUC). He obtained a Master’s Degree in International Relations from Jilin University in 2013. In 2019, he received his Ph.D. in Diplomacy at the School of International Politics, in Central China Normal University. He is the Author of academic publications focused on Public Diplomacy and Internationalization of Education. He Authored a chapter in the book Belt and Road Initiative: Chinese Initiative for Cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean (UNTDF Editions). His research interests include soft power, public diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy, and education hub models.

List of Figures

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

2.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 9.1

Fig. 11.1

Social services provided by consulates Peak #RickyRenuncia conversation timeline Sentiment and emotion analyses on Twitter Diaspora members join the #RickyRenuncia movement The Afro-Brazilian festival Lavage de la Madeleine has been held in Paris in September since 2001. Picture by Antonio Cançado (Credit Picture courtesy of photographer Antonio Cançado) Mex and the City logo (with permission to publish granted by Marina García-Vásquez, co-founder of Mex and the City)

38 169 173 176

216

272

xix

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 3.1

Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 6.4 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 11.1 Table 12.1

Institutions serving the diaspora by country State–diaspora relations initiatives and summary of benefits provided to the Salvadoran and Colombian diasporas by their respective states Recent changes to U.S. and Cuban bilateral policies Narratives and themes identified in Floridians’ Twitter Conversations about Cuba Percentage of authors employing narrative categories about Cuba on Twitter Narratives of the Cuban Diaspora Organizations Timeline (Torres Gotay, 2019) Most influential voices in the #RickyRenuncia Movement July 10, 2019–July 30, 2019 Women’s history in Mexican diplomacy Descriptive analysis of the three newspapers

34

59 130 137 144 147 164 171 267 294

xxi

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Diasporas from Latin America and Their Role in Public Diplomacy Vanessa Bravo and Maria De Moya

This book on Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy seeks to contribute to the understanding of the different strategic roles that diaspora groups play in modern public diplomacy efforts. In contrast to the traditional definition of public diplomacy as unilateral and unidirectional efforts led by state actors to win the hearts and minds of non-state actors located abroad through soft power, modern public diplomacy efforts are categorized by being more participatory, having a strong involvement of non-state actors as leaders or co-leaders of public diplomacy initiatives, building frequent multilateral partnerships, and focusing increasingly on global issues (Malone, 1985; Nye, 2008; Tuch, 1990).

V. Bravo (B) Elon University, Elon, NC, USA e-mail: [email protected] M. De Moya DePaul University, Chicago, IL, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Bravo and M. De Moya (eds.), Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74564-6_1

1

2

V. BRAVO AND M. DE MOYA

More importantly, this book provides the perspective of Latin American diasporas and nations, which are severely underrepresented in the public diplomacy literature. Additionally, because it is written from a strategic communication perspective, this book provides insight into a variety of public diplomacy approaches employed by modern-day Latin American diasporas as non-state leaders of public diplomacy efforts, where these Latin American diasporas use participatory approaches, forge diverse partnerships, and engage in strategic two-way communications, offline and online, to advocate for its support or its opposition of home and host countries’ decisions and policies. The book also describes some examples of diaspora-targeted, state-led public diplomacy efforts in the region. Taking a regional focus to the exploration of diasporas in public diplomacy, this edited book facilitates cross-country comparisons and the understanding of the phenomena beyond the country-specific cases. As recent research has shown, the socioeconomic and political context of the home and host nations have a significant impact on the relationship they have with their diasporas (Bravo, 2014a). Democratic governments can facilitate cooperation between diaspora and homeland, while more authoritarian regimes can have more difficulty gaining the support of the diaspora (Mirilovic, 2018). Similarly shifts in government and policies can affect the relationship the diasporas have with the homeland (e.g., De Moya, 2019; Shumow, 2014). From this perspective, Latin America presents an interesting field of study given the changes many of its countries have undergone in the recent past. Several countries in the region went from military to democratic regimes in the late twentieth century and some, like Venezuela, Brasil, Chile, Bolivia, and most recently, Mexico, elected populist leaders (Houle & Kenny, 2018; Huber & Schimpf, 2016). Along with these changes have come shifts in national and regional economies (Houle & Kenny, 2018) and thus on migration flows (International Office of Migration, 2018; Unicef, 2018). In this introductory chapter, we provide a definition of diaspora communities, summarize the roles diasporas can play in modern public diplomacy efforts, and explain the reasons why diasporas are (or should be) key actors for governments in home and host countries. In addition, we present an overview of Latin American diasporas and explain what makes them a unique locus for the study and practice of public diplomacy.

1

INTRODUCTION: DIASPORAS FROM LATIN AMERICA …

3

Diasporas in Public Diplomacy Public diplomacy had been traditionally defined as state-led strategic communications to engage publics abroad (Malone, 1985; Tuch, 1990). However, contributions by scholars in strategic communication, international relations, diplomacy and related fields acknowledged early on the role that non-state actors play in achieving nation-state goals (e.g., Fitzpatrick, 2007; Gilboa, 2008; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992). This understanding of the public diplomacy roles and contributions by non-state actors, such as activist groups, businesses, non-government organizations, and media outlets, led to a broader definition of public diplomacy as “the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented” (Sharp, 2005, p. 106). Contemporary scholars agree that public diplomacy is not solely the purview of the state. As Melissen (2005) detailed, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have converging interests with nation-states, multinational corporations employ enviable “public diplomacy muscle” (p. 12) and governments are increasingly engaging their “domestic constituency” (p. 13) for identity-building and foreign policy efforts. Thus, it should not be a great surprise that there is a growing attention among scholars and practitioners alike on diasporas in public diplomacy, both as key publics outside of the nation’s borders and as non-state diplomatic actors. While many scholars from a variety of disciplines have offered slightly different definitions of what constitutes a diaspora, it has been defined as a community formed by immigrants from a given country who keep cultural and socioeconomic ties to the homeland (Horboken, 2004). They are not homogeneous groups but often fragmented, complex, and layered communities (Horboken, 2004; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). In scholarly definitions, the concept of diaspora is often associated with terms like “dispersal” (from a homeland), “immigration,” “community,” and “transnationalism,” and with the phrases “location outside a homeland,” “orientation to a homeland,” and “group identity” (Grossman, 2018, p. 1). As evidenced in recent research, diasporas are key publics for a diverse array of organizations, including national and international NGOs, private companies, and of course, both host and home country governments

4

V. BRAVO AND M. DE MOYA

(e.g., Bravo, 2014a; Bravo & De Moya, 2015, 2018; Cull, 2008, 2009; Délano, 2014; Murti & Zaharna, 2014). The aforementioned research has shown that these communities’ importance is owed, in part, to their roles and/or potential as informal ambassadors, political influencers, oppositional activists, investors, remittance-senders, tourists, dual citizens, voters, candidates for office at home or abroad, facilitators of technology transfer, senders or receivers of goods and services, media producers and/or opinion leaders, and more. Thus, governments do actively lead efforts to engage their diaspora communities as targets and/or partners for their public diplomacy efforts, which are commonly studied under the umbrella of diaspora diplomacy (focused on state–diaspora relations). Conversely, a second perspective focuses on efforts led by the diasporas themselves whether in support of, or in opposition to, the homeland’s interests. Diaspora diplomacy has been defined as the home country efforts to engage its overseas community to support “building relationships with foreign countries” (Rana, 2013, p. 70). Like with other non-state actors, these publics and partners can be engaged through listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchanges, and international broadcasting (Cull, 2008, 2009). The home country’s goal tends to be to persuade its diasporas that they have a vested interest in the well-being of the homeland and their fellow nationals. For example, there are documented cases of Latin American governments that reach out to diaspora members to ask them to be directly involved in homeland cultural and political affairs (Bravo, 2011, 2012; De Moya, 2011; DeSipio et al., 2003). From the home government’s perspective, collaboration with the diaspora can result in building stronger relationships in host countries, and thus, support for their interests (Bravo & De Moya, 2015; Cowan & Arsenault, 2008; Murti & Zaharna, 2014). Studying the cases of the Salvadorian, Colombian, and Mexican governments (Bravo, 2012; Bravo & De Moya, 2015, 2018), we have found that some of the strategies that home countries employ to establish and/or strengthen diaspora–state relationships include special investment programs, aid opportunities, campaigns to communicate their rights at home and abroad, information provision, nation-branding partnerships, and mediated appeals to community interests and national identity, done through both traditional and social media.

1

INTRODUCTION: DIASPORAS FROM LATIN AMERICA …

5

As the practice of public diplomacy continues to evolve, with more opportunities to engage and with many channels through which to present different views in issues and policy debates, we can anticipate that diasporas will only gain more importance. Their role, as well as that of other non-state actors, gives increased credence to the call for more participatory models of public diplomacy, in which traditional information-provision strategies give way to those allowing for, or centered on, the co-creation of meaning. This perspective, longemphasized by some strategic communication scholars (e.g., Botan & Taylor, 2004; Curtin & Gaither, 2005; Dutta, 2015; Gaither & Curtin, 2018; Tombleson, & Wolf, 2017; Zaharna et al., 2013), requires an understanding that participatory approaches necessitate shifts in the power structures. In public diplomacy, this can mean going from stateled strategies to those in which nations have varying levels of involvement; from state goals being centric to being tangential or even disregarded. Diasporas and Participatory Public Diplomacy A shift toward participatory public diplomacy models has been longheralded. In fact, introducing his edited manuscript on a new public diplomacy approach nearly 15 years ago, Melissen (2005) wrote about a move away from information padding toward engagement and dialogue. This shift has been significantly expedited and facilitated by digital and social media. The increased adoption of social and participatory media, the importance of citizen journalism, and the ease of mobile communication, including direct messaging, have not only facilitated the pursuit of strategic communications by state and non-state actors, but they have also allowed for the voices, and priorities, of these non-state actors to be more visible and influential (Fitzpatrick, 2012, 2017; Seib, 2016; Zaharna & Uysal, 2016). Non-state actors have no need to wait to be invited to be a part of public diplomacy efforts. As Zaharna and Uysal (2016) explained, there can be a reversal of roles between the public and the state so that “instead of the state pursuing publics to gain public compliance, publics pursue the state with the intention of gaining the state’s official participation and support” (p. 113). This can be especially true when diasporas act as public diplomacy actors. Their strong networks, access to resources, ability to mobilize their community, and varied expertise allow them to design and implement strategies to advance their goals. For example, the Dominican diaspora

6

V. BRAVO AND M. DE MOYA

in the United States worked in coordination with the Haitian diaspora to gain international support in opposing a change to the Dominican constitution that altered the definition of which citizens had birth citizenship rights and which did not (De Moya, 2019). Even though their efforts had public diplomacy implications for the homeland, they were taken on without the input or involvement of the homeland’s government. The diaspora can lead public diplomacy, whether these efforts are done in coordination with, in favor of, or in opposition to the homeland, its policies, or its goals. Several factors can influence the nation-state’s relationship with the diaspora community. As Bravo’s (2011) state–diaspora relations model explained, the strength of this relationship can be influenced by factors such as the size of the community, the economic impact of remittances in the home country, the strategic priorities of the homeland’s government, and the state of the economy at home. More specifically, larger diaspora communities and those with a larger economic impact on the homeland will become greater priorities for their home-state and, usually, be subject to more relationship-building efforts. However, these relationships are fluid and can change when the government’s priorities change. If, for instance, governments need to increase their political legitimacy abroad, they are more likely to engage the diaspora for support. Similarly, these relationships (and priorities) are shaped by the socioeconomic, cultural, and political contexts of the homeland. It is equally important to consider that despite their best relationshipbuilding efforts, the homeland will not always achieve its relationship goals with all members of the diaspora. In our own research into the cases of Colombia, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Costa Rica, we have found that, in the same diaspora community, governments will find from those who identify strongly with the homeland’s administration to those who see themselves in complete opposition to it (e.g., Bravo, 2011, 2012, 2014a, 2014b; Bravo & De Moya, 2015; De Moya, 2011, 2019). This research evidences that the diaspora’s positionality is partially dependent on its reason for, and context of, exit from the homeland; its conditions in the adoptive country; the strength of its home country social network; its identity attachment to the homeland; and changes in policies at home. Diasporas can also become oppositional groups, such as when they disrupt the political, economical, or social climate of the home and/or host countries, or when they actively oppose governments at home or

1

INTRODUCTION: DIASPORAS FROM LATIN AMERICA …

7

in the host country (e.g., De Moya, 2019; Zaharna & Uysal, 2016). For example, they can cause diplomatic challenges when they settle in large numbers in unwelcoming host countries (e.g., Cevik & Sevin, 2017), actively work to prevent the resolution of international disputes (e.g., Brinkerhoff, 2004), and even implement strategies to gain international support to pressure the homeland into enacting changes to domestic policy (e.g., De Moya, 2019). In cases like these, diasporas can cause frictions among nations and can potentially start diplomatic crises. Similarly, but on the opposite end of the state–diaspora relations continuum, governments can engage their diasporas in problematic ways, in manners that resemble transnational authoritarianism and control rather than collaborative partnerships (Baser & Ozturk, 2020). As this body of research has shown, contextual variables of the home and host land can have a significant impact on the diaspora–state relationship as well as the role that diasporas can play in public diplomacy efforts. Therefore, a regionally focused view of the diaspora public diplomacy phenomena, as offered in this book, creates an opportunity to explore the nature of the region’s diaspora communities, and more specifically, how they are connected to public diplomacy initiatives and efforts in home and host countries.

Latin American Diasporas The Latin American and Caribbean region includes 33 countries, each with its own history as an immigrant-receiving and immigrant-sending nation. The size of these countries’ diasporas (as a percentage of their total population) is very varied. For example, large nations such as Mexico, which has approximately 11% of its population settled abroad, can have large diasporas; while in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, only 3.5, 2.5, and 0.9% of their population, respectively, lives outside its borders (World Bank Group, 2016; Worldometers, 2019a, 2019b). Similarly, small countries such as El Salvador, Belize, Jamaica, and Bermuda have significantly large diaspora communities, with the percentage of their population who has emigrated ranging from 18

8

V. BRAVO AND M. DE MOYA

to 40%1 ; while other small nations such as Costa Rica and Panama have less than 4% of their population abroad (World Bank Group, 2016; Worldometers, 2019a, 2019b). Each of these countries has diasporas in the region and in other continents, mainly Europe (International Office of Migrations, 2018). In the case of the Americas, the United States has traditionally been an immigrant-receiving country. Here, it is possible to find mature Latin American diasporas such as the Mexican diaspora, with centuries of history in the United States (Flores, 2017) or the Cuban American community in Miami, which has been a strong presence in Florida for about 60 years (Torres, 1995). Other Latin American diasporas in the United States and Europe reached a critical mass, for the most part, during the 1980s, such as Salvadorians, Hondurans, and Guatemalans (Pellegrino, 2004; Solimano, 2004). However, political and socioeconomic changes can affect the flows of immigration. For example, Venezuela was an immigrant-receiving nation from the period following the Second World War until the early 2000s, welcoming immigrants from the region, mainly Colombia, and enacting several immigration policies aimed at integration (Schwarz, 2016). However starting with the election of socialist President Hugo Chavez in 1993 and following his death and the economic crisis brought on by his successor, Nicolás Maduro, an estimated 2.3 million Venezuelans had left the country by 2018, moving to other Latin American countries (mainly Colombia) and the United States (International Office of Migration, 2018; Reuters, 2018). As they settle and organize around public and community organizations, diasporas can mobilize and lead collective action (Newland, 2010; Sheffer, 2003). The Mexican diaspora, for instance, has been highly active advocating for itself to gain absentee vote and dual citizenship, putting pressure so that the Mexican government plays a stronger role in protecting the Mexican diaspora members’ human rights in the United States, and pursuing a variety of additional benefits—political and otherwise—at home (Bravo & De Moya, 2018; Newland, 2010). Similarly, the Dominican diaspora in New York has advocated for immigrants to gain citizenship status and thus more rights in the United States, and 1 The World Bank Group (2016) estimated that about 40% of Jamaicans live abroad, 33% of Barbadians have left Barbados, and 25% of Salvadorans live outside the homeland. Similarly, one in five Belizeans and Bermudians and about 1.4 million Dominicans (out of a total population of 10 million, or about 14%) have migrated to the United States.

1

INTRODUCTION: DIASPORAS FROM LATIN AMERICA …

9

it has collaborated with other Latinos and African Americans to address police brutality in New York City, while also working to raise funds to alleviate socioeconomic needs at home (Aparicio, 2006; De Moya, 2011; Ricourt, 2015). Ecuadorians in Spain and Italy have succeeded in influencing the country’s Constitution to guarantee migrants’ rights through a commitment to policy reflecting those rights, which include voting rights, political representation, and a promise of support for migrants in transit (Margheritis, 2011). Another rich diaspora is the Cuban community in Miami, which opposed the Castro regime through both public displays (e.g., protests and speeches) and behind-the-scenes strategic actions such as putting political pressure on U.S. elected officials so that they do not lift the U.S. embargo on Cuba (Cuban Research Institute, 2011; Heindl, 2013). On the opposite side of the activism spectrum, some diaspora communities, both small and large, have had episodic events in which they have collaborated together, such as in diaspora festivals or specific summits, but they have not been able to organize, cohesively and long-term, in their host countries, for different contextual reasons. This is the case, for example, of Costa Ricans in the United States, where the community is comprised of only about 130,000 people, the Costa Rican consular presence is weak, and the home government has not had the need to leverage the diaspora for political support (Bravo, 2011, 2014a). Similarly, Nicaraguans in Costa Rica, despite being a community of about half a million (in a host country whose population is only five million people), have not been able to effectively advocate for themselves and their rights, neither at home, nor in the host country (Gindling, 2009; Mora Román & Guzmán, 2018). Many diasporas in the region also have a strong impact on their home economies (Newland, 2010). For example, the diasporas from El Salvador, Honduras, Haiti, Bermuda, or Jamaica send home remittances and make investments that account for more income than what their home governments obtain in foreign direct investment or foreign aid (World Bank Group, 2016). Why Do They Leave and Where Do They Go? Latin American diaspora members have left their home countries for different reasons: as economic migrants (Lesser & Batalova, 2017; Solimano, 2004), to escape political instability and/or authoritarian regimes

10

V. BRAVO AND M. DE MOYA

(Holmes, 2018; Lesser & Batalova, 2017) or to pursue special opportunities, such as higher education or jobs in academia (Pellegrino, 2001). While diaspora groups from Latin America have established themselves in other countries in the region and throughout the world, the United States is the largest receiving country of Latin American migrants (Solimano, 2004; World Bank Group, 2016). In fact, as of 2018, five Latin American countries were on the list of Top-10 Sending Countries of immigrants to the United States2 : Mexico, El Salvador, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala, in that order, with a combined population of approximately 16.3 million citizens in the country (López et al., 2018). Those numbers are the official figures but, in most cases, the actual numbers are higher but remain partially unaccounted because of the complexity of tracing undocumented immigrants. Why the special appeal of the United States as a preferred country of destination for diasporas from Latin America? Because of the strong presence that the United States has had, historically and recently, throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, both in positive and negative ways. On one hand, the United States has infused the region with important resources, financially and otherwise (Meyer, 2018). On the other hand, it has also been a strong presence in the region through diplomatic political pressure, through direct military interventions, and through the backing of violent, authoritarian—but capitalist and pro-American—regimes, especially in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Associated Press, 2019; Borger, 2018; Faux, 2017; Massey, 2013; Schoultz, 2009; Shesgreen, 2018; Valenzuela, 2004). For example, in Chile, the United States supported military dictator Augusto Pinochet, in the 1970s, in its strategy to unseat democratically elected Salvador Allende, to allegedly combat communism in the country (Central Intelligence Agency, 2000; Morley & McGillion, 2015). Similarly, in Guatemala, fear of a “red infection throughout Central America” (Schoultz, 2009, p. 339) led to a coup d’état in 1954, ousting Jacobo Arbenz and installing military dictator Carlos Castillo Armas. In another example, in Brazil, the United States backed the ousting of President Joao Goulart in 1964, which led to a 20-year military regime in the region’s largest economy (Heinz & Frühling, 1999). This history, repeated in 2 The Pew Research Center (López et al., 2018) estimates the Mexican population in the United States is approximately 11.6 million; El Salvador has about 1.4 million citizens in the United States; Cuba has close to 1.3 million; the Dominican Republic about 1.1 million; and Guatemala almost 1 million.

1

INTRODUCTION: DIASPORAS FROM LATIN AMERICA …

11

other countries as well, not only speaks to the complex relationship that Latin America has had, as a region, with the United States, but it also explains some of the conditions that resulted in an increased flow of Latin American immigrants to the United States and beyond (Massey, 2013). Not every country in the region, however, counts the United States as the main destination for its migrants. In the case of Nicaragua, Colombia, Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, and Uruguay, these immigrants tend to go, respectively, to Costa Rica, Venezuela, Spain, Argentina, Argentina, Argentina, and Argentina (World Bank Group, 2016). More recently, millions of Venezuelans have migrated to Colombia (International Office of Migrations, 2018). In Europe, Spain is the preferred country of destination (Pellegrino, 2004). In fact, some of the largest diaspora groups in Spain are from Colombia, Bolivia, Paraguay, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic, in that order (Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social, 2017). Many of the diaspora communities from Latin America tend to be positive forces in support of the home country’s people and/or government, regardless of where they settle. They send money to their relatives back home through remittances, invest in productive projects in their communities of origin, travel to the homeland as tourists, influence the political decisions of acquaintances and relatives at home, donate to political causes, become dual citizens in many cases, vote in the presidential elections at home through external voting processes (absentee vote), and some of them even participate directly in home-politics, running for office as representatives of the diaspora in Congress (Boccagni et al., 2016; Bravo, 2014b; Délano, 2014; Erlingsson & Tuman, 2017; Navarro Fierro et al., 2016; Pedroza & Palop-García, 2017; World Bank Group, 2016). In a public diplomacy setting, research has shown that diaspora members can facilitate access to decision-makers and publics, support the home country with their expertise and cultural knowhow, and provide an important third-party endorsement to their home government’s messages, which supports relationship-building efforts and credibility (e.g., Bravo, 2011). Still, some diaspora groups from Latin America strongly oppose their home governments and organize themselves around this oppositional framework: These diaspora groups form associations to contest their governments, develop strategic communications—online and offline—to make their complains be heard, and take strategic actions of different types to disrupt their governments at home, from peaceful protests to

12

V. BRAVO AND M. DE MOYA

attempted (and sometimes successful) coups d’etat. Two cases of oppositional diasporas from Latin America are the Haitian diaspora (Laguerre, 2006), prone to engineer coups d’etat at home, and the Cuban diaspora (Cuban Research Institute, 2011; Heindl, 2013), which has actively lobbied to keep the U.S. embargo on the island as far as the Castro regime (or its successors) are in power (Sesin, 2019). In regard to their impact in their host countries, Latin American diaspora groups offer a variety of contributions. They stimulate their host countries’ economy through their work, by paying taxes and by consuming goods and services (Bellows, 2011; Blau & Mackie, 2017; Bravo, 2014b; Cruz, 2018). They bring their cultural capital and their diversity to their new environments (Hirschman, 2013). In many cases, they also participate in the receiving country’s life by becoming politically active through advocacy, civic participation and by voting, when their immigration status allows it. While key public diplomacy actors, diasporas are also important publics for the host country. Here, these communities can be supportive of the host government, becoming informal ambassadors and informal brokers between home and host nations (Bravo, 2014b), but they can also be oppositional forces, engaged in national and transnational activism (DeWind & Segura, 2014; Quinsaat, 2016; Yukich, 2017). This has been evidenced by recent research in the case of activist groups in the United States that defend immigrant rights, in particular of Latinx immigrants, against what they consider to be non-supportive U.S. administration policies and rhetoric (e.g., Burke, 2018; De Moya & Bravo, 2016; Vargas et al., 2017). The socioeconomic and political contexts of the home and host nations, as indicated before, have a significant impact on the relationship nation-states have with their diasporas. Thus, Latin America presents a rich, diverse, and complex region to study diaspora diplomacy, and this book contributes to that effort. The Latin American Context In addition to the migration flows from and to Latin America, the region presents an interesting field of study given the changes that many of its countries have undergone in the recent past. For example, several countries in the region went from military to democratic regimes in the late twentieth century (Valenzuela, 2004) and some, like Venezuela,

1

INTRODUCTION: DIASPORAS FROM LATIN AMERICA …

13

Nicaragua, Brasil, Chile, Bolivia, and most recently, Mexico, elected populist leaders (Freedom House, 2018; Houle & Kenny, 2018; Huber & Schimpf, 2016). Still, the most recent Freedom House report (2018) found signs of resilience in the region, including a more democratic turn in Ecuador, stronger press freedom in Argentina and improvements in due process rights in Colombia. These changes have also brought on shifts in national and regional economies (Houle & Kenny, 2018) and thus on migration flows (International Office of Migration, 2018; Unicef, 2018). Different types of governments will affect diaspora–state relationships differently and, therefore, they will also impact the diaspora’s participation in public diplomacy efforts (e.g., Bravo, 2011; De Moya, 2019; Shumow, 2014). Democratic governments, for instance, can facilitate cooperation between diaspora and homeland, while more authoritarian regimes can have more difficulty gaining the support of the diaspora (Mirilovic, 2018). Similarly, shifts in government and policies can affect the relationship the diasporas have with the homeland. Interestingly, political regimes with some legitimacy issues or facing economic crises sometimes might approach their diaspora communities for support in stronger ways than financially stable or well-established democratic governments (Bravo, 2011). Although Latin American immigrants to and diasporas in the United States have been the subject of some recent research in the areas of public diplomacy, strategic communication, and international relations (e.g., Golan et al., 2018; LeoGrande, 2015; Len-Rios, 2017; Rivas, 2015), less is known about the flow of migration from one Latin American country to the other. Some chapters in this book address this phenomenon. Furthermore, to date, few published research has examined the role of Latin American diasporas as key actors in public diplomacy or strategic communication efforts (e.g., Abdi et al., 2019; Bermudez, 2010; De Moya & Jain, 2013; Eckstein, 2010; Gálvez-Rodríguez et al., 2018; García & Bailey, 2018; Hodges & Denegri-Knott, 2012; Len-Rios, 2017; Trieu et al., 2016). Therefore, there is a significant gap in research about the work that Latin American diasporas do to serve, or oppose, their homelands’ goals and policies. This book helps bridge that gap.

14

V. BRAVO AND M. DE MOYA

Structure of This Book This book is divided, right after this Introduction chapter (Chapter 1), into two main thematic sections: the first about state-to-diaspora public diplomacy cases and the second about diaspora-led public diplomacy efforts. The final two chapters in the second section focus, in particular, on diaspora media diplomacy. The first thematic section, titled Diaspora Relations: States Courting the Diaspora, examines the ways in which different nation-states establish relationships with their diaspora communities. It analyzes prominent cases about the intensive, creative efforts that some Latin American governments develop to build sustained relationships with their diasporas. For example, in Chapter 2, Dr. Karla Valenzuela-Moreno uses the Transnational Social Protection Framework (TSP) to examine, comparatively, how Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Ecuador provide social services and defend the civil and human rights of their diaspora communities as part of their public diplomacy efforts. Chapter 3, by Dr. Vanessa Bravo, highlights the cases of El Salvador and Colombia, which are the countries with the largest diaspora community in the United States from Central America and South America, respectively. The chapter describes how the governments in these two countries engage their U.S.-based diasporas, and how changes in government impact—sometimes strongly, sometimes subtly—the state-diaspora priorities for the homeland. Dr. Ana Margheritis, in Chapter 4, argues that recent diaspora engagement policies in Latin America have resembled courting practices. In Argentina, in particular, outreach efforts toward emigrants have evolved in three stages that have moved from assistance to political and social protections. However, the Argentinian efforts constitute, even today, a lukewarm approach that has not been institutionalized deeply as a central component of the state’s public diplomacy. In Chapter 5, Dr. Claudia Labarca and Dr. Philippe Werner-Wildner describe the synergies established between state policies and professional interests of entrepreneurs and businesspeople from Chile who live and conduct business in China. In this seamless convergence, Chile´s public diplomacy goals match the Chilean business–diaspora priorities. In other words, Chile’s state-led policies support the Chilean diaspora-led efforts in China, and vice versa.

1

INTRODUCTION: DIASPORAS FROM LATIN AMERICA …

15

The second section of the book, titled Diaspora-Led Public Diplomacy, explores initiatives developed by different diaspora groups to advocate for issues that affect them in the home or in the host country. These efforts, and/or the issues addressed, are directly tied to the homeland’s public diplomacy goals, even if not done in coordination, or in service, to the homeland. As such, the chapters included describe cases where diasporas become activist groups to address needs or challenges that impact them in the host or home countries, either in support of or in opposition to the homeland’s government. This section includes both historic and contemporary perspectives of highly visible case studies. As part of this second section, Chapter 6, by Dr. Maria De Moya and Dr. Vanessa Bravo, explains how the Cuban diaspora in the United States is heterogeneous and divided in its approach about the type of relationship that the United States should have with the island. As such, public diplomacy efforts by what De Moya and Bravo call “the new Cuban diaspora” clash with the efforts of diaspora groups considered “hardliners.” An exploration of Twitter posts describes the contrasting narratives put forth, in the last couple of years, by activist organizations CubaOne and the Cuban American National Foundation. In Chapter 7, Dr. Yadira Nieves-Pizarro and Dr. Juan Mundel, present the case of #RickyRenuncia, a grassroots campaign where the Puerto Rican diaspora around the world contributed to the mobilization of forces, inside and outside of Puerto Rico, to pressure for the resignation of then-governor Ricardo Roselló, which was achieved in a matter of weeks. This #RickyRenuncia campaign constitutes an interesting case of dissenting public diplomacy. Dr. Tania Gómez-Zapata highlights, in Chapter 8, the contributions from four Mexican organizations and people from civil society to the well being of Latinos in the United States. Her analysis includes a detailed description of the initiatives developed by one non-government organization, one university, one grassroots activist, and one business association to improve the living conditions and human rights of Latinx immigrants, in general, and of Mexicans in Chicago, in particular. Chapter 9 is a case study of the Lavage de la Madeleine, a diasporacreated and diaspora-led event that happens in Paris, France, every September since 2001. Brazilian scholars Dr. Clarice Ferreira Meneses, Deborah Rebello Lima, and Leonardo de Souza Boy explain how,

16

V. BRAVO AND M. DE MOYA

through this Afro-Brazilian cultural and religious festival, Brazil’s diaspora members in Paris act as public diplomats and informal cultural ambassadors of the homeland. Right after, Chapter 10 discusses how the voice of the Venezuelan diaspora is heard around the world through The Voice of the Diaspora project, founded and led by Venezuelan professor Tomás Páez Bravo who is, himself, a Venezuelan diaspora member living in Europe, actively opposing the government of Nicolás Maduro in his homeland. The last two chapters in this second section look at diaspora media as a public diplomacy tool. As these two final chapters show, Latin American diasporas have employed different types of media—from global to hyperlocal—to communicate with and about the diaspora communities, while at the same time informing the community about issues at home. In Chapter 11, Dr. Eduardo Luciano Tadeo Hernández, explores and describes a diasporic project launched in New York City, called Mex and The City. As the chapter´s abstract indicates, Mex and The City was developed by “women of Mexican origin, with different social backgrounds, who decided to write a blog to share their lives in the city and eventually realized the social potential to this initiative, transforming it into a project to change the image of Mexicans in New York.” This case study portrays the importance of having diasporic women using new technologies to construct spaces that tell a different story about an imagined community that is often stereotyped. Examining the case of Brazilians in the United States, in Chapter 12, Dr. Juliana Fernandes details how several Brazilian diaspora’s newspapers have communicated homeland politics. Taking an in-depth look at the 2018 Presidential Elections, she analyzes the impact of their coverage on the image of the nation, not only in the eyes of Brazilians in the United States, but also the wider audience who was attentive to the unconventional, conservative candidate leading the contest. Finally, the book’s conclusion chapter (Chapter 13), authored by the book´s co-editors, Dr. Vanessa Bravo and Dr. María De Moya, offers a summary of the lessons learned regarding the role of Latin American diasporas in public diplomacy. Here, we reflect on the complex, fluid, and ever-changing identities of Latin American diaspora groups who have settled in different countries around the world, but mainly in the United States, and we analyze the contrasting public diplomacy efforts and initiatives of the different nations or of the different diaspora communities in

1

INTRODUCTION: DIASPORAS FROM LATIN AMERICA …

17

host countries. We, the editors, also provide insights into future directions for the practice and study of diaspora public diplomacy in the region. Our aim is that through this book, readers will understand in more detail and with more nuance the complex realities of Latin America and the Caribbean, the characteristics of the diaspora communities from this region, the strong contributions of Latin American diasporas to their home and host countries, and the types of public diplomacy efforts that diaspora communities undertake both at home and abroad, supporting or opposing their home and host governments.

References Abdi, K., Talebpour, M., Fullerton, J., Ranjkesh, M., & Nooghabi, H. (2019). Identifying sports diplomacy resources as soft power tools. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 15(3), 1–9. Aparicio, A. (2006). Dominican-Americans and the politics of empowerment. University Press Florida. Associated Press, The. (2019, January 25). Before Venezuela, U.S. had long involvement in Latin America. AP News. https://www.apnews.com/2ded14 659982426c9b2552827734be83. Baser, B., & Ozturk, A. (2020). Positive and negative diaspora governance in context: From public diplomacy to transnational authoritarianism. Middle East Critique, 29(3), 1–16. Bellows, J. (2011, May 25). The many contributions of immigrants to the American economy. Treasury Notes. U.S. Department of Treasury. https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/The-Many-Contribut ions-of-Immigrants-to-the-American-Economy.aspx. Bermudez, A. (2010). The transnational political practices of Colombians in Spain and the United Kingdom: Politics ‘here’ and ‘there’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 33(1), 75–91. Blau, F., & Mackie, C. (2017). The economic and fiscal consequences of immigration. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine. The National Academies Press. https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/1. Boccagni, P., Lafleur, J., & Levitt, P. (2016). Transnational politics as cultural circulation: Toward a conceptual understanding of migrant political participation on the move. Mobilities, 11(3), 444–463. Borger, J. (2018, December 19). Fleeing a hell the U.S. helped create: Why Central Americans journey North. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian. com/us-news/2018/dec/19/central-america-migrants-us-foreign-policy. Botan, C., & Taylor, M. (2004). Public relations: State of the field. Journal of Communication, 54(4), 645–661.

18

V. BRAVO AND M. DE MOYA

Bravo, V. (2011). Conceptualization of diaspora relations from the government viewpoint: An exploratory qualitative study of diaspora relations in the cases of Costa Rica and El Salvador. Unpublished dissertation. University of Florida. http://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/UF/E0/04/35/51/00001/BRAVO_V.pdf. Bravo, V. (2012). Engaging the diaspora: El Salvador and Costa Rica’s use of social media to connect with their diaspora communities in the United States. Global Media Journal, Fall, 1–19. Bravo, V. (2014a). El Salvador and Costa Rica’s state-diaspora relations management. International Journal of Communication, 8, 22. http://ijoc.org/index. php/ijoc/article/view/1822. Bravo, V. (2014b). The importance of diaspora communities as key publics for national governments around the world. In G. J. Golan, S. U. Yang, & D. Kinsey (Eds.), International public relations and public diplomacy: Communication and engagement. Peter Lang. Bravo, V., & De Moya, M. (2015). Communicating the homeland’s relationship with its diaspora community: The cases of El Salvador and Colombia. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 10(1), 70–104. Bravo, V., & De Moya, M. (2018). Mexico’s public diplomacy efforts to engage its diaspora across the border: Case study of the programs, messages and strategies employed by the Mexican Embassy in the United States. Rising Powers Quarterly, 3(3), 173–196. http://risingpowersproject.com/quarte rly/mexicos-public-diplomacy-efforts-to-engage-its-diaspora-across-the-bor der-case-study-of-the-programs-messages-and-strategies-employed-by-themexican-embassy-in-the-united-states/. Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2004). Digital diasporas and international development: Afghan-Americans and the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Public Administration and Development: The International Journal of Management Research and Practice, 24(5), 397–413. Burke, C. (2018, June 19). 12 immigrant advocacy organizations to donate to if you can’t stand Trump’s family separation policy. Bustle.com. https:// www.bustle.com/p/12-immigrant-advocacy-organizations-to-donate-to-ifyou-cant-stand-trumps-family-separation-policy-9483834. Central Intelligence Agency. (2000, September 18). CIA activities in Chile. https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/#14. Cevik, S., & Sevin, E. (2017). A quest for soft power: Turkey and the Syrian refugee crisis. Journal of Communication Management, 21(4), 399–410. Cowan, G., & Arsenault, A. (2008). Moving from monologue to dialogue to collaboration: The three layers of public diplomacy. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 10–30. Cruz, M. (2018, April 16). Yes, all immigrants—even undocumented—Pay billions in taxes each year. Immigration Impact. American Immigration

1

INTRODUCTION: DIASPORAS FROM LATIN AMERICA …

19

Council. http://immigrationimpact.com/2018/04/16/undocumented-imm igrants-pay-taxes/. Cuban Research Institute. (2011). The Cuban diaspora in the 21st century. Florida International University. https://cri.fiu.edu/cuban-america/ the-cuban-diaspora-in-the-twenty-first-century/. Cull, N. (2008). Public diplomacy: Taxonomies and histories. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 31–54. Cull, N. (2009). Public diplomacy: Lessons from the past. CPD Perspectives on Public diplomacy, 2, 19. http://stage.uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpub licdiplomacy.org/files/legacy/publications/perspectives/CPDPerspectivesLes sons.pdf. Curtin, P., & Gaither, T. (2005). Privileging identity, difference, and power: The circuit of culture as a basis for public relations theory. Journal of Public Relations Research, 17 (2), 91–115. De Moya, M. (2011). A ground theory of global public relations by diaspora organizations: Building relationships, communities, and group identity. Unpublished dissertation. University of Florida. http://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/ UF/E0/04/28/58/00001/demoya_m.pdf. De Moya, M. (2019). Protesting the homeland: Diaspora dissent public relations efforts to oppose the Dominican Republic’s citizenship policies. In Protest Public Relations (pp. 106–127). Routledge. De Moya, M., & Bravo, V. (2016). The role of public relations in ethnic advocacy and activism: A proposed research agenda. Public Relations Inquiry, 5(3), 233–251. De Moya, M., & Jain, R. (2013). When tourists are your “friends”: Exploring the brand personality of Mexico and Brazil on Facebook. Public Relations Review, 39(1), 23–29. Délano, A. (2014). The diffusion of diaspora engagement policies: A Latin American agenda. Political Geography, 41, 90–100. DeSipio, L., Pachon, H., Rodolfo, O., & Lee, J. (2003). Immigrant politics at home and abroad: How Latino immigrants engage the politics of their home communities and the United States. Tomás Rivera Policy Institute. DeWind, J., & Segura, R. (Eds.). (2014). Diaspora lobbies and the US government: Convergence and divergence in making foreign policy. NYU Press. Dutta, M. J. (2015). Decolonizing communication for social change: A culturecentered approach. Communication Theory, 25(2), 123–143. Eckstein, S. (2010). Immigration, remittances, and transnational social capital formation: A Cuban case study. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 33(9), 1648–1667. Erlingsson, H., & Tuman, J. P. (2017). External voting rights in Latin America and the Caribbean: The influence of remittances, globalization, and partisan control. Latin American Policy, 8(2), 295–312.

20

V. BRAVO AND M. DE MOYA

Faux, J. (2017, October 18). How U.S. foreign policy helped create the immigration crisis. The Nation. https://www.thenation.com/article/how-us-foreignpolicy-helped-create-the-immigration-crisis. Fitzpatrick, K. (2007). Advancing the new public diplomacy: A public relations perspective. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 2(3), 187–211. Fitzpatrick, K. (2012). Defining strategic publics in a networked world: Public diplomacy’s challenge at home and abroad. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 7 (4), 421–440. Fitzpatrick, K. (2017). Public diplomacy in the public interest. The Journal of Public Interest Communications, 1(1), 78–92. Flores, A. (2017). Facts on U.S. Latinos, 2015. Pew Research Center. https:// www.pewhispanic.org/2017/09/18/facts-on-u-s-latinos/. Freedom House. (2018). Freedom in the world. https://freedomhouse.org/ sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2018_Final_SinglePage.pdf. Gaither, T., & Curtin, P. (2018). Articulating national identity in postcolonial democracies. In J. Johnston & M. Pieczka (Eds.), Public interest communication: Critical debates and global contexts. Routledge. Gálvez-Rodríguez, M., Sáez-Martín, A., García-Tabuyo, M., & Caba-Pérez, C. (2018). Exploring dialogic strategies in social media for fostering citizens’ interactions with Latin American local governments. Public Relations Review, 44(2), 265–276. García, L., & Bailey, O. (2018). The Mexican European diaspora: Class, race and distinctions on social networking sites. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45(15), 1–16. Gilboa, E. (2008). Searching for a theory of public diplomacy. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 55–77. Gindling, T. (2009). South–South migration: The impact of Nicaraguan immigrants on earnings, inequality and poverty in Costa Rica. World Development, 37 (1), 116–126. Golan, G., Arceneaux, P., & Soule, M. (2018). The Catholic Church as a public diplomacy actor: An analysis of the pope’s strategic narrative and international engagement. The Journal of International Communication, 25(1), 1–21. Grossman, J. (2018). Toward a definition of diaspora. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 42, 1–20. Heindl, B. (2013). Transnational activism in ethnic diasporas: Insights from Cuban exiles, American Jews and Irish Americans. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 39(3), 463–482. Heinz, W., & Frühling, H. (1999). Determinants of gross human rights violations by state and state sponsored actors in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina: 1960–1990 (Vol. 59). Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Hirschman, C. (2013). The contributions of immigrants to American culture. Daedalus, 142(3), 26–47.

1

INTRODUCTION: DIASPORAS FROM LATIN AMERICA …

21

Hodges, C., & Denegri-Knott, J. (2012). Transforming the city: The potential for urban ethnographies of PR: The case of Latin America. Public Relations Review, 38(4), 529–540. Holmes, C. (2018, June 21). 5 facts on migrants coming to the U.S. U.S. News & World Report. https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/art icles/2018-06-21/why-are-central-americans-coming-to-the-united-states. Horboken, V. (2004). Ethnic communications. In S. Spencer & G. Taylor (Eds.), Social identities: Multidisciplinary approaches (pp. 199–217). Routledge. Houle, C., & Kenny, P. (2018). The political and economic consequences of populist rule in Latin America. Government and Opposition, 53(2), 256–287. Huber, R., & Schimpf, C. (2016). Friend or foe? Testing the influence of populism on democratic quality in Latin America. Political Studies, 64(4), 872–889. International Office of Migration. (2018, July). Migration trends in the Americas. International Office of Migration. https://robuenosaires.iom.int/sites/ default/files/Informes/Tendencias_Migratorias_Nacionales_en_Americas__ Venezuela_EN_Julio_2018_web.pdf. Laguerre, M. (2006). Diaspora, politics, and globalization. Springer. Len-Rios, M. (2017). The politics of Latino publics: Immigration reform, political participation and intention to vote. Public Relations Review, 43(1), 249–257. LeoGrande, W. (2015). Cuba: Public diplomacy as a battle of ideas. In G. Weisman (Ed.), Isolate or engage: Adversarial states, US foreign policy, and public diplomacy (pp. 231–258). Stanford University Press. Lesser, G., & Batalova, J. (2017, April 5). Central American immigrants in the United States. Migration Policy Institute (MPI). https://www.migrationpol icy.org/article/central-american-immigrants-united-states. López, G., Bialik, K., & Radford, J. (2018, November 30). Key findings about U.S. immigrants. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/11/30/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/. Malone, G. (1985). Managing public diplomacy. Washington Quarterly, 8(3), 199–213. Margheritis, A. (2011). “Todos somos migrantes” (we are all migrants): The paradoxes of innovative state-led transnationalism in Ecuador. International Political Sociology, 5(2), 198–217. Massey, D. S. (2013). America’s immigration policy fiasco: Learning from past mistakes. Daedalus, 142(3), 5–15. Melissen, J. (2005). The new public diplomacy: Between theory and practice. In J. Melissen (Ed.), The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations. Palgrave Macmillan.

22

V. BRAVO AND M. DE MOYA

Meyer, P. (2018, May 9). U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2018 appropriations. Congressional Research Service. https:// fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45089.pdf. Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social. (2017). Flujo de autorizaciones de residencia concedidas a extranjeros. http://extranjeros.mitramiss. gob.es/es/Estadisticas/operaciones/flujos-autorizacion/2017/Residentes_T ablas_PRFlujo2017.pdf. Mirilovic, N. (2018). Regime type and diaspora politics: A dyadic approach. Foreign Policy Analysis, 14, 346–366. Mora Román, A., & Guzmán, M. (2018, November). Aspectos de la Migración Nicaragüense hacia Costa Rica [Aspects of the Nicaraguan Migration to Costa Rica]. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). https://reliefweb.int/rep ort/costa-rica/aspectos-de-la-migraci-n-nicarag-ense-en-costa-rica. Morley, M., & McGillion, C. (2015). Reagan and Pinochet. Cambridge University Press. Murti, B., & Zaharna, R. (2014). India’s digital diaspora diplomacy: Operationalizing collaborative public diplomacy strategies for social media. Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, 5(1), 3. Navarro Fierro, C., Almaraz Anaya, J., Sánchez Rodríguez, M., Robles Ríos, A., & Escutia, J. (2016). Electoral studies in compared international perspective: Voting from abroad in 18 Latin American countries. National Electoral Institute. Newland, K. (2010). Voice after exit: Diaspora advocacy. Migration Policy Institute, 18–19. Available at https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/voiceafter-exit-diaspora-advocacy. Nye, J., Jr. (2008). Public diplomacy and soft power. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 94–109. Pedroza, L., & Palop-García, P. (2017). Diaspora policies in comparison: An application of the Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX) for the Latin American and Caribbean region. Political Geography, 60, 165–178. Pellegrino, A. (2001). Trends in Latin American skilled migration: “Brain drain” or “brain exchange”? International Migration, 39(5), 111–132. Pellegrino, A. (2004). Migration from Latin America to Europe: Trends and policy changes. Migration Research Series. International Organization for Migration (IOM). http://www.oas.org/atip/migration/iom%20report%20m igration%20lac%20to%20eu.pdf. Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. (2006). Immigrant America: A portrait. University of California Press. Quinsaat, S. (2016). Diaspora activism in a non-traditional country of destination: The case of Filipinos in the Netherlands. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39(6), 1014–1033.

1

INTRODUCTION: DIASPORAS FROM LATIN AMERICA …

23

Rana, K. (2013). Diaspora diplomacy and public diplomacy. In R. Zaharna, A. Arsenault, & A. Fisher (Eds.), Relational, networked, and collaborative approaches to public diplomacy: The connective mindset (pp. 70–84). Routledge. Reuters. (2018, November 2). Venezuelan migration to Colombia may generate growth: World Bank. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-imm igration-colombia/venezuelan-migration-to-colombia-may-generate-growthworld-bank-idUSKCN1N72I9. Ricourt, M. (2015). Dominicans in New York City: Power from the margins. Routledge. Rivas, C. (2015). The use of the Spanish language as a cultural diplomacy strategy for extending Mexico’s soft power in the United States. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 11(2), 139–147. Schoultz, L. (2009). Beneath the United States: A history of US policy toward Latin America. Harvard University Press. Schwarz, T. (2016). ‘I won’t naturalize foreigners like crazy’: The naturalization campaign in Venezuela, 2004–2006. European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 101, 33–54. Seib, P. (2016). The future of diplomacy. Polity Press. Sesin, C. (2019, January 10). Majority of Cuban Americans don’t think embargo works, but there’s slight increase in support. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/support-u-s-embargo-cubaincreases-among-cuban-americans-miami-n957266. Sharp, P. (2005). Revolutionary states, outlaw regimes and the techniques of public diplomacy. In J. Melissen (Ed.), The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations (pp. 106–123). Palgrave Macmillan. Sheffer, G. (2003). Diaspora politics: At home abroad. Cambridge University Press. Shesgreen, D. (2018, December 21). How U.S. foreign policy in Central America may have fueled the migrant crisis. USA Today. https://www.usa today.com/story/news/world/2018/12/21/has-united-states-foreign-pol icy-central-america-fueled-migrant-crisis-donald-trump/2338489002/. Shumow, M. (2014). Media production in a transnational setting: Three models of immigrant journalism. Journalism, 15(8), 1076–1093. Signitzer, B., & Coombs, T. (1992). Public relations and public diplomacy: Conceptual convergences. Public Relations Review, 18(2), 137–147. Solimano, A. (2004). Globalization, history and international migration: A view from Latin America (Working paper 34). International Labour Office. http://www.ilo.int/wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgreports/ —integration/documents/publication/wcms_079132.pdf.

24

V. BRAVO AND M. DE MOYA

Tombleson, B., & Wolf, K. (2017). Rethinking the circuit of culture: How participatory culture has transformed cross-cultural communication. Public Relations Review, 43(1), 14–25. Torres, M. (1995). Encuentros y encontronazos: Homeland in the politics and identity of the Cuban diaspora. Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 4(2), 211–238. Trieu, M., Vargas, N., & Gonzales, R. (2016). Transnational patterns among Asian American and Latina/o American children of immigrants from Southern California. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42(7), 1177–1198. Tuch, H. (1990). Communicating with the world: U.S. public diplomacy overseas. St. Martin’s. Unicef. (2018, December 8). UNICEF Migration flows in Latin America and the Caribbean situation report No. 4 I 8 Nov–8 Dec 2018. https://reliefweb. int/report/venezuela-bolivarian-republic/unicef-migration-flows-latin-ame rica-and-caribbean-situation-2. Valenzuela, A. (2004). Latin American presidencies interrupted. Journal of Democracy, 15(4), 5–19. Vargas, E., Sanchez, G., & Valdez, J. (2017). Immigration policies and group identity: How immigrant laws affect linked fate among US Latino populations. Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics, 2(1), 35–62. World Bank Group. (2016). Migration and remittances factbook 2016, (3rd ed.). World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/23743. Worldometers. (2019a). Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean: 33. http://www.worldometers.info/geography/how-many-countries-in-latinamerica/. Worldometers. (2019b). Latin America and the Caribbean population (live). http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/latin-america-andthe-caribbean-population/. Yukich, G. (2017). Progressive activism among Buddhists, Hindus, and Muslims in the US. In Religion and progressive activism: New stories about faith and politics (pp. 225–245). New York University Press. Zaharna, R., Arsenault, A., & Fisher, A. (2013). Introduction: The connective shift. In R. Zaharna, A. Arsenault, & A. Fisher (Eds.), Relational, networked and collaborative approaches to public diplomacy (pp. 1–14). Routledge. Zaharna, R., & Uysal, N. (2016). Going for the jugular in public diplomacy: How adversarial publics using social media are challenging state legitimacy. Public Relations Review, 42(1), 109–119.

PART I

Diaspora Relations: States Courting the Diaspora

CHAPTER 2

Transnational Social Protection and the Role of Countries of Origin: The Cases of Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Ecuador Karla A. Valenzuela-Moreno

Social protection is defined as a wide range of interventions carried out by public, private, and voluntary organizations, as well as by informal networks, in order to support individuals, households, and communities in their efforts to prevent, manage, and overcome risks and vulnerabilities and to achieve their well-being (Barrientos & DeJong, 2004). Social protection has always been a contested issue: Questions arise concerning whether the state should be responsible for the most vulnerable ones or if these populations fall into vulnerability due to their own lack of adaptation to fit into the new market rules and insufficient personal efforts to thrive (Deeming & Smyth, 2015). The extent to which non-state actors should intervene is also questioned (De Neuborg, 2009).

K. A. Valenzuela-Moreno (B) Universidad Iberoamericana, México City, Mexico e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Bravo and M. De Moya (eds.), Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74564-6_2

27

28

K. A. VALENZUELA-MORENO

All of these matters become even more complex when migrants come into the picture. The idea of non-citizens receiving public services in a host country is one that implies structural changes in terms of the reformulation of social policies of the countries of destination (and also of origin), but one that also questions the notion of a nation-state as a homogenous and cohesive community, since foreigners may not be able to “integrate” as expected by host countries (Schinkel, 2018, pp. 2–3). Social services are, for many immigrants, the first approach to state institutions, so they become a kind of filter for newcomers, regulating their inclusion or exclusion: If they are eligible for social benefits, then they are also considered members of the community, the opposite happens when they are denied such services. Thus, welfare services put the state to the test in terms of deciding who is in and who is not, also challenging state structures in terms of their capacity to adapt to multiple and divergent needs (Amiraux, 2000; Bommes & Geddes, 2000). The state-restructuring that occurred globally due to neoliberalism starting in the 1970s had major implications in terms of social protection. Countries around the globe started to reduce their welfare programs and many social groups were affected by the cuts, including immigrants (Shapaizman, 2010; Shields, 2004; Valenzuela-Moreno, 2019). From the countries of origin perspective, the cuts represented more members of their diaspora falling out of any kind of protection, and thus becoming more vulnerable. However, it was not until the 1990s that some countries with considerable numbers of emigrants decided to establish a new kind of relationship with them, one that, among other points, would reinforce the social protection of their nationals abroad (Pedroza & Palop-García, 2017). The interest of the countries of origin toward their nationals abroad is related to the reconfiguration of the traditional vision of the emigrant. They stopped being considered as someone who forsakes their nation and are now not only valued as remittances senders, but also as bearers of human and social capital useful to the development of origin countries (Bravo, 2014; Fitzgerald, 2009). Furthermore, immigrants are able to influence both, countries of origin and destination, to a greater extent than before. The diaspora contributions are visible in many spheres such as capital investments, creation of employment opportunities through entrepreneurship, economic and material support for infrastructure in their hometowns, philanthropic donations, knowledge transfer, etc. (Boccagni & Decimo, 2013; Bravo, 2014; Bravo & De Moya, 2015;

2

TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION AND THE ROLE …

29

Rannveig Agunias & Newland, 2012). Additionally, emigrants are still decision-makers in their origin country, since they tend to be the breadwinners and influence the judgments of non-migrant relatives. Due to their capacity to impact certain processes in origin and destination countries, they have become strategic targets for the public diplomacy efforts of the former. Once the relevance of their diaspora was acknowledged, several countries realized that a considerable number of their nationals held a negative view toward their governments, related to feelings of neglect and inefficiency to create better job opportunities and social conditions to avoid emigration (Iskander, 2010). Thus, countries of origin started to develop strategies in order to include their citizens living abroad as active members of a “nation beyond borders.” One of the initiatives to achieve this goal was to provide social services to their diasporas (Levitt & De la Dehesa, 2003; Pedroza & Palop-García, 2017). Theoretically, there has been much analysis on state-led social protection programs, ranging from their conceptualization, to the laws regulating access to them. Derived from such analyzes, it is known that in order for social programs to succeed, they need to reduce risk factors, threats, and vulnerabilities (Conway et al., 2000; Holzmann & Jørgensen, 2001; Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2004), as well as improve access to social rights for excluded populations to achieve the transformation of unequal social structures (Babajanian & Hagen-Zanker, 2012, p. 2). However, when the international migration component is added, social protection becomes a relatively recent subject of study. Given the particular characteristics of people on the move (such as the lack of formal membership or status, and migrant-specific risks and vulnerabilities), a new research agenda becomes necessary to explain what kind of social protection mechanisms exist for diasporas. Levitt et al. (2017) propose a transnational social protection (TSP) framework to account for the varied actors that intervene in the transnational protection of migrants. In such a framework, countries of origin are stakeholders in the provision of social services to their diasporas. As Pedroza et al. (2018) point out, several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are experimenting and innovating in the field of emigrant policies, including social services provision. Therefore, this comparative case study contributes to the study of Latin American diasporas by explaining how Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Ecuador provide transnational social protection through their consulates.

30

K. A. VALENZUELA-MORENO

It also sheds light on understanding the motivations that led these countries to participate in their emigrants’ well-being abroad. For each country, examples were gathered from the websites of the consulates located where the majority of their emigrants reside (Deere & Alvarado, 2016; Government of the Republic of Guatemala, 2019, p. 9; IOM, 2011; Li Ng et al., 2019). For Mexico and Guatemala, examples were drawn from their consulates in the United States; for Ecuador, from its consulates in Spain and Italy; as for Bolivia, from its consulates in Spain and Argentina. Academic literature and white papers were also used as secondary sources. In the case of Bolivia, the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also consulted, in particular the information related to the Sub-Ministry of Institutional and Consular Management and the General Direction of Consular Affairs, as well as the website of the General Consulate in Madrid, Spain. For Ecuador, information was also gathered from the website of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility, especially from the section of the Sub-Ministry of Human Mobility (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, n.d). The National Council for the Assistance of the Guatemalan Migrant (CONAMIGUA) provided relevant information on that country’s diaspora; as for Mexico, the website of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad, which is part of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was consulted, too. Guatemala and Mexico had more data available on diasporas, mainly government reports on consular programs and community organizing (Government of the Republic of Guatemala, 2019; Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, n.d.), compared to Ecuador and Bolivia. The data-gathering from official documents and websites took place from October 1, 2019 to June 1, 2020.

Beyond the Goodwill: Why Countries of Origin Engage Their Diasporas Gamlen (2015) proposes two strategic actions that explain the rise of diaspora institutions: tapping and embracing. The former suggests that countries of origin approach their emigrants to benefit from the human, economic, and political resources that they have gained abroad. The latter relates to the national identity that states want to promote with their citizens scattered around the globe. The official discourse of countries of origin is that catering to their emigrants’ needs is their ethical and legal responsibility. This argument is hard to disagree with. However, international migrants have been considered a vulnerable population for a long

2

TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION AND THE ROLE …

31

time, before diaspora policies gained salience. This indicates that there are underlying motivations. Governments of the four countries examined realized that their nationals abroad are valuable assets, not only because of the remittances they send, but also because of the human and social capital they bring with them. All of these assets transform emigrants into desirable partners in development initiatives (Newland, 2010), since they had never been entirely “gone” and have kept providing for their hometowns in many ways. For some diasporas, their political representation and lobbying efforts at destination give them some leverage in negotiating with their countries of origin. In addition, there was a diversification of the international migrants’ profile, and skilled migration became a relevant topic (both in the academic and policy fields), specially framed in the brain gain versus brain waste, brain drain and brain circulation debates (Lowell & Findlay, 2002; Migration Data Portal, 2020; Rannveig Agunias & Newland, 2012). Another important consideration is the fact that immigrants who are better settled in their new places of residence tend to keep closer ties to their countries of origin (Portes et al., 2008). Under this assumption, it is convenient for such countries to invest in the well-being of their emigrants, since the better off they are abroad, the more significant their contributions tend to be. Thus, some countries started to develop a different narrative around emigrants that vindicated them as part of the “nation across borders” and as important contributors to the national development (Bravo & De Moya, 2015; Díaz de Cossío, 2010; Gamlen, 2008; González-Gutiérrez, 2006). In the particular case of Mexico, such a shift happened in the late 1980s, for three main reasons. First, the demographic growth put a strain on state services and the labor market, so emigration was viewed as an escape valve; the regularization of many Mexicans during that decade and the growing activismof hometown associations raised awareness of their potential to influence policy in both countries; finally, the identity loss of a growing second generation brought diaspora issues to the attention of the Mexican government (Bravo & De Moya, 2018; González Gutiérrez, 1999). As for Bolivia, the administration of Evo Morales represented a major shift, since he was the first president to place emigrant associations at the center of emigration policies (Hinojosa Gordonava et al., 2012; Rodrigo,

32

K. A. VALENZUELA-MORENO

2016). Domenech (2008) also states that the migration policy is nowadays a process of plural participation,1 which acknowledges emigrants’ rights while allowing them to shape the migration agenda of the country. Legislatively speaking, the most salient progress is the Migration Law, which acknowledges the migrants’ contributions to the economic, political, and cultural development of the country (Parella Rubio, 2018); it also proposes a National Migration Board, which would gather several Ministries to implement public policies to favor emigrants (Hinojosa Gordonava & de la Torre Ávila, 2014). Furthermore, it substitutes the term “migrant” for “citizen in a migration condition” (Parella Rubio, 2018, p. 261). The 2008 National Agreement for Bolivians Abroad also allows for dialogue mechanisms between the several state Ministries and Civil Society (Chiarello, 2013). In Latin America, especially in Argentina, there has been an effort to organize all Bolivians as a single political subject, a “Bolivian collectivity” (Rodrigo, 2016, p. 164). Ecuadorian diaspora started gaining salience in the presidential elections of 2006, when they were referred as the “Third Region” of the country, finally being recognized as a single political actor (Boccagni, 2011, p. 212). The Constitution of 2008 acknowledges the right to migrate and universal citizenship (Curillo, 2019), granting the diaspora a righteous place as full members of the Ecuadorian community (Margheritis, 2011). As for Guatemala, even though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has declared its responsibility toward the diaspora, most of its engagements have remained in the discursive level (Rosales Sandoval, 2014). Since 2007, there has been a plan for the protection and assistance of Guatemalans abroad; however, until recent time, there has been little evidence of implementation (Pedroza et al., 2018, p. 220). Other measures include a migration policy within the National Development Plan, oriented toward protecting the human rights of nationals abroad, and influencing negotiation processes in which community leaders are involved. In 2019, the federal government issued a document entitled Public Policy for the Protection and Attention of the Migrant Person 2019–2020, which contains strategic guidelines for the protection of migrants and their families in origin, transit, and return (Government of the Republic of Guatemala, 2019).

1 In Spanish the process was referred as “ciudadanización de la migración.”

2

TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION AND THE ROLE …

33

To be sure, all four countries have assisted their communities abroad for a long time, and also the communities have developed self-care strategies. However, there have been various changes since the 1990s with the intensification of diaspora–state relations and, nowadays, all four countries have institutions that either deal specifically with diaspora engagement, or this topic is part of their overall agenda. The Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX) is a tool created to measure the degree of adoption of emigrant policies of Latin American and Caribbean countries, using indicators such as citizenship, consular networks, institutional participation, economic policies, etc. According to the EMIX, Mexico and Ecuador are two of the countries with the highest marks. Guatemala is above average, while Bolivia holds an average score (Pedroza & Palop-García, 2017, p. 172). One of the subcomponents this index takes into account is whether countries “…have created bodies meant to represent emigrants or to carry their voice into policy making specifically to represent emigrants” (p. 168). This is the case for the four countries examined (see Table 2.1). Gamlen’s tapping and embracing categories served as a milestone for more specific categorizations. According to Chander (2006), diaspora policies are bonding mechanisms that may be classified as political, economic, or cultural. The political sphere includes laws that allow for dual citizenship or the right to vote from abroad. An example of a cultural mechanism is the effort to vindicate national identity through the foundation of cultural institutes or the proclamation of a Day of the Migrant. The economic aspect is mainly expressed through the attraction of remittances for development programs. Levitt and De la Dehesa (2003) categorized diaspora initiatives in five levels, as follows: extension of political rights (dual citizenship, right to vote overseas); reforms to government structures such as ministries and consulates; investment policies to attract remittances; symbolic policies designed to reinforce immigrants´ sense of belonging; and extension of state protection or services in addition to traditional consular services. It is in this last category that social services become part of a diaspora agenda, while consulates turn out to be important actors in diaspora engagement. As public services for foreigners became less available in destination countries, origin countries had better chances of successfully approaching their nationals abroad, despite the adverse sentiments that some immigrants held against the governments of such countries, as their decision to migrate is often linked with the inability of their governments to

34

K. A. VALENZUELA-MORENO

Table 2.1 Institutions serving the diaspora by country Country

Institutions

Mission

Bolivia

Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Sub-Ministry of Institutional and Consular Management/General Direction of Consular Affairs Sub-Ministry of Human Mobility

To manage the country’s foreign affairs to benefit Bolivian citizens

Ecuador

Guatemala

Mexico

To “plan, direct and evaluate human mobility policy related to emigration, immigration, transit, return and asylum, in order to protect and promote the rights of Ecuadorians abroad and those of foreigners in Ecuador.” It also promotes the economic and social inclusion of migrants and their families National Council for the Assistance To “coordinate, define, supervise of the Guatemalan Migrant and audit all government activities (CONAMIGUA) that protect Guatemalan migrants, their families in Guatemala, deportees, returnees and migrants in Guatemalan soil.” Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IME) To promote strategies, programs, and proposals that come from the communities abroad and that aim to strengthen their relationship with Mexico and contribute to their integration in their host countries

Source Information obtained from the websites of each institution listed in the column “Institutions.”

provide suitable labor market opportunities, social services, and social mobility. Thus, the provision of social services for migrants and their nonmigrant relatives was an opportunity for such countries to change this negative perspective. Furthermore, countries of origin tend to link social protection to anti-discrimination and social equity agendas (Boccagni, 2011, p. 214) as well as with migrant integration in destination countries (Délano, 2018).

2

TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION AND THE ROLE …

35

Transnational Social Protection as Theoretical Framework Social service provision for international migrants—as well as for nationals—has become a field in which multiple actors are involved; this can be explained by the reduction in social welfare—particularly for foreigners—and by the fact that other institutions may be better suited to cater for the transnational needs of people in the move (De Neubourg, 2009; Levitt et al., 2017). Transnational social protection (TSP) is a theoretical framework that moves away from the traditional conceptions of social services provision that places the state of destination in the center of social welfare, and in turn, accounts for the various actors and strategies that provide and protect individuals transnationally, focusing specifically on migrants, and considering the following areas (Levitt et al., 2017, p. 6): 1. advanced age and 2. survivors: cash benefits, pensions, funeral services, etc. 3. incapacity: disability pensions, paid sick leave, occupational injury, disease, cash benefits, etc. 4. health: access to healthcare 5. family: maternity and parental leave, early childhood education, childcare 6. active labor market policies: public employment services, training, job creation, start -up incentives, worker safety and rights 7. unemployment: compensations, severance pay, early retirement 8. housing: housing assistance 9. education: knowledge and skill production, credentialing This framework acknowledges the immigrants’ agency and resourcefulness in order to create strategies that allow them to resort to a wide variety of non-traditional service providers, including their own social networks. It also addresses the influence of transnational actors in national welfare systems. In order to understand how different stakeholders interact and complement each other, Levitt et al. (2017) propose the concept of resource environment to refer to the formal and informal options available for an individual from four potential sources, namely, the states, the markets, the third sector, and the social networks. There are a set of variables that

36

K. A. VALENZUELA-MORENO

define the availability of these options, such as the nature of the market, the capacity of the states, the types and resources of the non-for-profit sector, and the characteristics of the migrants and their families (country of origin, race, gender, qualifications, etc.). A similar approach that precedes the TSP is the Welfare Pentagon. This concept refers to a set of five institutions that individuals or households may have access to in order to alleviate certain needs, namely: family, social networks, markets, public authorities, and membership institutions (such as religious groups and ethnic organizations) (De Neubourg, 2009). Just as the variables in the TSP, the Welfare Pentagon also considers that institutions require individuals to have certain assets of varied nature, which condition their access to the aforementioned institutions. These assets range from financial (credit or bank accounts) to social (family ties, acquaintances). Another similarity between these two approaches is that they consider the possibility for an individual to use one or more sources at the same time; for instance, a person may choose to use a private institution to receive health services, while recurring to a family member for financial aid. Therefore, immigrants may use these sources interchangeably and simultaneously, depending on many factors, such as their assets, the specific problem they need to solve at a certain time during the migration process, and the availability of sources at a given moment. In the analysis of international migrants and social protection, it is not unusual to adopt a state-based approach and focus exclusively on the country of destination, as if immigrants were completely dislocated from their places of origin. Such analysis does not only disregard the migrants’ own efforts to provide for themselves and adapt to their new situation, and the long tradition of social network support of non-state actors, but it also fails to account for the diversification of organizations, policies, and institutions that provide social services, as well as for the growing kinds of protections that are now available. However, TSP and the Welfare Pentagon move away from this perspective and introduce the states of origin into the social protection discussion. While TSP specifically mentions countries of origin, the Welfare Pentagon also includes them when referring to public authorities, which, from a transnational perspective, may also refer to public institutions of such countries. Traditionally, consulates have offered legal services to alleviate the main problems migrant communities face, which are usually related to detention, deportation, and violation of their labor rights. Since the 1990s,

2

TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION AND THE ROLE …

37

these countries, especially Mexico, have made great efforts to complement conventional services with social protection-oriented programs, ranging from the common areas of education and health, to innovative ones, such as issuance of identification cards; financial education; community organizing and empowerment; ESL classes and alphabetization courses (Bravo & De Moya, 2018; Délano, 2018; González Gutiérrez, 2006; Hernández Joseph, 2015). All the four countries examined—although to a different extent— have widened the scope of social programs available to immigrants, usually through consular offices. Mexico takes the lead regarding diaspora empowerment programs (partly due to the sizes and numbers of its consulates across the United States). Although Bolivian and Ecuadorian diasporas keep limited relationships with their origin states (Price, 2017), they have benefited from international agreements with Spain to invest in pension schemes. The Ecuadorian Social Security Institute (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social, IESS) also offers several plans for Ecuadorians abroad, such as pension funds, economic support for funeral costs, maternity leave, unemployment insurance, etc. (Herrera & Grijalva, 2017). As for Guatemala, the services circumscribe to labor rights orientation, health services, and assistance to vulnerable populations (Government of Guatemala, 2019).

Consulates, Diaspora Engagement, and Transnational Social Protection Countries of origin have great advantage with respect to most actors in the resource environment, as they can have direct contact not only with migrants, but also with their non-migrant relatives. Thus, they have more information about their needs and can add new services to the existing portfolio of public services already provided by other stakeholders, so migrants can have an attractive “mix and match” of social services. Moreover, governments in countries of origin are also in the position to offer migrants public assistance back home in the event of their return and also plans to cater for non-migrant relatives. Another positive aspect is that social service provision may be done in a way that is more familiar to immigrants, for instance, in their language, and along with other nationals that may have similar problems, with no risk of their immigration status being disclosed. These services can also focus on certain diaspora-specific concerns, whereas if an immigrant were

38

K. A. VALENZUELA-MORENO

to resort to an NGO, she would probably receive general support and information that may not fully address her specific situation (for example, regularization laws may be a bigger issue for Latin Americans than for the Filipino community). On the other hand, countries of origin can also offer services in preparation for voluntary or forced return, such as continuing education valid in the country of origin, labor market certification for certain occupations or job experience gained abroad, and financial and saving plans upon retirement. Non-migrant relatives can also benefit from some services, such as affiliation to social security and benefits for land investment available through migrant relatives. As previously mentioned, the TSP framework suggests nine areas in which social protection focuses. Consular services of all the four countries Assistance for the voluntary return of vulnerable citizens

Pension schemes for emigrants and their families

Return of remains of deceased citizens of vulnerable families

SURVIVORS

ADVANCED AGE Labor rights orientation Professional training and labor certifications Financial literacy Social security for non-migrant relatives

INCAPACITY, FAMILIES, ACTIVE LABOR MARKET POLICIES, AND UNEMPLOYMENT

o

Job listings in home country

HOUSING

Health campaigns Early detection, referrals and preventive health services

Distance education programs

EDUCATION

Psychological and social support

HEALTH

Fig. 2.1 Social services provided by consulates2 2 As indicated in the previous footnote, Fig. 2.1. is published with permission of Universidad Iberoamericana Ciudad de México graphic designer Karla Gabriela Contreras Pascual, from the División de Investigación y Posgrado (Division of Research and Graduate Studies).

2

TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION AND THE ROLE …

39

examined cover almost all of those categories by providing the following services, as detailed in Fig. 2.1.3 The analysis of these consulates revealed that not only do they comply with eight out of nine categories of the TSP framework, but also that all four countries have itinerant consular services (ICS, also known as mobile consulates). These ICSs, as part of the homeland’s outreach strategy, cater to communities located far away from consulates, by bringing to them a wide range of services offered at the central offices. The ICS regularly offers passport renewals, birth certificates, and identification issuance. In addition to these services, the nations studied are looking for more ways to serve their diaspora. Guatemala has proposed the signing of agreements with NGOs in host countries that can reach out to communities located far from the consulates (Government of the Republic of Guatemala, 2019). Additionally, Mexico also has the Mobile Health Windows, which brings detection and preventive health services to such communities (Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, n.d.). This service has proven to be an effective means to access healthcare, especially for undocumented migrants (Valle et al., 2020). In all four cases, consulates also offer additional services targeting the potential return of emigrants. Ecuador (Boccagni, 2014), Bolivia (Parella Rubio, 2018), and Guatemala (Government of the Republic of Guatemala, 2019) have federal policies for remittance investment that range from counseling on the productive investment at the household level, private and public investment in infrastructure for communities of origin, and loans and investment opportunities targeted to the emigrants’ needs. Mexican consulates organize the Financial Literacy Week, which consists of several state and non-state actors providing useful information concerning remittance sending, loans, and investment opportunities in the United States (Institute of Mexicans Abroad, 2020). Some hometown governments also offer matching funds for remittances invested in the infrastructure of communities of origin, such as Guerrero (Government of the state of Guerrero, 2019) and Zacatecas (Government of Zacatecas, 2020). Diaspora empowerment has become a point of interest, which relates to community organizing, since the more empowered a community is, the 3 Figure 2.1. is published with permission of Universidad Iberoamericana Ciudad de México graphic designer Karla Gabriela Contreras Pascual, from the División de Investigación y Posgrado (Division of Research and Graduate Studies).

