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English Pages [218] Year 1975
Latin America 1974
Latin America
1974
Edited by Lester A. Sobel
Contributing editor.- Chris Hunt Indexed by Grace M. Ferrara
FACTS ON FILE, INC.
NEW YORK, N.Y.
Latin America 1974 © Copyright, 1975, by Facts on File, Inc.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without the permission of the publisher except for reasonably brief extracts used in reviews or scholarly works. Published by Facts on File, Inc., 119 West 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10019. Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 73-83047 ISBN 0-87196-252-7 987654321 PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Contents
Page FOREWORD..............................................................
1
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS.............................. Relationships Reexamined....................................... Economic Affairs......................................................
3 3 10
ARGENTINA.............................................................. Violence Precedes Peron’s Death.............................. Troubles in Cordoba................................................. Peron’s Final Months............................................... Peron’s Death........................................................... Mrs. Peron President, Violence Resumes................. Foreign Relations...................................................... Economic & Other Developments...........................
13 13 21 23 26 27 38 40
BOLIVIA..................................................................... Politics & Turmoil.................................................... Foreign & Economic Affairs.....................................
44 44 53
BRAZIL........................................................................ 55 Elections: Geisel President, Opposition Wins in Legislatures........................................... 55 Repression Continues............................................... 58 Economic & Foreign Affairs..................................... 61 Other Developments................................................. 63
CHILE............................................................................. Repressions Continue.................................................. Church Vs. Junta......................................................... Pinochet Wins Supreme Power................................... Junta Action & Resistance........................................... Foreign Intervention.................................................... Foreign & Economic Affairs........................................ Other Economic Developments...................................
66 66 77 78 79 85 90 9^
COLOMBIA................................................................... 98 Lopez Michelsen Wins Presidency.............................. 98 Economic Developments............................................ 100 Other Events................................................................ 103
COSTA RICA................................................................ Start of Oduber Administration................................
105 105
CUBA............................................................................ 109 OAS Sanctions Remain in Force................................ 109 Soviet Relations......................................................... 114 Economic & Foreign Affairs....................................... 115 Other Developments.................................................... 117 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC................................. Balaguer Wins Third Term..........................................
GUATEMALA............................................................. Fraud Charged as Presidency Is Awarded to Laugerud............................................
119
119 123 123
MEXICO....................................................................... 127 Foreign Policy.............................................................. 127 Economic Events......................................................... 130 Anti-Government Violence....................................... 133
PANAMA....................................................................... Canal Negotiations...................................................... Economic & Other Events..........................................
139 139 142
PERU............................................................................... Politics & Repression................................................. Press Under Attack...................................................... Foreign Affairs...........................................................
144 144 147 150
Economic Events...................................................... Other Developments.................................................
151 154
URUGUAY................................................................ Politics, Arrests & Press Curbs................................ Economic Developments..........................................
155 155 159
VENEZUELA.............................................................. 161 Oil: Nationalization Planned, Prices Raised............ 161 Other Economic Developments................................ 168 Other Events.............................................................. 171
OTHER AREAS......................................................... Bahamas................................................................... Barbados................................................................... Ecuador..................................................................... El Salvador................................................................ Grenada..................................................................... Guyana..................................................................... Haiti.......................................................................... Honduras................................................................... Jamaica..................................................................... Nicaragua................................................................... Paraguay................................................................... Puerto Rico................................................................ Surinam..................................................................... Trinidad & Tobago.................................................... West Indies Associated States..................................
172 172 172 173 175 176 178 180 180 183 185 188 189 190 191 191
INDEX
193
Foreword
This is the third volume of the Facts on File annual on Latin America. It records the history of Latin America and the Caribbean area during 1974. The purpose of this series is to give researchers, students, educators, librarians and others a convenient, reliable, un biased and inexpensive source of information on the many events that take place each year in this important part of the world. The 1974 volume, therefore, records the essential details of such events as Juan Peron’s death, the beginning of his widow’s term as president of Argentina, the cam paign to end OAS sanctions against Cuba and the dispute between the U.S. and Panama over the future of the Pan ama Canal and Canal Zone. But it also covers more than just the most important occurrences. It provides facts on economic developments, guerrilla operations, labor action, diplomatic relations, government corruption, political ma neuverings, student activism, military affairs and the many other events that make up the history of Latin America and the Caribbean area during 1974. The material of the book consists almost exclusively of the Latin American record compiled by Facts on File in its weekly reports on world events. Such changes as were made in producing this book were largely for the purpose of eliminating needless repetition, supplying necessary ampli fication or correcting error. Yet some useful repetition was
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LATIN AMERICA 1974
provided deliberately: for example, when two countries are involved in a single event, the report, or at least part of it, is often carried in the chapter for each of the two countries. This means more complete coverage of each country in the place the reader is most likely to look; this makes it less likely that these items will be overlooked, and this reduces some of the need to consult the index and other chapters to locate a specific fact. A conscientious effort was made to record all events with out bias.
Regional Developments
Relationships Reexamined
velopment Bank to ease deficits created by the petroleum shortage, would main tain current aid levels and would spur transfer of U.S. technology to Latin na tions. He cited recent progress in settling bi lateral disputes, including the U.S.’ quar rel with Mexico over Colorado River salinity; its dispute with Panama over con trol of the Panama Canal and Zone; and its conflict with Peru over compensation for nationalized U.S.-owned properties. Kissinger also called for a“reshaping” of the inter-American system, asking that the structure of the Organization of American States (OAS) be modernized but that aspects of it that “have shielded the hemisphere from outside conflict and helped preserve regional peace” be retained. The secretary did not mention Cuba, a subject that was not on the agenda. Cuba was the only Latin American nation not represented at the conference. Kissinger later met with the foreign ministers in closed sessions, and re portedly asserted the U.S. was prepared to discuss an interim solution to its long standing fisheries disputes with Peru and Ecuador, pending the U.N. conference on the law of the sea later in 1974. Peru and Ecuador claimed 200-mile offshore terri torial limits and had seized and fined nu merous U.S. fishing vessels in their ex tended waters in recent years.
Foreign ministers confer. U.S. Sec retary of State Henry A. Kissinger and the foreign ministers of 24 Latin American and Caribbean nations began three days of talks in Mexico City Feb. 21, with Kissinger calling for creation of a “new community” of hemispheric coun tries. The conference adjourned Feb. 23 after the drafting of a document on the discussions. “We meet here as equals,” Kissinger said in his opening day address. “Today— together—we can begin giving expression to our common aspirations and start shaping our common future.” The sec retary vowed that the U.S. would not “impose” its “political preferences,” would not “intervene in the domestic affairs of others,” and would “seek a free association of proud states.” In general terms, he called for cooperation in trade, energy policies, science, technology and development, and urged hemispheric nations to jointly es tablish “machinery” to help solve their disputes with the U.S. “We will promise only what we can deliver,” he asserted. “We will make what we can deliver count.” Kissinger said the U.S. would “do its utmost” to avoid new tariff barriers against Latin American imports, would empower the Inter-American De
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The final statement, called the Declaration of Tlatelolco (after the site of the Mexican Foreign Ministry, which hosted the talks), was issued Feb. 24. It postponed decisions on most major problems discussed at the meeting but called for “future conferences of a similar nature, within a permanent framework devoid of all rigid formality.” The foreign ministers rejected Kissinger’s call for a “new Western Hemisphere community.” The document called instead for “a system of collective economic security” allowing “parallel progress in the social, economic and cultural fields.” It said “the reality of Latin American unity” and Latin Amer ica’s ties with other developing nations were the foundation for “a frank and realistic relationship with the United States.” The document said Latin countries would “continue examining” other pro posals made by Kissinger, including es tablishment of an “international mechanism” to settle disputes between the U.S. and its neighbors. It asserted Latin foreign ministers would consult fur ther with Kissinger on problems related to multinational corporations at the Organi zation of American States meeting scheduled for April in Atlanta, Ga. The declaration said the U.S. “accepts a special responsibility” for the economic development of Latin America, adding that “the more developed countries of the Americas recognize that special attention should be paid to the needs of the lesser developed.” The U.S. pledged to maintain present aid levels; press for trade preferences for underdeveloped countries; avoid measures that would “restrict ac cess” of Latin exports to U.S. markets; and facilitate transfer of U.S. technology to Latin nations. The document welcomed progress in negotiations between the U.S. and Panama over the future of the Panama Canal and Zone. It did not mention Cuba, although it endorsed “the principle that every state has the right to choose its own political, economic and social system without foreign interference and that it is the duty of every state to refrain from in tervening in the affairs of another.” The economic and political blockade of Cuba was brought up in Kissinger’s
LATIN AMERICA 1974 private working session with his colleagues Feb. 22. Guyana’s Foreign Minister Shridath Ramphal reportedly asked the U.S. secretary what kind of “Western Hemisphe'e community” he had in mind if Cuba were excluded. Kissinger said at. a press conference Feb. 22 that Tlatelolco was “not the ap propriate forum to discuss Cuba.” However, he was reported to have pri vately indicated he would support a re cent application by Argentine subsidiaries of U.S. motor companies for licenses to sell cars to Cuba, a move that would reverse the U.S. policy of total economic blockade of the island. Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and Peru had joined Guyana in opposing Kissinger’s proposed “community,” preferring to em phasize Latin American ties to nonaligned countries. One foreign minister reportedly said the “community” sounded “like a combination of the Monroe Doctrine and the Warsaw Pact.” The Latin ministers and Kissinger were generally reported pleased by the infor mality and frankness of their discussions at Tlatelolco. Before Kissinger addressed the conference, the delegates heard Mexican President Luis Echeverria Alvarez and Colombian Foreign Minister Alfredo Vasquez Carrizosa speak of Latin Amer ica’s identity as part of the “Third World” of nonaligned nations. Latin America’s “struggles are coin cident and parallel to those being made by other nations against colonialism, modern attempts at subjugation [and] injustice in international transactions,” Echeverria said. He defended each nation’s “free right to dispose of its natural resources” and to “regulate foreign investment,” and concluded; “Let us consolidate . . . bonds based on autonomy, equality and justice. And let us exercise the militant solidarity of the peoples of the Third World in our own hemispheric home.” Vasquez Carrizosa said Latin Amer ica’s major problems were caused by lack of a comprehensive economic policy. He asserted inter- American relations would have to be separated from “the in terests of private foreign capital.” Kissinger had arrived in Mexico City Feb. 20 with a number of key U.S. legisla tors, including the Senate’s majority and
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS minority leaders, Mike Mansfield (D, Mont.) and Hugh Scott (R, Pa.). Their presence was designed to stimulate Congressional interest and sympathy for Latin American economic demands, in cluding generalized preference for Latin manufactured exports in U.S. markets, according to the New York Times Feb. 21. After his arrival, Kissinger had con ferred separately with Vasquez Carrizosa and with Foreign Ministers Mario Gibson Barboza of Brazil, Miguel Angel de la Flor of Peru, Aristides Calvani of Vene zuela and Alberto Vignes of Argentina. The Latin officials had arrived in Mexico two days before to map out a joint strategy before meeting Kissinger. Many were reported to have complained about this arrangement, with one asserting: “We put ourselves in the position of colonies meeting with the mother country.” Procedural debates among the Latin ministers Feb. 18-19 apparently did not produce a coherent strategy. However, the ministers did force Kissinger to drop from his personal agenda a discussion of possible hemispheric cooperation in the energy crisis, opposed strongly by Latin oil producers (Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru), which preferred bilateral negotia tions with their oil clients. Mexico was criticized Feb. 18 for using the conference for domestic political pur poses. Mexican Foreign Minister Emilio Rabasa led the other ministers to the Mexico City airport to meet President Echeverria on his return from a tour of Europe. Echeverria reportedly had post poned his return to take advantage of the foreign ministers’ presence.
OAS general assembly. The Organization of American States (OAS) opened its general assembly in Atlanta, Ga. April 19 and heard U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger call for progress toward “new horizons” of hemispheric cooperation and understanding. The assembly closed May 1. To prepare for the assembly, Kissinger had met privately in Washington April 17-18 with the foreign ministers of 24 hemispheric nations. Their talks stressed economic issues, particularly trade, but also touched on sensitive political issues
5 such as the continued isolation of Cuba from the inter-American system. Kissinger said April 17, to appease the foreign ministers on the trade issue, that he was sending William Eberle, President Nixon’s special representative for trade negotiations, on a fact-finding tour of 10 Latin nations beginning April 20. He added that the U.S. would take into ac count Latin concerns at the upcoming General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations in Geneva. In moves to defuse the Cuba issue, the U.S. agreed April 18 to issue export licenses to Argentine subsidiaries of three U.S. automobile firms—General Motors, Ford and Chrysler—to sell several hundred million dollars worth of cars and trucks to Havana. The U.S. also did not object to the taking of a poll of OAS members to determine whether to invite Cuba to a projected hemispheric foreign ministers’ meeting in Buenos Aires in March 1975. The U.S. insisted that its approval of the export licenses did not presage a change in its Cuba policy, and officials said the decision responded to threats by Argentina to nationalize the U.S. sub sidiaries if they were not allowed to sell to Cuba. Kissinger addressed the OAS assembly a second time April 20, asserting U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Ca ribbean would be that of “the good partner.” “We in the United States have come to realize that a revolution has taken place in Latin America,” he said. “We convene as equals.” Kissinger stressed the U.S.’ “special relationship” with its hemispheric neigh bors, but said it could not “mean the formation of an exclusive bloc.” “The world has already seen enough of pressure groups, exclusive spheres and discrimina tory arrangements,” he declared. Argentine Foreign Minister Alberto Vignes called for an end to the OAS’ blockade of Cuba, describing it as “un realistic and anachronistic.” Peruvian Foreign Minister Miguel Angel de la Flor agreed, calling the blockade “an obstacle to the renewal of inter-American relations which weakens the institutions.” Continuation of the boycott was sup ported by the Chilean foreign minister, Rear Adm. Ismael Huerta, who charged:
6 “Castroism continues to be an aggressive policy of intervention and constitutes a danger for peace and security in the con tinent.” Kissinger said April 21, as he left At lanta to return to Washington, that the U.S. “will not be establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba.” U.S. officials had said April 20 that Kissinger had omitted mention of Cuba in his addresses to the OAS assembly to avoid weakening President Nixon’s support in the U.S. against efforts to impeach him, the Miami Herald reported April 22. A step toward ending the isolation of Cuba was taken April 24 when Colombian Foreign Minister Alberto Vasquez Carrizosa called for consultations within the OAS to consider lifting its sanctions. “Each day, the sanctions become more fragile and less efficient,” Vasquez said, after referring to the recent U.S. approval of auto sales to Cuba by U.S. affiliates in Argentina, and recent improvements in U.S: relations with other Communist governments. Cuthbert Joseph, foreign minister of Trinidad & Tobago, called April 25 for an immediate decision to lift the Cuba em bargo “by simple majority” vote. Joseph opposed Vasquez Carrizosa and other foreign ministers who favored ending the sanctions only by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. The Assembly April 25 approved a record $116.2 million OAS budget for 1974-76 with $67.3 million earmarked for operation, and the rest for technical, cultural, social, educational and scientific assistance projects. The U.S. contributed the largest share of the funds, 66%, followed by Mexico with 8.2%, Brazil and Argentina with 7.4% each, and Venezuela with 3%. The assembly May 1 approved reso lutions extending the OAS restructuring committee for one year and ordering an investigation of charges that multina tional corporations based outside Latin America were interfering in the political and domestic affairs of hemispheric na tions. The restructuring committee had dealt with only three of the OAS charter’s 102 articles, and formal debate on a new charter was considered to be at least one year away. OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza had
LATIN AMERICA 1974 urged April 22 that Latin American coun tries “clearly define their policy” toward multinationals and toward private in vestment in general, and had suggested the development of Latin American multi nationals “to encourage trade among our countries and the export of manufactured goods and other products to areas outside the region.” “Fear that multinational or transna tional companies . . . might attain a dominant role” was a major obstacle to formation of a Latin American common market, Plaza said. OAS retains Cuba sanctions. The Orga nization of American States (OAS) up held its diplomatic and commercial em bargo of Cuba at a meeting of hemispheric foreign ministers in Quito, Ecuador Nov. 12. A resolution to lift the embargo failed to gain the required two-thirds majority of the 21 nations which signed the Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal As sistance, or Rio Treaty, under which the sanctions were imposed. Twelve countries voted for the resolution, three voted against, and six—including the U.S.— abstained. The favorable votes were cast by Vene zuela, Colombia and Costa Rica, which jointly introduced the resolution Nov. 10, and Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, the Dominican Republic and Trinidad & Tobago. Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay voted against the resolution, and Brazil, Bolivia, Haiti, Guatemala and Nicaragua joined the U.S. in abstaining. Opponents of the embargo had predicted Nov. 8, when the Quito meeting began, that they had the 14 votes needed to pass the resolution. However, Bolivia and Guatemala, which had publicly op posed the embargo, decided during the meeting to abstain. Diplomats quoted by the Washington Post Nov. 13 explained that the Bolivian government had shifted after an abortive attempt to overthrow the regime and that the Guatemalan foreign minister had been told his country’s military officers would not stand for a vote to lift the embargo. The U.S. refused to take part in the de bate on the embargo and was criticized for it by supporters of the resolution, par
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
ticularly Venezuelan Foreign Minister Efrain Schacht Aristeguieta and Colom bian Foreign Minister Indalecio Lievano. Lievano asserted Nov. 12 that the U.S. “does not have any policy” toward Latin America. Schacht had denounced U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger Nov. 10 for not appearing at the meeting. Kissinger’s absence was a “deplorable expression of the little interest he has” in inter American affairs and institutions, Schact said. Foreign Minister Gonzalo Facio of Costa Rica blamed the U.S. for the reso lution’s failure, calling Washington’s professed neutrality “negative.” “We have helped the United States when they needed us, and now that we need their help they do nothing,” Facio asserted Nov. 11. The chief U.S. delegate, Undersec retary of State Robert S. Ingersoll, ex plained Nov. 12 that the U.S. had remained silent “because we wished to avoid even the appearance of influencing by our remarks or our actions the out come of this meeting. We have not voted no and we have not worked against the resolution.” Ingersoll said the U.S. had opposed the Quito meeting but had been “persuaded by other nations that [the embargo] should be discussed.” The 12 supporters of the resolution issued a statement Nov. 12 assailing the embargo as “anachronistic, ineffective and inconvenient” and warning that the resolution’s failure “seriously com promises the authority of the OAS.” They called the requirement of a two-thirds ma jority “absurd” and “contrary to the democratic sense that should govern international bodies.” The statement implied that more OAS nations would join the seven that already ignored the sanctions. However, Ecuador, an opponent of the embargo, said Nov. 16 that it would not renew relations with Cuba in the near future. Jamaican Mines Minister Allan Isaacs called Nov. 16 for a new hemispheric or ganization that included Cuba and ex cluded the U.S. Jamaica was an OAS member but was ineligible to vote at Quito. (Anticommunist Cuban exiles exploded a bomb at OAS headquarters in Wash ington, D.C. Nov. 9, causing an estimated
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$100,000 damage. Cuban exiles were presumed responsible for explosions at the Bolivian embassy and a Brazilian cultural center in Quito Nov. 7.) Juana Castro, sister of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, and Carlos Prio Socarras, a former Cuban president, traveled to Quito on behalf of Cuban exiles, reportedly at the invitation of Chile. However, they were placed under police custody Nov. 7 when they attempted to hold a press conference. Ecuadorean officials said they had been admitted on the condition that they make no declara tions. The decision to hold the Quito meeting had been approved unanimously by the OAS Permanent Council Sept. 20. The meeting had been proposed Sept. 6 by rep resentatives of Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela. The president of the Permanent Council, Nander Pitty Velazquez of Panama, said Sept. 24 that the Quito meeting would not “pass judgment only on Cuba, but consider all evidence offered about acts of intervention anywhere, regardless of who committed them.” Panama was expected to raise the issue of U.S. control over the Panama Canal and Zone, and other delegations wished to dis cuss U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Chile, according to the Mexican newspaper Excelsior Sept. 25. Review of the Cuba sanctions was en dorsed by the U.S., although William Mailliard, the U.S. representative to the OAS, said Sept. 20 that “our willingness to re-examine the matter does not imply a judgment on the substance of the issue.” The Ford Administration had begun re viewing its entire Cuba policy in the light of Premier Fidel Castro’s expressed in terest in a dialogue with the U.S., the New York Times reported Sept. 11. (Diplomatic sources quoted by the Washington Post Sept. 7 said Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa had met secretly with U.S. representatives in Swit zerland while on an official visit there Aug. 27-Sept. 3. Roa denied this Sept. 7 and reaffirmed Cuba’s long-standing refusal to begin talks with the U.S. unless Wash ington lifted its economic embargo of the island.) The OAS sanctions were imposed in 1964 because of Cuba’s alleged interfer ence in the internal affairs of Venezuela.
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Venezuela’s OAS representative, Jose Maria Machin, said Sept. 19 that his country now had “no grievance to air” with Cuba. “A decade has passed,” he noted. “We feel we cannot remain indifferent to the changes occurring in world politics and to the new conditions of multipolar balance that are fortunately replacing the confrontations of the cold war.” The sanctions were now opposed by at least 14 OAS member states, the twothirds majority needed to lift the measures. Jamaica and Barbados could not vote on the issue because they had not signed the Inter-American Treaty of Re ciprocal Assistance. U.S. policy change urged. The Com mission on United States-Latin American Relations, an independently financed or ganization of U.S. businessmen, scholars and former government officials, sent a report to President Ford Oct. 29 urging him to end the U.S. trade embargo of Cuba and make other major changes in U.S. policy toward Latin America. “The United States should change its basic approach to Latin America and the Caribbean,” the report declared in its opening sentence. “We strongly believe that the policies which the United States has inherited from the past—including many of their most basic assumptions and goals—are inappropriate and irrelevant to the changed realities of the present and the trends of the future.” The report warned that if the U.S. did not end its policy of isolating Cuba, it might become the isolated nation “as one Latin American country after another renews relations” with Havana. “Eco nomically, the U.S. embargo is ineffec tive,” the report added. “It may serve as much to deny American manufacturers a chance to compete for exports as it does to deprive the Cuban regime of supplies.” The report also recommended that the U.S.: End all “covert” intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American countries. Promptly conclude a new treaty with Panama on sovereignty over the Panama Canal and Zone. Abandon discriminatory and retaliatory measures against countries that expropriated U.S. companies or prohibited commercial fishing by U.S. vessels within 200 miles of their coasts. (This meant repealing a number of restrictive amendments attached to legis lation passed by Congress.) Widen tariff preferences for Latin American goods.
LATIN AMERICA 1974 Make military equipment available to Latin coun tries on a “competitive, commercial and non-discriminatory basis,” but “not actively encourage” Latin arms purchases. Collaborate with Latin nations to develop codes of conduct for foreign investors. Grant more bilateral assistance to the poorer coun tries in the hemisphere and to projects within those countries that offered the greatest benefits to the poor. Abandon veto power in the Inter-American De velopment Bank.
The commission, consisting of 23 mem bers and chaired by Sol M. Linowitz, former U.S. delegate to the Organization of American States, was established earlier in 1974 with about $80,000 in sup port from the Ford and Clark Founda tions and from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Its members included Charles A. Meyer, former assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, and William D. Rogers, who resigned from the com mission recently after he was appointed to Meyer’s position.
Sea law parley inconclusive. The 3rd U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea adjourned in Caracas, Venezuela Aug. 29, after delegates from 148 nations failed to agree on any of the more than 100 issues they discussed. During the 10-week Caracas session, delegates had confined themselves to stating and restating their countries’ general positions and had not even begun hard negotiations on the issues, the Wall Street Journal reported Aug. 27. At the conference, virtually all na tions supported extension of territorial waters from three to 12 miles, and es tablishment of a further 188-mile “eco nomic zone” in which coastal states would have the right to exploit natural re sources. However, many developing na tions also wanted control over fishing, navigation, scientific research and anti pollution measures in the economic zone, which the rich nations opposed. Peru and Ecuador, which had already declared 200-mile territorial waters, an nounced July 23 that they would not sign any treaty that did not ratify these limits. Although delegates from most nations said publicly that they had not expected the Caracas session to produce a new treaty on pollution, many privately ex pressed disappointment with the session’s lack of achievement. The head of the Ecuadorean delegation, Luis Valencia
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Rodríguez, blamed the session’s failure on “the stubbornness of the superpowers, which have insisted on maintaining their privileges and the practice of sacking the riches of the seas next to other states,” it was reported Aug. 24. Latin anti-Communists meet. The second congress of the Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation, a private rightist organization claiming some 1,000 members, was held in Rio de Janeiro Jan. 24-27. Some 200 delegates from a score of Latin countries attended. The congress was not officially en dorsed by the Brazilian government, but representatives of the Justice Ministry, the Rio de Janeiro state government, the 1st Army command, the 1st Naval Dis trict and the police attended the open ing ceremony. Messages of support were sent by Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, president of Chile’s military junta, Presi dent Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay and President Arturo Armando Molina of El Salvador. The congress was opened by the Most Rev. Geraldo de Proenca Sigaud, arch bishop of Diamantina (Minas Gerais State), who charged infiltration of leftists, Communists and pro-Communists in the Roman Catholic clergy was “one of the major problems in Latin America today.” Proenca Sigaud stressed alleged Com munist infiltration of the Brazilian clergy, which he called “a new, serious phe nomenon.” In an apparent reply to Proenca Sigaud Jan. 26, Eugenio Cardinal de Araujo Sales, archbishop of Rio de Janiero, denounced rigid anti-communism and denied the Brazilian church had been infiltrated.
Russell court cites rights abuse. The second Bertrand Russell Tribunal met in Rome March 30-ApriI 6 to investigate charges of human rights violations in Latin America. After hearing testimony from Latin exiles and emigres, it condemned the governments of Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay for “crimes against humanity.” The international panel called for world action against torture and other human rights abuses in Latin America. The tribunal’s final report, drafted by
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Francois Rigaux, director of the Interna tional Law Institute in Louvain, France, noted the “systematic destruction of the rule of law” in Latin America to eliminate “the victories progressively achieved in the course of the history of the worker and peasant movement.” It charged that torture had become “an instrument of public administration” that originated in “the national governments which apply it and the foreign governments which inspire it, particularly Brazil, and beyond it, the U.S.” Press restrictions noted. The Freedom of the Press Committee of the Inter American Press Association (IAPA) reported April 5 that never in its history had it had to “contend with a greater number of violations of freedom of ex pression in the Americas.” The report, issued on the last day of the semiannual meeting of the lAPA’s board of directors, begun in Miami April 3, noted innumerable “methods used to re strict, violate or stamp out” press freedom in Latin America, ranging from “the outright closing of newspapers and the imprisonment, deportation or assassi nation of newspapermen to the more subtle but no less efficient measures of economic, legal, labor union or moral pressure.” The committee’s president, German Ornes of the Dominican Republic, had de livered a preliminary report April 3 denouncing suppression of press freedom in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Cuba, Haiti and Panama. Ornes was particularly critical of Uruguay, which he accused of “joining the list of the worst violators of public liberties.”
Ayacucho declaration signed. Represen tatives of eight Latin American countries, including four heads of state, met in Ayacucho, Peru Dec. 9 and signed a declaration of political and economic solidarity. Military leaders of the countries signed a separate document pledging to limit armaments and stop acquiring offensive weapons. All of the signatories—Peru, Venezuela, Panama, Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador—had been involved in frontier clashes in the past, and
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some still claimed territory in neighboring countries. The documents commemorated the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Ayacucho, in which South American troops decisively defeated Spanish forces, securing independence for the continent. The first document, called the Decla ration of Ayacucho, pledged: To stimulate and consolidate Latin American in tegration. To limit arms purchases and devote greater resources to development. To establish a consultative mechanism to resolve through negotiations any dispute among nations of the region. To enhance economic sovereignty through the defense of natural resources. To help Bolivia find an outlet to the sea. To support Panama’s claim to sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone.
The declaration was signed at the end of three days of meetings in Lima. These talks were more successful than an ticipated after the presidents of four sig natory nations declined to attend. Those who did attend were Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela, Hugo Banzer of Bolivia, Omar Torrijos of Panama and Juan Velasco of Peru. President Augusto Pinochet of Chile had declined at the last minute when he learned that Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa would be attending. (Roa reportedly offended most partici pants in the meetings when he declared to a Colombian newsman Dec. 9 that Pinochet was “a degenerate and son of a whore.” He called Chile’s failure to attend the talks a “defeat for North American imperialism and Chilean fascism.”) Perez, who was acclaimed by others at the talks for Venezuela’s support of Latin American nationalism and integration, said Dec. 10 that his country would use its oil as “a weapon of pressure to see that the basic export products of Latin American nations receive fair treatment in the international markets” and that Latin Americans pay fair prices for man ufactured goods and technology from in dustrialized countries.
Economic Affairs 'li record trade year. The value of Latin American exports rose by 30% in 1973, to a record $26 billion, it was reported Jan. 16. Latin America reported
LATIN AMERICA 1974 a positive trade balance of $1 billion, and its hard currency reserves reached a record $17 billion. The trade boom was spurred by sharp increases in international prices for many basic materials, including petroleum, cop per, iron ore, cotton, beef, sugar, coffee and cocoa. These products, in short sup ply, were exported by Latin nations. Latin America was also selling more manufac tured goods overseas, led by Brazil with exports of $2 billion in products such as automobiles, trucks, computer parts and shoes.
IDB approves special fund. The gov ernors of the Inter-American De velopment Bank (IDB) held their 15th an nual assembly in Santiago, Chile April 1 3 with nearly 1,000 delegates from 44 countries attending, including U.S. Treasury Secretary George Shultz and 10 members of the U.S. House of Representatives. At their 14th assembly, they had ap proved a Venezuelan proposal to create a special trust fund, administered by the bank without U.S. veto power, to finance regional natural resource development projects normally ignored by interna tional lending agencies. The trust fund, suggested by Vene zuelan President Carlos Andres Perez in March, would total at least $500 million, according to the French newspaper Le Monde April 9. Venezuela would con tribute to it from its huge oil income, and Ecuador and Trinidad and Tobago, also oil producers, would also contribute. Venezuelan Finance Minister Hector Hurtado proposed the fund April 2 and criticized the U.S. Congress for delaying approval of more U.S. funds for the IDB. Peruvian Finance Minister Guillermo Marco del Pont criticized the U.S.’ veto power in the bank and asserted that “powerful lobbies” representing multina tional corporations had tried to “restrict and condition the free use of the bank’s resources” when disagreements arose be tween the U.S. and Latin countries over expropriations. The president of Chile’s military junta, Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, opened the meeting April 1 and was followed by IDB President Antonio Ortiz Mena of Mexico, who noted that the bank had made 57 loans in 1973 for a record disbursement of $884 million.
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS Political control over agencies noted—A 1973 report prepared for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated that the 1DB and the World Bank had “for the most part . . . channeled funds to countries in which the United States has strategic and diplomatic interests and have refrained from lending to countries with which the United States has had in vestment disputes.” The report, following Latin charges that the U.S. exercised political control over disbursements by the lending agen cies, noted that “the World Bank’s de cision not to accept any major new pro posals for Chile has undoubtedly taken into account the unresolved nationaliza tion of United States-owned companies by the Chilean government. In the 1DB, no provisions exist prohibiting loans to expropriating countries, yet the bank has been reluctant to bring such loans to the board.”
Outbreak of‘banana war.’ Disagreement between members of the fledgling Union of Banana Exporting Countries (UPEB) and the U.S. firms United Brands Co. and Standard Fruit & Steamship Co. intensified during May-August. The trouble stemmed from a UPEB decision in March to impose an export tax of up to $1 per 40-pound crate on the pro ducing companies. Standard and United Brands retaliated by halting exports and cutting production in three of the four countries which actually imposed the tax—Costa Rica, Honduras and Pan ama. Leaders of the affected nations met several times to discuss the companies’ action. Representatives of all UPEB countries except Ecuador met in Panama July 15-17 and agreed to formally constitute UPEB by Sept. 17. Ecuador did not participate or impose the export tax because it said that as an oil producer, it was not suffering from the rise in world oil prices—the chief reason given by UPEB members for trying to increase their ba nana export revenues. Panama, which exported 32 million crates of bananas in 1972, was the only nation to impose and maintain the full $1 tax, putting it into effect April 1. United Brands retaliated by starting court action against the tax, and, according to banana workers’ leaders, by reducing cutting of fruit from five to two days a week.
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United Brands halted exports from Panama July 28, after the government de manded payment of the tax in cash, rather than in guaranteed certificates. Panama’s ambassador to Costa Rica, David Pere, charged June 3 that United Brands and Standard were involved in plots to assassinate Panama’s strongman, Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos, and to over throw the Costa Rican and Honduran governments. Torrijos had donated $1 million each to Honduras and Costa Rica May 27 to help them through their conflicts with the U.S. firms. Panama offered to buy United Brands’ local subsidiary, Chiriqui Land Co., and give it exclusive marketing rights for the next 10 years, it was reported Aug. 7. Costa Rica, which exported 53 million crates of bananas in 1972, imposed the $1 tax in April but was forced to reduce it to 25c a crate Aug. 1, after various retalia tory actions by both Standard and United Brands. Standard offered to sell out to the Costa Rican government May 18, reportedly claiming a book value of $18 million-$20 million for its local assets. Costa Rican Economy Minister Jorge Sanchez offered Standard $10 million July 25, and gave the firm until Aug. 30 to reply. Standard initially reacted to the Costa Rican export tax by halting exports, cut ting production and firing local workers, according to press reports. United Brands at first paid the Costa Rica tax, estimating it would affect its rival Standard more seriously, the London newsletter Latin America reported July 12. However, it changed tactics after President Daniel Oduber de cided to tax unfarmed land owned by foreigners (United Brands was the largest landowner in Costa Rica but used little of its property, according to Latin America). In June, the U.S. firm refused to settle a strike by workers for its banana sub sidiary, effectively matching Standard’s production cutback. The strike was halted July 8. Honduras, which exported 45 million crates of bananas in 1972, imposed a tax of 50c a crate April 25. Standard halted exports, cut production, and, according to labor union leaders, was destroying 145, 000 crates of bananas and other fruit each week in May, it was reported May 21. Standard initially denied the destruction
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but finally admitted it, according to the Miami Herald May 27. Standard resumed exporting bananas from Honduras at onethird its normal output, it was reported May 31, but the exports went to new markets—chiefly Belgium and Mo rocco—where the tax did not apply. Colombia, which exported only 10 million crates in 1972, imposed a 40c tax May 8. Although no specific retaliation by foreign firms was reported, President elect Alfonso Lopez Michelsen met June 7-8 with Torrijos and Oduber on Conta dora Island off Panama to discuss Tor rijos’ charges of plots by Standard and United Brands. The three leaders condemned “excesses” by multinational companies and reaffirmed the right of their countries to freely control the prices of their raw materials. UPEB constitution signed—Representa tives of Panama and four other nations— Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras—signed the ÜPEB constitution in Panama City Sept. 17, formally es tablishing the banana producers’ organi zation. Representatives of Mexico, the Do minican Republic, Jamaica and Ecuador attended the meeting as observers. Ecuador’s refusal to take full membership was seen as seriously weakening UPEB because Ecuador was the world’s major banana producer. Venezuela backs coffee stockpiling. Ven ezuela agreed to invest several million dollars from its increased oil wealth to underwrite action by coffee producing na tions to hold up world coffee prices. The commitment was announced Nov. 4 by President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen of Colombia, the world’s second largest coffee producer. Venezuela would finance coffee stockpiling by small Central American countries that needed im mediate income from coffee sales. Colombia and Brazil, the world’s leading producer, would finance their own stock piling. Latin coffee multinational set. Rep resentatives of Costa Rica, El Salva dor, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Mexico and Venezuela met in Caracas Nov. 15-17 and agreed to form a multinational cor
LATIN AMERICA 1974 poration to increase coffee prices on the world market. The firm, to be called Cia. Cafes Suaves Centrales, S.A. de C.V., would begin operations in January 1975 with head quarters in Mexico City. It would be financed largely by .Venezuela, which reportedly would contribute as much as $80 million to its operations. Venezuela said Nov. 19 that some of the money would be used by the new company to finance coffee stockpiling by Central American exporters. Brazil and Colombia, the world’s major coffee producers, did not join the com pany. However, President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen of Colombia said Nov. 20 that he fully supported Venezuela’s and Mexico’s coffee policies. Latin sugar cartel formed. Twenty na tions in Latin America and the Caribbean formed a sugar producers’ union to protect world sugar prices, currently at record levels. Formation of the cartel, called the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Sugar Exporting Countries, was an nounced Nov. 28 by Francisco Cano Es calante, president of the Mexican Na tional Sugar Commission, following a meeting of representatives of the member nations Nov. 25-27 on the island of Cozumel, off Mexico’s Caribbean coast. The members included Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Argentina, Barba dos, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guy ana, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela. Copper exporters to increase prices. Representatives of the world’s four major copper exporting nations—Peru, Chile, Zambia and Zaire—met in Lima, Peru Oct. 28-31 and agreed to work together to raise sagging copper prices. The nations, joined in the Intergovern mental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), produced more than 60% of the world’s copper exports. Peruvian President Juan Velasco Al varado addressed the CIPEC meeting Oct. 28 and urged the delegates to form a cartel similar to the Organization of Pe troleum Exporting Countries to fix copper prices on the world market.
Argentina
Violence Precedes Peron s Death
“illicit” political associations and “incite ment to violence,” but defined the terms ambiguously. Similar measures had been repealed by the Chamber in mid-1973, before the ERP stepped up its attacks on the armed forces and foreign businessmen and before intra-Peronist violence accelerated.
Juan D. Peron died of natural causes July 1, 1974 and was succeeded by his widow, Maria Estela Peron, as president of Argentina. Peron s death was preceded by more than four years of terrorism and of internecine violence among his followers. The violence paused only briefly after Peron died.
Garrison attacked, governor forced out— Peron and the right wing of his move ment had demanded swift approval of the bill after 60-70 ERP members attacked an army tank garrison at Azul, 170 miles south of Buenos Aires, the night of Jan. 19-20. The guerrillas occupied the gar rison and fought a seven-hour gun battle with troops, leaving two guerrillas, a sol dier, the base commander and his wife dead. The subversives escaped with a hos tage, Lt. Col. Jorge IbarzabaL Peron appeared on nationwide tele vision after the attack, wearing his army general’s uniform, and called on the armed forces, police, labor unions and his Justicialista Party to unite “to annihilate as soon as possible this criminal terror ism.” He accused left-wing Peronists of being “complacent” about terrorism, and indirectly criticized Buenos Aires Province Gov. Oscar Bidegain, a left-wing Peronist, by asserting terrorists were “operating in the province with the indifference of its authorities.” A majority of Peronist senators and deputies demanded Bidegain’s resignation
Terrorism curbs approved. The Chamber of Deputies passed President Juan Peron’s controversial anti-terrorism bill Jan. 25, less than a week after a bloody attack on an army tank garrison by guerrillas of the left-wing People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP). The bill, reforming the Argentine penal code, was approved 128-62, over the op position of virtually all non-Peronist legislators and members of the leftist Peronist Youth (JP). Eight JP deputies re signed Jan. 24 rather than vote on the bill, which they .said “could be turned against the Peronist people.” Police arrested some 70 opponents of the bill attempting to march on the Chamber during the all-night debate that preceded the vote. The bill virtually doubled prison sentences for convicted kidnappers, conspirators and armed extremists, and turned over internal security functions to the federal police rather than local law enforcement officers. It also outlawed 13
14 late Jan. 21, and the governor acceded Jan. 23. He was replaced Jan. 26 by the vice governor, Victorio Calabro. Police and soldiers carried out widespread raids in search of the Azul at tackers and announced the arrest of 13 suspects Jan. 23, including several persons allegedly wounded at the garrison. The left-wing Buenos Aires newspaper El Mundo printed an alleged letter from Ibarzabal Jan. 24 in which the colonel called himself a “prisoner of war” of the ERP. (Authorities had occupied El Mundo’s plant Jan. 21, apparently to prevent the publication of ERP communiques. The paper had resumed publication the next day. An explosion Jan. 7 had seriously damaged the Buenos Aires printing works that produced El Mundo and the semiofficial Peronist organ Mayoria.) Presumed rightists Jan. 23 killed a Communist Party member distributing pamphlets calling for a march on Congress to oppose the anti-terrorism bill. The' Liberation Armed Forces guer rilla group sent a communique to the press the same day threatening to carry out “people’s justice” against any deputy who voted for the bill. Leftists attacked. Alejandro Gio venco, a leader of the left-wing Peronist Youth, was wounded in Buenos Aires Jan. 2 in an ambush by unknown persons presumed to be right-wing Peronists. In a related incident Jan. 4, a Buenos Aires office of the Justicialista Movement was damaged by a bomb thrown by unknown persons. Nineteen separate bombings of offices and homes of leftists were reported early Jan. 26. Police said bombs exploded in Buenos Aires at seven JP offices, the office of a JP-dominated union, and a cafe fre quented by leftists; a woman was seriously injured by the last explosion. Other bombs exploded at the homes of leftist militants in suburban Buenos Aires and Rosario and at offices of the Communist Party and the Young Socialist Movement in Bahia Blanca. Meanwhile, intra-Peronist murders continued with the assassination of JP member Jorge Gallardo in Buenos Aires Feb. 6. A right-wing Peronist, Alejandro Giovenco of the Peronist Youth of the Ar
LATIN AMERICA 1974 gentine Republic (JPRA), was killed Feb. 18 when a bomb exploded in his briefcase.