40

K. A. VALENZUELA-MORENO

more organized they tend to be and thus, the more effective their collective actions to defend their own rights (Hernández Joseph, 2016). To be sure, Mexican consulates in the United States have a long-time tradition of supporting their communities by assisting them with their legal registration in host and destination countries. Most Mexican consulates now have a Window for the Comprehensive Support of Women (Ventanilla de Atención Integral de la Mujer), where they provide information about legal counseling, support groups, job placements, and other information regarding migrant women empowerment (Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, 2016). Ecuador has also made efforts to connect with their female diaspora; for example, in 2018, the Ecuadorian consulate in Cataluña arranged The Meeting of Organized Migrant Women (Ferrás Murcia & Martín Pérez, 2019, p. 195). Bolivia has also been very active in engaging their diaspora and trying to “articulate the collectivity” of Bolivians abroad by supporting the collective action of emigrant organizations (Rodrigo, 2016, pp. 9–10). As revealed by the analysis, consulates have undergone several transformations that allow them to have better communication with their population. Technology has helped consulates by implementing creative tools to keep in touch with their diasporas and spread useful information. For example, Mexican consulates have launched an app, MiConsulmex, and a website called Centre for Information and Assistance to Mexicans (Centro de Información y Asistencia a Mexicanos, CIAM), which contains updated information about legislative and policy changes (Gobierno de México, n.d). Ecuador has also launched an app called Ecuador Contigo, which contains useful information on the location and services of embassies and consular networks. It also has a Skype account and a telephone line available for frequently asked questions (Herrera & Grijalva, 2017). As for Bolivia, El Consulado de Bolivia en tus Manos is an app used to keep in touch with their communities. Social media platforms represent an opportunity for consulates to innovate and diversify the ways in which they get through certain information. These communication channels are also referred as Public Diplomacy 2.0, in which countries use social media and virtual communication tools to engage with their diasporas (Bravo & De Moya, 2018). Consulates of all the countries examined are very active on Facebook and Instagram, especially those located in communities that serve large numbers of their nationals. The information they share varies depending on the needs

2

TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION AND THE ROLE …

41

of the diasporic groups they serve; they range from mobile consulates’ schedules and cultural events to updates on immigration policies, etc. Virtual methods of communications have become especially handy during the COVID-19 pandemic, since most consular offices are temporarily closed. From an exploration of the social media accounts of these countries, the Mexican Consulate in Chicago informed their users that there are some services still available online (mainly consultations) through its social media accounts in Facebook and Instagram. The Consulate in San Diego hosted a virtual conference on thanatology and COVID-19, the Los Angeles Consulate kept most events virtually, for example, a series of talks on the importance of the Latino community in the city. Guatemalan consulates all over Mexico and the United States have used the hashtag #juntossaldremosadelante (#togetherwewillthrive), as an encouraging message for their diaspora. These examples account for the flexibility that social media offers in terms of adapting content to the diasporas’ needs. Another important aspect that has allowed the expansion of social and consular services in general, is the partnerships that consulates have been able to establish with several host-nation actors (Délano, 2018), such as immigrant coalitions, legal firms, hometown associations (HTAs), non-for-profit organizations, religious associations, insurance companies, banks, fiscal agencies, community centers, and universities, among others. The collaboration of all the aforementioned actors is invaluable because each of these institutions provides specialized services in its field, alleviating the lack of professionalization of consular officials on specific topics, as well as personnel shortage and insufficient budgets. For example, most Mexican consulates offer financial education by bringing together bank representatives, and most health initiatives are supported by fiscal agencies, NGOs, and university coalitions. HTAs are very important partners, especially for Guatemala and Mexico. Both countries provide assistance to register HTAs at consulates so they can endorse development projects in their communities of origin (Jonas & Rodriguez, 2014; Popkin, 2004; Smith & Bakker, 2008). They may also provide physical spaces at consular offices for HTAs to promote their services (Rodríguez, 2000). In the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, although HTAs tend to be very active, they “typically have no formal engagement with government institutions from the origin country” (Price, 2017, p. 71). Nonetheless, Ecuadorian NGOs serve a very important role by representing their community members with local

42

K. A. VALENZUELA-MORENO

authorities, and assisting them in employment search, accommodation, and healthcare (Pilati, 2012). As for Bolivian HTAs, consulates, especially in Argentina, have tried to organize them as a single body of Bolivians, and oftentimes ask for their assistance by lending consular offices physical spaces, or organizing their members around consular activities (Rodrigo, 2016). There are some challenges that Latin American diasporas in the United States have in common, such as members who lack migration status, who are generally the ones in most need of consular services and social assistance. To address those common challenges, the consulates of Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mexico launched the initiative called TRICAMEX in 2016. This agreement consists of informationsharing regarding best practices in consular protection, documentation, and service provision, among other consular activities. The four countries involved have also joined to build partnerships with local authorities and NGOs, and they have shared concerns with federal administration offices, such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Border Patrol (Subministry for Salvadorans Abroad, 2018). Furthermore, most educational and health practices carried out by Mexican consulates are not exclusive for their emigrants, so other migrants (mostly from Latin America) also benefit from such services (Délano & Yescas, 2014). The alliances that countries of origin have been able to build also include those with governments from countries of destination. For example, the Labor Rights Week—a series of activities to inform about conditions in the workplace and labor legislation—was a joint effort between Mexico, Guatemala and U.S government agencies that investigate worker abuse (Hagen, 2016). Aside from the practical benefits that derive from these partnerships, this collaboration sends a welcoming and accepting message to immigrant communities. Social Protection Services and Migrants’ Resource Environment There is a growing interest in partnering with diasporas across origin countries, especially within developing nations (Rannveig Agunias, 2009). Nowadays, all four countries are invested in engaging their diasporas through a variety of means, most of which go through their consulates. All countries provide services that could be classified as TSP. To be sure, immigrants have created their own social safety networks; however,

2

TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION AND THE ROLE …

43

countries of origin come into the social protection picture through their consular services, as one more actor of the migrant’s resource environment. There are some commonalities regarding the implementation of social services in the four countries. First, all consulates have implemented services tailored to the migrants’ needs, such as health and educational services, labor rights counseling, and even services for women (in the cases of Mexico and Ecuador). This evidences the interest of countries of origin in conferring their diasporas an active role in the policy-making process. It also explains why diasporas are such a key audience to achieve their public diplomacy goals. Information is an aspect that has been a cornerstone of consular activities; these institutions assume that the better informed their diasporas are, the better decisions they will make. Therefore, they have introduced programs such as informative talks about labor rights, preventive healthcare, financial, and banking options. This information closely relates to empowerment. The fact that consulates are so invested in empowering emigrants may also respond to their limited capacity in terms of changing the reality of host countries; in response, they try to provide certain tools to their diasporas in order to face hardship the best way they can (Hernández Joseph, 2016). The ways in which they communicate this information varies. For example, in the case of Mexico, most information regarding non-conventional consular services is offered while migrants are waiting for their IDs or legal counseling in consulates. HTAs also help disseminating this information to their members. For Bolivian consulates, HTAs have also become allies in communicating consular activities (Rodrigo, 2016). Apps have become popular information channels, MiConsulmex (Mexico) Ecuador Contigo (Ecuador), and El Consulado de Bolivia en tus Manos are mobile apps in which consulates offer updated information. Facebook and Instagram are also important means through which all consulates communicate with their diasporas. Consulates in all four countries are interested in partnering with several stakeholders in order to expand their social services offer, and even to be able to provide certain services at all. In the case of immigrant coalitions, HTAs, and some non-for-profit organizations, consulates may be interested in working with them because they may have closer ties with migrants than migrants do with the consulates, so they may be more familiar with their needs. Usually they have a good reputation within the communities, so it is easier for consulates to approach their nationals

44

K. A. VALENZUELA-MORENO

through their partnerships with such groups (Rodrigo, 2016; Hernández Joseph, 2016). Furthermore, these associations may be able to provide additional financial, staff, and space resources. In the case of Mexico, I argue, based on ethnographic work I have conducted with Mexican consulates in California, that HTAs also benefit from their partnership with consulates because they may reach other immigrant groups, so it is an opportunity for them to expand and become better known. In the case of HTAs, their representatives may have the chance to establish formal contact with government authorities of their countries of origin, which may pave the way to negotiations regarding their local towns and non-migrant families, or even a place for them in national politics. The extent to which emigrants are able to participate in national politics of countries of origin is quite different. Guatemalans and Bolivians that live abroad cannot run for office; Mexicans can only run for official positions in certain subnational jurisdictions and they even have “migrant candidates” in certain states, in which legislative positions are reserved for emigrants. As for Ecuadorians, they cannot be elected at the local or municipal levels, but they can run for office at the national level (Pedroza et al., 2018). However, there are also downsides related to these interactions. The literature has pointed to the potential cost of these relationships for the diaspora. Origin countries (mainly through consulates) search to identify and familiarize with their diasporas for various reasons; one is to implement political and social measures that expand their control beyond their territorial boundaries, which Ragazzi (2009) has referred to as the “‘spread of ‘neoliberal governmentality’ as a modular deterritorialized rationality and practice of power” (p. 383). For example, the provision of social services and the bonding created with HTAs could also be interpreted as a means to control community processes and modulate their incorporation to the political agenda, which could now be easier for the state to appropriate (Rodrigo, 2016; Smith, 2008). It is important to note that diasporas are not only constructed from the bottom-up, but state structures are also continuingly constructing the diaspora(Varadarajan, 2010). Such construction from the top-down allows for origin countries to regulate diasporic participation in public affairs on both, origin and destination countries.

2

TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION AND THE ROLE …

45

In sum, the increasing support of immigrant associations and hometown organizations is an effort that countries of origin are making in order to strengthen these actors so they can consolidate alliances and rely on them as active partners in social service provision, which turns immigrants into both, providers and recipients of social services. In this context, it could be argued that countries of origin have their own resource environment, composed of all actors through which they multiply their services, improve their capacity of community outreach and legitimate the government´s work concerning diasporic issues.

Conclusion In all four countries examined, consulates are strategic institutions for the implementation of emigrant policies. Apart from the conventional legal services provided (assistance during deportation and regularization processes), they have expanded their services to implement social protection mechanisms transnationally, as part of a wider agenda to establish and consolidate, but also control, their relationship with their diasporas. The role of countries of origin as social service providers can be regarded as a public diplomacy strategy, which is generally a win–win situation for all parties involved. For countries of origin, it represents an opportunity to legitimate themselves before their population abroad and consolidate a partnership that can contribute to national development, and, in some cases, it may represent a leverage in lobbying, especially with the countries where a considerable number of their expatriates are settled and hold important positions (politicians, scientists, artists, etc.). For countries of destination, it means that even when social services may be restricted, it is still possible for migrants to receive social relief without this implying a public expense on their side. Lastly, immigrants may perceive social protection services from their countries of origin not only as an affirmation of their national identity and sense of belonging, but also as a means of providing social services for their non-migrant relatives.

46

K. A. VALENZUELA-MORENO

References Amiraux, V. (2000). Unexpected biographies. Deconstructing the national welfare state? In M. Bommes & A. Geddes (Eds.), Immigration and welfare: Challenging the borders of the welfare state (pp. 227–247). Routledge. Babajanian, B., & Hagen-Zanker, J. (2012). Social protection and social exclusion: An analytical framework to assess the links. Overseas Development Institute. https://reletran.org.w0108631.kasserver.com/wp-content/ uploads/2013/07/Social-protection-and-social-exclusion.pdf. Barrientos, A., & DeJong, J. (2004). Child poverty and cash transfers (Working Paper No. 4). London: Childhood Poverty Research and Policy Centre and Save the Children. Boccagni, P. (2011). Social protection as a multi-actor process in Ecuadorian migration:Towards a transnationalism of social rights? In R. Sabates-Wheeler & R. Feldman (Eds.), Social protection and migration. Claiming social rights beyond borders. Palgrave Macmillan. Boccagni, P. (2014). Making the “Fifth Region” a real place? Emigrant policies and the emigration-nation nexus in Ecuador. National Identities, 16(2), 117– 137. Boccagni, P., & Decimo, F. (2013). Mapping social remittances. Migration Letters, 10(1), 1–10. Bommes, M., & Geddes, A. (2000). Immigration and welfare: Challenging the borders of the welfare state. Routledge. Bravo, V. (2014). The importance of diaspora communities as key publics for national governments around the world. In G. J. Golan, S. U. Yang, & D. Kinsey (Eds), International public relations and public diplomacy: Communication and engagement. Peter Lang. Bravo, V., & De Moya, M. (2015). Communicating the homeland’s relationship with its diaspora community: The cases of El Salvador and Colombia. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 10(1), 70–104. Bravo, V., & De Moya, M. (2018). Mexico’s public diplomacy efforts to engage its diaspora across the border: Case study of the programs, messages and strategies employed by the Mexican Embassy in the United States. Rising Powers Quarterly, 3(3), 173–196. https://risingpowersproject.com/quarte rly/mexicos-public-diplomacy-efforts-to-engage-its-diaspora-across-the-bor der-case-study-of-the-programs-messages-and-strategies-employed-by-themexican-embassy-in-the-united-states/. Chander, A. (2006). Homeward bound. New York University Law Review, 81, 60–89. Chiarello, L. (2013). Las políticas públicas sobre migraciones y la sociedad civil en América Latina: Los casos de Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay y Perú. Scalabrini International Migration Network.

2

TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION AND THE ROLE …

47

Conway, T., Hann, A., & Norton, A. (Eds.). (2000). Social protection: New direction for donor agencies. Overseas Development Institute. https://www. odi.org/resources/docs/2233.pdf. Curillo, J. (2019). Análisis de la nueva Ley Orgánica de Movilidad Humana del Ecuador, en aspectos relacionados con la emigración y la inmigración. Revista AFESE, 65. De Neubourg, C. (2009). The welfare pentagon and the social management of risks. In R. Sigg & C. Behrendt (Eds.), Social security in the global village (pp. 313–332). Transaction Publishers. Deeming, C., & Smyth, P. (2015). Social investment after neoliberalism: Policy, paradigms and political platforms. Journal of Social Policy, 44(2), 297–318. Délano, A., & Yescas, C. (2014). La diplomacia consular Mexicana frente a la migración indígena: Una Agenda Pendiente. Revista Mexicana De Política Exterior, 111, 143–166. Deere, C., & Alvarado, G. (2016). Asset accumulation through international migration: Gender, remittances, and decision making in Ecuador. Latin American Research Review, 51(4), 249–270. Délano, A. (2018). From here and there: Diaspora policies, integration, and social rights beyond borders. Oxford University Press. Díaz de Cossío, R. (2010). Mexicanos en el exterior: trayectorias y perspectivas (1990/2010). México: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores: Instituto Matías Romero. Domenech, E. (2008). La ciudadanización de la política migratoria en la región sudamericana: Vicisitudes de la agenda global. In S. Novick (Ed.), Las Migraciones en América Latina. Políticas, Culturas y Estrategias (pp. 423–448). Catálogos / CLACSO. Ferrás Murcia, M., & Martín Pérez, A. (2019). Asociaciones de inmigrantes y participación política como sociedad civil: Un estudio de caso en Barcelona. Migraciones, 46, 179–204. Fitzgerald, D. (2009). A nation of emigrants. How Mexico manages its migration. University of California Press. Gamlen, A. (2008). The emigration state and the modern geopolitical imagination. Political Geography, 27 (8), 840–856. Gamlen, A. (2015). The rise of diaspora institutions. In N. Singona, A. Gamlen, G. Liberatore, & H. Neveu Kringelbach (Eds.), Diasporas reimagined. spaces, practices and belonging. (pp. 166–171). Oxford Diasporas Programme. Gobierno de México. (n.d.). Centro de Información y Atención a Mexicanos. https://www.gob.mx/ciam. González Gutiérrez, C. (1999). Fostering identities: Mexico’s relations with its diaspora. The Journal of American History, 86(2), 545–567.

48

K. A. VALENZUELA-MORENO

González Gutiérrez, C. (2006). Relaciones Estado Diáspora, vol.1. Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior, Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, Asociación de Universidades e Instituciones de Educación Superior, Miguel Ángel Porrúa. Government of the Republic of Guatemala. (2019). Política Pública de Protección y Atención a la Persona Migrante 2019–2032. Guatemala City. https://www. minex.gob.gt/Uploads/PoliticaPublicaDeAtencionAlMigrante.pdf. Government of the State of Guerrero. (2019). Convocatoria Programa 2X1 para Migrantes. https://guerrero.gob.mx/articulos/convocatoria-delprograma-2x1-para-migrantes-2019/. Government of the State of Zacatecas. (2020). Reitera gobernador apoyo al programa 2X1. Trabajando unidos con los migrantes. https://www.zacatecas. gob.mx/reitera-gobernador-apoyo-al-programa-2x1-trabajando-unidos-conlos-migrantes/. Hagen, R. (2016, February 14). Mexican, Guatemalan consulates partner with U.S. to share labor info. The Sun. https://www.sbsun.com/social-affairs/201 60829/mexican-guatemalan-consulates-partner-with-us-to-share-labor-info. Hernández Joseph, D. (2015). Protección consular mexicana. Ford Foundation y Miguel Ángel Porrúa. Hernández Joseph‚ J. (2016). Protección consular mexicana. México: Miguel Ángel Porrúa. Herrera, V., & Grijalva, D. (2017). Políticas públicas para la población ecuatoriana migrante:¿Hacia una protección social transnacional? GIGAPP Estudios Working Papers, 4(66–71), 255–272. Hinojosa Gordonava, A. & de la Torre Ávila, L. (2014, December). Bolivia: Diaspora and Emigration Policies. Interact Research Report. Migration Policy Institute Europe. Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona, CEDEM. Hinojosa Gordonava, A., Domenech, E. & Lafleur, J. (2012). El voto de los migrantes Bolivianos en Madrid: Un asunto privado con impacto transnacional. In J. Lafleur (Ed.), Diáspora y Voto en el Exterior. La Participación Política de los Emigrantes Bolivianos en las Elecciones de su País de Origen (pp. 39–64). CIDOB. Holzmann, R., & Jørgensen, S. (2001). Social risk management: A new conceptual framework for social protection, and beyond. International Tax and Public Finance, 8(4), 529–556. Institute of Mexicans Abroad. (2020). Semana de Educación Financiera. https://www.gob.mx/ime/articulos/semana-de-educacion-financiera-sef. International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2011) Perfil Migratorio de Bolivia. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/perfil_migrat orio_de_bolivia.pdf. Iskander, N. (2010). Creative state. Forty years of migration and development policy in Morocco and Mexico. Cornell University Press.

2

TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION AND THE ROLE …

49

Jonas, S., & Rodriguez, N. (2014). Guatemala-U.S. migration. transforming regions. University of Texas Press. Levitt, P., & De la Dehesa, R. (2003). Transnational migration and the redefinition of the state: Variations and explanations. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 26(4), 587–611. Levitt, P., Viterna, J., Mueller, A., & Lloyd, C. (2017). Transnational social protection: Setting the agenda. Oxford Development Journal, 45(1), 2–19. Li Ng, J., Cárdenas Salgado, G., Espinosa, L., & Serrano, C. (2019). México: Anuario de Migración y Remesas 2019. National Council of Population, Fundación BBVA & BBVA Research. https://www.bbvaresearch.com/public aciones/mexico-anuario-de-migracion-y-remesas-2019/. Lowell, L., & Findlay, A. (2002). Migration of highly skilled persons from developing countries: Impact and policy responses. Synthesis Report. Geneva: International Labor Organization. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/gro ups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/ wcms_201706.pdf. Margheritis, A. (2011). “Todos somos migrantes” (We are all migrants): The paradoxes of innovative state-led transnationalism in Ecuador. International Political Sociology, 5(2), 198–217. Migration Data Portal. (2020). Diasporas. https://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/vic eministerio-de-movilidad-humana/. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia. (n.d). Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Breve Reseña Histórica. https://www.cancilleria.gob.bo/webmre/pagina/84. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador. (n.d.). Viceministerio de Movilidad Humana. https://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/viceministerio-de-movilidadhumana/. Newland, K. (2010). Diasporas. New partners in global development policy. Migration Policy Institute, Washington. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/res earch/diasporas-new-partners-global-development-policy. Parella Rubio, S. (2018). Retorno de migrantes bolivianos desde España: Retos y oportunidades para el desarrollo. En Migraciones Internacionales en Bolivia y Ecuador: Crisis Global, Estado y Desarrollo. Ecuador: FLACSO, 352. Pedroza, L., & Palop-García, P. (2017). Diaspora policies in comparison: An application of the Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX) for the Latin American and Caribbean region. Political Geography, 60, 165–178. Pedroza, L., Palop-García-García, P., & Hoffmann, B. (2018). Políticas hacia Emigrantes en América Latina y el Caribe. FLACSO. Pilati, K. (2012). Network resources and the political engagement of migrant organisations in Milan. Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies, 38(4), 671– 688. Popkin, E. (2004). Transnational migration and development in postwar peripheral states: An examination of Guatemalan and Salvadoran State linkages with

50

K. A. VALENZUELA-MORENO

their migrant population in Los Angeles. In U. Schuerkens (Ed.), Global forces and local life-worlds. Social transformations (pp. 143–168). Sage. Portes, A., Escobar, C., & Arana, R. (2008). Bridging the gap: Transnational and ethnic organizations in the political incorporation of immigrants in the United States. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 31(6), 1056–1090. Price, M. (2017). Constructing the Andean diaspora: State-based and immigrantled development strategies. In M. Hassankhan, L. Roopnarine, C. White, & R. Mahase (Eds.), Legacy of slavery and indentured labour (pp. 63–86). Routledge. Ragazzi, F. (2009). Governing diasporas. International Political Sociology, 3(4), 378–397. Rannveig Agunias, D. (2009). Committed to the diaspora: More developing countries setting up diaspora institutions. Migration Information Source. Rannveig Agunias, D., & Newland, K. (2012). Developing a roadmap for engaging diasporas in development. A handbook for policy makers and practitioners in home and host countries. International Organization for Migration and Migration Policy Institute. Rodrigo, F. (2016). La “diplomacia de doble vía” situada. Análisis del Viceconsulado del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia en la ciudad de La Plata. Estudios Sociales del Estado, 2( 3), 2422–7803. https://estudiossocialesdelestado.org/ index.php/ese/article/view/65/45. Rodríguez, L. (2000). 4ta Entrega. Guatemaltecos en Estados Unidos sin Derechos Políticos. INCEDES. https://www.incedes.org.gt/Master/notasxrodrig uez.pdf. Rosales Sandoval, I. (2014). Historia reciente de las políticas migratorias en Centroamérica. In P. Galeana (Coord.), Historia Comparada de las Migraciones en las Américas (pp. 201–227). UNAM-IIJ. Sabates-Wheeler, R., & Devereux, S. (2004). Transformative social protection (IDS Working Paper 232). Institute Development Studies. Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico. (2016). Ventanilla de Atención Integral para la Mujer. https://www.gob.mx/sre/documentos/material-de-difusionsobre-la-ventanilla-de-atencion-integral-para-la-mujer?state=published. Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico. (n.d.). Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior. https://consulmex.sre.gob.mx/austin/index.php/ime-articulo. Shapaizman, I. (2010). The influence of neo-liberal ideas and political conflict on the privatization process of immigrant policy: A comparison of Israel, Canada and the Netherlands. Centre for International Policy Exchanges. Schinkel, W. (2018). Against ‘immigrant integration’: For an end to neocolonial knowledge production. Comparative Migration Studies, 6(31), 1– 17. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327877326_Against_’immigr ant_integration’_for_an_end_to_neocolonial_knowledge_production.

2

TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION AND THE ROLE …

51

Shields, J. (2004). No safe haven: Markets, welfare and migrants. In P. Kretsendemas & A. Aparacio (Eds.), Immigrants, welfare reform and the poverty of policy (pp. 35–60). Praeger. Smith, R. (2008). Contradictions on diasporic institutionalization in Mexican politics: The 2006 migrant vote and other forms of inclusion and control. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 31(4), 708–741. Smith, M., & Bakker, M. (2008). Citizenship across borders. The political transnationalism of El Migrante. Cornell University Press. Subministry for Salvadorans Abroad. (2018). Experiencia del Espacio de Coordinación Local TRICAMEX, para la Protección Consular. https://www.cepal. org/sites/default/files/events/files/32_tricamex.pdf. Valenzuela-Moreno, K. (2019). Los consulados mexicanos en Estados Unidos: Una aproximación desde la protección social. INTERdisciplina, 7 (18), 59–79. https://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/inter/art icle/view/68460/61387. Valle, V., Gandoy, W., & Valenzuela-Moreno, K. (2020). Ventanillas de Salud: Defeating challenges in healthcare access for Mexican immigrants in the United States. Estudios Fronterizos, 21(43), 1–26. Varadarajan, L. (2010). The domestic abroad: Diasporas in international relations. Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 3

State–Diaspora Relations in El Salvador and Colombia: Building Legitimacy at Home While Trying to Protect and “Court” Citizens Abroad Vanessa Bravo

The diasporas from El Salvador and Colombia in the United States are the largest U.S.-based diasporas from a Central American country and a South American country, respectively (Pew Research Center Tabulations, 2016). Given their large size, and the contributions they provide to their countries of origin, both El Salvador’s and Colombia’s governments have developed relationship management strategies to engage these communities and keep them connected to the homeland (Bravo & De Moya, 2015). This chapter provides an overview of those relationship management strategies, which constitute part of El Salvador’s and Colombia’s public

V. Bravo (B) Elon University, Elon, NC, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Bravo and M. De Moya (eds.), Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74564-6_3

53

54

V. BRAVO

diplomacy efforts. It also explains how the latest changes in government in those two countries seemed to weaken the state–diaspora relationship building strategy in El Salvador (or, at least, the strategic communications about that strategy) in the first year in office of president Nayib Bukele (2019–2024), but not so in Colombia, where president Iván Duque Márquez (2018–2022) continued with similar initiatives to the ones established by previous governments. Diasporas are immigrant communities that reside in a host country but keep ties (social, cultural, political, economic, etc.) with the homeland (Horboken, 2004; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). In recent years, nationstates have engaged these communities as part of their public diplomacy efforts (Bravo, 2014, 2015; Bravo & De Moya, 2015, 2018; Cull, 2008; Délano, 2014; Murti & Zaharna, 2014). Public diplomacy refers to the strategic communications and actions undertaken that by state actors, traditionally (Cull, 2008; Tuch, 1990) and non-state actors as well (such as non-government organizations or corporations) (Fitzpatrick, 2007, 2017; Gilboa, 2008; Melissen, 2005; Snow & Cull, 2020), to engage audiences located abroad with the purpose of advancing goals deemed important for the home nation state. Although public diplomacy has traditionally referred to the engagement of foreign publics, it also encompasses the engagement of home audiences who live abroad, such as diaspora communities (Baser & Ozturk, 2020; Brinkerhoff, 2019). This includes the diaspora communities themselves conducting diaspora-led initiatives in host countries to support (Bravo, 2015; Murti & Zaharna, 2014) or oppose (Baser & Ozturk, 2020; Cevik & Sevin, 2017; De Moya, 2019; Uysal, 2019) the public diplomacy goals of the home government. Within this context, this chapter describes the main public diplomacy initiatives of El Salvador and Colombia to maintain contact with their citizens who live in the United States, and it describes the effects of the most recent change in government in each of those two countries (in El Salvador in 2019, and in Colombia, in 2018). First, the chapter offers some context about diaspora communities from Latin America in the United States, it delves then in the particular cases of El Salvador and Colombia, and it finishes with a reflection about the role that the home governments of El Salvador and Colombia are playing in “courting” their U.S.-based diasporas, expecting support for the home government and for the homeland in return.

3

STATE–DIASPORA RELATIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND COLOMBIA …

55

This chapter’s findings are based on the qualitative content analysis of news releases, factsheets, reports, speeches, and other documents posted on websites such as the ones of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador, between January 1, 2010 and July 31, 2020. It also includes a qualitative content analysis of tweets and Facebook posts of both Ministries posted in the same timeframe (January 1, 2010–July 31, 2020). This chapter draws data, as well, from previous research about Colombia’s and El Salvador’s state–diaspora relations (Bravo, 2014; Bravo & De Moya, 2015).

The Latin American Context In Latin America, Mexico is the top immigrant-sending country to the United States. One in four immigrants in the United States (or about 11.2 million people, in 2017) were born in Mexico (Radford, 2019). In the region, Mexico is also considered an exemplary leader in terms of developing policies, structures, and mechanisms to support its diaspora community in the United States and elsewhere (Bravo & De Moya, 2018; Délano, 2011; Hernández Joseph, 2012; Iskander, 2010). The Mexican diaspora is considered one of the better organized immigrant communities in the United States as well (Danielson, 2017; Délano, 2011; Smith, 2003).1 After Mexico, three Asian countries complete the top-four list of immigrant-sending countries to the United States (China, India, and the Philippines). But among Latin American countries, the next top-sending immigrant countries are El Salvador (top five), Guatemala2 (top 10), and Colombia (top 13), not counting two Caribbean nations: Cuba (top seven) and the Dominican Republic (top eight) (Pew Research Center Tabulations, 2016).

1 In this book, for example, Chapter 2 includes Mexico in an analysis of transnational social protections provided by the state in four different countries; Chapter 8 describes the activism of the Mexican diaspora in Chicago, and Chapter 11 focuses on the case of the diaspora-led project Mex and the City. 2 Chapter 2 in this book describes state-led diaspora engagement policies in four countries, including Guatemala.

56

V. BRAVO

Why El Salvador and Why Colombia? This chapter focuses on the state–diaspora relations of El Salvador and Colombia with their U.S.-based diasporas due to the particularities of the relationship in each country. In the case of El Salvador, the uniqueness of its diaspora is noteworthy. It is estimated that at least 20% of all Salvadorans have migrated to the United States (Noe-Bustamante et al., 2019a; World Bank, 2020), starting mainly during the 1980s and peaking especially after 1992, when the Civil War ended in El Salvador (Word Bank, 2020). To place things in perspective, it is worth noting that El Salvador is the smallest country in Central America, and it had only 6.4 million inhabitants in the homeland, as of 2020 (World Bank, 2020). Official sources estimate that between 1.3 million and more than 1.5 million Salvadorans have migrated to the United States (Noe-Bustamante et al., 2019a; World Bank, 2020), but unofficial estimates are higher, given the difficulty of accurately counting undocumented migrants. Many of these migrants left El Salvador because of economic reasons (mainly, the lack of jobs) (World Bank, 2020), but many more left due to the civil war that ensued from 1979 to 1992 (BBC, 2018), and to the insecurity that has reigned in the country ever since, including the gangs (called maras )-related violence and the high-crime rates (World Bank, 2020). Between immigrants, permanent residents and U.S.-born citizens of Salvadoran origin, there are at least 2.6 million people of Salvadoran origin living in the United States, according to the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (Noe-Bustamante et al., 2019a). The remittances (money that immigrants transfer back to their families and, hence, to their home economy) constitute a staggering 20% of the country’s GDP (World Bank, 2019). In contrast, Mexican immigrants’ remittances comprise only 3% of Mexico’s GDP (World Bank, 2019). In the case of Colombia, this is the country from South America with the most immigrants in the United States (Pew Research Center Tabulations, 2016), with a diaspora community of about 800,000 people (Noe-Bustamante et al., 2019b), which is larger than the one of bigger countries such as Brazil, Argentina, or Peru (Pew Research Center Tabulations, 2016). The emigration process for Colombia has happened, for the most part, as a result of the armed conflicts and drug wars that afflicted the country,

3

STATE–DIASPORA RELATIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND COLOMBIA …

57

especially after the 1980s. Colombians left, for the most part, to escape the country’s violence (Aristizabal Bedoya, 2019). Many of the Colombians who left their home country are well-educated citizens, of middle and upper middle class, with enough resources to reinvent themselves somewhere else. In fact, compared to the “average” Hispanic immigrant to the United States, Colombians have higher levels of formal education and a higher income (Noe-Bustamante et al., 2019b). Colombian remittances represent 2% of Colombia’s GDP (World Bank, 2019). In Colombia, there has been more political stability in the last 20 years than in the previous two decades. From 1979 until 1992, Colombia faced a civil war (BBC, 2018). In the 1980s and 1990s, the country also suffered persistent violence, political instability, an intense drug trade, and armed conflicts including clashes between military and paramilitary groups (Migration Policy Institute, 2015). In the 1990s, the Colombian economy shrank, and unemployment increased. Emigration increased as well, as a result. Between 1995 and 2005, for instance, 1.3 million Colombians migrated abroad (Migration Policy Institute, 2015). However, after 2003, under President Alvaro Uribe’s leadership (2002–2006 and 2006–2010), Colombia’s economy started to recover, the GDP grew strongly between 2003 and 2012, and the violence decreased, in part thanks to an agreement reached between the government and the FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the largest guerrilla group in the country) that allowed for the demobilization of FARC members and their incorporation into the political process under opposition political movements and parties (Migration Policy Institute, 2015). More recently, in November of 2016, the Colombian government, under President Juan Manuel Santos (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional—Social Party of National Unity, known as Partido de la U), signed a historic Peace Agreement with the FARC for its demobilization and disarmament, which even earned Santos a Nobel Peace Prize. However, a large portion of the Colombian population, as well as current president Iván Duque Márquez (2018–2026), are not supportive of the agreement because of its cost and its disappointing outcomes regarding violence levels and drug trafficking (Arredondo, 2019). In El Salvador, the situation has also improved in the last 20 years, and a fragile democracy has emerged, but with extreme changes regarding who is in power. The country is showing important political developments, such as having six democratic presidential elections, in a row, with peaceful transitions of power since the end of the civil war in 1992 (World

58

V. BRAVO

Bank, 2020). At the same time, the last three elections’ results have been surprising. In 2009, for instance, the political party Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN, or Farabundo Martí for the National Liberation), which used to be a guerilla group but became a political party in 1991 (BBC, 2018), won the presidential elections for the first time ever. FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes became president. Year 2009 was also the first year, in two decades, that right-wing party ARENA (the most traditional party in El Salvador) did not win the presidential elections. In another surprising victory, FMLN kept the presidency when FMLN candidate Salvador Sánchez Cerén won the 2014 elections (BBC, 2018). To add to these surprising results, in 2019, neither ARENA nor FMLN remained in power. In 2019, Nayib Bukele, age 38 at the time, won the presidential elections with a clear majority of the votes (53%), running as the leader of a coalition movement denominated the Grand Alliance for National Unity or Great National Alliance (GANA), which clustered around minority party Nuevas Ideas (New Ideas) (Oppmann, 2020; Renteria & Torres, 2019; The Economist, 2020). Bukele used to belong to FMLN but was expelled from it after the FMLN Ethics Committee determined he had broken party rules and had created internal divisions (Renteria & Torres, 2019). With Bukele’s victory, for the first time, neither ARENA nor FMLN won the national elections in El Salvador in 30 years (BBC, 2018). In just over two years since his inauguration on June 1, 2019, Bukele has created controversies with his populist style of governing, his appointing of relatives in government jobs, and his out-of-the-ordinary moves to assert his power in relation to the Salvadoran Congress and the Salvadoran Supreme Court ( Oppmann, 2020; The Economist, 2020). Through all these processes, the Salvadoran and Colombian diasporas have supported their home countries by sending money home to their relatives (remittances), by voting in the Presidential Elections from abroad (although in low numbers), by opening small businesses in their hometowns in some cases, and by representing their countries, informally, in U.S. society (Bravo & De Moya, 2015). In return, El Salvador and Colombia’s governments have offered their diaspora members multiple benefits of political, economic, and social nature (see Table 3.1, for a summary of the existing benefits up to 2018 and 2019, when Colombia and El Salvador experienced, respectively, their latest change in government). These governments have also “courted”

STATE–DIASPORA RELATIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND COLOMBIA …

(continued)

Governments of Antonio Saca (ARENA, 2004–2009), Mauricio Funes (FMLN, 2009–2014) and Salvador Sánchez Cerén (FMLN, 2014–2019) • Restructuring of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in 2005). This included the following: – Creation of the Vice-Ministry for Salvadorans Abroad and of the Salvadorans Abroad website. Both the links to the Vice-Ministry and the Salvadorans Abroad websites were prominently displayed on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ homepage. Both links were clickable and took the user to separate websites. This was the case at least until January 30, 2019, the last time the author of this chapter checked (and was able to find) this information online – LPDM law was enacted (its Spanish acronym stands for Special Law for the Protection and Development of the Migrant Person and His/Her Family) – Creation of the Conmigrantes Council. Conmigrantes is the Spanish acronym for National Council for the Protection and Development of the Migrant Person and His/Her Family. It is a state-led organization that includes, as associates, about 20 public institutions and non-profit organizations in El Salvador, as well as several diaspora organizations in the United States and Canada – The General Direction of Migration and Development and the General Direction of Human Rights are created • Increased number of services offered in consulates • Opening of “consulates of protection” (in migrants’ in transit routes within Central America and Mexico, to protect their human rights) • Phone hotlines in Mexico, the United States and Canada for migrants to receive support, in case of emergency • Increased political rights at home: External voting rights for the presidential elections are granted in 2014 • 2 × 1 matching funds for migrants to invest in productive projects in their communities of origin (hometowns), with fund matching from local governments

El Salvador 2004–2019

Direct benefits for the diaspora

Main advancements in state-led state–diaspora relations

Country

Table 3.1 State–diaspora relations initiatives and summary of benefits provided to the Salvadoran and Colombian diasporas by their respective states 3

59

Colombia 2010–2018

Cultural diplomacy

• • • •

“Courting” and communicating with the diaspora

Establishment of annual Distinguished Salvadoran (abroad) awards Celebration of the Day of the Salvadoran Abroad (since 2010, each Nov. 26) Establishment of a lottery honoring Salvadorans abroad Positive (and frequent) references to the diaspora in political speeches of the president and other officials to nurture the Salvadoran identity, to keep their sense of belonging alive, and to remind them of the importance that their remittances and investments have in the homeland • Descriptions of the diaspora, in political speeches and written materials, as strategic partners, agents of development, far-away brothers and sisters, and informal ambassadors of the homeland • Stronger messaging focus on defending the diaspora’s human rights in the United States and while in transit, regardless of the diaspora member’s immigration status • Emigration is discouraged, with mentions that migrating is dangerous, costs lives and destroys or divides families • Among other initiatives, organization of cultural and sports events (for example, soccer tournaments between diaspora teams and at-home teams) Governments of Juan Manuel Santos (Partido de la U, 2010–2014 and 2014–2018)

Main advancements in state-led state–diaspora relations

(continued)

Country

Table 3.1

60 V. BRAVO

• “Colombia Nos Une” (Colombia Unites Us) program, which includes benefits and/or favorable conditions to: – purchase a home upon return to Colombia through subsidized loans – contribute to a retirement fund (a pension program, called ColPensiones) – use financial services at home – get access to health services, education, and scholarships at home – participate in the “Highly Skilled Colombians Abroad” program, in which highly skilled diaspora members make connections with highly skilled Colombians at home, to contribute with their knowledge to government initiatives about science, innovation, and technology – participate in the “Highly Recognized Colombians Abroad,” to network and form business partnerships and entrepreneurships through the Plan Comunidad (the Community Plan) • Law 1565 (passed in July of 2012) created customs and tax exemptions, as well as other incentives, to encourage Colombian diaspora members to return permanently • Increased number of services offered in consulates • Education-services fairs, health-services fairs and “new-services” fairs in consulates targeted at diaspora members in cities such as New York • Note: Colombians have external voting rights in presidential elections (since 1961), in parliamentary elections (since 1997), and access to request dual citizenship (since 1991). Diaspora members can also run for office (for a seat in Congress) • Increased mentions in political speeches and in written materials of Colombians abroad, indicating that their government tries to protect their human rights abroad • References to the diaspora in political speeches of the president and other officials to nurture the Colombian identity and to keep their sense of belonging alive • Government emphasis on the message that Colombia is advancing and improving in aspects such as national security, health services, poverty levels, job creation, and bureaucratic efficiency • Consulates’ support for events organized by the diaspora abroad and organization of cultural events by consulates

Direct benefits

STATE–DIASPORA RELATIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND COLOMBIA …

Sources Compiled from Bravo (2012, 2014), Bravo and De Moya (2015), Migration Policy Institute (2015), and RedColombia.org (2020)

Cultural diplomacy

“Courting” and communicating with the diaspora

Main advancements in state-led state–diaspora relations

Country

3

61

62

V. BRAVO

their diaspora members more intentionally in the last couple of decades, portraying them in a positive light and disseminating strategic messages about them. For example, communications like this, by high-level representatives such as former Minister of Foreign Affairs Hugo Martínez, during a speech to inaugurate an Ibero-American Forum on Migration and Development, became frequent: After all, migrants are people eager to work hard, eager to advance. They, through the years, have brought progress to other countries, have created employment, have paid taxes, have generated development and have contributed significantly to the economic diversification and the competitiveness of their host countries. (“Palabras del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores Hugo Martínez al inaugurar el II Foro Iberoamericano sobre Migración y Desarrollo,” speech delivered on July 22, 2010. As quoted by Bravo & De Moya, 2015, p. 19)

The Situation in Recent Years: After Bukele (2019) and Duque (2018) Became Presidents The strong political changes that have happened within a newly found political stability in El Salvador since 1992, and the political stability— albeit fragile—that has also reigned in Colombia since 2003, have provided an interesting backdrop to study not only how and why the governments of these two countries have been trying to engage their diaspora communities, but also to explore, today, the differences and similarities in government priorities, from one government’s term to the next, in each of the two countries. Since Nayib Bukele won the Presidential Elections in El Salvador in 2019, full sections that contained information of interest for the diaspora disappeared from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. Other sources of information relevant to the diaspora suffered as well. For example, the Salvadoreños en el Exterior (Salvadorans Abroad) website is now empty.3 In the case of the Vice-Ministry for Salvadorans Abroad, its website is no longer linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ home page. The Ministry’s homepage still has a link to the Ministry’s “Working Areas” webpage, and this webpage lists, among others, the area “Citizens Abroad.” However, in this section there is only a five-line description 3 See https://rree.gob.sv/tag/salvadorenos-en-el-exterior/.

3

STATE–DIASPORA RELATIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND COLOMBIA …

63

that indicates that El Salvador promotes the exercise of the Salvadoran citizenship while abroad and the full respect of citizens’ rights for the migrant population of El Salvador, through the diaspora’s participation in processes related to domestic politics, the economy, cultural events in the homeland, the development of the diaspora’s communities of origin, and the reinsertion and return to the homeland (“Areas de Trabajo,” 2021). There is no additional information (or links) about the different benefits that used to be easy to find in the Ministry’s website in the past, in connection to the functions of the Vice-Ministry for Salvadorans Abroad (see Table 3.1). Using the Ministry website’s map, the author of this chapter was able to find a link titled Areas del Viceministerio para los Salvadoreños en el Exterior (Areas of the Vice-Ministry for Salvadorans Abroad), but it is just one informational page containing the objective of the ViceMinistry (according to its Five-Year Development Plan 2014–2019, which pertained to the previous government, not to Bukele’s), and a list of the Vice-Ministry’s offices or directorates (with two paragraphs describing the General Directorate of Linkages with Salvadorans Abroad—Dirección General de Vinculación con Salvadoreños en el Exterior). However, there was no link to access information about the Directorate just mentioned. The copyright for this webpage was from 20184 at the time of writing (August 2020). In contrast, before Bukele, the Vice-Ministry had its own website, and a clearly defined objective: Given the importance of the compatriots who live out of our borders, the Vice-Ministry for Salvadorans Abroad considers that: El Salvador is only thinkable, is only viable, and is only possible if Salvadorans abroad are included in the national development plans. In this framework, the ViceMinistry has as its fundamental objective the promotion of Salvadoransabroad rights and their access to opportunities for their inclusion in the national development. This is now the main function of the Salvadoran consulates in the administration of President Mauricio Funes. This new vision stems from a concept of sovereignty that transcends the exclusive protection of Salvadorans in some determined territory. (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de El Salvador, 2011, paras. 3, 4, 5, italics in the original, as quoted by Bravo, 2014, p. 1880)

4 For more details, see https://rree.gob.sv/viceministerio-para-los-salvadorenos-en-elexterior/areas-del-viceministerio-para-los-salvadorenos-en-el-exterior/.

64

V. BRAVO

The logo of Conmigrantes (in Spanish, the Consejo Nacional para la Protección y Desarrollo de la Persona Migrante y su Familia) was still included in the Ministry’s home page, but it was not clickable anymore. The Conmigrantes website was another source of detailed information, useful for the diaspora, about this Association and its services, and now it is nowhere to be found. Conmigrantes (in English, National Council for the Protection and Development of the Migrant Person and His/Her Family) is a state-led organization that includes, as associates, about 20 public institutions and non-profit organizations in El Salvador, as well as several diaspora organizations in the United States and Canada (Bravo & De Moya, 2015). If people want to find information about Conmigrantes today, they would have to conduct a Google search, and they would only find a few links to news about Conmigrantes (for instance, about its new executive board) (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2019), its Facebook page and Twitter handle, and the legal document that created Conmigrantes as an association (Asamblea Legislativa, 2011). While the results of a Google search would offer some information about what Conmigrantes is, how it was created and what it does, a diaspora member trying to find support while in the United States would find this information of little use (except for the social media platforms, which have more practical information but are not linked to the homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website). Through the website’s map at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, the author of this chapter was also able to locate a webpage called El Salvador Es Tu Casa (El Salvador is Your Home), which is supposed to provide information to Salvadoran diaspora members who decide to return home how to reinsert themselves in the home country financially, socially, and psychologically, and how to join several projects upon return (for instance, an agricultural project, an education project, a financialservices project, a gastronomy education project and a young-returnees livelihood project). However, each “section” contains only a short paragraph describing each project, with no contact information or instructions on how to participate.5 Still alive are the Facebook page and Twitter handle of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from El Salvador, created in previous governments.

5 For more information, see https://rree.gob.sv/elsalvadorestucasa/.

3

STATE–DIASPORA RELATIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND COLOMBIA …

65

On these platforms, some of the posts are about the diaspora or targeted at the diaspora, but these are not diaspora-devoted or diaspora-exclusive social media platforms. The diaspora-focused Facebook posts and tweets were mixed with all sorts of other posts: from who was named in what job position in the Ministry to what kind of diplomatic agreements were reached by the Minister. While perhaps important news in foreign affairs, these general posts have little interest for diaspora members living in the United States. Also alive at the time of writing were the phone hotlines in Mexico, the United States, and Canada, described in a previous section. They were also properly linked to the Ministry’s homepage. To be fair, in the homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Salvadorans who are abroad can find information about some traditional consular services provided today, and also in previous governments, by the Ministry (either services available online or provided in person at the consulates): among them, how to request a passport, a national ID card, a permit to travel internationally with a minor, and different certificates (births abroad, marriages abroad, deaths abroad, proof of being alive—for retirees who live abroad but receive a pension from El Salvador); as well as how to notarize documents, etc. There is also information (available, too, during previous governments) on how to access education programs provided online, how to finish secondary education (to obtain a high school degree while abroad), and a Gestión Humanitaria (Humanitarian Arrangements) section. In this last one, Salvadorans abroad are directed to the phone hotlines mentioned previously to request services such as government help to find relatives who disappeared while abroad, to repatriate children, to repatriate people who are sick or injured, to repatriate bodies of Salvadorans who died abroad, to support Salvadorans detained abroad, and to support Salvadorans whose human rights have been violated while abroad. The section that existed in previous governments but completely disappeared at the time of writing was the one called Salvadoreños en el Exterior (Salvadorans Abroad),6 which used to be linked to the homepage of the Ministry’s website. After much searching, the author of this study was able to find a website called ComunidadES,7 which is a site that functions as a database of Salvadoran diaspora communities (called

6 It used to be at https://rree.gob.sv/tag/salvadorenos-en-el-exterior/. 7 See http://www.comunidades.org.sv/index.php.

66

V. BRAVO

associations) around the world, promotes collaborations and alliances among those associations, and provides information about government services available to diaspora members through the Dirección General de Vinculación con Salvadoreños en el Exterior (General Directorate of Linkages with Salvadorans Abroad). In its “About Us” (Quiénes Somos) webpage,8 the ComunidadES website explains that this website belongs to the Vice-Ministry for Salvadorans Abroad. However, surprisingly, the ComunidadES website is not linked to the Ministry‘s homepage, it is nowhere to be found throughout the whole Ministry’s website, and it is not linked to the Vice-Ministry for Salvadorans Abroad webpage (which, as indicated before, is now empty). Once it is found, the ComunidadES website has useful information for the diaspora, but this information is “buried” in that it is not connected to the Ministry’s website. For instance, the ComunidadEs website provides information about several diaspora-targeted services provided by the Salvadoran government or it sends the user to other websites that have the actual information. That is the case for information about external voting rights, traveling to El Salvador, some tax exemptions if returning to El Salvador permanently, health plans available to diaspora members’ relatives who remain in El Salvador, getting the app ES Tu Consulado (El Salvador—Your Consulate, which is an app available through Google Play for Android phones but is incompatible with iPhones), and information on how to invest money, get bank loans, donate money to people/organizations in need, or start small businesses in El Salvador. All these are not new services developed by Bukele’s government, but they are accessible now through one single site. There are also sections with diaspora news, videos, photos, and success stories. In Colombia, in contrast, after Iván Duque Márquez (2018–2022) became president, the conditions for the diaspora and the state–diaspora policies and initiatives remained stable and followed the same approach as in previous governments (see Table 3.1 for details on those policies and initiatives). There have been no major changes after 2018 and until the time of writing. The “Colombia Nos Une” (Colombia Unites Us) program is still central in Colombia´s public diplomacy strategy, and the benefits described in Table 3.1 are still in place. Furthermore, just as it was before President Duque took office, the link to the “Colombia Nos Une”

8 See http://www.comunidades.org.sv/nosotros.php.

3

STATE–DIASPORA RELATIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND COLOMBIA …

67

website is prominently displayed on the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.

Conclusion: What Can Be Learned from These Cases? The findings from this chapter offer empirical support for the notion that transitional democracies in need of gaining legitimacy at home can be inclined to approach and engage their diaspora communities more intentionally and frequently than more stable, solid democracies (Bravo, 2014). Emerging, but fragile, democracies such as the ones that exist in El Salvador and Colombia have engaged their diaspora communities in strategic ways, keeping them close and rewarding them with political and socioeconomic benefits at home, with more strength and intentionality than more stable home governments (Bravo, 2014). But even in countries such as El Salvador, changes of government can also bring changes in levels of support toward the diaspora, depending on the government priorities. El Salvador and Colombia have large diaspora communities in the United States. This is a factor that can help explain why these countries try to engage (and to a certain extent, protect) those diaspora communities more strongly than similar countries do (for example, more than Costa Rica, a country of similar size and population to El Salvador) or than larger countries do (for example, more than Brazil or Argentina, which are larger in territory than Colombia, but with smaller diaspora communities in the United States, compared to Colombia). This interest in their diasporas on the part of Colombia and El Salvador is aided by the fact that these two countries are weak, transitional democracies that need both internal and external support and resources to function. Thus, reaching out to diaspora communities to request their support, financial and otherwise, is a logical step. However, the priorities of a country’s president, as mentioned previously, can also have a heavy impact in shaping the country’s approach toward its diaspora community (Bravo, 2014; Margheritis, 2007, 2011). More time is needed to study El Salvador’s case, given that Bukele has only been in power for two years (at the time of writing), and given that fighting COVID-19 might have shifted the priorities of Bukele’s government, but, at least for now, the findings of this study suggest

68

V. BRAVO

that President Bukele might have less interest in engaging the diaspora community than his three predecessors (presidents Saca, Funes and Sánchez Cerén). This can be seen in the large amount of information about the diaspora (or of interest to the diaspora) that has disappeared, is buried (perhaps unintentionally, but buried nonetheless), or became less detailed in websites of the Salvadoran government in recent times. The data-collection methodology used for this chapter does not allow to identify with certainty the reasons for this change in approach, but it is possible to interpret that because FMLN’ Mauricio Funes, in 2009, won the presidential elections by a narrow margin of 2%, he urgently needed to establish alliances with previously neglected sectors, such as the diaspora community, to increase his government’s legitimacy (Bravo, 2014). As such, Funes’ government developed initiatives and structures to better engage this public, and, furthermore, he “courted” the diaspora frequently, mentioning this community often in his speeches (Bravo, 2014). This interest in courting the diaspora members, offering them political rights at home, and focusing on defending their human rights in the United States and while in transit was intentional. José Manuel Castillo, then head of the Direction for the Strengthening of Salvadoran Organizations Abroad at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained: This is a state vision. The fact that Salvadorans abroad become key actors and active participants in the country’s development is a vision that crosses all the government institutions and ends in the institutionalization of those processes. It is a vision that is being accompanied by the creation of mechanisms, attention structures, and formal procedures, where each government institution adopts a role of attention to the Salvadoran abroad. (personal communication, June 22, 2011, as quoted in Bravo, 2014, p. 1879)

In contrast, the decisive victory of Bukele, who obtained 53% of the votes in 2019 (Palumbo & Malkin, 2019), perhaps allows him to govern more independently. For Colombia, as indicated previously, it seems that while the government changed in 2018, the priorities remained the same: To stay in touch but also “court” the diaspora members so that, in the short term, they support the home economy and, in the long term, they consider returning home with their resources and knowledge, to share them in the homeland. As such, the government has kept initiatives that facilitate the

3

STATE–DIASPORA RELATIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND COLOMBIA …

69

return home of expatriates (from favorable lines of credit to buy houses in Colombia to more efficient processes to come back). In Colombia, the political transition did not seem to affect the priorities toward the diaspora, and the programs and services available before Duque won the presidency in 2018 seem to be similar to the ones available presently. Different scholars (for instance, Bravo, 2014; Bravo & De Moya, 2015; Margheritis, 2007, 2011; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006) have argued that the strength of the state–diaspora relationship will depend on factors such as the diaspora members’ context of exit from the home country, the context of reception in the host country, the motivations for migrating and the existence of (or lack thereof) diaspora social networks available in the host country. Salvadorans have exited their country to escape a context of violence and strong financial need, and for many of them, the context of reception in the United States includes being undocumented or having just a Temporary Protection Status—TPS. In contrast, the majority of Colombians in the diaspora who live in the United States have acquired, through time, citizenship or legal residency thanks to family reunification, asylum or refugee resettlement processes and programs (Migration Policy Institute, 2015). These contrasting factors could help explain why, in the case of El Salvador, the government has focused on the protection of the diaspora’s human rights in the United States and during the process of migration (while in transit), given the vulnerable situation of many of the Salvadoran diaspora members at the time they migrate and within the context in which they live in the United States. On the other hand, Colombians have migrated, in general terms, with more resources than Salvadorans, and they have had a more favorable migratory status in the United States (Migration Policy Institute, 2015; Noe-Bustamante et al., 2019a, 2019b). As such, their home government has focused more strongly on reminding them that, at home and abroad, they are Colombians first, and that their connection to the home country is needed (for instance, through remittances and political participation in external voting processes) (Bravo & De Moya, 2015). The Colombian government has also focused on communicating that their eventual return to the homeland is expected (Bravo & De Moya, 2015). El Salvador and Colombia both have large diasporas in the United States. However, there are clear differences in their diaspora communities’ characteristics, context of exit from the homeland, context of reception

70

V. BRAVO

in the United States, and main needs while abroad. Accordingly, their home governments have placed different emphases on their diasporatargeted, public diplomacy initiatives. However, no matter the emphasis, both homelands are increasingly including their diasporas in their public diplomacy strategies and tactics.

References “Areas de Trabajo”. (2021). Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores—El Salvador. https://rree.gob.sv/areas-de-trabajo/. Aristizabal Bedoya, M. (2019, September 23). Colombia se ubica en la séptima casilla entre el top 10 de hispanohablantes en EE.UU. [Colombia ranks seventh among the top 10 Spanish speaking (countries) in the United States]. La República. https://www.larepublica.co/globoeconomia/colombia-seubica-en-la-septima-casilla-entre-el-top-10-de-hispanohablantes-en-eeuu-291 1405. Arredondo, J. (2019, December 30). The slow death of Colombia’s peace movement. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 2019/12/colombia-peace-farc/604078/. Asamblea Legislativa—República de El Salvador. (2011, April 14). Decreto No. 655 [Decree No. 655]. PDF available online through https://oig.cepal.org/ en/laws/6/country/salvador-13. Baser, B., & Ozturk, A. (2020). Positive and negative diaspora governance in context: From public diplomacy to transnational authoritarianism. Middle East Critique, 29(3), 1–16. BBC. (2018, May 16). El Salvador profile—Timeline. BBC News. https://www. bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19402222. Bravo, V. (2012). Engaging the diaspora: El Salvador and Costa Rica’s use of social media to connect with their diaspora communities in the United States. Global Media Journal, 11(21), 1–19. Bravo, V. (2014). El Salvador and Costa Rica’s state–diaspora relations management. International Journal of Communication, 8(22), 1872–1893. https:// ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/1822/1174. Bravo, V. (2015). The importance of diaspora communities as key publics for national governments around the world. In G. J. Golan, S. U. Yang, & D. F. Kinsey (Eds.), International public relations and public diplomacy (pp. 279– 296). New York: Peter Lang. Bravo, V., & De Moya, M. (2015). Communicating the homeland’s relationship with its diaspora community: The cases of El Salvador and Colombia. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 10(1), 70–104.

3

STATE–DIASPORA RELATIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND COLOMBIA …

71

Bravo, V., & De Moya, M. (2018). Mexico’s public diplomacy efforts to engage its diaspora across the border: Case study of the programs, messages and strategies employed by the Mexican Embassy in the United States. Rising Powers Quarterly, 3(3), 173–193. https://risingpowersproject.com/quarte rly/mexicos-public-diplomacy-efforts-to-engage-its-diaspora-across-the-bor der-case-study-of-the-programs-messages-and-strategies-employed-by-themexican-embassy-in-the-united-states/. Brinkerhoff, J. (2019). Diasporas and public diplomacy: Distinctions and future prospects. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 14(1–2), 51–64. Cevik, S., & Sevin, E. (2017). A quest for soft power: Turkey and the Syrian refugee crisis. Journal of Communication Management, 21(4), 399–410. Cull, N. (2008). Public diplomacy: Taxonomies and histories. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 31–54. Danielson, M. (2017). Emigrants get political: Mexican migrants engage their hometowns. Oxford University Press. De Moya, M. (2019). Protesting the homeland: Diaspora dissent public relations efforts to oppose the Dominican Republic’s citizenship policies. In Protest public relations (pp. 106–127). Routledge. Délano, A. (2011). Mexico and its diaspora in the United States: Policies of emigration since 1848. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Délano, A. (2014). The diffusion of diaspora engagement policies: A Latin American agenda. Political Geography, 41, 90–100. Fitzpatrick, K. (2007). Advancing the new public diplomacy: A public relations perspective. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 2(3), 187–211. Fitzpatrick, K. (2017). Public diplomacy in the public interest. The Journal of Public Interest Communications, 1(1), 78–92. Gilboa, E. (2008). Searching for a theory of public diplomacy. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 55–77. Hernández Joseph, D. (2012). Mexico’s concentration on consular services in the United States. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 7 (2), 227–236. Horboken, V. (2004). Ethnic communications. In S. Spencer & G. Taylor (Eds.), Social identities: Multidisciplinary approaches (pp. 199–217). Abingdon: Routledge. Iskander, N. (2010). Creative state: Forty years of migration and development policy in Morocco and Mexico. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Margheritis, A. (2007). State-led transnationalism and migration: Reaching out to the Argentine community in Spain. Global Networks, 7 (1), 87–106. Margheritis, A. (2011). “Todos somos migrantes” (We are all migrants): The paradoxes of innovative state-led transnationalism in Ecuador. International Political Sociology, 5(2), 198–217.

72

V. BRAVO

Melissen, J. (2005). The new public diplomacy: Between theory and practice. In J. Melissen (Ed.), The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Migration Policy Institute (MPI). (2015, May). The Colombian diaspora in the United States. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/select-diasporapopulations-united-states. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. (2019, August 14). Nuevo consejo de Conmigrantes se compromete a impulsar transformaciones en materia migratoria [New council of Conmigrantes commits to promote transformations in immigration matters]. https://rree.gob.sv/tag/conmigrantes/. Murti, B., & Zaharna, R. (2014). India’s digital diaspora diplomacy: Operationalizing collaborative public diplomacy strategies for social media. Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, 5(1), 3. Noe-Bustamante, L., Flores, A., & Shah, S. (2019a, September 16). Facts on hispanics of Salvadoran origin in the United States, 2017 . Pew Research Center Hispanic Trends. https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/fact-sheet/ u-s-hispanics-facts-on-salvadoran-origin-latinos/ Noe-Bustamante, L., Flores, A., & Shah, S. (2019b, September 16). Facts on hispanics of Colombian origin in the United States, 2017 . Pew Research Center Hispanic Trends. https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/fact-sheet/ u-s-hispanics-facts-on-colombian-origin-latinos/. Oppmann, P. (2020, May 21). Savior or strongman? El Salvador’s millennial president defies courts and Congress on coronavirus response. CNN.com. https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/21/americas/salvador-bukelecoronavirus-intl/index.html. Palumbo, G., & Malkin, E. (2019, February 3). Nayib Bukele, an outsider candidate, claims victory in El Salvador election. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/03/world/americas/sal vador-bukele-election.html. Pew Research Center Tabulations of 2016 American Community Survey. (2016). Statistical portrait of the foreign-born population in the United States, 2016. Pew Research. http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/ 2018/09/06132756/PH_2016-Foreign-Born-Statistical-Portraits_CurrentData_5_Country-of-birth.png. Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. (2006). Immigrant America: A portrait. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Radford, J. (2019, June 17). Key findings about U.S. immigrants. Pew Research Center: Fact Tank. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/17/ key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/. Red Colombia (REDHER). (2020). RedColombia.Org. http://www.redcol ombia.org/.

3

STATE–DIASPORA RELATIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND COLOMBIA …

73

Renteria, N., & Torres, N. (2019, February 4). El Salvador’s incoming president, shunned by ruling party, forged own path. Reuters.com. https://www.reuters. com/article/us-elsalvador-election-bukele/el-salvadors-incoming-presidentshunned-by-ruling-party-forged-own-path-idUSKCN1PU00X. Smith, R. C. (2003). Migrant membership as an instituted process: Transnationalization, the state and the extra-territorial conduct of Mexican politics. International Migration Review, 37 (2), 297–343. Snow, N., & Cull, N. (Eds.). (2020). Routledge handbook of public diplomacy. Routledge. The Economist. (2020, May 7). Hungry house: Nayib Bukele’s power grab in El Salvador. Economist.com. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/ 2020/05/07/nayib-bukeles-power-grab-in-el-salvador. Tuch, H. (1990). Communicating with the world: U.S. public diplomacy overseas. New York, NY: St. Martin’s. Uysal, N. (2019). The rise of diasporas as adversarial non-state actors in public diplomacy: The Turkish case. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 14(3), 272– 292. Word Bank (The). (2019). Personal remittances received (% of GDP)— El Salvador. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD. ZS?locations=SV. World Bank (The). (2020, April 12). The World Bank in El Salvador: Overview. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/elsalvador/overview.

CHAPTER 4

Diaspora Engagement Policies in Argentina: The Unfolding of a Still Lukewarm Approach Ana Margheritis

Diaspora engagement policies have become a worldwide approach to address multiple engagements of migrants with societies at both ends of their migration journey. As one of the venues for state and nonstate actors to manage migration flows across countries and regions cooperatively, these policies represent a potential form of transnational governance (Gamlen, 2018; Liu & van Dongen, 2016; Ragazzi, 2009). Latin American nations have joined this trend, although the timing, motivations, characteristics, and implications of each country’s outreach efforts vary considerably across countries. This chapter engages with the main theme of this book: It argues that in Latin America such outreach efforts have resembled courting practices. Courting diasporas is a deliberate expression of the ambivalent, still incipient, and openended relationship between states and diasporas, which is not exempt

A. Margheritis (B) University of Southampton, Southampton, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Bravo and M. De Moya (eds.), Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74564-6_4

75

76

A. MARGHERITIS

from conflict, detours, and setbacks and may (or may not) unfold into stable and fruitful partnerships (Margheritis, 2016, p. 1). Building upon the case of Argentina, this study presents an example of intermittent, selective, and relatively loose courting. Drawing on qualitative methods,1 this work shows that Argentina’s policies for citizens abroad have not involved intense courting yet and have not been institutionalized as a distinct and vibrant sphere of action. Most initiatives have rather waxed and waned over time. This chapter analyzes the three-fold evolution of such tepid attempts to reach out to emigrants (i.e., moving from an assistance-oriented to a political and lately to a social protection approach). It identifies the main features and issues at each stage of policy unfolding since the turn of the century, and it provides elements for a preliminary assessment of policy impact.

The Expansion of Politics and Policies Beyond Borders Emigration policies and diaspora politics have become growing lines of inquiry within migration studies lately. The analytical focus has been changing to integrate sociological or anthropological (i.e., bottom-up) perspectives (e.g., Burgees, 2005; Laguerre, 1998; Larner, 2007, among others) and institutional/political ones (or, top-down) (e.g., Bloch, 2017; Fitzgerald, 2006; Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003) and, at the same time, to pay due attention to countries of origin. In the Latin American Southern Cone, given that nation- and state-building was closely intertwined with promoting population and immigration, there was historically little political (and scholarly concern) with nationals abroad. In the last few decades, emigration crises and/or structural migration imbalances called attention to the de facto redefinition of national borders and the development of transnational practices, including new forms of doing politics and policies. Yet, for most South American countries outreach efforts fall within the remit of consular offices.2 Bureaucratic resistance and infighting have 1 This piece builds upon data collected for various projects on this case study via archival research, analysis of texts and online platforms, several rounds of interviews and personal communications with public officials, migrant leaders, international organizations’ and non-governmental organization’s officers, academic and media specialists, etc. 2 Only Ecuador attempted to create a separate, autonomous institution. The experience lagged behind expectations and lasted only a few years.

4

DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN ARGENTINA …

77

been common and often resulted from diplomats’ opposition to engage with emigrant communities beyond traditional consular assistance. Public diplomacy is a relatively new terminology among foreign affairs cadres. Although emigrants’ contributions as cultural ambassadors and agents of public diplomacy—who could eventually support building relationships with foreign (host) countries (Rana, 2013)—have been acknowledged in political discourses, diaspora engagement policies have been largely driven by domestic concerns. The idea that diaspora engagement policies might constitute a dimension of diplomatic activities and a helpful tool of soft power (Nye, 2008) is still to take root in South American foreign affairs circles. Moreover, in terms of policy responses, as the case of Argentina illustrates, the possibilities and limits of courting have to be understood against the background of a complex (at times, violent) relationship between the state and civil society in the Southern Cone. The history of this relationship is marked by a traumatic memory of exit conditions for many emigrants; hence, it still translates into distrust of political institutions and elites, indifference, and/or ambivalence about home politics. This study builds on various bodies of literature to frame the Argentine case. Studies on diaspora engagement policies help to explain the top-down dynamic by which states may seek to reach out to their citizens abroad (e.g., Ancien et al., 2009; Gamlen, 2008; Ho, 2011; Ragazzi, 2009). The most recent syntheses include cases from all regions, but South American cases are rarely included in the typologies drawn (Délano & Gamlen, 2014; Ragazzi, 2014). State involvement with citizens abroad has been generally understood as a response to migrants’ demands and increasing capacity to organize and lobby, and more likely to happen when massive emigration has a significant political impact, such as Mexicans in the United States (e.g., Bravo & De Moya, 2018; Goldring, 2002; Smith, 2003). The attempt to capture remittances and/or benefit from the lobby capacity of emigrants in the host country, and the role of the state apparatus and political parties have been identified as the main drivers in the establishment of links with emigrants (e.g., Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). This explanation links diaspora policies and national development projects, which lately turned to emigrants for support. Yet, it misses the intricate and complex interplay of political and economic transitions,

78

A. MARGHERITIS

which in the Global South re-shaped state capacity to enlist supporters and extract resources. A few studies on other regions focus on transitional cases and implications for state reshaping (e.g., Brand, 2006; Kapur, 2010), but the path to transitions and the distinct features of political systems preclude extrapolations to South American cases. Only recently there has been an expansion of case studies and investigation of distinct and selective approaches to emigration policy (e.g., those catering to specific, and often, multiple segments of the diaspora, such as Tsourapas, 2015) and how this may give place to the emergence of new geographies of national membership, or not. Southern Cone countries and Argentina in particular have received little attention in the literature and defy neat classification for a number of reasons. States rely on disarticulated, inefficient apparatuses that have undergone multiple and diverse reforms in the last half century. Emigration policy is usually highly centralized in few offices around the Executive power rather than balkanized; there is little to none local level involvement—two assumptions typically inferred from the Mexican case (Fitzgerald, 2006). Migrant organizations are relatively few, participation and mobilization are low and intermittent, and home-town associations are not the locus of migrant activities. Thus, the agenda-setting capacity of social actors in a transnational space cannot be assumed as effective as in other regions (e.g. Brand, 2006). Furthermore, countries like Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina have very low dependency on remittances. They all lack political parties with strong transnational outreach capacity, and electoral cycles show that parties face serious troubles to rebuild and/or maintain allegiances. In addition, it is argued that the widespread adoption of diaspora policies is best explained by a particular form of governmentality deemed “neoliberal,” which has presumably swept the entire world, one that “glorifies markets and prescribes light-touch, out-sourced forms of regulation that mimic markets and instils values of self-responsibility and participation into networks of active citizens” (Délano & Gamlen, 2014, p. 46) and typologies are drawn accordingly (Ragazzi, 2014). In contrast, this chapter underscores the value of detailed case studies and presents one in which a distinct, post-neoliberal rationale3 prevailed at the launching 3 The term post-neoliberalism is generally used to describe political positions, ideas, and policy approaches based on a critique of the neoliberal reforms favoured by the Washington Consensus after the debt crisis in early 1980s. Accordingly, the post-neoliberal

4

DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN ARGENTINA …

79

of diaspora policies. Although capitalizing on emigrants’ contributions may have been part of the attempt to foster national development in the Southern Cone, the legacies of neoliberal attempts and the lack of progress in changing bureaucratic culture and practices have impinged upon state capacities and kept emigration policies caught in a stop and go cycle, inconsistencies, and/or delays. It is not evident, then, to what extent, and how, state initiatives might contribute to recast the notions of society beyond borders and citizenship in a transnational space. Thus, this study takes a cautious approach to celebratory views of engagement. It problematizes engagement rather than taking it for granted. The notion of “courting” underlines that some sending states have turned to friendly discourses, cultivation of links, and attempts to capture the support and resources of their citizens residing abroad; it also accounts for the fading of several initiatives, the recurrent controversies and setbacks, and the conflicts they generated. In other words, courting diasporas captures the nuances of engagement; it underscores the ambivalent, still incipient, and open-ended relationship between states and diasporas, which is not exempt of contestation, detours, and setbacks and may (or may not) unfold into stable and fruitful partnerships. This study documents that this dual dynamic is present in Argentina’s approach to its citizens abroad. Building on new insights and comparative works on Latin America and other regions (e.g., Dickinson & Bailey, 2007; Ho, 2011; Larner, 2007; Margheritis, 2016), it provides further evidence that country-specific variables help to explain policy outcome variation, as well as policy results.

Argentina’s Attempt to Reach Out to Its Citizens Abroad Background on Emigration and Diaspora Institutions Historically, immigration was inextricably linked to Argentina’s state- and nation-building processes. The imperative to populate its vast territory

agenda of several Latin American governments has included, among other things, a nationalist and (neo) populist rhetoric, increased state interventionism in the economy, nationalisations of industries and key economic resources, and welfare social programmes to reduce poverty.

80

A. MARGHERITIS

translated into an open-door policy in the late nineteenth century, preferably regarding European newcomers. Immigration flows continued until the 1960s approximately, helping to consolidate the image of being a country of immigration (Fitzgerald & Cook-Martin, 2014, pp. 299–332). In particular, Italy, Spain, and Argentina constituted a “migration system” since the mid-nineteenth century; states’ attempt to establish or maintain nationhood links is reflected in citizenship regimes (including dual citizenship) and migrant practices (Cook-Martin, 2008). Thus, we observe that the last massive wave of Argentine emigrants moving to Europe in the early twenty-first century rely on dual citizenship to “blend” within the host society and integrate via the labor market rather than engaging in associational life with co-nationals. They also tend to rely on relatively high human and social capital, adopt individualistic strategies, and seek very little support from institutions of the home country or migrant-related non-governmental organizations (Margheritis, 2017). This implies that they are less likely to engage with the home state policies. Some groups of Argentines abroad have proved able to advance a few demands at specific moments in time, but associational life in general revolves mainly around cultural and social issues. The level of organization varies considerably across associations and destination sites, ranging from little contact to old ties with state agencies.4 Given this historical background, Argentina’s coming to terms with different waves of emigration is a relatively new and top-down phenomenon, only partially incorporated into political rhetoric and actions since the 2001 crisis, when there was a peak in emigration flows. While in the past, emigration had been considered a temporary problem, mostly linked to political instability and persecution, in the early 2000s, it started to be seen as a relatively constant and heterogeneous trend, related to the deteriorating political and economic situation (Jachimowicz, 2006). As it is explained in the following section, it is in that decade that consular services and institutions expanded and informal

4 The Anglo-Argentine Society in the UK is a notable example. Founded in 1948, it builds upon long-standing bilateral links and several generations of migrants between the two countries. It focuses on cultural events, charitable goals, and cultivation of friendly ties between the two nations. It does not engage with political issues at all or with advancing any specific claims of Argentines living abroad. It works in close collaboration with public officials at the Argentine Embassy and Consulate in London and is located in the same building. Personal communication with Chairwoman, London, 27 February 2020.

4

DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN ARGENTINA …

81

relations with some groups of nationals abroad intensified,5 although intermittently. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its office of Argentines Abroad, embassies, and consulates, has a long tradition of assistance to individual emigrants (that is, people who request help to solve specific problems), but it has lacked a comprehensive, pro-engagement approach toward the emigrant community and the development of broader links. Even though some diplomats are interested in cultivating those relations, they admit that it would take time and some restructuring of their professional training and the consular institution itself in order to pass from an assistance-oriented and technical function to one that is more political in relation to emigrants.6 In terms of numbers, emigration increased since the mid-1970s and peaked at the time of the 2001 crisis and immediately afterward. The profile of the last wave of Argentine emigrants is characterized by young, educated emigrants, with relatives or networks in Spain—that together with Italy became a preferred destination—employed at the time of leaving, and non-active in migrants’ associations (OIM, 2012b). According to the UN Population Division (Department of Economic and Social Affairs), in 2017 the total number of Argentine emigrants was 977,200.7 This figure, which has been relatively stable since 2005, is around 2.27 percent of the total population of Argentina (44.3 million in 2017). In 2017, the top five destinations were Spain, the United States, Italy, Chile, and Paraguay, in this order, with the first three countries attracting around 55 percent of the total. The gender composition of emigrants was balanced.8

5 For instance, the 2005 regularization process in Spain created an opportunity to develop an incipient relationship between Argentine consulates and some migrant associations. 6 Interview with Minister, Argentines Abroad Office, Consular Affairs, Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Buenos Aires, 12 July 2005. Interview with Consul, Argentine Consulate in London, 27 February 2020. 7 See https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock_abs_origin&t=2017&cm49=32. Accessed 25 February 2019. 8 Cf. https://datosmacro.expansion.com/demografia/migracion/emigracion/argentina. Accessed 26 February.

82

A. MARGHERITIS

Expanding Consular Services Antecedents of policy initiatives toward emigration are to be found in the late 1950s, when governments showed some concern with brain drain and drew up some plans to repatriate scientists. After democratization in 1983, governments were sensitive toward the hardships endured by former political exiles. In the context of reparatory measures, in 1991, Law 24,007 was passed to allow external voting (Novick & Murias, 2005). Increasing concern translated into institutional developments, such as the creation or expansion of specific offices to address emigrants’ demands. The Argentines Abroad Office, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has expanded considerably over the last 20 years in terms of personnel and functions. The International Affairs Office was created within the National Migration Office (Ministry of the Interior) in 1998 to deal with all issues and negotiations that involve foreign state and non-state9 actors. Simultaneously, at the regional level, migration issues became more visible not only in the domestic sphere of most countries but also in their foreign policy agenda and multilateral negotiations. In Argentina, the friendly relations established with European countries since democratization—particularly with Spain—provided a propitious environment for collaboration; many descendants of Italians and Spaniards emigrated. A new migration policy developed when President Néstor Kirchner took office in 2003, and it revolved around the idea of migration as a right. It included new initiatives and several new institutional spheres to address the problem of emigrants. Most of these initiatives did not originate in (or tried to answer) emigrants’ demands. The government’s concern with updating and expanding governing techniques beyond borders paralleled the increasing salience given to these questions by the press at that time (Novick & Murias, 2005, pp. 18–19). One of the first measures was the creation of a website to conduct an online census of Argentines in Spain. The idea originated in the Ministry

9 Interview with Chief of Staff, International Affairs Office, National Directorate for Migrations, Ministry of the Interior of Argentina, Buenos Aires, 27 December 2005.

4

DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN ARGENTINA …

83

of the Interior and was seen as a way to create a direct communication line between individuals and a state agency.10 Another initiative is the Raíces Program (Raíces being the Spanish acronym for network of Argentine Researchers and Scientists Abroad; also meaning roots), initially implemented by the Secretariat of Science, Technology, and Productive Innovation within the Ministry of Education. This program aims to strengthen the scientific and technological capacities of the country by promoting the permanent residency of national researchers in Argentina and collaboration links with Argentine researchers residing abroad. There are also subsidies to favor the return migration of professionals and knowledge transfer (for instance, through the development of scientific activities during sabbatical years).11 The Raíces Program (declared “state policy” by Law 26,421 in 2008 and still effective) is probably the initiative that has achieved more consistency and sustainability over time. Under the Kirchners, repatriation of scientists increased, as well as the number of doctoral scholarships and funds to support research projects, in line with other policies to improve human resources and encourage scientific and technological investigation, including the creation of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Productive Innovation in 2007. The program had then a database of around 4500 scientists abroad and various mechanisms to engage with those who did not plan to return. Since 2003, it has contributed to the return and re-insertion of 820 scientists and to a decline of brain drain (Presidencia de la Nación, 2011, pp. 5–13). In this respect, Argentina joined the group of countries that have courted the diaspora selectively: It has mainly approached highly skilled emigrants as a way of capitalizing on their human resources and networks. In addition, the government increased efforts to provide support and assistance to all emigrants on several issues, such as paperwork procedures, support with the regularization process of Argentine immigrants to Spain in early 2005, consular services via itinerant offices, etc. The regularization in Spain was an opportunity to establish some contacts

10 Information provided by the National Directorate for Migrations, Ministry of the Interior. Interview with Chief of Staff, Buenos Aires, 27 December 2005. 11 See http://www.raices.secyt.gov.ar/.

84

A. MARGHERITIS

with the emigrants’ associations,12 which occasionally demanded information and help. Those steps were consistent with the spirit of Migration Law 25,781, passed on December 17, 2003, and effective on January 20, 2004. Title IX of that law is devoted to Argentines abroad (Giustiniani, 2004; Novick, 2005). As a result of these efforts, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became increasingly involved in questions concerning emigrants. Its Secretariat of Foreign Relations included the “protection of Argentines abroad”13 among its strategic goals. The Argentines Abroad Office grew hand in hand with the increase in emigration flows over the last twenty years: its personnel tripled in a decade; it was upgraded from Department to Dirección in the organizational structure of the ministry; it engaged in new activities as demands increased, and back then acquired a more prominent role as the government showed interest in migration issues.14 In contrast to other Latin American cases, efforts to capture or manage remittances have been very limited, probably because figures remain relatively low15 in comparison to other countries. Nevertheless, Argentina acknowledged migrants’ right to send remittances, and the 2003 national migration law above established tax exemptions for returnees who want to bring their personal belongings, tools for productive activities, and vehicles. Launching Political Initiatives Efforts to capture political support and non-material resources have been relatively intense. In 2004, Argentina launched a new initiative named the “Province 25 Program,”16 in reference to the Argentine community living abroad. The underlying goal was to recover or maintain nationhood 12 Interview with Minister, Argentines Abroad Office, Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Buenos Aires, 5 December 2005. 13 See http://www.mrecic.gov.ar/. 14 Interview with Coordinator, Department of Social Assistance, Argentines Abroad

Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires, 3 January 2006. 15 Remittances were relatively constant until the 2000, increased up to the 2008 world crisis and amounted to US$ 640 million in 2010, that is, only 0.17% of the GDP (OIM, 2012b, p. 64). They have decreased since then to 0.099% of GDP in 2018. Cf. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?loc ations=AR. Accessed 9 March 2020. 16 Argentina is politically and administratively divided into 23 provinces plus one autonomous district (the capital city).

4

DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN ARGENTINA …

85

links with expatriates, especially with those who left around the time of the 2001 crisis and felt extremely disappointed by political elites. Tentatively estimating that there are around a million Argentines living abroad, emigrants would represent then the fourth largest province in terms of population. Given their profile (as explained before), they represented a source of human capital. Hence, for the first appointees to this office, the country would benefit from establishing collaboration programs or providing incentives17 for return. In the short run, the program focused on facilitating certain procedures (ID and passport renewals, clean police record certificates, etc.), as well as increasing emigrants’ participation18 in national elections. In the long run, the program sought other goals too, such as the homogenization of the institutional format of emigrants’ associations (which still includes a very diverse array of organizations) and the allocation of some seats in the Congress for expatriates’ representation. In other words, emigrants’ political rights were a key component and aim of the program, although such goal is today dormant, as is detailed in the following section. Back then, the transnational dimension of courting gained momentum and paved the way for the policy to become selective in another respect, too. The friendly relation between Argentina and Spain under Néstor Kirchner’s and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s administrations, respectively, facilitated collaboration with Spanish immigration officials and made Argentine emigrants residing in Spain the main addressees of this program. A few formal and informal contacts with emigrants’ associations took place to gather information and find the ways to respond to their main concerns. Overall, the initiatives above have not followed a linear, progressive path. Some of them have been relatively successful in terms of achieving initial goals, such as the Raíces Program. Other goals have somehow faded or reached a plateau (e.g., the Province 25 Program). The reasons are to be found largely in changes in the migration dynamics

17 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/interior/provincias-y-municipios/argentinos-enel-exterior. Accessed 26 May 2020. 18 Interview with the first official in charge of the preparatory tasks to launch the program and advisor to the Secretary for Provinces, Ministry of the Interior, Buenos Aires, 21 December 2005.