Left-wing Peronists seized—The cam paign by right-wing Peronists to purge leftists from the Justicialista movement continued in the rest of the country in February with the arrest of dozens of members of the leftist Peronist Youth (JP), Peronist Working Youth (JTP), Peronist University Youth (JUP) and Peronist guerrilla groups. An estimated 30-40 persons were seized in Buenos Aires Feb. 12 in connection with an alleged plot by leftist Peronists and Uruguayan Tupamaro guerrillas to assassinate President Peron, Vice Presi dent Maria Estela Martinez de Peron and Uruguayan President Juan Maria Bordaberry during Bordaberry’s brief visit to the capital that day. (Bordaberry and the Perons witnessed the ratification of the River Plate treaty between their countries and signing of an accord recognizing the juridical capacity of a mixed commission to oversee construction and operation of the Ar gentine-Uruguayan hydroelectric com plex at Salto Grande on the Uruguay River.) Federal police said Carlos Alberto Caride, a founder of the Peronist Revolu tionary Armed Forces guerrilla group and associate of deposed Buenos Aires Province Gov. Oscar Bidegain, and six presumed Tupamaros had been arrested as they allegedly proceeded to the planned assassination spot. Later reports said some 30 Uruguayan nationals had been arrested. Police added that the assassi nation plot was part of a more extensive plan by left-wing Peronists to assassinate or kidnap public officials and attack state oil and gas installations, discovered Feb. 10 when a number of leftist Peronists were captured in a gun battle with police in Mar del Plata. Left-wing Peronist leaders denounced the plot allegations Feb. 12-14, asserting they had previously warned government officials that police officers were fabri cating assassination plots to separate them from Peron. The London newsletter Latin America suggested Feb. 22 that the alleged plot was a “frame-up” of Caride. (Caride was freed April 1 by a federal judge who ruled that the government had
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presented insufficient evidence against him.) Police raids and dozens of arrests in Buenos Aires were reported Feb. 14 and 15. A lawyer for Mario Firmenich, a Montoneros guerrilla leader, charged Feb. 14 that Firmenich had disappeared and demanded to know if and why he had been arrested. Another Montoneros leader, Roberto Quieto, was arrested in Rosario Feb. 19 on charges of “usurping authority and adulterating public documents.” (Quieto was released March 8 and Firmenich March 16.) Two days later, federal police raided JTP headquarters in Buenos Aires and ar rested more than 30 persons. The raid was directed by the three top police leaders, who reportedly had joined the Peronist right wing in its crusade against the left. Another 17 JTP members were later ar rested in Moron, Buenos Aires Province, according to La Prensa of Buenos Aires Feb.27. JTP leader Jose Rosenberg had been held and reportedly abused in Mar del Plata Feb. 16-17, along with JUP member Norberto Trucchi. Leaders of the JP in La Plata charged Feb. 23 that police had arrested three JP members but had refused to acknowledge it.
Other unrest—The Montoneros had returned to action in January, after remaining inactive since the Peronists returned to power May 25, 1973, it was reported Feb. 1. They had occupied and seized documents from the registrar’s office in the town of Carlos Paz, Cordoba Province, among other activities. At least four persons were killed and 15 wounded Feb. 22 in a gun battle and rioting in the southern town of Comodoro Rivadavia. The violence began when some 500 workers from the left-wing “official” branch of the local petroleum workers’ union marched to reclaim their head quarters from a group of right-wingers who had occupied it since Feb. 20 to protest alleged Marxist infiltration of the union leadership. The protesters were being guarded by police when the shooting broke out. Some 60 members of the right-wing JPRA attacked the editorial offices of the Buenos Aires leftist newspaper El Mundo
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early Feb. 23, firing on the building and beating a reporter. Police later intervened and reportedly arrested 17 newspaper em ployes. All were subsequently released ex cept Ana Maria Guzzetti, a reporter who had angered President Peron at a recent news conference. (Peron had asked that Guzzetti be tried for slander after she asked him if the government planned action to “deter the fascist escalation and wave of crimes committed by parapolice groups.” (The Association of Argentine Jour nalistic Entities Jan. 31 had denounced alleged attacks on press freedom including “threats, intimidations and confiscation of [newspaper] editions.” It called on the government to respect the press and its role in a democratic society.) A powerful bomb was thrown at the en trance of the building of the Buenos Aires leftist Peronist newspaper Noticias March 9. Three persons in the building next door were injured. A bomb was thrown at Buenos Aires headquarters of the national Metallur gical Workers Union the same night, after elections for the union leadership. Mem bers opposed to the conservative lead ership had charged they were prevented from running opposition slates. The official candidate for adjunct secretary general of the union was Labor Minister Ricardo Otero. Bomb explosions in Buenos Aires April 19 later damaged several shops near the printing company that published political magazines of the Peronist right and left. Ten days earlier, members of the Peronist Armed Forces guerrilla group had taken credit for attacks on 12 buses in Mar del Plata to protest an increase in bus fares. More than 20 bombs exploded in Buenos Aires May 29-30, most at au tomobile dealers, according to the Miami Herald June 1. At least 10 bombings were reported the same days in Cordoba, pre sumably in commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the Cordoba worker and student rebellion which helped bring down Gen. Juan Carlos Ongania, then the nation’s military dictator. A bomb had blown up the Buenos Aires headquarters of the General Labor Con federation May 28. Other explosions had damaged a department store and two branches of the Bank of Commerce in the capital May 25.
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Peronists assassinated. Intra-Peronist violence continued. Rogelio Coria, former secretary general of the national Construction Workers Union, was shot to death in Buenos Aires March 22. According to the French newspaper Le Monde March 24, Coria was among “the most corrupt ele ments” of the right wing of the Peronist labor movement and had opposed the return of President Juan Peron to Argen tina and the designation of Hector Campora as Peronist presidential candidate in December 1972. He had recently returned to Argentina from his residence in Paraguay. Luis A. David, a supporter of Peron and head of the right-wing Nationalist Liberation Alliance, had been found shot to death March 21 near San Nicolas (Buenos Aires Province). The adjunct sec retary of the San Nicolas Construction Workers Union, Roberto Jose Kusner, had been shot dead the day before. Another right-wing Peronist, Miguel Angel Castrofini, of the Nueva Argentina university faction, was assassinated March 8. Juan Manuel Abai Medina, ex-sec retary of the National Justicialista Move ment and an organizer of radical Peronist youth groups, was wounded in the arm in an assassination attempt in Buenos Aires March 23. Presumed rightists fired on him from a passing car and threw two grenades into the apartment building into which he retreated. Unknown gunmen fired on the home of Tucuman City Councilwoman Lucialda Cerca March 25. Cerca belonged to the government’s Justicialista Liberation Front (FREJULI). Police dismantled a bomb April 3 out side the San Fernando (Buenos Aires Province) home of Deputy Miguel Angel Davico, also a FREJULI member. Antonio Magaldi, secretary general of the regional General Labor Confederation in San Nicolas (Buenos Aires Province), was shot to death April 4. The next day a leftist Peronist organizer, Fernando Quin teros, was dragged from his Buenos Aires home and shot dead by two men claiming to be policemen. Quinteros, who worked in shantytowns around the capital, had opposed Social Welfare Minister Jose Lopez Rega’s program for slum dwellers, which he
LATIN AMERICA 1974
claimed made their situation worse than before. Police had killed a slum dweller March 25 in a demonstration against Lopez Rega’s policies by some 300 persons. The Peronist Montoneros guerrilla group later blamed the social welfare minister for the killing and said the “crime must be paid for sooner or later,” the London newslet ter Latin America reported April 5. This was the first implicit death threat by the Montoneros against anyone so close to President Peron. Maria Liliana Ivanoff of the leftist Peronist Youth (JP) was kidnapped and shot to death by presumed Peronist rightists outside Buenos Aires April 26. Carlos Mugica, a leader of the Third World Priests Movement with close ties to the JP, was gunned down as he left his church in the capital May 11. The government news agency TELAM charged May 14 that Mugica had been killed by the Peronist Montoneros guer rilla group, presumably for his recent ap peals to leftists to moderate their attacks on the orthodox Peronist leadership and remain loyal to President Peron. How ever, the London newsletter Latin Amer ica noted May 17 that Mugica had first gained prominence by defending two dead Montoneros, and that the guerrillas never killed a person for making appeals such as Mugica’s. JP leader Carlos Castelacci was killed May 10 in a gun battle with other leftist Peronists over possession of one of the JP’s Buenos Aires offices. Three young members of the Socialist Workers Party were kidnapped from a meeting in suburban Buenos Aires May 30 and later found shot to death. The unidentified abductors, who were armed with machine guns, also kidnapped, beat and later released three other party mem bers, all women. It was announced by authorities in Buenos Aires June 11 that Remo Crotta, head of the paper industry union, and Francisco Oscar Martinez, of the Peronist Youth organization in La Plata, had been found dead. Both had been reported kidnapped earlier. May Day violence. Right- and left-wing Peronists battled in the streets of Buenos Aires May 1, after President Juan Peron delivered his traditional May Day address
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to 100,000 supporters and bitterly at tacked the Peronist left. Bands of leftists and rightists fought with staves and fists, causing several inju ries but no reported deaths. Peron extolled the conservative trade unions, which dominated his political movement, saying: “I want this first meeting of ours on Labor Day to be an act of homage to those organizations and their wise leaders.” He eulogized con servative unionists who had recently been assassinated, and warned that “the voice of punishment has not yet sounded” for their murderers. Peron denounced leaders of the leftist Peronist youth organizations, calling them “beardless infiltrators” and “mercenaries of foreign forces.” When leftists interrupted his speech with chants for a more radical government, Peron an grily called them “idiots.” More than 20,000 leftists attended the rally. One of their leaders, Juan Carlos Anon, had charged April 23 that the government had been arresting leftists to prevent them from attending. Police had announced the arrest of seven Peronist Montoneros guerrillas April 23 on charges of illegal possession of arms and explosives.
New security unit. The rally had been preceded by other Peronist violence and by non-Peronist guerrilla violence, which had influenced the government to appoint a new National Security Council to re establish civil peace. The council, created April 19 by Defense Minister Angel Rob ledo and Interior Minister Benito Llambi, consisted of members of the state and federal police and the three branches of the armed forces. The government May 28 created a spe cial industrial police force to guard Ar gentine and foreign factories against guer rilla attacks. ERP, Latin guerrillas unite. Leaders of the left-wing People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP) had said at a clandestine press conference near Buenos Aires Feb. 14 that they would step up their attacks on the Argentine military and form a “common front” with leftist guerrillas of Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay.
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One of the leaders, who identified himself as Enrique Gorriaran, said: “We consider that to halt or diminish the fight against the oppressor army would allow it to reorganize and to pass over to the offensive.” He asserted the recent ERP attack on the army’s Azul garrison in Buenos Aires Province had proved to be a “political success” because it fur ther separated leftists from the “bour geois reformer” President Peron. Another of the leaders, identified as Domingo Mena, said the ERP and the Revolutionary Left Movement of Chile, the National Liberation Army of Bolivia and the Tupamaro guerrillas of Uruguay were “prepared to do combat under a joint command.” A joint declaration by the four groups pledged to overthrow “imperialist-capitalist reaction, to annihi late counterrevolutionary armies, expel Yankee and European imperialism from Latin American soil, country by country, and initiate the construction of socialism in each of our countries . . .”
Terrorist kidnappers active. Douglas Roberts, administrative director of Pepsi Cola S.A., local affiliate of the U.S. firm PepsiCo, was abducted in suburban Buenos Aires Jan. 4. Roberts was freed Feb. 2 after the payment of an undisclosed sum. The police announced later that they had arrested three of the abductors and recovered part of the ransom. Some 6,000 workers at the Peugeot au tomobile factory outside Buenos Aires staged a two-hour strike Jan. 4 to protest the kidnapping Dec. 28, 1973 of the fac tory director, Yves Boisset. Boisset’s release was announced by Peugeot March 18. French sources in Buenos Aires said the abductors had demanded $4 million in ransom. The ERP announced the release of Julio Baraldo, director of the local affiliate of Italy’s Bereta arms factory, in exchange for an undetermined quantity of arms, it was reported Jan. 19. U.S. engineer Charles Hayes was freed Jan. 31 after a month in captivity, when his A. G. McKee construction company reportedly paid a $1 million ransom. Henry Andersen, the Danish executive of the Bank of London and South Amer ica who was kidnapped late in 1973, was
18 released Feb. 19 after reported payment of a large ransom. Mario Reduto, a retired naval petty officer kidnapped Feb. 22, was found dead in a garbage dump in Zarate (Buenos Aires Province) March 14. The ERP admitted “executing” Reduto, whom it had accused of heading a parapolice group which allegedly attacked and tortured leftists. Members of the ERP Feb. 23 kid napped Antonio Vallocchia, an executive of Swift & Company in Rosario, whom they held responsible for the “unjustified dismissal of 42 workers demanding decent salaries.” Swift said Feb. 26 that it would reinstate the 42 employes and pay them for the days they were out of work, in ac cordance with ERP demands. ERP members in Buenos Aires kidnap ped a retired army officer March 29 and released him unharmed the same day. The former officer, Lt. Col. Jorge Alberto Rivero, was the prosecutor in a court martial against an army private who allegedly collaborated in an unsuccessful attempt by the ERP to occupy the head quarters of the Argentine Medical Corps in September 1973. Rivero said the guer rillas questioned him about the case for 45 minutes. The ERP May 15 freed army Col. Flo rencio Crespo, whom it had kidnapped in November 1973. Crespo told newsmen he had been treated “very well” by his cap tors but had been released for “health reasons.” Gregorio Manoukian, president of the Tanti chain of supermarkets, was killed in a kidnap attempt in Buenos Aires June 7. Jose Chohelo, a Peugeot representative in the capital, had been kidnapped June 3 and ransomed for $200,000 June 11. Samuelson ransom paid. Esso Argentina paid a record sum to the People’s Revolu tionary Army (ERP) to ransom its refinery manager, Victor Samuelson, but the guerrillas waited for H months before releasing him. The Exxon Corp, affiliate announced March 13 it had paid $14.2 million for Samuelson, kidnapped by the ERP in December 1973. The guerrillas had also demanded that a communique they issued on the kidnapping be printed by 12 news papers in Buenos Aires and some 30 in the
LATIN AMERICA 1974 provinces, but all but three papers in the capital declined in fear of reprisals from the government. The left-wing El Mundo published the message on its front page March 13. The government closed the paper the next day and ordered . criminal proceedings against its publishers and editors for “trying to encourage the propagation of subversive action.” (But the Superior Court of Justice May 3 annulled the de cree against El Mundo.) (Newspapers were officially forbidden to publish ERP messages or even mention the guerrilla group’s name, but this was frequently violated. The conservative op position newspaper La Prensa reported the group’s activities and printed its name almost daily.) The ERP communique said Esso had agreed originally to pay $4.2 million in supplies to victims of recent floods in Ar gentina, plus $10 million in cash as “indemnization” for “the superprofits that Esso has obtained in the country, thanks to the exploitation of its workers.” However, the message stated, “existing obstacles” had made distribution of the supplies unfeasible, so the entire $14.2 million had been paid in cash. Esso repatriated its remaining U.S. executives March 14-15 to avert any new kidnappings. Fear of abduction or murder had caused more than 500 U.S. business executives to leave Argentina during the past few months, the Miami Herald reported March 22. The estimated 300 U.S. businessmen who remained in the country reportedly headed small con cerns. The ERP freed Samuelson April 29. An ERP communique to Buenos Aires newspapers said Samuelson had been re leased at the home of the pediatrician who had treated his children before they and Samuelson’s wife left Argentina in Jan uary. The statement guaranteed the safety of other ERP captives, but it warned: “There will be no truce for exploiting firms and the oppressor army.” Samuelson’s release had been delayed while his captors changed the huge ransom from U.S. dollars into other cur rencies or other dollars, so the serial num bers could not be traced, according to Ar gentine financial sources cited in press reports April 27.
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The June 4 issue of the ERP’s official publication, Red Star, said the guerrillas would spend $7 million of the ransom to finance “armed struggle in Chile, Argen tina, Bolivia and Uruguay.’’ U.S. aide wounded, kidnapped. Guer rillas of the left-wing People’s Revolu tionary Army (ERP) April 12 wounded and briefly kidnapped Alfred A. Laun III, director of the U.S. Information Service in Cordoba. Laun was the first U.S. dip lomat kidnapped in Argentina. The guerrillas invaded Laun’s home outside Cordoba in the morning and wounded him in the head, abdomen and shoulder when he resisted abduction. They released him that evening, apparently for fear he would die in captivity. Laun underwent surgery in a Cordoba clinic, and was reported “out of danger” April 15. Shortly after the kidnapping, the ERP sent a message to a Cordoba radio station claiming credit for the abduction. The guerrillas said Laun would be “inter rogated on counterrevolutionary activities in Vietnam, Santo Domingo, Brazil and Bolivia, and for his active participation as a liaison in the fascist military coup against our brother people in Chile. He will also be interrogated on his ties with the Central Intelligence Agency.” The Argentine Chamber of Deputies called April 21 for an investigation of the possibility that Laun had “carried out extradiplomatic activities for some special organization of his country, such as the” CIA. The police had found a high-powered transmitter in Laun’s home. The U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires denied Laun had ever worked for or with the CIA, or served in Brazil or Bolivia. It also denied he had participated in any activities connected with Chile. Laun pre viously had served in the Dominican Re public, South Vietnam and Thailand. (Claudio Alberto Luduena, sought in the brief kidnapping and wounding of Laun, was killed in Cordoba April 28 as he at tempted unsuccessfully to kidnap Antonio Minetti, a business executive.)
Other terrorism. Among other develop ments involving terrorists: Unknown terrorists attacked a police station in Rosario Jan. 16, seriously
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wounding one officer before setting fire to the building. Police raided an ERP hideout in Rosario March 6 and arrested Oscar Ciarlotti, who allegedly participated in the 1973 kidnapping of his uncle, retired Rear Adm. Francisco Aleman. ERP members stole firearms in attacks staged on police stations in Ciudadela (Buenos Aires Province) March 8, Resis tencia (Chaco Province) March 15 and Melincue (Santa Fe Province) March 23. The guerrillas killed a police officer in the Resistencia raid and freed two imprisoned comrades in the Melincue attack. The following month the personnel manager at the Fiat automobile plant in Cordoba, Roberto Francisco Klecher, was shot to death by unknown ambushers April 4. ERP guerrillas had killed another Fiat executive, Oberdan Sallustro, in April 1972. The culprits arrested then had been freed in May 1973 in a general am nesty declared by ex-President Hector Campora. Police in Santa Fe reported smashing an ERP cell April 10, arresting two alleged guerrillas and seizing arms and ex plosives. The day before, an armed group had attacked headquarters of an army en gineers battalion in Santa Fe, killing one soldier and wounding another. A tourist bus garage and a branch of the United Bank of Holland were bombed by terrorists in Buenos Aires April 19. The next day some 30 alleged ERP mem bers occupied the neighborhood of Villanueva in Campana, outside the capital and held a five-hour gun battle with police. Three policemen were seriously wounded and seven guerrillas captured in the action. More than 100 persons were arrested in Campana April 22-23 as police conducted raids to find ERP hideouts. ERP members shot and killed Jorge Quiroga, a former judge of the disbanded anti-subversive court, in downtown Buenos Aires April 28. Quiroga had inter rogated and sent to prison the 16 ERP and Peronist guerrillas who were killed by au thorities at the Trelew naval air base prison in August 1972. Buenos Aires police claimed May 6 that the ERP was also responsible for the murder of Manuel R. Garcia, a moderate Peronist labor leader, outside the capital May 4. However, the ERP did not nor mally attack Peronists of any tendency.
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ERP members April 30 occupied a highway police post outside the city of Tafi, and escaped with the station’s trans mitter equipment. The same day, police in Cordoba arrested Juan Martin Guevara, brother of the late guerrilla leader Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who allegedly was carrying false identification papers and copies of ERP publications. Bombs exploded simultaneously May 5 at the Buenos Aires offices of five Ford au tomobile dealers and at the American Club. Another bomb was set off at the branch of the Bank of London and South America, causing property damage. Two policemen were killed and a third was wounded May 6 in a shootout with presumed leftist guerrillas in San Justo, outside Buenos Aires.
Guerrilla hunt fails. Hundreds of persons were arrested in Tucuman Province May 18-21 as federal police mounted a major campaign against the left-wing People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP). But the Tucuman drive ended in failure May 25. The action followed further violence by the ERP and by members of the opposing Peronist political factions and a warning by President Juan Peron that Argentina faced civil war. Peron was quoted May 16 as saying that because of “revolutionary infantilism,” Argentina might have “reached a situation of unavoidable confrontation.” Police backed by army helicopters seized more than 150 persons in a moun tainous area of Tucuman May 18. About 100 were later released when they were found to have no connections with the ERP, according to unofficial sources. Announcing the abandonment of the anti-ERP drive May 25, security forces said bad weather had enabled the guer rillas to escape encirclement. The task force of more than 1,000 po licemen and soldiers reportedly captured only 27 alleged guerrillas, none of them major ERP leaders. The failure of the anti-guerrilla effort was dramatized May 31 when more than 40 ERP members briefly occupied the town of Acheral, which had served as a center of operations for the campaign. At a parade celebrating Army Day May 29, the army commander, Gen.
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Leandro Anaya, spoke out strongly against guerrilla violence and said the army would “contribute decisively to prevent the aggressor from achieving his final objective: the seizure of power and the dissolution of our institutions.”
Security command formed. Bombings, assassinations and kidnappings continued in Buenos Aires and other cities, leading President Juan Peron to set up a new committee to command all security operations. The committee, reported June 7, consisted of Peron, the ministers of defense, interior and justice, and the three armed forces commanders. Its orders would be carried out by a new security secretariat headed by Brig. Gen. Alberto Caceres, the frontier police chief who had served as federal police chief under the supplanted military dictatorship. Peron warned June 17 that if violence continued, the government “must answer with a repression that is also a little more violent and stronger.” Socialists arrested—Police in Rosario raided a meeting of the Socialist Youths Union May 19, arresting 51 persons and allegedly seizing weapons.
Press crackdown. The magazine El Des camisado, the most widely read and au thoritative organ of the left-wing Peronist Youth movement (JP), was closed by order of the Interior Ministry April 8. The magazine Militancia, which also reflected JP opinion, was closed the next day. El Descamisado had repeatedly at tacked conservative trade unionists, the government’s anti-inflationary wage-price freeze, and virtually every major official around President Juan Peron. In recent issues it had commended the assassination of right-wing union leaders and had called the March shooting of former Construc tion Workers Union leader Rogelio Coria a case of “popular justice.” A March issue of’ El Descamisado reportedly had embarrassed Peron by citing 1969 statements implying he had approved of the assassination by guer rillas of Augusto Vandor, leader of the Metallurgical Workers Union, who reportedly had threatened Peron’s control of the labor movement.
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The ban on El Descamisado was va cated by a Buenos Aires court July 13 on the ground that the magazine had not tried to promote chaos, as the government had charged. Militancia subsequently reappeared as El Peronista, but the government June 4 banned its publication and sale as well as the appearance of any publications that might replace it.
Troubles in Cordoba Conflict between left-wing and right wing forces resulted in a police revolt in Cordoba, where right-wing police elements overthrew a left-wing provincial administra tion. The federal Perón government then assumed temporary administration of the province.
Cordoba government conflict. Cordoba Province Gov. Ricardo Obregon Cano, a left-wing Peronist, charged Jan. 18 that unnamed federal officials had mounted a campaign against his administration. The assertion followed a call by the Cordoba city intendant, Juan Carlos Avalos, for federal intervention in the provincial government. Avalos, a right-wing Peronist, had charged in letters to President Perón and Interior Minister Benito Llambi Jan. 6 that the provincial vice governor, Atilio Lopez, was leading, a Cordoba city transport workers strike for political reasons. The stoppage, by the Automotive Streetcar Union, was called Jan. 4 and settled Jan. 7 when the government granted the strikers higher wages. Lopez, a former secretary general of the union, had endorsed the strike Jan. 6. Lopez was expelled Jan. 14 from the association of Cordoba’s 62 Peronist or ganizations,. dominated by orthodox Peronists. Both he and Obregon Cano had long been attacked by conservatives in the Peronist movement. Cordoba police revolt. An estimated 800 right-wing policemen seized control of the city of Cordoba late Feb. 27 and ousted the elected provincial government, dom inated by left-wing Peronists. The rebels, representing more than a third of the city’s police force, acted with
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the apparent approval of President Juan Peron. They seized the provincial Govern ment House and arrested Gov. Ricardo Obregon Cano, Vice Gov. Atilio Lopez and some 80 other officials including pro vincial Cabinet ministers and legislators. All were released two days later but were prevented from returning to their govern ment posts. Peron initially refused to intervene in the situation, but he asked Congress March 2 to remove Obregon from office and let the president name a successor. Congress was dominated by conservative Peronists sympathetic to the Cordoba rebels. The revolt was touched off Feb. 27 when Obregon dismissed the city police chief, Lt. Col. Antonio Navarro, who was accused of organizing bombing attempts against left-wing Peronists, including Vice Gov. Lopez. (A former deputy police chief, Lt. Col. Julian Chiappe, had charged Feb. 15 that Navarro had used police funds and vehicles improperly and had conspired against the provincial government.) Navarro refused to resign and led officers loyal to him in seizing the Govern ment House, arresting the officials, sur rounding police stations throughout the city and taking over all radio and tele vision stations. The rebels broadcast a message asserting they had “decided to put an end to the uncontrolled Marxist in filtration in the province” and were pre pared to defend the decision “to the ulti mate consequences.” The insurgents also attempted unsuc cessfully to blow up the printing presses of the city’s leading newspaper, La Voz del Interior, which apparently had angered them by detailing charges against 19 po licemen accused of executing five innocent farmers in January after mistaking them for left-wing guerrillas. The rebels were immediately supported by the city’s right-wing unions but de nounced by the leftist regional leadership of the General Labor Confederation (CGT). A communique signed by CGT Secretary General Roberto Tapia and Ad junct Secretary Agustin Tosco placed union members on “alert” and charged that “reactionary. . . forces have appealed to the police chief to create a situation of rebellion, chaos and violence that would
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provoke the fall of the government elected by the people . . Snipers fired on the rebels in different parts of the city Feb. 27-28. Cordoba was paralyzed Feb. 28 as right-wing unions struck to support the rebels and right-wing civilians joined po licemen in patrolling the streets. Two po licemen and a bystander were killed in a clash between police and civilians, and the home of a judge was badly damaged by a bomb explosion. Some 250 federal police were sent in from Buenos Aires, but they were not put into action. The Cordoba Justice Ministry declared Obregon out of office Feb. 28 and installed in his place the president of the provin cial Chamber of Deputies, Mario Dante Agodino. Agodino pledged new guberna torial elections for September. He subsequently met with captive Obregon in an effort to resolve the general conflict, according to police sources. Obregon and the other officials were re leased March 1, and many of them im mediately went into hiding. Left-wing labor leaders also were in hiding, and right-wing unionists took advantage of their absence to elect a new regional CGT leader, Bernabe Barcena of the Millers Union. Labor Minister Ricardo Otero flew in from Buenos Aires to view the election and confirm Barcena in his new office. (The election also was endorsed by national CGT Secretary General Adelino Romero, who at the time was in Cuba, ac cording to the French newspaper Le Monde March 3.) Cordoba remained paralyzed March 1; shooting was heard throughout the city, and Obregon’s vacant home was bombed. In Buenos Aires, Peron discussed the situation with his Cabinet, and the op position leader, Ricardo Balbin of the Radical Civic Union, met with Interior Minister Benito Llambi and Secretary to the Presidency Vicente Solano Lima. Balbin later said that the Cordoba revolt was “subversive” and that Obregon should be reinstated. Clashes between civilians and rebel police continued in Cordoba March 2 as the death toll rose to five. Police raided offices and homes of leftists, and there was a shootout in front of the office of the Socialist Workers Party. A policeman was killed in a raid by civilians on the Los
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Cocos police station in the interior of the province. Peron asked Congress to dismiss Obregon and his government, charging they had “tolerated and at times even fo mented diverse conflictive situations which provoked a growing climate of public unrest.” Obregon declared from hiding that he did not intend to resign. Cordoba government removed. The federal government took over the govern ment of Cordoba Province March 12 after Congress voted the action to end the police revolt. President Peron then named a con servative follower, Diulio Brunelli, to re place Cordoba Gov. Ricardo Obregon Cano, whose left-wing administration had angered right-wing policemen and other orthodox Peronists. Brunelli most re cently had worked for Social Welfare Minister Jose Lopez Rega, one of Peron’s most conservative advisers. Obregon and Cordoba Vice Gov. Atilio Lopez had resigned March 8 after fighting for more than a week to retain their posts. Obregon charged in his letter of res ignation that the “conspiracy” against his government had “the support of officials of the national government, especially the interibr minister and the labor minister.” Interior Minister Benito Llambi had ig nored Obregon’s repeated calls for federal intervention against the police rebels, and Labor Minister Ricardo Otero had ap proved the conservative take-over of the regional General Labor Confederation during the revolt. Peron’s request to replace the Cordoba regime had been approved by the Senate March 5 and by the Chamber of Deputies March 8, in each instance after long hours of debate in which the opposition parties, principally the Radical Civic Union (UCR), opposed the action as unconstitu tional. UCR leader Ricardo Balbin had said March 4 that “the problem of Cordoba is strictly seditious and a federal intervenor should be named to reinstate in their offices the legitimately elected authorities. . .” The final intervention measure in cluded, as a concession to the opposition parties and Obregon, an article de manding that Lt. Col. Antonio Na
ARGENTINA varro and other leaders of the Cordoba revolt be tried for sedition. Navarro re signed as Cordoba police commander March 13. A new Cordoba police chief, Lt. Col. Juan Carlos Landa, assumed office March 21. The Communist Party had vigorously opposed Obregon’s removal, asserting in its organ Nuestra Palabra March 7 that the police revolt marked the beginning of a “Chilean-style coup, with its criminal methods and genocidal objectives,” in Ar gentina. Police raided Communist offices in Cordoba March 8 and arrested eight persons.
Unrest continues. Violence continued in Cordoba both before and after the ouster of the left-wing regime and the federal takeover. Three more persons were killed March 3 as the strike and unrest continued. A police station at Los Reartes outside Cordoba was briefly occupied by civilian attackers. Heavy firing between snipers and police and civilian patrols was reported for the fourth consecutive night March 4, but no casualties were reported. The next day, as right-wing trade unions lifted their general strike in support of the police rebels, snip ers fired on police and radio stations oc cupied by the rebels. Eighteen bombing incidents were re ported March 8. An affiliate of at least one U.S. firm, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., was among the targets. Several more bombs exploded in the city March 10, and in Salsipuedes young supporters of Gov. Obregon threw incendiary bombs at the town hall. Unknown persons threw Molotov cock tails into crowded streets in Cordoba March 11, provoking a shootout. Leaflets were found near the scene in which the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), the major left-wing guerrilla group, de nounced the “police-fascist coup” that de posed Obregon. Four bombings were reported March 12, and five the night of March 15-16. A group of avowed ERP members briefly occupied and then dynamited Cordoba’s LV2 La Voz del Pueblo radio station March 16.
23 Two bomb explosions were reported early March 22. The Buenos Aires news paper La Prensa said other bombings had occurred almost daily during the previous week. Three policemen had been wounded early March 20 in a shootout with un known ambushers. Unidentified terrorists unsuccessfully tried to occupy the transmitting plant of the radio station LV3 Radio Cordoba March 26. Later the same day a po liceman and a terrorist were wounded in a gun battle in another part of the city. Bombs were thrown at three private homes in Cordoba March 27. An army lieutenant colonel and a union lawyer were among owners of the homes. Several more bombings were reported April 3. Juan Martin Guevara, brother of the late revolutionary leader Ernesto “Che” Guevara, was placed under preventive detention by order of a Cordoba federal judge July 15. The judge ruled that there was sufficient evidence for an unlawful association indictment against Guevara, who was arrested late in April.
Peron’s Final Months Peron returns to Government House. President Peron resumed working in the Government House in Buenos Aires April 15, after living and performing almost all his presidential duties in his suburban residence for more than three months. Peron’s seclusion in his residence had sparked insistent rumors that he was in failing health. However, his aides now said his health was “excellent.” Despite the events in Cordoba and other recent setbacks, left-wing Peronists apparently continued to support the government. Some 40,000 Peronist youths held a rally at a Buenos Aires soc cer stadium March 11 and chanted marching songs and slogans in praise of the president. Speakers denounced the powerful right-wing trade unionists and recent government policies and appoint ments, but reiterated their loyalty to Peron.
Allende elected to Senate post. Jose Antonio Allende was elected president pro tempore of the Senate, second in line of
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succession to the presidency, it was who, before resigning,according to reports reported April 30. The election had the cited by the newsletter Latin America May 3, had tried to arrest Margaride blessing of President Peron, whose wife, the vice president, was first in line to suc (then head of the political police) and had had serious differences with Villar, then ceed him. Allende was a member of the small his second in command. Iniguez was Popular Christian Party, of the govern . believed to have complained that senior ment’s Justicialista Liberation Front government officials, faced with serious political problems, “resorted to indis coalition. He represented Cordoba. criminate police repression to solve them,” Latin America reported. Military intelligence chief quits. Brig. Social Welfare Minister Jose Lopez Gen. Haroldo Pomar, head of the armed Rega, a retired police corporal, was forces’ intelligence service, resigned May named police commissioner general in a 10 under apparent pressure from the surprise decree May 3. The promotion, a government. jump of 15 ranks, was attacked May 11 by Pomar was an old political enemy of Sen. Amadeo Frugoli, of the Mendoza President Peron and a close friend of re Democratic Party, who called it a tired Lt. Gen. Alejandro Lanusse, whose “flagrant attack on the force” and a “clear military regime yielded to the Peronist case of personal favoritism.” Lopez Rega government in May 1973. Pomar had was among President Peron’s closest recently been reprimanded by Defense advisers, and was a bitter enemy of the Minister Angel Robledo for attending a Peronist left. ceremony of the leftist state oil workers’ union. Robledo had warned Lanusse May 9 Solano Lima quits presidency post. against meeting with army officers and Vicente Solano Lima resigned as sec staying at military garrisons when he retary general of the presidency June 4. traveled about Argentina. Another high He was named an adviser to President government official had recently warned Peron with ministerial rank, and replaced that “the danger of a military conspiracy in his old post by army Col. Vicente is always present,” the Miami Herald Damasco. reported May 11. Solano Lima, a former vice president, Pomar was succeeded June 5 by Brig. also remained rector of Buenos Aires Gen. Eduardo Episcopo. University. He had assumed that post April 2, after Congress passed a law Top police officers quit. The seven mem giving rectors complete authority in all bers of the federal police general staff administrative and ideological questions on their campuses. The measure, ap asked to be retired May 13 rather than proved March 14, also forbade political serve under Luis Margaride, appointed proselytizing on campus—a provision ap deputy police chief by President Peron parently aimed at leftist activists. May 10. Twenty-one police officers of the Solano Lima resigned after failing in an next highest rank also resigned in protest. attempt to prevent the conservative labor Margaride, an enemy of the Peronist minister, Ricardo Otero, from des left, had won notoriety under the sup ignating the State Employes Associa planted military dictatorship when, as tion as the only union allowed to orga chief of the morals squad, he staged fre quent raids in downtown hotels in search nize Buenos Aires University’s 10,000 workers, the London newsletter Latin of adulterous couples. He was dismissed America reported June 14, when his officers seized a number of highThe majority of non-teaching personnel ranking government officials. at the university were members of another Acting federal police chief Alberto union that generally supported the Villar had been named permanent chief radical views of a majority of the students May 10. He was the first non-military and teaching staff, Latin America man to hold the position since 1955. reported. Solano Lima had seen Otero’s Villar replaced Gen. Miguel A. Iniguez, interference as an obstacle to reconcilia-
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tion within the troubled university and had used his position as secretary general of the presidency to argue his case, ac cording to the newsletter. Economic policy attacks & resignation threat. President Peron June 12 threatened to resign unless he got full public sup port for his economic policies, which were under increasing attack from busi nessmen, newspapers and workers. He withdrew the threat after an estimated 100,000 workers from Peronist labor unions gathered outside the Government House and urged him to stay on. The government’s wage and price con trols, embodied in the “social pact” signed in 1973 by Peronist labor and management groups, had been threatened by inflation, shortages, wildcat strikes, a growing black market and criticism from non-Peronist newspapers and from busi nessmen who claimed they were being driven to bankruptcy. Workers had been given a general 13% wage increase March 28, but this was followed by larger increases in the prices of gas, electricity, gasoline and public transport. The inflation rate, which the pact had reduced from 80% to 12%, ac cording to government figures, reportedly tripled in May, and price-controlled foodstuffs such as eggs, milk and sugar were reported scarce. An estimated 240,000 public school teachers staged three strikes for a 100% wage increase—a 24-hour stoppage May 23 and longer walkouts May 28-29 and June 4-6. Policemen, railway and in dustrial workers, and newspaper em ployes struck at various times (on June 1, stoppages were reported at four news papers, a television station, the subway and railway systems and two steel plants.) The staff of the daily La Nation received a $120 monthly wage increase after it struck May 30, the journalists and printing workers for La Prensa received a $138 increase to end their five-day stop page June 5. Businessmen charged that the price controls were causing the scarcity of goods and raw materials, forcing them to buy on the black market. The newspaper Clarin, of ex-President Arturo Frondizi’s Desarrollista movement, severely criti
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cized the social pact, and the conservative Review of the River Plate accused Peron May 31 of imposing greater state control over the economy “than that ruling in Chile at the time of the fall of [President Salvador] Allende.” The Review and other conservative publications also attacked the govern ment for granting a large credit to Cuba and for establishing joint enterprises with state-ownedfirms from Eastern Europe. The Review charged that the government, in its deals with Cuba, was “lightening the costly burden of maintaining the spearhead of the Soviet regime on American territory.” Peron went on radio and television June 12 to make an emotional denunciation of all opponents of the social pact, including businessmen, dissident union leaders, black marketeers, “oligarchic news papers” and feuding sectors of his own political movement. He asserted that he had returned to Ar gentina in 1973 to “liberate the country from foreign dependence” and “to unite” Argentines. “If I find that this sacrifice is in vain,” Peron said, “I will not hesitate one instant in yielding [the presidency] to those who can occupy it with better chances of success.” Peron asked for strong public support for the social pact. He received it within hours, as the General Labor Con federation (CGT) called a 1C hour strike, virtually paralyzing Buenos Aires, and massed some 100,000 workers into the Plaza de Mayo, in front of the Govern ment House, to ask Peron to stay in office. Peron obliged, saying he would fulfill his duties “until I take my last breath.” Peron’s attack on conservative critics succeeded in strengthening support for the government among Peronist leftists. Mario Firmenich, a leader of the Monto neros organization, praised Peron’s speech and urged the government to step up its attack on “imperialism and the oligarchy.” The entire Cabinet and the govern ment’s economic council offered to resign June 12 to give Peron a free hand, but he rejected the offer June 13. The govern ment immediately moved to bolster the social pact.
26 The Chamber of Deputies June 12 passed a bill containing strong penalties for businessmen who sold goods above the official prices or hoarded products for sale on the black market. . The economic council, after meeting with Peron June 13, gave producers and distributors 72 hours to submit a sworn statement giving an inventory of all stocks that would be subject to production and storage controls. The government June 14 announced a program, called “Operation Pygmy,” to fight the black market, and officials announced the confiscation of 150,000 hams and an equal quantity of cheeses hoarded in different stores. Leaders of the General Economic Con federation (CGE), the Peronist manage ment group, expressed renewed support for the social pact after meeting with Peron June 18.