86

A. MARGHERITIS

and lack of political push from key actors (i.e., the President, ministers). Given receding migration outflows and the domestic repercussions of the increasing volume of intra-regional immigration,19 the Kirchners’ governments (2003–2015) re-focused the attention toward immigration in the mid-2000s (more so under Mrs. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s terms: 2007–2015). Since she took office, the President was no longer directly involved in emigration like under her husband’s administration, thus depriving the earlier initiatives of one of its main political impulses. As a result, Province 25 Program went from a phase of intense activity and exchanges with migrant associations (particularly those in Spain) between 2007 and 2009 to low-profile, assistance-oriented activities in the following years. Several meetings with representatives of emigrants were held and a bill to create the “Exterior” (extra-territorial) District and grant emigrants parliamentary representation20 was submitted in 2009. However, the project did not receive enough endorsement in Congress and the meetings did not lead to the institutionalization of a certain mechanism of dialogue and collaboration like in other countries21 (e.g., consultation councils). Those bills are not under discussion today. Thus, in practice, the program has turned away from its initial political goals and became totally focused on maintaining communication with and providing services22 to citizens residing abroad (e.g., processing concrete demands, offering information to potential returnees, facilitating paperwork).23 Another small office, created in 2008, has carried out similar tasks: the Department of Argentines Abroad, within the Directorate of International and Social Affairs at the National Directorate of

19 For details on this point, see OIM (2012a). 20 See full text of the bill at http://boletinargentino.blogspot.com/2009/12/argent

ina-creacion-del-distrito.html. 21 On this respect, a bill to create councils of residents abroad and a general council of

emigration was sent to Congress in 2004 but it has not been approved yet. See http:// www.diputados.gob.ar/proyectos/proyecto.jsp?id=49684. 22 See http://www.mininterior.gov.ar/provincias/p25_mision.php?idName=provincias& idNameSubMenu=provinciasProv25&idNameSubMenuDer=intProvProv25Mision. 23 Interview with Director, Department of Argentines Abroad, National Directorate of Migrations, Buenos Aires, 12 June 2014.

4

DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN ARGENTINA …

87

Migration.24 In the meantime, the Directorate of International Migrations within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concentrated on having an impact on the global debate on international migration (e.g., promoting an approach based on human rights and national development considerations; requesting that Argentine nationals are treated in equal conditions as natives in the host countries), but did not have plans to formalize a dialogue with the diaspora, which, in the eyes of public officials, remained dispersed and disorganized.25 These offices occasionally exchanged information, but there is no evidence of any formal mechanism of coordination. In sum, toward the end of Mrs. Kirchners’ term, Argentina was back on providing mainly traditional consular services. Engagement with the diaspora was not considered a priority and remained at a low-intensity level. Enhancing Assistance For the last few years, two complementary factors have contributed to expand the links that the Argentine state maintains with its non-resident citizens, one at the regional level and one in the realm of domestic politics. On the one hand, the Residency Agreement signed by member states of MERCOSUR, in 2002, inspired by the goal of facilitating free circulation within a broader (relatively integrated) economic space, gave Argentines access to legal residency and related rights within the bloc, such as right to work, petition, exit/entry, worship, family reunification, and send remittances. Regarding employment and access to health services, MERCOSUR citizens are offered equal treatment vis-à-vis nationals of the country of residency and the possibility of consolidating all contributions into a single social security scheme.26 However, the full and proper implementation of these “portable” rights within the bloc depends on these being relatively new agreements 24 Interview with Chief Official (Ministro de Segunda), Directorate of International

Migrations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires, 13 June 2014. 25 Interview with advisor, Directorate of International Migrations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires, 13 June 2014. 26 See http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/v/6425/5/innova.front/residirytrabaja renelmercosur. The Cartilla de Ciudadanía/Citizenship Booklet provides further details. See http://www.cartillaciudadania.mercosur.int/es.

88

A. MARGHERITIS

and state capacities of member states. In fact, although the Residency Agreement facilitates access to legal residence, workers are subject to the law of the member state in which they work. There is a grey area in migration norms in South America regarding full guarantees and claimmaking mechanisms, as well as lack of clear and efficient judicial means in case migrants are deprived of (or face obstacles to exercise) their rights. In such cases, migrants are advised to resort to the ombudsman offices, human rights institutions, and legal centers (OIM/IPDH, 2017). Moreover, within the 2013 World Forum on Human Rights held in Brazil, an assessment of progress on free circulation, protection of migrants’ rights, and regional citizenship within the MERCOSUR countries was made. The evaluation suggests that initiatives in these three areas, albeit closely intertwined, they are often addressed as compartmentalized rather than in connection to one another. Conclusions indicate that the protection and exercise of rights face serious obstacles in practice and full implementation of regional accords is still pending. Reasons for these underwhelming outcomes include (a) the lack of adaptation and harmonization of national legal and institutional frameworks to the new norms, and (b) bureaucratic obstacles such as lack of budget, technical and managerial expertise, and information systems. In the words of one of the participants to the Forum: “The challenge is to install Mercosur at the national level. Mercosur orbits up, but we cannot anchor it in legislative discussions or in public policies” (IPPDH, 2013, p. 19). Further evidence suggests that intra-regional migrants’ capacity to access stable working conditions and welfare benefits is limited in all countries (Margheritis, 2018; Texidó & Warn, 2013). On the other hand, the Macri administration (2015–2019) introduced some changes in its relationship with Argentines abroad. In contrast to major political parties, which have not developed a department and/or position dedicated to dealing with nationals residing abroad and have not engaged in a major parliamentary debate on these matters lately, the PRO (Propuesta Republicana/Republican Proposal) created a website to gather proposals from Argentines abroad and engage them with the proposed changes above.27 Facilitating and digitizing procedures regarding the exercise of political rights became a key goal. For instance, citizens living abroad used to be

27 See http://www.pro.com.ar/argentinosenelexterior/. Accessed 10 May 2018.

4

DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN ARGENTINA …

89

expected to register before casting a vote; since 2017, by Decree 403, those whose current domicile abroad is properly recorded in their ID are automatically included in the Registry of Voters Residing Abroad and can cast a ballot in the consular office with jurisdiction in their area of residency. Another recent innovation (implemented in the October 2017 elections) was the setting of an information stand at the main airport to inform nationals abroad of voting rights, requirements, and procedures.28 As per Decree 45/2019, epistolary voting was implemented for the first time in the 2019 elections as an additional option (i.e., giving citizens abroad two alternatives: casting the vote in person at consular offices or by post).29 The Macri administration also attempted to develop a comprehensive registry of nationals abroad. To that effect, these nationals could request their registration in the so-called Libro de Matrícula/Matricular Registry of the Consulate, at the nearest consulate to their place of residency abroad. Registration was optional and free. Emigrants could also request a certificate or proof of registration for a fee, and such a certificate would be valid for a year. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended registration as a way of facilitating administrative procedures and creating a channel of communication so citizens abroad can receive relevant information. It was then also possible to register online at the general website of the Argentine government.30 In addition, it is worth noting that pensions are a notable exception within the lack of fully fledged diaspora engagement policies. In this area, nationals residing abroad can rely on some assistance to consolidate contributions made in more than one country and related procedures. Indeed, the Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social/National Administration of Social Security (ANSES) informs online of international agreements with Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Spain, Italy, Portugal,

28 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/elecciones-2017-stand-informativo-enezeiza-para-los-argentinos-en-el-exterior. Accessed 15 May 2018. 29 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/los-argentinos-en-el-exterior-ya-puedenvotar-por-correo-postal. Accessed 9 March 2020. 30 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/argentinosenelmundo/registro. Accessed 9 May 2018.

90

A. MARGHERITIS

Greece, and MERCOSUR members.31 ANSES further informs of agreements with other countries, such as Belgium, Colombia, Slovenia, France, Luxemburg, and Peru, as well as the Inter-American Multilateral Agreement on Social Security, effective since 1 August 2016.32 The main implication of these agreements concerns the portability of pension contributions made by Argentines who have worked in several countries and allow them to consolidate all contributions in a single pension scheme. Under Macri, Argentines abroad could also request to the home country a revision in the amount of their Argentine pension via the Programa de Reparación Histórica/Historic Reparation Program (created in June 2016) based on legal sentences of the Supreme Court and other courts.33 This program aimed at solving two chronic problems: improving pensions (which have seriously deteriorated historically) and ending legal suits to the state by pensioners. Paperwork procedures have been simplified in this area, too. To receive an Argentine pension abroad, nationals residing abroad have to submit life certificates regularly (twice a year). They have to report to the national social security agency by submitting ID and pension pay slip. Consulates assist retirees with the life certificate by transmitting the certificate via electronic means to the ANSES. This was designed to give retirees an optional means of submitting the certificate and to expedite the procedure.34 Retirees can submit the certificate to consulates in person or via regular mail.35 This represents an innovation implemented in early 2017 as a result of inter-ministerial cooperation between the Ministry of

31 See https://www.anses.gob.ar/tramites/trabajadores-en-el-exterior/. Accessed 15 May 2018. 32 See https://www.anses.gob.ar/prestaciones/prestaciones-por-convenio-internaci onal/. Accessed 15 May 2018. 33 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/consultar-si-estas-incluido-en-la-reparacion-histor ica-de-jubilados-ypensionados. Accessed 15 May 2018. 34 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/dar-fe-de-vida-supervivencia-para-jubilados-y-pen sionados-argentinos-en-el-exterior. Further information is available in the ANSES website: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/dar-fe-de-vida-supervivencia-para-jubilados-y-pen sionados-argentinos-en-el-exterior. Accessed 15 May 2018. 35 See http://www.csidn.mrecic.gov.ar/es/content/anses-informacion-para-jubilados-ypensionados-que-residen-en-el-exterior. Accessed 15 May 2018.

4

DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN ARGENTINA …

91

Foreign Affairs and the ANSES.36 There was also a brief attempt to start developing a more substantial diaspora engagement policy through the Subsecretariat of Institutional Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2016. This was considered then one of the axes of the “public diplomacy” (also known as “people’s diplomacy”) envisioned by the Macri administration,37 in sync with other outreaching efforts to foster dialogue and feedback mechanisms between such ministry and social actors in situ and via social networks.38 Thus, in the last few years, the most notable developments regarding emigrants are the extensive use of online means of communication to diffuse practical information of interest to nationals abroad and the change of terminology to address them in all web pages. Rather than placing them “in the exterior” of the national borders as in the past, emigrants are today “in the world”—a language nuance which might indicate simply geographical dispersion and/or an incipient attempt to foster inclusion in the country of origin. It is too early to assess if the Fernández’s government (2019–2023) would continue with this approach.

Conclusion The nature of the institutional framework and character of engagement policies described above indicates that Argentina’s attempt to develop diaspora policies has not followed a linear, progressive path. It has rather advanced in stops and goes in the development of such policies, that is, state outreach efforts have been intermittent and of varying intensity. Some initiatives have been relatively successful in terms of achieving initial goals, such as the Raíces Program. Others have somehow faded or reached a plateau. That is the case of the Province 25 Program. There has been little progress in the area of social protection for non-resident citizens. Providing information has become, instead, the main component of the last two governments’ approach to emigrants. Nevertheless, in practice, information diffusion seems to be part of general policies rather than a protection or assistance mechanism fully integrated into a package of 36 See https://www.casarosada.gob.ar/informacion/eventos-destacados-presi/38505jubilados-y-pensionados-que-residen-en-el-exterior-pueden-acreditar-superviviencia-pormedios-electronicos. Accessed 15 May 2018. 37 Interview with Consul, Argentine Consulate in London, 27 February 2020. 38 See https://www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org/printpdf/82361. Accessed 6 March 2020.

92

A. MARGHERITIS

diaspora engagement policies. The fact that, when consulted, consulate officials refer to the national institution for general information illustrates this point.39 The main initial motivation to expand services to emigrants initially derived not from the size or resources of the diaspora but from the emigrants’ profile and, to some extent, the need for an emerging governing coalition to build up its identity and support base in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis. In addition, given the concern with national development, state outreach led to an emphasis on the return of highly qualified citizens living abroad and/or scientific collaboration as a way of reversing the emigration trend and compensating for the loss of human capital. Political enfranchisement—not a new, engagementoriented measure but a pre-existing right—remained confined to extraterritorial voting in presidential elections. A few other measures aim at cultivating links with the country of origin, but these are thin in the area of social welfare protection or benefits. This is reflected, on the one hand, in bureaucratic practices, which remain compartmentalized and relatively inconsistent. Diaspora policies still constitute a relatively new area of state intervention in which expertise has been scarce and progress is still incipient and intermittent. By all accounts, engaging with Argentines abroad is a relatively new task for traditional consular cadres. On the other hand, emigrants’ claims and mobilization have not been intense, constant, and effective enough to resonate domestically on a regular basis and become a driver of engagement. Overall, thus, Argentina has exhibited a lukewarm and intermittent approach to diaspora engagement. No specialized office or formal consultative mechanism has been created yet. Selective measures were implemented regarding destinations (e. g., Spain) or specific groups (e.g., scientists). As this study shows, there is some progress on extending assistance via consular services and little progress on social protection at the transnational level, except for the area of pensions. MERCOSUR and other bilateral agreements offer some Argentines working abroad additional options regarding access to social protection, but the exercise of those rights is contingent on host countries’ capacity to implement norms.

39 Personal communication, Minister, Argentine Embassy in London, 18 April 2018; Political Section staff member, 9 March 2020.

4

DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN ARGENTINA …

93

References Ancien, D., Boyle, M., & Kitchin, R. (2009, June). Exploring diaspora strategies: An international comparison (Workshop report). Ireland: National University of Maynooth. Brand, L. (2006). Citizens abroad: Emigration and the state in the Middle East and North Africa. Cambridge University Press. Bloch, A. (2017). Transnationalism and the state: Recurring themes and new directions. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40(9), 1508–1519. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/01419870.2017.1300294. Bravo, V., & De Moya, M. (2018). Mexico’s public diplomacy efforts to engage its diaspora across the border: Case study of the programs, messages and strategies employed by the Mexican Embassy in the United States. Rising Powers Quarterly, 3(3), 173–193. Burgees, K. (2005). Migrant philanthropy and local governance. In B. J. Merz (Ed.), New patterns for Mexico: Observations on remittances, philanthropic giving, and equitable development. Harvard University Press. Cook-Martin, D. (2008). Rules, red tape, and paperwork: The archeology of state control over migrants. Journal of Historical Sociology, 21(1), 82–119. Délano, A., & Gamlen, A. (2014). Comparing and theorizing state-diaspora relations. Political Geography, 41, 43–53. Dickinson, J., & Bailey, A. (2007). (Re)membering diaspora: Uneven geographies of Indian dual citizenship. Political Geography, 26, 757–774. Fitzgerald, D. (2006, Summer). Inside the sending state: The politics of Mexican emigration control. International Migration Review, 40(2), 259–293. Fitzgerald, D., & Cook-Martin, D. (2014). Culling the masses. The democratic origins of racist immigration policy in the Americas. Harvard University Press. Gamlen, A. (2008). The emigration state and the modern geopolitical imagination. Political Geography, 27 (8), 840–856. Gamlen, A. (2018). Diaspora institutions and diaspora governance. International Migration Review, 48(1_suppl), 180–217. Giustiniani, R. (Ed.). (2004). Migración: Un Derecho Humano. Editorial Prometeo. Goldring, L. (2002). The Mexican state and transmigrant organizations: Negotiating the boundaries of membership and participation. Latin American Research Review, 37 (3), 55–99. Ho, E. (2011). Claiming the diaspora: Elite mobility, sending state strategies and the spatialities of citizenship. Progress in Human Geography, 35(6), 757–772. IPPDH. (2013). Libre Circulación de Trabajadores, Ciudadanía Regional y Derechos Humanos de Migrantes. Instituto de Políticas Públicas en Derechos Humanos del MERCOSUR.

94

A. MARGHERITIS

Jachimowicz, M. (2006). Argentina: A new era of migration and migration policy. Migration Policy Institute. Available at https://www.migrationpolicy. org/article/argentina-new-era-migration-and-migration-policy. Kapur, D. (2010). Diaspora, development and democracy: The domestic impact of international migration from India. Princeton University Press. Laguerre, M. (1998). Diasporic citizenship: Haitians Americans in transnational America. St. Martin’s Press. Larner, W. (2007). Expatriate experts and globalizing governmentalities: The New Zealand diaspora strategy. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 32(3), 331–345. Levitt, P., & de la Dehesa, R. (2003). Transnational migration and the redefinition of the state: Variations and explanations. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 26(4), 587–611. Liu, H., & van Dongen, E. (2016). China’s diaspora policies as a new mode of transnational governance. Journal of Contemporary China, 25(102), 805–821. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1184894. Margheritis, A. (2016). Migration governance across regions: State-diaspora relations in the Latin American-Southern Europe Corridor. Routledge. Margheritis, A. (2017). Transnational associational life and political mobilization of Ecuadorians and Argentines in Spain and Italy: What role for sending state policies? Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 19(2/3), 254–280. Margheritis, A. (2018). South American regional citizenship as figurative frontier: European influences in a political project in the making. In A. Margheritis (Ed.), Shaping migration between Europe and Latin America: New perspectives and challenges (pp. 95–114). SAS Publications. Novick, S. (2005). Evolución reciente de la política migratoria argentina. Paper delivered at the XXV International Population Conference, Tours, France, July 18–23. Novick, S., & Murias, M. G. (2005, March). Dos estudios sobre la emigración reciente en la Argentina (Working Paper No. 42). Buenos Aires: Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Buenos Aires. Nye, J. (2008). Public diplomacy and soft power. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 94–109. OIM. (2012a). El impacto de las migraciones en Argentina. In Cuadernos Migratorios, 2. Organización Internacional para las Migraciones. OIM. (2012b). Perfil Migratorio de Argentina 2012. Organización Internacional para las Migraciones. OIM/IPDH. (2017). Derechos Humanos de Personas Migrantes. Manual Regional. Organización Internacional para las Migraciones/Instituto de Políticas Públicas en Derechos Humanos del MERCOSUR.

4

DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN ARGENTINA …

95

Presidencia de la Nación. (2011). Programa RAICES. Una Política de Estado. Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación Productiva, Presidencia de la Nación. Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003). International migration and sending countries: Perceptions, policies, and transnational relations. Palgrave/Macmillan. Ragazzi, F. (2009). Governing diasporas. International Political Sociology, 3, 378–397. Ragazzi, F. (2014). A comparative analysis of diaspora policies. Political Geography, 41, 74–84. Rana, K. (2013). Diaspora diplomacy and public diplomacy. In R. Zaharna, A. Arsenault & A. Fisher (Eds.), Relational, networked and collaborative approaches to public diplomacy: The connective mindshift (pp. 70–85). Routledge. Smith, R. (2003). Migrant membership as an instituted process: Transnationalization, the state and the extra-territorial conduct of Mexican politics. International Migration Review, 37 (2), 297–343. Texidó, E., & Warn, E. (2013). Migrant well-being and development: South America (Working Paper for the World Migration Report). Geneva, Switzerland: IOM. Tsourapas, G. (2015). Why do states develop multi-tier emigrant policies? Evidence from Egypt. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Available online at https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1049940.

CHAPTER 5

Chileans in China and How They View Their Role in Public Diplomacy: Between Entrepreneurship and State Policies Claudia Labarca and Philippe Werner-Wildner

In 2006, Chile became the first country to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the People’s Republic of China. This institutional milestone shaped great expectations on both business and political Chilean elites that saw the Chinese market as the best economic partner that a nation like Chile could have (Labarca, 2015). As it has been profusely studied, Chile is an example of a successful open economy that needs trade and investment partners to sustain its neoliberal economic model (Edwards & Cox, 2000). But the FTA not only brought economic expectations, it

C. Labarca (B) Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile e-mail: [email protected] P. Werner-Wildner China Normal University/Study Chile, Santiago, Chile © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Bravo and M. De Moya (eds.), Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74564-6_5

97

98

C. LABARCA AND P. WERNER-WILDNER

also triggered a growing number of Chilean entrepreneurs and executives sent to—in a way—“conquer” the Chinese market.1 In 2002, no more than 10 Chileans (including the diplomatic personnel) lived in Shanghai, one of the most important Chinese cities (Labarca, 2015). Today, the Chilean Embassy in China reports about 690 Chileans registered in the Beijing consulate2 and 400 in Shanghai (Labarca, 2015). The knowledge about Chile among the Chinese has also improved. In 2007, 74 percent of the Chinese respondents answered negatively to the question, Do you know Chile? in a poll conducted by the Trade Commission of Chile in Shanghai (Labarca, 2014), while recent studies show that familiarity with Chile has consistently grown in the last years (Imagen de Chile, 2017). Trade to China has also boosted. According to the Foreign Relations Ministry, China has become the first destination for Chilean exports. Between 2006 and 2018, trade grew 346 percent.3 This entrepreneurial effort has been supported by a diplomatic strategy based on systematic efforts to improve Chile’s reputation and visibility in key countries (Jiménez-Martínez, 2013, 2017). In China, for example, the government mobilized important resources for the Shanghai Expo in 2010, and since 2014 it organizes the Chile Week in China, in which Chinese and Chilean businesspeople gather for business purposes. In this context, the questions that guided this research were the following: What is the role the Chilean diaspora plays on public diplomacy efforts in China? What are the Chilean diaspora community’s dynamics in relation to its governmental actions in China? By answering these questions, this chapter contributes to fill the gap on Latin American diaspora studies, given that studies of “institutionalized diaspora relations and how they relate to development aspirations of countries in the global South tend to focus on Asian and African countries” (Malecki, 2017, p. 6). This study of the Chilean diaspora in China will show the interplay between private entrepreneurship and State-driven policies and will focus

1 This narrative of “conquistadores” is present in many of the interviews the main author has carried out with Chilean entrepreneurs and businesspeople. 2 See https://www.asexmacapacita.cl/estudiar-y-trabajar-en-china-una-tendencia-quecrece-entre-los-chilenos. 3 More information at https://www.subrei.gob.cl/2019/03/direcon-expone-sobre-ben eficios-de-la-modernizacion-del-tlc-chile-china/.

5

CHILEANS IN CHINA AND HOW THEY VIEW THEIR ROLE …

99

not on the traditional political dimensions of diasporas but on the business collaborations state-diaspora relations can forge.

Theoretical Approach to Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Public Diplomacy has attracted the attention of scholars since the 1960s (Entman, 2008; Gilboa, 2008; Golan, 2013). Although originally the term referred to the way states communicate with foreign publics (Gilboa, 2002; Gregory, 2011; Nye, 2008; Potter, 2002/2003; Tuch, 1990), new conceptualizations understand that other actors, such as companies or NGOs, are important means to engage with international audiences (Kiss & Shelton, 2007). Globalization and technological revolutions (Nye, 2008) have augmented the state’s need to communicate its affairs to generate good reputation and acceptance within the international public opinion (Lee, 2013). For the purposes of this research, public diplomacy is understood as “an information and persuasion strategy aimed at a foreign audience in order to get a favorable opinion for the foreign policy of a country or organization” (La Porte, 2007). This prism avoids reducing the field of study to the relevance of the state as the only salient actor within the realm of public diplomacy. As many authors have noted, engagement and the relational perspective of public diplomacy are key to form foreign public opinion (Zaharna, 2018). As such, the communication of values and the formation of long-term relationships based on mutual understanding are important components (Leonard, 2002). Engagement is key in public diplomacy’s tasks. Engaging the different publics requires “an emphasis on dialogue and activities aimed at building relations with nations, institutions and people” (Gregory, 2011, p. 352). In the context of public diplomacy and diaspora communities, this study understands transnational diaspora entrepreneurs as “migrants and their descendants who establish entrepreneurial activities that span the national business environments of their countries of origin and countries of residence” (Riddle et al., 2010, p. 398). Research about the role of diaspora communities in business activities (Elo, 2014; Idris, 2018, 2019; Rauch & Trindade, 2002) is growing. However, there is limited research on how diaspora communities engage in public diplomacy (Goodman & Wang, 2006), especially in the case of Latin America (Bravo, 2015;

100

C. LABARCA AND P. WERNER-WILDNER

De Moya, 2018). By focusing on a diaspora community comprised of good number of businesspeople, such as the Chilean diaspora in China, this study assumes that political (and economic) relations between home and host countries “upend brand equity and product quality in consumer brand perception and choice” (Wang, 2006, p. 45). This study explores a new approach about the Chilean diaspora, given that since the 1970s and until the 1990s, the Chilean diaspora left the home country as a result of the political oppression of the Augusto Pinochet’s regime (Wright, 1995). It is estimated that more than 200,000 Chileans left their country to avoid the violation of their human rights (Wright et al., 1998), in what has been called a “forced exile” (Wright & Oñate Zúñiga, 2007) between 1973 and up to the late 1980s. However, after the country regained its democracy in 1990, the Chilean diaspora around the world has been driven by students and entrepreneurs, following a path of depoliticization. The Chilean diaspora today offers a rich case of study to understand how diaspora communities contribute to their home country’s economic development and how they can become spokespeople and representatives “for a range of institutional actors (and) discourses” (Malecki, 2017, p. 41). Diaspora in a Globalized World Diasporas are defined and conceptualized in different ways (Safran, 1991), but there is consensus that they are human groups that decide to leave their countries of origin and set new goals abroad (Docquier & Lodigiani, 2010). The term has been used roughly to define communities of dissimilar migrants. These groups may include expatriates, expelled people, political refugees, foreigners, and ethnic minorities (Safran, 1991). Usher (2005) understands that “in general, diasporas can be considered to be transnational populations - living in a country other than their country of origin, but with ties to the country of origin. Diasporas are generally considered to be more permanently settled than temporary migrants, but there is not complete agreement as to whether temporary migrants are or are not considered to be diasporas” (p. 47). Diasporas can affect the host country, generating “trust, providing market information and reducing transaction costs” (Docquier & Lodigiani, 2010, p. 566). They can also promote trade, investment, and technology adoption in the country of origin (Bravo, 2015).

5

CHILEANS IN CHINA AND HOW THEY VIEW THEIR ROLE …

101

Diaspora networks “consist of groups of individuals engaged in various ways in the economies and societies of their destination and source countries (…). These networks can be formal or informal. Migrants as diasporas form social, business, entrepreneurial and other networks that evolve into economic actors” (Elo, 2014, p. 3). These networks may involve social changes and thus migrant transnationalism “can lead to broader transformations” (Vertovec, 2004, p. 973). Diaspora networks move in between the areas of international business and international entrepreneurship, forming networks that connect them with the host countries (Elo, 2014; Idris, 2018, 2019). Beltran (2010) identifies three categories of business diasporas: (1) commercial diaspora: migrants who have gone to look for opportunities through the importation of products from their countries of origin; (2) the elite diaspora, which is linked to a migration that goes to the host country as expatriates; they are highly qualified and they tend to work in companies of their countries of origin; and (3) the “transnationalism from below” diaspora. This is the migrant mass of unskilled labor, often overexploited, with lower salaries than those of the other groups. Social Capital, Bonding Relationships and Bridging Relationships of Diasporas The social relationships established by diasporas in host countries may vary, but they play a key role in providing opportunities for the diaspora member, or, in other words, in providing social capital, which is “a multidimensional phenomenon encompassing a stock of social norms, values, beliefs, trusts, obligations, relationships, networks, friends, memberships, civic engagement, information flows, and institutions that foster cooperation and collective actions for mutual benefits and contributes to economic and social development” (Humnath & Yasunobu, 2009, p. 486). The concept also implies connections among individuals, and thus, the networks with standards of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them (Putnam, 2000). This indicates that social capital is structured based on the quality of the engagement that different social groups can develop. Those social groups have different clusters and ties that bridge and bond these social relationships. Bridging relationships involve communicating with weak ties or developing new ties and connecting clusters within a network. Bonding relationships involve maintenance and continuation of

102

C. LABARCA AND P. WERNER-WILDNER

strong ties that do not reach across subnetworks (Hossain & Veenstra, 2017). Bridging social capital involves crosscutting or overlying networks, like any kind of association that brings an individual to connect with people from a different cross-section of society, while bonding is related to the development of close networks, like associations of individuals with similar backgrounds (Coffé & Geys, 2007). Sino Chilean Relations Chile’s projection to the world is axial to strengthen its external relations. As a small open economy, developing its economic diplomacy and its public diplomacy is key to its economic development (Labarca, 2015). In fact, since 2008, Chile has channeled its efforts to generate a country brand institutionally through the Chilean National Image Project (Jiménez-Martínez, 2017), in which China has a relevant role. In 2020, Chile and China celebrated 50 years of uninterrupted diplomatic relations. This milestone reflects constant efforts that show the interest of emerging economies like Chile to look to the future in the interest of pragmatism, political friendship, and peaceful development. China and Chile have a long and prosperous history of linkages. For example, in 2014, Chile exported US$19 billion to China (Heine, 2015). Furthermore, during 2018, trade between both countries exceeded US $41,000 million. China is Chile’s main trading partner, receiving 32 percent of all Chilean exports. Additionally, Chile not only was the first South American country to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in 1970, but it was also the first Latin American country to recognize China in its membership of the World Trade Organization, in 1999. Chile was also the first country in the region to recognize its Asian counterpart as a market economy, in 2004. Finally, Chile was the first Western country to sign an FTA with the PRC in 2005 (Labarca, 2015; Labarca & Montt, 2019; Walker, 2015). This has generated a growing presence of Chilean nationals in China, mainly located in big cities, comprised of students and businesspeople, for the most part. This chapter contributes to the understanding of this diaspora community’s characteristics, motivations, identities, and levels of social capital. It also explores its contributions to public diplomacy efforts promoted by the Chilean government in China.

5

CHILEANS IN CHINA AND HOW THEY VIEW THEIR ROLE …

103

Methodology As indicated before, the Chilean diaspora of the twentieth century has been studied mainly through its experience of being exiled people from the Pinochet Regime. As such, the research on this area has focused on the Chilean diaspora’s political identity. In contrast, the current Chilean diaspora in China has unique characteristics. To explore these particularities, we carried out 19 semi-structured, in-depth interviews between October 15, 2019 and January 15, 2020. Following McIntosh and Morse (2015), we employed interviews as a data collection strategy “to ascertain participants’ perspectives regarding an experience pertaining to the research topic” (p. 1). The recruitment was performed using purposive sampling and snowball sampling. Purposive sampling intends to “purposely choose data that fits the parameters of the project’s research questions, goals, and purposes” (Tracy, 2013, p. 134). Both authors had great knowledge of Chileans living in China (in fact, one of the authors lived in China for five years and was part of the diaspora), so we were able to reach well-informed respondents who could provide relevant answers to achieve the research objectives. In addition, many of the interviewees offered to connect us with their acquaintances, to cooperate with the research. Thus, the sampling also used snowball techniques. Respondents needed to comply with the following characteristics: Having lived and worked in China for at least three years, having work or diplomatic visa, occupying a managerial position, and perceiving they had freedom of speech to share their views, from a corporate and political perspective. The 19 participants in this study are Chileans who live either in urban poles, such as Shanghai (9 participants) and Beijing (6 participants), or in smaller cities, such as Shenzhen. Of them, 16 are men and 3 are women. Regarding economic sectors, most of the informants work in the wine industry and the international trade industry. All of them held managerial positions. Interviews were conducted mainly by phone, using online software such as WeChat and WhatsApp, in Spanish (native language of the respondents), and then translated to English. All but one of the interviews was recorded. The other one was conducted while taking notes. Transcripts were analyzed by identifying emerging codes (or themes) related to the diaspora characteristics and its social capital (bonding and bridging relationships). Exemplary quotes were selected by one of the authors, and

104

C. LABARCA AND P. WERNER-WILDNER

the other author double-checked the accurate translation, from Spanish to English, of those exemplary quotes.

Findings The interviews revealed six main categories. For the purposes of this chapter, we will focus on three of the most relevant aspects for discussion: characteristics of the Chilean diaspora in China, the public/private interaction to develop public diplomacy strategies, and the Chilean diaspora social capital in China. Characteristics of These Chilean Diaspora Members in China As described by the participants, most view the Chilean diaspora as highly skilled businesspeople, with professional motivations. Being businesspeople is their main identity feature. Some interviewees also referred to how their characteristics depend on the region where they live, as well as how these diaspora members are in constant evolution. Most of the respondents self-identify as being well-educated, experienced transnational diaspora members, focused on conducting global business. For example, I am 100 percent dedicated to international businesses and trade. I look for new products, but I also have my own brands to distribute in Chile and recently in Latin America. [...] Well, the first thing is that they (the Chilean diaspora in China) are all entrepreneurs or sales representatives; trained people. Very smart ... yes, that is the first thing: because in China it is quite difficult to keep it going. So, they (diaspora members) are always innovating and creating new things. (Respondent 5, Shenzhen, entrepreneur)

The previous quote stresses the important role Chilean diaspora members have within international business networks, but it also highlights the sense of achievement that means to be in a leadership position in China, which is considered by most of the respondents as a dynamic, yet complicated market. This sense of professional achievement includes the self-identity of being high-level executives:

5

CHILEANS IN CHINA AND HOW THEY VIEW THEIR ROLE …

105

Everything started as an expatriate program. They (the company) give you money to move containers (referring to personal belongings), move things from your country and take them to China, settle down in China […]. They give you a budget to buy (a house), eventually, and they also help you in the process of apartment rental and (finding) schools. In economic terms, it is attractive, but it is a brutal amount of work. In terms of work, China is tremendously stressful. (Respondent 17. Shanghai. Sales Director Key Accounts)

China is perceived as a premium location, and as an important step in their professional success, which appears to be the main motivation in all the informants’ narratives. Therefore, there is a self-perception of being part of a business elite supported by their companies. China represents a critical stage for their own careers and personal development. Within the narrative of the respondents, the ideas of success, business development, and market creation constitute the basis and essence of their managerial responsibilities. China, then, is seen as a land of opportunities, ideal to achieve professional dreams: (China) appealed to me. Things were happening there. It was the factory of the world, if you like. A country with growth rates of 10 percent, for 10 to 20 years, with all kinds of products and culturally so different [...]. A super interesting challenge, and super good for my career as well, to develop myself professionally [...]. I was in contact with all kinds of factories and suppliers of different types of products [...] Many doors opened with a wider perspective. (Respondent 13. Shanghai. Purchasing Office Manager)

Geographic Distribution: Homogeneity vs Heterogeneity Respondents identified mainly three groups of Chilean diaspora members, according to their geographic location. They assert that businesspeople (mostly expatriates) are located, for the most part, in Shanghai. According to the informants, businesspeople go to Shanghai because they consider this city not only attractive and westernized but also because they perceive that most businesses may be located there. This can be related to the fact that Chilean governmental efforts into developing business in China have been made by a state-led agency, Pro Chile, that has actively helped developing new Chilean businesses, mainly in Shanghai (Labarca, 2015). Students, in contrast, are concentrated mainly in Beijing (as most of the Chinese scholarships for Chileans are provided to go to Beijing), while many independent entrepreneurs are divided among cost cities such as

106

C. LABARCA AND P. WERNER-WILDNER

Shenzhen or Guangzhou and also in Shanghai. Entrepreneurs, however, are the smallest part of this diaspora. When referring to these differences, interviewees used metaphors to explain the geographical distribution: “Beijing is rock; Shanghai is Pop. Simple, isn’t it? What happens is that in Beijing there are more students” (Respondent 7. Shanghai. Managing director for Asia). Other informants agreed on this dual dimension. While—as a whole—the Chilean diaspora is perceived as heterogeneous, when analyzed by city, this view changes: Super homogeneous. […] (The people that come to) Shanghai come from the same type of universities, the same type of jobs. […] In Beijing, it is another kind of people, totally different. […] For example, Chilean groups in Shanghai were always supporting the government5 […], in Beijing it was the opposite. Politically, the groups are super diverse. (Respondent 3. Beijing. Commercial Director)

The division, then, is not only because they hold different occupations, but it is also related to political views. While Beijing attracts more left-leaning intellectuals and students, Shanghai and coastal cities have received a corporate diaspora, normally related to right-wing political thoughts. Changing Nature of the Chilean Diaspora All the respondents—especially those who have been in China longer— agreed that the landscape of the Chilean diaspora has evolved. Not only because it has grown and geographically expanded, but because of its diversification by gender and age. Younger people and professional women have started to arrive in the last years. According to the respondents, there are two reasons that may explain this. On the one hand, in the last years China started to be perceived as an interesting place to go, safe and exciting, due to more liberal governmental policies. As this respondent asserts: It has been changing. My first experience was finding a diaspora (with most members) over 40 years old, professional, long-standing and experienced in Asian markets, with family ties. Currently, it is younger, with other perspectives; many of them are starting a family in China […] (At the beginning, they were) representatives of Chilean firms, in total no more than a dozen. The main city of that diaspora was Shanghai, for economic, commercial and financial reasons. In Beijing, the diaspora was mainly made up of

5

CHILEANS IN CHINA AND HOW THEY VIEW THEIR ROLE …

107

diplomatic personnel from the embassy, some, a handful of young people studying with the first scholarships […] I would say that the change […] was the 2008 Olympic Games. […] I have always stated that the American dream has been replaced by the Chinese dream for younger Chilean students. (Respondent 4. Different cities. Former diplomat)

On the other hand, the maturity of Chilean corporations and their experience in the Chinese market allow them to send younger people. Respondents agreed that once companies are initially settled by more experienced executives, this opens the door for younger people to come, allowing changes in the diaspora landscaping. While all interviewees agreed on the reality of these demographic changes, they also underlined that the mystic of the first migrants has also changed toward a more individualistic and self-centered diaspora, which affects social capital levels among diaspora members, as discussed later. Public/Private Interaction to Develop Public Diplomacy Strategies This category highlights the nature of the relationship between Chilean companies and the Chilean authorities based in China. Promotional interactions are the most common, followed by relational interactions, and finally, by the presence of a common narrative regarding the Sino Chilean relations among private and public entities. Promotional Interaction Findings here support previous literature that highlights the commercial and restricted nature of Sino Chilean relations (Labarca, 2013). Indeed, the results show that the relationship established between Chilean private companies and the Chilean governmental representatives located in China is bounded by a common commercial objective: To increase the economic ties between Chile and the PRC. This is an economic/commercial embassy. Chile’s agenda is fundamentally commercial, and the embassy is committed to that. Hence, there are few political issues addressed. It is focused on Chilean and Chinese companies. That is the role. (Respondent 7. Shanghai. Managing Director Asia)

108

C. LABARCA AND P. WERNER-WILDNER

The relationship, then, is narrowed to commercial and promotional activities, understanding that a deeper economic cooperation will secure both private and governmental interests and gains: Every tool, every option to make Chile known in China is necessary, no matter what. […] There is a complement between private and public action. They work together because public actions allow private actions to emerge: (for example) governments create commercial agreements [….] I think this must be a statist role. A role of the state –not the government– to encourage and educate people about China. (Respondent 9. Manager. Wuhan)

Despite the importance respondents give to the public/private cooperation regarding Chile’s promotion within China—and the role played by the diaspora in it—there is consensus that these actions are scarce and without an institutional strategy behind them. Most of them highlighted the need to systematize the relationships among the Chilean state organizations (i.e., the Embassy, consulates, the Office of Trade and Commerce) and the Chilean companies established in China, to coordinate a common discourse and strategy. In turn, this lack of institutional strategy encourages the empowerment of the relational perspective on bilateral relations. Relational Interaction Relational interactions emerge not only because of the lack of institutionalization described in the previous section, but also as a result of the sociocultural and political structure in China, where—as stated in the literature review—personal networking (guanxi relationships, as extensively studied by Gold et al., 2002; Labarca, 2015; Liu, 2000; Pye, 1986) may influence the economic success of foreign companies in China. Personal characteristics of the businesspeople (such as personality, knowledge of the local culture and language, level of education, and so on) and their own personal ties (guanxi) with Chilean authorities become relevant to boost corporate ties (see Labarca, 2013, 2015). The respondents agree that personality, working capacity, and social abilities of the Chilean governmental representatives are key aspects to improve economic ties with the Chinese. On the contrary, officials may harm economic relations when they are inefficient in performing their role. The individual, then, becomes relevant within the institutional sphere. This is

5

CHILEANS IN CHINA AND HOW THEY VIEW THEIR ROLE …

109

congruent with previous research in which personal ties and connections (guanxi, as the concept in Chinese) are still relevant to be successful in business (Labarca, 2015; Labarca & Ampuero, 2020).4 In China, it is important that the Chilean authorities participate directly or indirectly in business activities with the Chilean diaspora because, in the Chinese political culture, the state is still a critical economic actor (Naughton, 2007; Niquet, 2017). Therefore, it is important that the Chilean government supports the transnational business diaspora members by converging in the pursuit of similar objectives. The fact that the Chilean authorities are involved in business in China is powerful because China is a country in which the government is relevant; the government is super relevant. In other countries, when a company receives two representatives, and one of them is from a state company and the other is from a private company, they give priority to the private company. In China it is the other way around. Somehow, belonging to a state-owned company […] for the Chinese people has greater value. It relates to how the social structure is built in China. That is why the (country) image is important and government representatives are important. The participation of the Chilean consul or of a commercial attaché in a corporate event is much more important than bringing successful entrepreneurs from Chile. (Respondent 12. Shanghai. General Manager)

Another respondent said that the support of an authority regarding the product or company constitutes an “assurance of quality” (Respondent 7. Shanghai. Managing Director for Asia), and, therefore, having good communication and engagement between the state and the diaspora members becomes essential to business success. Narrative Interaction Labarca and Montt (2019) noted the creation of a diplomatic narrative aimed to highlight the long-term Chilean economic diplomacy toward China. This narrative positioned Chile as a privileged economic partner

4 The literature explains the importance of guanxi (connections, similar to the Latin

American term compadrazgo) not only in business but as a culturally rooted Chinese behavior in which reciprocity and favors are important aspects of relational management. Regarding literature on guanxi and its importance in modern China, please see, among many, Su et al. (2007), Zaharna (2018) (to understand the importance of the relational layer in the concept) and Gold et al. (2002).

110

C. LABARCA AND P. WERNER-WILDNER

for China in Latin America, having to be the first to support China in significant milestones (at an international/political level). This research finds support to this perspective, as “respondent 5” asserts: It is a subject (referring to the common narrative between the Chilean and the Chinese governments) of many years of relations that can be trusted… so the Chinese love all this history. It is also a matter of bilateral trust, built year after year. Chile and China have 200 years of history, and there has never been a fight […]. So, it is fidelity, loyalty and tradition, too. (Respondent 5. Shenzhen, Marketing and International Trading entrepreneur)

However, and although there is still presence of this narrative, its emphasis has evolved toward an apolitical but trade-related approach. The private sector has grabbed and appropriated the bilateral discourse, highlighting the important role the diaspora has in the relationship. As this respondent explains: I am one of those who think […] that the Chilean diaspora (in China) has managed to change (the narrative) from being the first South American country to recognize China as a state to be the first country that today provides fresh fruit to China. The current Chilean diaspora is the one that alerted about, encouraged and identified non-traditional cities and nontraditional markets to explore the fruit market. (Respondent 4. Former diplomat)

As this quote expresses, it is the market—rather than political actors— that becomes essential in the creation of this modified bilateral narrative that contributes to the development of economic ties between both nations. This development of economic ties, as explained previously, constitutes the first public diplomacy goal of Chile in China. As the next respondent explains, building a common narrative about what is Chile and about its products generates a win–win situation for both political and private actors. It is a quite honest narrative […] Truly, the commercial relation between China and Chile, when compared to other countries of the Latin American region, is stronger. Many consumers know that. Not only wine, but people in general. If you get in a taxi, they may know about Chile, its fruits, its wines, its copper. So, it’s a narrative that people know and believe. In my

5

CHILEANS IN CHINA AND HOW THEY VIEW THEIR ROLE …

111

industry, much of the brand value is the value of the origin of the product, Chile. So, part of our role is also to sell Chile because that’s how we are selling our brand. (Respondent 5. Shenzhen, Marketing and International Trading entrepreneur)

This quote relates to the idea that Chilean companies in China and thus, the diaspora behind them, have found a way to engage in new relationships, assisting the state function in constructing a positive discourse directed at Chinese audiences. Furthermore, they may act as having a subsidiary role. For example, respondents agree that Chilean businesspeople have become the “real ambassadors” that strengthen the ties between both nations: “Chileans living in China are the true ambassadors (because) in Chile they do not understand the Chinese people. […] Instead, Chileans here, interacting daily with the Chinese people, are learning from them. They know how to deal with the Chinese” (Respondent 9. Manager. Wuhan). However, these efforts may be diluted given that the Chilean diaspora in China is still considered too small to have a significant impact on public diplomacy or country image initiatives. Respondents believe that the Chilean presence in China is weak, although changing rapidly. They recognize, nonetheless, the Chilean diaspora as having a key role in supporting public diplomacy efforts through their products and brands, especially regarding agricultural products (fruits and wine). We (the diaspora) are very few; but Chilean companies are involved in businesses that are key for the Chinese. Because of that, we are known, and we have opportunities to get involved and grow. Everyone knows about the Chilean cherries, our grapes […]. Copper is essential; imagine that China consumes 50 percent of the world’s copper. Chile is the world’s largest copper producer. It is a win-win match. Absolutely. They are businesses made just for each other. (Respondent 12. General Manager. Shanghai)

Moreover, Chilean products become a symbolic representation of a country that only recently started to appear in the Chinese imaginary. In China, it (Chile) does not exist and a reputation is yet to be formed. The consumers do not know Chile. The only way the Chinese get to know Chile is because of our products. By buying a little blueberry box or getting the Chilean cherry, they encounter our country for the first time.

112

C. LABARCA AND P. WERNER-WILDNER

This work is done by the private sector. If you sell a Chilean product, then, the representative, or the seller, they feel committed to this task. (Respondent 3. Beijing. Commercial Director)

Chilean Diaspora and Social Capital Taking Putnam’s (2000) terms “bridging social capital” and “bonding social capital,” we asked the participants to describe the diaspora’s internal social cohesion, as well as how they engage or not with the local community. Results varied within our sample. “Bonding social capital” refers to the kind of social capital that is “inward looking and tends to reinforce exclusive identities in homogeneous groups,” which in turn creates “strong in–group loyalty” (Putnam, 2000, pp. 22–23). “Bridging social capital” is a feature of social organizations such as social networks, which have norms and social trust that facilitate the coordination and cooperation with other social groups for mutual benefits (Putnam, 2000). In the case of the Chilean diaspora’s “bridging social capital” (which refers to whether they “melt” with the local community and create ties with them), the results of this research indicate that the bridging social capital is very low between the Chilean and the Chinese communities. Very few respondents mentioned having strong ties with the local community. In those cases, these were diaspora members who live in geographic isolation from bigger Chilean communities or who have family ties with Chinese people or with other foreign people. For example, a respondent who lives in a city outside Shanghai and Beijing (the largest communities in which Chileans are settled), said: “I know many Chileans who mostly have Chinese friends, without much contact with Chilean friends. They have married or are engaged to Chinese people, and they have perfected the Chinese language just like native people” (Respondent 10. Beijing. International trading entrepreneur). When analyzing the data and the respondent profiles, it is possible to argue that the more “bonding social capital” (ties created among Chileans) diaspora members have, the less “bridging social capital” they exhibit (in other words, the more they interact with each other, the less the Chilean diaspora members seem to want to share their spare time with local Chinese people). For example, this responded said the following:

5

CHILEANS IN CHINA AND HOW THEY VIEW THEIR ROLE …

113

I mostly (relate to) foreigners because one always seeks more familiarity, and because, overall, most of the day you are surrounded by the Chinese. In my spare time, I prefer to “get away from China” a bit. To keep some sanity. Currently, I have no Chinese friends. (Respondent 14. Purchasing Office Manager. Shanghai)

Although the reasons vary, there is a tendency to explain this lack of associativity as being due to perceived cultural or social barriers, such as language, besides the need and desire to encounter familiarity among similar cultures by relating more often to Chileans. Regarding the “bonding social capital” among the Chilean diaspora members, results are mixed. On the one hand, many respondents feel connected to the Chilean community both at a professional and at a personal level. They describe trusting relations and strong ties formation, especially in those cases where the participants share ties beyond nationality. For example, participants described that Chilean families with small children tend to socialize more with each other, even choosing to live in the same building. They also share other social spaces such as events organized by the community or after-work activities. As expected, those respondents tend to isolate from the Chinese and find community among themselves, especially those living in Shanghai or Beijing: It is almost like family, despite being from companies that are direct competitors of mine […]. It is a unique relationship, where your competitor is also your friend. We share our (work) problems, and that has made me understand many industries that I had not known before […] I know very well their problems, and who is who within each company. (Respondent 18. Shanghai. Regional Director of Asia)

Thus, participants perceive cooperation and solidarity traits as one of the main characteristics of the Chilean diaspora in China, which allows forming strong ties within the community. It is important to highlight, nonetheless, that even when there is high bonding social capital and low bridging social capital, there is always a good and polite working relationship with their Chinese coworkers and colleagues. As stated earlier, the Chileans in China are conscious of the importance that the diaspora members have as ambassadors of Chile and, therefore, they tend to care about their Chinese colleagues, at least within the workspace. Finally, a small group of participants believes that low bonding social capital among the Chileans in China prevails. Contrary to the previous

114

C. LABARCA AND P. WERNER-WILDNER

description, they see a prevalence of competition rather than cooperation, and they describe the ties within the community as weak. It looks like they (Chilean businesspeople) continue competing with each other. Someone from the wine industry is competing with another “wine guy.” So, in Chilean style, “you are on your own,” and “we are all competing among each other.” […] (But I think) we are competing against New Zealand or France. We should all work together to have a better country image, because, individually, we mean nothing. (Respondent 6. Beijing. General Manager)

For this group, improving their “Chileaness” or Chilean cohesion seems important to improve their ties with their Chinese business partners as well. However, they have realized that sharing a national identity is not necessarily conducive to friendship with other Chileans, despite some previous imaginaries, or despite the community sharing time together during specific historical dates or celebrations relevant to Chile: When you go to China, you think that cooperation and solidarity exist (within the Chilean community), but it doesn’t. It’s like being in Santiago (referring to social divisions in the city of Santiago, Chile). There are Chileans who meet with Chileans, and Chileans who meet with foreigners. [...] But in terms of relationships, I think you get together with people you just like; or with people you have affinity with. But, in general, the Chilean community is not very close, except for [Independence Day on] September 18t6h ... when we all come together. (Respondent 7. Shanghai. Managing Director Asia)

Conclusion This research shows that the Chilean diaspora in China has an important relational role in helping the Chilean state to develop public diplomacy goals, not only representing their nation but also promoting Chilean products. Thus, as in Wang (2006), we find an intertwined relationship between private actors and state policies. Furthermore, the respondents indicated that they not only have the duty to promote their brand or product, but they understand their role in promoting Chile and informing Chinese audiences about Chile. For example, diaspora members share, in their personal and business discourse, some of the diplomatic narratives, especially those related

5

CHILEANS IN CHINA AND HOW THEY VIEW THEIR ROLE …

115

to friendship and economic cooperation as bilateral characteristics. As previous research has noted, this discourse is used by the private sector to take advantage and gain trust with potential Chinese partners (Labarca, 2015). This discourse entangles not only the Chilean–Chinese current and historical friendship, cooperation, and bilateral relation, but also recent additions to this narrative, which have taken a preponderant role, for example, by adding value to the relationship insofar Chilean products are placed as part of the bilateral relation. The case of the Chilean cherries in China is a good example, as they not only the most successful cherries in China but also an important component of the Chinese New Year. The Chilean product has become part of the Chinese culture and, as such, part of the Chilean–Chinese narrative. By deeply engaging with Chinese counterparts (although restricted to the business realm), diaspora members contribute to Chile’s public diplomacy. As Zaharna (2018) indicates, relational public diplomacy needs to be considered holistically, especially in a Chinese cultural setting, because of the cultural Chinese characteristics deeply linked to concepts such as guanxi, as previously explained. This implies a further commitment of private actors in order to support—and sometimes subside—state interventions. The influence of the Chilean diaspora on Chilean public diplomacy efforts happens mainly because of four reasons. First, because of the characteristics of the diaspora (transnational, business-like, well-educated, motivated to be successful), which entangles with the Chilean state’s policies of developing stronger economic ties with the People’s Republic of China. Second, because the Chilean business diaspora understands—since theirs is a recent migration to China—that Chile needs to be positively known in China if they themselves want to be successful. In a sense, they feel responsible for the success of positioning Chile in the Chinese minds (and this goes beyond the idea of the Chinese just as consumers, since the Chilean diaspora members feel they perform the function of informal ambassadors of the whole Chilean brand). A third reason is that there is pragmatism in both political and economic actors, although there is strong criticism toward the state and its lack of strategy, resources, and long-term policies to face the competitive Chinese market. The fourth reason is that, although the findings of this study show the low bridging social capital between the Chilean diaspora and the local Chinese, the results of this study also show that there

116

C. LABARCA AND P. WERNER-WILDNER

is a certain blending with the local community, although restricted to the business sphere. This is a pragmatic relationship, aimed to obtain business success. As previous research has found, this type of social relationship may emulate the restricted nature of the bilateral relations between Chile and China, focused only on pursuing economic, mutually beneficial goals (Labarca, 2013). Economic cooperation, then, guides the relational sphere. As a weakness that the Chilean diaspora in China exhibits, this study found low bonding social capital levels among the Chilean diaspora members, although this varies among the respondents. Some respondents said that higher levels of social capital may enhance their business success through cooperation and by improving and shortening the learning curve in doing business in China, for example. Future research is needed to further evaluate the evolution of the Chilean diaspora in China and to explore new ways in which its growing presence may influence state policies in general, and public diplomacy policies, in particular. An important consideration is that this study explored the view of the diaspora, free of any specific context or situation, to offer an initial understanding of how they perceive their public diplomacy roles. However, future research could delve further into how local events, both at home and in the host country, affect the diaspora, their transnational business, and, thus, their involvement in public diplomacy. For instance, at home (in Chile), during and after the time we conducted the interviews for this chapter, Chile faced a social outbreak that affected not only the political and economic landscape but also its international image. Although most of the respondents explained that so far there were no immediate consequences for bilateral trade, the Chilean domestic sociopolitical conflict still continues and, at this point, is difficult to predict how it will affect Chile’s international commerce in the future. We did not analyze that aspect, but future research should analyze the effects that the social outbreak might bring for Chile’s international image and public diplomacy efforts. Regarding the impact of local events in host contexts, China is frequently involved in international disputes that garner global media attention. For example, we can point to the value of considering the impact of the recent Covid-19 pandemic in the Chilean diaspora’s relationship to the home and host nations, especially regarding the strength of the presence of Chileans in China, in the short and long terms.

5

CHILEANS IN CHINA AND HOW THEY VIEW THEIR ROLE …

117

References Beltran, J. (2010). Comunidades asiáticas en España: Movilidad transnacional en un territorio de frontera. CIDOB D’afers Internacionals, 92, 15–37. Bravo, V. (2015). The importance of diaspora communities as key publics for national governments around the world. In G. Golan, S. Yang, & D. Kinsey (Eds.), International public relations and public diplomacy (pp. 279–296). Peter Lang. Coffé, H., & Geys, B. (2007). Toward an empirical characterization of bridging and bonding social capital. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 36, 121– 139. De Moya, M. (2018). Protesting the homeland: Diaspora dissent public relations efforts to oppose the Dominican Republic’s citizenship policies. Protest public relations (pp. 106–127). Routledge. Docquier, F., & Lodigiani, E. (2010). Skilled migration and business networks. Open Economies Review, 21, 565–588. Edwards, S., & Cox, A. (2000). Reformas económicas y mercados laborales: Aspectos relativos a políticas y lecciones derivadas del caso chileno. Estudios Públicos, 78, 45–100. https://www.cepchile.cl/cep/site/artic/201 60303/asocfile/20160303184519/rev78_edwards.pdf. Elo, M. (2014). Diaspora networks in international business and transnational entrepreneurship—A literature review. Zentra Working Papers in Transnational Studies, 40, 1–22. Entman, R. (2008). Theorizing mediated public diplomacy: The U.S. case. International Journal of Press/Politics, 13(2), 87–102. Gilboa, E. (2002). Global communication and foreign policy. Journal of Communication, 52(4), 731–748. Gilboa, E. (2008). Searching for a theory of public diplomacy. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616, 55–77. Golan, G. (2013). An integrated approach to public diplomacy. American Behavioral Scientist, 57 (9), 1251–1255. Gold, T., Guthrie, D., & Wank, D. (2002). An introduction to the study of Guanxi. In T. Gold, D. Guthrie, & D. Wank (Eds.), Social connections in China: Institutions, culture, and the changing nature of Guanxi. Cambridge University Press. Goodman, M., & Wang, J. (2006). Public diplomacy and global business. Journal of Business Strategy, 27 (3), 41–49. https://doi.org/10.1108/027566 60610663826. Gregory, B. (2011). American public diplomacy: Enduring characteristics, elusive transformation. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 6(2), 351–372. Heine, J. (2015). Carta del ex embajador de Chile en la República Popular China. De Andes a la Gran Muralla: 45 años. Ed. BCN.

118

C. LABARCA AND P. WERNER-WILDNER

Hossain, D., & Veenstra, A. (2017). Social capital and relationship maintenance: Uses of social media among the South Asian Diaspora in the U.S. Asian Journal of Communication, 27, 1–17. Humnath, B., & Yasunobu, K. (2009). What is social capital? A comprehensive review of the concept. Journal of Social Science, 37, 480–510. Idris, M. (2018). Same migrants, two business models: Culture-centered and non-traditional businesses established by Ethiopians and Eritreans in Washington D.C. In Africa and globalization (pp. 93–108). Palgrave Macmillan. Idris, M. (2019). Solidarity and social networks: The invisible backbone that Ethiopians and Eritreans in Washington D.C. used to transform Adams Morgan and U Street. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 18, 1–16. Imagen de Chile. (2017). https://marcachile.cl/wp-content/uploads/2017/ 08/presentacion_ejecutiva_estudio_imagen_de_chile_en_china_180817.pdf. Jiménez-Martínez, C. (2013). Chile’s quest to improve its image abroad. Place Brand Public Diplomacy, 9(4), 279–290. https://doi.org/10.1057/pb.201 3.25. Jiménez-Martínez, C. (2017). Making Chile visible: Purposes, operationalisation and audiences from the perspective of nation branding practitioners. Geopolitics, 22, 502–524. Kiss, A., & Shelton, D. (2007). Guide to international environmental law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Labarca, C. (2013). Identity and institutionalisation as trust building strategies: The Sino-Chilean case. Revista Ciencias Políticas, 33, 489–511. https://doi. org/10.4067/S0718-090X2013000200004. Labarca, C. (2014). International business and trust: The Sino Chilean experience. International Journal of Cross Cultural Management, 14(3), 323–342. Labarca, C. (2015). Ni hao Mr. Pérez, buenos días Mr. Li: Chile y China: Cultura, negocios y confianza en la era global. Ediciones UC. Labarca, C., & Ampuero, P. (2020). Cultural and global perspectives to relationship management in international public relations: The Sino-Chilean case study. International Communication Gazette. June 9 Online first. https:// doi.org/10.1177/1748048520929817. Labarca, C., & Montt, M. (2019). Discurso como representación de sentido en las relaciones internacionales: El caso Sino-Chileno. Estudios Políticos, 47, 163–184. La Porte, T. (2007). La diplomacia pública americana: Lecciones para una comunicación internacional. Comunicación y Sociedad, 20, 23–59. Lee, Y. (2013). La diplomacia pública y el soft power de China. La Diplomacia Pública China en America Latina: Lecciones para Chile (pp. 71–120). Ril Editores.

5

CHILEANS IN CHINA AND HOW THEY VIEW THEIR ROLE …

119

Leonard, M. (2002). Diplomacy by other means. Foreign Policy, 132, 48–56, as cited in Wang, J. (2006), Public diplomacy and global business. Journal of Business Strategy, 27, 41–49. Liu, H. (2000). Globalization, institutionalization and the social foundation of chinese business networks. In H. Wai-Chung Yeung, & K. Olds (Eds.), Globalization of Chinese business firms (pp. 105–125). Basingstoke: MacMillan. Malecki, A. (2017). Repoliticising development: The diaspora knowledge network (DKN) Chile global and its contribution to development in Chile. Doctoral Thesis. Retrieved from https://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/ 12955. McIntosh, M., & Morse, J. (2015). Situating and constructing diversity in semistructured interviews. Global Qualitative Nursing Research. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1177/2333393615597674. Naughton, B. (2007). The Chinese economy: Transitions and growth. MIT Press. Niquet, V. (2017). La Puissance Chinoise en 100 Questions. Tallandier. Nye, J. (2008). Public diplomacy and soft power. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616, 94–109. Potter, E. (2002/2003). Canada and the new public diplomacy. International Journal, 58(1), 43–64. Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. Simon & Schuster. Pye, L. (1986). The China trade: making the deal. Harvard Business Review, 64(4), 74–80. Rauch, J., & Trindade, V. (2002). Ethnic Chinese networks in international trade. Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(1), 116–130. Riddle, L., Hrivnak, G., & Nielsen, T. (2010). Transnational diaspora entrepreneurship in emerging markets: Bridging institutional divides. Journal of International Management, 16, 398–411. Safran, W. (1991). Diaspora in modern societies: Myth of homeland and return. Diaspora 1(1), 83–99, in Fleischer, F. (2012). La diáspora China: Un acercamiento a la migración China en Colombia. Revista De Estudios Sociales, 42, 71–79. Su, C., Mitchell, R., & Sirgy, J. (2007). Enabling Guanxi management in China: A hierarchical stakeholder model of effective Guanxi. Journal of Business Ethics, 71(3), 301–319. Tracy, S. (2013). Qualitative research methods: Collecting evidence, crafting analysis, communicating impact. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. Tuch, H. (1990). Communicating with the world: U.S. public diplomacy overseas. St. Martin’s Press. Usher, E. (2005). International migration and the millennium development goals. United Nations Population Fund, in Elo, M. (2014). Diaspora networks in

120

C. LABARCA AND P. WERNER-WILDNER

international business and transnational entrepreneurship—A literature review. Zentra Working Papers in Transnational Studies, 40, 1–22. Vertovec, S. (2004). Migrant transnationalism and modes of transformation. International Migration Review, 38, 970–1001, in Elo, M. (2014). Diaspora networks in international business and transnational entrepreneurship—A literature review. Zentra Working Papers in Transnational Studies, 40, 1–22. Walker, P. (2015). Presentación del ex presidente del Senado de Chile. De los Andes a la Gran Muralla: 45 años. Ed BCN. Wang, J. (2006). Public diplomacy and global business. Journal of Business Strategy, 27, 41–49. Wright, T. (1995). Review: Legacy of dictatorship: Works on the Chilean diaspora. Latin American Research Review, 30(3), 198–209. Wright, T., Oñate, R., & Hodgson, I. (1998). Flight from Chile: Voices of exile. University of New Mexico Press. Wright, T., & Oñate Zúñiga, R. (2007). Chilean political exile. Latin American Perspectives, 34(4), 31–49. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X07302902. Zaharna, R. (2018). Global engagement culture and communication insights from public diplomacy. In The handbook of communication engagement (pp. 311–330). Wiley.

PART II

Diaspora-led Public Diplomacy

CHAPTER 6

The New Cuban Diaspora Maria De Moya and Vanessa Bravo

Miguel Díaz-Canel had not even been born when Fidel Castro took control of Cuba and demoted the government of Fulgencio Batista on January 1, 1959 (Ahmed & Robles, 2018). Today, Díaz-Canel is the first Cuban leader in almost 60 years to not carry the “Castro” last name: Fidel Castro ruled from January 1959 to February 2008 (officially, although he delegated his duties to his brother Raul in 2006 because he was sick); and Raúl led Cuba from February 2008 (officially) until April of 2018, when he semi-retired but remained president of the Communist Party (Ahmed & Robles, 2018). Ever since the Cuban Revolution of 1959, Cubans have left the island in droves and have settled, for the most part, in the United States: There, for the most part, in Florida, and within the state, for the most part, in Miami (or Tampa) (Blizzard & Batalova, 2020; Duany, 2017). Initially,

M. De Moya (B) DePaul University, Chicago, IL, USA e-mail: [email protected] V. Bravo Elon University, Elon, NA, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Bravo and M. De Moya (eds.), Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74564-6_6

123

124

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

those who left Cuba and settled in Florida were mainly part of the middle, middle-high, and high socioeconomic classes at home, and they left because they saw no future, neither financial nor political, in a regime that was no longer capitalist (Duany, 2017; PBS American Experience, 2005). Several other Cuban migration waves ensued, years or decades after, and something they all have in common is that they oppose, albeit with varying degrees of intensity, the current non-democratic regime in the island (Alfaraz, 2018). However, with the passing of time and the emergence of new generations (foreign-born and U.S.-born), Cubans and Cuban-Americans in Florida have become more diverse, and less united in regard to how much they should oppose the government at home (Duany, 2017; Hill & Moreno, 1996; PBS American Experience, 2005; Torres, 1995). The Cuban diaspora in Florida is divided, mainly, into two contrasting groups, ideologically speaking: (1) the “hardliners,” who completely oppose the Cuban government and do not want any softening in the U.S.–Cuba relationship (Weissenstein & Lee; 2017), and (2) a newer generation of Cubans in Florida who might not support the government in the island either but are, nonetheless, in favor of improving some (or all) aspects of the U.S.–Cuba relationship (Fabian et al., 2020; Hill & Moreno, 1996). This two-fold division, we acknowledge upfront, is mostly artificial because, in reality, the views of the Cuban diaspora members about their government at home can be placed in a long continuum (Torres, 1995), rather than in just two groups, but we are placing the diaspora into two main groups, nonetheless, to indicate that there is a harder approach and a softer approach in how diaspora members see how the relationship could exist—or not—with the Cuban state. For a more nuanced analysis of the characteristics and ebbs and flows of each migration wave from Cuba to the United States, since the 1960s to the mid-2010s, see Duany (2017). The group that we call “the new Cuban diaspora,” comprised of Cuban people from different migration waves, approves more often the traveling of Cubans to the island, the possibility of supporting their relatives at home through remittances, and the idea of, potentially, achieving the end of the long-lasting U.S. embargo, which is a series of economic sanctions imposed on Cuba since 1960 (Duany, 2017). The emergence of this second group, or “new Cuban diaspora,” has changed the way in which the diaspora performs its public diplomacy roles. Diaspora activist organizations exist in both groups, but the hardliners—an older generation—seem destined to fade through time.

6

THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

125

In public diplomacy, credibility and legitimacy are no longer powers solely wielded by the state (Hayden, 2013). In fact, diasporas have increased their significance and importance in this work as both supporters of the homeland and oppositional publics (Délano, 2014; De Moya, 2019). Just as importantly, they promote narratives about the homeland (Alfaraz, 2018; Mariou, 2020; Newland, 2010). Therefore, this chapter explores the narratives of Cuba from the perspective of CubanAmerican organizations, Floridians, and the Floridian diaspora, more than six decades after the Cuban revolution. Additionally, Twitter discussions are analyzed to understand the competing narratives about Cuba that are most salient among Floridians and members of the diaspora. As findings show, these marked differences between more supportive policies toward the island nation and those demanding U.S. officials to keep or strengthen restrictions are still salient in audiences’ discussions, together with critiques of communism, socialism and the Cuban government. However, the emergence of alternative narratives, focused on partnerships, community and engagement highlight the generational shift of the diaspora. With this shift comes a new diaspora public diplomacy strategy for Cuban-Americans, less focused on the Cuban regime and history, and with a strategic view toward the future.

Understanding the Cuban Diaspora Community Cubans are one of the largest diaspora groups in the United States. In 2018, for instance, according to the 2018 American Community Surveys (ACS), they were the seventh largest group, with about 1.3 million people (Blizzard & Batalova, 2020). At the same time, compared to the overall U.S. population and to the overall U.S. foreign-born population, Cubans have lower education levels and lower household income levels (U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey, 2018). While the United States is not the only country where the Cuban diaspora has settled, and while Florida and Miami are not, respectively, the only state and city where they live in the United States, the large majority of the Cuban diaspora has made Florida, and in particular Miami and Tampa, its home away from home (Blizzard & Batalova, 2020; Krogstad, 2017). The migrations of Cubans to Florida have happened at different key moments. At the risk of oversimplifying, the process can be summarized by saying that the “Revolution generation” left Cuba in the 1960s and

126

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

1970s,1 for the most part (Blizzard & Batalova, 2020; Duany, 2017); the “Marielitos” arrived in Florida mainly in 1980 (Torres, 1995); thousands of Cubans arrived between 1994 and 1995 during the Rafter Crisis (the “crisis de los balseros”) (Alfaraz, 2018); thousands more arrived after the fall of the Soviet Union (Duany, 2017); and the number of migrants from Cuba to Florida increased again significantly in the mid-2010s (Alfaraz, 2018; Duany, 2017), for reasons we explain below. If we consider that in the United States, by “rule of thumb,” one generation spans about 15 to 25 years (CNN Editorial Research, 2020), enough time has passed for the “Revolution generation” to have children, grandchildren, and even perhaps great-grandchildren in the United States. The “Marielitos” have had time, as well, to have children and even young grandchildren, and the Cubans who arrived during the Rafter Crisis have had time to have children, too. It can be argued that about six—even seven—generations of Cubans have shaped or are shaping today the characteristics of the Cuban diaspora in Florida—and the characteristics of their activism. As described earlier, the “Revolution generation” left Cuba right after Fidel Castro grabbed power by force in 1959, and roughly for the next 15 years. They were considered political refugees in the United States, or exiles, mostly supportive of the Batista regime that was ousted by Fidel Castro (Duany, 2017). They grew from being 79,000 in 1960 to 439,000 in 1970 (Blizzard & Batalova, 2020). The “Marielitos” carry that nickname because this is a group of about 125,000 Cubans who were allowed to leave Cuba at once, in exodus, in 1980, leaving the port of Mariel (Cuba) in thousands of boats that crossed the Florida Straits and arrived in the United States in what is known as the Mariel boatlift (Blizzard & Batalova, 2020; Torres, 1995). By announcing that “all those wanting to leave the country could do so” (Torres, 1995, p. 220), the Cuban regime also got rid of dissidents, opposition forces, and even people who had committed crimes and were in jail on the island (Torres, 1995). Different migration movements from Cuba to the United States kept happening during and after the 1980s, but the most recent and numerous group of Cuban immigrants have arrived in Florida in the last decade (after 2012), either as a result of the worsening economic situation in the island after the fall of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991 (Duany, 2017) 1 Duany (2017) divides the 1960s and 1970s into two historical phases: the historical exile (1959–1962) and the freedom flights (1965–1973).

6

THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

127

and the shrinking financial support from Venezuela, due to its oil crisis (Fabian et al., 2020), or because they were afraid about rumors that the preferential treatment granted to Cubans for decades in the United States was about to finish (Duany, 2017). This latter reason—the renewed desire to leave Cuba among younger generations—became especially true when U.S. President Barack Obama started conversations with Raúl Castro during Obama’s second term. In fact, in 2014–2015, Obama substantially softened the tense U.S.–Cuba relationship that had characterized the bilateral affairs (Baker, 2014).

U.S.–Cuba Relations The first softening of U.S. rules in decades came with the Obama presidency. In agreement with Raúl Castro, Obama restored full diplomatic relations between the two countries and eased restrictions on Cuban remittances, travel to the island (for family visits, public performances, and activities of professional, educational, or religious nature), and banking transactions with Cuba (allowing the use of U.S. credit and debit cards in Cuba and the possibility for American travelers to import up to $400 worth of goods from Cuba) (Baker, 2014; Cuban Research Institute, 2020). The Embassy of the United States of America reopened in Havana, and the Cuban Embassy reopened in Washington DC, on July 20, 2015 (U.S. Embassy in Cuba, 2020). The possibility of ending the U.S. embargo on Cuba was also on the table for discussion, but it did not happen (Baker, 2014). These policies were controversial but did find support in the diaspora. As a survey by the Cuban Research Institute (2018) found, in Miami-Dade county, Florida, 63% expressed support for opening diplomatic relations with Cuba. As expected, those diaspora members who had immigrated after 1995, together with second- and third-generation Cuban-Americans, were those most likely to strongly back Obama’s shifts in policies (75 and 77%, respectively), as well as 77% of Cuban-American registered voters. Although these changes were considered good news by many Cubans at home and abroad, they also had the reverse effect of making many Cubans in the island afraid that the Cuban Adjustment Act2 and the “wet 2 The Cuban Adjustment Act is a preferential immigration treatment that has existed since 1966 and allows Cubans to have “a direct and swift path to legal permanent

128

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

foot dry foot” policy3 were about to disappear. And, as a result, thousands of Cubans decided to migrate in the early and mid-2010s, before it was too late to benefit from the preferential treatment given to Cubans in the United States, in comparison to other migrants from the rest of Latin America (Blizzard & Batalova, 2020; Duany, 2017). These more recent migrants, in comparison to the ones who arrived in the 1960s, 1970s, and even the 1980s, tend to have lower education and lower income levels than the ones who arrived previously, and this is also the case in comparison to other Latin American migrants in the United States (Blizzard & Batalova, 2020).

The Role of the Cuban Diaspora in Florida Throughout this whole process of migration from Cuba to the United States, from 1960 until today, the role of the Cuban diaspora in the United States has been to oppose the regime at home and to ensure that the U.S. government pressures the Cuban rulers, in the hopes to bring about change in the island (Hill & Moreno, 1996). As explained previously, different Cuban diaspora communities in Florida have opposed their government in different ways and with different intensity, and these diaspora communities have even confronted each other—and attacked each other sometimes, verbally and even physically, including

residence” in the United States (Blizzard & Batalova, 2020). It lets them request an adjustment of status soon after they arrive in the United States, which puts them in a fast-track pathway to become permanent residents. The Cuban Adjustment Act also allows them to receive funds to adjust to life in the United States. Thus, some barriers that exist for most other migrants who seek permanent residence in the United States do not apply for Cubans, when it comes to obtaining a Green Card. Find more details about the Cuban Adjustment Act at https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-eligib ility/green-card-for-a-cuban-native-or-citizen. 3 The “wet foot dry foot” policy started in 2005, while Bill Clinton was president, under which Cubans who arrived at a U.S. land port (rather than just to U.S. territorial waters, as it was allowed previously) and without a visa were admitted or paroled into the country, instead of being detained and/or deported back to their country of origin, as it happens with most other migrants who arrive to U.S. land ports without a visa (Blizzard & Batalova, 2020). Barack Obama rescinded the “wet foot dry foot” policy in January 2017, at the very end of his second term in office (Blizzard & Batalova, 2020). At the time of writing, the Cuban Adjustment Act remained in effect and the end of the “wet foot dry foot” policy had not been reversed.

6

THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

129

by exploding bombs in homes and businesses of political opponents— because of their different positions regarding the type of relationship that should be maintained, or not, with the homeland (Torres, 1995). At the end, after six decades, the conflicts among the different diaspora groups from Cuban origin in Florida, and the unrelenting opposition of the Cuban hardliners to any softening in the U.S.–Cuban relations (Griswold, 2005; Weissenstein & Lee, 2017) have not contributed to improve the situation of Cubans in the homeland, where Cubans currently live in scarcity, with rationing of staple foods such as rice, chicken, eggs, and beans, and basic necessities such as soap, toothpaste, pads, and toilet paper (Associated Press, 2019). The arrival of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency in January of 2017 resulted in a renewed hard position, at least in appearance, of the United States toward the island (Duany, 2017). Trump was opposed to ending the embargo and reversed some of the changes implemented during Obama’s second term (Fabian et al., 2020). For example, there was a reduction in the number of categories under which Americans can apply to travel to Cuba, and U.S. trade was banned with any Cuban entity linked to the military (such as the Marriott-run Four Points Sheraton Hotel in Cuba) (Fabian et al., 2020). However, other changes regarding Cuba, implemented during Obama’s second term in office, are still in place: the U.S. Embassy still functions in Havana (U.S. Embassy in Cuba, 2020), traveling to Cuba is still possible, although less open than during Obama´s time, remittances to Cuba can still be sent, Cuba went off a U.S. list of states that sponsor terror (until the Trump administration put it back on the list on January 12, 2021), and the end of the “wet foot, dry foot” policy has not been reversed (Duany, 2017; Fabian et al., 2020; U.S. Department of State, 2021). In other words, the “hard stance” by Trump was a narrative that pleased many hardliners but, in reality, few changes were actually implemented. Table 6.1. details some of the changes implemented by the Trump administration from 2017 to 2020 and the changes in Cuban openness to the world in the same period. Younger and newer immigrants in Florida tend to oppose the embargo: 65% of Cuban-Americans ages 18–39 and 60% of immigrants who arrived after 1995 (Cuban Research Institute, 2018). A Florida International University’s survey (Cuban Research Institute, 2018) also found that 65% of diaspora members (across age groups) supported “people-to-people” travel opportunities.