Peron’s Death Peron dies, wife assumes presidency. President Juan Domingo Peron died of a heart attack July 1. He was 78. His death left Argentina in a state of great un certainty, with deep political divisions and growing economic problems. The presidency was assumed by Peron’s widow, Maria Estela (Isabel) Martinez de Peron, who became the first woman chief of state in the Americas. Mrs. Peron an nounced her husband’s death in an emo tional radio address in which she called him “a true apostle of peace and nonvio lence.” Mrs. Peron had assumed executive powers June 29, when doctors ordered Peron to take “absolute rest” while they treated him for what they said was in fectious bronchitis with heart complica tions. Peron was first reported ill June 18, when he failed to go to his office because of a “grippe condition.” Most political groups and military leaders had pledged their support for Mrs. Peron June 29-30, citing the Consti tution’s provisions for the vice president to rule if the president was incapacitated. The commanders of the three armed forces sent messages to all military bases June 30 stating that “there is no other political solution than that which is
LATIN AMERICA 1974 founded in the total and absolute respect for the Constitution and its laws.” The 250,000-member left-wing Peron ist Youth Organization announced its unconditional support for Mrs. Peron June 29, and the Montoneros guerrilla group, also on the Peronist left, said it backed the vice president “as long as Gen. Peron is not in the physical condition to continue exercising the presidency.” Both groups previously had criticized Mrs. Peron for favoring her husband’s most conservative advisers, including Social Welfare Minister Jose Lopez Rega, whom the Peronist left called a “fascist.” Hundreds of thousands of citizens lined the streets of Buenos Aires July 2 to watch Peron’s body be transported from the presidential residence to the Metro politan Cathedral for a requiem mass and then to Congress to lie in state. Citizens viewed the body in Congress until July 4, when it was returned to the presidential palace for burial. The mass July 2 was performed by Antonio Cardinal Caggiano, archbishop of Buenos Aires and primate of Argen tina’s Roman Catholic Church, who called Peron a “Christian,” a “humanist” and an “enemy of violence.” The reli gious services were attended by Mrs. Peron, government and labor leaders, and foreign dignitaries including Uruguayan President Juan Maria Bordaberry. Two other Latin American presidents, Gens. Hugo Banzer Suarez of Bolivia and Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay, paid their last respects to Peron in Congress July 3. Heads of state throughout the con tinent expressed sorrow at Peron’s death. The right-wing Brazilian regime declared three days of mourning July 2, while Cuban Premier Fidel Castro declared a similar mourning period and called Peron’s death “a blow to all of Latin America.” President Nixon said July 1 that Peron had been “a source of inspiration to his countrymen.” In the Soviet Union, Pre mier Alexei Kosygin, President Nikolai Podgorny and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited the Argentine embassy July 5 to express their condolences to the ambassador. Virtually all Argentine sectors, in cluding the armed forces and the op position political parties, expressed sor
ARGENTINA row at Peron’s death and support for Mrs. Peron’s presidency July 2-4. Only one newspaper, La Prensa, an old foe of Peron, attacked the president in its edi torial July 2. (In retaliation, the Peronist Newspaper Vendors Union “broke rela tions” with La Prensa—implying it would cut off the paper’s distribution—and Peronists attacked the newspaper’s offices in Cordoba and Rosario July 6.) The Montoneros organization, the ac knowledged leader of the Peronist left wing, expressed support for Mrs. Peron July 2 but warned that “the political vacuum left by Gen. Peron’s absence may be filled by adventurists and unscrupulous persons who already are making plans to take power.” The Montoneros apparently referred to Social Welfare Minister Jose Lopez Rega, a close adviser of both Peron and his widow whom they considered reactionary. Lopez Rega went on national radio and television July 1 to appeal for national unity. He was the only government official aside from Mrs. Peron to make a national broadcast in the days following Peron’s death. In a slap at the Peronist left, Lopez Rega barred Vicente Solano Lima, a pres idential adviser and former vice pres ident, from expressing his condolences to Mrs. Peron July 1. Solano Lima recently had given consideration to the views of leftists at the University of Buenos Aires, of which he was rector. He resigned his posts as presidential adviser and uni versity rector in indignation July 1. Mrs. Peron said she would follow her husband’s national and international policies “without an iota of change.” “Everything that General Peron con sidered good will also be considered good by me,” she asserted July 8
Mrs. Peron President, Violence Resumes Mor Roig slain. Peron’s death was fol lowed by a brief lull in political hostilities as the nation paid him its last respects and virtually all sectors expressed full sup port for his widow and successor, Pres ident Maria Estela Martinez de Peron. However, political violence soon resumed and culminated in the assassi
27 nation July 15 of ex-interior Minister Arturo Mor Roig. In addition, economic uncertainty continued as Mrs. Peron declared a general wage bonus July 8, weakening her husband’s “social pact,” and the moderate leader of the General Labor Confederation (CGT), Adelino Romero, died of a heart attack July 14. Mor Roig was shot to death in sub urban Buenos Aires July 15. Mor Roig had been in office in August 1972, when officers at the Trelew naval air base in Patagonia killed 16 leftist guer rillas, many of them members of the outlawed People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP). The ERP had vowed to kill every official in the chain of command at that time and had subsequently assassinated Rear. Adm. Hermes Quijada, who had chaired the joint chiefs of staff at the time of the killings. . The search for Mor Roig’s murderers proved to be a bloody one. Police in Buenos Aires reported July 16 that two men and a woman had been killed when they exchanged gunfire with officers seeking to search their automo bile. Interior Minister Benito Llambi an nounced July 18 that four suspects had been killed and 28 arrested since the assassination, and all were members of the ERP or of other left-wing extremist groups. However, the ERP denied responsibility for Mor Roig’s death in a press communique July 18. (Ex-President Alejandro Lanusse, in whose Cabinet Mor Roig had served, charged the Peronist Montoneros organi zation had committed the assassination, the French newspaper Le Monde reported July 21.) Two more suspects were killed July 20 in a shootout with police. Police claimed to have found arms and “subversive” literature in the suspects’ automobile.
Intervention in Mendoza. President Peron July 12 asked Congress to approve legislation ordering federal intervention in the government of Mendoza Province. Mendoza Gov. Alberto Martinez Baca had been impeached and suspended from office June 5 by the provincial Chamber of Deputies, which accused him of mis managing the state-owned Giol winery. Martinez had asked July 11 that certain
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members of the provincial Senate, which would try him on the Chamber’s charges, be disqualified for having already made judgments against him in the case. Mrs. Peron’s request for federal inter vention—allowed where the security or stability of a provincial government was in jeopardy—was criticized by opposition politicians, who called it “a new violation of the Constitution and the laws,” the Mexican newspaper Excelsior reported July 14. The Argentine Federalist Forces, which grouped together Mendoza’s major provincial parties, noted that intervention was unnecessary when “the mechanisms of the Constitution are acting to resolve the conflict.” Martinez Baca was linked with left wing Peronists. as was the third provincial governor to lose his post in 1974, Cordoba’s Ricardo Obregon Cano.
Catamarca governor quits. Hugo Alberto Mott, moderate Peronist gov ernor of Catamarca Province, resigned July 18 in a dispute with right-wing Peronist labor union leaders. Mott quit after officials of the local General Labor Confederation (CGT) and the “62 Organizations,” both dominated by conservative Peronists, demanded that he fire the provincial government and social welfare ministers. The rightists charged the ministers had offended de corum and public morality, had made “arbitrary” appointments at high levels, and had allowed foreign ideologies to infiltrate public offices. Violence. Alleged Peronist rightists July 6 raped and beat to death a pregnant woman who belonged to the left wing Peronist Youth (JP). The JP charged July 8 that rightists also had killed another of its members, identified as Eduardo Romero. Leandro Salato, a high official in the Social Welfare Ministry, was shot and seriously wounded by unidentified per sons near Buenos Aires July 12. Unidentified gunmen fired on an army convoy outside Buenos Aires July 16, wounding a junior officer and a soldier. Later that day, unidentified persons opened machinegun fire on the suburban Buenos Aires home of Juan M. Courard,
LATIN AMERICA 1974 president of Ford Motor Argentina. A powerful bomb exploded in a Buenos Aires building housing offices of the Lawyers Guild July 17, wounding at least four persons. The Guild was well-known for its defense of leftist political prisoners and its lawsuits against right-wing labor unions. David Kraiselburd, chairman of the board of the news agency Noticias Ar gentinas and publisher of the La Plata newspaper El Dia, was shot to death July 17 as police closed in on the house in La Plata where he was held by kidnappers. Police wounded and captured one abductor, identified as Carlos Starita, an alleged member of the left-wing Peronist University Youth. Kraiselburd had been kidnapped June 25, but his captors had not contacted his family nor made a ransom demand. Jorge H. Ferrari, an official in the Economy Ministry, was assassinated by unidentified persons in the Buenos Aires suburb of San Justo July 20. Rodolfo Ortega Pena, the leading left wing Peronist congressman, was assas sinated in Buenos Aires July 31. Martin Salas, a young right-wing Peronist, was shot to death in La Plata Aug. 5, and four leftist Peronists in that city were killed in apparent retaliation Aug. 6-7. Ortega Pena, a journalist and lawyer who had vigorously defended imprisoned guerrillas under the supplanted military dictatorship, was the first congressman to be killed in recent years. An estimated 350 persons were arrested Aug. 2 when police used tear gas to dis perse a crowd attempting to witness Or tega Pena’s burial. Police declared, over the widow’s objections, that only mem bers of Ortega Pena’s family could attend the interment. A group calling itself “Montoneros Sol diers of Perón” claimed responsibility for Ortega Pena’s murder in a communique to the press Aug. 3. A United Press International report Aug. 3 said the group was an offshoot of the left-wing Peronist Montoneros guerrillas, but the London newsletter Latin America reported Aug. 9 that the group was right-wing Peronist and had no connection with the Monto neros. Another communique to the press Aug. 7 claimed Ortega Pena had been assassinated by a rightist group identified as Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA).
ARGENTINA ERP members briefly occupied a naval installation in La Plata July 29 and stole arms and uniforms. Guerrillas fought a gun battle with an infantry unit in Jujuy Province July 30. Members of labor unions were the targets of several bomb and machinegun attacks in Buenos Aires and the interior the same day. No casualties were reported. Separate ERP bands wearing army uniforms attacked army installations in Cordoba and Catamarca Provinces before dawn Aug. 11. At least five persons were killed as police and soldiers fought off the guerrillas, according to press reports. In Cordoba, about 60 guerrillas at tacked a military arms factory at Villa Maria, escaping with weapons, uniforms and two military hostages. Two policemen and one guerrilla were killed in the fight ing, according to official sources. At about the same time, an estimated 40 guerrillas attacked an infantry post outside the city of Catamarca, northwest of Cordoba; two guerrillas were reported killed in the fighting there. Immediately after the raids, security forces sealed off the Bolivian border and began an intensive search for the guer rillas. Police in Catamarca spotted a guer rilla band Aug. 12 and engaged it in battle, reportedly killing 16 insurgents. Police claimed Aug. 13 that 23 guerrillas had been captured since the Aug. 11 attacks. Combined security forces pursued a guer rilla column in the province’s mountains Aug. 13-15, killing or arresting at least 27 insurgents. The ERP acknowledged Aug. 28 that it had suffered a “serious defeat” at the hands of police and soldiers in Cata marca. ERP leader Roberto Santucho asserted Sept. 18 that his group would stage “indis criminate executions” of army officers in retaliation for the alleged execution by the army of 14-16 guerrillas captured during an ERP raid on an infantry post in Cata marca Province in August. The ERP was held responsible for the murders of an army colonel in Cordoba and an army lieutenant in Rosario Sept. 25 and for a machinegun attack in Buenos Aires Sept. 30 in which two army officers and a non-commissioned officer were wounded. ERP members also killed a policeman and a civilian Sept. 21 when they briefly occupied the northwestern town of Santa Lucia, near Tucuman.
29 Meanwhile, bombings and assassina tions of Peronist leaders continued. An estimated 50 bomb explosions were reported in Buenos Aires and other parts of the country Aug. 22, the second an niversary of the killing of 16 leftist guer rillas at the naval air base at Trelew, and more than 100 bomb blasts were reported Sept. 16-17. Other bombings occurred daily, many at dealerships of IKA-Renault, an automobile company involved in a bitter labor dispute. Four members of the left-wing Peronist Youth organization were killed in suburbs of Buenos Aires Aug. 22-23. At least seven Peronists were killed in a wave of assassinations Sept. 16-18. Among the victims were Atilio Lopez, a leftist union leader and former vice governor of Cordoba Province, killed Sept. 16; Alejandro Bartoch, a rightist doctor, Sept. 17; and Dante Balcanera, a rightist union leader, Sept. 18. President Peron Sept. 18 held another emergency meeting on curbing violence, attended by Cabinet members, Con gressional leaders and the president of the Supreme Court. In addition to the bombings and assassinations, there were several kidnap pings by presumed leftists. Retired army Capt. Carlos Arteaga was wounded and kidnapped Aug. 24; he apparently died of his wounds in captivity, and his body was found Aug. 29. Retired navy Capt. Eduardo Griffin, who was imprisoned in 1951-55 for participating in an abortive coup attempt against the late President Juan Peron, was abducted Aug. 30.
Labor disputes flare—A number of labor conflicts contributed to the tension and violence in Argentina in August and September. The worst was in the industrial city of Cordoba, where 12,000 members of SMATA, the mechanics workers union, worked to rule and staged a number of strikes against the two plants of IKA-Renault, the local affiliate of the French au tomobile firm Renault, to support de mands for a 60% wage increase. The increase was rejected Aug. 1 by IKA-Renault and by the Labor Ministry, which claimed it would undermine the Social Pact, the basic instrument of Peronist economic policy. The job action
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that ensued threatened $100 million worth of export contracts that IKA-Renault had signed with Cuba, Poland, Libya and Chile. SMATA’s Cordoba local was led by Rene Salamanca, a member of the Revo lutionary Communist Party, and was at odds with the union’s national leadership, composed of moderate Peronists. The SMATA local was supported by the Cordoba Light and Power Union, led by leftist Agustin Tosco. IKA-Renault locked out its workers Aug. 3, but it was persuaded to abandon the lockout Aug. 5 by Labor Minister Ricardo Otero. However, Otero allowed federal police to guard the IKA-Renault plants, causing SMATA workers to strike in protest Aug. 8. IKA-Renault resorted to another lockout Sept. 3 as partial strikes and work to rule continued. IKA-Renault dealerships were bombed in different parts of the country in August, presumably by leftists. The Peronist Armed Forces (FAP), a small guerrilla group, claimed responsibility for a number of the bombings and for the murder Aug. 27 of IKA-Renault’s labor relations manager, Ricardo Boya. SMATA’s Cordoba lawyer, Alfredo Curuchet, was assassinated by presumed rightists Sept. 11. IKA Renault finally granted the de mands Sept. 17. Cabinet shuffle. President Maria Estela Martinez de Peron shuffled her Cabinet Aug. 13 in what was widely interpreted as a shift toward more conservative poli cies. Mrs. Peron accepted the resignations of Interior Minister Benito Llambi, De fense Minister Angel Robledo and Educa tion Minister Jorge Taiana, replacing them with men who had served in the sec ond administration of her late husband, President Juan Peron, in the 1950s. Alberto Rocamora, a former president of the Chamber of Deputies, was named interior minister; Oscar Ivanissevich, a former education minister, reassumd that post; and Adolfo Savino was ap pointed defense minister. Rocamora and Savino were close associates of Social Welfare Minister Jose Lopez Rega, the most conservative member of the Cabinet and the official closest to Mrs. Peron,
LATIN AMERICA 1974 according to the London newsletter Latin America Aug. 23. The other five Cabinet ministers, in cluding Economy Minister Jose Gelbard, who was reported to be at odds with Lopez Rega, retained their posts. (Gelbard, the Cabinet’s chief defender of the wage-price freeze embodied in the Social Pact, had suffered a setback July 23 when he was forced to dismiss his com merce secretary, Miguel Revestido, and his industrial development secretary, Al berto Davie, and replace them with more “orthodox” Peronists, according to Latin America July 26. However, Gel bard succeeded Sept. 3 in forcing the resignation of Central Bank President Alfredo Gomez Morales, a right-wing Peronist with whom he had long been at odds.) The replacement of Taiana as educa tion minister was denounced by leftwing students at Buenos Aires University, some 800 of whom occupied six faculties and the rector’s office Aug. 14. The rector’s office was cleared peacefully later in the day. Taiana had been accused by right-wing Peronists of allowing the left to “take over” the university. The new education minister, Ivanissevich, said Aug. 14 that there would be no change in the govern ment’s university policy “for the time being.” Ex-Defense Minister Robledo was named ambassador to Mexico and ex Interior Minister Llambi ambassador to Canada, it was reported Aug. 23.
Leftist publications closed—In a further move toward the right, President Peron banned the last two newspapers represent ing the Peronist left, Noticias and La Causa Peronista. Police invaded the Noticias building in Buenos Aires Aug. 27, seizing all copies of the newspaper, expelling its editorial staff and allegedly confiscating several firearms. Interior Minister Rocamora said the publication was being closed for not “collaborating in the national pacifica tion.” No one was arrested, but Mrs. Peron later ordered Noticias’ editors prosecuted, according to a report Sept. 5. Noticias, strongly identified with the Montoneros organization, had published in its last editions a story in which a
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left-wing Peronist youth, Carlos Baglietto, charged two of his companions had been killed and he had been seriously wounded by men claiming to be plainclothes policemen. Noticias had previously printed reports that policemen or right wing trade unionists with strong links to the police had attacked left-wing Peronists. La Causa Peronista was banned Sept. 6, two days after it printed a story in which Mario Firmenich and Norma Arrostito, leaders of the Montoneros, described how they and five other Peronist guerrillas kidnapped, tried and executed ex-Presi dent Pedro Aramburu in 1970. Firmenich and Arrostito would be prosecuted de spite receiving an amnesty for the crime in 1973, the news agency LATIN reported Sept. 6. La Causa Peronista had denounced the government in recent editorials. It charged Aug. 13 that since Gen. Peron’s death, right-wing “anti-fatherland forces” in the government had sought to “do away with everything.” The paper asserted Aug. 20 that the government was “detached from the real struggle of the people” and that the people would consequently “have re course to all the weapons of struggle. .. to identify the enemy.” The latter editorial was titled, “Has the Hour of the Guerrilla Arrived?” Party & university posts. Among politi cal developments: President Maria Estela Martinez de Peron accepted the presidency of the Justicialista Party National Council Sept. 29. In practice, her duties would be per formed by Raul Lastiri, president of the Chamber of Deputies. The Justicialista council had replaced its regional leaders in five provinces— Santiago.de! Estero, La Rioja, Salta, Chubut and Jujuy—Sept. 27. At Buenos Aires University, the na tion’s largest, Rector Eduardo Ottalagano was conducting a massive purge of leftist professors, it was reported Oct. 20. Raul Zardini, recently named dean of exact sciences at the university, had caused a furor by telling a Buenos Aires newspaper that he admired Italian fas cism and that he considered democracy a “juridicial invention,” it was reported Nov. 1.
31 Police occupied the state university in La Plata and forced the resignation of the rector and the suspension of classes, it was reported Oct. 18.
Montoneros resume guerrilla warfare. The Montoneros, the left-wing Peronist guerrilla group, returned underground. The Montoneros, accused by officials of murdering ex-interior Minister Arturo Mor Roig and newspaper executive David Kraiselburd, were increasingly critical of the rightists who influenced President Maria Estela Martinez de Peron, particu larly Social Welfare Minister Jose Lopez Rega. Montoneros leader Mario Firme nich had said Aug. 12 that Mrs. Peron was not the “heir” of her late husband, President Juan Peron, because “the leadership of the masses cannot be in herited.” An alleged Montoneros internal document disseminated among journalists Aug. 3 said the guerrillas should restruc ture their ranks for a “resistance stage” because there was no longer any “reason” to support Mrs. Peron. A “formal break” with her government would “depend on circumstances,” the document stated. Firmenich said at a press conference Sept. 6 that his movement had begun a “people’s war” against the government, which, he claimed, had been “captured by imperialists and oligarchs” since Juan Pe ron’s death. Firmenich charged that Mrs. Peron’s administration had made it im possible for leftists to operate legally, leaving armed warfare as their only al ternative. Firmenich said the Montoneros had assassinated two anti-guerrilla security officers, kidnapped an engineer and car ried out a number of machinegun and bombing attacks against automobile dealerships and other targets in recent days. Montoneros in Tucuman claimed credit for the murder of sugar executive Jose Maria Paz Sept. 7. Firmenich said the Montoneros were not yet strong enough to battle police and military units, but he expected they would be strong enough “in several weeks.” He did not rule out the possibility of joining forces with the ERP, which was leftist but not Peronist. “There is no need to confuse political ideologies,” he said. “We will have to see what their policy is ... if it is like ours, we can act together . . .”
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The Montoneros’ decision to resume guerrilla warfare was supported by the other organizations of the Peronist left, although they chose to remain above ground. It was denounced by the right wing Peronist newspaper Mayoria, which asserted the Montoneros were now out of the Peronist movement, and by the inde pendent daily La Opinion, which said the guerrillas were out of touch with reality. The strongest support for the Monto neros came from leftist students at Buenos Aires University, where Peronist youths had occupied all but one of the faculties since Aug. 14. The University’s interim rector, Raul Laguzzi, openly backed the Montoneros. Laguzzi and his wife were seriously injured and their fourmonth-old son was killed Sept. 7 when their home was bombed by presumed right-wing Peronists. President Peron met with the com manders of the armed forces and leaders of anti-guerrilla operations Sept. 7 in an apparent effort to devise a strategy against the Montoneros and militant students. Mrs. Peron replaced Laguzzi Sept. 17 with Eduardo Ottalagano, a right-wing Peronist and presidential staff member, who immediately closed the university for a week on grounds that it had become a focus of “subversion against the national powers.” Three Montoneros in Rosario were killed Sept. 9 when a bomb they were carrying detonated prematurely. The Montoneros killed two persons Sept. 19 in kidnapping Juan and Jorge Born, directors of Bunge & Born Co., one of the largest international trading con glomerates in Latin America. A Monto neros communique later demanded $50 million in ransom for the Born brothers and said they would be “tried for the acts committed against the workers, the people and the national interest by the monopolies to which they belong.” The communique said the two persons killed— the Borns’ chauffeur and the manager of one of their companies—had tried to prevent the kidnapping. ERP-Montonero accord. The major left wing guerrilla groups—the People’s Revo lutionary Army (ERP) and the Monto neros—agreed to coordinate operations in
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the future despite their serious ideological differences, the London newsletter Latin America reported Sept. 27. The ERP magazine The Combatant an nounced Sept. 26 that the ERP was “pre pared to collaborate with the Montoneros in the military field, tp stage joint attacks against the armed forces, the police and the repressive forces in general, and the imperialist corporations.” However, the ERP said the two groups could not form a “joint military force” because the Monto neros were not a “revolutionary organiza tion” but a group with “erroneous popu list concepts at the service of a bourgeois illusion.”
Rightist violence increases. Political vio lence continued in Buenos Aires and other cities Sept. 19-30 as a right-wing group, the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA), stepped up its campaign to murder several dozen prominent leftists. The AAA (erroneously identified in early reports as Argentine Anti-Imperialist Action) had been organized by the federal police chief, Alberto Villar, with the cooperation of Eduardo Ottala gano, rector of Buenos Aires University, and Carlos Frattini, an official in the Education. Ministry, according to the London newsletter Latin America Nov. The AAA threatened Sept. 5 to kill 10 liberal and leftist federal deputies for “in famous treason against the fatherland.” Two of the legislators, Leonardo Bettanin and Miguel Zavala Rodriguez of the Peronist Youth, resigned Sept. 12 to protest conservative government policies. Members of the AAA then assassinated Julio Troxler, a leftist former deputy police chief of Buenos Aires, Sept. 20. In a communique Sept. 21, the group said it was responsible for the murders of four other prominent leftists, including Atilio Lopez, former vice governor of Cordoba Province, and that it intended to kill 12 more leftists, including ex-President Hector Campora, former Buenos Aires University Rector Raul Laguzzi and Congressman Hector Sandler. A report in El Nacional of Caracas Sept. 28 said the AAA had a “black list” of 49 persons to be assassinated, most of them left-wing Peronists.
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The AAA communique said Troxler had been killed because he was “a commie and a bad Argentine.” It added: “Five are down and the lefties will continue to fall wherever they are.” The AAA was held responsible for the murders of a leftist construction worker in Bahia Blanca Sept. 22; a magazine editor, a television employe and a third person in Buenos Aires Sept. 26; and two relatives of former President Arturo Frondizi Sept. 27. Silvio Frondizi, brother of the ex-president, was dragged from his Buenos Aires home and later found dead outside the city. His son-in-law, Luis Mendiburu, was killed trying to prevent the abduction. Frondizi was a Marxist lawyer and essayist; his brother ran a small political party that, according to the newsletter Latin America Sept. 27, was near a break with the government. Several people who were on the AAA’s death list or feared they might eventually appear on it fled Argentina. Rodolfo Puiggros, the liberal former rector of Buenos Aires University, took asylum in the Mexican embassy Sept. 24—an unusual step since he was not being sought by the government—and was flown to Mexico City the next day. Laguzzi, who had recently been wounded in a terrorist at tack, fled to Mexico Sept. 28. (The cur rent rector of Buenos Aires University, Eduardo Ottalagano, a rightist, survived an assassination attempt in Villaguay Sept. 23. Ottalagano was unharmed, but his assailant and a local hotel owner were killed and two policemen were wounded in the incident. The assailant’s political affiliation was not revealed.) Two prominent actors, Norman Briski and Nacha Guevara, fled to Peru Sept. 28, two days after the AAA threatened to kill them and three other well-known per formers. The Argentine Actors Associa tion struck Sept. 27 to protest the threat. Former presidential candidate Oscar Alende, leader of the small Popular Revo lutionary Alliance, demanded Sept. 22 that the government “identify” the AAA’s members and investigate their “connections,” particularly any possible links to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. (The independent newspaper La Opinion wondered in an editorial Sept. 25 what the objectives of the CIA in Argen tina might be. Hector Sandler, the
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congressman on the AAA’s death list, asked the government Sept. 25 to call in U.S. Ambassador Robert Hill and ques tion him on local CIA activities. Hill had been called a “CIA agent” by left-wing Peronist publications before he arrived in Argentina early in 1974. The AAA added several additional persons to its death list Sept. 30-Oct. 1, threatening to kill each if he did not leave the country. Army Gen. Juan Carlos Sosa, leftist union leader Armando Cabo and former Bishop Jeronimo Podesta were threatened by the AAA Sept. 30. The next day the rightists threatened three legislators from the Radical Party— Deputy Mario Amaya and Senators Hipolito Solari Yrigoyen and Humberto Perette—and a dean and three professors at the state university in Rosario. With these the AAA had passed “death sentences” on 61 persons, 19 of whom had been killed in the past two months, ac cording to El Nacional of Caracas Oct. 2. The AAA’s threats caused an exodus of leftist politicians, artists and intellectuals. Former Interior Minister Esteban Righi, a reputed leftist, and his wife took asylum in the Mexican embassy Sept. 30 and were flown to Mexico, it was reported Oct. 2. Ex-Bishop Podesta said Oct. 3 that he was leaving the country because the govern ment would not protect him. Another man threatened by the AAA, leftist Deputy Hector Sandler, took up residence in his congressional office Oct. 9 because police had refused to protect his home. According to the London newsletter Latin America Oct. 11, it was generally assumed that AAA members included soldiers and police, with the police in ulti mate control. Montoneros leader Ro berto Quieto charged at a clandestine press conference Oct. 4 that the AAA was “organized by the federal police chief, Alberto Villar,” and that its “inspiration and political orientation” came from the government itself. Latin America noted that AAA victims such as Julio Troxler and Atilio Lopez had offered no resistance to their assassins, indicating they had been stopped by men they took to be police. (Two Uruguayans who claimed to have been kidnapped and tortured by the AAA in September asserted in Stockholm Nov. 4 that the AAA was composed of Ar gentine and Uruguayan police and that it
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was “directed by the government, by people who include President Isabel Perón and [Social Welfare] Minister Jose Lopez Rega.” The Uruguayans, who had taken asylum in Sweden after being released by the AAA, said three of their comrades had been murdered by the rightists.) Quieto said Oct. 4 that the Montoneros were prepared to negotiate a truce with the government if it would grant emergency wage increases, end its inter vention in the trade unions, restore freedom of political expression, repeal repressive security legislation, stop the AAA assassination campaign and fire Villar and his deputy chief, Luis Margaride. The ERP offered a truce of its own Oct. 6, asking the government in return to free all political prisoners, repeal the new anti-subversion act and restore the ERP to legality. The AAA raided headquarters of the Communist Party in Cordoba Oct. 9 and severely beat several persons. A woman kidnapped during the raid was later mur dered, according to the Cuban newspaper Granma Oct. 21. The Communist Party charged Oct. 23 that AAA terrorism in Cordoba was “sanctioned and tolerated” by the provincial government. The AAA later added dozens of new names to its death list. It threatened to kill 44 leftists in Entre Rios Province, north of Buenos Aires, according to a report Oct. 21. In Tucuman Province, the deans of law and economics at the state university resigned Oct. 22 after both were threatened by the AAA and after the law dean’s home was bombed. Anti-terrorism bill. Congress Sept. 28 passed an anti-terrorism bill that was sub mitted by President Peron and backed by the armed forces. The law provided stiff prison terms for persons who dissem inated subversive propaganda or tried to change the nation’s political struc ture “by means not laid down by the Constitution,” and it restricted news reporting of activities by illegal groups. Observers said the wording of the bill indicated it was designed primarily to fight leftist guerrillas, although the government said Sept. 27 that it would also be used against rightist assassins. Citing the news curb, the Association of Argentine Newspaper Enterprises, the
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nation’s leading press group, charged the law “affects freedom of the press,” the Mexican newspaper Excelsior reported Oct. 3. The law set prison terms of two to six years for persons who possessed, published or reported “facts, commu niques or photographs related to terrorist actions.” Mrs. Peron had charged Sept. 26 that leftist guerrillas were trying to provoke a military coup, and she pledged to the armed forces that her government would press a full battle against subversives. In an attempt to gather support amid the increasing violence, Mrs. Peron held a rally in Buenos Aires Sept. 20. Only 30, 000-50,000 persons attended even though the huge General Labor Confederation called an eight-hour nationwide strike to enable workers to see the president. The crowd, composed almost exclusively of conservative Peronists, chanted slogans against the Montoneros as Mrs. Peron denounced “those who only know how to kill, . . . those who obstruct the road to liberation and national pacification.” Assassinations continue. Assassinations by rightist and leftist commandos continued in Buenos Aires and other cities Oct. 1-14. Three alleged members of the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Marxist guerrilla group, were killed in a shootout with police in Cordoba Oct. 1. The next day ERP members killed army Capt. Miguel Angel Paiva in Buenos Aires. Mario Eduardo Favario, an alleged ERP leader, was arrested in connection with the murder Oct. 3. The Montoneros, the left-wing Peronist guerrillas, were held responsible for the murder of Jose Maria Russo, a civil ser vant, in Santa Fe Oct. 1. Teodoro Vivas, a former left-wing Peronist, was killed in Tucuman Oct. 3, presumably by the Ar gentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA). Army Maj. Jaime Gimento was assassi nated Oct. 7, and police announced the same day that 138 persons had been ar rested in raids against subversives. The AAA killed two more persons Oct. 8—Rodolfo Achem, administrative sec retary at La Plata National University, and Carlos Miguel, director ' of the university’s planning department. Army Lt. Juan Carlos Gambande was as
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sassinated in Santa Fe Oct. 11. Two newsmen were found shot to death outside Buenos Aires Oct. 13, and a Peronist leftist, Juan Carlos Leiva, was murdered in La Plata Oct. 14. President Maria Estela Martinez de Perón made a number of appeals to end the violence, and she was supported by a 15-minute general strike called Oct. 11 by the General Labor Confederation, the nation’s largest labor group. In a televised message Oct. 8, Mrs. Perón vowed to “definitively eradicate all expressions of terrorism and subversion” without “sliding into authoritarianism.” In a speech in Santiago del Estero Oct. 12, she called terrorists “mercenaries at the service of foreign interests.” Leftists were held responsible for other assassinations and terrorist attacks in late October. Army Lt. Col. Jose Francisco Garden was shot to death in San Miguel, Buenos Aires Province Oct. 23; con servative Peronists Juan Carlos Mariani and Juan Vera were killed in San Martin, Buenos Aires the same day; and the rightist university professor Bruno Jordan Genta was murdered in Buenos Aires Oct. 27. The August 22 faction of the ERP claimed to have slain Jordan Genta. In other attacks attributed to the ERP, an army lieutenant was shot and wounded in Cordoba Oct. 18, and a retired lieu tenant colonel was gravely injured in Buenos Aires Oct. 25. The ERP had vowed to kill 14 army officers in retalia tion for the alleged murder of 14 guerrillas by police in Catamarca Province in August. The Montoneros raided a cemetery in Buenos Aires early Oct. 16 and stole the body of Gen. Pedro Aramburu, whom they had assassinated in 1970. They said they would hold the corpse until the remains of Eva Perón were repatriated from Spain. Observers said the Monto neros sought to prevent the government from transferring Aramburu’s body to a planned mausoleum for heroes of Ar gentine history. (The embalmed remains of Eva Perón were returned to Argentina Nov. 17, and the Montoneros returned Aramburu’s body the same day.) Prats killed—Retired Gen. Carlos Prats Gonzalez, the former Chilean army commander, and his wife were killed early
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Sept. 30 when a bomb exploded in or under their car as they drove to their Buenos Aires home.
Leftist union raided—Police in Cordoba raided the headquarters of the militant Light and Power Union Oct. 9 and ar rested more than 70 persons. They claimed to have found arms and am munition allegedly used by union mem bers, but this was denied by Agustin Tosco, the union’s former secretary general, according to the newsletter Latin America Oct. 18. The raid reflected the government’s aim of isolating leftist guerrillas from their natural bases of support—particularly the universities and the radical unions—in preparation for a major police and mil itary campaign against them, according to Latin America. The Light and Power Union, the Cordoba mechanics union SMATA and the Buenos Aires Typographers Federa tion (FGB) had recently been taken over by pro-government unionists who ousted their leftist leaders. Raimundo Ongaro, the ousted FGB leader, was arrested Oct. 30 and charged with illegal arms possession.
Economy minister quits. Jose Gelbard, who had directed the Argentine economy since the Peronists returned to power in May 1973, resigned as economy minister Oct. 21. His departure was seen by many as signaling the end of the Social Pact, the wage-price freeze through which he had greatly reduced Argentina’s annual in flation rate. Gelbard was replaced by former Central Bank President Alfredo Gomez Morales, who had repeatedly criticized his policy. Gomez Morales, a right-wing Peronist, was backed by Jose Lopez Rega, the reactionary social welfare minister and private secretary to President Maria Estela Martinez de Peron. Gelbard said in his resignation letter that he was quitting because “we have entered a phase in which political circum stances and definitions have acquired in creased significance. [These] should al ways be facilitated by those of us who embrace the cause of national unity for re construction and liberation.” His eco nomic team resigned with him.
36 Gelbard most recently had opposed Mrs. Peron’s plan to call a national meeting to consider wage increases de manded by the General Labor Con federation (CGT), the nation’s largest labor group. Gelbard had predicted such increases would set off an inflationary wave. In addition to the CGT, Gelbard had alienated conservative political and eco nomic groups, particularly the wealthy rural landowners. A draft agrarian reform law supported by Gelbard had been bitterly attacked by landowners in July because it provided for land taxation according to potential productivity and expropriation of unfarmed or badly farmed land, according to a report July 26. . ... Conservatives also had criticized Gelbard’s commercial agreements with Socialist nations, including the Soviet Union and Cuba, but Mrs. Peron and government spokesmen said Oct. 21 that Argentina would continue to ignore ideological barriers in choosing its trade partners. Police Chief Villar slain. Federal Police Chief Alberto Villar and his wife were killed Nov. 1 when left-wing terrorists set off a bomb in a cabin cruiser on which they were sailing off the Argentine coast at Tigre, 20 miles north of Buenos Aires. The Montoneros, the Peronist guerrilla group, took credit for the assassination Nov. 2. It had frequently accused Villar and his deputy, Luis Margaride (who be came police chief Nov. 4), of encouraging the torture and murder of political prisoners. Villar was the first high government official assassinated since the Peronists returned to power in May 1973. His murder increased pressure on President Maria Estela Martinez de Peron to crack down on terrorism before it provoked a military coup. Police began an intensive search for leftist subversives immediately after the assassination. Four persons were reported arrested in connection with the murder Nov. 2, but seven policemen were wounded the same day when a bomb exploded in an uncovered leftist hideout. The Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA), the right-wing terrorist group,
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assassinated four leftists Nov. 3 in ap parent retaliation for Villar’s murder. The victims were Juan Carlos Nievas, Ruben Boussas and Arturo Robles Urquiza, all members of the Socialist Workers Party in Buenos Aires, and Alberto Della Riva, a left-wing Peronist professor at the state university in La Plata.The AAA had murdered five other persons Oct. 31, according to press reports. Two of the victims were Carlos Llerena Rojas, a civil servant who belonged to the small Leftist Popular Front, and Isaac Valeriano Yorke, a leader of the left-wing Peronist Youth. State of siege imposed. President Maria Estela Martinez de Peron placed the nation under a state of siege Nov. 6 as political assassinations and other terrorist attacks continued. Constitutional guarantees were sus pended, and security forces were em powered to search and detain without warrant and to hold prisoners without charges. Detainees had the right to choose exile over eventual trial. Mrs. Peron acted after meeting with the three armed forces commanders. She sent a bill to Congress Dec. 6 asking for power to call up the armed forces to fight subversion and to set up a centralized national security program under her office. Journalists arrested—Police in Cor rientes Nov. 11 arrested Jose Romero Feris, publisher of the newspaper El Li toral, and editor Gabriel Feris for allegedly violating a law against printing statements by terrorist groups. Ernesto Carmona, a Chilean editor with the Buenos Aires newspaper El Cronista Commercial, had been reported arrested Oct. 30. Ulla Allgier, a West German journalist who had been threatened by the right-wing Argentine Anticommunist Alliance, had been seized along with Carmona, according to the London newsletter Latin America Nov. 8. Another West German, radio correspon dent Walter Hanf, had been arrested without explanation Oct. 29.
Terrorism continues—Violence con tinued to take lives throughout Argen tina. Army Maj. Nestor Lopez was shot
ARGENTINA
down in Santa Fe Nov. 7, and Lt. Roberto Carbajo was murdered in San Nicolas Nov. 12. Both assassinations were at tributed to the ERP. Police Sgt. Joaquin Casas, a bodyguard for the new deputy federal police chief, was killed by unknown guerrillas in Buenos Aires Nov. 9. Another police sergeant was murdered in the capital Nov. 13. At least 38 assassinations and more than 500 arrests were reported between mid-November and mid-December, al though the AAA seemed to remain im mune from arrest. Most of the arrests were aimed at de stroying the ERP. The ERP killed two more army officers—Lt. Col. Jorge Ibarzabal Nov. 19 and Capt. Humberto Viola Dec. 1—but the guerrillas abandoned their campaign against the army Dec. 12 be cause Viola’s young daughter had acci dentally been killed along with him. Four alleged ERP members were killed in a shootout with police in Cordoba Nov. 20, and three more suspected guerrillas died in similar fashion in Buenos Aires Nov. 21. The bullet-riddled bodies of six presumed guerrillas were found by police in Buenos Aires Dec. 5, and six others were found Dec. 13. These last 12 alleged guerrillas were presumably killed by the AAA after they were arrested by police or soldiers. The wife of captive ERP ieader Oscar Montenegro was murdered in Tucuman Dec. 2, and their son was assassinated Dec. 6. Other leftists not directly linked to the ERP were also killed. Two lawyers who had defended political prisoners were found shot to death in Santa Fe Province Nov. 18, a few days after they were ar rested by local security forces. Two ele mentary school teachers were as sassinated in Tigre Dec. 13, after they were arrested there. Other leftist victims included a member of the Peronist Youth (JP), killed in Buenos Aires Dec. 5, and a member of the Revolutionary Communist Party, mur dered in La Plata Dec. 7. Rodolfo Galim berti, a major JP leader, disappeared and was feared dead, the Buenos Aires news paper La Calle reported Nov. 30. The Montoneros, the leftist Peronist guerrillas, assassinated Ruben Dominico, a right-wing Buenos Aires city coun
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cilman, and his bodyguard Dec. 7. Leftist guerrillas were also presumed responsi ble for the murder Dec. 4 of Ramon Samaniego, personnel manager of a Buenos Aires metal plant, and the assassi nation Dec. 14 of Antonio dos Santos Larangeira, a fishing industrialist of Portuguese origin. In other terrorist action, avowed mem bers of the left-wing Liberation Armed Forces used firebombs to destroy at least 18 army buses in a factory lot outside Buenos Aires Nov. 7. An estimated 25 bombs exploded in front of the homes of police officials in Cordoba Nov. 9. Among recent bombings, leftists were held responsible for explosions at a branch of First National City Bank of New York and two General Motors Corp, showrooms in Buenos Aires Nov. 25, and rightists were given credit for firebombing a movie set in the capital Nov. 17. The movie was about Jewish gauchos in 19th century Argentina. Anti-Semitic slogans had been shouted at a recent Buenos Aires rally by rightists demanding the return to Argentina of the remains of Juan Manuel de Rosas, the 19th century Argentine dictator who died and was buried in En gland. Police in La Plata claimed Nov. 26 to have discovered the headquarters of the Liberation Armed Forces, a small Marxist guerrilla group, and arrested several members. Soldiers guarded numerous elementary schools in and around Buenos Aires Nov. 12-13, following repeated threats against teachers and pupils by unknown persons. Citizens reportedly had been alarmed by the threats, by recent sexual assaults on young girls in their schools and by the kidnapping of three students who were told by their captors to convey death threats to their teachers. U.S. woman reported tortured—Olga Talamante, a U.S. citizen under police detention for four weeks, charged she had been beaten and given electric shocks in custody, the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires reported Dec. 9. Police said Talamante had been ar rested with 12 Argentines in a house in Azul, south of the capital, that contained firearms and “other subversive material.”