130

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

Table 6.1 Recent changes to U.S. and Cuban bilateral policies 2017 June

President Trump makes changes to U.S. policies toward Cuba, prohibiting business transactions with the Cuban government or military and restricting travel to the island

September

The U.S. State Department responds to attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Havana by ordering the departure of non-emergency personnel The United States orders the removal of 15 Cuban diplomats from their Embassy in Washington, DC

October 2018 March April July December 2019 February

June October

The U.S. Department of State announces that its embassy in Havana will continue to operate with minimum personnel Cuba appoints Miguel Díaz-Canel as president, while Raúl Castro remains head of the Cuban Communist Party The Cuban government presents a new constitution and calls for public debate of the proposed changes The Cuban National Assembly approves a new constitution, after receiving public feedback The new constitution is ratified by Cuba’s electorate, reaffirming the nation’s commitment to socialism and the leadership of the Cuban Communist Party The Trump administration prohibits “people-to-people“ travel for U.S. citizens as well as cruise ships from traveling to the island President Trump limits U.S. commercial flights to Cuba to those headed to Havana

2020 January

Charter flights to nine Cuban airports are prohibited, with Havana being the only permitted destination March Cuba sends doctors to countries affected by the Coronavirus pandemic July The Cuban government allows the use of U.S. dollars in select government-run stores and eliminates a 10% tax on the currency Adapted from the Cuban Research Institute (2020) Chronology of U.S.–Cuba Relations

The stricter stance in the U.S. political perspective regarding Cuba after Trump took office can be connected to the activism of the Cuban “hardliners” and of several Cuban-American Republican members of Congress (Weissenstein & Lee, 2017). The “hardliners” group is composed mainly of older people, especially men (Cuban Research Institute, 2018; PBS American Experience, 2005), who do not want the current Cuban government to keep operating, under any circumstances

6

THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

131

(Griswold, 2005; Weissenstein & Lee; 2017). The “hardliners,” for the most part, have supported the U.S. embargo that has Cuba immersed in poverty and deprivation, which negatively impacts Cuba’s general population (Griswold, 2005; Associated Press, 2019). Trump has catered to the “hardliners” because this group of Cubans is politically influential in Washington DC (PBS American Experience, 2005; Weissenstein & Lee, 2017), and most Cubans who have lived in the United States for long periods tend to be conservative and tend to vote Republican (Hill & Moreno, 1996), so Trump had a political interest in “courting” them (Duany, 2017; Weissenstein & Lee, 2017). However, while all Cuban generations in Florida long for change in Cuba, while many oppose the idea of the United States establishing diplomatic relations with the island, and while most of them identify strongly with the Cuban culture, not all care in the same way about the scars their parents and grandparents may carry when it comes to the system in the homeland (Baker, 2014; Hill & Moreno, 1996; Torres, 1995). Hill & Moreno (1996) found, for example, “important, and at times dramatic, differences in the political attitudes of different generational cohorts of Cuban-Americans” (p. 190), based on their length of residency in the United States. Differences exist, as well, depending on the person’s age (Fabian et al., 2020). Younger Cubans tend to be more often affiliated with the Democratic Party or identify themselves as independents, in comparison to older generations, which tend to lean Republican (Fabian et al., 2020). The literature has clearly pointed to the generational divide that exists today among Cubans in the United States (Hill & Moreno, 1996; Fabian et al., 2020; Torres, 1995). And many Americans are also changing their views about Cuba. For example, in October 2014, a poll conducted by The New York Times indicated that 6 in 10 Americans supported re-establishing relations with Cuba (Baker, 2014).

Cuban-American Organizations The Cuban Research Institute (n.d) at Florida International University lists 28 Cuban-American not-for-profit organizations and institutes. Several of these are trade organizations (e.g., Cuban-American Certified Public Accountants, Educators or Civil Engineers), while the rest of the organizations can be grouped in two categories: advocacy organizations

132

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

seeking to foster human rights, democracy, and civil society in Cuba; and organizations whose mission it is to promote Cuban culture and history. The opening of U.S.–Cuban diplomatic relations during the Obama administration was a significant test for the Cuban diaspora in Florida. Activist groups emerged or reactivated themselves either to oppose Obama’s actions (Mazzei & Gamez Torres, 2016) or to support the changes implemented by Obama (Marte, 2016). Among the groups who have opposed the softening in the U.S.– Cuban relations is the powerful Cuban-American National Foundation. This group, formerly led by builder Jorge Más Canosa (who died in 1997), has been a strong lobbying force in Washington D.C. for decades, it has shaped U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, and it has advocated for maintaining and, if possible, tightening the U.S. embargo (PBS American Experience, 2005). Other anti-Cuba groups in the United States are Inspire America Foundation (Weissenstein & Lee, 2017), Vigilia Mambisa (Marte, 2016), Ladies in White, Cuban Patriotic Union, and Cubalex (Mazzei & Gamez Torres, 2016). On the opposite corner, movements and groups like CubaOne (Weissenstein & Lee, 2017), a young pro-engaging-Cuba lobby group,#CubaNow (Marte, 2016) and Cuba Study Group (Fabian et al., 2020) have highlighted the benefits of having friendly relations between the two countries. For example, one of those benefits is the economic gains for the tourism industry in both countries that has clearly happened since Obama´s eased U.S. travel to Cuba (e.g., Sopo, 2017), after which the number of American travelers to the island tripled (Weissenstein & Lee, 2017). Another similar organization, seeking to help build relationships between Cuba and the United States is Cuban-Americans for Engagement (CAFE), based on “principles of exchange, engagement, normalization of relations and diplomacy” (Cuban-Americans for Engagement, n.d., para. (1). As they view it: The Cuban American community is not monolithic in either opinion or action. This community contains a diversity of positions, including those who call for a different policy between the U.S. and Cuba and the Cuban government with its diaspora. We believe that this diversity of opinion should be represented accordingly in the public sphere. (para. 1)

6

THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

133

Each of these organizations makes evident how they decide to engage (and to what degree) with the Cuban people and government at home, with different diaspora groups having competing narratives (Alfaraz, 2018; Fabian et al., 2020). In this context of “hardliners” versus “the new Cuban diaspora,” this chapter details the narratives about Cuba and Cubans by these organizations. Then, the narrative of Floridians is explored through an analysis of Twitter conversations, going back to June 2018 and until May 2020. Lastly, the analysis focuses on recent narratives promoted by Cuban individuals on Twitter, from April 2020 to August 2020. Twitter was selected because this social media channel is the most used for public diplomacy (Twiplomacy, 2018), and it allows for exploring public understanding and public opinion on issues (Balcells & Padró-Solanet, 2020; Hobbs et al., 2020).

Strategic Narratives and Diaspora Public Diplomacy As defined by O’Loughlin et al. (2012), strategic narratives are “a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of international politics to shape the behaviour of domestic and international actors” (p. 3). In the context of public diplomacy efforts, narratives are promoted by different actors in an attempt to present events or groups of determined meanings that serve their objectives (Miskimmon et al., 2013; Natarajan, 2014). Strategic narratives can be categorized in issue, identity, and system narratives. The latter, which refer to the structure of international affairs (O’Loughlin, et al., 2012) are less relevant to the analysis of this chapter, as it is limited to the contexts of Cuba and its diaspora in Cuba. Identity narratives relate to the political actors that engage in persuasive communication and try to influence conversations about the issue, while issue narratives relate to policy debates and other problems of shared concern (Miskimmon et al., 2013; van Noort, 2019). As O’Loughlin et al. (2012) explained, strategic narratives have both internal (domestic) and external (international) audiences. They are also future-oriented, whether they refer to the past or the present, because they are intended to shape future policies, relations, etc. Strategic narratives make identity claims by articulating positions on issues, policy domains, etc., that are distinctive, placing the public diplomacy actor or subject (e.g., a nation or diaspora community) in relation to the international system.

134

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

The content of strategic narratives is dynamic and is constantly being negotiated through the interaction of different publics, and therefore, they are also influenced (or limited) by the reputation and understanding that these publics have of the actor (O’Loughlin et al., 2012). Lastly, but just as important, as no narrative “exists in a vacuum,” there are multiple narratives that compete and overlap, “epochal and issue-specific,” in the public debate of issues (O’Loughlin et al., 2012, p. 102).

Narratives About the Cuban Diaspora This chapter presents the narratives of the Cuban Diaspora from two distinct perspectives. First, Brandwatch, which is a software that analyzes social media conversations (e.g., Brandwatch, n.d.; Joyce, 2019), was utilized to identify themes in conversations of Floridians on Twitter related to Cuba, its people and its diaspora. This information provided a broader understanding of how the country and its people are perceived in one of the most important audience groups. Then, the websites and Twitter channels of two organizations were analyzed: CubaOne (cubaon e.org) and Cuban American National Foundation (www.canf.org). These were selected as contrasting cases, as they represent two ends of the spectrum in the diaspora’s position toward Cuba, which were compared with the discussions on Twitter. Twitter has become an important channel for individuals and media professionals to discuss issues and promote their narratives (Lasorsa et al., 2012; Valenzuela et al., 2017; Vis, 2013). The platform also makes it possible to explore how narratives are contested in real time, as individuals publicly debate in support, or opposition, to a certain interpretation of issues (Kligler-Vilenchik & Thorson, 2016). In the context of public diplomacy, recent research has detailed how this channel is used by government officials, diaspora members and the general audiences in attempts to engage, inform and persuade (e.g., Dodd & Collins, 2017; Duncombe, 2019; Shahin & Huang, 2019; Uysal & Schroeder, 2019). Given the significance of the medium, it was selected as the field of study for the audience’s discussions of Cuba. Using the Brandwatch categories, the software was trained to analyze the tweets, as related to narratives about Cuba. A Brandwatch query was created to collect all

6

THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

135

Tweets in English and Spanish referencing Cubans,4 limiting the results to authors in Florida. The time frame selected for the analysis was June 1, 2017, to July 31, 2020, to encompass the recent policy changes. The query resulted in nearly three million mentions for the four-year time period. In order to reduce duplications and focus on substantive messages, retweets and shares were eliminated, and the analysis was limited to original posts and replies, resulting in a sample of 876,374 tweets, with the conversation divided 38.5% in English and 61.6% in Spanish.5 Additionally, the number of unique authors participating in the conversation in English was almost three times the number of those posting in Spanish,6 evidencing that Spanish speakers were likely to engage more often in the discussion. Using the software’s consumer research solutions, Custom Classifiers (Taylor, 2020) were set up to automatically categorize the content. This feature allows for creating categories of data, which the software then classifies automatically. The process is similar to an inductive thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), which identifies, analyzes, and reports patterns or themes within data. Learning from the manual categorization directed by the researcher (Brandwatch, n.d.), Brandwatch software organizes and describes the information in rich detail. This software allows “using machine learning to train custom classifiers that can segment your data according to more abstract criteria that can’t easily be defined” (Joyce, 2019, para. 9). We interpreted the categories constructed for this analysis as themes in conversations about Cuba on Twitter, based on the aforementioned definition of themes, and applied Braun and Clarke’s (2006) definition of themes as capturing “something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set” (p. 10).

4 The query terms used were Cuba and Cuban, both in Spanish and English. Following an initial reading of a random sample of tweets, and their Spanish translation, the plural terms Cubanos and Cubanas were also used. Mentions of food and vacations were excluded. 5 The total number of posts in English were 336,995 and 539,379 in Spanish. However, since some posts included both languages, it is possible that some of those posts might have been counted twice. 6 A total of 79,708 unique authors posted about Cuba in English (37% female and 63% male); while 28,888 posted in Spanish (67% were male and 33% female).

136

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

More than 650 randomly selected tweets were analyzed qualitatively by the authors, to identify 11 themes in the text, as defined in Table 6.2. These themes were incorporated in the software for the automated analysis. From this qualitative analysis and the software’s results, the authors grouped themes into narratives (see Table 6.2). Lastly, the resulting analysis was confirmed through a qualitative analysis of a random subsample of 200 tweets from Spring 2020.

Public Narratives About Cuba Floridians’ Twitter conversations of Cuba centered on five key narratives: Island Struggles, Cuban Politics, Diaspora Interests, Warnings about Communism and Socialism, and Image of the Diaspora. Island struggles. This narrative was the one most employed by authors participating in discussions of Cuba (both in Spanish and English)7 related to the experience of living in Cuba. They made claims about hardships experienced by people, because of the government or the system. The theme of Abuses by the Cuban Regime was central to this narrative. This included posts discussing how Cubans are deprived of their human rights, imprisoned or killed by the government and submitted to strict and restrictive policies. A related theme was Precarious living conditions, which included stories of the poverty, hunger, housing insecurity and other challenges that people face in their everyday lives. For example: Just 90 miles away from the Florida Keys are the poor people of Cuba. They are going through a tough time at this moment. Food is lacking. We are truly very blessed. (Del Mar, 2019) Doctors are shipped around the world and Cubans are stuck with medical students, and to see one of them even is bearly impossible. Cubans, are currently fighting (literally) in huge lines to buy SOAP because there hasn’t been in any stores for months. (Perez, 2020)8

These themes were frequently used in conjunction with the Free Cuba theme, which called for the Cuban people to be lifted from these abuses, often making personalized and emotional appeals, as in this tweet:

7 This narrative was used by 34% of English-speakers and 37% of Spanish speakers. 8 The spelling is as in the original tweet.

Dangers of communism/ socialism

Precarious Living Conditions

Free Cuba

Mentions of the scarcity of resources or services, of the living conditions in Cuba, poverty, hunger, infrastructure, etc.

Conversations about people deprived of their rights, disappearing, arrested, killed, or abused at the hands of the Cuban administration. Political prisoners With a focus on the Cuban people, this narrative calls Cuba’s liberation from the regime; freedom; opening of Cuba and its people

Definition

(continued)

“Castro used firing squads to kill thousands of its own people, including children! Bernie has lost his mind & soul! Go live in Russia or Cuba. Get out of USA” (Davis, 2020) “Wonderful evening supporting @CUBADECIDE and recognizing @Almagro_OEA2015 for his dedication to human rights and a free and democratic Cuba. Thank you for your unwavering leadership” (Lago, 2018) “My sincerest condolences to all the cuban families that have lost a loved one because of the tornado and for those hurt. It is sad that in our #Cuba there are still people living in rugged houses that crumble with rain or a tornado” (Polo, 2019)

Examples

Narratives and themes identified in Floridians’ Twitter Conversations about Cuba

Island struggles Abuses by the Cuban Regime

Theme

Table 6.2

6 THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

137

Definition Critiques of communism or socialism; warning of its dangers; comparisons to Venezuela or Russia

Against Communism/Socialism

(continued)

Theme

Table 6.2

“Send them to Venezuela, North Korea, or Cuba so they learn 1st hand what it’s like to live w/out freedom. Maybe that will humble them a bit.” (Obrion, 2017) “Ron if you love Socialism so much why don’t you go live in those workers paradise. Go to North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela. Just go without all your money and live like the regular population. Then tell me how great it is to have nothing” (Tom, 2018)

Examples

138 M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

Cuban politics Cuba International Relations Related to Cuba’s relationship with other countries and international organizations like the United Nations (UN) and the Inter-American Development Bank

(continued)

Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez is expected to tell lies to defend the interests of the Castro regime. However, a number of his erroneous statements about “promoting human rights” in Cuba seemed particularly ridiculous to various UN assembly members in Geneva. (Cuba, 2018)

Recounts their own or their family’s experience “My family came from Cuba legally 33 years in Cuba and/or with communism/socialism ago, I was 12. While in American History class I fell in love with my new country. Reagan was our president. USA gave us the freedom, hope, love & prosperity that Cuba denied my family for years. Thank You, USA I am forever grateful.” (Simancas, 2018) “I agree with this and those stats are all fake. My uncle was a doctor in Cuba and was forced to falsify reasons for death or he would be fired. He’s told me many incidents where patients died of heart problems and had to write otherwise. Cuba has been destroyed by communism.” (Negron, 2018)

Personal or Family experience

Examples

Definition

Theme

6 THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

139

Diaspora Interests U.S. Politics

Keeping the Culture

Image of the Diaspora Cuban-Americans

Sure this will be a great deal for all involved—except the players: “MLB, Cuban Baseball Federation reach agreement that will eliminate need for players to defect” (Neal, 2018)

The majority of Cuban-Americans that I know have been involved in the pro-democracy cause 4 many yrs & do not support engagement w/regime (Martinez, 2017)

Messages about U.S. politicians and their “Voting for Sanders would ensure the U.S. opposition or support to Cuba, communism or would become another Cuba. Sanders is on socialism record saying how much admiration he has for Fidel Castro for what he did for the Cuban people.” (Anita, 2019)

Characterizations of the qualities and culture of the diaspora in the United States. Personalized stories of living in the U.S. including highlighting achievements, successes, and shortcomings News, events and celebrations of Cuban music, literature, traditions and baseball

Reporting information about Cuban politicians, “The Cuban regime is already illegitimate The changes in the government of Cuba, etc. referendum of February 24 does not meet minimum guarantees, therefore it is a fraud #Cuba has no legitimate Constitution” (Suarez, 2019)

Cuban Government

Examples

Definition

(continued)

Theme

Table 6.2

140 M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

Definition Has to do with the formal rules and regulations adopted by the United States and having to do with Cuba, such as trade embargoes, restrictions for travel

Theme

U.S. Cuban Policies

Both Bill Clinton and Barack Obama understood this and ran as pro-sanctions candidates and did well in Florida. Hillary Clinton ran as an anti-sanctions pro-engagement candidate and lost the state. (Suarez, 2020)

Examples

6 THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

141

142

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

Because the Cuban people got tired of so much abuse, misery and repression, because all communist dictatorships are obsolete and they have no support from a FREE and DEMOCRATIC world.#IVoteNO.9 (Echezabal, 2019)

Cuban politics. Discussions related to the Cuban government, commentaries on corruption of officials, and views on the country’s international relations made up the Cuban Politics narrative, which was the second most employed by authors writing in English (27% of authors). Two themes made up this narrative: First, the Cuban Government theme, which related to politicians, evaluations of the Cuban government’s work and statements by people in the office and the party. For example: Socialist Cuba is planning a series of potentially far-reaching changes, with a new constitution set to recognize the free market and private property, while dividing political powers between a president and a prime minister. (Ralph, 2018)

The second theme was Cuban International Relations, which referred to Cuba in the world stage, including the relationship that Cuba has with other countries in the region, and especially Latin American nations, as well as international organizations such as the United Nations and the Inter-American Development Bank. For Spanish-speaking authors, this narrative was the third most used, employed by 17% of them. We only hope that the #HumanRights abuses reach the #AmericasSummit. That people know the lack of #FreedomOfSpeech in #Cuba. That they know that the island is full of #PoliticalPrisioners. (Alonso, 2018)

Diaspora Interest. This narrative was the second most employed by those posting in Spanish (21% of authors), and the second least used for English-language posts (16% of authors). The themes associated with this diaspora referred to U.S. politics (e.g., politicians, political parties, candidates, etc.), as well as U.S. policies toward Cuba. The messages included both expressions of support and opposition for the political parties involved and the government policies implemented. For example:

9 Translated from Spanish by the authors.

6

THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

143

These new U.S. restrictions on remittances and travel to #Cuba will only hurt - rather than help - the Cuban people. This is a giant step backwards and only emboldens hardliners on both sides of the Florida straits that seek to maintain the status quo. (Gorordo, 2019)

Dangers of communism/socialism. Narratives related to the dangers of communist/socialist systems were the third most salient for Englishspeaking authors (18%) and the least used (11%) for Spanish speakers. The first associated theme, Against Communism, included references to the system itself and how it leads to loss of rights, economic strife and hardship for citizens. The second theme in this narrative was Personal or Family experience, in which the authors related the hardships they had faced themselves or the stories they had heard from family members to express their opposition to the system, as shown in this example: So sad that is what communism looks like. You will be made to submit. I am scared. I am a cuban political refugee. So so sad to see how the Soviets achieved their goal. (Lup, 2020)

Image of the diaspora. The least employed narrative referred to individuals of the diaspora, their shared experience and their identity. This narrative was employed by 6% of the English-speaking authors and 14% of the Spanish speakers. The Keeping the Culture theme had to do with these most visible and tangible traits of the community, including music, dance, food, and baseball. The Cuban American theme referred to the characteristics of the community, shared experiences, and identity. The themes could be uplifting the achievements of the diaspora or presenting a critique of their traits or behaviors. For example: The racism of a certain generation of Cuban Americans may astonish readers, but it helps if you remember many don’t consider themselves people of color. (Soto, 2020)

Shifting Narratives These five narratives were present for the whole period analyzed, with shifts in the numbers of authors engaged with each, as shown in Table 6.3. Considering the third quarter of 2017, when the policy changes had to do with restrictions to travel and the shaky diplomatic relationship with

144

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

Table 6.3 Percentage of authors employing narrative categories about Cuba on Twitter Island struggles Dangers of communism

Q32017 Q42017 Q12018 Q22018 Q32018 Q42018 Q12019 Q22019 Q32019 Q42019 Q12020 Q22020

Cuban politics

Identity of the diaspora

Diaspora interests

English Spanish English Spanish English Spanish English Spanish English Spanish 33.4 26.1 2.8 8.9 53.3 25.0 8.4 27.7 2.1 12.3 37.3

24.2

5.6

6.9

49.2

24.2

4.5

28.7

3.4

16.1

40.3

33.3

13.0

8.4

29.9

20.0

9.0

18.6

7.8

19.8

39.7

31.7

9.9

8.8

36.7

25.8

4.1

14.6

9.6

19.1

31.1

32.1

13.2

11.7

29.4

17.2

14.5

21.3

11.8

17.7

26.4

35.7

16.4

12.0

22.7

13.9

11.7

18.6

22.8

19.7

38.4

41.0

30.5

13.8

23.6

13.5

2.6

6.0

4.9

25.6

31.2

36.9

20.3

12.1

22.1

15.7

4.0

8.3

22.3

27.0

25.6

39.4

18.4

12.4

21.5

14.4

6.0

12.8

28.5

21.0

39.9

44.9

21.8

12.3

25.6

13.9

5.6

8.8

7.1

20.2

30.5

39.9

24.8

12.8

15.5

18.1

3.5

7.5

25.7

21.7

37.8

45.9

24.7

12.9

17.8

11.8

4.3

5.8

15.4

23.6

Note Time periods are divided by quarter (3-month) periods, where Q1: January-March; Q2: AprilJun; Q3: July-September; Q4: October-December. Percentages represent the portion of total authors employing these narratives in the selected time frame, separated by language of the post. Selected cells made up a third or more of the conversation for the time period

Cuba, most of the conversation was related to the Cuban Politics narratives (for posts in English) and the Island Struggles narratives (in both languages), as well as the Identity of the Diaspora. The first narrative is more related to the removal of Cuban diplomats but less relevant to other policy changes. Island struggle narratives could also be informed (or inform) the changes in travel policy to the changes. It is telling that the Island Struggles narrative continued to be a significant portion of discussions (in either language) for the three years analyzed and even increasing over time for Spanish-language authors.

6

THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

145

Another notable shift in narratives has to do with Dangers in Communism, which was a narrative seldom used during 2017 and 2018, but in 2019 it increased to nearly 20% of the conversation in English and over 10% of the conversation in Spanish. During the second quarter of 2018, Cuba transitioned to Miguel Diaz-Canel’s presidency and in the following two quarters, the country introduced changes to its constitution. Coinciding with these changes, Cuba Politics was the most used narrative in the second and third quarter of 2018 (employed by 26% of Spanish-language posts and 37% of English-language posts), although for Spanish-speaking authors this narrative decreased in use for the rest of the time. While Cuba started 2019 by reaffirming its commitment to socialism and the Communist Party, the narrative of Dangers of Communism was higher for English-language posts (30%) and remained present in approximately one-fifth of this conversation, but it was not as significant for the Spanish-language authors. Lastly, the two quarters analyzed for 2020 showed attempts by the Cuban government to communicate its openness, but the authors discussing the country and its people continued to focus on precarious living conditions, abuses by the government and calls for a free Cuba (corresponding to the Island Struggles narrative). However, for Spanish-language authors, Diaspora Interests persisted as one of the most important narratives.

Cuban Diaspora Organizations The Cuban American National Foundation’s (CANF) is committed to bringing “freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights to Cuba. Recognizing that sustainable change must come from within, our mission aims to identify independent civil society leaders as agents of change, and support their efforts to restore and rebuild Cuban society – a society that has suffered for generations under the repression of dictatorship” (CANF, n.d., para. 1). As described on its website, its approach involves the following: Working with partners on the island to understand the struggles and needs of the Cuban people and finding ways to bring about change. This also includes fostering civic engagement, activism, community building and consciousness-raising about every Cuban’s “right to claim and

146

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

demand certain basic freedoms” (CANF, n.d., para. 2) The organization goals include raising awareness about the socioeconomic and political situation in Cuba, staying vigilant for potential human rights abuses to bring them to the attention of the international community, and engaging in policy analysis, research and recommendations. The organization prioritizes three main issues. The first is human rights, which it approaches through collaborations with Cuban leaders and communication with the international community with the goal of creating networks and building solidarity for opposition in Cuba. The second, connectivity, is related to ensuring affordable, private and open access to the internet for Cubans. Lastly, it focuses on institutions and infrastructure, which is related to its support toward rebuilding the country’s buildings and streets, ensuring access to potable water, etc., and trying to ensure the citizens’ ability to organize and create civic society and nongovernmental organizations. CANF lists eight partnering institutions on the island, all engaged in non-violent advocacy and activism against the regime (CANF, n.d). These partners include the Unión Patriótica de Cuba (UNPACU), a Cuban opposition group; Damas de Blanco, who are female relatives of political prisoners; and Foro Anti Totalitario (FANTU), a not-for-profit pro-democracy organization in Cuba. CANF also details the programs it leads on the island, which are focused on engaging children and adults in community work, fostering civil society, and providing food, housing and other support (CANF, n.d.).

CANF Strategic Narratives The focus of this organization is on the experience on the island, and, therefore, most of its communication has to do with the living conditions of the Cuban people. Through the description of the Cuba-based projects (CANF, n.d.), clear narratives about the homeland emerge: 1. Inhospitable. The focus here is on the precarious living conditions of the island. In the description of these projects, a dire view of living conditions in Cuba emerge, with unreliable and unfair education; communities marginalized; inadequate housing, where children are “left to fend for themselves while their parents do whatever they can to produce the bare minimum” (The Color of Hope, n.d., para. 1) and where many “suffer from hunger, thirst, and general neglect at the hand of their government” (Capitan Tondique, n.d., para. 2).

6

Table 6.4 Narratives of the Cuban Diaspora Organizations People

Cuba Government

THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

147

Cuban American National Foundation

CubaOne Foundation

Powerless people Tireless freedom fighters Inhospitable Tyrannical

A new generation of Cubans Community Your Cuba N/A

2. Powerless people. Communication materials describe many Cuban children lacking “proper education and principles” (Rayitos de Esperanza, n.d., para. 1), at risk of becoming “sullen and individualistic.” They tell the story of powerless people and people in need of a sense of purpose (Revelation, n.d.). 3. Tireless freedom fighters, such as Las Damas de Blanco, who “defied intense repression” to present the Cuban situation to the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (Damas de Blanco, n.d., para 2), as well as the labor organization Asociacion Sindical Independiente de Cuba (n.d), which works toward “a free, democratic, and human-rights-respecting Island; if not for themselves, then for their children and/or grandchildren” (para. 2). 4. Abuses by the Cuban Regime: Violent beatings, harassment by government police, disregard for labor and human rights; neglect for their suffering; opposition leaders being imprisoned (Damas de Blanco, n.d.; Political Prisoners Program, n.d.) (Table 6.4).

CubaOne Strategic Narratives CubaOne is a young organization that “offers a new generation of CubanAmericans the opportunity to give back to Cuba, build relationships with the Cuban people, and explore their heritage through high-impact trips to the island” (CubaOne, n.d., para. 1). Their members describe their approach as based on engagement, by supporting leaders in both Cuba and the United States; connection, related to the aim of building long term partnerships between both countries; heritage, referred to helping participants learn about their culture and identity; and community, which aims to bring “healing and respect to our parents, our elders and our generation” (CubaOne, n.d., para. 3). The organization publishes a blog

148

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

on its website, called Follow Along (https://cubaone.org/blog-2/fol low-along-new), in which it provides first-person stories about travel, informs about U.S. policies toward Cuba, and encourages U.S.–Cuba engagement. Its sole focus is on helping Cuban-Americans establish connections to the homeland and their identity, and, in this way, supporting the people of Cuba. Not surprisingly, its narratives were markedly different from the Cuban American National Foundation. One of the defining characteristics of these narratives is that they avoid qualifications of the Cuban government, administration or political system. Therefore, the narratives focused on the Cuban people and the island, as follows: 1. A new generation of Cubans: This narrative relates mostly to CubanAmericans, but it is also relevant to younger Cubans on the island. Emphasizes how they are different from previous generations. Focuses on their desire to have a relationship with Cuba and aim for collaboration to support Cuba (e.g., Cano, 2019; Placencia, 2018). 2. Community: When referring to the group or individuals, the narrative about Cubans (Cuban-Americans and Cubans on the island) centers on community. Cubans on the island are hosts, entrepreneurs, artists, family; while Cuban-Americans are returning Cubans, friends, supporters, etc. The underlying goal of the narrative is fostering meaningful interactions between Cubans in the United States or on the island (e.g., Sivit, 2019). This narrative was also evident in pieces authored by Cubans on the island. 3. Your Cuba: The experience and image of Cuba is presented as subjective. Cuba is the homeland., or the place of your ancestors. Cuba is a place to visit family and to experience your culture. Cuba is familiar. Cuba is different and diverse. The emphasis on this narrative is for individuals to focus on their own interpretation on Cuba (e.g., Acosta, 2018). 4. U.S. Travel Policies: The organization also discussed travel policies by the U.S. government, with a focus on advocating for openness and providing clarifications for the policies recently enacted (e.g., Sopo, 2018).

6

THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

149

Audience Narratives Used by the Diaspora Organizations As can be appreciated by the descriptions presented, the understanding of Cuba, Cubans and the Cuban leadership varies by group; i.e., the diaspora organizations and the general public. It is telling that the narratives of the CANF are closely related to those held by the Twitter users, in that the focus is on struggles and hardships of Cubans and the abuses of the regime. These narratives are closer to the priorities of the older generation of the diaspora. However, CubanOne’s narratives are significantly different, with a focus on building relationships and community. The image of Cuba they want to promote is a nation that is different and maybe even misunderstood, supporting their goal of promoting travel to Cuba, by positioning it as a place that needs to be experienced. unrelenting opposition of the Cuban hardliners to any softening in the U.S.–Cuban relations (Griswold, 2005; Weissenstein & Lee, 2017) have not contributed to improve the situation of Cuba. In relation to Cuban people, CANF focuses more on their need for help, with a narrative of people who are powerless or victims of the abuses of the government. This narrative is congruent with the audience’s focus on the Free Cuba narrative, which positions people on the island as needing to be liberated or saved. On the other end of the spectrum is CANF’s focus on the brave activists and opposition leaders in Cuba, who defy repression and fight for human rights. This perspective of the people was mostly absent from the audience’s narratives, which only included this theme of liberation in stories retelling their own or their family’s experience. What was most telling about the differences in these narratives is that CubaOne seems to intentionally avoid judgments on the Cuban government or its politics. Even though the group does not express support for Cuba’s regime in any way, they also do not openly denounce its practices. In doing so, they avoid promoting a narrative of Cuba as a place people should avoid or be afraid of, but they do not address many of the concerns Cuban-Americans might have in visiting the ancestral homeland.

Conclusion The narratives surrounding Cubans and Cuba are as diverse as the new diaspora community. While some Cubans hold on to the position that the

150

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

only way to bring about change in the homeland is to stick to strict sanctions and the restrictive policies adopted by the United States decades ago, as the diaspora groups have changed so have the organizations that represent their interests. Some, like CANF, are focused on helping the people of Cuba while keeping the pressure on the U.S. politicians and leaders (as well as the international community) to ensure restrictive policies on the island that might pressure the regime to change, as detailed in previous research (e.g., Griswold, 2005; Hill & Moreno, 1996; Weissenstein & Lee; 2017. As strategic narratives are future-oriented (O’Loughlin et al., 2012), the specific tie to policy makes a strategic choice for the diaspora, even if they have not been able to achieve their goal. Also, it must be acknowledged that the regime has already changed. Although it has kept to its socialist ideals, and although power is centralized in the Communist Party, it has opened up to the world in a way that might not have been imagined in the 1990s, when a strong wave of immigrants joined the diaspora, or in a way that was just starting when the last big wave of Cuban immigrants arrived in the United States in the mid2010s. Strategically, some younger organizations, like CubaOne, have chosen to focus on building relationships with Cubans, providing direct assistance to families on the island and reconnecting Cuban-Americans with their culture. Their narratives represent these priorities, and a result of the constant negotiation to which strategic narratives are submitted (O’Loughlin et al., 2012). Viewing them as public diplomacy actors, these different diaspora groups and generations are pursuing distinct goals. CANF, as a member of the hardliners’ generation, focuses on the state first, prioritizing opposition to the regime. As ambassadors for the Cuban people, its members are highlighting their difficulties and struggles, as it fits with the opposition goal and narratives. However, in doing so, they are providing an image of people that (save few examples remaining on the island and those brave enough to escape) are powerless and dependent on this international support. As the Twitter analysis showed, these narratives permeate to the larger audiences. On the other hand, CubaOne, as a new-generation diaspora organization, is focused on the Cuban people first, including not only those who remain in the homeland, but also those who have migrated or have been born in the United States and are now part of the Cuban-American experience. Their narratives are built around personal experiences of

6

THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

151

limited scope. In this way, these narratives are similar to the theme of Personal Experience identified in Twitter discussions, with the significant difference that on Twitter this theme was used to edify the Dangers of Socialism/Communism narrative. Although messages related to Hardship in the Homeland, and Cuban Policies/Politics could be found in this organization’s Twitter messages, the analysis of its website content shows that these narratives were mainly informational, with little or no value judgment attached. This shift in narrative does allow the organization to extend invitations to experience Cuba first hand and acknowledge the country’s need for change, but this change is left open to interpretation, as they do not promote a clear vision, as the hardliners do. As ambassadors for the Cuban people, they highlight the diversity of the community (in views, interests, experiences, etc.) in a way that other organizations do not, but they still come short of being advocates for people who are living in a repressive system that they are evidently aware of. In this way, the narrative shift of the new generation is both more open and welcoming, and less powerful at the same time, if considered for its potential to bring about change. The case of Cuba highlights how credibility, power, and legitimacy do not only belong to the state, as Hayden (2013) posited. This diaspora, like many do, performs its public diplomacy role through the promotion of narratives about the homeland (e.g., Alfaraz, 2018; Mariou, 2020), which in turn communicates not only the diaspora‘s understanding of the homeland’s current situation but the diaspora’s aspirations for what it can be.

References Acosta, A. (2018). Not your stereotypical Cuba. CubaOne. https://cubaone.org/ not-your-stereotypical-cuba. Ahmed, A., & Robles, F. (2018, April 19). Who is Miguel Díaz-Canel, Cuba’s new president? The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/ 19/world/americas/miguel-diaz-canel-bermudez-cuba.html. Alfaraz, G. (2018). Framing the diaspora and the homeland: Language ideologies in the Cuban diaspora. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 254, 49–69. Alonso, V. (2018, April 10) [@photovanessa]. Solo esperamos que estos abusos a los #DerechosHumanos lleguen a la #CumbreDeLasAmericas. Que se de a conocer la falta de #LibertadDeExpresion en #Cuba. Que se sepa que la isla

152

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

esta llena de #presospolíticos. https://t.co/543QUjZxLQ [Tweet]. Twitter. http://twitter.com/photovanessa/statuses/983768165967638528. Anita [@Aneetchkook]. (2019, August 24). JSapp_AR Voting for Sanders would ensure the U.S. would become another Cuba. Sanders is on record saying how much admiration he has for Fidel Castro for what he did for the Cuban people. He tried to walk that back in 2016 but Sanders’ Communist leanings are there and always have been. [Tweet] Twitter. http://twitter.com/Aneetc hkoo/statuses/1165298628635824128. Asociación Sindical Independiente de Cuba. (n.d). Cuba-based projects: Asociación Sindical Independiente de Cuba. Cuban American Foundation. https://www.canf.org/our-work/cuba-based-projects/481-asociacionsindical-independiente-de-cuba-asic. Associated Press, The. (2019, May 11). Cuba rations staple foods and soap in face of economic crisis. NewYorkTimes.com. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2019/05/11/world/americas/cuba-rationing-sanctions.html. Baker, P. (2014, December 17). U.S. to restore full relations with Cuba, erasing a last trace of Cold War hostility. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/2014/12/18/world/americas/us-cuba-relations.html. Balcells, J., & Padró-Solanet, A. (2020). Crossing lines in the Twitter debate on Catalonia’s Independence. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 25(1), 28–52. Blizzard, B., & Batalova, J. (2020, June 11). Cuban immigrants in the United States. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ cuban-immigrants-united-states-2018. Brandwatch. (n.d). Custom classifiers. https://support.brandwatch.com/hc/enus/articles/360002648038. Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77–101. Cano, H. (2019, April 8). Living on the Hyphen. Cuba One: Tu Cuba. Retrieved from: https://cubaone.org/living-on-the-hyphen. Capitan Tondique. (n.d.) Cuba-based Projects: Capitan Tondique. CubanAmerican National Foundation. https://www.canf.org/our-work/cubabased-projects/478-capitan-tondique. CANF. (n.d.) Cuba-based projects. Cuba American National Foundation. https://www.canf.org/our-work/cuba-based-projects. CNN Editorial Research. (2020, September 1). American generations fast facts. CNN.com. https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/06/us/baby-boo mer-generation-fast-facts/index.html. Cuban American National Foundation. (n.d.). About us: Purpose. https://www. canf.org/about-us/purpose. Cuban Americans for Engagement. (n.d.). About us. https://www.cafeporcuba. org/about-us.

6

THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

153

Cuban Research Institute. (2018). 2018 FIU Cuba Poll. Florida International University. https://cri.fiu.edu/research/cuba-poll/2018-fiu-cuba-poll.pdf. Cuban Research Institute. (n.d.). Cuban AmericaCuban-American Organizations and Institutions. Florida International University. https://cri.fiu.edu/ cuban-america/org-institutes/. Cuban Research Institute. (2020). Chronology of U.S. Cuba relations. Florida International University. https://cri.fiu.edu/us-cuba/chronology-of-us-cubarelations/. Cuba, F. [@facecuba] (2018, May 17). Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez is expected to tell lies to defend the interests of the Castro regime. However, a number of his erroneous statements about ‘promoting human rights’ in Cuba seemed particularly ridiculous to various UN assembly members in Geneva. https://t.co/0WsJ9QbTgx. [Tweet] Twitter. http://twitter.com/facecuba/ statuses/997255086584643584. Damas de Blanco. (n.d.). Cuba-based project: Damas de Blanco. Cuban American National Foundation. https://www.canf.org/our-work/cuba-based-projects/ 494-damas-de-blanco. Davis, M. S. [@Davis50Marilyn] (2020, February 25). Castro used firing squad to kill thousands of its own people, including children! Bernie has lost his mind & soul! Go live in Russia or Cuba. Get out of USA! [Tweet] Titter. http://twitter.com/Davis50Marilyn/statuses/1232299263746564096. Del Mar, A. [@ArielDelMar6] (2019, July 4). @JohnTrumpFanKJV Just 90 miles away from the Florida Keys are the poor people of Cuba. They are going through a tough time at this moment. Food is lacking. We are truly very blessed. [Tweet] Twitter. http://twitter.com/ArielDelMar6/statuses/ 1146961171792179200. Délano, A. (2014). The diffusion of diaspora engagement policies: A Latin American agenda. Political Geography, 41, 90–100. De Moya, M. (2019). Protesting the homeland: Diaspora dissent public relations efforts to oppose the Dominican Republic’s citizenship policies. In Protest Public Relations (pp. 106–127). Routledge. Dodd, M., & Collins, S. (2017). Public relations message strategies and public diplomacy 2.0: An empirical analysis using Central-Eastern European and Western Embassy Twitter accounts. Public relations review, 43(2), 417–425. Duany, J. (2017, July 6). Cuban migration: A postrevolution exodus ebbs and flows. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ cuban-migration-postrevolution-exodus-ebbs-and-flows. Duncombe, C. (2019). Social media is an important tool for public diplomacy. Soft Power and Diplomacy, 112. Echezabal, J. [@EchezabalJuan] (2019, February 4). Porqué el pueblo cubano se cansó de tanto abuso, miseria y represión, porque las dictaduras comunistas son obsoletas y no tienen el apoyo del mundo LIBRE y DEMOCRÁTICO

154

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

#YoVotoNO https://t.co/2KWnkfhL5w [Tweet] Twitter. http://twitter. com/EchezabalJuan/statuses/1092482715755122688. Fabian, J., Wicary, S., & Bartenstein, B. (2020, June 30). Trump defies demographics by courting Cuba hardliners in Florida. Bloomberg.com. https:// www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-30/trump-woos-cuba-hardli ners-despite-their-waning-clout-in-florida. Gorordo, F. [@fgorordo] (2019, April 17). These new U.S. restrictions on remittances and travel to #Cuba will only hurt—rather than help—the Cuban people. This is a giant step backwards and only emboldens hardliners on both sides of the Florida straits that seek to maintain the status quo. [Tweet]. Twitter. http://twitter.com/fgorordo/statuses/1118569638470852608. Griswold, D. (2005, October 12). Four decades of failure: The U.S. embargo against Cuba. CATO Institute. https://www.cato.org/publications/spe eches/four-decades-failure-us-embargo-against-cuba. Hayden, C. (2013). Logic of Narrative and networks in US public diplomacy. Journal of International Communication., 19(2), 196–218. Hill, K., & Moreno, D. (1996). Second-generation cubans. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 18(2), 175–193. Hobbs, M., Della Bosca, H., Schlosberg, D., & Sun, C. (2020). Turf wars: Using social media network analysis to examine the suspected astroturfing campaign for the Adani Carmichael Coal mine on Twitter. Journal of Public Affairs, 20(2). e2057. Joyce, G. (2019, September 17). 5 cool things you can do with brandwatch consumer research that you couldn’t do before. Brandwatch. https://www.bra ndwatch.com/blog/5-cool-things-brandwatch-consumer-research/. Kligler-Vilenchik, N., & Thorson, K. (2016). Good citizenship as a frame contest: Kony 2012, memes, and critiques of the networked citizen. New Media & Society, 18(9), 1993–2011. Krogstad, J. (2017, January 13). Surge in Cuban immigration to the U.S. continued through 2016. Pew Research Center: FacTank.https://www.pewres earch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/13/cuban-immigration-to-u-s-surges-as-relati ons-warm/. Lago, V. [@Vince_Lago] (2018, February 10). Wonderful evening supporting @CUBADECIDE and recognizing @Almagro_OEA2015 for his dedication to human rights and a free and democratic Cuba. Thank you for your unwavering leadership. [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/Vince_Lago/status/ 962544636752515072. Lasorsa, D., Lewis, S., & Holton, A. (2012). Normalizing Twitter: Journalism practice in an emerging communication space. Journalism Studies, 13, 19–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2011.571825. Lup, L. D. [@lupsmit] (2020, June 28). So sad that is what communism looks like. Youwill be made to submit. I am scared. I am a cuban political

6

THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

155

refugee. So so sad to see how the Soviets achieved their goal. Watch soviet 70’s defector Yuri Bezmenov interview in UTube. He spelled it out. Infiltrated Academia [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/lupesmit/status/127 7417295007055874 Mariou, E. (2020). Narratives about ‘homeland’, heritage, languages and belonging: A case of ‘return’ migration. Linguistics and Education, 56, 100793. Marte, J. (2016, March 20). Cuban Americans split over Obama´s trip to Havana. WashingtonPost.com. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ cuban-americans-are-split-on-the-value-of-obamas-trip-to-havana/2016/03/ 20/6b0eda50-ed59-11e5-bc08-3e03a5b41910_story.html. Martinez, A. M. (2017, June 19). [@anamargaritam] @irinavilarino @kennethv_123 The majority of Cuban-Americans that I know have been involved in the pro-democracy cause 4 many yrs & do not support engagement w/regime [Tweet]. Twitter. http://twitter.com/anamargar itam/statuses/876892103720280065. Mazzei, P., & Gamez Torres, N. (2016, March 22). Cuban dissidents meet Obama to air grievances about Castro–and about new U.S. policy. MiamiHerald.com. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/cuba/article67626962.html. Miskimmon, A., O’Loughlin, B., & Roselle, L. (2013). Strategic narratives: Communication, power and the new world order. Routledge. Natarajan, K. (2014). Digital public diplomacy and a strategic narrative for India. Strategic Analysis, 38(1), 91–106. https://doi.org/10.1080/097 00161.2014.863478. Neal, M. A. (2018, December 19). Sure this will be a great deal for all involved—except the players: ‘MLB, Cuban Baseball Federation reach agreement that will eliminate need for players to defect’ https://t.co/zjnRkE GFDm [Tweet]. Twitter http://twitter.com/NewBlackMan/statuses/107 5508418360815616. Negron, C. [@thechrisnegron] (2018, August 22). @espinosaawendy @sebas_q99 I agree with this and those stats are all fake. My uncle was a doctor in Cuba and was forced to falsify reasons for death or he would be fired. He’s told me many incidents where patients died of heart problems and had to write otherwise. Cuba has been destroyed by communism. [Tweet]. Twitter. http://twi tter.com/thechrisnegron/statuses/1032413718917918720. Newland, K. (2010). Voice after exit: Diaspora advocacy. Migration Policy Institute. O’Loughlin, B., Miskimmon, A., & Roselle, L. (2012). Forging the world: Strategic narratives and international relations. Centre for European Politics / New Political Communications Unit. http://www.newpolcom.rhul.ac.uk/ npcu-blog/2012/1/17/strategic-narratives-working-paper-published.html.

156

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

Obrion, C. [@cyndi_obrion] (2017, April 30). @TEN_GOP Send them to Venezuela, North Korea, or Cuba so they learn 1st hand what it’s like to live w/out freedom. Maybe that will humble them a bit. [Tweet]. Twitter. http://twitter.com/cyndi_obrion/statuses/858757233294938112. PBS American Experience. (2005). Cuban exiles in America. PBS.org. https:// www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/castro-cuban-exiles-ame rica/. Perez, D. [@DanielPe05] (2020, March 29). @frankcastro Doctors are shipped around the world and Cubans are stuck with medical students, and to see one of them even is bearly impossible. Cubans, are currently fighting (literally) in huge lines to buy SOAP because there hasn’t been in any stores for months. [Tweet]. Twitter. http://twitter.com/DanielPe05/statuses/124444 2482206793729. Placencia, P. (2018). I kind of want to go, but my parents will kill me. CubaOne. Retrieved from https://cubaone.org/i-kind-of-want-to-go-butmy-parents-will-kill-me. Political Prisoners Program. (n.d). Cuba-based projects: Political prisoners program. Cuban American Foundation. https://www.canf.org/our-work/ cuba-based-projects/37-political-prisoners-program Polo, F. [@Polo4congress] (2019, June 28) Mis mas dolidas condolencias para todas las familias cubanas que han perdido un ser querido a causa del tornado y los lesionados. Es una tristeza que en nuestra #Cuba todavía existan personas viviendo dentro de escambrosas casas que se derrumban con una lluvia o tornado. https://t.co/Z8Ujhq37KK [Tweet]. Twitter. http://twitter.com/ FPolo116/statuses/1090059455327322113. Ralph, J. [@NevadaJack2] (2018, July 14) Socialist Cuba is planning a series of potentially far-reaching changes, with a new constitution set to recognize the free market and private property, while dividing political powers between a president and a prime minister. https://t.co/Er8TgI83BF [Tweet]. Twitter. http://twitter.com/NevadaJack2/statuses/1018348700110745600. Simancas, C. [@CarlosSimancas] (2018, May 23). My family came from Cuba legally 33 years ago, I was 12. While in American History class I felt in love with my new country. Reagan was our president. USA gave us the freedom, hope, love & prosperity that Cuba denied my family for years. Thank You, USA I am forever grateful. [Tweet]. Twitter. http://twitter.com/SUPgrlCar oline/statuses/999262975017082880. Shahin, S., & Huang, Q. (2019). Friend, Ally, or Rival? Twitter diplomacy as “technosocial” performance of national identity. International Journal of Communication, 13, 19. Sivit, M. (2019, June 19). How to plan a ‘support for the Cuban people’ trip. CubaOne. https://cubaone.org/cuban-people-trip/.

6

THE NEW CUBAN DIASPORA

157

Sopo, G. (2017, January 21). Young Cubans here and on the island are indebted to Obama. CubaOne. https://cubaone.org/obamas-cuba-legacy/. Sopo, G. (2018, April 18). With power succession underway, CubaOne urges the U.S. and Cuba to resume engagement. CubaOne.https://cubaone.org/withpower-succession-underway-cubaone-urges-the-u-s-and-cuba-to-resume-eng agement. Soto, A. [@SotoAlfred] (2020, June 5). The racism of a certain generation of Cuban Americans may astonish readers, but it helps if you remember many don’t consider themselves people of color. My take. https://t.co/sHJBja APkJ [Tweet]. Twitter. http://twitter.com/SotoAlfred/statuses/127616581 5033901061. Suarez, J. [@johnjsuarez] (2020, February 6). Both Bill Clinton and Barack Obama understood this and ran as pro-sanctions candidates and did well in Florida. Hillary Clinton ran as an anti-sanctions pro-engagement candidate and lost the state. https://t.co/TDUIbXGAxv 14/15 https://t.co/NFJjqd MOh0 [Tweet]. Twitter. http://twitter.com/johnjsuarez/statuses/122561 5846757871616. Rayitos de Esperanza. (n.d.). Cuba-based projects: Rayitos de Esperanza. Cuban American National Foundation. https://www.canf.org/our-work/ cuba-based-projects/496-rayitos-de-esperanza. Revelation. (n.d.). Cuba-based projects: Revelation. Cuban American National Foundation. https://www.canf.org/our-work/cuba-based-projects/495-rev elation. Suarez, J. [@johnjsuarez] (2019, February 12) @RosaMariaPaya The Cuban regime is already illegitimate The referendum of February 24 does not meet minimum guarantees, therefore it is a fraud #Cuba has no legitimate Constitution “Rosa M Payá asks the world to ignore the Cuban regime after the referendum” [Tweet]. Twitter. http://twitter.com/johnjsuarez/statuses/109 5517822619451392. Taylor, N. (2020). Introducing data upload API: 5 new types of data you can analyze in Brandwatch. Brandwatch. https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/int roducing-data-upload-api/ The Color of Hope. (n.d.). Cuba-based projects: The Color of Hope. Cuban American National Foundation. https://www.canf.org/our-work/cuba-based-pro jects/33-the-color-of-hope. Tom, M. [@MPD6126] (2018, July 2). @perlmutations The Obama socialist transformation of America. Ron if you love Socialism so much why don’t you go live in those workers paradise. Go to North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela. Just go without all your money and live like the regular population. Then tell me how great it is to have nothing. [Tweet] Twitter. http://twitter.com/MPD 6126/statuses/1013871514758909954.

158

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

Torres, M. (1995). Encuentros y encontronazos: Homeland in the politics and identity of the Cuban diaspora. Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 4(2), 211–238. Twiplomacy. (2018). Twiplomacy Study 2018. https://twiplomacy.com/blog/twi plomacy-study-2018/. U.S. Census Bureau. (n.d.). 2018 American community survey (ACS). https:// data.census.gov/cedsci/. U.S. Department of State. (2021). State sponsors of terrorism: Bureau of Counterterrorism. https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/. U.S. Embassy in Cuba. (2020). U.S. Embassy Havana. https://cu.usembassy. gov/embassy/havana/. Uysal, N., & Schroeder, J. (2019). Turkey’s Twitter public diplomacy: Towards a “new” cult of personality. Public Relations Review, 45(5), 101837. Valenzuela, S., Puente, S., & Flores, P. (2017). Comparing disaster news on Twitter and television: An intermedia agenda setting perspective. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media., 61(4), 615–637. https://doi.org/10. 1080/08838151.2017.1344673. van Noort, C. (2019). The construction of power in the strategic narratives of the BRICS. Global Society, 33(4), 462–478. https://doi.org/10.1080/136 00826.2019.1581733. Vis, F. (2013). Twitter as a reporting tool for breaking news: Journalists tweeting the 2011 UK riots. Digital Journalism, 1(1), 27–47. Weissenstein, M., & Lee, M. (2017, June 13). Cuba hardliners, US defenders battle over new Trump policy. APNews.com. https://apnews.com/34591d 958a4347f98465837a3a780bca/Cuba-hardliners,-US-defenders-battle-overnew-Trump-policy.

CHAPTER 7

#RickyRenuncia: The Hashtag That Took Collective Outrage from Social Media to the Streets Yadira Nieves-Pizarro and Juan Mundel

Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory, “belonging to but not a part of the United States” (Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244). Furthermore, Puerto Ricans hold a category of citizenship that does not include all the entitlements to U.S. constitutional rights such as electing the President or having a voting representative in Congress (Malavet, 2004; Torruella, 1988). Although the island’s official languages are English and Spanish, the latter is used in everyday life and in local government institutions. Puerto Ricans refer to the archipelago as “el país,” which translates to “the country” (Morris, 1995). Additionally, as research has documented, there is a distinctly Puerto Rican national identity that binds its people

Y. Nieves-Pizarro (B) Universidad Interamericana, Bayamón, Puerto Rico e-mail: [email protected] J. Mundel Arizona State University, Phoenix, Arizona, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Bravo and M. De Moya (eds.), Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74564-6_7

159

160

Y. NIEVES-PIZARRO AND J. MUNDEL

through culture, language, and mutual recognition (Hall, 1989; Miller, 1995). Therefore, although citizens of the United States, Puerto Ricans come to the U.S. mainland like migrants and as a racial other, under a specter of colonialism (Duany, 2009; Hinojosa, 2018; Nieves-Pizarro, 2016; Whalen & Vázquez-Hernández, 2008). This diaspora group is the second-largest population of Hispanic origin in the United States and has settled mainly in New York City, Chicago, and more recently, in Orlando (Collazo et al., 2010; Motel & Patten, 2012; Rayer, 2018; Sutter & Hernández, 2018). Currently, there are more Puerto Ricans living in the United States (5.5 million) than on the Island (3.3 million) (Román, 2018; United States Census Bureau, 2021). Like many Latin Americans who have put down roots in the mainland, most diaspora members develop a distinct identity, portraying themselves as part of a translocal nation split between the motherland and the United States (Duany, 2002). Nonetheless, Puerto Ricans in the diaspora retain strong social and cultural bonds to their “patria.” In this era of globalization, the diaspora plays a significant role as transnational actors and major contributors to international politics (Reis, 2004). While origin countries might hold the notion that migrants are absent, traitors or enemies, others have come to see their value as allies, partners and agents of development (Bravo, 2015). In public diplomacy, which is traditionally defined as the direct communication of states with foreign peoples (Sevin, 2017), their participation in transnational social and political processes is encouraged (Bobes, 2012). In a colonial setting such as Puerto Rico (Immerwahr, 2016), the diaspora plays an important political force as the migration stateside increases. Although citizen rights are limited in U.S. overseas territories, Puerto Ricans who establish residency in any of the 50 states can exercise the full extent of their constitutional rights (Arroyo-Flores et al., 2019; King, 2019) and pressure Congress and the President to act in favor of the archipelago. Therefore, the government and the people of Puerto Rico face the challenge of having to appeal to their federal government, much like a foreign nation would (Bea & Garret, 2010; Burnett et al., 2001; Malavet, 2004; Thornburgh, 2007).1 Thus, the need for 1 The U.S. Supreme Court determined that Puerto Rico is neither a foreign country nor part of the United States (Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244) because it is not fully incorporated into the Union. Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory, described

7

#RICKYRENUNCIA: THE HASHTAG THAT TOOK …

161

public diplomacy efforts to represent the people and the territory in the U.S. mainland, but also for the diaspora in U.S. mainland to advance its interests in regard to the homeland. For example, after 60 years using the island-municipality of Vieques as a practice range, the diaspora played an important part in achieving the exit of the U.S. Navy in 2003, during President Bill Clinton’s administration (Stanchich, 2013). On the other hand, at the end of President Barack Obama’s administration in 2016, Puerto Ricans living in the mainland were key in the release of political prisoner and pro-independence activist Óscar López Rivera, who had been charged with seditious conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. government (Molina, 2017). One of the characteristics that suggest a group has become diasporic in nature is the conviction that its members should commit to the restoration, safety, and prosperity of the homeland (Reis, 2004). For instance, after Hurricane María swept across Puerto Rico in 2017, members of the Puerto Rican diaspora in the United States put forth private efforts as a result of the federal/local governments’ poor recovery response (Pérez, 2018; Rivera Clemente, 2018a, 2018b). In these initiatives, social media was key in the coordination of relief efforts and donations from individuals and organizations in the Puerto Rican diaspora that are said to be around $212 million (Red de Fundaciones de Puerto Rico, 2018; TeleSur, 2017). Generally, political engagement at the local level is limited to Puerto Rico’s geographical space. As a result, when it comes to political participation via direct vote, Puerto Ricans who live in the mainland have their hands tied. Diaspora members cannot vote in local elections because that privilege is restricted to residents and individuals in the Military or university students (Comisión Estatal de Elecciones, 2017). Nonetheless, when it came to demand the resignation of the governor, the diaspora made their voices heard. In summer 2019, the Puerto Rican press published hundreds of pages of a chat transcription in which Puerto Rico Governor Ricardo Roselló,

as “foreign” in a domestic sense (Burnett et al., 2001). Congress governs Puerto Rico under the Territorial Clause of the Constitution (Burnett et al., 2001). Puerto Ricans cannot vote for the President. And the Resident Commissioner, the Island’s delegate in the House of Representatives, has voice but no vote in matters concerning its constituents. Thus, although Puerto Ricans are affected by federal legislation, the local government has no power to tip the balance in its favor.

162

Y. NIEVES-PIZARRO AND J. MUNDEL

members of his staff, and lobbyist friends discussed personal and official matters (Florido & Romo, 2019). The conversations were littered with mocking, homophobic, and misogynistic slurs aimed at political enemies and journalists, as well as discussion of sensitive government information with people outside the governments (El Nuevo Día, 2019a; Valentin Ortiz & Minet, 2019). These messages came after more than a year of strife between citizens and the local government over the Hurricane Maria recovery and a persistent economic depression. Social media became the platform used by Puerto Ricans on the island and abroad to organize protests and demonstrations demanding the governor’s resignation, bringing people together in the archipelago, the U.S. Mainland, and Europe (El Nuevo Día, 2019a; Martínez, 2019; Metro, 2019a; Sepúlveda, 2019a, 2019b). When the chat scandal became public, social media not only captured the ability of individuals to exchange information about politics (Bode et al., 2014), but also fueled protests and demonstrations from citizens not affiliated to traditional political groups. For 15 days, young people led the demonstrations around the archipelago using the #Rickyrenuncia hashtag (Vélez Santiago, 2019) until Rosselló announced his decision to resign as Governor (Toro, 2019). The demonstrations and confrontations between protestors and local police were documented in detail across traditional media outlets in Puerto Rico and abroad, as well as social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. Young people used social media to raise awareness, call for marches (Gonzalez-Lizarraga et al., 2016), and publish a counternarrative to the portrayal of protestors in traditional media outlets. For one thing, protestors reported the use of excessive force through social media (Hill & Tiefenthäler, 2019). And while the outrage increased, so did the use of social media, which prompted engagement in political activities such as protests, rallies, and demonstrations (Mahmood et al., 2016). #Rickyrenuncia allowed a message to get out, called global attention to Puerto Rico, and attempted to bring visibility and accountability to the government (Bonilla & Rosa, 2015). Consequently, diaspora members used social media to call and celebrate demonstrations in Washington, DC; Orlando, Florida; Denver, Colorado; Austin and Dallas, Texas; Seattle, Washington; and Saint Louis, Missouri (El Nuevo Día, 2019a). In addition, Puerto Ricans living in the Netherlands; St. Kitts; Madrid and Barcelona, Spain; Switzerland; France; and Slovenia showcased on

7

#RICKYRENUNCIA: THE HASHTAG THAT TOOK …

163

social media their demand for Rosselló’s resignation (El Nuevo Día, 2019c). #Rickyrenuncia live streams created a feeling of shared temporality during protests and confrontations with police (Bonilla & Rosa, 2015). Witnessing the events as they unraveled through the lens of an acquaintance’s mobile phone in the Island offered the diaspora an experience of “real time” political engagement, community, and collective effervescence (Bonilla & Rosa, 2015) (Table 7.1).

Theoretical Perspectives: Social Capital, Social Media, and Virtual Cosmopolitanism Existing theory provides some insights into why and how people choose to socialize and coordinate actions via social media. Research shows, for example, that individuals prefer to spend time with others who share similar socio-cultural factors such as language, customs, history, and values, among others (Reynolds, 2004). Often, those who share such socio-cultural factors are members of the same ethnic group (Reynolds, 2004), although globalization has allowed for the spreading of cultural values around the world, powering social connections internationally. When individuals migrate to a different culture, they often keep strong social and material connections to their national identity and homeland (Kelly & Lusis, 2006; Kilduff & Corley, 1999), which is referred to as diaspora (Bravo, 2015; Ferguson et al., 2016). In the United States, Latinx diasporas have built distinct communities, such as Nuyoricans, an amalgamation of the terms “New York” and “Puerto Rican,” used to refer to members or culture of the Puerto Rican diaspora in New York City. Beaverstock (2002) explains that it is common for migrants to choose destinations where there is an ex-pat community available that shares similar worldviews and/or where there are existing connections. Migrants often leverage these social networks to get established upon arriving in a foreign country (Beine et al., 2011). The United States is a viable destination for Puerto Ricans, given that there is no need for a visa, the distance from the homeland is short, and the working and living conditions are better, but also because of the large network of Puerto Rican diaspora members living there. However, in addition to engaging local social groups, diasporas continue to contribute socially and economically to their homeland (Bravo, 2015; Ferguson et al., 2016), as observed when the Puerto Rican community provided support to the Island after Hurricane María (Pérez,

164

Y. NIEVES-PIZARRO AND J. MUNDEL

Table 7.1 Timeline (Torres Gotay, 2019) July 8

July 10

July 11 July 12

July 13

July 14

July 15

July 16

July 17

July 18

July 19

Screenshots of a Telegram Chat between Governor Ricardo Rosselló and inner circle government officials and advisors leak. The next day, Ricardo Llerandi, Rosselló’s Chief of Staff, confirms its authenticity (El Nuevo Día, 2019d) U.S. Department of Justice indicted Julia Keleher, Education Secretary. Arizona U.S. Representative and chairman of the Natural Resources Committee, Raul Grijalva, asked for Rosselló’s resignation. Grijalva oversees proposed changes to the PROMESA law, which created a financial oversight board that controls Puerto Rico’s finances Rosselló offered a press conference where he apologized but refused to resign More screenshots of the chat leak, with attacks aimed at Puerto Rico Police Court Monitor, Arnaldo Claudio, appointed by the U.S. District Court after being placed in syndication The Centro de Periodismo Investigativo published 889 pages of the Telegram Chat between Governor Rosselló and inner circle government officials and advisors (El Nuevo Día, 2019b). The #RickyRenuncia hashtag bloomed on social media. Party leaders withdrew their support and protests escalated. However, the Governor says he will not step down Rosselló attended El Calvario Church service, where parishioners prayed for him, and he asked for forgiveness. The event was live-streamed on social media Workers’ Unions convened for the first massive protest in Old San Juan Urban music artists Bad Bunny and Residente join the protests Rosselló participates in an arranged interview in the morning Talk Show Nación Z, broadcast by Spanish Broadcasting System’s (SBS) Z-93 radio station and Mega TV Rosselló offers his last press conference, which lasted two hours. He contended that he had mandated a legal analysis that exonerated him from any legal wrongdoing in the chat Pop star Ricky Martin announces he will join the protests Urban artists Residente and Bad Bunnya spearheaded a protest in Old San Juan, launching the single “Afilando cuchillos” as the soundtrack of that summer’s movement Rosselló would not appear in public anymore, yet he sent a written statement where he insisted that he would not leave office. Prominent members of his party, such as ex-governor Luis Fortuño, and Bayamón Mayor Ramon Luis Rivera, ask for his resignation Puerto Rican Representatives Jennifer González and Nydia Velázquez, as well as Senators Rick Scott and Elizabeth Warren, ask Rosselló to step down. Rosselló’s Press Secretary, Dennise Perez, resigns

(continued)

7

#RICKYRENUNCIA: THE HASHTAG THAT TOOK …

165

Table 7.1 (continued) July 20

July 22

July 23

July 24

Protests continue in Fortaleza Street. Rosselló announces he will not run for office in 2020 and leaves his post as President of the Partido Nuevo Progresista, which favors Puerto Rican Statehood. Furthermore, he said he would submit to an impeachment process, a possibility that legislators were considering in light of his unwillingness to resign Over 500,000 participate in the National Strike. Fox News’ Shepard Smith interviews Rosselló, where he fails to justify him staying in power amidst the pressure Carlos “Johnny” Méndez, president of the House of Representatives, consulted with legal experts who recommend impeachment, for which Roselló could be convicted of at least five crimes 11:53 p.m. Rosselló announces his resignation

a René Pérez Joglar, or Residente, is a Puerto Rican urban music singer and songwriter who addresses

social and political issues in Latin America and the Caribbean. Benito Martínez Ocasio, or Bad Bunny, is a Puerto Rican Latin Trap singer. They were very vocal during the protests to oust Governor Rosselló in the Summer of 2019, both on and offline

2018; Rivera Clemente, 2018a, 2018b). All this presents a complex relationship building and maintaining scenario. Scholars have used social capital as a framework through which the development of networks, trust, and norms for effective social group functioning can be explained (e.g., Musso & Weare, 2017; Putra et al., 2019; Whiteman-Sandland et al., 2018). Per social capital, individuals act together to pursue a shared set of objectives (Putnam, 2000). Social capital allows individuals to access different formal and informal resources, and diasporas use social capital by capitalizing on the power of networks, developing connections with each other, even if their social ties are weak. These connections become key in securing housing, employment, and new suitable social networks (Ferguson et al., 2016). Social media, then, can provide social capital. In this chapter, we understand social media as a virtual third space (McEwan & Sobre-Denton, 2011) that allows individuals to fulfill social and cultural obligations related to belonging to a particular diaspora while maintaining relationships in the homeland. Ellison et al. (2007) documented that individuals use social media to access bonding and bridging social capital. We ascribe to Sobre-Denton’s (2016) view that social media, text messaging, and online communities allow individuals to engage in community-building.

166

Y. NIEVES-PIZARRO AND J. MUNDEL

Research shows that social media also allows for participating in cosmopolitan solidarity and activism(McEwan & Sobre-Denton, 2011; Sobre-Denton, 2016). For example, the diaspora sharing images showing the consequences of natural disasters and protesting against the lack of resources in the Island can help boost the voice of Puerto Ricans across the mainland, which helps with garnering support from other American citizens. Engaging in these viral behaviors as a means for mobilizing for social or political reasons is referred to as virtual cosmopolitanism (Mitter, 2012). Sobre-Denton (2016) argues for virtual cosmopolitanism as a “contact space to grow solidarities across traditional and corporeal cultural boundaries in ways that, if utilized with care and the necessary skill, can bridge nation-state boundaries and re-center peripheral group’s advocacy agendas” (p. 1718). Thus, in this chapter, we examine how social media was used both by those in Puerto Rico as well as those living in the mainland United States to examine to what extent social media was used for virtual cosmopolitanism and for maintaining social capital. Latinx Social Media Activism The Internet, and especially social media, affords users with the ability to raise consciousness through posts that voice their world views (Sobre-Denton, 2016). Further, social media fosters relationships and community-building while promoting actively engaged users (De Moya & Bravo, 2016). These platforms allow users not only to see content, but also share, engage with, and create content to be shared almost instantly. In fact, social media has been used for cosmopolitan solidarity raising awareness about local disasters, as was the 2004 tsunami in Phuket or the Haitian earthquake in 2009 (Sobre-Denton, 2016). Further, social media has been used as a space for protest during the Arab Spring. More recently, social media has been the voice of protests against the system in several parts of Latin America, not only in Puerto Rico but also in Venezuela (e.g., against the Maduro regime) (Martinoticias.com, 2016; Munger et al., 2019; Nugent, 2019; Pardo, 2015; Veccio, 2019) and in Argentina, for instance, denouncing the high number of assassinated

7

#RICKYRENUNCIA: THE HASHTAG THAT TOOK …

167

women as a result of gender violence,2 using the “Ni Una Menos” (Not even one less) campaign disseminated through the #NiUnaMenos movement3 (Accossatto & Sendra, 2018; Chenou & Cepeda-Másmela, 2019; Ellcessor, 2018; Infobae, 2018; Univision, 2016). Social media represents an important resource for activism because it sparks individual participation for social and political causes (Chon & Park, 2020). Furthermore, social media acts as a bridge between local populations and diaspora members who hold collective-connective activities with the purpose of bringing about global political change (Chon & Park, 2020; Sobre-Denton, 2016). For example, in Guatemala, El Movimiento Cívico Nacional used Facebook to call for President Alvaro Colom’s resignation after a video of a recently deceased lawyer surfaced, accusing the politician of assassination. The movement collected 5000 signatures demanding Colom’s resignation. The pressure on social media led to the creation of an independent commission that investigated the circumstances of the lawyer’s death (Sobre-Denton, 2016). Diasporas also have a role in influencing public opinion and policies (Bravo, 2015). For instance, Puerto Ricans living in the U.S. mainland acted upon social media consensus regarding the federal government’s response to environmental disasters. During Hurricane Maria’s recovery phase, Puerto Ricans living in the United States increased pressure on the government when supplies gathered in New York, Florida, Connecticut and Chicago did not reach victims (Rivera Clemente, 2018a, 2018b). Puerto Rican Congresswomen Nydia Velazquez and Alexandria OcasioCortez claimed, in the media, for the disbursement of the long delayed, already-assigned recovery emergency funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (Ruiz-Ramos, 2020), especially after an earthquake sequence in January 2020 destroyed houses in various municipalities in southern Puerto Rico (Rivera Clemente, 2020). Social media has become a viable tool for raising concerns regarding sensitive issues given that they allow for protection and identity concealment (Sobre-Denton, 2016). Social media has become an efficient and appropriate venue for sharing political views and/or engaging with social issues that are important to its users (Pew Research Center, 2018).

2 Find “Ni Una Menos” on Twitter @ColectivoNUM; Instagram @ColectivoNUM; or Facebook @NUMArgentina. 3 For more information, see https://niunamenos.org.ar.

168

Y. NIEVES-PIZARRO AND J. MUNDEL

Method Using the data mining tool Brandwatch, this study investigated 1,393,239 public social media posts to find out how Puerto Ricans and the Puerto Rican diaspora in the United States reacted and felt about the #RickyRenuncia movement. The growth of social media has enabled mining and analyzing social media content. Analyzing this content is important given that social media posts are considered a window through which realtime insights about people’s sentiments can be explained (Jayasanka et al., 2013). Brandwatch is a sentiment analysis tool developed in the United Kingdom, available commercially through the Crimson Hexagon brand. This tool looks at social media posts and attempts to assess whether users’ sentiment (i.e., attitudes about individuals, products, places or events) toward a particular issue is positive, negative, or neutral (Jayasanka et al., 2013). The term “RickyRenuncia” was entered in Brandwatch as one of the words that should appear in the tweet for it to be included in the sample, and the following words were entered as optional terms to help refine the search: “Ricky Renuncia” Ricky Renuncia rickyrenuncia protestas “Puerto Rico” puertorico isla gobernador governor quit rosello “ricardo rosello” (sic). Sample Using Crimson Hexagon, and based on the timeline of events, we searched for Twitter posts between July 10 and July 30, 2019. While governor Rosselló resigned on July 24, we included tweets from the following days after the resignation to capture people’s attitudes immediately after the announcement. The #RickyRenuncia search produced a universe of 1,393,239 tweets for analysis. While the majority of the conversation was produced on the Island (62%), 29% of the tweets were from the United States and other countries (9%). In the mainland, those states with a higher presence of Puerto Rican diaspora showed the most engagement, including Florida (22% of the posts), New York (16.8%), California, (9.3%), and Texas (9.1%).

7

#RICKYRENUNCIA: THE HASHTAG THAT TOOK …

169

Results: What Was the Conversation? Peaks in Conversation While Puerto Ricans took to social media early on to start protesting against the governor’s inaction, it was not until famous personalities started using the hashtag #RickyRenuncia, which became a symbol of resistance, that the conversation peaked. According to Brandwatch, July 16, 2019 reflected the largest number of mentions to the movement, reaching 249,262 tweets in one day (see Fig. 7.1). In the days leading to July 16, the Centro de Periodismo Investigativo had published 889 pages of chat messages between Rosselló and other officials and advisors. While the public was condemning the governor via social media, Rosselló live-streamed a religious service where parishioners prayed for him and asked for forgiveness. Coincidentally, voices for and against Rosselló merged within the same third virtual space. Key Conversation Drivers On July 15–16, different music artists such as Ricky Martin took to social media to voice their outrage at Rosselló, which resulted in peak mentions. “Leading the charge on social media and on the ground was pop star Ricky Martin, who called on all sectors of society to demand respect for the LGBTQ+ community and to join him in the nationwide protests. The influential musicians Residente, Bad Bunny, and iLe collaborated in

Fig. 7.1 Peak #RickyRenuncia conversation timeline

170

Y. NIEVES-PIZARRO AND J. MUNDEL

Afilando Los Cuchillos (Sharpening the Knives), a hymn designed to fire up protesters” (Ruiz-Ramos, 2020). A summary of the most influential voices on Twitter is presented in Table 7.2. Previous research had documented the effectiveness of having celebrities engage with a movement on social media. Ellcessor (2018) argues that when celebrities engage in activismvia social media, the social capital associated with such celebrity allows for (1) forging a variety of connections, (2) reinforcing perceptions of authenticity related to the endorsed movement, and (3) spreading the values of the movement to disparate audiences. Ellcessor (2018) points out that there is something to be said about the authenticity of the celebrity’s claim in regard to the social movement. While many Puerto Ricans voiced their anger against the government’s actions, Ricky Martin’s protest was in direct response to the homophobic claims made by Rosselló. The tweets analyzed showed that Puerto Ricans both in the U.S. mainland and in the Island inserted celebrities such as Ricky Martin in their social media to express their feelings about #RickyRenuncia. For example, Twitter user @ananacarro asked Ricky Martin to help with the mainland relief efforts once done “taking the trash out in Puerto Rico”. On the other hand, other users simply tagged Ricky Martin in the hopes that this would help to make their opinions be heard. For example, user @toscamanu retweeted a text speaking about “united people claiming the resignation of the sweet talker [Rossello].” Additionally, others used their accounts to express solidarity with the celebrity’s activism, such as @PeroJulio, who wrote “PUERTO RICO BELONGS TO EVERYONE” and shared and tagged the singer flying an LGBTQ+ flag in a street protest. Other singers, such as René Pérez, from Calle 13, and Bad Bunny were often mentioned on Twitter by users who appreciated their appearances at street protests on the Island. Other influential voices in the debate included New York’s Representative Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez, born from a Puerto Rican family (Wang, 2018). Ocasio-Cortez gave voice to the many Puerto Ricans who do not have a say in United States politics and used social media to call Americans to “stand with la isla” in multiple tweets, demanding Rosselló’s resignation (Kruta, 2019). NBC News explained that the success behind the Representative’s social media strategy lies on the match between her characteristics and the demographics of her voters, which allowed for strong identification.

7

#RICKYRENUNCIA: THE HASHTAG THAT TOOK …

171

Table 7.2 Most influential voices in the #RickyRenuncia Movement July 10, 2019–July 30, 2019 User

Influencer score

Tweets

Followers

Following

Ricardo Rosselló @ricardorossello Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez @AOC Ricky Martin @ricky_martin David Begnaud @davidbegnaud Molusco @Moluskein Bad Bunny @sanbenito Joshua Potash @ JoshuaPotash Albert @albertcastillo Residente @residente Devilette @devilette

8.7

54.9 k

159 k

3.03 k

1.6

8.6 k

4.86 M

1.53 k

1.6

6.88 k

20.5 M

426

1.4

29.4 k

198 k

2.77 k

1.4

289 k

262 k

901

1.3

396

810 k

0

1

4.76 k

21.1 k

10.8 k

0.9

86.9 k

4.4 k

874

0.9

29.6 k

5.88 M

1.78 k

0.8

122 k

3.63 k

932

Demographics Research in the use of language expression shows men and women use language differently (Boneva et al., 2001). Mohammad and Yang (2011) indicate that women generally use language, even in computermediated environments, to foster personal relations, sharing concerns, and supporting others. Men, however, use language to express social position, discuss activities, and use confrontational expressions. In our analysis of the #RickyRenuncia conversation on Twitter, we found that women were more vocal (accounting for 52% of tweets) than men (48%) on social media, which supports the view that women are more likely to use their voice for sharing concerns and supporting others.