38 Santa Cruz governor ousted. The federal government took control of the govern ment of Santa Cruz Province Oct. 7, ousting Gov. Jorge Cepernic, who had been accused of leftist sympathies. Copernic was replaced by Augusto Pedro Saffores.
Salta government replaced. The govern ment of Salta Province was taken over by the federal government Nov. 22 on orders of President Peron. Gov. Miguel Ragone, known as a left-wing Peronist, was suc ceeded by Jose Alejandro Mosquera, a Cordoba lawyer. The action was denounced by the Radical Civic Union, the major opposition party, which called it “another provincial raid” by the Peronist administration. Five provincial governments had been taken over in 1973, and the governors of two other provinces had been forced to resign. The rector of Salta University had been arrested Nov. 13 for alleged violations of the anti-subversive law. A policeman had been wounded the night before when two bombs exploded on the university’s campus.
Foreign Relations U.S. envoy called CIA agent. The left wing Peronist weekly El Descamisado charged Jan. 8 that the new U.S. am bassador to Argentina, Robert C. Hill, was a member of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Hill’s appointment had been approved by President Peron, but the envoy had not yet arrived in Buenos Aires. Hill was a former vice president of W.R. Grace & Co. and a former director of the United Fruit Co.—whose opera tions had been bitterly criticized by Latin American nationalists—and had been directly linked, in testimony before the U.S. Senate, to the CIA-planned coup that overthrew Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. Argentina and the U.S. were neverthe less enjoying warm relations, as shown by the signing in late 1973 of a $756 million loan pact with the Inter-American De velopment Bank, which would have been impossible without U.S. support, the newsletter Latin America noted Jan. 4.
LATIN AMERICA 1974
The U.S. Export-Import Bank ap proved a $21.6 million loan for a Buenos Aires steel mill expansion project, it was reported July 18. Libyan oil deal. An Argentine trade mis sion headed by Social Welfare Minister Jose Lopez Rega visited Libya Jan. 26Feb. 4 and signed a number of agreements including one for Libya to supply Argen tina with 3 million tons of oil in 1974 and as much or more in 1975. The oil, which began arriving in Argen tina in March, was bought at a very high price—$18.72 a barrel—but was of high quality, according to the Andean Times’ Latin America Economic Report Feb. 22. The purchases were financed first by a group of Italian banks and subsequently by Chase Manhattan Bank of New York, the London newsletter Latin America re ported May 17. As its part of the oil deal, the Argentine mission to Libya offered to set up a vehicle assembly plant near Tripoli, help build an oil refinery and a liquid natural gas plant, and help construct half a million Libyan schoolrooms and 2,000 apartments. A Libyan mission to Argentina signed agreements in Buenos Aires March 1 to import 30,000 metric tons of Argentine sugar, 96,000 tons of bread wheat, 15,000 tons of corn and 24,000 tons of barley. The Argentine National Bank later signed a $40 million agreement to export motor vehicles, irrigation pipes and beef to Libya, it was reported April 12. Social Welfare Minister Jose Lopez Rega announced Nov. 2 that Libya would grant Argentina a $200 million loan to purchase agricultural and livestock goods. Libya would buy $200 million worth of Argentine grain and sugar in 1975 and spend another $200 million for Argentine ships in the next few years, the London newsletter Latin America reported Nov. 29. Libya would supply Argentina with 300 million cubic meters of oil annually. Argentine deals with Cuba. More than 200 Argentine businessmen and govern ment officials traveled to Havana Feb. 25 to consolidate purchasing agreements under a $ 1.2 billion credit granted to Cuba by Argentina in 1973.
ARGENTINA The mission, headed by Jose Gelbard, then Argentine economy minister, included executives of the Argentine subsidiaries of three U.S. automobile firms—General Motors Corp., Ford Motor Co. and Chrysler Corp.—which were negotiating contracts to seil Cuba 44,000 vehicles. Argentine plants of the French firm Citroen and the West German concern Mercedes-Benz had already signed sales contracts with Cuba, it was reported Feb. 26. The Argentine subisidary of Italy’s Fiat Motor Co. signed a contract Jan. 16 to ship to Cuba $81 million worth of rail road cars and equipment. The U.S. affiliates started signing con tracts with Cuban negotiators after the U.S. government, which maintained an economic blockade of Cuba along with most members of the Organization of American States (OAS), granted them special export licenses. Under a $24.2 million agreement signed in Buenos Aires April 23, Chrysler would ship 9,000 sedans to Havana over the next three years and establish a sales and maintenance service in Cuba. Under Ford’s $30 million contract with Cuba, signed in the Argentine capital April 30, 1,000 cars and 500 heavy trucks would be shipped to Havana in 1974 and an equal number would be exported in 1975-76. Gen eral Motors agreed to sell 6,000 taxis to Cuba for about $30 million, it was reported June 26. In Buenos Aires, the decision had been hailed as a major victory for Argentine foreign policy and evidence that Cuba’s enforced isolation was doomed. The news paper Cronica asserted the U.S. had been forced to admit that the export of cars to Cuba was “a sovereign Argentine de cision.” The English-language Buenos Aires Herald said the decision “un doubtedly signals the eventual end of the economic blockade of Cuba.’’ The U.S.’ attempt to make the final decision on the auto exports had been denounced by Gelberd March 28 and by the Argentine Congress April 4. Cuba had become Argentina’s principal trade partner in Latin America, having purchased more than $500 million worth of Argentine products in less than a year, it was reported July 11.
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Soviet credit report denied. Argentine sources in Moscow reported May 7 that the Soviet Union had pledged $600 mil lion in credits to help Argentina double its power generating capacity by 1977. But Economy Minister Gelbard admitted May 22 that the report was incorrect. The report was made during a visit to the Soviet Union by a 135-member Argen tine mission headed by Gelbard. The dele gates visited the U.S.S.R. May 5-8 before leaving for other East European countries. The credit had been sought to fi nance purchase of Soviet equipment for hydroelectric projects at Salto Grande on the Uruguay River (undertaken jointly by Argentina and Uruguay) and at Alicura in Mendoza Province, and for expansion of the Chocon Dam and construction of two thermal projects in La Plata and Rosario. The sources said the Argentine delega tion also had cemented a number of com mercial deals, including the sale of Ar gentine meat, rice, fruits and juice concentrates, shoes, chemicals and wines to the Soviet Union. Other agreements signed in Moscow included ones for coop eration in the fields of trade, economic and technical-scientific development, ac cording to the Andean Times’ Latin America Economic Report May 17. A Soviet delegation had visited Argen tina for 10 days in February, signing on Feb. 13 agreements on trade, payments and technical cooperation which involved $200 million. Gelbard met with Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev after arriving in Moscow May 5. He con ferred the next day with Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny and Premier Alexei Kosygin. All three Soviet leaders were awarded Argentina’s highest decoration. Juan Peron had accepted an invitation to visit the Soviet Union in the fall. A joint Soviet-Argentine communique issued May 10, after Gelbard’s departure, asserted relations between the two coun tries, were improving and Argentina was interested in establishing contact with COMECON, the Communist economic bloc. The Argentine mission proceeded May 8 to Warsaw, where Gelbard met with Polish President Henryk Jablonski, Com
40 munist Party First Secretary Edward Gierek and other officials during a twoday visit. Four agreements to improve Argentine-Polish trade relations were signed May 9, including ones for Poland to supply technical equipment and ma chinery on credit terms. Gelbard said Peron would visit Poland after his visit to the Soviet Union. Gelbard went on to Czechoslovakia May 10-12 and Hungary May 13-14. Ar gentina and Czechoslovakia had signed a trade agreement Feb. 24 under which the Czechoslovak firm Skoda would supply turbines and generators for four Argen tine thermal and hydroelectric power sta tions, and launch a joint venture with Argentina for a turbine manufacturing plant. Gelbard said May 22 that the mission to Eastern Europe had produced trade agree ments worth about $4 billion. Argentina also had signed agreements with Rumania March 8, at the end of a four-day visit to Buenos Aires by Ru manian Communist Party First Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu. They included a $100 million credit for Argentine purchase of Rumanian equipment and capital goods. The government said the Soviet Union had arranged to buy 12,000 tons of meat from Argentina, it was reported July 9. An Argentine economic mission in Moscow Sept. 20 signed an agreement under which Argentina would sell 90,000 tons of meat to the Soviet Union over the next three years. Torrijos visits. Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos, Panama’s military ruler, visited Ar gentina Jan. 15-19, conferring with Pres ident Peron and other officials. Peron said Jan. 16 that Argentina fully supported Panama’s demand for sov ereignty over the Panama Canal and Zone. Torrijos said Jan. 17 that Peron was a “leader of America, from whom we soldiers who came after have much to learn.”
Bolivian exiles arrested. A number of prominent Bolivian exiles were seized by Argentine police May 3 and held until May 7, apparently at the behest of the Bolivian government, which accused them of plotting to overthrow Bolivian Pres ident Hugo Banzer Suarez.
LATIN AMERICA 1974 The detainees, according to the Washington Post May 5, were Juan Le chin Oquendo, former Bolivian vice president and still leader of Bolivia’s mili tant mineworkers; Jorge Gutierrez Men dieta, his political secretary; Edil Sando val Moron, ex-president of the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies; Col. Samuel Gal lardo, former Bolivian army chief of staff, and Ted Cordova-Claure, former press secretary to exiled President Juan Jose Torres and currently foreign editor for the Buenos Aires newspaper La Opinion. The Argentine government news agency TELAM reported May 7 that Lechin, Cordova-Claure, Sandoval and two other Bolivians not cited in earlier reports—Fe lipe Malky and Victor Levy—had been freed by police that day, but Gutierrez would remain in jail. No mention was made of Gallardo. Most press reports alleged the arrests had been made at the request of the Bo livian government, which reportedly had sent a list of exiled enemies to the Ar gentine government the week before. However, the Bolivian embassy in Buenos Aires denied requesting the arrests, and Argentine Defense Minister Angel Rob ledo claimed May 9 that the exiles had been detained solely “for trafficking in al kaloids.”
Economic & Other Developments Trade income at high level. Economy Ministry figures, reported March 1, showed Argentina’s export earnings in 1973 reached $2.794 billion against im ports of $1.895 billion, the highest for eign trade surplus in 35 years. Revised fig ures released by the ministry later and reported March 15 showed export earn ings at $3.05 billion. Exports of maize and sorghum in 1974 showed increases of 93% over 1973 and 58% over 1972, it was reported July 19. Spain signed an agreement to purchase 300,000 tons of Argentine corn and sorghum, it was reported March 26. Argentina agreed to spend $160 million to purchase 16 boats, 10 to be built in Spain, three in Scotland and three in Ar gentina, it was reported May 17. Tractor exports in January-April 1974 showed a 460% increase over the same pe riod of 1973, it was reported June 14.
ARGENTINA The value of mineral exports in January-July exceeded $7.7 million, com pared with some $9 million for all of 1973, it was reported Sept. 6. Exports of manu factured goods totaled $375 million during January-June, up 25% over the same period of 1973, it was reported Aug. 30. Argentine meat exports to Europe in January-September were 48.9% behind those of the same period in 1973, earning 37.9% less in foreign exchange, it was reported Nov. 8. Prices for beef on the bone reportedly had dropped from $1,300 a ton to $900 a ton during the period. A Paraguayan mission had agreed to make important purchases of wheat, oil and industrial products in Argentina, it was reported Nov. 15.
Foreign loans. A group of U.S. banks headed by Bank of America agreed to lend Argentina $100 million (announced April 17). The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) authorized the largest single loan in its history—$95 million—to help finance the second stage of an ArgentineUruguayan hydroelectric project at Salto Grande on the Uruguay River, it was reported Nov. 8. Total cost of the project was estimated at more than $950 million. The IDB Oct. 31 had approved loans of $45 million to help improve irrigation and agricultural production in San Juan Province. The government announced June 13 that it had arranged an eight-year floating-rate Eurodollar loan of $100 million to help support the country’s eco nomic development. A 23-bank syndicate assisted in the negotiations.
Expropriation & nationalization. The government announced April 18 that it would pay a total of $25 million to three U.S. banks, a West German Bank and a Spanish bank for Argentine interests expropriated by the government in Sep tember 1973. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. would be paid $7.93 million for its controlling in terest in Banco Frances del Rio de la Plata; First National City Bank of New York, $3.5 million for its branch in Bahia
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Blanca and $1.27 million for its share capital in Banco Argentine del Atlantico in Mar del Plata; and Chase Manhattan Bank of New York, $3.8 million, to be shared with Dresden Bank of West Germany for their majority interest in Banco Argentine de Comercio. Chase Manhattan called the com pensation offer “considerably below what we would consider fair value.” The government Aug. 1 took control of five television stations—three in Buenos Aires, one in Mendoza and one in Mar del Plata—attaining an objective announced by President Juan Peron before his death. Trustees representing the regime had unofficially run the stations since October 1973, when their licenses expired. Although there was general agreement that the stations should be nationalized, opposition parties protested that tele vision policy would be formulated exclu sively by the executive branch, without the participation of Congress. President Maria Estela Martinez de Peron main tained the executive was empowered to do so, and she was supported by the Peronist majority in Congress. The take-overs followed raids on two of the stations in July by armed men claiming to represent employes who fa vored nationalization. One raid was led by Jorge Conti, the government trustee run ning the invaded station, the New York Times reported Aug. 1. Conti was a close associate of the rightist Social Welfare minister, Jose Lopez Rega. (In a censorship order, the government Sept. 24 banned “Mannix,” “Kung Fu,” “Mod Squad” and other imported tele vision shows that “promote violence by Oriental and Western means.”) The government Aug. 23 ordered the nationalization of oil marketing but post poned expropriating the foreign oil refineries. Gasoline service stations were ordered nationalized Aug. 28. Until these measures were taken, the state oil firm YPF had marketed about 50% of Argen tina’s oil. Mrs. Peron said at a rally attended by 80,000 persons in Buenos Aires Oct. 17 that three major foreign electronics com panies would be “Argentinized.” She did not elaborate on the term. The firms were Standard Electric Ar gentina Co., a subsidiary of International
42 Telephone and Telegraph Corp, of the U.S.; Siemens S.A., a subsidiary of the West German concern Siemens A.G.; and the Italo-Argentine Electricity Co., controlled by Swiss capital. A presidential decree Sept. 30 had annulled partially completed contracts worth $225 million between Standard Electric, Siemens and the Argentine state telephone company ENTel. The pacts, to modernize Argentina’s telephone system, had been signed in 1969 by the military regime of Gen. Juan Carlos Ongania. The Senate had voted unanimously Sept. 5 to annul them because they overcharged ENTel and were “manifestly immoral.” The government Sept. 20 ordered Stan dard Electric to pay it $23 million in in demnities. (The Chamber of Deputies had annul led the government’s contracts with ITT as “a fraud against the country.” Congres sional investigators had charged that ITT’s Standard Electric Argentina had made considerably more profit in its sales to ENTel than in its other operations in Argentina, it was reported July 19.) Petrochemical plants, oil discovery. The General Mosconi petrochemicals plant at Ensenada outside Buenos Aires had been formally inaugurated at the end of June, in another step toward Argentine self sufficiency in petrochemicals, it was reported July 12. Petrochemical exports had been suspended to increase domestic supply, it was reported June 28. The Italian chemical firm Montedison S.p.A. announced May 21 that it had signed a long-range $1 billion agreement with Argentina to design and construct a huge petrochemical complex at Bahia Blanca, south of Buenos Aires. The state oil company YPF announced the discovery of oil reserves worth an esti mated $5 billion in Mendoza Province, it was reported June 21. They would be de veloped using Rumanian technology.
Drought cuts grain yield. A persistent drought in the major grain producing areas threatened the nation’s agricultural production and its ability to help relieve the world’s acute food shortage, the New York Times reported Dec. 15.
LATIN AMERICA 1974 Leading farmers’ organizations said the drought had already cut the grain crop in southern Buenos Aires Province and La Pampa Province by one-third and the yield in Entre Rios Province by half. The three provinces produced more than half of Argentina’s wheat, corn and sorghum. Argentine wheat production for the 1973-74 season totaled 6.5 million tons, a drop of 17% from the previous year’s figure, it was reported June 21. The area sown was down by 24.4%, and production in Buenos Aires Province, the principal wheat producer, was down by 24%. Sowing of barley and rye also had fallen. The food situation was further compli cated by extensive smuggling of grain into neighboring Bolivia, Chile and Paraguay, where merchants offered higher prices than the Argentine National Grain Board, the only authorized buyer of crops in Ar gentina.
Other economic developments. Among developments reported: Construction of the nation’s largest shipbuilding yard would begin in Punta Este, Patagonia at a cost of nearly $100 million, it was announced July 12. Pro duction of 150,000-ton boats was sched uled to start in 1976. New copper discoveries were made in Neuquen Province, it was reported July 19. An Anglo-Italian consortium would build a plant to produce newsprint from sugar cane waste in Tucuman Province, with an annual capacity of one million tons, 70% of which would be exported, it was reported Aug. 2. The largest aluminum plant in Latin America was inaugurated in Puerto Madryn, Chubut Province, under the management of the firm Aluminio Argen tina, it was reported Aug. 2. It was ex pected eventually to produce 144,000 tons of aluminum annually, enough to cover internal demand and leave some for ex port. The government planned to increase copper production to 150,000 tons a year by the end of 1977, and simultaneously in crease its zinc and lead output, it was reported Aug. 23. Metals imports cur rently exceeded $350 million annually.
ARGENTINA
Work was progressing slowly in Sierra Grande, Patagonia, where by 1976 3.5 million tons of iron ore would be mined annually and processed into two million tons of concentrated magnetite in a Japanese-built plant, according to the Aug. 23 report. The government an nounced it would import 100 million tons of iron ore and two million tons of manga nese ore from Brazil for the Argentine steel industry, it was reported Sept. 27. There were fewer bankruptcies in Ar gentina in January-June than during any six-month period in the previous 14 years, it was reported Aug. 9. Economy Minister Jose Gel bard said this reflected a recovery of liquidity, a more hopeful business cli mate and greater solidity in the economic situation in general. The government’s revenues rose by al most 100% in January-August, but the budget deficit remained at 50%, it was reported Sept. 20.
Argentine floods. At least 60 persons died and over 100,000 were left homeless in three northwestern provinces in Argen tina following severe flooding, it was re ported Feb.17.
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workers and an equivalent raise in pay ments for their dependents.
Labor developments. Adelino Romero, the moderate secretary general of the Gen eral Labor Confederation (CGT) died July 14. Romero, leader of the Textile Workers Union, had been re-elected to his CGT post July 12, but three of his supporters on the federation’s executive council had been replaced by more conservative unionists, giving the conservatives a ma jority of the council. Segundo Palma, the rightist Construction Workers Union leader, was elected deputy secretary general, and he became secretary general upon Romero’s death. The increase in the rightists’ power was engineered by Lorenzo Miguel, leader of the Metallurgical Workers Union and an ally of Social Welfare Minister Lopez Rega. Miguel’s union recently had won large wage increases for its members, in defiance of the social pact.
The Buenos Aires Typographers Federation (FGB) announced Aug. 29 that it would increase the strikes and par tial work stoppages it had staged against two newspapers, Cronica and La Razon, Wages & prices. President Maria Estela to demand higher wages and other Peron July 8 announced a bonus of a benefits. Labor Minister Ricardo Otero month’s wages for all workers, pensioners had ended recognition of the union Aug. and retired persons, to be awarded later in July, to compensate for rising prices and 28 for its “continuous attacks on the the government’s prohibition of strikes. Social Pact.” The bonus reportedly had been agreed to The FGB’s leader, Raimundo Ongaro, June 29, before Juan Peron’s death. It a left-wing Peronist, called Otero “a ser was a blow to the wage-price freeze vant of imperialism” Aug. 20 and an embodied in the labor-management social nounced Sept. 2 that FGB would join pact. Cordoba’s SMATA affiliate, its Light and Wholesale prices in Argentina had Power Union and other “rebel” labor or risen by an average 4.2% in May, the ganizations in forming a new group to op highest increase for any month since the pose the Peronist General Labor Con Peronists returned to power in May 1973, federation, the nation’s most powerful it was reported July 5. Prices of imported labor alliance. goods continued to rise faster than those More than 200,000 primary and high of domestic products (5.6% against 3.9%), ’ school teachers struck across the country and importers complained that the Sept. 4 5 to demand higher wages and a government’s price controls were making better retirement plan. it unprofitable to import a number of A collective transport strike called in essential goods, according to the London Buenos Aires Nov. 28 ended the next day newsletter Latin America. after the government arrested the trans President Peron later (Oct. 31) granted port union’s leader. a 15% wage increase to all Argentine
Bolivia
Politics & Turmoil Food shortages and inflation added to the opposition buffeting the regime of President Hugo Banzer Suarez during 1974. In addition to strikes and civilian demonstrations, a series of military and leftist plots were reported by the govern ment, which crushed two overt military re volts during the year. By early November, Bolivia was under direct military rule.
Paz Estenssoro said in Asuncion Jan. 9 that neither he nor his party had par ticipated in subversive activities, as the government charged. “Our position was legalistic and supportive of the 1974 elec tions, despite our withdrawal from the government,” he asserted.
Opposition called weak. The left ist opposition was weak, controlling the nation’s trade unions but lacking a sufficient base to bid for power, the London newsletter Latin America re ported Jan. 11. Ex-President Juan Jose Torres, in Ar Humboldt leads MNR. Ciro Humboldt, gentina since May 1973, had been or second in command of the Revolutionary ganizing his National Left Alliance (AIN), Nationalist Movement (MNR), assumed the party leadership Jan. 8 after the expul which consisted of a small group of revo lutionary militants. The AIN had signed a sion to Paraguay of ex-President Victor series of policy documents with the prin Paz Estenssoro. The ex-president was or cipal Bolivian left-wing parties and had dered out of the country six weeks after been accused of participating in recent he had directed MNR members to leave the military-civilian government. “plots” the government claimed to have According to an official communique, thwarted. Paz Estenssoro and five MNR aides were Other exiled Bolivian leftists had expelled for trying to create divisions suffered greatly as a result of the Chilean among the armed forces and for agitating military coup, Latin America reported. among workers to create social unrest. Many had been jailed, shot or dispersed to Humboldt accused Paz Estenssoro of . different countries by the Chilean junta, having “greatly jeopardized party unity,” which was aided in this work by the Boli and he rejected the ex-president’s call for vian police. Simon Reyes, the miners’ the MNR to abandon the military-civilian leader and Communist Party official, was government. He also accused Paz Es in a Santiago prison, and other Bolivians were hiding in foreign embassies, including tenssoro of “agreeing passively to leave the country,” contradicting the govern Maj. Ruben Sanchez in the Honduran em ment’s assertion that the ex-president had bassy. The Bolivians who had gained been arrested and deported. asylum in the Argentine embassy had
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BOLIVIA
generally been transferred to the remote Argentine provinces of Misiones and Cor rientes, far from Torres and his orga nizers in Buenos Aires, according to Latin America.
Food shortage, price hikes protested. Workers around the country struck and clashed with police Jan. 21-Feb. 2 in pro test against food shortages and increases in the prices of sugar, rice, flour, bread, noodles and coffee. The government used troops Jan. 29-30 to put down a mass ac tion by peasants whose protest took the form of a six-day road blockade. The price hikes, some as high as 100%, were ordered by the government Jan. 21 to alleviate the food shortage, caused by producers and merchants who smuggled their wares into neighboring countries where prices were up to twice as high as in Bolivia. Government and military officials were reportedly implicated in the smug gling. A general wage increase of some $20 a month was decreed along with the price increases but was rejected by workers as too small. Union representatives de manded a $60 increase. About 14,000 industrial workers at more than 100 plants in La Paz declared a 36-hour strike Jan. 21 to protest the government measures. Several hundred housewives demonstrated outside the presidential palace, and students and police clashed in the streets of the capital. More than 20 persons were arrested for alleged “agitation,” including Benjamin Miguel, leader of the small Christian Democratic Party. Miguel was seized after making a radio broadcast in which he charged that the standard of living of the majority of the employable population and pensioners would be halved by the new measures, the London newsletter Latin America reported Jan. 25. Some 35,000 miners joined the strike Jan. 22. The government, blaming the strikes on alleged subversives, announced the arrest of members of the National Liberation Army guerrilla group, the Communist Party and the Revolutionary Left Movement. In Quillacollo, an in dustrial town outside Cochabamba,
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workers clashed with police. (Police had violently dispersed a workers’ demon stration against the high cost of living in Quillacollo Jan. 13, according to the Cuban press agency Prensa Latina.) Miners, factory workers and merchants declared a nationwide 24-hour strike Jan. 23, and other workers placed themselves in a state of “alert.” The national Press Employes Union denounced the govern ment’s economic policies as increasing “the hunger of the poor.” Residents of Quillacollo dynamited two important bridges near the town, clashed with police and took six hostages, including the Cochabamba transit director. They were reported in control of the town the next day. Some 8,000 bank and insurance workers began a 24-hour strike Jan. 24. The number of persons arrested increased to 70, including a newspaper columnist who had linked government officials to smuggling. President Hugo Banzer Suarez met Jan. 25 with miners’ representatives, but they rejected his offer of a 25% wage ad justment in addition to the earlier $20 in crease. The Roman Catholic Church Episcopal Conference issued a strongly worded document the same day charging government inefficiency and corruption were to blame for the economic crisis. The document chided the government for “indiscriminate public spending [and] technical inefficiency” and for institu tionalizing “big swindles and organized contraband.” It asserted “the people have lost confidence to such a point that a state of collective apathy and defeatism can be observed.” The Confederation of Private Enter prises joined the protest Jan. 26, claiming its member firms could “not even re motely” afford the $20 monthly bonus awarded to workers when food prices were increased. The group charged the government’s economic policies were rooted in “excesses in public spending, inorganic issues [of money], [and] deficits in certain private and public enterprises.” It warned of runaway inflation unless the government took “corrective measures” to expand production. Faced with an action by more than 10,000 peasants, President Banzer declared
46 a nationwide state of siege Jan. 28 and subsequently ordered troops to move against the peasants, who had blocked three roads outside Cochabamba since Jan. 25, preventing supplies from reaching the city. Road-clearing operations began late Jan. 29 and were completed the next day. At least 13 persons were killed, dozens were injured and dozens arrested in clashes between soldiers and protesters. The armed farm workers Jan. 25 had blockaded the roads linking Cochabamba with Santa Cruz, La Paz and Oruro. Banzer sent Agriculture Minister Alberto Natusch and Peasant Affairs Minister Ramon Azero to negotiate with the protest leaders, but these said they would talk only with the president. Banzer refused to leave La Paz. Troops and assault cars from the army’s Tarapaca regiment were sent to the protest area Jan. 26, and 47 persons were arrested, according to official sources. Banzer appeared on nationwide radio and television Jan. 28 to announce the state of siege, which suspended all consti tutional rights, established a strict curfew, and gave sweeping powers to the police and armed forces. But the protesters refused to abandon their blockade of Cochabamba, which began feeling shortages of essential supplies. Before Banzer’s address, Interior Minister Walter Castro told newsmen the protest was part of a plot hatched by Bo livian and other Latin American extre mists at a recent meeting in France. The plan, he said,' envisioned urban and rural guerrilla operations in Bolivia, beginning with offensives across the Brazilian and Argentine borders, and eventual establish ment of Bolivia as a base for subversive operations throughout the continent. Castro said the plot’s mastermind was Antonio Arguedas, a former Cabinet minister linked to the unsuccessful Bo livian guerrilla operation of the late Ernesto (Che) Guevara. The government also briefly implicated a retired army staff chief, Gen. Eladio Sanchez. (The Manchester Guardian Weekly declared Feb. 2, however, that rather than a plot, there was an explosion of resentment against the regime from all classes of society.)
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Troops moved to clear the peasant bar ricades Jan. 29 after reporting that the new governor of Cochabamba Province, Gen. Juan Perez Tapia, had been taken hostage by protest leaders with whom he was attempting to negotiate. The army claimed to have freed Perez after the roads were cleared Jan. 30. However, Perez Jan. 31 denied having been taken hostage, and said his talks with the pro testers were going well when the troops moved into action. (Perez and peasant leaders charged army units had attacked as the protesters were preparing to lift their barricades and after they had been told Banzer would fly to Cochabamba to meet with them, ac cording to the New York Times Feb. 2.) Officials began linking Gen. Sanchez with the protest Jan. 29. Gen. Carlos Alcoreza, army commander, said Jan. 30 that Sanchez, a few other retired officers and several civilians had planned a coup against Banzer for Jan. 29, but the scheme was foiled by the state of siege an nouncement. However, Sanchez was cleared of all charges by the joint military command Feb. 1. Protest leaders said Jan. 31 that they were willing to talk with Banzer about their grievances, but clandestine radio sta tions said peasants were regrouping and would resist the government “to the ulti mate consequences.” Banzer asserted any extremist violence would be crushed and offered the new theory that the protests against his government had been planned in Cuba with the assistance of Carlos Altamirano, the exiled Chilean Socialist leader. Banzer met later with a group of peasant leaders from the Bolivian high plateau and “authorized” them to kill any “Communist agitator” in their area. About 4,800 tin miners in the Oruro mining region called a 48-hour wildcat strike Feb. 1-2 to protest the govern ment’s economic policies and express “solidarity with the peasants of Cochabamba.” They represented 10% of the mining work force. The Commission for Justice and Peace, which included Catholic clergy and laymen, asserted in an open letter to Banzer Feb. 3 that the number of dead peasants in the Cochabamba valley
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reached “close to 100,” according to “wit nesses present” at the clearing of the blockaded roads. “Any massacre is inhu mane,” the commission asserted, “but it is all the more painful when it is perpetrated against the humble peasants of our country.” The Roman Catholic Church Episcopal Conference Feb. 3 made public its second denunciation of the government in a week, criticizing Banzer’s economic policies and the repressive measures used to put down political unrest. The conference, which represented the nation’s bishops, urged the government to roll back the recent food price increases and stop describing “as extremist or sub versive any dissenting opinion.” It also called for government aid to the families “affected by the loss of members because of the deplorable events of these past days.” Mine workers and employes of banks charged Feb. 5 that the government had arrested several of their leaders in the pre vious few days. Among those detained was Armado Porres of the Federation of Mineworkers Unions. Food shortage continues. The shortage of food continued in many cities, aggra vated by recent heavy rains and Roods which damaged crops and livestock, it was reported March 8. Rain and flood damage was estimated at $26 million in La Paz Department. In an effort to increase supplies and halt the rise in food prices, the government had decreed a 90-day suspension of taxes on “essential” imported foods—milk, rice, flour, fats and canned fish—it was re ported March 8. President -Banzer said March 5 that Bolivia would have to “endure penuries” because of the food situation, and warned that speculators in essential articles would be jailed.
Cabinet revised. President Hugo Banzer Suarez shuffled his Cabinet Feb. 14. The Cabinet membership was reduced from 18 to 16 with the merger of the Agri culture and Peasant Affairs Ministries and abolition of the Ministry of State. Four officials resigned, two new minis
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ters—both army officers—were named, two ministers shifted posts and the others retained their posts. The Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) and the Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) each retained four posts, regarded as token political representation in an essentially military Cabinet. Peasant Affairs Minister Col. Ramon Azero, held responsible for the killing of some 100 peasants to end the Cochabamba protest, was dismissed, and his post was merged with that of Agri culture Minister Col. Alberto Natusch Busch. Interior Minister Col. Walter Castro also was dismissed and replaced by Col. Juan Pereda Asbun, who moved from the Industry and Trade Ministry. Pereda’s industry post was given to Col. Miguel Ayoroa Montero. Col. Guillermo Jimenez Gallo, director of the Bolivian Development Corp. (CBF), was named energy and hydrocarbons minister, replacing Roberto Capriles, who became presidential coordinating minis ter. Capriles’ new post was essentially that of Minister-Secretary to the Presi dency Guido Valle Antelo, who resigned Feb. 13 after proposing that the Cabinet membership be reduced to 13 and that his office be given greater powers. Minister of State Waldo Cerruto was named ambassador to Argentina, and his office was abolished. Ex-Interior Minister Walter Castro was named military at tache in Buenos Aires. Col. Mario Vargas, another member of the anti-Guevara operation, replaced Col. Jimenez Gallo at the CBF. Oscar Cespedes, a vigorous anti-Com munist and ex-secretary of the Bolivian Peasants Federation, was named under secretary of agriculture and peasant affairs.
Russell court cites rights abuse. The second Bertrand Russell Tribunal met in Rome March 30-April 6 to investigate charges of human rights violations in Latin America. After hearing testimony from Latin exiles and emigres, it condemned the governments of Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay for “crimes against humanity.” The tribunal’s final report, drafted by Francois Rigaux, director of the Interna
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tional Law Institute in Louvain, France, noted the “systematic destruction of the rule of law’’ in Latin America to eliminate “the victories progressively achieved in the course of the history of the worker and peasant movement.”
Argentina arrests exiles. A number of prominent Bolivian exiles were seized by Argentine police May 3 and held until May 7, apparently at the behest of the Bolivian government, which accused them of plotting to overthrow Bolivian Pres ident Hugo Banzer Suarez. The detainees, according to the Washington Post May 5, were Juan Le chin Oquendo, former Bolivian vice president and still leader of Bolivia’s mili tant mineworkers; Jorge Gutierrez Men dieta, his political secretary; Edil Sando val Moron, ex-president of the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies; Col. Samuel Gal lardo, former Bolivian army chief of staff, and Ted Cordova-Claure, former press secretary to exiled President Juan Jose Torres and currently foreign editor for the Buenos Aires newspaper La Opinion. The Argentine government news agency TELAM reported May 7 that Lechin, Cordova-Claure, Sandoval and two other Bolivians not cited in earlier reports—Fe lipe Malky and Victor Levy—had been freed by police that day, but Gutierrez would remain in jail. Most press reports alleged the arrests had been made at the request of the Bo livian government, which reportedly had sent a list of exiled enemies to the Ar gentine government the week before. However, the Bolivian embassy in Buenos Aires denied requesting the arrests, and Argentine Defense Minister Angel Rob ledo claimed May 9 that the exiles had been detained solely “for trafficking in al kaloids.” Lechin, Sandoval and other Bolivian exiles had joined Torres and Bolivian ex President Hernan Siles Zuazo April 18 in signing a document in Buenos Aires which urged Bolivians to “fight to overthrow the dictatorship of Hugo Banzer” and halt Brazilian “expansionist plans” in Bolivia. Coup attempt fails. Members of the army’s Tarapaca armored regiment tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the govern
LATIN AMERICA 1974 ment June 4, following growing protests by students and opposition politicians against the domestic and foreign policies of President Hugo Banzer Suarez. The rebels attacked the presidential palace in La Paz late in the evening and broadcast a radio communique claiming they were in control of the government. However, they retreated to their barracks and surrendered after the palace guard gave them one hour to withdraw, ac cording to press reports. The government announced June 5 that the revolt had been crushed. The rebel communique was signed by Lt. Cols. Raul Lopez Leyton and Gary Prado Salmon, who reportedly had links with the Revolutionary Nationalist Move ment (MNR), of the government’s po litical coalition. The communique said the revolt was “strictly military,” but MNR leader Ciro Humboidt apparently took refuge in the Peruvian embassy. Twenty-four army officers, including Prado Salmon and Lopez Leyton, were dismissed from the service June 7. Government officials said Lopez Leyton had received political asylum in the Ar gentine embassy, while Prado Salmon and two other rebel officers had been expelled to Paraguay, according to reports June 9. Four rebel officers including Lt. Col. Ricardo Sanchez took refuge in the Brazi lian embassy and subsequently were flown to Sao Paulo, it was reported June 12. Banzer charged in a radio and television address June 5 that the coup attempt was led by Humboldt and Carlos Valverde, a former housing minister and leader of the Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB), the other party in the government coalition. The president accused them of col laborating with the “extreme left,” al though both leaders were politically con servative. Valverde had fled to Paraguay in 1973, but Banzer said he had recently returned and was in hiding. The government had claimed May 31 to have discovered a plot by Valverde and other Bolivian exiles in Argentina to “im pose a socialist regime” in Bolivia. In terior Minister Col. Juan Pereda Asbun announced June 1 that a number of “ultra-leftists” had been arrested in the interior, and five FSB members had been exiled to Paraguay. According to reports, the alleged plot
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was a government attempt to explain the growing protests by students and op position politicians against its strict con trol of the nation’s universities and its eco nomic alliance with Brazil. Students at San Andres University in La Paz had struck May 17 to protest the appointment the day before of a military rector, Col. Jose Antonio Zelaya. The government had made the appointment without consulting the university’s deans or allowing a formal election. The stu dents said their strike was aimed at de mocratizing the university and restoring its autonomy. Student demonstrations escalated May 21 when Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel arrived to witness the signing of a broad economic agreement between his government and Bolivia. Police dispersed student rallies in La Paz and Co chabamba, and the government an nounced that it was expelling to Paraguay three political leaders who had publicly opposed the Brazilian pact—ex-Foreign Minister Walter Guevara Arce of the Authentic Revolutionary Party (PRA); Benjamin Miguel of the Christian Demo cratic Party (PDC), and Ramon Claure of the Left Revolutionary Nationalist Move ment. Protests continued May 22, when the pact was signed in Cochabamba in Geisel’s and Banzer’s presence. Complete details of the agreement were not re leased, but it was known to provide for Bolivia to sell Brazil 240 million cubic feet of natural gas daily for 20 years in return for Brazilian assistance in establishing a $600 million “pole of development” in southeastern Bolivia including a gas pipeline and steel, petrochemical and cement plants. The PRA and PDC had condemned the agreement as liable to provoke the loss of eastern Bolivia to Brazil, it was reported May 31. Victor Paz Estenssoro, the exiled MNR leader, had charged the pact might cause “the economic and political disin tegration” of Bolivia, it was reported May 24. Several dozen students were arrested in La Paz May 23, according to university officials. Cochabamba University stu dents joined the San Andres strike May 27, and support for the student strikers was reported from miners, factory
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workers, political leaders and the Na tional Confederation of Professionals. The leader of the professionals’ group, Manuel Morales Davila, was arrested June 7. The student strikes continued after the abortive military coup, and authorities ar rested 100 strikers June 7. The French newspaper Le Monde reported June 8 that 36 students had been arrested on charges of participating in the military revolt. Student and faculty leaders finally ended the strike June 18, after the government accepted 10 demands in cluding dismissal of the rector, Col. Jose Antonio Zelaya, respect for university au tonomy, and democratic election of university authorities. Writer Jorge Siles Salinas was named rector until elections could be held, and the government pledged to free 26 students arrested since the strike began in May. Four of the rebel leaders said from exile in Argentina July 8 that the high com mand had “betrayed” the military move ment against Banzer. The four, including ex-Lt. Col. Raul Lopez Leyton, asserted they had met with the high command be fore the revolt and had received full sup port for their demands—including the re placement of Banzer—as well as a pledge that they would not be prosecuted if the rebellion failed. The demands, in addition to Banzer’s resignation, were: establishment of a military government without participation by the government’s civilian allies, the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) and the Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB); prompt scheduling of general elec tions, without a government candidate; resolution of the regime’s conflict with the universities, allowing university autonomy and democratic election of university au thorities; prosecution of all who had be come wealthy at the expense of the state; clarification of the meaning of “political crimes.” The rebels said Industry and Trade Minister Col. Miguel Ayoroa Montano, who acted as their intermediary with the high command, had vowed to resign if any of the demands was not fulfilled. Ayoroa did resign July 8, but Banzer confirmed him in office.
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Other rebel leaders in exile in Paraguay, including ex-Lt. Col. Gary Prado Salmon, issued a similar statement reported July 5. A third rebel document, released earlier by the Bolivian Interior Ministry and reported by the London newsletter Latin America June 28, had denounced Banzer’s “repressive and inhuman” attitude and asserted that the armed forces supported the struggles of Bolivian workers, stu dents and peasants. The rebels, Latin America reported, noted that they had helped bring Banzer to power in 1971 to end “the anarchy im posed by indecisive military governments, lacking in vision and incapable of directing the country towards progress.” However, Banzer had placed his personal interests before the country’s, the rebels charged. They proposed creation of a “second re public” which rejected capitalism and communism in favor of socialist, hu manist and Christian values, Latin America reported. In a related development, ex-President Hernan Siles Zuazo, who had called for Banzer’s overthrow in April, had slipped into Bolivia in June but had been forced to leave again, according to reports cited by the Miami Herald June 25.
Guerrilla 'plot' charged—Interior Minister Pereda asserted July 4 that a guerrilla group calling itself the Black Condor was preparing to attack the Banzer regime under the leadership of ex Presidents Alfredo Ovando and Juan Jose Torres and of French radical journalist Regis Debray. Pereda said Torres had given Ovando money he allegedly received from the People’s Revolutionary Army, the Ar gentine Marxist guerrilla group that recently had collected millions of dollars in ransom money for foreign businessmen it had kidnapped. Ovando, who lived in Spain, denied Pereda’s charges “categorically” July 5.
Military Cabinet sworn; elections pledged. President Hugo Banzer Suarez swore in an all-military Cabinet July 8, vowing to return the country to constitu tional rule in 1975. His action appeared to satisfy two of the demands made by leaders of the abor
LATIN AMERICA 1974 tive June military coup. However, Gen. Oscar Adriazola, chairman of the joint military high command, asserted July 8 that elections would not be called until the government “institutionalized the revo lution.” Banzer accepted the resignations of the Cabinet’s 12 civilian ministers and reduced the number of Cabinet posts from 17 to 14. He retained four of the old Cabinet’s five military members, re placing only Defense Minister Gen. Jaime F. Mendieta, and named military officers to the other posts. The Housing and Health portfolios were temporarily left vacant. The new Cabinet: Foreign affairs—Gen. Alberto Guzman Soriano; defense—Gen. Rene Bernal Escalante; finance—Lt. Col. Victor Cas tillo Suarez; labor—Col. Mario Vargas Salinas; interior—Col. Juan Pereda Asbun; education—Col. Waldo Bernal; agriculture—Col. Alberto Natusch Busch; energy & hydrocarbons—Col. Guillermo Jimenez Gallo; industry & trade—Col. Miguel Ayoroa Montano; mines & metallurgy—Col. Jose Antonio Zelaya; presidential coordination—Gen. Juan Lechin Suarez; transport & com munications—Capt. Walter Nunez Rivero. . Banzer shuffled the Cabinet after touring military garrisons across the country to determine the extent of sup port for the demands of the coup leaders. He reportedly found the armed forces divided, with many officers strongly op posed to his rule. After the Cabinet revision, leaders of the MNR and FSB expressed support for Banzer despite their exclusion from the government. The MNR leadership was described as in disarray. After party leader Ciro Humboldt took refuge in the Peruvian embassy during the coup at tempt June 5, Jaime Arellano took his place. However, Arellano subsequently resigned to form a new “nationalist and democratic leftist” party, according to a report July 7, and was accused by other MNR leaders of conspiring against the government. New plot ‘foiled.’ Interior Minister Juan Pereda Asbun claimed July 24 that the government had foiled a “new plot” to
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overthrow Banzer and set up a “Marxist regime” in Bolivia. The conspiracy allegedly was dis covered after the arrest of ex-Lt. Col. Gary Prado Salmon, a leader of the abor tive June military coup attempt; and the interception of a letter from Christian Democratic Party (PDC) leader Benjamin Miguel to the PDC political commission saying that Argentina’s armed forces had offered to back ex-President Alfredo Ovando Candia in an attempt to regain power. Prado Salmon apparently had slipped into Bolivia from Paraguay. Miguel’s let ter reportedly was written from Asuncion, the Paraguayan capital. Argentine Foreign Minister Alberto Vignes expressed his country’s “dis pleasure” over Pereda Asbun’s charges July 27, asserting they were based on “a letter whose authenticity has not been verified.” Vignes said Argentina had never interfered in the internal affairs of another nation. The government announced July 24 that “several conspirators” had been ar rested, including Lt. Carlos Prado Yepez—officially the.only partisan of the June coup attempt not dismissed from the army—and four professors at San Andres University in La Paz. The professors were reported released July 29. (The Venezuelan newspaper El Na tional reported Aug. 24 that despite the government’s condemnation of the June plot, most of the partisans of the coup attempt had been restored to active duty. Prado Salmon was not imprisoned after his arrest but sent to a remote part of the Bolivian Northwest near the Bra zilian border, according to El Nacional). The Christian Democrats issued a statement Aug. 12 charging Banzer’s na tionalism was nothing but “mad anticom munism.” Jorge Vargas Lucero, the party’s acting secretary, was subsequently arrested, it was reported Aug. 23.
Miners protest. Delegates to a con ference of the Bolivian Federation of Mine Workers’ Unions denounced the govern ment and reaffirmed their loyalty to the outlawed Bolivian Workers’ Federation (COB). Noel Vasquez, leader of the Center South Miners’ Council, said Aug. 13, the
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day the conference began, that Banzer should resign because he, like former U.S. President Nixon, had abused his presidential powers. Leaders of the Siglo XX mine, who were among the nation’s most militant miners, called the Banzer regime fascist and dictatorial Aug. 15. The COB Aug. 8 had accused Banzer of violating the most elemental Bolivian rights, creating an atmosphere of terror and instituting policies designed to drown the working classes in poverty and misery. The government had no mandate to “give away [Bolivia’s] wealth, allow the pil laging of its natural resources and threaten its territorial integrity,” the COB asserted.
Election date dispute & Banzer’s brief resignation. President Banzer submitted his resignation Aug. 30 but withdrew it later the same day at the request of the armed forces, according to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Gen. Carlos Alcoreza Melgarejo. “The president enjoys the full support of the armed forces to continue ruling,” Alcoreza said. “We consider his presence at the head of the government indis pensable.” Banzer acted one day after one of his chief civilian supporters, Mario Gutierrez, leader of the Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB), publicly urged that the 1975 elec tions be advanced and that amnesty be granted to all persons arrested or exiled in attempts to overthrow Banzer. The president opposed granting such an am nesty. Banzer had announced July 23 that elections would be held in October 1975, and power would be transferred “to whomever is chosen in the balloting” in December 1975. Gutierrez wanted the elections advanced to May 1975. Banzer had named two official organi zations to facilitate the transfer of power: the National Council on Structural Reforms (CONARE), which would draw up a new Constitution for approval in a referendum scheduled for March 1975; and the Nationalist Political Council (CPN), which would act as a “bridge” be tween the government and the public. The CPN would consist of 12 rep resentatives of the armed forces, three of the political parties, three of peasant
52 organizations, and the interior and presidential coordination ministers. CON ARE would consist of 30 persons from the nation’s “live forces.” (Various political groups declined to participate in CONARE because they said a Consti tution could not be drawn up under “a de facto regime in which there is no parliament,” it was reported July 30.) In his statement Aug. 29, Gutierrez called for the FSB and the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), the other major civilian political party, to form an alliance similar to Colombia’s outgoing National Front, which would enable them to govern jointly and give Bolivia the “profound political peace and national harmony” ’that Colombia had “enjoyed for 17 years.” Gutierrez offered himself as the projected coalition’s presidential candidate in 1975. (Banzer announced July 29 that he would not run in the elec tions.) Gutierrez said he recognized Victor Paz Estenssoro and Ciro Humboldt as the only legitimate MNR leaders. Both lived in exile, but Humboldt reportedly re turned to Bolivia secretly Aug. 28 and held a clandestine press conference in La Paz Aug. 29 in which he demanded early elections and amnesty for political prisoners. Leftist ‘plots.’ The government reported crushing a series of leftist plots during September and October, and press sources reported increased government repres sion of labor unions, student groups and political parties that opposed Banzer. The opposition to Banzer stemmed partly from his refusal to declare an am nesty for political prisoners and his ap parent intention to run for the presidency in 1975. Political leaders were reported stunned by Banzer’s assertion Sept. 21 that he would run “if the people ask me” and by his nomination for the presidency by the National Peasants Confederation, reported Oct. 4. Banzer said Oct. 9 that he would not be a candidate in 1975, but his opponents were not reassured. Opponents were also outraged by the formation Sept. 2 of the National Action Committee (CAN), a right-wing para military force pledged to eradicate leftist extremism. The Christian Democratic Party charged Oct. 16 that the CAN was
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created by Banzer and, like the terrorist Argentine Anticommunist Alliance, was funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. One of the alleged plots was attributed Sept. 29 to retired' Gen. Eladio Sanchez Gironda, the former army staff chief, who was arrested and banished to Argentina. Ciro Humboldt, the MNR leader believed to be in hiding somewhere in Bolivia, was also accused in the alleged plot. Also arrested Sept. 29 were Manuel Morales Davila, leader of the National Confederation of Professionals (he was exiled Oct. 1), and Jose Valdivieso and Mery Bernal de Ayllon, who had led thou sands of teachers on a two-week strike to protest government control of the La Paz Teachers Federation. Morales Davila had been trying to negotiate an end to the strike. The government responded to the strike by declaring an end to the school year, which was protested by thousands of workers and students in La Paz Oct. 4. Some 22,000 factory workers in La Paz and Cochabamba struck to protest the school closing Oct. 7. An attempt by teachers to reopen the schools failed that day because few students showed up for classes. Five leaders of the Political Alliance— which combined the Left Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, the Christian Democratic Party and the Authentic Revolutionary Party—were exiled to Paraguay Oct. 17. They were among eight opposition leaders arrested Oct. 9 and ac cused of blowing up a statue of the late U.S. President John F. Kennedy in La Paz the day before. The government had charged Oct. 8 that the statue’s destruction was part of a terrorist plot led by ex-Maj. Ruben Sanchez Valdivia, who had led loyalist re sistance to the military coup that put Banzer in power in 1971. A document issued in La Paz Oct. 17 and allegedly signed by Sanchez on behalf of the ex tremist Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) claimed responsibility for the bombing and accused Banzer of convert ing Bolivia into “a satellite of American imperialism and the Brazilian sub-empire.” The government claimed Oct. 9 it had discovered two more subversive plots, these by members of the FAR, the Revo lutionary Left Movement and the Na
BOLIVIA tional Liberation Army. These groups were “financed from abroad,” according to a government official. Leftists were also presumed responsible for a bomb explosion in the lottery building in La Paz Oct. 14 which injured seven persons.
Military revolt crushed. Paratroopers under the command of President Banzer put down a revolt in Santa Cruz Nov. 7 by members of the 2nd Batallion of the army’s “Manchego” Regiment, which specialized in anti-guerrilla operations, the government reported. Loyalist and rebel troops clashed several times in Santa Cruz and in Montero, 30 miles north, and loyalist jets bombed several parts of the city, officials said. Casualties were reported on both sides. No further details were available be cause the government imposed strict censorship on the national and foreign press. The uprising was led by Gens. Julio Prado Montano and Orlando Alvarez, who were arrested, and by former Interior Minister Carlos Valverde, who escaped with other rebels into the jungles north of Santa Cruz, the government reported Nov. 8. It had charged Nov. 7 that the rebels were backed by former President Victor Paz Estenssoro, the exiled leader of the Revolutionary Nationalist Move ment (MNR).
Military rule declared. The armed forces officially took control of the country Nov. 9. A series of decrees issued under the state of siege, declared Nov. 7 when the rebellion began, gave the military full political and administrative powers until 1980. The elections scheduled for 1975 were canceled, and the activities of all political parties—including those that had participated in Banzer’s government— were suspended. The right of assembly was revoked and the leaders of labor unions, professional associations and student groups were dis missed. Citizens over 21 years of age were required to perform civilian service for the government whenever it asked. The government pledged to defend Bolivia’s “territorial integrity,” find an
53 outlet to the Pacific Ocean, develop the nation “to its highest potential” and effect a “just distribution of wealth,” according to the decrees. The all-military Cabinet resigned shortly before the decrees were issued. Housing Minister Jose Patino Ayoroa was placed under house arrest on charges of aiding the defeated rebels.
Foreign & Economic Affairs U.S. oil pacts signed. The state oil firm YPFB recently had signed oil and natural gas exploration and exploitation contracts with three U.S. companies, after signing four similar contracts with U.S. and French concerns during the previous 10 months, according to the Andean Times’ Latin America Economic Report Jan. 4. The latest contracts were with the Amerada Hess-Amoco partnership, for a one million hectare area in the Chaco, on the Paraguayan border, and with Sun Oil, for a comparable area on the Bolivian high plateau. Bolivia’s contract terms were borrowed from the pacts being signed by Peru and foreign concerns. Their central idea was that the foreign company financed and carried out all exploration in the contract area, and the oil was shared in kind be tween the company and YPFB on a prefixed percentage, at the well-head. This avoided complex tax and royalty calcula tions. The production split averaged out to roughly 52/48 in favor of YPFB, al though payments such as social security reduced the company’s net share to about 45%. Each contract carried minimum work and expenditure requirements. All oil and gas pipelines would belong to YPFB, which would charge pipeline fees to the contract company. If the pipeline were originally constructed to serve an area assigned to one company, the com pany would have priority over third parties in its use. YPFB was also exploring on its own in various parts of the country—including the high plateau, the Tarija area in the far south and the Santa Cruz and Chaco regions—but its technical and financial capacity remained limited, the Times reported.
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Most exports of Bolivian crude—an oil of very high quality—went to other South American countries. The main buyers were Argentina, Peru and Brazil. Energy and Hydrocarbons Minister Guillermo Jimenez Gallo announced March 27 that four new foreign oil com panies would sign operations contracts with the state petroleum concern YPFB, bringing to 12 the number of foreign oil firms operating in the country. The government announced plans to sell 240 million cubic feet of gas to Brazil, it was reported March 28.
Brazil penetration cited. Foreign Min ister Gen. Alberto Guzman said the government was worried about Brazilian penetration of Bolivia and reports from Venezuela of a Brazilian plan for terri torial expansion, beginning with Bolivia, the news agency LATIN reported Jan. 11. Guzman told newsmen he was studying reports from the Community Devel opment Department of peaceful Brazilian penetration across Bolivia’s northeastern border, but he declined to comment directly on a recent report in the Caracas newspaper El Mundo, which alleged the Venezuelan government had obtained a Brazilian army plan for invasion and an nexation of Bolivian and other foreign ter ritory. (Venezuela denied knowledge of the document in a telegram to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, LATIN reported.) Bolivia was investigating allegations that Brazilian banks had been taking over land and property in Bolivia by lending money to peasants in frontier areas at high interest rates, and foreclosing when the peasants could not keep up the pay ments, the newsletter Latin America reported Jan. 18.
LATIN AMERICA 1974 Sea outlet plan reported. Sources in La Paz reported that Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel had proposed a plan whereby Chile would cede to Bolivia a nar row corridor down to its northern coast, along the line of the railway from La Paz, to give Bolivia its long-sought outlet to the sea, according to the newsletter Latin America March 29. The report evoked a response from Peruvian Prime Minister Gen. Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, who said Peru would have to be consulted if the “solution” in volved the former Peruvian provinces of Arica and Tarapaca, which Chile occupied after a war with Peru and Bolivia in 1879. A treaty which later ceded the provinces to Chile prohibited Chile from ceding them to any third state without Peruvian approval. Peruvian President Juan Velasco Al varado said March 29 that he would never allow Chile to give Bolivia territory it had taken from Peru, observers in La Paz reported.
Tin refining problem. The Bolivian government’s mining concern COMIBOL reported that tin concentrates were building up because the smelter at Volta Redonda in Brazil was having trouble refining Bolivia’s extremely complex ores, according to the London newsletter Latin America March 1. Bolivian tin previously had gone to the Williams Harvey smelter in Lancashire, England, whose workers were more highly skilled, but the smelter had closed in December 1973. Mines Minister Raul Lerna Patino and his brother Jorge, technical director of the Bolivian state smelting corporation ENAF, had killed a plan for Bolivia to buy the British smelter and keep it in operation.
Brazil
Elections: Geisel President, Opposition Wins in Legislatures
and officeholders from public life. He also urged an end to “unemployment, arbi trary arrests and persecution, police ter rorism, torture and violence.” Congressman Lysaneas Maciel had spoken for the MDB “Authentic” faction before the vote, comparing the current political situation in Brazil to the early days of Adolf Hitler in Germany, “when average citizens were afraid to oppose the Nazis.” The statement led to a shouting match with ARENA members, who said Maciel was exaggerating. The MDB, which called the election a “farce,” had run what it called an “antiqampaign,” holding rallies in several cities to spread its criticism of the government system. Guimaraes described the effort as “abstract surrealism” but said the op position “must use the few democratic in stitutions we have left.” Geisel, 65, until recently had run the state oil monopoly, Petrobras, and was considered an effective administrator. The son of German Lutheran immigrants, he became Brazil’s first non-Roman Catholic president. Geisel was sworn in for a five-year term March 15 as Brazil’s 28th president. He was the fourth military man to win the office since the armed forces had seized pojver in 1964. Geisel took the oath of office before a joint session of Congress and delegations from 88 foreign nations. He later received the presidential sash from outgoing
After the election of the ruling ARENA's candidate to the presidency in January, a relatively free election produced victory for the opposition MDB in balloting for legisla tive seats in November.
Geisel elected president. Retired army Gens. Ernesto Geisel and Adalberto Pereira dos Santos were elected president and vice president of Brazil, respectively, in indirect voting Jan. 15. The generals received 400 of 497 votes in the electoral college, composed of federal and provincial legislators and dominated by the government party, ARENA. Seventy-six electors voted for the candidates of the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), Ulysses Guimaraes and Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, and 21 electors, members of the MDB’s “Authentic” faction, abstained in protest. Geisel said in a brief television address later Jan. 15 that his administration would “preserve stability and order for the progress and well-being of the country” and would act quickly’ against “any sub versive tendencies or acts of corruption.” Guimaraes had denounced the indirect electoral process shortly before the vote, calling on the government to hold direct popular elections and suspend the law em powering the president to bar politicians
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56 President Emilio G. Medici and swore in his Cabinet. In a brief inaugural address, Geisel praised the previous military governments for “laying the solid bases of the national renovation.” He did not promise to re store democratic rule but expressed hope “in an even more promising future of a broad national consensus around the magnificent aim of creating a just, pros perous and sovereign state.” Geisel gave special thanks for the presence at the ceremonies of Mrs. Richard M. Nixon, wife of the U.S. president, President Juan Maria Bor daberry of Uruguay, President Hugo Banzer Suarez of Bolivia and Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, president of the Chilean military junta. Geisel met with the three Latin leaders March 16. Pinochet had arrived in Brazil March 13, and Banzer, Bordaberry and Mrs. Nixon had arrived the next day. The Chilean and Bolivian officials conferred twice March 14 in an apparent effort to improve relations between their two coun tries, which did not have diplomatic ties. Pinochet was denounced March 14 by Francisco Pinto, an opposition deputy from the impoverished northeastern state of Bahia, who called him “the oppressor of the Chilean people” and compared him to Lt. William L. Calley, the U.S. soldier convicted of murdering at least 22 South Vietnamese civilians. Pinto charged Pinochet was promoting a “Brazil-Chile-Bolivia-Paraguay political axis,” an alliance of Latin dictatorships. Brazilian government censors allowed publication of excerpts from Pinto’s state ment, it was reported March 16. Bordaberry told newsmen March 15 that there was “a common Marxist ag gression” against Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia but denied his country sought an alliance with the other three. Banzer echoed Bordaberry’s denial, aserting his meetings with Pinochet stressed basic bi lateral problems such as the renewal of diplomatic relations. (Pinto was sentenced to six months in prison Oct. 11 after his conviction on charges of violating a national security law provision forbidding “insults” to the leader of a country with which Brazil had normal diplomatic relations.)
LATIN AMERICA 1974 Geisel’s Cabinet. Geisel had announced the composition of his Cabinet Feb. 21. Only three aides of outgoing President Emilio G. Medici were on the list: Brig. Joelmir Campos de Araripe and Joao Paulo dos Reis Velloso, who retained their respective posts as air minister and plan ning minister, and Gen. Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figuereido, who moved from chief of the president’s military household to head of the National Intelligence Service. The other ministers: Civil Cabinet chief—Gen. Golbery do Couto e Silva; military Cabinet chief—Gen. Dilermando Gomes Monteiro; finance—Mario Henrique Si monsen; justice—Armando Falcao; foreign rela tions—Antonio Azeredo da Silveira; mines & energy—Shigeaki Ueki; industry & commerce—Se vere Gomes; interior—Mauricio Rangel Reis; agricul ture—Alysson Paulinelli; transport—Gen. Dyrcey de Araujo Nogueira; communications—Gen. Euclides Quandt de Oliveria; education—Ney Braga; health— Paulo de Almeida Machado; labor—Arnaldo Prieto; army—Gen. Vicente Dale Coutinho; and navy—Adm. Geraldo de Azevedo Henning.
Gen. Couto e Silva’s post was new and its duties unknown, but observers said he would be the key man in the new govern ment and would be responsible, among other things, for its relations with the Roman Catholic Church. Couto e Silva, a professional soldier from the southern most state of Rio Grande do Sul, was a past president of the National In telligence Service and was considered Brazil’s leading military and geopolitical theoretician. Simonson, chosen to replace Finance Minister Antonio Delfim Neto, was a 38year-old engineer and economist from Sao Paulo. He was vice president of the Bozzano-Simonsen investment bank and had recently headed the national anti illiteracy movement, MOBRAL, in which he had earned a reputation as a na tionalist. Ueki, the new mines and energy minister, also 38, was an economist of Japanese origin who had worked closely with Geisel in the state oil monopoly. He was currently director of finances for Petrobras and was involved in negotia tions between its foreign subsidiary, Braspetro, and Middle East nations. Falcao, named to replace hard-line Justice Minister Alfredo Buzaid, had held his new post 15 years before in the civilian government of ex-President Juscelino
BRAZIL Kubitschek. The new foreign minister, Azeredo da Silveira—currently am bassador to Argentina—was considered a skilled professional diplomat committed to Brazil’s active “global” foreign policy.
MDB wins in legislatures. The Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), the only officially tolerated opposition group, soundly defeated the government’s ARENA party in federal and state legis lative elections Nov. 15. The elections were the freest in more than 10 years, with opposition candidates allowed to criticize the military regime on television and at public rallies. The results were widely interpreted as a repudiation of the government’s economic and social policies and a protest against an inflation rate estimated at 33%. Nevertheless, the vote was expected to have little direct impact on national policy. The federal legislatures were vir tually powerless as the result of a series of “institutional decrees” that gave the executive branch dictatorial authority. However, state governors needed the ap proval of state legislatures on many deci sions, making some amount of change possible on the local level. The MDB increased its strength in the Senate from seven seats to 20 and in the Chamber of Deputies from 87 seats to 166. The remaining 46 Senate and 198 Cham ber seats were retained or won by the government’s ARENA party. The election results were announced by Justice Min ister Armando Falcao Dec. 5. With more than 33% of the Chamber seats, the MDB would be empowered to form investigative committees and sum mon government officials for testimony. High military officials feared the party would open inquiries into human rights violations and the activities of certain se curity organizations, according to the London newsletter Latin America Dec. 6. In an apparent warning to the MDB, Falcao stressed Dec. 5 that “the ordinary and extraordinary revolutionary legis lation remains in full and absolute force.” The election also gave the MDB con trol of the state assemblies in Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, Pernambuco, Parana, Rio de Janeiro, Santa Catarina and Ceara, according to the London newslet ter Latin America.
57 The key states were Sao Paulo, the most populous, where MDB Senate candi date Orestes Quercia led his ARENA op ponent by a 3-1 margin; Rio Grande do Sul, President Ernesto Geisel’s home state, where MDB Senate candidate Paul Brossard defeated ARENA’S Nestor Jost; and Rio de Janeiro. In Maranhao, where the MDB did not run a Senate candidate, abstentions and spoiled ballots exceeded the votes cast for ARENA. MDB leaders made subdued victory statements after the vote, apparently fearing a backlash from hard-line military officers who had not wanted the elections to take place. Party President Ulysses Guimaraes said simply, “I hope the men running our country do some meditating and use our resources to help create a more just society,” it was reported Nov. 17. He added two days later that MDB legislators would not be “negativistic,” and would approve “bills of public in terest” introduced by the government. Sen. Andre Franco Montoro, MDB vice chairman and national coordinator, said in a post-election interview with the news magazine Veja that the ARENA lost votes by MDB’s use of government statis tics showing that workers’ pay declined while industrial production rose. Archbishop Helder Camara, an out spoken critic of the regime, said Nov. 20 that the elections were “a national plebi scite in which the people expressed their desire for change.” He added: “If there is any country where the rich get richer and the poor, poorer, it is Brazil.” The MDB had stressed the economic issue throughout the campaign, winning the votes of workers and poor persons who were hardest hit by inflation. The party reportedly won the votes of students and intellectuals by appealing for an end to repression of civil liberties. In an apparent effort to avert an MDB victory, Geisel and his Cabinet approved a series of emergency economic measures Oct. 30. These included a 10% wage in crease for all workers; a reduction of in come taxes paid by small businesses; and provision of some 1.5 billion cruzeiros to revive the consumer durables market. The measures would inevitably refuel the inflationary process, the newsletter Latin America observed Nov. 1. The elections were among the most peaceful in Brazil’s violent political his
58 tory. Only one man was reported killed in a political dispute, in Goias State, ac cording to a report Nov. 17.
Repression Continues Despite the inauguration of a relative moderate as president and the freedom per mitted in the legislative election campaign, political arrests and charges of other gov ernment repression continued during 1974. New arrests, torture reported. More than 40 Roman Catholic laymen and women were arrested in January and Feb ruary as security forces continued their crackdown on dissident, church-con nected intellectuals’ and workers’ groups. The arrests followed a reopening of the Brazilian church-state conflict, caused when the government closed two Catholic radio stations—Radio Nove de Julho in October 1973 and Radio Palmares in mid December. The closing of Radio Nove de Julho, a Sao Paulo station, was in terpreted as retaliation against Cardinal Arns’ criticism of the government. An editorial in the church weekly O Sao Paulo citing the new church-state conflict was censored by the government, it was reported Jan. 11. Among those arrested were seven members of the metal workers’ union. This had led to a series of work stoppages in December 1973 against the Villares elevator company in Sao Paulo. The stop pages were called the first real strike action in Brazil since the government assumed dictatorial powers in December 1968. Informed sources reported that some of those arrested were tortured, according to the Miami Herald Feb. 22. The first arrests reported were those of Dermy Azevedo, a journalist with the newspaper Ultima Hora, and his wife, Darcy Azevedo, Jan. 17. Dermy Azevedo was close to Paulo Evaristo Cardinal Arns, archbishop of Sao Paulo, an out spoken critic of the military regime. Maria Nilde Mascellani, a pioneer in Brazilian vocational education and a Catholic lay leader, was seized by political police Jan. 18 in what was considered a
LATIN AMERICA 1974 government warning to dissident church groups, the New York Times reported Jan.21. Mascellani had close contacts with Sao Paulo’s outspoken Paulo Evaristo Cardinal Arns and with the group of progressive bishops championing the rights of dispossessed peasants in the Amazon region. She had campaigned for release of the Rev. Francois Jentel, a French priest jailed for allegedly inciting peasants to revolt in 1973. Police also arrested Mascellani’s sec retary and office boy and two friends, one a journalist and the other a university professor. The office boy and the professor were later released, the Times reported. Members of workers’ groups connected with two Sao Paulo industrial parishes were reported arrested Jan. 26. Other ar rests in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro were reported in press reports Jan. 31, Feb. 10 and Feb. 22. Church circles described the arrests as an independent action by security services to persuade President-elect Geisel to con tinue the government’s hard line toward church dissidents. However, representa tives of Geisel simultaneously met with church officials including Cardinal Arns in an effort to improve church-state rela tions, the New York Times reported Feb. 24. Arns met Feb. 19 with Gen. Couto e Silva, who would head Geisel’s Cabi net after March 15. In this and other meetings church officials were told that the government was prepared to end abuses by the security services, lift press censorship and lessen social inequalities but that it also wanted the church to exer cise control over the declarations of bish ops and priests. The church officials re portedly replied that each bishop was re sponsible for his statements. Arns had intervened personally with the Sao Paulo military chief on behalf of Dermy Azevedo and of Mascellani.
Camara gets peace prize—Msgr. Helder Camara, archbishop of Olinda and Recife, received the “People’s Peace Prize” in Oslo, Norway Feb. 10 in recog nition of his “fight for peace, freedom, justice and human dignity against oppres sion and exploitation.”
BRAZIL
Russell court cites rights abuse. The second Bertrand Russell Tribunal met in Rome March 30-April 6 to investigate charges of human rights violations in Latin America. After hearing testimony from Latin exiles and emigres, it condemned the governments of Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay for “crimes against humanity.” The tribunal’s final report, drafted by Francois Rigaux, director of the Interna tional Law Institute in Louvain, France, noted the “systematic destruction of the rule of law” in Latin America to eliminate “the victories progressively achieved in the course of the history of the worker and peasant movement.” It charged that torture had become “an instrument of public administration” that originated in “the national governments which apply it and the foreign governments which inspire it, particularly Brazil, and beyond it, the U.S.”
Press restrictions noted. The Freedom of the Press Committee of the Inter American Press Association (IAPA) reported April 5 that never in its history had it had to “contend with a greater number of violations of freedom of ex pression in the Americas.” The committee’s president, German Ornes of the Dominican Republic, had de livered a preliminary report April 3 denouncing suppression of press freedom in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Cuba, Haiti and Panama. Recently, police in the northeastern city of Recife had arrested and tortured Carlos Garcia, bureau chief of the nation’s leading newspaper, O Estado de Sao Paulo. Garcia was released after vigorous protests by the newspaper’s publisher owner, Julio de Mesquita Neto. A U.S. journalist, Henry Raymont, had been seized and quizzed Jan. 18 by Rio de Janeiro political police, who made a copy of an interview he had taped with President Juan Peron of Argentina. Raymont was released following interven tion by the executive vice president of O Jornal do Brasil, for which he wrote.
Police chief quits. Federal Police Chief Gen. Antonio Bandeira resigned in what
59 was seen as a possible move by President Geisel to end police abuses, it was reported March 16. Independent police repression continued through the last days of the Medici administration. ‘Death squad’ developments. Two po licemen were condemned to 16 and 19 years in jail respectively, in the first sentences given to members of a police “death squad,” it was reported March 15. The two had been convicted of killing a petty criminal in 1969. The development followed a resurgence of death squad activity. Death squads had accounted for 27 deaths in the first seven weeks of 1974, according to police sources in Rio, cited by the London newsletter Latin America Feb. 22. Sao Paulo police inspector Sergio Fleury, considered the leader of that city’s death squad, had been freed during this period after being held since October 1973 on charges of killing a drug peddler, it was reported Jan. 23. Fleury was acquitted Nov. 23 of killing a petty criminal in 1969 but reportedly was accused in 22 other death squad murders. (The Washington Post reported Nov. 24 that a prosecutor who had been zealous in pressing the case against Fleury had been fired without ex planation.) The bullet-riddled bodies of five men were found in an abandoned automobile outside Rio de Janeiro July 30. The vic tims, all sought by police for robbery and drug dealing, were presumed killed by the death squad. The squad was responsible for about 15 murders a month, according to the Washington Post Sept. 4. President Ernesto Geisel said he was “appalled and shocked” by the im promptu execution of two teen-aged delin quents by police in the crime-ridden Rio de Janeiro suburb of Nova Iguacu, a death squad stronghold, it was reported Aug. 30. The boys were shot to death in front of witnesses. The government ar rested two state policemen and later declared them guilty of the crime, it was reported Sept. 5.
New arrests reported. Police embarked on a new wave of political arrests April 3 22, detaining as many as 200 persons
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without disclosing charges against them. Fifty-three students, professors, jour nalists, Roman Catholic labor leaders and social workers were reported arrested in Sao Paulo April 3 following student un rest at the University of Sao Paulo and two of its branches outside the city in March. All 1,050 students at the university’s medical school had struck for more than a week, it was reported March 27, to protest the school’s internship program. The university’s Council of Academic Centers—representing the only student organizations recognized by the govern ment—had also issued a statement sup porting student protests and “reorganiza tion and strengthening of [the students’] free and representative organizations, channels of expression, and the defense of their legitimate aspirations.” Students also had struck at the university’s social sciences department to protest the timetable of some courses, and at the university’s Riberao and Sao Preto branches to protest the price of student meals. Among those detained in Sao Paulo was Francisco de Oliveira, who worked at the center for social studies CEBRAP. Sergio Fleury, the police officer recently held for alleged membership in the Sao Paulo “death squad,” helped interrogate the prisoners, the London newsletter Latin America reported April 26. More than 1,500 students and professors met at Sao Paulo University April 5 and formed the “Committee for the Defense of Brazilian Political Prisoners,” to work for the release of those arrested and enlist public support for their cause. They held further meetings and formed subcommittees in the following days, it was reported April 12. More arrests were reported in Sao Paulo April 22. The detainees, mostly students, were estimated at 100. Other ar rests were reported in Brasilia, Belo Ho rizonte and other cities. According to Latin America April 26, the arrests reflected the difficulties Pres ident Ernesto Geisel was experiencing in trying to impose a softer line on civil liberties. Geisel reportedly wanted a political deal with the Roman Catholic
LATIN AMERICA 1974
Church, the universities and the press to erase the government’s image as an abuser of human rights. However, reac tionary forces in the regime, notably a group of younger army officers, opposed any move toward a political opening, Latin America reported. Ex-presidents regain rights. The gov ernment’s 10-year suspension of the political rights of 102 persons, including ex-Presidents Joao Goulart and Janio Quadros, expired April 10. However, the regime asserted it would not tolerate “challenges and argumentations” from them. Goulart, overthrown by the armed forces in 1964, lived in Uruguay. He was quoted April 17 as saying he would never return to Brazil. Torture & disappearances. The torture of political prisoners by police and disap pearance of real and imagined opponents of the government were cited Aug. 12 by Heleno Claudio Fragoso, a leading lawyer, in an address to the national conference of the Brazilian Bar Associa tion. Fragoso demanded repeal of Institu tional Act No. 5, the 1968 law that gave the president virtually dictatorial powers. Torture and disappearances in Brazil had been denounced June 21 by Martin Ennals, secretary general of Amnesty International. The disappearances had been brought to the attention of President Geisel and his chief aide, Gen. Golbery do Couto e Silva, but Couto e Silva had denied knowledge of the whereabouts of vanished persons, the London newsletter Latin America reported July 19. Repression had been attacked by Paul Brossard, opposition candidate for governor of Rio Grande do Sul State, in a televised debate with government candi date Nestor Jost, Latin America reported Oct. 4. Following the broadcast, Sao Paulo police mounted a new wave of ar rests in an apparent effort to embarrass Geisel and thwart any moves by him to liberalize the regime, Latin America reported. U.S. Ambassador John Crimmins strongly protested Oct. 4 the torture of a U.S. citizen by police.
BRAZIL
Frederick B. Morris, a businessman and former Methodist minister living in Recife, was arrested Sept. 30 for alleged subversive activities. He told the U.S. consul in Recife, who visited him in prison, that he had been beaten by police and tortured with electric shocks “of high intensity,” according to a U.S. embassy spokesman. The consul “saw bruises and contusions on Morris’ back, buttocks and wrists,” the spokesman said. (Morris was expelled from Brazil Oct. 17 on charges of subversive activities.) Timothy Ross, a British freelance journalist who had reported on torture in Brazil, was accused with eight Brazilians of robbing a security van and a super market in 1971 and killing a guard and wounding three others in the first incident. Ross rejected the charges in Buenos Aires Oct. 4. New torture report. A new report smug gled out of Brazil and sent to various human rights organizations alleged that 78 persons had been tortured to death in Brazil for political reasons since 1969, the New York Times reported Nov. 4. The document, dated February 1974, was compiled by a group of lawyers, Roman Catholic militants, relatives of political prisoners and former prisoners, according to two of its members. Indepen dent sources including priests, professors and journalists had corroborated its in formation, the Times reported. Political prisoners were tortured princi pally by members of the Operations Center for Internal Defense, a semi clandestine organization of military and police agents under the direction of the army’s intelligence service, according to the document. More than 300 persons were identified in the report as torturers, persons who ordered torture, or infor mers. Among the victims of torture listed in the report was Rev. Henrique Pereira Neto, who was kidnapped and killed in 1969; he had been an aide to Archbishop Helder Camara. The last death by tor ture listed in the report took place in November 1973, but church sources reported that 21 persons arrested recently were now missing and some were presumed dead, according to the Times.
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Economic & Foreign Affairs Inflation, trade deficit high. The cost of living and the national trade deficit rose sharply during the first five months of 1974, forcing the government to devalue the cruzeiro four times and to institute various economic controls. The government said the cost of living rose by about 18% in January-May, but unofficial sources claimed the increase was greater, it was reported June 10. Food prices in Rio de Janeiro rose by almost 30% during the period, according to a report June 14. They rose by 14.9% in one week in April alone, after the government lifted controls on meat prices and these rose overnight by 60%. There were also food shortages dating from the last months of 1973 and early in 1974, when the outgoing government lifted artificial controls and merchants withheld food until prices rose further, it was reported May 28. The government devalued the cruzeiro four times in January-June. The fourth devaluation, reported July 5, was by 2.03%, for a total of 9.62%. The national trade deficit totaled a record $2.1 billion in January-May, with imports of $4.57 billion against exports of $2.57 billion. The May deficit alone was $700 million. The deficit was attributed largely to the high cost of oil imports. The accelerating cost of luxury imports also was a factor. The government took a number of steps to reduce the trade deficit, including a 100% surcharge on 500 luxury imports ranging from cosmetics to liquor, it was reported July 5. Other measures included a ban on the purchase of private airplanes abroad (this did not affect airlines) and a ban on credit for foreign travel. A sharp rise in the cost of fertilizer severely affected agriculture, it was reported June 21. The cost of planting cotton would rise by 15.9%, coffee by 31.2%, maize by 33.5%, wheat by 29.6% and soybeans by 20.4%. The soybean situation was particularly critical, following the collapse of world prices. Only 340,000 tons of soybeans were ex ported in January-May, against a projected 1974 total of 2.5 million tons
62 and sales of almost 700,000 tons in January-May 1973. Meanwhile, there was a worsening domestic banking crisis, and credit was extremely tight, according to the London newsletter Latin America July 5. Failures of medium-sized companies were an nounced every week, the newsletter reported. Bolivia fears penetration. Bolivian For eign Minister Alberto Guzman said his government was worried about Brazilian penetration of Bolivia and reports from Venezuela of a Brazilian plan for terri torial expansion, beginning with Bolivia, the news agency LATIN reported Jan. 11. Guzman told newsmen he was studying reports from the Community Devel opment Department of peaceful Brazilian penetration across Bolivia’s northeastern border, but he declined to comment directly on a recent report in the Caracas newspaper El Mundo, which alleged the Venezuelan government had obtained a Brazilian army plan for invasion and an nexation of Bolivian and other foreign ter ritory. (Venezuela denied knowledge of the document in a telegram to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, LATIN reported.) Bolivia was investigating allegations that Brazilian banks had been taking over land and property in Bolivia by lending money to peasants in frontier areas at high interest rates, and foreclosing when the peasants could not keep up the pay ments, the newsletter Latin America reported Jan. 18. China ties set. Brazil and China es tablished diplomatic relations Aug. 15, agreeing to exchange ambassadors “as quickly as possible.” Brazil recognized the Communist regime in Peking as the “only legal government of China” and “took note” of Peking’s claim that Taiwan was part of China. The Taiwan government sus pended relations with Brazil the next day, calling its recognition of Peking an un friendly act. Establishment of a joint Chinese-Bra zilian economic commission was an nounced after the resumption of relations. A Chinese mission had been in Brazil since
LATIN AMERICA 1974
Aug. 7. Brazil reportedly sought to buy Chinese coal, chemical products and crude oil, and China was reported pre pared to increase its purchases of Bra zilian sugar and to buy soybeans and corn. A 30-member mission headed by Giulite Coutinho, president of the Brazilian Exporters Association, had visited China in April as a first step toward establishing commercial relations.
Foreign-economic developments. A gov ernment official said May 16 that new international prices for equipment, fuel and raw materials would raise from $2 billion to $3 billion the cost of the massive Itaipu hydroelectric project, undertaken jointly with Paraguay on the Parana River. A group of international companies headed by Alcan Aluminium Ltd. of Canada and by Cia. Vale do Rio Doce of Brazil would proceed with the $170 million initial stage of a project to produce 3.7 million tons of bauxite from reserves in the Trombetas area of Brazil’s Amazon River basin, it was reported June 14. Construction would begin immediately, and shipments were planned to begin in 1978, Alcan announced. Alcan ' and its Brazilian unit Alcan Alumino do Brasil S.A. also planned a $30 million aluminum sheet rolling complex in the Sao Paulo area, it was reported June 6. The first phase of the project would be a cold rolling mill with an eventual annual capacity of 100,000 tons. The International Finance Corp. (IFC), a World Bank affiliate, announced May 8 that it would invest $64.5 million to help the Brazilian steel firm Cia. Siderurgica da Guanabara double its production ca pacity. Iron ore mining was developing rapidly in Brazil, whose known reserves of 65,000 million tons were the world’s fourth largest, it was reported May 31. The IFC April 16 had announced ar rangement of a $31 million loan to help build a textile mill in Sao Paulo State, to help meet rapidly growing domestic de mand for durable cotton fabric. General Motors Corp, of the U.S. confirmed it would invest $146 million during the next two years to build a fac tory to produce diesel engines near Sao Paulo, it was reported July 5.