172

Y. NIEVES-PIZARRO AND J. MUNDEL

Sentiment The nature of the #RickyRenuncia conversation on Twitter is different from many other social media movements for many reasons. First, while it is possible to find new content under the hashtag today, the movement was short-lived as a consequence of the governor’s resignation on July 24. Second, unlike social media movements that are still fighting for changes in the system, such as #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter, or some environmental movements related to plastic pollution, the tweets collected under #RickyRenuncia also include the jubilee associated with Rossello’s resignation. Although some tweets exhibited positive sentiments (39.5%), most of the conversation was negative (60.5% of all tweets), according to the results of the Brandwatch sentiment analysis, which includes the emotions associated with the tweets, as presented in Fig. 7.2. Tweets classified as representing positive sentiments by Brandwatch included statements of pride for being a Puerto Rican, such as @PedroJulio’s tweet making references to Ricky Martin, calling him the Ricky that actually represents the people of Puerto Rico (instead of “Ricky” Roselló) because of his “dignity, love, pride, hope, and humanity.” Other positive tweets also referred to the love for the homeland, as reflected in @anthony_pr27 tweet, who stated his love for his “beautiful homeland Puerto Rico” and claimed that people would not let politics win this battle. The majority of the tweets, however, represented negative sentiments. Users such as @alejandraa took to Twitter to share her grief and to question whether her tears were explained by bravery, shame, or by being let down by politicians who “sold” her land. Others blamed Rosselló of drying their faces with dollar bills instead of towels, and they alluded to corruption.

Discussion Puerto Ricans in the U.S. mainland are counted on for support when there is a crisis going on in the Island. They pressure the U.S. Congress and President, for instance, for supportive policies (Arroyo-Flores et al., 2019; Bea & Garret, 2010; Burnett et al., 2001; King, 2019), but they also lend a hand when social and economic needs arise. For example, after Hurricane María impacted the tourism industry, the Puerto Rican diaspora was central in the recovery in several ways: They sent over money,

7

Fig. 7.2 Sentiment and emotion analyses on Twitter

#RICKYRENUNCIA: THE HASHTAG THAT TOOK …

173

174

Y. NIEVES-PIZARRO AND J. MUNDEL

shipped packages with supplies, and signed up to volunteer in cleanup and rebuilding efforts (Navarro, 2017; Vertical News, 2016). The diaspora also encouraged tourism to the Island, not only of foreigners, but the diaspora members themselves traveled to Puerto Rico in large numbers to do “voluntourism tours” (volunteering to work in recovery projects during their vacations) or for pleasure (Spinks, 2018). As a result, Discover Puerto Rico, the island’s destination marketing organization, announced record-breaking numbers in tourism revenue for 2019 (Caratini, 2020). This is important because tourism is a stable source of economic growth for Puerto Rico (Husein & Kara, 2020), representing 7–10% of the GDP (Aponte-Parés, 2019; Croes & Rivera, 2010). Tourism in the Island, nonetheless, is continuously being challenged by a competitive market in the Caribbean, and, pre-Hurricane Maria, because the Puerto Rican government had not articulated a successful marketing strategy (Croes & Rivera, 2010; EFE USA, 2015). After the hurricane, the diaspora contributed to define a tourism strategy, supporting the state-led “Meaningful Travel” campaign and other private efforts (Spinks, 2018). In other words, the diaspora contributed to the advancement of the goals of the home nation-state, becoming public diplomacy allies or supporters of the home government and, by setting a good example, contributing to the improvement of Puerto Rico’s image abroad (another public diplomacy goal). With no legal limits for moving, Puerto Rican migration to U.S. mainland persists as the political and financial crises remain active at home. The diaspora has acquired significant political power in states such as Florida, New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania and continue to advocate for vulnerable communities while holding local and federal governments accountable (Matthews, 2017; News is my business, 2020). For example, social media provides a significant number of Puerto Ricans in the diaspora with virtual contact spaces that propel activismand rise consciousness about social and political issues in the homeland (Sobre-Denton, 2016). In this context, diaspora members can become catalysts of collective action (Cardoso et al., 2013), such as when they contributed to force the resignation of Governor Ricardo Roselló and his advisors. As this Twitter analysis showed, people from all walks of life participated in the protests that ended with the resignation of then Puerto Rican governor Ricardo Roselló. Individuals from different generations, beliefs, and ideologies came together through sharing personalized content and

7

#RICKYRENUNCIA: THE HASHTAG THAT TOOK …

175

one common goal on virtual spaces (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Vaast et al., 2017). As research in other contexts has found, for the Puerto Rican diaspora, interaction between like-minded individuals on social media stimulated activism (Chon & Park, 2020). Diaspora mobilization developed with a common objective, in a concerted effort with island protest activities through the hashtag #RickyRenuncia, which clearly emphasized the goal of the movement. As Yang (2016) found, social movements have narrative form and center on a quest; in this case, the mission was a change of government. Figure 7.34 shows some of the communications the diaspora developed to mobilize their peers in the United States. From the beginning, Twitter users held narrative agency over this movement on the platform. The leaked chats marked the beginning of the conflict, sparking comments, retweets, and personal stories expressing their anger with Rosselló. The narrative reached its crisis when the public pressure on social media and through institutional channels made his resignation inevitable. Finally, the episode ended with his official resignation. All the while, Twitter users, many of them living off the island and, thus, considered part of the diaspora, contributed to the larger story of the Governor’s resignation as it developed (Campbell, 2005; Yang, 2016). In this case, which ended with Roselló’s resignation, the diaspora supported the goals of the civil society in Puerto Rico, and hence, of the people the government should serve. At the same time, the diaspora opposed a powerful politician at home, and in that sense, the diaspora became an actor of oppositional public diplomacy (De Moya, 2018; Zaharna & Uysal, 2016) by trying to improve the conditions in the homeland even if that meant opposing the political establishment in place at the time. While diaspora members have a commitment to the recovery, protection, and prosperity of the homeland (Reis, 2004), oftentimes, the diaspora may oppose home governments in pursuit of benefits for the home country (De Moya, 2018; Tam & Kim, 2019). As opposing publics,

4 Tweet published with permission of author @angrybrowngrl (Bianca Fernández Concepción). Posters of Los Angeles and Chicago Perreo en Solidaridad published with permission of designer Lester Rey. Poster “Puerto Rico has spoken” published with permission of designer Karlota Rodríguez. Picture “La Diáspora grita con el pueblo” published with permission of photographer Mario Rubén Carrión.

176

Y. NIEVES-PIZARRO AND J. MUNDEL

Fig. 7.3 Diaspora members join the #RickyRenuncia movement5 5 angrybrowngrl. (2019, July 21). La diáspora con Puerto Rico [Tweet]. Retrieved February 26, 2020, from https://twitter.com/angrybrowngrl/status/115304918856281 2928.

7

#RICKYRENUNCIA: THE HASHTAG THAT TOOK …

177

Fig. 7.3 (continued)

Puerto Ricans living in the mainland channeled their negative experiences through social media, triggering contagion effects that influenced like-minded individuals (Tam & Kim, 2019). This opposition, however, countered previous diaspora efforts to improve the image of Puerto Rico. Often, states ignore or dismiss powerless publics, but in this case, celebrity support legitimated their claims, alienating Rossello’s case for remaining in office (Ellcessor, 2018). Twitter users engaged high profile Puerto Ricans in Action. (2019). Puerto Rico Has Spoken: Gov. Rosselló Has Got to Go! Puerto Ricans in Action. Retrieved February 26, 2020 from https://www.puertoric ansinaction.com/new-page. Credits: Tweet published with permission of author @angrybrowngrl (Bianca Fernández Concepción). Posters of Los Angeles and Chicago Perreo en Solidaridad published with permission of designer Lester Rey. Poster “Puerto Rico has spoken” published with permission of designer Karlota Rodríguez. Picture “La Diáspora grita con el pueblo” published with permission of photographer Mario Rubén Carrión.

178

Y. NIEVES-PIZARRO AND J. MUNDEL

politicians, international singers, and actors to endorse the cause. Just as seen in other social media movements, the voice of celebrities and artists helped spread the message among a variety of audiences, which helped the movement gain momentum. In the case of Puerto Rico, influencers such as recording artists Ricky Martin, Residente, and Bad Bunny were praised for their online and offline claims on behalf of Puerto Ricans. They themselves became oppositional actors that raised Puerto Rico´s visibility abroad (a positive public diplomacy goal) while calling attention to the governance crisis going on at home (a negative public diplomacy outcome). Protests also motivated U.S President Donald Trump as well as Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren to join the chorus of voices asking the Governor to step down (Duygala, 2019; El Nuevo Día, 2019e). In the context of public diplomacy, #RickyRenuncia reinforced the notion of the strength that virtual communities can hold to enact political change. Through social media, local and abroad-based actors were able to rally people to demonstrate offline and to achieve change. The Puerto Rican diaspora has continued to be active. In January 2020, for instance, a series of earthquakes left thousands of families in the south of the Island without a home and fearing for their safety. Refugee camps were established in Ponce, Peñuelas, Guayanilla, and Yauco (Metro, 2019b). When the aid was not arriving swiftly enough, many (including diaspora members) flocked the Puerto Rican south with necessities items. However, seven government warehouses with supplies that had not been distributed were discovered (Correa Colón, 2020), raising suspicions about negligence and corruption. A #WandaRenuncia call (this time, asking for Puerto Rican governor Wanda Vásquez resignation) emerged after locating the missing supplies. Protests arose but not at the level of the #RickyRenuncia movement. And also in 2020, to alleviate the effects of the Coronavirus (COVID19) emergency, the diaspora joined Puerto Rican independence groups to request the U.S. Federal Government for the approval of moratoriums on mortgage payments, rent, loans, and utilities (Delgado, 2020). Puerto Ricans living in the mainland also funded frontline community health care workers, giving cash assistance to those excluded from federal and local economic stimulus packages (News is my business, 2020). Once again, the diaspora became an actor of public diplomacy, in this case aligning its goals with the goals of the homeland.

7

#RICKYRENUNCIA: THE HASHTAG THAT TOOK …

179

Furthermore, COVID-19 seems to be demonstrating that the United States should not rely on foreign countries for essential medical supplies and pharmaceuticals (Garofalo, 2020). In response, local politicians and the diaspora are lobbying in the U.S. Congress for the return of the pharmaceutical industry to the Island. To contextualize, a financial crisis and recession that has never really ended hit Puerto Rico in 2006 when Congress ended the tax breaks offered to U.S. manufacturers for locating their companies in Puerto Rico (Schoen, 2017). This incentive, which represented 24% of Puerto Rico’s GDP at the time (Fernández, 2008), allowed U.S. companies to send earnings back to the mainland without paying federal corporate taxes (Garofalo, 2020; Heine & Gallagher, 2020). As the economic crisis, corruption, and climate change challenges continue to impact the life chances for Puerto Ricans on the Island, migration stateside keeps increasing as individuals seek job opportunities and improved quality of life across the U.S. mainland (Sutter & Hernández, 2018). The lack of political powers afforded to Puerto Ricans on the Island as a consequence of the colonial relationship with the United States shifts the responsibility toward diaspora members to lobby for changes in policy and in federal funds spending. Historically, Puerto Ricans have garnered support for political causes through activism. Today, social media has proven a central means to facilitate collective action to promote social change (Chon & Park, 2020). Culture and language compel diaspora members to remain connected to the homeland. Recruitment and mobilization of the Puerto Rican diaspora for activism in both the Island and the mainland will continue to elevate diasporic strategic communications and actions as a way to collectively push for change.

References Accossatto, R., & Sendra, M. (2018). Movimientos feministas en la era digital. Las estrategias comunicacionales del movimiento Ni Una Menos. Encuentros : Revistade Ciencias Humanas. Teoría Social y Pensamiento Crítico, 8, 117– 136. Aponte-Parés, L. (2019). The imperial gaze: Tourism and Puerto Rico—A review essay. Centro Journal, 31(1), 103–141. Arroyo-Flores, J., Rosa, A., & Aranda, E. (2019). Understanding Puerto Rican voting in the United States. https://scholars.org/contribution/understan ding-puerto-rican-voting-united-states.

180

Y. NIEVES-PIZARRO AND J. MUNDEL

Bea, K., & Garret, R. S. (2010). Political status of Puerto Rico: Options for congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress. Beaverstock, J. (2002). Transnational elites in global cities: British expatriates in Singapore’s financial district. Geoforum, 33(4), 525–538. Beine, M., Docquier, F., & Özden, Ç. (2011). Diaspora effects in international migration: Key questions and methodological issues. The World Bank. Bennett, W., & Segerberg, A. (2012). The logic of connective action. Information, Communication & Society, 15(5), 739–768. Bobes, V. (2012). Diáspora, ciudadanía y contactos transnacionales. Nueva Sociedad (242). Bode, L., Vraga, E., Borah, P., & Shah, D. (2014). A new space for political behavior: Political social networking and its democratic consequences. Computer-Mediated Communication, 19, 414–429. https://doi. org/10.1111/jcc4.12048. Boneva, B., Kraut, R., & Frohlich, D. (2001). Using e-mail for personal relationships: The difference gender makes. American Behavioral Scientist, 45(3), 530–549. Bonilla, Y., & Rosa, J. (2015). #Ferguson: Digital protest, hashtag ethnography, and the racial politics of social media in the United States. American Ethnologist, 4–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/amet.12112. Bravo, V. (2015). The importance of diaspora communities as key publics for national governments around the world. In G. Golan, S. Yang, & D. Kinsey (Eds.), International public relations and public diplomacy: Communication and engagement (pp. 279–296). Peter Lang. Burnett, C., Marshall, B., Joseph, G., & Rosenberg, E. (2001). Foreign in a domestic sense: Puerto Rico, American expansion, and the constitution. Duke University Press. Campbell, K. (2005). Agency: Promiscuous and protean. Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 2(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/147914204 2000332134. Caratini, A. (2020). Puerto Rico tourism industry experiences record breaking 2019. Discover Puerto Rico. San Juan, PR. Cardoso, A., Boudreau, M., & Carvalho, J. (2013). Think individually, act collectively: Studying the dynamics of a technologically enabled civic movement. In International Conference on Information Systems. Milan. Chenou, J., & Cepeda-Másmela, C. (2019). #NiUnaMenos: Data activism from the global south. Television & New Media, 20(4), 396–411. Chon, M., & Park, H. (2020). Social media activism in the digital age: Testing an integrative model of activism on contentious issues. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 97 (1), 72–97.

7

#RICKYRENUNCIA: THE HASHTAG THAT TOOK …

181

Collazo, S., Ryan, C., & Bauman, K. (2010). Profile of the Puerto Rican population in the United States and Puerto Rico: 2008. Dallas, TX. Comisión Estatal de Elecciones. (2017). Junta Administrativa de Voto Ausente y Adelantado. https://ww2.ceepur.org/es-pr/EducacionyAdiestramiento/Pag inas/Solicitud-de-Voto.aspx#vausente. Correa Colón, D. (2020, January 18). En medio de emergencia con terremotos aparecen suministros de María sin entregar. Metro. https://www.metro.pr/ pr/noticias/2020/01/18/medio-emergencia-terremotos-aparecen-sumini stros-maria-sin-entregar.html. Croes, R., & Rivera, M. (2010). Testing the empirical link between tourism and competitiveness: Evidence from Puerto Rico. Tourism Economics, 16(1), 217–234. De Moya, M. (2018). Protesting the homeland: Diaspora dissent public relations efforts to oppose the Dominican Republic’s citizenship policies. In Protest public relations (pp. 106–127). Routledge. De Moya, M., & Bravo, V. (2016). The role of public relations in ethnic advocacy and activism: A proposed research agenda. Public Relations Inquiry, 5(3), 233–251. Delgado, J. (2020, April 18). Diaspora and independent groups call for mortgage moratorium. El Nuevo Día. https://www.elnuevodia.com/english/english/ nota/diasporaandindependentgroupscallformortgagemoratorium-2562194/. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244. Duany, J. (2002). The Puerto Rican nation on the move: Identities on the Island and in the United States. The University of North Carolina Press. Duany, J. (2009). The Puerto Rican diaspora to the United States: A postcolonial migration. Center for Puerto Rican Studies, Hunter College, City University of New York. Duygala, R. (2019, July 18). Trump slams “corrupt” Puerto Rican officials as protesters call for governor’s resignation. Politico. Retrieved from https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/18/donald-trump-puertorico-ricardo-rossello-1421367. EFE USA. (2015, December 12). Escasa formación y movilidad, entre mayores retos del turismo en Puerto Rico. EFE. https://www.efe.com/efe/usa/pue rto-rico/escasa-formacion-y-movilidad-entre-mayores-retos-del-turismo-enpuerto-rico/50000110-2788478#. Ellcessor, E. (2018). “One tweet to make so much noise”: Connected celebrity activism in the case of Marlee Matlin. New Media & Society, 20(1), 255–271. Ellison, N., Steinfield, C., & Lampe, C. (2007). The benefits of Facebook “friends”: Social capital and college students’ use of online social network sites. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 12(4), 1143–1168.

182

Y. NIEVES-PIZARRO AND J. MUNDEL

El Nuevo Día. (2019a, July 21). Marcha también la diáspora boricua de la zona de Washington D.C. El Nuevo Día. https://www.elnuevodia.com/not icias/eeuu/nota/marchatambienladiasporaboricuadelazonadewashingtondc2506975/. El Nuevo Día. (2019b, July 14). El Chat de la Vergüenza. El Nuevo Día. https://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/politica/nota/documentoespeci alelchatdelaverguenza-2505490/. El Nuevo Día. (2019c, July 17). Protestas contra Ricardo Rosselló trascienden a nivel mundial. El Nuevo Día. https://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/ politica/nota/protestascontraricardorossellotrasciendenanivelmundial-250 6206/. El Nuevo Día. (2019d, July 9). Un nuevo chat deja al descubierto las interioridades de la administración de Rosselló. El Nuevo Día. https://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/locales/nota/unnuevochatdeja aldescubiertolasinterioridadesdelaadministracionderossello-2504312/. El Nuevo Día. (2019e, July 25). Figuras del patio y a nivel internacional reaccionan a la renuncia de Ricardo Rosselló. El Nuevo Día. https://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/politica/nota/figurasdelpatioyan ivelinternacionalreaccionanalarenunciadericardorossello-2507878. Fernández, D. (2008). Pharmaceutical manufacturing: Key to economic growth. ReVista, 7 (3), 50–51. Ferguson, J., Salominaite, E., & Boersma, K. (2016). Past, present and future: how the Lithuanian diaspora in the Netherlands accumulates human capital from social capital. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42(13), 2205– 2225. Florido, A., & Romo, V. (2019, July 15). Puerto Rico governor defies calls to resign amid growing protests over text chats. NPR. https://www.npr.org/ 2019/07/15/742058101/puerto-rico-governor-defies-calls-to-resign-amidgrowing-protests-over-text-chat. Garofalo, G. (2020, March 19). COVID-19 reinforces need to boost pharmaceutical industry in Puerto Rico. The Weekly Journal. Gonzalez-Lizarraga, M., Becerra-Traver, M., & Yanez-Diaz, M. (2016). Ciberactivismo: Nueva forma de participación para estudiantes universitarios. Comunicar, 46, 47–54. Hall, S. (1989). Cultural identity and diaspora. Framework, 36, 222–237. Heine, J., & Gallagher, K. (2020, May 13). Puerto Rico is shovel-ready for the COVID-19 recovery. The Hill. Hill, E., & Tiefenthäler, A. (2019). Did Puerto Rican police go too far during protests? What the video shows. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2019/07/27/us/puerto-rico-violence-protests.html.

7

#RICKYRENUNCIA: THE HASHTAG THAT TOOK …

183

Hinojosa, J. (2018). Two sides of the coin of Puerto Rican migration: Depopulation in Puerto Rico and the redefinition of the diaspora. Centro Journal, 30(3), 230–253. Husein, J., & Kara, M. (2020). Examining the stability of the long-run relationship between tourism and economic growth for Puerto Rico. Tourism Analysis. https://doi-org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/10.3727/108354220 X15758301241927. Immerwahr, D. (2016). The greater United States: Territory and empire in US history. Diplomatic History, 40(3), 373–391. Infobae. (2018). “Ni una menos”: Lali Espósito, Jimena Barón, Flor Peña y muchas famosas, presentes en la marcha. Retrieved from https://www.infobae. com/teleshow/infoshow/2018/06/03/ni-una-menos-lali-esposito-jimenabaron-flor-pena-y-muchas-famosas-presentes-en-la-marcha/. Jayasanka, R., Madhushani, T., Marcus, E., Aberathne, I., & Premaratne, S. (2013, November). Sentiment analysis for social media. In Information Technology Research Symposium. Kelly, P., & Lusis, T. (2006). Migration and the transnational habitus: Evidence from Canada and the Philippines. Environment and Planning A, 38(5), 831– 847. Kilduff, M., & Corley, K. (1999). The diaspora effect: The influence of exiles on their cultures of origin. M@n@gement, pp. 1–12. King, L. (2019, May 7). Puerto Rico: At the center of a political storm, but can its residents vote for president? USA Today. https://www.usatoday.com/ story/news/politics/elections/2019/05/07/why-puerto-rico-residents-cantvote-even-though-they-are-us-citizens/1119543001/. Kruta, V. (2019, July 20). Ocasio-Cortez calls for embattled Puerto Rico governor to resign, won’t do the same for Maduro. Daily Caller. https:// dailycaller.com/2019/07/20/ocasio-cortez-puerto-rico-ricardo-rossello-res ign-maduro/. Mahmood, Q., Firduas, A., & Adnan, H. (2016). Social media and protest behavior. PUTAJ-Humanities and Social Sciences, 23(2), 201–214. Malavet, P. (2004). America’s colony: The political and cultural conflict between the United States and Puerto Rico. New York University Press. Martínez, M. (2019). Manifestaciones Digitales de Ricky Renuncia. Retrieved from https://mikel.media/manifestaciones-digitales/. Martinoticias.com. (2016). Las redes sociales son alternativa a la censura en Venezuela. Retrieved from https://www.radiotelevisionmarti.com/a/redessociales-censura-venezuela/124230.html. Matthews, D. (2017, October 5). What the Hurricane Maria migration will do to Puerto Rico—And the US. Vox. https://www.vox.com/policy-and-pol itics/2017/10/5/16403952/hurricane-maria-puerto-rico-migration.

184

Y. NIEVES-PIZARRO AND J. MUNDEL

McEwan, B., & Sobre-Denton, M. (2011). Virtual cosmopolitanism: Constructing third cultures and transmitting social and cultural capital through social media. Journal of International and Intercultural Communication, 4(4), 252–258. Metro. (2019a). Protestan contra Rosselló en estación Grand Central en NYC. Metro. https://www.metro.pr/pr/noticias/2019/07/22/protestancontra-rossello-en-estacion-grand-central-en-nyc.html. Metro. (2019b, July 13). Luis Rivera Marín: “No existe razón que trastoque mi conciencia ni tranquilidad.” Metro. https://www.metro.pr/pr/noticias/ 2019/07/13/luis-rivera-marin-no-existe-razon-que-trastoque-mi-concienciani-tranquilidad.html. Miller, D. (1995). On nationality. Oxford University Press. Mitter, P. (2012, February 21). Frameworks for considering cultural exchange: The case of India and America. In Proceedings and Other Publications, 20–37. Mohammad, S., & Yang, T. (2011, June). Tracking sentiment in mail: How genders differ on emotional axes. In Proceedings of the 2nd workshop on computational approaches to subjectivity and sentiment analysis (pp. 70–79). Association for Computational Linguistics. Molina, A. (2017). La fuerza comunitaria que liberó a Oscar López. Retrieved June 20, 2020, from https://boricuahumanrights.org/?p=6314. Morris, N. (1995). Puerto Rico: Culture, politics, and identity. Praeger. Motel, S., & Patten, E. (2012, June). Hispanics of Puerto Rican origin in the United States, 2010. Pew Research Center Hispanic Trends Project (pp. 1–6). Munger, K., Bonneau, R., Nagler, J., & Tucker, J. (2019). Elites tweet to get feet off the streets: Measuring regime social media strategies during protest. Political Science Research and Methods, 7 (4), 815–834. Musso, J., & Weare, C. (2017). Social capital and community representation: How multiform networks promote local democracy in Los Angeles. Urban Studies, 54(11), 2521–2539. Navarro, M. (2017, November 3). Puerto Rico on her mind: How to help a stricken Island called home. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/2017/11/03/travel/puerto-rico-virgin-islands-hurricane-maria-irmavolunteer-tourism.html. News is my business. (2020, April 20). Open society foundations invest $500K in Puerto Rico’s COVID-19 response. News Is My Business. https://newsis mybusiness.com/open-society-foundations-invest-500k-in-puerto-ricos-covid19-response/. Nieves-Pizarro, Y. (2016). Free Óscar López Rivera! News coverage of United States domestic human rights issues. Journal of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies, 28(2), 152–173.

7

#RICKYRENUNCIA: THE HASHTAG THAT TOOK …

185

Nugent, C. (2019, April). Venezuelans are starving for information: The battle to get news in a country in chaos. Time. https://time.com/5571504/venezu ela-internet-press-freedom/. Pardo, D. (2015). La verdadera dimensión de la escasez en Venezuela. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/05/150512_venezuela_esc asez_reportaje_dp. Pérez, J. (2018, July 26). La diáspora cambia el enfoque de su apoyo a Puerto Rico. El Nuevo Día. https://www.elnuevodia.com/corresponsalias/florida/ notas/la-diaspora-cambia-el-enfoque-de-su-apoyo-a-puerto-rico/. Pew Research Center. (2018). Activism in the social media age. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/07/11/act ivism-in-the-social-media-age/. Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital. In Culture and politics (pp. 223–234). Palgrave Macmillan. Putra, N., Wulandari, D., & Narmaditya, B. (2019). Social capital and community business development. In KnE social sciences (pp. 958–966). Rayer, S. (2018). Estimating the migration of Puerto Ricans to Florida using flight passenger data. Gainesville, FL. https://www.bebr.ufl.edu/. Red de Fundaciones de Puerto Rico. (2018). Philanthropy and Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria: How a natural disaster put Puerto Rico on the philanthropic map and the implications for the future. San Juan, PR. Reis, M. (2004). Theorizing diaspora: Perspectives on “classical” and “contemporary” diaspora. International Migration, 42(2), 41–60. Reynolds, T. (2004). Caribbean families, social capital and young people’s diasporic identities. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29(6), 1087–1103. Rivera Clemente, Y. (2018a, September 8). Celebra la diáspora su papel en recuperación. El Vocero. https://www.elvocero.com/actualidad/celebra-ladi-spora-su-papel-en-recuperaci-n/article_71f72f60-9b86-11e8-8087-1785e7 e9b935.html. Rivera Clemente, Y. (2018b, September 18). Diáspora pide explicaciones al gobierno. El Vocero. https://www.elvocero.com/actualidad/di-spora-pideexplicaciones-al-gobierno/article_ae459b04-baea-11e8-a4ae-7b62c346dc0e. html. Rivera Clemente, Y. (2020, February 17). Impulsarán en el Congreso fondos de recuperación. El Vocero. https://www.elvocero.com/gobierno/politica/imp ulsar-n-en-el-congreso-fondos-de-recuperaci-n/article_2e5a280c-5129-11ea9c06-ef64107ee9fc.html. Román, N. (2018). Puerto Ricans in the United States: 2010–2016. Center for Puerto Rican Studies. New York, NY. https://centropr.hunter.cuny.edu/res earch/data-center/data-sheets/puerto-ricans-united-states-2010-2016. Ruiz-Ramos, G. (2020). A battered island holds its head high. Forecast. https:// forecastpublicart.org/a-battered-island/.

186

Y. NIEVES-PIZARRO AND J. MUNDEL

Schoen, J. (2017, September 26). Here’s how an obscure tax change sank Puerto Rico’s economy. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/26/hereshow-an-obscure-tax-change-sank-puerto-ricos-economy.html. Sepúlveda, A. (2019a, July 21). De millennial a millennial: Una nueva generación lidera la repulsa a Rosselló. Noticel. https://www.noticel.com/pop-/de-mil lennial-a-millennial-una-nueva-generacion-lidera-la-repulsa-a-rossello/109729 8829. Sepúlveda, B. (2019b, July 16). Solidarios en Europa con manifestaciones en la isla. El Vocero. https://www.elvocero.com/actualidad/solidarios-en-europacon-manifestaciones-en-la-isla/article_ab5c0c18-a804-11e9-a971-9b61bc25b 031.html. Sevin, E. (2017). Public diplomacy and the implementation of foreign policy in the US, Sweden and Turkey. Palgrave Macmillan. Sobre-Denton, M. (2016). Virtual intercultural bridgework: Social media, virtual cosmopolitanism, and activist community-building. New Media and Society, 18(8), 1715–1731. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444814567988. Spinks, R. (2018, March 21). Instead of asking tourists to ignore the hurricane, Puerto Rico invited them to rebuild. Quartz.com. https://qz.com/quartzy/ 1233253/hurricane-maria-recovery-tourists-are-helping-rebuild-puerto-rico/. Stanchich, M. (2013, May 14). Ten years after ousting US navy, Vieques confronts contamination. Huffpost. Sutter, J. D., & Hernández, S. (2018, February 21). “Exodus” from Puerto Rico: A visual guide. CNN . https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/21/us/pue rto-rico-migration-data-invs/index.html. Tam, L., & Kim, J. (2019). Who are publics in public diplomacy? Proposing a taxonomy of foreign publics as an intersection between symbolic environment and behavioral experiences. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 15(1), 28– 37. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-018-0104-z. TeleSur. (2017, September 21). Social media comes to Puerto Rico’s aid in the wake of Hurricane María. TeleSur. https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/ Social-Media-Comes-to-Puerto-Ricos-Aid-In-Wake-of-Hurricane-Maria--201 70921-0026.html. Thornburgh, D. (2007). Puerto Rico’s future: A time to decide. The CSIS Press. Toro, A. T. (2019, July 24). Puerto Rico ya no es el mismo país. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/es/2019/07/24/puerto-rico-renuncia-rossello/. Torres Gotay, B. (2019). El levantamiento del pueblo que sacó a Ricardo Rosselló. El Nuevo Día. https://resumen.elnuevodia.com/2019/Ellevanta mientodelpuebloquesacóaRicardoRossellódelpoder/. Torruella, J. (1988). The supreme court and Puerto Rico: The doctrine of separate and unequal. Editorial Universidad de Puerto Rico. United States Census Bureau. (2021). Puerto Rico. https://www.census.gov/qui ckfacts/PR.

7

#RICKYRENUNCIA: THE HASHTAG THAT TOOK …

187

Univision. (2016). Estas son las ilustraciones con las que los argentinos están diciendo #NiUnaMenos. Univision. https://www.univision.com/noticias/vio lencia-de-genero/estas-son-las-ilustraciones-con-las-que-los-argentinos-estandiciendo-niunamenos. Vaast, E., Safadi, H., Lapointe, L., & Negoita, B. (2017). Social media affordances for connective action: An examination of microblogging use during the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. MIS Quarterly, 41(4), 1179–1206. Valentin Ortiz, L., & Minet, C. (2019). Las 889 páginas de Telegram entre Rosselló Nevares y sus allegados. Retrieved July 24, 2019, from https://periodismoinvestigativo.com/2019/07/las-889-paginas-de-tel egram-entre-rossello-nevares-y-sus-allegados/. Veccio, C. (2019). Venezuelans will not rest until Maduro is gone and democracy is restored. Miami Herald. https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/oped/article238598818.html#storylink=cpy. Vélez Santiago, P. (2019). La generación del “yo no me dejo”: Los jóvenes en el corazón de las protestas que provocaron la renuncia de Rosselló. Univision. https://www.univision.com/noticias/estados-unidos/la-generacion-del-yono-me-dejo-los-jovenes-en-el-corazon-de-las-protestas-que-provocaron-la-ren uncia-de-rossello. Vertical News. (2016, May 12). Puerto Rico tourism company reports Puerto Rico is dedicated to containing Zika, welcomes tourists to Puerto Rico. Politics and Government Business, p. 54. Wang, V. (2018, June 27). Who is Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez? A democratic giant slayer. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/ nyregion/alexandria-ocasio-cortez.html. Whalen, C., & Vázquez-Hernández, V. (2008). The Puerto Rican diaspora: Historical perspectives. Temple University Press. Whiteman-Sandland, J., Hawkins, J., & Clayton, D. (2018). The role of social capital and community belongingness for exercise adherence: An exploratory study of the CrossFit gym model. Journal of Health Psychology, 23(12), 1545– 1556. Yang, G. (2016). Narrative agency in hashtag activism: The case of #blacklivesmatter. Media and Communication, 4(4), 13–17. https://doi.org/10. 17645/mac.v4i4.692. Zaharna, R., & Uysal, N. (2016). Going for the jugular in public diplomacy: How adversarial publics using social media are challenging state legitimacy. Public Relations Review, 42(1), 109–119.

CHAPTER 8

Civil Society as an Advocate of Mexicans and Latinos in the United States: The Chicago Case Tania Gómez Zapata

In public diplomacy (PD), not only nation-states play a transcendental role in engaging foreign audiences (Fitzpatrick, 2017; Rana, 2013; Zaharna & Uysal, 2016), but diaspora communities can also perform a similar role: They are becoming critical actors by promoting their home countries and their own interests in the host countries where they live (Fitzpatrick, 2012; Quinsaat, 2016; Sheffer, 2003; Tsagarousianou, 2004). Diaspora diplomacy, as some authors have called it, or public diplomacy that involves diaspora communities (either as leaders of public diplomacy initiatives, as partners of state-led efforts, or as opposing parties to some home countries decisions), has captured the attention of diplomats and academics in recent years (Bravo, 2014; Brinkerhoff, 2019; De

T. Gómez Zapata (B) Universidad de las Américas Puebla (UDLAP), Puebla, México e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Bravo and M. De Moya (eds.), Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74564-6_8

189

190

T. GÓMEZ ZAPATA

Moya, 2018; DiploFoundation, 2019; Gilboa, 2008; Gonzalez, 2011; Ho & McConnell, 2017). The scope and limits of the term are still contested in the literature. However, a relevant aspect to consider is the role of civil society in promoting a home country in a host country, which some authors have described as citizen diplomacy (The Center for Citizen Diplomacy, 2019). Notwithstanding the term used, the acknowledgment of the contributions made by diasporas in interacting with their governments, with foreign audiences, and in foreign policy matters has increased in recent times (Diplomatisches Ho & McConnell, 2017; Magazin, 2018; Oxford Department of International Development, 2019). Latin American diasporas’ participation in domestic and foreign policy in the United States has been documented as well (Academy for Cultural Diplomacy, 2019; Kemper & Fisher, 2006; Tienda & Sánchez, 2013). A diaspora is a “group that recognizes its separateness based on common ethnicity/nationality, lives in a host country, and maintains some kind of attachment to the home country” (Lahneman, 2005, p. 7). In the United States, the Latin American diaspora is comprised of millions of people, from many countries, who are members of different diaspora groups. At the same time, they see themselves, sometimes, as a collective group and have worked together in shared initiatives and programs, pursuing common interests (Academy for Cultural Diplomacy, 2019; Laglagaron, 2010). The largest Latin American diaspora in the United States is the Mexican diaspora. In fact, 62% of Latinos in the United States are Mexicans or Mexican Americans (Maloney, 2019). The Mexican diaspora is, as well, one of the most active Latin American diasporas when it comes to advocate for themselves, both in Mexico and the United States (Bravo, 2014; Bravo & De Moya, 2018). In recent times, during Donald Trump’s presidential campaign (2015– 2016), the Latino community suffered one of the most harmful and concerted attacks, damaging its reputation in the United States (De la Torre, 2018; Rodier, 2015). As a result, Latino-serving organizations responded publicly to counter Trump’s offensive claims and to try to shift the narrative. In this chapter, four testimonies from key Mexican and Latino civil society leaders in Chicago, provided prior to Trump becoming president in January 2017, are presented to illustrate how the Latino diaspora responded to his attacks, which supports the argument that diasporas can

8

CIVIL SOCIETY AS AN ADVOCATE OF MEXICANS AND LATINOS …

191

play a key role during international crises, independently from nationstates, but advancing the home nation-states’ public diplomacy goals nonetheless, including defending the human rights of the home country’s citizens abroad. The Latino community in Chicago is regarded as one of the most dynamic in the United States, acting as a protector of its immigration rights and contributing to political matters that are relevant to them (Latino Policy Forum, 2020). It has also advocated for the Latino community’s interests, in general (Pallares & Flores-González, 2010).

The Latino Diaspora, the Latino Nation and Public Diplomacy The understanding of the Latino community in the United States is limited. Latinos are often not seen as a diverse group of people with many particularities and specificities, depending on country of origin or ancestry, socioeconomic status, level of education, political affiliation, and many other factors. On the contrary, many Americans equate being Latino to being Mexican (Lee et al., 2017). As the Latino diaspora numbers increased in the United States in the last decades, its political relevance and strength augmented, too (Flores, 2017). As Bustamente et al. (2020, p. 1) indicated, “Latinos are expected for the first time to be the nation’s largest racial or ethnic minority in a U.S. presidential election, with a record 32 million projected to be eligible to vote. They... account for 13.3% of all eligible voters. However, the number of Latino eligible voters is still far below the 60 million Latinos who live in the country.” Some nongovernmental organizations have lobbied for the Latino community in the United States on policy matters that favor them. It can be argued that these civil society organizations act as diplomatic instruments of the “Latino Nation” (the imagined community), and of specific countries of origin, to pursue policies locally. As groups established in a foreign nation, and as foreigners to the host country, they develop strategies and tactics to engage with home and host governments and, in that regard, they become actors that perform public diplomacy functions (Cull, 2019). These functions, or components of foreign public engagement, as Cull called them, include listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and news/international broadcasting (Cull, 2019).

192

T. GÓMEZ ZAPATA

In this context, Chicago was an ideal site to investigate how diaspora groups advocate to advance their interests and mobilize for political gains because Chicago has a diverse community with a large Latino diaspora. By 2017, the Latino community had become the largest minority there (Serrato, 2017), with 803,000 Latinos (officially, according to the U.S. Census, including both foreign-born and U.S.-born Latinos, although the total number is probably higher) in a city of 2.7 million people. Of them, 75% are Mexicans or Mexican Americans (Serrato, 2017).

Gaining the Advocates’ Perspectives Semi-structured interviews were conducted, in person, to obtain the advocates’ perspectives for this research. The interviews took place in Chicago from May 18 to May 23 of 2016. The only phone interview was with Joaquín Boker, president of the U.S.–Mexican Business Association’s Chicago Chapter (AEM), on June 6, 2016. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed. The interviewees answered questions about how the Latino community organizations in the city were countering the negative discourse being disseminated by Trump, given that, at the time, Latinos had seen an increase in discrimination levels on the streets after (then-Republican candidate) Trump gave the infamous speech where he called Mexican immigrants“rapists” and other derogatory terms (Sanchez & GomezAguinaga, 2017). The participants were also asked about their efforts to support the Latino community with their organized actions. The four key participants (Mexican and Latino civil society leaders) were Oscar Chacón, executive director of non-profit Alianza Americas; Javier Laguna, director of the Chicago Campus of the Autonomous National University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México—UNAM, by its acronym in Spanish); Elvia Yolanda Torres, a social activist well known among the Mexican community in Chicago; and Joaquín Boker, mentioned previously. Their testimonies illustrate the involvement of actors from four areas of civil society in Chicago: immigration rights, the education sector, grassroots social activism, and the business community. The following sections present the perspectives of these key informants.

8

CIVIL SOCIETY AS AN ADVOCATE OF MEXICANS AND LATINOS …

193

The Perspectives Immigration Rights Perspective: Oscar Chacón, Executive Director of Alianza Americas Founded in 2004 as the National Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean Communities (NALACC), this organization changed its name in 2015 to Alianza Americas. It defends the rights of Latin American immigrants in the United States (including Mexicans, Central Americans, Caribbeans, and South Americans, in numerical order). NALACC is a network of almost 60 organizations, each of which comprises other small organizations (Alianza Americas, 2020a). For example, one of its members, the Federation of Clubs of Michoacanos of Illinois, includes about 28 clubs. Although the members pay a symbolic membership fee, Alianza Americas subsists thanks to international donations. Oscar Chacón, executive director of Alianza Americas and the most visible public voice of the organization, explained that Latin Americans had become a large collective in the United States by the end of the 1990s; for example, based on the 2000 U.S. Census, they represented 52% of the foreign-born population residing in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000a, 2000b). Despite these strong numbers, the community did not have an organization to advocate for their immigration rights. There were numerous organizations that promoted the social, economic and political agendas of U.S.-born Latinos (Americans with a Latin American background), but there was a need to create a voice for the Latin American immigrant population in the United States. This community of immigrantsis closely linked to the realities of their own countries through the money they send home to their families (remittances), their general interest in the homeland’s news and other activities (Bravo, 2014). They are interested in events happening in their own towns, municipalities, and countries, and, therefore, they tend to have a permanent communication channel with their families at home, which differs somewhat from Latinos born in the United States (second and third generations). Latin American immigrants exhibit a transnational configuration (Benítez, 2006). Unfortunately, Chacón said, Latinos are perceived in the United States as belonging to a homogenous group, which is a misguided judgment. Latinos born in Latin America and U.S.-born Latinos have different problems and their levels of organization are different. They also face distinct issues according to their countries of origin or ancestry and depending

194

T. GÓMEZ ZAPATA

on what socioeconomic and political context they have in the United States. Thus NALACC, now Alianza Americas, was founded in response to these challenges under the premise of protecting Latin American-born immigrants. As indicated before, many white Americans equate being Latino to being Mexican. Chacón explained that the reason for this misconception is that the largest group of foreigners living in the United States came from Mexico (30%), and the largest number of Mexicans living outside their own country reside in the United States (about 12 million). Therefore, Mexican culture has a strong influence on the stereotypical conception of the Latino in the United States. In this respect, when asked about Trump’s rhetoric against Mexicans, Chacón explained: When you sum up all the rest of the Latin American nationalities, mainly Spanish speakers, clearly you have a universe of people headed by the Mexican culture due to the number of Mexicans in the United States. The anti-immigrant narrative, which has been constructed since the 1980s, tends to present all Latin Americans as Mexicans. When Mexicans are publicly attacked here, they are not only attacking Mexicans, they are attacking the whole social group of Latinos who have an ethnic, cultural and linguistic affinity. In our organization, we combat the idea of some Latin Americans who believe that ‘if they are attacking Mexicans, that has nothing to do with the rest of Latinos from other nationalities.’ That is a naïve posture. In reality, the attacks are aimed at any person linked to the Mexican ethnicity, and that, in the United States, means the Latino, in general.

Since 2004, there has been a large number of organizations led by Latin American immigrants whose priority has been to respond to the processes of political, economic, social, and cultural integration in some localities (Directory of Latino American Organizations, 2020). Chacón believes, however, that none of those organizations had developed processes to gain influence in policy decision-making that impacts the lives of Latin American immigrants, in general, in the United States.1

1 While that is Chacón’s perspective, the editors of this book acknowledge that there are organizations that integrate Latino people from several countries (foreign-born and U.S.-born) and that try to gain influence in policy-decision-making in the United States at a national level, such as UnidosUS, United We Dream, or LULAC (League of United Latin American Citizens), just to mention three cases.

8

CIVIL SOCIETY AS AN ADVOCATE OF MEXICANS AND LATINOS …

195

Alianza Americas focuses on political incidence; its perspective is not only transnational and not only interested in domestic incidents in the United States but also in the foreign policy of the United States toward Latin America and the national policies of the Latin American nations where its members come from. Alianza Americas has found that a large number of Latin Americans leave their countries to emigrate to the United States, firstly, as a consequence of the incapacity of their home societies to offer economic, political, cultural, and social conditions for development; and secondly, due to internal political instability, violence and insecurity, such as it has occurred in Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Colombia, where, in recent decades, a large proportion of the population has been mobilized. Furthermore, there is another type of immigrant: young professionals who seek to insert themselves in the progress of more developed nations and to take advantage of globalization processes. Since the 1980s, some U.S. groups have articulated a racist and xenophobic political agenda against Mexican immigrants (and, therefore, against Latinos in general). These groups believe that Latinos have become a threat to the country, to an alleged “American identity” and to the U.S. economic wellness. These marginal groups of the 1980s have gained more political power in recent times and have become a strong anti-immigrant ideological force, even in moderate political groups of both Republicans and Democrats, especially because of the increase of the Latino population in the United States. This can be seen in cities such as Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston, Miami, and New York, where Democrats have a strong influence but where this anti-immigrant discourse is also present (ADL, 2018). Chacón remarked: “For me, this is a reflection of how this agenda has expanded.” The work of Alianza Americas has been crucial in this context, given that it is an agency that consists of a network of organizations. Since 2009, it has led an awareness campaign called “We Are” (“Somos,” in Spanish) whose goal is to “tackle the roots of oppression against communities of color, immigrants, Muslims, women, and the LGTBQ community” (Alianza Americas, 2020b, p. 1). Chacón explained that “the only way to deactivate the prejudice of this anti-immigration rhetoric is through a significant social interaction.” Thus, it is vital to develop strategies to encourage a horizontal exchange between Americans and Latin American immigrants. The latter has been one of the most dynamic factors of demographic change in the country, as they tend to have larger families than

196

T. GÓMEZ ZAPATA

their White and Black counterparts. Thanks to this, the United States has a lower rate of aging than other developed countries in Europe or than Canada. “We have injected youth into the USA,” Chacón said. However, there is a political agenda that tends to place blame on Latinos for the problems of U.S. society (García & Sanchez, 2008). Some Americans believe that they are losing their jobs to Latinos and that their economic situation has deteriorated while Latinos have had their wellness enhanced (Chavez, 2013). Chacón said, “An agenda of ‘us against them’ has been created.” Thus, Alianza Americas exerts political influence to counter that agenda. Even though some Latin American immigrants have gained political positions, such as Marty Castro, who was part of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights during Barack Obama’s administration, it has not been enough. Chacón explained: As Latin Americans, we need to understand that given our numerical presence and demographic characteristics, we have an enormous possibility to transform society, but we need to articulate these efforts in order to produce changes. Currently, there are about 55 million Latinos in the United States; academic, corporate and political spheres need to hand over certain spaces to Latinos, as we are almost reaching 20% of U.S. society, but we have not been able to articulate organizational processes that maximize the spaces we have been winning. There is low or no Latin-American presence in most of these sectors.

To protect the rights of immigrants, Alianza Americas has created several campaigns such as “Keep Our Families Together” (opposing deportations), “Somos/We Are” (calling out racism and negative stereotypes about immigrants and immigration), “Power of the Pen” (urging Obama’s administration to halt deportations in 2014), and “Protect Children Across Borders” (supporting families fleeing violence), among others.2 In what it believes was a huge victory, Alianza Americas stood up for the Latin American community in a period of strong anti-Latin American and anti-Mexican attacks in 2016. Besides promoting public policies on migration, Alianza Americas has encouraged new narratives on Latin American migration through the development of the

2 More information about these campaigns can be found at https://www.alianzaameri cas.org.

8

CIVIL SOCIETY AS AN ADVOCATE OF MEXICANS AND LATINOS …

197

campaigns mentioned before. In addition, it advocated for the protection of Dreamers, the young immigrants without legal status in the United States who benefited from the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy,3 and for the protection of undocumented parents of U.S.-born citizens and permanent residents, through its support of the Deferred Action of Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) policy.4 As Chacón recounts, Alianza Americas also boosted the external voting participation of Mexican, Salvadoran, and Honduran immigrants in presidential elections in their own countries. In addition, it organized leadership workshops for immigrants working in the construction sector to strengthen their organizational capacity. Moreover, the organization acts as a voice of the community in academia and media forums. Chacón favors presenting Latin Americans not only as an immigration force, but also as a multisectoral presence in U.S. society. Proper political communication that projects this reality of the Latino presence is needed. “We need to be clear on what we want, how we will arrive there, and how we will measure success regarding our insertion and acceptance in U.S. society.” From young leaders, he wants more offline action. “There is a need for a superior level of organization. Some young leaders exist as Twitter leaders, but they are not acting outside the Internet sphere.” Alianza Americas is a Latino-community advocate. Advocacy, one of the key instruments of public diplomacy, is “an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by undertaking an international communication activity to promote a particular policy, idea, or that actor’s general interests in the minds of a foreign public” (Cull, 2019, p. 39). As such, Alianza Americas is functioning as a public diplomat.

3 “Then-U.S. President Barack Obama launched DACA in June 2012 to provide reprieve from deportation to young people who came to the United States as children. Though DACA does not provide official legal status or a pathway to citizenship to these individuals, it does allow them to be ‘lawfully present’ without the threat of deportation and apply for driver’s licenses and work permits.” Source: Americas Society. Council of the Americas (https://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-what-daca), para. #4. 4 “DAPA was introduced by the Obama administration in November 2014. It grants deferred action status to some undocumented immigrants who have lived in the U.S. since 2010 and have children who are either American citizens or lawful permanent residents of the United States.” Source: VOA (https://www.voanews.com/usa/what-are-dapa-anddaca), paras. #2–3.

198

T. GÓMEZ ZAPATA

Education Sector Perspective: Javier Laguna, Director of the Chicago Campus of the Autonomous National University of Mexico (UNAM) Even though the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) receives its budget from the public treasury, it is autonomous and independent from the Mexican government (Zepeda Gil, 2016). In the 1920s, UNAM initiated an international program with a summer school in its campus in Mexico City, teaching foreigners Spanish, Mexican History, and Mexican Culture. These can be described as UNAM’s first activities of public diplomacy (PD), although these efforts were not recognized as PD at the time. Due to the success of this initiative, in 1944, UNAM opened its first international campus in San Antonio, Texas, in an official effort to internationalize its presence (UNAM, 2020). In the 1990s and the 2000s, this process was strengthened by opening several socalled “extension schools.” For example, the Extension School of Quebec, Canada, was created in 1995 and the Extension School of Los Angeles, in 2005 (Gaceta UNAM, 2019). In 2004, its Chicago campus opened. Since 2010, new campus modalities, known as Centers of Mexican Studies, have been added to prestigious universities. Today, UNAM has 14 international centers in nine countries in four continents: in the United States (in San Antonio, Chicago, Los Angeles, Seattle, Tucson, and Boston); Germany (in Berlin), China (in Beijing), Costa Rica (in San Jose), Spain (in Madrid), France (in Paris), the United Kingdom (in London), South Africa (in Johannesburg), and Canada (in Quebec) (UNAM Global, 2018). UNAM‘s three pillars are teaching, research, and cultural dissemination, and this has enabled its internationalization policies and efforts, including the promotion of student exchanges. Javier Laguna, director of UNAM’s Chicago campus, highlighted that the mission of the centers is to bring the university closer to all those interested in Mexico’s history, language, traditions, culture, and economic development through courses, seminaries, and diplomas. It follows the vision of José Vasconcelos, rector of UNAM in the 1920s, who believed in Latin American integration. Each UNAM campus has its own challenges and independent organization. For example, as Laguna explained, not all campuses have been able to become financially self-sufficient, and not all of them have the same vocation. However, they all promote the academic cooperation between Mexico and the countries where UNAM centers are established. In the

8

CIVIL SOCIETY AS AN ADVOCATE OF MEXICANS AND LATINOS …

199

case of the Chicago campus, it has promoted collaborative agreements, especially between Chicago and Mexico City, and has created exchanges between academics and students from both countries. “Our role, in a sense, is being like ambassadors of UNAM and Mexico here in Chicago,” Laguna said. By 2016, UNAM Chicago had about 12 collaborative agreements with universities in Illinois, which included academic and student exchanges, information collaboration, and joint projects and seminars, among other initiatives. Education exchanges like these or like the U.S. Fulbright Program (Bureau of Educational & Cultural Affairs, 2020) have been described in the literature as instruments of public diplomacy (Waithaka & Maluki, 2016). UNAM Chicago is a public diplomat through its education partnerships, which also promote the image of Mexico abroad. Laguna explained that one of the most popular activities at the Chicago center is its Spanish language program, which attracts a large number of students. In addition, specialized Spanish courses are offered to hospital staff members (doctors, nurses, laboratory technicians, etc.) interested in improving their technical vocabulary when communicating with Spanishspeaking patients. These specialized students also learn about the Mexican culture to make them more sensitive to cultural differences. For example, a Mexican (or Latin American teenage girl, for that matter) may not be allowed to attend a gynecological session without her mother present due to traditional values, and this can affect her sex education, what she shares or not with her doctor, and her access to contraception methods. This might be different for teenagers in the United States, and it is worth understanding the difference. Other specialized Spanish courses target psychologists and social workers. Some of these courses are UNAM-provided but taught at the University of Chicago. They are important sources of income for UNAM Chicago, allowing the campus to be financially self-sufficient in some respects. Additionally, teachers at Chicago’s public schools also receive Spanish classes. One of the problems faced by children of Latin American immigrant parents is the high level of desertion, which produces other social problems. The Spanish courses make teachers more aware of the particularities of this population. These courses are connected to the public diplomacy tool known as exchange diplomacy (Cull, 2019), which focuses on education, especially of foreigners. The objective is to promote the values of a country in other territories. Certainly, UNAM Chicago connects with teachers of U.S.

200

T. GÓMEZ ZAPATA

public schools to help them understand the Latino/Mexican community, its characteristics, and values. Additionally, this campus practices the cultural diplomacydimension of public diplomacy (Cull, 2019) when it holds cultural events to attract Latinos, other Americans and also citizens from other countries to showcase Mexico, its culture, and other relevant topics related to both the Mexican and the Latino community. Other in-person courses target the general population of Chicago with topics related to culture, history, tourism, and languages of Mexico. There are classes focused on specific regions—such as Oaxaca, Yucatán, or Chihuahua—and on specific cultural manifestations, such as salsa, danzón, and Afro-American rhythms. There are online education programs as well (UNAM Chicago, 2020). During the summer, in particular, a large number of Mexican students visit the Chicago campus to take English classes, while Mexican medicine, psychology, and law students are offered specialized courses. For example, Mexican doctors take an English medical course; 80% of this course involves visiting medical schools to attend clinical sessions in hospitals. They are also encouraged to attend conferences and other courses. Besides improving their level of English on short-term courses, they also return to Mexico with more knowledge and a renewed vision of their profession. An added benefit is that they interact with American students and professionals, which is also part of exchange diplomacy. UNAM Chicago, in cooperation with a local community college, has also become an education center for the city’s general population, but especially for Mexican immigrants with limited education, Laguna said. They receive instruction in computing and micro-enterprises, and they participate in work training in several sectors, such as construction, gardening, restaurants, and hospitality, where they learn new skills and take English or Spanish classes. These studies are certified by a diploma issued by both UNAM and the community college. Laguna said that half of the tuition fee is covered by the Institute of Mexicans Abroad and by the Secretariat of International Relations of the Mexican government. One-quarter of the cost is sponsored by UNAM Chicago, and the remainder is paid by the student. Laguna recognized, nonetheless, that it has been difficult to attract Mexican immigrants to this type of courses, even though they have been specially designed for them: One of the challenging aspects for first-generation Mexicans is our high level of organizational inefficiency. It is a reflection of the fragmentation

8

CIVIL SOCIETY AS AN ADVOCATE OF MEXICANS AND LATINOS …

201

among different groups that exists in Mexico. For example, Oaxaca has 520 municipalities, and each municipality represents one ethnicity or family. This atomization is transferred to the United States exactly, which does not help us have an effective organization among the Mexican population… Certainly, immigrants of the second and third generations have different characteristics. They could become political actors and agents of change to improve the image of Latinos here.

One of the useful strategies to attract more Mexican immigrants has been UNAM Chicago’s agreement with the Chamber of Commerce of La Villita, a predominantly Mexican neighborhood in Chicago and a popular Latino shopping zone. This has enabled UNAM Chicago to get closer to the Mexican population by promoting activities and training at La Villita’s library. Another tactic has been to become the official venue of the Mexican Talents Network‘s activities. This network, promoted by the Mexican government worldwide, recruits successful Mexican professionals to participate in a variety of projects, such as linking Mexican students with U.S. companies, for example. UNAM Chicago, in summary, has embraced its functions of public diplomat through its cultural diplomacyand exchange diplomacy initiatives. Likewise, UNAM Chicago helps in the construction of a stronger, more positive image of Mexicans and Latinos in Illinois and the rest of the United States. Grassroots Social Activism Perspective: Elvia Yolanda Torres, Social Activist Chicago has been home to relevant Latino movements, especially in the 1960s (Betancur & Garcia, 2011; Hope et al., 2016; Pallares & FloresGonzález, 2010), and this continues today. When walking through the city of Chicago, it is possible to stumble across events involving Mexican civil society. For example, the event “Migrant Women, Silent Leaders. Great Women” took place on May 18, 2016, at 6 p.m., at the Guadalupe Reyes Children & Family Center, located at 1951 W. 19th St. Esther Burgos Jiménez, director of the State House of Mexico; Aida Y. Salerno, representative of the Government of the State of Durango in Illinois; Alejandra Segura, coordinator in Chicago of the Initiative of Mexico City; Vicenta “Tita” Santana, from the radio station WCGO

202

T. GÓMEZ ZAPATA

1590AM; and Francisco Márquez, community representative of the Mexican Consulate of Chicago, gathered together to discuss several issues of interest to the Mexican immigrant population. The event was organized by Elvia Yolanda Torres Cosío, an independent social activist working on behalf of the Mexican community through her autonomous organization called “Reintégrate” (Reintegrate). Torres, president of this civil society organization (which does not receive public funds, and in which Torres works during her spare time), explained why she does what she does during an interview in a Chicago cafeteria. She began by relating her personal story: I am a widow, and if I knew the risks of emigrating, I would not have come here… I came with two of my three children at the end of the 1990s because I wanted to provide them with a better education. I wanted them to be bilingual. I am from the state of Jalisco, where I worked for the government as the director of the department of social work at the jails in the municipalities of the state. We had a great lifestyle. My husband had a great job. We had some businesses, but suddenly everything changed. We had an accident and my husband died… So I decided to come to the United States, and I started working in a factory, packing and selling bread. I also began to sell burritos prepared by me, and I started making more money from selling my burritos than from my salary at the factory. At the beginning, I had two or three jobs in order to provide for my children.

Today, Torres’ oldest child is an architect, the middle child has two bachelor’s degrees and works as one of the senior managers at United Airlines, and the youngest has a master’s degree in global marketing. This is a transnational family: Torres’ two daughters live in Mexico and her son works in Houston. She lives by herself in Chicago. Torres has two bachelor’s degrees from universities in Jalisco, and she has been awarded scholarships from several educational institutes in Chicago, where she has studied political leadership and business administration, among other subjects. After working in a factory, she began climbing the career ladder until she became an assistant to an attorney. Torres began her social activism in Chicago in the year 2000, after her son was accused of “a crime he did not commit.” She contacted the media and senators in Congress, and she also requested help from the Mexican Consulate in Chicago. However, her actions had no effect until she contacted a radio station. It was then when the case started to attract visibility, and people began to attend the court hearings. Initially,

8

CIVIL SOCIETY AS AN ADVOCATE OF MEXICANS AND LATINOS …

203

70 people attended, and then 140. The family suffered many acts of racism through the process, and they found signs next to their house with phrases such as “Go home, wetback,” and “Shit Mexicans.” They had to leave their mostly white neighborhood. At that time, Torres and her son did not have the appropriate visas to stay in the United States. After a month and a half of being held in detention, her son was set free, but they were going to be deported until Dick Durbin, a Democrat senator, provided assistance with their migration process, which eventually gave Torres and her children permanent lawful residence (commonly referred to as “green cards”). After this experience, Torres promised to help anyone who needed her help, even without payment, and so her activist career began. Since then, she has offered hundreds of workshops to the immigrant communityon a wide array of topics. Between 2012 and 2014, Torres presided the Commission of Political Affairs of the Advisory Council of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad, although this body disappeared during the administration of Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto. This commission was formed with Mexicans residing in the most important cities in the United States, and its purpose was to visit the chambers of deputies and senators in Mexico to defend the interests of Mexicans abroad. Torres won the presidency of the political affairs commission for Chicago. She said: Chicago is the best politically organized city for social activism. It achieved the acceptance of dual nationality for Mexicans, the driving license for undocumented residents … Illinois is the first state to give ID cards to undocumented children, and, from here, the electoral vote was promoted for Mexicans living abroad. We are very organized here.

With Verónica Toscano, who resides in the state of Georgia, Torres has promoted the external voting rights that Mexicans abroad have. Offering their citizens abroad external voting rights is something that many homeland governments in Latin America do, as part of their diaspora engagement policies (see Bravo, 2014; Bravo & De Moya, 2018). Torres started promoting this benefit in 2016 through the Migrant Women Project. Even though she was not endorsed by the Mexican Consulate in Chicago (so hers was an independent initiative), she obtained support from other Mexican organizations. She also helps organize Mexican Independence Day celebrations in Chicago.

204

T. GÓMEZ ZAPATA

People like Torres and other activist diaspora members have been described as “instruments of other’s diplomatic agendas” (Brinkerhoff, 2019). While the Migrant Women Project is diaspora-led, the Mexican Independence Day celebration is a state–diaspora joint effort, not just in Chicago but throughout the United States (Tatum, 2014). This collaborative public diplomacy event promotes and celebrates Mexican values overseas. Cultural celebrations like this one are an important way in which foreign states and local organizations engage in public diplomacy (De Moya, 2011). Torres has also advocated for the need to prepare documented and undocumented immigrants to be able to deal with situations such as having family members in U.S. jails or facing the death of relatives in the homeland. She does this on her own, independent from her consulate, and free of charge. She noted that there are other social activists in Chicago who help the community in times of misfortune, such as Artemio Arreola, Carlos Arango, Luis Pelayo, María de Amezcua, Marcia Soto, and many others. And she highlighted an important political triumph obtained in the homeland by the diaspora community: In 2016, two social activists from Chicago became the representatives of the Mexican diaspora in their home states—Fabián Morales, for the Mexican state of Guerrero, and José Luis Gutiérrez, for Michoacán—a high honor for any social activist. These Mexican social activists exemplify how members of the civil society can be agents of public diplomacy, with or without the support of their home governments, engaging in advocacy, cultural diplomacy and listening, key features of public diplomacy (Cull, 2019). The Business Community Perspective: Joaquín Boker, President of the U.S.–Mexican Business Association’s Chicago Chapter (AEM) The Mexican business community in Chicago has two contrasting groups. One is the U.S.–Mexican Business Association (AEM, for its acronym in Spanish), which consists of elite businesspeople who work collectively “to help Mexican business-people and professionals to achieve success in the United States, and to assist American business-people interested in doing business in Mexico” (AEM, 2020, p. 1). The other is The Little Village 26th Street Area Chamber of Commerce, known by the Latin American community as “La Villita,” which unites the popular entrepreneurial sector in the city (Little Village Chamber, 2020).

8

CIVIL SOCIETY AS AN ADVOCATE OF MEXICANS AND LATINOS …

205

AEM is led by professionals and owners of large companies, while “La Villita” comprises entrepreneurs involved in small- and medium-sized businesses. These two business groups represent the two realities of the Mexican business community in the United States. This section focuses on AEM’s work in Chicago. AEM was founded in San Antonio, Texas, in 1996, and it has close to 800 members (AEM, 2020). Eighty percent of them are business owners from sectors such as energy, technology, consulting services, food and beverage, construction, the environment economy, the real estate industry, and others. Each member pays annually either $400 (individual membership) or $1000 (corporate membership) to belong to AEM (AEM, 2020). Currently, the association has 13 chapters in the U.S. cities of Austin, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, San Antonio, San Francisco, The Woodlands, and Washington, D.C., and in the Mexican cities of Guanajuato, Monterrey and Mexico City. AEM’s activities are independent of both countries’ governments. Joaquín Boker, president of the AEM Chicago Chapter between 2016 and 2018, explained that Chicago is one of the most important business cities in the United States, and it has a large Mexican population. For example, “the total trade in 2016 between Chicago and Mexico was U.S. $21.2 billion” and “over 130 Chicago-area companies are in Mexico, including Baxter, Groupon, Hyatt, Illinois Tool Works, Ingredion, McDonald’s, Motorola Solutions, and United Continental” (AEM, 2020, paras #4–5). Also, there are many important Mexican companies in Chicago, such as Amtex Chemical, Cemex, Bimbo, and Famsa (AEM, 2020). When asked about the challenges about the perception of Mexicans in the United States in the months before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Boker said: “We have to represent our country properly in the United States. Our greatness has not yet been represented properly here, which is part of the reason why Americans have a diminished perception of Mexico.” Boker believes that while government authorities must participate actively in building a country’s image abroad, it is also the shared responsibility of the civil society to perform a similar role: “Reflecting on the projection of the values and culture of a country is a task that concerns all members of a society.” Accordingly, businesspeople in Chicago joined efforts to empower the Mexican identity in the United States. Boker suggested that Mexico should have a platform and place to gather not

206

T. GÓMEZ ZAPATA

just businesspeople but Mexicans in general, in order to empower the diaspora in Chicago as well as in the rest of the United States. He added: Even though Chicago is an important business center, there is not yet a platform that gathers Mexican leaders in the city. We require a club, a center where we could gather. I am a Mexican with a German background (sixth generation). In any country where I have lived, I have attended a German club, a German school, a German church, and this has created links with the German community in the countries where I have lived. Here in Chicago, we need a Mexican club.

The AEM Chicago Chapter and La Villita have contributed to create links between Mexico and the United States, and, therefore, between Mexicans and Americans. The business sector’s role in public diplomacy has been explained in the literature, which indicates that, in particular, global firms play a role in disseminating a “global world-view” (Wang, 2006, p. 46) and being a “bridge between nations” (Goodman, 2006, p. 5).

Lessons Learned The work of the Latino civil society representatives presented here is evidence of the relevant role that diaspora members can play in the promotion of their home countries abroad. In addition, when properly organized, these leaders and other independent voices have demonstrated that they can be relevant actors in the protection of immigrants’ rights and interests. Capturing the testimonies of these four Latinos (during May and June 2016), before Donald Trump rose to power, it was noticeable that there is a perception that the discriminatory environment in which Latinos live in the United States had intensified. At the same time, each testimony elicited an example of how the civil society can contribute to advocate for their community in challenging times, even independently from their country’s governmental actions. One of the goals of public diplomacy is to guard the image of a nation and of its members abroad or with foreign audiences at home. With regard to the question of whether the diaspora’s mobilization can counteract the negative discourse that has penetrated American society, especially since Trump announced his candidacy, the answer provided by these leaders is that the Mexican–Latino society in the United States

8

CIVIL SOCIETY AS AN ADVOCATE OF MEXICANS AND LATINOS …

207

can certainly achieve this objective, but leadership and organization are indispensable. The Mexican diaspora has seen the need to strengthen its image as it continuously faces distrust from the American public. These imageconstruction efforts not only benefit the Mexican diaspora, but Latin American diasporas in general, given how frequently Americans perceive most Latinos to be Mexicans, in stereotypical ways (Browne et al., 2020 and Center for American Progress & Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica, 2015). In this context, social civil activists such as Elvia Yolanda Torres Cosío and organizations such as Alianza Americas, UNAM Chicago and the AEM Chicago Chapter work on a daily basis to build a stronger presence and a more positive image for the Latino diaspora in the United States, in general, and for the Mexican diaspora, in particular. However, one of the aspects to improve concerns the formation and empowerment of young leaders so that they can reach leading positions in the American government, in businesses and civil organizations. Certainly, a better organization of the civil society organizations, within them and among them, could improve the effectiveness and success rate when trying to implement policies at a national level that benefit Latinos in the United States. In particular, diaspora communities could be catalysts for the creation of favorable foreign policy, at home and in the United States. A big challenge for Latinos is that they have not been able to overcome the negative stereotypes that exist about them in the United States, and they have not been able to persuade (or, sometimes, simply inform) some Americans about all their positive aspects and all their contributions to the U.S. economy, society, and culture. Education centers could be relevant actors in this regard. For example, UNAM Chicago, an autonomous organization independent from Mexico’s government, is a successful public diplomacy agent. Besides its links with American universities, UNAM Chicago is an agent of educational exchange (one of the core aspects of public diplomacy) through Spanish classes, technical education courses, and specialized courses for both Mexicans and Americans. It has also avidly promoted Mexican cultural activities in Chicago and elsewhere. With its 14 international centers, UNAM could become an even stronger connector between Mexico and the foreign publics by working jointly with the home country’s governmental authorities.

208

T. GÓMEZ ZAPATA

Finally, as mentioned before, people like Elvia Yolanda Torres Cosío— whose initial tragic story is representative of the lives of a large number of Latin American immigrants in the United States (both documented and undocumented)—highlight the transcendental role of independent social activists at the grassroots level. Torres’ efforts to be heard by U.S. authorities (such as senators), the U.S. media, and the U.S. society, even during adverse circumstances, demonstrate that individual leadership that embraces collaboration and synergy can be a powerful element for the advancement of the Latin American diaspora in the United States. The number of Latinos in the United States is significant and, therefore, they have the potential to advance their goals through political participation, as the outstanding cases in this chapter demonstrate. As these interviewees showed, the Mexican diaspora is a transcendental actor in advancing a better understanding of Latinos in the United States. When considering the Latino community as a nation within a nation, diasporas can serve as public diplomacy agents. As noted by Cull (2019), one of the key aspects of public diplomacy is advocacy, which is used by all these four civil society members in their organizations and initiatives. Additionally, they engage in the listening function of public diplomacy to understand their community needs and to advocate to solve them. Also, they represent their community by participating in the media as speakers on behalf of their country or the Latino community, such as in the case of Alianza Americas, which is known in public diplomacy as “international broadcasting” (Cull, 2019, p. 5). In some cases, they use cultural diplomacyas well to promote activities that showcase Mexico in a positive light. As Chicago UNAM, they also practice exchange diplomacy by offering a large number of educational programs for the Latino community, but also for U.S. citizens and residents, and it even hosts Mexican students who come to the United States to complete their education. Diasporas, then, can be key intermediaries and supporters of the public diplomacy goals of their home nations, and at the same time, they can contribute to advance foreign policies in the diaspora’s host country, either in collaboration with the home government or independent from it (Bravo, 2015). The case of the Mexican diaspora-led actions in Chicago, independent from its nation-state’s governmental efforts, suggests that diaspora communities can be strategic interlocutors and public diplomacy advocates for the home country.

8

CIVIL SOCIETY AS AN ADVOCATE OF MEXICANS AND LATINOS …

209

References Academy for Cultural Diplomacy. (2019). Diaspora. Latin American diaspora in the world. Academy for Cultural Diplomacy: Cultural Diplomacy in Latin America (CDLA). https://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/index.php? en_cdla_diaspora. ADL. (2018, November). A report from the center on extremism. Mainstreaming hate: The anti-immigrant movement in the U.S. http://adl.org/. https:// www.adl.org/media/12249/download. AEM. (2020, February 3). US-MX business association. http://aemusa.org/. https://aemusa.org/. Alianza Americas. (2020a). Members. https://www.alianzaamericas.org/. https://www.alianzaamericas.org/about/members-page/. Alianza Americas. (2020b). Somos: We are 2018. https://www.alianzaamericas. org/. https://www.alianzaamericas.org/somos-2/. Benítez, J. (2006). Transnational dimensions of the digital divide among Salvadoran immigrants in the Washington DC metropolitan area. Global Networks, 6(2), 181–199. Betancur, J., & Garcia, M. (2011). The 2006–2007 immigration mobilizations and community capacity: The experience of Chicago. Latino Studies, 9(1), 10–37. Bravo, V. (2014). El Salvador and Costa Rica’s state–diaspora relations management. International Journal of Communication, 8, 22. https://ijoc.org/ index.php/ijoc/article/view/1822. Bravo, V. (2015). The importance of diaspora communities as key publics for national governments around the world. In G. Golan, S. Yang, & D. Kinsey (Eds.), International public relations and public diplomacy (pp. 279–296). Peter Lang. Bravo, V., & De Moya, M. (2018). Mexico’s public diplomacy efforts to engage its diaspora across the border: Case study of the programs, messages and strategies employed by the Mexican embassy in the United States. Rising Powers Quarterly, 3(3), 173–193. https://risingpowersproject.com/quarte rly/mexicos-public-diplomacy-efforts-to-engage-its-diaspora-across-the-bor der-case-study-of-the-programs-messages-and-strategies-employed-by-themexican-embassy-in-the-united-states/. Brinkerhoff, J. (2019). Diasporas and public diplomacy: Distinction and future prospects. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 14(1–2), 51–64. Browne, I., Tatum, K., & Gonzalez, B. (2020, January 10). Presumed Mexican until proven otherwise: Identity work and intersectional typicality among middle-class Dominican and Mexican immigrants. Social Problems. https:// doi.org/10.1093/socpro/spz056. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. (2020). The fulbright program. U.S. Department of State. https://eca.state.gov/fulbright.

210

T. GÓMEZ ZAPATA

Bustamente, L., Budiman, A., & López, M. (2020, January 21). Where Latinos have the most eligible voters in the 2020 election. Fact Tank. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/01/ 31/where-latinos-have-the-most-eligible-voters-in-the-2020-election/. Center for American Progress and Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica. (2015, November). Latinos are shaping the future of the United States. How the United States and Mexico are growing together. Center for American Progress. https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2015/11/23114334/CAP-CIDE-report2-WEB.pdf. Chavez, L. (2013). The Latino threat: Constructing immigrants, citizens, and the nation. Stanford University Press. Cull, N. (2019). Public diplomacy: Foundations for global engagement in the digital age. Polity. De la Torre, C. (2018). Populism revived: Donald Trump and the Latin American leftist populists. The Americas, 75(4), 733-753. https://doi.org/10. 1017/tam.2018.39. De Moya, M. (2011). A grounded theory of global public relations by diaspora organizations: Building relationships, communities, and group identity. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida. De Moya, M. (2018). Protesting the homeland: Diaspora dissent public relations efforts to oppose the Dominican Republic’s citizenship policies. In Protest public relations (pp. 106–127). Routledge. DiploFoundation. (2019). Consular and Diaspora diplomacy. Diplomacy.edu. https://www.diplomacy.edu/courses/consular. Diplomatisches Magazin. (2018, November 20). “Diaspora-diplomacy” as a foreign policy strategy. https://www.diplomatisches-magazin.de/en/article/ ifair-diaspora-diplomatie-als-aussenpolitische-strategie/. Directory of Latino American Organizations. (2020). Mexican American news. https://mexican-american.org/community/organizations.html. Fitzpatrick, K. (2012). Defining strategic publics in a networked world: Public diplomacy’s challenge at home and abroad. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 7 (4), 421–440. Fitzpatrick, K. (2017). Public diplomacy in the public interest. The Journal of Public Interest Communications, 1(1), 78–92. Flores, A. (2017, September 18). How the U.S. Hispanic population is changing. Pew Reserch Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/18/ how-the-u-s-hispanic-population-is-changing/. Gaceta UNAM. (2019). Cumple la UNAM 75 años de internacionalización. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). https://www.gaceta. unam.mx/cumple-la-unam-75-anos-de-internacionalizacion/. García, C., & Sanchez, G. (2008). Hispanics and the U.S. political system: Moving into the mainstream. Routledge.

8

CIVIL SOCIETY AS AN ADVOCATE OF MEXICANS AND LATINOS …

211

Gilboa, E. (2008). Searching for a theory of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy in a changing world. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616, 55–77. Goodman, M. (2006). The role of business in public diplomacy. Journal of Business Strategy, 27 (3), 5–7. Gonzalez III, J. (2011). Diaspora diplomacy: Philippine migration and its soft power influences. Mill City Press. Ho, E., & McConnell, F. (2017). Conceptualizing ‘diaspora diplomacy’: Territory and populations betwixt the domestic and foreign. Journal in Human Geography, 43(2), 235–255. Hope, E., Keels, M., & Durkee, M. (2016). Participation in Black Lives Matter and deferred action for childhood arrivals: Modern activism among Black and Latino college students. Journal of Diversity in Higher Education, 9(3), 203– 215. Kemper, R., & Fisher, M. (2006). Comings and goings: The multiple faces on Latin American diasporas. Revista Europea De Estudios Latinoamericanos y Del Caribe, 80, 83–89. Laglagaron, L. (2010). Protection through integration: The Mexican government’s efforts to aid migrants in the United States. Migration Policy Institute. Lahneman, W. (2005) Impact of Diaspora communities on national and global politics. Center for International and Security Studies. University of Maryland. https://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002& context=db-security-studies. Latino Policy Forum. (2020). About us. LatinoPolicyForum.org. https://www. latinopolicyforum.org/about. Lee, B., Martin, M., & Hall, M. (2017). Solamente Mexicanos? Patterns and sources of Hispanic diversity in US metropolitan areas. Social Science Research, 68, 117–131. Little Village Chamber of Commerce. (2020). https://littlevillagechamber.org/. Maloney, C. (2019) The Economic state of the Latino community in America. Joint Economic Committee. US Senate. https://www.jec.senate.gov/pub lic/_cache/files/379f7a7c-e7b3-4830-b1a9-94c3df013b81/economic-stateof-the-latino-community-in-america-final-errata-10-15-2019.pdf. Oxford Department of International Development. (2019). Digital diaspora diplomacy. https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/content/digital-diaspora-diplomacy. Pallares, A., & Flores-González, N. (Eds.). (2010). ¡Marcha! Latino Chicago and immigrant rights movements. University of Illinois Press. Quinsaat, S. (2016). Diaspora activism in a non-traditional country of destination: The case of Filipinos in the Netherlands. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39(6), 1014–1033.