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The U.S. Export-Import Bank au thorized two loans totaling $43.2 million to the Brazilian airline Varig, reported May 10, and a $22.7 million credit to the airline Viacao Aerea Sao Paulo S.A., reported April 10. The loans would help finance purchase of U.S. jetliners. The World Bank would lend Brazil $60 million to invest in its cattle industry, it was reported April 5. Brazil’s foreign debt reached a record $13.5 billion, it was reported June 28. A consortium of U.S. and other banks headed by Bank of America announced Oct. 16 an agreement to lend $45 million to the Brazilian National Railways to buy U.S.-made diesel-electric locomotives, track and accessories. Half of the total was to be lent by the Export-Import Bank.
Foreign investment up. Total foreign in vestments registered in Brazil had risen to $5.5 billion in November 1974 with over 75% of the total in manufacturing and processing industries, notably chemicals and transport materials, according to Central Bank figures cited by the Andean Times’ Latin America Economic Re port Jan.3, 1975The bank said 42 countries had “eco nomic interests” in Brazil, but 80% of these interests were controlled by six na tions—the U.S., West Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Canada and Great Britain. In addition, investments registered under Panama, the Dutch Antilles and Luxem bourg (for 7.5% of the total) were assumed to represent money from elsewhere, including Brazil itself, ac cording to the report. Of the major investors, Japan was expanding its Brazilian activities most rapidly. Japanese investments and rein vestments in Brazil bad increased by 80% from June 1973 to June 1974, to total $429 million. Among current investment plans, Shell International Petroleum Co. would spend $143 million to diversify its Brazilian in terests into petrochemicals, mining of non-ferrous metals and tourism (the last by constructing a chain of hotels and mo tels); Volkswagen of West Germany would build a new automobile factory; and Saab of Sweden would quadruple the capacity of its local automobile plant.
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Other Developments Indian policy denounced. Anthro pologists and political activists attending a conference in the U.S. Nov. 8 accused multinational corporations of conspiring with the Brazilian government to drive In dian tribes from the Amazon River Basin to speed the industrial development of the area. Speakers at the meeting at the Brook ings Institution in Washington, D.C. charged the companies and the Brazilian regime were effectively eliminating entire tribes by displacing them from their native grounds in the mineral-rich basin. The corporations included Litton In dustries and General Motors Corp, of the U.S., Fiat of Italy, Komatsu of Japan and Alcan Aluminium of Canada, all of which were involved in the construction of roads in the Amazon area, according to a report released Nov. 18 by two U.S. groups that attended the conference, Indigena Inc. and North American Friends of Brazil. Dr. Rene Fuerst of Switzerland charged at the conference that Brazil’s National Indian Foundation (FUNAI), set up to protect Indians, was actually “an in strument for the pacification of the area” to hasten its development. Fuerst said members of the Kranhacarore tribe, first contacted by FUNAI workers in 1973, contracted diseases and abandoned their fields within a year as a section of the trans-Amazon highway was built in their area. Dr. Kenneth Brecher, an anthro pologist at Oxford University in Great Britain, said Indians who had resisted FUNAI’s efforts to relocate them had been killed by soldiers. Ralph Nader, the U.S. consumer activist, called at the conference for a U.S. Congressional investigation to deter mine whether U.S. agencies and private companies were partly responsible for “the destruction of Indian nations in Brazil.” He said Brazilian government indifference and U.S.-assisted devel opment programs in the Amazon Basin had caused the elimination of 87 of the 230 tribes known in Brazil in 1900. The report by Indigena and North American Friends of Brazil said Brazilian
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Indians were “threatened now as never before. Indians continue to be system atically exterminated and destroyed.” Indians of the Waimiri-Atroaris tribe had killed five members of a FUNA1 pacification group and wounded three others in an ambush Oct. 3 north of Manaus. Other Indians had attacked a work gang on the trans-Amazon highway Nov. 17, apparently kidnapping three la borers. Thousands die in Brazilian floods. An estimated 2,000-5,000 persons were killed following massive flooding, Brazilian of ficials reported. The rains, which ended March 29, followed months of drought and caused over $400 million in damage which left more than 300,000 homeless. The worst hit area was Tubarao, an agricultural community in southern Santa Catarina, with a population of 70,000. As many as 1,000 persons were reported dead. Waters of the Tubarao River re portedly rose over 36 feet within hours. Severe flooding also occurred in the north, where whole towns were evacuated and many cattle drowned. There were re ports of malaria, yellow fever and ty phoid.
Meningitis epidemic. An outbreak of meningitis in Brazil took more than 2,000 lives and affected about 20,000 Brazilians between January and mid-October, ac cording to data made public by Health Minister Paulo de Almeida Machado. In Sao Paulo, the city worst hit by the epidemic, meningitis caused 200 hospi talizations and 15 deaths a day. Dr. Carlos de Oliveira Bastos, director of the city’s Emilio Ribas Hospital, said most of the victims were slum dwellers. The number of cases in Rio de Janeiro had increased from three to nine daily since January, according to the state’s health secretary, Silvio Barboza da Cruz, Nov. 2. Some 140 persons were estimated to have died from meningitis in Rio since July. There were also numerous cases of meningitis in Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre and Brasilia, according to United Press International Nov. 2. The Health Ministry had not admitted
LATIN AMERICA 1974 the gravity of the situation until Aug. 7, when it sent a report to President Geisel disclosing that 10,572 cases of meningitis had been reported in Brazil in JanuaryJuly—7,851 in Sao Paulo—with a fatality rate of more than 10%. Spread of the disease was facilitated by malnutrition and inadequate sanitary fa cilities among Sao Paulo’s poor, insufficient hospital space and medical personnel to attend the sick, and a lack of vaccine to combat the disease. Meningitis was an inflammation of the membrane surrounding the brain, caused in Brazil’s case by the meningococcus bacterium, which could be spread through nasal and throat discharges. Health au thorities recommended that citizens eat more protein and avoid congested areas, but neither of these precautions were possible for those hit hardest. (According to an Education Ministry report cited by the news agency LATIN Aug. 18, 70% of Brazil’s children aged 2-6 were undernourished.) The influential O Estado de Sao Paulo and other newspapers criticized the government July 24-25 for not immu nizing Sao Paulo’s two million children and for not providing adequate hospital facilities, for the city. News of the epi demic was censored in publications throughout Brazil beginning July 26. O Estado de Sao Paulo reported July 26 that Brazil had no meningitis vac cine to combat the epidemic, that state and federal health authorities were not coordinating their activities and that there was panic in the city. Health Minister Almeida Machado an nounced July 27 that 226,000 doses of vac cine had arrived from France but could not be used until the government finished testing them in mid-August. Vaccine also had been ordered from the U.S., but it did not arrive until Aug. 3. Thousands of persons fled Sao Paulo July 27 after the official death toll passed 220. Hundreds of cases also were reported in Rio and Brasilia, where hospital fa cilities were equally inadequate. Uruguay closed its Brazilian border Aug. 1 to prevent spread of the disease into its territory, and Paraguay began in specting persons crossing its border after
BRAZIL seven cases and one death from meningitis were reported there. Peru, Argentina and Bolivia also announced special health in spections of persons entering from Brazil, it was reported Aug. 6.
The epidemic grew worse in early Sep tember, killing a record 90 persons in Sao Paulo during the first week of the month. A record 2,426 persons were hospitalized in that city Sept. 18. (According to the London newsletter Latin America Aug. 2, epidemics of men ingitis and other diseases in Brazil’s cities were linked to the declining standard of living and the collapse of public services. Measles and dysentery remained the most serious diseases in working class districts, causing more than 30% of all deaths of young children.
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(Health Minister Almeida Machado had admitted in a speech to Congress in June that his ministry had “an obsolete, an tifunctional structure, lacking any sense of purpose or planning,” Latin America reported. He noted a steady decline of federal budget resources allocated to health, from 12.6% of the total in 1968 to 5.3% in 1971. and down further in 1971 73. But Latin America reported Sept. 20 that funds allocated to the Health Min istry in the 1975 budget were 72% greater than in the 1974 budget, presumably as a result of the meningitis outbreak. (An outbreak of bubonic plague had killed 32 persons in Bahia State since July, it was reported Oct. 5. More than 300 cases were reported, but health officials claimed the disease was now “under con trol.”)
Chile
The New York Times reported Jan. 12 that the junta had recently arrested at least six physicians connected with the ousted government, including former Health Minister Mario Lagos, lung spe cialist Victor Farga and nutrition expert Giorgio Solimano Cantuarias. The current health minister, air force Col. Alberto Spoerer Covarrubia, said the arrests probably were linked to investiga tions into the discovery of 25-30 clan destine hospitals in the Santiago area. Spoerer said the hospitals were part of the ousted government’s alleged plan to at tack the armed forces, but other sources said they had been set up in the event of an attempted military coup and resulting civil war, the Times reported. Spoerer said 16 doctors were being held in the Chacabuco detention camp in northern Chile, some having been con victed of “actively participating” in formation of the hospitals. In Valparaiso, the Times added, 60 left-wing or indepen dent doctors, of a total of 400, were being investigated and risked suspension from medical practice, and another 15 had been jailed or forced to flee. Le Monde reported Jan. 12 that the International Actors Federation had protested the persecution of Chilean artists by the junta. The Sweden-based group named 14 performers and directors killed, tortured, jailed or disappeared since the coup. Abuse of human rights in the port city of Valparaiso was reported by the New
Repressions Continue The military junta ruling Chile was ac cused throughout 1974 of continuing such repressions as arbitrary arrests, the torture ofprisoners, political killings and press sup pression. By late June, Gen. Augusto Pino chet Ugarte had emerged as the strongman of the junta.
Killings & arrests. Ex-Sen. Carlos Altamirano, the leftist most sought by the military junta, appeared Jan. 2 in Havana. Altamirano said at a press conference the following day that since the Sep tember 1973 coup two-thirds of the So cialist national and regional leadership had been killed or imprisoned, but the party remained alive and committed “to fight until the complete defeat of the fascist military junta.” Altamirano charged that since the coup, more than 15,000 persons had been “assassinated,” more than 30,000 arrested for political reasons, thousands tortured, more than 200,000 dismissed from their jobs and more than 25,000 expelled from universities. He charged that many priests had been killed or imprisoned and 175 had been deported. Altamirano praised the many priests who had helped leftists escape from Chile but denounced the Roman Catholic hierarchy for not speaking out against the junta’s “atrocities.” 66
CHILE York Times Jan. 23. The navy, which con trolled the city, had reportedly per secuted supporters of the ousted govern ment, and arrests and torture of prisoners there were continuing. Residents believed more persons had been killed in Valpa raiso than elsewhere during and after the military coup and believed the nationwide death toll was 15,000, compared with the 2,500 figure then admitted by the junta, the Times reported. Seven men employed by a Santiago construction firm had been arrested for inciting workers to strike, it was reported Jan. 21. They were the first strike arrests confirmed by the junta.
Extremists executed—Authorities Jan. 19 announced the execution of six extre mists for their part in an armed attack the day before on a military jeep outside the northern city of Quillota. Six other alleged extremists, being transported in the jeep from one prison to another, were allegedly killed in the at tack, and two prisoners, identified as lawyer Ruben Cabezas and former Quillota Mayor Pablo Gac, both So cialists, allegedly escaped. Other executions, torture and political arrests were reported by refugees from Chile arriving in Cuba, according to the Cuban press agency Prensa Latina Jan. 3. Eighteen Communist youths were reportedly executed Dec. 25, 1973, following the killing of three other youths Dec. 14, according to Prensa Latina. The latter three were among 10 arrested in a raid on a sports club; the seven survivors were tortured, Prensa Latina reported. Authorities also were raiding schools to arrest leftist students and had jailed student Patricio Vergara, son of former Interior Undersecretary Daniel Vergara, according to Prensa Latina. Victor Jara, a leftist folk singer who had won fame throughout Chile, had been mur dered in the national stadium in Santiago after the military coup, according to an article by a Chilean refugee in Argentina printed by the Buenos Aires newspaper La Opinion Jan. 3.
Resistance continues—Le Monde Jan. 5 reported a number of acts of resistance against the military government, in cluding the bombing of a factory in the
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northern city of Calama Jan. 2, which killed one person and injured another. Unidentified persons blew up a warehouse in Punta Arenas and tried unsuccessfully to blow up a section of the trans-Andean railway, Le Monde reported Jan. 9. In a related development Feb. 6, Gen. Pinochet charged that 45 home-made grenades and enough material to assemble 76 other grenades had been found in a house in Santiago. He said a “gigantic” explosives factory allegedly discovered in the Santiago suburb of Maipu a week be fore was “one of at least five arms and ex plosives deposits of terrorists.” Ex-ministers freed—The junta Jan. 24 announced the release of five prisoners, in cluding ex-Cabinet ministers Carlos Briones and Pascual Barraza, saying there were no official charges against them. The others released were Aniceto Rodriguez, former senator and leader of the Socialist Party’s moderate wing; Raul Ampuero, former senator from the small Popular Socialist Union, and Hernan Mu nita Contreras. Le Monde reported Jan. 29 that Angel Parra, a popular singer, also had been re leased. Patricio Hurtado, a former deputy from the MAPU Party, was released from the Chacabuco detention camp May 19, reportedly because no charges had been lodged against him. Torture charges continue. Amnesty International charged Jan. 20 that the military junta had allowed widespread torture of political prisoners under the guidance of “foreign experts," specifically Brazilian police agents. Amnesty Secretary General Martin Ennals said in a letter to Gen. Augusto Pi nochet Ugarte, junta president, that an Amnesty commission that visited Chile in November 1973 had interviewed po litical prisoners who showed “visible signs of torture” and prison guards who freely admitted the training of Chilean interro gators by Brazilian agents. The guards reportedly referred to a four-day training course given by the Brazilians in the Chil ean Defense Ministry building. Ennals charged recent reports from Chile indicated torture of political pris
LATIN AMERICA 1974
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oners and other abuses of human rights were continuing. The Amnesty team—Frank C. New man, of the University of California Law School at Berkeley; Bruce W. Sumner, presiding judge of the Orange County, Calif. Supreme Court, and Roger Plant, an Amnesty staff researcher—spoke with prisoners and guards in the National Sta dium in Santiago, now vacated of prisoners. According to Ennals, they were given “considerable liberty” to con duct their inquiry. The commission’s findings, released at United Nations headquarters in New York Jan. 18, were rejected by the junta, which said the commission had refused to go outside Santiago and thus could not make a well-founded judgment on Chile as a whole. A spokesman for the commission said the inquiry had been limited because its members were short of time. Excerpts from the Amnesty report: SOME INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS
1. In Chile are there prisoners of con science? The answer Is Yes. Because of their beliefs are people threat ened with detention, though they have neither usedr nor advocated violence? The answer is Yes. In our opinion the statement In thé UN General Assembly on October 9, 1973, that "We do not persecute anyone for political reasons in Chile,” was not accurate. 2. Are prisoners treated humanely? The answer is No, Far too many detainees have been kept In communicado, their families advised as to neither the fact of arrest nor the place of detention. ... 3. Is torture used? In our opinion the 2d statement In the UN General Assembly on October 9, 1973, that "We have no tortures In Chile,” al&o was not accurate. Yet as of November 8, when we left. We be lieve that, in the Santiago area, at least, the Use off torture nad decreased. ...
4. Are people being executed? The Answer is Yes. In our opinion the 3d statement in the General As&mbly on October 9, that "We do not mutder anyone In Chile’, was in accurate if Ambassador Bazan meant to finply that since September 11 thb government forces have killed no one Without just cause, Without trial. (Of. to his letter of Septem ber 25 to the UN Secretary General, 8G/.SM/ 1893, p. 2: "(Hluman rights will be faith fully observed m Chfié. , . . Regarding th« Insidious nlmours about tortures and mass
or arbitrary executions in Chile, my govern ment denies them with Its utmost vigor ...”) Near the end of October the government decreed that summary executions should cease. Since then executions are said to be pursuant td sentence Of the courts ihartlal. Often At night we heard gunfire; no one suggested to us durlrig out stay that people thus wire executed. Many people believe, though that killings of "fleeing prisoners” hate not in fact been Justified. .. B. Was International law violated by the arrests, detentions, interrogations, and kill ings that have taken place since September 11? The answer Is Yes.. ..
Socialist reported tortured. Chilean sources in Lima, Peru said Alejandro Jiliberto, administrative undersecretary of the outlawed Socialist Party, had been tortured and lay near death in a Santiago military hospital, according to the Cuban press agency Prensa Latina Jan. 16. The French newspaper Le Monde confirmed Jan. 24 that Jiliberto, a former legislator, had been arrested at the end of December 1973 and was in grave con dition. Opposition ‘recess’ decree. The junta Jan. 21 issued a decree regulating the “re cess” of the former opposition political parties, declared shortly after the military coup. The decree prohibited virtually all of the parties’ former activities, allowing them only to keep most of their property. Party registries, however, were closed retroactively to Oct. 11, 1973 and ordered turned over to the Interior Ministry.
Christian Democrats criticize junta. Leaders of the Christian Democratic Party made their first major criticism of the military junta’s social and economic policies but asserted they had not broken with the armed forces. The criticism was contained in a letter to the junta president, Gen. Augusto Pi nochet Ugarte, from party President Pat ricio Aylwin and First Vice President Osvaldo Olguin. It was dated Jan. 18 and reported by the foreign press Feb. 8. “A lasting order cannot be created on the basis of repression,” the letter declared. “Many Chileans have been or
CHILE are being deprived of their jobs, detained, censured, threatened or pressured in different ways without any justification other than the ideas or opinions which they profess, or which are attributed to them.” The letter denounced the “denial of any real possibility of adequate defense for ac cused persons; preventive detention of undetermined length for people who are not tried by competent tribunals; and the use of moral or physical pressures to ob tain confessions.” These constituted “a denial of justice and a grave violation of human rights,” the letter charged. The letter also protested the suspension of political party activity and de nounced “a systematic and malevolent campaign against the Christian Dem ocrats.” It added; “We are convinced that the absolute inactivity of the democratic sectors facilitates the underground efforts of the Marxist groups. Without guidelines from their leaders, our rank and file mem bers and sympathizers are at the mercy of rumor, trickery and infiltration.” As for economic matters, the letter protested junta policies that it said placed the heaviest burden on the poor. “The remunerations of workers barely permit them to feed themselves and in many cases do not allow them to meet the vital needs of their families,” the letter declared. “We do not exaggerate when we say that there are many who are hungry. Meanwhile, there are businesses whose profits exceed all expectations. No one can ignore the injustice of this situation and the dangers which it entails.” Aylwin met with Interior Minister Gen. Oscar Bonilla Jan. 28 and 29. He said in a subsequent private memorandum that Christian Democratic leaders wanted the period of military rule “to be as brief as possible” but understood “that it cannot be too brief, that it can last two, three or maybe five years,” the New York Times reported Feb. 8. Bonilla was said to have replied to the Christian Democratic criticism by asserting that repression was necessary to defeat groups that proposed violence and “have the arms to do it,” according to the Miami Herald Feb. 10. Defense Minister Patricio Carvajal said Feb. 11 that the junta’s ultimate objective was “to prevent a return to the polluted
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democracy which allowed a minority of demagogues as dupes to take command of the nation.” Even the right-wing National Party, a vigorous supporter of the junta, had protested the repression, the Washington Post reported March 23. Former Na tional Sen. Francisco Bulnes said he had protested the suspension of political activities and other arbitratry measures, but had been ignored by the junta.
Edelstam denounces junta—Harald Edelstam, former Swedish ambassador to Chile, asserted in Mexico Jan. 12 that the junta was supported by “only 30%” of the Chilean people and might be forced to hold free elections by “pressures from in side and outside Chile.” Edelstam, expelled from Chile in December 1973, charged “the persecu tions by the Chilean military junta continue implacably. The resistance reor ganizes day by day.” Refugees flee Chile. A stream of refu gees was reported flowing from Chile. The Geneva-based Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration had reported Jan. 2 that since mid-October 1973, 2,225 refugees, about half Chilean, had left Chile for other countries. Most reportedly went to Western Europe, with the largest number, 442, going to Sweden, and the next largest, 385, to France. Only three Eastern European countries had taken refugees, with 45 going to East Germany, 17 to Yugoslavia and three to the Soviet Union, the committee reported. (The Washington Post reported Jan. 5 that only three Communist nations—East Germany, Yugoslavia and Cuba—had re sponded favorably to an appeal by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, to take refugees from U.N. posts in Chile. (Cuba had agreed to take 100 and East Germany 70, according to the Post. But the New York Times reported Jan. 10 that East Germany had granted asylum to 400, identified by the Communist news paper Neues Deutschland as members of Chile’s ousted Popular Unity coalition. The U.S.S.R. had been criticized by Latin American leftists for refusing to accept
70 Chilean refugees, many of whom were loyal members of Chile’s Moscow-line Communist Party.) The Paris paper Le Monde reported Jan. 3 that France led all nations in ac cepting refugees from Chile, having welcomed some 1,000 persons fleeing the military regime. The figure was confirmed the next day by French Premier Pierre Messmer. According to Le Monde, the refugees included more than 600 Chileans, some 60 French nationals (many of them priests and nuns) and about 300 other non Chileans (including leftists from other Latin American countries who had found temporary asylum in posts established by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Red Cross). The junta had recently granted the French embassy 191 safe-conducts, all requested before the Dec. 11, 1973 deadline, Le Monde reported. This left in question only about 30 so-called “difficult cases,” most involving former govern ment officials being investigated by the junta for possible criminal prosecution. The junta had extended to Feb. 3 the deadline for refugees in foreign embassies to leave Chile, Le Monde reported Jan. 5. The junta reported Jan. 7 that it had granted 6,462 safe-conduct passes for travel abroad, including 3,419 to Chileans hiding in foreign embassies. It claimed to have expelled 552 foreigners and allowed 605 others to leave since the military coup. Some 80 refugees left Chile for Cuba Jan. 8. They included Bolivian, Uru guayan and Brazilian nationals as well as Chileans. Cuban officials in London and other European cities were urging Chilean refugees there to move to Havana and join a movement to overthrow the junta, the Miami Herald reported Jan. 21. U.N. officials said 1,750 foreign refugees remained in their Chilean sanc tuaries, and only 260 of these had received safe-conduct. No foreign countries had volunteered to take any of the remaining refugees, according to the officials. Eighty Chilean refugees, identified as Socialist Party members and relatives of imprisoned leftists, traveled to France Jan. 16 after hiding in the French embassy in Santiago since the military coup.
LATIN AMERICA 1974 The Foreign Ministry announced Jan. 15 that it would grant safe-conduct to nine former government officials and legisla tors hiding in the Colombian embassy, in cluding ex-Congressman Oscar Garreton, leader of the outlawed MAPU Party, and Hernan del Canto, the former interior minister and government secretary gen eral. Sergio Insunza, justice minister in the ousted government, was later granted permission to leave his refuge in the Hon duran embassy and to go abroad. A hospitalized ex-minister, Rolando Calderon, was returned to the Swedish embassy in Santiago, it was reported Feb. 15. He had been shot by a sniper in December 1973 while under Swedish pro tection in the Cuban embassy. The term of duration of the United Na tions-sponsored National Committee for Aid to Refugees had expired Feb. 3, but a private organization to operate its refugee centers had simultaneously been es tablished, according to Ernest Schlatter, representative of the U.N. High Com missioner for Refugees. U.N. sources said about 7,000 foreign and Chilean refugees had left Chile since the military coup. The junta had decided to reject any new requests by refugees for safe-conduct abroad, Le Monde reported Feb. 9. How ever, it continued to consider requests received previously. Argentina protests shooting—The Ar gentine government formally protested Jan. 3 and 7 the fatal shooting by police of a Chilean who had taken asylum in the Argentine embassy in Santiago. The victim, Sergio Leiva Molina, was shot late Jan. 2 and died Jan. 3. Police claimed he had left the Argentine embassy grounds and was trying to re-enter them when he was shot. The embassy said he had not left the embassy garden. Leiva reportedly had been granted safe-conduct and was waiting to leave for Argentina when he was killed. Chilean Foreign Undersecretary En rique Carvallo was dismissed Jan. 7, reportedly as a result of the Leiva in cident. Chilean police entered the Argentine embassy in Santiago and arrested the sec retary general of the Revolutionary Rad ical Youth, Alejandro Montesinos, who had taken asylum there, the Buenos Aires newspaper Noticias reported March 14.
CHILE
Press under control. The junta Jan. 12 established prepublication censorship of all newspapers and magazines, and sus pended the right-wing newspaper La Segunda. No explanations for either move were given. However, the New York Times reported Jan. 13 that the censorship was imposed, in the words of one source, “to prevent the spread of alarmist news,” and La Segunda was closed for printing a front-page article Jan. 11 on the current cigarette shortage, brought on by price speculation. The junta earlier had abolished the left wing press and allowed only newspapers that supported it and exercised self censorship. The prior censorship of the news me dia was lifted later, but the regime ordered the media to continue to censor itself, it was reported Feb. 6. Col. Pedro Ewing, government secretary general, said he expected “cooperation from all news media to avoid distorted in formation.” The junta Feb. 6 decreed prison sentences for persons responsible for publications, cartoons, articles or headlines which were pornographic or violated good taste. The Christian Democratic organ La Prensa had been censored for the first time, it was reported Feb. 8. An editorial on the independence of the judiciary was deleted by military officials. The pa per’s directors said Feb. 21 that the paper was closing for financial reasons. They denied there were also political reasons, although observers noted that La Prensa had reflected growing Christian Demo cratic disenchantment with the military junta. A Chilean newsman, Manuel Cabieses Donoso, had been tortured at Chacabuco and was in a “very precarious” state of health, the Venezuelan newspaper El Globo reported Feb. 17. In a related development, George Roth, a British journalist, was held by police Feb. 27-28 and threatened with expulsion for sending abroad dispatches with allegedly “gross distortions.” The junta April 19 ordered the expul sion of another foreign journalist, Pierre Rieben of Switzerland.
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Augustin Giannoni, Santiago director of Inter Press news service, was arrested May 14 in connection with a story he wrote on military maneuvers in the capital. He was released May 17 and deported to his native Uruguay. The radio station Radio Presidente Balmaceda, owned by the Christian Democratic Party, was placed under direct military censorship June 7.
Press restrictions noted. The Freedom of the Press Committee of the Inter American Press Association (IAPA) reported April 5 that never in its history had it had to “contend with a greater number of violations of freedom of ex pression in the Americas.” The committee’s president, German Ornes of the Dominican Republic, had de livered a preliminary report April 3 denouncing suppression of press freedom in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Cuba, Haiti and Panama. Senior generals resign. Two senior army generals considered to be politically moderate resigned in February, ap parently strengthening the government’s hardline forces led by junta members Gen. Gustavo Leigh Guzman and Adm. Jose Toribio Merino. Gen. Manuel Torres de la Cruz, the army’s new inspector general, resigned Feb. 19, and Gen. Orlando Urbina Her rera, chief of the general staff, quit the next day. Torres was replaced by Gen. Hector Bravo Munoz, who kept his job as chief of logistics. Torres had been linked with the con servative sector of the Christian Demo cratic Party, led by ex-President Eduardo Frei. Urbina had belonged to the group of “constitutionalist” officers who sur rounded the former army commander in chief, Gen. Carlos Prats Gonzalez, an op ponent of the September 1973 military coup. He- was associated with Gens. Mario Sepulveda and Guillermo Pick ering, who resigned with Prats in August 1973.
72 Kennedy denounces junta. U.S. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D, Mass.) ex coriated the military junta Feb. 3 and urged President Nixon to “condition any U.S. military or economic assistance on the junta’s respect for human rights and progress in the restoration of constitu tional government.” “More than four months after the vio lent overthrow of the Allende govern ment,” Kennedy said, “the junta continues its gross violations of human rights. Reports in many quarters—in cluding our own government as well as the most respected international humani tarian organizations—suggest continued repression, the denial of safe-conduct passes to many political refugees, new waves of arrests, the torture of prisoners, and executions at an alarming rate.” Kennedy, chairman of the Senate Judi ciary Subcommittee on Refugees, re leased a partially censored version of a Jan. 28 State Department letter replying to a series of questions he submitted to the department on conditions in Chile. Specific estimates of deaths during the military coup were deleted, but Kennedy said they were “in the thousands.” U.N. unit asks rights observance. The United Nations Human Rights Com mission sent a message to the military junta Feb. 28 asking it to end “all viola tions of human rights, committed in defiance of the principles enunciated in the United Nations Charter and in other international documents . . .” The Commission said it had “examined with profound uneasiness the numerous reports from diverse sources according to which flagrant and massive violations of human rights have been committed in Chile.” It asked in particular that the junta release five important political prisoners—Clodomiro Almeyda, Luis Corvalan, Enrique Kirberg, Pedro Felipe Ramirez and Anselmo Sule—whose “situation has been reported as danger ous.” The message resulted from a com promise in which the Soviet Union agreed to drop a resolution condemning the sup pression of human rights in Chile, in return for which Chile dropped a reso lution denouncing Moscow’s treatment
LATIN AMERICA 1974 and exiling of writer Alexander Solzhe nitsyn. Chile reportedly agreed to release the men, two of whom—Corvalan, head of the outlawed Chilean Communist Party, and Kirberg, a former.university rector— the Soviets were particularly concerned about. The message followed an emotional ap peal to the Commission Feb. 25 by Hortensia Bussi de Allende, widow of Chilean President Salvador Allende. She asked the Commission to condemn the Chilean junta for “genocidal repression.” Although U.S. immigration authorities allowed Mrs. Allende to make the U.N. appeal, they prohibited her from traveling to Washington, D.C., where she was scheduled to appear at a press conference on Chile organized by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D, Mass.), the Cuban press agency Prensa Latina reported Feb. 26. Kennedy was among several U.S. legislators who sponsored a Capitol Hill forum on Chile financed by the Fund for New Priorities, the Washington Post reported March 11. He told the forum that several international investigations and “the innumerable personal accounts that have been submitted to my office disclose the grossest violations of human rights” in Chile.
Representatives of the World Fed eration of Democratic Youths reported March 11, after visiting Chile, that the military junta was holding more than 30,000 political prisoners. The Bertrand Russell Tribunal met in Rome March 30-April 6 to investigate charges of human rights violations in Latin America. After hearing testimony from Latin exiles and emigres, it condemned the governments of Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay for “crimes against humanity.”
At a Scandinavian conference, the for eign ministers of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland called April 5 for more world pressure against political persecution and imprisonment in Chile. Swedish Foreign Minister Sven Andersson said “world opinion [regarding Chile] unfortunately is not as active as popular opinion in the Scandinavian coun tries.”
CHILE The Soviet news agency Tass reported April 7 that Luis Souza, director of a publicity campaign to improve the junta’s image abroad, had been mistakenly ar rested and tortured for four days. Se curity forces reportedly called the incident a “regrettable error.” A State Department official said April 15 that the U.S. had expressed concern over reports of human rights violations in Chile, the Washington Post reported April 16. Chilean Foreign Minister Ismael Huerta, in the U.S. April 15, said he was unaware of the expression of concern.
State of emergency extended—The junta announced March 16 that the sixmonth state of emergency, which allowed arrests without charges, among other measures, would remain in force until Sept. 11, one year after the military coup. Political arrests continued, keeping pace with releases of political prisoners, and included members of apolitical re ligious groups. The junta announced March 22 that it had transferred to the Pisagua prison camp, in the northern desert, five leaders of the Silo movement who had been held in Santiago for more than a month. Siloists advocated a communal, nonmaterialistic way of life; the junta ac cused them of being “servants of interna tional communism” seeking to implant “malignant ideas in youthful minds” and destroy the traditional family system. An earlier police raid on the Santiago temple of the Divine Light Mission re sulted in the arrest of 208 disciples of the young Indian guru Maharaj Ji, the New York Times reported March 24. Those arrested included 12 foreigners, who were expelled from Chile March 22. Torture report disclosed—The Mexican newspaper Excelsior May 16 published excerpts from an extensive report on tor ture of Chilean political prisoners, pre pared by a Chilean interchurch group called the Committee of Cooperation for Peace in Chile. The committee was sponsored by Chile’s Roman Catholic, Protestant and Jewish religious leaders. Its report, not in tended for publication, was obtained by Excelsior director Julio Scherer Garcia during a recent visit to Chile. Scherer wrote the May 16 article and subsequent
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reports on other aspects of repression by thejunta. The report cited at least 134 cases of torture of political prisoners and 12 cases of death by torture since the September 1973 military coup. “The tortures noted here,” it declared, “are only those that leave no margin of doubt. They have been recalled by those who suffered them, or recounted by those who witnessed them.” The cases were cited by date, location and type of torture. The tortures included beatings, burns, immersion in water, electrical shock and simulated executions. A spokesman for the junta charged May 17 that the Excelsior story was “a grave distortion of reality” based on “material of dubious quality.” Chile’s censored press denounced the Mexican newspaper, with El Mercurio, Santiago’s leading daily, accusing it of starting “a new campaign against the junta.” (The Geneva-based International Com mission of Jurists declared May 16 that three of its members had visited Chile for 10 days in April and found that Chilean political prisoners were systematically subjected to “various forms of ill treat ment, sometimes amounting to severe torture.”) Excelsior published another article by Scherer May 19 reporting that since the military coup 25% of Chile’s university professors had been fired and 20,000 students suspended or expelled for po litical or moral reasons. Toha suicide reported. The military junta announced March 15 that former Interior and Defense Minister Jose Toha Gonzalez, a close aide of the late Pres ident Salvador Allende, had hanged himself in a Santiago military hospital. The announcement was challenged by Chilean and foreign leftists, ecclesiastical authorities and independent observers, who doubted that Toha, who apparently was dying of stomach cancer, was strong enough to hang himself. Former Chilean Socialist Party leader Carlos Altamirano charged in Paris that Toha had been mur dered after being subjected to more than six months of “extreme physical and psychological tortures,” according to the French newspaper Le Monde March 20.
74 The primate of Chile’s Roman Catholic Church, Raul Cardinal Silva Henriquez, celebrated a requiem mass for Toha in the Santiago cathedral March 17, a service never celebrated for suicides. An esti mated 3,000 mourners followed the funeral procession, and many shouted leftist slogans banned after the September 1973 military coup. Former Socialist Sen. Aniceto Rodriguez was prevented from delivering the funeral oration by military authorities. Among the mourners were members of the former opposition political parties, in cluding Tomas Pablo, ex-president of the Senate, and Fernando Castillo Velasco, former rector of Catholic University. Some sources reported a number of ar rests after the ceremony, according to the London newsletter Latin America March 22. Junta President Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte March 20 rejected charges that Toha had been murdered and denounced Carlos Altamirano as “a mollusk trying to leave tracks which he couldn’t establish in Chile.”
Death sentences revoked. Several death sentences were commuted to life impris onment. Two members of the outlawed Socialist Party were sentenced to death by a military court in Osorno, the Cuban news paper Granma reported March 30. The charges against them were violation of the arms control law and “terrorism and political activism.” Five members of the outlawed Socialist Party were sentenced to death April 25 by a military court in San Fernando, south of Santiago, for encouraging resistance to the armed forces. They were resentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor May 6, following protests against the death sentences from the Inter-American Com mission on Human Rights and various foreign governments. Two other Socialists were sentenced to death and four to life imprisonment by a military court in Valdivia May 5. The bishop of Valdivia called for clemency for them May 7, and the commutation of their sentences to life imprisonment was reported June 11.
LATIN AMERICA 1974 The junta had decided to grant appeals on all death sentences, it was reported May 20. In the past, no appeals of court martial verdicts had been permitted. Naval authorities in Valparaiso an nounced May 2 that the city’s former civil police chief, Juan Bustos Marchant, had committed suicide in jail.
Air force sedition trials. A military court in Santiago April 17-June 7 tried 57 air force officials and 10 civilians publicly on charges of sedition. The court July 30 ordered death sen tences for three ex-officers and a civilian and prison terms ranging from 300 days to life for 60 other defendants. (Final sentences pronounced Sept. 27 ranged from 200 days to 30 years.) The death sentences were commuted Aug. 5 to 30 years in prison by Gen. Jose Berdichevski, who as military judge re viewed all cases. The men whose sentences were commuted were ex-Capt. Raul Vergara Meneses, former Col. Ernesto Galaz Guzman, ex-Sgt. Belarmino Constanzo Merino, and Carlos Lazo. Lazo had been vice president of the state bank and a leader of the Socialist Party under the late President Salvador Allende. Four persons were acquitted, including Gen. Alberto Bachelet, who died of a reported heart attack in prison in March. A second defendant who had died before coming to trial was Jose Espinosa Santis, who, according to defense attorneys, had been shot to death in an air force com pound several months before. Two of the defendants—ex-Capt. Carlos Carvacho and ex-Cpl. Ivan Figueroa—were sentenced to life im prisonment, and four other former officers received 20-year jail terms. Maria Teresa Wedeles Mendez, Lazo’s private secretary and the only woman on trial, received a 300-day sentence. The air force prosecutor, Gen. Orlando Gutierrez, had opened the proceedings April 17 with an announcement that a confession had been obtained from each defendant. (Defense attorneys had charged pri vately that the confessions were obtained by torture, the New York Times reported April 18. Defense lawyer Roberto Garr-
CHILE eton said all of his clients “were tortured through beatings and electricity into signing confessions.”) The prosecution charged the defendants had committed treason by establishing ties with the civilian Marxist parties and turning over “military secrets” to “the enemy.” The enemy was defined as the Popular Unity government, which the prosecution alleged had lost its legitimacy by repeatedly breaking the law. Defense attorneys argued that if the ousted government was the enemy, then military’officials who had served in it be fore joining the coup, such as air force Gens. Cesar Ruiz and Humberto Magliochetti, were also liable to charges. Ruiz currently was rector of the University of Chile. Defense attorney Horacio Carvajal challenged the legitimacy of the court April 18, asserting it could not try offenses against Chile’s military code under wartime rules because a state of war was not declared until Sept. 11, 1973, the day of the coup. The court-martial president, Gen. Juan Soler, rejected this argument April 19, asserting the armed forces had been engaged in an undeclared war against armed groups within Chile as much as two years before the coup. Jaime Cruzat, a civilian lawyer assisting the prosecution, said the war dated from 1971, when foreign arms shipments to the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) were first noted. Lazo and another civilian, Socialist ex Sen. Eric Schnake, had been among the last to be tried, both on charges of high treason. The prosecution charged June 4 that they had received, from military officers loyal to Allende, military secrets that would have endangered the nation’s internal and external security had they fallen into the hands of Argentine and Cuban citizens who at that time were working for the government. Among defendants for whom the death penalty was asked was ex-Capt. Carlos Carvacho. He was accused May 28 of giving the MIR a map of the El Bosque air force base, so the MIR could take it over. Most defense attorneys and foreign legal observers questioned the legal foun dations of the trials, and the validity of confessions. Schnake’s attorney claimed
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that before Schnake signed his confession, he was held “incommunicado for long periods, often without food, tied and with a sack over his head. He was beaten and mistreated.” One of the foreign observers, Joseph P. Morray of the U.S., charged that the rights of one defendant, an air force sergeant, had been violated May 29 when a judge cut off his attorney’s remarks as “political” and ordered the attorney re placed. The prosecution made “political” statements when it called the Allende government “illegal,” Morray asserted. A second observer, Argentine judge Salvador Maria Lozada, said May 31 that “justice is absent” from the trials. “When a defense attorney denounces torture,” he noted, “he is silenced. But the prosecutor is allowed to characterize the MIR and the Popular Unity government parties as ‘enemies’ in his arguments.” Former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, also an observer at the trials, asserted May 27, on his return to the U.S., that “democracy is dead” in Chile. He said that the military junta’s “reign of terror” continued while the U.S. remained silent. Clark June 3 accused the Nixon Administration of being one of the junta’s principal props. Other trials—The court-martial of 51 MIR members began in Temuco March 27, and was reported concluded March 30. The French newspaper Le Monde said March 30 that 47 of the defendants had been sentenced to jail terms ranging from two months to 20 years. The charges against them included violation of the arms control law and the internal security law. A military court in Rancagua May 28 sentenced 17 men to terms ranging from 241 days to eight years for allegedly creating paramilitary groups with ex treme leftists and violating the internal se curity law in O’Higgins Province before the coup. Seven others were acquitted. An air force military tribunal June 13 sentenced. 19 men to prison terms ranging from 41 days to life for opposing the armed forces after the September 1973 coup, the London Times reported June 15. Two other men were set free.
76 Vuskovic, Del Canto leave. Two officials of the ousted government, former Economy Minister Pedro Vuskovic and ex-interior Minister Hernan del Canto, were allowed to go into exile after spending several months in foreign embassies in Santiago. Del Canto flew to Colombia April 13 and Vuskovic to Mexico April 21. The Mexican government had given top priority to obtaining Vuskovic’s release, the Washington Post reported April 22. Mexican Foreign Ministry sources said Mexico had conditioned future purchases of Chilean goods on Vuskovic’s emi gration. The governments of Colombia and Venezuela had accused the junta April 9 of procrastinating in granting safe-con duct passes to persons who had taken asylum in their embassies in Santiago.
Refugees fly to Mexico. Seventy-two political refugees, including former Transport Undersecretary Jaime Faivovich, were allowed to leave the Mexican embassy in Santiago June 2 and fly to Mexico City. They were accompanied by Mexican Foreign Minister Emilio Rabasa, who had arrived in Chile May 30 on a mission to improve Mexico’s strained relations with the military junta. Rabasa conferred May 30 with Chilean Foreign Minister Ismael Huerta and the next day with junta president Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. Rabasa said June 1 that he had failed in only one of his objectives—to secure the release of ex-Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda, who was held by the junta and scheduled for trial. Colombia, another nation at odds with the junta, sent a “goodwill mission” to Chile June 5 headed by Gen. Jorge Ordonez. Huerta had charged May 24 that the former Colombian ambassador in Santiago, Juan B. Fernandez, had collaborated with Chilean extremists and Communists. However, Chile May 31 had given safe-conduct to Colombia to So cialist ex-Sen. Adonis Sepulveda, who had taken refuge in the Colombian embassy. Among former government officials al lowed to leave were ex-Labor Minister Mireya Baltra, who flew to the Nether lands June 3; ex-Agriculture Minister
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Jacques Chonchol, to Venezuela June 8; and former Allende adviser Mario Palestro, to Norway June 10. Carmen Lazo, a former Chilean So cialist legislator, had been allowed to fly to Colombia April 29, after living in the Colombian embassy in Santiago for seven months. Miriam Contreras, private sec retary to Allende, left for Sweden May 29. However, the junta asked Stockholm to extradite her to Chile to stand trial for alleged embezzlement, conspiracy and other “serious crimes.”
More refugees depart. The last 16 refugees who had received asylum in the Swedish embassy in Santiago arrived in Stockholm June 19. They included former Labor Minister Luis Figueroa and ex-Ag riculture Minister Rolando Calderon. Two leaders of the outlawed Com munist Party, former Sen. Julieta Campusano and ex-Deputy Alejandro Rojas, had left Chile June 10 with safe conducts for Denmark and France, respectively. Eugenio Massi, former di rector of the leftist newspaper Puro Chile, had traveled to France June 8. Ex-Agriculture Minister Jacques Chon chol also had flown to France June 8, after stopping in Caracas, where refugees from the Venezuelan embassy in Santiago, where Chonchol had hidden, received asylum. The Venezuelan embassy, like Sweden’s, was now empty of refugees. The military junta had pledged to give safe-conducts to all refugees in foreign embassies as soon as possible, but it warned that the eight refugees in the Italian embassy would not get them unless Italy “normalized” relations with Chile, it was reported June 21. The Italian government did not recognize the junta. In a related development June 12, the U.S. State Department disclosed that it had denied entry visas to 120 Chilean refugees who had requested them since the September 1973 military coup. Harry Schlauderman, an aide to Jack Kubisch, assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs, said: “The United States is not nor can it be responsible for everything that happens in Latin America. It is not nor was it responsible for the course of events in Chile.”
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Church Vs. Junta Church magazine criticizes junta. The Roman Catholic review Mensaje, founded by Jesuits, asserted in its most recent issue that “force” would not enable Chileans to build a “fatherland” where “justice and brotherhood exist not only in speeches but in actions,” it was reported Jan. 25. This was considered the first overt criticism of the junta by a sector of the Chilean church, which was divided by the military coup. (in a similar development Jan. 22, El Mercurio, the nation’s leading newspaper, criticized the junta’s strict censorship of the media. The critique was printed in full in the paper’s Valparaiso edition but censored in the Santiago edition. It said, among other things, that Chileans must be allowed “to face the truth.” El Mercurio had vigorously supported the junta since the coup. (In another church-state development reported March 29, the rector of the Catholic University in Santiago, retired Adm. Jorge Swett, dismissed the director of the university’s television channel, Rev. Raul Hasbun. Hasbun, a supporter of the junta, had refused to dismiss a number of employes as requested by the rector. The television station’s senior staff resigned in solidarity with Hasbun, it was reported April 5.) Clerics support prisoners. Clergymen March 29 filed a habeas-corpus mo tion before a court of appeals in Santiago for 131 persons who were arrested and disappeared after the military coup. The measure requested the court to ask military authorities about the fate of the detained individuals, where they were being held, and for what reasons. If they were being held without charge, the mo tion asked their release. The petitioners included Msgr. Fernando Ariza Ruiz, auxiliary bishop of the Roman Catholic archdiocese of Santiago, Rev. Helmut Frenz, Lutheran bishop of Chile, and Angel Kreiman, high rabbi of Chile. They characterized the persons they cited as being mostly poor and of no political importance.
77 Cardinal Silva threatened. Raul Car dinal Silva Henriquez, archbishop of Santiago and primate of Chile’s Roman Catholic Church, said in a sermon April 14 that he had received threats against his life and was being protected by body guards. Silva sharply criticized the military junta, asserting it had not listened to the church’s protests against continuing repression. “That is why we cry today, with the pain of a father who sees the break-up of his family, the struggle of his children, the death of some and the im prisonment and suffering of many among them,” Silva said. The junta asserted April 14 that Silva’s life had been threatened by “leftist extre mists.” Bishops criticize junta. Chile’s Roman Catholic Church issued a statement April 24, criticizing the military junta for its economic policies, political repression and violations of human rights. The declaration, titled “Reconciliation in Chile,” was endorsed by a majority of the nation’s bishops. It was distributed by Raul Cardinal Silva, who said that he had received a telegram from Pope Paul VI urging Chile’s bishops to continue their efforts toward national conciliation and pacification. “We are concerned, in the first place, with the climate of insecurity and fear [in Chile], whose roots we believe are found in accusations, false rumors and the lack of participation and information,” the bish ops declared. “We are also concerned with the social dimensions of the current economic situa tion . . . [including] the increase in unem ployment and job dismissals for arbitrary or ideological reasons,” they continued. “We fear that, by accelerating economic development, the economy is being struc tured in such a way that wage earners must bear an excessive share of sacrifice without having the desired level of partici pation . . .” After expressing concern over the junta’s educational policies, which alleg edly denied “enough participation by parents and the academic community,” the bishops protested against “the
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lack of effective legal safeguards for per sonal security that is evident in arbitrary or excessively long detentions in which neither the persons concerned nor their families know the specific charges against them; in interrogations that use physical and moral pressures; in the limited possi bilities for a legal defense; in unequal sentences in different parts of the country; in restrictions of the normal rights of ap peal.” The bishops said they did not doubt the “righteous intention nor the good will of our governors. But as pastors, we see ob jective obstacles to reconciliation among Chileans. Such situations can be over come only by the unrestricted respect for human rights as formulated by the United Nations and the Second Vatican Council.” The criticism was rejected by Gen. Gus tavo Leigh, air force commander and junta member, who said of the bishops: “I have great respect for the church, but like many men, without realizing it, they are vehicles for Marxism.” A spokesman for the junta said May 25 that it had broken up a subversive group of priests and members of the outlawed Revolutionary Left Movement who allegedly received coded orders from Moscow. The junta said the next day that a leader of the group, Deacon Mario Irarrazabal, had been arrested and expelled from Chile, and four other priests, all members of a group called “Christians for Socialism,” had been ordered seized and deported. Anti-church campaign denounced. Chile’s Roman Catholic bishops issued a declaration May 29 charging a “hateful campaign” had been unleashed against them, particularly against Raul Cardinal Silva Henriquez, the church primate, and Fernando Ariztia, his auxiliary bishop. Bishop Aritzia was a leader of the in terchurch Committee of Cooperation for Peace in Chile, whose report on widespread torture under the junta had been disclosed in May. Silva had been bitterly attacked in let ters printed in Chile’s censored news papers throughout May, while he was on a trip to the U.S., Europe and the Vatican. Following his return, he was honored at a
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mass June 5 in the Santiago cathedral, where he was cheered by thousands of poor and lower middle class residents, in cluding relatives of political prisoners and supporters of the ousted Popular Unity government. . Silva asks amnesty. Raul Cardinal Silva Henriquez called for an amnesty for political prisoners in a homily Nov. 24. Silva had resigned as chancellor of the Catholic University Oct. 25 in a dispute with retired Vice Adm. Jorge Swett, the school’s rector, who had issued a ruling earlier which provoked the resignations of one vice rector and three deans.
Pinochet Wins Supreme Power Pinochet assumes executive powers. Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte assumed sole executive powers as president of Chile June 26. The other three members of the ruling military junta were assigned subor dinate advisory and legislative roles in his government. According to press reports, the de velopment reflected Pinochet’s growing power and the apparent failure of the collective military leadership. A decree published June 25 proclaimed Pinochet “supreme chief of the nation” for an indefinite period, with “special powers” to: Dictate decrees to “execute the law;” control the armed forces and the judi ciary; name Cabinet ministers, diplomats, provincial chiefs and judges; hire and fire government employes and control the nation’s budget; maintain diplomatic and commercial relations with other coun tries; declare a state of emergency in the event of foreign invasion or internal com motion; order the arrest and transfer of persons anywhere in Chile and pardon convicted criminals. Legislative power was assigned to the commanders of the three armed forces and the national police. Pinochet remained army commander; the other service chiefs were navy Adm. Jose Toribio Merino, air force Gen. Gustavo Leigh and police Gen. Cesar Mendoza. Merino was placed in charge of economic legislation, Leigh of social policy and Mendoza of agriculture.
CHILE In case of Pinochet’s illness, death or absence from the country, the line of suc cession to the presidency would be the navy commander, the air force chief and the police commander. Cabinet shuffled—President Pinochet announced sweeping changes in his Cabinet July 10, replacing eight ministers and creating two new portfolios. The entire Cabinet had resigned July 1 to give Pinochet a free hand. The new ministers—14 military officers and three civilians—were sworn in July 11. Only four members of the old Cabinet retained their posts, and three shifted portfolios. The new Cabinet maintained roughly the same military representation as its predecessor, with five ministers from the army and three each from the navy, air force and national police. The major changes in the Cabinet reportedly were the dismissals of Foreign Minister Rear Adm. Ismael Huerta and Mining Minister Gen. Arturo Yovane. Both had mishandled sensitive foreign issues, according to the newsletter Latin America July 19. Huerta was named Chilean ambassador and permanent dele gate to the U.N. July 11. The three civilians in the new Cabinet all received economic portfolios. Fer nando Leniz was confirmed as econ omy minister, Jorge Cauas was named finance minister, and Raul Saez took over the newly created Economic Co ordination Ministry, which would coor dinate the economic policies of the Fi nance, Economy, Mining, Agriculture and Transport Ministries and the National Planning Office. Cauas recently had resigned from the Christian Democratic Party, with which the military junta was at odds. The new Cabinet: Interior—Gen. Cesar Benavides Escobar (army); foreign—Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal (navy); defense—Gen. Oscar Bonilla (army); economy — Fernando Leniz; finance—Jorge Cauas; education— Rear Adm. Hugo Castro (navy); justice—Gen. Hugo Musante (police); public works—Brig. Gen. Sergio Figueroa (air force); agriculture—Gen. Tucapel Vallejos (police); land & colonization—Gen. Mario Mackay (police); transport (new post}—Gen. Enrique Garin Zea (army); health—Brig. Gen. Francisco Her rera (air force); mining—Brig. Gen. Agustin Toro Davila (army); housing—Rear Adm. Arturo Troncoso (navy); government secretary general—Col. Pedro Ewing (army); economic coordination—Raul Saez; labor—Brig. Gen. Nicanor Diaz Estrada (air force).
79 Pinochet told the new ministers at a brief swearing-in ceremony that they had “the difficult and patriotic mission of saving Chile from the critical economic situation that we inherited.” They must “effect a profound change in the mentality of Chileans” in order to “protect and make strong and powerful all the institu tions that the political and administrative corruption of the [ousted] regime” un dermined, Pinochet asserted. New national regions set—Before swearing in the new Cabinet July 11, Pi nochet signed a decree dividing Chile into 12 regions plus the Santiago metropolitan area (in place of the existing 25 provinces). Gen. Julio Canessa, president of the National Administrative Reform Com mission, said July 12 that the purpose of the reorganization was to decentralize the administration and better balance the different areas of the country.
Junta Action & Resistance Death penalty expanded. The military junta July 11 decreed that the death penalty henceforth could be ordered in cases of kidnapping, terrorist acts, illegal trafficking in arms and explosives, and in citing sabotage against production and public services.
Arrests & trials. More than 10,000 persons were arrested in Santiago, Valpa raiso and other cities July 20—21 on allegedly non-political charges. Several hundred persons had been reported ar rested for alleged common crimes July 16. Authorities claimed July 24 that the wave of arrests was part of a crackdown on common criminals. They said the July 20-21 arrests were for “suspicion of breaking the law,” drunkenness, curfew violations, narcotics consumption and other offenses. Press sources reported at least some of the arrests were for political reasons. There were at least 6,000 political prisoners in Chile, with a high turnover among them due to releases and new ar rests, the New York Times reported July 27. Almost none of the prisoners at the Chacabuco camp in the northern desert had charges pending against them.
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An air force court in the capital June 14 had sentenced 21 members of the Revolu tionary Left Movement (MIR) to prison terms ranging from 540 days to life for alleged subversion and infiltrating the armed forces. A military court in Santiago June 28 sentenced two persons to life imprison ment and 35 others to five years in jail for forming militias and resisting the armed forces. Rev. Mariano Puga Concha recently had been detained for alleged political activities in a Santiago slum neighbor hood, the Supreme Court announced July 24. Arturo Jiron, a doctor for the late President Allende, had been transferred to house arrest in Santiago after being held for several months in the maximum se curity prison on Dawson Island in the Strait of Magellan, it was announced July 3. A military court in Concepcion Aug. 1, sentenced seven persons to one-three years in jail for illegal arms stockpiling. The Supreme Court Aug. 1 denied a writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf of ex Communist Party leader Luis Corvalan, who awaited trial in an undisclosed Santiago military barracks. Corvalan’s lawyers, headed by Spanish jurist Joaquin Ruiz Gimenez, argued that Corvalan was not being allowed to communicate with them or with his family. Authorities had announced Aug. 11 that 1,788 persons had been arrested in Santiago, Concepcion and Valparaiso in the government’s continuing campaign against “common criminals.” An additional 300 persons were reported arrested Aug. 26, and the gov ernment said they would be sent to the North and put to work “for the good of the community.” More than 500 persons were arrested in a raid on a Santiago slum Sept. 1, after the alleged capture of seven “extremists” and discovery of a group called the Armed Resistance Organiza tion.
State of internal war ended. President Pinochet Sept. 11 lifted the state of internal war, in effect since the military coup one year before, but said the state of siege, the daily curfew and the use of mil itary courts would be maintained “for a considerable time.” Leaders of the Chil
LATIN AMERICA 1974 ean Roman Catholic Church, two Protestant denominations and the Jewish community had asked Pinochet Aug. 24 to lift the state of war, free political prisoners and stop political trials by mili tary courts. . Pinochet had declared Aug. 13 that no political activities would be allowed for at least two more years because Chileans “are not ready for political freedom.” The Popular Unity parties, he asserted, were banned forever. MIR leader killed. Miguel Enriquez, secretary general of the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), was killed Oct. 5 in a shootout with police and soldiers who surrounded the house where he was hiding in the Santiago suburb of San Miguel. Carmen Castillo, a MIR militant and daughter of Fernando Castillo, former rector of the Catholic University, was wounded in the action and captured. Her exhusband, Andres Pascal Allende, a member of the MIR central committee and nephew of the late President Salvador Allende, was wounded, but escaped. Enriquez’ death reportedly left the armed resistance to the military junta in disarray. Enriquez was the only major leftist leader not in jail or exile, and he had devoted himself since the September 1973 military coup to organizing militant op position. A number of MIR members took asylum in the Italian embassy in Santiago after his death, the government reported Oct. 11. (A total of 107 persons took asylum in the Italian embassy Oct. 6-11, according to Foreign Minister Vice Adm. Patricio Carvajal. Italy did not recognize the junta, and had not replaced its ambassador to Chile, who had returned to Italy shortly after the coup. The Mexican newspaper Excelsior reported Nov. 25 that 80 of 230 political refugees in the Italian em bassy had been given safe-conduct to leave Chile but that no foreign nation had been found willing to accept them.) Security forces claimed to have found Enriquez’ hideout while searching for the MIR militants who robbed a branch of the Bank of Chile in Santiago Oct. 1. Most of the stolen money was found in the San Miguel hideout, and the rest was recovered with the arrest of two MIR members Oct. 11, according to officials.
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Security officers also claimed to have found in Enriquez’ hideout 26 Soviet auto matic weapons, six submachine guns and a “great quantity” of hand grenades and ammunition. There were numerous appeals to the junta from different parts of the world asking humane treatment for Carmen Castillo, who was seven months pregnant, the French newspaper Le Monde reported Oct. 10. She was exiled to France Oct. 26. (Bautista van Schowen, a top MIR leader arrested 10 months earlier, had been tortured so severely that he was now an invalid, according to reports cited by Le Monde Oct. 8.) Allende's sister seized. Authorities an nounced Nov. 4 that former Congress woman Laura Allende de Pascal, sister of the late President Salvador Allende, had been arrested in Santiago two days earlier on charges of aiding the outlawed Revolu tionary Left Movement (MIR). Her hus band, Gaston Pascal Lyon, was arrested without explanation Dec. 9. Interior Undersecretary Enrique Mon tero said security officers raiding Mrs. Pascal’s home had found four grenades and a number of letters and documents linking her to the MIR. Her son, Andres Pascal Allende, had recently assumed leadership of the guerrilla movement following the death of MIR Secretary General Miguel Enriquez. Two of Mrs. Pascal’s other children, Pedro Gaston Pascal Allende and Denise Pascal de Chadwick, charged in Mexico City Nov. 5 that their mother was being held hostage until Andres surrendered to authorities. They denied she was con nected in any way with the MIR, noting she was recovering from two operations for cancer. Reports in the U.S. said Mrs. Pascal was being denied cobalt radiation treat ments in an effort to speed Andres’ sur render, according to the Washington Post Nov. 21. Mrs. Pascal was arrested shortly after Claudio Rodriguez, a member of the MIR central committee, was killed in a shootout with police in downtown San tiago. Another central committee member, Alejandro de la Barra, and his wife, Ana Maria Puga, died in a shootout with military intelligence agents Nov. 20.
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The body of MIR militant Lumi Videla was hurled into the garden of the Italian embassy in Santiago early Nov. 3, during the nightly curfew. An embassy doctor said she had died of asphyxiation. An esti mated 30 MIR members were in the em bassy with political asylum. A MIR communique to the press Nov. 15, signed by Andres Pascal Allende, said Videla had been killed by intelligence agents. It added that her husband, Sergio Perez, a member of the MIR central com mittee, also had been murdered by au thorities. Meanwhile, security forces continued an intensive search for MIR members in different parts of the country. Authorities claimed Nov. 6 to have broken up a guer rilla cell in the northern province of Arica, arresting 25 militants. Persons with any possible connection to MIR members were being arrested in an apparent at tempt to frighten potential supporters, sympathizers or relatives, the Washington Post reported Nov. 24. A MIR communique reported by the Mexican newspaper Excelsior Oct. 19 said MIR planned to recruit 1,000 mem bers to form an armed force against the military junta. The note said Miguel Enriquez had returned to Chile from abroad shortly before his death to begin the recruiting.
Rights abuses charged. International organizations and foreign newspapers renewed accusations that the torture of political prisoners and other abuses of human rights were continuing in Chile. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a unit of the Organization of American States, reported Aug. 2 that a team of investigators it had sent to Chile in July had found evidence that torture was used in the interrogation of political prisoners, that persons held without charge were required to do hard labor, that Chileans sometimes disappeared for days or weeks after being seized by police or military intelligence agents and that military courts had limited access by lawyers to their clients and had tried persons under wartime rules for acts com mitted before the rules were instituted in September 1973. The United Nations Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro
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tection of Minorities, a unit of the Human Rights Commission, Aug. 22 noted “tor ture and other cruel, inhuman or de grading treatments or punishments” in Chile. It urged the Human Rights Com mission to investigate these at its next session. (The junta sent a letter to U.N. Sec retary General Kurt Waldheim Aug. 23 accusing the subcommission of being “dis criminatory” and denouncing violations of human rights in the Soviet Union and Cuba. Chilean “official policy toward ac cused subversive elements is justice, pure and simple,” the letter asserted.) The International Commission to Investigate the Crimes of the Chilean Military Junta, a leftist organization based in Sweden, charged Sept. 9 that 30, 000 Chileans had been “murdered” during the first year of military rule. The com mission’s members included Ulf Sundqvist, Finland’s education minister, and Mario Soares, the Portuguese foreign minister. Joseph Novitski, a correspondent for the Washington Post, had been placed under house arrest for seven hours in Santiago Aug. 31, two days after he telephoned a story to the Post reporting that two leftists had been summarily exe cuted by police in Buin, south of Santiago, Aug. 13. The Post printed the story Sept. 2, saying it had held it for two days be cause of threats against Novitski by Chilean officials. The Chilean junta had banned summary executions earlier in 1974. Novitski reported that the Buin killings were revealed in records of the Santiago Court of Appeals. Amnesty International charged in an 80-page report Sept. 10 that although mass executions apparently had ended, torture of political prisoners continued. Martin Ennals, the organization’s sec retary general, wrote in a preface to the report that the “death roll” of political victims in Chile “is unprecedented in Latin American history and there is little indication that the situation is improving or that a return to normality is intended.” “The most common forms of physical torture have been prolonged beatings with truncheons, fists or bags of moist ma terial, electricity to all parts of the body, burning with cigarettes or acid,” the
LATIN AMERICA 1974 report charged. “Such physical tortures have been accompanied with deprivation of food, drink and sleep. At times more primitive and brutal methods have continued to be used.” A number of foreign dignitaries joined in the criticism of the Chilean junta. Swedish Premier Olof Palme charged Sept. 15 that the junta had violated “all the human rights,” and he called its mem bers “despicable crooks.” The junta re torted that Palme was a “puppet” in a campaign against Chile led by the Soviet Union and Cuba, it was reported Sept. 19. Most Rev. Michael Ramsey, arch bishop of Canterbury and primate of the Anglican Church, declared Oct. 7, after completing a tour of Latin America, that the people of Chile were “suffering ter ribly” under the junta. He praised Raul Cardinal Silva Henriquez, archbishop of Santiago and primate of the Chilean Roman Catholic Church, who was the only important Chilean personality able to criticize the junta with impunity. Silva warned Sept. 18, at a mass at tended by President Augusto Pinochet and his entire Cabinet, that a regime that denied individual liberties would inevitably fail. The junta was also condemned by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), which asserted in a report Oct. 23 that repression in Chile was “more ubiquitous and more systematic” than at any time since the military coup. “For every detainee who has been re leased in recent months at least two new arrests have been made,” the report alleged. There were 700 known arrests of political suspects in May-August, and at least 600 more since early October. In ad dition, some 10,000-15,000 Chileans, mostly poor persons, had been arrested and held briefly during these periods in an apparent attempt by security forces to in timidate the population, the report charged. The report said that before the coup, there was a “participatory democracy” in Chile in which all sectors of the population took part in national life. “All this has now been systematically suppressed,” the report declared. “This is perhaps the greatest injury of all to have been inflicted on the people of Chile.” Chile rejected the ICJ document Oct.
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24 as “Soviet propaganda” and “gro tesque lies.” President Pinochet Nov. 14 rejected a Nov. 6 U.N. General Assembly resolu tion calling for the release of political prisoners and restoration of human rights in Chile. Pinochet called the resolution “an aberration” and charged the U.N. was “infiltrated” by “Soviet commu nism.” A second resolution condemning the abuse of human rights in Chile was passed Nov. 23 by the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The resolution was approved 47-13 with 31 abstentions, reportedly over the op position of a majority of Latin American delegations.
The junta asserted in its rebuttal that the investigators had failed to consider alleged human rights violations by Chile’s ousted civilian government. However, the investigators said it was not within their duties to decide whether “this regime is more or less desirable than the previous regime.” They added that “neither the number nor the seriousness” of charges received by the OAS under the ousted government were cause for an on-thescene investigation. The investigators included citizens of Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, the U.S. and Chile. The Chilean was Mario Bianchi, a former foreign minister, and the American was Robert F. Woodward, a former ambassador to Chile.
OAS team charges rights abuse. An investigating team of the Organization of American States (OAS) accused Chile’s military junta Dec. 4 of committing “ex tremely serious violations of human rights,” including widespread torture of political prisoners. The team, representing the Inter American Commission on Human Rights, an OAS agency, visited Chile for 12 days at the end of July. It made its charges in a 175-page report to the OAS Permanent Council. Chile submitted a 125-page rebuttal saying the report contained “important and grave deficien cies” and “manifest errors.” The report accused the junta of vio lating 10 fundamental rights established by hemispheric agreements to which Chile was committed. These were the rights to life, personal safety, liberty, habeas corpus, due process, expression and in formation, assembly, association, opinion and equality before the law and political participation. The investigators stressed the abridg ment of political rights—noting that the communications media were censored and that “Marxism is generically considered as a felony”—and the extensive physical and mental torture of political prisoners. The report said prisoners consistently alleged that torture took place in five specific military or police installations. The investigators were denied access to these places, although they were allowed to visit prisons and interview prisoners freely.
Letelier freed; many barred from country. Orlando Letelier, the former Chilean ambassador to the U.S.,who held several Cabinet posts in the ousted Popular Unity government, was freed from prison Sept. 10 and exiled to Vene zuela. His release had long been sought by friends, government officials and civil libertarians in the U.S. and other coun tries. It was finally obtained by Diego Ar ria, governor of Caracas, who flew to Santiago to accompany Letelier out of Chile. Letelier had been held with other prominent political prisoners in the naval jail at Ritoque, on the central coast, after being imprisoned on Dawson Island in the Strait of Magellan. Osvaldo Puccio Jr., son of the personal secretary to the late President Salvador Allende, was freed and exiled with Lete lier. His father remained a political prisoner. The military junta announced Sept. 20 that it would free 270 imprisoned leftists; it claimed Oct. 3 that 386 political prisoners had been released in the pre vious 23 days. The junta said Oct. 3 that it now held only 748 political prisoners, but unofficial reports put the total in the thou sands, with a high of 60,000 reported by Popular Unity sources in Argentina Sept. 25. . President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte said Sept. 11 that he would free nearly all political prisoners if they would leave Chile “definitively” and if the Soviet Union and Cuba released an equal
84 number of political prisoners. The pro posal was ridiculed Sept. 13 by Tass, the official Soviet news agency, which com pared Pinochet to the Roman emperor Caligula in his “savage brutality and rare cynicism.” However, Moscow later agreed to study the proposal, according to a statement Oct. 18 by Capt. Claudio Collados, an undersecretary in the Chil ean Foreign Ministry. A number of exiled Popular Unity leaders were barred from ever returning to Chile. Aniceto Rodríguez, a former senator and Socialist Party member, was barred Sept. 12 after he said in Caracas that Chilean exiles had agreed to “fight in side and outside [Chile] to rescue the liberties that will return Chile to the rule of law and allow its people to live in dignity.” Bernardo Leighton, a founder of the Christian Democratic Party, which sup ported the junta, was barred from returning to Chile Oct. 9. He and Rafael Gumucio, a former Christian Democrat and Popular Unity senator, had issued a statement in Rome Aug. 16 calling the junta “fascist and reactionary” and criticizing those “formerly engaged in progressive political tasks” who now sup ported Pinochet. Christian Democratic leaders in Chile denounced the ban on Leighton Oct. 10, calling it an “unjustifiable attack on human rights.” However, the party’s first vice president, Osvaldo Olguin, said after meeting with Interior Minister Gen. Cesar Benavides Oct. 15 that the Christian Democrats still supported the junta. The Chilean citizenship of Ex-Labor Minister Luis Figueroa, a Communist, was revoked Sept. 25 after he made a speech in Paris denouncing the junta.
Prisoners freed, exiled—The junta Dec. 6 freed 16 of an estimated 100 political prisoners who accepted exile as a con dition for their release. Officials said the prisoners “constitute a danger to the internal security of the state.” Those released included Patricio Cor balan Carrera, son of former Socialist Sen. Maria Elena Carrera, who lived in exile in Peru. A spokesman for a refugee committee said four of the 16 would travel to Rumania and another would go to the Netherlands. The program to release the prisoners
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followed lengthy negotiations between the government, various refugee organiza tions and the International Red Cross. Fuentealba expelled. Renan Fuentealba, a former senator and president of the Christian Democratic Party, was exiled to Peru Nov. 26 after the French news agency Agence France-Presse quoted him as calling for the restoration of human rights in Chile. A communique from the Interior Ministry said Fuentealba had “defied the nation’s authority, compromised the pres tige of Chile abroad and attempted to alter the internal peace.” Fuentealba led the left wing of his party and was opposed to any accommodation with the military junta, according to press reports. Ex-President Eduardo Frei and 69 other Christian Democrats protested Fuentealba’s expulsion Nov. 28 in a formal note to the junta. The note contained an apparently conciliatory passage in which the signatories pro claimed their desire to “unify Chileans to construct development, peace, justice and full respect for [human] dignity.” Frei and former Sen. Patricio Aylwin, who led the party’s right wing, recently had urged Chilean and other Latin American Christian Democrats to reach an agreement with the junta, according to the London newsletter Latin America Nov. 1. A number of conservative Christian Democrats including Juan de Dios Car mona, a former senator and defense minister, had sent the junta a note Nov. 16 calling for the “full exercise of civil rights” in Chile but denouncing recent criticism of the junta by the United Na tions. Prats killed. Retired Gen. Carlos Prats Gonzalez, exiled ex-Chilean army commander, and his wife were killed early Sept. 30 when a bomb exploded in or under their car as they drove to their home in Buenos Aires. Prats, who had lived in Argentina since Chile’s Sept. 1973 military coup, had a reputation as a leftist because he had served in the Cabinet of the late Chilean President Salvador Allende. A close friend of Prats, quoted by the
CHILE Washington Post Oct. 1, said Prats had said recently that he had received in formation of a plan to kill him. Prats had reportedly said the assassination would be staged by Chilean or U.S. rightists who knew he was writing his memoirs and could divulge much information about the preparations for the Chilean coup. Resistencia Democrática, a publication of Chilean exiles in Buenos Aires, charged that Prats’ murder had been ordered by Chilean military intelligence and carried out under the direction of Juan Luis Ossa Bulnes, the so-called “military chief’’ of the reactionary National Party in Chile, the Mexican newspaper Excelsior re ported Oct. 7. Immediately after the assassination, the military attache at the Chilean em bassy raided Prats’ apartment and photographed a number of documents, in cluding Prats’ memoirs, Resistencia Democrática reported. These subse quently disappeared, according to the London newsletter Latin America Oct. 4. Prominent Chilean exiles charged that the junta had ordered Prats’ execution. Moy de Toha, widow of Jose Toha Gonzalez, a leader of the ousted Popular Unity government, said in an interview published by Excelsior Oct. 1 that Prats was killed because “he represented a per manent threat to the Chilean regime; he could be a rallying point for strong armed contingents that disapprove of the cruel and dehumanizing ways of the military junta. He was the last bastion of the constitutional armed forces in Chile.” Hortensia Bussi de Allende, widow of President Salvador Allende Gossens, echoed Mrs. Toha’s charge in Rome Oct. 1. In Paris, Carlos Altamirano, leader of the outlawed Chilean Socialist Party, said Oct. 2 that Prats’ assassins were “ter rorists paid by Santiago and Wash ington.” Prats had said in a letter to Mrs. Allende dated March 16 that despite his refusal to engage in political activities in Argentina, he had been watched by “a cu rious and mixed network of informants, and there have been many efforts in Chile to find some way of damaging my honor and permitting them to display me as ‘the general at the service of Marxism’ . . .” In a letter to Mrs. Toha dated Aug. 29 Prats had denounced President Augusto
85 Pinochet Ugarte, who led the September 1973 military coup, comparing him to the late Haitian dictator, Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier. Pinochet’s personality, Prats wrote, “admirably combines a great smallness of mind and a great dose of spiritual perversity.” Prats said “Pi nochet’s treason has no parallel in Chilean history.” Prats wrote Mrs. Toha that he would not openly criticize the junta because the junta would use this in its own favor. “My great wish,” he wrote, “is for the day to come when the majority of my former comrades at arms will see for themselves that they have been tricked and have com mitted the greatest historical mistake in becoming the executioners of their people, of their country.” Prats’ letters to the two widows were printed by Excelsior Oct. 1.
Foreign Intervention Brazil anti-Allende aid reported. A Washington Post report Jan. 8 asserted that private groups in Brazil gave financial and other support to the civil resistance movement that helped topple the govern ment of the late President Salvador Allende Gossens. The article, by correspondent Marlise Simons, said that there was no evi dence the Brazilian government had par ticipated in the anti-Allende activity, al though the local intelligence services must have been aware of it. Two Brazilians, Glycon de Paiva and Aristoteles Drummond, admitted helping anti-Allende forces and said other private groups gave arms, money and political ad vice to Chilean opponents of Allende, Si mons reported. De Paiva was linked to Brazil’s Institute for Research and Social Studies (IPES), which, according to Si mons, organized, financed and coor dinated activities by businessmen and military officers in 1961-64 to help oust the Brazilian government of Joao Goulart. De Paiva was also a consultant to several U.S. and multinational corpora tions, the Post reported. De Paiva reportedly said that after Allende’s election in 1970 a number of Chilean businessmen asked his advice, and
86 he explained how civilians could prepare the conditions for a military coup against the president. He recommended they create political and economic chaos, fo menting discontent and fear of commu nism among workers and managers, blocking legislation by leftist parties, or ganizing demonstrations and resorting to terrorism if necessary. On de Paiva’s recommendation, a Chilean version of IPES, the Center for Public Opinion Studies, was created in Santiago by middle-class economic associations and businessmen and landholders. The center became a prin cipal source of anti-government strike strategy, rumor campaigns, shock troops for street demonstrations, and the women’s movement against the govern ment, Simons reported. Simultaneously, the opposition Chris tian Democrats founded the Social and Economic Studies Corp., funded by local as well as Italian and West German Chris tian Democrats, which, according to sources, employed psychologists and so ciologists to plan the ouster of Gen. Carlos Prats, who until his resignation as army commander was Allende’s firmest supporter in the armed forces, Simons reported. Anti-Allende activists, particularly the neo-fascist Fatherland and Liberty Party, received funds and arms from Brazilians, the Post reported. Brazilians also helped finance the anti-government strikes im mediately preceding the coup, according to the Post. Orlando Saenz, until recently the mil itary junta’s principal economic adviser, successfully raised money abroad to pay the strikers not to work, Simons said.
Covert CIA action reported. A major controversy was touched off in Wash ington by the disclosure Sept. 8 that the Nixon Administration had approved covert activities by the Central In telligence Agency in Chile in 1970-73 in an effort to undermine the government of the late President Salvador Allende Gossens. To finance these activities, more than $8 million was authorized by the so-called 40 Committee, a high-level intelligence panel chaired by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in his capacity as national se curity adviser to former President Nixon, according to testimony by CIA Director
LATIN AMERICA 1974 William E. Colby to the Subcommittee on Intelligence of the House of Representa tives’ Armed Services Committee. Colby’s testimony, given in executive session April 22, was revealed in a confidential letter from Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D, Mass.), a critic of U.S. Chilean policy, to Rep. Thomas E. Morgan (D, Pa.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The letter was leaked to the New York Times and the Washington Post. Harrington asked Morgan to open a full investigation into the CIA’s role in the September 1973 military coup in which Allende died and his elected government was overthrown. He said he had appealed to other legislators including Sen. J. William Fulbright (D, Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Rep. Dante Fascell (D, Fla.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter-American Af fairs, but none had been willing to pursue the matter. Harrington asserted Sept. 8 that Congress avoided an investigation for fear it might turn up facts that would “damage or embarrass Kissinger.” Colby’s testimony was made available to Harrington by Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D, Mich.), chairman of the intelligence subcommittee. Harrington reported the testimony from memory, having been allowed to read it twice but not to take notes. According to his letter, Colby testified that: ■ In 1969, before Allende’s election, the 40 Committee authorized about $500,000 to “fund individuals who could be nur tured to keep the anti-Allende forces alive and intact.” (The CIA, Colby testified, had spent $3 million to help Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei defeat Allende in the 1964 presidential election.) ■ During the 1970 election, the commit tee approved $500,000 to help “opposition party personnel.” ■ After the election, which Allende won by a plurality, the committee earmarked $350,000 in an unsuccessful effort “to bribe the Chilean Congress” to choose Allende’s opponent in the runoff vote. ■ After Allende’s inaugural, the com mittee authorized $5 million for “more destabilization efforts during the period from 1971 to 1973.” ■ About $1.5 million was earmarked by the committee to help opposition parties in Chile’s 1973 Congressional elections, in
CHILE which Allende’s coalition improved on its 1976 vote percentage. “Some of these funds were used to support an unnamed but influential anti-Allende newspaper,” according to Harrington’s account. ■ In August 1973, during the wave of strikes that precipitated Allende’s down fall, the committee authorized $1 million for “further political destabilization activities.” The program was called off when Allende was overthrown, but the funds were spent after Chile’s military government was installed, Colby testified. The CIA’s activities in Chile, Har rington wrote, “were viewed [by the Nixon Administration] as a prototype, or labo ratory experiment, to test the techniques of heavy financial investment in efforts to discredit and bring down a government.” Disclosure of Colby’s testimony brought immediate protests from a number of sources, including Democratic legislators and newspaper editorials. The New York Times said Sept. 8 that Colby’s testimony indicated the State Department and the White House had “repeatedly and deliberately misled the public and the Congress about the extent of U.S. involve ment in the internal affairs of Chile.” Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D, Mass.) charged Sept. 9 that CIA funding of Allende’s opponents “represents not only a flagrant violation of our alleged policy of non-intervention in Chilean affairs but also an appalling lack of forthrightness with the Congress.” He noted that the CIA activities disclosed by Colby had been “denied time and time again by high officials of the Nixon and now the Ford Administrations.” Sen. Frank Church (D, Ida.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcom mittee on Multinational Corporations, which investigated attempts by Interna tional Telephone & Telegraph Corp. (ITT) to subvert Allende’s government, said to news personnel Sept. 11 that he was “incensed” by Colby’s testimony. During the ITT hearings, two State De partment officials—Charles A. Meyer, former assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs, and Edward M. Korry, former ambassador to Chile—had testified under oath that the U.S. had maintained a policy of non-intervention toward Chile under Allende. They also refused to answer specific questions about what they said were privileged communi cations on U.S. policy toward Allende.
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The staff of Church’s subcommittee, headed by chief counsel Jerome Levinson, issued a report, leaked to the press Sept. 16, recommending that perjury investiga tions be initiated against Meyer, Korry and former CIA Director Richard Helms, who testified during 1973 hearings on his confirmation as ambassador to Iran that the CIA had not passed money to Al lende’s opponents. The staff report also accused Kissinger of “deceiving” the Senate Foreign Rela tions Committee in secret testimony Sept. 17, 1973, shortly after the Chilean coup. Kissinger had minimized the role of the CIA in Chile’s 1970 election, asserting the agency’s objectives were “to strengthen the democratic political parties and give them a basis for winning the election in 1976.” The report recommended that the record of hearings for Kissinger’s con firmation as secretary of state be reopened and that he be asked to give a “rationale” for covert CIA activities in Chile. (Kissinger’s direct involvement in ef forts to undermine Allende was described in “The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,” a book by two former U.S. intelligence officials,which was published in June after being partially censored at the CIA’s re quest. A deleted passage in the book quoted Kissinger as telling the 40 Com mittee on June 27, 1970: “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch [Chile] go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people,” the New York Times reported Sept. 11.) The State Department, meanwhile, stood by its previous assertions that the U.S. had not intervened in Chilean internal affairs after Allende’s election. State Department spokesman Robert Anderson Sept. 9 backed the testimony of Korry and Meyer before the Senate multi nationals subcommittee. Korry defended his testimony Sept. 15, asserting the U.S. had pursued “an extraordinarily soft line” toward Chile during Allende’s first year as president, during which Korry was U.S. ambassador. Colby refused to comment on his reported testimony, although he did not deny that Harrington’s account of it was accurate. He emphasized Sept.'13 that the CIA’s covert activities in Chile were ap proved by the National Security Council and thus reflected “national policy.” He added that “the chairman or various
88 members of” key Congressional commit tees had been kept informed of these activities.
Ford admits U.S. role. At a televised news conference Sept. 16, U.S. President Gerald R. Ford conceded that the U.S. had engaged in covert activities against the Allende regime. Ford was asked: “Is it the policy of your Administration to attempt to de stabilize the governments of other de mocracies?” Ford responded that it was “a very im portant question:” “Our government, like other govern ments, does take certain actions in the in telligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security. I am informed reliably that Communist nations spend vastly more money than we do for the same kind of purposes. Now, in this particular case, as I understand it and there’s no doubt in my mind, our govern ment had no involvement in any way whatsoever in the coup itself. In a period of time, three or four years ago, there was an effort being made by the Allende government to destroy opposition news media, both the writing press as well as the electronic press. And to destroy op position political parties. And the effort that was made in this case was to help and assist the preservation of opposition news papers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties. I think this is in the best interest of the people in Chile, and certainly in our best interest.” Ford added that a committee had been in existence since 1948 to review covert U.S. operations and the information was relayed to the appropriate Congressional committees. (Ford was referring to the 40 Committee, which had been set up by the late President John F. Kennedy to provide Administration control over CIA ac tivities after Cuban exiles trained and equipped by the agency failed in their 1961 invasion of Cuba.) He said he favored retention of the panel and would meet with the Congressional bodies to see whether they wanted any changes made in the review process. Ford’s defense of CIA activities in Chile drew a flurry of protest.