212

T. GÓMEZ ZAPATA

Rana, K. (2013). Diaspora diplomacy and public diplomacy. In R. Zaharna, A. Arsenault, & S. Riordan, S. (Eds.), The new diplomacy. Polity, 124, quoting Livingston, S. (2001, July), Diplomacy and remote sensing technology, iMP Magazine. Rodier, J. (2015). The Latin-American community unites against Donald Trump. Le Journal International Archives. https://www.lejournalinternational.fr/ The-Latin-American-community-unites-against-Donald-Trump_a3409.html. Sanchez, G., & Gomez-Aguinaga, B. (2017). Latino rejection of the Trump campaign. How Trump’s racialized rhetoric mobilized the Latino electorate as never before. Aztlán. A Journal of Chicago Studies, 42(2), 165–181. Serrato, J. (2017, October 13). Mexicans and ‘Hispanics’, now the largest minority in Chicago. Chicago Tribune. https://www.chicagotribune.com/ hoy/ct-mexicans-and-hispanics-largest-minority-in-chicago-20171013-story. html. Sheffer, G. (2003). Diaspora politics: At home abroad. Cambridge University Press. Tatum, C. (Ed.) (2014). Encyclopedia of Latino culture: From Calaveras to Quinceañeras (Vol. 1). Greenwood. The Center for Citizen Diplomacy. (2019). Understanding citizen diplomacy. https://www.centerforcitizendiplomacy.org/about-us/understanding/. Tienda, M., & Sanchez, S. (2013). Latin American immigration to the United States. Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 142(3), 48–64. Tsagarousianou, R. (2004). Rethinking the concept of diaspora: Mobility, connectivityand communication in a globalised world. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 1(1), 52–65. UNAM. (2020). Cronología Histórica. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). https://www.unam.mx/acerca-de-la-unam/unam-en-el-tie mpo/cronologia-historica-de-la-unam/1920. UNAM Chicago. (2020). Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Chicago. https://www.unamchicago.org/. UNAM Global. (2018). La UNAM con Nuevas Sedes en Alemania, Sudáfrica y Estados Unidos. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). https://www.unamglobal.unam.mx/?p=42017. US Census Bureau. (2001a, March). Overview of race and Hispanic origin: Census 2000 brief . United States Census 2000. https://www.census.gov/ prod/2001pubs/cenbr01-1.pdf. US Census Bureau. (2001b, May). The Hispanic population: Census 2000 brief . United States Census 2000. https://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2k br01-3.pdf.

8

CIVIL SOCIETY AS AN ADVOCATE OF MEXICANS AND LATINOS …

213

Waithaka, J., & Maluki, P. (2016). International education exchange as a public diplomacy instrument. International Journal of Science Arts and Commerce, 1(3), 1–8. Wang, J. (2006). Public diplomacy and global business. Journal of Business Strategy, 27 (2), 41–49. Zaharna, R., & Uysal, N. (2016). Going for the jugular in public diplomacy: How adversarial publics using social media are challenging state legitimacy. Public Relations Review, 42(1), 109–119. Zepeda Gil, R. (2016). El juego de la asignación presupuestal a las universidades públicas estatales en México después de la transición democrática. Revista Mexicana De Investigación Educativa (RMIE), 21(70), 901–928.

CHAPTER 9

The Diaspora of Bahia and Afro-Brazilian Culture in Contemporary France Clarice Ferreira Menezes, Deborah Rebello Lima, and Leonardo de Souza Boy

Brazil, as part of the Atlantic world, is a privileged laboratory of cultural globalization (Gruzinski, 2004), and cultural diplomacy is a significant part of the international projection work of Brazilian representatives abroad (Boy & Ferreira Menezes, 2019; Ferreira Menezes, 2015). Likewise, Brazilian immigrants in the diaspora actively work to articulate their cultural heritage abroad in collective efforts that depend on the very understanding of the Brazilian national identity.

C. Ferreira Menezes (B) University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil URL: http://lattes.cnpq.br/9224577684754686 D. Rebello Lima University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil L. de Souza Boy University of Paris-Saclay, Paris, France © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Bravo and M. De Moya (eds.), Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74564-6_9

215

216

C. FERREIRA MENEZES ET AL.

Fig. 9.1 The Afro-Brazilian festival Lavage de la Madeleine has been held in Paris in September since 2001. Picture by Antonio Cançado (Credit Picture courtesy of photographer Antonio Cançado)

The Brazilian diaspora’s initiatives promote the nation’s cultural identity abroad, either through formal mechanisms or informal interactions with host-country communities, and they help construct and strengthen the image of Brazil and its cultural expressions. As such, Brazilian diasporas play the role of cultural diplomacy actors who facilitate “cultural transmission across an international boundary” (Cull, 2009, p. 51). This chapter focuses on one diaspora-led event that the Brazilian diaspora brought to and popularized in Paris, France: the Lavage de la Madeleine (see Fig. 9.1). It has its origins in the Lavagem da Escadaria do Bonfim in Bahia (Brazil), but it has been exported and adapted to reflect the richness of Brazilian cultures and peoples in the French context. This Afro-Brazilian cultural and religious festival happens in Paris every September since 2001, and it is part of Paris official cultural calendar. By focusing in this case, this chapter explores the role of the Brazilian diaspora in sharing the homeland’s culture and, in the process, acting as public diplomats and informal ambassadors of Brazil.

9

THE DIASPORA OF BAHIA AND AFRO-BRAZILIAN …

217

In terms of its structure, this chapter first describes Brazil as a diasporic country, multiethnic, and multicultural; it explains then the reasons why Brazilians abroad are such a strong presence; and it focuses on the case study of the Lavage de la Madeleine, using secondary sources and primary data collected through participant observation and through three interviews conducted in 2014, 2017, and 2020 with Roberto Chaves, founder and organizer in Paris of the Lavage de la Madeleine. Finally, the chapter connects the case study to the field of public diplomacy to argue that, through this festival, diaspora members in France are acting as non-state public diplomats.

The Multiethnic Brazilian Culture The formation of Brazil is linked to its colonial past, which combined the presence of slave labor and the stimulation of non-black immigration through state policies, since the end of slavery in the late 1880s to the mid-1920s (Andrews, 1996). This resulted in a unique configuration of the country in terms of ethnic and cultural diversity. In the early 1900s, for example, the Brazilian government, through policies such as the política de branqueamento,1 sought to promote the “whitening” of the Brazilian population through the immigration of Europeans (Ferreira, 2002). As Andrews (1998, p. 98) observed, the majority (63.6%) of Europeans who came to Brazil at this period had their tickets paid by the government. Later, in the twentieth century, Brazil received a large number of immigrants from Turkey (Goldfeld, 2012) and Japan (Handa, 1987). More recently, the Brazilian government’s strategy to create a national identity evolved, defending a communion between the “three races”— indigenous, black, and white-based on the “racial democracy thesis”

1 The policy of “whitening” was a eugenicist policy that assumed that whitening the Brazilian population would guarantee healthy, productive and integrated individuals as opposed to the black population, perceived as degenerate, lazy, and sick. With the end of slavery, Brazil’s whitening project becomes a state policy. It was up to the state to determine which foreigner was welcomed or not and, relying on the attempt to support population whitening, the state machine began to deny visas to blacks and Asians in favor of the immigration of Europeans to Brazil. Of the 2.5 million Europeans who arrived in Brazil between 1890 and 1914, one million were financed by the Brazilian state (Andrews, 1996, pp. 485–486).

218

C. FERREIRA MENEZES ET AL.

(Freyre, 2003).2 However, as Fernandes (1972) highlights, the state’s previous whitening policies resulted in the denial of traits associated with the black population. This can be seen, for example, in the ban of religious cults based on Afro culture or the prohibition of the practice of capoeira until the 1930s3 (Fléchet, 2013). Although today is precisely this mixed culture that makes Brazil so appealing to international communities, the understanding, and celebration of this multiethnic culture was a product of difficult and slow political shifts that happened in view of the precarious and violent situation to which black and indigenous peoples were subjected (Bastide, 1964). In the late 1980s, the democratic opening in Brazil (after a long military dictatorship) was accompanied by substantial changes in state policies about Afro-Brazilian culture. The creation of the Palmares Cultural Foundation in 1988, linked to the creation of the Ministry of Culture itself (Calabre, 2009), aimed to “promote the preservation of cultural, social and economic values resulting from the black influence on the formation of Brazilian society” (Brasil, Fundação Palmares, 1988). In 1989, the “Caó Law” (Brasil. Law 7.716/89) and its re-edition in 1997 transformed racial insults and religious intolerance into non-bailable crimes. During Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government (1995–2002), and under pressure from the black movement, intellectuals and part of the civil society, a commitment to affirmative action for black people was established (Santos, 2008). This led to the creation of the Inter-Ministerial

2 Gilberto Freyre published, during the nationalist period of Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s, The masters and the slaves, which aimed to provide a synthesis of Brazil as the communion of the three races in Brazil: white, black, and indigenous. 3 Capoeira is a tradition recreated from African experiences that reverence music, dance, art and the struggle of various African tribes. The tradition was transported to Brazil, where it evolved. The Penal Code of the Republic of the United States of Brazil—Decree number 847, of October 11, 1890—prohibited, until the middle of 1930s, the activity of capoeira in Brazil, once perceived as a symbol of resistance. Capoeira was considered as something to be erased from Brazilian social life. Offenders were sentenced to prison. In 1937, the Department of Education registered capoeira as a Physical Education course. However, its symbolic cultural value was removed from the Afro-descendant heritage until its recognition by President Getúlio Vargas as an essential part of Brazilian culture. From the 1980s onwards, capoeira gained prominence in the Brazilian cultural universe as a popular cultural manifestation (Palhares, 2007) that informs the national curriculum’s teaching of Afro-Brazilian history and culture (Guimarães & Silva, 2015). This tradition was recognized as a world cultural heritage by UNESCO in 2014.

9

THE DIASPORA OF BAHIA AND AFRO-BRAZILIAN …

219

Work Group (IWG)4 for the protection of the remaining quilombos 5 and for the recognition of Zumbi 6 as a national hero (Grin, 2014). President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2011) made the political choice of dealing with Brazil’s historical debt to the Afro-descendant population. At the domestic level, the goal was to better represent the symbolic and citizenship dimensions7 of the nation. In foreign policy, the interest was to improve the image of Brazil in the international arena. Several public policies were developed as a result to finance nongovernmental organizations in order to promote and preserve Brazil’s cultural diversity, nationally and internationally. One example is the socalled Live Culture Program (Lima, 2013).8 Finally, the government’s policies started to deal with the socio-economic inequality based on Brazil’s historical denial of the contributions of its black population. The appointment of Gilberto Gil as head of the Ministry of Culture in 2003 was, in this context, a movement to affirm the inclusion of 4 In Portuguese Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial (GTI). It placed members of the

civil society in the most strategic ministries of Brazil to enhance the importance of the black population in the media, including showcasing black people as well in the official advertising of the federal government (Silva & Rosemberg, 2009, p. 87). 5 A quilombo, during the colonization of Brazil, was a community formed by fugitive slaves in colonial and imperial Brazil, until the end of slavery (Carneiro, 1958), which had organizative capacity (Moura, 1981) to defend the group against its masters and enemies. The best-known quilombo was Palmares, the center of resistance to slavery in the northeastern 1700s Brazil. 6 Zumbi (1655–1695) was the leader of the Quilombo dos Palmares, a community of

runaway slaves. He fought for the liberation of the slaves, for the freedom of religious cult and for the spread of the practice of African culture in the quilombo, as a way to preserve the ancestral roots. He adopted guerrilla strategies to defend the settlement during his leadership, and over the century, he became a national icon of black resistance in Brazil (Carneiro, 1958; Freitas, 1984). On November 20, 1996, he was declared national hero (Brasil. Law 9.315). The date of his death was adopted as the National Day of Zumbi and the Black Consciousness (Brasil. Law 12.519), on November 20, 2011, a law that was sanctioned by then president Dilma Rousseff. 7 In 2003, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs of Brazil started to understand culture as a concept guided by three perspectives: 1º symbolic, 2º citizenship; 3º economic. So, culture was conceptualized as a symbolic manifestation of society, a citizenship right that has to be guaranteed by the state, and also an economic resource for the country’s development (Ministério da Cultura, 2011). 8 As mentioned by Lima (2013), these organizations were called Pontos de Cultura (Points of Culture), and they started a new approach in the relationship between the state and cultural groups, by supporting the work of cultural groups in their communities (Lima, 2013).

220

C. FERREIRA MENEZES ET AL.

black culture within Brazil’s pluralism. As Minister of Culture, Gil emphasized the need to revive Brazilian black culture, recognizing the violence and exclusions in the history of black people in Brazil (Gil & Oliveira, 2015). Nationally, cultural policies were enacted, including the opening of museums dedicated to black culture and African heritage in Brazil, such as the Quilombo dos Palmares Museum, in 2007, recognized as Mercosur’s Cultural Heritage in 2017 (IPHAN, 2017). As observed, the historical process through which Brazil became (and continues to be) a multicultural and multiethnic country with a rich, diverse culture is interestingly complex.9 For the purpose of this chapter, it suffices to understand that Brazil has a plural identity, characterized by an ethnic and culturally mixed society: indigenous groups, Afro-descendants, European descendants, and Asian descendants (Ribeiro, 1995; Schwarcz, 1993). Today, for example, Brazil has the second-largest black population in the world, behind Nigeria. According to the 2018 Census of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), 56% of Brazilians declared themselves Afro-descendants (9% as black and 47% as pardo—mixed ethnicities with black—), 43% as white and 1% as Asian or indigenous.10

Brazil’s Diaspora, Territories of Brazilianness, and Cultural Diplomacy As a post-colonial nation-state, Brazil has experienced several diasporic movements and, today, Brazil also has a significant diasporic population. The country has experienced three large migrations waves: at the time of the Military Dictatorship (1964–1984); in the 1980s, due to the economic crisis that hit Latin America; and, more recently, during the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, as a result of new opportunities created by Brazil’s international projection (Boy & Ferreira 9 For a more detailed view of this historical process, see, for instance, Reis (2000), Gregor (2000), Gomes (2000), Ferreira (2002), Ferreira Menezes (2015), Andrews (1996), Alencastro (1988), Bethel (2002), IBGE (2000), Goldfeld (2012), Handa (1987), Fernandes (1972), Fléchet (2013), Bastide (1964), Santos (2008), and Saraiva (2010), among others. 10 Brazil has a population of about 210 million people. Census’ results are based on self-declaration. In recent years, the number of Afro-descendants has increased due to a greater acceptance of the African ancestry by the general population, breaking with the eugenicist ideal of whiteness of the past.

9

THE DIASPORA OF BAHIA AND AFRO-BRAZILIAN …

221

Menezes, 2019). According to the World Migration Organization (IOM), in 2017, more than 1.6 million Brazilians lived abroad.11 These diasporic movements, and the very articulation by the diaspora of Brazilian cultural elements abroad, propitiated the emergence of territories of Brazilianness in host countries. The diaspora, as an imagined national community (Anderson, 1998), seeks cultural elements from the country of origin that ties it as a group in host countries. This shared identity and culture connect diasporas, such as the one formed by Brazilians abroad, to their homeland. At the same time, migrants need dialogue spaces with the population of the receiving country to adjust to their new environment while reaffirming a cultural exception.12 As such, a territory of Brazilianness is understood as a transnational space where the Brazilian culture is maintained through national music, arts, and events. The twentieth-century inaugurated out-of-Brazil diasporic movements. As Almeida (2013) highlights, the first Brazilian emigrants were considered an intellectual elite13 : professors, researchers, and artists pushed to exile by the Military Dictatorship (1964–1983). About 5000 of them left in the 1960s and 1970s (Machado, 1979). Paradoxically, this strengthened Brazil’s public diplomacy, as it resulted in the creation of Brazilian study centers in European and American universities, as well as some artists receiving government financial support to perform abroad (Calabre, 2006; Fléchet, 2019). The Latin American economic crises of the 1980s created another wave of migration, with an estimated 600,000 Brazilians leaving the country between 1980 and 1990, in search of a better life and employment opportunities (Adas & Adas, 2004). During that time, France was a popular destination in Europe for Brazilians (Almeida & Baeninger, 2016). According to INSEE (2019) data, the population of Brazilians in France increased from 9000 in 1982, to more than 62,000 in 2016.

11 Altogether, according to IOM’s survey of 2017, about 7% of the Brazilian population is spread around the world, the vast majority in Europe. 12 Cultural exception is a term used to refer to the fact that cultural goods and services should not be part of the regular goods included in trade agreements. States, instead, are responsible for creating indirect trade barriers to protect the value of national artists and their expressions (Acheson & Maule, 2006). 13 Most were educated and intellectualized middle classes, although to a lesser extent there was also the migration of Brazilians with low education and rural workers abroad (Chotil, 2015; Rolland, 2008).

222

C. FERREIRA MENEZES ET AL.

The Afro-Brazilian migration to Europe since the 1970s brought to the European Continent cultural expressions that were highly contrasting to local cultures. Some of the most iconic examples were capoeira (Frangella, 2013), the practice of the Afro-Brazilian religion umbanda, and the installation of candomblé terreiros (Schmidt, 2016), which are places to practice this Afro-Brazilian religion. In this process, the so-called Brazilian territories emerged. Santos (1994) understands these territories not as political divisions of territory but as spaces of interaction and identification that carry meaning, feeling, and attachment (historical, cultural, practical). What Ferreira Menezes (2019) called “territories of Brazilianness ” are groups of Brazilian residents in foreign countries—and of citizens of the host-country interested in Brazil—that try to keep identity links to Brazil focusing on cultural, social, political, or even religious ties. They have periodic meetings to advocate for social causes such as the defense of democracy in Brazil, and they also organize themselves on social media, such as the Facebook group “Brasileiras de Paris.” These territories are not geographically fixed but are points of support for the Brazilian population living abroad; at the same time, they serve as bridges to interactions with host-community publics. Santos (1994) describes them as vertical territories in which cultural practices and identities provide links and promote a different kind of territorial formation, not based on political, or geographic definitions. We consider that this concept describes well the diasporic movement of Brazilians in France who want to continue the cultural manifestations of their homeland. In this sense, the territories of Brazilianness also project the Brazilian identity abroad. For example, the transnationalization of the candomblé and the umbandaAfro-Brazilian religions from the terreiros are signs of Afro-Brazilian diasporic cultural manifestations outside Brazil. Researchers have addressed the question of African American religions (Capone, 2001–2002; Frigerio, 2004), but the Brazilian case is not as widely understood. Besides samba and capoeira, there is a wide range of Brazilian sociocultural manifestations. In France, we can highlight the following ones: the Lavage de la Madeleine (our case study, described later), Choro and Forró festivals, film festivals and political debates (Ferreira Menezes, 2019). Associations governed by Law 1901 in Paris, which offer classes in Maracatu, Frevo, Samba, and Afoxé, are laboratories of Brazilian culture and social experience. The capoeira groups established in France since the

9

THE DIASPORA OF BAHIA AND AFRO-BRAZILIAN …

223

1980s (which had their civic value recognized in 2017 by the Brazilian Representation at UNESCO), the Brazilian restaurants and brasseries in Paris, research associations on Brazil in France, virtual communities of Brazilians in Paris and, more recently, the Marielle Franco garden, inaugurated in 2019 (Paris, Mairie du 10e, 2019) are additional examples. All these spaces are diasporic manifestations of a way of being away from home, making these new environments spaces of memory and of political-social practices.

From Bahia to Paris; from Bonfim to Madeleine The Lavage de la Madeleine is a Brazilian festival that has been taking place annually in France since 2001. It is based on the transposition of a similar festival that occurs in Brazil, more precisely in Bahia: the Lavagem da Escadaria do Bonfim.14 Since the 1970s, the cultural universe of Bahia has gradually been transported to France (Ferreira Menezes, 2019). Initially, it happened mainly through the books of Jorge Amado but also with the exile and passage of artists like Gilberto Gil and Caetano Veloso. Later, it also happened with cultural expressions such as capoeira, which spread worldwide, and through the exportation of songs such as Lambada and rhythms as axé music. Although comparatively less popular, the Lavage de la Madeleine transports part of the Afro-Brazilian nation to Europe, highlighting the cultural and religious syncretism of the country and paving the way for these cultural manifestations to be recognized by UNESCO, as capoeira was (Felício, 2015). At the same time, France became multiethnic after the migrations following the 1960s wave of decolonization (Tucci, 2011). The French are perceived as being understanding of and willing to participate in multicultural manifestations. The significant number of nonBrazilians who actively participate in the events and associations related to the Lavage de la Madeleine is an example of their cultural openness.

14 The Lavagem da Escadaria do Bonfim is a Brazilian Cultural Heritage since 2013, certified by the Brazilian National Historic and Artistic Heritage Institute (IPHAN) by Decret n. 3551, of July 5, 2013.

224

C. FERREIRA MENEZES ET AL.

It All Started with Bonfim The ritual of Lavagem do Bonfim began in the mid-1700s when the Captain of a Portuguese Navy decided to wash the church of Bonfim as a way to thank God for his ship surviving bad weather (Verger, 1987). The initial church-washing ritual evolved after the Portuguese Catholic faith joined the cult of Oxalá, performed by slaves during the construction of the new church.15 It was the way in which slaves, forbidden to profess any faith other than the Catholic one, kept the cult to the Candomblé gods alive: re-interpreting Catholic images and associating them with those from the Yoruba 16 culture. Since then, African and Catholic cults have come together in Bahia: The eight-kilometers procession and the washing of the church’s staircase and of the Bonfim churchyard has become a tourist attraction and a demonstration of Northeastern cultural traditions (Miguez, 2002). Recognized, in 2013, by IPHAN as a national cultural immaterial heritage symbol of African resistance, to preserve Bahia’s identity and living memory, the Lavagem do Bonfim is considered one of the most deeply rooted traditions in Brazil. Nowadays, this tradition shares, with carnival, the place of the most important popular manifestation of Brazilian culture. In Bahia, the Lavagem do Bonfim festivities strengthen the ties among the population and maintain Bahia’s identity (Velho, 1988). Similar to the Lavagem do Bonfim is the Lavagem de Santo Amaro da Purificação, also in Bahia, which is the city with the biggest concentration of terreiros of candomblé and umbanda in the region. One of the icons of the contemporary Santo Amaro’s ritual is Pai Pote, from the candomble Ilê Axe Oju Onire.17 Mendes (2007, p. 7) explains that “these popular religious festivals were one of the ways found by this population to alleviate the implacable and adverse forms of Bahian society exclusion at the end of the eighteenth century.”

15 Oxalá could be considered as Jesus for Afro-Brazilian religions (Pinheiro, 2008). 16 As noted by Verger (1981), the term Yoruba referred, in its origin, to a group

formed by millions of individuals who, coming from Africa, shared languages, cultures and traditions without having, in its origin, a political entity. 17 Pai Pote is also the babalorixá responsible for the Lavage de la Madeleine, in Paris.

9

THE DIASPORA OF BAHIA AND AFRO-BRAZILIAN …

225

The ritual of the Lavagem do Bonfim gave birth to a similar ritual outside Brazil: the Lavage de la Madeleine, in Paris. The Lavage de la Madeleine festival, created by Roberto Chaves, is a cultural-religious festival celebrated each year in Paris, that propagates the values of the Lavagem do Bonfim. To better understand what the festival entails as well as his aims, Ferreira Menezes conducted interviews with Chaves18 and with other participants of the Lavage de la Madeleine as part of our study about this case.

The Lavage de la Madeleine: A Case Study in Diaspora Public Diplomacy The Lavage de la Madeleine Festival was created based on the example of the Bonfim celebration in Bahia, as an effort to transport Afro-Brazilian traditions to Europe. It is celebrated every year since 2001, it is listed in Paris’ calendar of cultural events (France, Ministère de la Culture, n.d.; ParisInfo, 2020), and it receives attention from both French and Brazilian media.19 The aim was to build an image of Brazil that was different from what had been conveyed to the European public until then. In 1998, Roberto Chaves, an artist from Santo Amaro da Purificação, in Bahia, who emigrated to Europe in the 1990s, began to think about a project to present the Brazilian culture in France in a different, less stereotypical way. This was a moment of emigration of Brazilians to France, and as such, these migrants were dealing with stereotypes circulating in France about Brazil. They had to respond either reinforcing them, rejecting them, or rearticulating them. Chaves considered it a duty to present Brazilian culture without clichés. Besides the carnival and football stereotypes, he saw the Lavagem do Bonfim as an opportunity to present the Afro-Brazilian culture to the French. Chaves described during our interviews that the first step was to find a place to celebrate the Afro-Brazilian religion of orixá in Paris. The Madeleine Church was not the first place chosen to attempt to transport

18 Roberto Chaves was interviewed three times by the researchers on 11–16–2014, 09–06–2017 and 03–11–2020. 19 For instance, from French and Brazilian newspapers such as Télérama (2018) and UOL (2019).

226

C. FERREIRA MENEZES ET AL.

the Lavagem do Bonfim to Paris. Between 1998 and 2001, the intention was to repeat the washing ceremony on the stairs of the Basilica Sacre Coeur of Montmartre. After unsuccessful attempts between 1998 and 2000 a new place was designated by the Paris City Hall for this ecumenical festival: the Madeleine Church. With records dating to the twelfth century, “La Madeleine” is important for Parisians and for diasporic groups for two major factors: the status of this Catholic Church itself in Paris and the history of Saint Mary Magdalene (Marie Madeleine, in French). For Chaves (2014, interview), having a renegade Saint—Mary Magdalene, patron of the sinners and of the repentant, historically disowned by the Catholic Church—as the patron of the Lavage de la Madeleine worked beautifully as a symbol of resistance and acceptance of this Afroreligious ritual in Europe. He highlighted that the Lavage de la Madeleine would incorporate the idea of a diasporic population festival, a party for renegades, sinners, and people with different beliefs. The Lavage de la Madeleine has a lot of similarities and some differences to the ones that take place in Brazil. For example, among the latter, while the Church of Bonfim was closed to the cult of orixás by the papacy during the slavery period because of its link to African culture, making it possible to wash only its staircase. The opening Mass of the festival takes place inside the Madeleine, in an ecumenical celebration that is led by the curator of the Church and Babalorixá of the terreiro Ilê Axé Oju Oniê, representative of candomblé, who travels to Paris annually for the celebration of the ritual. Furthermore, while the Lavagem do Bonfim and in Santo Amaro da Purificação occur annually in February, the choice of September for the celebration of the Lavage de la Madeleine was intentional. The reasons for this choice are the following: (i) the beginning of the French academic year happens in early September, which helps the event attract a wider public during a season of mild weather, at the end of the summer and (ii) it happens linked to the celebration of the Independence of Brazil, promulgated on September 7, 1822. By choosing a date of interest for Brazilian authorities and Brazilian nationals to celebrate the Lavage, the diaspora strategically attracts more attention from the Brazilian Embassy in Paris.

9

THE DIASPORA OF BAHIA AND AFRO-BRAZILIAN …

227

2005: A Turning Point In 2005, the Lavage became a Festival of Brazilian Culture in France, and it started to receive attention from Brazil’s government representatives, who started to see the festival as an important opportunity to promote the national identity of Brazil in France and to conduct public diplomacy. As a result, the Brazilian government (led at the time by president Lula da Silva) sought to build partnerships with the Festival’s organizers. It is worth noting that 2005 was an important year for Brazilian cultural diplomacy in connection to France, in general, precisely because 2005 was the Year of Brazil in France (Ferreira Menezes, 2015),20 under the plural name Brésil, Brésils.21 The Lavage de la Madeleine turned that year into a one-week long Festival of Brazilian Culture that featured a Brazilian Market (with Brazilian accessories and typical food) and a largerthan-usual parade in which several Brazilian cultural associations based in Paris (of Maracatu, capoeira, percussion and politics) took part. Through the years, the Festival has been able to reach a larger audience every time. The festival is now attended by about 30,000 participants, Chaves said. In our perspective, the festival also represents an outstanding example of cultural diplomacy22 led by diaspora groups. As Perrier (2012), explains, this celebration is negotiated by the population of both nations, creating a space for Brazilian artists as legitimate cultural representatives in France. It is within the spectrum of Brazilianness in Paris that the festival becomes a place of reunion, of multiple identity creation, and of symbolic representation.

20 Using 2005 to transform the religious event into a Brazilian Cultural Festival was an important move to get closer to the Brazilian Government’s new approach to cultural diversity. It was also then when the Festival began to count with the presence of the Brazilian Embassy, and it was later attended by ambassador Paulo Cesar de Oliveira Ramos. 21 As Ferreira Menezes (2015) pointed out, by putting the name in plural, the organization of the Year of Brazil in France (comprised by the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, the Institut Français, the Brazilian Embassy and government representatives) intended to highlight the plurality of cultures that make Brazil be appreciated internationally. 22 Besides the government’s actions, the presence of Gilberto Gil (minister of Culture and also an internationally known Brazilian singer), Caetano Veloso (another major artist with his work well-known outside Brazil), Cristina Córdula, and Vincent Cassel (both popular TV artists in France) provided international visibility for the Festival.

228

C. FERREIRA MENEZES ET AL.

The festival has crossed the frontier of Afro-Baianidade 23 and it has become, over the years, the largest festival of Brazilian culture in France and also a reference point for Brazilians in Europe. It also pays homage, each year, to different Brazilian states and cities, presenting specific cultural traits of these places as a way to honor Brazil and Brazilians, but also as a way to share the richness of the Brazilian culture with the French population. Through this celebration, Brazilians represent “the ludic aspect of the black Brazilian, the one who is always ready to celebrate, to play with its sensuality, with its swing. In short, a stereotype deeply rooted in the traditions of Brazilian society and in the representation that the French have of Brazilians” (Perrier, 2012, pp. 9–10). But the festival also incorporates social and political themes, such as its 2019 tribute to the “women of resistance,” a group of Brazilian women who fought for democracy during Brazil’s dictatorial period. The Lavage is also a point of confluence with other Brazilian cultural associations in Paris, like the Maracatu Oju Oba Association, the Batala percussion group, and several other Capoeira groups. Although the Association Vive Madeleine is responsible for the Festival annually, the support of several other organizations, both Brazilian and transnational, is important. UNESCO, for example, which is a privileged spectator of the Lavage de la Madeleine—with its headquarters in Paris—recognized the festival’s cultural value. Since 2011, the Lavage de la Madeleine has received the seal of UNESCO’s “slave route” a worldwide program that aims to reconcile the duty of memory and the dissemination of historical truths (UNESCO, 2019). In the last editions, the resources coming from the Brazilian government for the festival have considerably decreased due to adjustments to the government’s budget for cultural activities.24 However, the Brazilian 23 Afro-Baianidade is a term used to refer to the African traits present in the culture of Bahia, a northeast region of Brazil. 24 The cultural sector has been losing space in the Brazilian political agenda in an accelerated manner in recent years. In 2016, the cultural budget suffered a brief extinction, but it was able to be replaced thanks to the demonstration of intellectuals and artists who advocated for its maintenance. However, in 2019, under the new majority government, the budget for cultural activities was merged with the ones for other social policies and programs, and it was severely cut. In the past, the Festival was financially supported by different organizations. For example, in 2017—the year with the largest amount of sponsorship money, the following companies and government offices were sponsors of the

9

THE DIASPORA OF BAHIA AND AFRO-BRAZILIAN …

229

community in France and the Parisian population interested in Brazil have tried to offer their support to keep this tradition alive.

Conclusion When they migrate, immigrants leave behind the home country but not the home culture. On the contrary, they carry with them traditions, social norms, collective experiences, habits, and ways of living, feeling, acting, and thinking that get expressed through language and culture (Sayad, 1999) in the host countries where diasporas settle. In the process, diasporic spaces, geographical, or virtual, get created for the diaspora to express its cultural traits in the host environment. Migratory flows of Brazilians to France have contributed to the transnationalization of Brazilians’ cultural traits and to the emergence of diaspora-led cultural events there. Brazil’s government has also contributed in this process through its cultural diplomacy, a tool of foreign policy used by states to enhance the relationship between countries by bonds of affinity through cultural exchanges. Regretfully, the Brazilian government’s support for cultural practices— historically inconsistent—has decreased since 2016. The political upheaval suffered by the country, with the impeachment of then president Dilma Rousseff, was accompanied by the acceleration of a discourse of fiscal austerity and the necessity of decreasing public spending (Barbalho, 2018), including in cultural programs. The Brazilian diasporic community in France has managed, nonetheless, to establish several territories of Brazilianness. The Lavage de la Madeleine is, precisely, one territory of Brazilianness that fosters Brazilian cultural diversity and serves as a deterritorialized space for the Afro-Brazilian community to resist and express itself, to be seen and be appreciated, and to interact with the French population. The festival has fulfilled the dual role of attracting Brazilian citizens in France and of disseminating the rich Brazilian culture among the French in Paris. The Lavage de la Madeleine festival is also a quite emblematic example of diaspora-led cultural diplomacy. This celebration, originated in Bahia

festival: Galeries Lafayette, Le Littré, MoneyGram, Centre de Danse du Marais, SACEM, 8º District City Hall, 14º District City Hall, Bem in Paris, Indies Live, Terraçai, Embassy of Brazil in Paris, Brasil França, Brazilians without Borders, DS, UNESCO, Paris City Hall, IESA Arts & Culture, Paris Call Me, Tips Paris, Marts Festas, and Latin Radio.

230

C. FERREIRA MENEZES ET AL.

and created by descendants of slaves, was transported to French territory by Brazilians themselves, without the need for government intervention. In this way, it is an authentic and engaging opportunity for foreigners to approach Brazilian culture and for Brazilians to maintain affective cultural ties to the homeland. This is especially significant given how the AfroBrazilian culture had to overcome a long period of denial and negligence before occupying a prominent space in Brazil’s domestic and international cultural promotion. The preservation of the Afro-Brazilian cultural wealth has happened because of the resistance and persistence of the black population in Brazil, and it has been finally recognized as a key component of the country’s culture—of Brazil’s religion, rhythms, and dances—that continues to attract foreign interest and builds goodwill for the country and its peoples. The fact that the Lavage de la Madeleine is currently part of the official calendar of the city of Paris is a point of pride, as indicated by the Festival organizer, Roberto Chaves. However, the festival had to adapt, to some extent, to the host context. Chaves explained that it was necessary to transform the event, which used to be strictly religious, into a more open celebration. By transforming it into a broad Brazilian Cultural Festival that encompasses the Lavage as its central focus, it expanded to include additional cultural expressions such as batucada, Maracatu, samba, and forró as part of the Lavage’s festival. The social interactions among Brazilian diaspora members are enhanced as well by the existence of the Lavage de la Madeleine, because the Brazilians who participate in the festival and in its organization process get to know each other and participate in activities that take place throughout the year, until the date of the next festival. These diaspora-led activities, even if independent from the home government, end up contributing to the public diplomacy goals of Brazil, for instance, by disseminating Brazilian culture, by improving the country’s image and reputation, by building cultural bridges and by having diaspora members perform the function of informal ambassadors, especially given the budget cuts to official diplomacy since the political crisis of 2016.

9

THE DIASPORA OF BAHIA AND AFRO-BRAZILIAN …

231

References Adas, M., & Adas, S. (2004). Panorama Geográfico do Brasil: Contradições, Impasses e Desafios Socioespaciais. Moderna. Acheson, K., & Maule, C. (2006). Culture in international trade. In V. Ginsburgh & D. Throsby (Eds.), Handbook of the economics of art and culture. North-Holland. Alencastro, L. (1988). Proletários e escravos: imigrantes portugueses e cativos africanos no Rio de Janeiro, 1850–1870. Novos Estudos Cebrap, 21, 30–56. Almeida, G. (2013) Au Revoir, Brésil: Um Estudo Sobre a Imigração Brasileira na França Após 1980. São Paulo. Almeida, G., & Baeninger, R. (2016). A imigração brasileira na França: do tipo histórico às modalidades migratórias contemporâneas. Revista Brasileira de Estudos de População, 33(1), 129–153. Anderson, B. (1998) Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. Verso Books. Andrews, G. (1996). Brazilian racial democracy, 1900–90: An American counterpoint. Journal of Contemporary History, 31(3), 483–507. Andrews, G. (1998). Negros e Brancos em São Paulo. Edusc. Barbalho, A. (2018). Política cultural em tempo de crise: o Ministério da Cultura no Governo Temer. Revista de Políticas Públicas da UFMA. Bastide, R. (1964). Brasil terra de contrastes. Difusão Europeia do Livro. Bethel, L. (2002) A Abolição do Comércio Brasileiro de Escravos: a Grã-Bretanha, o Brasil e a Questão do Comércio Brasileiro de Escravos (1807–1869). Senado Federal, Conselho Editorial. Boy, L., & Ferreira Menezes, C. (2019). Brazilian cultural diplomacy in Europe in the early 21st century: Bridging the gap between nations with international events. European Journal of Cultural Management & Policy, 9(1). Brasil. (1890). Decreto n. 847, de 11 de outubro de 1890. Promulga o Código Penal. Brasil. (1988). Diário Oficial de 22 de agosto de 1988. Art. 1º of the LAW Nº 7.668. Autoriza Poder Executivo a constituir a Fundação Cultural Palmares. Brasil. (1989). Lei n. 7.716, de 05 de janeiro de 1989. Define os crimes resultantes de preconceito de raça ou de cor. Calabre, L. (2006). O conselho federal de cultura, 1971–1974. Estudos Históricos, 37 , 81–98. Calabre, L. (2009). Políticas Culturais no Brasil: Dos Anos 1930 ao Século XXI . Rio de. Ed. FGV. Capone, S. (2001–2002). La diffusion des religions afro-américaines en Europe, Psychopathologieafricaine, XXXI (1), 3–16. Carneiro, E. (1958). O quilombo dos Palmares. Companhia Editora Nacional. Chaves, R. (2014, November 16). Personal communication [Interview] about the Lavagem da Madeleine. Paris, France.

232

C. FERREIRA MENEZES ET AL.

Chaves, R. (2020, March 11). Personal communication [Phone and email interview] about the Lavagem da Madeleine. Paris, France. Chotil, M. (2015). L’Exil Ouvrier: La Saga des Brésiliens Contraints au Départ, 1964–1985. Éditions Estaimpuis. Cull, N. (2009). Public diplomacy: Lessons from the past (No. s 12). Figueroa Press. Felício, L. (2015). A influência da diversidade cultural da capoeira no Brasil. Revista FSA, 12(6). Fernandes, F. (1972) O negro no mundo dos brancos. Difusão Europeia. Ferreira, L. (2002). A presença italiana em belo horizonte e seus impactos no universo socio-cultural em construção. PUC Minas. Ferreira Menezes, C. (2015). Representações Identitárias e Projeção Internacional: A Diplomacia Cultural Brasileira (2003–2009). Tese de Doutorado. Fundação Getúlio Vargas. Ferreira Menezes, C. (2019). Do sazonal ao cotidiano: A sedimentação de territórios de brasilidade na França no início do século XXI. Seminary. II Congresso da Associação de Brasilianistas na Europa. ABRE. Fléchet, A. (2013). Si Tu Vas à Rio... La Musique Populaire Brésilienne en France au XXe Siècle. Armand Colin, coll. Recherches. Fléchet, A. (2019). Les partitions de l’identité - La diplomatie musicale brésilienne au XXe siècle. In Histoire culturelle du Brésil (XIXe - XXIe siècles). IHEAL. France. (n.d.). Ministère de la Culture. Fiche Lavage de la Madeleine. https:// bit.ly/3ikGhb3. Frangella, S. (2013). Afro-Brazilian culture in London: Images and discourses in transnational Portuguese Studies, 29(1). Freitas, D. (1984). Palmares: A Guerra Dos Escravos. Mercado Aberto. Freyre, G. (2003). Casa-Grande & Senzala: Formação da Família Brasileira sob o Regime da Economia Patriarcal. Global. Frigerio, A. (2004). Re-Africanization in secondary religious diasporas: Constructing a world religion. Civilisations, LI (1–2), 39–60, Bruxelles, Université libre de Bruxelles. Gil, G., & Oliveira. A. (2015). Disposições amoráveis. Iyá Omin. Goldfeld, M. (2012). O Brasil, o Império Otomano e a Sociedade Internacional: Contrastes e Conexões (1850–1919). PhD Thesis, Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC/FGV. Gomes, A. (2000) Imigrantes italianos: Entre a Italianità e a Brasilidade. IBGE. Brasil: 500 anos de povoamento. IBGE. Gregor, V. (2000) Imigração alemã: formação de uma comunidade teutobrasileira. IBGE. Brasil: 500 anos de povoamento. IBGE. Grin, M. (2014). “Raça” - Debate Público no Brasil (1997:2007). Mauad X.

9

THE DIASPORA OF BAHIA AND AFRO-BRAZILIAN …

233

Gruzinski, S. (2004) Les quatre parties du monde. Histoire d’une mondialisation. Ed. La Martinière. Guimarães, L. & Silva, J. (2015). A implantaçãoo da Lei 10.639/03 por meio da capoeira. Anais do XIV Encontro Regional de História - 1964/2014: 50 anos do Golpe Militar no Brasil. Universidade Estadual do Paraná. Handa, T. (1987). O Imigrante Japonês: História de sua Vida no Brasil. T. A. Queiroz. IBGE. (2000). Brasil 500 anos: Território brasileiro e povoamento – razões da emigração italiana. IBGE: Brasil 500 anos. Rio de Janeiro. INSEE. (2019). Recensement de la Population, Exploitation Principale. Répartition des Immigrés par Pays de Naissance Détaillé d’Amérique et Océanie. INSEE. IPHAN. (2013). Certifica a festa do Senhor do Bom Jesus do Bonfim – BA. Certificado de inscrição da Festa do Senhor do Bonfim enquanto bem cultural do Brasil. IPHAN. (2017). Serra da Barriga (AL) recebe certificação de Patrimônio Cultural do MERCOSUL. Lima, D. (2013). As Teias de uma Rede: Uma Análise do Programa Cultura Viva. Dissertação. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas. Machado, C. (1979). Os exilados: 5 mil Brasileiros à Espera de Anistia. São Paulo. Mendes, E. (2007). A Lavagem das Escadarias do Nosso Senhor do Bonfim da Bahia: Identidade e Memória no Final dos Oitocentos. UERJ. Miguez, P. (2002). A Organização da Cultura na “Cidade da Bahia”. Tese. Faculdade de Comunicação, Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA). Ministério da Cultura. (2011). Cultura em Três Dimensões. Material informativo: As Políticas do Ministério da Cultura de 2003 a 2010. MinC. Moura, C. (1981). Rebeliões na Senzala: Quilombos, Insurreições Guerrilhas. Ed. Ciências Humanas. Palhares, L. (2007) Educação e Cultura popular: inclusão social pela capoeira. Licere, Belo Horizonte, 10(3). ParisInfo. (2020). Lavage de la Madeleine. https://en.parisinfo.com/paris-showexhibition/194372/lavage-de-la-madeleine. Paris, Mairie du 10e (2019). Un nouveau jardin suspendu au dessus des voies de la gare de l’Est: Un hommage À la militante brésilienne Marielle Franco. https://www.mairie10.paris.fr/actualites/inauguration-sam edi-21-septembre-2019-decouvrez-le-nouveau-jardin-marielle-franco-899. Perrier, L. (2012). La niche artistique des Afro-brésiliens à Paris: Un opérateur de reconnaissance sociale. Frontières identitaires et Représentations de l’altérité, Paris, France. pp.1/21, Collection FIRA—HAL-SHS. https://hal shs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00747437/document. Pinheiro, E. (2008). O Espetáculo das Aguas: Um estudo sobre o ritual das Águas de Oxalá do Axé Opô Afonjá – Século XIX. Dissertação. Rio de Janeiro, UERJ.

234

C. FERREIRA MENEZES ET AL.

Reis, J. (2000). A presença negra: encontros e conflitos. IBGE: Brasil: 500 anos de povoamento. IBGE. Ribeiro, D. (1995). O Povo Brasileiro: A Formação e o Sentido do Brasil. Global. Rolland, D. (2008). L’exil brésilien en France: Histoire et imaginaire. L’Harmattan. Santos, S. A. (2008) Movimentos Negros, Educação e Ações Afirmativas. PhD Thesis, Brasília: UnB. Santos, M. (1994) Território, Globalização e Fragmentação. Huictec. Saraiva, J. (2010). The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: The rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy. RBPI , 53(spe), 169–182. Sayad A. (1999). La Double Absence. Des Illusions de L’émigré aux Souffrances de l’immigré. Seuil. Schmidt, B. (2016). Contemporary religions in Brazil. Oxford Handbooks. Schwarcz, L. (1993). O Espetáculo das Raças. Cientistas, Instituições e Questão Racial no Brasil, 1870–1930. Companhia das Letras. Silva, P. & Rosemberg, F. (2009). Black and white people in the Brazilian Media: Racist discourse and practices of resistance. In Van T. Dijk. Racism and discourse in Latin America. Lexington Books. Télérama. (2018). Grand défilé pour la paix - Lavage de la Madeleine. https:// sortir.telerama.fr/evenements/clubbing/grand-defile-pour-la-paix-lavage-dela-madeleine,n5698260.php. Tucci, I. (2011). Immigration, intégration et diversité en France et en Allemagne. Caisse Nationale d’Allocations Familianles: Informations Sociales, 163 (pp. 116–123). CAIRN. UNESCO. (2019). Slave Route Project. https://en.unesco.org/themes/foster ing-rights-inclusion/slave-route. Uol. (2019, August 9). Lavagem da Madeleine Atinge a Maioridade e Cria a ala Mulheres da Resistência. https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/ rfi/2019/09/08/lavagem-da-madeleine-atinge-a-maioridade-e-cria-a-ala-mul heres-da-resistencia.htm. Velho, G. (1988). Memória, identidade e projeto, uma visão antropológica. Revista Tempo Brasileiro. Rio de Janeiro. Verger, P. (1981). Orixás: Deuses Iorubás na África e no Novo Mundo. São Paulo: Corrupio. Verger, P. (1987). Fluxo e Refluxo do Tráfico de Escravos entre o Golfo do Benin e a Bahia de Todos os Santos: Dos séculos XVII a XIX. Corrupio.

CHAPTER 10

The Strategy of the Venezuelan Diaspora: Collaboration, Representation, and Reconstruction of Venezuelan People in Colombia, Latin America and the World Tomás Páez Bravo

Venezuela was a country of immigrants that received people from Europe, mainly from Spain, Italy, and Portugal, Latin American, and Caribbean countries (Berglund, 1994; Bidegain, 1987; Pacheco Rios, 2016; Torrealba, 1988). However, since 1998, Venezuela began a sustained migration process, which grew from over 430,000 migrants in 2005, to more than 4.3 million in 2019, turning Venezuela into a country of emigrants (International Office of Migration, 2019). There is no official data about this phenomenon from the Venezuelan regime since it is not acknowledged, except for mentions of a “brain drain” (Castellanos, 2014), which is an insufficient and inadequate understanding of the phenomenon.

T. Páez Bravo (B) Venezuela’s Central University, Caracas, Venezuela © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Bravo and M. De Moya (eds.), Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74564-6_10

235

236

T. PÁEZ BRAVO

However, there is no doubt that the extensive diaspora has a role to play in the international image and relations of the nation. As a Venezuelan citizen residing in Spain, and as a sociologist, I advocate for democracy and freedom in Venezuela, and I collaborate with or lead various organizations that aim to bring change to the country. As part of these efforts, I have conducted extensive research and policy analysis about the Venezuelan diaspora. Applying a variety of research methods, I have sought to identify the number of Venezuelan migrants, country of destiny, academic level and integration to the host country; as well as understand the determinants of their decisions to leave Venezuela, their willingness to return and their commitment to participate in the reconstruction process. This work has been published as a book, in academic journals, reports and invited posts (e.g. Páez, 2015, 2017a, 2017b, 2018, 2019). In doing this work, I also wanted to give voice to those citizens whose existence the government denies. My research approach is based on the concept of brain circulation, which refers to those citizens of a nation that gain experience and knowledge through migration, and rather than permanently severing their ties, they maintain strong networks in their homeland and/or decide return to contribute to its development (Patterson, 2006; Shin & Moon, 2018). The working assumption is that diasporas not only seek to benefit themselves, but also their countries of origin and destiny. I spearhead the Observatory of the Venezuelan Diaspora (ODV, acronym in Spanish) as an ongoing research project, which also serves to help establish links between the Venezuelan diaspora and the Venezuelan organizations abroad. The ODV, which started in 2013, is still a work in progress in which information is continuously updated by gathering information about the Venezuelan diaspora around the world, the organizations they have created, the specialized work they pursue, and the projects and programs they lead. The Platform of the Venezuelan Diaspora (PDV, acronym in Spanish) is a mechanism we use to connect Venezuelan organizations to diasporic associations around the world for the development of new projects and businesses, etc. Additionally, the ODV showcases the work of those diasporic organizations all around the world through La Voz de La Diáspora, a weekly radio and TV segment transmitted by Radio Caracas (e.g. Radio Caracas Radio and Television, 2020; RCR750, 2019, 2020) in the radio and television program “Buen Provecho,” since 2017 and still ongoing at the time of writing.

10

THE STRATEGY OF THE VENEZUELAN DIASPORA …

237

In this chapter, I present findings, constantly updated, about the conceptual and empirical dimensions of the network of Venezuelan diaspora associations in a transnational process, which aims to give voice to the exodus and develop mechanisms to ensure their participation in the process of rebuilding Venezuela.

The Twenty-First-Century Venezuelan Diaspora Although frequently mentioned in literature about immigration and diaspora (Páez, 2015, 2019; Saxenian, 2005), the distinction between country of origin (home country), of transit and of destination (host country) may be inaccurate and elusive. There are countries with high numbers of migrants and others that are traditionally host countries, such as Venezuela and the United States, respectively (e.g., Castillo Crasto & Reguant Álvarez, 2017; Páez, 2015). Venezuela’s history as a host country laid the foundations for the circularity of migrations to and from Venezuela, due to the link of immigrants with their countries of origin (Páez, 2015, 2019; Páez, & Phelan, 2018). This also contributed to the development of both Venezuela and the countries where they came from, such as Colombia, Italy, and Spain (Páez & Phelan, 2018). The Diaspora promoted Venezuela’s culture, architecture, science, gastronomy, and technology, as well as made it possible to have a prosperous, urbanized country with per capita income levels close to those of Italy toward the end of the 1970s (Garcia Rangel, 2019). There, they made investments, created bilateral companies, cultivated permanent family relationships and left the legacy of dual nationality to their offspring (Bull & Rosales, 2020; Páez, 2015, 2019). Having been an immigrant-receiving country affects the selection of the destination city of those who emigrate today. Venezuela received an estimate of two million Colombians from the 1960s until the 1980s, while, now, it is Colombia that receives a similar number of Venezuelans. In fact, it is estimated that about 4 million Venezuelans have migrated to Colombia in recent years (Reuters Staff, 2018). Between 1998 and 2015, an average of 120,000 people per year left Venezuela. Since 2016, the average is closer to 1.1 million annually (Páez & Phelan, 2018; Reuters Staff, 2018). This marked increase has to do with the worsening of the Venezuelan socioeconomic and political crisis (Vivas & Páez, 2017). There are some differences between the first and

238

T. PÁEZ BRAVO

second migration wave of Venezuelans, as detailed by Páez and Phelan (2018): First, the speed of growth; second, the means by which they travel (bus, small boats, on foot); third, the countries of destiny, most of which are in the South; and fourth, the level of the impoverishment of the Venezuelan citizens. Today, Latin America and the Caribbean countries host more than two-thirds of Venezuelan migrants, and just Colombia has received 28% of them (OCHA, 2020). The largest diaspora is in Colombia, followed by Peru, with nearly 1 million migrants; and Chile, with over 450,000 in different cities. Just Bogotá, in Colombia, is home to nearly 400,000 Venezuelans, a number similar to that of the total Venezuelan migrants in Ecuador or Spain. Those who have migrated in the last four years have done so within the framework of an impoverished country; more than 90% of the Venezuelan population is within that fringe (e.g. Hausmann, 2017; Vivas & Páez, 2017). This migratory experience influences the ways in which the diaspora comes together and relates to the host and home countries. From Venezuelan officials, there is very little information shared about the exodus from the country or the size of the diaspora (Cañizález, 2018). This phenomenon is not acknowledged by the current regime. As Cañizález (2018) explained, and as I have denounced several times during interviews, even in the speech of Venezuelan officials, there is an attempt to reduce the importance of the Venezuelan immigration, or the people who have migrated are disqualified by them. In one news article (El Nacional, 2018), for example, president Nicolás Maduro1 is quoted as saying that he knew that many people have been brainwashed against the country, have left and are repentant because they are now washing toilets in Miami.2 Cañizález (2018) adds that not offering information about issues that the regime considers sensible, such as migration, might have been a sporadic practice for the Hugo Chavez presidency (Chavez was

1 Nicolás Maduro is not recognized as president by all Venezuelans. For more details on this controversy, please see the news article Guaido vs. Maduro: Who is backing whom in Venezuela? by Reuters Editorial Staff (2019, April 30), at http://www.terras.edu.ar/ biblioteca/10/FP_Tocqueville_2_Unidad_4.pdf. 2 The original quote in Spanish was: “Sé de muchos que la propaganda en contra de nuestro país les llenó la mente, se fueron y están arrepentidos. No sabes cuánta gente está lavando pocetas en Miami. ¿Tú te irías a lavar pocetas en Miami? Yo no dejaría mi patria jamás”.

10

THE STRATEGY OF THE VENEZUELAN DIASPORA …

239

president of Venezuela from 1999 to 2013), but for Maduro’s regime, it has become policy. However, since 2014, international media started paying increased attention to Venezuelan immigration, especially in Spain (e.g. LoboGuerrero, 2014; Lozano, 2019; Serrato, 2017). Similarly, international non-governmental organizations such as the International Office of Migration (2019), the United Nations Human Rights Commission (OHCHR, 2019) and Human Rights Watch (2020) have called attention to the humanitarian crisis and called on the international community to intervene. The contemporary diaspora started to grow at the beginning of the century, with the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998; before that, there were just a few Venezuelans abroad (Páez, 2015; Páez & Phelan, 2018). The OCHA (2020) estimated that by the end of 2018, some three million Venezuelans had left the country. Through the ODV research, we estimate that the Venezuelan diaspora could be made up of as many as double that number, which constitutes approximately 20% of the Venezuelan population. Due to the lack of reliable information from the government, there was a need to conduct independent research about the Venezuelan diaspora around the world, their organizations and initiatives. This research project, titled Observatory of the Venezuelan Diaspora (Observatorio de la Diaspora Venezolana, or ODV, in Spanish) not only gathers information about the diaspora, but it also helps establish links between diaspora members and Venezuelan organizations abroad. In the absence of comprehensive information about the diaspora, the ODV collected information from a variety of sources, official statistics, UNHCR/IOM data about the Venezuelan migration, and the network of diasporic associations. Currently, we track the diaspora worldwide (including in approximately 300 cities and 90 countries), and those results can be found in Páez (2015, 2017a, and in a forthcoming third edition to be published in Colombia). Through our research, we have inquired about the diaspora members’ integration into their host society, skills, competencies, intention to return, and their interest or willingness to participate in supporting the recovery process of the country. This information was collected by using a variety of tools: online questionnaires, in-depth interviews, life stories, workshops, and focus groups in which thousands of Venezuelans have participated. This project, which started in 2013, is still a work

240

T. PÁEZ BRAVO

in progress in which information is continuously updated by using the same research tools just mentioned. Based on this research, the following section presents some of the insights we have gained about the diaspora and their public diplomacy efforts, through the ODV.

The Diaspora Communities’ Adopted Homes Latin American countries have been an example to the rest of the world, providing open arms and bridges to Venezuelan migrants (O’Boyle, 2020; Selee & Bolter, 2020). As detailed by the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR, 2019), many of these nations have plans for receiving Venezuelans and provide them with medical treatment upon arrival, receive them without identity cards or authenticated documents, and they have afforded them with diverse opportunities for integration. They welcome Venezuelans in the midst of their own economic difficulties and despite their institutional weaknesses. They have managed to handle a massive exodus that involves sudden and huge expenses not planned in their scarce budgets. Migration occurs in localities and cities that have different strengths and are differentially equipped to deal with migrants. This, in turn, affects the different ways in which immigrants experience their adoptive communities. Adoptive societies offer, according to their possibilities, employment opportunities. They also act as centers for capital, talent and ideas to come together (e.g., Caponio & Borkert, 2010; Scholten & Penninx, 2016). Research shows that “nearly all migrants, whether international or internal, are destined for cities, for it is in the city that their human capital is most rewarded” (Duncan & Popp, 2017, p. 3). The impact of immigrants and their inclusion in the host cities that take them in can vary according to the interinstitutional strengths, economic development, political interests, and specific realities of each city (De Shalit, 2018; Páez, 2019). In each one, particular challenges are posed to companies, institutions, authorities, and exodus associations. In the case of the Venezuelan diaspora, there are important differences between Bogotá, Cúcuta, and Barranquilla. In the Colombian capital of Bogotá, the Venezuelan diaspora represents nearly 5% of the population, while in the less developed regions the percentage could reach values close to 30%. In the much less developed cities of Pacaraima and Boa Vista, in the north of Brazil, Venezuelan migrants represent 10–15% or even more of the population. These cities have become important points of attention and collaboration for the diaspora.

10

THE STRATEGY OF THE VENEZUELAN DIASPORA …

241

The Venezuelan Diaspora as Public Diplomacy Actors The Venezuelan diaspora is a transmigrant community. As Glick Schiller et al. (1992) states, transmigrants are those “that they develop and maintain multiple family, social, economic, political, and religious and organizational ties that stretch borders” (p. IX). Venezuelans living outside the homeland keep and develop strong familiar networks and links back home. With, or perhaps because, of these networks, they also try to influence the image of the community abroad and the politics at home.

Narratives About the Diaspora and Reasons for Leaving Diaspora members around the world have expressed their reasons for leaving the country, which mainly include the following: (1) The nation’s economic deterioration (hyperinflation, lack of job opportunities); and (2) Insecurity (legal and personal), both condensed and exacerbated in the current socialist model in Venezuela. Migration, like all social events, is multifactor, having to do with border issues, power groups, human rights, integration, and xenophobia (Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Frías-Vázquez & Arcila, 2019), and often striking nationalist and local sensitivity chords (Franco-Guillén, 2016; Pryce, 2018; Van der Zwet, 2016). In building a common understanding of this phenomena, popular media plays an important role by attributing certain characteristics or narratives to immigration and immigrants. In the media, persistent myths about Venezuelan migration are evident. As Cañizález (2018) indicates, the press in Latin America has not overlooked the massive presence of Venezuelans immigrants, and it has covered it from the perspective of its volume, strain on other nations, and even the reasoning of those Venezuelans who choose to stay in the homeland. Similarly, as part of the OVD, we conducted an analysis of international media, finding evidence of the persistence of these myths in the media narratives, when referring to Venezuelan immigrants. Some of these myths refer to a brain drain from Venezuela, in which the homeland’s talent is fleeing (e.g. Dube, 2019; EFE, 2019; Mount, 2019). Arguments exist that immigrants tax or destroy the host country’s welfare system, or that immigrants steal jobs, which are common themes and myths in the worldwide coverage of immigration (e.g., Avdagic &

242

T. PÁEZ BRAVO

Savage, 2019; Brouwer et al., 2017; Lawlor & Tolley, 2017; Rendon et al., 2019). Another common aspect is the criminalization of immigrants, which is marked by xenophobia (e.g. D’Ancona, 2016; Menjívar, 2016). The ways in which the immigrants themselves understand their reasons for leaving and staying away are similar to these deep-rooted myths and beliefs shared by the media. In the ODV research, we found that in the case of the Venezuelan diaspora members, when asked if they want to return to the homeland or under which conditions they would return, their answers have to do with a change in the government system and being guaranteed a safe standard of living. Another of the reasons for the migration of Venezuelans has been the crime rate (John, 2019; Páez, 2015). For example, in 2017, the number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in Venezuela (57) more than doubled the number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in Colombia (25), a country that has suffered five decades of armed confrontation and has lowered dramatically its number of homicides in the last decade (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019). As recent reports have shown, in Venezuela there is insecurity and death (Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia, 2019; Rojas, 2019). Insecurity, as a push for migration, was also evident in drawings made by ODV diaspora focus-group participants during sessions that we held in France and Spain in 2015. The results and drawings gathered through the focus groups can be found in Páez (2017a). One of them shows Venezuela as an hourglass, filled not with sand, but with blood. Another showed the map of Venezuela covered by crosses, resembling a graveyard. One of the ODV interviewees—a forty year old man who lives in Colombia—put it this way: “In Venezuela the only full refrigerator is that of the morgue (…) I prefer to bid farewell to people at the airport, rather than at the cemetery.”

Rebuilding and Developing the Homeland Saying goodbye to the homeland, however, does not mean that migrants in the diaspora forget about the people they leave behind. In fact, given the dire view of the current state of Venezuela, it is not surprising that even while establishing themselves abroad, diaspora members continue to pursue goals in the homeland. In fact, rebuilding the home country or contributing to its development are two important functions that diaspora

10

THE STRATEGY OF THE VENEZUELAN DIASPORA …

243

communities can perform in public diplomacy as non-state actors who contribute to the achievement of national development goals (Fitzpatrick, 2007, 2012, 2017; Gilboa, 2008). These efforts are led either in coordination with their home government (Baser, 2018; Bravo, 2014; De Moya, 2011) or in opposition to it (De Moya, 2019; Zaharna & Uysal, 2016). As research has shown, the diaspora’s networks, resources, coordination, expertise and shared goals allow them to work collectively to advance their own public diplomacy goals (e.g., De Moya, 2019; Shumow, 2014). In the case of the Venezuelan diaspora, they work either in opposition to, or at least without coordination with, the national government. Buxton (2017) lists the extensive Venezuelan diaspora as part of the “diverse and eclectic network of interests and actors that make up Venezuela’s opposition movement” (p. 4). For the diaspora to act collectively, the importance of the diaspora associations is beyond doubt. As research has shown, they possess information, data, knowledge, and systematic contact with their communities, with whom they have established trusted and dependable relationships (Páez, 2018). The OVD has revealed that diaspora members have participated in many public diplomacy activities on all five continents. Venezuelan diaspora organizations adopt different names and forms, such as Casa Venezolana (Venezuelan house) in Belgium (https://en.casavenezolanabelgica.org/sobre), Casa Venezuela Association in Spain (https://aso caven.org), Diálogo por Venezuela (Dialogue for Venezuela) in France (https://www.facebook.com/Dialogo.por.Venezuela.Francia) and the Association of Venezuelan Journalists Abroad (APEVEX, in Spanish; https://apevex.wordpress.com). They engage with each other and with external audiences through a variety of channels, including participating as guest speakers in radio and TV programs in the countries where they reside, but also through local radio programs created by the diasporic organizations in various cities. They have also connected with each other through diaspora associations formed both in Europe and in the Americas. Another example is Plan País (www.planpais.com), a U.S.-based organization that has been working for over 10 years to educate and connect Venezuelan youth abroad (Plan País, 2020a). As the Plan País’ “About Us” page indicates, the aim is that the people they reach “are transformed into ambassadors of the Venezuelan potential: raising awareness about Venezuela in their communities and nurturing impactful initiatives” (Plan País, 2020b, “About Us,” para. 3). Plan País has national reach. One of

244

T. PÁEZ BRAVO

the ways it reaches thousands of people3 is through social media. It has an active Instagram page with more than 15,000 followers (https://www. instagram.com/planpais), a Twitter Channel with nearly 5000 followers (https://twitter.com/planpais), and a Facebook page with over 2000 likes and more than 3000 followers. Through these channels, Plan País shares stories from diaspora members and highlights different NGOs and advocacy organizations. Plan País also engages with diaspora members and supporters via events, such as annual youth conferences like the one that happened in March of 2019 in Miami, Florida, and the one that happened in November of 2019 in Paris, France (Plan País, 2020b). The collective work of this and other diaspora organizations, the support for the creation of new associations, and the virtual and faceto-face membership, in many of them, has allowed for the development of cultural and relationship-building projects, the strengthening of the network and the establishment of a relation based in mutual trust. It has also allowed for access to privileged information and for participation in various projects underway, under construction, or in their design phase. Together, we have come a long way in connecting and reinforcing previously existing links in areas such as environment, education, and Venezuelan entrepreneurship in Colombia and Latin America. French diplomat Alexis de Tocqueville highlighted the significance of these types of associations, stating that “in order for men to remain civilized, or to become civilized, it is necessary that the art of association be developed among them. Associationism allows the overcoming of social isolation, fosters sociability, an exchange of experiences and, last but not least, finding valid references for an effective integration in society” ([de] Tocqueville, 2007, p. 11). Similarly, in the case of the Venezuelan diaspora, partnerships facilitate and multiply the work with migrants, and thus, these partnerships have been supported by multilateral organizations, local governments and various countries. Associations and networks of Venezuelans created in these two decades have accumulated a lot of experience. They have formulated and executed projects and initiatives in all countries of the region. Two examples in which I have participated in, directly, are one entrepreneurial project that has been presented to the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), the Regional Citizenship Initiative, and a project presented in Argentina

3 The numbers of followers reported here correspond to September 2020 audiences.

10

THE STRATEGY OF THE VENEZUELAN DIASPORA …

245

and Spain to place Venezuelan migrants in cities in need of repopulation. These initiatives have been carried out with the associations and networks’ own resources, outside the official Venezuelan embassies, which have been transformed into extensions of the regime at home. They have adopted their engagement strategies around the motto: Diaspora is not the problem, we are part of the solution. Venezuelan diaspora associations have been essential in the outlining and deploying of the strategies and principles followed by our community, globally. More specifically, these associations have performed the following roles and services: • Guiding newcomers and helping them in the integration process, defending their human rights in the host countries; • Documenting, denouncing, and disseminating the Venezuela human tragedy; • Creating different teams in diverse fields to develop projects, some of them jointly with organizations and institutions in Venezuela, in areas such as energy and oil, education, health, environment, etc.; • Developing—together with representatives of political parties—relationships with the parliament (at local, regional, national, and supranational levels); • Creating special organizations to send medicines, medical equipment, and food to Venezuela; • Formalizing professional organizations that gather Venezuelan journalists, medical doctors, musicians, etc.; and, • Communicating virtually with hundreds of Venezuelan Facebook groups by countries and cities, and, in some countries, they have webpages and radio programs. Through these roles, the Venezuelan diaspora and its associations have engaged in public diplomacy (Bravo, 2014; Bravo & De Moya, 2015) by promoting Venezuelan culture, business and common projects, while also opposing the government (De Moya, 2019; Zaharna & Uysal, 2016). In my perspective, based on the work I have developed with the ODV and the PDV, I consider that the regime institutions, like embassies, offer limited support to the diaspora: They mainly offer procedures to get passports and legal documents. I argue that the regimen uses those institutions, mainly the embassies, as political tools. This can explain

246

T. PÁEZ BRAVO

why diasporic organizations are the ones responsible for putting together scientific congresses; organizing shows and events for Venezuelan musicians, filmmakers, and comedians; coming up with gastronomy and binational encounters; and publishing Venezuelan literature.4 Overall, the work of these organizations is quite active and broad. It includes integration of migrants in host cities and provision of information regarding employment opportunities and regularization programs, as well as facilitating access to documents and special permits. They promote projects to make the best use of the migrants’ skills in host cities, and they ensure the delivery of their services in locations far away from large urban centers. There are Venezuelan diaspora associations that promote entrepreneurship and integration in Colombia (Cúcuta, Medellín, Bogotá), Argentina (Buenos Aires), Perú (Lima), and other host cities. In Bogotá, for instance, programs are carried out with the help of local institutions5 and specialized organizations such as bilateral business associations, chambers of commerce, universities and research centers. With them, diaspora associations in Bogotá implement a wide variety of projects in a broad range of areas: political proposals for exodus management, programs aimed at counteracting and avoiding xenophobia in specific locations, meetings, and publications, and the documentation and dissemination of diaspora problems, among others. To the projects already mentioned, we could add the “xenophobia” network established in collaboration with the Universidad de La Sabana (Colombia), and ININCO (Instituto de Investigaciones de la Comunicación, which can be translated as Institute for Communication Studies), at the Universidad Central de Venezuela. This network content analyzes media outlets with the aim of identifying xenophobic content.

4 There is a large number of shows organized by diasporic organizations. One example is the Colombian Binational Encounters in areas like film production, business meetings, literature festivals, etc. 5 For example, the Chamber of Commerce of Bogotá and Corporación GENVAL developed an entrepreneurship and integration pilot project.

10

THE STRATEGY OF THE VENEZUELAN DIASPORA …

247

Diaspora Media In recent years, new partnerships have emerged for the ODV. In 2017 we started a pioneering weekly TV and Radio program called “The Diaspora’s Voice in Buen Provecho” (“La Voz de la Diáspora en Buen Provecho”), which allows Venezuelans abroad a presence in their homeland to present what they are doing in different fields.6 More recently, we created the radio and TV show Diaspora and Environment, to link Venezuelan human capital specialized in the study of the environment to different projects and institutions in Venezuela. In the last couple of years, similar spaces have been created in other countries like Chile and Colombia.7 The pioneer experience of “La Voz de la Diáspora en Buen Provecho” is transmitted by the oldest radio station in the country, Radio Caracas .8 Week after week since 2017, this program has facilitated the joining of efforts to connect the diaspora and the homeland, as well as to create a positive image of the diaspora members. In the past four years, more than 200 diaspora organizations throughout the globe have participated in the program, presenting their achievements and expectations. There are also trade organizations whose members participate in this network. In cities with a large number of migrants, specialization and division of labor has been possible, and specific diaspora organizations have been established in areas such as energy and oil, engineering, medicine and health, communication and freedom of expression, etc.

6 The program can be watched on YouTube.com and through the Facebook page “La voz de la diáspora”. 7 In Chile, journalist Yeleiza Cayama conducts a program for the Venezuelan diaspora and, more recently, in Colombia, “Tierra de Gracia” (a similar program) was created. The Venezuelan Observatory of the Rosario University develops a weekly program at the university radio station as well. 8 This program has been broadcast for the past four years, since 2017, through RCR.TV and RCR750 weekly. It is the segment “The Voice of the Venezuelan Diaspora” in the show “Buen Provecho,” and it is conducted by Thays Peñalver.

248

T. PÁEZ BRAVO

Contributions of the Venezuelan Diaspora Abroad and in the Homeland In their limitless contempt for “those who are different,” citizens and their governments can create fatalistic visions of migration, which can result in physical or legal obstacles that, in porous borders such as the Colombian-Venezuelan border, can transform the journey to work into a migratory process (e.g. Páez, 2019). In receiving countries around the world, some political leaders, journalists and media have tried to equate migration with crime (e.g., Hungary Prime Minister Victor Orban and politician Marine Le Pen, in France) (Gorondi, 2019; Dearden, 2017). These leaders stigmatize migrants and repudiate the poor. Migrants are accused of causing unemployment, reducing wages, destroying “nationality and identity,” undermining security, and increasing poverty. The reasoning assumes the existence of a fixed number of service and housing providers, a fixed number of employers, a finite job offer and the idea that immigrants will occupy those positions earning lower wages (e.g., Páez, 2019; World Bank, 2018b). These critics often leave aside another part of this reality: Migrants consume and buy (food, services, transport, housing, etc.) and this boosts economic activity and multiplies productive chains (World Bank, 2018b). They are producers and consumers (Páez, 2015, 2018, 2019). Therefore, they create direct and indirect jobs and, thus, contribute to reducing poverty. Migrants also undertake projects and invest, and create wealth and employment (Páez, 2015, 2018, 2019). Their work and their taxes contribute to the State more than what they receive from their services and those used by them (Moreno & Bruquetas Callejo, 2011). Recent studies by international organizations confirm that migration has positive impacts on development (World Bank, 2018b). We have shown some examples of these contributions. To those, we can add the “Particles Physics in Venezuela Network” (Rangel-Smith et al., 2018) and its “Venezuelan Agora Initiative;” as a result of this project, the “Revista de Occidente” dedicated a special edition to the consensus for the Venezuelan reconstruction. As our study has revealed, the aggregate demand of the Venezuelan diaspora (in the cities and localities they have chosen to migrate) creates jobs, directly and indirectly, promotes the expansion of trade, fosters the specialization and division of labor and, thus, increases the well-being of

10

THE STRATEGY OF THE VENEZUELAN DIASPORA …

249

all. Venezuelan immigration provides the host country with a workingage population and with holders of knowledge, skills, and competencies. Recent data on the contributions of the Venezuelan exodus to the GDP of countries such as Peru and Chile confirm the positive role of the diaspora in the development of host countries (e.g., BBVA, 2019; FMI, 2020; UNHCR-ACNUR, 2020). Historically, remittances to Venezuela were insignificant because migration was a trivial phenomenon. However, in the 2010s, remittances became very important for Venezuela. In 2003, Venezuela installed a controlled exchange rate that created enormous distortions in the market (Caselli, 2013; Fletcher, 2004). There was an official exchange rate and the black market or market exchange rate, which was much higher than the official one. Since 2013, the economic situation in Venezuela has deteriorated at a fast pace (Caselli, 2013). Even the official statistics of the Venezuelan Central Bank, after a long silence of three years, admitted the collapse of the economy. Due to the controlled exchange rate, remittances are sent in ways other than the official financial system, making it difficult to track and measure them. According to the research of Gustavo Oliveros (director of Ecoanalítica), the amount of remittances to Venezuela was $4000 billions in 2019, $2500 billions in 2018, $1500 billions in 2017, and $78 million in 2016 (Orozco, 2020, p. 4; VOANoticias.com, 2019). The flow of remittances is now an important commodity and the second-largest source of foreign earnings after oil (Orozco, 2020). “We estimate that remittance flows are reaching over 2 million recipient households, which equates to more than 35 percent of the country’s households. In fact, given the economic situation in the country, remittances now account for 5 percent of Venezuela’s GDP” (Orozco, 2020, p. 11). “In addition to transferring funds back to Venezuela, Venezuelans abroad send in-kind transfers such as food, clothing, toiletries, and furniture to family and friends” (Orozco, 2020, p. 12). Several studies show that a 10% increase in official international remittances reduces poverty by approximately 3.5% of people living in that situation (e.g. World Bank, 2006, 2018b). They also boost the capital market and the creation of new financial products. Regardless of the estimates, the amounts of global remittances “exceeded, and almost tripled, those of international cooperation and development” in recent years (Orozco, 2020; Orozco & Klaas, 2020, p. 11). “In addition, remittances

250

T. PÁEZ BRAVO

are more than twice the size of international aid flows” (World Bank, 2006, p. 13). Venezuelan diaspora members, as other migrants, also operate as commercial attachés, trade and investment drivers, and their knowledge of the host country and of the country of origin makes them a privileged source of information that allows costs to be reduced within the process of internationalization of companies (VelocityGlobal, 2020). “Social remittances” circulate with migrants: know-how, technological diffusion, culture and knowledge, areas that have received less attention and are, therefore, no less important for development.

Conclusion When we were a country of immigration, the institutional framework in Venezuela was created to address that reality. Today, as a country of strong emigration, it is necessary to provide a new institutional framework to meet the current circumstances. This framework must be streamlined. It should provide great flexibility and give society and the private sector due to precedence. As the Global Forum on Migration and Development states, a public–private partnership is necessary, envisaged in our platform, and we need to give voice to companies and entrepreneurs. It is important to continue taking advantage of cross-border mobility, bilateral business networks, entrepreneurial networks, as well as existing university, and institutional networks. These are key pieces for regional dialogue. The “open arms” policy uncovers many windows to private and public integration in the region, for joint work between countries of origin and host countries. This is facilitated by the fact that regional elites’ awareness and conviction have grown regarding the urgency of developing links through the exodus between countries of origin and host countries. It is an opportunity to strengthen development as a human goal. In addition, the exchange of skills and abilities, and of know-how, is inherent to economic growth. In 2015, labor migration was estimated to increase gross domestic product by 4%, close to 3.2. trillion dollars (World Bank, 2018a, p. 9). “In fact, migrants make up just 3.4 percent of the world’s population, but MGI’s research finds that they contribute nearly 10 percent of global GDP. They contributed roughly $6.7 trillion to global GDP in 2015—some $3 trillion more than they would have produced in their origin countries. Developed nations realize more than 90 percent of this effect” (McKinsey & Company, 2016, p. #6).

10

THE STRATEGY OF THE VENEZUELAN DIASPORA …

251

Migrants help competition, innovation, and business expansion. They carry with them skills that narrow the gaps in native labor forces and also introduce new ideas and perspectives. Levitt says that “they (the migrants) can still advance state consolidation and national development from their new homes” (Levitt, 2001, p. 10). I would add that in some areas it will be necessary to encourage migration in order to facilitate access and contact with knowledge in the leading sectors. Having seen all the dimensions in which migrants participate and could participate, it is important that those who assume responsibility for coordinating the project assess its significance for the countries of origin and for host countries. The new perspective claims that instead of offering incentives for migrants to return to their country of origin, it is essential to ensure a better management of the relationship with the diaspora and its associations. Management of the exodus is conceived by us as part of a broader effort in the region and the world. In our perspective, the damage perpetrated on Venezuela by twenty-first-century Socialism has been huge and goes beyond the scope of macroeconomics. It has left deep social wounds, destroyed the culture of work and merit and annihilated productivity. The democratic change that Venezuelan democrats are trying to build with the global support of The Lima Group, the Organization of American States, the European Union, USA, Canada, Japan, and other countries that do not recognize the actual regime, is presented as a new opportunity to recover the country along with the countries and cities that today host Venezuelans. This will require many investments and a lot of human capital. Everyone is welcome to contribute.

References Avdagic, S., & Savage, L. (2019). Negativity bias: The impact of framing of immigration on welfare state support in Germany, Sweden and the UK. British Journal of Political Science, 51(2), 1–22. Baser, B. (2018). Homeland calling: Kurdish diaspora and state-building in the Kurdistan region of Iraq in the post-Saddam era. Middle East Critique, 27 (1), 77–94. BBVA. (2019, October 11). BBVA research: El aporte de la inmigración venezolana a la economía peruana (The contribution of Venezuelan immigration to the Peruvian economy). https://www.bbva.com/es/pe/bbva-research-elaporte-de-la-inmigracion-venezolana-a-la-economia-peruana/.

252

T. PÁEZ BRAVO

Berglund, S. (1994). Italian Immigration in Venezuela: A story still untold. Center for Migration Studies Special Issues, 11(3), 173–209. Bidegain, G. (1987). Democracia, migración y retorno: los argentinos, chilenos y uruguayos en Venezuela. International Migration, 25(3), 299–323. Bravo, V. (2014). The importance of diaspora communities as key publics for national governments around the world. In G. J. Golan, S. U. Yang, & D. Kinsey (Eds.), International public relations and public diplomacy: Communication and engagement. Peter Lang. Bravo, V., & De Moya, M. (2015). Communicating the homeland’s relationship with its diaspora community: The cases of El Salvador and Colombia. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 10(1), 70–104. Brouwer, J., van der Woude, M., & Van der Leun, J. (2017). Framing migration and the process of crimmigration: A systematic analysis of the media representation of unauthorized immigrants in the Netherlands. European Journal of Criminology, 14(1), 100–119. Bull, B., & Rosales, A. (2020). Into the shadows: Sanctions, rentierism, and economic informalization in Venezuela. European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 109, 107–133. Buxton, J. (2017). Situation normal in Venezuela: All fouled up: Amid an historic crisis, Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro hangs on with the help of a stalwart ally: The country’s long dysfunctional opposition. NACLA Report on the Americas, 49(1), 3–6. Cañizález, A. (2018, July 6). ¿Es una diáspora la emigración masiva de venezolanos? (Is the massive migration of Venezuelans a diaspora?). Prodavinci.com. https://prodavinci.com/es-una-diaspora-la-emigracion-mas iva-de-venezolanos/. Caponio, T., & Borkert, M. (2010). The local dimension of migration policymaking (p. 204). Amsterdam University Press. Caselli, I. (2013, September 5). Venezuela’s economic woes: Sabotage or mismanagement? BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-ame rica-23970027. Castellanos, L. (2014, October 14). Fuga de cerebros en Venezuela: Gobierno prende alarmas y habría regulación. CNN En Español. https://cnnespanol. cnn.com/2014/12/14/fuga-de-cerebros-en-venezuela-gobierno-enciendealarmas-y-asoma-posibilidad-de-regulacion/. Castillo Crasto, T., & Reguant Álvarez, M. (2017). Percepciones sobre la migración venezolana: Causas, España como destino, expectativas de retorno. Migraciones, 41, 133–163. Chandler, C. R., & Tsai, Y. M. (2001). Social factors influencing immigration attitudes: An analysis of data from the General Social Survey. The Social Science Journal, 38(2), 177–188.

10

THE STRATEGY OF THE VENEZUELAN DIASPORA …

253

D’Ancona, M. A. C. (2016). Immigration as a threat: Explaining the changing pattern of xenophobia in Spain. Journal of International Migration and Integration, 17 (2), 569–591. De Moya, M. (2011). A ground theory of global public relations by Diaspora Organizations: Building relationships, communities, and group identity. Unpublished Dissertation. University of Florida. http://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl. edu/UF/E0/04/28/58/00001/demoya_m.pdf. De Moya, M. (2019). Protesting the homeland: Diaspora dissent public relations efforts to oppose the Dominican Republic’s citizenship policies. In Protest public relations (pp. 106–127). Routledge. De Shalit, A. (2018). Cities and immigration: Political and moral dilemmas in the new era of migration. Oxford University Press. Dearden, L. (2017, April 18). French elections: Marine Le Pen vows to suspend immigration to “protect France”. Independent.co.uk. https://www.indepe ndent.co.uk/news/world/europe/french-elections-latest-marine-le-pen-imm igration-suspend-protect-france-borders-front-national-fn-a7689326.html. Dube, R. (2019, March 17). Venezuela’s power grid afflicted by Brain Drain, corruption. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/venezu elas-power-grid-afflicted-by-brain-drain-corruption-11552852210. Duncan, H., & Popp, I. (2017). Migrants and cities: Stepping beyond world migration report 2015. In IOM (2017), World migration report 2018. IOM. EFE. (2019, June 11). Gremio denuncia una masiva “fuga de cerebros” en la industria eléctrica venezolana. Agencia EFE. https://www.efe.com/efe/ame rica/sociedad/gremio-denuncia-una-masiva-fuga-de-cerebros-en-la-industriaelectrica-venezolana/20000013-3997400. El Nacional. (2018, April 3). Maduro sobre migrantes venezolanos: ¿Tú te irías a lavar pocetas en Miami? El Nacional. http://www.el-nacional.com/ noticias/politica/maduro-sobre-migrantes-venezolanos-irias-lavar-pocetasmiami_229452. Fitzpatrick, K. (2007). Advancing the new public diplomacy: A public relations perspective. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 2(3), 187–211. Fitzpatrick, K. (2012). Defining strategic publics in a networked world: Public diplomacy’s challenge at home and abroad. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 7 (4), 421–440. Fitzpatrick, K. (2017). Public diplomacy in the public interest. The Journal of Public Interest Communications, 1(1), 78–92. Fletcher, E. (2004). Bolívar distorted: The effects of exchange controls on the Venezuelan Economy or “Perhaps Chávez spent too much time reading Machiavelli and not enough time reading Adam. Duke University. PDF. FMI (Fondo Monetario Internacional). (2020, February 23). EFE: Fondo Monetario Internacional reconoce el impacto positivo de la migración venezolana (International Monetary Fund recognizes positive impact of

254

T. PÁEZ BRAVO

Venezuelan migration). Portafolio. https://www.portafolio.co/economia/ fmi-reconoce-impacto-positivo-de-la-inmigracion-venezolana-538380. Franco-Guillén, N. (2016). Selfishness of the affluent? Stateless nationalist and regionalist parties and immigration. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42(8), 1304–1316. Frías-Vázquez, M., & Arcila, C. (2019, October). Hate speech against Central American immigrants in Mexico: Analysis of xenophobia and racism in politicians, media and citizens. In Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Technological Ecosystems for Enhancing Multiculturality (pp. 956–960). Garcia Rangel, S. (2019). Ni allá ni acá–a short story about the Venezuela diaspora and the perennial border crossings. http://repository.falmouth.ac. uk/3603/1/Book%20of%20Abstracts_Borders%20and%20Crossings%202 019.pdf. Gilboa, E. (2008). Searching for a theory of public diplomacy. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 55–77. Glick Schiller, N., Basch, L., & Blanc-Szanton, C. (1992). Towards a definition of transnationalism: Introductory remarks and research questions. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 645(1), ix–xiv. Gorondi, P. (2019, April 5). Hungarian PM Orban launches campaign with antimigrant plan. APNews.com. https://apnews.com/ddff4e9c32f74ffcac4fee39 07a7f1e5. Hausmann, R. (2017). Venezuela’s unprecedented collapse. Project Syndicate, 31. Human Rights Watch. (2020). Venezuela. https://www.hrw.org/americas/ven ezuela. International Office of Migration. (2019). Migration trends in the Americas: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. International Office of Migration. https:// www.iom.int/external/migration-trends-americas-bolivarian-republic-ven ezuela. John, M. (2019). Venezuelan economic crisis: Crossing Latin American and Caribbean borders. Migration and Development, 8(3), 437–447. Lawlor, A., & Tolley, E. (2017). Deciding who’s legitimate: News media framing of immigrants and refugees. International Journal of Communication, 11, 25. Levitt, P. (2001). Transnational migration: Taking stock and future directions. Global Networks, 1(3), 195–216. http://felfel.is/sites/default/files/Lev itt%20-%20Transnational%20Migration%20-%20taking%20stock%20and%20f uture%20directions.pdf. Lobo-Guerrero, C. (2014, October 3). El talento se fuga de Venezuela. El País. https://elpais.com/internacional/2014/10/03/actualidad/141237 0839_134305.html.

10

THE STRATEGY OF THE VENEZUELAN DIASPORA …

255

Lozano, D. (2019, June 8). Diáspora venezolana, una “avalancha” sin límites (Venezuelan diaspora, a limitless landslide). El Mundo Internacional. https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2019/06/08/5cfbf084fc6c 83ed0f8b45aa.html. McKinsey & Company. (2016, November 30). Global migration’s impact and opportunity. McKinsey Global Institute. https://www.mckinsey.com/fea tured-insights/employment-and-growth/global-migrations-impact-and-opp ortunity. Menjívar, C. (2016). Immigrant criminalization in law and the media: Effects on Latino immigrant workers’ identities in Arizona. American Behavioral Scientist, 60(5–6), 597–616. Moreno, F., & Bruquetas Callejo, M. (2011). Inmigración y estado de bienestar en España (Immigration and welfare state in Spain). In Colección Estudios Sociales N.31, Obra Social La Caixa, España. Mount, I. (2019, February 27). Venezuela’s top talent seeks sanctuary in Spain. The Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/7f2831f2-35b411e9-bb0c-42459962a812. O’Boyle, B. (2020, April 20). How Latin American countries and cities have welcomed migrants. Americas Quarterly. https://www.americasquarterly. org/article/how-latin-american-countries-and-cities-have-welcomed-mig rants/. Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia. (2019). Informe Anual de Violencia. https://observatoriodeviolencia.org.ve/news/informe-anual-de-violencia2019/. OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). (2020). Refugee and migrant response plan 2020, for refugees and migrants from Venezuela (January–December 2020). https://reliefweb.int/report/col ombia/refugee-and-migrant-response-plan-2020-refugees-and-migrants-ven ezuela-january. OHCHR (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner). (2019, July 4). U.N. Human Rights report on Venezuela urges immediate measures to halt and remedy grave rights violations. https://www.ohchr.org/ EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24788&LangID=E. Orozco, M. (2020). Remittances to Latina America and the Caribbean in 2019: Emerging patterns. TheDialogue.org. https://www.thedialogue.org/ analysis/remittances-to-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-in-2019-emergingchallenges/. Orozco, M., & Klaas, K. (2020). Money transfers to Venezuela: Remittance flows Amidst evolving foreign exchange. TheDialogue.org. https://www. google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKE wjEoKehtvbrAhUhYjUKHUDCAAUQFjABegQIBhAB&url=https%3A%2F% 2Fwww.thedialogue.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2020%2F05%2FR

256

T. PÁEZ BRAVO

eport-Money-Transfers-to-Venezuela_May-2020-2.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3Yb W8UgUyVghA1Pxe0D42e. Pacheco Ríos, G. (2016). Idas y Venidas: El Flujo Migratorio entre Colombia y Venezuela 1999–2015 (Going and coming back: The immigration influx between Colombia and Venezuela 1999–2015). Unpublished thesis presented to fulfill graduation requirements at the Universidad Militar de Granada (Military University of Granada). Páez, T. (2015). La Voz de la Diáspora Venezolana (The voice of Venezuelan diaspora). Editorial La Catarata. Páez, T. (2017a). La Voz de la Diáspora Venezolana (The voice of Venezuelan diaspora), second edition. Editorial El Estilete. Páez, T. (2017b). Amid economic crisis and political turmoil, Venezuelans form a new exodus. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ article/amid-economic-crisis-and-political-turmoil-venezuelans-form-newexodus. Páez, T. (2018). Venezuelans are leaving because of hunger, instability and poverty. ID4D. Agence Française de Développement. https://ideas4develo pment.org/en/venezuela-hunger-instability-poverty/. Páez, T. (2019). El papel de la diáspora venezolana en la reconstrucción de Venezuela (The role of the Venezuelan diaspora in the Venezuelan reconstruction). In Venezuela: Consensos para la Reconstrucción (Venezuela: Consensus for reconstruction). Revista de Occidente, Julio-Agosto, 458–459, 35–50. Páez, T., & Phelan, M. (2018). Emigración venezolana hacia España en tiempos de Revolución Bolivariana (1998–2017) (Venezuelan migration to Spain during the times of the Bolivarian Revolution (1998–2017). Revista Internacional de Estudios Migratorios, 8(2). http://ojs.ual.es/ojs/index.php/RIEM/ article/view/2629. Patterson, R. (2006). Transnationalism: Diaspora-homeland development. Social Forces, 84(4), 1891–1907. Plan País. (2020a). Plan País 2020. https://www.planpais.com/. Plan País. (2020b). ¿Quiénes Somos?. https://www.planpais.com/quienes-somos. html. Pryce, D. K. (2018). US citizens’ current attitudes toward immigrants and immigration: A study from the general social survey. Social Science Quarterly, 99(4), 1467–1483. Rangel-Smith, C., Camacho Toro, R., & Ocariz, J. (2018, October 4). Diáspora organizada: Física de partículas en Venezuela (Organized diaspora: Particles physics in Venezuela). Revista Persea: Cultura Científica para América Latina. https://revistapersea.com/ciencia-sociedad/diaspora-organi zada-fisica-de-particulas-en-venezuela/.

10

THE STRATEGY OF THE VENEZUELAN DIASPORA …

257

RCR (Radio Caracas Radio and Television). (2020). “La voz de la diáspora venezolana en Buen Provecho” with Thays Peñalver and Tomás Páez: Experts. in Radio Caracas Radio and Television (RCR.TV/ RCRC) [Weekly segment in radio an TV program Buen Provecho, since 2017 until present time]. RCR750. (2019, May 20). Buen Provecho “La Voz de la Diáspora” con Tomás Páez. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qsMKs1UiTTI. RCR750. (2020, June 22). Buen Provecho “La Voz de la Diáspora” con Tomás Páez. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZfBW9d3BMeU. Rendon, H., De Moya, M., & Johnson, M. A. (2019). “Dreamers” or threat: Bilingual frame building of DACA immigrants. Newspaper Research Journal, 40(1), 7–24. Reuters Staff. (2018, October 2). Four million Venezuelans may live in Colombia by 2021: Minister. Reuters.com. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezu ela-migration-colombia/four-million-venezuelans-may-live-in-colombia-by2021-minister-idUSKCN1MC2NZ. Rojas, Y. (2019, April 30). Más de 330.000 muertes violentas en 20 años de régimen chavista en Venezuela. ABC Internacional. https://www.abc.es/int ernacional/abci-mas-330000-muertes-violentas-20-anos-regimen-chavista-ven ezuela-201904120203_noticia.html. Saxenian, A. (2005). From brain drain to circulation brain: Transnational communities and regional upgrading in India and China. Studies in Comparative International Development, Summer, 40(2), 35–61. https://www.res earchgate.net/publication/237827782_From_Brain_Drain_to_Brain_Circula tion_Transnational_Communities_and_Regional_Upgrading_in_India_and_ China. Scholten, P., & Penninx, R. (2016). The multilevel governance of migration and integration. In Integration processes and policies in Europe (pp. 91–108). Springer. Selee, A., & Bolter, J. (2020, February 7). Could Venezuela´s loss be Latin America’s Gain? ForeignPolicy.com. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/ 07/could-venezuelas-loss-be-latin-americas-gain/. Serrato, F. (2017, July 16). La diáspora venezolana vota contra Maduro (The Venezuelan diaspora votes against Maduro). El País. https://elpais.com/int ernacional/2017/07/16/actualidad/1500231111_932034.html. Shin, G., & Moon, R. (2018). From brain drain to brain circulation and linkage. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Working Paper. Stanford University. https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/publication/brain-drain-brain-circulationand-linkage. Shumow, M. (2014). Media production in a transnational setting: Three models of immigrant journalism. Journalism, 15(8), 1076–1093. [de] Tocqueville, A. (2007). La democracia en América. http://www.terras.edu. ar/biblioteca/10/FP_Tocqueville_2_Unidad_4.pdf.

258

T. PÁEZ BRAVO

Torrealba, R. (1988). Recent trends in international migration to Venezuela: Results of a national migration survey. Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos, 3(10), 415. UNHCR. (2019, December 14). R4V Regional Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela. https://data2.unhcr.org/es/documents/det ails/67282#_ga=2.95005468.1285068470.1600365380-327197475.160 0365380. UNHCR-ACNUR. (2020, March 19). La economía de Roraima [Brasil] y el flujo de venezolanos: Evidencias y subsidios para políticas públicas (The economy of Roraima [Brazil] and the influx of venezuelans: Evidence and subsidies for public policies). https://www.refworld.org.es/docid/5e73a2 e04.html. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2019, July). Global study on homicide: Homicide trends, patterns and criminal justice response. https:// www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja& uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwidlfaThvbrAhXvgXIEHdvCDbkQFjAAegQIBRAB& url=s%3A%2F%2Fwww.unodc.org%2Funodc%2Fen%2Fdata-and-analysis%2Fg lobal-study-on-homicide.html&usg=AOvVaw0535lW4FgLJnn8ldXE2v9z. Van der Zwet, A. (2016). To see ourselves as others see us: Identity and attitudes towards immigration amongst civic nationalists. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42(8), 1242–1256. VelocityGlobal. (2020, March 30). Globalization benefits and challenges. https:// velocityglobal.com/blog/globalization-benefits-and-challenges/. Vivas Peñalver, L., & Páez, T. (2017). The Venezuelan diaspora, another impending crisis? Freedom House Report. VOANoticias.com. (2019, October 11). Por miles, se multiplicó dependencia de los venezolanos a las remesas (By thousands, the dependency of venezuelans on remittances multiplied). https://www.voanoticias.com/venezuela/ remesas-venezuela-exportacion-petroleo. World Bank. (2006). Global economic prospects. http://documents.worldbank. org/curated/en/507301468142196936/pdf/343200GEP02006.pdf. World Bank. (2018a). Moving for prosperity: Global migration and labor markets. Policy Research Report. World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/res earch/publication/moving-for-prosperity. World Bank. (2018b, June 14). Global migration can be a potent tool in the fight to end poverty across the world—New report. World Bank. https://www.wor ldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/06/14/global-migration-can-be-apotent-tool-in-the-fight-to-end-poverty-across-the-world-new-report. Zaharna, R., & Uysal, N. (2016). Going for the jugular in public diplomacy: How adversarial publics using social media are challenging state legitimacy. Public Relations Review, 42(1), 109–119.

CHAPTER 11

Mexican Diasporic Women in Public Diplomacy: A Case Study of “Mex and the City” in the United States Eduardo Luciano Tadeo Hernández

Edmund Gullion, a U.S. diplomat and professor, coined the term public diplomacy in the 1960s (Cull, 2006), when he imagined how communication with foreign publics could be possible in the Cold War context, where the ideological confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union translated in the media construction of the other as a threat (Taylor, 2003). The way in which the term public diplomacy was born brings to mind the classic depiction of the levels of analysis in International Relations (Waltz, 2001): Man, the State and War. Mexican scholar Mónica Trujillo López (2014) observed that Waltz’s perspective reflects an association of international politics to masculinity. The same logic could be applied to public diplomacy: It was born with a male- and State-centered narrative. Today, scholars are also concerned with how this term can be applied to or be enriched with Global South

E. L. Tadeo Hernández (B) Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City, Mexico © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Bravo and M. De Moya (eds.), Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74564-6_11

259

260

E. L. TADEO HERNÁNDEZ

experiences. Furthermore, there is a current debate about going beyond State-actor approaches to understand a new diplomatic paradigm where non-State actors play an important role in a globalized world and in a new media environment characterized by networked communications (Castells, 2008; Melissen, 2005). This new public diplomacy paradigm allows us to consider diasporas at the center of our analysis. Diasporas are understood as “immigrants who still feel a connection to their country of origin” (Brinkerhoff, 2009, p. 1) and who, in the context of public diplomacy, can be instruments for States or other actors, but they can also be agents in their own rights (Bravo, 2014). This chapter is concerned with the diaspora as agents in public diplomacy. Therefore, it understands that diasporas can perform three diplomatic roles: advocacy, representation, and mediation (Ho & Mcconnell, 2019). These roles are not necessarily in favor of national interests or against them, per se; rather, they are informed by diverse diasporic concerns (Bravo, 2014; De Moya, 2019; Zaharna & Uysal, 2016). In performing these roles, diasporas can become mediators between countries and also cultural ambassadors, among other possibilities (Bermejo Mora, 2012; Bravo & De Moya, 2015, 2018; Gonzalez, 2014). Scholars argue that diasporas can contribute in a unique way to public diplomacy due to the diversity of their agendas and the particularities of their identity formation (Bravo, 2014; Brinkerhoff, 2019; Kö¸ser Akçapar & Bayraktar Aksel, 2017; Li, 2012; Schumann, 2004; Tadeo Hernández, 2017). Scholarship has moved from questions about the legitimacy of non-State actors in public diplomacy to questions on how those specific actors contribute to the practice, in practical and theoretical terms (Ayhan, 2019; Bravo, 2014; Bravo & De Moya, 2015; Cull, 2019; DeWind & Segura, 2014; La Porte, 2012; Quinsaat, 2016). Nonetheless, there is still limited discussion on how women matter in these analytical frameworks. Thus, the aim of this case study is to reflect on the role of Global South women in public diplomacy, specifically Mexican diasporic women. Thinking about the Mexican diaspora brings us immediately to the United States, home for approximately 34 million Mexicans, including those who were born in Mexico and then migrated, and those Mexican Americans born in the United States, which are the majority (Stepler & Brown, 2015). In every city where they are located, such as Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York (Brown & Lopez, 2013), the diasporic agenda varies according to the interests, concerns, and identities of the Mexican

11

MEXICAN DIASPORIC WOMEN IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY …

261

communities, given that they come or are descendants of people from different regions within Mexico (MPI, 2015). The study of the Mexican diaspora has a great tradition in academia: Scholars have analyzed its impact on Mexico (Shain, 1999) and the Mexican State policies toward it (Délano, 2018). However, it has not been until very recently that authors have started framing the Mexican diaspora analysis within the field of public diplomacy, emphasizing government strategies to communicate and represent the diaspora, mostly in the United States (Bravo & De Moya, 2018; Villanueva, 2011, 2015), or contributing to approaches that deal with Mexican government public diplomacy in general (Villanueva, 2011, 2017). In contrast, this chapter shifts the focus away from the Mexican government, by placing the Mexican diaspora at the center and, in particular, by taking a gender perspective that centers women narratives, which I believe are fundamental to make sense of the new public diplomacy involving Global South nations, such as Mexico. In this case study, I explore and describe a diasporic project launched in New York City, called Mex and the City. It was developed by women of Mexican origin, with different social backgrounds, who decided to write a blog to share their lives in the city and eventually realized the social potential to this initiative, transforming it into a project to change the image of Mexicans in New York (Iris Avelar, personal communication, May 2, 2019). This case study allows us to reflect on the role of gender in diplomacy and public diplomacy, the importance of diasporic women, and the use of new technologies in the construction of spaces to tell new stories about the imagined community. In order to approach these questions, I explore how women’s diasporic experiences inform projects of cultural representation, and therefore, their public diplomacy efforts. I take the Mex and the City website as a point of departure, because it connected later to other platforms such as Tumblr and Instagram. My dialogue with the founders started in 2019 and, ever since, I paid the most attention to the blog on Tumblr, given that it is where they launched the project Racial Profiling, which led to the construction of a multiple-actor network and the discourse of the Global Mexican. Methodologically, this chapter explores the content of Mex and the City by reviewing how the discourse of Mexican women and their diasporic identity are represented through the digital profiles in Tumblr, and it also analyzes how the organization itself is informed by the stories

262

E. L. TADEO HERNÁNDEZ

of two Mexican women from the diaspora, both founders of Mex and the City, whom I interviewed for this study. These in-depth interviews served to better understand the driving forces behind their cultural representation project. Ultimately, I reflect about the formation process of women-led diaspora projects that start at the personal level and evolve into a (public) diplomatic one, as they become cultural influencers, i.e. cultural ambassadors for their community and beyond. To present this analysis, the chapter is structured as follows: First, it deals with the question of gender in International Relations to critically reflect how this perspective can be introduced into the public diplomacy debate. Second, it looks at how women, in general, and diasporic women, in particular, have been considered in diplomacy. Third, it moves to the consideration of how Mexican women have participated in public diplomacy, pointing to the limited attention given to diasporic women. Fourth, it briefly discusses some methodological aspects in regard to this case of study. Fifth, it discusses the case of Mex and the City from a public diplomacy perspective. Sixth, it offers some final thoughts about the limits of this research and on new possible areas for further academic work.

Gender in International Relations and Public Diplomacy A contemporary look at public diplomacy, from an international relations perspective, provides room for a reflectivist approach that goes beyond positivist epistemological and ontological concerns to think about international system, actors, and processes (Lozano Vázquez, 2014). Feminist questions became part of a post positivist agenda that also aimed to end the separation between the object of study and the researcher, considering that subjectivities matter and, therefore, they should also be acknowledged, and that considering the identity construction of international actors is a way to understand the political world (Trujillo López, 2016). Diplomacy is not permanent and unchangeable; it is a constantly constructed and gendered space with diverse voices and actors. Since the introduction of feminist concerns into international relations around the end of the 1980s, there has been resistance to them by the most conservative (let’s call them “classic”) representatives of International Relations theories (Weber, 2014). Some male scholars demanded that the question of gender find a place and a time to be considered; in other words, for the question of gender to be contained (Weber, 2014).

11

MEXICAN DIASPORIC WOMEN IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY …

263

The male gaze tried to impose the mapping route for the feminist agenda, in an example of mansplaining (Solnit, 2012) in the theoretical debate of international relations. Coming back to the feminist perspective, Weber (2014) asked: “What if gender is not something to be placed or added to, but something through which the world is viewed?” (p. 99). That is to say that more than a fixed variable of analysis, a feminist perspective should be understood as a position, both academically and politically speaking. Diplomacy has “traditionally and formally been a domain reserved for men only” (Aggestam & Towns, 2019, p. 9) and, therefore, a gender perspective contributes not only to enrich the theoretical debate on diplomacy, but the debate on social inequalities in regard to recognizing the role of women in diplomacy, such as their leading role in peace processes (UNWOMEN, 2012) and public diplomacy. Given that “the distinction between official and unofficial diplomacy is eroding” (Aggestam & Towns, 2019, p. 11), discussing the new public diplomacy implies thinking on how women are part of the official and unofficial diplomatic representation of given imagined communities.1 When it comes to the theoretical debate on gender and diplomacy in Mexico, several women scholars have moved the agenda forward on areas such as the history of women rights in diplomacy (Ramírez Flores, 2006), postcolonialism and development (Marchand, 2009) and, more recently, Mexican foreign policy and gender (Magaña Martínez, 2016; Telles Calderón, 2020). Other scholars, such as Trujillo López (2016), have contributed in pedagogical ways to the study of feminism in international relations and diplomacy. For instance, she is one of the intellectuals2 who made possible the recent inclusion of a gender section in the Mexican Association of International Relations (AMEI, in Spanish), the leading and largest academic organization on International Relations in the country (AMEI, 2020a). The first meeting of the section took place in 2018. As a participant myself, I could observe that it was attended by

1 Imagined communities are groups of people that share a sense of belonging to the nation, which is constructed through material bases such as maps, museums, newspapers, etc., which frame the symbolic dimension of the collective (Anderson, 1993). 2 According to the AMEI website, other scholars who prepared the gender section were Marianne H. Marchand, Elena Ayala Galí, Rocío del Carmen Osorno Velázquez, Edmundo Meza Rodríguez, Guy Emerson, Marcela Álvarez Pérez y Adriana Sletza Ortega Ramírez (AMEI, 2020b).

264

E. L. TADEO HERNÁNDEZ

a considerable number of students (most of them women) who not only showed great interest in the gender perspective but also expressed how they perceived resistance by their professors when wanting to research from this world vision (AMEI, 2020b). This is similar to the resistance Weber (2014) described in the case of Anglo-Saxon scholars. Thus, this literature reflects on how important it is to keep embracing a gender perspective on public diplomacy to think about the role of women in the field.

The Roles of Women in Diplomacy There have already been some efforts to try to think about the role of women in diplomacy; however, a great deal of the research has been centered either on Europe or the United States (e.g. Aggestam & Towns, 2019; Glant, 2002; Jeffreys-Jones, 1995; Mori, 2015). Indeed, going beyond eurocentrism (Aggestam & Towns, 2019, p. 23) should be part of the research agenda for the study of women and (public) diplomacy. Women in diplomacy can be viewed from the perspective of the official representation of the State, as well as a part of the nonofficial diplomacy. In official diplomacy, women started to be allowed into the foreign service in the twentieth century, with Brazil, United States, Turkey, Denmark, Norway, France, Great Britain, Canada, Sweden, and Japan leading the charge (Aggestam & Towns, 2019). The entering of women into diplomacy in certain countries should be read along the efforts of the feminist first wave3 to gain visibility, aiming at advancing women’s political rights in society (Cano, 2018). Of these countries, Brazil and Turkey would eventually prohibit, for a given period, the participation of women in diplomacy (Aggestam & Towns, 2019, p. 15). And different political landscapes in different countries created different obstacles for women, at different times, against the advance of their diplomatic careers in a male-centered world (see Aggestam & Towns, 2019, for more details). Today, the gender gap in diplomacy has been reduced worldwide (Aggestam & Towns, 2019). In Mexico, for instance, as of 2020, about 56% of Mexican Foreign Service personnel were women (Piscopo & Hinojosa, 2020). But even if women occupy high political positions such

3 Other structural and historical factors should be considered as well, since not all societies went through the same feminist waves as the United States (Cano, 2018).

11

MEXICAN DIASPORIC WOMEN IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY …

265

as Ministers of Foreign Affairs and become visible voices of their NationStates, most of them still find great challenges to advance to positions of power (Aggestam & Towns, 2019). For Mexican women diplomats joining the foreign services, there are cultural and socioeconomic barriers they must deal with; for instance, having to choose between their careers or their family life, especially when they do not have supportive husbands or partners; another challenge may be the lack of support of the ministry to pay for travel expenses or provide social security for their partners; also, women diplomats some times are discriminated in certain host States that may not favor the participation of women in diplomacy due to religious or cultural values (Ramírez Flores, 2006, pp. 777–778). When it comes to nonofficial actors in different aspects of diplomacy, we can think of at least three forms of women participation: First, the figure of ambassadress (Mori, 2015), which refers to wives of official male diplomats, who play important roles in terms of hospitality in the host country. In a way, these “women’s lives and worth were constructed through service to their husbands, families, and the state” (Mori, 2015, p. 152). To this day, the spouses of male diplomats play an important role in approaching elite members of the host society, helping advance agendas related to official diplomacy. They can be diplomatic intermediaries, because they do not hold a formal or official position, yet, from their nonofficial position, they can affect official diplomacy. Second is the figure of women as audiences; that is to say, receivers of public diplomacy messages. For instance, young African women have been recipients of German public diplomacy messages through broadcasting (Połonska-Kimunguyi, ´ 2015), where colonial logics are reproduced and where women are targets of discourses from the Western hemisphere that sometimes do not focus on local women and their concerns. Third and last is the figure of diaspora women, who are informed by a transnational perspective and have the capacity of bridging spaces, cultures, and agendas. These women have gone through a process of migration either as first generations in the host country or were born from first (or subsequent) generation’s parents. In terms of diasporic women as (public) diplomats, researchers have mostly explored the role of elite women or women who belong to highprofile diaspora groups and strategic networks (Stone & Douglas, 2018; Tigau, 2014). “The more qualified the diasporas are, the bigger the chance they have of influencing political and economic change” (Tigau,

266

E. L. TADEO HERNÁNDEZ

2014, p. 426). This statement might also apply to the capacity of diasporas to influence cultural dialogue and promote a change of perceptions about their diasporic group in the host society (Bermejo Mora, 2012). When discussing Mexican diasporic women as actors with origins in the Global South, it also becomes crucial to think of their ethnic identity, in order to understand how their sense of belonging to the imagined community is recreated transnationally. Furthermore, I propose that the process of recreating their identity is a fundamental element of their diplomatic agency and one of the driving forces behind their public diplomacy activities, as will be detailed next.

Mexican Women and Diplomacy The history of official diplomacy in Mexico has primarily been constructed by the male gaze. Diplomatic records show that this male representation was still prominent in the first decades of the twentieth century; this is confirmed by the numerous resources (books, biographies, articles, documentaries, etc.) produced about the role of Mexican male diplomats, particularly writers and intellectuals, considered the cornerstone of Mexican diplomacy (CGBSenado, 2017; Sepúlveda Amor, 2010; SRE, 1998). Mexican male diplomats provided invaluable contributions to the nation’s diplomacy, and this value should be recognized; however, the recognition of women’s contributions to the Mexican official diplomatic history is not fully realized. For instance, in a prologue dedicated to a book based on Ambassador Alfonso Reyes’ writings on diplomacy, Mexican Ambassador Bernardo Sepúlveda Amor praised the work and talent of 10 famous Mexican male writers who became ambassadors and “helped to widen and enrich the Mexican foreign policy in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries” (Sepúlveda Amor, 2010, p. 9). There is no mention of a single woman writer who contributed to Mexico’s image and cultural diplomacy, as well as to its international prestige. For example, Rosario Castellanos was a professor at the National University of Mexico (UNAM, in Spanish) and a feminist writer who introduced the discussion of the Second Sex (Simone de Beauvoir, 1989) in Mexico and created a beautiful and intelligent fiction narrative about indigenous people of the Mexican state of Chiapas, among many other things. She was appointed ambassador to Israel by the Mexican government in 1971, dying unexpectedly during her mission in 1974 (Del

11

MEXICAN DIASPORIC WOMEN IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY …

267

Ángel, 2018). Fortunately, the memory of Castellanos has been maintained due to all the academic work she published. Her life also inspired a movie in 2018, called “Los Adioses,” by director Natalia Beristáin. There were other female writers who were not official diplomats but gained recognition in the twentieth century and also contributed through literature to the construction of images of and knowledge about Mexico, such as Elena Garro (1963), Elena Poniatowska (1971), and Inés Arredondo (1979). They, and the official female diplomats, should be considered in analysis of women’s roles in Mexican public diplomacy. There have been some efforts to recognize the role of women in diplomacy by diplomats themselves and by Mexican female scholars. For instance, Ramírez Flores (2006) wrote “La mujer mexicana en la diplomacia” [Mexican Women in Diplomacy], where she deals with various aspects of women enrollment in diplomacy: the increasing number of women in the Mexican public administration, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century; the evolution of the normative structure of the Mexican Foreign Service; and the obstacles women have confronted in the process. Advances of women’s rights in Mexican diplomacy have been gradual. Table 11.1 summarizes some of the most historical moments, including the appointment of Rosario Green as the first female Secretary Table 11.1 Women’s history in Mexican diplomacy

1935 Palma Guillén de Nicolau is the first woman apppointed to a diploma c posi on

1950 Amalia Caballero Cas llo de León is the first woman appointed as Ambassador

1975 First World Conference of Women is celebrated in Mexico

1998 Rosario Green Macías is the first woman appointed as Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Source Information from Ramírez Flores (2006), Green (2013), and Gutiérrez Nieto (2015)

268

E. L. TADEO HERNÁNDEZ

of Foreign Affairs in Mexico. Like her, other women ambassadors have gained notable recognition.4 In the twenty-first century, Mexican women diplomats have also been directly engaged with the country’s public diplomacy agenda. For instance, Ambassador Melba Pria (2015–2018) had a very successful role as the representative of Mexico in India. She came up with a project to move around the city in a rickshaw decorated by a Mexican artist. She also approached the Indian public to promote the debate on cities’ pollution and mitigation measures; this gesture was celebrated by Indian media and society, and also by the Mexican audience (ExcélsiorTV, 2016; Kaushik, 2019). The most explored area regarding women and diplomacy in the Mexican case deals with official diplomacy; there are no materials I could find that record the Mexican female diasporas at the center of the public diplomacy analysis. This absence could be partially explained by the fact that “leadership in traditional societies in Latin America and in new and emerging Mexican diasporic communities in the United States is typically associated with men” (Garcia, 2008, p. 42). However, women have played important roles in the Mexican diaspora as activists (Garcia, 2008) and as part of certain diasporic agendas. Now, women of the Mexican diaspora are also contributing to the reinterpretation of public diplomacy, by creating community solidarity and promoting and adapting Mexican heritage and traditions, like the League of Mexican American Women (LMAW, 2020); or empowering Latinas leadership and influencing public debate in the United States through the participation in MANA,5 a National Latina Organization (MANA, 2020); or by raising the voices of indigenous communities through arts and music, as it is the case with singer and composer Lila Downs, a Mexican American woman with indigenous roots (Downs, 2020).

4 To name a few of the female diplomats who rose to notoriety, we have Olga Pellicer, Carmen Moreno Toscano and Aída González Martínez (Ramírez Flores, 2006). Also, after Green Macías, two more women became Secretaries of Foreign Affairs: Patricia Espinosa (2006–2012) and Claudia Ruiz Massieu (2015–2017), the latter advancing some women platforms within the ministry (Villanueva & Tadeo Hernández, 2019). 5 MANA used to be called Mexican American Women’s National Association.

11

MEXICAN DIASPORIC WOMEN IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY …

269

Mexican Diasporic Media and Public Diplomacy When it comes to discussing women in public diplomacy, media plays a crucial role. Media is understood here as “any materiality that is able to transmit codified messages” (Kummels, 2012b, p. 14). Both official and non-state actors can transmit messages and communicate purposefully with host societies, but each actor, including diasporas, brings specific elements in the discussion. Diasporic media has been fundamental for the re-creation of subjectivities and collective identities in transnational contexts, but also to generate dynamics of relocation in symbolic ways (Karim, 2003). Diasporas can also develop or participate in new media genders such as videocartas (videoletters) or cine indígena (indigenous cinema), as it is clear among Mexican indigenous communities (Kummels, 2012a). When the voice of the diaspora transcends the diasporic community and reaches other audiences in the host or homeland state is when its public diplomacy potential can develop. Historically, some women in the Mexican diaspora have used media to express their identities and concerns about U.S. society. Literature has been used by the diaspora to comment on their ethnicity, sociocultural factors, and feminist perspectives in their communities and beyond (Maciel, 2018). But not all diasporic women are able to create messages through media directed at the host society: There are also inequalities reflected on who can have access to media representation. Also, the women who can actually represent themselves through media and conduct public diplomacy have the challenge of dismantling stereotypes about them and about the people of Mexican heritage in the United States. Indeed, changing stereotypes about certain diasporic communities is a challenge for public diplomacy, and it seems that digital spaces have the potential to help diasporas with that goal. Mex and the City Case Study This case study of Mex and the City illustrates how life stories of diaspora members are crucial to understand their diplomatic roles. Diaspora voices are fundamental to make sense of social and international phenomena (Cvetkovich, 2011), and, therefore, they can also have relevance in understanding diplomatic matters. The voices of women diaspora members never have a fixed identity related to a given culture. That is to say,

270

E. L. TADEO HERNÁNDEZ

the diaspora voice is socially constructed, time–space situated, and always changing (Ryang, 2008). The narratives for this case study were collected through in-depth, semi-structured interviews with two key members of the New York City project Mex and the City: Mexican diasporic women Marina GarciaVasquez and Iris Avelar. The interview with Iris Avelar was conducted in Spanish in May 2019 in her Brooklyn-based Mexican restaurant “La Superior.” The interview with Marina Garcia-Vasquez was conducted in English and via Skype in November 2019. Interviews have been used before in the study of diasporas and International Relations (Brinkerhoff, 2009). Mex and the City is both an online community and a creative agency that promotes a different Mexican identity discourse, non-stereotypical, through digital and physical spaces for the Mexican community and beyond. For this case study, besides the stories collected through the interviews with the two founders, I analyzed the content in their Tumblr blog, in order to make sense of how these women’s diasporic identities inform the cultural representations presented in this online space. By presenting positive images of Mexico and Mexicans, by promoting the richness of Mexican cultures and peoples, by informing Mexicans abroad and U.S. residents and citizens of events and cultural expressions related to Mexico happening in the United States, these diasporic women advance goals that are shared with public diplomacy initiatives of Mexico. In supporting and advancing those goals, these women act as nonofficial public diplomacy agents, even if they do not define themselves in those terms. As nonofficial public diplomats, these women’s stories help to understand what other elements help to motivate diplomatic action beyond the so-called “national interest,” supposedly considered the main driving force of official public diplomacy. The interpretation of their stories is contrasted with the goals of the diasporic organization they also represent. Mex and the City (M&TC) and Women’ Life Stories Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) wrote about the new mestiza, a woman of Mexican origin who comes to make sense of her identity in the migration context, in the United States. Language, culture, and gender are

11

MEXICAN DIASPORIC WOMEN IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY …

271

a continuing process of transformation in Nepantla,6 the “in-between space” from which the new mestiza can bridge different cultures and worlds. However, as explained before, women in the Mexican diaspora do not represent either a united front or one single story; each of them has her own stories and memories, and also shared experiences with other women of the diaspora. If there is something they share in common is the liminal space called Nepantla, from which they deal with cultural difference. Therefore, telling the stories of the founders of Mex and the City requires not only to think of the medium itself but also to recognize the women’s trajectories and how they informed their public diplomacy project. Marina García-Vásquez is the intellectual author of Mex and the City, but Iris Avelar was also a fundamental part of the project. Ruby Vizcarra and Erika Mercado were involved in the foundation and development of the organization as well. It all began when Marina proposed to her friends to make a social experiment through Tumblr, a platform for publishing blogs, which was popular at the end of the 2000–2010 decade. Basically, these friends wanted to share their experiences as women of Mexican origin in New York; they would post about cultural activities and adventures in New York City. Soon they started having followers who liked their Mexican, female, New York City narrative. Realizing the project’s potential, they decided to develop it into an online community and a creative agency with the aim of promoting a global Mexican culture and the work of Mexican creators (see Fig. 11.1). This online community can be found at https://mexnthecity.com/front/. According to its website, “M&TC reflects a community of New York tastemakers, trendsetters, and culture mavens across many industries. Think fashion designers, gallerists, boutique shops owners, restaurateurs, hoteliers, media executives, artists, and philanthropists. M&TC promotes positive images of Mexican identity and culture on a global scale” (MexandtheCity, 2019, para. 3). In terms of the organization’s goals and modus operandi, there are a couple of aspects of M&TC that help us realize why this project can

6 Nepantla comes from the náhuatl panotla (bridge), which can be translated as “the middle ground.” Anzaldúa uses this term “from Mexican cultural, historical and linguistic indigenous roots to re(signify) the profound experience of the disarticulated position between-worlds, between-visions- as a fundamental Chicano experience” (Joysmith, 2015, p.12).

272

E. L. TADEO HERNÁNDEZ

Fig. 11.1 Mex and the City logo (with permission to publish granted by Marina García-Vásquez, co-founder of Mex and the City)

be considered public diplomacy: First, there is the intention to promote positive images of Mexican identity and a new Mexican global culture. A major concern is to influence the discourse about Mexicans in New York through creative works; this is part of a representational agenda, which is one of the diasporic roles identified by scholars of diaspora diplomacy (Ho & Mcconnell, 2019). Creative discourses are the means to construct a representational discourse of a Mexican identity that is assumed to be global, as the city where this identity is transformed and reconstructed. Space here is crucial to understand this notion of the global, which also reflects the diasporic condition of transnationalism, where global networks articulate the diasporic experiences. A second aspect that confirms the nonofficial public diplomacy paradigm is the relation between the non-state actors and the medium of communication. Manuel Castells (2008) has referred to the relevance of digital networks to explain the participation of non-state actors in the new public sphere and in public diplomacy. M&TC has found in communication technologies and social networks the opportunity to participate in the dialogue about the Mexican identity and image in the United States.

11

MEXICAN DIASPORIC WOMEN IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY …

273

Mex and the City started with a blog,7 and it eventually incorporated a website, a Facebook page8 and an Instagram account.9 One of its main projects was called Racial Profiling, a series of portraits and interviews of Mexican nationals and Mexican Americans that were published initially in the Tumblr blog to emphasize their contribution to society from a transnational perspective. Mexican diasporic women, in particular, are represented as creative, hardworking entrepreneurs, artists, and social leaders; they are global Mexicans not only because they are in New York, but because they create it. Some of this content has moved to Instagram, where they currently maintain most of their activity: They have become a project based on digital visuality. As of September 2, 2020 its Instagram account had more than 13,000 followers and more than 2,200 posts. Also, thanks to digital networks, they have established communication with other Mexican diaspora communities in Europe, and they have engaged in projects with Mexicans who live in other global cities such as Los Angeles and Mexico City. M&TC has received some support from the Mexican Cultural Institute of New York, without compromising its agenda vis a vis the Mexican’s government interests. The third aspect of this discussion has to do with the profile of diaspora members who are related to the creative field. The diaspora literature mentioned earlier talked about the importance of their capabilities to advance economic, political, and cultural agendas in the host country (Tigau, 2014). The profile of the founding members of Mex and the City suggests they have a certain education and professional background that allows them to perform different representations of the Mexican identity. This matters when we think about Mexicans in New York, because according to what scholars have found, by 2006, only about 2% of Mexicans in the city worked in fields related to media, art, entertainment, sports, or design (Limonic, 2008). This certainly tells us that not all members of the diaspora can speak and create narratives that challenge stereotypes about Mexicans in the United States. Having established why Mex and the City can be considered a public diplomacy project by the Mexican diaspora, I will turn to the reflection on how diasporic women’s life stories inform the diplomatic dimension

7 See https://mexandthecity.tumblr.com. 8 See https://www.facebook.com/MexntheCity. 9 See https://www.instagram.com/mexnthecity/.

274

E. L. TADEO HERNÁNDEZ

of the project, which is certainly not motivated by the national interest of the Nation-State. For this matter, I will only refer to certain parts of the life stories of Marina Garcia-Vasquez and Iris Avelar, which relate to the foundation of M&TC. Marina Garcia-Vasquez, the intellectual author of Mex and the City, believes that her identity and her professional work goes together. She explains: I want to talk about two things: One is my identity and the other is my professional work, and I say that they are tight. My mother was born in Mexico, in Chihuahua, and she moved to the United States at a very young age, and my dad’s family is part of the community of Mexicans who were going back and forth between Guanajuato and California with the Bracero movement and with other migration movements. My parents met in college at UCSB, the University of Santa Barbara. My mom was studying Education and my dad was studying Engineering or something. They are part of the founding group that started MECHA within the Chicano movement. That was super important because I was raised with this very political push or self-representation for…. my dad was very much Chicano, and he pushed that kind of identity on to me. As a young child, I grew up in this Chicano movement of arts and culture; my family was pretty much tied to Teatro Campesino. (Marina Garcia-Vasquez, personal communication, November 6, 2019)

Marina expressed an intergenerational dimension of the Mexican identity in the United States, one that connects different places, professions, interests, and families. She discussed the importance of Chicanx identity, which is part of a resistance movement that emerged in the 1960s. The Chicanx environment surrounded Marina and informed her about the transcendence of culture to advance social agendas. This seems to be part of what Mex and the City does with creative content to promote a positive Mexican identity. She also mentioned that, for her, it was not easy to come into terms with what it meant to be Mexican. Although she thought she knew who she was, at the end, she realized that this was not the case. That is the reason why moving to New York from California was crucial: [It happened] when I moved from California to New York, and that’s kind of like what happened, by the shift of knowing that there was great potential for my own representation… but we didn’t really have it yet, we didn’t have names for it, we did not have intersectionality, we didn’t have this idea that we could be committed to each other. Mexican nationals

11

MEXICAN DIASPORIC WOMEN IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY …

275

and Mexican Americans, we are very much segregated. (Marina GarciaVasquez, personal communication, November 6, 2019)

The decision to move to the global city was also a way to question her own identity. New York City meant for her to find out other Mexicans and relating to them. There was a social need to construct, collectively, a Mexican identity in a global space. Embracing diversity and solidarity appears to be one of the shared goals of Marina Garcia-Vasquez with Iris Avelar, who was the first one of these friends to move to NYC. Iris remembers how she met Marina and how she decided to move to New York: I met Marina after I graduated from San Francisco State University. She also studied in the same university, but we didn’t become friends at the time. It was not until I started to work at a magazine in San Francisco, around 2005. The magazine was named Planet, and she was editor or managing director. I was working as a publisher assistant. We met at a party and we became friends. I lasted like a year in the magazine and, after that, I came to New York. Marina called later, and she said she also wanted to come. (Iris Avelar, personal communication, May 2, 2019)

Iris Avelar mentioned that California is the place where these educational backgrounds, professional interests, and friendship emerged among the two girls, who saw New York as the opportunity to look for something bigger than San Francisco. Although before moving to NYC there were not any plans to launch M&TC, the experience of living in the city and getting to know that there were other Mexicans out there motivated them to do something to make diverse Mexicans visible. That diversity is also expressed in Iris’ identity: I was born in San Francisco, California. When I was three years old, we went back to Guadalajara [Mexico]. We stayed there for five years and then we came back to California. It was a cultural shock; the United States was very different to what I had imagined. I learned English in school. [In terms of my identity] I can say that I am Mexican, but I was born in the United States, but I am not Chicanx. I can tell I am Mexican; I always say

276

E. L. TADEO HERNÁNDEZ

that, but then the Pocha10 inside of me comes out. (Iris Avelar, personal communication, May 2, 2019)

Diversity is what comes to mind when contrasting the stories of Iris and Marina. This relates to the fundamental argument of M&TC: Regardless of what the background of Mexicans is, there are ways to support and represent each other, it just requires certain willingness to create dialogue and to look for opportunities offered in global cities such as New York. Indeed, Mexicans in New York represent diverse identities, agendas, and interests, but they are working together to create positive images, as a strategy of public diplomacy seems to be the best example of a nonofficialdiplomatic paradigm. It stands out that Mexican women, as presented in this case, are the ones embracing diversity and acting as nepantleras (Anzaldúa, 1987), capable of bridging different cultural worlds. Today, the founders of Mex and the City are working on a book that talks about their collective projects, to reflect on the different social and cultural impacts they had, but also to celebrate the connections and collaborations with the different artists they have worked with. They want to have an analogic memory that preserves their work, because, unfortunately, a lot of what they published on Tumblr was lost due to a virus. Also, some of the co-founders still organize events, working with different artists, designers, and brands. Erika Mercado and Iris Avelar have been involved the most in this cultural and brand-management face of Mex and the City. For instance, Avelar organized, in 2019, a Cinco de Mayo celebration in New York. And given that visual communication is important for the organization, its Instagram today is its most active platform.

Final Considerations Mex and the City is a diasporic public diplomacy channel because it allows the Mexican diaspora, particularly women, to speak to the U.S. society and the Mexican community, promoting a positive and creative discourse about Mexico that aims to deconstruct the stereotypes created in the U.S. media and the U.S. hegemonic culture about people of Mexican 10 Pocha, or Pocho, refers to a person of Mexican origin who was born in the United States and uses English and Spanish interchangeably when speaking.

11

MEXICAN DIASPORIC WOMEN IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY …

277

heritage. Also, it is a vehicle for cultural representation, since it places at its center the construction of an identity discourse through visuality and textuality that presents a diverse interpretation of the Mexican nation through diasporic voices. In taking on the role of cultural ambassadors, the producers of this web series participated in public diplomacy by (1) creating networks of solidarity with artists and creators of Mexican origin and by helping them to communicate their stories in cities like New York, but also in the digital sphere; (2) acting as mediators between Mexican and U.S. societies through cultural representation mechanisms enacted in their media discourses; and (3) advocating for the right of people of Mexican heritage, specially creators, to be recognized as contributors to U.S. society. Mex and the City helped to introduce the discussion of Mexicans as a creative community in the global era. Thus, collaborators of the project have received attention from U.S. and Mexican cultural institutes. This effort represents one step forward in changing stereotypes about Mexico and the Mexican community in the United States. Mex and the City also reflects how taking into account women’s voices from the Global South can give us a critical insight into public diplomacy by adding to the debate the persistent inequalities surrounding diaspora communities. The capability and knowledge of the founders to communicate with the U.S. audience, in order to change the discourse on Mexicans, is the product of larger intergenerational and historical efforts to make Mexicans, and particularly Mexican women, be heard in U.S. society. In this sense, what this women’s organization gives us is also the possibility to consider intersectionality. This is rather crucial because representing and advancing diverse discourses and working to empower the voices of diasporas can make the difference for contemporary public diplomacy. More attention should be paid to women’s contributions to diplomacy in either official or nonofficial terms. In particular, diasporic women, at least the ones who lead communication efforts such as this one, are very important non-state actors for public diplomacy, since they act through digital networks, creating solidarity mechanisms and communicating by creative platforms. They also have the capacity to construct international linkages among diaspora members and promote inter-city relations with other diasporas. Mexican diasporic women are playing a crucial role in promoting new discourses about Mexican identity in the United States; those efforts are also informed from their past and the identities they have constructed vis

278

E. L. TADEO HERNÁNDEZ

a vis their family, Mexico, the United States, and their professional formations. Nowadays, when prejudice and xenophobia are affecting Mexicans in the United States, these kinds of projects that aim to change the image of Mexico seem to be adequate as counter-narratives for hate speech. I do not mean to say that Mex and the City has solved the problem of the negative image of Mexico in the United States, but it is creating a transnational network of Mexican diaspora members that can together come up with different initiatives, in different spaces, to raise their voices and advance their goals. At the same time, diasporic women can speak to other members of the diaspora, to state actors and to non-state actors, but also to the field of public diplomacy. They are asking to be recognized as public diplomats of the twenty-first century.

References Aggestam, K., & Towns, A. (2019). The gender turn in diplomacy: A new research agenda. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 21(1), 9–28. AMEI. (2020a). ¿Qué es AMEI? Asociación Mexicana de Estudios Internacionales. https://www.amei.mx/quienes-somos/que-es-la-amei/. AMEI. (2020b). Primera Reunión de Trabajo de la Sección de Género, Interseccionalidades, Teorías Feministas y Queer (GIFQ). Asociación Mexicana de Estudios Internacionales. https://www.amei.mx/eventos/xxxii-congresoanual-la-amei/primera-reunion-de-trabajo-de-la-seccion-de-genero-intersecc ionalidades-teorias-feministas-y-queer-gifq/. Anderson, B. (1993). Comunidades imaginadas: Reflexiones sobre el origen y la difusión del nacionalismo. Fondo de Cultura Económica. Anzaldúa, G. (1987). Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza. aunt lute books. Arredondo, I. (1979). Río subterráneo. Joaquín Mortiz. Ayhan, K. (2019). The boundaries of public diplomacy and nonstate actors: A taxonomy of perspectives. International Studies Perspectives, 20(1), 63–83. Bermejo Mora, E. (2012). La diáspora cultural mexicana y la proyección de imaginarios en el exterior. Política Exterior Mexicana, 96, 131–149. Bravo, V. (2014). The importance of diaspora communities as key publics for national governments around the world. In G. J. Golan, S.-U. Yang, & D. F. Kinsey (Eds.), International public relations and public diplomacy: Communication and engagement. Peter Lang. Bravo, V., & De Moya, M. (2015). Communicating the homeland’s relationship with its diaspora community: The cases of El Salvador and Colombia. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 10(1), 70–104.

11

MEXICAN DIASPORIC WOMEN IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY …

279

Bravo, V., & De Moya, M. (2018). Mexico’s public diplomacy efforts to engage its diaspora across the border: Case study of the programs, messages and strategies employed by the Mexican Embassy in the United States. Rising Powers Quarterly, 3(3), 173–193. Brinkerhoff, J. (2009). Digital diasporas: Identity and transnational engagement. Cambridge University Press. Brinkerhoff, J. (2019). Diasporas and public diplomacy: Distinctions and future prospects. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 14(1–2), 51–64. Brown, A., & Lopez, M. (2013). Mapping the Latino population, by state, county and city. Pew Research Center: Hispanic Trends. Cano, G. (2018, November). El Feminismo y sus Olas. Letras Libres. https:// www.letraslibres.com/mexico/revista/el-feminismo-y-sus-olas. Castells, M. (2008). The new public sphere: Global civil society, communication networks, and global governance. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616, 78–93. CGBSenado. (2017). Octavio Paz y su legado a la diplomacia mexicana. https:// centrogilbertobosques.senado.gob.mx/docs/NI_010217_Octavio_Paz.pdf. Cull, N. (2006). Public diplomacy before Gullion: The evolution of a Phrase. CDP Blog. https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/public-diplomacy-gullionevolution-phrase. Cull, N. (2019). Public diplomacy: Foundations for global engagement in the digital age. Polity Press. Cvetkovich, A. (2011). Can the diaspora speak? Afghan Americans and the 9/11 oral history archive. Radical History Review, 111(111), 90–100. de Beauvoir, S. (1989). The Second Sex. Vintage Books. De Moya, M. (2019). Protesting the homeland: Diaspora dissent public relations efforts to oppose the Dominican Republic’s citizenship policies. In Protest public relations (pp. 106–127). Routledge. Délano, A. (2018). From here and there: Diaspora policies, integration, and social rights beyond borders. Oxford Scholarship Online. Del Ángel, D. (2018). Rosario Castellanos. Enciclopedia de La Literatura En México. https://www.elem.mx/autor/datos/211. DeWind, J., & Segura, R. (Eds.). (2014). Diaspora lobbies and the US government: Convergence and divergence in making foreign policy. New York University Press. Downs, L. (2020). Acerca de. Lila Downs. https://www.liladowns.com/ace rca-de/. ExcélsiorTV. (2016). Entrevista a Melba Pría, embajadora de México en India / Yuriria Sierra. ExcélsiorTV. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4oUgV9 MkWM. Garcia, V. (2008). Silvia Tlaseca and the Kaolin mushroom workers union: Women’s leadership in the Mexican Diaspora. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture, 34(1), 42–47.

280

E. L. TADEO HERNÁNDEZ

Garro, E. (1963). Los recuerdos del porvenir. Joaquín Mortiz. Glant, T. (2002). Against all odds: Vira B. Whitehouse and Rosika Schwimmer in Switzerland, 1918. American Studies Internacional, 40(1), 34–51. Gonzalez III, J. (2014). Diaspora diplomacy: Influences from Philippine migration. Public Diplomacy Magazine. https://publicdiplomacymagazine.com/dia spora-diplomacy-influences-from-philippine-migrants/. Green, R. (2013). La Canciller. Rosario Green: memorias y algo más. Planeta. Gutiérrez Nieto, G. (2015, March 15). Las mujeres y la diplomacia mexicana. Siempre. https://www.siempre.mx/2015/03/las-mujeres-y-la-diplom acia-mexicana/. Ho, E., & Mcconnell, F. (2019). Conceptualizing ‘diaspora diplomacy’: Territory and populations betwixt the domestic and foreign. Progress in Human Geography, 43(2), 235–255. Jeffreys-Jones, R. (1995). Changing Differences: Women and shaping of the American Foreign Policy, 1917–1994. Rutgers University Press. Joysmith, C. (2015). Nepantla y escritura chicana. In C. Joysmith (Ed.), Nepantla: liminalidad y transición. Escritura chicana de mujeres. UNAM. Karim, K. (Ed.). (2003). The media of diaspora. Routledge. Kaushik, D. (2019, June 6). Melba Pria, former Mexican ambassador to India: I’ll always be the ambassador with the autorickshaw. The Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/melba-pria-former-mexicanambassador-to-india-ill-always-be-the-ambassador-with-the-autorickshaw/art icleshow/69661896.cms. Kö¸ser Akçapar, S., & Bayraktar Aksel, D. (2017). Public diplomacy through diaspora engagement: The case of Turkey. Perceptions, 22(4), 135–160. Kummels, I. (2012a). Cine Indígena: Vídeo, Migration and the Dynamics of Belonging between México and the USA. In I. Kummels (Ed.), Espacios mediáticos : cultura y representación en México (pp. 201–224). edition tranvía. Kummels, I. (2012b). Espacios mediáticos: cultura y representación en MéxicoIntroducción. In I. Kummels (Ed.), Espacios mediáticos: cultura y representación en México (p. 210). edition tranvía. La Porte, T. (2012). The impact of ‘intermestic’ non-state actors on the conceptual framework of public diplomacy. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 7 (4), 441–458. Li, H. (2012). The Chinese diaspora and China’s public diplomacy: Contentious politics for the Beijing Olympic Float in the Pasadena Rose Parade. International Journal of Communication, 6, 2245–2279. Limonic, L. (2008). Where do Latinos work? Occupational structure and mobility within New York City’s Latino population 1990–2006. LMAW. (2020). Events. League of Mexican American Women. https://www.the leagueofmexicanamericanwomen.org/projects. Lozano Vázquez, A. (2014). Debates y diálogo entre Positivismo y Pos positivismo en Relaciones Internacionales. In J. A. Schiavon Uriegas, A. S. Ortega

11

MEXICAN DIASPORIC WOMEN IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY …

281

Ramírez, M. López-Vallejo Olvera, & R. Velázquez Flores (Eds.), Teorías de Relaciones Internacionales en el siglo xxi: interpretaciones críticas desde México´ (pp. 81–97). BUAP, COLSAN, UABC, UANL, UPAEP. Maciel, D. (2018). Piedras contra la luna: el florecimiento cultural del otro México. In D. R. Maciel, J. Gómez-Quiñonez, & R. Griswold del Castillo (Eds.), La creación de la nación chicana: perspectivas historiográficas (pp. 452– 456). Siglo XXI Editores-UNAM. Magaña Martínez, B. (2016). Feminismo y política exterior. Nexos. https://www. nexos.com.mx/?p=28326. MANA. (2020). About. Mana a National Latina Organization. https://www.her mana.org Marchand, M. (2009). The future of gender and development after 9/11: Insights from postcolonial feminism and transnationalism. Third World Quarterly, 30(5), 921–935. Melissen, J. (2005). The new public diplomacy: Between theory and practice. In J. Melissen (Ed.), The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations (pp. 3–27). Palgrave Macmillan. MexandtheCity. (2019). About. Mex and the City. https://mexnthecity.com/ front/#about. Mori, J. (2015). How women make diplomacy: The British Embassy in Paris, 1815–1841. Journal of Women’s History, 27 (4), 137–149. MPI. (2015). The Mexican Diaspora in the United States. Migration Policy Institute. Piscopo, J., & Hinojosa, M. (2020, March 7). Más mujeres en la política exterior mexicana. Milenio. https://www.milenio.com/opinion/jennifer-pis copo-magda-hinojojosa/columna-jennifer-piscopo-magda-hinojosa/mas-muj eres-en-la-politica-exterior-mexicana. Połonska-Kimunguyi, ´ E. (2015). From public service broadcaster to development actor: Deutsche Welle and the (con)quest of African female audiences. Critical Arts, 29(3), 382–399. Poniatowska, E. (1971). La noche de tlatelolco. Era. Quinsaat, S. (2016). Diaspora activism in a non-traditional country of destination: The case of Filipinos in the Netherlands. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39(6), 1014–1033. Ramírez Flores, N. (2006). La mujer en la diplomacia mexicana. Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional, 6, 759–784. Ryang, S. (2008). Writing selves in diaspora: Ethnography of autobiographies of Korean women in Japan and the United States. Lexington Books. Schumann, C. (2004). Political articulation in the diaspora: Media, language, and dialogue in the case of Arab-Americans. Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 13(2/3), 307–330.

282

E. L. TADEO HERNÁNDEZ

Sepúlveda Amor, B. (2010). Prólogo. In A. Reyes (Ed.), Relaciones Internacionales (pp. 7–66). FCE-ITESM. Shain, Y. (1999). The Mexican–American diaspora’s impact on Mexico. The Academy of Political Science, 114(4), 661–691. Solnit, R. (2012). Men Explain Things to Me. Guernica. https://www.guerni camag.com/rebecca-solnit-men-explain-things-to-me/. SRE. (1998). Escritores en la diplomacia mexicana. SRE. Stepler, R., & Brown, A. (2015). Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States, 1980–2013. Stone, D., & Douglas, E. (2018). Advance diaspora diplomacy in a networked world. International Journal of Cultural Policy, 24(6), 710–723. Tadeo Hernández, E. (2017). Annyeonghaseyo to the digital sphere: The online public diplomacy of the Korean diaspora in the US. In K. Ayhan (Ed.), Korea’s soft power and public diplomacy (pp. 187–208). Hangang Network. Taylor, P. (2003). Munitions of the mind: A history of propaganda from the ancient world to the present day (3rd ed.). Manchester University Press. Telles Calderón, T. (2020, March). ¿Una política exterior feminista mexicana? Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica. https://revistafal.com/una-politica-exteriorfeminista-mexicana/. Tigau, C. (2014). Las élites en la diáspora como embajadoras culturales: The Diaspora Elites as Cultural Ambassadors. Revista Mexicana De Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 222, 423–428. Trujillo López, M. (2014). Feminismo y Género. In J. A. Schiavon, A. S. Ortega Ramírez, M. López-Vallejo Olvera, & R. Velázquez Flores (Eds.), Teorías de Relaciones Internacionales en el siglo xxi: interpretaciones críticas desde México (pp. 455–471). Trujillo López, M. (2016). Feminismo y Género. In J. A. Schiavon Uriegas, A. S. Ortega Ramírez, M. López-Vallejo Olvera, & R. Velázquez Flores (Eds.), Teorías de Relaciones Internacionales en el siglo XXI: Interpretaciones críticas desde México (2a ed.). AMEI, BUAP, CIDE, COLSAN, UABC, UANL, UPAEP. UNWOMEN. (2012). Women’s participation in peace negotiations: Connections between presence and influence. https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/hea dquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2012/10/wpssource book-03a-womenpeacenegotiations-en.pdf?la=en&vs=1159. Villanueva, C., & Tadeo Hernández, E. (2019). Mexican foreign policy and diplomacy: From defensive tradition to incomplete modernity. Politics and Policy. Villanueva, C. (2011). The rise and fall of Mexico’s international image: Stereotypical identities, media strategies and diplomacy dilemmas. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 7 (1), 23–31.

11

MEXICAN DIASPORIC WOMEN IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY …

283

Villanueva, C. (2015). The use of the Spanish language as a cultural diplomacy strategy for extending Mexico’s soft power in the United States. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 11, 139–147. Villanueva, C. (2017). Mexico’s Public Diplomacy Approach to the Indo-Pacific: A Thin Soft Power? Politics and Policy, 45(5), 793–812. Waltz, K. (2001). Man, the state and war: A theoretical analysis. Columbia University Press. Weber, C. (2014). International relations theory: A Critical Introduction (4th ed.). Routledge. Zaharna, R., & Uysal, N. (2016). Going for the jugular in public diplomacy: How adversarial publics using social media are challenging state legitimacy. Public Relations Review, 42(1), 109–119.

CHAPTER 12

Brazilian Ethnic Media in the United States: An Analysis of Their Social Control and Pluralistic Functions in an Electoral Context Juliana Fernandes

Diasporas are “communities of people who left their ancestral homes and settled in foreign countries, but who preserve the memory of and links with the land of their fathers and forefathers” (Horboken, 2004, p. 201). With the diasporic experience comes the need for a sense of belonging and community to feel part of the host country while also keeping ties with the homeland (De Moya, 2011). One way in which diasporas organize themselves to build community is through the creation and use of media. In particular, ethnic media perform pluralistic functions that lead to political participation and integration (Johnson, 2000; Subervi-Velez, 1986; Viswanath & Arora, 2000).

J. Fernandes (B) University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Bravo and M. De Moya (eds.), Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74564-6_12

285

286

J. FERNANDES

In this chapter, Brazilian ethnic media in the United States is used as a case study to demonstrate how three newspapers communicated information about the 2018 Brazilian election and to analyze how they performed ethnic media functions. This particular election was chosen because it attracted the attention from not only Brazilians living abroad, but also from the world, due to a very unconventional, conservative candidate leading the race, and a previous administration plagued by corruption and scandals (Charner & Reverdosa, 2018). The chapter is organized as follows. First, a brief overview of the Brazilian political and electoral system is presented. Next, Brazilian immigration to the United States is described, followed by a discussion on the emergence of U.S.-based Brazilian ethnic media and their connection with public diplomacy. The theoretical background for this study, which is based on the tenants of ethnic media research and their functions, is explained next. A qualitative content analysis is then presented, and it is followed by a discussion and directions for future research.

Overview of the Brazilian Political and Electoral System Brazil is a federal representative democratic republic governed under a presidential system that has three levels of government: federal, state, and municipal. Each of these three levels has three branches: executive, legislative, and judiciary. Brazilian citizens between the ages of 18 and 70 years old1 elect representatives for the executive and legislative, while the judiciary is chosen through competitive examinations or political nominations (Brasil, 2016, Chapter 3, section 2). Similar to the United States, Brazil has 26 fairly independent states and the Federal District (“Distrito Federal ”), where the capital of the country, Brasilia, is located. These states can create their own laws as long as they do not conflict with federal legislation. Contrary to the United States, Brazil does not hold primary elections, giving the parties autonomy to select their nominee. Consequently, to run for office in Brazil, a candidate needs to be affiliated with a political party. Independent candidates do not exist (TSE, n.d.; TSE, 2016). In that vein, 1 Voting is mandatory for citizens between the ages of 18 and 70, but it is facultative for any citizen between 16 and 18 years old, older than 70 years old, and for those who are illiterate (Brasil, 2016; TSE, 2018).

12

BRAZILIAN ETHNIC MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES …

287

Brazil has a multi-party system, where, according to the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE, n.d.), the country’s electoral tribunal, 32 political parties are currently registered. These parties range from the far-left to center to the far-right. To win an election, a candidate must achieve 51% of the valid votes, otherwise, a runoff is scheduled approximately three weeks after Election Day (Brasil, 2016). If a runoff occurs, the candidate with most votes wins the election. Voting in Brazil is a right but also a legal obligation (Brasil, 2016). Citizens who do not vote or justify their absence from voting receive a monetary penalty fee, which can prevent them from renewing and obtaining important federal documents (Brasil, 2016). Federal and state level elections are separate from municipal elections, driving voters to polling locations every two years. The only way to vote in Brazil is by going to polling locations on Election Day, and Brazilians living abroad can vote only for President at the designated consulate or embassy (TSE, 2016). This practice of external voting rights is common for many other countries in Latin America (Pallister, 2020; Pedroza & Palop-García, 2017). External voting rights are important for Brazilian candidates because large numbers of citizens living abroad might “swamp” or “tip” election results, but mobilizing external voters might prove difficult for candidates (Caramani & Grotz, 2015). Here, diasporas and ethnic media become important as they can serve a range of functions, from community building and watchdog, to providing information and motivate political participation (Johnson, 2000; Viswanath & Arora, 2000).

Brazilian Immigration to the United States Since the 1970s, the foreign-born population in the United States has continued to increase (U.S. Census, n.d.). According to U.S. Census Bureau data (2020), foreign-born residents made up 45.8 million (about 14%) of the U.S. population in 2019. Brazilians started migrating to the United States in the late 1980s mostly due to economic reasons, such as high inflation and unemployment at home (Blizzard & Batalova, 2019). However, Marcus’ (2009a, p. 494) qualitative analysis revealed five other reasons: curiosity (i.e., “excitement of learning about another culture”), the U.S. cultural influence (i.e., “the United States is better”), reunion with family or loved

288

J. FERNANDES

ones (i.e., “to be with my husband”), education (i.e., “to study English”), and escape (i.e., “divorce, unhappiness”). The Brazilian immigrant population in the United States doubled during the 1980s, almost tripled in the 1990s, and then stabilized following the Great Recession of 2007–2009 (Blizzard & Batalova, 2019). Approximately 450,000 Brazilians live in the United States, according to the 2010 U.S. Census and the 2017 American Community Survey (ACS), and this number represents 1% of the U.S. immigrant population (U.S. Census, 2017). As the United States tightened its immigration laws over the years, it became more difficult for Brazilians to acquire tourist visas—the common way of getting admittance into the country and then overstaying to work (Zell & Skop, 2011). As a result, many Brazilians started entering the United States via Mexico, swelling the number of Brazilian apprehensions in the U.S. southern border (Attanasio & Marcelo, 2019; Rother, 2005). In an attempt to reduce this situation, in 2005 Mexico started to require visas from Brazilians (Kraul & Gauouette, 2005). By 2007, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated that 1.2 million Brazilians lived in the United States, a big discrepancy with the estimate offered by the Migration Policy Institute for 2017 (of about 450,000) (Blizzard & Batalova, 2019). This discrepancy could be attributed to undocumented immigration (Skidmore, 2010). Regardless of which is the right number, Brazilians started forming large communities in places such as Florida, Massachusetts, Georgia, California, New Jersey, Connecticut, and New York (Blizzard & Batalova, 2019; Marcus, 2009a, 2009b). Simultaneously to this migration, Brazilian ethnic media started to appear in the United States in the late 1980s. More specifically, The Brazilian Times (Somerville—MA, 1988), the Brazilian Voice (Newark— NJ, 1988), Brasileiros & Brasileiras (Orlando—FL, 1994), Brazilian Press (Newark—NJ, 1997), and The Brasilians (New York, NY, 1972) surfaced as sources of ethnic media for Brazilians living abroad. Although these newspapers might not be the primary source of information for Brazilians living in the United States, ethnic media serves several important purposes. As detailed in the following section, these media preserve the cultural identity of these groups by providing relevant homeland news as well as facilitating the adaptation process by providing resources that can be used in the host country (Lin & Song, 2006). While U.S. media have seen a decline in their audiences, ethnic media have seen a significant

12

BRAZILIAN ETHNIC MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES …

289

growth (Deuze, 2006; Pew Research Center, 2006), especially among Hispanic newspapers. Considering this background, this chapter presents an analysis of the understudied Brazilian ethnic media in the United States by examining how the 2018 Brazilian election was covered and reported at a moment of significant political strife in the homeland. The focus is on three ethnic media publications that circulate where there is a strong concentration of Brazilian immigrants: Florida, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. To understand how these publications covered the elections at home, and how they serve the diaspora community in general, a review of the literature on ethnic media functions follows.

Ethnic Media and Their Functions Ojo (2006) describes ethnic media as being “usually products of attempts by various ethnic groups to organize themselves and sustain their cultural heritage” in the process of making their place in their new multicultural society, as they “provide news and programs of interest to the people of their respective ethnic community” (p. 351). Underrepresentation and the lack of visibility of these communities in the host country’s mainstream media is a strong factor why ethnic media are established (Moran, 2006; Ojo, 2006). For example, a survey of The New York Times revealed 11 stories about the 2018 Brazilian election and 28 stories about other topics related to Brazil during the two months preceding the election. Although Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and has a significant immigrant population in the United States, news stories about that country are sparse. Of course, this is not a case unique to Brazil, but nevertheless, it results in Brazilians and other expatriate communities seeking a vehicle to get information about the homeland, through digital or social media channels from Brazil, or through ethnic media in the host country. Ethnic groups seek information about ways to function within the host country community (Alencar & Deuze, 2017; Christiansen, 2004). More importantly, ethnic media give people in the diaspora community a sense of belonging (Agirreazkuenaga & Larrondo, 2018). Acquisition of information and sense of belonging are just two of the functions that ethnic media can serve in the process of adaptation to a host country (Lin & Song, 2006). Extant research linking ethnic media to adaptation

290

J. FERNANDES

has focused mainly on three processes: assimilation, acculturation, and a pluralistic view. Research on ethnic media and assimilation dates back to the 1920s. Assimilation was described as the process through which immigrants detached from the homeland’s culture to embrace the host culture (Gordon, 1964; Gudykunst & Kim, 1997; Marzolaf, 1979; SuberviVelez, 1986) in order to adjust to the new environment. Under the assimilation view,2 ethnic media’s main functions were to serve as instruments of social control to maintain the dominant language, ideology, and market rules of the host country (Johnson, 2000). A second approach came in the 1960s as a response to the assimilation perspective, acknowledging that instead of a one-way process in which immigrants blended into a host culture, there was a two-way exchange where both the immigrant and the host community changed or adapted to one another (Gordon, 1964). The focus turned to “acculturation.” It was similar in that it described the process of adopting the norms, values, and behaviors of the host community (Berry, 1980, 1997; Lakey, 2003), but it also emphasized that the acquisition of the host country culture was gradual and that one could become acculturated while retaining some aspects of one’s own culture (Kim, 1988). Under this approach, for immigrants to become acculturated to the host country, involvement with its mainstream media was fundamental, and as involvement with mainstream media increased, ethnic media use decreased (Kim, 1981, 1982, 1984). In the assimilation perspective, the role of the media was also linked to social control. As defined by Viswanath and Arora (2000), social control referred to “the internalization of norms and values by the individual, where the individual’s values and behavior conform to group norms and that of the social structure” (p. 47). Because the media serve as spaces where social problems are identified and explained, they were thought of as being able to condition or influence the audience (Scheufele, 1999). In this context, ethnic media perform an assimilatory function when they focus their coverage on local culture, traditions and processes, such as participation in the host-community’s political processes, promoting

2 Assimilation theory has been criticized and rejected by scholars for being untestable, as it does not specify when changes occur (Lyman, 1968) and because of its ideological overtones. Glazer and Moynihan (1970) rejected the idea of assimilation as unreal. They suggested that “historical experiences, cultures, skills, and times of arrival” (p. 14) developed unique economic, political, and cultural patterns for each immigrant group.