LATIN AMERICA 1974 The strongest criticism of Ford’s state ment on Chile came from Sen. Walter Mondale (D, Minn.). “If we are so concerned about the exis tence of opposition elements and the preservation of democracy in Chile,” Mondale asked, “do we now have a program to help support the democratic politicians and journalists who have now been muzzled, banned and jailed?” The State Department and White House refused to elaborate on Ford’s claim that the Allende government had sought to destroy opposition parties, newspapers and electronic media. Acting White House Press Secretary John W. Hushen said he stood by Ford’s statement and any further comment would have to come from the State Department. State Department spokesman Robert Anderson said Ford’s statement “speaks for itself.” According to a Harris Poll, reported Oct. 28, 60% of the U.S. population opposed the CIA’s intervention in Chilean internal affairs before the coup, while only 18% favored it. The Inter-American Press Association reported Nov. 28 that President Ford had turned down its re quest for the names of anti-Allende news papers financed by the CIA.
Kissinger directed air embargo? Secre tary of State Kissinger had personally directed the Nixon Administration’s pro gram to curtail economic aid and cred its to Chile during Allende’s presidency, according to government sources quoted by the New York Times Sept. 15. The Nixon Administration had re peatedly denied there was any program of economic sanctions against Allende, asserting his government’s inability to get loans and credits reflected its poor credit risk. During Allende’s tenure in office, the Times sources said, Kissinger, then Pres ident Nixon’s national security adviser, directed a series of weekly meetings at which Administration officials worked out a policy of economic sanctions. The officials reportedly included assistant sec retaries in the State, Defense and Trea sury Departments and national security aides of Kissinger. “The whole purpose of the meetings in the first couple of months after
CHILE [Allende’s] election was to insure that the various aid agencies and lending agencies were rejiggered to make sure that [Allende] wasn’t to get a penny,” one source told the Times.
CIA paid for anti-Allende strikes? The CIA in 1972-73 directly subsidized the strikes by Chilean middle-class groups that helped precipitate the military coup against the Allende regime, according to reports in the New York Times Sept. 20. Intelligence sources told the Times that most of the more than $8 million au thorized for covert CIA activities in Chile had been used to provide strike benefits and other means of support for anti Allende truckers, taxi drivers, shop owners and workers. This contradicted public and private claims by President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that the money had been used solely to protect opposi tion political parties and news media that were allegedly threatened by Allende’s government, the Times noted Sept. 21. According to the Times’ sources, the CIA’s involvement with anti-Allende labor groups was part of a broad agency effort to infiltrate all areas of Chile’s government and politics. By September 1973, when the military seized power, the CIA had agents and informers in every party of Allende’s Popular Unity coali tion, although it failed to infiltrate the extremist Revolutionary Left Movement, the sources said. Most of the funds that did go to the opposition news media went to the news paper El Mercurio, according to one source, who called the paper “the only serious political force” in Chilean press and broadcasting. (El Mercurio editor Rene Silva denied this in a letter to the Inter-American Press Association made public Oct. 5. “Although I don’t partici pate in the financial side of the company,” Silva said, “I am certain that its incomes have legitimate and normal origins...”) One CIA official who justified the covert activities said he nonetheless con sidered U.S. policy in Chile a failure be cause “we were not looking for a military coup,” the Times reported. However, another source said “people on the far right” who were determined to over
89 throw Allende “were increasingly seen at the [U.S.] embassy in 1972 and 1973.” A number of sources said CIA director William Colby, contrary to published ac counts, had fully briefed two U.S. Con gressional subcommittees on CIA financ ing of labor unions and trade groups during Allende’s presidency. The panels were the Senate Foreign Affairs Sub committee on Western Hemisphere Af fairs and the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence. The Times reported Sept. 21 that Kissinger had not mentioned financing the unions and trade groups in briefings before the Cabinet Sept. 17 and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Sept. 19. The financing was also neglected in a briefing by Kissinger and Ford for nine Congressional leaders Sept. 19, the Times reported. Kissinger reportedly told Cabinet mem bers Sept. 17 that “all we did was support newspapers and political opponents of Allende who were under siege ” and that the total CIA investment in Chile since 1964—some $11 million—was “mar ginal.” The CIA financing of anti-Allende strikers was part of a “get rougher” policy adopted by the Nixon Administration in mid-October 1971, the Times reported Sept. 24. Adoption of the policy followed: Allende’s announcement that Chile would not compensate nationalized U.S. copper firms; the replacement of U.S. Ambassa dor Edward M. Korry by career diplomat Nathaniel M. Davis; and U.S. intelligence reports that Cuban arms were being smuggled to Chilean leftists, according to the Times. All CIA activities in Chile from that point were conducted under the direct authority and supervision of Davis, one source told the Times. Further U.S. efforts against Allende were reported Oct. 2 by Washington columnist Jack Anderson, who alleged the International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. (ITT) had dispatched an expert in the placing of electronic “bugs” to Chile in 1971, and the expert had gained access to the presidential palace. ITT denied it had tapped Allende’s office, although Anderson did not directly accuse it of doing so, Anderson noted in a column Nov. 7.
90 Foreign firms linked to ’73 strikes— Companies based in Mexico, Venezuela and Peru had helped finance the middle class strikes of 1973, according to Chilean businessmen quoted by the New York Times Oct. 16. The businessmen were prominent mem bers of SOFOFA, Chile’s most important industrial organization. They said $200, 000 donated by the foreign concerns had been channeled to striking truck owners, shopkeepers and professional groups in the weeks preceding the overthrow of the late President Salvador Allende. Of that total, the businessmen said, $100,000 was contributed by Protexa, a Mexican manufacturing corporation with a Chilean asphalt affiliate; $50,000 by Grupo Mendoza, one of Venezuela’s largest business groups, with interests in machinery imports, cement and paper production; and $50,000 by an unidentified Peruvian company. Protexa and Grupo Mendoza denied any involvement in the Chilean strikes Oct. 15. The businessmen quoted by the Times said they did not know whether the money donated by the foreign firms had origi nally come from the CIA. In a related development reported by the London newsletter Latin America Oct. 18, Marlise Simons, a Dutch journalist who reported on Chile for the Washington Post, said in a radio broadcast in the Netherlands that retired Gen. Carlos Prats Gonzalez, the assassinated former Chilean army com mander, had told her in correspondence before his death that European Christian Democratic parties had provided money to help overthrow the Popular Unity government and that Christian Demo cratic ex-President Eduardo Frei was mainly to blame for the military coup.
Foreign & Economic Affairs During 1974 the junta reached settle ments on payments to U.S. companies for expropriated properties, and it made prog ress in negotiating foreign loans and in renegotiating foreign debts.
Dow units returned. The U.S. firm Dow Chemical Co. said Jan. 4 that the junta had formally returned to it two Chilean
LATIN AMERICA 1974 affiliates “requisitioned” by the ousted government in October 1972. The units, reportedly worth more than $32 million, were Dow Quimica Chilena S.A., a polystyrene producer 100% owned by Dow, and Petroquímica Dow S.A., a low-density polyethylene and polyvinyl chloride producer owned 70% by Dow and 30% by two Chilean government agencies.
OPIC repayment. The Chilean govern ment had reimbursed the Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC), a U.S. government insuring agency, more than $1.5 million in a first step toward repaying OPIC $8.2 million to cover defaults by the ousted government to Braden Copper Co., a subsidiary of Kennecott Copper Corp., and the Bank of America, it was reported Feb. 11. The full payment would be made over the next seven years. OPIC and the Chilean government June 19 signed an agreement rescheduling payment of a $22 million Chilean debt to the agency. Approximately $19 million of the debt, plus interest, covered install ments due under a series of promissory notes guaranteed by OPIC. The notes originally had been held by Braden Cop per Co. Kennécott announced Oct. 24 that Chile had agreed to pay $68 million as compensation for Kennecott copper properties nationalized in 1971. Cerro compensation pact. Cerro Corp, announced March 12 that Chile had agreed to pay at least $41.9 million for its Chilean copper interests, which were nationalized in 1971 by the ousted Popular Unity government. Under an agreement signed in Santiago by representatives of the U.S. firm and the Chilean military junta, Cerro would receive a $3.2 million cash payment—al ready delivered—and nearly $38.7 million in 17-year notes carrying a 9.165% in terest rate. The notes, guaranteed by Chile’s Central Bank, would be free of Chilean taxes. The settlement appeared to cover most of Cerro’s interest in Compañía Minera Andina S.A., the expropriated firm. Cerro’s 1972 annual report said its invest ment in Andina totaled $39.7 million, in cluding equity, notes and interest.
CHILE The agreement also provided for Cerro to purchase “copper-bearing materials” that could not be processed in Chile. As Cerro sold these materials, the proceeds would be applied to repayment of the notes, in inverse order of maturity. Cerro was the only one of the three major U.S. copper firms in Chile maintaining cordial relations with the de posed government after its properties were nationalized. Cerro had continued to provide technical assistance to the Chilean operators of Andina’s Rio Blanco mine.
Anaconda settlement. The military government and Anaconda Co. of the U.S. announced July 24 that they had reached a settlement over the 1971 expro priation of Anaconda’s two Chilean sub sidiaries. The subsidiaries, Chile Exploration Co. and Andes Copper Mining Co., operated the Chuquicamata and El Salvador cop per mines. Chile had purchased 51 % of the companies in 1969 under President Eduardo Frei and had nationalized the other 49% two years later under the late President Salvador Allende. Under the settlement, Chile im mediately paid Anaconda $65 million— $59 million for the Allende seizure and $6 million for the Frei purchase—and signed $188 million worth of promissory notes guaranteed by the Chilean Central Bank. The notes bore an annual interest rate of 10%, and were payable in equal install ments semiannually over a 10-year period beginning Feb. 1, 1975. Anaconda said all prior claims and con troversies between it and the Chilean government were resolved, including all claims for Chilean taxes, all legal actions in Chile and the U.S., and all claims re garding notes issued to Anaconda’s sub sidiaries at the end of 1969. The settlement also left Anaconda free to continue arbitration of its claim against the Overseas Private Investment Corp.
ITT compensation. International Tele phone & Telegraph Corp, said Dec. 20 that the Chilean government would pay it $125.2 million for equity and debt in the Chile Telephone Co., nationalized by the ousted Popular Unity government in 1971.
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Foreign investment sought. The mil itary junta July 11 enacted a new Statute of the Foreign Investor drafted specifically to attract foreign capital to Chile. The law declared that foreign invest ment was indispensable for an accelerated rate of economic growth in Chile and barred discrimination between national and foreign investments. It established a Foreign Investment Committee to oversee new transactions between Chile and foreign firms. Foreign companies would be allowed to send “invested capital, utilities or benefits” out of the country. However, “foreign investment in areas reserved by law to national companies” would not be accepted, the law stated. IMF credit. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Jan. 30 approved a stand-by arrangement allowing Chile to borrow the equivalent of $94.8 million over the next 12 months to overcome its serious foreign exchange deficit, but this was only half the sum requested. The credit was granted after IMF officials in Washington, D.C. conferred with members of a Chilean economic mission. The mission’s members—Economy Minister Fernando Leniz, junta economic adviser Raul Saez and junta copper nego tiator Julio Philippi—told the Washington Post Jan. 29 that Chile was now importing 70% of its petroleum and that recent price increases would raise the yearly cost of petroleum-related imports to $400 million in 1974. They said foreign invest ment would be sought to form a joint company to exploit copper reserves in Chile’s northern Atacama desert. According to the London newsletter Latin America Feb. 1, an IMF mission to Chile earlier had estimated the nation’s foreign currency deficit at $1 billion in 1974, $720 million in 1975, $500 million in 1976 and $400 million in 1977. However, the estimate was based on a number of ex tremely optimistic assumptions, the news letter noted. Among the assumptions: copper ex ports must remain at current record levels; copper prices must stay around or above 75c a pound; no compensation must
92 be paid to the U.S. copper companies expropriated by the ousted government; the internal marginal savings rate must rise from the current 10%-12% to more than 40%; and agricultural imports must be cut by $200 million (they cost more than $500 million in. 1973). A World Bank delegation arrived in Santiago Feb. 11 to study the junta’s credit requests. The bank had lent Chile $13 million after conferring with the Leniz mission. Leniz had returned to Chile with only stop-gap loans to keep the economy afloat, according to the London newslet ter Latin America Feb. 15. Leniz had defended the junta’s eco nomic policies Feb. 4 before the Inter American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, an agency of the Organization of American States. The committee urged Feb. 6 that international organizations give “massive financial support” to the junta.
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government, according to Chilean eco nomic adviser Raul Saez. The creditor nations, known as the “Paris Club,” were the U.S., West Germany, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Great Britain and Switzerland. Despite its estimated $4 billion foreign debt, Chile had taken an estimated $570 million in foreign loans since the Sep tember 1973 military coup, it was re ported March 15. The agreement, keyed to Chile’s com mitment to compensate U.S. copper com panies, permitted the Chileans to repay only 5%-10% of the $1 billion due in 1974. However, Chile would have to repay other outstanding debts. The Netherlands, a minor creditor, had tried unsuccessfully Feb. 21 to persuade the major creditors to withhold agree ment until the Chilean junta liberalized its domestic policies. The U.S., Great Britain and West Germany rejected the proposal as an “introduction of political questions in a financial negotiation.”
Brazilian, Argentine loans. Central Bank President Gen. Eduardo Cano returned from a visit to Brazil with $50 million in credits from the Brazilian government, it was reported Jan. 10. Late in 1973 he had signed two agreements with Argentina for loans totaling $20 million. Finland canceled a credit pact signed with the Allende government in August 1973 for an ambitious forestry de velopment program, it was reported Feb. 1. Finland said conditions in Chile “have changed so much that the continuation of cooperation does not correspond with the spirit nor the aims of the agreement.” Japan’s Marubeni Corp, granted a $12 million loan to Chile’s state electricity firm to purchase four gas turbine genera tors for the mining and industrial areas of northern Chile, it was reported May 3.
Controversial IDB loan granted. A controversial $22 million loan to help finance the Chilean junta’s agricultural recovery program had been “rammed through” the Inter-American Devel opment Bank by the U.S. over the op position of several Latin American na tions, the Washington Post reported April 2. The credit was approved without the usual technical review of the application, to which Mexico and Venezuela, among other nations, objected. The money would be used to provide credits for farmers, farm cooperatives and agricultural orga nizations to purchase equipment, seed, fertilizers and insecticides.
Foreign debt renegotiation pact. Chile’s 12 creditor nations agreed March 25 to refinance 80% of Chile’s foreign debt falling due between Jan. 1, 1973 and Dec. 31,1974. The accord, following an agreement in principle Feb. 23, covered more than $750 million, including $200 million already consolidated by the ousted Popular Unity
The Inter-American Development Bank April 25 approved a $75.3 million loan to help build a hydroelectric power plant in Antuco, south of Santiago. The loan was an expanded version of one denied to the ousted government in 1972. U.S. support for the loan was attacked April 26 by U.S. Sen. Walter Mondale (D, Minn.), who noted Chile was a military dictatorship under investigation by the Organization of American States.
CHILE Political control over agencies noted—A 1973 report prepared for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated that the IDB and the World Bank had “for the most part . . . channeled funds to countries in which the United States has strategic and diplomatic interests and have refrained from lending to countries with which the United States has had in vestment disputes,” the London newslet ter Latin America reported April 5. The report, following Latin charges that the U.S. exercised political control over disbursements by the lending agen cies, noted that “the World Bank’s de cision not to accept any major new pro posals for Chile has undoubtedly taken into account the unresolved nationaliza tion of United States-owned companies by the Chilean government. In the IDB, no provisions exist prohibiting loans to expropriating countries, yet the bank has been reluctant to bring such loans to the board.” The report was apparently written be fore the Chilean military coup, but not published until March Latin America reported.
Britain ends aid, arms sales. Great Britain’s Labor government March 27 cut off aid and military sales to Chile to un derscore its “desire to see democracy and human rights fully respected” by the military junta. The junta responded March 29 by threatening to suspend cop per shipments to Britain. British Foreign Secretary James Calla ghan told the House of Commons March 27 that new arms export licenses would not be granted to Chile and that existing contracts were being “urgently” reviewed. He referred to a $120 million contract for Britain to build two frigates and two submarines for Chile. Overseas Development Minister Judith Hart announced the same day that there would be no new aid to Chile and that cur rent aid was being halted except for sup port for Chilean students and graduates coming to Britain and financing for com pletion of one or two minor technical assistance projects. British aid to Chile in the six months ending March 31 was esti mated at $1,632,680. Chilean Mines Minister Gen. Arturo
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Yovane said March 29 that he would recommend that the junta suspend all shipments of copper to Great Britain. He expressed surprise over the British move, asserting that “Chile has always co operated with Great Britain without considering momentary circumstances ” and that “the matter of [Chilean] political prisoners has been cleared up.” Callaghan had said March 27 that the Labor government also would “consider sympathetically” applications from Chil ean refugees to settle in Britain. Liberals and leftists in the U.K. had criticized the recently supplanted Conservative govern ment for not accepting Chilean immi grants and for refusing asylum in Britain’s embassy in Santiago to Chilean political refugees. British Prime Minister Harold Wil son said May 21 that Britain no longer would supply spare parts for British-made jet fighters used by the Chilean air force. In his remarks, according to Chilean reports May 23, Wilson said the junta had committed “acts of terrorism and murder,” killing “many persons.” But Wilson May 21 confirmed Calla ghan’s statement of April 10 that the war ships under contract would be delivered.
U.S. confirms jet-fighter sale. U.S. officials confirmed Oct. 7 that the U.S. had agreed to sell Chile supersonic jet fighters and close air support attack planes in a $72 million arms deal. Chile would buy 18 Northrop F-5E fighters for $60 million under a contract signed in June and 16 Cessna A-37 attack planes under an agreement reached in 1973, the officials said. Chile sought the weaponry because it was concerned over recent Peruvian arms purchases, accord ing to the Washington Post Oct. 7. Disclosure of the arms deal followed the defeat in the U.S. Congress of two measures to cut off military aid to Chile because of violations of human rights by its military junta. An amendment cutting off the aid, attached by the Senate Oct. 1 to a resolution authorizing spending for agencies whose regular appropriations had not yet been enacted, was killed in House-Senate conference Oct. 3. A similar amendment to the foreign aid authoriza tion bill, voted by the Senate Oct. 2, died
94 when the Senate voted to recommit the bill the same day. A bitter dispute had been touched off earlier in the U.S. State Department when it was learned that Secretary of State Kissinger had rebuked the U.S. ambassa dor to Chile, David H. Popper, for dis cussing torture and other human rights issues during a meeting on military aid with Chilean officials, the New York Times reported Sept. 27. Unnamed officials told the Times that Kissinger had reacted angrily when he read a cable report that Popper had brought up human rights in a talk on aid with Chilean Defense Minister Gen. Oscar Bonilla July 22. “Tell Popper to cut out the political science lectures,” Kissinger reportedly wrote on the cable. Popper later received a formal complaint from the State Department. Some department officials explained that Kissinger was only complaining about Popper’s alleged attempt to im properly link the human rights issue with proposals for additional military aid for Chile, the Times reported. However, other officials noted that amendments to the 1973 foreign aid bill had specifically in structed the Nixon Administration to ask the Chilean government to “protect the human rights of all individuals.” (U.S. Rep. Donald M. Fraser [D, Minn.] June 4 condemned “the in difference and silence of the government of the United States” before continuing reports of repression in Chile. He said U.S. aid authorized for Chile in 1975 was 16 times greater than aid given to the Allende government in 1973.)
Colombia, Mexico withdraw envoys. Colombia officially withdrew its am bassador from Chile May 20 and rejected the credentials of Chile’s new ambassador in Bogota May 22. Mexico had withdrawn its ambassador from Santiago April 19. The Colombian action, which the Chilean junta called “deplorable,” followed the junta’s refusal to grant safe conduct passes abroad to the refugees who remained in the Colombian embassy in Santiago. The Mexican move followed strained relations between Mexico and Chile since the September 1973 coup. The Mexican government broke diplo matic relations with Chile Nov. 26.
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Mexican Foreign Minister Emilio Rabasa said Nov. 27 that the ties had “died a natural death.” Venezuela agreed to represent Mexican interests in Santiago. The military junta denounced the “strange rupture” in- its relations with Mexico Nov. 29, saying it “confirms the dimensions of the international attack Chile is suffering.” The junta had long claimed there was an international Com munist conspiracy against Chile led by the Soviet Union.
West Berlin consulate bombed. A bomb exploded June 12 in the Chilean consulate building in West Berlin, shattering win dows and causing minor injuries.
Other Economic Developments Budget. Finance Minister Lorenzo Gotuzzo Jan. 2 announced the largest government budget in Chilean history, with expenditures totaling 1.3 trillion es cudos ($3.6 billion, according to the official exchange rate cited by the Associated Press). He said the deficit would be only 15%, compared with the ousted government’s alleged 1973 budget deficit of 50%.
Economic situation bad. Government and press sources disclosed the extent of Chile’s economic distress. Economy Minister Fernando Leniz said the junta’s drastic economic measures had kept 1973 inflation below 600%, it was reported Jan. 4. The expected expansion in Chile’s money supply had not ma terialized. But because of the price increases ordered in October 1973, forcing up the price of foodstuffs by 650%, most Chil eans were forced to spend most of their in comes on food, and were not buying other goods which then filled shops and stores, according to the Andean Times’ Latin America Economic Report Jan. 4. Overall November 1973 sales had fallen by 25% from August, with much greater contractions reported for some products (footwear sales, for example, were down by 78%). At the same time, industrial production had returned to “normal” levels in October 1973, due principally to the end
CHILE
of the anti-government strikes. (But it was reported March 15 that industrial production had then fallen in November and December.) The government claimed unem ployment had dropped from 5.7% to 4.9% in November 1973, but other sources said the real unemployment figure was around five times higher, the Andean Times reported. Laws guaranteeing stability of employment had been suspended. Inflation rose during January by 16.39%, according to the Cuban news paper Granma Feb. 14. Junta President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte said in Arica Feb. 1 that Chile was “practically bankrupt.” ‘Poblaciones’ conditions poor. Condi tions in Santiago’s “poblaciones” (shanty towns) had deteriorated markedly since the military coup, with a reappearance of delinquency, heavy liquor traffic and disease, Le Monde reported Jan. 5. Left-wing leaders who had helped orga nize the poblaciones, eliminating crime and improving health and housing condi tions, had either disappeared or been ar rested or killed since the coup, Le Monde reported. One leader, a woman linked by the press to Alejandro Villalbas (Co mandante Mickey), leader of the Nueva Habana población, had been tortured, ac cording to Le Monde. Local clinics had been dismantled, leading to a reappearance of diarrhea in infants, and the price of public housing had been raised so high that members of poblaciones could no longer afford it, Le Monde said.
Hoarders arrested. The government ordered drastic sanctions against hoarders Jan. 14, following reports that shopowners had withheld a number of essential articles since the beginning of the month in anticipation of higher prices. At least 13 shopowners were reported ar rested Jan. 17, eight of them in Concep cion. Articles such as sugar, flour, vegetable oil and cigarettes had begun disappearing, inconveniencing families with low in comes. Shopowners charged cigarette producers were withholding tobacco from
95 them until prices were raised, but the producers denied this. The vegetable oil shortage was normal for this time of year, but there was no explanation for the flour shortage, ac cording to El Nacional of Caracas Jan. 15. The Economy Ministry had raised wheat prices Jan. 12, assuring a future in crease in flour and bread prices. Lowpriced, flour-based noodles were a staple of the diet of poor Chileans. A decree issued Jan. 24 set prison terms of 61 days-20 years for economic crimes including hoarding of essential articles, sales fraud and sabotage of in dustrial machinery. The decree included penalties of up to 20 years for journalists “spreading false or tendentious news, . . . inventing events or contracts, or using any other method to change the normality of supply or prices.” New price increases, announced Jan. 26, on essential articles such as sugar, oil, gas and gasoline had led to protests from angry housewives, according to Latin America Feb. 15. Sugar was up by 2,200% since the military coup, oil by 1,400% and gasoline by 860%. In addition, urban and rural property valuation would be in creased by 10 and 30 times respectively, having a heavy impact on rents, Latin America reported. The Cuban news agency Prensa Latina had reported that five leaders of a Valpa raiso bus owners’ association had recently been jailed for distributing “subversive” pamphlets which protested the junta’s refusal to allow transport prices to keep up with fuel prices, Latin America reported. (The junta Jan. 27 invalidated a 1939 law barring vineyards of more than 110,000 hectares, in a move to boost wine produc tion.)
Government plans to sell bank shares. Government officials were working out a scheme to sell back the majority shareholding purchase by the state de velopment corporation CORFO in all the formerly private commercial banks, according to the Andean Times’ Latin America Economic Report Jan. 25. Economy Minister Leniz said the government wished to sell 250 million
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shares in the 22 banks, valued at about $150 million, the Times reported. Leniz had been a leading representative of the powerful Edwards family, whose widespread commercial and industrial holdings had included, until its purchase by the ousted government in 1971, the Banco de A. Edwards, Chile’s largest private bank. Meanwhile, the government was handing back to their former owners com panies which had come under state con trol, but only after the owners signed a contract with CORFO, the Times reported. The conditions of the contract included abiding by the regulations of a “social statute” on which the junta was still working. The statute would provide for some form of worker participation in ownership, according to the Times. The junta June 12 began selling to private investors shares of 40 of the 350 industries nationalized or requisitioned by the ousted civilian government. Twentyone metals factories had been returned to their previous owners May 24.
New economic measures. The military junta announced a series of economic measures during the first half of June, as the economic situation continued to dete riorate. The cost of living had risen by 103.3% in the first five months of 1974, according to a report June 10, and unemployment had reached an official 9.2%, the highest in 15 years, it was reported June 21. The unem ployment figure disguised a much larger figure for underemployment, according to the London newsletter Latin America. Economy Minister Fernando Leniz June 5 announced big price increases for staples, and a bonus of 10,000 escudos for workers in both the public and private sector for June. The price of milk rose by 100%, cooking oil by 90%, bread by 79% and cigarettes by 115%. Leniz charged Chile had inherited its inflationary process from the ousted Popular Unity govern ment. Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, junta president, announced a new plan to deal with inflation June 7. Employment in the public sector would be cut by 20%, with a moratorium on recruitment of new personnel beginning in June. All govern
LATIN AMERICA 1974 ment agencies would cut spending by 15%, and no new public works would be started. Finally, the universities and their tele vision channels would be self-financing by 1976. Leniz June 13 announced a 20% wage adjustment for the beginning of July— coupled with a family bonus of 5,000 es cudos—and a further 15% adjustment in October. He said the minimum monthly wage would be raised to 34,300 escudos. The escudo was devalued by 4J^% June 18, following a 6J^% devaluation May 27. It was then devalued by 6.8% July 12 and by 3.4% July 25. The military government, like the Popular Unity administration it overthrew, was rapidly increasing the amount of money in circulation and granting compensatory wage increases and bonuses to workers, according to the Andean Times’ Latin America Economic Report (LAER) July 5. A study by Ode plan, the planning office, said the amount of currency in circulation had expanded by 59.6% in January-March, and by 416% in the previous 12 months. The government had largely failed to get the private sector to reassume control over companies taken over by the ousted government, LAER reported July 5. Few of the original owners were willing to assume the large debts run up by their companies after nationalization, particu larly with the current lack of consumer purchasing power. The only owners willing to do so were those who had a mo nopoly on a given product, and they transferred payment of the debt to the consumer through massive price in creases, LAER reported. The junta had signed an agreement with General Motors Corp. April 11 for General Motors to resume manufacturing automobiles in Chile. The president of the state development firm CORFO, Gen. Sergio Nuno, had signed an agreement with Japanese com panies to build two wood-processing plants in the South, it was reported Feb. 8. Initial Japanese financing would total $100 million. Chile’s Compania de Aceros del Pacifico signed a $200 million agreement to sell iron to Japan, it was reported March 8.
CHILE Copper exporters to increase prices. Representatives of the world’s four major copper exporting nations—Peru, Chile, Zambia and Zaire—met in Lima, Peru Oct. 28-31 and agreed to work together to raise sagging copper prices. The nations, joined in the Intergovern mental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), produced more than 60% of the world’s copper exports.
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Chile’s large copper mines—formerly operated by Kennecott, Anaconda and Cerro Corp.—reported that production in January-June had increased by 44% over the same period of 1973, according to the newsletter Latin America July 19. The El Teniente copper mine had produced 23,100 short tons in April, claimed officially to be a record, it was reported May 24.
Colombia
Lopez Michelsen Wins Presidency Alfonso Lopez Michelsen of the Liberal Party was elected president of Colombia by a decisive margin in April after an elec tion in which inflation had been a major issue.
Early campaign events. Ex-President Carlos Lleras Restrepo had decided not to participate in the presidential election campaign “for personal reasons” and to leave Colombia for three months, the London newsletter Latin America re ported Jan. 18.. The decision was one of several recent setbacks for the candidate of Lleras’ Liberal Party, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, the newsletter noted. Lopez had been criticized at the end of 1973 by another conservative Liberal, banker and for mer Cabinet minister Joaquin Vallejo Arbelaez. Lopez faced stiff competition on the center and left from Maria Eugenia Rojas de Moreno of the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO), Hernando Echeverry Mejia of the National Opposition Union and Hermes Duarte of the Christian Democratic Party, Latin America re ported. Rightists apparently were uniting behind Conservative Party candidate Al varo Gomez Hurtado, a forceful cam paigner backed by a massive publicity effort.
In an apparent move to facilitate an alliance with ANAPO, Lopez had asked the Supreme Court at the end of 1973 to rule on the constitutionality of certain parts of the arrangement ending the Liberal-Conservative National Front agreement—particularly the provision for continuing the equal distribution of minis tries and other administrative posts be tween the two parties, Latin America reported. The court upheld the provisions, barring the ANAPO-Liberal alliance and presenting ANAPO, should it win the election, with the obligation to govern with a Liberal-Conservative Cabinet, Latin America noted. ANAPO candidate Rojas de Moreno had been shot at in an apparent assassi nation attempt reported Jan. 4. The Cu ban magazine Bohemia reported Jan. 25 that the mayor and other officials of the township of La Uvita had been dismissed and charged with complicity in the assassi nation attempt. The government decreed that the number of senators to be elected April 21 would decrease from 120 to 110, and the number of deputies from 210 to 194, Latin America reported March 8.
Lopez elected president. Liberal Party candidate Alfonso Lopez Michelsen was elected president of Colombia by a land slide April 21. More than half of the 9 million eligible voters cast ballots, reversing a trend of 50%-67% voter absenteeism over the past 98
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16 years. Absenteeism in the April voting had been considerably higher for Con gressional contests than for the pres idential race. Absenteeism was 64.4% for races in the Chamber of Deputies, 60.8% for the Senate and 51.4% for the pres idency, it was reported May 3. The elections were preceded by com paratively little violence, but two students were killed April 19 in clashes between police and students at the National University in Bogota. The university’s faculty association condemned the police for what it called “brutal action” against the youths and attacked the government for allegedly giving “new deadly weapons to the police to be tested on university students.” (The association referred to anti-riot equipment imported from the U.S. a week earlier, including guns that fired rubber bullets, grenades in rubber canisters and smoke and tear gas equip ment. Police denied using the new weapons.) Violence continued at the university later April 19 when students seriously wounded a secret police agent. Five persons were killed April 19 in the Andean village of Yacopi, 150 miles south of Bogota. First reports said guerrillas of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces had committed the murders to frighten voters away from the polls, but police later claimed the incident was a “common hold-up.” Post-election violence—Election-related violence continued in late April and May outside the southwestern city of Cali. Four aides of Sen. Victor Mosquera Chaux were wounded April 26 when a bomb apparently intended for the senator exploded in Popayan. Liberal leader Mury Iza Quintero was shot to death by unidentified persons in Caicedonia May 20.
Lopez Michelsen takes office. Lopez Michelsen was inaugurated as president of Colombia for a four-year term Aug. 7. He pledged to promote Latin American in tegration and to fight inflation, end administrative corruption, decentralize economic power and “satisfy the old, repressed aspirations” of Colombians.
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Before taking the oath of office, Lopez announced a Cabinet composed of one army general and six members each of the Liberal and Conservative Parties. Lopez, a Liberal, was obliged by the Constitution to name a coalition Cabinet. Lopez named one woman to the Cabinet—Labor Minister Maria Elena del Crovo—and in an unprecedented move, he named women to six of the 22 depart mental governorships Aug. 8. A woman also was named economic secretary to the presidency. The new Cabinet: Government (interior)—Cornelio Reyes (Con servative); foreign—Indalecio Lievano Aguirre (Liberal); finance—Rodrigo Botero Montoya (Liberal); development—Jorge Ramirez Ocampo (Conservative); agriculture—Rafael Pardo Buelvas (Conservative); communications—Jaime Garcia Parra (Conservative); education—Hernando Duran Dussan (Liberal); labor—Maria Elena del Crovo (Liberal); defense—Gen. Abraham Varon Valencia; mines—Eduardo del Hierro (Conservative); justice— Alberto Santofimio Botero (Liberal); health— Haroldo Calvo (Liberal); and public works—Hum berto Salcedo Collantes (Conservative).
The Cabinet members were well received with the exception of Agriculture Minister Pardo, who was criticized by peasants’ associations. A columnist for the newspaper El Tiempo Aug. 8 called Pardo, a former president of the Cotton Growers Federation, “one of the bishops of the agrarian union synod, which un leashed such a war against the Colombian peasantry.” Pardo said he would “be a spokesman for the peasants” and ex pressed agreement with Lopez’ goal of changing the agrarian reform program, which had showed little success despite an investment of some $300 million over 13 years. The most favorable commentary in the press was for the Cabinet’s economic specialists—Finance Minister Botero, De velopment Minister Ramirez Ocampo and Mines Minister del Hierro. Botero headed a special government “economic team” of young technocrats, many graduated from U.S. universities, which had been preparing the new government’s economic policy for the previous three months. Lopez emphasized in his inaugural speech that a major priority of his administration would be to resolve Colombia’s dispute with Venezuela over jurisdictional waters in the Gulf of Vene
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zuela, which was believed to contain rich oil reserves. Lopez had cultivated close relations with Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez since Perez’ election in December 1973 and had conferred with Perez in Caracas July 27 on his return trip to Colombia from a vacation in the U.S. and Europe. (In Paris, Lopez had met July 13 with French President Valery Giscard d‘Estaing, with whom he discussed inflation, French nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean [which Colombia opposed] and “Latin American problems in general.”) Before his inauguration, Lopez had vowed to attack Colombia’s high inflation rate—25% in 1973 and reportedly rising further in 1974—by cutting government expenditures, slowing the rapid increase in exports (particularly of foods needed in Colombia) and implementing a “wages and income policy to help those sectors of the population with no banking power to get a better share of the national product,” the Washington Post reported June 9. He had also pledged to give the vote to 18-year-olds; eliminate discrimination against women; sign a new treaty with the Vatican to allow civil marriage and di vorce; reorganize the agrarian reform system to create separate agencies for land distribution and water utilization; and renew diplomatic relations with Cuba. Foreign Minister Lievano said Aug. 8 that he would soon begin consultations with other Latin American foreign minis ters on ending the continent’s economic and political blockade of Cuba. In an ap parent first step toward that goal, Colombia and Cuba had signed an agreement to prevent hijacking of air planes and vessels between their borders July 22. Lopez had pledged as his major foreign policy goals to promote unity among members of the six-nation Andean Group and among all Latin American countries. Congress, in which the Liberals held a 58% majority, had convened July 20. Turbay elected vice president. Julio Ce sar Turbay Ayala was elected vice presi dent of Colombia at a joint session of Congress Sept. 4. His duties were to as sume the presidency in the event of Presi dent Alfonso Lopez Michelsen’s absence
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or death. Turbay, a former foreign minis ter, headed the conservative wing of Lopez’ Liberal Party.
New military leaders named. President Lopez Michelsen and Defense Minister Gen. Abraham Varon Valencia revised the military high command Aug. 13. Gen. Alvaro Herrera Calderon was named armed forces commander, and Gen. Carlos Lombana Cuervo was ap pointed to head the joint chiefs of staff. Gen. Alvaro Valencia Tovar be came army commander, replacing Varon Valencia, Gen. Federico Rincon was named air force commander. Valencia Tovar's appointment pro voked the resignation of eight senior army officers, according to the London newsletter Latin America Aug. 30. Valen cia, an anti-guerrilla fighter in the 1960s, advocated economic and social reform as the chief remedy for violence. His first act as army commander was to organize a military-civilian seminar in Antioquia to discuss the country’s social and educa tional problems and the participation of the armed forces in their solution, Latin America reported.
Economic Developments Anti-inflation measures. The govern ment introduced measures to control the rise in the cost of living, according to the Andean Times’ Latin America Economic Report March 22. During 1973 the cost-of-living index had gone up by 25% and 22.1%, respec tively, for different classes of workers and salaried employes, with food prices rising by 31.5% and 30.6% respectively. Inflation in January was 3%. The new measures included price con trols, which the government said would be enforced more strongly in 1974; establish ment of a permanent stock of basic foods to insure a regular and adequate supply to the markets (supported by a ban on ex port of a wide range of foodstuff’s); con trolling supplies by manipulating the im port market; reducing the expansion of means of payment, which rose by 29% in 1973 (partly as a result of higher income from exports) compared with an increase
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of only 7.5% in total production of goods and services; and new controls on govern ment spending. Other measures introduced in February included a $20 million increase in the im port quota, to $120 million a month, to ab sorb surplus liquidity and insure a steady supply of raw materials and agricultural equipment; an increase in the bank rate from 14% to 16%; and new tax incentives for farmers. Colombian economists doubted the government’s ability to enforce the new measures any more effectively than the 1973 measures, the Andean Times re ported. The wages of military officers and po licemen were raised by 20% to keep pace with inflation, it was reported Feb. 7. The government raised its posted price for crude oil exports by 76%, to $14.20 a barrel, it was announced Jan. 25. Mines Minister Gerardo Silva Valderrama said the move was consistent with his previous assertion that Colombia might suspend petroleum exports in the second half of 1974. Colombia was self-sufficient in oil. The price of crude oil delivered to local refineries was raised to $4 a barrel for all oil produced from new wells and from areas currently being explored, it was reported March 22. The previous price of $2.34 a barrel would continue to apply to crude from wells already in production. The higher prices were intended to en courage oil firms to spend more on ex ploration.
pacity of 20,000 barrels a day, it was reported Jan.18. Japan’s Fullo Development Co. would invest $30 million to develop a new oil field after striking oil at a well in Putumayo Department that had an estimated ca pacity of 1,740 barrels a day, it was reported March 1. The state mining firm Ecominas would begin exploiting the nation’s phosphate reserves in 1974, according to an official announcement reported Jan. 25. The U.S.-owned International Mining Corp, had agreed to sell 100% of its Choco Pacifico gold mine to Colombian investors for a 20% down payment of $2 million, with the remainder to be paid from the mine’s earnings, it was reported Feb. 1. The firm was also selling its Pato Consolidated Gold Dredging Corp, for a 20% down payment of $9 million, with the remainder to be paid from earnings.
Foreign bank loans. The government had negotiated two Eurodollar loans totaling $90 million from two groups of U.S., European and Japanese banks to help refinance the foreign debt, it was reported Jan. 4. The Inter-American Development Bank would lend Interconexión Eléctrica $48.5 million to help finance the second stage of the Chivor hydroelectric project, doubling the plant’s initial capacity of 500,000 kilowatts, it was reported Jan. 11.
Emergency economic measures. The new administration of President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen declared a state of eco nomic emergency and issued a series of decrees to combat fiscal bankruptcy, inflation, a fall in wages, and contraband export of food. The unprecedented state of emergency was declared Sept. 17. It allowed the government to enact economic legislation by decree for 45 days, avoiding the long delays normally faced by legislation in Congress. The decrees would remain in force after the emergency period ended. A variety of measures enacted Sept. 18-Oct. 13 aimed at cutting government expenditures (seen by many as the prin cipal cause of inflation), redistributing in come, boosting agricultural production and achieving what the government called
Oil & mining. Among developments of early 1974: The Brazilian state oil firm Petrobras would build one, and possibly two, oil refineries in Colombia, each with a ca
‘Banana war’ developments. The conflict between members of the fledgling Union of Banana Exporting Countries (UPEB) and the U.S. firms United Brands Co. and Standard Fruit & Steamship Co. intensified during May-August. The trouble stemmed from an UPEB decision in March to impose an export tax of up to $1 per 40-pound crate on the pro ducing companies. Colombia, which exported only 10 million crates in 1972, imposed a 40