12

BRAZILIAN ETHNIC MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES …

291

understanding between the host community and the diaspora, and demonstrating the patriotism of the diaspora community. The third phase in ethnic media research emerged in the late 1970s and it adopted a pluralistic view. Both at the individual and group level, pluralism refers to the ability of immigrants to display their membership to different groups and cultures as they see fit, in addition to practicing their home culture while also participating in the host society (Subervi-Velez, 1986). According to this view, ethnic media might offer the diaspora an opportunity to preserve the homeland culture and identity by continual practice of native language and promotion of ethnic pride; to maintain a minority news agenda by announcing community events; to promote political and social interests that lead to active engagement; to communicate collective expressions of anger and injustice, and to counter negative stereotypes seen in the mass media (Johnson, 2000). Here, again, the social control role of ethnic media can be significant. As described by Viswanath and Arora (2000), ethnic media can contribute to strengthen the community’s identity; to promote a sense of belonging to a heritage different from the mainstream; and to promote the community by providing information on community members, highlighting their contribution to the adoptive society. Those functions of ethnic media for immigrant groups or diaspora communities can be linked to some of the goals typically advanced by home countries through public diplomacy, which encompass the tools employed by state and non-state actors “to understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior; build and manage relationships; and influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values” (Gregory, 2008, p. 276). In this context, ethnic media is one of the tools at the diaspora’s disposal to bring the community together, shape their image, and advance their goals, thus supporting public diplomacy efforts (e.g. Bravo, 2011, 2014; Budarick, 2014; De Moya, 2011, 2018; Georgiou, 2006).

Ethnic Media and Public Diplomacy Ethnic media aids the diaspora in communicating the community’s identity and fostering a sense of belonging (De Moya, 2011; Georgiou, 2006). It also facilitates the formation and management of connections across national boundaries (Budarick, 2014). In this sense, ethnic media can function as a tool for soft power. The cohesiveness of the diaspora is helped by “imaginaries and communication infrastructures (diasporic

292

J. FERNANDES

media and cultural spaces) upon which multiple and diverse processes of identity and community are constructed, and depend on the production of narratives and discourses that reproduce and sustain relevant frames of self-identification, and collective action” (Tsagarousianou, 2004, p. 64). Ethnic and diasporic media allow for the creation of spaces of solidarity within the community, where people can share experiences across distances and help each other transcend their national boundaries to understand themselves as part of a larger transnational community (Budarick, 2014). Ethnic media (i.e. Latino media) call attention to diaspora issues (e.g. De Moya, 2011) and are channels through which the diaspora can support home governments or, in some cases, oppose them (De Moya, 2018; Uysal, 2019). Considering how ethnic media can support the diaspora’s public diplomacy efforts, this chapter presents a case study of how three Brazilian publications based in the United States covered the 2018 Brazilian election. A qualitative content analysis was conducted to explore the social control and pluralistic media functions of these ethnic media outlets within an election context. Although exploratory, this study adds to the limited research on ethnic media and elections (Fernandes & Shumow, 2016; Rendon et al., 2019). The 2018 Brazilian elections are an appropriate context for this study because it was a moment of profound political polarization in the country, where a far-right populist candidate, Jair Bolsonaro, led the polls and promised change amid a previous administration labeled corrupt (Londono & Casado, 2019). The 2018 Brazilian elections captured considerable media attention not only in Brazil but around the world (Charner & Reverdosa, 2018; Gatinois, 2018; Lafuente, 2018). As the world watched the elections unfold, Brazilians living abroad, including in the United States, participated by voting and organizing rallies against or pro-Bolsonaro (G1, 2018; Marquez, 2018). In this way, the Brazilian diaspora represented itself as a political force abroad. Even far from the homeland, they advocated for change and a better tomorrow for Brazil. In this context of the 2018 Brazilian election, this study seeks to answer the following research questions: (1) How did these ethnic newspapers cover the elections and connect the diaspora to the homeland’s political activity?, (2) What ethnic media functions could be observed at play in these publications?, and (3) In what way these functions served or not the diaspora’s public diplomacy efforts?

12

BRAZILIAN ETHNIC MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES …

293

Electoral cycles present a unique opportunity for the study of ethnic media functions because they revolve about an event that is happening in the homeland but where the diaspora members in a host country have the opportunity to cast a ballot, abroad, that shapes the political landscape at home. To study how Brazilian ethnic media communicated information about the 2018 presidential election and to observe their functions in this context, a qualitative content analysis of all media content related to the 2018 elections produced by three U.S.-based Brazilian newspapers was conducted (following the approach of Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, and O’Connor & Gibson, 2003) from one month (September of 2018) before Election Day to one month (October of 2018) before the runoff happened in Brazil.

Brazilian Diaspora Newspapers The digital editions of immigrant media newspapers that circulate in geographic areas with the most concentration of Brazilians in the United States (MPI, 2019)3 were selected for analysis. These newspapers’ websites4 are available to all Portuguese-speaking communities in the United States, while their print editions target Brazilians living in Massachusetts (for the Brazilian Times ), New Jersey (for the Brazilian Voice), and Florida (for Brasileiros & Brasileiras ). All three are written in Portuguese, and in addition to their print and digital issues, they have social media presence on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, where they also share news and interact with the community. Similar to other ethnic newspapers, these publications can be acquired for free at local gas stations, ethnic restaurants, and grocery stores (Fernandes & Shumow, 2016), but also via free subscription (e.g. Brasileiros & Brasileiras, n.d.).

3 According to a Migration Policy Institute report, three states in the United States contained the largest population of Brazilian immigrants in 2017: Florida, Massachusetts, and California. Because no ethnic newspaper was found in the state of California, I selected a Brazilian newspaper in the fourth most populous state, New Jersey. In fact, if one analyzes the Brazilian population by metropolitan area, the Los Angeles—Long Beach—Anaheim Metro area comes in fourth, while metro areas in MA, FL, and NJ come first. 4 See Brazilian Voice: https://brazilianvoice.com; Brazilian Times: https://www.brazil iantimes.com/; and Brasileiros & Brasilieras: https://journalbb.com.

294

J. FERNANDES

Table 12.1 Descriptive analysis of the three newspapers

Issues with election news without election news Stories mean number of stories Front Page Stories

Brazilian Voice

Brazilian Times

Brasileiros & Brasileiras

Total

9 9 0

26 16 10

2 1 1

37 26 11

41 4.5

29 1.8

3 1.5

73 7.8

5

12

0

17

Brazilian Times was founded in 1988 and has three print editions a week, serving mainly communities in Massachusetts, but its website indicates that it also offers print and digital versions for Florida and New York. Brazilian Voice, published weekly and founded in 1988, serves communities in New Jersey, Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania. Brasileiros & Brasileiras, published monthly, was founded in 1994 and serves communities in central and south Florida. As Table 12.1 shows, in the timeframe of the study, Brazilian Voice published nine issues, all with news about the election; Brazilian Times published 26 issues, but only 16 featured news about the election, and Brasileiros & Brasileiras published two issues, but only the month of October featured election-related news. While Brazilian Times offered digital versions for Florida, New York, and Massachusetts, only the Massachusetts version was used to avoid oversampling from this particular newspaper and to represent its primary target community. Once the digital versions were collected, each issue of the three publications was screened for election stories, selecting any story that mentioned the 2018 elections, resulting in a total sample of 73 stories.

Analysis of the Media Coverage The analysis was conducted by the author of this study, who, as a Brazilian immigrant living in Florida, is a native Portuguese speaker. In qualitative research, it is important to acknowledge the positionality of the researcher; therefore, it should be highlighted that my personal experience as an immigrant, as well as my engagement with ethnic media during

12

BRAZILIAN ETHNIC MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES …

295

my first years in the United States, provides first-hand experience related to the many concepts discussed in this chapter. The first stage of the analysis followed a quantitative approach to describe the prominence given to election coverage by these media. The second stage explored the salient ethnic media functions identified in the news stories selected for the study, as established by previous research (Johnson, 2000; Viswanath & Arora, 2000). Pluralistic Ethnic Media Functions These functions are evident in (a) the portrayal of native culture, which refers to the maintenance of language and promotion of ethnic pride, (b) a focus on a minority news agenda, which in an electoral context refers to announcements of community political events and coverage of these activities, (c) coverage of political participation, which refers to the promotion of the groups’ political interests, and (d) the symbolic empowerment process, which refers to the existence and size (i.e., in terms of circulation) of a communication vehicle as a symbol of the community’s power. Although this last function cannot be garnered by the news content analysis, it is safe to assume that symbolic empowerment is one of the functions performed by all three newspapers. First, because these newspapers have been in business for more than 25 years; and second, because they consistently publish within U.S. cities that host large Brazilian communities. This combination of time in business and population reach validates these publications’ symbolic power, which simply refers to having a sustained presence within the community. Social Control Functions This study focused on the distributive control process5 of ethnic media, which refers to the role of the media in reporting routine events. Within social control and distributive functions (Viswanath & Arora, 2000), the following functions are observed: (a) cultural transmission refers to the reporting and publishing of information related to the community, such

5 The other type of information control process is feedback, which refers to the role of the media in reporting with the aim of drawing attention to a potential problem in the system (Viswanath & Arora, 2000).

296

J. FERNANDES

as festivals, meetings, events, etc., (b) the ethnic newspaper as a community booster refers to the reporting of information about the community in a positive light. It highlights the achievements and successes of immigrants, (c) the community paper as a sentinel refers to the role of media as radars and early warning systems against external threats, (d) the assimilatory function refers to the efforts put forth by the ethnic newspaper to cover the community’s involvement with local politics and the relationship between the ethnic group and the host country, and (e) the informational function refers to the role of providing information about the local community and the homeland. Following the initial analysis, an inductive approach was employed to identify and organize topics emerging from the data. Finally, these topics were collapsed into overarching themes related to ethnic media functions, ethnic media roles in the diaspora’s public diplomacy efforts and ethnic media connections of the diaspora to the homeland’s political activity. The Prominence of Election Coverage Across the three newspapers, 37 issues were collected for the two months under study, out of which, 26 issues included election coverage (see Table 12.1). Despite having fewer issues and running weekly, Brazilian Voice had the greatest quantity of election coverage (41 stories), followed by Brazilian Times (29 stories), and Brasileiros & Brasileiras, with three stories. In terms of prominence, the analysis of the front page of the publications revealed that election news stories were absent from the front pages of Brasileiros & Brasileiras, but they did make the front page of Brazilian Voice five times (out of nine issues), with coverage of the election timeline, the increase in the number of Brazilians living abroad and eligible to vote, and the Brazilians who live in the United States but were running for office in Brazil. Brazilian Times published election news on the front page 12 times (out of 16 issues), covering the electoral process, Brazilians who live in the United States but were running for office in Brazil, and the candidates’ rallies.

12

BRAZILIAN ETHNIC MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES …

297

Ethnic Media Functions Identified in the Election Coverage Both pluralistic and social control media functions were evident in the articles. For the most part, all pluralistic functions were observed in all issues, while social control functions were identified to a lesser degree. As detailed below, the Brazilian Times issues had a balance between pluralistic and social control functions, while the Brazilian Voice focused more on the pluralistic dimensions. The one issue from Brasileiros & Brasileiras tilted toward pluralistic functions. Pluralistic Functions in Depth Across all issues analyzed, native culture, which in this study was understood as language preservation, was immediately identified because the entire content of these publications was written in Portuguese. A second dimension, ethnic pride, refers to the news focus on Brazilians, their cultural or community events, and the use of national symbols, such as the Brazilian flag. Proportionally, both Brazilian Voice and Brazilian Times covered stories containing this pluralistic function. For example: “Brasileiros realizam evento pro Bolsonaro in Everett (MA)” Brazilians organize event in favor of Bolsonaro in Everett (MA) (Brazilian Times, issue 3164, front page). Of the nine issues in Brazilian Voice, six had at least one story highlighting ethnic pride, while of the 16 issues in Brazilian Times, 11 had at least one ethnic pride story. Ethnic pride was showcased through the coverage of Brazilians who live in the United States and were running for office in Brazil, the coverage of rallies and events in favor or against a candidate, and the use of the national flag, and yellow and green colors, in these news stories. Both dimensions of disseminating a minority agenda and highlighting the diaspora’s political participation shed light on how these diasporic media connect the diaspora to the political activity in the homeland. Although the topic under investigation in this study is the 2018 election in Brazil, the three publications used news about the election as a gateway to establish a minority news agenda that expanded beyond borders. This is understandable given that these three geographical areas have a large population of Brazilian immigrants, and those who have formalized their legal status in the United States are eligible to transfer their voting precinct to their respective Brazilian consulate or embassy. Most of the issues contained stories that focused on the local community,

298

J. FERNANDES

such as information about the upcoming election and voting procedures (e.g. Brazilian Times; issue 3174; Brazilian Voice, issue 1797), Brazilians living in the United States but running for offices in Brazil (e.g., Brazilian Voice, issue 1798), coverage of events favoring or rejecting a candidate (e.g., Brazilian Times, issue 3166), and stories about estimates of the number of Brazilians living abroad. Political participation was prevalent throughout the news stories in all three newspapers, but in different ways. For example, Brazilian Voice had a wider focus, touching on issues related to the homeland, such as Bolsonaro’s stabbing episode during a rally in Brazil, and corruption scandals at home, while also covering issues related to the local community, such as political events and information about the electoral process abroad. For example: “Brasileiros preparam-se para as eleicoes presidenciaveis no domingo (7),” Brazilians get ready for the upcoming presidential elections on Sunday (7) (Brazilian Voice, issue 1797, p. 26). On the other hand, Brazilian Times had a narrower focus, with stories mainly concerning the local community, such as political events and explanations of the electoral process. For example: “O Grupo Mulher Brasileira esta trabalhando para informar a comunidade Brasileiras sobre as eleicoes Brasileiras…” The Brazilian Women Group is working to inform the Brazilian community about the Brazilian elections… (Brazilian Times, issue 3168, p. 12). The one issue from Brasileiros & Brasileiras had a limited scope and focused solely on the electoral process for Brazilians abroad (i.e., polling locations, times, dates). These pluralistic functions speak to the immigrants’ ability to express, through ethnic media, their culture and membership in a diaspora community, as well as the promotion of their political and social interests (which can lead to more engagement). Social control functions can emphasize and promote the acquisition of the host country’s culture and/or the adherence to the homeland’s culture. Social Control Functions in Depth Of the overarching functions identified by previous research, social control was investigated by taking the framework explained by Viswanath and Arora (2000), which posits that within this social control overarching function, ethnic media might serve other specific roles, such as cultural transmission, boosting the community, assimilation, and informational roles.

12

BRAZILIAN ETHNIC MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES …

299

Cultural transmission refers to the publishing of information on community events and programs, and it does not threaten or question the powerful groups within the community. As observed in the pluralistic function of political participation, Brazilian Times adopted a local emphasis, reporting on events and gatherings that occurred within the host society but with participants composed of Brazilian diaspora members. Thus, the cultural transmission function was observable in this newspaper at a higher level than in the other two newspapers. The community booster role was also pervasive throughout the stories in two of the newspapers (Brazilian Voice and Brazilian Times ); for instance, in stories about Brazilian immigrants running for office (e.g., Brazilian Voice, issue 1794), the coverage of political events (e.g., Brazilian Times, issue 3166), and the focus on how well organized the events were. A third function centers on the community newspaper as a sentinel. Previous research has proposed that media can serve as a sentinel (Laswell, 1948) and alert the systems (i.e., in this case, the diaspora community) of external threats (Viswanath & Arora, 2000). In the context of ethnic groups living in a host country, discrimination and other vulnerabilities are likely to occur, and the diaspora media can serve as a watchdog by reporting on issues about immigration laws, and rights and obligations, among others. Nevertheless, in this study, the concept of sentinel was evidenced in a slightly different manner. Instead of focusing on immigration per se, the concept of sentinel was brought into the political context, as in being a sentinel of the 2018 Brazilian election. One story in the Brazilian Times mentioned the issue of potential fraud in the election, which connects to the function of sentinel or watchdog: “Em Massachusetts, uma Brasileira disse que viajou 140km para votar, mas a urna nao estava funcionando…o mesario mandou todos irem embora”, In Massachusetts, a Brazilian women traveled 140km to vote, but the electronic ballot was not working…the poll worker sent everyone home,” (Brazilian Times, issue 3175, p. 2)

The assimilatory function of ethnic media was not clearly observed. Only one story in the Brazilian Times could perhaps fit this category. The story covered the visit of the mayor of Framingham, MA, to the Brazilian consulate in the area (Brazilian Times, issue 3175, p. 2), reflecting the

300

J. FERNANDES

notion of positive feelings existing between the diaspora and the host community. The informational function was observed in the three newspapers, with Brazilian Voice reporting and informing about issues happening in the home country as well as issues connected to the local Brazilian community. Brazilian Times had a local Brazilian community focus, with very few stories about issues discussed in Brazil. Brasileiros & Brasileiras, as mentioned previously, was limited in scope and focused solely on the electoral process in the October issue. Topics in the Newspaper Coverage In the case of the Brazilian Voice, although it had fewer issues during the two months under analysis, this ethnic newspaper presented a broader scope in its coverage of the 2018 Brazilian elections. In particular, its stories focused on corruption, campaign strategies, the horse race, the main policy issues, the candidates, the types of voters, community news and events, and the electoral process. Brazilian Times, on the other hand, presented a narrower scope, which focused much more on community news and events, and the electoral process. Less than a handful of stories were focused on the horserace or other topics related to the election. Finally, Brasileiros & Brasileiras, a monthly newspaper, had a limited scope in covering the election. In its October issue, two of the three stories were about the electoral process, and they informed eligible voters about polling locations and how to file an absentee ballot. The third story was an opinion piece related to the extreme polarization of the election and how social media contributed to this. Two clear overarching themes emerged from the data, which were presented differently by the three publications analyzed. The two themes are homeland society (i.e., attributes related to keeping ties and understanding the homeland culture) and diaspora community (i.e., attributes and behaviors related to community building and engagement, such as dissemination of local political information). Both of these overarching themes are more directly related to the pluralistic functions of ethnic media because they encompass the notion that one can adapt to the host country while also maintaining the native culture. The homeland society theme was clearly evidenced in the Brazilian Voice coverage, where in almost every issue, stories were about the

12

BRAZILIAN ETHNIC MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES …

301

topics happening and discussed in Brazil, as well as local events about the election. The diaspora community6 theme was evidenced in the Brazilian Voice as well, highlighting coverage of local events and local opinion leaders (e.g., immigrants running for office). However, it was the Brazilian Times that used this theme as the foundation for its stories about the election. It reported very little about issues in Brazil.

Discussion Through a qualitative content analysis, this study investigated how ethnic media functions are present in news stories about the 2018 Brazilian election in Brazilian newspapers based in the United States. In general, both pluralistic and social control functions permeated the content of the news stories about the election, providing further support to the notion that both processes can work simultaneously through media. Pluralistic functions of symbolic empowerment and native culture were readily observed in all three publications. Symbolic empowerment was pervasive because these publications have been in business for more than 25 years and were founded at moments of great influx of Brazilian immigrants to the United States. Therefore, although these publications might be small in comparison to mainstream media, these characteristics allow them to have symbolic power within the targeted community: the Brazilian diaspora. Native culture was also strongly observed in these publications in two ways. The first was through language. The three publications under study were entirely written in Portuguese, fulfilling the function of maintenance of native language. The second, ethnic pride, was a common function throughout election news stories. Ethnic pride was linked to stories that involved political rallies favoring one of the presidential candidates, Jair Bolsonaro. These stories usually emphasized the large number of Brazilian supporters in an event, their impeccable organization, and the use of Brazilian flags and t-shirts. Furthermore, in most cases, these ethnic pride stories usually made the front page of the newspapers, and the stories themselves occupied a large proportion of the pages, with the inclusion of pictures. 6 Brasileiros & Brasileiras had very few stories, and since it is published monthly, it was difficult to establish an overarching theme for it when analyzing the 2018 election. Therefore, it was excluded from the thematic analysis.

302

J. FERNANDES

Another pluralistic function observed was the focus on a minority news agenda; however, each publication had a different approach. Brazilian Voice adopted a broader scope, reporting on issues that not necessarily would affect Brazilians living abroad but that were of general interest (i.e., homeland community theme). For instance, this publication reported about the horserace, the campaign strategies of some candidates, and policy issues. In addition, despite having fewer issues, Brazilian Voice also focused on reporting about the Brazilian electoral process, providing constant information about where to vote, how to vote, and the documentation necessary. Brazilian Times, on the other hand, adopted a narrower scope, publishing more stories that would be of interest to the local community (i.e., diaspora community theme). For instance, most stories were related to the electoral process for Brazilians living abroad, the events in favor of candidates, and gatherings to provide information about the election. Brasileiros & Brasileiras, a monthly publication, only published one story about the electoral process. Political participation , yet another pluralistic function, focused on how the diaspora can maintain political ties with the homeland. Cultural transmission was evident and perhaps the most prevalent among the social control functions. Brazilian Times used this function the most by focusing its news stories on issues directly related to the community (i.e., electoral process abroad, events). Other social control functions observed were the newspaper as a community booster and informative functions, while the newspaper as a sentinel and the assimilatory functions were sparse. In summary, while both processes of ethnic media functions were observed in this analysis, in this electoral context, the pluralistic functions dominated over the social control functions, which could be attributed to the scope of the election per se, whose results would affect Brazilians living in Brazil the most, not so much the ones living abroad. These publications fulfilled, for the most part, an overall pluralistic function of maintaining one’s native identity, while also providing information on how to function within the host society. Considering these results, it can be argued that these newspapers –or diaspora media—contribute to advance the interests of the Brazilian diaspora in the United States by keeping the community well informed about issues happening in the home country (i.e., communicating political information from the homeland that strengthens the ties of the diaspora with the country of origin), by promoting political participation abroad

12

BRAZILIAN ETHNIC MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES …

303

through an external voting process that shapes the political landscape at home, by helping in the preservation of the diaspora’s political identity abroad, and by supporting the diaspora in the process of adjusting to their lives in the host community. As such, diaspora media have the potential to stimulate political activity abroad (in the case of this study, in relation to political processes happening at home), pluralistic views, ethnic pride, activism, connection to the homeland, a sense of community, and the maintenance of a Brazilian identity. Although outside the scope of this study, it could be argued that the outcomes described in the previous sentence can, in turn, help the diaspora members maintain a connection to the homeland that can translate into many results: political influence at home, economic support of families back in Brazil, investments in the homeland, nostalgia tourism, and the like (Bravo, 2014). These are, as well, typical goals pursued by home government’s public diplomacy initiatives. Diaspora media, in other words, can facilitate the achievement of public diplomacy goals advanced by non-state actors (such as diaspora communities) that can converge with similar public diplomacy objectives established by home countries (De Moya, 2011). All in all, these ethnic newspapers or diaspora media are fulfilling the public diplomacy function of garnering “support among people abroad for a particular nation’s foreign policies, ideals and values” (Fitzpatrick, 2007, p. 196).

References Agirreazkuenaga, I., & Larrondo, A. (2018). Much more than airtime: Radio strategies to foster an inclusive Latino identity in the Basque country. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44(9), 1604–1620. https://doi.org/10. 1080/1369183X.2017.1339595. Alencar, A., & Deuze, M. (2017). News for assimilation or integration? Examining the functions of news in shaping acculturation experiences of immigrants in the Netherlands and Spain. European Journal of Communication, 32(2), 151–166. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323117689993. Attanasio, C., & Marcelo, P. (2019, December 13). Brazilians arrive in waves at the US-Mexico border. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/06c09bc61c3c bd4432d1dfe751e90914. Berry, J. (1980). Acculturation as varieties of adaptation. In A. M. Padilha (Ed.), Acculturation: Theory, models, and some new findings (pp. 9–25). Westview. Berry, J. (1997). Immigration, acculturation, and adaptation. Applied Psychology, 46(1), 5–34. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-0597.1997.tb01087.x.

304

J. FERNANDES

Blizzard, B., & Batalova, J. (2019, August 29). Brazilian immigrants in the United States. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ article/brazilian-immigrants-united-states. Brasil. (2016). Constituicao da Republica Federativa do Brasil de 1988. http:// www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Constituicao/Constituicao.htm#art14. Brasileiros & Brasileiras. (n.d.). Front page. Retrieved June 30, 2020, from https://jornalbb.com/. Bravo, V. (2011). Conceptualization of diaspora relations from the government viewpoint: An exploratory qualitative study of diaspora relations in the cases of Costa Rica and El Salvador. Unpublished Dissertation, University of Florida. http://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/UF/E0/04/35/51/00001/BRAVO_V.pdf. Bravo, V. (2014). The importance of diaspora communities as key publics for national governments around the world. In G. Golan, S. Yang, & D. Kinsey (Eds.), International public relations and public diplomacy: Communication and engagement (pp. 279–296). Peter Lang. Budarick, J. (2014). Media and the limits of transnational solidarity: Unanswered questions in the relationship between diaspora, communication and community. Global Media and Communication, 10(2), 139–153. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/1742766514540070. Caramani, D., & Grotz, F. (2015). Beyond citizenship and residence? Exploring the extension of voting rights in the age of globalization. Democratization, 22(5), 799–819. Charner, F., & Reverdosa, M. (2018, October 29). Far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro wins presidential election in Brazil. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/ 2018/10/28/americas/brazil-election/index.html. Christiansen, C. (2004). News media consumption among immigrants in Europe: The relevance of diaspora. Ethnicities, 4(2), 185–207. https://doi.org/10. 1177/1468796804042603. De Moya, M. (2011). A ground theory of global public relations by diaspora organizations: Building relationships, communities, and group identity. Unpublished Dissertation, University of Florida. http://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/ UF/E0/04/28/58/00001/demoya_m.pdf. De Moya, M. (2018). Protesting the homeland: Diaspora dissent public relations efforts to oppose the Dominican Republic’s citizenship policies. In A. Adi (Ed.), Protest public relations: Communicating dissent and activism (pp. 106– 127). Routledge. Deuze, M. (2006). Ethnic media, community media and participatory culture. Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism, 7 (3), 262–280. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/1464884906065512. Fernandes, J., & Shumow, M. (2016). Framing politics in transnational communities: Spanish-language immigrant media and election coverage in South

12

BRAZILIAN ETHNIC MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES …

305

Florida. Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism, 17 (8), 961–978. https:// doi.org/10.1177/1464884914542743. Fitzpatrick, K. (2007). Advancing the new public diplomacy: A public relations perspective. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 2(3), 187–211. https://doi. org/10.1163/187119007X240497. G1. (2018, September 29). EUA, Reino Unido, Portugal e outros países têm manifestações contra Bolsonaro. Globo.com. https://g1.globo.com/mundo/ noticia/2018/09/29/eua-reino-unido-portugal-e-outros-paises-tem-manife stacoes-contra-bolsonaro.ghtml. Gatinois, C. (2018, October 26). Election au Brésil: Jair Bolsonaro, ou la faillite de la classe politique. Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/art icle/2018/10/26/election-au-bresil-jair-bolsonaro-ou-la-faillite-de-la-classepolitique_5374866_3222.html. Georgiou, M. (2006). Diaspora, identity and the media: Diasporic transnationalism and mediated spacialities. Hampton Press. Glazer, N., & Moynihan, D. (1970). Beyond the melting pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City (Vol. 63). MIT Press. Gordon, M. (1964). Assimilation in American life. Oxford University Press. Gregory, B. (2008). Public diplomacy: Sunrise of an academic field. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(March), 274–290. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311723. Gudykunst, W., & Kim, Y. (1997). Communicating with strangers: An approach to intercultural communication (3rd ed.). McGraw-Hill. Horboken, V. (2004). Ethnic communications. In S. Spencer & G. Taylor (Eds.), Social identities: Multidisciplinary approaches (pp. 199–217). Routledge. Hsieh, H., & Shannon, S. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. Qualitative Health Research, 15(9), 1277–1288. https://doi.org/10. 1177/1049732305276687. Johnson, M. (2000). How ethnic are U.S. ethnic media: The case of Latina magazines. Mass Communication & Society, 3(2&3), 229–248. https://doi. org/10.1207/S15327825MCS0323_04. Kim, Y. (1981). Intercultural communication in the context of immigrant acculturation. [Paper presentation], ed. at the International Communication Association, Minneapolis, MN, United States. Kim, Y. (1982). Communication and acculturation. In L. Samover & R. Porter (Eds.), Intercultural communication: A reader. Wadsworth. Kim, Y. (1984). Searching for creative integration. In W. B. Gudykunst & Y. Y. Kim (Eds.), Methods for intercultural communication research. Sage. Kim, Y. (1988). Communication and cross-cultural adaptation: An integrative theory. Multilingual Matters.

306

J. FERNANDES

Kraul, C., & Gauouette, L. (2005, September 14). No-visa agreement backfired on Mexico. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/laxpm-2005-sep-14-fg-mexbrazil14-story.html. Lafuente, J. (2018, October 9). Bolsonaro’s surprise success in Brazil gives new impetus to the rise of the far right. El Pais. https://english.elpais.com/elp ais/2018/10/09/inenglish/1539079014_311747.html. Lakey, P. (2003). Acculturation: A review of the literature. Intercultural Communication Studies, 12(2), 103–118. Laswell, H. (1948). The structure and function of communication in society. In L. Bryson (Ed.), The communication of ideas (pp. 37–71). Harper. Lyman, S. (1968). The race relations cycle of Robert E. Park. Pacific Sociological Review, 11(1), 16–22. Lin, W. & Song, H. (2006). Geo-ethnic storytelling: An examination of ethnic media content in contemporary immigrant communities. Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism, 7 (3), 362–388. https://doi.org/10.1177/146488 4906065518. Londono, E., & Casado, L. (2019, March 22). With a second president in jail, Brazil’s Carwash probe lives on. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/2019/03/22/world/americas/brazil-car-wash-corruption-temer.html. Marcus, A. (2009a). Brazilian immigration to the United States and the geographical imagination. Geographical Review, 99(4), 481–498. www.jstor. org/stable/40377412. Marcus, A. (2009b). (Re)creating places and spaces in two countries: Brazilian transnational migration processes. Journal of Cultural Geography, 26(2), 173– 198. https://doi.org/10.1080/08873630903003672. Marquez, F. (2018, September 29). Sabado tem manisfestacoes pro and contra Bolsonaro em cidades to Brasil e do exterior. Diario do Poder. https://diariodopoder.com.br/brasil-e-regioes/sabado-tem-manifesta coes-pro-e-contra-bolsonaro-em-cidades-do-brasil-e-exterior. Marzolaf, M. (1979). The Danish-language press in America. Arno Press. Moran, K. C. (2006). Is changing the language enough? The Spanish-language ‘alternative’ in the USA. Journalism, 7 (3), 389–405. O’Connor, H., & Gibson, N. (2003). A step-by-step guide to qualitative data analysis. Journal of Aboriginal and Indigenous Community Health, 1(1), 63– 90. Ojo, T. (2006). Ethnic print media in the multicultural nation of Canada. Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism, 7 (3), 343–361. https://doi.org/10. 1177/1464884906065517. Pallister, K. (2020). Migrant populations and external voting: The politics of suffrage expansion in Central America. Policy Studies, 41(2–3), 271–287.

12

BRAZILIAN ETHNIC MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES …

307

Pedroza, L., & Palop-García, P. (2017). Diaspora policies in comparison: An application of the Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX) for the Latin American and Caribbean region. Political Geography, 60, 165–178. Pew Research Center. (2006, August 21). What’s next for the ethnic media? https://www.journalism.org/2006/08/21/whats-next-for-the-ethnicmedia/. Rendon, H., De Moya, M., & Johnson, M. (2019). “Dreamers” or threat: Bilingual frame building of DACA immigrants. Newspaper Research Journal, 40(1), 7–24. https://doi.org/10.1177/0739532918814448. Rother, L. (2005, June 30). Brazilians streaming into U.S. through Mexican border. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/30/ world/americas/brazilians-streaming-into-us-through-mexican-border.html. Scheufele, D. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. Journal of Communication, 49(1), 103–122. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1999.tb0 2784.x. Skidmore, T. (2010). Brazil: Five centuries of change. Oxford University. https:// library.brown.edu/create/fivecenturiesofchange/. Subervi-Velez, F. (1986). The mass media and ethnic assimilation and pluralism: A review and research proposal with special focus on Hispanics. Communication Research, 13(1), 71–96. https://doi.org/10.1177/009365028601 300105. Tsagarousianou, R. (2004). Rethinking the concept of diaspora: Mobility, connectivity and communication in a globalised world. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 1(1). TSE (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral). (n.d.). Partidos politicos registrados no TSE. Retrieved June 30, 2020, from http://www.tse.jus.br/partidos/partidos-pol iticos/registrados-no-tse. TSE (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral). (n.d.). Registro de candidatos. http://www. tse.jus.br/eleicoes/processo-eleitoral-brasileiro/candidaturas/registro-de-can didatos. TSE (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral). (2016). Código eleitoral anotado e legislação complementar. http://www.tse.jus.br/hotsites/catalogo-publicacoes/pdf/ codigo_eleitoral/codigo-eleitoral-anotado-e-legislacao-complementar-12-edi cao-atualizado.pdf. TSE (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral). (2018, April 3). Eleicoes 2018: Saiba para quem o voto e facultativo e obrigatorio. http://www.tse.jus.br/imprensa/not icias-tse/2018/Abril/eleicoes-2018-saiba-para-quem-o-voto-e-facultativo-eobrigatorio. U.S. Census Bureau. (n.d.). The foreign-born population in the United States. https://www.census.gov/newsroom/pdf/cspan_fb_slides.pdf. U.S. Census Bureau. (2017). American Community Survey. https://factfinder. census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml.

308

J. FERNANDES

U.S. Census Bureau. (2020). Table 2.1. Foreign-born ppopulation by sex, aage, and year of entry: 2019. Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2019/demo/ foreign-born/cps-2019.html. Uysal, N. (2019). The rise of diasporas as adversarial non-state actors in public diplomacy: The Turkish case. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 14(3), 272– 292. https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191X-14401030. Viswanath, K., & Arora, P. (2000). Ethnic media in the United States: An essay on their role in integration, assimilation, and social control. Mass Communication & Society, 3(1), 39–56. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327825MCS 0301_03. Zell, S., & Skop, E. (2011). Social networks and selectivity in Brazilian migration to Japan and the United States. Population, Space and Place, 17 (5), 469–488. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.615.

PART III

Conclusion

CHAPTER 13

Conclusion: Lessons Learned and Future Research Maria De Moya and Vanessa Bravo

We edited Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy with the purpose of highlighting the different strategic roles that diaspora communities can play in modern public diplomacy efforts. Taking a strategic communication perspective and, more importantly, focusing on the experiences of Latin American diasporas and nations, we sought to contribute to building the theoretical and practical understanding of public diplomacy in and about this region, which has been significantly understudied. We have long found this oversight perplexing, given the expanse of the Latin American diaspora and its importance in South America, North America, Europe, and the rest of the world.1 1 For a more detailed description of this expanse and this worldwide importance of Latin American diaspora communities, please refer to Chapter 1 in this book.

M. De Moya DePaul University, Chicago, IL, USA V. Bravo (B) Elon University, Elon, NC, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Bravo and M. De Moya (eds.), Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74564-6_13

311

312

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

The authors in this edited book, all Latin American scholars and most of them members of diaspora communities themselves, presented studies based on a contemporary conceptualization of public diplomacy2 efforts, which are more participatory and collaborative (Fisher, 2013; Fitzpatrick, 2017; Manor, 2019; Zaharna et al., 2014), increasingly led by nonstate actors (Lee & Ayhan, 2015; Melissen, 2005; Popkova, 2020; Seib, 2016; Sevin, 2017; Uysal, 2019), frequently advanced through partnerships with private and civil society groups (Cull, 2019; Fitzpatrick, 2009; Gregory, 2011), and often driven by relationship-building objectives and problem-solving goals (Bravo, 2014a; Bravo & De Moya, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 2017; Zaharna et al., 2014). In adopting this modern view of public diplomacy, the contributing authors examined the degree to which the Latin American diasporas’ involvement in public diplomacy has indeed been participatory, driven by partnerships, and centered on relationship-building and problem-solving. While the authors’ chapters demonstrate that the answer is, for the most part, positive, they also provide insights about the challenges of these efforts and limitations of the power of the diaspora to advance goals that benefit the homeland and advance the national interests of the civil society in the home country.3

2 Chapter 1 in this book provides, in more detail, a definition of public diplomacy and an overview of how the understanding of public diplomacy has evolved through time, in the academic literature and the professional practice. 3 Recent discussions among public diplomacy scholars, both in the literature and in academic conferences, have questioned the level of power that non-state actors can have in a field dominated by the political and financial power of the state, where some states tend to benefit the interests of the elites and/or the rulers, and in post-colonial settings. For instance, the 2020 virtual summit “Cultural Diplomacy as Critical Practice” organized on Sept. 24–25, 2020 by North American Cultural Diplomacy Initiative (NACDI), included recent research on this question. Scholars have also questioned who benefits and who is impacted when non-state actors pursue public diplomacy in the benefit of the homeland. This is an important question that cannot be properly addressed in this chapter. However, we can share that our research is based on understanding that diaspora communities strategize and work together to solve problems that affect communities and the civil society in the homeland; and that they can be intentional in their work to address problems that affect diaspora communities in host countries, within the limitations imposed by the realities of host- and home-countries’ contexts.

13

CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE RESEARCH

313

Latin American Diasporas and the Public Diplomacy Literature As explained in the introduction to this book, diaspora members can play many roles at home and abroad. At home, by voting in presidential elections through external voting rights, running for office (for Congress seats, for instance), influencing political decisions of family members and friends, sending remittances, investing in small businesses, getting involved in activism, facilitating technology transfers, sending goods, and engaging in nostalgia tourism, among other roles (e.g. Bravo, 2014a; Bravo & De Moya, 2015, 2018; Cull, 2008; Délano, 2014; De Moya, 2019; Murti & Zaharna, 2014). They are also important members of their host countries, performing the role of informal ambassadors of the homeland, influencing local politics, becoming dual citizens, participating in the political process, producing media content for transnational consumption, and becoming opinion leaders about issues related to both their home and host communities (e.g. Bravo, 2014a; Bravo & De Moya, 2015, 2018; Cull, 2008; Délano, 2014; Murti & Zaharna, 2014). In performing these roles, diasporas may be working in partnership with homeland governments, and these partnerships can in turn lead to successful outcomes, where the goals of the home state and the diaspora align. In Labarca and Werner-Wildner’s research (in Chapter 5), they explained the partnership of the Chilean diaspora members who conduct business in China, in service to their own and to state interests. Similarly, this type of partnership is explored in Ferreira Menezes, Rebello Lima, and De Souza Boy’s study of the Brazilian diaspora in France (Chapter 9). In the celebrations of the Afro-Brazilian festival Lavage de la Madeleine, organized by Brazilians who live in Paris, the cultural diplomacyinterests of the Brazilian diaspora and the homeland aligned. While the state support for this festival has weaned in recent years, the celebration continues strong with the leadership of the diaspora. The state might reap some benefits, but efforts like these are more for the diaspora, which is empowered through the opportunities for interaction, collaboration, and shared celebration of their culture. Nation-states increasingly recognize that diaspora members are members of the home-country’s extended community, with rights, needs,

314

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

and interests that they need to attend to, regardless of where they are located in the world (Bravo & De Moya, 2015, 2018; Délano, 2011, 2014, 2018; Gamlen, 2019; Ragazzi, 2014). As such, some nation-states sponsor programs or offer benefits to diaspora communities, to support them and build a closer relationship with them. As Valenzuela-Moreno (Chapter 2) details in her analysis of social protections offered to diaspora communities by the governments of Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Ecuador, those benefits were weaker or nonexistent even a few decades ago. Now these state governments work to support immigrant associations, hometown organizations, and other similar groups, legitimizing and strengthening partnerships that will help them achieve foreign policy goals. Additionally, as Bravo detailed (Chapter 3), the main protections and benefits that the governments of El Salvador and Colombia have extended to their citizens who live abroad have become an integral part of their public diplomacy strategy, while for Argentina (Margheritis, Chapter 4) the engagement has been constant, if uneven. Implied in this focus on social protections are the power dynamics of home and host governments and the members of the diasporas from Latin American countries. Diaspora communities can find themselves in vulnerable positions in their host countries and, in some ways, dependent on the homeland’s support. However, even when they can be self-sufficient and independent in host environments, diaspora groups can benefit from their collective action and their shared mission. Power Imbalances Power in the state–diaspora relationship is seldom balanced, and it does not always benefit Latin American diasporas. Some experiences showcase that the capacity that these communities have to produce positive changes in the homeland are limited and constrained by power differentials in relation to their home governments. There is reason, when it comes to Latin American diasporas, to have a less optimistic view about the impact of non-state actors in public diplomacy than that espoused by Melissen (2005), who acknowledged the potential of non-state actors to become powerful interlocutors in the public diplomacy sphere, although he was referring, mainly, to non-state actors such as international nongovernmental organizations and multinational corporations (Melissen, 2005). This powerful stance ascribed to non-state actors in public diplomacy is

13

CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE RESEARCH

315

rarely the situation for diaspora groups, in particular from and in the Latin American region, as several of our chapters illustrate. For example, the lobbying efforts and oppositional activism undertaken in Washington, DC. and Florida by the Cuban diaspora members known as the “hardliners,” while sustained and somewhat successful in terms of being heard and noticed by the U.S. political establishment, have not brought change, up to the time of writing this volume, to the political system in Cuba, even after six decades of strong dissent against the Communist regime in the island. As we detail in Chapter 6, this has not changed the hardliners’ strategy, as evidenced in their strategic narrative choices, but it has given rise to different strategies by other Cuban diaspora members and organizations, who are less focused on the seemingly impossible goal of establishing a democratic system in Cuba, and, instead, prioritized their relationship-building goals through people-to-people democracy. Rather than direct opposition to the state’s goals, it is more common for Latin American diasporas to undertake initiatives to support developments in the homeland and help their country’s people; or to help the homeland advance its goals in the host nation, even if they are not working in close coordination to the state. For example, Gomez Zapata’s analysis (Chapter 8) of the Mexican diaspora in Chicago, which leads its own effort to advocate on its behalf and on behalf of the Latino community as a whole, describes a changing political and social landscape rife with bias and intolerance for immigrantsand people of color. Even if both the state and the diaspora want to lead coordinated efforts, there is the added challenge of constant changes in approaches toward the diaspora in ever-changing homeland government’s priorities. As Bravo (Chapter 3) and Margheritis (Chapter 4) described, these factors have been determinants of the diaspora–state relationships in the cases of El Salvador and Argentina, respectively. Together, these studies provide evidence to the understanding that political instability and government changes in the region can significantly shift or truncate long-term public diplomacy goals, plans, and strategies that either the nation-state or the diaspora might have pursued. Whether it is better for the nation and its people when the state and the diaspora work in opposition or in support of the same goal is a question that seems better answered case-by-case and which really depends on the homeland’s government system and commitment to democracy.

316

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

Diasporas in Opposition Of course, a lack of collaboration does not necessarily mean that the state and the diaspora are pursuing different or even contrasting objectives. However, when they do, diasporas have proven to be formidable opponents to the homeland’s attempt to shape its image, advance policies and/or strengthen relationships abroad. In cases like these, diasporas might see themselves as working to benefit the homeland, even if they oppose the home government at the same time. In those cases, diasporaled efforts emerge as examples of dissent public diplomacy (e.g. De Moya, 2019; Uysal, 2019) and are developed in strong opposition to home governments. That certain diasporas work decidedly against their home governments, it should be noted, is not the same as saying that they work against their homelands. As De Moya (2019) found in her study of the Dominican diaspora, if not for its oppositional role to the government, the human rights abuses committed against people of Haitian descent and Haitian immigrantsmight not be known to the international community. This, we would argue, serves the country more than maintaining its reputation as a go-to vacation spot. Consider, also, the average citizen’s understanding of the realities in Cuba, for example, in the absence of those strategic narratives that the diaspora has built over more than 60 years. When diasporas’ public diplomacy efforts are led in opposition to the state, it is because diaspora groups perceive that their home governments are not working for the benefit of the majority in the civil society at home, such as in the case of Puerto Rico (Chapter 7) and in a much stronger way, Cuba (Chapter 6) and Venezuela (Chapter 10). Diasporas, nonetheless, are not always powerful and their efforts might be insufficient or have limited results, even after long periods of activism. However, in the cases presented here, the diaspora has proven to be an important public diplomacy actor. The digital media environment can be a great equalizer for these groups, allowing them to strategize, collaborate, and promote their own interpretations about the homeland and their policies, as the chapters by Páez-Bravo, Nieves-Pizzarro and Mundel, Fernandes, and Tadeo-Hernández show. When diaspora public diplomacy efforts succeed in opposition to the homeland’s government, they can have a significant impact on the homeland. As the literature shows, the Haitian diaspora, through history, has demoted several governments at home through coups d’etat (Laguerre,

13

CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE RESEARCH

317

2006). In this book, Nieves-Pizzarro and Mundel (Chapter 7) demonstrated, in the case of the #RickyRenuncia campaign, that the participation of the diaspora residing outside of the island was vital in achieving the resignation of Puerto Rican governor Ricardo Roselló. Cases like these are, of course, not exclusive to the region, but they have impacted the practice of public diplomacy for states and diasporas alike. The Latin American Context Through the research presented in these chapters, differences that appear specific to the Latin American region can be highlighted. The first is that, despite previous work pointing to the ease with which a non-state actor such as a diaspora community can successfully establish strategic partnerships with other non-state actors (e.g. La Porte, 2012), that has not been the case for the programs reviewed here. This points that possible challenges in the case of a Latin American diaspora community could be the political instability in the region, the dispersion of the diaspora groups from Latin America around the world, the informal organizational structure of some groups, as well as other contextual factors in home and host environments, which could make these collaborations difficult. Collaborations do exist, of course, where diasporas have partnered with businesses, brands, cultural associations, or education centers to work together in punctual events and short-term initiatives, but long-term partnerships in the region are the exception, rather than the rule. One of the diaspora groups that has been somewhat successful in establishing partnerships with the state and/or with other non-state actors is the Mexican diaspora, as illustrated in Chapter 8 and in previous literature (e.g. Bravo & De Moya, 2018) but even those partnerships have been hard to maintain over time as priorities shift and local contexts change. On the other hand, even with the emergence of new, and the persistence of older authoritarian and populist governments in the region, public diplomacy literature from other parts of the world has described cases of dictatorial or authoritarian governments that exert a strong control over their diasporas—which could include spying on them, harassing them, or forcing them to pay diaspora taxes—in what has been called transnational authoritarianism (Adamson, 2020; Baser & Ozturk, 2020; Tsourapas, 2020). The problem is not as pervasive, or maybe as evident, in the case of Latin America.

318

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

While Latin America has had its fair share of dictators and authoritarian regimes (Borger, 2018; Heinz & Frühling, 1999; Schoultz, 2009; Shesgreen, 2018), a certain stability has reigned in the region for at least two decades, with some notable exceptions (Freedom House, 2018). This perhaps explains the lack of examples of the transnational grip trying to control or dominate diaspora communities in host nations, which has been documented in diasporas of East Europe, Asia, and East Africa (Adamson, 2020; Baser & Ozturk, 2020). Because this strong hold is lacking, diaspora members from Venezuela, for example, can build a network of many nations with the goal of opposing the government, as detailed in Páez-Bravo’s analysis (Chapter 10). What can be found, however, are cases of what Adamson (2020) calls non-state authoritarianism when it comes to diaspora politics. This refers to some diaspora groups opposing or trying to control or repress other diaspora groups from the same home country. We found similar dynamics in the older generation of diaspora members from Cuba in the United States (Chapter 6). What the chapters of this book have collectively demonstrated are the impact that contextual factors at home can have in the attention the state gives to the diaspora (e.g. Bravo, 2011; 2014a, 2014b) and the desire of most diasporas to collaborate in initiatives that bring benefits to the homeland and to the diaspora community itself. An example of the latter is described in the synergy of efforts between state representatives and diaspora members in the case of Chileans living in China or the common goal of the state and the diaspora of improving the image of Brazil in France. As an example of the different ways in which states approach their diasporas, Argentina during the last decades has created what is described as a “lukewarm approach” in the state’s diaspora-engagement policies, as described in Margheritis’ chapter (Chapter 4); as well as how the arrival of Nayib Bukele to power in El Salvador in 2019 weakened the attention afforded by the state to the Salvadoran diaspora in the United States, compared to the previous 15 years, as Bravo detailed in Chapter 3. In contrast, the relative political stability maintained during the last two decades in Chile (with the significant exception of the 2019–2020 protests) and the political stability gained in Colombia in the last 15 years have created conditions for a positive state–diaspora relationship, as both Bravo’s and Labarca and Werner-Wildner’s chapters show.

13

CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE RESEARCH

319

Nieves-Pizzarro and Mundel’s contribution highlight how social media platforms and the Internet, in general, make the diaspora less locationbound and more able to organize despite the geographical distance from the homeland. This point is also emphasized in Fernandes’ chapter, who analyzed how diaspora mediacan inform diasporas, organize them around different causes, and galvanize them around specific issues. Similarly, Tadeo-Hernández’s analysis of the Mex and the City initiative (Chapter 11) shows how this digital media helps diaspora communities in the process of identity formation and maintenance. In each of these cases, there is also the effect of strengthening the feeling of ethnic pride, and calling people to action, especially when it is necessary for them to participate in the political process at home. Future Research: Potential and Limitations of the Diaspora’s Impact This book, in focusing on public diplomacy efforts by or for the diaspora, does not directly address the question of how these initiatives affect other key publics, for both the diaspora and the state. Outside of the specific goals of fostering political change at home, building business relationships, sharing and maintaining the homeland’s culture, an important question remains about how these efforts are affecting other communities, partners, or governments. Although beyond the scope of the research presented here, the chapters in this book lead to observations that can foster future research in public diplomacy. For example, when considering the cases of Venezuela and Cuba presented in this book, we identified the concern that the efforts could be lost to an echo chamber, in which these diaspora groups are essentially engaging like-minded publics. The persistence of narratives among Floridian audiences regarding Cuba, even with increased advocacy undertaken by new-generation diaspora members (as we showed in Chapter 6) could be seen as evidence of this dynamic. If the goal of their public diplomacy efforts is to persuade, or even to mobilize support, then these dynamics can lead to failures. Also, despite their similarities, the chapters highlight the uniqueness of each of these diasporas. Some, like the cases of Cubans or Brazilians in Florida, might see themselves as distinct because of their immigration experience. This perceived difference would influence their public diplomacy goals and approaches, but it also limits their collaboration across diaspora groups. As Gomez Zapata’s chapter showed, this collaboration

320

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

can be instrumental when the challenges that the community faces have to do with their shared identity of immigrants, or Latino/as. In this case, literature has shown that the Mexican state and diaspora have more experience and successes in building partnerships that benefit themselves and other diasporas (e.g. Alejo & Villanueva Ulfgard, 2019; Bravo & De Moya, 2018). A lingering question raised by the Gómez-Zapata and Páez-Bravo chapters is to what degree diasporas will be able to address stereotypes, stigma and xenophobia faced in host countries. In places like the United States, this xenophobia can affect groups of diasporas, like the Latino or Asian communities, in a way that could be affiliated with a single country of origin (e.g. Mexico, China), or in a way in which the country of origin is irrelevant (e.g. Sánchez, 2011). In modern migration dynamics, discrimination processes can be tied to a single community, such as the case of the Latin American nations that received Colombian immigrants in the 1990s and Venezuelans immigrants since the early 2000s (Arredondo, 2018; Pugh et al., 2020). Additionally, we hope that the chapters in this book will inspire scholars and practitioners of public diplomacy to consider the need for diverse, localized, and critical views of public diplomacy. It is important to highlight the importance of engaging in the ongoing discussions about critical approaches to public diplomacy, in general, and to state–diaspora relations, in particular. More specifically, we invite you to reflect on the following questions: • If the state and the diaspora are pursuing the same goal, are state– diaspora partnerships always desirable? Consider that the diaspora’s ability or interest in connecting to their home state in a meaningful way could be diminished if those states have failed them, especially if this was one of their motivations to migrate. • How can homeland governments overcome the diaspora’s persistent negative perceptions of the state (which could be outdated) and engage them as more than audiences, as partners? • How can diaspora organizations understand and affect the power differentials that dominate their relationships with home and host land governments and institutions? • What moral authority do states have to solicit support from the diaspora, when they have given little in return to their diaspora members, and likely, to relatives left behind in the homeland?

13

CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE RESEARCH

321

• What moral authority do diasporas or particular subgroups of diasporas who left the homeland to retain their wealth and power have to demand change at home? • How are diaspora members ensuring that their public diplomacy efforts (especially those seeking sweeping changes in homeland politics and policies) serve not only their fellow diaspora members, but also the people at home? These questions and potential research areas could be very significant for improving the practice of public diplomacy and for informing theoretical development. The inclusion of Latin America and other similarly overlooked contexts is also essential, as they are the only solution to the ethnocentrism that affects much of the research in the field. We posit these questions because we believe that they are urgent and deserve better answers than the ones that current public diplomacy literature has been able to provide. Today, researchers have access to an abundance of avenues for future inquiry and discussion regarding contemporary approaches to public diplomacy, to the role of non-state actors in it, to the role of diaspora groups as unique non-state actors, to the relevance and strategic function of state-led diaspora-engagement policies, to the many roles that Latin American diasporas can play and are playing in public diplomacy, and, in particular, to the importance of Latin America as a region for the scholarly advancement of the discipline and for the practice of public diplomacy, worldwide. As Molleda pointedly wrote in the Foreword to this book, highlighting the relevance of the Latin American perspective: “Challenges and opportunities that the region has faced for decades can inform the dramatic conditions that other latitudes are facing today and will face in the future.” For public diplomacy scholars and practitioners, an understanding of this context can expand their view of the strategies and approaches that can, or should, be employed in pursuit of goals that will serve the many and the most needy; even when faced with power imbalances and an ever-evolving political landscape.

322

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

References Adamson, F. (2020). Non-state authoritarianism and diaspora politics. Global Networks, 20(1), 150–169. Alejo, A., & Villanueva Ulfgard, R. (2019). Proactive, responsible, and in good faith: Network diplomacy in Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Latin American Policy, 10(2), 220–235. Arredondo, P. (Ed.). (2018). Latinx immigrants: Transcending acculturation and xenophobia. Springer. Baser, B., & Ozturk, A. (2020). Positive and negative diaspora governance in context: From public diplomacy to transnational authoritarianism. Middle East Critique, 1–16. Borger, J. (2018, December 19). Fleeing a hell the U.S. helped create: Why Central Americans journey North. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian. com/us-news/2018/dec/19/central-america-migrants-us-foreign-policy. Bravo, V. (2011). Conceptualization of Diaspora relations from the government viewpoint: An exploratory qualitative study of Diaspora relations in the Cases of Costa Rica and El Salvador. Unpublished Dissertation, University of Florida. https://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/UF/E0/04/35/51/ 00001/BRAVO_V.pdf. Bravo, V. (2014a). The importance of diaspora communities as key publics for national governments around the world. In G. Golan, S. Yang, & D. Kinsey (Eds.), International public relations and public diplomacy: Communication and engagement (pp. 279–296). Peter Lang. Bravo, V. (2014b). El Salvador and Costa Rica’s state-diaspora relations management. International Journal of Communication, 8 (22). https://ijoc.org/ index.php/ijoc/article/view/1822. Bravo, V., & De Moya, M. (2015). Communicating the homeland’s relationship with its diaspora community: The cases of El Salvador and Colombia. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 10(1), 70–104. Bravo, V., & De Moya, M. (2018). Mexico’s public diplomacy efforts to engage its diaspora across the border: Case study of the programs, messages and strategies employed by the Mexican Embassy in the United States. Rising Powers Quarterly, 3(3), 173–193. https://risingpowersproject.com/quarte rly/mexicos-public-diplomacy-efforts-to-engage-its-diaspora-across-the-bor der-case-study-of-the-programs-messages-and-strategies-employed-by-themexican-embassy-in-the-united-states/. Cull, N. (2008). Public diplomacy: Taxonomies and histories. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 31–54. Cull, N. (2019). Public diplomacy: Foundations for global engagement in the digital age. Wiley.

13

CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE RESEARCH

323

De Moya, M. (2019). Protesting the homeland: Diaspora dissent public relations efforts to oppose the Dominican Republic’s citizenship policies. In Protest public relations (pp. 106–127). Routledge. Délano, A. (2011). Mexico and its Diaspora in the United States: Policies of emigration since 1848. Cambridge University Press. Délano, A. (2014). The diffusion of diaspora engagement policies: A Latin American agenda. Political Geography, 41, 90–100. Délano, A. (2018). From here and there: Diaspora policies, integration, and social rights beyond borders. Oxford University Press. Fisher, A. (2013). Collaborative public diplomacy: How transnational networks influenced American studies in Europe. Springer. Fitzpatrick, K. (2009). Privatized public diplomacy. In Toward a new public diplomacy (pp. 155–172). Palgrave Macmillan. Fitzpatrick, K. (2017). Public diplomacy in the public interest. The Journal of Public Interest Communications, 1(1), 78–78. Freedom House. (2018). Freedom in the world. https://freedomhouse.org/ sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2018_Final_SinglePage.pdf. Gamlen, A. (2019). Human geopolitics: States, emigrants, and the rise of Diaspora institutions. Oxford University Press. Gregory, B. (2011). American public diplomacy: Enduring characteristics, elusive transformation. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 6(3–4), 351–372. Heinz, W., & Frühling, H. (1999). Determinants of gross human rights violations by state and state sponsored actors in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina: 1960–1990 (Vol. 59). Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. La Porte, T. (2012). The impact of ‘intermestic’ non-state actors on the conceptual framework of public diplomacy. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 7 (4), 441–458. Laguerre, M. S. (2006). Diaspora, politics, and globalization. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Lee, G., & Ayhan, K. (2015). Why do we need non-state actors in public diplomacy? Theoretical discussion of relational, networked and collaborative public diplomacy. Journal of International and Area Studies, 57–77. Manor, I. (2019). The digitalization of public diplomacy. Springer International Publishing. Melissen, J. (2005). The new public diplomacy: Between theory and practice. In The new public diplomacy (pp. 3–27). Palgrave Macmillan. Murti, B., & Zaharna, R. (2014). India’s digital Diaspora diplomacy: Operationalizing collaborative public diplomacy strategies for social media. Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, 5(1), 3. Popkova, A. (2020). Transnational non-state actors as “alt agents” of public diplomacy: Putin’s Russia versus open Russia. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 16(1), 70–79.

324

M. DE MOYA AND V. BRAVO

Pugh, J., Jiménez, L., & Latuff, B. (2020). Welcome wears thin for Colombians in Ecuador as Venezuelans become more visible. Migration Information Source. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/welcome-wears-thin-for-col ombians-ecuador. Ragazzi, F. (2014). A comparative analysis of diaspora policies. Political Geography, 41, 74–89. Sánchez, R. (2011). The toxic tonic: Narratives of xenophobia. Latino Studies, 9(1), 126–144. Schoultz, L. (2009). Beneath the United States: A history of US policy toward Latin America. Harvard University Press. Seib, P. (2016). The future of #diplomacy. Polity Press. Sevin, E. (2017). A multilayered approach to public diplomacy evaluation: Pathways of connection. Politics & Policy, 45(5), 879–901. Shesgreen, D. (2018, December 21). How U.S. foreign policy in Central America may have fueled the migrant crisis. USA Today. https://www.usa today.com/story/news/world/2018/12/21/has-united-states-foreign-pol icy-central-america-fueled-migrant-crisis-donald-trump/2338489002/. Tsourapas, G. (2020). Global autocracies: Strategies of transnational repression, legitimation, and co-optation in world politics. International Studies Review, 1–29. Uysal, N. (2019). The rise of diasporas as adversarial non-state actors in public diplomacy: The Turkish case. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 14(3), 272– 292. Zaharna, R., Arsenault, A., & Fisher, A. (Eds.). (2014). Relational, networked and collaborative approaches to public diplomacy: The connective mindshift. Routledge.

Index

A Acculturation, 290 Activism, 9, 12, 31, 55, 126, 130, 145, 146, 166, 167, 170, 174, 175, 179, 192, 202, 203, 303, 313, 315, 316 Adoptive, 6 communities, 240 society, 291 Africa(n), 98, 218–220, 222, 224, 226, 228, 265 Afro-Brazilians, 16, 216, 218, 222–225, 229, 230, 313 Aid, 4, 9, 36, 178, 250 Alianza Americas, 192–197, 207 Allende, Salvador, 10 Arbenz, Jacobo, 10 Argentina, 11, 13, 14, 30, 32, 42, 56, 67, 76–85, 87, 91, 92, 166, 244, 246, 314, 315, 318 Argentinian diaspora, 7, 14 Asia, 106, 107, 109, 113, 114, 318 Assimilation, 290, 298

B Bahia (in Brazil), 216, 223–225, 228, 229 Bolivia, 2, 11, 13, 14, 29–31, 33, 34, 39–41, 314 Bolivian diaspora, 37 Border, vi, 3, 7, 29, 63, 76, 79, 82, 91, 229, 241, 248, 288, 297 Patrol, 42 Brain circulation, 31, 236 Brain drain, 31, 82, 83, 235, 241 Brazil, 7, 10, 56, 67, 78, 88, 89, 215–230, 240, 264, 286, 287, 289, 292, 293, 296–298, 300–303, 318 Brazilian diaspora, 16, 216, 220, 229, 230, 292, 293, 299, 301, 302, 313 Bukele, Nayib, 54, 58, 62, 63, 66–68, 318 C Capoeira, 218, 222, 223, 227, 228

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Bravo and M. De Moya (eds.), Latin American Diasporas in Public Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74564-6

325

326

INDEX

Caracas Radio, 236, 247 television, 236 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 218 Caribbean, 7, 10, 17, 29, 33, 55, 165, 174, 193, 235, 238 Castillo Armas, Carlos, 10 Castro, Fidel, 123, 126 Castro, Raul, 127, 130, 140 Catholic Church, 226 Chavez, Hugo, 8, 238 Chicago, 15, 41, 55, 160, 167, 190–192, 195, 198–208, 260, 315 Chile, 2, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 81, 89, 97, 98, 102, 104, 107–111, 113–116, 238, 247, 249, 318 Chilean diaspora, 14, 98, 100, 103–106, 109–116, 313 China, 14, 55, 97, 98, 100, 102–111, 113–116, 198, 313, 318, 320 Citizenship, 6, 8, 32, 33, 61, 63, 69, 79, 80, 88, 159, 197, 219 Civil society, 32, 77, 132, 145, 146, 175, 190, 191, 204–206, 208, 218, 219, 312, 316 in Mexico, 15, 190, 192, 201 Collective action, 8, 40, 101, 174, 179, 292, 314 Colombia, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 53–58, 61, 62, 66–69, 90, 195, 237– 239, 242, 244, 246, 247, 314, 318 Colombian diaspora, 58, 59, 61, 69 Communism, 10, 125, 138–140, 143 Communist, 142, 143, 315 Community adoptive, 240 ethnic, 289, 299 imagined, 16, 191, 221, 261, 263, 266

immigrant, 28, 42, 45, 54–56, 192, 193, 203, 204, 290, 291, 296, 301, 315, 316, 320 Constructing the diaspora, 44 Cooperation, 2, 13, 90, 101, 108, 112–116, 198, 200, 249 Costa Rica, 6, 8, 9, 11, 67, 198 Courting the diaspora, 68 COVID-19, vi, 41, 116, 179 Criminalization, 242 Cuba, 9, 10, 55, 123–140, 142, 144–149, 151, 315, 316, 318, 319 Cuban American, 8, 15, 124, 125, 127, 129, 131, 132, 140, 143, 147–150 diaspora, 12, 15, 124–126, 128, 132–134, 315 embargo, 9, 12, 124, 127, 129, 131, 132 hardliners, 15, 124, 129–131, 133, 143, 149–151, 315 Cuban revolution, 123, 125 Cultural diplomacy, 4, 60, 61, 191, 200, 201, 208, 215, 216, 227, 229, 266, 313 D da Silva, Luiz Inácio “Lula”, 219, 220, 227 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), 197 Democracy, 57, 67, 100, 132, 145, 222, 228, 236, 315 democratic, 2, 12, 13, 57, 137, 147, 251, 286, 315 Development, v, 28, 31–33, 41, 45, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 68, 76, 77, 79, 81–83, 87, 91, 92, 98, 100–102, 105, 110, 160, 165, 195, 196, 198, 219, 236, 237,

INDEX

240, 242, 244, 248–251, 263, 271, 315, 321 Diaspora business entrepreneurship, 98 investment, 4, 9, 28, 33, 237 Diaspora culture art, 221 music, 221 religion, 222 Diaspora definition, 2, 3, 100 Diaspora diplomacy, 4, 12, 189, 272 Diaspora identity, 103, 221, 303, 319 Diaspora media, 14, 16, 247, 299, 302, 303, 319 Diaspora(s) activism, 9, 12, 31, 55, 126, 166, 170, 174, 175, 179, 303, 313, 316 associations, 11, 64, 66, 236, 237, 239, 243, 245, 246, 251 constructing the, 44 courting, 14, 54, 60, 61, 68, 75, 79 education, viii, 10, 125, 273, 317 engagement, 5, 14, 32, 33, 54, 55, 75, 77, 79, 87, 89, 91, 92, 109, 125, 161, 163, 168, 203, 291, 298, 300, 314, 318, 321 organizations, vii, 3, 8, 15, 40, 59, 64, 66, 108, 112, 124, 125, 134, 145, 147, 149, 150, 161, 203, 204, 207, 208, 236, 239, 243, 244, 246, 247, 315, 320 policies, 2, 5–7, 13, 14, 31, 33, 41, 55, 66, 75–79, 89, 91, 92, 142, 150, 167, 179, 203, 207, 208, 261, 303, 316, 318, 321 Diplomacy citizen, 190, 270, 314 cultural, 4, 60, 61, 77, 191, 200, 201, 208, 215, 216, 227, 229, 265, 266, 313 state-led, 2, 14, 189, 321

327

Discrimination, 192, 299, 320 Dominican Republic, 6, 10, 11, 55 Dominican diaspora, 5, 8, 316 Donations, 28, 161, 193 Dreamers, 197 Duque Márquez, Iván, 54, 57, 66

E Economic crisis, 8, 179, 220 Ecuador, 13, 14, 29, 30, 33, 34, 39–41, 76, 238, 314 Ecuadorian diaspora, 32, 37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility, 30 Elections, 8, 11, 16, 32, 57–59, 61, 68, 85, 89, 92, 161, 191, 197, 205, 239, 286, 287, 289, 292–302, 313 Electoral system, 286 El Salvador, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 42, 53–59, 62, 64–67, 69, 195, 314, 315, 318 Salvadorian diaspora, 4, 8 Vice-Ministry for Salvadorans Abroad, 59, 62, 63, 66 Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX), 33 Emigrant(s), 14, 28–31, 39, 42–44, 76, 77, 79–86, 89, 91, 92, 221, 235 policies, 29, 32, 33, 45 rights, 32 Emigration, 29, 31, 34, 56, 57, 60, 76–82, 84, 86, 92, 225, 250 crisis, 76 Ethnic community, 100, 285, 287, 289–293, 295–300, 303 media, 286–302 storytelling, 271

328

INDEX

F Facebook, 40, 41, 43, 55, 64, 65, 162, 167, 222, 244, 247, 273, 293 Feminism, 263 feminist, 262–264, 266, 269 Foreign policy, 3, 82, 132, 190, 195, 207, 219, 229, 263, 266 goals, 314 strategy, 99 France, 15, 90, 114, 162, 198, 216, 217, 221–223, 225, 227, 229, 242–244, 248, 264, 313, 318 Free Trade Agreement, 97, 102 Funes, Mauricio, 58, 59, 63, 68

G Gender, 36, 81, 106, 261–264, 269, 270 violence, 167 Global Forum on Migration and Development, 250 Goulart, Joao, 10 Grassroots, 15, 208 activism, 192, 201 organizations, 15 Guatemala, 10, 14, 29, 30, 32–34, 37, 39, 41, 42, 55, 167, 195, 314 National Council for the Assistance of the Guatemalan Migrant, 30, 34

H Haiti, 9 Haitian diaspora, 6, 12, 316 Hispanic(s), 57, 160 community, 289 media, 288

Homeland, vi, 2–4, 6, 8, 11, 13–16, 39, 54, 56, 60, 63, 125, 129, 131, 146, 148–151, 161, 163, 165, 172, 174, 175, 178, 179, 193, 204, 216, 221, 222, 230, 236, 241, 247, 285, 289–293, 296–298, 300, 302, 303, 312–316, 319 governments, vi, 4, 6, 7, 15, 53, 54, 68–70, 160, 175, 203, 242, 243, 248, 303, 313–316, 320 institutions, v Host nation(s), 2, 12, 116, 315, 318 Humanitarian, 239 Arrangements, 65

I Immigrant communities, 3, 8, 12, 28, 42, 43, 54–56, 192, 193, 195, 197, 200, 202–204, 290, 291, 293, 296, 297, 299, 301, 314–316, 320 Immigration, 3, 12, 37, 76, 79, 86, 196, 217, 238, 239, 241, 249, 250, 288, 299, 319 policies, 8, 34, 41, 76, 85 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 42 Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), 244 International Office of Migration, 2, 8, 11, 13, 235, 239

J Journalism, 5 Journalists, 162, 245, 247, 248

INDEX

L Latinos, 9, 15, 190–196, 200, 201, 206–208 Latino community, 41, 190–192, 200, 208, 315 Lavage de la Madeleine, 15, 216, 217, 222–230, 313 Legitimacy, 6, 13, 67, 68, 125, 151, 260

M Madrid, 30, 162, 198 Maduro, Nicolas, 8, 16, 166, 238 Media diaspora, 14, 16, 41, 64, 65, 161, 208, 247, 269, 285, 287, 289, 291–293, 296–300, 302, 303, 319 ethnic, 286–293, 295–303 international, 239, 241 U.S., 64, 162, 208, 259, 269, 273, 276, 277, 286, 288, 289, 292, 293, 297, 301, 302 Melissen, Jan, 3, 5, 54, 260, 312, 314 Membership, 29, 36, 78, 101, 102, 193, 205, 244, 291, 298 Mex and the City (M&TC), 16, 55, 261, 262, 269–278, 319 Mexican American, 190, 192, 260, 268, 273, 275 Mexican diaspora, 8, 55, 190, 204, 207, 208, 260, 261, 268, 269, 273, 276, 278, 315, 317 Mexico Institute of Mexicans Abroad, 30, 39, 200, 203 Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 30, 39, 40, 268 Universidad Autónoma de México (UNAM), 192, 198–201, 207, 208, 266

329

Miami, 8, 9, 123, 125, 195, 205, 238, 244 Migrants, 9, 11, 28–32, 34–40, 42, 43, 45, 56, 59, 62, 63, 75–78, 80, 81, 84, 86, 88, 99–101, 107, 126, 128, 160, 163, 221, 225, 235–238, 240, 242, 244–248, 250, 251 in transit, 9, 69 Military, 2, 10, 12, 57, 129, 130, 161 Dictatorship, 218, 220, 221 Morales, Evo, 31 N New York, 8, 16, 61, 163, 167, 168, 170, 174, 195, 260, 261, 271–277, 288, 294 Nicaragua, 11, 13 Ni Una Menos, 167 Non-state actors, 1, 3–5, 27, 36, 39, 54, 75, 82, 243, 260, 269, 272, 277, 278, 291, 303, 312, 314, 317, 321 diplomats, 3, 217 Nostalgia tourism, 303, 313 O Obama, Barack, 127–129, 132, 141, 161, 196, 197 Observatory of the Venezuelan Diaspora (ODV), 236, 239, 240, 242, 245, 247 Organizations aid, 36 government, vii, 3, 6, 11, 41, 45, 66, 161, 191, 207, 219, 220, 228, 239, 244, 314, 320 international, 3, 7, 76, 139, 142, 146, 150, 219, 239, 248, 314

330

INDEX

non-profit, 59, 64 P Paraguay, 11, 81 Paris, 15, 16, 198, 216, 217, 222–230, 244, 313 People-to-people diplomacy, 129, 130 Peru, 56, 90, 238, 249 Pew Research Center, 10, 167, 289 Pinochet, Augusto, 10, 100, 103 Pluralism/pluralistic dimensions, 297 functions, 285, 292, 295, 297–302 media, 285, 291, 292, 297, 298, 300, 301, 303 Political, vi, vii, 2, 4, 6, 8–12, 14, 30–33, 44, 54, 57–62, 67–69, 76, 77, 80, 82, 84–86, 88, 92, 97, 99, 100, 103, 106–110, 115, 116, 124, 126, 129–131, 133, 137, 142, 146, 148, 161–163, 165–167, 174, 175, 178, 179, 191–197, 201–204, 218, 219, 222, 224, 228–230, 237, 240, 241, 245, 246, 262, 264, 265, 273, 274, 286, 289–293, 295, 296, 298–300, 303, 312, 313, 315, 318, 319, 321 action, 76, 197, 319 participation, 12, 13, 32, 63, 69, 78, 160, 161, 167, 208, 264, 285, 287, 290, 297–299, 302 Politics, 11, 16, 44, 63, 76, 77, 87, 133, 142, 149, 160, 162, 170, 172, 227, 241, 259, 296, 313, 318, 321 Populism populist government, 317 Portuguese, v, 224, 293, 294, 297, 301 Protest(s), 9, 11, 162–166, 169, 170, 174, 175, 178, 318

Public diplomacy (PD), v, vii, viii, 1–5, 7, 11, 13–17, 29, 54, 77, 91, 98, 99, 102, 111, 115, 116, 124, 133, 134, 150, 151, 160, 161, 174, 175, 178, 189, 197, 199, 204, 206–208, 217, 221, 227, 240, 243, 245, 259–265, 267–273, 276–278, 286, 291, 292, 296, 311, 312, 314, 316, 317, 319–321 goals, 14, 15, 43, 54, 110, 114, 174, 178, 191, 206, 208, 230, 243, 270, 303, 315, 319 strategies, vii, 4, 5, 45, 66, 70, 99, 104, 107, 125, 276, 314, 315 Public relations, 107, 262 Puerto Rico, 15, 159–162, 164, 166, 167, 170, 172, 174–179, 316

Q Quilombos , 219

R Racism, 143, 196, 203 Racist, 195 Remittances, 6, 9, 11, 28, 31, 33, 39, 56–58, 60, 69, 77, 78, 84, 87, 124, 129, 193, 249, 313 Social remittances, 250 #RickyRenuncia, 15, 162–164, 168–172, 175, 176, 178, 317 Roselló, Ricardo, 15, 161, 165, 172, 174, 175, 317

S San Juan (Puerto Rico), 164 Santos, Juan Manuel, 57, 60, 222 Social benefits, 28, 38, 112

INDEX

capital, 28, 31, 80, 101–104, 107, 112, 113, 115, 116, 165, 166, 170 control, 44, 290–292, 295, 297, 298, 301, 302, 317 movement, 170, 172, 175 protection, 14, 27–29, 34, 36, 43, 45, 76, 91, 92, 314 services, 14, 28, 29, 33–37, 41, 43–45 Social identity, 6, 222 Socialism, 125, 130, 136–140, 143, 145, 251 Socialist, 8, 142, 143, 150, 241 Social media, 4, 5, 40, 41, 64, 65, 133, 134, 161–172, 174, 175, 177–179, 222, 244, 289, 293, 300, 319 networks, 162, 165, 246, 272 Soft power, 1, 77, 291 Spain, 9, 11, 30, 37, 80–83, 85, 86, 89, 92, 162, 198, 235–239, 242, 243, 245 Spanish, v, 32, 59, 64, 83, 85, 103, 135, 136, 142, 145, 159, 192, 194, 195, 198, 199, 204, 207, 236, 238, 239, 263, 266, 270, 276 State, 1, 3, 5, 6, 14, 27, 28, 30, 32, 35–37, 44, 54, 55, 68, 75, 77–80, 82, 88, 90, 92, 99, 109, 111, 115, 123, 125, 129, 150, 151, 160, 168, 177, 203, 204, 217–219, 221, 241, 248, 259, 260, 264, 265, 278, 286, 291, 293, 312, 313, 315–320 -diaspora relations model, 6 -led diplomacy, 2 Stereotypes, 196, 207, 225, 228, 269, 273, 276, 277, 291, 320 Strategic

331

communication, vi, vii, 2, 3, 5, 11, 13, 54, 179, 311 engagement, 101, 245 narratives, 133, 134, 146, 150, 315, 316 T Temporary Protection Status (TPS), 69 Tourism, 132, 172, 174, 200, 303, 313 Trade, vi, 57, 97, 98, 100, 102–104, 116, 129, 205, 221, 247, 248, 250 Transnational(ism), 3, 101, 272 communities, 3 social protection, 29, 35, 38, 55, 92 Trump, Donald, 129–131, 178, 190, 192, 194, 206 Twitter, 15, 64, 125, 133–135, 144, 149–151, 162, 168, 170–175, 177, 197, 293 U Umbanda, 222, 224 United Nations (UN), 81, 139 Commission on Human Rights, 239 Refugee Agency, 240 United States (US) Census, 192, 193, 287, 288 Congress, 159–161, 172, 179 immigration, 8, 60, 127, 191, 193, 197, 237, 286–288 law, 288 Uribe, Alvaro, 57 Uruguay, 11, 78, 89 V Venezuela, 2, 8, 11, 12, 127, 138, 166, 235–237, 239, 241–243,

332

INDEX

245–247, 249–251, 316, 318, 319 brain drain, 235, 241 Venezuelan diaspora, 16, 236, 237, 239–248, 250 Vertical territories, 222 Virtual cosmopolitanism, 166

W Washington D.C., 127, 130–132, 162, 205, 315 Welfare services, 28 Wet foot, dry foot, 128, 129 Women in the diaspora, 269, 271 Workers, 42, 88, 138, 164, 178, 199, 221

Visa, 103, 128, 163, 203, 217 residency, 87 tourist, 288

X Xenophobia, 241, 242, 246, 278, 320

Voice of the diaspora, 16, 269 Voting rights, 9, 59, 61, 66, 89, 203, 287, 313

Y Yoruba, 224